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

NUMÉRO SPÉCIAL/SPECIAL ISSUE

VICTOR TURNER:

UN HOMMAGE CANADIEN

A CANADIAN TRIBUTE

THE HECKMAN BINDERY, INC. N. MANCHESTER, INDIANA

Sous la direction de/Guest Edited by PAUL BOUISSAC

COLLABORATEURS/CONTRIBUTORS

Henry G. Barnard, Paul Bouissac, Ronald L. Grimes,
Charles D. Laughlin, Jr., Andrew P. Lyons, Harriet D. Lyons,
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PRÉSENTATION

Paul Bouissac
University of Toronto

> All is in motion but some social flows move so slowly relatively to others that they seem almost as fixed and stationary as the landscape and the geographical levels under it, though these too, are, of course, forever in slow flux. (Turner 1974:44).

Le legs de Victor Turner aux sciences humaines se présente sous la forme d'un défi. En effet, la conceptualisation des phénomènes sociaux implique en général une certaine abstraction de leur dimension temporelle en faveur de traits relativement stables, permanents ou universels. C'est donc bien une entreprise en quelque sorte paradoxale—mais qui peut difficilement être éludée—que de tenter de conceptualiser le mouvement, le flux, le changement perpétuel, etc., non en tant qu'êtres de raisons, entités physiques ou mathématiques, mais dans la réalité humaine, à travers l'expérience du devenir social. Le projet héraclitéen qui lança Victor Turner dans sa quête du temps nous a valu une abondance de métaphores originales, d'analogies fertiles et d'irrésistibles néologismes. En définissant "Societas" comme "un processus comportant quelques traits systématiques, plutôt que comme un modèle construit d'après un système organique ou mécanique" ("as a process with some systematic features, rather than as modelled on an abstract organic or mechanical system" [1982:29]), Turner a tenté d'opérer un renversement total de l'approche dominante de son époque. Revendication romantique certes, mais aussi audace intellectuelle qui consiste à confronter la pensée du temps non comme objet abstrait, dialectiquement ou autrement, mais comme vécu social. Chercher à appréhender les concepts en tant que procès réels de sociétés en devenir constant conduit inévitablement à reconnaître, dans tous les sens du mot, d'innombrables chevauchements, des frontières incertaines, des zones floues, des lacunes béantes et même d'irréductibles incohérences, qui, pensés dans leur ensemble, suggèrent un ordre supérieur qui transcenderait l'artificialité des constructions théoriques bien définies. Vouloir décrire cet ordre, et, en même temps, rendre compte exactement de l'expérience quotidienne, ce fut là le défi de Victor Turner. Une telle entreprise ne saurait être menée à bien sans un méta-langage très puissant. Les mathématiques auraient pu lui en fournir l'outil; l'autre possibilité qui s'offrait était le langage métaphorique, poétique, religieux. Tout le portait vers cette seconde voie, sa formation, son tempérament, ses dons de créateur et de communicateur. Il convenait toutefois de soumettre l'imagination créatrice à un certain degré de systématicité dans la construction et l'utilisation de ce métalangage; d'où un ensemble de concepts, empruntés à des domaines très différents, mais

articulés les uns aux autres afin de forger un instrument assez souple capable de conceptualiser toute cette part de l'expérience qui échappe, semble-t-il, à l'analyse des structures. "Drame," "rituel," "liminalité," "communitas," "societas," etc., sont suffisament connus et ont été assez discutés, contestés, défendus, utilisés et redéfinis au cours des deux dernières décennies pour qu'il soit nécessaire d'y revenir ici. Le débat, d'ailleurs, est loin d'être clos. Qu'il suffise de noter le profit intellectuel et existentiel que de nombreux chercheurs ont trouvé dans ce langage, y puisant la force et les moyens méthodologiques d'affronter des objets se prêtant mal, en apparence, à des réductions de type structuraliste. Certes, la démarche peut être, et a été contestée; mais la leçon demeure: l'objet des sciences humaines ne saurait être complet s'il n'inclut les émotions, les sentiments, les transformations individuelles et collectives qui forment la texture, sinon l'armature, du vécu social, un vécu en constant devenir que rien n'arrête sinon, çà et là, ponctuellement, la mort.

Les chercheurs canadiens qui ont décidé de collaborer à ce numéro d'*Anthropologica*, publié en hommage posthume à Victor Turner, ont voulu ainsi témoigner de ce qu'ils doivent à sa pensée et à sa personne et cela à des titres divers; il est significatif que s'y côtoient des disciples de toujours et des amis de l'autre bord, si l'on peut dire; des collègues qui se remémorent avec émotion des débats parfois vifs auxquels succédaient des libations réconciliatoires et de jeunes chercheurs qui n'ont connu Victor Turner que par ses livres. La contribution de sa famille même à ce volume est la marque d'un certain éthos Turnérien s'embarrassant peu des contraintes d'écoles et de clans, et plaçant sa foi et son honneur dans une communication généreuse et loyale. Sa famille s'entend ici, comme il se doit, au sens large et inclut Richard Schechner qui depuis plus de dix ans participait à toutes les aventures intellectuelles de son mentor.

Il serait exagéré de prétendre que les articles réunis dans ce volume forment un tout structuré et parfaitement cohérent. L'ordre dans lequel ils sont présentés obéit toutefois à un certain rituel.

Il convenait que les proches ouvrent et ferment le cortège où soient symboliquement représentés l'Afrique, la politique, la musique, la littérature, le carnaval, la religion, l'école et le théâtre. Non que cette liste épuise tous les domaines dans lesquels Victor Turner a laissé sa marque; mais c'est ici la diversité même qui fait signe.

Eric Schwimmer, invité de l'autre bord de l'Anthropologie, rend un hommage technique, si l'on peut dire, au maître de l'anti-structure, hommage sans lequel ce volume resterait aux confins de l'inceste intellectuel.

Avec la contribution de Frank Manning, incontestablement l'un des plus éminents "turnériens" du Canada, est abordé ce qui peut apparaître comme le problème central de la pensée de Victor Turner: la dimension politique des rites, à la fois instruments de contrôle et moyens de libération, lieux de tensions, perpétuellement à négocier, entre l'oppression des structures sociales, toujours promptes à "redresser" les déviations, et la subversion de ces structures d'exclusion par la "communitas," nourrie par l'émergence constante et puissante d'anti-structures. Partant du concept de "social drama"—que l'on hésite à traduire par "drame social" pour des raisons évidentes—Manning en vient à proposer, dans une analyse de la vie politique dans les Caraïbes, l'idée de "theatre state"—l'état-théâtre où toutes les formes culturelles, en particulier la musique, jouent leur rôle, comme l'avait fait Clifford Geertz à propos de Bali.

Andrew et Harriet Lyons, s'inspirant de la thèse que "liminalité" et "communitas" ne sont pas des phénomènes limités aux sociétés traditionnelles mais peuvent s'observer dans la cité moderne, entreprennent d'examiner de ce point de vue des séries dramatiques programmées à la télévision nigérienne (Benin City), et dont le thème est "la lutte des classes."

Ronald Grimes explore l'inspiration dramaturgique de la théorie anthropologique de Victor Turner par le biais d'une comparaison entre son concept de "social drama" et l'idée de "drame rituel" de T. S. Eliot, comparaison qui gravite autour de l'exemple de *Meurtre dans la cathédrale*.

En proposant une analyse de quelques numéros acrobatiques sous le double signe de la pyramide et de la roue, je souligne dans ma propre contribution, l'opposition constitutive entre structure et anti-structure qui articule le sens produit par ces numéros. Comme beaucoup d'autres rites, le cirque est en effet à la fois "redressement" et "déviation," et sans doute faut-il chercher dans cette ambiguïté l'origine de sa fascination.

Ann Miller examine le processus interprétatif entrepris par les communautés religieuses féminines au cours des années 70, notamment la redéfinition du cloître. Elle analyse les métaphores liminales utilisées dans ce processus de restructuration sociale: de l'épouse transcendante du Christ au clown profane.

Dans son article sur l'esprit du don, Charles Laughlin, partant du célèbre essai de Marcel Mauss, intègre les théories anthropologiques, philosophiques et religieuses du don dans une perspective qui inclut des notions d'amour, de sociabilité, de flux et de totalité—c'est-à-dire tout ce qui relève du concept turnérien de "communitas"—et qui s'oppose aux comportements d'accaparement, de peur, d'égoisme et de fragmentation—phénomènes de "structures" par excellence.

L'école, lieu où ces structures sociales se forgent, est l'objet de l'analyse présentée par Peter McLaren. À partir de la notion de "rite," qu'il réexamine d'un point de vue critique, il construit un modèle conceptuel qui lui permet d'aborder l'étude anthropologique de l'instruction scolaire dans une école secondaire urbaine. Il identifie ainsi les principales formes d'interaction—parmi lesquelles la manipulation pédagogique des symboles revêt une importance particulière—et il les interprète en fonction d'une typologie du rite.

Richard Schechner, enfin, qui collabora avec Victor Turner à de nombreux projets, décrit les dernières directions prises par cette intelligence ouverte, toujours confrontée à de nouveaux défis, leur faisant face avec appétit et générosité; neuropsychologie, éthologie, génétique, sociobiologie furent pour Victor Turner autant d'occasions de redéfinir ses positions, de se resituer par rapport aux plus récentes avancées de la connaissance, sans s'interdire naturellement de les interpréter en fonction de sa propre vision de l'humanité.

Il reste à espérer que cet hommage canadien à Victor Turner portera non seulement témoignage de l'influence de sa pensée dans les domaines les plus divers des sciences humaines, mais contribuera aussi à prolonger cette pensée attentive au devenir, soucieuse de saisir les nouvements subtils, les tensions latentes, les cheminements souterrains qui continuent de façonner, lentement mais inexorablement, nos paysages les plus familiers.

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

Victor Witter Turner (1920-1983)

Photograph by Edith L. Turner

VICTOR TURNER AS WE REMEMBER HIM

Edith Turner
University of Virginia

Frederick Turner
University of Texas at Dallas

Ce texte met l'accent sur la personnalité de Victor W. Turner. Il discute de ses impressions sur la conscience, sur la mort et la religion; il décrit ses mythes personnels: Peter Pan; le chevalier, la mort et le démon; la licorne. Turner a livré, par ailleurs, ses propres concepts de "liminalité" et de "communitas" qui ont maintenant une existence autonome. Il était un père généreux, un agréable humaniste et un poète. Politiquement, il était populiste et pacifiste. Il aimait tous les arts quoiqu'il appréciait surtout le folklore. La famille, ses amis, et ses collègues le regrettent profondément.

This memoir concentrates on the personal side of Victor W. Turner. It discusses his feelings about consciousness, death, and religion, and describes his personal myths: Peter Pan; the Knight, Death, and the Devil; and the Unicorn. Turner lived his own concepts of liminality and commmunitas, yet stood outside them. He was a generous father, a delightful humorist, and a poet. His politics were populist and pacifist, and he was omnivorous in his artistic tastes, although he especially liked folk art. He is deeply missed by his family, his friends, and his colleagues.

Those who knew Victor Turner only through his mainstream anthropological writings knew him as a remarkable ethnologist and scholar: a social scientist and heir of the great tradition of British anthropology, a master of fieldwork technique, and an intellectual whose unerring grasp of theory and method, erudition in several collateral fields, and analytic brilliance created several classic books. He was perhaps the foremost exponent of the comparative study of ritual of his time.

Readers who stepped further in and saw through the dense prose to the pleasurable play of thought, who took the poetic, philosophical, and mystical references in Vic's books seriously, and who investigated some of his more speculative and wide-ranging essays, might discover another layer to his thought. Vic was also a philosopher of religion and art whose work is becoming increasingly influential as an instrument of religious reform and renewal and as a significant new direction in hermeneutics and

semiotics. His work is also a theoretical foundation for exciting new directions in the performing arts.

Towards the end of his career, Vic was working in yet another direction: a new psychology based on the remarkable body of recent discoveries about the anatomy, function, and development of the human brain.

Personal memoirs such as this usually propose a sort of revisionist "inside view" which can lead the public to a "humanized" assessment of a major figure. By "humanized," we mean reduced, relativized, and subject to accusations of ideological bias or to personal attack. Freud and Frost, to name but two, have suffered in this way, and many readers are oddly relieved by an excuse to write off the uncomfortable presence of true originality in their midst. We can offer no such comfort here. The more one knows about Vic's life, the more entirely authentic it is, and the more convincing the personal warrant of his work becomes. Vic needs no humanizing. Not that he was without personal weaknesses, flaws, and secrets; but his weaknesses were the kind that made his friends love him even more, and his flaws were the natural result of the scale on which he had his being. His secrets never stayed secret very long, and were as much a cause for amusement and sympathy as for surprise when they came out.

For the record, Vic was a painstakingly conscientious and generous teacher, a faithful friend even when it meant breaking a friend's unhealthy dependence on him, a loving and beloved father, and a husband who was a friend, hero, conspirator, and lover. He himself believed that he was a wicked man and that his own feelings of love and generosity were invalid because he was so conscious of all his own thought processes (he believed his left hand always knew what the right was doing). Vic never believed in the authenticity of his own moral virtues because he doubted their spontaneity on the grounds of the clarity of his self-awareness. His very humility was one thing nobody could argue him out of; he was convinced of his own constitutional dishonesty. In fact, there has never been a more honest man.

Vic's only real flaw was his fear of death. This was related to the luminousness of his self-consciousness; he didn't believe he had a real being of his own, but that he was only his consciousness, and when that ceased, he would disappear. We think that he believed in the immortality of other people's souls, but not his own.

Yet Vic was a very pious man—a pious and honorable communist in his youth, and a pious Catholic with a devotion to the Virgin Mary in his maturity. His love for the Virgin Mary was from the outside, so to speak, as he affirmed a communion which he felt he was too wicked to share. Not that there was anything

limited in his piety; he was a pious adherent of the Ndembu cult of Kavula the thunder god, and in his own fashion, a good Hindu, a good Jew, a Shintoist, a Blakean or Eckhartian mystic, and a brilliant atheist humanist. His mind, like Walt Whitman's, embraced multitudes, and his deepest motto was "nothing human is alien to me." Contraries did not sit passively in his consciousness; his pluralism was an active and energetic source of positive ideas and testable hypotheses.

Three of Vic's personal myths are very revealing. All of his life he saw himself as Peter Pan, the boy who runs away from home, learns to fly, never grows up, and is forever locked out of the warm house of his parents and must stare from the dark through the window at those who have forgotten him. Vic's second myth found a reflection in Albrecht Dürer's etching of the knight, death, and the devil; death for Vic always rode at his shoulder, and though he kept the faith, he could not escape its scythe. The third myth was the unicorn in Rilke's marvelous poem. Vic felt himself to be a mythical beast, a chimera, something that didn't really exist. These are all myths of innocence, and they are accurate symbols of Vic's psychic world. It is very strange to say of one as intensely self-aware as Vic that he was an innocent, but that is true. He had perhaps a kind of innocence and spontaneity that lies on the far side of the most involuted self-analysis.

Many people knew Vic as the life and soul of the very best anthropological parties, and a grand drinking companion and raconteur. His Ndembu hunter's dance (which was done on his arthritic hip with undiminished *brio* in his later years), and his renditions of Robert Burns and the comedian Harry Lauder are legendary. His accent would shift into broad Scots as the party warmed up. In the words of one observer, he had a Dionysian vocation, but there is a sort of pathos in the Bacchus figure, a sacrificial quality, and even a touch of the scapegoat. Maybe there was something manic and addictive about him, as there was about the actor John Belushi. Although people warmed their hands at Vic, his parties were his attempt to create a communion which, because of his alienness (his single horn, or his wings), he could not fully share. Faust, too, was one of his myths: *O lente lente currite equis nocte*. Although Vic knew *communitas* when he saw it and was more talented than anyone at creating it, he always felt that it would justly reject him. Likewise, he believed Freud's theory that one day his sons would rise up against him and destroy him, and he always wanted to let his sons have their victory without incurring guilt for the crime.

We think that in his last months, after his first heart attack, Vic lost his fear of death. He became very quiet, cheerful, and gentle, like a child.

Vic was the most marvelous father one could imagine. He read all the great adventure stories and as much of the classics to us as we were old enough to take, including a great deal of Shakespeare. He read *The Lord of the Rings* three times, *The Once and Future King* twice, all of John Buchan, all of Kipling, *Hornblower*, Marryat, Selma Lagerlof, Tove Janssen, Grimm, Andersen, Jack London, Conan Doyle, and Rider Haggard. And he did this with an astonishing range of voices and accents. To this day, we cannot reread any of these books without hearing the characterizations he created. His mother, he reminded us, was an actress, and he was a ham at heart.

On weekends, Vic took us on long drives or walks with a picnic. We climbed Table Mountain in South Africa and explored the Capetown docks, made unauthorized forays by truck from Zambia into Angola and what was then the Congo, and rediscovered the sources of the Zambesi and the great Zambesi rapids in the Mwinilunga district of Zambia. We escaped brushfires and furious hornets and ate the delicious alien fruit of Africa: the mucha, the nshindwa, and the mfungu. In England, Vic took us up the mountains of the Peak District, up the witch-haunted hill of Pendle, and into the rich, creamy countryside of Cheshire. And then into America: Half Moon Bay and Crystal Springs Lake in California, Lake Cayuga in New York state, and the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia.

This was an extremely funny man. He was well known for his puns, which were complicated, vile, often multilingual, crusted with etymological excrescences, and liable to hideous variations and prologations. He told funny anecdotes with consummate timing and had fine lines in Rabelaisian and gallows humor.

Vic was constantly curious about other people. He must have remembered many hundreds of names, along with people's actions, marriages, nationalities, religious affiliations, and racial backgrounds. He loved and valued the differences in people, and had anecdotes about everybody that we can never remember as cruel, though they were often ridiculous. He was curious about all ideas, and would entertain *any* position to see how it worked and how fertile it might be.

Vic remained a populist and a pacifist all his life. He was a conscientious objector during the Second World War and volunteered for the very dangerous bomb disposal service. Although he was Old Left most of his life, there was a period when he was something of an ultramontane G. K. Chesterton conservative, and he had a great deal of sympathy for the radical Third World Left. But he had none of the intolerance and self-righteousness that characterizes the far left and right. Though he began as a classicist and student of English literature, and dearly loved high culture and the classics, he loved popular and folk culture even more.

In music and art, Vic enjoyed the vigorous, the colorful, and the full-blooded. He liked Gauguin, Rodin, and Dürer, demotic Hindu and Buddist art, and Mexican and Brazilian folk art. He liked Mahler, Beethoven, Louis Armstrong, Harry Lauder, and Brazilian Samba music. His favorite poets were Rilke, Blake, Rimbaud, and Whitman; his favorite novelists were Dostoyevsky and D. H. Lawrence. But what he read most avidly when he could relax was science fiction, and he could engulf two or three science fiction novels at a time.

Although Vic loved all the forms of order and structure in the world and in human culture, he loved the chaotic forces which subvert and overthrow these forms even more. He felt intuitively that chaos was fertile, productive, and creative, and would have enjoyed the new discoveries in mathematics about fractals, strange attractors, period doubling, and the rich morphogenesis that flourishes unpredictably on the outside edges of predictable order.

It may seem strange that an anthropologist as distinguished as Vic always felt that he had missed his true calling. He often said that he really wanted to be a poet, but had fallen into anthropology, if not by accident, through following his interest and curiosity rather than his destiny. But this may have been a way of encouraging his children, all of whom are poets and writers of one kind or another, for he would say that it was up to us to achieve what he had failed to do. In actual fact, Vic wrote poetry all his life, but did not have the time or the contact with other literary people to prepare his work for publication. We believe that much of his poetry is remarkable and worthy of publication. In any case, when Vic was maturing as a writer, the available poetic forms did not provide sufficient scope for his remarkable powers as a creative scientist, philosopher, and storyteller.

Although Vic treasured the capacity his reputation gave him of being able to help bright graduate students of his own intellectual "tribe," he was totally uninterested in money, status, and power. He was unconcerned about his personal appearance (his clothes were a disgrace), but remained a little vain about his unflagging skill at table-tennis, and he always boasted about his youthful prowess at soccer (his nickname was "the Tank") and as a middle-distance runner. Because he never did things in an ordinary way, he was the despair of college administrators. He gave money away and then worried about it afterwards. Unless one counts a certain innocent and unconscious dignity that was the result of Vic's disinclination to waste time with what he called "bullshit," he never stood on his dignity.

Our family life was often stormy. Although his children felt very free to rebel against Vic, and did, we had a very loving family life with deep trust in the basic ties that made us

more willing to explore our differences, to try to convert others in the family to our own points of view, and even to launch unrestrained and glorious attacks on each other's opinions. Vic never stood above an argument. Instead, he always tried out the ideas of the other side on his own pulses, became interested and upset if these ideas made sense, and then incorporated them into his own position the next time.

No doubt every person's death is the archetypal death to his or her children or spouse. But to us, Vic's death seems especially to exhibit the steep contrast between the warm, astonishing, manifested vitality of life and the muffled and inexplicable darkness of death. It also means the contrast between the pathetic fleshliness, vulnerability, and grotesque comedy of the body, and the unforgettable and continuing dynamism of whatever it is we mean by the soul. Vic had two funerals. The first was a Requiem Mass in church, which was the best kind of farewell, with readings from Rilke's beautiful ninth Elegy on the Country of Pain, and from Ezekiel, Gerard Manley Hopkins, the Sermon on the Mount, and Paul's epistle on love to the Corinthians. There was another funeral at home afterwards, with Vic's family, students, and anthropological and theatrical friends re-enacting a full-scale Ndembu funeral for a tribal chief. All of this was done properly according to Vic's own field notes, with drums, masked dancers, ritual, and large quantities of beer and spirits. In that second funeral, we all felt Vic's spirit, dancing and singing among us as he would have done in life.

A TRIBUTE TO VICTOR TURNER (1920-1983)

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Cet article présente une courte esquisse bibliographique pour résumer certains rôles importants que Victor W. Turner a joué dans diverses disciplines et quelques-unes de ses principales contributions théoriques. En mettant l'accent sur la nature originale et interdisciplinaire des thèses de Turner sur la théorie du rituel et sur la symbologie comparée, l'article soutient que l'héritage de Turner constitue une des grandes contributions de notre ère à la théorie du social.

This article uses a brief biographical sketch to summarize some of the major disciplinary affiliations and theoretical contributions of Victor W. Turner. By highlighting the originality and interdisciplinary nature of Turner's advances in ritual theory and comparative symbology, the article assesses Turner's legacy as one of the great contributors to modern social theory.

The death of Victor Turner came as a great shock to scholars around the world. Described as a "creative maverick," a "polymath," and an "iconoclast," Turner was recognized as one of the leading anthropological exponents of symbolic analysis and ritual studies. In describing his own style of symbolic analysis, Turner preferred the term "comparative symbology." His work was epochal, inaugurating a new era in the understanding of both preliterate and contemporary cultural forms. By laying the groundwork for a new dispensation connecting the processual dimensions of Van Gennep's rites of passage to modern theater, history, literature, and the performative dimensions of everyday life, Turner signed the anthropology of his time with his own unique stamp. Ronald L. Grimes (see "Victor Turner's Social Drama and T. S. Elliot's Ritual Drama" by Ronald L. Grimes in this volume of *Anthropologica*) offers the following description of Turner's contribution to ritual scholarship:

> Turner is an academic fool. He has stood on his head and told us that rituals are not seedbeds of change; that rituals not only control process, they generate it; that rituals not only mark boundaries, they evoke phasic motion in a culture. (1982:202)

As an author and coauthor, Turner bequeathed some twenty books and monographs to scholarship. For over thirty years, he

also wrote reviews, editorial forewords, journal articles, and commentaries. The caliber of his work was so outstanding that his name was eventually entered into dictionaries and encyclopedias as a standard reference. While most of his work treated broad themes in religious studies and political anthropology, Turner also produced a sagacious sampling of writings on theater and the dramatic characteristics of everyday life (e.g., the anthropology of experience). His fundamental grasp of developments in numerous academic domains was nothing less than prodigious. Grimes makes an understatement when he comments that Turner has "grounded his theoretical formulations in large amounts of carefully studied data without becoming lost in them" (1982:133).

Like Marshall McLuhan, Turner was a true interdisciplinary scholar. Both men had a penchant, amounting to genius, for eschewing disciplinary endogamy and opening up the study of humankind to eclectic approaches that encompass the liberal arts as well as the "hard" sciences. It is to Turner's credit that he has been—and will no doubt continue to be—regularly referenced in works dealing with hitherto discrete or only marginally-connected academic domains.

