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BOOK REVIEWS / COMPTES RENDUS

CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP

On January 1, 1989, ownership of *Anthropologica* was transferred from Laurentian University to Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario. The journal is to be published by Wilfrid Laurier University Press. All editorial correspondence should be addressed to: *Anthropologica*, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3C5. The journal's new editors are: Andrew and Harriet Lyons (Co-Editors) of Wilfrid Laurier University, Jean-Marc Philibert (Co-Editor, manuscripts in French) of the University of Western Ontario, and Mathias G. Guenther (Managing Editor) at Wilfrid Laurier University.

Volume XXX was edited by Dr. Kathryn Molohon at Laurentian University with the assistance of the new editors at Wilfrid Laurier University. It is published by Wilfrid Laurier University Press by arrangement with Laurentian University.

TRANSFERT DE LA PROPRIETE

Le premier janvier 1989, la propriété de la revue *Anthropologica* est transférée de l'Université Laurentienne à l'Université Wilfrid Laurier, Waterloo, Ontario. Elle sera publiée par La Presse de l'Université Wilfrid Laurier. Toute correspondance concernant la rédaction doit être adressée à: *Anthropologica*, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3C5. Voici les nouveaux rédacteurs de la revue: Andrew et Harriet Lyons (corédacteurs) de l'Université Wilfrid Laurier et Jean-Marc Philibert (corédacteur, les manuscrits en français) de l'Université Western Ontario. Mathias G. Guenther (rédacteur et administrateur).

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FOREST FALLOWING AMONG THE APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN FOLK: AN ETHNOHISTORICAL STUDY

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Abstract: The practice of clearing new fields from forests and abandoning old fields to forest fallow is an ancient agricultural adaptation. Forest fallowing was still practiced in parts of the temperate world by 1900, including the Appalachian mountains. Forest fallowing survived in Appalachia, because it was cheaper to fallow fields than to use costly fertilizers. Forest fallowing, however, required an abundance of forest land for continued success. After 1900, Appalachia lost its surplus forest land to industries and governmental agencies. Trapped on a declining land base, Appalachian mountain farming became maladaptive, resulting in rural depopulation and the demise of forest fallowing.

Résumé: La pratique qui consiste à défricher de nouvelles terres forestières et, par la suite, de les laisser en jachère est en fait un mode ancien d'adaptation agricole. Cet usage était encore d'habitude jusqu'à 1900 dans quelques pays tempérés, les montagnes des Appalaches y compris.On continuait à jachérer la campagne forestiére parce que ce procédé était plus économique que l'emploi des fertilisants. Il fallait néanmoins, pour réussir cette operation de manière continue, une grande quantité de terre forestière. Après 1900, le territoire des Appalaches perdit son excédent de terre forestière au profit des industries et des agences gouvernementales. Une fois la réduction des terres amorcée, l'exploitation agricole du territoire de montagne des Appalaches ne pouvait s'effectuer, entraînant la baisse de la population rurale et l'échec du système de la jachère forestière.

The inhabitants of the Southern Appalachian Mountains (Figure 1) do not refer to themselves as "hillbillies." Nor do they call themselves "mountaineers," or more politely, "highlanders" (Williams 1972:49, 54). They simply refer to themselves as "just plain folks," which is precisely what most of them are—the descendants of the "plain folks" of the Old South.

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Figure 1: The Southern Appalachian Mountains

The History of the Appalachian Mountain Folk

Historian Frank L. Owsley first drew attention to the "plain folks" of the Old South (1784-1860)—the white agriculturalists who lived outside the plantation economy and who formed the bulk of the Southern free population. The plain folks included slaveholding farmers with fewer than twenty slaves as well as the more numerous slaveless farmers. Although some folks acquired dozens of slaves and entered the ranks of cotton planters, most aspired to own "land and other property sufficient to give them and their children a sense of security and well-being" (Owsley 1969:36).

To achieve this sense of security and well-being, plain folks pursued a farming and grazing economy. On their farmsteads, they practiced "patch" farming, clearing temporary fields, or "patches," from the forests, planting corn until yields declined, abandoning the old fields, and then clearing new fields from the remaining forests. Patch-farming of corn provided food for families as well as a source of cash, if the corn was distilled into whiskey. In the unfenced woodlands, or "open-range," which lay beyond their farmsteads, they grazed cattle and other livestock, allowing the animals to forage in the forests during most of the year. Once or twice a year, they collected their animals for butchering and marketing. Livestock-grazing thus furnished meat for home consumption as well as surplus livestock for sale. Taken together, grazing and farming permitted plain folk families to meet easily their subsistence and cash needs, and these agricultural practices provided the economic base for a distinctive way of life (Otto 1983:29-31; Peterson, Pearson, and Snow 1982).

Most plain folk families lived on isolated farmsteads, surrounded by tracts of unfenced woodlands, but they were not socially isolated. Each farmstead belonged to a dispersed rural neighbourhood, or "community," whose numbers were united by friendship, marriage, and kinship. Though dispersed over several square miles, the members of a community called on their friends, relatives, and in-laws for aid in clearing land, gathering corn, collecting livestock, and slaughtering animals (Otto 1981a:76-81).

By 1861, the eve of the Civil War, the plain folk way of life was found from Virginia to Texas (Otto 1985:199-200). In the Southern Appalachian mountains, the vast majority of the free inhabitants lived this way. Before the Civil War, the Appalachian mountain folk attracted little more attention than did those in Virginia or Texas or anywhere else. Their way of life differed little from that of the plain folk who lived elsewhere in the Old South (Otto 1981b:20-27).

The Civil War (1861-65) and the postbellum cotton boom shattered the old plain folk economy. After the war, high cotton prices encouraged planters to expand their cotton acreage. Since the plain folk still grazed their livestock on the open-range, cattle often strayed into cotton fields. Hoping to protect

valuable cotton fields from wandering cattle, planters in postbellum state legislatures enacted laws forcing plain folk to fence in their stock. Because these fencing laws effectively ended open-range grazing in much of the South, many plain folk turned to cotton-growing as a livelihood. They borrowed money for cotton seed, fertilizer, and equipment. If prices were high, they paid off their debts and made a small profit. If cotton prices were low, they became debtors, often losing their farms in the process. Landless folks then joined the growing mass of "poor white" tenant farmers and mill workers (McDonald and McWhiney 1980:1115-1118).

Cotton growing, however, proved unfeasible in much of the Southern Appalachian mountains, because of the poor soils, rugged terrain, and unpredictable frosts (U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics 1935:9-10). Thus, the Appalachian mountains remained something of a plain folk enclave in the years after the Civil War. At the turn of the twentieth century, the bulk of the Appalachian mountain folk pursued a grazing and farming economy as their plain folk ancestors had done. To obtain cash to pay taxes and to buy a few consumer goods, some mountain folk sold illegal corn whiskey, but most sold surplus livestock. Cattle, for example, were driven on the hoof to nearby markets and sold for a clear profit (Semple 1901:600-603; Kephart 1913:42-43, 123). Though cattle-raising was both legal and profitable, it required an abundance of open-range for continued success. Since every range cow needed at least fifteen acres of woodlands pasture, even a modest herd of only twenty cattle required as much as 300 acres of woodlands range (see Hilliard 1972:136).

But by 1900, extractive industries such as coal mining and logging were competing with mountain farmers for the use of the woodlands. Beginning in the 1880s, private mining and timber companies acquired vast tracts of mountain woodlands. Whole valleys were given over to railroads, coal mines, and coal towns, while forested slopes were denuded of their trees, leaving eroded, cut-over lands (Eller 1982:86-112, 128-160). And after the passage of the Weeks Act of 1911, which permitted the federal government to acquire forested watershed lands, the U.S. Forest Service added thousands of acres of woodlands and cut-over lands to its public forests (Kahn 1974). By 1930, only 60 percent of the land in the Southern Appalachian Mountains was still owned by farm families (Gray 1933:9).

Losing their woodlands range to extractive industries and to the growing federal forests, mountain folk were no longer able to raise sizeable herds of livestock on the open-range. Retaining a few cows for milk and a few hogs for meat, mountain farmers turned from livestock-grazing to corn-growing in an effort to make a living. Raising corn to feed their families as well as to make whiskey to sell in the nearby towns, farmers continued the traditional practice of patch farming (Caudill 1963:147-149). They followed a "cycle of

clearing steep hillsides, cultivating them to corn for a few years, abandoning them to pasture and then to brush and forest growth, subsequently replacing the abandoned area by a new clearing" (Gray 1933:9). This cycle of rotating fields with forest is better known to anthropologists as "shifting cultivation," "slash-and-burn farming," or more accurately, as "forest fallowing" (see Whittlesey 1937; Conklin 1954; Freeman 1955; Schlippe 1955; Conklin 1961; Geertz 1963; Boserup 1965; Russell 1968; Clarke 1976; Christiansen 1981).

The Nature of Forest Fallowing

The custom of clearing temporary fields from forests, planting crops until yields decline, and then allowing the fields to revert to forest fallow is a well-known anthropological phenomenon. This seemingly primitive type of agriculture may be an effective adaptation to forest environments, where heavy annual rainfall leaches nutrients from the soils. On such soils, trees develop complex root systems to collect leaching minerals and maintain them in a nearly closed cycle in the living vegetation. By clearing and burning the vegetation on a new field, farmers break the cycle, releasing accumulated minerals in the form of fertilizing ash. After a few seasons, the ash leaches out, the topsoils erode, crop yields decline, and the old field reverts to forest fallow. When the old field is reforested and the nutrients are restored, it may be cleared and farmed anew. Since tropical forests have amazing recuperative powers, an old field may be fully reforested and restored within a decade. But in temperate forests, where winter interrupts the growth cycle, it may be decades before an old field is fully reforested and restored (see Geertz 1963:20-25; Sanchez 1976:347-359, 404-405; Clarke 1976:247-249; Russell 1968:59, 61-62).

The most successful forest fallowing adaptations are those based on root-crops, which are grown in temporary fields claimed from tropical forests. Root-crops such as yams offer abundant yields per acre, they make few demands on soil fertility, and tropical forests recuperate their vegetation and nutrients so swiftly that old fields may be re-cleared and farmed again after only a decade. Given these advantages, the population densities of tropical root-crop cultivators in Africa and New Guinea may be "well in excess of 150 [persons] per square mile" (Harris 1972:248, 253).

Less successful forest fallowing adaptations are those based on seed-crops, which are grown in fields claimed from tropical forests. Seed-crops such as corn offer lower yields per acre than root-crops, they make greater demands on soil fertility, and tropical forests recuperate more slowly on eroded corn fields. Given these disadvantages, the population densities of tropical seed-crop cultivators are far lower than those of root-crop farmers. Among tropical seed-crop cultivators who practice forest fallowing in South

America, population densities of "less than ten [persons] per square mile are usual" (Harris 1972:248, 253-254).

The least successful forest fallowing adaptations are those based on seed-crops grown in fields cleared from temperate forests. Temperate deciduous and coniferous forests recuperate far more slowly than tropical forests; and even when mature, temperate forests accumulate less vegetation and nutrients than their tropical counterparts (Rodin and Bazilevich 1967:209, 211, 246). It has already been noted that temperate forests recuperate so slowly that old fields may not be re-cleared and farmed again for several decades. Given these problems, the population densities of temperate seed-crop cultivators are even lower than those of tropical seed-crop cultivators (Harris 1972:254-255).

During antiquity, forest fallowing was found from the temperate forests of Europe, northeastern Asia, and North America to the tropical forests of Africa, southeastern Asia, Oceania, and South America. Although forest fallowing is still prevalent in tropical forests, it has virtually vanished from the world's temperate forests (Russell 1968:59-60; Grigg 1974:62-63). To explain this disappearance of temperate forest fallowing, Esther Boserup has argued that increasing population pressures in Europe and northern Asia led to the evolution of more intensive types of agriculture, wherein the same fields were cropped yearly and fertility was maintained by manuring and crop rotation. Though intensive agriculture required more labour, time, and capital than forest fallowing, it increased crop yields, thus feeding a growing population (Boserup 1965:16-20, 33, 44-46; Boserup 1976:23-24). As population pressures intensified in temperate Eurasia, intensive agriculture superseded forest fallowing. By 1900, temperate forest fallowing was found only in the sparsely-settled fringes of Russia, Finland, Japan, and Korea (Linnard 1970:192; Mead 1953:44-45; Jones 1921:18-19; Grajadanzev 1944:95) as well as in the Southern Appalachian mountains of the United States.

Forest Fallowing in the Appalachian Mountains

The remarkable survival of forest fallowing in the temperate Appalachian mountains was rather well documented, thanks to outside interest in the region during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A series of family feuds, including the infamous Hatfield-McCoy vendetta, focused national attention on the Appalachian mountains. Appalachia was first "discovered" by travelers and journalists, who were soon followed by missionaries, educators, folklorists, sociologists, geographers, and agronomists. From the 1870s to the 1930s, an outpouring of literature on the Appalachian mountains described the landscape as well as the lifeways of the inhabitants. Inspired by outside interest in Appalachia, some native mountaineers also published accounts of local life (Klotter 1980). Few who wrote about Appa-

lachian mountain life failed to comment upon the local agricultural practices, since farming altered the landscape, provided subsistence for the bulk of the population, and competed with logging and coal-mining for land, forests, and labour (Edwards 1935).

Given the relative plenitude of written sources about Appalachian agriculture during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these sources may provide the data base for an ethnohistorical study of forest fallowing from the 1870s to the 1930s. Ethnohistory is defined as the synchronic ethnographic description of a past stage of culture, especially a description based on written sources that are contemporary with that stage (Sturtevant 1968:454). Ethnohistory utilizes written sources about past cultural phenomena, but its aims are essentially those of cultural anthropology—the describing and understanding of cultures and cultural processes (Carmack 1972:232). In this case, the ethnohistorical sources from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century described the cultural phenomenon of forest fallowing in considerable detail, including such aspects as land-clearing, crop-planting, and the cycle of rotating fields and forest.

The cycle of Appalachian forest fallowing began with the laborious task of clearing the forest growth from new fields. To ease this task, a mountain farmer called on his neighbours for help, forming communal work groups to clear the land. The farmer then returned the favour by working to clear his neighbours' fields in turn (Morton 1903:53; Haney 1906:86-87).

Appalachian land-clearing began with "grubbing" or rooting up the forest undergrowth with hoes:

> Not far beyond, a dozen men were grubbing a piece of new land. Each workman had assigned to him a strip one rod wide extending across the field. . . . All underbrush and all the sapling trees were removed and the roots torn out, but large trees were left to be girdled. (Morton 1903:64)

After piling and burning the undergrowth, farmers "deadened" the large trees by "girdling"—cutting a ring in the bark with axes so sap could not rise to nourish the branches (Raine 1924:30):

> In clearing new ground, everyone followed the ancient custom of girdling the tree trunks and letting them stand in spectral ugliness until they rotted and fell. This is a quick and easy way to get rid of the shade that otherwise would blunt the crops, and it prevents such trees as chestnut, buckeye, and basswood from sprouting from the stumps. (Kephart 1913:37)

Girdling the trees conserved labour and allowed farmers to plant crops the first season in their partially-cleared fields (Primack 1962:485). After fencing their fields with split-rails (Whitaker 1918:10), Appalachian mountain farmers planted a succession of crops which invariably included corn—a

versatile, high-yield crop which served as food, fodder, or even a source of cash if distilled:

> Corn or buckwheat is usually grown on these newly cleared fields between the girdled trees during the first season. . . . Following this, corn may be planted one or two years more; then small grains, either wheat, rye, or oats, for one or two years, then fallow [of] worthless weeds. (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1902:58)

Clearing and cultivating exposed the soil to the elements, leading to soil depletion and erosion:

> Unless it is well cared for, the land has by this time become poor, for it has lost its original humus. The soil has become less porous and less able to absorb the rainfall and erosion begins. Means are rarely taken to prevent or check this erosion, so it increases rapidly and the field is soon abandoned and a new one cleared. (Glenn 1911:11)

Although this Appalachian cycle of fields and forest closely resembled modern tropical forest fallowing (see Boserup 1965), Appalachian forest farming also included features that are rarely or never found in contemporary tropical forest farming. Typically, modern tropical forest farmers live in villages, they own land communally, they till their crops with hand-held tools, and they rarely keep large domestic animals such as cattle (Harris 1972:248; Grigg 1974:57-58; Boserup 1965:35, 78). Appalachian forest farmers, on the other hand, lived on dispersed farmsteads, they owned land individually, they tilled crops with ox-drawn plows, and they used old fields as pastures for their cattle.

Appalachian farmsteads followed the mountain valleys and straggled up the mountain slopes and ridges. Some mountain families "squatted" on public lands without obtaining formal title, but most owned or rented farms (Vincent 1898:3; Allen 1886:58). Individual mountain farmsteads often incorporated dozens of acres, but most of the acreage was in "old fields" and forests. Only a fraction of a typical farmstead was tilled at any given time (Semple 1901:600; Davis 1924:31-33). To till their fields, Appalachian mountain farmers used ox-drawn "bull-tongues" (scratch plows that lacked moldboards but possessed shares) to "scrabble the ground two or three inches deep for the planting" of corn (Spaulding 1915:66; Thompson 1910:30). After a few years of tillage, fields no longer yielded remunerative crops of corn but still offered a few seasons of grass and weeds, serving as rough pasture for cattle before reverting to forest (Jillson 1928:13).

Since the cycle of fields and forest in Southern Appalachia noticeably altered the landscape, few visitors to the mountains failed to comment on the "deadenings" (fields filled with girdled trees) as they passed through the mountains (eds., Ziegler and Grosscup 1883:258; Warner 1888:21, 53; Elliott

1906:489-490). Visitors to the mountains also viewed ox-drawn plows, split-rail fences, log cabins, homemade furnishings, and even homespun garments—all the familiar attributes of American pioneer life. Many observers felt as if they had been transported back to the time of Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett, and Abe Lincoln's boyhood. By the 1890s, academic visitors were proclaiming the Appalachian mountains to be a "retarded frontier," whose people belonged to "the last century." Appalachia was regarded as an isolated enclave of pioneer culture, where visitors could hear archaic words, listen to traditional ballads, be regaled with folktales about witches, and view log cabins surrounded by "deadenings." Given this context, Appalachian forest farming was perceived as yet another survival from the pioneer past (eg., Vincent 1898; Frost 1900; Semple 1901).

In dismissing forest farming as a pioneer survival, visitors to the Appalachian mountains may have overlooked the advantages that forest fallowing offers its practitioners. The most laborious aspect of forest farming is the periodic clearing of new fields in forests to replace the old fields turned out to forest fallow, but this task is lightened by reliance on communal work groups and by the use of fire to burn forest vegetation. Since the burning of forest growth also releases nutrients in the form of fertilizing ash, even the poorest soils are enriched for a few seasons (Boserup 1965:348; Netting 1977:61). Requiring little labour and no fertilizer, forest fallowing may have proved highly beneficial to Appalachian mountain farmers, who confronted such agricultural problems as poor transportation, little capital, untimely frosts, nutrient-poor soils, and steep slopes.

A farmer's ability to sell his crops and to purchase commercial goods depends upon his access to reliable transportation such as railroads (Hays 1977:71). After the Civil War (1861-65), railroads began penetrating Southern Appalachia, but the railways generally by-passed the mountains and followed the larger valleys. After 1900, railroads also began entering the mountains, but the lines generally serviced the coal mines and sawmills and not the agricultural settlements. For many mountain folks seasonal paths along mountain streams remained their only link to the larger American economy (Price 1883:172; Schockel 1916:115-118; Davis 1930:99).

Since poor transportation limited most mountain folks' participation in the market economy, they retained self-sufficient farming practices that were based on corn-cropping and forest fallowing (Davis 1924:61-62). Given their limited cash incomes and capital resources, mountain folks could not acquire the latest farming equipment and techniques. Even commercial fertilizers were priced beyond the means of most mountain farmers. During the early twentieth century, fertilizers retailed for more than $23.00 a ton. In fact, fertilizers were so expensive that Southern farmers used commercial manures only on their cash crops such as cotton and rarely on their corn crops. Even

so, many Southern farmers went deeply into debt in order to buy commercial fertilizers (Taylor 1953:491-495, 510-512). Mountain farmers wisely avoided undue expense and indebtedness by raising corn—a crop which offered high yields without commercial fertilizers and which was grown in "deadenings" claimed from mountain forests (Davis 1924:67-68).

"Deadenings" impressed outsiders as pioneer survivals, but these partially-cleared fields with their standing, girdled trees may have offered mountain farmers a means of coping with an unpredictable climate. In the Appalachian mountains, frosts could occur during ten months of the year. The air currents generated between deadenings and the neighbouring woods fostered the formation of dews and fogs, often saving corn crops from untimely frosts (Thomas 1926:27-28; U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics 1935:9; Lang 1968:53).

In addition to unseasonable frosts, the Appalachian climate was characterized by heavy yearly rainfall, which leached minerals from mountain slopes, creating acidic, nutrient-poor soils. Trees living on Appalachian mountain soils possessed complex root networks to collect the leaching minerals and lock them up in the living vegetation. Nutrients were restored to soils by burning the forest vegetation, thus releasing the entrapped minerals and fertilizing even the poorest soils for a few years (U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics 1935:10; Soil Survey Staff 1975:412-413, 421, 428; Steila 1976:143; Clark and Haswell 1970:40-41).

In the Appalachian mountains, farmers generally burned the forest vegetation in two stages. During the first seasons, workers removed and burned the undergrowth, but they girdled the large trees. After a few years of cultivation, farmers often removed the girdled trees by calling on their neighbours for a "log-rolling"—the formation of a communal work group to fell, pile, and burn the dead trees (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1902:58; Morton 1903:54). Burning the forest growth not only released nutrients locked up in underbrush and trees, but the heat from fires killed insect pests and weeds. And since the forest vegetation was removed in stages, the root networks of the girdled, dead trees helped retain the thin topsoils for a few years of cultivation, even on steep mountain slopes (Clark and Haswell 1970:42; Keith 1928:27; Lutz and Chandler 1946:455).

Despite these advantages which forest farming may have offered its practitioners, forest fallowing possessed a major disadvantage: it imposed a ceiling on agricultural productivity. Mountain farmers typically cultivated less than a third of the acreage on their farms at any given time. The bulk of their farm acreage was in forest or in "old fields" undergoing gradual reforestation. After being cultivated until crop yields declined or soils eroded, old fields were fallowed, serving as scrub pasture until finally giving rise to mixed hardwood forest. After an old field was reforested, it could then be

cleared and farmed anew. But if the field was cultivated before reforestation and restoration of nutrients in the forest growth was completed, then declining yields, soil exhaustion, and severe erosion resulted. Since the reforestation of old fields took decades in temperate Appalachia, farmers were constantly clearing new fields to replace the land turned out to forest fallow. And since the reforestation of old fields lagged behind the clearing of new fields, the continued success of Appalachian forest farming required a surplus of fresh woodlands to provide new corn fields (Davis 1924:33-34, 61; Jillson 1928:13; Keith 1928:27; Glenn 1911:11-12).

Fortunately, Appalachian mountain farmers lived within one of the world's largest temperate deciduous forests (Committee 1926). One government survey estimated that three-fourths of Southern Appalachia was still forested as late as 1910 (Glenn 1911:8-9). But during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, extractive industries and the federal forest service acquired millions of acres of forest land. By 1930, private companies and federal agencies controlled 40 per cent of the land in Southern Appalachia (Gray 1933:9).

Although mountain farmers still retained 60 per cent of the land, their farm acreage was being subdivided by the practice of partible inheritance, or dividing family lands among all the heirs. This practice allowed the heirs to pursue farming as a way of life, but it steadily subdivided the agricultural land, increasing the number of farms and decreasing their average size and productivity. As an example, there were about 35,000 family farms in Kentucky's Cumberland Plateaus in 1880, and the average farm was 176 acres in size. If no more than a third of a farm's acreage was cultivated at one time, the average mountain farm of 1880 provided less than 58 acres of cropland. Forty years later, in 1920, there were more than 71,000 farms in the Kentucky Cumberlands, and the average farm was only 83 acres in size. If no more than a third of a farm's acreage was cultivated at a time, the average mountain farm of 1920 provided less than 27 acres of cropland (Barron 1977:212-213; Davis 1924:48-53). As mountain farms declined in size, their productivity also declined, either as a function of smaller cultivated plots or more rapid rotation of previously tilled fields. Writing in 1927, one observer found the typical Kentucky mountain farm contained 37 acres of forest, 23 acres of fallow and only 22 acres of cropland which was "far from first quality" (Cooper 1927:13).

Mountain farmers were attempting to feed a growing population on a declining agricultural base. Southern Appalachia had the highest birth rate in the United States, for mountain families needed children to aid in the farm work. Larger families, of course, increased the population pressures on the remaining land. By 1910, population densities in Kentucky's Cumberland Plateaus had reached an average of 43 persons per square mile (Barron

1977:212; Schockel 1916:118)—a population density far surpassing that of modern seed-crop cultivators (Harris 1972:248). Appalachian forest farming failed to support the growing rural population. During the 1910s and 1920s, many mountain families migrated to Oklahoma and Texas, hoping to continue the agricultural way of life as tenant farmers. Others abandoned farming altogether, settling in the coal towns and logging camps of Southern Appalachia (Combs 1913:43-44; Shackelford and Weinberg, eds., 1977:193-209).

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, some of these migrants returned to Southern Appalachia, further swelling the ranks of mountain farmers. About 400,000 farms were found in the Appalachian mountains during the 1930s; half of them were less than fifty acres in size, and one-fourth were smaller than twenty acres. Such minuscule farms offered little more than space for a house, a vegetable garden, and an eroded corn field. Farmers living on such tiny tracts could no longer clear new fields to replace the old fields turned out to forest fallow. They continued to cultivate their old fields; and soil exhaustion and severe erosion became common complaints on mountain farms (Taylor 1938:13; Clayton and Nicholls 1932:86-88).

World War Two (1941-45) and a booming national economy precipitated a new wave of out-migration from Southern Appalachia. Between 1940 and 1960, over two million people left the mountains to seek jobs in the industrial cities of the Midwest and South. Among the migrants were hundreds of thousands of farmers who simply abandoned their eroded hillside farmsteads (Brown and Hillery 1962:54-78; Harris, Tolley and Coutu 1963:44-47).