Victor Witter Turner was born in Glasgow, Scotland on May 28, 1920. His father was an electronics engineer and his mother, an actress. During World War II, military service interrupted his formal education at University College, London, where he had begun his study of poetry and classics at the age of eighteen. Conscripted for five years as a noncombatant, Turner lived in a gypsy caravan near the army base at Rugby with his wife, Edith, and his first two children (Manning 1984:20). After the war, he switched from literature to anthropology, working basically within the Anglo-American anthropological tradition. After completing an honors degree in anthropology at the University of London at age twenty-nine, he began his career as a research officer at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). It was here that he undertook his highly celebrated two-and-one-half-year study of the Lunda-Ndembu, shifting from demography and economics to ritual symbolism and effecting "a transition that appears to have coincided with his alienation from Marxism and his growing conviction that the symbolic expression of shared meanings, not the attraction of material interests, lie at the center of human relationships" (Manning 1984:20; see "The Performance of Politics: Caribbean Music and the Anthropology of Victor Turner" by Frank E. Manning in this volume of *Anthropologica*).

Later, Turner went on to study at the University of Manchester. Max Gluckman, former Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, and leader of what became known as the "Manchester School" of British social anthropology, was the head of the anthropology department during Turner's student days at Manchester. Under the influence of Gluckman's ideas, Turner

completed his Ph.D. in June 1955. He then stayed on at Manchester for several years as a Senior Fellow and Senior Lecturer. His work formed the basis of two monographs as well as his Ph.D. thesis, which then became the perdurable work, *Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life* (1957). During this period, Turner worked under the tutelage of some of the leading anthropologists of the day, including Raymond Firth, Daryll Forde, Meyer Fortes, Edmund Leach, S. F. Nadel, and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown.

In 1961, Turner traveled to California, where he had received an appointment as a Fellow for Advanced Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University, and where he wrote his seminal work, *The Drums of Affliction: A Study of Religious Processes Among the Ndembu of Zambia* (1968). Although he returned to Manchester a year later, he continued to be attracted to the interdisciplinary nature of American academic life. Predictably, he returned to the United States, and in 1963 accepted an appointment in the Department of Anthropology at Cornell University.

Five years later, Turner changed appointments by accepting a position at the University of Chicago as Professor of Social Thought and Anthropology. At Chicago, he sat on a prestigious six-member committee which included such notables as novelist Saul Bellow, philosopher Hannah Arendt, and art critic Harold Rosenberg. Turner's move to Chicago "coincided with a shift of interest from 'tribal' to 'world' religions, and more generally, from small scale to mass societies" (Manning 1984:21). His final appointment was at the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, where he was awarded the William R. Kenyan, Jr. Chair of Anthropology in 1971, and was also given memberships in the Department of Religion, the Center for Advanced Studies, and the South Asia Program.

Turner was a member of the Royal Anthropological Institute, which awarded him the Rivers Memorial Medal in 1965. He was a Fellow of numerous academic organizations, including the Association of Social Anthropologists of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, the Royal Anthropological Institute, the International African Institute, the American Anthropological Association, the American Ethnological Society, the New York Academy of Sciences, the African Studies Association of America, the Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Society for the Study of Religion, the American Folklore Association, the Explorer's Club, and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. He was also an Einstein Fellow at the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, and a Fellow of the Society for the Humanities.

Turner was trained in the school of British functionalist rationalism, and his early anthropological fieldwork reflected a

structural-functionalist approach. Eventually he steered away from attempts to understand culture as a functional or static moment frozen in time, and preferred instead to conceive of cultural, literary, and artistic genres as "processes." Throughout the remainder of his career, he continued to assail the limitations of structural functionalism and to stress the concepts of indeterminacy, reflexivity, and "becoming" in his work. This change of direction was greatly influenced by Arnold Van Gennep's work on rites of passage (1960), by the philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (1976), and by the pioneering efforts of Gregory Bateson (1972) and his followers in the development of cybernetic systems theory.

Turner's concept of liminality (including its close cognates, anti-structure and communitas) has been avidly accepted by scholars in anthropology, liberal arts, religious studies, and performance studies. In fact, this concept is now quite commonplace in scholarly discourse. One of Turner's most audacious discriminations was his distinction between the sensory (orectic) and ideological (normative) poles of the ritual symbol, and his explanation of how these two poles mutually tincture one another, thereby fusing the normative with the sensory and the moral with the material. Turner maintained that during the interchange between these two poles, the conceptual is given the power of the experiential and vice versa, thus making the obligatory desirable. Many scholars have found these and other Turnerian theories efficacious for examining contemporary social settings. In the end, Turner will probably best be remembered for his work on social drama and the role of metaphor in assigning meaning to social behavior and conduct.

Turner ascribed a great deal of importance to analyzing and understanding contemporary ritual forms in both religious and non-religious settings. Holding the crystal of culture up to the light of modern scholarship, he gave it a slight twist so that the images of the sacred could be seen as reflected in the events of secular life. His celebrated infatuation with symbols, rituals, and social dramas eventually led to his watershed essay, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (1969), which was originally delivered as the 1966 Lewis Henry Morgan Lectures at the University of Rochester. Many years and many books later, we find the study of humankind broadened and illuminated by his peerless research.

Turner was an extraordinarily gifted field-worker. He considered ethnography as something to be "performed" rather than to be simply codified into a written text. In his later years, he worked with Richard Schechner, an experimental theater director and performance theorist at New York University (see "Victor Turner's Last Adventure" by Richard Schechner in this volume of *Anthropologica*), and became engaged in writing and performing scripts based on his ethnographic fieldwork. The results of

Turner's collaboration with Schechner can be found in his book, *From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play* (1982). Turner's own fieldwork echoed his theories of play and subjunctivity, as it assumed a creative lucidity that was often pathfinding in both its expressiveness and insight.

As a Catholic, Turner's religiousness was strengthened by his fieldwork among the Ndembu, where he gained a new appreciation for the power of the ritual process. Liturgical scholars such as Mary Collins continue to cite Turner's writings on ritual in their attempts to reform the Catholic Mass. In his later work, Turner examined the dynamics of Christian pilgrimage and undertook field expeditions to Mexico, Ireland, Britain, and various parts of Europe. Several studies on this topic were coauthored with his wife, Edith. He also became interested in pilgrimage within Asian religions, and went on field expeditions to India, Sri Lanka, and Japan. His last writings were on the Rio *Carnaval* and the topics of creativity and festivity.

Turner disagreed with contemporaries Max Gluckman and Raymond Firth, who claimed that dramatic analysis was too "loaded" and not "neutral" enough for scientific use. He argued that social dramas were evident on all levels of social organization. Some of today's most influential drama educators can now be described as symbolic consociates of Turner, working under the influence of the Turnerian vulgate, whose doctrines are directed at understanding ritual and drama as a cluster of symbols. For example, Canadian drama educator Richard Courtney owes a particular allegiance to Turner's innovative research.

As the theoretical trajectories from Turner's work continue to converge around numerous disciplinary fields and create an atmosphere of intellectual ferment, religionists, anthropologists, semiologists, performance theorists, and drama educators remain indebted to the work of this unique man who strode so knowingly and with such profound insight across the frontier of culture.

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EXPRIMER L'INEXPRIMABLE

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Cette analyse générale de l'oeuvre de Victor Turner porte surtout sur ses rapports au structuralisme et à l'anthropologie esthétique. D'autre part, elle présente une oeuvre inédite en français: *Chihamba, the White Spirit: A Ritual Drama of the Ndembu.*

This article analyzes in detail Turner's early essay titled *Chihamba, the White Spirit: A Ritual Drama of the Ndembu.* It is argued that Turner was less fundamentally opposed to French structuralism than is often supposed. Not only has his work made a signal contribution to *religious* anthropology, but his contribution to *aesthetic* anthropology should also not be ignored.

Je n'ai jamais rencontré Victor Turner mais nous nous écrivions, et je le trouvais d'une gentillesse extraordinaire envers une personne qu'il ne connaissait pas. Quoi que l'on pense de son concept de *communitas* comme contribution à la science, il est important de se rappeler qu'il le vivait dans sa vie quotidienne et que beaucoup de ses collègues en ont profité. Il semble, d'autre part, que l'anthropologie était, pour Turner, plus qu'une science: c'était le témoignage d'une personne tout entière, un "acte d'être."

Célèbre parmi les anglo-saxons, l'oeuvre de Victor Turner est beaucoup moins connue parmi les francophones. Il y a à cela des causes historiques que je rappelle ici très rapidement: l'anthropologie symbolique s'établit assez tôt en France; Durkheim et van Gennep la pratiquaient déjà; puis, vinrent Mauss, Griaule, Lienhardt, Leiris, et plusieurs autres. Dans les pays anglo-saxons, par contre, l'école fonctionnaliste en anthropologie, brillante à maints égards, choisit le rôle, le statut, et la dignité comme concepts de base (Turner 1969:131) et fonda son épistémologie sur le déterminisme socio-économique et l'objectivisme radical.

Turner put donc revitaliser l'anthropologie anglo-saxonne quand il prit le symbole comme concept de base, et quand il fonda son épistémologie, en partie, sur l'intuition et sur la quête spirituelle des chercheurs. Ces derniers pouvaient donc désormais aller sur le terrain pour trouver des "éducateurs" plutôt que des "informateurs," et ils pouvaient vivre en tant qu'expérience religieuse leur initiation aux cultures des sociétés tribales. Turner mit au point une méthodologie très exigeante pour l'analyse du symbolique, sans esquiver les problèmes d'analyse de la structure sociale. Cette méthodologie a inspiré toute une

génération de chercheurs anglo-saxons, mais elle ne pouvait pas jouer le même rôle historique pour les francophones.

En effet l'anthropologie de ces derniers souffrait peut-être de l'inconvénient inverse: incapable de se séparer radicalement de la philosophie, de la littérature, et même de la théologie, elle manquait de méthodes pour établir des théories à partir des données ethnographiques. L'enseignement de Claude Lévi-Strauss a intégré dans un discours synthétique une grande richesse de données prises dans l'ordre du conçu ainsi que dans l'ordre du vécu. Or, ce discours s'opposa surtout au subjectivisme littéraire et philosophique de la tradition française, tandis que le discours de Turner s'opposa le plus souvent à l'objectivisme excessif des anglo-saxons. On comprend donc pourquoi ces deux grands savants devaient diverger souvent dans les nuances de leurs théories et dans leurs stratégies d'exposition, malgré la convergence essentielle de leurs orientations générales.

Cette convergence est pourtant évidente si l'on considère ces deux approches du point de vue de la sémiotique et si l'on accepte l'idée traditionnelle de la sémiotique comme étant composée d'aspects syntaxiques, sémantiques, et pragmatiques. On voit alors que la pragmatique de Turner et celle de Lévi-Strauss sont au fond la même: les deux savants rapportent toujours le symbolique au "contexte" établi par les méthodes de l'anthropologie sociale traditionnelle.

La différence se situe plutôt, comme le fait remarquer avec justesse Dan Sperber (1974), sur les plans du syntactique et du sémantique, car Lévi-Strauss s'est toujours méfié des méthodes de l'ethnologie française traditionnelle qui construisait des "systèmes de pensée" plus ou moins intuitivement à partir des données ethnosémantiques. Il voulait donc contrôler cette intuition par l'analyse syntaxique qui n'est jamais absente du structuralisme. Turner, au contraire, se méfiait du syntaxique qui lui rappelait les schèmes formalistes de Radcliffe-Brown et de Merton. Il redoutait surtout d'enfermer dans une "structure" les choses qui ne sont pas structurables. Sa méthode est donc avant tout ethnosémantique, mais elle n'a pas besoin des "systèmes de pensée" traditionnels. Elle trace les valeurs les plus profondes d'une culture à partir de ce que Turner appelait des "symboles rituels."

Le "symbole rituel" est la "molécule" de l'analyse turnérienne (Turner 1970:8) comme le "mythème" est l'"atome" de l'analyse lévi-straussienne. Le "mytnème" est, si je l'ai bien compris, l'unité minimale du discours mythique qui comporte une contradiction logique. Le "mythe" est alors un ensemble arbitraire mais structuré de mythèmes. Le "symbole rituel," par contre, ne comprend pas nécessairement une contradiction logique, mais il est "polysémique," ou "multivocal." Défini par Turner à plusieurs reprises (1962:78; 1965:82; 1968:21; 1969:52;

1970:8-10), ce symbole fait partie simultanément de plusieurs domaines culturels entre lesquels il n'existe aucun lien logique ou nécessaire. Utilisé dans le rite, ce symbole réunit donc tout un spectre de référents, les fusionne dans une représentation unique, et confirme ainsi ce que Turner appelle l'intuition profonde de l'unité réelle et spirituelle des choses.

Turner explique (1974:28) que ces référents se relient par analogie aux problèmes de fond de la conjoncture historique. Introduit dans le rite, le "symbole rituel" est donc l'unité minimale d'une opération magique, "efficace," "conative," qui vise à exorciser ces problèmes par un acte libérateur.

On a souvent critiqué le structuralisme pour son manque d'attention à cette question de l'efficacité. Car cette dernière théorie distingue nettement entre deux fonctions intellectuelles de l'homme: celle de la classification objective des phénomènes, de la "naturalisation de l'homme" par la religion et par le mythe, et celle des illusions magiques, du sacrifice et des rites transformateurs, bref, de l'humanisation de la nature. Donc, tandis que le structuralisme a beaucoup contribué à notre connaissance des systèmes classificatoires et rationnels, il a plutôt boudé l'étude de l'efficacité et de l'illusion magique.

Cette tendance n'a pourtant pas duré. Dans le monde francophone et ailleurs, l'anthropologie contemporaine s'intéresse beaucoup à la sorcellerie, au roi sacré et aux rites de possession. Dans ce domaine, certains concepts turnériens, tels la *communitas*, le *liminal*, l'anti-structure, trouvent leur appui dans la tradition phénoménologique de Buber, de Ricoeur, et de Girard, mais ils sont loin de faire l'unanimité. Remarquons pourtant que ces derniers concepts sont des développements de la théorie de Turner plutôt que son fondement, car le concept avec lequel il explique l'efficacité symbolique et l'illusion magique est surtout celui du "symbole rituel."

La meilleure façon de démontrer les implications de cette idée serait probablement de la comparer au traitement sommaire du symbole rituel dans *La pensée sauvage* (Lévi-Strauss 1962:ch. 8). Rappelons que Lévi-Strauss choisit comme exemple du "symbole rituel" le concombre fourni par les Nuer pour remplacer le boeuf comme victime sacrificielle. Lévi-Strauss commente: "faute de boeuf on sacrifie un concombre, mais l'inverse serait une absurdité. Au contraire, pour le totémisme . . ., les relations sont toujours réversibles" (ibid.:297). "Le schème du sacrifice consiste en une opération irréversible (la destruction d'une victime), dont la nécessité résulte de la mise en communication préalable de deux "récipients" qui ne sont pas au même niveau" (ibid.:298).

Mais on remarque une deuxième différence, cette fois sur le plan épistémologique. Car les études de Lévi-Strauss qui portent

sur le totémisme et sur les mythes font des distinctions très précises entre les espèces et même les variétés d'animaux ou de plantes auxquelles une certaine culture a donné une valeur symbolique. Ainsi, la signification de certains mythes peut dépendre des valeurs symboliques différentes attribuées à deux variétés différentes de cochon sauvage (Lévi-Strauss 1964:92-95). Le structuralisme ne s'intéresse guère aux différences du même ordre quand il s'agit des symboles rituels. Lévi-Strauss dit, par exemple: "en tant que victime sacrificielle, un concombre vaut un oeuf, un oeuf un poussin, un poussin une poule, une poule une chèvre, une chèvre un boeuf".

Pour Victor Turner, les différences entre les symboles rituels étaient tout aussi importantes que celles entre les symboles mythiques. Or, il savait fort bien que ces différences ne peuvent pas se codifier dans un système de classifications. À cause de la multivocalité de ces symboles, chacun n'est pas seulement *unique* mais aussi *inépuisable*.

Cela veut dire premièrement, que l'on ne peut pas substituer un symbole à un autre sans changer le sens du rite, pour les mêmes raisons que l'on ne peut pas changer les mots dans un poème sans détruire sa "valeur" esthétique. Mais deuxièmement, le rite ressemble au poème en ce qu'aucune paraphrase n'en peut rendre compte avec exactitude. Finalement, les émotions profondes provoquées par ces symboles—religieuses ainsi qu'esthétiques—sont du type qualifié par Aristote de "cathartique."

Cela soulève plusieurs questions: pourquoi Turner s'est-il rigoureusement limité à l'aspect religieux de ces émotions tandis que Lévi-Strauss se borne tout aussi rigoureusement à leur aspect esthétique (1971:586-589)? Quel était vraiment l'engagement personnel de Turner envers la religion? Deuxièmement, la portée des découvertes de Turner va-t-elle au delà de son programme religieux? Le "symbole rituel" peut-il devenir le modèle d'une anthropologie esthétique, d'une anthropologie du théâtre, constitutée d'après l'analogie de la "symbologie" turnérienne?

Nous introduirons ces thèmes en rapport avec l'une des premières oeuvres de Turner, *Chihamba, the White Spirit: A Ritual Drama of the Ndembu* (1962), qui réunit l'évocation (très érudite, très bien documentée) du génie religieux d'une tribu au récit de la quête religieuse de son ethnographe. Car ce petit livre, plus qu'aucun autre de son auteur, dépasse toutes les possibilités de l'analyse sémantique et donne une forme concrète à l'indicible.

Afin de se faire initier au culte chihamba, une personne doit d'abord souffrir d'une affliction que ce culte est censé guérir. Le mal est personnifié dans un esprit nommé Kavula, mais cet esprit en est aussi le guérisseur. Dans un premier temps, les novices souffrants visitent une hutte où ils parlent avec un personnage caché identifié à cet esprit même.

Le lendemain, les adeptes construisent un fétiche de Kavula tandis que les novices font l'apprentissage de son rituel, qui exige qu'ils portent son joug pendant toute la journée. Quand ils sont finalement admis dans son enclos, c'est presque le crépuscule.

On leur donne alors des hochets avec la consigne de "tuer l'esprit *Chihamba*," à savoir Kavula lui-même, qui se cache sous un gros mortier renversé, muni d'un coq rouge et brandissant un nombre de hochets. Chaque novice frappe de son hochet un tissu recouvrant le mortier, tout en disant *pa - a*. Sous les coups de hochets, successifs, Kavula fait semblant de mourir et frissonne comme un agonisant. Le coq chante. On éloigne alors les novices, on sort le dieu de sa cachette, après quoi on asperge le mortier du sang du coq immolé.

Quand les novices retournent on les invite encore une fois à tuer Kavula. Celui-ci est remplacé désormais par le fétiche, recouvert de farine de cassave, supporté par un étai en bois, et toujours caché sous le mortier et le tissu. Un adepte placé dans la brousse peut manipuler l'étai à l'aide d'une longue corde dissimulée sous le feuillage. Pendant la deuxième mise à mort qui s'ensuit, on simule donc l'agonie du dieu en agitant cette corde.

Après, on révèle aux novices la disparition du dieu et le mortier ensanglanté et on leur pose une question truquée: sous ce mortier, il y a quoi? Les novices ne peuvent ni le savoir ni le deviner sauf si un adepte compatissant leur souffle subrepticement les composantes du fétiche. Quand les novices répètent correctement cette réponse, les adeptes leur disent: "vous êtes déchargés." Voilà donc la puissance capricieuse de Kavula: avant le rite, les novices étaient malades, coupables, en situation honteuse. Dès qu'ils ont tué le dieu guérisseur, on les déclare innocents, on les décharge (1962:85).

L'informateur de Turner expliqua: "On tue Kavula pour effrayer le novice. Car il croit qu'il a vraiment tué Kavula. Les adeptes lui disent que c'est un esprit secourable. Ils ne font que tromper les novices." Et il ajouta: "Kavula prend tous les pouvoirs" (1962:44).

Regardons d'abord comment Turner s'engage personnellement dans ce texte. Dans une "Introduction" à *Chihamba*, publiée en 1975, il déclare avoir vécu "beaucoup d'années" en "matérialiste agnostique et monistique." Les Ndembu lui enseignèrent les premiers que les rites et leur symbolique ont une "valeur ontologique," bien ancrée au coeur de la matière humaine. Cependant, nous ne pouvons rien gagner de notre connaissance des processus religieux à moins que nous ne puissions les regarder de l'intérieur. Pour appuyer ses dires, Turner cite Srinivas qui fait remarquer que les anthropologues sont nés trois fois: la deuxième naissance se produit pendant leur recherche sur le

terrain, mais leur troisième naissance a lieu dans leur culture d'origine qui est devenue "exotisée." Or, Turner pense que cela est tout aussi vrai pour la religion, que l'anthropologue retourne à sa propre religion mais que son expérience du terrain lui permet de vivre celle-ci d'une manière plus "liminale."

Cette réflexion tardive n'exprime peut-être pas exactement le point de vue du Victor Turner, beaucoup plus jeune, qui s'était embarqué sur le terrain chez les Ndembu, qui avait fait sa thèse sur leurs schismes et la continuité dans leur société et qui avait commencé par la suite, avec beaucoup de prudence, à analyser leurs symboles de divination et de révélation. Car ce Victor Turner plus jeune se proposa, pour son essai *Chihamba*, une problématique bien plus précise: de clarifier la personnalité complexe du dieu immolé et la signification de la blancheur des objets symboliques qui lui sont associés (ibid.:80-81).

Cette problématique de Chihamba a donné lieu à plusieurs malentendus, comme ceux exprimés par Horton dans un article célèbre (1964) qui accusa Turner de deux crimes dont l'un semble pourtant exclure logiquement l'autre: le relativisme culturel et l'ethnocentrisme. Insistons donc sur le fait que cette oeuvre n'est ni relativiste ni ethnocentrique. Car si on voulait relativiser la mort de Kavula, on devrait dire que cette histoire est vraie *pour les Ndembu* mais qu'elle n'a pas de valeur de vérité *pour les chrétiens*. Mais la position de Turner est tout le contraire: il croit à l'existence de vérités religieuses universelles. Le rite de l'immolation de Kavula communique par ces paradoxes profonds ces mêmes vérités; il exprime "un acte d'être total qui dépasse la vie et la mort" (ibid.:84).

Turner reconnaît cependant qu'un tel "acte d'être" dépasse de toute évidence nos analyses sémantiques, nos classifications, et nos analogies. Il trouve dans le symbole de la blancheur l'expression de ce dépassement, chez les Ndembu ainsi que dans la religion chrétienne et dans le roman *Moby Dick* de Melville. Dans tous ces cas, la blancheur représente "le pur acte d'être," "tout ce qui n'est pas pensable" (ibid.:91). Elle "incarne l'invisible" (ibid.).

Si ce phénomène est tellement universel, on pourrait bien se demander pourquoi il faut aller l'étudier chez les Ndembu. Turner répond à cette question dans les mêmes termes que Jung: l'immolation de Kavula est un "symbole vivant" dont les acteurs ne comprennent pas eux-mêmes toute la signification. Mais ce "symbole vivant" se communique aussi au lecteur qui n'est pas Ndembu (ibid.:80).

Malgré cette évocation de Jung, et malgré son vocabulaire thomiste, Turner a présenté Kavula comme un vrai dieu païen. La description de ses qualités particulières (ibid.:83-85) comprend presque toutes les composantes du modèle du paganisme dressé dans

l'étude récente d'Augé (1982). Kavula est surtout un dieu persécuteur des vivants (ibid.:85, 91). Ni ses adeptes ni les novices souffrants ne l'aiment avec passion, comme les chrétiens aiment le Christ. L'efficacité du rite ne dépend d'ailleurs nullement de ce type de sentiments, mais uniquement de l'exécution magistrale d'une supercherie théâtrale complexe. Turner et Augé donnent le même rôle à la ruse, à la fétichisation, au mimétisme caricatural, à l'ambivalence du thème de la mort, et à la dérision du pouvoir.

D'autre part, les novices retrouvent, par l'immolation de Kavula, le sens de la force qu'ils avaient perdu et qui constitue (dans l'analyse de Turner aussi bien que dans celle d'Augé) la puissance sacrée. Finalement Turner reconnaît, à l'instar d'Augé, que "loin d'être transcendental, le dieu immolé devient immanent dans beaucoup de personnes et d'objets" (ibid.:85). En effet, Kavula est une fabrication, au sens que toute son intervention est mise en scène par les hommes. "Par contre," enchaîne Turner avec un brin d'audace, "les êtres et les phénomènes blancs racontés dans la Bible ne sont pas que des figures: ils sont ce qu'ils sont" (ibid.:93).

On se rappellera, dans ce contexte, la baleine de Jonas qui ressemble de si près aux monstres présentés lors des rites d'initiation en Nouvelle-Guinée et en Australie. Doit-on donc accorder un statut épistémologique spécial à cette baleine? Et pourquoi?