Private timber companies acquired some of the abandoned farm acreage, but more land passed into the federal forests. By 1930, the U.S. Forest Service managed seven national forests in Southern Appalachia, incorporating more than two million acres. And by 1960, the nine federal forests of Appalachia contained more than eleven million acres (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1949:711-713; Gibbard 1962:115).

Coal companies also expanded their holdings at the expense of Appalachian farmland, when they introduced strip-mining after World War Two. Bulldozers, power shovels, and trucks removed the overburden covering coal seams at a fraction of the cost of underground mining. Strip-mining, nonetheless, removed soils and vegetation as well as overburden, transforming fields and forests into barren slopes. By 1964, about 800,000 acres in Southern Appalachia had been disturbed by strip-mining; less than half of this total had been permanently restored (Caudill 1963:309-324; Gibbard 1962:108-109; Hart 1968:429).

Strip-mining, the expansion of the federal forests, and rural depopulation contributed to the loss of thousands of acres of farm land that was once cultivated by forest fallowing techniques. The acreage of harvested cropland in the Cumberland-Allegheny Plateaus of Kentucky, West Virginia, and Tennessee plummeted from 576,300 acres in 1939 to only 35,300 acres in 1974 (Hart 1978:5-16). In much of contemporary Southern Appalachia, farming is presently confined to the larger valleys, where transportation as well as terrain permits intensive commercial agriculture based on tobacco, grains, and livestock. Commercial fertilizers and modern machinery have now become commonplace on the remaining Appalachian farms (Raulston and Livingood 1974:224-226).

Conclusions

At first glance, the decline of forest fallowing in the Southern Appalachian Mountains seems to support the Boserup hypothesis: population pressures in the temperate world led to the abandonment of forest fallowing and the adoption of more intensive agricultural techniques (Boserup 1965:16-18). At the turn of the twentieth century, most mountain farmers practiced forest fallowing to maintain soil fertility. Forest fallowing permitted mountain farmers to raise corn with little labour and no fertilizer. They cleared temporary fields from the forests, planted corn in the fields until yields declined, and then abandoned the fields to gradual reforestation—a process which took two or more decades in the temperate Appalachian mountains. Given the slow reforestation and restoration of old fields, mountain farmers cultivated less than a third of their total land, since the bulk of their acreage was in forest fallow. Forest fallowing thus imposed a ceiling on agricultural productivity. As the rural population increased during the twentieth century, forest farming failed to feed the additional mouths, resulting in massive out-migration and the abandonment of forest fallowing.

The demise of Appalachian forest fallowing was not, however, simply a function of increasing population pressures on the land. The vulnerability of Appalachian mountain farming to population pressures was enhanced by the practice of individual land tenure, the use of plows to till fields, and the grazing of cattle on old fields—features which seldom appear among tropical forest farmers who hold land communally, till crops with hand-held tools, and rarely graze livestock on old fields.

The prevalence of individual land tenure and the custom of partible inheritance among Appalachian mountain farms led to the subdivision of agricultural land, yielding smaller and less productive farms. By the late 1930s, an estimated 100,000 mountain farms were smaller than twenty acres in size. This meant that thousands of families were "trying to make a living on from 3 to 10 acres of poor land" (Taylor 1938:13). On such small tracts,

farmers could no longer practice forest fallowing. They continued to plant corn in old fields year after year, resulting in soil exhaustion and erosion.

Soil erosion was accelerated by the use of plows in cultivation and by the grazing of cattle on old fields. In the 1940s, U.S. Forest Service researchers studied the effects of plow cultivation and cattle-grazing on experimental fields in the Blue Ridge Mountains of western North Carolina. They removed the forest cover from fields, cultivated successive corn crops with "bull-tongue" plows, and exposed the mountain soils to rainfall. They recorded soil losses approaching one ton per acre per year. After a few years of cultivation and declining crop yields, they turned the corn fields out to fallow, allowing cattle to graze on weeds and brush in the old fields. Browsing cattle, however, had an impact upon the soil, reducing its ability to absorb and retain rainwater. Soil losses on the old field pastures approximated three-fourths of a ton per acre per year. Thus, the cumulative effect of plowing and grazing on mountain fields was severe soil erosion (Dils 1953:7, 17-18, 20, 23, 25-26, 49-52). The more severely a field was eroded, the more slowly the forest growth recuperated. Reforestation was further delayed if farmers continued to use the old fields as fallow pastures, since grazing cattle fed on tree sprouts and saplings. Reforestation of severely eroded fields required a generation or more (Glenn 1911:9; Johnson 1952).

Since grazing and plowing greatly lengthened the time needed to reforest old fields, Appalachian mountain farming required a surplus of fresh forest land to provide new fields, while fallow fields were undergoing gradual restoration. But during the twentieth century, Appalachia's surplus of forest land was lost to the extractive industries and governmental agencies, which penetrated the region. By 1930, private corporations and public forests claimed almost half of Appalachia's land. Forest land, which had once served as temporary fields for corn crops or as open-range for livestock, was lost to Appalachian mountain farming. Trapped on a declining land base, Appalachian forest farming succumbed to low productivity, soil exhaustion, and population pressures.

Therefore, the decline of forest fallowing in temperate Appalachia may be attributed to external economic and political pressures as well as to internal pressures created by inheritance patterns, inappropriate farming practices, and increasing population. Since the Boserup hypothesis explains the demise of temperate forest fallowing only in terms of internal population pressures, it may be necessary to reformulate her hypothesis: the abandonment of forest fallowing in the temperate world may have resulted from external economic and political pressures as well as from internal social, technological, and population pressures. There may be no single cause to explain the disappearance of forest fallowing in the modern temperate world.

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A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF CASES OF REINCARNATION AMONG THE BEAVER AND GITKSAN INDIANS[1]

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Abstract: The author describes belief in and cases of reincarnation among two different groups of Indians in northern British Columbia, Canada, the Beaver and the Gitksan, and gives illustrative examples in which a child is identified as a particular person returned. The differences in belief, e.g. belief in cross-sex reincarnation among the Beaver, and multiple reincarnation of one person among the Gitksan, are examples of cultural conditioning, although the author posits that belief in reincarnation is endemic in shamanic societies and concludes that while the cases do not demonstrate that reincarnation actually takes place, case oriented studies gather valuable data which needs to be assessed.

Résumé: Cet article discut du phénomène de réincarnation vu par deux groupes aborigènes, les Castors et les Gitksans, du nord de la colombie britanique, Canada. Les Castors croient qu'on peut changer de sexe entre réincarnations, alors que les Gitksans pensent qu'on peut se réincarnait plusiers fois simultanement, mais en gardant le même sexe. Bien que les différences de croyance soient bien entendu des exemples de conditionnement socio-culturel, l'auteur suggère que la réincarnation est endemique chez les cultures chamaniques. Il conclue que même si des cas particuliers dans ces deux cultures ne démontrent pas la veracité du phénomène de réincarnation, ces cas le suggèrent, et demandent un examen approfondi.

During the summer of 1984 I did research on cases of reincarnation among the Beaver and Gitksan Indians of British Columbia, Canada, following the methods Dr. Ian Stevenson of the University of Virginia has developed (Stevenson 1974, 1975b).[2] My extensive field work with the Beaver Indians had shown that belief in human and animal reincarnation is an integral part of their world view (Mills 1986), and led me to posit a belief in reincarnation as one of the basic philosophical tenets of a widespread American Indian philosophy (Mills 1982, 1984).

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When I tested my hypothesis about reincarnation by conducting a search of the literature available for a sample of ten North American Indian tribes from ten different culture areas during my Ph.D. research (1982), I found evidence of belief in human reincarnation among only half of these tribes, although all ten were reported to believe in reincarnation of animals. Since then I have found reference to belief in reincarnation in another of the societies included in my sample.[3]

Although belief in reincarnation received the least confirmation of the five beliefs tested, I did not consider the issue closed. It appeared that the relative lack of confirmation might well be due to a lack of thorough questioning on the part of the original investigators. Often, when there is mention of human reincarnation in the ethnographers' reports I scrutinized, it is not found among the material on religion, but sequestered away under "Birth Customs" relating to the native explanation of birthmarks. Stevenson, who has been studying cases suggestive of reincarnation in a number of cultures for over twenty years (1966, 1974, 1975a & b, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1986) has found that the information contained in the Human Relations Area Files (1972) on the subject of reincarnation is meagre (Stevenson 1984).

Once introduced to Stevenson's case-oriented study of reincarnation, I decided to employ it among the Beaver and Gitksan Indians to learn more about their belief in, and reported cases of, reincarnation. I spent July 1984 with the Beaver Indians with my time divided between two projects, and six days with the Gitksan, at the beginning of August 1984.

This paper summarizes the special characteristics of the twenty-three Beaver Indian cases and the thirty-five Gitksan cases in which a living individual is reputed to have been a particular person in his or her past life. Examples are given of some of the most noteworthy cases. The variation between the Beaver Indian belief in cross-sex reincarnation and the Gitksan belief in multiple simultaneous reincarnation of the same person is briefly discussed and compared to the range of related belief among the Australian aborigines. I posit that belief in reincarnation characterizes or characterized shamanic cultures in general and was maintained in many agricultural societies. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the role of such case-oriented research within the discipline of anthropology.

Beaver Indian Belief in and Cases of Reincarnation

The Beaver Indians are Northern Athapaskans who live in the Peace River area of northeastern British Columbia, Canada, where they hunted and gathered the local flora and fauna, pursuits they continue to follow in the context of a less nomadic, reserve-centered setting. They have retained a bilateral kinship system without lineages or clans. Beaver Indian material and spiritual culture has been described elsewhere (Brody 1982; Mills 1982, 1984, 1985,

1986; Ridington 1977; Ridington and Ridington 1970).

During the four weeks I spent with the Beaver Indians in 1984 they reported twenty-three cases or partial cases of reincarnation. A "partial case" will be defined here as a case where the "previous personality," to use Stevenson's term, is unknown. Two partial cases are described in the notes,[4] while Table 1 summarizes some of the characteristics of the Beaver cases of reincarnation.

Among the Beaver, all people are said to be the reincarnation of souls who have been on earth before. The mongoloid spot on the base of the spine of their babies was said by three of my informants to be caused by the entity being pushed out of heaven when it was time for it to be born back on earth. All but one Beaver child in my sample was born with a mongoloid spot.[5]

The Beaver say that in most cases no one knows who a person was in its previous life. This amnesia occurs when the soul of a deceased person has succeeded in reaching *yage*, which loosely translates as "heaven." There the discarnate person or soul is washed and chooses a new light body, although it remains recognizable by relatives who also arrive. While souls who reach *yage* are eventually reborn as newborn babies, their memories of their past life, of specific people and places, and of their likes and dislikes are rendered largely inaccessible by the transformation of being in heaven. However, whether one remembers a past life or not, the Beaver Indians believe everyone is reborn.

About five percent of the current Beaver population fits into the category of "special child." As one informant put it, "the ones that get born again [and are 'special children'] are those who don't really make it to heaven, who never get past that place where you have to grab hold of the cross." When such a soul is born as a "special child," it brings with it some of the knowledge, preferences and aversions, and personality it had manifested in its past life.

The Beaver Indians have two opposing attitudes with respect to reincarnation. On the one hand, to be reborn quickly makes one a "special child." Such children are indeed cherished, and actions reminiscent of the previous personality are encouraged, as described below. On the other hand, the Prophet Movement, which has had a major impact on the Beaver Indians for the last 160-180 years (Mills 1982; Ridington 1977), places a positive value on living one's life so that one can follow the trail to *yage* after death.

Those who die violently and/or when drunk are described as unable to find the path to *yage* or heaven, and are therefore obliged to be ghosts, hovering in a confused state near where they lived before death until they are eventually reborn.[6] However, as Table 1 (Column F) shows, fifty-three percent of the previous personalities in recognized cases of reincarnation did not die from violence. Column G of Table 1 shows that there is a wide range in the

age at death of the previous personality, with the median age being thirty years (see Stevenson 1986 for comparison with other cultures). The definition of violence and cause of death is not the same in Beaver and western society.[7] There is no negative stigma, but rather considerable prestige associated with being a "special child" and the reincarnation of someone who has been constrained to lead the lonely existence of a ghost.

There are a number of ways by which a child comes to be known as a "special child," that is, the reincarnation of someone who is deceased. Children are classed as special children either because (1) someone specifies to whom they want to be reborn; (2) someone has what Stevenson calls an "announcing dream"[8] before the baby is born which indicates who it was in its previous life, or has visits from the ghost of the deceased; (3) a child is particularly precocious; (4) a child exhibits behaviour or memories appropriate to the previous personality; (5) a child has a birthmark or marks which may relate to wounds or scars on the previous personality; or (6) some combination or all of the above.

As there are too many cases to describe here, this section will focus on Beaver cases with birthmarks and cases of cross-sex reincarnation, before summarizing two of the most noteworthy Beaver cases. In the notes, two cases are described where the previous personality stated to whom he would return before his death.[9] Also described are instances of announcing dreams, visions and visits from the ghost of the dead.[10]

Birthmarks

Besides dreams and visions, birthmarks are a common indication that someone has been reborn. In fourteen of the fifteen cases where I gathered complete information on birthmarks, "special children" had birthmarks. In some instances the birthmark serves to identify the previous personality of a newborn child in the absence of dreams and other indications. Birthmarks were present in two of the most interesting Beaver cases described below. Notes 4, 10, and 13 give other examples of birthmarks.

In most of the Beaver cases, however, the relation of birthmarks on the children to scars and wounds on the previous personality is obscure. I hope to obtain the medical records and autopsies of a number of the previous personalities to see if birthmarks on their alleged reincarnations correspond to anything recorded about the previous personality. In many instances the individuals and their parents were not sure if the personality had scars or lesions that corresponded to the birthmarks. Some birthmarks and congenital defects were explained as being the result of the revenge of offended animals such as an eagle (one case) or rabbits (two cases).

Cross-Sex Reincarnation

In all three cases of cross-sex reincarnation in this study, the previous personality was male and the subject was female (Cases Number 4, 6, and 11). In two of the three cases where a child was reputed to be reborn to the same parents, the child was male in the previous life and returned as a female. An informant stated that the choice of sex was the option of the returning ghost (see Note 10, *Vision,* for parents' preference).

Case Number 15, marked by a plus and minus in Column K, Table 1, was born with both male and female genitalia, and the hospital removed the male genitals. I was not able to learn whether the Beaver explain this ambiguity by reference to indecision on the part of the previous female personality as to its future sex.

The only other Beaver case of cross-sex reincarnation was an aged man, who was 84 at the time of his death. He was the protagonist in Hugh Brody's *Maps and Dreams* (1982) where he is given the pseudonym Joseph Patsah. He is said to be reborn as the daughter of the previous personality's daughter. This identification is confirmed by the baby's great affection for Joseph Patsah's wife and youngest daughter. Indeed the baby is being raised by Joseph Patsah's wife who has not remarried. They saw nothing incongruous in dressing "him" in a frilly dress and stretch tights.

Chuck and Amy: Two Beaver Indian Cases of Reincarnation

Rarely, a "special child" has memories from or speaks from the point of view of the previous personality. Chuck and Amy are cases of this type. Pseudonyms have been used here and throughout the article to mask the identity of the people in question.

Chuck. Baby boy Chuck (Case Number 12) was born with a large birthmark just below the hairline on his forehead. As no one had dreamed about the baby's identity before his birth, this birthmark gave people the first basis for equating him with a man who had apparently shot himself in the head. Since the previous personality was inebriated and away from the reserve at the time this happened, his relatives are not certain whether or not he intended to shoot himself.

Chuck reconfirmed the association established by his birthmark by calling the daughter of the previous personality by her Beaver Indian name, "Coca." Indeed, "Coca" was his first word, spoken when he was eleven months old. At the age of three, he had also formed a fast friendship with the previous personality's son, and called this eleven year old "*Ba,*" or "Sonny."

Chuck also exhibits a strong will and precocity in the skills of the previous personality. The previous personality was noted for his skill as a horse wrangler, and was one of the favorite employees of a local big game outfitter.

Table 1
Beaver Indian Cases of Reincarnation

Case #	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
1	+	+	+	?	+	-	50y	2y	?	+	-
2	+	-	?	?	-	-	2-3y	2y	n	+	-
3	+	+	+	?	?	+	16y	9m	-	-	-
4	+	-	-	-	-	-	8m	1y	n	+	+
5	+	+	-	+	+	+	30y	3y	-	-	-
6	+	-	?	?	-	-	8m	1y	n	?	+
7	+?	+	-	+	+?	+?	37y	5y	?	?	-
8	+	+?	-	+	n	-	70y	7m	+	-	-
9	?	?	?	?	n	-	2m	n	n	n	n
10	-	?	+	+	n	n	?	n	n	n	n
11	+	-	-	+	n	-	84y	23m	?	?	+
12	+	+	-	+	+	+	35y	9m	?	?	-
13	+	?	-	+	?	+	29y	17m	+	-+	-
14	-	?	?	+	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
15	+	?	+	+	+	-	80y	5y	?	?	-+
16	+	+	+	+	-+	+	30y	11m	-	-	-
17	+	-	-	+	n	+	38/50y	5y	-	-	-
18	+	+	+	+	?	-	40y?	9m?	-	-	-
19	-	?	-	+							
20	+	+	+	+	n	+	30y	3m	-	-	-
21	+?	n	+	?	n						
22	-	+	-	?							
23	-	?	+	?							
Total:	17	8	8	13	6	8	*	**	2	4	3

Column A: Previous Personality known
Column B: Precocity
Column C: Announcing Dream
Column D: Birthmark
Column E: Action or Memory Reminiscent of Previous Personality
Column F: Violent Cause of Death
Column G: Previous Personality's Age at Time of Death
Column H: Interval Between death of Previous Personality & Birth of Subject
Column I: Previous Personality States Preference for Parents in Next Life
Column J: Parents Chose Previous Personality
Column K: Cross-Sex Reincarnation

Key: + means present
- means absent
n means not applicable

*Age at death: three babies; one person in their teens; nine aged 29-50; and two aged 70 or over. Median = 30 years.

**Interval between death of Previous Personality and birth of Subject: eight cases of less than a year; five cases of two to three years; three cases of three or more years. Median = 1 year.

At the age of three, Chuck was continually mounting his father's horse and riding as far as he could go before he was discovered and brought back home. The fame of his exploits, which included walking alone for miles, at the age of three, to round up the horses, spread to other reserves.

In observing Chuck, I was struck by the precocity of his behaviour, when I saw him wait until his father's horse was out of sight behind his grandparent's house so that he could mount it without being apprehended. His parents also saw him leading the horse towards his grandparents' stoop so that he could reach the stirrup. They commented on this achievement with proud amusement, and did not interfere. Out of sight of his parents and grandparents, he succeeded in mounting the horse. A neighbour saw him on the horse and alerted his mother, who took him off. He then awaited his chance to mount the horse again when it was out of sight. When he was taken off his father's horse for the second time during the course of one meal, he cried, was consoled, and then went off by himself to throw horse shoes at an adult-sized horse shoe toss.[11]

A week later, when I passed by Chuck's reserve a second time, there he was, mounting his father's horse again. Whereas other Beaver children are adept at horsemanship, Chuck's interest and determination were exceptional. At the same time, it was obvious that his parents were proud of his exploits and encouraged them. Never before had I seen a father leave his horse saddled, bridled, and so readily available for a youngster to ride. It will be interesting to see how this child progresses.

Amy. Another of the most interesting Beaver cases involves a young woman we will call Amy who has memories from a previous life (Case Number 5). At birth, the sizeable strawberry red birthmark on her left breast convinced her parents and the community that she was a "special child."

However, no one had any idea who she had been until at the age of four she said to her mother, as they rode a bus, "I sure hate Frank Alta. I never want to see his face again." These were strong words from a mild-mannered, if precocious four year old, especially since she had never seen Frank Alta, who had moved to another reserve following the death of his wife three years before Amy was born. On another occasion, Amy said, "I'd sure like some fish from Fish Lake. It has been a long time since I had any." Amy had not had any fish from Fish Lake during her lifetime.

These two statements suggested to Amy's parents that she had been Marie Alta, Frank's late wife. Marie and Frank had frequently camped at Fish Lake, where they caught and dried fish. Marie had died under ambiguous circumstances. One afternoon she and her husband returned from town, bringing with them a certain amount of liquor. That night, Marie burned to death when their house was destroyed by fire. Frank was found at his niece's house completely incapacitated from alcohol. People at the reserve suspected foul play on the part of Frank, but said nothing to the police.[12]

After little four-year-old Amy made these startling statements, she was taken by her parents to the late prophet. People frequently told me that not everyone dreams about who is coming back, and that the prophet is the one

whose dreams are to be listened to. The prophet confirmed that Amy La Poussec was Marie Alta, who had come back.

Amy's case is widely known among the Beaver. I first heard about it from her half-sister who lives at another reserve. When I interviewed Amy, aged twenty in 1984 and the mother of two "special children," she had forgotten many of the details of what she had said in her childhood. It is often difficult or impossible to interview people in seclusion. Amy's aunt, mentioned in Note 12, was present at our interview and filled in the gaps in Amy's memory: "Remember, you said. . . ." Amy had forgotten that Marie Alta's husband was Frank, but continued to feel a strong aversion to him. At the time of this study, Frank had recently visited Amy's reserve, where he had lived when married to Marie. Amy felt such a strong aversion to him that she avoided going to the house where he was staying during the duration of his visit, despite the fact that this was a home she visited daily. At the time of Frank's visit, Amy did not know why she felt such antipathy towards him.

Amy reported that she continues to have dreams about an old lady which she feels are related to being Marie Alta. Since the Beaver are characteristically reticent about describing "medicine experiences," I did not manage to gather more information about her dreams. Amy concurred with the opinion of her aunt, mentioned above, that her twin son and daughter, aged twenty-six months during the study, were the two babies Marie Alta had miscarried during her marriage to Frank Alta. There are various other interpretations of the previous identities of these twins, both of whom have birthmarks.[13]

Gitksan Belief in and Cases of Reincarnation

The Gitksan, the Nishga of the Nass River, and the Tsimshian Indians who live along the Pacific coast and near the mouth of the Skeena River in British Columbia, Canada, comprise the Northwest Coast Tsimshian Indians. The matrilineal Gitksan live along the upper Skeena River where the abundance of salmon allowed settlement in villages similar to other Northwest Coast Indians. Their belief in reincarnation has been noted before (see Adams 1973:26-31).

One Gitksan elder said:

> Our grandfathers believed in reincarnation. The old people knew the language of the reincarnated. When a new baby was born, those who knew that language would listen to the babies talk. They would offer them some of their property: ax, bow, arrow or a club. The baby would be happy to have some of his property again. They knew the language of the reincarnated. But since that time we have all become Christians. We have lost all that.

Table 2
Summary of Chronology of Features in Two Beaver Indian Cases of Reincarnation (Chuck and Amy)

The Case of Chuck

1. FEATURE: Born with birthmark on his forehead on same location as self-inflicted gun shot wound on his previous personality.
   INFORMANTS: Chuck's mother; the previous personality's mother; and the previous personality's wife.
   COMMENTS: Autopsy of previous personality not yet checked.
2. RECOGNITION: Recognized previous personality's youngest daughter, called her by her familiar name, "Coca," when eleven months old.
   INFORMANTS: Chuck's father; Chuck's mother; and his father's sister.
   COMMENTS: This was Chuck's first word, said in recognition of Coca, and before he spoke the names of his siblings. Coca lives three miles away and hence was/is a less frequent associate than his siblings.
3. RECOGNITION: Recognized his previous personality's son whom he calls by Beaver term for "son."
   INFORMANTS: Father's sister; mother; previous personality's wife.
   COMMENTS: Chuck seeks out previous personality's son as companion, although the latter is eight years his senior.
4. PRECOCIOUS BEHAVIOUR: Chuck walked miles by himself to round up horses.
   INFORMANTS: Mother; father; father's sister; numerous other witnesses in his community.
   COMMENTS: Previous personality was a noted horse wrangler who rounded up horses for his own hunting and worked for a big game outfitter.
5. PRECOCIOUS BEHAVIOUR: Mounts and rides horse as often as he can.
   INFORMANTS: Mother, father, numerous other witnesses, personal observation.
   COMMENTS: His persistence and dedication were noteworthy. One distantly related informant said, "You know how the father doesn't hardly ever talk, and the mother is such a mouse, and look at Chuck, what a hellion he is."

The Case of Amy

1. FEATURE: Born with a sizable red birthmark on her left breast.
   INFORMANTS: Sister, personal observation.
   COMMENTS: Relation to previous personality obscure: she had TB and some suspect she was stabbed before she died in a fire.
2. STATEMENT: Amy said, "I sure hate Frank Alta. I never want to see his face again," when four years old.
   INFORMANTS: Amy's half-sister; her father's sister.
   COMMENTS: Amy had not met Frank Alta who moved to another reserve before her birth. The antagonism is attributed to the previous personality's death in ambiguous circumstances.
3. STATEMENT: Amy said, "I would sure like to eat fish from Fish Lake. It is a long time since I had any."
   INFORMANTS: Amy's half-sister; her father's sister.
   COMMENTS: Previous personality and her husband, Frank Alta, frequently

fished at Fish Lake. Amy had not been there or eaten fish from there since her birth.

4. PRECOCIOUS BEHAVIOUR: Amy was precocious in assuming housewifely tasks of cooking and washing dishes.
   INFORMANTS: Amy; personal observation in 1971.
   COMMENTS: Amy wanted to perform these tasks when so young her mother was afraid she would burn herself on the stove, etc. and tried, unsuccessfully, to prevent her.
5. AVERSION: Amy continues to avoid Frank Alta.
   INFORMANTS: Amy.
   COMMENTS: Amy has forgotten her earlier statements, and had forgotten that Frank Alta was the previous personality's wife, but continues to feel an aversion to Frank Alta and, at twenty years of age, still sees an old lady in her dreams which she thinks is related to the previous personality.

Nevertheless, we were able to gather partial information on thirty-five cases of reincarnation among the Gitksan in the course of six days. Table 3 lists the particulars of the thirty-five Gitksan cases.

My impression during my brief stay was that I had only begun to learn about all the known Gitksan cases. Many more cases were alluded to, which I did not have time to investigate, whereas my more extended research among the Beaver had, I felt, touched on a large proportion of the cases known there. If true this suggests that a far greater percentage of the Gitksan population know who they were in their previous reincarnation than is the case among the Beaver.

I was fortunate to interview Jean Slade, an elderly lady of eighty-seven, since deceased, who had been cited as the dreamer who had identified the previous personality in several cases. She confirmed those cases, but said that her memory of them was vague, and then proceeded to identify the previous personality of one after another of her grandchildren and great-grandchildren as they came into the room. When such a person dies, a huge store of information about people who have died and who are potential candidates for reincarnation dies with them. In fact, I suspected that the paucity of cases cited at one of the Beaver reserves might be due to the absence of any old women remaining there. However, I was told that Jean Slade was not the only person "who knows the language of the reincarnated," and that such complete knowledge is widespread throughout the culture. "Even the dogs and cats have names," and are seen as returning life after life to the same family (Don Ryan 1984).

Although much has undoubtedly been lost or changed by becoming Christian, as the Gitksan elder quoted above said, Christianity has not supplanted the Gitksan belief in reincarnation. One informant said, "I heard one

Table 3
Gitksan Cases of Reincarnation

Case #	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
1.	+	?	?	?	+	+	?				-	famo	-
2.	+	n	+	+	n	n	?				-	momomobr	+
3.	+				+	+	?				-		
4.	+				+		?				-	momofasidada	+
5.	+						?				-		
6.	+										-		
7.	+				+	+					-		
8.	+		+					long			-		+
9.	+										-		
10.	+							10y			-	momosi	+
11.	+				+						-	mosifawi	+
12.											-		
13.	+										-		
14.	+		+	+							-		+
15.	+					+	25				-		
16.	+	+-	+			+	25	11m			-	momosi	+
17.	+					+	25	13m			-		-
18.	+		+			-	78	5m			-		+
19.	+	+	+	+	+	-	78	3m	+		-	momomo	+
20.	+		+			-	78			+	-		+
21.	+			+				4y			-	mosi	+
22.	+										-		
23.	+										-		
24.	+										-		
25.	+		+		+-						-		
26.	+		+								-	momomobr	+
27.	+										-		
28.	+		+								-		-
29.				+							-		
30.											-		
31.			+								-		
32.				+							-	momo	+
33.	+		-	+	-	-					-		
34.			+						+		-		
35.	+		+	+	+							momomosi	+
Total:	29	2	13	8	8	1/2			2	1	0		14/17

Key: + means present; - means absent; n means not applicable
Column A: Previous Personality known
Column B: Precocity
Column C: Announcing Dream
Column D: Birthmark
Column E: Action or Memory Appropriate to Previous Personality
Column F: Violent Cause of Death
Column G: Previous Personality's Age at Death
Column H: Interval Between Death of Previous Personality and Subject's Birth
Column I: Previous Personality Stated Preference for Parents
Column J: Parents Chose Previous Personality
Column K: Cross-Sex Reincarnation

Column L: Relation of Subject to Previous Personality
Column M: Subject a Member of the House of the Previous Personality

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evangelist say that if you're really good, God will send you back to this world." No Gitksan ever suggested the Beaver alternative of staying in heaven as preferable to the alternative of being reborn (see Note 19).

The Gitksan not only value being reborn, but also value being reborn simultaneously in several people. One informant said, "Whoever is a good spirit will come back five times," while others mentioned four times. Another informant said, "I heard my grandfather came back in many places. I was pleased to hear that, because he had suffered quite a bit before he passed away." Jean, the old lady mentioned above, said, "A good person comes back seven times." Laughing, she added, "I'm going to come back ten times."

In one instance, different informants suggested different "come backs" of the same late individual, and were apparently unaware of the other person's concept of who was equated with whom. This situation parallels some of the Beaver Indian cases.[14]

However, in the majority of cases of multiple reincarnations, both the previous personality's relatives and the subjects themselves were aware of the other multiple "come backs." In some cases, informants expressed a sense of rivalry over this claim, and due to their own or the previous personality's alleged antipathy to the parents, doubted that the previous personality would have chosen to come back where he or she was supposed to have done so. "You will hear all sorts of counter claims when you talk to——," people sometimes said. Nevertheless, these same individuals usually acknowledged that the previous personality was reincarnated in all of the specified individuals.

In all Gitksan cases of reincarnation in this study, both the previous personality and the subject are of the same sex. Although Marie-Françoise Guédon cited a case where one man and his late grandmother were said to be reincarnations of the same individual (Guédon 1984), I was not able to interview the man in question. When I asked one Gitksan lady about this case, she said that she had never heard of anyone returning in the opposite sex.

Whereas there were virtually no cases of cross-sex reincarnation among the Gitksan in this study, reincarnation in the same house or clan was cited as desirable. In all but three of the thirty-five Gitksan cases, the subject is in the same house and clan as the alleged previous personality. Since the Gitksan are matrilineal, it is considered appropriate for individuals to come back in the same matrilineage, where they can potentially inherit the names held by the people they were presumed to reincarnate. One informant said, "Have to

be same family. Take the Indian names." As a person's name or names are passed on to adults immediately upon the person's death, the succession of names related to reincarnation remains unclear. This is not something about which information was gathered in 1984, and is a subject for future research.

As is the case with the Beaver, the Gitksan consider dreams, visits from the disembodied or ghostly previous personality, birthmarks, and/or memory or behaviour appropriate to the previous personality as the means of knowing who has been reincarnated as whom. I will summarize one dream and birthmark case before turning to two lengthy instances of multiple reincarnation of the same person.

A Dream and Birth Mark Case (Case Number 2)

Jean Slade, the grandmother of a young woman who was taking the Native Indian Teacher's Education Program of the University of British Columbia (NITEP) in Prince Rupert, British Columbia, dreamed of an elderly man named Clarence Mack who had recently died. This man appeared in Jean Slade's dream and said, "I don't want to live in Prince Rupert." From this, Jean knew that her granddaughter in Prince Rupert was carrying the child who was to be "reincarnated from" Clarence Mack.

When the baby boy was born in Prince Rupert in 1983, he had a birthmark in the form of an indentation at an angle on his left temple. I was told by the mother and her grandmother that Clarence Mack had a larger indentation in his forehead in the same place. The grandmother, Jean Slade, thought the mark was from an injury Clarence Mack had sustained in his youth, from falling on a fence inside a smokehouse. However, when I interviewed Clarence Mack's widow, she said that Clarence had been born with this striking birthmark, which looked like a scar covering a serious indentation in the skull. She said Clarence had this birthmark because he was the reincarnation of a man who had died when he slipped and gashed his head on rocks while fishing in the river. Anyone who has seen the Gitksan and Carrier fishing in the turbulent narrows of the local rivers will understand how such an accident can happen.

Another interesting case with some similar features (Case Number 35) involved the previous personality falling into the water, and the "come back" having related birthmarks and some aspects of behaviour appropriate to the previous personality.

Cases of Multiple Reincarnations of One Person

Susan Albert: (Case Numbers 18, 19 & 20): According to her daughter, Margaret, Susan Albert was a Gitksan "princess," who felt that it was time to go (see Figure 1). "Whenever she got up to give her testimony [in church], she always asked the Lord if he would take her and this is what [happened]. She

had a stroke and she never regained consciousness. She was seventy-six or seventy-eight."

Figure 1
Relevant Members of Susan Albert and Cliff's Family Tree.



Key: O is female; X is male. (Name) is the name of the Previous Personality

Note: The genealogy has been simplified; therefore Cynthia's older siblings do not appear. Martha's son is included as he is said to be the reincarnation of Jean Slade's husband (case Number 28). The third reincarnation of Cliff does not appear as he is not as closely related.

Margaret reported that, "During the years, Mother [Susan Albert] always claimed she wanted Cynthia [Margaret's daughter and Susan Albert's granddaughter] to be her mother when she came back. . . . 'I want to be born beautiful, clever and not poor anymore. And I'm going to have blond hair,' Mother said."

When Susan Albert died, both her granddaughter Cynthia, and one of her great-granddaughters (Susan Albert's other daughter's daughter's daughter) were pregnant. Cynthia's cousin Katie had thought that Cynthia was going to have a boy until she dreamed of Susan Albert. She then told Cynthia

that she was was going to have a girl who would be the reincarnation of Susan Albert.

Susan Albert's daughter Margaret flew to Vancouver to attend the birth of her daughter's first child (case Number 19). On the eve of the baby's birth Margaret dreamed of her mother so vividly that she said, "Mother, what are you doing in Vancouver?" From the dream Margaret knew her mother was returning, and she said to her son-in-law, "Don't count on a boy. Mother was here."

The baby girl, Rhonda Mead, was born a blond, though this is less surprising because her father is a non-Indian, as is her maternal grandfather. Rhonda also met Susan Albert's other specifications: in 1984 Rhonda was eleven, and her mother stated that she gets certificates for outstanding academic achievement in school. Since Rhonda's father had a steady job at the Vancouver airport, Rhonda was comfortably situated. In addition, Rhonda exhibited marked precocity and memories appropriate to her great-grandmother, Susan Albert.

The public health nurse who visited Cynthia and her newborn daughter Rhonda when she was three weeks old, noted that baby Rhonda was atypically advanced. The nurse said Cynthia should treat Rhonda like a five or six month old baby because she could pull herself up like a baby of that age. Before Rhonda was eight months old, she was able to walk and to talk. Her mother noted several times that she was talking before she had teeth. "And then she got her teeth all at once, like they were her [Susan Albert's] teeth."

When Rhonda was about fifteen months old, she was taken to Hazelton, British Columbia to visit her grandparents. Rhonda then insisted that her uncle relinquish the easy chair in which he was sitting, saying, "That's my chair." Her mother Cynthia said, "She just screamed bloody murder if anybody sat in her chair. She just used to squirm and push Fred away." The chair was indeed one of two that had belonged to Susan Albert, and which her daughter Margaret had brought over to her own house after Susan's death.

When it was time to eat, Rhonda refused until she was brought a chair which had been sitting near the bathroom with things piled on it. Her grandmother reported that Rhonda "threw everything off of it and brought it in and sat down and she wouldn't let anyone else. She says, 'That's my chair.'" The grandfather added that although Rhonda could barely see over the edge of the table while sitting on the chair, she insisted, "That's my chair." This was the other chair which Margaret had brought from Susan Albert's house.

On the same trip, Rhonda went around her grandmother's house stuffing clothes piled for laundry into shopping bags. Her grandfather noted that this was just like Susan Albert, who, "being short of closet space, kept unseasonal clothes in old flour sacks. There was a time when we were *reminded*

that Susan Albert was getting her way."

On subsequent visits to her grandparents, Rhonda continued to chase her uncle out of "her chair." Years later, Rhonda's grandmother, Margaret, remarked to her son Fred that Rhonda was "becoming more mortal now, she's not making such a fuss about the chair." Fred replied, "That's what you think. She's still trying to pull me off her chair."

On Rhonda's second visit, her mother and grandparents were talking about prices and mentioned the figure "seven dollars." Rhonda, who had not apparently been following the adults' conversation until that point, said, "That's my dog." At one time Susan Albert had purchased a dog for seven dollars and "having a sense of humor," as her son-in-law put it, had named the dog Seven Dollars. Since the dog had died before Susan Albert, he was not a frequent subject of conversation.

On another occasion, Rhonda's mother, Cynthia, and her grandmother, Margaret, were looking through Margaret's jewellery. Rhonda came up, picked up a bracelet which had belonged to Susan Albert and said, "That's my bracelet."

Given Rhonda's precocity, her identification with Susan Albert's belongings, and her fulfillment of Susan Albert's request to be blond, smart, and well off, Rhonda's birthmark was seen as a less important, if confirmatory indication of reincarnation. Rhonda has a birthmark on her right wrist which resembles a curving brown line. This is said to correspond to the tattoo of an S (for Susan) which Susan Albert had on the same part of her right arm. Rhonda also has a birthmark on her leg. Susan's daughter Margaret did not know if her mother had a scar, tattoo or birthmark on her leg as the prototype of Rhonda's birthmark.

In 1984, Rhonda did not remember saying any of these things. Her grandmother Margaret said, "After a certain age it [the awareness] leaves, but then the genes are still there so the idiom still comes out." The grandmother said she didn't know much about how or why the memories would fade, but added that the dreams she used to have, in which her mother, Susan Albert, appeared and warned her of anything serious that was about to happen to Rhonda, ceased as well.

At one point during the interview, I asked Rhonda's mother, Cynthia, if Susan Albert chided her for smoking. Rhonda answered with a very emphatic "Yes"—i.e., answered for the late Susan Albert whom she is said to be, as her grandmother Margaret says, "reincarnated from."

Rhonda is one of three girls who were eleven years old in 1984 and who are reputed to be reincarnations "from," as they say, Susan Albert. One of the others is her cousin Sheila (case Number 18). Margaret's brother-in-law, Peter, dreamed that Susan Albert was also coming as Sheila, the daughter of his own daughter, Martha (see Figure 1). When I asked Rhonda if she felt

close to Sheila or similar to Sheila, she did not indicate any special feeling of closeness. Both Rhonda's mother and grandmother said that Sheila was smart, but dark.

While Cynthia and her mother Margaret accept Sheila as being "reincarnated from" Susan Albert on the basis of Peter's dream, they are reluctant to accept Susan Richards as the third reincarnation of Susan Albert (case Number 20). Susan Richards is the daughter of Lilly, a woman raised by Margaret's half-sister. Both Cynthia and Margaret acknowledged that Lilly "claimed she dreamed of Mother [Susan Albert] before her child was born," and agreed that Lilly was paying Susan Albert an honour in naming her daughter, Susan Richards, after her. However, Cynthia and Margaret felt quite strongly that Susan Albert would not have wanted to come back in "that family" because the father of Susan Richards shouts at her in a way that Susan Albert would not have tolerated. Margaret also said that her mother would not be as homely as Susan Richards. In addition, Rhonda's mother gave a lengthy explanation of the rivalry between herself and Lilly in their teen-age years. Rhonda's mother and grandmother then sent me off with the warning, "You'll hear lots of counter claims.... Some people say Rhonda can't be Mother [Susan Albert] because she came back too soon. [Rhonda was born three months after Susan Albert's death]. But I heard Billy Graham say, 'Where Spirit wants to go, Spirit goes.'"

Although I was not able to meet the other two girls said to be reincarnations of Susan Albert, I interviewed Sheila's grandmother, Martha, who agreed that all three girls are reincarnated "from Susan Albert." Martha said, "My grandmother [Susan Albert] said, 'I'll come back lots of times. Maybe Chinese, maybe black, maybe as a dog,'" although she also said that Susan Albert had a well developed sense of humor. Martha did not refer to Susan Albert's request to be blond, but said that Margaret objected to Sheila's claim to be Susan Albert because Susan said she wanted to be well-off. "When she said that I just walked off."

Martha has no problem accepting Susan Richards as another reincarnation of Susan Albert. She says that Lilly and Susan Albert were close in the last years of the latter's life. Whether these girls have had any memories comparable to Rhonda's, were strikingly precocious, or have birthmarks, I do not yet know.

Cliff: (Cases 15, 16, 17): Another case of multiple reincarnation with some overlap in personnel serves to illustrate other features of Gitksan reincarnation. This case involves Cliff, Susan Albert's other daughter's son (see Figure 1).

In October 1974, Cliff set out to drive from Hazelton to Prince George, British Columbia and never arrived at his destination. He was missing for a number of months, and his desolate parents sent people as far as Ft. Nelson,

British Columbia, where he had worked, and to Vancouver to look for him. Cliff was twenty-five years old when he disappeared, and was the youngest child in his family.

Both Margaret and her husband had dreams of Cliff which indicated that he was no longer alive. Margaret said Cliff once came as a poltergeist, and threw off a picture that was sitting on the television. Margaret told Cliff that because she had an electric stove, she could not put any food in the fire, as is the Gitksan custom to appease a ghost, but she asked him to sit down and make himself at home. When Margaret and her husband told Cliff's mother, Helen, and her husband, Peter, about this event, they were still reluctant to believe that Cliff was dead. When I interviewed Helen, she said she had also heard Cliff coming into the house and checking on her in her bedroom, as he was wont to do, but there was no one there. Still she was reluctant to believe he was dead.

The following year in July, 1975, someone drove off the road and into the river on the way from Hazelton to Prince Rupert, British Columbia. During the search for the car involved in this accident, Cliff's car, with his remains inside, was found. He had apparently gone off the road and drowned in the river.

After that, Cliff's father, Peter, told his niece, Cynthia, that he had an image of two trees as he sat on the sofa in the same room with her. Cynthia was pregnant at the time. Peter said that she would have twins and that one of them would be Cliff. At that time, Cynthia did not know she was carrying twins. The following September, 1975, a little less than a year after Cliff's death, Cynthia gave birth to twin boys in Vancouver.

Just before the twins were born, Cynthia's parents, who were in Hazelton, British Columbia, had a very vivid dream in which Cliff was calling Margaret, "Grammie, Granny." Margaret's non-Indian husband, Ed, also heard this sound which woke them up. The sound was so real that Ed went to the door, but there was no one there. It seemed to Margaret and Ed that Cliff was present. Before his death, Cliff called Margaret "aunt" rather than "grandmother."

Only one of the twins, Christopher (case Number 16), is thought to be Cliff. The anomaly of twins is explained by Cliff's desire for a brother close to him in age. Cynthia explained, "You see Cliff always wanted a baby brother. . . . He had, you know, sisters, but he always wanted a brother about his age. Cliff's brother Ralph was old enough to be his father. He called him 'uncle.'"

After the twins were born, Peter's daughter Katie told Cynthia of a dream of Peter's in which Cliff had come to her as one of the twins. Katie reported, "He said, 'Cliff is with a good family.'" Shortly after that Peter died. His widow, Helen, said the strain of not knowing what had happened to

Cliff had broken his health.

When Margaret took her daughter Cynthia with Rhonda and the baby twins to consult Jean Slade, the latter "named the children off," stating that Rhonda was Susan Albert, Christopher was Cliff and that Cliff's twin was the late Leroy Albert (case Number 14).

Unlike his elder sister, Rhonda, Christopher, the twin who is said to be Cliff, has no memories appropriate to a past life. He is good at mathematics like Cliff, and adept at Cliff's trade of carpentry, but his twin brother also shares these talents. He also has a lighter spot on each of his cheeks which is said to correspond to the same feature in Cliff. More strikingly, he has a brown birthmark in the groin area which corresponds to a similar birthmark on Cliff. While both his mother, Cynthia, and his grandmother, Margaret, were aware that Christopher had a birthmark, neither had had occasion to know that Cliff had one at the same spot. However, Margaret's son, Fred, had noted the existence of the birthmark on his cousin Cliff.

Both Margaret and Cynthia accept the idea that Cliff has also come back as two other boys. "But of course they claim that the soul can have more than one person," Margaret said. One of the other "reincarnations from" Cliff is Helen and Peter's other son's daughter's son, William (case Number 17). The third reincarnation is Robert, the son of Alex and Elizabeth (case Number 15; see Figure 1).

I interviewed Elizabeth only long enough to confirm that she is of the opinion that her son Robert is a reincarnation of Cliff. In addition to Margaret and Cynthia, Cliff's mother and his sister (the only sister that I interviewed) confirmed that Robert is Cliff returned. Independently, a local schoolteacher told me that Robert was born with fetal alcohol syndrome, and a Gitksan informant said that this bore a relation to the inebriated condition which, apparently, had had something to do with Cliff's driving his car off the road.

Although I did not have an opportunity to meet William, the presumed third reincarnation of Cliff, I interviewed his great-grandmother and great-aunt about his case. In addition, I was given some information by Margaret and Cynthia. This is a case where the reincarnation belongs to a different clan than the previous personality. Cliff was a member of the Fireweed clan, while William belongs to his mother's clan, the Wolf.

Margaret commented: "But when their [Helen and Peter's] grandchild had her boy, which was in November [a year after Cliff's death, and two months after the twins were born] . . . they said that was Cliff, too, that was reincarnated. With the old Indian customs you don't usually go outside of your [clan], unless you had nowhere else to go. But then, it was accepted because Harry was upset at losing his brother . . . we're all supposed to belong to the same family group in the same long house, years ago, and Wil-

liam isn't [in the same house and clan] as Cliff; but you see, they decided that to comfort Helen and them because they were so broken up. . . ."

William's great-grandmother did not comment on William being in the wrong clan, but instead emphasized the similarity between William and Cliff: "William acts like Cliff. Sometimes real friendly, sometimes angry like Cliff. Cliff used to give money to the old people and William does the same thing, gives money to old people."

William's great-aunt and Cliff's sister said, "Cliff, he would come back to William, because he was so close to Harry and his family. William really acts like Cliff. He was really smart. He was a Number One carpenter. Harry really spoils William. Poor William."

The Gitksan take reincarnation within the clan seriously enough that only three out of thirty-five cases mentioned in 1984 deviated from this pattern. Interestingly, in one case (Number One), where the parents were quite sure that their daughter was reincarnated from a certain lady, they did not make a public claim, because their own marriage was incorrect in that they were both from the same Frog Clan (note that two other girls are also said to be this same lady returned).

However, emotional closeness seems to affect Gitksan anticipation of rebirth as well as house affiliation. Margaret was skeptical about Jean Slade's equation of the other twin with a man named Leroy Albert. Although Leroy Albert came from the same house, he did not figure significantly in her life.

Summary and Discussion

Despite having become nominally and/or practising Christians, both the Beaver and the Gitksan Indians of British Columbia, Canada firmly believe in reincarnation. However there are some differences in their beliefs. Although the Beaver believe that everyone reincarnates, they say that those souls that reach *yage* (heaven) do not clearly recall their past life on earth after they are reborn. They say that only those souls who choose and/or are chosen to reincarnate quickly after death, or who are unable to reach *yage*, retain distinct memories, personality traits, or birth marks which identify them as members of the category of "special child."

For the Gitksan, it appears that the same combination of the desires of the deceased and the desires of the remaining relatives to have the deceased return to them is seen as drawing an individual back to a particular family. However, they have a stronger desire to return quickly, without a respite in a place equivalent to *yage*, and to return in a number of different individuals. Therefore, it appears that a larger proportion of the population is said to reincarnate soon after death, and often in the form of more than one individual. The Beaver Indians, by contrast, did not cite any examples of multiple reincarnation of the same individual.

Table 4

Summary of Chronology of Features in Two Gitksan Cases of Reincarnation

The Case of the Multiple Reincarnation of Susan Albert, Previous Personality of Rhonda, Sheila and Susan Richards

Rhonda:

1. ANNOUNCING DREAM: Susan Albert's daughter's daughter dreamed that her mother's sister's daughter was going to give birth to a reincarnation of Susan Albert.
2. ANNOUNCING DREAM: Previous personality's daughter dreams of her mother on eve of the birth of her daughter's daughter.
3. FEATURE: Rhonda is born a blond.
   COMMENTS: Susan Albert was said to have stated that she wanted to be reborn, "blond, smart, and well-off."
4. FEATURE: Rhonda is born with a birthmark which corresponds to a tattoo on Susan Albert.
   COMMENTS: Susan Albert had a tattoo of an "S" on her right wrist. At eleven years of age Rhonda has a birthmark on her right wrist which resembles an opened up S.
5. PRECOCITY: When Rhonda was three weeks old the public health nurse noted that she could hold herself up like a five or six month old child.
6. PRECOCITY: Rhonda walked and talked at eight months.
   COMMENTS: Her mother noted that she talked before she had teeth, and then she got her teeth all at once, "like they were her [Susan Albert's] teeth."
7. RECOGNITION: Rhonda recognized Susan Albert's easy chair, said, "That's my chair," and repeatedly insisted on sitting in it, removing her mother's brother from it.
8. RECOGNITION: Rhonda recognized Susan Albert's dining room chair, again saying, "That's my chair," and insisted on sitting on the chair to eat.
9. RECOGNITION: Rhonda identified "Seven Dollars" as her dog.
   COMMENTS: Susan Albert had had a dog named "Seven Dollars," which died before she did.
10. RECOGNITION: Rhonda identified a bracelet of Susan Albert's as being hers.
11. BEHAVIOUR: Rhonda, as a very little girl, stuffed clothes in sacks, as Susan Albert had.
12. FEATURE: Rhonda gets awards for academic achievement.
    COMMENT: This is seen as fulfillment of Susan Albert's expressed wish to be reborn "Smart." (See Item 3).
    NOTE: Two other girls are said to also be Susan Albert reborn [Neither Yet Interviewed]:

Sheila

Dark, smart and comfortably off.

Susan Richards

Her mother, Susan Albert's adopted daughter's daughter, dreamed repeatedly of Susan Albert when pregnant.

The Case of Multiple Reincarnation of Cliff, Previous Personality of Christopher, William, and Robert

CHRISTOPHER:

1. ANNOUNCING IMAGE: Cliff's father had an image of two trees while with Cynthia which he said meant that his son would be reborn as one of twins to her.
   COMMENTS: Cliff was said to want to return as a twin because he always wanted a brother about his same age.
2. FEATURE: Christopher was born with a birth mark on the groin corresponding to one on Cliff at the same location.
3. FEATURE: Christopher has lighter patches on his cheeks, as did Cliff.
4. PHOBIA: Christopher initially had a fear of water which he has since overcome.
   COMMENTS: Cliff died when the car he was driving went off the road and submerged in the river.
   NOTE: Two other boys are said to be Cliff reborn [Neither Yet Interviewed]

William:

1. BEHAVIORAL FEATURE: Said to act like Cliff, e.g. alternately friendly and angry.
   COMMENT: William is Cliff's brother's daughter's son, but not in the same lineage or house. He is said to have returned as he did because Cliff's brother missed him so and desired his return to his daughter.

Robert:

1. FEATURE: Born with fetal alcohol syndrome.
   COMMENT: This is said to reflect Cliff's attraction to alcohol and state of inebriation at death.