Car la proposition principale de Turner est bien juste: ces monstres initiatiques ne se réduisent jamais aux figures; ils ne sont pas "comme si" mais plutôt: ils sont. En plus, nous ne rencontrons pas, dans cette première monographie religieuse de Turner, les concepts "d'anti-structure" et de "communitas." Il ne faut surtout pas les laisser entrer dans le texte à la dérobée. Car Kavula donne à l'univers Ndembu la puissance du renouvellement cyclique. Il se manifeste normalement dans la nature; les adeptes qui s'occupent de son culte sont les malades guéris par son intervention. Quand il descend sur terre lors des moments de crise de la communauté humaine, et quand on le tue, il redevient la racine de l'arbre *ikamba da chihamba*—le principe de la croissance des denrées, diffusé parmi beaucoup de personnes et d'objets.

La terre se renouvelle en effet mais son collège sacerdotal trouve également de nouveaux membres pour remplacer les décédés. Si on veut parler ici de mystère, il s'agit plutôt du mystère de la reproduction. Ce miracle du renouvellement du monde est bien présenté dans le texte, tandis que la *communitas* n'y figure pas, sauf dans un commentaire tardif de Turner (1975), qui s'inspire de Bergson, Buber, et d'autres philosophes.

Dans le culte de Kavula, les femmes précèdent les hommes parce que le dieu serait friand de leur lait et de leurs seins. Il est leur grand-père, mais il est aussi bébé; quand il veut du lait, il parle aussi de "faire caca." Turner a donc bien décrit le renouvellement symbolique du monde dans lequel les mères prennent la première position. Ensuite on fait croire à ces femmes qu'elles ont tué le dieu. Lors de la fête qui s'ensuit, ces novices se voient accorder le statut d'adeptes.

L'analyse de Turner nous révèle donc les inversions, les réversions, les perversions de ce culte—tout sauf l'anti-structure. Mais on ne devrait probablement pas critiquer ce dernier concept turnérien *en français* parce qu'il peut bien s'agir ici d'une confusion linguistique. Turner n'a jamais utilisé le mot *structure* dans le sens lévi-straussien, mais toujours comme Radcliffe-Brown et Merton. En ce sens, le culte de Kavula est peut-être "anti-structural." Mais ce culte fait bien partie de la "structure," si on donne à ce mot un sens lévi-straussien comme c'est l'habitude chez la plupart des anthropologues francophones d'aujourd'hui.

L'engagement de Turner dans cet ouvrage a donc été de présenter une sorte de *religio universalis*, où les images du culte de Kavula font pendant à la Bible et à Melville. Pour le reste, on croit volontiers à son aveu que Kavula l'a renvoyé à St-Thomas d'Aquin et qu'il a retrouvé la religion de sa propre tribu. Mais ce livre, *Chihamba*, est passionnant parce qu'il occupe une position "liminaire"—il décrit le processus de la rencontre de l'auteur, d'abord avec Kavula, ensuite avec St-Thomas.

La méthode de Turner est une synthèse habile de l'anthropologie et de la sémiotique. Son fondement est toujours l'anthropologie, c'est-à-dire la méthode ethnographique développée par l'anthropologie sociale et culturelle. Cependant, cette méthode ethnographique était presque incapable, avant Turner, de décrire les symboles rituels. Turner a donc élaboré son système de taxinomie des symboles rituels, adaptant aux besoins des ethnographes certains concepts développés par les sémioticiens et les linguistes. Ce système de taxinomie fournit, avant tout, la typologie des connotations des symboles.

Le livre *Chihamba* présente ainsi un lexique extrêmement riche de symboles rituels avec leurs diverses connotations. Ces connotations se communiquent partiellement à travers des descriptions, des actes rituels, mais surtout dans les "exégèses" des symboles offertes par les informateurs principaux de Turner. Quand Turner affirme que ces informateurs étaient en fait ses "éducateurs," c'est parce qu'ils présentaient, à travers ce lexique, toute une philosophie, tout un système de pensée qui a aidé Turner à développer sa propre pensée religieuse.

Comment peut-on en effet construire des systèmes de pensée à partir de ces symboles rituels? D'abord, Turner dit que les connotations d'un symbole rituel le connectent aux domaines les plus disparates de la culture. Le système de pensée est donc immanent dans chacun de ces symboles. Cependant, les objets étudiés par Turner ne sont jamais des symboles rituels isolés. Chacun d'eux est toujours relié, dans l'espace et dans le temps, à d'autres symboles rituels avec lesquels il forme un ensemble.

Regardons d'abord le cas où l'ensemble s'étale dans l'espace. La figure de Kavula est un "symbole rituel" de Turner, mais l'objet rencontré et tué par les novices sous le nom de Kavula est un assemblage de plusieurs composantes dont chacune est elle-même un symbole rituel. Au début de la cérémonie, la figure de Kavula se compose d'un interprète, d'un coq, d'un mortier, d'une nappe, de la farine de cassave, etc. À la fin de la cérémonie, l'interprète est remplacé par le fétiche—le rasoir, la hache, la houe, l'aiguille, les perles, etc. Le coq est remplacé par son sang, dont est éclaboussé le mortier.

Tandis que chacun des symboles isolés connecte des domaines culturels multiples, les liens entre les symboles sont moins évidents, sauf sur le plan strictement pragmatique. Chaque composante renvoie à l'un ou l'autre des domaines de l'efficacité de Kavula. Elles doivent toutes être représentées, car si on en omet une, le Kavula-fétiche manquera d'un de ses pouvoirs, au dam de ceux qui peuvent en avoir besoin. Ces besoins suffisent pour déterminer les composantes de l'ensemble nommé Kavula.

Cependant, comme le dirait un mathématicien, cet ensemble n'a pas de structure de groupe. De toute façon, Turner n'admettrait pas de structure de groupe. Malheureusement, les fétiches africains ont été plus ou moins ignorés des structuralistes et on ne peut pas savoir ce qu'une analyse comparative de la composition et de la construction des fétiches pourrait donner. Rappelons pourtant que Lévi-Strauss a commenté une peinture de Max Ernst qui rapprocherait "deux éléments de nature apparemment opposée sur un plan de nature opposée à la leur" (1983:328). Lévi-Strauss déclare que cette peinture "transgresse la frontière entre le monde extérieur et le monde intérieur." Elle est donc analysable par la méthode structuraliste, pourvu que ses éléments et son plan puissent se joindre par la voie méditative.

Turner, quant à lui, réduit la multiplicité des symboles composant Kavula à deux paradigmes, celui de la blancheur et celui de l'immolation du dieu. En arrière-plan, Kavula représente le renouvellement de la terre. Cette réduction non-structuraliste va (1) de la réalité concrète à l'abstraction; (2) du système culturel aux principes universels. Car Kavula n'est que l'occasion pour les éducateurs Ndembu d'expliquer à Turner, et pour Turner d'expliquer à nous tous, ce qu'est l'*homme rituel*.

C'est l'homme qui reconnaît sa dépendance de l'acte primaire d'être (Turner 1975:84), qui veut exprimer l'impensable et qui fixe sur ce problème toute son attention (ibid.:87). On ne peut pas rendre compte de ses pratiques en les assimilant à des catégories de pratiques non-religieuses (ibid.:86). Turner admet sans ambages que l'intuition doit être au centre de toute recherche sur les rites (ibid.:86-87).

Les symboles rituels s'enchaînent aussi dans le temps, lors des "drames rituels." La démonstration exemplaire du drame rituel est l'analyse des conflits sociaux dans un village Ndembu où on invita enfin un guérisseur notoire à célébrer un rite majeur de purification (*Les tambours de l'affliction* 1968). Ici, Turner nous renseigne en détails sur les causes sociales des maladies, car quand les cultes sont efficaces, ceux-ci transforment les rapports sociaux dans lesquels les novices sont impliqués (Turner 1962:12, 59). Ainsi, le "drame rituel" *se charge* du social, même s'il ne s'y réduit jamais. Il revient à ce drame de représenter par des moyens théâtraux les droits, les obligations, et le contexte culturel d'un statut social (ibid.:273). Or, Turner distingue entre les drames "sociaux" et les drames "rituels." Tous les deux jouent le même rôle dans la résolution des crises sociales, mais le drame "rituel" comprend toujours un sacrifice par lequel le violateur des lois est puni symboliquement. Il se peut bien que personne n'ait violé des lois: le système a besoin de boucs émissaires, qui sont pourtant innocentés, nous l'avons vu, par le rite sacrificiel.

Mais finalement, Turner réduit le drame rituel à certaines constances de la biologie humaine et animale, à la dichotomie entre le village et la brousse, à la valeur symbolique de certaines couleurs, telles le blanc, le rouge, le noir, dont Turner démontre toute la polysémie (ibid.:279). Tout ce qui nous reste, donc, à la fin de l'analyse éblouissante des symboles rituels des "tambours de l'affliction" est un petit nombre de "régularités" dont la qualité est universelle plutôt que liée à une culture locale quelconque. Car l'objet des recherches de Turner reste toujours, non pas la culture Ndembu, mais l'homme rituel.

Il ne fait pas de doute que le rite de Chihamba provoque chez les novices une exaltation extrême. Cette exaltation a souvent été étudiée en esthétique ainsi que par les sciences de la religion. Du côté de l'esthétique, on en est arrivé à croire que l'émotion esthétique n'existe pas comme état distinctif, et qu'aucun observateur ne pourrait la distinguer de l'émotion religieuse; il semble que toute une gamme d'expériences pourrait causer des états d'âme assez similaires (Arnheim 1973).

Comment ces états extraordinaires se produisent-ils? Si on cherche la réponse à cette question, il est bien possible que les recherches de Turner nous renseignent mieux que les recherches

esthétiques. Car dans son livre *Les tambours de l'affliction* (1968), Turner a démontré que le régisseur véritable des drames rituels adapte ses scénarios et ses mises-en-scène selon les occasions sociales, qu'il est donc un manipulateur bien rompu aux symboles cathartiques. La mise-en-scène de l'agonie de Kavula exige également les dons d'un bon régisseur qui sache créer une illusion crédible de la manifestation du dieu.

Turner n'y semble pas insensible. Il reproduit, par exemple, presque tout le libretto des "médecins" (1962:17-22) joué lors de la première entrevue des novices avec Kavula, au cours de laquelle les novices reçoivent leur nom initiatique. Quand Kavula a fini l'instruction des patients, il monte au sommet de la hutte et rejette ses hochets vers le bas avec un éclat horrifiant. Le peuple hurle: "nous sommes morts." . . . On peut donc distinguer deux types d'efficacité dans le drame rituel: l'efficacité rituelle, bien sûr, mais aussi l'efficacité de l'interprète qui joue Kavula.

Une telle représentation serait peu convaincante si les "médecins" en général et l'interprète de Kavula en particulier ne faisaient que suivre leur "code rituel." Car ces tromperies et ces illusions sont très complexes du point de vue théâtral. Même la farce la plus vulgaire pose des problèmes assez difficiles aux comédiens—plus difficiles à jouer, dit-on souvent, qu'une tragédie—mais si cette farce doit être simultanément un drame sacré et si la guérison des novices en dépend, si l'assistance doit être amenée à croire sérieusement à sa mort collective, provoquée par les hochets de Kavula, alors on est en présence d'une théâtralité tout à fait exceptionnelle.

Nous ne voulons évidemment pas, par les remarques de notre dernier paragraphe, rendre compte de l'*homme rituel* en l'assimilant à la catégorie des pratiques esthétiques. Nous admettons que les esprits sont visibles à l'homme religieux (ou rituel) et que l'interprète de ce drame rituel ne réussira normalement pas, à moins que Kavula ne soit clairement dans son esprit, et qu'il ne soit visible dans sa forme et dans ses moindres gestes et également audible, dans sa voix authentique d'être divin. L'interprète doit bien le voir, l'écouter, et s'identifier totalement à ce qu'il représente. Ce processus d'identification à l'organisme spectral qui inspire le comédien fait d'ailleurs partie du système de représentation théâtrale enseigné par Antonin Artaud.

J'arrive donc enfin à la proposition principale de cet article: que la théorie du drame rituel de Turner et la théorie du "théâtre et son double" d'Artaud sont très semblables et même presque identiques. Car, tout d'abord, les deux épisodes de Kavula—comment il tue des serviteurs et comment ses serviteurs le tuent par la suite, et chaque fois par les hochets, mort théâtrale par excellence—voilà un thème pour le théâtre de la

cruauté d'Artaud. Mais deuxièmement, rappelons que ce théâtre métaphysique d'Artaud existait d'abord seulement dans l'imagination de son auteur, et qu'Artaud voyagea par la suite au Mexique, pour y apprendre les drames rituels des Tarahumaras, et qu'il écrit, après son apprentissage de ces drames: "J'ai écrit le Rite du Peyotl en état de conversion, et avec déjà cent cinquante ou deux cents hosties récentes dans le corps" (1974:36).

On voit bien que certains concepts de Turner, tels la liminalité, l'anti-structure, la communitas, ne sont pas vraiment essentiels à sa problématique. Ces concepts ne sont pas faciles à traduire en français, parce qu'ils existent déjà dans le lexique anthropologique de la pensée française: le mot *structure* connote Lévi-Strauss plutôt que Radcliffe-Brown; le mot *communitas* connote Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Bergson, (peut-être Buber aussi), plutôt qu'Antonin Artaud; et le mot *liminalité* semble connoter le monde de Ricoeur établi en marge du monde de Radcliffe-Brown. Ces concepts ne sont donc guère traduisibles.

L'essentiel de la problématique de Turner peut se résumer par les concepts du symbole rituel, du drame rituel, et de la polysémie. Évidemment, nous ne voulons pas dire que l'interprétation traditionnelle de l'oeuvre de Turner est erronée. Nous ne voulons que proposer une lecture particulière qui semble pertinente à la situation d'aujourd'hui et au lecteur francophone. Cette lecture veut mettre Turner dans le contexte de deux écrivains français de génie qui furent ses contemporains: Artaud et Barthes.

Nous avons déjà parlé brièvement d'Antonin Artaud. Nous croyons que le concept clef de Turner—l'acte primaire d'être, emprunté à Thomas d'Aquin—est équivalent au concept clef d'Artaud: l'organisme affectif analogue (1964:199). Car ces concepts connotent, tous les deux, les idées de l'imitation et de la personnification. Pour tous les deux, la divinité n'est ni connaissable ni pensable mais elle *est*, et nos actes doivent la représenter. Cette idée est thomiste mais, comme le fait finement remarquer Turner, elle est thomiste dans le sens de la Comédie Divine de Dante (1975:18). L'essence peut se présenter à l'intuition de la personne humaine qui peut la mettre en scène. Nous avons parlé de la mise-en-scène de Kavula; je suppose qu'on pourrait bien l'envisager dans le code d'Artaud:

> des projections et des précipitations de conflits, des luttes indescriptibles de principes, prises sous cet angle vertigineux et glissant où toute vérité se perd en réalisant la fusion inextricable et unique de l'abstrait et du concret. (1964:79)
>
> Pour se servir de son affectivité comme le lutteur utilise sa musculature, il faut voir l'être humain comme un double, comme le Kha des Embaumés de l'Egypte,

> comme un spectre perpétuel où rayonnent les forces de l'affectivité. (1964:201)
>
> De plus ces gestes symboliques, ces masques, ces attitudes, ces mouvements particuliers ou d'ensemble, dont les significations innombrables constituent une part importante du langage concret du théâtre, gestes évocateurs, attitudes émotives, ou arbitraires, pilonnages éperdus de rythmes et de sons, se doubleront . . . de tous les lapsus de l'esprit et de la langue, par lesquels se manifeste ce que l'on pourrait appeler les impuissances de la parole, et il y a là une richesse d'expression prodigieuse, à laquelle nous ne manquerons pas occasionnellement de recourir. (1964: 146)

Ces citations évoqueront la façon dont Artaud aborde (1) les symboles rituels; (2) le drame rituel; et (3) la polysémie. Tandis que ces idées correspondent d'assez près à l'image de l'homme rituel véhiculée par Turner dans son livre *Chihamba*, sans oublier les improvisations et les lapsus inséparables de tout drame rituel, elles laissent dans l'ombre un autre aspect tout à fait indispensable de l'image de Turner ethnographe: son obsession de dresser des inventaires de symboles, des lexiques de signes à travers lesquels le rite Ndembu se manifeste dans toute sa particularité. Car Turner n'oublie jamais les moyens par lesquels l'expérience cathartique du drame rituel devient possible: à chaque phase du rite correspond un ensemble de symboles polysémiques dont il faut faire l'exégèse. Même la somme de toutes ces exégèses ne suffit pas pour *expliquer* l'expérience cathartique parce que celle-ci relève du mystère, mais elle peut suffire pour la compréhension intuitive.

Le dispositif scientifique des exégèses de Victor Turner est très sophistiqué. L'approche intuitive n'intervient absolument pas jusqu'au moment de la totalisation quand elle devient épistémologiquement nécessaire. À cet égard, l'approche de Turner ressemble beaucoup à la lecture barthésienne des textes pluriels, comme il la pratique dans son essai *S/Z*. La méthode de cette lecture se résume ainsi: rester attentif au pluriel du texte, refuser de construire le texte, le suivre pas à pas, établir ses grands codes, ensuite dégager ses thèmes de base qui s'imposent par la répétition des mêmes connotations dans un vaste corpus de signes. Turner admet d'ailleurs (1975:29) "l'influence" de Barthes sur certains de ses écrits. On ne sait pourtant pas à quels écrits de Barthes il se réfère.

La convergence la plus grande entre l'oeuvre de Turner et celle de Barthes se manifeste dans la dernière période de Barthes, notamment *S/Z* (1970) et *L'empire des signes* (1970). Or, presque toute la méthode de Turner était bien en place avant cette date. Peut-être s'agit-il d'une profonde affinité des

esprits des deux savants plutôt que d'un processus de diffusion unilatérale. Toutefois, il y avait aussi une grande différence entre les deux hommes qui devient évidente si on regarde la remarque suivante de Barthes:

> On entend souvent dire que l'art a pour charge *d'exprimer l'inexprimable*: c'est le contraire qu'il faut dire . . .: toute la tâche de l'art est d'inexprimer *l'exprimable*, d'enlever à la langue du monde, qui est la pauvre et puissante langue des passions, une parole *autre*, une parole *exacte*. (1964:15)

Car il semble bien que l'objet de Barthes soit purement esthétique tandis que le désir d'exprimer l'inexprimable fait partie, on l'a vu, de la théologie thomiste et du projet de Turner. Cependant, on doit bien donner raison à Barthes quand il décrit la polysémie, et encore plus le texte pluriel, comme une manière d'"inexprimer l'exprimable." Cette vision des choses s'applique tout aussi bien à l'appareil de Turner: le dieu qui "tue" les novices, les novices qui "tuent" le dieu. On peut très bien dire que le mot "tuer" utilisé ici—dans le même sens que Turner l'utilise dans son livre *Chihamba*—est un exemple de la "pauvre et puissante langue des passions," car ce n'est clairement pas "une parole exacte." La bête vérité c'est que ni le dieu ni les novices ne meurent.

Cependant, Turner nous donne des informations beaucoup plus exactes quand il décrit les actions des adeptes, des "médecins," des initiés. Car eux, ils ne croient pas du tout à la mort du dieu ou des novices. Ils savent bien que c'est du faux-semblant. Les exégètes de Turner, très bien instruits, ne s'y trompent pas non plus. Strictement parlant, Turner offre donc deux types de discours très différents: la "pauvre et puissante langue des passions," proférée par les novices, et une parole autre et exacte proférée par ses informateurs fiables, par ses "éducateurs."

Or, la première langue veut, en effet, exprimer l'inexprimable: elle décrit comme la mort ce qui ne l'est pas et elle est prise dans tous les pièges du discours des adeptes. La deuxième langue, celle des adeptes, utilise des concepts tout à fait exprimables: les objets composant le fétiche et le dieu, les supercheries, le métier d'interprète, la mise-en-scène de la série d'actes rituels. Mais ils "inexpriment"—dans le sens qu'ils manipulent savamment—leur ensemble de signes polysémiques qui restent flous. Ils ne peuvent créer leurs illusions que par la polysémie de ces signes.

Deux lectures de *Chihamba* sont donc en principe possibles: une lecture "religieuse" et une lecture "esthétique." La première est assez bien connue; peut-être devrait-on s'attarder un peu à la deuxième. Je ne veux pas dire qu'elle est meilleure, mais elle

n'est pas pire. Elle intéressera surtout ceux qui veulent développer aujourd'hui la sous-discipline de l'anthropologie esthétique. Car les oeuvres de Turner ont beaucoup à y contribuer. Très peu d'ethnographes ont décrit et analysé avec une finesse semblable la parole des initiateurs et la polysémie de cette parole.

Je ne suis donc pas d'accord avec Sperber (1974) quand il critique les renseignements ethnosémantiques de Turner, comme si c'était essentiel que ces renseignements soient complets et totalement objectifs. Turner nous donne une idée très adéquate de la forme générale du dispositif symbolique des "médecins"; il explique très bien comment ils font leur travail. Ce sont des informations assez rares, absentes chez la plupart des ethnographes.

Je crois aussi que les réticences de Lévi-Strauss vont un peu trop loin. Il avait certainement raison de réagir quand certaines personnes voulaient *substituer* le "symbole rituel" au mythème comme atome du symbolique. Ma discussion aura démontré une fois de plus que ces deux "atomes" servent des fins très différentes; il n'y a pas de contradiction entre les théories qui les soutiennent.

Les méthodes de Turner nous permettent d'introduire en anthropologie une totalisation esthétique du domaine des sens apparemment disparates. Lévi-Strauss lui-même semble d'ailleurs en être bien conscient quand il parle de la polysémie comme opérant "un rapprochement insoupçonné de l'auditeur (de musiques), qui permettrait aussi de connecter deux champs sémantiques qui paraissaient très écartés l'un de l'autre" (1971:588).

Si on veut comprendre comment se construit l'illusion et donc l'exaltation du rite, les connotations dégagées par Turner permettent de reconstruire le dispositif des magiciens. Les illusions, comment peut-on les créer? Il faut d'abord que l'on sache pénétrer dans la cuisine du magicien, comme le fait Eco, par exemple, dans son essai "Lector in fabula" (1979:Ch. 8). L'analyse turnérienne répond parfaitement à la question: comment faire croire à un Ndembu qu'il est mort quand il n'est pas mort du tout, ou qu'il a tué un dieu. . . . Cette question devient encore plus intéressante quand cette magie constitue une technique, parfois efficace, pour guérir les malades.

Turner présente côte à côte une réflexion sur les symboles mystiques et la figure de l'*artifex*, connaisseur de l'imaginaire des hommes, qui sait créer des illusions—guérisseuses ou tueuses. Il se sert d'une parole "autre" et "exacte" qui est tout aussi intéressante que la langue puissante des passions.

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THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICS: CARIBBEAN MUSIC AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF VICTOR TURNER

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Cet article aborde l'un des problèmes centraux de la pensée anthropologique de Victor Turner: la dimension politique des rites, à la fois instruments de contrôle et moyen de libération. La tension engendrée par les deux pôles des structures et des anti-structures doit en effet être perpétuellement négociée. Les premières sont toujours promptes à corriger les déviations, les secondes à subvertir l'ordre établi en suscitant l'émergence d'un processus d'émancipation et de confusion (la "communitas"). Partant du concept de "drame social," modèle dynamique par lequel s'articule le jeu conflictuel de ces deux forces opposées, l'auteur propose une analyse de la vie politique dans les Caraïbes, et montre en particulier le rôle que joue la musique dans ce qu'il appelle un "état-théâtre."

This article addresses a central issue in Victor Turner's anthropological thought: the political dimension of rituals as both tools of social control and processes of emancipation. The ever-recurring tensions between repressive social structures and subversion brought about by the emergence of anti-structures must be negotiated through a constant process of social adjustment. On the one hand, social structures are prone to redress deviations. On the other hand, "communitas" tends to dissolve separation, exclusion, and prohibition. Using the concept of social drama, the author analyzes aspects of political life in the Caribbean islands and shows the role played by music in what he calls "the theater state."

INTRODUCTION

Victor Turner began his career with a study of kinship and village politics in the forests of Ndembuland, and ended it with a study of *Carnaval* performances on the streets of Rio. Spanning his vast range of interests, as he would surely have agreed, was an underlying processual unity. The *framework* of this process is a continuing attentiveness to both politics and performance. At the same time, the *dynamic* of the process is a growing emphasis on the primacy, significance, and efficacy of performative genres, including ritual, drama, sport, festivity, and so on, within the political arena.

In Turner's first major book, *Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life* (1957), he saw ritual as a "redressive mechanism" which both restates and restores a sense of social solidarity that has been shattered by conflicts. Since there are no effective secular means of accomplishing these unifying objectives, ritual is recurrently performed (1957:288-331). Later, Turner emphasized that ritual is an important phase in both political and other social processes (1964:21; 1968:269-283); that the role of ritual is to "produce" and "instigate" action (1964:24, 39); and that under certain conditions, a religious ceremony might be termed "political" (1966:4). Even later, Turner developed his well-known ideas about liminal and liminoid performance genres. These genres were variously depicted as highlights of human experience, critiques of culture, sources of creativity, influences for political and social change, and crucial watersheds in long-term historical movements (1969, 1974, 1977, 1978). In some of Turner's final writings on theatre and festivity, he saw these and other ludic genres as cultural analogues of genetic mutation (1983b:223), and proposed that the Rio *Carnaval* is both "the creative anti-structure of mechanized modernity" and a "kind of paradigm . . . for the whole modern and post-modern world" (1983a:124). Thus, Turner's thinking developed from regarding ritual performance as a "redressive mechanism" which reinforces the structure of traditional societies, to regarding festival performance as an anti-structural critique of "mechanized" modern societies.