Interviews with two Kwakiutl informants, a Coast Tsimshian from Hartley Bay, and several Coast Salish people which were conducted in November and December, 1984, produced numerous cases of multiple reincarnation for all these groups.[15]

The desire to reincarnate in multiple individuals appears to be a remarkable extension of the Northwest Coast concern with rank, wealth and property about which a great deal of anthropological literature has been written (see, for example, Adams 1973; Benedict 1934; Codere 1950; Rubel and Rosman 1983).

The Gitksan examples given in this paper indicate a certain degree of competitiveness in establishing the claim to be the reincarnation of a particular high status person, as well as a willingness to acknowledge that an individual can simultaneously reincarnate in a number of different people.[16] However, multiple reincarnation has also been noted for the Inuit (Stevenson 1969), and, farther afield, among the Igbo of Nigeria (Stevenson 1985, 1986).

In twelve percent of the Beaver cases the subject was reputed to have reincarnated in the opposite sex. The Gitksan cases did not include cross-sex reincarnation, and informants said cross-sex reincarnation does not happen.[17]

Stevenson has noted that cross-sex reincarnation is absent among the Haida and Tlingit cases he has gathered on the Northwest Coast of North America, and also among the Druse of Lebanon and the Alevi of Turkey. It occurs in three percent of the cases from India, twelve percent of the cases from Sri Lanka, thirteen percent of the cases in Thailand, fifteen percent of the cases from the United States, eighteen percent of the Igbo cases and thirty-three percent of the cases from Burma (Stevenson 1986). Slobodin (1970) has noted the presence of cross-sex reincarnation among the Kutchin and Goulet (1982) has recorded it among an unidentified Canadian Dene group. Bernard Saladin d'Anglure (1986) has recently developed a symbolic interpretation of cross-sex reincarnation among the Inuit.

I suspect that the absence of cross-sex reincarnation among the Gitksan is related to an emphasis on reincarnating in the same clan or lineage, which occurs in ninety-one percent of the cases. This is important if the presumed reincarnate is to assume the titles held by the predecessor, as the titles are the property of the house. Some, although by no means all, of the Gitksan titles are sex linked. I expect that the same emphasis on succession to hereditary titles accounts for the absence of cross-sex reincarnation among the Haida and Tlingit. However, the situation is complex. Among the matrilineal Haida, as Rubel and Rosman (1983) state, a man is a reincarnation of his father's father, whose name he inherits. For the Haida and other groups with only two clans, one's father's father is a member of one's own clan; thus bilateral reincarnation and reincarnation into the same clan are one and the same thing. The same principle applies for the patrilineal Northwest Coast groups such as the Kawkiutl. More research is necessary to see how the succession of titles relates to reincarnation in general and the absence of cross-sex reincarnation on the Northwest Coast of North America.[18]

Origin of the Belief in Reincarnation

Here I would like to turn to the question of the origin and diffusion of the belief in reincarnation among the Beaver and Gitksan Indians.

Stevenson has reviewed the evidence of Asian contact on the Northwest Coast of North America prior to European incursions on the continent, and concludes that the concept of reincarnation may have been introduced from Asiatic and presumably Chinese Buddhist contacts (1974:222). While not doubting the contacts which Stevenson mentions, I suspect that the belief in reincarnation should be seen as being part of the prior shamanic religion on whose roots Hindu and Buddhist beliefs in reincarnation were also founded.

It seems to me that the experience of the shaman, who is trained to leave his or her body and travel in search of the wandering or captured soul of his patient, demonstrates to both the patient and the audience the permanence of the soul after it has left the body. Experiences related to reincarnation, such as

the appearance of deceased persons in human or in animal form (metempsychosis), and out-of-body experiences, are common among shamanic cultures (see for example, Hallowell 1955). All of these experiences presuppose the existence of a soul substance which survives physical death and which can reanimate another body.

If shamanic societies believe in reincarnation, one would expect that their oral traditions would be replete with instances of reincarnation. This is apparently not the case for the two peoples discussed in this paper, the Beaver and the Gitksan Indians of British Columbia, Canada.

The Beaver Indians have a story in which a discussion takes place about what should happen to humans after death. The discussion asks if people sprout again like wild rhubarb, which rises again each spring. No, the Beaver Indian trickster concludes, throwing a stone into the lake; the soul should sink like the stone in the lake, and not rise again. Nowhere in the rest of Beaver myths is there any specific mention of reincarnation, although there are instances where a monstrous foe reanimates itself after being apparently killed in a nightmare-like situation (Ridington 1977).

Is this the trickster tricking us again? It is important to bear in mind that the majority of Beaver myths are about a time in the world's history before the existence of humans as we or the Beaver know them. The protagonist in these Beaver myths is an immortal being who simply retires from the earth when he has completed his task of making the world safe for humans. The world had earlier become perilous because First Human populated it with dangerous monsters created through thought projection, in imitation of the creation of the useful animals thought into existence by a higher being. One of the things the myths do is establish a precedent or blueprint for travel out of the body and out of ordinary space and time. This is the essence of the vision quest and the shamanic experience among North American and other native peoples.

John Cove (1982, 1985) has noted that the Gitksan and Tsimshian oral tradition does not directly mention reincarnation. However, Seguin (1984, 1985) suggests that reincarnation may be the key to unlocking the symbolism of the Tsimshian potlatch, and cogently interprets some Tsimshian myths as being about reincarnation. In both Beaver and Tsimshian society reincarnation appears to be so deeply ingrained that it need have no explicit mention in their oral traditions and becomes the sub-stratum on which the oral tradition rests.[19]

My hypothesis is that no matter how much diffusion of the concept of reincarnation may have taken place between Chinese Buddhists and Northwest Coast peoples, belief in reincarnation is ancient, not only in America but among shamanic peoples throughout the world.

This hypothesis is supported by the documentation of the Australian aborigine and sub-Saharan African belief in reincarnation. Spencer and Gillen describe the variations in belief in reincarnation among the northern tribes in Australia (1966; 1904). Spencer states, "I am, myself, inclined to think that some such belief [in reincarnation] was once universal [among Australian aborigines] for the reason that it now exists in tribes so widely different from one another (1966:23)." The variation in particulars of the belief in Australia parallels some of the differences between the Beaver and Gitksan concepts, including the presence or absence of cross-sex reincarnation. Spencer says, "In some tribes such as the Dieri and Warramunga, the belief holds that the sex changes at each successive reincarnation," while in other tribes belief in cross-sex reincarnation is absent (1966:23-24). The depiction of the relation of spirit children to totems and spirit doubles to guardian spirits closely resembles North American Indian belief.[20]

Parrinder (1957) similarly notes the perseverance of belief in reincarnation in Africa in what we would differentiate as both hunter-gathering and agricultural societies. He points out that in the Indian sub-continent, the aboriginal Dravidians appear to have introduced the concept of reincarnation to the invading Aryans. The prevalence of belief in reincarnation among hunter-gathering societies generally, and the patterns of variation in the belief, are subjects which need further research, although Stevenson has made impressive inroads on the task (Pasricha and Stevenson 1986; Stevenson 1986).

Stevenson's research into cases of the reincarnation type differs from the usual anthropological description in that Stevenson, who is Carlson Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the Division of Personality Studies in the Department of Behavioral Medicine and Psychiatry at the University of Virginia, is interested in scientifically investigating the etiology of children who remember past lives, to see if there is any scientific evidence of the survival of the personality out of the body or after corporeal death. Anthropology, on the other hand, typically looks at the range of thought in terms of structural patterns or the effect of interlocking child rearing practices and cultural constructs.

There is no doubt that cultural belief provides a framework which influences both Beaver and Gitksan parents' attitudes towards what they see as evidence of reincarnation. When Jean Slade asks her great-granddaughter where James and Lucy are, knowing that these were the children of the lady whom she is convinced her great-granddaughter reincarnates, she is encouraging her great-granddaughter to identify with this woman. The case of Chuck, the three year old boy who was encouraged to ride his father's horse, has been discussed above. Nonetheless, the evidence deserves to be looked at carefully to discern what is cultural construction and what is evidence that

something remarkable is occurring. While none of the cases recorded in 1984 offer incontrovertible proof of the existence of reincarnation, the spontaneous statements of Amy and Rhonda are difficult to explain without recourse to very intense telepathic projection on the part of the surrounding relatives.

Stevenson similarly concludes that the numerous and carefully documented cases of children who remember past lives even in those societies where the previous personality is completely unknown to his relatives, do not prove the existence of reincarnation.[21] However, as he says (1975b), the growing body of cross-cultural cases deserves careful scrutiny.

Stevenson's forthcoming multi-volume work on birthmarks and birth defects and their correspondence to wounds, lesions and scars on the previous personality, will present important evidence of the persistence and effect of the previous personality on the soma of the presumed reincarnate after the death of the physical body. The investigation of birthmarks may help us to understand the relation of individual and cultural patterns to genetic patterns. Perhaps thought and personality provide some of the template that determines which of the immense number of possible DNA combinations take place.

Anthropology has typically considered the investigation of the validity of such subjects to be outside its domain. As Aberle has pointed out, anthropology is largely an historical science which "can have few accomplishments as science in the Newtonian style" (Aberle 1987:551). While it is indeed true that the study of human societies does not lend itself to reversible experimentation, anthropology can employ the scientific method to examine the validity of the data its subjects in non-western societies present. By a shift in emphasis, anthropologists can explore the power of symbolic thought on the psyche and soma of human beings. The growing convergence of biological, psychological and anthropological investigations should facilitate the study of reported states, such as reincarnation. The colonial mentality that "we know better" is certainly out of date. It is exactly this kind of convergence that Schechner posits as the next step in the post-Turnerian anthropological adventure (Schechner in Turner 1986).

The advantages of such open-mindedness are immense. In this brief investigation I found that telling the Gitksan and Beaver that I was interested in gathering data on cases of reincarnation, so that it could be scientifically and critically examined by a western audience, produced an impressive outpouring of very interesting material. I look forward to the opportunity to study how reincarnation interfaces with Gitksan potlatches and the succession of names and the Gitksan sense of identity. From the Beaver I hope to learn if the intimate relation between an individual and his or her guardian spirits or *muyine* is believed to be maintained life after life, as the Australian aborigine material suggests.

An understanding of the concept of reincarnation will add immensely to our understanding of culture, community and experience of the self, as Seguin (1984, 1985) suggests. In continuing to examine the variety of human experience, anthropology has the opportunity to examine some of the profundities of the human condition. There is much to be learned.

While talking in 1984 to a Hartley Bay informant who had given remarkable detail on her Coast Salish husband's friendship with one of his mother's multiple reincarnations, I said, as I tried to imagine what it meant to have multiple reincarnations "from" the same person, "Reincarnation must give you a different sense of the self." She replied, "It gives us a different sense to be in tune with *Spirit*."

Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Canadian Ethnology Society conference in Toronto, May 1985. I am grateful to Ian Stevenson for his useful critique of the paper, not all of which I have incorporated.
2. I did field work with the Beaver Indians during the summer of 1964, from June, 1965, to August, 1966, during the summers of 1967 and 1968, during the winter of 1968-69, a month in the summer of 1969, a month in the winter of 1971-72, two weeks in the summer of 1976, and a month in the summer of 1984. I would like to acknowledge a N.I.M.H. Graduate Fellowship which funded the first three field trips, and a Canadian National Museum of Man Ethnographic Field Research Contract for field work with the Beaver Indians in the summer of 1984 and funding from the Division of Personality Studies of the Department of Behavioral Medicine and Psychiatry of the University of Virginia for field work with the Beaver and Gitksan in July and the beginning of August, 1984, and with the Kwakiutl and Coast Salish in November and December, 1984. During my study of the Gitksan, Richard Barrazuol, a graduate student in Anthropology at the University of British Columbia, worked as my assistant. I am grateful to the chiefs of the Doig, Blueberry, Halfway and Prophet River Reserves and the Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Tribal Council for permission to carry out the studies, and especially to the Beaver and Gitksan people who so willingly contributed their knowledge.
3. The six North American Indian tribes in my sample of ten for which I found belief in reincarnation are the Copper Eskimo (Boas 1888; Freuchen 1961:207-208; Stefansson 1927:367); the Carrier [which include the Wet'suwet'en] (Jenness 1943:538-539, 549), the Blackfoot (Wissler 1912:28), the Winnebago (Radin 1913:303-313, 1923:313-16), the Yurok (Thompson 1916), and the Zuni (Tedlock 1975:270). The four for which I originally found no reference to belief in human reincarnation were the Shoshoni, the Nez Percé, the Iroquois and the Pomo (Mills 1984). Since then I have noted Hewitt's (1895:109) reference to belief in reincarnation among the Iroquois. Frazer (1935:199) noted belief in reincarnation among the Huron, based on Rélations des Jesuites, (1636:130, Canadian reprint, Quebec, 1858). See also Trigger (1976, 1988). Other North American Indian tribes for whom belief in reincarnation I have noted include the Tlingit (Knapp and Childe 1896:160; de Laguna 1954:183-190; Krause 1956:192 citing Veniaminov 1840; Stevenson 1974:216-269), the Haida (Dawson 1880; Krause 1956; Swanton 1905; Stevenson 1975a), the Gitksan (Adams 1973:26-31), the Kwakiutl (Boas 1921:713, 1932:202, 1969a:17-18,51; 1969b:288; Goldman 1975:62), the Tsimshian (Seguin 1984:120-123, 1985), the Upper Tanana (McKennan 1959:160), the Kaska (Honigmann 1954:137), the Kutchin (Osgood 1936:140; Slobodin 1970:67-78),

the Eyak (Birket-Smith and de Laguna 1938:171), the Tahlatan (Emmons 1911), the Dene-Tha (Goulet 1982), the Twana (Elmendorf 1960:484, 512-521), the Chipewyan (Sharp 1986:257-259), the Arapaho (Hilger 1952:4-6), the Hopi (Murdock 1934:346), the Navaho (Haile 1943) the Chippewa (Hilger 1951:4), the Ojibwa (Hallowell 1955), the Delaware (Zeisberger 1885) and the Seminole, based on Brinton (1876:270). Further Inuit references include Balikci (1970), Birket-Smith (1959), Guemple (1988), Saladin d'Anglure (1986), and Stevenson (1969). Unpublished citations from anthropologists who have noted belief while working in the field concern the Sto:lo Interior Salish (Daly 1988), and the Swampy River Cree (Sullivan 1988).

4. Beaver Indian Partial Cases: In the category of "special children" whose previous personality is unknown is the case (Number 23) of a child whose birth was predicted by an old man who dreamed that his daughter's stepchild was pregnant before she was aware that she was. The old man's dream did not identify who the baby had been previously, but simply announced that the mother would have a baby girl, followed by another girl, then two boys, and no more children after that. This dream indeed came true.

   In the other partial case (Number 10), a man dreamed that his cousin, a classificatory sister would have a special child. The child was born with numerous birthmarks, including one that swelled and ebbed periodically. The dreamer still calls this child the Beaver word for leader, and uses this word as her name. Neither he nor anyone else knows who she was in her past life.
5. Some informants voiced skepticism concerning the relationship between mongoloid spots and rebirth. One young woman said, "How can all the babies born with blue spots be born again? Look how many have blue spots." Another said, "that can't be," because her son, whose father is not all Indian, was born without a blue spot. The mother of another child, whose mongoloid spot was manifested not only in the usual way, but also in several symmetrical blue spots running up the spine, reported that the (Caucasian) doctor who delivered the baby said, "Somebody sure beat him up."
6. Returning as I did in the summer of 1984 after an absence of some years, one of the first things I was told was who had died and made it to heaven, and who was wandering around as a ghost. Ghosts are seen as being very lonely and sad. They are unable either to return to the world of the living, or make it to the land of the dead until they have sufficiently retraced the steps they have taken in their lives to merit re-birth or entry into *yage* ("heaven"). Ghosts are also feared because they are said to try to steal the souls of the living, particularly newborn babies, in an attempt to follow the soul to *yage*.
7. The question of cause of death is not as straightforward as it would appear. I have considered a violent death to be one in which the person died in an accident such as a car crash, or when death was the result of interpersonal violence such as fighting. It is important to recognize that Beaver Indians use different categories to understand such events. For example, a death which we would attribute to natural causes such as the death of an octogenarian from a stroke or heart attack might be explained by the Beaver as being the result of "bad medicine" directed at the victim by another person. Similarly, where a western observer might attribute death to alcohol-related behaviour, as in the case of a house burning down when its occupants were highly inebriated, the Beaver would blame interpersonal hostility, often on psychic levels, rather than inebriation. Just as explanations of the causes of deaths differ, so do Beaver evaluations of the individual. Someone addicted to alcohol is not held in the same contempt by the Beaver Indians as in non-Indian society.
8. Stevenson says, "I use the expression announcing dream to refer to a dream experienced by a pregnant woman, and sometimes by one of her close relatives or friends, in which, as it seems to the dreamer, a deceased person communicates his wish or intention to be reborn as the baby of the pregnant woman" (Stevenson 1975b:68).

9. In two out of twenty-three Beaver cases, the previous personality was reported to have specified to whom he wanted to be reborn before his death. In one case (Number 8), an old man stated to whom he wanted to be reborn. People generally agree that he was reborn to the parents he had chosen (although see Note 14), and that he would have been on the strength of his expressed wishes. His identity is further confirmed by a birthmark resembling a light scar which is visible on his birth picture. The birthmark had disappeared by the time I saw him, when he was eight months old. The scar-like birthmark corresponded to a scar on the forehead of the previous personality, which had been received in a fight, and bore no relation to the previous personality's cause of death.
10. *Dreams, visions and visits from the ghost:* When someone has a dream which identifies the coming child as someone who has died, the Beaver consider the dream valid. In one case (Number 15), the pregnant mother dreamed of a particular old lady who had been dead five years. Everyone accepts this child, now fifteen, as being the old lady reborn. Indeed, since the child's birth, her nickname has been the Beaver name of the previous personality. This individual was born with a number of abnormal characteristics but I was unable to learn whether they are thought to be related to the previous personality.

    In another case (Number 20) an older woman whom I will call Ruth dreamed that a particular woman who had died was standing at the window and wanted to come in. Her daughter then became pregnant, and the case was further confirmed in the Beavers' eyes when the baby was born with bumps on the back of the head. The previous personality had been killed by being hit on the back of the head.

    After the violent death of one of Ruth's daughters, Ruth's elder classificatory sister at another reserve dreamed that when the murdered woman got to heaven, they sent her back. My informant said, "She's going to come to one of these women here, she say. That time soon lots of women were pregnant. The baby could come to any one, she say. [One baby born shortly after this was] sure small baby, but at birth she had one tooth. Everyone was sure surprised. They show that baby to grandma and she say 'That's the one, that's Marta Fox come back.'"

    When I later met the mother and baby, the mother agreed that her baby, who has a sizable strawberry birthmark on her arm as well, was Marta Fox. However the next day she said she didn't think so, as her baby was born three months after the reputed previous personality's death. The mother was alluding to the new concept, learned from the white medical authorities, that the gestation time for a baby is nine months. Previously the Beaver Indians thought conception took place close to the time the mother felt the "quickening" or movement of the baby in the end of the first trimester of pregnancy.

    In another instance where there was an announcing dream (Case Number 3), the stepfather of Meg dreamed that she would have a baby who was the reincarnation of Mike, a sixteen year old youth who was greatly cherished by everyone. He died when the truck in which he was riding went off the road into a body of water. He was the last child of his mother, who is a close friend and classificatory sister of Meg's. Many people told me about this case, but when I sought out Mike's mother, she had not heard that Mike is reputed to have returned to Meg. Her ignorance of the case is facilitated by the fact that she has moved from the Indian community where she previously lived into Ft. St. John, British Columbia. However, having learned that Vincent Marto had dreamed that Mike was coming to Meg, she accepted the idea that Meg's son is Mike returned and said, "They didn't tell me because of how I would feel."

    Ghosts: There are several instances where parents felt quite certain of the identity of their unborn children, even without an announcing dream, because the ghost of the previous personality had been seen up until the mother became pregnant. One mother said, "They heard Bill's ghost walking around. Lena missed her brother terribly, too much she cried, but after I had Mark she didn't cry anymore." This is Case Number 13,

described in Note 9.

In yet another case (Number 21), a young father felt someone touch his foot, but there was no one there. He and everyone he spoke to was quite sure that it was the ghost of the young woman, mentioned above, who had been murdered, (the same young woman who had figured in the dream of the old lady at another reserve). Shortly after this his brother-in-law heard a baby crying in the house. When he went to see whose baby it was, there was no baby. One of my informants explained, "When a ghost is heard by a mother crying as a baby, it has suffered enough and is ready to come back as a baby. Then the mother-to-be may hear a baby crying. . . . From there, Rita start to be pregnant."

Vision: In this rather unique case, the father of the previous personality was a prophet who had a vision while wide awake (Case Number 1). The father, who has been dead for thirty years, was desolate when his middle-aged son died approximately fifty years ago. He fasted and cried on his son's grave for ten days until something came to him and said he shouldn't be carrying on like that, because such intense mourning was a thing of the devil (*dunemenachiday*), but that he could have his son back.

The prophet then stopped grieving, told the people of his vision, and was content. His wife had died and he married her younger sister. The first child the new wife had was a girl, and not his son returned. The next child was a boy whom everyone agrees is the previous one returned. He was given the same name as the previous personality and is said to look just the same, to have been remarkably precocious, and to be very clever. The gray hair which he began getting when he was eleven years old is seen as a sign that he is continuing the same life begun in the previous body.

11. Strong preferences and aversions in a child are frequently explained as the legacy of the previous personality. In one case (Number 14), the child was said to be the reincarnation of a woman who was murdered by her husband when he was drunk. The child is noted for having a strong aversion to people who are drinking and an unusually strong reaction to the sight of blood.
12. According to one informant, Marie Alta had had a premonition of death before her trip to town, and had suggested to her classificatory sister (mother's sister's daughter), who was widowed, that she marry Frank after her impending death. Marie did not know how she would die. Whereas her classificatory sister had agreed that it would be a good idea to marry Frank if Marie should die, when she saw how Marie died she no longer felt the same inclination. The whole community was shocked to lose Marie Alta, who was highly esteemed. After Marie's death, Frank Alta moved to another reserve, where he married the prophet's granddaughter. Amy is the daughter of the above mentioned widow's brother, who called Marie Alta "elder sister."
13. While everyone I spoke to concurred that Amy is Marie Alta returned, there was considerable disagreement over who her twins, twenty-six months old at the time of the study, had been in their previous lives. Although no one had dreamed of who they were, both were born with birth marks. Starla, the girl twin (Case Number 7), has a series of red spots in an area about the size of a quarter on the right side of her abdomen above the navel. Richard, the boy twin (Case Number 17), has a larger brown patch below his navel.

    Starla is being raised by Amy's classificatory sister (mother's sister's daughter) at another reserve. Many people including Starla's stepmother think that Starla is Amy's mother returned, and note behavioral similarities. Amy's mother had died seven years earlier of exposure when inebriated. One person believed that Richard, the boy twin, was Amy's mother's brother who died only two days before his sister, while another thought that Richard was the reincarnation of his father's father who had shot himself some five years previously. Richard's striking habit of crying loudly was seen as related to his being his father's father reborn. Still another equation was made at Amy's home

reserve by Marie Alta's confidant (see Note 12). The confidant suspects that the twins are the two babies which Marie Alta miscarried during her marriage to Frank Alta. This identity was put forward within Amy's hearing, and Amy said she concurred.

Since many people cited Amy's step-grandmother as the source of the knowledge that the twins are the the mother's mother and the father's father, or the mother's mother's brother, I sought out the step grandmother's opinion. She said she did not know who they were although she said Starla was a "special child," i.e., a reincarnation of someone, and called Starla "a born adult." The only person she was sure of was their mother, Amy, "who was Marie Alta come back." She was sure of this because Charlie Yahey, the Beaver Indian prophet, had said so.

14. Among the Beaver and the Gitksan, there are some interesting instances of discrepancy between different peoples' equation of who had been who before. Sometimes these discrepancies seemed to be the result of hazy memory on the part of an informant; sometimes they reflected the different opinions of different informants; and sometimes they seemed to be the result of the incomplete circulation of information. For example, the half-sister of the mother of one Beaver baby (case Number 8) had not heard that her nephew was thought to be the reincarnation of her husband's father despite the fact that she lives in the same house as her half sister and the baby.
15. Margaret Seguin has not confirmed the existence of contemporary cases of multiple reincarnation among the Coast Tsimshian, although she cites current examples of reincarnation and notes the significance of the concept of multiple reincarnation for unlocking the symbolism of the potlatch (1984, 1985). Despite numerous years of field work with the Beaver Indians, I was not aware of the numerous specific cases until I concentrated on inquiring about the subject. The same situation may explain Seguin's statement that belief in multiple reincarnation is no longer active.
16. John Adams has suggested (in comments on my sequel paper on Gitksan, Wet'suwet'en and Beaver Indian reincarnation, delivered at the Fourth International Conference on Hunting and Gathering Societies, London School of Economics, September 1986) that the Gitksan belief in multiple reincarnation of the same person may be related to the fact that the population of the Gitksan is rapidly expanding after a period of serious decline. At the time I did not think this explained the phenomenon, as the Beaver and the Wet'suwet'en, who have experienced similar population drops and recent increases, do not believe in multiple reincarnation. However, I now recognize that since the Gitksan seem to expect a higher percentage of the population to be identifiable as a particular person reborn than do the Beaver or the Wet'suwet'en (the Bulkley River Carrier), the same kind of population flux could have this differential effect. Nonetheless my hunch is that belief in multiple reincarnation is not new among the Gitksan and other Northwest Coast people.
17. One innovative Gitksan leader, a year after having learned of the Beaver Indian belief in cross-sex reincarnation, said he would consider returning as a woman and in his father's clan, because he perceives a spiritual weakness in that clan, but said he would have to prepare his future parents to accept him back.
18. Stevenson (1986) relates the high incidence of male subjects of cases of the reincarnation type among the Igbo of Nigeria to the cultural deference given to males. Among the Beaver sixty-three percent of the subjects are female. This is a higher percentage of female subjects than in any of the cultures studied to date by Stevenson (op. cit.). Among the Gitksan fifty-one percent of the subjects are female. This ties with Sri Lanka, the culture with the highest proportion of female subjects among the cultures studied by Stevenson. Note that the unusually high incidence of male subjects among the Igbo is coupled with the second-highest incidence of cross-sex reincarnation (op.cit.). Perhaps the greatest measure of male dominance is in those male oriented societies which do not believe it an option for someone to be reborn as the opposite sex,

such as the Alevi of Turkey and the Druse of Lebanon.

19. Seguin suggests that the Tsimshian myths of the land of the dead and of reincarnation are contradictory, and an example of the Tsimshian tolerance of ambiguity. In the context of Gitksan and Beaver eschatology the two concepts are compatible: the land of the dead is inhabited by humans after death and before rebirth, although not all humans reach the land of the dead before reincarnating. For the Gitksan more research is necessary, but I suspect that that they believe some aspect of the soul goes to the land of the dead while another aspect returns to the babies in whom they reincarnate.
20. An analysis of the relation between the variation in incidence of cross-sex reincarnation and male initiation rites, and matrilineal or patrilineal descent in Australia (and elsewhere) would produce some interesting data on the question of gender identity.
21. Stevenson has presented the percentage of cases in which the subject is related to the previous personality's family, is acquainted with the previous personality's family, or had no prior knowledge of the previous personality's family (1986). In general, there is a higher incidence of children with past life memories of someone unknown to their family in large scale societies where not everyone is related. Among the Beaver and Gitksan not only is there a cultural preference for and expectation of being reborn to close relatives, but the web of kinship tends also to include the whole society. The exceptions to this are the United States non-tribal cases, which, like the Tlingit, the Igbo and the Haida, are very largely with the "same family." The explanation may be that such cases are more likely to be identified, or solved, when the subject speaks as someone known to the family.

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ORNITHOLOGIC: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF DUTCH BIRD NOMENCLATURE

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> To all the good the Almighty gave people on earth, for our use as well as for our joy, belongs the gift of birds.
>
> — (Linnaeus)

Abstract: As a departure from tradition this article analyses a Western system of classification: Dutch bird taxonomy. It would appear that the difference between "cold" and "warm" societies is less extensive than one might think. In Western societies a difference exists between some kinds of classification. There are the so-called "scientific" classifications, which are inspired by Aristotle's work, and there are the folk taxonomies, which are collective representations and which, consequently, have no individual creator. This difference appears most plainly if one speaks of *a priori* and *a posteriori* classifications. Dutch bird taxonomy is of the latter type; one could, following Locke, describe it as a series of *natural kind* as opposed to *nominal kind* terms. The principles upon which the taxonomy is constructed are examined in some detail.

Résumé: En abandonnant la tradition, cet article est l'analyse d'une classification occidentale: la nomenclature des oiseaux hollandais. Il semble que la différence entre la pensée des sociétés froides et des sociétés chaudes est moins profonde qu'on ne croyait. Dans les sociétés occidentales il existe une différence entre des types de classifications. Il y a des classifications qui s'inspirent d'Aristote, celles dites "scientifiques", et il y a des ordres du peuple, qui sont une réprésentation de la collectivité et qui, comme résultat, n'ont pas un créateur spécifique. Cette différence semble la plus claire au niveau de classifications *a priori* et *a posteriori*. La nomenclature des oiseaux hollandais est de ce dernier type, et on peut la nommer aussi une série en termes *natural kinds* en la contrastant aux terms *nominal kinds*, en suivant Locke. Les terms *natural kinds* ne changent guère; une analyse ethymologique était, dans certains cas, nécessaire. Les noms des

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> oiseaux sont pour la plupart binairs, et il était possible des les diviser en construisant des catégories racines et des sub-catégories préfixes. Il y a cinq catégories dans les deux séries. Les phénomènes entrant dans la catégorie des racines sont les mêmes que celles des sub-catégories des préfixes: Voix, Extérieur, Comportement, Biotope, et Saison. Le plus remarquable est que les oiseaux communs entrant dans la même catégorie quant au racine, entrent aussi la même sub-catégorie, celle des préfixes. Des oiseaux rares peuvent être classés dans la même catégorie-racine, mais leur pré-fixes sont toujours dans un autre sub-catégorie.

Birds are animals which distinguish themselves quite clearly from all other animals by way of their plumage, and by means of their ability to fly. In this way they have almost always formed a natural and distinct group. Presumably only by accident ornithologists and Dutch laymen share the opinion that birds comprise a unique group; no one should state that a bat is a bird merely because it is able to fly!

An analysis of the nomenclature of birds offers an entirely different field of study from the investigation of the symbolic value birds have in Dutch culture. In such an analysis myths, proverbs and the like are analyzed, and many birds would be dealt with in this way. The crow, for example, will turn out to be a bird which is almost unanimously seen as related to death. In the analysis of nomenclature, however, all birds are involved, and its aim is to reveal the underlying principles of the names. The central question asked here is: what are the criteria used for naming them?

Scientific and Folk Classification

For a long time the emphasis in structural anthropology has been on the analysis of myths, and the appeal of Lévi-Strauss' work led to an increasing interest in them. As a result of this many equally interesting domains of research have more or less been neglected lately. The same author, however, pointed also at other fields of research for any one interested in revealing subsurface structures. *Le totemisme aujourd'hui* (1962a) and *La pensée sauvage* (1962b) both deal with the knowledge people have of their natural surroundings. And one of the most important aims of these works is to demonstrate that non-Western and Western scientific thinking run along comparable lines. This parallelism accommodates the tendency of non-Western thought to aim at features which are directly perceptible to the senses, whereas Western scientific thought focuses much more on a conceptual level. In spite of this difference, Lévi-Strauss credits non-Western thought with a large amount of theory building capacity and he emphasizes the immense knowledge non-Western cultures have of their natural surroundings (Lévi-Strauss 1962b:16-74).

Unfortunately, Lévi-Strauss has more or less ignored the fact that there might also be differences between scientific knowledge and folk knowledge with regard to the natural surroundings in the West. Indeed this difference has not been substantiated in most non-Western cultures; mythical thinking and totemic logic are the common way of dealing with the universe, according to Lévi-Strauss. The acquisition of knowledge of the concrete outside world is done by *bricolage,* which Lévi-Strauss contrasts with science as we know it. And the question whether a taxonomy is "scientific" or not seems to be important to many researchers, insofar as a number of ethnoscientists, just like Lévi-Strauss, uttered amazement when they compared non-western classification with western scientific classifications. Berlin, Breedlove and Raven report enthusiastically that much of the Tzeltal botanical data show that many species (according to Western botany) are recognized. The authors even claim that they "readily comprehend the distinction between our usual Linnaean system of classification and any particular folk taxonomy" (Berlin, Breedlove, Raven 1962:62-65). This remark is rather peculiar, and it raises questions. First, Western botany does not use a Linnaean mode of classification; this is seen as highly artificial and not fit to differentiate biologically between botanical species. The only thing Linnaean in Western botany is its nomenclature, which is completely arbitrary and does not influence classification. Linnaeus' *Critica botanica* (1753) is, indeed, still referred to when naming plants, but here Linnaean influence stops. The three authors also remark that "Linnaean" classifications are more general whereas folk classifications tend to be more specific, and, hence, have a high predictive value. The predictive value of western botanical systems, however, is very effective (cf. Jeffrey 1969), and this implies beforehand that the difference between folk classification and "botanical systems" is perhaps much slighter than the authors claim.

Lévi-Strauss says that totemic classification is constructed by the *bricoleur*, the one who deals with pre-constrained elements and who tackles the concrete only. Nonetheless, Lévi-Strauss also says that "indigenous classifications" are not only methodical and founded on a well constructed theoretical basis, but they seem also comparable from a formal point of view with those of zoology and botany (1962:59). The question remains: What is the *bricoleur*, an amateur or a scientist?

As a result it may be questioned whether the entire problem is a diversion in the comparative study of classification. For instance: the sixteenth and seventeenth Herbalists in the Netherlands and Germany, were they *bricoleurs* or scientists? (cf. van den Broek 1985.) These questions seem to be a waste of time. What we do like to know, however, is what the underlying principles are of various classifications, and what the nature of the differences and likenesses is between different modes of classification. And we see that

hardly any attention has been paid to the analysis of Western nonscientific classifications, and because scientists insist that there is a difference between this type and scientific classification, it might be revealed that non-Western thought differs even less from Western thought in general than Lévi-Strauss in an ambiguous way tried to make plausible. However, presuming that the difference between non-Western classification and Western classification in general may be deduced from the differences existing between the latter and Western "scientific" taxonomies, is a very hazardous way of reasoning.

The difference between Western and non-Western thought seems to weaken the more we go back into the history of science in Western Europe. This does not mean that a specific and fixed path for the development or evolutionary change of non-Western thought may be outlined.

Lévi-Strauss' criterion for separating Western from non-Western thought was the degree of conceptualization. This term proves to be of enormous importance when studying classifications, be it "scientific" or folk.

In Western Europe, "scientific" classifications have strongly been influenced by the works of Aristotle, and all taxonomists have been inspired by the comparative zoology of the Stagirite (cf. Larson 1971; Sachs 1885:1, par. 1-5; Simpson 1961:36). In this zoology one thought to find one of the most important distinctions between classifications: natural versus conceptual. Though some taxonomists think this distinction to be ambiguous (Simpson 1961), it is of more than minor importance to differentiate between both types since it strongly determined the discussion of classification in general. Natural classification implies the *a posteriori* or empirical ordering of elements without the application of presuppositions. Objects are classified the way they appear to the senses; they are grouped and ordered according to outward likenesses and differences. This type of classification emerges on a directly perceptual level, no *a priori* principles are applied, and is thus rightly to be called a "science de concret," to use Lévi-Strauss's term. Conceptual classification, on the other hand, is determined by the use of *a priori* principles. Certain criteria, or presupposed rules are to be used when one starts classifying a particular realm of nature (cf. van den Broek 1984, 1985; Dauhin 1926:82; Larson 1971:19-20; Lévi-Strauss 1962:15; Simpson 1961:24).

The shift from natural to conceptual classification was made permanent after the acceptance of the taxonomic systems of Carl von Linné. This scientific paradigm took the place of quasi-conceptual and natural classifications which vied with each other for many centuries, especially in botany. Conceptual classification emerged because of the lack of confidence among botanists, when dealing with the natural classification while lacking a really systematic approach. Hiereonymus Bock, Dodoens, L'Obel, Fuchs and Charles de L'Escluse and many other herbalists in the sixteenth and seven-

teenth centuries did not succeed in elaborating coherent systems, and in zoology the situation was even worse; Linné called this branch of natural history an "Augean stable" (cf. Larson 6, 25-9; Lepenies 1978:48; Linnaeus 1735).

The change from natural to conceptual classification is coupled with the evolution in sciences dealing with nature, from natural history, being the descriptions of various realms of nature, to physics, the systematic analysis of the universe. New ways of ordering had to be developed when huge amounts of brand new data were being collected by scientists and scholars who embarked on ships which were sent to explore new worlds. The result of this was an *Erfahrungsdruck,* (pressure of experience) as Lepenies calls it, and this was the main stimulus for reviewing the old ways of classifying natural phenomena (Lepenies 1978:16-17, 82-83).

If we were to draw the line between the different modes of thought Lévi-Strauss speaks of, prescientific and scientific thinking, and thereby distinguish between *a posteriori*, natural, classification, and a conceptual kind of classification, employing *a priori* principles and criteria based on logic, we would find that the nomenclature of Dutch birds belongs to the first group. However, modern botanists claim that they construct natural classifications, which are, however, quite different from the ones the Herbalists constructed, because they rely on biological/evolutionary notions. So the difference between "scientific" and folk classification cannot be induced merely by determining whether a taxonomy is "natural" or "conceptual." The mixture of both might have been possible, however, as ornithologists became active and recognized subspecies, for instance, among equivalently classed birds in the folk nomenclature. No indication, though, exists for presuming that *a priori* principles were used in a disturbing way, and the "new" names are patterned in the same way as the traditional ones.

The nomenclature of Dutch birds forms a classification "system" in itself; i.e., the systematic arrangement has been established through the names. However, one cannot say that the construction of a "system" was a consciously chosen goal. One finds, of course, groups not unlike genera and classes: birds of prey, water birds, song birds etc., but these orderings are the result of induction and not obtained by using *a priori* principles.

As a result of the critics in the nineteenth century, modern taxonomists reject a name-based classification, on the basis that a specific realm of nature should be segmented according to order, class, genera, species, and variety. Dauhin thought the names in Linnaeus' system too vague because of the mnemotechnical criteria which played such an important role in his nomenclature. Though Dauhin acknowledged the importance of mnemotechnical aspects in nomenclature, these could not justify the vagueness of the names (cf. Dauhin 1926). Despite the critique, Linnaeus' nomenclatural system won the battle, and it is still being used.

The difference between natural and conceptual classification coincides with the difference between "natural" and "nominal kind" terms, with regard to nomenclature. The basis of this difference was already developed by John Locke; he defined terms as nominal when they are associated with some abstract idea or definition that determines which things have a right to be called by that name. The "nominal essences," as Locke called them, are made by man, while "real essences," exist in the things themselves and are given by nature (Locke 1690:283-295). Both these notions have been reviewed in more recent times, but the difference remains. "Natural kinds" are covered by "natural terms," which are not analytic. This means that the semantic meaning of a word, a natural kind term, cannot be obtained by giving a list of features. It can, however, be characterized by a cluster of features, none of which would be sufficient in itself to determine the natural kind the term covers.

Nominal kinds, on the other hand, are easily defined and usually quite flexible. They have the character of concepts as their meaning has been agreed on. Natural kinds, however, have the character of proper names, and they are not easily submitted to change. Even when a mouse appeared to be a marsupial after modern evolutionary investigation, people would still tend to call it a mouse (cf. Putnam 1977:102-108; Quine 1977:155-176; Schwartz 1977:27, 34). The rigidity of Dutch bird names is easily demonstrated by the fact that despite accepting Linnaean nomenclature, the folk names still exist and are still being used.

The birds in the taxonomies of post-Linnaean biology, however, obviously have the character of *nominal kinds,* having nominal terms: their meaning has been agreed on, and the names strongly resemble concepts, and have to obey to particular rules. Moreover, if a certain bird appeared to belong to another genetic branch, modern taxonomists would not hesitate to rectify the error, classify the bird otherwise and give it another name. The criteria for classification are chosen out of evolutionary considerations; nomenclature is no longer so important, and the names have become rather trivial.

In practice the results of the separation of natural and conceptual classification might seem ambiguous. However, it is obvious that the use of *a priori* criteria makes the decision as to whether a certain element belongs to a certain group easier than it would be if no such principles were applied. Both natural and conceptual classification constitute a field of interest for the anthropologist. In the case of natural classification, we have to trace the criteria which have (subconsciously) been used when ordering nature, whereas with a conceptual classification the criteria for ordering have clearly been stated. In spite of this, it is, of course, the anthropologist's task to elucidate the chosen criteria, and to put them in their cultural context.

The Names

As soon as we turn to the names, we see that most of them have a binary character; they consist of two parts, a stem and a prefix. The stem stands for the "genus," as it were, and the prefix for the "species."

When tracing the nature and meaning of all the stems, five main categories are revealed, each of which refers to a specific domain connected with the birds. These five categories are: 1. terms related to the outward appearance of the birds in the broadest sense, 2. terms related to the voice of the birds, 3. terms related to nonvocal bodily behavior, 4. terms referring to specific natural surroundings, 5. terms denoting specific climatological or seasonal circumstances.

A fairly large number of names needed an etymological explanation, as the original meaning had disappeared. This was, however, never necessary with the prefixes; these are much more "modern" in character. After clarification, a remarkable fact is revealed: the prefixes point to exactly the same domains as the stems do. So here, too, appearance, voice, behavior, biotope, and climate/season become the categories for ordering the prefixes.

Names which refer in the stem to the appearance of the birds, are represented in the main category APPEARANCE; those referring to the voice fall into the category VOICE, and so forth (see table). The prefixes which specify the "species" are represented in the appropriate categories. An example may clarify the tenor of what is outlined above. The three kinds of *snip* (= beak, bill), the *houtsnip, watersnip,* and *poelsnip* (literal translation: wood bill, water bill, and moor bill), *Scopoloax rusticola, Capella gallinago,* and *Capella media*), each fall into the main category APPEARANCE, as the stem of the name refers to the outward form and figure of the birds. The prefixes, however, all refer to the natural surroundings the birds live in, and so all prefixes fall into the subcategory BIOTOPE.

The entire nomenclatural system is based on relations between the birds and five different domains, which are more or less immediately connected with the birds.

It will prove to be most important to turn to the birds as biological beings, as an interesting peculiarity is revealed. As we have already remarked, among several groups of birds various specimens share the same name stem, but have different prefixes. These are divided in different subcategories as they refer to different domains. If one considers the *uilen* (owls), *uil* being onomatopoeic, they all belong to the same main category: VOICE. Four of the owls have prefixes which refer to the natural surroundings, and so all four fall into the same subcategory: BIOTOPE (*Strix aluco, Asio flammeus, Athene noctua, Tyto alba*; literally translated: wood owl, field owl, stone owl, and church owl). Three owls, however, fall into another subcategory; these are the *Ransuiil* (*Asio otus* "veil owl"), the *Sneeuwuil*

(*Nyctea scandiaca,* "snow owl") and the *Ruiqpootuil* (*Aegoleus funereus,* "rough legged owl"). The first one scarcely have been named without reference to its outward appearance, since its voice, behaviour and biotope are hardly different from those of the other owls. Both other owls, however, are much more interesting. Their names do not belong to the subcategory BIOTOPE; in the case of the *Ruiqpootuil,* the name falls into the subcategory APPEARANCE, as it refers to the heavily feathered legs of this nocturnal bird of prey. The name *Sneeuwuil* is a bit ambiguous as the prefix may either refer to the appearance of the bird—it is "snow white"—or to the season during which it is to be seen in Holland. The common denominator, however, is the fact that these birds are, what one calls in Holland rare "winter guests." And herewith we have hit upon one of the most important features of the nomenclature system: All rare birds which share the stem of their name with more common species have prefixes which invariably refer to other domains than the prefixes of the names of these more common species. It is obvious that an anthropologist studying such a nomenclature/classification system should be totally familiar with the natural environment which imparts to it its sense. In a familiar environment, this task need not be too complex, but it might pose serious problems in more exotic surroundings. Were it not possible to determine whether or not specific birds are "winter guests," the scheme for the nomenclature of Dutch birds would not have been traced. Where birds share a particular stem in their names and so belong to the same main category, one is able to predict with a certain degree of accuracy which ones are rare. This is because the prefixes of this last group refer to different domains.

The Dutch may have had some problems during the process of naming the birds, for particular birds have apparently not been "recognized," i.e., it was never determined to which group of more familiar birds these particular birds belong. The result of this is a group of birds without a definite stem in their names; instead they have a totally neutral one: *-vogel* (-bird). For example, this is true of the *pestvogell* ("plague bird," *Bombycilla garrulus*), *Ijsvogel* ("ice bird," *Alcedo atthis*), and the *Kramsvogel* ("claw bird," *Turdus pilaris*). The first and the second have been associated with a specific season and the third with its appearance in the prefix of the name.

As mentioned earlier, a number of names had to be clarified etymologically and some of them were rather difficult to explain. It is remarkable that these difficulties mainly concerned the names of the birds of prey. Apparently these were named so early that the origin of the names is almost obscured by the mists of time. The archaic character of the names is supported by the fact that although owls, crows, and birds of prey have always played an important role in mythology, symbolism and heraldry, their names do not refer at all to such roles. This may be a reason to presume that the names are much older

than their mythological or symbolic role; at any rate, it demonstrates the immutability of the names.

Within the group of names with a stem referring to the general appearance of the birds, one finds names which have a metaphorical character. We find names like *Frater* ("friar," *Carduelis flavirostris*), because of the bird's resemblance to a lay-brother having a garland of "hair" around the head and wearing a brown habit; the *Nonnetje* ("little nun," *Mergus albellus*), because of its quiet nature and black and white habit: the *Grote-* and *Kleine burgemeester* ("big and little mayor," *Larus hyperboreus, Larus glaucoides*), wearing a black and white garment and having an impressive gait; and the *Kneu* (sociable or "cosy bird," *Carduelis cannabina*), for living in small, social, "cosy" groups chattering all day. Moreover, by *kneu* is usually meant an old woman.

Apart from the folk nomenclature as it can be found in every field guide, which may be considered as a crystalization of folk knowledge, there are more popular names for a number of birds, which are mostly restricted to particular regions in Holland. These names must, however, be characterized as "slang," for people using these names very well know that they are not the birds' proper names, but only nicknames. An example of names like this is *drijfsijsje,* which with people in Amsterdam alone refer to ducks. Also in Amsterdam one has *finkies,* which is a slang word for *vinken* (finches) denoting most song birds. These names, however, denote only classes of birds, and exist in juxtaposition with the ordinary folk nomenclature.

Names and Numbers

The main category VOICE forms the largest group in the scheme, immediately followed by APPEARANCE, then, BEHAVIOR, BIOTOPE, and SEASON. The reference to the voice of the birds proves to have been very successful as a stem, and combinations with all other domains could be made, something which cannot be said of the other stems. As a prefix, however, "voice" has not been used frequently; it was used only once in combination with another domain: appearance. One may conclude that "voice" was seen to be a very basic category, and birds were associated with their voice directly or not at all.

APPEARANCE, the second largest group, proves not only to have been a very appropriate main category, but was very useful as a subcategory as well, and it was used as such 86 times. Additionally "appearance" occurred in combination with all other domains.

BEHAVIOR, a not inconsiderable group when forming stems, constitutes a rather small group of subcategories and was used as such only eight times. For BIOTOPE the reverse is true: as a main category it was not often used, but as a subcategory it forms the second largest group. This reveals that

most birds have been associated with a domain directly linked with the birds themselves; the relation of the bird to its environment proves to be of secondary importance. This feature of folk classification is made clear by the fact that an even more difficult relation to perceive, that of the bird and the time or season in which it appears, constitutes a very small group, both as a sub- and a main category, albeit numerous species hibernate in Holland.

Almost every name being of binary character, it is not only the frequency with which a domain has been used as a stem or prefix that is important, but also the mutual occurrence of domains. The combination most preferred is the one with "appearance" in main as well as in subcategory. Therefore one may conclude that despite the fact that VOICE forms the largest main category, this auditory quality was less important in the process of naming the birds than visual qualities. This feature is stressed when we see that the second largest combination "behavior" also implies visual features connected with the birds.

Other "strong" combinations are VOICE/appearance, and VOICE/biotope. However, the fact that combinations are involved certainly does not imply an arbitrary sequence of domains. On the contrary, we see that some sequences prove not to be reversible. The combination of "appearance" being a stem and "behavior," being a prefix occurs only twice. The same is true for the ratios VOICE/appearance to APPEARANCE/voice which is 18:1, and VOICE/behavior to BEHAVIOR/voice being 1:0 in the possible sequences. Thus in the process of naming the birds there must have been preferences not only for particular domains, but also for particular combinations, especially for certain sequences. "Voice" has often been chosen for a stem, but rarely for a prefix, and the same is true for "behavior." In case of "appearance" we see that the subcategory is twice as large as the main category; with "biotope" this difference is even larger.

It is obvious that the names referring to visual, directly perceptible features form the largest group. If we include the auditory references as they occur in the main category and subcategory "voice," we are able to conclude that over 80% of the names consist of associations which are based on directly perceivable sensory data, namely 139.

Presumably we will never be able to say whether the nomenclature system of Dutch birds was developed consciously or is the result of a subconscious process. What we do know, however, is that certain regularities are to be found in the nomenclature when it comes to naming rare birds, and that very obvious preferences for particular domains played a part. Moreover, one tended to refer to the appearance of the bird rather than to other attributes. Besides this, an obvious preference for certain combinations and sequences of domains could be traced.

Table 1

Prefixes	Voice	Appearance	Behavior	Biotope	Season	
Voice	20	1	-	-	-	21
Appearance	18	35	22	7	4	86
Behavior	1	2	5	-	-	8
Biotope	17	10	10	3	1	41
Season	2	-	-	2	2	6
	58	48	37	12	7	162

Note: The table shows the numbers of the combinations of main categories (stems of the binary names), and subcategories formed by the prefixes. Main categories are given vertically, subcategories given horizontally.

Conclusion

Lévi-Strauss's idea of two parallel modes of thought which seem to separate non-Western and Western scientific manners of dealing with the universe, cannot, perhaps, be called incorrect. It is, however, incomplete as it does not note the equal difference that seems to exist between "scientific" practices and folk taxonomies in the West itself. Apparently Western thought is also characterized by directly perceptible sensory data when it comes to constructing nomenclature; even in the realm of science sensory data play a very important role, although they are complemented by concepts and logic (van den Broek 1985). Quine and Schwartz say that a field of knowledge becomes increasingly scientific to the extent that it depends more and more on subsurface structure rather than superficial observable properties in the process of classifying and naming things and species (cf. Quine 1977:167; Schwartz 1977:31). Though this sounds very plausible, it does not explain the reason for depending on subsurface structures when studying nature. *Erfahrungsdruck* may have been a reason, but this too gives no reason for nature being ordered in a particular manner. There must have been some sort of objectification, or even demystification, in order to treat nature as a domain of research rather then an infinite realm of phenomena wherein and with the help of which we are able to survive.

The notion of an order that one was able to find was first developed by Linnaeus (1707-1778), and he believed that God had installed order in nature at the moment of Creation. Logic would prove to be the ultimate means to detect the Divine Order, and he was also among the first to reduce reality to logic. Reality as it appeared to the senses became insufficient, and logic was applied to tackle the world of vegetation. Linnaeus no longer perceived morphological but logical relations between plants. Though he knew himself that the system he thus constructed—*Systema naturae* in 1735—was too artificial, it nonetheless was capable of creating order in the chaos of numerous plant classifications.