Although the philosophical idealism of Turner's position has made some critics uneasy (e.g., Horton 1964), there is no doubt that a sizable number of anthropologists have moved in a similar direction. Commenting on recent studies of how symbolic phenomena are related to history and political economy, MacAloon detects:

> . . . increasing unease with endlessly repeated, jejune claims that symbolic forms and cultural performances "express," "depict," and "display" structural patterns and institutional interests. A growing number of studies have sought to demonstrate that ludic and ritual performances, for example, may play a primary role in constituting political formations and institutions in the first place, in actively making history rather than reactively expressing it. (1984:315)

In addition to citing Turner (1974), MacAloon also cites Appadurai (1981), Da Matta (1984), Geertz (1980), Gusfield (1981), and Sahlins (1981) as representative of this emphasis. He might also have mentioned comparable recent trends in British social anthropology, especially among those who are part of what I am tempted to term the "Manchester Diaspora." Of particular interest is the "two-dimensional" model of Abner Cohen, who was Turner's first student at the University of Manchester. For Cohen

(1974), popular performances not only have a cultural life of their own, but also play an instrumental role in political processes, where performance is politics in an aesthetic idiom.

The cultural style of the Caribbean makes it an appropriate context in which to examine the connection of performance and politics. Caribbean politicians, regardless of ideological persuasion, are characteristically flamboyant performers who creatively appropriate popular culture as the basis of spectacular and highly entertaining political dramas (cf. Stone 1974:18-19; Singham 1968:283; Manning 1980). But it is not simply that politics is suffused with performance. Conversely, performance genres are highly political, both in content and in terms of being actively engaged in the political arena. In short, the Caribbean is something of a theater state—not classic theater, as in Geertz's (1980) account of Balinese politics, but the theater of comedy, absurdity, and what West Indians call "pappyshow," a blend of foolishness and mockery.

In this paper I will examine the politics of calypso, one of the Caribbean's most colorful and ludic musical traditions. I will concentrate on Barbados, where the music has gained immense popularity within the past decade and taken on a distinctive national character. I will try to demonstrate that calypso is an important constituent of Barbadian politics and political culture, and further, that is has played a significant role as a critique of recent political events in the Caribbean, notably the controversial invasion of Grenada.

CALYPSO AND POLITICS

Calypso is a form of music which first appeared in the mid-nineteenth century among ex-slaves in Trinidad (Rohlehr 1972; Elder 1973). It is best known as a medium of topical commentary. The singers, or calypsonians, are social observers who usually employ a mode of satirical humor to lyricize about the everyday world around them. The calypsonian lampoons established authority, inverts normative systems in order to expose their underlying absurdity and injustice, and reveals the comic underpinnings and possibilities of situations which are usually taken seriously. In Turner's vocabulary, the calypsonian is a liminal or liminoid figure, a personal embodiment of social anti-structure.

Political issues and personalities have long been targets of the calypsonian's critique. In the mid-1940s, an early leader of the decolonization movement in Trinidad named Albert Gomes made the following observation:

> The calypso is the most effective political weapon in Trinidad. The singers—all of them—are men reared in poverty and oppression, and they sing of the life they

> know. Thus it is that even when cleverly camouflaged with wit and banter, the sharp tang of social criticism is evident in their songs. Moreover, people go to the calypso tents to be entertained. What politician, who must harangue from the rostrum, can boast of a better opportunity for influencing people's minds? The fact that the tents are so sedulously supervised by the police reveals the extent to which the calypso singers influence political thought. (Gomes, quoted in Warner 1983:61)

Ironically, Gomes knew of what he spoke. He was defeated a decade later by an Oxford-trained historian, Dr. Eric Williams, during an election campaign which the "Mighty Sparrow"—perhaps the greatest calypsonian of all time and a strong Williams supporter—described as a contest between "Big Brain" (Williams) and "Big Belly" (the portly Gomes):

> I am sure you've heard the story
> about Big Brain and Big Belly
> Well, Sparrow ain't 'fraid to talk
> Who don't like it can take a walk
> Fight finish, no bruise, no cuts
> But a man fall down on he guts.

Like Gomes, Williams appreciated the political power of calypso. He spoke of it in his historical writings (1962) and sought to gain wider recognition for the music, once even delivering a three and one-half hour speech to the ruling party in which he quoted repeatedly from Black Stalin's calypso, "Caribbean Man" (Warner 1983:85).

While old and relatively obscure calypso traditions have been discerned in a number of West Indian islands (Quevado 1983:14-20), the music in what Elder (1973:31) calls its "modern" and "contemporary" forms was almost exclusively associated with Trinidad until the late 1950s. Since that time, the development of modified versions of the Trinidad Carnival in several eastern Caribbean countries has provided both a stimulus and a context for the emergence of local calypso forms. Today, a number of the Caribbean's best calypsonians come from the "small islands": Short Shirt, Obstinate, and Swallow (Antigua); Arrow (Montserrat); and Becket and Scorcher (St. Vincent).

The most recent West Indian country to adopt calypso as a national rhythm was Barbados. During the latter half of the 1970s, Barbadian interest in calypso developed slowly and was coincident with the introduction of a carnival-style festival known as Crop Over. The first Crop Over calypso contest was held in 1980. In 1981, radio stations in Barbados began to tape Crop Over performances in the "tents" where calypso shows were being held (the word "tent" refers to any location where calypso shows

are held; today, most "tents" in the Caribbean are meeting halls or auditoriums which are rented for the season). In 1983, television stations began covering Crop Over performances. During this period, press coverage of calypso expanded and included reviews of tent shows, interviews with calypsonians, editorial comments by entertainment writers, and the like. In 1984, nine tents were open during the two-month Crop Over season in Barbados, and about 150 calypsonians registered for the competition. Clearly, Barbados calypso is now one of the most exciting developments in West Indian popular culture.

The florescence of calypso in Barbados is somewhat of a cultural paradox. As the Caribbean's most restrained, Protestant, and smugly "English" society, Barbados would seem to be an unlikely environment for a music which is suffused with the ludic, licensed ethos which made Trinidad famous. Indeed, before the current calypso "boom," popular music in Barbados consisted mostly of gospel, ballads, and sedate imitations of American soul.

The Barbadian resolution of this cultural paradox has been the development of a lyrical tradition in calypso which is both serious and morally engaged. Themes of reform, retribution, judgment, justice, and accountability are recurrent. The role or even "duty" of the calypsonian is to exhort and educate as well as to entertain. This role is consistent with both conventional Protestant values and Barbadians' cherished view of themselves as the scholars and teachers of the Caribbean (Lewis 1968:226).

The best-known feature of Barbadian calypso is undoubtedly its penchant for strident political criticism. A major target of this criticism has been the government of Prime Minister Tom Adams, which was elected in 1976 and reelected in 1981. The competitive struggle for public support between Adams and his calypso critics is a striking example of how a performance genre can become an active and influential agent in a society's political life.

THE MIGHTY GABBY

The volume of calypso which has been produced in Barbados is too vast to discuss in one essay. For that reason, this paper will focus primarily on a star performer named Anthony Carter (better known as "The Mighty Gabby") who exemplifies, and transcends, the genre of calypso. Gabby is a veteran of the Barbados Theatre Workshop in New York and a sometime folk singer inspired by the "protest" music of the Vietnam War. During the late 1970s, he produced a number of calypsos which were known for their blunt political criticism and their rhythmic innovations, notably a Nigerian-style, six-eight beat. In 1982, Gabby's big breakthrough occurred in the form of a hit song titled "Jack."

This song was aimed at Jack Dear, the Chairman of the Barbados Tourist Board, who mooted recommendations to allow hotels to own private beaches and to have the government restrict the activities of vendors at other beaches. Gabby's strident defiance of Dear, whom he maligned as a non-Barbadian of uncertain parentage, struck a responsive chord in the Barbados public. The song became a smash hit in tent shows, sold a huge number of records, and was the year's "Tune of the Crop" (i.e., a Barbados version of a road march).

In 1983, Gabby released his now classic song, "Boots," which was a frontal attack on Barbados' militarization policy. By the summer of 1983, the Barbados Defense Force had undergone a sizable expansion. A few years earlier, deployment of the Barbados Defense Force in St. Vincent to quell a Rastafarian uprising on Union Island had also aroused controversy. Gabby built his song on a series of rhetorical questions in a style which is reminiscent of both pulpit and classroom. These rhetorical questions are answered by his chorus:

Can we afford to feed that army
While so many children go naked and hungry?
No, no, no, no! (choral refrain)
Can we afford to remain passive
While that soldier army grow so massive?
No, no, no, no! (choral refrain)
Well don't tell me, tell Tommy
He giving them four square meals,
Some of them so fat, they could hardly run
And they shooting bull's eyes with automatic gun.

Like "Jack" and several of Gabby's other songs, "Boots" was banned from the government-owned Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) radio—a move which Gabby gleefully maintains fired public interest and spurred record sales. However, the song's major international publicity was generated by the event which it foreshadowed—the invasion of Grenada in Fall 1983. Even *Time* magazine noticed Gabby, one of the few occasions when a calypsonian has enjoyed that dubious distinction!

In 1983, Gabby's opposition to Barbados Prime Minister Tom Adams took on a more personal tone in another of his hit songs, titled "Mr. T." Although Gabby wrote this song for the calypsonian "Grynner," who recorded it, the authorship of the song was so openly known that it was generally considered to be Gabby's calypso. Skillfully presenting himself as the voice of the public, Gabby opens by citing his gullibility in marking an "X" beside the name of "Mr. T." on an election ballot:

I was so dumb,
When you come with rum,
To steal my "X" from me

You came with big tricks
Corned beef and biscuits
To rob my democracy.

As the song continues, Gabby gains political wisdom and pleads to be released from Mr. T's fold:

Look, I learn my lesson well
You can't trick me again
No more rice grain
Can turn my brain
So "T," I dropping out and saying . . .
"T," lemme go, don't hold me
Lemme go, unfold me, lemme go
"T," lemme go, don't hold me
Lemme go, I aiming now to be free.

Following this refrain, Gabby intensifies his opposition to "Mr. T." and hopes to bring him down through public humiliation and subsequently at the ballot box, a fitting defeat in the only West Indian country where the "Westminster system" of politics has been more-or-less consistent with British practice:

I goin' rip yuh pants
I goin' make yuh dance
You will know that I
Is a nest of ants
I goin' milk yuh goat
I goin' sink yuh boat
And next, I goin' get yuh with my "X."

During several in-person conversations, Gabby has articulated a world view based on revivalism and social reform, twin themes with deep roots in black Barbadian history.

"We have a situation in the Caribbean that is very disturbing," he once said. "We used to be a people who were so serene. Now, all of a sudden, we're breaking heads." Then he continued in rhyme: "We used to have visitors who came for the sun. Now we have visitors who come with the gun." With the zealous dedication of a crusader, Gabby vows to set matters right regardless of the cost: "A calypsonian is a social commentator, and he has got to do that . . . Me, Gabby, I cannot be bought. And nothing can stop me from saying what I have to say. I'll say it regardless. There's no way to stop me—except by physical death."

The 1984 Crop Over season saw Gabby deal explicitly with the Grenada controversy. One calypso song, titled "Dem Poor Grenadians," began with a declaration of conscience which Gabby embellished with homiletic gestures of righteous anger in his tent performance:

They want me to say I agree with Tom and Eugenia (Note 1)
They want me to say I agree with that Eddie Seaga (Note 2)
They want me to stifle my conscience
None of that nonsense
I am not their convenience
And if they claim they all for democracy
Why they invade Grenada to bring back that Gairy? (Note 3)
I was never for the invasion
Military occupation
No kind of intervention
Of a nation by a nation
But indirect economic sanctions
Coupled with other actions
Would have been enough injections
To save dem poor Grenadians.

In comparing this song to some of the more equivocal commentaries on Grenada by Trinidadian calypsonians, we see that Gabby evoked a fundamentalist rationale to explain his stance: "Every artist has a different approach. Mine is straightforward and blunt and to the point. I have no kind of nice casing to put on anything, and no icing. I am going to the heart and root of this problem, to get it finished with."

In 1984, Gabby's biggest hits were the two songs that he recorded, "One Day Coming Soon" and "Cadavers." "One Day Coming Soon" forecasts an imminent mass uprising against politicians and the "ruling class," and is filled with abundant millennial images. It predicts that wicked people will be "running, stumbling . . . sliding, hiding, . . . bawling, crawling." They will be "begging we . . . to ease the pain"; but it will be "too late."

"Cadavers" was a stinging attack on one of the controversial consequences of the Grenada invasion, the establishment of a campus of the St. George's University Medical School in Barbados. The medical profession in Barbados strongly opposed this move, and there were persistent rumors that the venture was financed by underworld money. Dressed in a skeleton costume, Gabby focused on an issue which deeply stirred public imagination—the school's practice of importing corpses for medical analysis:

Barbados is a big joke
To them big boys, in their big tie and coat
We barely got space to bury
Anybody in we cementary [*sic*]
But just to put pressure on all of we
Them fellas importing duppy (Note 4).

Just go to your butcher
He will sell you a piece of cadaver
Look under your cellar
They hiding another cadaver

I tell you, Ahhhhhhh! Them importing dracula.
Ahhhhhhhhhhhh! Them importing dracula.

Who is this jackass, who is this fool
That bring to Bimshire, St. George's Medical School?
Who tell them we want in Barbados
All them skeleton, obeah (Note 5) bone, and duppy?
Who tell them to bring in the Mafia money?
I hope it is not that Tommy.

Gabby's political stance is echoed by other prominent calypsonians. "Red Plastic Bag," who has regularly won the "Pic O'de Crop" (Barbados' equivalent of Calypso Monarch) title since the early 1980s, makes a thoroughgoing criticism of the political status quo in his 1984 winning song, "Bim." This song also raises the issue of cadavers: "Even if them Yankees bring in cadavers to frighten me/They can't move me, I ain't leaving this country." Besides singing "Mr. T." in 1983, the Barbados calypsonian "Grynner" won the 1984 "Tune of the Crop" title with "Stinging Bees," a song which identified Prime Minister Tom Adams, his cabinet, and several like-minded politicians elsewhere in the Caribbean as "bees, stinging you and me." The calypsonian "Young Blood" sang "Sport Billie," a thoroughgoing attack on the Barbados Minister of Education, replete with allusions to sexual perversion. At about the same time, "Invader No. 3" sang "Politician's Dream," a song which accused incumbent politicians of dreaming of Caribbean unity while practicing narrow self-interest "when they wake up." Meanwhile, the calypsonian "Black Pawn" shifted Gabby's apocalyptic theme into a Rastafarian context and predicted in a song called "Judgment Day" that there will be a millennium when "wickedness," "inequality," and "oppression" will be revealed and rectified.

In addition to his detractors, Prime Minister Adams also has calypsonian supporters, although none of these have achieved the success or popularity of some of the detractors. Adams' best-known supporter is "Serenader," who praised him in a 1984 calypso titled "Tom is de Man":

Who is the man with all the brain?
I don't like to call no name
Let me hear you loud and plain
It is Tom (choral refrain).

Who is the man we read about
That make Coard (Note 6) shut up he mout'?
Let me hear you loud, and shout
"It is Tom" (choral refrain).

POLITICS IN ANOTHER MODE

Lyrical content aside, what is the political role of Barbadian calypso? An ethnographic clue to this question emerged during the 1983 Crop Over season in an extraordinary debate on calypso in the Barbados House of Assembly. This debate was instigated by Opposition questions about the censorship of Gabby's top calypsos. Prime Minister Adams' masterful, if contradictory, reply was that it was not the Barbados Government which was under attack, but tourists, soldiers, and other innocent people. Adams cautioned that calypso filled with hatred needlessly injured these people and also caused resentment and hostility throughout Barbados society. Then, in a humorous vein, Adams advised calypsonians not to take themselves too seriously, and to avoid singing songs that politicians had written for them (a reference to his earlier contention that members of the Opposition were writing calypsos). Estimating that eighty to ninety percent of Barbados calypso deals with political themes, Adams proposed that the theme of politics reflects the serious "Barbados spirit," just as the sexual preoccupation of Trinidadian calypso reflects that country's basic concerns. He went on to tell an uproarious chamber and gallery that one does not expect to hear a song like "Ma Ma Look Ah Boo Boo Deh" (a classic Trinidadian calypso) in Barbados.

This debate had important implications. First, by debating calypso, Barbados politicians not only acknowledged its impact, but also gave it a certain legitimacy. Second, in the symmetrical, rational logic for which Barbadians—who are steeped in the classics—are famous, if it is appropriate for politicians to criticize calypso in Parliament, then it is equally appropriate for calypsonians to criticize politics in the tents.

Gabby responded to the House of Assembly debate by ridiculing and reversing Adams' admonition to calypsonians about taking themselves too seriously. He told me his statement was a "joke:"

> When the Prime Minister said that calypsonians should not take themselves seriously, I thought it was one of the biggest jokes I have ever heard. What he was telling me—and telling the rest of the world—is that Shakespeare should not take himself seriously. I consider myself as much a poet as William Shakespeare . . .
>
> If the politicians don't take us seriously, we're going to cause them an awful lot of problems—not in terms of violence, but in terms of telling the people what we know . . .

The following year, the conflict between Adams and Gabby escalated. Gabby's songs were again banned from air play, and as

a result of what one astute informant calls "executive action," his music was also removed from the shelves of Barbadian record stores. In addition, Adams took personal legal action against Gabby for defamation in a charge which was specifically tied to the song, "Cadavers."

As this "social drama" continues to unfold, it suggests that Gabby is a key figure in the Barbadian political arena, and that he is playing a role accentuated by the name of his tent, "Battleground," as well as by the tent's location in the headquarters of the "official" Opposition Party! Gabby has been mooted as a political candidate, and Adams himself says that he expects Gabby to run against him. As a precedent, the Trinidadian calypsonian "Attila the Hun" ran successfully for the Port of Spain City Council in 1946. A half-century earlier, colonial authorities had threatened to abolish the Port of Spain City Council until another calypsonian, Richard Coeur de Leon, mustered massive public opinion against the move. Like a great number of calypsonians, "Attila the Hun" is often cited in parliamentary debates (Warner 1983:60). Meanwhile, Gabby denies an interest in elective office while wryly observing that calypsonians have more power than politicians.

Warner stated that calypso is a "mirror for the society" (1983:87). However, the present case takes us beyond this conventional position. In Barbados, calypso not only reflects the political process; it is also an integral and influential part of that process. Tent shows, censorship controversies, epic "Gabby and Tom" battles, and calypso debates in Parliament are crucial, and even central, ethnographic components of contemporary Barbadian politics. While reactively depicting and distilling political realities, calypso is actively engaged in the creation of those realities.

THE CULTURAL FORCE OF PERFORMANCE

In *From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play*, Victor Turner proposed:

> Where social dramas find their cultural "doubles" . . . in aesthetic dramas and other genres of cultural performance, there may well develop, as Richard Schechner has argued, a convergence between them, so that the processual form of social dramas is implicit in aesthetic dramas (even if only by reversal or negation) while the *rhetoric* [his emphasis] of social dramas—and hence the shape of argument—is drawn from cultural performances. There was a lot of Perry Mason in Watergate! (1982:90)

Under what circumstances does a cultural performance shape the "argumentative" form of a social or political drama/process? The Barbadian case offers a clue to this important question. In Barbados, the censorship of calypsos is politically problematic because it contradicts the popular and deeply-ingrained belief of Barbadians that they have inherited British civil rights and freedoms. Barbados is, after all, the Caribbean's famed "little England." Ironically, this belief is often cited as one of the factors which encouraged political calypso. As a Barbadian journalist once told me: "We've always talked about being the freest country in the world, having total freedom of speech and expression. The calypsonians take this as license to be as seriously critical as they care to be." Thus, calypso represents a basic political value which the "official" political system is supposed to embody and expound, but which in practice is compromised and contravened by the political system.

A corroborative example of this comes from MacAloon's study of another performance tradition in another Caribbean country: international amateur sport in Puerto Rico (1984). In the context of discussing the "systematic interconnectedness" and "mutual structuring" of sport and politics, MacAloon argues that the Puerto Rican "mania" for international sport bears heavily on the question of statehood as the central issue of politics. If Puerto Rico becomes a U.S. state, it would lose its eligibility for separate competition in international athletic events, which are the only arenas where Puerto Rico can represent itself as a nation among nations. This gives sport a profound and powerful significance vis-a-vis politics (in the conventional sense). "In politics the status of Puerto Rico as a nation is ambiguous, conflicted, disputed; in international Olympic sport, it is not" (1984:326).

These observations suggest that popular performance forms can be a rather "pure" version of the ideals which give a society its distinctive self-awareness. Ideals with that type of significance are likely to be a powerful cultural force, particularly in domains of social life where normative standards are diluted, obscured, or transgressed. The capacity of religious ritual to exert precisely this sort of force in traditional societies has long been appreciated. Through the work of Victor Turner, we are beginning to see how performance genres of a most secular and profane nature can "play" a comparable role in the modern and modernizing world.

NOTES

1. Eugenia Charles, the Prime Minister of Dominica.

2. The Prime Minister of Jamaica.

3. Eric Gairy, the former Prime Minister of Grenada who was deposed during the 1979 revolution.

4. "Duppy" is a general term for a ghost or spirit.

5. "Obeah" is a form of divinatory and manipulative magic with sinister connotations.

6. Bernard Coard, leader of the faction which ousted former Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop in 1983.

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"RETURN OF THE IKOI-KOI": MANIFESTATIONS OF LIMINALITY ON NIGERIAN TELEVISION

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Selon Victor Turner, la *liminalité* et la *communitas* peuvent se manifester sous des formes diverses dans la vie culturelle des cités modernes. Cet article examine des instances d'anti-structure dans un feuilleton télévisé observé à Benin City au Nigeria. Dans cette série, dont le thème est "la lutte des classes," "Hotel de Jordan" se moque, entre autres, des hommes riches, des sorciers, et des fonctionnaires. Les auteurs examinent le rôle de la *liminalité* dans l'intrigue, les dialogues et la caractérisation des personnages. En particulier, ils analysent en détail un épisode qui met en jeu les représentations collectives concernant les esprits et les fantômes comme base d'une allégorie de la crise sociale qui aboutit à un coup d'état en Décembre 1983.

As Victor Turner indicated, liminality and communitas may be present in diverse cultural performances in modern cities. This article examines manifestations of anti-structure in a popular television drama series in Benin City, Nigeria, whose theme has been described as "the class struggle." This drama series is titled "Hotel de Jordan," and lampoons, *inter alia*, rich men, native doctors, and government officials. The role of liminality in plot, language, and characterization is explored. There is a detailed analysis of an episode which utilizes collective representations concerning ghosts and shades to construct an allegory for the social drama in Nigeria which culminated in a military coup d'état in December 1983.

Nevertheless the symbolic genres of industrial leisure are analogous, if not homologous, to rituals (particularly their liminal phases) in tribal societies. That is they are similar in function, if not in structure. . . . In other words, they play with the factors of culture, assemble them in random, grotesque, improbable, surprising combinations, just as tribesmen do when they make masks, disguise as monsters, combine many disparate ritual symbols, or invert or parody profane reality. But they do this in a far more complicated way, multiplying genres of artistic and popular

> entertainments, and within each allowing authors, dramatists, painters, sculptors, musicians, folksingers and others lavish scope to generate not only weird forms but also models highly critical of the status quo. Although their style is much more ludic, less culturally constrained, and less subordinated to "the ritual process" than in tribal and agrarian societies, it nevertheless very often has a serious intent. (Turner 1978:282)

INTRODUCTION

In contemporary urban Nigeria, television is rapidly replacing traditional forms of evening entertainment; e.g., the telling of folktales, the singing of traditional songs, and the playing of "moonlight games." Much television programming consists of foreign imports—mainly detective serials, situation comedies, cartoons, and feature films. A good deal of each day's programming is given over to local and network news and current affairs (see Note 1). All of these categories of viewing present interesting problems to social scientists. Anthropologists who are interested in expressive culture may learn a great deal from analysis of yet another type of programming, locally produced drama. It is here that Nigerian writers and performers have the freedom to transform their experience into symbolic statements, and where Nigerian audiences may observe their lives mirrored and transformed by the new technology. In Benin City, the capital of both Bendel State and the old Benin Empire, the most popular Nigerian drama, indeed the most popular television program, is "Hotel de Jordan," a long-running series of hour-length farcical plays featuring a common set of characters.

During the course of our six-month study (see Note 2), some 354 people were asked to name their favorite T.V. program. Two hundred and thirty-one valid responses were received, with 374 preferences being named. Eighty-three informants named "Hotel de Jordan" as a favorite program. The next most popular program, "The Professionals," received thirty-six votes. "Hotel de Jordan" appeals to young and old, women and men, and to members of diverse social classes and different ethnic groups (such as the Edo or Bini, traditional inhabitants of Benin City and its environs, and their erstwhile subjects and neighbors such as the Urhobo, Ishan, Itsekiri, and Bendelite Ibo, many of them migrants to the city). Market women, housewives, schoolchildren, carpenters, mechanics, taxi drivers, shop assistants, casual laborers, technicians, matriarchs, and retired gentlemen all expressed a liking for "Hotel de Jordan." The only negative comments we received about the program were from a few members of the traditional and new élites, a group similar to those in other countries who reject programs which appeal to the mass audience.

To understand the appeal of "Hotel de Jordan" is to understand the social processes unfolding in Southern Nigeria in the period since independence. The program lampoons bureaucrats, corrupt businessmen, wealthy polygynists, traditional rulers, naïve radicals, quack native doctors, and even the military. It gives visibility to the common man, though he is more often depicted as a trickster than as a working-class hero. In fine, "Hotel de Jordan" may be said, in Victor Turner's terms, to exalt anti-structure and to elevate it above structure. Perhaps by that very diversity, the diverse audience of the program may possess one of the few types of communitas which is possible in an urban environment (see Turner 1969:94-165; 1978:280-282).

When asked why they liked "Hotel de Jordan," respondents typically gave brief answers which stressed the local topicality of the program. One representative response was: "It shows what's going on around here." However, other programs which are intended to present Bendelites with images of their city and their state (e.g., local documentaries and interviews with local personalities) are not nearly so popular. In analyzing the special appeal of "Hotel de Jordan," we shall suggest that a modern medium can acquire immense audience loyalty by doing what ritual and folk art have always done: acknowledging the tensions and weaknesses of a community to itself, while restating the underlying social values which must ultimately be upheld. "Hotel de Jordan" does this for the inhabitants of Bendel State, for Nigeria, for Africa, and always and especially, for Benin City.

PLOT, CHARACTER, AND MISE EN SCENE IN "HOTEL DE JORDAN"

Jordan City is Benin City in thin disguise. The fictitious "Hotel de Jordan," whose casino bar is a social center of sorts, provides the setting for much of the action. A typical "Hotel de Jordan" plot involves lampooning the greed and pretensions of one or more rich, influential, and/or arrogant characters, and the defeat of these characters' designs for further self-aggrandizement. These defeats are generally brought about not by concerted and noble actions on the part of the down-trodden, but rather by the often bumbling efforts of the under-class to achieve some material gratifications of their own. Often, the conflict between different manifestations of greed brings about everybody's downfall. For example, in one episode, Chief Ajas, an ignorant, wealthy womanizer (a polygynist in this episode), has worked out a new system for winning the football pools, but because one of his three wives resents the attention Chief Ajas devotes to the pools, the wife burns what turns out to be a winning coupon. While Ajas lies on the sofa in a state of shock after discovering his loss, his wives have a heated altercation with each other. Ajas recovers his *sangfroid* sufficiently to enable him to concentrate on the re-invention of his pools system. He wins again, but his joy is quickly dampened as his wives wrangle over

the division of the spoils. The general buffoonery of the situation is heightened by the fact that two of the wives are played by male actors in female dress, actors who normally play Idemudia, Ajas' servant, and Kokori, Idemudia's ally in various plots to thwart Ajas.

In another episode, Idemudia and Kokori, in their normal male roles, attempt to seduce a beautiful and wealthy young woman, upon whom the middle-aged Ajas has his own designs. In the end, the girl is rescued (and won) by a handsome young journalist after a scuffle between the other contenders for her favors.

In a third episode, this same journalist, who intends to make a scoop by exposing the poor conditions in the local prison, ends up imprisoned himself and abused by the prisoners, who are not the noble sons of the earth he had naïvely imagined them to be. They strip him of his watch, his pen, and his clothing. Their leader is content to be a "big man" within the criminal class and does not take kindly to an intruder who wishes to change the order upon which his status depends.

The general selfishness of all the characters is a consistent theme in "Hotel de Jordan." In one allegorical episode, two rich characters are shown riding two poorer ones like horses, while reading out paeans to democracy from the newspapers. One of the "horses," played by Last Eguavoen (a bank manager named "Dr. Milo Monroe"), utters a continuous stream of Marxist rhetoric. In the end there is a rebellion, but riders and horses merely change places. The structure of the situation is not altered.

While certain unique plots find a place in the memory of the viewers, the audience of "Hotel de Jordan" expect, as do the audience of any soap opera or comedy show, that a certain format will be followed in most episodes of the program. For the most part, they are not disappointed. In three of the six episodes we viewed, the opening scene—a comic interaction between Idemudia and Kokori, in which both characters burst into song—was followed by an interchange in Ajas' living room, in which the chief unknowingly made a fool of himself. The program usually ends with a scene of raucous disorder.

Where stock sequence is not followed, the humor may be embellished by the fact that inhabitants of the imaginary "Jordan City" are themselves acting a role in the program; e.g., Idemudia may be a "horse" or "Ajas' wife." These bridges in characterization ensure that audience expectations are seldom upset.

The program depends heavily upon three popular characters: Idemudia, Kokori, and Ajas. Of these, Idemudia is probably the one most beloved by the audience. The program's director describes Idemudia in these terms:

> Chief Ajas' domestic servant. Incurably superstitious and irrational in his clinging to traditional customs and beliefs. His voice is a wonderful natural asset and comes useful in soothing his master in times of troubles and also in exhorting him in times of self-delusion. (Ihonde 1984:7)

Agbonifo Enaruna, who has played Idemudia since 1974, is a local celebrity. He told us that when he leaves his home or his work as a welder at the University of Benin Medical School Teaching Hospital, children follow his motorcycle, screaming, "Idemudia! Idemudia!"

Despite his stardom and an earlier distinguished career as a folk musician, Enaruna lives unpretentiously in a typical Bini house with his aged mother, two wives, and twelve children, whom he supports by manual labor, not acting. Like Idemudia, Enaruna is the last son of an Edo chief. Since under Edo law, primogeniture is the preferred mode of inheritance, the last son in a large family is likely to be a poor man. As an actor, Enaruna earns no more than the character he plays receives as a houseboy.

Nigerian local television stations operate on very low budgets. The estimated expenditure for writers, actors, and props for an episode of "Hotel de Jordan" is five hundred *naira* (abbreviated as N; at that time $850.00 in Canadian funds). A leading actor in "Hotel de Jordan" earns forty naira an episode. The script writer will earn eighty naira a script. In consequence, writers and actors cannot support themselves by these trades. They either have other full-time jobs at the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), or work outside of television. The lack of a good outside broadcast-ing camera means that rushes of outdoor sequences shot at various locations in Benin City are re-used for many different shows.

The stage sets used in "Hotel de Jordan" are simple and inexpensive: a few pieces of living room furniture in front of a "wall," in which there is a painted facsimile of a door; a barroom at a hotel with but one table and a few cheap chairs. There is no attempt to create an illusion of reality.

In an article on cinema in Nigeria, Wole Soyinka has suggested that a lack of illusion imposed on Nigerian (or indeed any nation's) theater by technical or financial constraints may make it easier to impart social messages because the audience is not allowed to indulge in escapism, and the producer is not dependent upon those who might pay the piper and therefore call the tune (Soyinka 1979:89-102).

Both "Hotel de Jordan" and another more serious Nigerian Television Authority program, "Bendel Playhouse," draw heavily on the folk tradition for plots; ghosts, witches, and herbalists are

not strangers to the screen. In this sense, "Hotel de Jordan" is a people's program. As Oritsagbemi Slater, who plays the casino manager in "Hotel de Jordan" and directs television dramas, remarked, the reason why so much television drama in Benin City remains so close to the folk tradition is that the actors, writers, and directors are themselves a product of it.

JORDAN CITY/BENIN CITY

To non-natives, Benin City is known for its brasses, bronzes, and ivories; its divine kings or Obas; and its once-great empire. Today, the traditional arts and crafts still flourish, and the Oba still reigns in his palace, albeit with reduced authority. Benin City now has approximately half a million inhabitants. It is the traditional home of the Edo proper, or Bini. A number of related groups, such as the Ishan and Urhobo, live in Bendel State, as do such non-Edo populations as the Itsekiri of the Delta area and a strong Ibo component in the areas adjacent to the Niger River. There are now substantial non-Edo minorities in Benin City itself, including migrants from other states and representatives of all the groups in Bendel State. Bendelites often describe their state as a "mini-Nigeria," so diverse is its ethnic composition and so profound are its ethnic tensions.

Trade of every description is the most conspicuous feature of Benin City as citizens go about the pressing business of earning a living. There are busy markets, large and small supermarkets, street stands and tiny shops, and numerous street hawkers. Motorists stuck in congested traffic are pressured by vendors offering chewing gum, biscuits, washcloths, toys, hats, and toilet paper. Petty trading is an avenue by which almost anyone can earn a little money, although competition is intense and profit margins are low. Some Bendelites are employed in light manufacturing which uses the products of the rain forest, lumber and rubber. Small workshops make and sell hand-crafted furniture, and small factories produce tissue products. The repair of appliances and automobiles provides an opportunity for many small entrepreneurs. State government and such public institutions as schools and hospitals, as well as a major federal university (the University of Benin, which includes both a medical school and a teaching hospital), are important both for the employment they provide and the amenities they offer. Several large breweries and bottling plants are also major employers.

Most native Edo proper or Bini still have farms in one of the village communities surrounding Benin City and visit them regularly. Even those residents of Benin City who are members of the Ishan and Urhobo ethnic groups frequently commute to their farms on weekends. Although relatives may provide some produce for those without farms of their own (yams, cassava, fruit, and vegetables), the landless and those who have come to Benin City

from more distant parts of Bendel State and Nigeria are totally dependent on the urban cash economy.

A large number of the inhabitants of Benin City are still employed in domestic service as nannies, cooks, night watchmen, and cleaners. A growing, small minority have no jobs at all.

The director of "Hotel de Jordan," Jonathan Ihonde, who wrote many of the scripts for the earlier programs, has said that Jordan City could be anywhere in Africa (Ihonde 1984:5). Indeed, this could be so, for Jordan City's problems are those of many Nigerian cities, and much that is true of Nigeria is also true of much of post-independence Africa. However, shots of easily recognizable Benin landmarks, the occasional use of Edo, and the employment of the local variety of pidgin as the main language of the program afford Benin City residents a greater sense of affinity with Jordanians than can be enjoyed by residents of other localities.

Jonathan Ihonde has stated that the central concern in "Hotel de Jordan" is class struggle (ibid.). He himself was at the time state chairman of the Nigerian Labor Congress. In daily life in Benin City, inequality in income and access to amenities is a constant subject of discussion and angry comment. A number of informants commented on the unfair advantages enjoyed by the "big men" at the expense of the "common man" (these are the actual terms employed).

The economic plight of the lower classes in Nigeria was exacerbated by the end of the oil boom in 1981 and extraordinary inflation in the prices of basic staples such as yams, cassava, rice, soap, and cooking oil. In fact, the inflation rate for products of this kind has exceeded the rate of inflation in the price of luxury goods. Cutbacks in public spending hurt the poor more than the rich: public hospitals have few drugs, public schools lack necessary equipment, and power and water are available to most consumers on an unpredictable and irregular basis. Meanwhile, the rich use local and foreign private schools and hospitals and possess their own generators and boreholes.

A successful professional man or local businessman in Nigeria will earn (often substantially) over 10,000 naira ($17,000.00 in Canadian funds) a year; pay very little tax; gain quite a great deal in unofficial commissions; possess a Peugeot or a Mercedes; have a well-appointed house in the Government Reservation Area along with a staff of servants; and own a large color television, a stereo, and frequently, a video recorder and air conditioner.

By contrast, a servant will earn N120-200 per month for a sixty- to eighty-hour week. A junior civil servant will earn N200-300 per month, while a petty trader will earn N150 per

month, although many well-established market women earn much more than this. Given Nigerian prices, which by any available standards of comparison are double to triple those in North America and Western Europe, these figures speak for themselves.

It is notable that, despite all the comments we heard concerning these inequalities, there is no strong proletarian movement in Nigeria and no socialist party has ever had a national base. Class consciousness is therefore incipient at best in the urban areas, and is often submerged by ethnic rivalries. An Ishan taxi driver expressed contempt for the "big men," but identified them with the Edo élite despite the fact that his own brother was a rich businessman.

THE TELEVISION AUDIENCE IN BENIN CITY: WHO'S WATCHING?

"Hotel de Jordan" is produced by the Nigerian Television Authority in Benin City, or NTA (Benin). The station has been in existence since 1973, and the program also dates back to that year. There are currently two television stations in Benin City: NTA (Benin), which has been a federal station since 1976, and BTV (Bendel Television), which was created by the Bendel State government in late 1981.

The television audience in Benin City has grown immensely in the past few years. Katz and Wedell report that as late as the early 1970s, there was only one television to approximately 1,000 Nigerians (Katz and Wedell 1978:Table A4). Later Nigerian statistics indicate a quick growth in viewership.

Approximately seventy-five percent of our informants had access to television; slightly under sixty percent had television in their own households. Our interview data show that fifty-two percent of T.V. households had acquired their television sets during the years 1979-1984 (see Note 3). In one compound we visited in the center of Benin City, which was occupied by one extended family and its tenants, there were sixty people and fourteen television sets. Occupations of the family heads included such ordinary trades as carpentry and automobile body repair. Artisans and skilled workers tend to have bought television sets (mainly small black-and-white receivers) since 1979; all the sets in the household described above had been acquired during this period. This fact is significant, because survey data for the late seventies (Ikime 1979:57) show that the television audience at that time was predominantly upper-middle-class.

Because the availability of television to the nonélite is so recent, when "Hotel de Jordan" was first produced, it did not reach many members of the audience for which it was intended, and who are now its most loyal fans. Television is still unavailable

to most of the rural population in Bendel State. Those villages which have T.V. reception tend to be more involved in the money economy and/or closer to the city than those without television. Perhaps for this reason, the few rural viewers we interviewed liked "Hotel de Jordan" very much.

THE RETURN OF THE IKOI-KOI: THE SHADES VISIT JORDAN CITY

At 8:00 p.m. on February 11, 1984, the Ikoi-Koi, "ghosts" or "vampires," whose faces were painted white, returned to Jordan City and were seen on Benin City television in an episode of "Hotel de Jordan" titled "Return of the Ikoi-Koi." Because of financial hardship, "Return of the Ikoi-Koi" was the only new episode of "Hotel de Jordan" to be presented between Christmas 1983 and early April 1984. On other Saturday evenings, repeat episodes were shown, and "Return of the Ikoi-Koi" was shown a second time in March. It has proven to be extremely popular. When we saw it on February 11, 1984, our children and ourselves were four in an audience of fifty seated before a television screen in a home in Oluko village, ten miles north of Benin City. We were thus simultaneously able to view both the program and the audience.

On December 31, 1983, an event not unrelated to the "Return of the Ikoi-Koi" occurred in Nigeria. After fifty-one months of civilian government, the military had reestablished power through a coup d'état. "Return of the Ikoi-Koi" was intended and widely understood to be an allegory concerning these recent political circumstances. As we shall see, the personnel, content, structure, and function of "Return of the Ikoi-Koi" bear a number of similarities to traditional masquerades in Bendel State communities. Such masquerades belong to a performance genre which incorporates most of the classic elements of anti-structure (see Turner 1969:94-165).

In "Return of the Ikoi-Koi," the Ikoi-Koi appear in the bush, outside banks, in petrol stations, and in Chief Ajas' home, frightening both the poor (Idemudia and Kokori) and the rich (Ajas and his circle of friends). The casino manager of the Hotel de Jordan appears in Ajas' living room disguised as a wild young man with Rastafarian hair. By his disguise, he suggests that one may frustrate the Ikoi-Koi. Accordingly, the poor parade as big men, while the rich pretend to be their servants. Captain Nnamonu, head of Jordan City's security organization, proclaims on television that rumors of the return of the Ikoi-Koi are false. Ajas and his friends celebrate the disappearance of the Ikoi-Koi, and resume their corrupt dealings. Their happy negotiations are frustrated by a false reappearance of the Ikoi-Koi (a joke by Idemudia and Kokori). Immediately thereafter, the whole

cast is reduced to a state of trembling, incoherent idiocy by the reappearance of the "real" Ikoi-Koi.

EPISODIC DETAIL AND CHARACTERIZATION

In the first scene of "Return of the Ikoi-Koi," the Ikoi-Koi appear in the forest. Their frightening appearance is enhanced by music and sound effects. There is an opening drum roll. After twenty seconds, the drums are joined by wind and electrical instruments. The opening sequence lasts three minutes.

Idemudia and the hunchback Kokori appear on the screen, clearing farmland in the forest. They sing a farming song in the Edo language ("A gha y'ugbo do," or "If one goes to the farm"), and discuss their plans to plant plantains. The Ikoi-Koi appear; Idemudia and Kokori quit the forest in fright.

In the next scene, Ajas is talking to his girlfriend in his living room. He announces that he is about to clear some farmland and asks his girlfriend to serve them both drinks. He promises that he will give both the girlfriend's mother and sister rights to the produce of certain farmland, but refuses his girlfriend's request for her own rights to such produce. Would a tortoise try to remove the load (the tortoise's shell) from his back? Ajas claims that his girlfriend is his property and the two of them are like a snail and its shell. Any property he acquires will automatically be hers. In the end, he relents and gives her a large allotment.

All of the above statements are rendered in a denser pidgin than that of most of the other characters. Hilarity greeted some of Ajas' utterances. Not only is the pidgin Ajas uses thick; it is bad pidgin, replete with idiosyncrasies or catch-phrases such as "You hear me so?", with comical trips of the tongue ("skita" for "sister"; "miskate" for "mistake"), and with inelegant grammatical flaws ("you's" for the vocative "you"). It is the coarse language of a coarse man who is a buffoon despite himself; although he has acquired much wealth, he will never acquire social panache.

Having reluctantly agreed to give his girlfriend some yams, Ajas goes on to state his political and economic philosophy, thus allowing the script writer to lampoon the big man who preaches democracy while avidly pursuing his own advantage. This sequence is an exposé of the inherent contradiction of democracy—the contradiction between the doctrine of equality for all and the premium placed on individual liberty, including the liberty to advance one's own interests at the expense of others. Ajas advises his girlfriend not to sell her newly promised yams in the marketplace. It seems he believes that the interests of the masses are best served when he himself is the sole dealer in

yams. If we believe Ajas' self-styled "recitation for democracy," it would appear that the interests of all are joined in him:

> And I say. I quote:
>
> "Democracy is here de government of de peoples by de peoples and for de peoples." And if I bring am for dis yam matter now, democracy go meany . . . em . . . yez . . . y'. . . y' . . . yams of de peoples, by de peoples and for de peoples. Now "of de people" mean to say now de people here get de yam. Dere "by de people" mean to say now de people dey struggle dig de yam from de ground. And "for de people" he mean to say de people must bring de yams for Chief Ajasi, and Chief Ajasi go sell am again for de masses. Yeh, for de masses.

This speech is an elaboration of a remark he has made a few minutes earlier in response to his girlfriend's suggestion that a farmer with a family to feed might face hardship if he released his yams to Chief Ajas:

> . . . de farmer no be masses, so derefore de farmer he also buy from Chief Ajas.

An important tenet of democratic jurisprudence also comes in for some twisting here—the notion of equality before the law. Asked what would happen if the farmer refused to part with his yams, Ajas waxes indignant; indeed, he almost forgets the right word for such a farmer's heinous selfishness:

> Na sabo . . . sabo . . . sabo . . . SABOTAGE . . . straightaway arrest for jail.

The government which came to power with the December 31, 1983 coup justified its suspension of democracy mainly on the grounds that the politicians had allowed hoarding and corruption to place essential commodities beyond the reach of the ordinary man. Thus, linking a defense of hoarding with a defense of democracy served to establish "Return of the Ikoi-Koi" as a commentary on current events. However, one must bear in mind that Ajas has been a central character in "Hotel de Jordan" since long before the coup, and that the audience laughs at his utterances partly because these utterances are what Chief Ajas is expected to say. His rhetoric encapsulates all that is comic in his character.

Humor, according to Gregory Bateson (1969), brings forward elements of a social field which are normally relegated to the background. In his ignorance, Ajas flaunts what big men who are more clever take pains to conceal. He will retain his capacity to draw laughter for longer than "Return of the Ikoi-koi" will retain its specific topicality—indeed, he will retain this capacity for as long as certain truths about social relations are

hidden behind the customary attempts of "big men" to justify their actions.

Chief Ajas' discourse on democracy is followed by a brief episode in which the Ikoi-Koi appear in the streets of Jordan City, spreading terror among their beholders and arousing laughter in the television audience. A frightened crowd begins to gather in Ajas' house:

> Tell me now. Wetin [what] you see? IKOI-KOI!

Outside, the Ikoi-Koi appear in a parking lot, where they pursue the assistant bank manager, Gberegedegberu (a deliberate tongue-twister of a name), a corrupt petty capitalist who is always plotting against his boss, the Marxist Dr. Milo Monroe. In the next scene, Gberegedegberu joins a crowd gathered a few days later in Ajas' house. The crowd also includes Ajas' friend and rival, Chief Igho, whose name means "money" in the Edo language, and various other local personalities.

Gberegedegberu announces that he is ready for death. He can no longer bear "the mortal agony—the mental torment—the gruesome experience and the excruciating feeling." He calls upon his tormentors:

> Ikoi-Koi! Come take my life! Come take my life! For four days this body has seen no rest. For four days these eyes have seen no sleep.

The audience is no longer listening to pidgin; instead it is hearing a melodramatic speech in the English prescribed by the literature examiners of the West African Examinations Council. Gberegedegberu may indeed impress his fellow Jordanians with his erudition; to the viewer who has witnessed this manipulation of language in real life, his flowery version of it is comically pretentious.

The gathering is stirred by the sensational entrance of Hotel de Jordan's casino manager, Dr. Ibn Mujid, a trickster known for his love of women, gambling, and profanity. He informs Ajas and his friends that they should no longer fear the Ikoi-Koi because, as he confidently asserts, the Ikoi-Koi can be tricked:

> Ikoi-Koi knows me here on earth-i only by the image-i of my other self-i in the world beyond me . . . you can deceive it.
>
> You can deceive am?
>
> Change-i. Change your appearance-i. Change your status-i. Change everything about you-i.

True to his word, Mujid is disguised in a Rastafarian wig and is wearing corduroy pants with a conspicuous patch on the crotch. His speech has also acquired a peculiarity which it does not normally have.

Mujid's suggestions are implemented forthwith. Ajas and Igho reappear in cheap leisure suits as the chauffeurs of Volkswagens. Their servants, Idemudia and Kokori, don the agbadas (native robes) of the rich, and delight in insulting their bosses and sending them off on petty errands:

> Driver! Igho! Foolish driver! Look-e, head like a cocoyam.

Ajas and Igho assert their changed identities:

> Tell Ikoi-Koi, say you be big man. You be Chief Igho. I be driver. I no be Ajas.

Alarmed by the unrest in the town, the Mayor's Security Officer, Captain Nnamonu, appears on Jordan City's television screens and delivers a speech that is a parody of the broadcasts by senior military officers which have become a regular feature of evening television in Nigeria since the 1983 coup. On two occasions, we watched Benin City audiences greet this event with hilarity (see Note 4). The speech reassures the public that the Ikoi-Koi are not present in Jordan City and warns "fellow Jordanians" that they will be "summarily dealt with" should they perpetuate the rumors of the Ikoi-Koi's appearance. Some of the confusion ascribed to the citizenry's fear of the Ikoi-Koi is reminiscent of the conditions which obtained during the five-day curfew following the coup:

> All activities grind to a halt at 6:00 p.m. daily as people rush to get home before dark.

Captain Nnamonu's advice to the residents of Jordan City is identical to that which concluded Brigadier Abacha's announcement of the coup:

> All are advised to be law-abiding and to go about their normal business peacefully. Goodnight.

Meanwhile, the tactic of disguise appears to have succeeded: the Ikoi-Koi no longer haunt Ajas and his friends. The incompetent native doctor Okhue boasts that he is responsible for the Ikoi-Koi's final disappearance:

> I kill dis one! I kill dis one! I kill am!

The delighted Ajas announces that from now on Okhue will be known by the title "Professor." The corrupt assistant bank manag-

er, Gberegedegberu, is heard saying to someone, "Meet me in my office for a loan."

The return of normality is brief. The Ikoi-Koi reappear. Their first reappearance is a trick by Idemudia and Kokori. The cast barely has time to recover from this jest when the real Ikoi-Koi enter the room.