The perception of relations and the ordering of things is a universal human practice, and is the most fundamental feature in thought and language. The manner in which a classification is established may differ enormously. The same data may lead to various classificatory schemes, and a huge influence may be credited to literacy (cf. Goody 1977), a topic we will not deal with here. We must accept the existence, and in fact the need not only of many classifications, but of many kinds of classifications, says Simpson (cf. Simpson 1961:26), pointing at a tolerance many eighteenth century natural historians in France could not muster (cf. van den Broek 1984).

What does the analysis of nomenclature or other classifications tell us? Research of this kind may reveal the underlying principles of those ordering systems; moreover, it tells us something about the perception of nature in a particular culture. The separation between natural and conceptual classification already indicates a fundamental difference in modes of cognition and the attitude towards nature. The criteria, however, consciously chosen or traced by means of analysis, demonstrate the way in which elements of nature have been related.

In the case of the Dutch bird nomenclature, the conclusion may be that the members of Dutch culture did see the birds as a coherent biological entity, but they did not presume an internal structure, on a subsurface level, to exist in the avifauna. Nowadays taxonomies are based on the theory that the species are evolutionarily linked together, and the classifications show these kinship ties. The Dutch faced the birds open-mindedly and named them in the way they appeared to the senses. Voice, an auditory quality, appearance and behavior, both visual qualities, prove to have been the most important domains to refer to when naming the birds. This way the world of birds was made accessible. Even now not everyone will need the systematics of the modern ornithologist, and perhaps we can say, as did Thoreau, when noting a bird crossing our path: "I give the Latin (merely) on account of the savoriness of the trivial name."

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CORE VALUES AMONG NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERMEN IN THE 1960s

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Abstract: In this article the core values of fishermen on the South Coast of Newfoundland in the 1960's are compared with those of a farming/fishing population from the Blasket Islands off western Ireland from a generation earlier in time. The data from which the values are derived consists partly of autobiographical materials, but mainly was obtained through projective narrative tests based on those developed by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). The author finds a considerable congruence between the two populations, both in respect of the five values which were the basis of the Kluckhohn study, but also in respect of three others which have emerged in his own work.

Résumé: Dans cet article on compare les sentiments fondamentals des pêcheurs de la côte méridionale de la Terre Nouvelle dans les années soixantes par rapport à ceux d'une population des cultivateurs et des pêcheurs d'une genération d'auparavant qui habitait les Iles de Blasket au large de L'Irlande occidentale. Les données dont ces sentiments sont dérivés consistent en partie des matières autobiographiques, mais on y a obtenu la plupart par les tests projectifs sous forme de récit qu'on a façonné d'après Kluckhohn et Strodtbeck (1961). L'auteur a trouvé un congruence considérable entre les deux populations et à l'égard des cinq sentiments qui se faisaient le base de l'étude de Kluckhohn et à l'égard des trois autres qui se sont développés de son propre travail.

Over 25 years ago Florence Kluckhohn and her associates completed a pioneer study of the values of five neighbouring ethnic groups in the American southwest (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961). In this analysis they isolated five problem areas which they believed are common to all human groups, and referred to a sixth in a footnote, although they did not include this in their analysis. In a recent study of the fishermen/farmers of the (now abandoned) Irish island community of Great Blasket (Whitaker 1986) I have attempted to resurrect Kluckhohn's schema, using as my principal data the extraordinary autobiographies that were written by no less than four different members of that community, as well as the published letters of a fifth islander. This exercise had been in my mind for some thirty years, since I had first visited those islands, which form the westernmost outlier of Europe, in 1954. I increas-

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ingly believed that this fine corpus of material might offer an alternative way to examine values from that employed by Kluckhohn and her team, who devised anecdotal objective (projective) tests, incorporating descriptions of social situations, on which they asked their informants to comment. However, the Blasket Islands are probably unique in anthropological experience for the sheer quantity and quality of the "personal documents" provided by the subjects in a totally voluntary and generally unrehearsed manner.

When I first arrived in Newfoundland in 1959 I resolved to undertake a further study in the same tradition. However, there was only a minimum body of Newfoundland autobiographies, and, although one cannot claim that the Blasket authors were "typical" members of their society, it was immediately apparent that the few Newfoundlanders who had written their life histories were quite exceptional. One must therefore at once question whether the values of such writers were possibly quite different from those of the majority of their fellow-citizens. Preliminary inquiries erroneously suggested to me that only a few rural Newfoundlanders at that time had such oratorical skills that they could spontaneously, and without prompting, verbalise their life experiences in such a way as to permit a listener from outside the society to extract specific statements illustrating the subject's fundamental values. It therefore became clear to me that I would have to resort to objective tests of the type prepared by Kluckhohn, which were made available to me prior to the publication of the work. She, however, had the advantage of being concerned with American ethnic minorities which were generally well documented already, so that the preparation of such narratives required rather less prior contact with the community before the projective test was compiled. Pilot studies were in fact completed in that project.

I had arrived in Newfoundland as perhaps only the second behavioural scientist ever to be interested in investigating the traditional culture, and especially the values, of that isolated former colony—Britain's "oldest"—and prior ethnography was non-existent. In these circumstances I was obliged to depend on the advice of the neophyte sociology and anthropology students whom I was teaching at Memorial University of Newfoundland. However, there was one considerable "plus" which most anthropologists do not have: namely the fact that Newfoundlanders were totally English speaking, and at that time considered themselves to be culturally part of the British imperial population. In their education British textbooks had been used. The colony had joined Canada in an unusual way some ten years before, but the economic effects of this change were only just beginning to manifest themselves. Few Newfoundland women had left the island, whilst the only time their menfolk had been abroad was during the two World Wars, in the second of which Newfoundland provided a Forestry Corps as well as other soldiers, and also as fishermen making casual visits to mainland ports whilst fishing. A

number of Newfoundlanders had visited the Caribbean, following the ancient economic pattern of trading dried cod for rum and sugar. It may be presumed that all these encounters with the outside world were, with the exception of wartime residence abroad, too brief for any fundamental changes to occur in their pattern of value-orientations. At the end of the 1950s television was only beginning to encroach upon the consciousness of the population of Newfoundland, so that if I chose to work in some of the more isolated areas, I would be in contact with informants relatively unaffected by this all-pervasive medium. Radio was a more familiar experience at that time, and would doubtless have to be taken into account; however I early discovered that it was the local private transmitters that formed the major sources of information, and such stations, of which one was dominant, were run by Newfoundlanders, who might be expected to share many of the traditional values. The CBC, which elsewhere in Canada was followed by a significant section of the population, was less influential outside the provincial capital, St. John's.

I therefore determined to visit different communities along the South Coast of Newfoundland, inhabited solely by persons deriving a livelihood from the sea, and not at that time linked by road, either with each other, or with any other part of Newfoundland.[1] This population had not long before been the subject of a special government enquiry, the South Coast Commission, which had isolated the special problems of the region, although nobody had essayed to describe the social characteristics of this population.

Farley Mowat, who lived in the South Coast outport Messers Cove from 1962 to 1967, has described the situation of this population at that time:

> They are an Antaean people, adamantine, indomitable, and profoundly certain of themselves. They are a natural people who have not lost, as we have lost, consciousness of unity with the natural world around them. They are an extraordinarily conscious people imbued with an exceptional sensitivity toward each other. They are a people who accept hardship and who, from the crucible of their endurance, had created the conditions requisite to human happiness. They are supremely effective human beings; and they are among the last inhabitants of this planet who still appear—or until recently appeared—to possess the answer to that nagging question, "Who, and what, am I?"
>
> But this was an illusion. In distinctly envisaging these people's lives as they had been, we failed to glimpse the heart of darkness beating black within the present hour. Their lives had undergone a sinister sea-change. We had not long been about our task when we began to recognize the change, and began to understand that our account was being transmuted, without our volition, into a requiem. We who had come to chronicle human life in its most admirable guise remained to witness and record the passing of a people. (Mowat & de Visser 1968 unpaginated)

Assisted by one or two students, then not even half-trained as social scientists, I travelled slowly along the coast—the only public transport were two Canadian National steamers that went in each direction once a week, on a journey that took five days, calling in at many of these isolated settlements, known in the vernacular as "outports." Preparing narratives in advance was far from easy. Narratives had to be systematic. They had to present familiar situations to which an informant might respond with some empathy. Informants might then discuss them in such a way that their own values might be elicited. I decided early on that I would confine the exercise to mature males who were involved in regular fishing, since I believed (as it turned out, correctly) that these individuals might more easily exhibit some rapport with the chief investigator, then a man in his early thirties, who had arrived recently from Scotland. I attempted to distance myself from the stereotypical government officials who were beginning to appear on the scene. I was accompanied from time to time by rather young male students who came from the area, but whom I suspected might be treated by their fellow South Coastmen as either deviant, or at any rate too ambitious, because they had left the community for at least four years to pursue a university education. (In point of fact several of these people had been away from their home communities at high school, and therefore their own local rapport rested primarily on kin-ties; they were often themselves somewhat estranged from the life-style, and the accompanying values, of the communities in which they were raised.) This difficulty, of which I quickly became aware, was not however amenable to any immediate rectification, and in the absence of any preexisting sociological literature dealing with Newfoundland, I early realised that my study would remain liable to criticism on this account. Field anthropologists—and I had myself already worked for some four years in three other cultures[2]—can seldom be methodological purists, and confronted with a situation where they wish to record a rapidly vanishing way of life they have often to accept some deficiencies in their procedures, even though this will expose them to subsequent criticism by armchair commentators.

I decided to continue with my project, in spite of the difficulties over research personnel and the more serious inadequacy of full preparation of projective test material. I have long delayed publication as I had hoped to obtain further field data. Such an aspiration is no longer feasible, however, since modernization and resettlement have changed the social situation totally. Nevertheless the favourable reception of preprints of my Blasket materials convinces me that there is still academic interest in the study of traditional values. Regretfully, we have virtually stood still in this theoretical area in the intervening period, and have not been systematically developing new methods or classifications. In the meantime, however, Newfoundland has, in an anthropological sense, become arguably the best-documented prov-

ince of Canada.[3] I can therefore now supplement my observations with direct quotations from the local population which, I believe, can throw light on the underlying values of Newfoundland fishermen in the 1960s. A few of these citations come from the Great Northern Peninsula, a region culturally similar, which shared the isolation and absence of roads until the 1960s. The only significant difference between the two areas is the limited farming that supplements the fisheries of the more northerly fishermen. For the South Coast we are fortunate in having the descriptive work of one of Canada's foremost writers and his wife.[4]

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It will be recalled that Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck gave no special priority among their five core values (the adjective is mine). There is in fact some interrelationship between these, but none was attributed ascendancy over the others. Among seafarers, however, it might be argued that there is some primacy attached to the question of the Man/Nature relationship, since this is especially germane to the maritime lifestyle. The question is formulated: "What is the relation of Man to Nature (Supernature)?" There are three potential responses: Man is subjugated to Nature; Man must have a Harmonious relation with Nature; and Man has Mastery over Nature. In my study of the Blasket Islanders (as also elsewhere—Whitaker 1976:374) I have suggested that the sea is the least predictable and controllable of the elements, and that those who derive their living from it are inevitably and frequently reminded of their relative helplessness in many marine situations. The uncertainty of fishing, which combines all the unpredictability of the hunt with the frequent additional determinant of a variable price-system for their fish, brought about by market forces over which they have no control, leaves the participants with a great sense of powerlessness. The Blasket people certainly all accepted that Man is subordinate to Nature.

In the narrative material which I employed, there were several situations described where the informants might comment on the forces operating to determine their livelihood. In the great majority of responses (87%) there is an unequivocal assertion that it is outside human ability either to control the catch or to achieve an equitable market price. "The Almighty" will determine whether the fish may be caught, and an over-eager fisherman may be brought to heel by the visitation of storm or other adversity. Although it is conceded that modern inventions in marine technology may help the fisherman in some degree—and few of my informants had much understanding of such developments at that time—nevertheless the fishes' movements are determined by a natural, or more probably supernatural, force which it would be both wrong and foolish to question. Indeed, a clearly fatalistic philosophy underlies this value, and the range of human initiatives is believed to be

clearly circumscribed. If Man persists in developing techniques to extract more fish than the Deity might wish, the fish themselves might be taken away, elsewhere in the ocean beyond Man's knowledge, and thus human striving would be effectively thwarted. Those people who did not provide a response that one could immediately define as an assertion of Man's subordination to Nature, instead made some comment suggesting coexistence between Man and Nature, that might be coded as representing a Man/Nature Harmony, although I should perhaps stress that I never obtained a response which included the word "harmony" itself. No individual said anything that might be interpreted as suggesting that Man has Mastery over Nature. Mowat expresses this value well:

> For those who live by it and upon it, the sea is the ultimate reality in their existence. They accept it as their master, for they know they will never master it. The sea is there. It is their life: it gives them life and sometimes, in its moments of fury, it gives them death. They do not struggle against its imponderable strength, nor do they stand in braggart's opposition to its powers.
>
> "Ah, me son," a schooner skipper told me once, "We don't be takin' nothin' from the sea. We sneaks up on what we wants—and wiggles it away." (Mowat & de Visser 1968 unpaginated)

A second value-orientation identified by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck is encapsulated in the response to the question "What is the character of innate Human Nature?" They identified three basic responses, Evil, a mixture of Good-and-Evil, and Good, and each of these may be qualified as mutable or immutable. In my examination of the Blasket material, I found fourteen out of fifteen statements recovered from the autobiographical texts reflecting the middle category Good-and-Evil, which might seem to contain some concept of change. A single statement from Blasket suggested immutability, and this also applied to a mixed categorization of Human Nature. It is to be remembered that the Blasket Islanders, like the great majority of citizens of the Republic of Ireland are Roman Catholic, with a high degree of daily religious observance at the domestic level. The South Coast fishermen of Newfoundland are predominantly Anglican, with an inclination towards the "Low Church" end of the churchmanship spectrum. However this variation between the two populations in respect of religious adherence is not reflected in any difference in the responses of the fishermen, who on the South Coast all accepted that Human Nature cannot be categorized in absolute terms, nor can it be seen to be unchanging. The religious doctrine of the potential redemption of Man through the saving activity of the Holy Spirit was once specifically asserted in the consideration of the projective material which was used to introduce these discussions. Whereas Catholicism sees such redemption as achieved through the sacraments, the variety of Anglicanism practiced on the South Coast is more open about how this might be obtained. In record-

ing this comment, however, I must stress that theological explanations of the type here advanced will not be volunteered by the vast majority of Newfoundland fishermen from the South Coast. Perhaps in other areas, where there is a strong tradition of Nonconformity, and numbers of unordained local preachers, the discussion of this point might be pursued in a more theological vein. In the only attempt I made to replicate the South Coast values study in Newfoundland, which was in Notre Dame Bay, an area now strongly United Church—the successor to the British Nonconformist tradition—I did get more argumentative discussion in this style but my data are too sparse to permit me to assert that this was characteristic of all United Church regions of the island.

A third, and perhaps the most interesting, value-orientation, is provided in response to the question "What is the temporal focus of Human Life?" The three logical alternatives are *Past, Present,* and *Future.* Here, as among islanders from southwestern Ireland, the data obtained are mixed. The *Past orientation,* in which in particular the old social order is mourned, and praised as superior to the *Present,* seemed to be general among informants over 55 years of age. It was often verbalized in comparisons between the old order represented by pre-Confederation Newfoundland, especially in narratives about Newfoundland before the economic collapse in the early 1930s led to the abrogation of Newfoundland's status as a separate Dominion—followed between 1933 and 1949 by direct (colonial) rule from London under what was uniquely named "Commission of Government"—and the new role of Newfoundland as the tenth province of Canada. However I should stress that my survey was undertaken before the full economic benefits of joining the Canadian Confederation might have become clear. Younger males were still optimistic that substantial change would occur in the future, and therefore they would provide responses that might be so coded. This raises the intriguing possibility that the time value-orientation is itself susceptible to change in the course of an individual's life-cycle.

This value might be linked to the now less fashionable sociological distinction between *Deferred Gratification* patterns, and *Immediate Gratification* activity. Of course such labels must be used with care, since any individual might have episodes of behaviour in which the goal is *Immediate Gratification,* as when he engages in sex without any expectation of procreation, or when he drinks enough to be inebriated. Many individuals who might be capital accumulators, putting money aside in the hope that it increases, or deferring the pleasures of high life for a hard grind as a university student (in the nowadays mistaken expectation that this will lead to higher future remuneration), may still engage in purely gratificatory sex, or get blind drunk. These labels must be attached to some general mode of behaviour rather than to each single human activity. Male Newfoundlanders

certainly have a traditional pattern of sexual and bucolic indulgence that might belie the assertion of *Future time-orientation,* and paradoxically it is the young—who are most *Future-oriented*—who exhibit such behaviour most frequently. I believe that this is probably equally true in the cultures studied by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, and I would therefore suggest that much more work needs to be done on the problem of the apparent lack of congruence between asserted ideals and actual behaviour. (I should also record that a few informants delivered responses which could be labelled *Present,* and also that there was marked discrepancy between the coding schedules covering these, showing that individuals might interpret the same statements quite differently. Unfortunately my data are insufficient to examine this point further.)

A fourth value-orientation is indicated in response to the question "What is the modality of human activity?", to which Kluckhohn and her associates identify three alternatives, labelled somewhat awkwardly *Being, Being-in-Becoming,* and *Doing.* Whereas in the *Being* orientation the individual prefers activity perceived to be intrinsic to the human personality, in the *Being-in-Becoming* orientation the idea of development is paramount. The *Doing* orientation, so familiar to much of American society, stresses activity resulting in accomplishments measurable by standards external to the individuals concerned. The *Doing* orientation seemed to dominate much of the responses, although again in the case of older men it was less marked, many bemoaning that physical decline prevented their preferred activity level being attained. The obligation to be active was well expressed by Angus Bennett of Daniel's Harbour on the Great Northern Peninsula: "A man doesn't need to be hungry very often around here if he's willing to work" (Green 1974:8). I had anticipated that Catholic/Protestant differences might be exhibited here, and that the former might display the *Being* response more frequently. However my sample did not permit such an assertion to be tested. It is noteworthy that in my analysis of the Blasket authors' data, all three responses were represented, although the *Being* orientation was most numerous. However in that study one must be aware that generalizations were derived from only five authors.

The final orientation analysed in *Variations in Value-orientations* relates to the question "What is the modality of man's relationship to other men?", and has a range of three responses: *Lineality, Collaterality,* and *Individualism.* The Lineal principle stresses continuity of the group through time, and ordered positional succession. This is characteristic of many of the responses I received, although I was particularly dissatisfied with the projective material that was prepared for assessing this category. The distinction between *Lineality* and *Collaterality* is not easily made in considering a bilateral society not organized into distinctive kin-groups. As a result there was also some disagreement between the coders who were given the task of reducing the

collected statements, usually recorded on tape, into these three categories. However it must be stated that the *Individualistic* response, although present, was rare.[5] Newfoundlanders in general, and the South Coast people in particular, have experienced long years of poverty and even hunger, to which they have responded by adopting a pattern of mutual aid which is the antithesis of Individualism. The more cynical commentator would add that this has prepared Newfoundlanders to cash in on the Welfare State. The strong sense of obligation to share is shown in the marked hospitality that characterizes the isolated communities. Thus Bruce Roberts of Woody Point, Bonne Bay (at the base of the Great Northern Peninsula) said:

> You'd knock on any door, and they'd sing out and say, "come in!" There wasn't any strangers in those times. And mostly you didn't knock at all, but lifted the latch and walked into the kitchen, and took a seat on the settle. . . . No matter where it was along the whole coast, it was jest like walkin' into your own home. (Taylor & Horwood 1976:8)

In the Blasket corpus all three orientations were represented, although the Individualistic response was confined to one author. Kluckhohn and her team discuss in a footnote (1961:10n.) a sixth universal human problem: Man's conception of space and his place in it.

In my Blasket study I have interpreted this as including Man's relationship to the Environment, and his commitment to the Local Community. As in the case of the Blasket Islanders, the South Coastmen conceived of the sea as inhospitable and dangerous, only to be encountered because one's livelihood is derived from it. The terrestrial environment, however, is seen to possess great beauty, and this is particularly true of the local community from which the individual hails. At the time of my study the extensive relocation program had not made much progress on the South Coast, but the potential threat was being raised, and this gave rise to almost eulogistic statements which defined the home locality.

The degree of this sentiment across Newfoundland is documented in Ralph Mathews' fine study of the problems brought about by that program, *There's no better place than here* (1976). One informant from the community he names "Mountain Cove" in Bonne Bay at the base of the Great Northern Peninsula said: "I'd sooner be here than anywhere else in the world" (Mathews 1976:63). Angus Bennett who lived somewhat to the north on the same peninsula said: "Lived here all my life at Daniel's Harbour, Sir, and I couldn't of asked the Good Lord for anything better" (Green 1974:8). A young girl from Burgeo on the South Coast also expressed this strong identification with place:

> The worstest thing I know is that we got to go away. I watches the gulls following the boats out there and I wish I was a gull sometimes, because nobody makes them go away from where they belongs. Those gulls are some lucky! They can stay and live in Burgeo until they dies. It won't be very long before they's nobody here except the gulls at all. (Mowat & de Visser 1968 unpaginated)

An outsider like myself, confronted with the harshness of the South Coast, as well as the isolation, might be excused the fleeting thought that such local pride and rivalry was at times a little overdone, were it not that this is replicated in many communities on the fringes of the North Atlantic, including such remote places as northwestern Iceland and the Hebridean Islands. Yet curiously such places provide the reservoir from which emigrants to the New World have emerged over many generations. I would therefore suggest that this dimension also requires considerable further study.

This is true of my seventh and eighth value-orientations, which I have developed independently of Kluckhohn and her associates in my study of Great Blasket. These concern the relations between people of different generations, or of different gender. I have posited the questions "What is the appropriate modality between human generations?" and "What is the modality of human gender relationships?" In the former category we must recognize some potential overlap with the question concerning Time-orientation. On the matter of gender, my data are distinctly skewed, since my sample is exclusively male. At the time I undertook this study there was a clear rivalry emerging between the different age cohorts, and also an apparently long term one between the two sexes. This latter had perhaps been present in Newfoundland society since it was first colonized, but, again, this assertion requires a more intensive analysis of available ethnohistorical materials. However my data show that these orientations are relevant, and I hope that in future their analysis will be undertaken.

* * * * *

In this article I have been motivated by two aspirations, one relating to maritime societies of which Newfoundland now provides one of the better documented examples, and another of general theoretical significance to anthropology. I have been led to resurrect some old field data that I had not published before. I am aware of its deficiencies, both in respect to the number of informants—29 in all, and not all of these completely tested—but even more in respect of the projective instrument that was used, prepared in all too great haste. The passage of time since it was collected would now permit a longitudinal study of changes in value-orientations following relative modernization.

We also need cross-cultural comparative analysis of value-orientations among different fishing communities. My own work has led me across the various island groups around the North Atlantic littoral. I have often asserted in discussions that fishermen in Norway, Scotland, Ireland, Iceland, and Atlantic Canada have more in common with each other than they have with the urban populations of the nation-states that they inhabit. But as long as such assertions rest on the subjective impressions of anthropologists, rather than on objective, quantified data, the anthropologist will still be liable to be labelled a woolly-minded romantic. Certainly there is a general congruence between the depiction of the values of the fishermen of the Great Blasket off western Ireland, and those of Newfoundland.

In conclusion, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck must be seen as significant pioneers, although all too few have followed them into the substantive area they sought to illuminate. Their book is irritating in its methodological complexity, but their isolation of five universal value-orientations is, I believe, still of analytical value. Three other value-orientations have been here delineated, one of which they anticipated.[6]

Notes

1. The preliminary fieldwork on the South Coast in 1960 was financed by a grant from the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council; other interviews were conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Memorial University of Newfoundland, of which I was a co-founder, in the period 1961-63.
2. My prior fieldwork included somewhat under two years among reindeer herding Sámi (Lapps) in Northern Scandinavia and Finland, 1950-54; two years in crofting communities in northern Scotland especially in the Outer Hebrides and the northern islands (Orkney and Shetland), 1952-59; and field visits to Albanophone shepherds in Montenegro, the Kosmet and Western Macedonia 1953-54.
3. The only published anthropological monograph on a South Coast community, (Chiaramonte 1970) deals with François, there named "Deep Harbour."
4. Farley Mowat lived in Messers cove near Burgeo from 1962-67. This community is sympathetically described in a thinly fictional account by his wife Claire Mowat (1983), and the area also is the locus of Mowat's less friendly treatment in his account of the killing of a rare Fin Whale (1972). Another, more easterly, community on that coast is François, which is the main scene of the five photographs by de Visser, with elegaic text by Mowat (Mowat & de Visser 1968). The illustrations in particular depict the harshness of the life of fishermen on that coast.
5. Chiaramonte, working in François in 1962-63, also employed derivatives of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's schedules to study values (independently of myself). I have not seen that material, which is largely unpublished. However it must be recorded that his findings, which are briefly reported in a transactional analysis (Chiaramonte 1970:69-61), markedly differ from my own. He emphasizes the high value placed on individualism, but also recognizes "an expression of collaterality." François certainly seems exceptional in downplaying sibling obligations, and the differences in our conclusions may possibly be due to some aberrance in the values held in that community. However Chiaramonte follows Barth's transactional mode which renders comparison of our

materials somewhat more difficult. A knowledge of these differences has contributed to my hesitation in presenting my own material.

6. This paper was first presented to a symposium on "small-scale fisheries" at the 1985 annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association. I am indebted to the positive critique of colleagues at that session. I must also acknowledge the generous leave policy of Simon Fraser University.

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THE DEATHS OF SISYPHUS: STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF A CLASSICAL MYTH

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Abstract: As punishment for deceiving death, Sisyphus must endlessly roll a rock up a hill in Hades, only for it to roll back down. A structural analysis reveals the connections between the punishment and the crime, and demonstrates that the interpretation of myth resides in the operations of thought, not in particular contents.

Résumé: En punition de tromper la mort, Sisyphe doit rouler sans cesse un rocher au haut d'une colline aux enfers, seulement pour qu'il roule toujours en bas. Une analyse structurale révèle les rapports entre le châtiment et le crime et démontre que l'interprétation du mythe réside dans les opérations de la pensée, pas dans des contenus particuliers.

In Greek mythology, Sisyphus was the king of Corinth condemned by Zeus endlessly to roll a rock up a hill in Hades, only to have it roll back down. This image of the hill and rock has been central to Sisyphus "from Homer to Camus" (Halton 1975), and has given rise to many interpretations: historical, astronomical, sociological, philosophical, etc. It has even found a place in popular speech, being commonly used to signify a tiresome and seemingly endless task. Actually, as will be shown, the repetitive aspect of Sisyphus' punishment is much more important to these varying interpretations than is his suffering. I want to make it clear at the outset, however, that it is not my intention to evaluate these other theories but to pursue a line of inquiry of my own. What interests me about Sisyphus is the question: What did Sisyphus do to deserve the punishment he received, i.e., how does the punishment fit the crime? I wish to "demystify" the hill and rock by showing how they operate in a narrative context.

At the same time, the analysis has certain limitations. It makes no claims about the origins of Sisyphean lore, whether such origins lie in Greek history, psychology, or society. Perhaps more disturbing to scholars is the fact that the textual material is derivative in the sense that I do not return to

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original Greek literary sources (although the material has been provided by classicists). Nevertheless, these weaknesses should not detract from the strengths of the analysis: it will be shown that the hill and rock are fully intelligible in terms of the story provided and that the methodology is applicable to other contexts and investigations of the problem.

It was apparently Sisyphus' crime to deceive death twice.[1] The following version is given by Grant and Hazel (1973:368):

> When Sisyphus founded Ephyra [Corinth], he established the Isthmian Games there in honour of Melicertes, whose body he had found and buried there; and he fortified the neighbouring high hill of the Acrocorinth as a citadel and watch-tower. One day he caught sight of Zeus as he was carrying off the river-nymph Aegina, daughter of the river-god Asopus and of Metope; Zeus took her to the isle of Oenone, where he ravished her. Asopus gave chase, and asked for information from Sisyphus, who promised to tell what he knew, in return for a spring of fresh water on the Acrocorinth, which Asopus immediately produced (the spring of Pirene). Zeus was furious at Sisyphus' disclosure, and punished him by sending Thanatos (Death) to take him off to the house of Hades. Sisyphus, a master of cunning, somehow tricked Thanatos, bound him, and threw him into a dungeon, with the result that mortals ceased to die. Then the gods, disturbed by this abnormal phenomenon, sent Ares to release Thanatos, who came looking for Sisyphus once again. However Sisyphus had given his wife, the Pleiad Merope, careful instructions what to do in such an eventuality: she left his body unburied and made none of the customary offerings to the dead. Thus Sisyphus tricked Hades, for that god was so angry at Merope's neglectfulness that he, or his wife Persephone, allowed Sisyphus to return to the upper world to punish Merope and make her bury his body. On returning to Corinth, however, Sisyphus did no such thing, but resumed his life and lived on to a great age in defiance of the gods of the Underworld. It was felt to be because of this impiety, quite as much as for his tale-telling about Zeus, that his shade was punished in Tartarus after his death. For he was forced to roll a great stone eternally up a hill; when he had nearly pushed it to the top, it always rolled down again to the bottom.

It is important to notice that the deaths are not equivalent. Sequentially, we are given the following arrangement:



However, it may be supposed that the first death comes to Sisyphus prematurely. Thus, the first death refers (postpositionally, as it were, in the diagram) to the too short life, the second to the too long life, and the third to old age. Furthermore, the development is not linear. Between a life which is too short (an early death) and a life which is too long (immortality), the myth settles on old age.

Now, unless one agrees with Harrison that Sisyphus' punishment "bears no relation to his supposed offence" (1908:609), it is necessary to show what the relationship is. In the first place, the hill in Tartarus has its counterpart in the Upperworld in the Acrocorinth (cf. Reinach 1903:171). It will be shown later to what extent these describe different distances. Nevertheless, one function of the image of the hill (and rock, which is rolled to the top and which rolls to the bottom) is to mediate the Upperworld and Underworld as high and low. The myth also establishes an equivalence between Upperworld and Underworld and life and death (this, too, will be modified later). In shifting from a spatial to a temporal order, rolling the rock up and down the hill can be understood as periodicity.[2] Of course, in terms of time (periodicity), the distances (up and down) are not equal. One direction can be defined as too short and the other as too long.

This is analogous to the problem of "limping" in the sense that Lévi-Strauss has given the term, originally in connection with Oedipus.[3] Whereas a normal gait expresses (as an anatomical signifier) the regular alternation of terms (such as life and death), limping shortens one side and lengthens the other (Lévi-Strauss 1974:464). For Lévi-Strauss, this implies that limping belies periodicity by, e.g., shortening death and lengthening life (see especially *ibid.*:461). The situation in Sisyphus is more complicated than this, but I introduce it in order to propose that rolling the rock up the hill and its rolling back down also expresses unequal periodicity. With the opposition initially between high and low and then between life and death, the hill and rock now encode unequal relations between life and death. More precisely, the "right distance" is established not as a relation between terms but as a relation between relations. For Sisyphus the task is to mediate, not life and death considered in the absolute, but the short life and long life (the two deaths or deceptions).[4]

An additional consideration is necessary. If the myth is viewed in terms of the difference (or distance) between gods and men as immortal and mortal, it can be seen not only that Hades is the inverse of Heaven, but that men and mortality are situated between the gods above and the gods below, between (in effect) a "full" or continuous life and a "full" or continuous death. It is not clear from the literature that in passing from Heaven to Hades the value of immortality is reversed. Nevertheless, in so far as Heaven and Hades correspond to extreme values of life and death, high and low, it would appear that the too short life situates man away from earth and closer to Hades, while the too long life situates man closer to Heaven. This is not inconsistent with the formulation given earlier, in that the too short life represents an excessive conjunction with death and the too long life an excessive disjunction. However, in passing from the scene of the crime above to that of the punishment below, the myth does not add together the distances between Heaven and

earth and between earth and Hades. The latter distance is a transposition as well as an inversion of the former (which is the meaning of the fact that the hill in Hades has its counterpart in the Upperworld in the Acrocorinth). Actually, it would be more correct to say that it is a condensation of the two. The situation at the end of the myth does not merely complete a syntagmatic chain but totalizes it as a paradigmatic set. It is by this process that the hill and rock become a metaphor rather than remain or function as simply a part of the story.

This can be stated more precisely. A composite picture, as described in the previous paragraph, can be presented as follows:



This emphasizes the intermediate positions of earth and men in respect to high and low and life and death. However, for Sisyphus to roll the rock to the top of the hill is more than to attempt to achieve the midpoint in this sense. On the contrary, as explained in the first part of the analysis, the hill in the Underworld expresses two distances rather than one. This is because the oppositions between the Upperworld and Underworld, the too long and too short lives, and the Acrocorinth and hill are not (as in the composite representation) all on the same level. The Upperworld and Underworld (the world of the living and world of the dead) are opposed as high, life/low, death; the too

long and too short lives are opposed as two relations between the Upperworld and Underworld (whether men spend too long or too short a time in the world of the living); and the Acrocorinth and hill are opposed, roughly speaking, as crime/punishment, which is a problem of relations between the too long and too short lives. Thus, it was maintained that between a life which is too long and a life which is too short, the solution chosen in the myth is old age.

In other words, the point of balance is the same as in the composite picture, but here the myth progresses (in a structural rather than narrative sense) from an opposition between the Upperworld and Underworld to increasingly complex relations between them. This partly explains the condensation mentioned earlier, since the hill is not just in the Underworld, nor does it simply mediate a full death and a half life–half death, but mediates relations between the Upperworld and Underworld in general. The Acrocorinth (in the Upperworld) can also be said to mediate the Upperworld and Underworld in this respect, but it is important to add that the Acrocorinth is one of the signifieds of the hill in the Underworld and not the other way around. The former is situated primarily on the syntagmatic level of the myth, whereas the latter is situated primarily along the "axis of selection" (Muller and Richardson 1982:13) as a paradigm of relations in the myth as a whole.

It should be emphasized that this discussion of life and death does not exhaust the significance of Sisyphus. However, it does illustrate the operations occurring at this level. Furthermore, it illustrates that myth does not reside in the objects of thought (content) but in its operations. Thus, some have tried to find in Sisyphus the rising and setting of the sun or the rising and falling of the waves, or even the "vain struggle of man in the pursuit of knowledge" (*Encyclopedia Britannica* 1911:161). However, the "roll" of the hill and rock is not substantive but relational. To substitute day and night for life and death merely shifts the periodicity elsewhere.[5] Similarly, Graves maintains that Sisyphus attempts to "substitute patrilineal for matrilineal laws of succession" (apparently a reference to Sisyphus seducing his niece, Tyro, in other contexts) (1957:II, 15; I, 217; cf. Reinach 1903:168). Aside from any relation to Zeus' sexual violation of Aegina in the beginning of the myth, this is merely a sociological variant of the solar formula. In Barthes' words, the problem is "not to reduce the Text to a signified, whatever it may be (historical, economic, folkloristic or kerygmatic), but to hold its *signifiance* fully open" (1977:141).

Notes

1. In this respect, it is of interest that the subject of Camus' own *Myth of Sisyphus* is also that of death. Thus, he declares at the outset, "There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy" (1967:3).
2. Such transformations are common in mythology. For example, the proper distance

between sky and earth is frequently established as day and night.

3. Oedipus, whose name means "swollen foot" (similar connotations are found in the surnames of his father-line) and who solves the riddle of the feet (and cane) (Lévi-Strauss 1967:210-211; Barthes 1977:135; Jameson 1961:242), also cheats periodicity.
4. This contrasts with Leach's study of time and periodicity in the Greek corpus pertaining to Cronus. For Leach, the Greeks viewed time as an oscillation or alternation between discontinuous contrasts, whether they be day and night, life and death, male and female, etc. (1961:126-129). While the analysis of the hill and rock in Sisyphus agrees with this picture, it shows that such an alternation is elaborated into more complex forms, involving relations between relations and not just relations between terms.
5. In other versions of the solar theory, the rock represents the "sun, which, after attaining its highest point in the heavens at the time of the summer solstice, glides back again, only to begin its career anew on the shortest day" (Bianchi 1877:207-208). Significantly, this transformation of day and night into (unequal) relations between day and night (long day and short day) recalls that of life and death into the long life and short life.

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BOOK REVIEWS / COMPTES RENDUS

Food Energy in Tropical Ecosystems
Edited by Dorothy J. Cattle and Karl H. Schwerin
New York, New York: Gordon and Breach, 1985. (Food and Nutrition in History and Anthropology Series, Volume 4). xxiv + 290 pp. Maps, charts, illus., references, index. $55.00

Reviewer: John W. Bennett,
Washington University.
St. Louis, Mo.

This volume is based on a panel symposium presented at the 1980 annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association. The original panel papers occupy the first two of four sections of papers, and pertain to the field of "nutritional anthropology", a fairly recent mixture of anthropological studies of subsistence, field ethnography on food habits, and nutritional science. The reviewer served as one of two discussants for the panel, so this is his second round. He is pleased to report that the original group of papers has been revised and improved, although basic difficulties with their logic and methodology, which the reviewer criticized on the occasion of the panel, remain largely unchanged.

The title of the volume is misleading, since the most frequent theme of the papers is social change and economic development as a factor in diet and nutrition (the principal point of criticism made by the reviewer in his role as discussant was the limited use of this theme, and he is therefore gratified to note that somebody was listening!) There is no really hard measurement of "food energy" in any paper, only indirect assessments at best; and there is certainly no analysis of "ecosystems" in the technical sense of the word. The overall impression given by the book is eclectic, with little or no integration of themes and concepts across the papers. The book contains some interesting information on tropical foods and their production and changes, but it is incidental and episodic. In the honest opinion of this reviewer, the book is hardly worth the astonishing price of $55.

There are four sets of papers: the first, "Dietary Staples", consists of revised versions of two of the original panel papers, one, by Darna Dufour dealing with manioc; the other, by Peter Kunstadter, with rice. Aside from this concern with staples, the papers share nothing in common as to method or theory. The second group, also consisting of panel papers, has four contributions by E. A. Berlin, E. N. Anderson, C. Wilson, and K. G. Dewey, grouped under the title, "Subsistence Strategy". However, there is no definition of this term nor do the papers share common methods and concepts. The third section is called "Adaptation to Ecosystems", and consists of three papers by A. and P. Fleuret, M. McCutcheon, and R. R. Thaman and P. M. Thomas, reprinted from other sources or recruited for the book. These three papers are useful descriptive, narrative, more or less "geographical" accounts of crops and adaptive change in two Pacific islands and one African locus. The final section, "Afterwords" consists of two papers, one by Antoinette Brown entitled "The Tropics and Nutrition"; the other, by one of the editors, Karl Schwerin, called "Food Crops in the Tropics". These two papers are really general introductions and should have been placed first, not last. The roster of "tropical ecosystems" included

in the book is limited, and there is no attempt to define systematically different types of ecosystems or to relate the papers to such a classification. Two or three pages in Schwerin's piece seem to attempt a review of the papers, but mainly in the context of animal protein resources. However, there can be no real analysis of this latter topic since all of the authors are concerned mainly with vegetable crops and only mention animal protein sources in passing. There is a brief introduction by Angela Little which lists seven key questions in the field of "food science and technology" as applied to "nonindustrialized populations living in tropical ecosystems", most of which are only marginally or anecdotally dealt with in the papers that follow. We have become inured to this kind of disparateness and poor integration in symposia based on panels, but this seems an especially serious case.

Despite the disjointed character of the book, there is much of interest of a factual nature. Those papers which seem to present either useful information, or are constructed with an especially sound protocol of relating data to aims are the following: Kunstadter's piece on rice in a northern Thai community; Christine Wilson's general paper on staples and calories in Southeast Asian diets; Eugene Anderson's portrayal of Chinese and Malay subsistence patterns in Penang; the three papers in Part III, as already noted; and Schwerin's descriptive review of crops and foods.

The remainder of this review will consist of detailed critiques of three papers—one by a nutritional scientist (Dewey) and two by anthropologists (Dufour and Anderson) which contain serious methodological problems, especially relevant for the field of nutritional anthropology.

As noted, a process examined or referred to in at least seven of the eleven papers in the volume concerns the effects of modernization on diet. The results, if we can go by these papers, are mixed: in some cases the consequences are deleterious to dietary diversity and quality; in other cases, subsistence production is sustained, or even reasserts itself in the midst of the shift to cash economy, market crops, and store-bought foods. It seems to depend on the nature of the crops, the "culture", and on the passage of time. In general, there seems no doubt that in at least the early stages of transition to the production of cash crops, foodstuffs produced by families with substantial home garden plots, or hunting and gathering activities, become less diverse. Processed foods, sugar, etc, increase in the diet. There is sufficient documentation of this process in the general literature on the Third World to accept it as common. However, it does seem to have a historical dimension; that is, it may well be an early effect, and as the paper by Kunstadter shows, a reversion to home-produced foods may occur later in the process. Alternatively, as the paper by A. & P. Fleuret shows, cash cropping in other settings may have little or no impact.

A paper by Kathryn Dewey, a nutritionist, on the nutritional consequences of a shift to commercial agriculture in a region of Tabasco, Mexico (reprinted from *Human Ecology*; not presented at the meeting) has some ambiguous aspects which exemplify the difficulties in handling dietary change. The region is also affected by intensive oil production, but the study is concerned exclusively with the possible dietary effects resulting from a shift from partial subsistence to cash cropping. Dewey used a sample of 149 preschool children, subjecting them to a standard battery of physiological and somatic tests and measurements designed to measure nutritional effects. She selected children from families that fell into two categories—those who maintained a "a certain degree of self-sufficiency in food through subsis-

tence production'' (p. 113) and those who no longer do so. She immediately acknowledges, however, that this cannot be used as a before-after sampling, since ''all'' families have been affected by the social and economic changes in the region. The point is that there is not nor has there ever been ''pure'' subsistence production in Tabasco; there have always been various degrees, with variability in families' reliance on production for the market.

The findings on nutritional effects are entirely statistical: several hypotheses about causation are related mathematically to the body measurement data from the child sample, and the results, while hedged, seem to ''imply that families in the study who have maintained a greater degree of self-sufficiency are better off nutritionally . . .'' (p. 124). Sugar consumption is a key variable—''there is a significant negative correlation between sugar consumption and height, even when other variables that might influence height are controlled for''(p. 126). Economic variables are examined with reference to the possible effect of rising income: she found that increased income does not mean that nutritional status increases; none of the correlations are statistically significant. She also remarks that there were so few families with significantly higher income that the findings may be meaningless (p. 130).

There is more, but these notes on her findings may serve to provide a basis for discussion. The basic problem is that there is no *direct* physiological demonstration that dietary changes have measurable effects on children: the analysis is entirely statistical; only tendencies are found in the form of correlations of greater or lesser significance. This would mean that in a group of children from families relying on a bought diet, there will be some children who show the expected physical effects and some that do not. So, statistical tendencies aside, why do some children escape the effects? Because their families compensate for dietary deficiencies in some way? Limit candy consumption? Beg, borrow or steal home-produced foods? No information relating to this variation is presented. She acknowledges, properly, that families cannot be separated—''impossible'' (p. 140)—into subsistence and commercial farmers, hence she has only averaged statistical tendencies. Within this vague and contaminated sample, the better method would have been to do ethnography on food habits: examine family food habits to see how in particular cases reliance on cash actually influenced the habits. The reviewer is profoundly skeptical of this type of nutritional survey research, done at one time, and totally neglecting variation, temporal dimensions, and particular stages or phases of a regional socioeconomic change process. There is also no possible way of determining that commercial agriculture is the villain, since the region has been extensively affected by industrial production as well. She cannot distinguish between the two sets of influences, since she reports no data on precisely how particular families responded to particular types of changes—cash cropping, wage labour, media, etc.

With respect to the problem of the relationship of commercial cropping to diet and nutrition, one suspects that the underlying issues are economic, and pertain to the nature of the crop. The paper by A. and P. Fleuret indicates that bananas remain important in East Africa even in areas where extensive commercial agriculture has taken hold—possibly because they have commercial as well as subsistence value. In the Tabasco case, the impact may well have been greater, because the subsistence regime was mainly swidden, based on crops with no commercial significance. Likewise, in the Thai village discussed by Kunstadter, rice continues or resurges as a

staple subsistence food because it has dual importance. The same holds true for cassava in the Pacific, as detailed in the Thaman and Thomas paper. None of these studies, except Kunstadter's, really do the preliminary institutional (economic, etc.) analysis necessary to set the subsistence *vs.* commercial change in proper perspective.

The short-term-study method which is traditional in field ethnography is used in most of these papers, and the financial and temporal exigencies of fieldwork being what they are, one suspects there is not much one can do about it. However, it is apparent that those papers in the book which represent continuous or repeated observations over long periods of time stand out as superior in depth of judgement; in a nutshell, they suggest that if a sufficiently long period of time is given to the study, one tends to find that human groups balance out dietary biases or labor and energy biases in the production sphere. An example of a *short*-term study—four families over a single month of observation—is anthropologist Darna Dufour's account of manioc production in an Amazonian village. Manioc provides most of the calories, she finds, and women do most of the work on manioc. She notes that men focus on "local fish and animal populations"; such foods are important because of their "nutrient density and high protein quality". However, there is no nutritional or labor-time analysis of the contribution of this men-gathered subsistence to parallel the manioc calorie analysis. Her major point is that women work harder than men to produce calories, but in the absence of a companion study of the men's contribution the findings are impossible to evaluate. The original version of the paper, as read at the meeting, had a feminist orientation: somehow the fact that women worked harder to produce calories was evidence of something or other, perhaps exploitation. In the published version, this bias has been partially corrected or at least acknowledged, by noting, in the last sentence of the paper: "Second, the maintenance of stable energy flow by women allows men considerable flexibility in their time-energy budgets, a flexibility which is critical to the exploitation of available animal protein resources" (p. 18). Where is the evidence for this assertion? In addition, fluctuation in manioc supply or processing, due to any number of factors—shortage of women or manioc, modernization effects, etc, would mean that the men's contribution would loom even larger. But this cannot be determined in one month, with only four families as a sample. I do not mean to cast doubt on the specific findings respecting female work on manioc processing, but, without the parallel information on the men's contribution on the non-calorie side, this study has no discernible point.

The paper by anthropologist Eugene Anderson is a good example of the mixture of insight and bias which characterizes some papers and other literature in the nutritional anthropology field. In a sense, there is an urge to have one's cake and eat it too (all puns excused). Step by step: first, Anderson's paper makes some excellent points: he shows how two very different "food systems"—the Malay and the Chinese—exist side by side, and provide their eaters with adequate diets, but have differing implications for long-range dietary viability and resource conservation. This is precisely what food anthropologists ought to do. But this apparently doesn't satisfy, because Anderson takes one more step: he evaluates certain aspects of the diet in terms of scientific nutritional standards, e.g., "However, the large amounts of lard, white flour and sugar in the Chinese diet are at best of dubious value" (pp. 93-94), and these, he continues, are the foods which were introduced in the course of

"modernization". He notes they can be expected to increase in use as modernization progresses, etc.

Again, in one sense this is true and important. However, there are two problems: first, as other papers in the volume attest, traditional subsistence-oriented and desirable food habits can be sustained or can reassert themselves in the midst of modernization, supplementing or ameliorating the effects of modernization; i.e., intake of these "modern" processed foods can persist or increase but their bad (?) effects can be neutralized. The second issue is the use of Western nutritional standards to judge any article of diet, whatever its source, as good or bad. As Angela Little notes in the Introduction (p. xvii), we tend to judge diets nutritionally on the basis of the use of foods in our own Western diet. Is this what Anderson is doing? Probably, but the reviewer should note that the descriptive contributions of his paper tend to outweigh his possible confusion on nutritional standards; i.e., his demonstration that the cultural and economic factors behind the Malay systems are not trivial, but rooted in the institutional patterns of Malay society, minority group status, etc.

Since the majority of papers deal with staples in the form of vegetable crops, there are two categories of foods which are conspicuously neglected in the papers: those regularly used foods with animal protein; and secondary foods of all kinds, snacks, weeds, gifts, vegetable and animal. This neglect is so obvious that it probably explains Schwerin's final paper, where he does his best to pick out of the papers the few references to these non-staple foods in order to set them against the predominant emphasis on staple vegetable foods. As he notes (p. 258), "Our authors have made no attempt to be exhaustive, thus we can expect even greater diversity exists in the local food systems than is documented here". This seems a most kindly acknowledgement of the fact that a book with the resounding general title of this one really does not provide a single detailed analysis of a *whole* diet for anyone.

The issue is this: when one is dealing with these part-subsistence, part market-oriented rural economies, the standards of nutritional analysis used in the Western urban world simply cannot be used with any confidence. Particular intakes of staples may be high or low, but the corresponding fluctuation in incidental and supplementary foods of all kinds will tend to obviate simple conclusions about nutritional adequacy. This lesson was learned a long time ago; it is surprising that so little was done with it in the papers in the volume that represent field studies of diet. Thus Schwerin feels impelled to make up the difference in part by raising the issue and doing his best to provide generalized information.

We are left in some confusion. If the diets of most human groups tend to fluctuate, with stages and stases, and a tendency to move toward a reasonably adequate nutritional level, then what precisely is the role of the expert? Certainly his data and conclusions, drawn from single, synchronic studies, is not much to go on. Nutritional standards, originally felt by anthropologists to be "hard", and offering something better than soft cultural preference standards, have turned out to be extraordinarily slippery, limited by samples, time, and technical difficulties. Energy intake and output have proven resistive to fieldwork.

Where does this leave us? Back where we were in the late 1940s: with the study of *food habits* as the one distinctive contribution anthropologists can make to human diet (e.g Montgomery and Bennett 1979:124-144). How is food produced or acquired, what are the culturally-defined preferences; what potential foods in the environment are neglected because of preferences; how do preferences change and

why? Elements of these queries are present in the papers in this volume, but no single paper provides a detailed description of a complete dietary; hence the ambiguities and omissions. There are of course some gains from using the nutritional approach: one is the use of a simple method of measuring intake, namely, weighing particular foods over a period of time, which is used by those few papers which aim at some sort of analysis, and this is better than attempts at determining actual nutrient content, which has not proven feasible. However, anthropologists need not replicate nutritional analysis; they have their own specialties. There is no substitute for good ethnography on the cultural meaning of food and food preferences, which should not be diluted by chasing after presumably hard data on nutrition and food chemistry, or resorting to generalized geographical descriptions.

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1979 Anthropological Studies of Food and Nutrition. *In* The Uses of Anthropology. Edited by W. Goldschmidt. Washington: American Anthropological Association.

The Nuer Conquest: The Structure and Development of an Expansionist System
Raymond C. Kelly
Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1985. viii + 320 pp.
Maps, Bibliography. Distributed in Canada by John Wiley and Sons. $39.50 (cloth); $17.95 (paper).

Reviewer: Harold K. Schneider
Indiana University

Kelly undertakes an unusual task for African ethnology, the application of a cybernetic analysis, in the tradition of Rappaport, to the Nuer. The question which guides his analysis is "How can we explain the fact that the Nuer, an offshoot of the Dinka and culturally like them, expanded between the years 1818 and 1890 from an area of 8,700 square miles to 35,000 square miles, in the course of which they overran large parts of Dinka and Anuak territory?" Rejecting what he documents as the usual explanation made by such people as Evans-Pritchard and Sahlins, population pressure, he details the differences in the Nuer and Dinka systems, such as the structure of bridewealth distribution, livestock management practices, herd structures, population densities, and others. He develops a cybernetic model showing how the interaction of these variables produced a negative feedback process among Nuer which led to increasing expansion, whereas the Dinka system remained stable. Furthermore, he points to the root cause of this expansion in Nuer ideas of what the ideal bridewealth should be—a cultural cause.

Kelly is to be congratulated for using an approach which takes ethnological analysis in Africa to a higher level than usual, because he attempts to define variables and assess their dynamic impact. Dynamics, in the sense in which the term is used in analytical science, is not one of anthropology's long suits. Think of Almagor's (1978) typical and static analysis of the Dassanetch system as compared to Carr's (1977) social geographic analysis of the same system as it reacted over

several decades to the impact of the Ethiopian and British Sudanese governments closing off their western grazing lands.