Throughout most of this performance, anti-structure has reigned triumphant. In the pages that follow, we shall analyze more fully some of the devices by which the atmosphere of anti-structure is created and maintained.

"HOTEL DE JORDAN" AND THE LANGUAGE OF ANTI-STRUCTURE

In "The Return of the Ikoi-Koi," no less than in other episodes of "Hotel de Jordan," the characters' use of language is crucial in defining their relationships to each other and to the audience. Although Idemudia and Kokori sing in the Edo langauge, they speak the ordinary pidgin English of the masses in Bendel State, a pidgin which is intelligible to most inhabitants of Southern Nigeria. Ajas speaks a garbled pidgin, which gives the lie to all his posturing. Most educated members of the Nigerian bourgeoisie, including government officials, speak Nigerian Standard English in public and often in private, sometimes with idiosyncrasies appropriate to their roles—e.g., the florid literary pretentiousness of Gberegedegberu in this episode. However, most of the dialogue in all episodes of "Hotel de Jordan" is in Bendelite pidgin.

"Hotel de Jordan" is one of relatively few radio and television programs in Benin City which make substantial use of Bendelite pidgin English. All told, not more than two percent of air-wave time in Benin City is occupied by programs in Bendelite pidgin, despite the fact that pidgin is the most widely understood language in Southern Nigeria.

Significantly, pidgin is not used for broadcasting the news, despite repeated proposals to introduce it. One news announcer told us that he would feel "silly" reading the news in pidgin. In the print media, pidgin is almost entirely relegated to two contexts: the satirical and the sexual. Serious newspapers, whether local or national, use pidgin captions for political cartoons. The salacious Friday newspaper, *Lagos Weekend*, prints a column in pidgin which is usually even more risqué than the rest of the paper. *Ikebe Super*, a humorous magazine that appeals to prurient adolescents throughout Southern Nigeria, consists of comic strips and photographic stories captioned in pidgin.

Why is a language which is deemed unsuitable for news broadcasting an ideal vehicle for social satire and sexual ribaldry?

There are many mutually intelligible local varieties of Nigerian pidgin English. When spoken, the various pidgins are sufficiently different from Standard English that they are incomprehensible to an untrained listener. Furthermore, pidgins are not accepted as authentic languages by either the Nigerian élite or the educational establishment. To hold any nonmanual job in government or modern business, or to be admitted to an institution of higher learning, one must speak Standard English. Pidgin has low social status, and those educated even to the primary level find something inherently comic about it.

Even those who do not speak Standard English, and who may be more fluent in pidgin than in the their vernacular, reserve pidgin for certain contexts. For example, pidgin is used in the market and in the street, but would not be used in addressing the ancestors or elders. Under no circumstances would an Edo greet the Oba (divine king) in pidgin!

Nonetheless, pidgin is the language of choice in certain circumstances, even though Standard English and a vernacular may be equally available to the speakers. An American-trained university lecturer told us that when he relaxes with educated friends who speak the same vernacular as he does, everyone habitually uses pidgin because "pidgin is the language we use when we feel warm and comfortable with each other." A seemingly opposite use of pidgin was also observed in offices and shops where formal communications in Standard English may be switched to pidgin when a disagreement erupts. Thus, diglossic "code switching" from Nigerian Standard English or vernacular to pidgin indicates a change from formality to informality, from impersonality to personal engagement, from low affect to high affect, and from hierarchy to equality. Pidgin is not the language of *gesellschaft*. For that very reason, it is the ideal language for anti-structure.

THE USES OF ANTI-STRUCTURE IN "HOTEL DE JORDAN": COMEDY AND MASQUERADE

The opening sequences of "Return of the Ikoi-Koi" presented a contrast between the labor of Idemudia and Kokori on their little plots of land and the schemes of the corrupt Ajas to cheat the populace of their labor. Such is the structure of life in Jordan City. The casino manager's scheme resembles the ritual role reversals which so fascinated Victor Turner (see, for instance, 1969:166-203). The shades have visited Jordan City. To escape their wrath, the rich must wear the clothes and adopt the roles of the poor. The poor act like big men and insult the rich. However, there is no successful movement out of liminality, because the Ikoi-Koi return (see Note 5).

Parody, like inversion and lampooning, is a frequent component of the liminal condition. All three elements, as well as other features of liminality such as fear, a blurring of the border between the natural and the supernatural, and a certain amount of sexual horseplay, are present in "Return of the Ikoi-Koi" (see Turner 1967).

Masking of all kinds is, of course, frequently associated with liminality. The Ikoi-Koi wear white paint on their faces and the Bendelites laugh at these "spirits," whose name in the Edo language means "I pound yam," a homely and largely feminine activity. However, members of the viewing audience do not laugh at their own ghosts and masqueraders any more than the characters in "Hotel de Jordan" laugh at the Ikoi-Koi. We may better understand the significance of the "liminoid" Ikoi-Koi to the Benin City audience if we comprehend the role which is traditionally and currently played by liminars in the social dramas of the region.

Religious pluralism is now as strong a feature of life in Benin City as ethnic diversity. Traditional Edo religion and the worship of ancestors and the Oba still flourish, as do Catholicism, Baptism, Aladura, Islam, and a number of pentecostal sects, including Bishop Bensen Idahosa's Church of God Mission. Whatever religion an inhabitant of Benin City may profess, he or she is likely to believe in the existence of a supernatural realm inhabited by witches and ghosts, whose intervention in daily life is a social fact. There are, of course, skeptics, including some members of the educated elite and some adherents of the more "Western" religious groups. The views of the majority were repeatedly brought home to us in conversations with friends and informants. For obvious reasons, we are more concerned here with ghosts than with witches.

In traditional Edo belief, there is an opposition between "Agbon" and "Erinmwin," the earth and the spirit world, the living and the dead. The solemn and regular worship of ancestors was formerly the main religion of the Edo people. This worship was and still is a manifestation of structure rather than of anti-structure. There are occasions upon which the spirits of the dead appear to challenge structure. Following their deaths, men who die without sons or who do not live to become members of the *edion* (collective elders of a village) become *ighele-erinmwin*, members of the spirits' *ighele*, the age-grade which precedes elderhood. These spirits hinder the progress of the souls of members of the *edion* on their way to the spirit world, and are often revealed by diviners to be influencing human affairs on occasions when elders behave inappropriately or when members of the living *ighele* threaten the authority of the elders (Bradbury 1973:249). Bradbury observes that offerings are made to appease the *ighele-erinmwin* on such occasions, and that these offerings are secretly cast away at night, often at crossroads in the bush,

in the manner employed for offerings made to appease witches and enemies (ibid.). Bradbury suggests that beliefs concerning *ighele-erinmwin* are a projection into the spirit world of a general resentment in Edo society by relatively junior males against the powerful elders, and that these beliefs represent an unspoken resentment of sons toward their fathers which is beneath the more manifest grievances of *ighele* members against the *edion*. This category of Edo spirits is thus viewed as supernatural agents of rebellion against authority.

Members of the *ighele-erinmwin* collect offerings by night along lonely bush paths—just the sort of spot where the Ikoi-Koi first frighten Idemudia and Kokori. Though these representatives of the powerless are the first to be frightened by the Ikoi-Koi, later in this episode of "Hotel de Jordan," it is their social superiors who are most terrified, and who assume identities similar to those of Idemudia and Kokori in order to escape.

The Ikoi-Koi are not, of course, masqueraders any more than they are actual members of *ighele-erinmwin*, but the social function they perform in Jordan City is not dissimilar to that of masked *erinmwin* at a number of festivals and other occasions in the villages around Benin City, and, indeed, in non-Edo areas throughout Nigeria.

The most prominent of the masquerades in the Edo villages near Benin City is that performed by members of the *Ovia* cult (see Bradbury 1973:185-209; Ben-Amos 1980:52-57). Ovia herself is a character in Edo folklore who is typical of Edo village cult deities:

> . . . also worshipped are rebel warriors and fugitive queens who fled the court into the countryside and there transformed themselves into features of the environment: rivers, lakes, and hills. (Ben-Amos 1980:57)

According to Bradbury, Ovia herself was a wife of the king of Oyo, who fled the palace because of jealousy in the harem and was transformed into a river (Bradbury 1973:87-88).

With very rare exceptions, cult masquerades such as *Ovia* are not allowed within Benin City. They represent rural rebellion as opposed to urban power; yet, paradoxically, the purpose of such cults is to restore order to villages by disturbing routine.

In numerous ways, *Ovia* resembles many male cults in Africa. The men go into seclusion; the women cannot visit them and are subject to a number of taboos. The bull-roarer is used. At various times the *erinmwin*, the spirits of heroic elders of the village, impersonated by spectacularly masked men, perform their dances in the village before the houses of prominent villagers.

At certain points in *Ovia*, the masqueraders wander around the villages receiving gifts. Through them, Ovia may be asked to convey blessings of long life and prosperity; to harm witches, sorcerers, jealous co-wives, women who sought to make their husbands impotent, and, indeed, all who are guilty of any anti-social behavior. The notion that the masqueraders restore social calm by cursing those who wish to spoil the village (ibid.) is of paramount importance. Quarrelling is banned during *Ovia*.

We asked one informant whether masqueraders enter village communities on any occasion other than the performance of such cult ceremonies as *Ovia*. In reply, she cited a case in Oluko village north of Benin City where a masquerade was used to settle a property dispute. The *erinmwin* called the contestants to order, and peace was restored to the village.

Some time in 1982, fifty percent of the goats disappeared from Oluko village. The *erinmwin* came in the night. Men and boys went out to see them. The *erinmwin* cursed the thieves, and then returned to the underworld. Two weeks later, three men in the village died. It was believed that these three men were the thieves.

We asked our informant whether there was a general notion that the spirits could act to redress wrongs on earth, and she answered that there was. Would an Edo be able and willing to place the actions of the fictional Ikoi-Koi into such a social context? There is evidence to think so.

The Ikoi-Koi were not, of course, real spirits; the purpose of the television program "Return of the Ikoi-koi" was to comment on the 1983 military coup d'état. In a previous program, which we had not seen, the Ikoi-Koi had forced Ajas, Idemudia, and others to confess their sins, and had then withdrawn. So, too, did the military withdraw when civilian rule was reestablished in 1979. Now the military (Ikoi-Koi) had returned because civilian rule had failed, corruption was rife, and the rich had swallowed the riches of the nation.

THE 1983 MILITARY COUP AS SOCIAL DRAMA

The December 31, 1983 military coup and events leading up to it, as they are understood in Nigeria, are in fact very similar in structure to a Turnerian social drama. Social dramas, as Turner describes them, typically proceed through four stages. A breach of norm-governed social relations is followed by a phase of mounting crisis. Eventually, some redressive action is taken, after which community re-integration may be achieved. Alternatively, there may be some "social recognition and legitimization

of irreparable schism between the contesting parties" (Turner 1957:11-92; 1974:37-42).

Nigeria's current economic woes date from the collapse of the oil boom in 1981. The impact of the economic crisis on ordinary Nigerians has intensified since the imposition of austerity measures by the civilian government in 1982.

This period from 1982 to December 31, 1983 was certainly one of mounting crisis. During the autumn of 1983, the question for many Nigerians was not whether there was going to be a coup d'état, but when.

Although world economic conditions, especially a decline in the price of oil, were partly to blame for the Nigerian economic crisis both before and after the coup, the attention of both the public and the press was focused largely on admittedly widespread corruption. There was continual talk about the amount of money that had been illegally removed from the economy through bribery, currency trafficking, and hoarding. A further breach in norm-governed social relations was occasioned by the 1983 general elections, which most Bendelites believed were extensively rigged. Instigators of the December 31, 1983 coup were thus able to claim successfully that they were indeed taking redressive social action, and the greeting during the first weeks of January 1984 was "Happy New Year and Happy New Government!"

However, re-integration seems unlikely in the near future, and public acknowledgment of irretrievable schism is not easily resorted to in a modern nation-state, although the Biafran secessionists tried to force such acknowledgment in 1967. Many Nigerians anticipate military coups and counter-coups at fairly regular intervals for the foreseeable future, as has indeed been the case over the past twenty years when there have been eight (not all successful) military coups, and two forms of civilian government. What is relevant to this analysis is both the cyclical nature of the changes in Nigerian government and the insistence that personal violations of social norms are responsible for Nigeria's problems. This suggests that a model of Turnerian social drama, or something very much like it, provides a pattern by which political upheavals are interpreted by Nigerians. Insofar as the pattern described is not exclusive to Nigeria, or even to Africa, it is possible that certain paradigms concerning guilt and community redress may retain considerable power in many parts of the world where village politics are, or have recently been, the major arena for political action. The elements of mounting crisis, individual misconduct, and impermanence of resolution are all present in "Return of the Ikoi-Koi," and are intended as an allegorical representation of the coup on December 31, 1983.

Both the 1983 Nigerian coup and the television program, "Return of the Ikoi-Koi," brought imperfections in the social

order into sharp focus. These social imperfections have long been present, and will continue to be so, but were submerged during the intervals between crises. This is perhaps the most important characteristic which the program and the events which led up to it share with the social dramas of traditional African villages.

CONCLUSION

Like all social events, "Hotel de Jordan" has many meanings. The meaning of such an event for a social actor depends, of course, on the actor's place in the social structure. The outsider can interpret those meanings according to his or her disciplinary or political perspective. Students of mass communications may view "Hotel de Jordan" as an interesting development in "indigenous" programing and a model for those who wish to reject cultural imperialism. Students of drama will observe that many of the conventions of farce are observed, including stock characters, errors in language, and the reduction of the numinous to the bizarre. Anthropologists and folklorists also have their own perspectives. The writers of "Hotel de Jordan" have reassembled elements from ritual and folklore into a new bricolage. This is no mere antiquarianism. The traditions on which these writers draw are still alive in the minds of the people, just as witches and ghosts were to Shakespeare's audiences.

The power of "Hotel de Jordan" lies in its humor. Like the trickster, the griot, and the court jester, the characters in "Hotel de Jordan" make negative statements about social hierarchy and reveal the moral improprieties and injustices which underlay routine social action. Although the emotional burden of such statements may not always be easy to decipher, we can make observations about their nature. The source of this humor is not so much what is said, but the way it is said, who says it, and when it is said. The statements themselves are conventional ways of describing the negative features of everyday life in a Nigerian city. Such negative collective representations (Lyons 1978) are a perhaps misunderstood genre of social action. One of the present authors has suggested that the sociology of knowledge must expand to encompass the study of social conventions by which the imperfections of a society are articulated. The work of Victor Turner was a breakthrough in this undertaking.

The late Richard Dorson (1972:66-67) viewed African folklore as the product of people barred by their status from cultural dominance; e.g., women and the young. Historically, African folklore occurred in a situation where the potential for class or proto-class conflict was certainly present. In Dorson's sense, "Hotel de Jordan" is folklore on television. The plots may be "new," but the material and themes conform to social expectations.

"Return of the Ikoi-Koi" is not a play about ritual, but rather a play on ritual themes. The established structure involves hierarchy and the exploitation of the masses by Ajas. The shades visit Jordan City and effect, as they do in ritual, a reversal of roles so that in the liminal stage of the dramatic action, the rich are humbled, the poor are exalted, and communitas is established between them insofar as they must cooperate to deceive the Ikoi-Koi. The equation between the military and the shades is simply made—they are frightening, socially necessary, yet comically brutal. In the last scenes of the play, the original social structure is re-established, only to disintegrate again in the final moments.

The differences between traditional village ritual and television "ritual" drama are also significant. The shades in *Ovia* wear elaborate and distinct regalia, curse effectively, and requite real wrongs. In popular belief, ghosts are not content merely to chase and terrify miscreants. The Ikoi-Koi belong to no particular village, but are instead generic ancestor figures. Their very name indicates their comic function. Above all, real ritual has no fourth stage immediately following re-incorporation in which the liminal, the anti-structural, re-emerges. Such events are permissible in farce. The audience of "Hotel de Jordan" is well aware of the ritual themes which Ikoi-Koi embody. It also knows that the spirits cannot return every time a social wrong occurs.

Our reading of "Return of the Ikoi-Koi" is based on our study of the play as a social fact; as the product of ritual, oral tradition, and contemporary events; and as the product of the mutual understandings and inter-subjective experience of writers, producers, actors, and audience. This inter-subjective experience is articulated through certain cultural templates. The success of "Hotel de Jordan" as a popular drama reflects its writers' ability to manipulate such templates for a new medium.

NOTES

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1. At the time of our study, there were approximately six and one-half hours of programming in Benin City on weekdays, and eleven hours per day on weekends.

2. The research on which this article is based was conducted over a six-month period between November 1, 1983 and May 1, 1984 in Benin City, Nigeria. Our methodology involved a series of interviews with personnel at the two television and two radio stations in Benin City, interviews and more informal conversations with some of the local "media celebrities," and about 350 unstructured interviews conducted in the streets and markets of Benin City. We also visited homes in the city and in nearby villages, and enjoyed the hospitality of several kind families. We visited a public viewing center in the village of Ehor, watched others watch television, and watched others watching us watch television. Above all else, we participated, insofar as we were able to do so, in the daily life of a busy city.

3. N=119.

4. The authors had the opportunity to hear Captain Nnamonu's address in the presence of a Benin audience for a second time on April 23, 1984, at "Top Stage '84," a benefit performance on behalf of Nigerian Television Authority (Benin) in Benin City.

5. One assumes that in a subsequent episode, Ajas and company will be back unscathed, and up to their old tricks. As Turner remarked, "If the liminality of life-crisis rites may be, perhaps audaciously, compared to tragedy—for both imply humbling, stripping and pain, the liminality of status reversal may be compared to comedy, for both involve mockery and inversion, but not destruction of structural roles and overzealous adherents to them (1969:201)."

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VICTOR TURNER'S SOCIAL DRAMA AND T. S. ELIOT'S RITUAL DRAMA

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Cet article se présente comme une analyse de deux textes mis en opposition l'un face à l'autre: c'est une étude de Victor Turner au sujet d'une pièce de T. S. Eliot. Aucun argument ne démontre que l'un dérive de l'autre. Publiée en 1974, l'étude cherche à montrer que la théorie de Turner sur la nature du drame social exerce un impact sur l'interprétation du conflit opposant l'archevêque Thomas Becket au roi Henri II d'Angleterre en 1170. Le drame rituel d'Eliot, publié en 1935, commémore le martyre de Becket. Une différence considérable définit les genres et les intentions de ces deux oeuvres. Toutefois, la lecture de chaque texte, l'un éclairant l'autre, nous conduit à la discussion de leur critique respective et révèle le sens de métaphores dominantes inspirant l'interprétation que donnent Turner et Eliot du fait historique.

This article "intertextualizes" a case study by Victor Turner with a play by T. S. Eliot, without arguing that either is derived from the other. The case study, published in 1974, brings Turner's theory of social drama to bear on the confrontation between Archbishop Thomas Becket and King Henry II of England in 1170 A.D. The play is a ritual drama published by Eliot in 1935 for a commemoration of Becket's martyrdom. Thus, the genres and intentions of the two works differ considerably. Nevertheless, reading each text in the light of the other leads to a discussion of the mutual critiques they imply, and reveals the dominant metaphors that organize Turner's and Eliot's treatment of the same historic event.

INTRODUCTION

The confrontation between Archbishop Thomas Becket and King Henry II of England in 1170 A.D. has been anthropologically analyzed by Victor Turner and ritually dramatized by T. S. Eliot. I propose to show that, despite the difference of genre, the two treatments are comparable in that each depends on a system of dominant metaphors. My thesis is that Eliot's metaphors are essentially spatial, static, and circular, whereas Turner's metaphors are temporal, linear, and processual. The reason for this comparison is to show how a theologically-based play and a theo-

retically-grounded analysis can imply mutual criticisms and refinements. This undertaking illustrates the fruitfulness of linking the conceptually and textually oriented methods of religious studies with the social science methods of anthropology. First, Turner's theory will be outlined. This will be followed by a consideration of Turner's treatment of the case of Thomas Becket, and an examination of the play, *Murder in the Cathedral*, by T. S. Eliot (originally published in 1935). Finally, I will compare Turner's interpretation of the confrontation with that of Eliot.

TURNER'S THEORY OF SOCIAL DRAMA

Victor Turner's term for any conflictual social interaction is "social drama." Such interaction can be analyzed in four phases: (1) breach; (2) crisis; (3) redress; and (4) reintegration. Although Turner acknowledges the possibility of other models in addition to this agonistic one (Turner 1980:151), he tends to treat all social conflict in terms of it. He says he arrived at the model by observing social interaction among the Ndembu of west-central Angola in Africa, and then subsequently recognizing the same pattern elsewhere. Turner insists that he did not derive the model from Aristotle's description of tragedy on the stage and then impose it on social interactions (ibid.: 153). Consequently, his dramatistic method is anthropological rather than esthetic in origin. Despite his recognition that esthetic drama (which he calls "cultural performance") and social drama are dialectically related, Turner often assigns priority to social drama. In his "genealogy of genres," social drama is the "grandparent," while stage drama is the "child." The "parent" between generations is ritual. Thus, social drama is the basis of ritual and judiciary procedures, which then become the bases of cultural performances.

It is difficult to determine whether Turner imagines the movement of drama from one level to another as historical, causal-developmental, theoretical-methodological, or phenomenological-typological. He seems to vacillate among these possibilities. In any case, his "genealogy" becomes dialectical insofar as cultural performances such as narrative and drama function as paradigms which provoke further social dramas, thus completing the circle. Put simply, stories can "emplot" lives (ibid.:153). When stories do this, they reach below the level of consciousness and lay "fiduciary hold" on a person or group of persons (ibid.:154). Such persons, whom Turner refers to as "star groupers," seem possessed. Their actions seem driven by scenarios exercising cognitive, emotive, and conative force.

Of special importance is redress, the third phase of social drama. Redress: (1) evokes rituals and other cultural performances; and (2) gives rise to reflexivity (performances in which a society can contemplate itself). If we think of cultural per-

formances as derived from social performances, we must look for the origins of cultural performances not in social drama in general, but in redress, the third phase of social drama. Redress occurs when judiciary proceedings and religious ritual provide symbolic feedback during a crisis. Law, whose ritual dimensions Turner designates "ceremony" or "secular ritual" (ibid.:156, 161), *indicates*, while religious (or liminal) ritual *transforms*. Ceremony reflects normative, structured, social realities, while ritual, in the narrower sense of the term, dissolves order and casts things into a "subjunctive" mode. Turner states that this subjunctivity is the "mother of indicativity" (ibid.:164). Thus, one may amplify the previous analysis in the form of the following diagram:

Social Drama:

(a) Breach (b) Crisis (c) Redress (d) Reintegration

Ritual (Broad Sense):

(a) Ritual (strict sense): Subjunctive, Liminal, Religious.
(b) Ceremony: Indicative, Normative, Political.

Reflexivity:

Cultural Performances:

(a) Drama
(b) Narrative: Stories, Gossip, Chronicles.

Reflexivity, which Turner thinks can heal a breach in the social fabric by enacting it, is derived from rituals of both the juridical and religious sort. In turn, reflexivity is the kind of self-awareness that can lead to an esthetic frame of mind. Thus, it can produce drama and various sorts of narratives, including chronicle, story, and gossip. Because Turner does not explicitly state whether he thinks of dramas as a form of narrative, his discussion is more ambiguous than the above diagram makes the progression seem. Another caution about the above flow chart is that ritual does not *produce* reflexivity in the human mind so much as ritual *is* reflexivity in the somatic-performative mode.

Turner's model for understanding ritual consists of the phases of a rite of passage as schematized by Van Gennep (1960): separation, transition, and incorporation. As is well-known by now, Turner emphasizes the middle or "liminal" phase, regarding it as a powerful source of transformation and innovation in culture. Since he himself posits a parallel between the phases of a rite of passage and those of a social drama, one might wonder which is really the model for which:

Phases of a Rite of Passage:	Separation (preliminal) →	Transition (liminal) →	Incorporation (postliminal) →
Phases of a Social Drama:	Breach-Crisis	Redress	Reintegration

Does Turner perceive social dramas in terms of rites of passage, or does he perceive a rite of passage in terms of social dramas? Or, do such striking homologies between ritual experience and social experience occur as the result of some underlying, third factor? Although Turner neither raises nor answers this question, it is nevertheless clear why he emphasizes redress: if ritual transition is going to be carried out, it follows that its counterpart will also be carried out. To recapitulate this piecing together of Turner's argument thus far: (1) redress is the ritual hinge of social drama; (2) the model for ritual is the rite of passage; (3) the hinge of a rite of passage is its liminal phase; (4) liminality in ritual *is* a cultural mode of reflexivity; and (5) an increase in ritual reflexivity helps heal a social breach, and gives rise to esthetic narrative and drama.

Turner claims that ritual has a dramatic structure, a plot (Turner and Turner 1980:161). Sequencing in a ritual is irreversible. In maintaining this, Turner challenges theorists such as Eliade (1959), who treat ritual in terms of circular imagery. For Turner, ritual does not "return," but instead, goes somewhere. Ritual has a "point": namely, to transform. Although Turner is willing to imagine ceremony as circular, he sees ritual, in the "pure" sense (his term, Turner and Turner 1980:163), as linear.

By now it is obvious that Turner thinks of social conflict, ritual enactment, and stage drama as all being "dramatic," by which he seems to mean linear, conflict-laden, and time-bound. Whether the source of Turner's dramatism is one, the other, or all three of these is impossible to tell. Since he clearly sees "drama" everywhere, this inclines one to treat drama as part of his method.

Turner uses the term "narrative" to refer to: (1) the chronological connections between events; (2) indigenous (emic) words, stories, and gossip about those events; and (3) an anthropologist's (etic) account of the same events. Symbols are what connect the different levels of narrative (Turner and Turner 1980:145). Turner is especially careful to warn against the "cognitive ethnocentrism" of failing to recognize that an anthropologist's narrative is emic and culture-bound from the point of view of those who are indigenous to the culture being studied. He insists that an "anthropology of experience" must always strive to

know "men and women alive" (ibid.:143-144) before it tries to account nomothetically for their action. The nearest an observer can come to actual experience is to discover what events mean to men and women. For a definition of meaning, Turner relies on Dilthey (1976). He thus defines meaning as what "enables us to conceive of an intrinsic affinity between the successive events of life"—that is, memory's ability to negotiate a fit between past and present (Turner and Turner 1980:156). Obviously, such a definition of meaning commits its proponent to a method that is historical and time-conscious. An implication of this definition is that meaningful reflexivity is also retrospective and inescapably historical.

TURNER'S INTERPRETATION OF BECKET'S SOCIAL DRAMA

Until he became friends with King Henry II of England, the English cleric Thomas Becket (1118-1170 C.E.) had held minor clerical and civil offices. In time, Henry II ensured that Becket was elevated to the office of Archbishop of Canterbury, whereby the king probably thought he could control both church and state. Eventually, a bitter conflict arose between the two men. Since Becket had a mind of his own and insisted on the autonomy of ecclesiastical office, he soon found himself in defiance of his king. In 1170 C.E., responding to harsh words spoken by Henry II, a group of knights forced their way into Canterbury Cathedral and slew the archbishop. Three years later, accompanied by Henry's public penance and support, Becket was canonized as a martyr and saint. His veneration continues today with the shrine at Canterbury as its center.

Turner's analysis of Thomas Becket (1974:Chapter 2) focuses specifically on the Council of Northampton, which preceded his martyrdom by six years. At this council, Thomas lost all hope of reconciliation with Henry. One might have expected Turner to concentrate on the "ultimate drama" (1974:79) at Canterbury in 1170. Instead, Turner focuses on the earlier drama at Northampton because: (1) he believes this to be the initial breach of a social drama; and (2) there is suggestive historical evidence that it was during this week-long council that Becket began to enact a "root paradigm," that of the martyr entering upon the *via crucis*.

What Turner does *not* do with this social drama is organize the historical data chronologically or present them in terms of the four phases of social drama: (1) breach; (2) crisis; (3) redress; and (4) reintegration. In fact, Turner's scheme falls into the background. Having noted that King Henry II tries to *begin* at the redressive stage, Turner remarks, " . . . Breach soon becomes crisis and crisis grew so severe that available, formal means of redress proved inadequate, throwing back the situation into deeper crisis . . ." (1974:79).

One can infer from this statement that Turner's theoretical insistence on the linear, temporal nature of social drama and ritual is not as strict in practice as it sometimes sounds. As Turner alludes to the phases of social drama here, they seem to be repeatable and do not necessarily follow a single, chronological order. Rather, they are less a rigid scenario or plot structure and more akin to "layers" of consciousness or action. Yet Turner was deeply resistant to cyclical models (see, for example, Turner and Turner 1980:154) because he associated cyclical models with the timeless, abstract structures produced by synchronic methods (see Turner 1971:349-353). Like Evans-Pritchard, Turner felt that anthropology ought to be closely linked to history and its diachronic methods. "Social dramas," he says, "represent . . . the time axes of fields" (1971:363). Nevertheless, when Turner speaks of social dramas as "possessing a regularly recurring 'processional form' or 'diachronic profile'" (1971:351), one can hardly resist pointing out that terms like "recurring," "form," and "profile" connote structures which are abstracted from their time-bound historical contexts.

Turner (1974:63) states that his study of the Icelandic sagas (1971) led him to the study of Becket. In both cases, he introduces the social dramatistic scheme but abbreviates his actual use of it to a page or so (see, for example, 1971:369; 1974:79). Both analyses are split between a discussion of theoretical terms (e.g., "arena," "field," "paradigms," "root metaphors") and the chronicling of historical contexts. The specifically anthropological contribution of Turner's reading of the Icelandic sagas concentrates on kinship, while his treatment of Becket concentrates on the martyrdom paradigm. In both cases, Turner seems to have to let go of his model of social drama in order to follow the actual course of events. The result is a less than perfect integration of narrating and theorizing, both of which are in themselves provocative. I suspect that the technical terms of Turner's theory serve as a repository for the "timeless," structural side of his interpretation, while chronicling and narrating carry the processual side. If forced by data to choose, he typically narrates. Occasionally, the storyteller overcomes the anthropologist. For example, consider Turner's tone and personal involvement in the following passage:

> This was Thomas' [Becket's] low point, the rock bottom of his life, Black Monday. Picture the gloom and desperation of the scene. There was Thomas, sick on his pallet in St. Andrew's monastery outside Northampton town, having been debarred by royal pressure from taking up the more comfortable quarters to which his rank entitled him—but in a strange way foreshadowing his exile among Cistercian monks in Pontigny and his attempt to emulate the humility of the ideal monk. The king was all cold cruelty, masked in moral law and accusation. The weather was dank and dull, as I have

> often known it myself in the Northampton area in autumn. (1974:84)

Turner's central thesis about Becket is that he is controlled by an "archetypal" paradigm (1974:92), which Turner speaks of as being "in people's heads" (1974:96). The curious thing about this terminology is how static and timeless "archetypal" sounds, and how intellectualistic "people's heads" rings. Such connotations go against the grain of Turner's own insistence that symbols are dynamic and emotion-laden. In any case, his point in introducing the notion of an archetypal paradigm is to suggest that the series of events beginning at Northampton is best treated not as if it were a series of political or moral decisions (1974:69), but rather as if it were a "fate," "genetic code," or "rite" (1974:72). The evidence that Becket himself was unconsciously driven by (if not consciously aspiring to) a model is his deliberate choice to violate the liturgical calendar by saying the Mass of St. Stephen the Martyr out of season. This mass begins, "Princes sat and spoke against me: and the wicked persecuted me . . ." (Psalm 118). Turner does not appear to sense any contradiction between treating the paradigm as having a "fiduciary hold" (1974:64) on Becket and suggesting that Becket "stage manages" (1974:66) the whole affair. His general point is that people in the throes of crisis act from preconscious roots, and that these roots stylize and dramatize actions.

T. S. ELIOT'S RITUAL DRAMA

In order to gain a perspective on Victor Turner's interpretation of Becket, I want to examine T. S. Eliot's play, *Murder in the Cathedral* (1963; originally published in 1935). Were it not for Turner's "incursive nomadism" (his term), it might seem like an odd mixing of genres to compare a case study and a play, since neither the forms nor the authors' intentions are quite parallel. But just as there is story-telling and drama in Turner's analysis, so is there a ritual and dramatic theory of action in Eliot's play. Although both Turner and Eliot were Catholic (the one Roman Catholic, the other Anglo Catholic), we should not consider their differences to be an indigenous squabble over meaning, since Turner writes as an anthropologist and Eliot as a Christian poet. I am prone to view Eliot's play as the more emic view, and Turner's as the more etic.

In his play, *Murder in the Cathedral*, T. S. Eliot is not at great pains to tell a story. Since this play was written to be performed at the 1935 Canterbury Festival on the very grounds where King Henry II incited the slaying of Archbishop Thomas Becket, Eliot could assume that most of his audience knew the story of the historical events which the play dramatizes. In this case, Eliot did not produce art for its own sake. The very fact

that his play was written for the occasion of the martyrdom which it commemorates makes it ritual drama.

In ritual drama, the actions of the drama are no surprise. Since people know what is coming, interest does not depend on being kept in suspense until the end. The primary actions of such a performance are its drawing "forward" of the political-ecclesiastical event of December 1170 A.D., its drawing "down" the mercy of God and Christ, and its evoking the intercessions of Blessed Thomas, as the concluding *Kyrie* of the play illustrates. For one kind of audience member, these actions must have been liturgical; for another kind, entertainment. However, this divergence of intention is probably no different from that of most ritual dramas. The fact that the 1935 event was both ritual and drama invites this intermingling of frames and motives. Eliot's script opens with a chorus of poor women from Canterbury who are waiting in the seasonal limbo between harvest and new year. The theme of waiting dominates their song. "For us, the poor," they say, "there is no action,/ But only to wait and to witness" (1963:13). Their action of walking to the cathedral precincts is but the "presage of an act" (1963:11). Their feet and eyes have been "forced" by this incipient foreboding of action. They fear Becket's action will disrupt their cycle of "living and partly living."

An activist ideology might regard all waiting as impotent passivity. A Marxist version would interpret waiting as evidence of the function of peasant religion as an opiate. But Eliot has something different in mind, namely the waiting of martyrs and saints. Even if the waiting of the peasant women were parasitic—the circling of vultures ready to suck Becket's blood and pick his bones—there is another kind of inaction that demands to be differently understood. Passive inaction is an opiate, while receptive inaction is not. Eliot poetically characterizes ritual proper—the sort Turner would have called "transformative"—as being essentially receptive. Receptive inaction waits for destiny, that more inclusive action which is in the hands of God. When the Second Priest complains about the "foolish, immodest and babbling women," Thomas Becket replies:

> They know and do not know, what it is to act or suffer.
> They know and do not know, that action is suffering
> And suffering action. Neither does the agent suffer
> Nor the patient act. But both are fixed
> In an eternal action, and eternal patience
> To which all must consent that it may be willed
> And which all must suffer that they may will it,
> That the pattern may subsist, for the pattern is the action
> And the suffering, that the wheel may turn and still
> Be forever still. (1963:21-22)

One might surmise that Eliot had just finished reading either Kenneth Burke (1969) or a Buddhist philosopher. Especially when symbolized by the image of a turning wheel, eternal action sounds very much like the "action which is repose" or the "overcoming from underneath" of Asian thought. Grover Smith (1956:190) states that at the time Eliot wrote the play, he was interested in Aristotle; this at least accounts for the similarities to Burke. Eliot's view of action is in keeping with both Christian mysticism and Catholic theologies of martyrdom and sainthood, to which Aristotle contributed significantly via Thomas Aquinas.

Ritual action of the liturgical sort is not supposed to be ordered in some arbitrary fashion. Rather, liturgists intend this action to accord with ultimate principles of order: God and the cosmos as an expression of his *logos*. Not only is liturgical action patterned, it is supposed to replicate a greater, nonarbitrary pattern which "subsists" and is "forever still." Actually, the notion of replication does not go far enough; it is too Platonic for Eliot's Aristotelian Thomism. In Eliot's play, the same passage quoted above, in which Thomas Becket patronizes the women, is quoted back to him by one of the Tempters (1963:40-41). This quotation is almost verbatim except for the omission of one line: "For the pattern is the action / And the suffering." What the Tempter does not know, but Becket does, is that the pattern is not somewhere else in eternity, but here in the "sordid particulars." The action does not simply imitate a pattern; it *is* the pattern. Put another way, a ritual gesture does not imitate the *logos* so much as incarnate it. Although Becket is higher on the ladder of ecclesiastical hierarchy than either the priests or the women of the chorus, he both knows and does not know what action and passion (suffering) are. As "agents," people move and act. As "patients," they suffer and are still. In this they do not differ from the wheel of the cosmos, which at its circumference turns, and at its center is forever still. The difference between the actions of performers and the movements of the wheel is that, except in special moments like martyrdom or meditation, ritual actors seem unable to do both at once. Instead, they oscillate back and forth between activity and passivity, between taking cosmic law into their own hands and resigning from responsibility for the direction of their own feet. The knights in the play typify the first possibility, and the chorus of women, the second.

I have said there are no surprises in ritual drama, but in social drama, there are. The audience watching a ritual drama may know what is going to happen in a play about Becket, but Becket, caught in a ritualizing event, does not know what is going to happen to him, even if he suspects the knights will kill him when he enters the cathedral. He "knows and does not know." What he does not know is presented to him by the Tempters, who "do not wait upon ceremony" (1963:23).

In deciding on a course of action, Becket is tempted to do a number of things. But, he says, ". . . The substance of our first act / Will be shadows, and the strife with shadows" (1963:23). Among the shadowy deeds that tempt him are: (1) to forget the past and return to his easy friendship with the king; (2) to give up his ecclesiastical office and again be chancellor under the king (then, to use this office with intelligent self-interest to obtain justice); and (3) to form alliances with the English barons. Becket says he expected these three temptations, but the Fourth Tempter, who "precedes expectation," presents a surprise. Although the other tempters at least identify themselves by function, the fourth tempter has no name. The temptation he offers, as he quotes Becket back to himself, is twofold and specifically ritualistic. It is to exercise the power of the keys in excommunicating the king (1963:37), and to seek the way of martyrdom (1963:39). This is the temptation "to do the right deed for the wrong reason" (1963:44). The temptation is to turn a religious act into a political one, thereby making the greater cause which Becket ought to serve, serve him instead.

Becket views this temptation as emerging from his "soul's sickness" (1963:40). In its face, he can neither act nor suffer action without damnation. He is doubly bound. Yet in the end, the passionate action of becoming a martyr is precisely what makes his gesture efficacious and revelatory. The deed arising from the depths of his temptation becomes the ground of the ritual of dying in faith. Untransposed, the deed would of course destroy him, but done for the right reason, it sustains him. "Right" does not mean "good." Nor does "reason" mean "rationally justifiable." Becket is wiser than this and says, "Sin grows with doing good" (1963:45). The action of the heights can tempt as surely as any action of the depths. What Becket must find is the action that is both. This kind of action can arise only at the still point. It is an action with no name.

Structurally, the prose interlude is the still point of the play. Its homiletical prose contrasts sharply with the dramatic poetry of the first and second parts of the play that it separates. The sermon is preached on Christmas morning—by Christian reckoning, the hinge of time. In his homily, Archbishop Becket points to the paradox involved in reenacting Christ's passion and death in the Mass, while at the same time celebrating his birth:

> For who in the World will both mourn and rejoice at once and for the same reason? For either joy will be overborne by mourning, or mourning will be cast out by joy; so it is only in these our Christian mysteries that we can rejoice and mourn at once for the same reason. (1963:48)

By comparing the death of martyrs to that of Christ, this sermon suggests that the only valid reason for an action such as

allowing one's own death is the will of God. This amounts to implying that such a deed is unmotivated, at least in any psychosocial sense. The right sort of action is one which God himself performs through a person. Here we approach the liturgical motive proper. Perhaps we should call it a non-motive. Although there are other motives (personal, political, and social), from a martyr's point of view they are secondary to the problem of overcoming attachment to any motive whatsoever, including unconscious ones.

Thomas Becket's struggle is to find a motive for action that is neither willful activism nor resigned passivity. His dying as a martyr is at once a ritual, ethical, political, psychological, and theological conundrum. Ritually, martyrdom is formal self-sacrifice in the context of an historical tradition of such gestures. Ethically and politically, it is a choice which is pressured on all sides by group interests, and which is capable of substantially altering the balance of power. Psychologically, it is a contest between the self and its shadows, a struggle of self against the desire for revenge. Theologically, martyrdom presents the difficulty of aligning temporal deeds with eternal ones and of orienting the cycles of this world to the movement of the great cosmic wheel.

The chorus's song which opens Part II of Eliot's play emphasizes spatial and temporal orientation: Where are the signs of Spring? Is the wind stored up in the East? East and Spring are the directional and seasonal symbols that orient the event taking place in Canterbury. The chorus queries: "Between Christmas and Easter what work shall be done?" ". . . The time is short/But waiting is long" (1963:54). The playwright's task is to orient the action that everyone—audience, chorus, and characters—knows is going to happen. Not the outcome, but only the orientation of the action is in question. When questions of orientation displace those of outcome, ritual begins to overshadow drama.

The slaying of Thomas Becket occurs on December 29, 1170. Between Christmas and this date, the feasts of St. Stephen the Martyr, St. John the Apostle, and the slain Holy Innocents have been celebrated, almost as if establishing Becket's lineage. However, all of time—that of natural and liturgical season, as well as that of eternity—is now coagulated by virtue of the action of passion which is about to transpire on Thursday:

> What day is the day that we know that we hope or fear for?
> Every day is the day we should fear from or hope from.
> One moment
> Weighs like another. Only in retrospection, selection,
> We say, that was the day. The critical moment.
> That is always now, and here. Even now, in sordid
> particulars
> The eternal design may appear. (1963:57)

By carrying in banners of the martyrs, the priests orient the deed in ecclesiastical history. The knights arrive and, by rhetorically rehearsing Becket's actions, such as the fact that he once anathematized the king and fled to France for seven years, they orient his martyrdom in secular political history. As always, the chorus orients the action cosmologically and cyclically; it both knows already, and still does not quite know, what is going to happen. What the knights know by decision and counsel with the king, the women know by premonition, in their veins, brains, and guts (1963:68). Even though they do not commit the deed, they consent through complicity and must beg Becket's forgiveness. The chorus forgets easily—"humankind cannot bear very much reality" (1963:69)—but its feet always remember.

Spatial orientation follows the temporal. The priests, in an effort to save their archbishop's life, drag him into the cathedral and bar the door. He will die in a sacred place. Becket shouts at them to open the door; a sanctuary is not a fortress. The priests try to convince Becket that the knights have become beasts and the door has always been barred against animals, but Becket accuses them of arguing by results. In carrying out this deed, he believes that only form and motive, not end, must be considered. He must become a "patient" who suffers action rather than an agent who commits it, and he must assent to it, not simply be its victim.

When Becket is killed, the action ramifies. Ritually, it becomes a transaction in which the saint offers his blood to pay for Christ's death, just as Christ had sacrificed his blood to buy Becket's life (1963:75). Eventually, the event will have the effect of a sacrificial cleansing. But presently, for the chorus, it is a polluting action because its orientation is eternal rather than cyclical:

> These acts marked a limit to our suffering.
> Every horror had its definition.
> Every sorrow had a kind of end:
> In life there is not time to grieve long.
> But this, this is out of life, this is out of time,
> An instant eternity of evil and wrong.
> We are soiled by a filth that we cannot clear, united to supernatural vermin,
> It is not we alone, it is not the house, it is not the city that is defiled,
> But the world that is wholly foul. (1963:77-78)

The drama among the characters ends here, but that between characters and audience intensifies. The knights turn directly to the audience and ask us to judge between them and Becket. Arguing in rhetorical prose that they are fair-minded Englishmen, men of action rather than word, they argue their case like modern, liberal lawyers. They claim they deserve our applause. Even if they

are guilty, they say, the audience is also guilty. The passivity of the audience is considered complicity similar to that of the chorus. The Fourth Knight, like the Fourth Tempter, presents the most convincing case. He seizes on the ambiguous aspects of who *really* killed the Archbishop (1963:83). His answer to his own rhetorical question is that Becket's action constitutes suicide rather than martyrdom; the Archbishop deliberately set out to provoke his own death. If this is true, Becket's action is not patience or passion at all, but disguised aggression.

The case is left unsettled and the verdict unrendered as the priests take over and form a bridge to the final chorus. The third priest berates the knights, who have already exited, accusing them of trying to justify their actions by weaving fictions that unravel during the very moment they weave them. They will never succeed, even by losing themselves in "filthy rites" and "libidinous courts" (1963:85).

The chorus has the last word, but its language and petitions are priestly and accompanied by a "Te Deum" sung in Latin in the background. The concluding notes are of confession, petition, and thanksgiving. Whatever the nature of Becket's final motive—whether it was suicidal or sacrificial—the concluding action and widest frame of the play is liturgical. The ending is not happy, moving from the confession of sin to thanksgiving and praise. Since its movement is just the reverse, one is led to read it as ironic. We know very well that the chorus, waxing archaic and priestly in its last chant, will surely do the same thing again. There will always be the need for "mercies of blood" (1963:81); the cycle must go on, the wheel must turn again.

COMPARING A RITUAL DRAMA AND A SOCIAL DRAMA

Although the events at Canterbury in 1170 A.D were social drama, T. S. Eliot's play of 1935 was ritual drama. And Victor Turner's essay of 1974 was a social dramatistic analysis. The social forms of drama and ritual are relatively "unframed" (cf. Goffman 1974). By this, I mean that because they are almost invisibly embedded in the fabric of society, their patterns are observable only to trained observers. In contrast, esthetic forms of drama and religious forms of ritual are "framed"; that is, bounded, differentiated, and set apart as nameable genres of action. T. S. Eliot's play is doubly framed as ritual and as drama, whereas Victor Turner's study attempts to frame a series of events that to the participants probably seemed chaotic and without pattern or order. The variables can be diagrammed on two intersecting axes:



Framed ritual or "rites" fall in the first quadrant; an example is the liturgy of the Mass. A rite is not secondary in the sense that ritual action is necessarily derived from social action. Rather, a rite is secondary in the sense that it has been cordoned off and its actions have been selected, deliberately arranged, and elevated. The actions of the Mass are "other" than ordinary ones. The second quadrant, framed drama, contains most of the modern plays which are performed in theaters. Whereas rites are differentiated by being elevated into norms, plays are increasingly differentiated by having attention focused on them as art forms rather than as agents of social reinforcement or religious edification. Since Eliot's play, by both intention and social location, is not quite theatrical in this sense, it falls near the midway point between the ritualistic and dramatic poles.

Quadrant three contains unframed, or social drama. Events in this quadrant are unframed insofar as the actors are completely unaware of social events around them. There is no dramatic process or ritual structure, but merely chaos. The framed/ unframed polarity is not only concerned with people's awareness of events as such, but also with the degree to which a society or individual recognizes an action as distinct or nameable. Something is framed when it is bounded; it is unframed when it no longer has its own niche or identity. Whenever participants in ordinary social interaction begin to think of themselves as playing parts in a play or enacting ritualized roles, framing has begun. Looking back, Turner can frame the events of 1170 A.D. as a social drama in four acts. Drama is present not because an actor decided to perform it, but because a trained observer has seen events dramatistically. One way to frame action is to impose a theory on it; another way is to impose an image on it. The framing of the social drama of 1170 began rapidly. By 1173, people regarded the event as a "deed." As I use the term, a deed is a gesture or event which has been singled out as an orientation point around which other actions can cluster as a center. An event becomes a deed if people return to it, imitate it, or measure themselves by it as if it were a standard.

If one were to define ritual only in terms of intentional action, the term "unframed ritual" in quadrant four would be self-contradictory. However, it is helpful to consider certain

actions, such as habitually repeated or stylized ones, as potential ritual gestures. Interaction ritual is a term referring to tacit, barely recognizable ritual processes. Unframed ritual is "nascent" (see Grimes 1982:Chapter 4) or "decadent," and is still gaining or beginning to lose its distinctions from ordinary actions. Lack of a frame (cf. Mary Douglas's definition of "grid," 1973: Chapter 4) may indicate that the action lacks a social consensus. Thus, a comparatively unframed ritual is likely to be highly individualized, if not idiosyncratic, even though part of what may make it ritualized is that it seems to repeat or recapitulate other actions. Ritualization consists of actions that can be "seen as" ritual, but which actors themselves may not consider to be such. Victor Turner refers to such events as "liminoid" (Turner and Turner 1978:253).

Even though T. S. Eliot's work is a ritual drama focused on an ultimate moment in Thomas Becket's life, and Victor Turner's work is a social dramatistic analysis focused on an initial phase in Becket's life, these two works are by no means incommensurate, as the following chart illustrates:

TURNER	ELIOT
1. "Ritual Paradigms and Political Action: Thomas Becket at the Council of Northampton," a social dramatistic analysis. (1974:Chapter 2)	1. *Murder in the Cathedral*, a ritual drama.
2. Analysis focused on breach, an initial phase.	2. Dramatization concentrated on redress, a concluding moment.
3. Primary drama is in phases of social interaction.	3. Primary drama is in the eras of Christian history.
4. An etic, political frame for an emically religious event.	4. An emically religious frame for an etic political event.
5. Lapses into hagiographic storytelling.	5. Lapses into Aristotelian theorizing.
6. Too little analysis?	6. Too little narrative?
7. Social drama threatening to become ritually fixed.	7. Sacrificial rite threatening to become dramatically polluted.