Kelly's analysis is reminiscent of economic analysis, but although he uses the word "economic" frequently, there is little that can be called economics in this work, "economic" standing rather for "methods of production." This is too bad. I think an analysis like this would benefit from adding the economic dimension, which would not necessarily conflict with it and would add depth. A fundamental problem with Kelly's model is the lack of quantification of many important variables, so that it comes off looking like modeling without numbers, a heuristic exercise. The ratio of cattle to people is a crucial variable in Kelly's study, but not once in the book are any actual ratios given. Economic analysis, however, has shown that such things as ratios of labor input to output typically assume curvilinear form, with the result that dependable conclusions about such things as production cannot be made by merely projecting linearly these ratios from one level to another.

Kelly's analysis, therefore, while intriguing and worth consideration, is difficult to accept. Most particularly I find it hard to believe that the Nuer stress on the production of cattle beyond subsistence needs, can be explained by their desire to exceed the "ideal" bridewealth payments in order to gain more prestige. And it is precisely this claim which Kelly argues is the engine which drives Nuer expansion.

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Directions in Cognitive Anthropology
Janet W.D. Dougherty, ed
Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1985. 451 pp.

Reviewer: William C. McCormack
University of Calgary

Janet Dougherty, a cognitive anthropologist trained at the University of California (Berkeley) and subsequently a post-doctoral fellow in linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, presents a challenging compilation of fourteen original and four reprinted articles, with pedagogical introductions, to demonstrate "current research by cognitive anthropologists reflecting the contemporary breadth and underlying unity of the field" (Acknowledgments). The unity expressed by Dougherty derives from concentrating on where concepts in folk classification come from—a preoccupation she acknowledges was inspired many years ago by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay (loc. cit. and p. 9). Also represented is a trend derivative of the work of cognitive anthropologists on artificial intelligence—research which con-

siders not only what computers can do, but also what people do, in text comprehension—thus three papers foreground the new interest of cognitive science in analyzing "schemata and discourse rather than categories and lexemes" (p. 429). Topics neglected in this book include ethnomethodology; language and the brain; language acquisition; language and literacy; linguistic pragmatics; nonverbal communication; structuralist, semiotic, and literary theory of symbols; syntax; text linguistics; and Whorfian cryptotypes. Other scholars would likely see unity in cognitive anthropology from the perspective of such areas of research.

Section I raises the problem of interface between thought and language in terms of the theory of fuzzy sets. Three papers, one of which proposes a new formal semantics, favor the view that non-fuzzy mental concepts, as represented in classical logic, become fuzzy as these are mapped verbally onto a real world which experience teaches is not black-or-white (discrete) but variously hued (graded). Conversely, a paper on color-naming in the Tarahumara language supports Paul Kay's claim that colors and other natural categories are inherently fuzzy in thought. The latter position reoccurs in Section III, where a paper culturally analyzing "commitment" in American marriage supports the claim of George Lakoff and Charles Fillmore that the mind—unlike computers—operates by fuzzy logic. Section II papers view the individual as "simultaneously . . . a learner and creator of culture" (p. 8), showing that folk classifications change according to what they are good for, and alter as the individual becomes expert. This variationist theme appears also in Sections I and III, and Naomi Quinn's paper in III is the most salient example of the new trend to utilize discourse analysis to arrive at "the relevance of [specified] schemata in a variety of expressions of group life, showing their repeated value in understanding them" (p. 430).

This collection makes demands on readers to be familiar with the ethnoscientific and conceptualist discourse-analysis techniques of the Yale school, and to be patient when issues of metaphor and schema, Whorfianism, natural logic, semantics, taxonomic formalism, and the omniscient informant are not resolved. At the same time, it is a collection which everyone interested in language, thought, and culture should read.

Spiritualist Healers in Mexico: Successes and Failures of Alternative Therapeutics
Kaja Finkler
Praeger Special Studies. New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1985. xii + 256 pp. Tables, figures, bibliography. $27.95 (cloth).

Reviewer: Michael H. Logan
University of Tennessee

Unlike so many who write on ethnomedical beliefs and practices, Kaja Finkler, in a truly impressive study of Spiritualist healing in Mexico, goes beyond the commonly seen emic and functional analyses of folk medicine to explore something that most anthropologists fail to provide: quantitative data on the outcome of patients treated under the regime of a non-Western medical system. In so doing Finkler effectively intertwines quantitative data with qualitative materials drawn from case-histories

and intensive interviews. The result is an ethnographically rich, yet rigorous portrayal of an alternative health care system. Not only is the reader given a sensitive picture of those who seek the services of faith healers, but more importantly one also gains an understanding of why this mode of therapy succeeds and fails as it does. Though there are numerous other qualities seen in Finkler's book, this single feature, that of breaking away from a tradition of descriptive reporting and conjecture to explore actual patient outcome, is what makes this book so welcome and distinctive.

The research setting for Finkler's book is Juarez (a pseudonym), a rural mestizo town located some 80 miles north of Mexico City in the state of Hidalgo. The people of Juarez and those in neighbouring areas exhibit virtually all of the health problems typical for much of Mexico: poverty, malnutrition, high infant-early childhood death rates, poor public hygiene, contaminated water, and pronounced frequencies of gastrointestinal and upper-respiratory disorders. The ecological and epidemiological profiles set forth by Finkler are useful for understanding the pattern many patients follow in their quest for therapy. Of particular interest are the contrasts drawn by Finkler between Spiritualism and both biomedicine and various means of traditional health care. This adds greatly to the reader's understanding of what Spiritualist healing actually entails.

In Juarez, and elsewhere throughout Mexico, modern medicine coexists with several differing therapeutic systems, ranging from herbalism and midwifery to *curanderismo*. Spiritualist healing, of course, is both an alternative and parallel resource to biomedicine in Mexico, where, since the 1920s, its popularity has grown steadily; it now serves patients from virtually all segments of Mexican Society. While its growth can be attributed primarily to the changing social and economic milieu of Mexico, much of Spiritualism's popularity has resulted from its status as a religion distinct from Catholicism. Finkler emphasizes, and rightly so, that "Spiritualism is first and foremost a religion and only secondarily a health-care delivery establishment" (p. 11). Her overview of the history, organizational structure, and epistemology of Spiritualism as a religious movement is well done, and such coverage blends well into the area of her primary concern, that of Spiritualism as a theory and response to illness.

Central to Spiritualist ideology is the belief that various spiritual entities—all impersonal, yet ranging from the truly malevolent to the benevolent—affect both the onset and cessation of illness among the living. Illness is attributed to spirit intrusion, a condition where a patient's body has been taken over by dark spirits (*seres obscuros*). Healing, as with disease onset, is attributed to spiritual forces, but here benevolent spirits—*media luz* ("moderate light") or, more importantly, *alta luz* ("complete light")—come into play. They enter the body of Spiritualist healers, who then function, frequently in a trance state, as mediums through which these spirits, and ultimately God and the other principals in the Spiritualist pantheon (Jehova, Jesus Christ and Virgin Mary, Father Elias), guide the healer in selecting a course of therapy, which employs both naturalistic procedures, most commonly medicinal plants, and religious purification, here the decoupling of dark spirits from the afflicted patient.

Finkler's interest in Spiritualism developed indirectly from earlier research experiences in Mexico. Through occasional visits to Spiritualist temples she increasingly began to wonder why so many people attended these temples and whether the

"litany of symptoms they presented" (p. ix) could be successfully dealt with through Spiritualist healing. This, coupled with her growing awareness that "few researchers had systematically studied the outcomes of traditional therapies" (p. x), gave cause for doing the research presented in this book. Soon after selecting Juarez as the study locality, Finkler, at risk of creating numerous ethical and professional dilemmas, assumed dual roles, one as an ethnographer and the other, at the urging of temple members, as a Spiritualist healer. Few, if any, anthropologists have come as close to the topic of Spiritualism as Kaja Finkler. Both the depth and quality of her data speak compellingly of the rapport and insight she gained through this dual experience.

Her methodology is exemplary. Key variables are operationalized, contrasts are drawn between Spiritualists and controls, diverse elicitation techniques are employed, hypotheses are assessed statistically. Unlike many studies, Finkler's is replicable. Her findings are equally impressive. She clearly demonstrates that Spiritualist healing "is not a miraculous cure" . . . "nor is it a hoax or sham as it is viewed by many medical practitioners" (p. 193). Spiritualism, like biomedicine, is marked by both success and failure in treating the sick. Assessing therapeutic outcome, though, is extremely difficult. "If the task is problematic for medical practitioners," writes Finkler, "it is formidable for the anthropological study of nonmedical therapeutic regimes" (p. 119). But this is precisely where Finkler succeeds. Her data, drawn through interviews and use of the Cornell Medical Index questionnaire, clearly reveal where Spiritualist healing does have a significant, positive effect on outcome, both in terms of symptom remission and resumption of normal behavior. Though its virtues are limited—"In the majority of cases Spiritualists fail to heal" (p. 136)—this form of therapy does help followers improve the quality of their lives, even though many of their underlying diseases have not been dealt with effectively. Spiritualism's principal strength is symbolic, not medical. But both are essential, of course, for maximizing patient recovery and well-being.

The ultimate contribution of Finkler's research is that, by examining outcomes of Spiritualist healing, other anthropologists can employ her methodological perspectives in their analyses of differing forms of ethnomedical therapy. For as Finkler notes, "Once the therapeutic benefits are assessed in many different cultural contexts, it will be possible to unveil the universal underpinnings of the health-restoring process. This avenue of inquiry is compelling from a theoretical and a clinical perspective because it enables medical practitioners to maximize health-care delivery to the advantage of both patient and healer" (p. 157).

Finkler's book is an important step in this direction. Though limited topically to Spiritualist healing, the implications of this book—methodological, theoretical, applied—go well beyond the subject at hand and the setting of Juarez to touch on questions basic to improving our understanding of culture's complex impact on health and disease.

Nous ne sommes pas programmés : génétique, hérédité, idéologie
Richard C. Lewontin, Steven Rose, Léon J. Kamin
Paris, La Découverte, 1985. Traduit de l'édition américaine, *Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human Nature,* New York, Pantheon Books, 1984.

Reviewer: François-Xavier Ribordy
Université Laurentienne

Ce livre, écrit par un généticien, un neurobiologiste et un psychologue, est une dénontiation du déterminisme biologique pratiqué par certains généticiens, bio-sociologues et criminologues néo-conservateurs qui veulent imposer leurs théories afin de rétablir l'eugénisme pour défendre les intérêts de leur propre classe sociale.

Les auteurs de ce livre analysent, de façon très critique, les études et les preuves présentées par les tenants des thèses de l'inégalité biologique, et démontrent, sans le moindre doute, les faiblesses et les malhonnêtetés de certains chercheurs à les méthodes de recherches inadéquates et invalides, le recueil douteux et la manipulation des données, la fumisterie dê leurs interprétations et de leurs conclusions.

Dans ce livre, la bio-sociologie est replacée dans son contexte historique et idéologique, à savoir celle de la bourgeoisie scientifique qui veut imposer ses jugements de valeur afin de démontrer que les inégalités sociales, sont innées et transmises héréditairement. Il est prouvé que l'intelligence, mesurée par le Q.1., ne mesure que l'intersection sociale, qu'elle n'est pas héréditaire. Les études du psychologue anglais Cyril Burt sur les jumeaux séparés qui démontraient l'hérédité de l'intelligence, se sont avérées l'une des fraudes les plus énormes dans l'histoire des sciences. Le classement hiérarchique du monde, à l'aide de cette mesure, n'a comme base que la notion de classes défendue par certains scientifiques.

En ce qui concerne l'inégalité du patriarcat et la supériorité de l'homme sur la femme, les bio-sociologues étaient parvenus à prouver que par son intelligence, sa force, sa volonté . . . l'homme est fait pour commander, pour diriger, la femme ne peut donc être qu'un animal domestique. Certains neuro-physiologistes et neuro-anatomistes ont réussi à démontrer des différences intellectuelles selon les sexes; par l'étude du poids des cerveaux respectifs et de l'inégalité des hémispheres, ils ont prouvé que le partriarcat est un fait inévitable dans notre société et que l'égalité des sexes est une chimère; enfin, selon eux, nous vivons dans un monde où la compétition et l'agressivité sont nécessaires, et seuls les hommes sont à même d'y faire face.

Ainsi que l'anthropologie physique tente encore de le démontrer, les inégalités sociales sont considérées comme étant d'ordre biologique: la supériorité de la race blanche sur les autres ne ferait aucun doute! Or, des études sérieuses sur le code génétique, sur les groupes sanguins, sur le Q.1., dénoncent les supercheries et prouvent de la non-différence génétique entre les races.

De même, l'hérédité des maladies mentales comme la schizophrénie, telle que mise de l'avant part certains biologistes, est fortement mise en doute. Lorsqu'on réexamine scrupuleusement les résultats des recherches familiales, gémellelaires, et sur les enfants adoptés, on s'aperçoit du peu de valeur scientifique des chiffres et, par voie de conséquence, de leur interprétation, si bien que tout laisse croire que la schizophrénie serait un phénomène social, et cela tant au point de vue épidémiologique que stigmatique.

Les auteurs de ce livre se posent la question de savoir pourquoi tant de gens, scientifiques et non, croient en l'hérédité de l'intelligence, des comportements, de la criminalité. . . . C'est parce que c'est là ce qu'ils veulent croire. . . . C'est parce que cela répond à leur vision d'une société de classes. . . . Une société dans laquelle ils se placent au sommet de la hiérarchie. . . . Et qu'il est commode d'y demeurer quond les inégalités se perpétuent et que certains sont plus égaux que d'autres.

Les déterministes biologiques, n'utilisent dans leur recherches que quelques variables allant dans le sens de leurs préjugés, et ne rendant pas compte de l'énorme complexité du social qui ne se limite pas à quelques gènes, et cela d'autant plus lorsque ces études sont conduites pour des raisons nettement idéologiques.

Ce livre comporte unê bibliographie impressionnante, qui permet aux lecteurs et aux chercheurs d'approfondir leurs connaissances. Ce livre est un manuel à utiliser dans des cours universitaires, en biologie, en psychologie, en sociologie, en anthropologie, en criminologie, en histoire et même en science politique. La traduction française est excellente et exprime bien la pensée des auteurs tout en évitant l'ésotérisme et l'hexagonal.

Four Villages: Architecture in Nepal
Katherine D. Blair
Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press co-published with the Craft and Folk Art Museum (Los Angeles), 1985. 71 pp. $10.00 (paper).

Reviewer: Robert A. Paul
Emory University

This book is the result of a museum exhibition of the same name, and its layout and format reflect its origins: it is a slim but oversized paperback, with numerous black and white photographs and architectural drawings. The book is not just a catalogue for the exhibit, however, nor is it essentially a picture book or coffee-table volume. The author has attempted through a juxtaposition of photos, diagrams, and expository prose to capture the distinctive styles of architecture of four different ethnic groups and ecologies in Nepal, situating the houses and villages in cultural context.

After an introductory chapter, which does a creditable job of summarizing essential geographic, economic, and social aspects of Nepal in general, the book consists of four chapters, each divided into two sections. The first section of each chapter attempts a thumbnail ethnography of the group whose architecture is being discussed while the second section focusses on the design, use, and construction of a typical house in the village studied.

The four ethnic groups surveyed include Tharus of an Inner Terai Valley; Gurungs of the Modi River Valley; Marphalis of Panchgaon, a subgroup of Thakalis living in an inner Himalayan valley below Dhaulagiri, and Newars living in a village in the Kathmandu Valley.

The book is at its best explaining the suitability of house styles to the local conditions in which they are found. Factors as varied as climate, land use, raw material availability, transport, labor sources, balanced requirements for sunlight and protection against cold and wind, structural requirements, history, and aesthetic traditions

are shown to interact to determine the recognizably distinctive features of village and house styles in the different groups. Thus one learns, for example, that the absence of chimneys, leading to smoke-filled houses, has the advantage of reducing the threat of wood-boring insects by coating timbers with tar, and of keeping out malarial mosquitos. The lowland dwelling Tharus, hence, put up with the smoke; while the Marphalis, in their high and dry climate, have responded eagerly to the innovation of chimneys made out of flattened transport tins.

The idea of looking at cultures through their architecture, and at architecture as a cultural product, is a good one. Because of this, one wishes the author had pursued it in a somewhat more ambitious and systematic way. The anthropologist would have benefitted from more data on household composition, land ownership, and numerous other matters while the architectural reader, I would guess, will find technical information lacking. Likewise, the photos at present constitute a nice travel essay, but do not really constitute a disciplined approach to the subject.

The book's ambitions are, however, relatively modest. The author makes no effort to claim that these four villages represent anything other than themselves; and there is no unifying framework of theory or comparison. Within the limits of what it attempts, then, this book is a slight but attractive presentation of an interesting aspect of Nepali ethnography.

The Lowland Maya Postclassic
Edited by Arlen F. Chase and Prudence M. Rice
Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1985. viii + 352 pp. Photos, maps, charts, bibliography. n.p. (cloth).

Reviewer: Richard E.W. Adams
University of Texas at San Antonio

This is a valiant attempt to put together a coherent volume on the Maya Lowland Postclassic period (ca. 900-1540 AD). Unfortunately, it does not meet the tests of utility, comprehensiveness, or currency. Ten essays were taken from a 1979 symposium organized for the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association, others added, an introduction written, bridging passages inserted by the editors, and a final synthesis written by David Freidel.

The volume editors say that they aim at a state of the art assessment, interpretation, and explanation of the Postclassic. Most of the articles and papers are by researchers who have recently been or currently are engaged in work which bears on the questions of the Postclassic. However, the author list is selective and thereby omits important people, data, and ideas. Several themes of the Postclassic are identified by the editors and include those of long distance trade, locations of communities in coastal and riverine situations, and the emphasis on militarism. A space of 250,000 square kilometres, and a time span of 600 years are the framework. Five regions which comprehend some 50% of the total area are defined. The remainder of the lowlands are either unknown during the period or refuge zones.

The book largely consists of the specific and sometimes excessively detailed reports on recent project results. The lack of comprehensiveness is created by the fact that no effort is made to systematically review and integrate information on the

major sites of the Postclassic: Chichen Itza, Mayapan, Tulum, Acanceh, and others. Thus a curious situation is created of major holes around which the authors and editors talk. Nonetheless, some quite good data is placed on record, and some very stimulating interpretations are suggested. The Lamanai site in Belize is discussed by David Pendergast who points out the continuities and lack of disjunctions between the Classic and Postclassic at the site, which seems to have been continuously occupied from ca. 250 BC until ca. 1700 AD. Important work on the Yucatec intrusions into the south at the time of the Classic collapse are documented and discussed by the Chases, the Rices, and others. Here one wonders why Hammond's crucial data on the question were not used; the bibliography has citations up to 1983 when that information was available. It becomes clear, on reading closely, that not all papers were updated after 1979. Mis-citations and some other bibliographic problems compound this atavism. Some papers contain misstatements of fact and misreadings of the writings of others.

Among the most stimulating of the papers is the work of Joseph Ball who suggests that in the Postclassic record of Central Campeche we have a set of refugee populations. Wonderly, in his discussion of the Sula area of Honduras, makes excellent use of archaeological and ethnohistoric data. Other candles also shine in the general darkness.

Freidel attempts to draw together the disparate threads of discussion and information. He notes three themes that emerge: continuity and disjunction, the role of external groups in the lowland Maya postclassic, and the heterogeneity of postclassic cultural groups. In spite of this readable and interesting essay, the volume does not constitute what is needed. That is, we still lack a comprehensive, carefully systematic, and balanced assessment of all of the data and theory on the Lowland Maya Postclassic; a volume which will complement those on the Collapse, the Origins, and the Settlement Patterns.

The book can be used with care by professionals who already know the literature, and can avoid the pitfalls of error in interpretation, citation, and fact.

Yawar Fiesta
Jose Maria Arguedas
Translated by Frances Horning Barraclough. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1985. lxxi + 200 pp. $19.95 (cloth), $8.95 (paper).

Reviewer: Susan Niles
Lafayette College

Set in the highland town of Puquio in the 1930s, Arguedas' novel describes residents' plans for a bullfight to celebrate Peru's national holiday. Traditionally a way for men of two *ayllus* to compete for honor in the bloody festival that gives the work its title, the "Indian bullfight" is banned by officials who force the town to hire a Spanish bullfighter to instill proper moral values in the peasants. The novel focuses on the interaction of members of the *ayllus*, local mestizos, representatives of the government, and university students returning from Lima as they react to, and eventually reject, the government edict. Arguedas compares the history of Puquio's construction of a road with the story of the domination of the bull to demonstrate the

effectiveness and courage of the natives as they work toward a common goal and to show the failure of alien institutions to meet the needs of that population.

Despite the richness of the characterization in the work and the inherent drama in the events it chronicles, *Yawar Fiesta*is a difficult novel for a reader who is not already familiar with the Andes. It requires an understanding of the intricacies of the Peruvian class system, conveyed in style of speech and terms of address, to follow the conflict between the various groups. Most of the events are recounted in dialogue, in a style of speech Arguedas created to include regionalisms and syntactic errors that a monolingual Spanish speaker might expect to hear from a Quechua speaker. As he explains in his introductory essay (pp. xiii-xxi), it is a speech style with great connotative value in Peruvian Spanish. Unfortunately, this kind of dialogue poses enormous challenges to the translator. Ms. Barraclough chose to offer a literal translation of the dialogue, resulting in an ungrammatical and distracting speech. The Puquians end up sounding less like members of an underclass than like Yoda: "'My eye first he'll take out! Like thieving sparrowhawk my eye first he'll eat!'" (p. 8). It would have been more effective for the translator to be less faithful to the original and create a language that would make sense in English.

The decision to offer a literal translation results in the use of uncommon and formal words that sound unnatural and lead to a stiffness of style that is not appropriate to the spirit of the novel. For example, *gamonal* is consistently translated as "landowning exploiter." This phrase is plausible when it is used by a university student, spouting revolutionary phrases as he sits beneath a photograph of Mariategui (p. 73); it is absurd when offered as a neutral description of social status: "'The Priest is inside there, the Mayor, all the landowning exploiters, and Don Julian Aranguena'" (p. 50).

The same problem is seen in the lumbering translation of the ethnographic essay that follows the novel. Anthropologists will be dismayed to see that native terms for social divisions and political offices have all been translated into English, with minimal explanatory notes.

I had hoped that this edition would make Arguedas' fine novel available for classroom use as a fictional supplement to an ethnography that considers highland class interactions. Unfortunately, the translation is so unsuccessful as to be nearly incomprehensible to me, and I could not imagine using it with students new to Andean studies. It is to be hoped that future offerings of Indianist novels in this series will be more successfully translated, as there is a real need for such works to be available.

The Production of Inequality: Gender and Exchange Among the Kewa
Lisette Josephides
New York: Tavistock, 1985. x + 242 pp. Maps, charts, glossary, bibliography, name and subject indexes.

Reviewer: Paula Brown Glick
State University of New York

The top "in" words this year are inequality and production; exchange and gender are demoted to subtitle status. Power is rising, transaction steady, reciprocity declin-

ing, sexual antagonism must be refined. Discussion of key terms and their interconnections, causal and co-varying, is weighted with references to recent analysis in the New Guinea highlands, as Josephides reports her fieldwork among the Kewa of the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea.

The book's earlier incarnation as a doctoral thesis under the direction of Andrew Strathern is stated at the start. The author also takes up interpretations of Godelier, Modjeska, Feil, Meggitt, Lederman, Le Roy, Sillitoe, M. Strathern, and theoretical positions of Marx, Mauss, Gregory, Ortner and Whitehead, Rosaldo, and some few others. Kewa data are introduced to support or contrast with these other descriptions and interpretations, especially of the Mendi, Enga and Melpa of the highlands.

The main argument is both clear and acceptable. Male dominance of the exchange system, control of land, female labour and resources, patriliny, and patrilocality, result in women having the status of "peripheral sojourners" in their fathers' and their husbands' clan and settlement. Women are equally subordinate. However, men are unequally dominant. While Kewa men do not accumulate wealth or control large exchange networks, there is a male status hierarchy.

I found the criteria for big men and power inconsistent, perhaps because Josephides does not carefully distinguish precontact, recent, and contemporary roles. Traditionally warriors and effective orators were important. Big men were the leaders of cults which were introduced from other communities, celebrated with pig kills, and then discarded for new cults. The founders of settlements are big men who mobilize their relatives and adherents to organize pig kills. A big man may hire labour to prepare a large garden area, paying the workers with pork. He adds to his capacity to produce food and pigs, and thus his exchange potential. When Josephides did her field study money, gained from cash crops and migrant labour, had become necessary for status and exchange. She found that a wise and effective mediator is respected. The elected councilors and magistrates are big men because of their power to influence people and resolve disputes. If power is the measure of status, these are different powers which need not reside in the same person. We may begin to look for differentials among these leaders.

The ethnographic information is not entirely satisfactory. The involvement of former cults, traditional dancers, and contemporary Christian sects in pig feasts is unexplained. It would appear that the peacemaking and ritual functions of pig kills have gone while the activities continue, but this is unfortunately not examined. The role of women as links between their natal and husbands' groups, and the jurisdiction they have in allocating pork among their relatives at pig kills could be more closely examined.

The Production of Inequality seems under-edited: its readability, judgmental phrasing, inconsistency of tense, and the way that paragraphs run on with connectives (yet, but, although, while, etc.) could all be improved. Despite these criticisms I feel that the book, with its stunning aphorisms, is a valuable contribution. It brings together current thinking and provides an excellent and distinctive case study of the Kewa pig feast complex, the relationship between production by women and transactions of men, and the big man system. Anthropology of the New Guinea highlands has stimulated the most penetrating analyses of the complexities of hierarchy without accumulation. Josephides's work will surely be appreciated and dissected by the next wave of writers on inequality and production.

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1967 Les structures élémentaires de la parenté. Paris: Mouton. Publication originale en 1949.

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