8. Political motivation as the principle of explanation.	8. Political motivation as temptation.
9. Becket both "stage manages" and is in the "fiduciary hold" of a paradigm (i.e., his martyrdom is both manipulative and unconscious).	9. Becket knows and does not know (i.e., he neither unconsciously chooses nor deliberately avoids martyrdom).
10. Paradigms are in "actors'" heads.	10. "Eternal design" is in the sordid particulars."
11. Paradigms emplot actions which, in turn, form patterns.	11. The pattern *is* the action.
12. Dominant metaphors: temporal, linear, processual (e.g., "flow").	12. Dominant metaphors: spatial, circular, static (e.g., the "forever still" center).

Although Eliot and Turner make quite different uses of it, drama is the continuum between them. Turner's dramatistic theory of action leads him to locate drama first of all in social interaction, and then to find drama analogized or reflected on the stage. Even though Eliot is a poet, he does not locate the primary drama on the stage, although a more "platonic" playwright might have done so. As a Christian dramatist, Eliot has located the primary drama in history, specifically in the events that link the crucifixion of Jesus to Becket's death, and which in turn link both of these to the commemorative festival of 1935. Turner has erected an etic, political frame around events that devotees would frame religiously, while Eliot casts a religious frame around an event which historians regard as political. Nevertheless, both men retain elements of the religious-political dialectic. In both treatments of Becket, the dialectic is deliberate, although each work sometimes seems to "lapse" into its own opposite genre—Turner's interpretation into hagiographic storytelling, and Eliot's Becket into Aristotelian theorizing about action. The outcome of this is that Eliot's drama, classic though it has become, is not strong on narrative. Similarly, Turner's treatment of Becket contains too much narration and too little analysis for anthropologists with nomothetic goals in mind.

By emphasizing the paradigm that grips Becket, Turner's interpretation makes the events of the social drama appear to be like a rite. And despite Eliot's sparse attention to characterization or plot, his poetry manages to dramatize a sacrificial rite. For all that might be said about the kinship, or even the identity of ritual and drama on a theoretical level, one or the other may dominate in actual performance. Even though Turner analyzes a social drama which is usually characterized by flow,

an archetypal paradigm threatens to fix the action into a rite or fate. The opposite is true for Eliot, whose Becket is in danger of undermining the efficacy of martyrdom by yielding to dramatically-instigated acts. What for Turner is a principle of explanation is for Eliot's Becket a temptation—namely, to do the right thing for a wrong (i.e., political) reason.

Both Turner and Eliot depict Becket as undergoing a motivational struggle. However, Turner's characterization of Becket has him vacillating between manipulative stage managing (*a la* Goffman) and unconscious compulsion. Because it is "beneath conscious prehension" (1974:64), Turner's "fiduciary hold" is not a synonym for faith. By contrast, Eliot's Becket, who knows and does not know, is hardly unconscious and struggles to reject both stage managing and benevolent political action. Although we do not know if he achieves this, Eliot's Becket aims at faithful action, which is neither mere resignation nor willful coercion.

Turner metaphorically locates the paradigms that compel Becket "in actors' heads." By comparison, Eliot places the "eternal design" in the sordid particulars. Even though Eliot's conception might seem to remove such a design from the possibility of criticism, its roots in culture and politics are never denied. Thus, eternity is no less (or more) accessible than the insides of actors' heads. Eliot's Aristotelian insistence that the pattern *is* the action means that one cannot avoid cultural criticism when thinking theologically. The difference between Turner and Eliot on this point is probably that Eliot would be less willing than Turner to subject theological standards to cultural criticism. On the other hand, Turner is more prone to see the connection between paradigm and action as automatic, and as unmediated by highly self-conscious, ethical reflection. Turner locates reflexivity in the time after, not the time before or during, a crisis.

In the final analysis, many of the differences between Eliot as a dramatist and Victor Turner as an anthropologist are the results of their dominant metaphors. By appealing to temporal, linear, or processual metaphors—"flow," for example—Turner conceives of action as phasic. By using spatial, circular, or static metaphors—e.g., the center that is "forever still"—Eliot treats actions as if they were layers or rings.

Though this comparison could continue, its basic parameters are now drawn, and it is obvious that I am not content merely to "apply" Turner's theory to Eliot's play, thus casting Eliot's play in the role of "data." Nor am I willing to admit that the differences in form and social function of dramatic and scholarly work warrant their compartmentalization. If we allow the play to question the theory, and do not merely apply the theory to the play, we are forced to ask Turner whether it is adequate: (1) to consider either narrative or social drama as only linear; and (2)

to claim that all rituals have a dramatic plot. Eliot's play helps us notice the static, circular side of Turner's interpretation. Although Eliot's play is dramatic, it makes minimum use of plot, thus calling into question Turner's treatment of all rites as narratively structured.

If we allow Turner's theory and case study to question Eliot, we must ask whether it is really clear that Becket was conscious of the intricacies of martyrological theology. Was Becket unwittingly compelled by *images* rather than theology? Secondly, to what extent is martyrdom only a retrospective view? Perhaps martyrs do not "exist" except in the hearts and minds of those who wish to "invent" them after the fact.

Reading or seeing Eliot's play makes one keenly aware that the only access to the social drama which Turner analyzes is through data which are strongly marked by earlier ritual drama. In other words, one may interpret the ritual drama as hermeneutically primary, even though the social drama is historically primary. The paradigm which Turner locates historically in actors' heads can just as well be located in the Mass, in yearly Canterbury Festivals, or even in Turner's head. "Where" one locates the paradigm is important, although by no means obvious. There is no reason why the paradigm cannot arise in two heads: Becket's, and because he is British (Scottish) and Catholic, Turner's. However, it is not easy to locate the martyrdom model both in the "depths" (Turner 1980:163) and on the "surface," which is where we would locate it metaphorically if we believe that Becket may have been stage managing.

Another problem which emerges from the comparison of Eliot and Turner is whether stage drama is a reflection of social drama, or vice-versa. On principle, can we assign priority to one or the other? Does the drama occur between Becket and King Henry II, between Turner and Becket, or between Eliot and Turner? Perhaps there are several overlapping dramas: (1) within Becket's head; (2) between Becket and Henry; (3) between Turner and Becket; and, if we are to be fully reflexive, (4) between Turner's and Eliot's readings of the affair.

If we take Eliot's interpretation seriously, we cannot simply consider the social and political forces surrounding Becket. Instead, we must also consider: (1) Becket's motivational struggle; and (2) the exegesis of the event as offered by pilgrims, performers, and the clergy at Canterbury. Theologies of martyrdom and ecclesiastical assessments of Becket's act are both partly "indigenous exegesis," and partly competing anthropological theory. On one level, the emic and etic accounts of Becket's actions are in conflict. Eliot's specification of Becket's motive is overridden not only by Turner's social dramatism theory, but also by *any* theory that argues from results or assumes the priority of stage-managed martyrdom. Among other things, Eliot's

Becket implicitly challenges the omni-competence of any social-psychological interpretation of action. To do this, Eliot does not merely hide behind dogma, but presents an argument. In his Christmas sermon, Becket does not announce some infallible revelation, but presents an argument for serious reflection and serious consideration of theological attitudes in addition to serious consideration of the results or phases of a process. Through Becket, Eliot challenges any view of action that either makes it the result of personal decision and "willpower," or construes it more passively as the product of reified social "forces." In fact, Turner also criticizes those who reify culture and make it a causal agent (see Turner and Turner 1980:144). When seen as a motive for action, "culture" is no less mystical than Eliot's "eternal design."

The process of juxtaposing a *theory* and *case study* of the Becket social drama against a *ritual dramatization* of that same drama, and thus confusing two orders of conceptualization, may seem to be stepping over a sacred boundary. But the conflict between the two orders (i.e., between Becket and King Henry II, and between Eliot's drama and Turner's dramatism) is real. Whether or not theorists would like to keep the two spheres—explanation (etic) and belief (emic)—separate, these two spheres are sometimes, as a matter of historical and social fact, experienced as competing and clashing. There may be no strategy more indebted to Turner than allowing his own research to enter into the arena of debate with a scholarly dramatist such as Eliot.

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LA PYRAMIDE ET LA ROUE: JEUX FORMELS ET EFFETS DE SENS DANS LES SPECTACLES DE CIRQUE[1]

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Cet article examine quelques numéros d'acrobatie du point de vue d'une opposition fonctionnelle entre *ordre* et *chaos*. Les métaphores de la pyramide et de la roue—métaphores qui ont engendré certains termes techniques du vocabulaire du cirque—articulent les pôles de l'opposition: intégration et harmonie sociales *vs.* expression individuelle et comportement anarchique. Les spectacles de cirque "représentent" cette tension, qui soustend l'expérience sociale de la plupart des individus, et l'orchestre, pour ainsi dire, dans des actions réglées, réalisant au sein de la matrice formée par cette opposition des combinaisons et des transformations variées. Les exemples choisis proviennent de cirques américains, européens et indiens. En conclusion, quelques règles appartenant au code sémiotique du cirque sont proposées et commentées à la lumière des résultats d'une enquête systématique portant sur les spectacles du cirque observés au cours de ces dernières années.

This article examines selected circus acrobatic acts from the point of view of a functional opposition between *order* and *chaos*. The metaphors of the pyramid and the wheel—metaphors which generate technical terms in circus jargon—articulate the poles of the opposition: social integration and harmony *versus* individual expression and anarchical behavior. Some aspects of circus spectacles "represent" this tension, which is at the root of the social experience of most individuals. These aspects of circus spectacles orchestrate this tension, so to speak, in a display of patterned actions which implement various combinations and transformations within the framework of this basic opposition. Examples are taken from the American, European, and Indian circuses. In conclusion, rules pertaining to the semiotic code of the circus are proposed in view of a systematic inquiry of circus programs in recent years.

Structure has been the theoretical point of departure for so many social anthropological studies that it has acquired a positive connotation—even though I would prefer to regard structure rather as the "outward bound or circumference," as Blake might have said, than as

> the center or substance of a system of social relations or ideas. When I speak of anti-structure, therefore, I really mean something positive, a generative center. (Turner 1974:273)

L'ordre et le chaos sont abondamment thématisés dans les spectacles du cirque tels qu'on peut les observer de nos jours. La parade initiale, le défilé final, l'étiquette qui règle les rapports des artistes entre eux et avec le public, la solennité qui est de rigueur pour certains numéros, l'ordonnancement strict du programme, la structure même de la représentation qui assigne à chacun sa place dans le temps et dans l'espace, sont autant de figures de l'ordre, c'est-à-dire de l'ensemble des rapports sociaux formellement déterminés, et dont la récurrence est prévisible souvent jusque dans les moindres détails. Tout manquement à cet ordre est immédiatement sanctionné; qu'un animal dressé saute hors de la piste pendant un numéro, ou qu'un spectateur se hasarde dans l'espace réservé aux artistes, et tout s'interrompt aussitôt jusqu'à ce que chacun soit remis à sa place. Les spectateurs eux-mêmes sont répartis dans un espace matériellement structuré qui est le fidèle reflet de l'ordre social qui prévaut dans le contexte socio-culturel du spectacle, que le fondement en soit ou non de nature purement économique. Quant aux artistes, leur spécialité, leur rôle et leur place dans le programme sont réglés par une subtile hiérarchie qui est la source d'innombrables tensions et qui fait l'objet d'un constant commentaire, nourri de querelles de préséance, de jalousies personnelles, et souvent même d'antagonismes qui aboutissent à des affrontements violents. Toutefois ce jeu de force à l'oeuvre dans les négociations et les intrigues de coulisses se résoud dans la structure relativement stable d'un programme d'une "saison," ou d'un engagement plus court; ce qui s'offre alors aux spectateurs est l'image harmonieuse d'un microcosme où s'équilibrent les fonctions sociales et les valeurs individuelles, répondant ainsi à l'image d'un public généralement discipliné où chacun occupe la place numérotée, ou la section correspondant à la catégorie de son billet, elle-même indicative, dans une certaine mesure, du statut économique et social de son possesseur. L'idéologie de l'ordre, qui s'exprime dans certains cirques par une structure administrative de nature quasi-militaire, est souvent même rendue explicite au niveau du spectacle par des fanfares martiales exécutées par des musiciens en uniformes qui défilent au pas dans la piste, par les coups de sifflets autoritaires du régisseur ponctuant la succession des numéros, par la présence enfin, souvent obligatoire, de représentants de la force publique. Mais elle peut s'exprimer aussi verbalement dans le commentaire du programme, comme dans ce cirque allemand, observé en 1984, où la directrice ouvre le spectable par un bref discours de bienvenue qu'elle conclut par un éloge du cirque "microcosme bien ordonné, reflet d'une société harmonieuse où chacun oeuvre à la place que Dieu lui a assignée"

(Zircus Sarasani, Düsseldorf, Allemagne de l'Ouest, 8-9 novembre 1984).

Mais ce n'est là qu'un aspect du cirque, car il n'est pas moins évident que de nombreuses figures de l'anarchie sont indissociablement mêlées à ce genre de spectacle, au point d'avoir fait du mot "cirque" un synonyme populaire de désordre et de chaos. Le "charivari" qui, encore à une époque récente, ouvrait traditionnellement le spectacle de cirque et qui persiste sous des formes diverses—retour aux sources dans les spectacles dit "à l'ancienne" ou versions modernisées de style "Halfwitt" (voir Note 2)—réalise une inversion de l'ordre social puisque les participants s'y livrent à des comportements strictement individuels, chacun faisant en même temps des sauts différents ou des sauts identiques mais non synchronisés, créant une impression de désordre généralisé qu'accompagne une musique à dominance cacophonique. Contribuent aussi à cet effet les innombrables transgressions catégorielles, anthropomorphisation des animaux et zoomorphisation des humains, que le cirque pousse aux limites du possible, bouleversant ainsi les rapports d'exclusion qui articulent l'univers culturel ambiant. Un autre facteur important est constitué par les comportements antisociaux et subversifs dont les clowns font étalage et qu'ils érigent en principes provisoires. Règles de bienséance, tour de parole, manières de table, et bien d'autres codes et conventions, sont allègrement transgressés, avec plus ou moins de finesse et d'art, mais évoquant toujours le spectre à la fois enthousiasmant et angoissant de l'émancipation totale des individus dans un monde sans lois, où les garants de l'ordre seraient bafoués et le contrat social récusé. Et s'il est vrai que les entrées clownesques s'emploient en général à réduire ces écarts par rapport à la norme culturelle et à conclure par la restauration de l'ordre, il n'en reste pas moins vrai que le clown est associé, dans l'imaginaire culturel, au mépris des lois et à la profanation du sacré. Il convient enfin d'ajouter à ces aspects marquants de la substance même du spectacle, sa forme particulière: rapidité de son déroulement sur un rythme vif et ininterrompu; extrême densité de l'information qui vient assaillir le spectateur, surtout dans le cas des cirques à plusieurs pistes où deux ou trois numéros, et parfois davantage, sont présentés en même temps; saturation intense et simultanée de tous les canaux de la perception, vue, ouïe, odorat, mais aussi goût—surtout dans le cirque nord-américain où le public fait grande consommation pendant le spectacle de nourritures quasi-rituelles: "popcorn" et "barbe-à-papa"; toucher, enfin, qu'accroît la nature même des sièges où chaque place sur les bancs n'est pas individuellement isolée, mais simplement définie par les limites du corps qui l'occupe et où s'abolissent momentanément les règles proxémiques qui modulent l'espace personnel, sans oublier la nécessaire immersion dans la foule indifférenciée, à l'entrée et à la sortie. Naturellement, certaines de ces caractéristiques n'appartiennent pas qu'au

cirque—les stades et halls sportifs (où d'ailleurs les cirques se produisent souvent) réduisent au minimum l'espace personnel des spectateurs—mais elles prennent une valeur particulière dans le contexte des autres aspects qui, eux, lui sont propres, à commencer par le genre de spectacle qu'il offre.

Le cirque en tant qu'expérience collective est en effet déterminé par la nature de ce qu'il donne à voir, par ce qui est visuellement articulé dans la piste à l'intention d'un public qui a consenti le sacrifice économique que représente le prix d'un billet en échange de deux ou trois heures passées à regarder, en général avec une intense attention, des séquences de comportements typiques dont la contemplation lui procure une indéniable satisfaction. C'est la nature de cette satisfaction qui suscite la curiosité de l'ethnologue dans la mesure où il se trouve en présence d'un phénomène collectif ancré dans la représentation de formes symboliques, bien codifiées sinon totalement ritualisées, auxquelles le public répond par des comportements eux-mêmes codifiés: silences, applaudissements, rire, exprimant des sentiments ou émotions relativement stéréotypés: angoisse, soulagement, admiration, incrédulité, etc. Le but de cet article est de contribuer à l'élucidation de ce problème par l'examen de quelques numéros—pris dans le cirque occidental et dans le cirque indien—où se combinent des figures de l'ordre et du chaos, traduites souvent grâce à l'opposition de la stabilité et du mouvement que métaphorisent visuellement la pyramide et la roue.

La "pyramide" est un terme du vocabulaire technique du cirque qui désigne certaines configurations humaines ou animales caractérisées par leur forme plus ou moins triangulaire. Il ne s'agit donc pas de pyramides au sens proprement géométrique du mot, mais plutôt de constructions analogiques échafaudées à partir d'une base formée soit par des accessoires (tabourets ou structure métallique) sur lesquels viennent se placer des animaux, soit par des acrobates sur les épaules desquels d'autres acrobates se tiennent en équilibre sur deux ou trois hauteurs, c'est-à-dire que ces derniers peuvent, à leur tour, supporter une troisième rangée, moins nombreuse, parfois couronnée d'un dernier acrobate qui forme ainsi le sommet de la pyramide. Dans le cas des pyramides de fauves, un animal vient se placer sur la plateforme supérieure, suivi d'autres animaux qui occupent de chaque côté de lui des plateformes de moindre hauteur disposées en ordre décroissant; lorsque le groupe de fauves est composé d'animaux de tailles ou d'espèces différentes le dresseur cherche en général à obtenir un effet de symétrie équilibrant ainsi visuellement les deux côtés de la "pyramide." Le terme renvoie donc à deux caractéristiques de la pyramide géométrique: symétrie et stabilité, qui en sont des effets plutôt que des traits définitionnels. Mais il y a plus, car l'image de la pyramide permet aussi de métaphoriser les relations hiérarchiques entre individus, qu'il s'agisse de la pyramide évolutionniste ou de la

pyramide sociale, valeurs qui sont particulièrement productives dans la genèse des numéros de cirque. Avant d'examiner en détail un type de numéro qui met en oeuvre avec beaucoup de netteté tout le potentiel sémantique de cette forme géométrique, signalons que le terme désigne aussi par extension toute figure, dans les numéros d'équidés et d'éléphants, marquée par une stabilité momentanée et par une configuration symétrique, obtenue en faisant poser les antérieurs de certains animaux sur la croupe d'autres animaux placés de telle sorte que l'ensemble constitue un tout visuellement cohérent. Toutefois, dans ces numéros, comme d'ailleurs dans les numéros de fauves, la pyramide n'est qu'une figure parmi d'autres, importante certes dans la mesure où elle démontre, géométriquement pourrait-on dire, la maîtrise du dresseur qui réussit à contraindre des animaux "sauvages" à prendre place dans un ensemble formel de relations harmonieuses, mais épisodique puisque le même processus est réitéré par le moyen d'autres figures souvent plus démonstratives encore. En revanche, dans le numéro type qui va être maintenant analysé la pyramide est le thème central, ou, du moins, l'un des deux pôles par rapport auxquels le numéro tout entier est structuré.

D'ailleurs, d'une manière apparemment paradoxale, le nom de ce genre de numéro renvoie au second pôle, celui des sauts individuels qui succèdent à la construction successive de plusieurs pyramides humaines. C'est une spécialité acrobatique, généralement considérée comme étant arabe, ou plus exactement maghrébine; les troupes, d'une dizaine de membres en moyenne, le plus souvent exclusivement masculines, sont connues sous des noms tels que "les Mohameds, sauteurs marocains" ou "les Abdullahs," "la troupe Marrakesh," etc. Un numéro typique se déroule de la manière suivante: les acrobates font leur entrée d'une manière rapide et tumultueuse en exécutant quelques sauts et en poussant des cris, puis tous en ligne au centre de la piste, ils saluent le public. Ils entreprennent alors de construire successivement plusieurs sortes de pyramides, commençant par une assise très large, c'est-à-dire que quatre ou cinq acrobates, debout sur le sol, servent de base au reste de la troupe qui grimpent sur leurs épaules et s'y tiennent en équilibre le temps d'une pose soutenue; puis la pyramide se défait et une autre de structure différente, lui succède; il peut s'agir alors d'une base triangulaire formée par trois hommes arc-boutés les uns contre les autres, en soutenant trois autres sur leurs épaules qui eux-mêmes en supportent deux, sur les épaules desquels vient s'installer un neuvième acrobate, généralement le plus léger du groupe. Puis s'édifie une autre structure humaine reposant entièrement sur les épaules de deux porteurs seulement. Enfin après une brève pause pendant laquelle l'annonceur présente l'un des acrobates qui se met solennellement au centre de la piste, tous les autres viennent se mettre en place autour de lui et commencent à construire une sorte de colonne où le porteur soutient à lui seul tous les autres sur ses épaules. Du point de vue technique, ces exercices demandent évidemment non seulement

de la force mais aussi un art consommé de l'équilibre et un esprit d'équipe qui s'exprime par la synchronisation des mouvements ainsi que par de nombreux signes d'entente mutuelle —signes qui soulignent la solidarité du groupe et dont la présence joue un rôle important dans la constitution sémiotique du numéro. Rappelons enfin que ces troupes ne comportent en général pas de femmes.

Ce dernier exercice collectif achevé, le groupe se disperse et chaque individu se met à tour de rôle à exécuter des sauts soit sur place, soit, après avoir pris de l'élan à partir de l'entrée, en traversant la piste diamétralement ou en suivant circulairement son pourtour. À l'exception d'un saut à deux, d'apparence tératomorphique, exécuté en tournant le long de la piste, chaque acrobate fait une démonstration individuelle d'un saut particulier, répété plusieurs fois, et revient se placer, après avoir salué le public, dans l'entrée d'où il repartira, son tour venu, pour une nouvelle démonstration soit du même saut que précédemment mais exécuté avec plus d'audace et de brio, soit d'un saut différent. À la fin, tous les sauteurs se retrouvent dans la piste, répartis sur toute sa superficie, et se mettent à exécuter sur place chacun un saut différent, créant une impression de charivari endiablé, de chaos éblouissant dans le chatoiement de leurs costumes et au rythme accéléré de la musique. À un signal donné par le chef de troupe, tous s'immobilisent soudain, saluent le public qui les applaudit et sortent de piste.

Ce schéma général, composé par abstraction à partir de nombreuses descriptions particulières, constitue la matrice de ce genre de numéro. Chaque troupe l'interprète à sa manière et les variations portent sur le nombre des acrobates, sur la structure des pyramides successives et sur le genre et le nombre des sauts exécutés. Quelles que soient les circonstances, les mêmes oppositions fondamentales articulent tous les numéros de ce paradigme: d'abord l'opposition entre, d'une part, les comportements complémentaires d'un travail d'équipe et, d'autre part, les comportements individuels. La première partie pourrait être, en effet, définie comme une représentation imagée du "chacun pour tous," la deuxième, du "chacun pour soi." D'un côté, la démonstration de la solidarité sociale, de l'autre l'explosion anarchique des talents individuels, non asservis à la réalisation d'une tâche collective.

La troupe "Tangier" servira d'exemple pour illustrer ce paradigme acrobatique. La description qui suit est construite à partir de plusieurs observations successives en août 1984 et en février 1985, dans deux programmes du "Garden Bros. Circus," à Toronto.

Les sept acrobates font leur entrée d'une manière impétueuse, chacun s'arrêtant à un endroit particulier de la piste de

manière à en saturer l'espace, et tous exécutent immédiatement un saut périlleux sur place avant de saluer le public. Les pyramides construites incluent les six combinaisons suivantes: (1) cinq acrobates sont alignés les uns à côté des autres, deux autres montent sur les épaules du second et du quatrième et s'y tiennent debout. Le troisième acrobate, c'est-à-dire celui qui se trouve en position centrale, est alors soulevé du sol par les efforts conjugués des deux porteurs qui sont de chaque côté de lui et dont les mains viennent le soutenir aux hanches tandis que les deux acrobates qui se trouvent sur leurs épaules le saisissent par les mains et le soulèvent. Puis les deux acrobates qui sont aux extrémités de la ligne sont également soulevés du sol dans la même position mais soutenus d'un seul côté. À ce moment (1) les deux hommes de la base en supportent cinq autres formant un ensemble symétrique et se mettent, l'un à avancer et l'autre à reculer de manière à décrire un cercle complet, c'est-à-dire à présenter à tous les spectateurs successivement la figure géométrique ainsi réalisée; (2) trois acrobates se mettent en ligne; deux autres viennent se placer l'un sur l'autre sur les épaules de celui qui est au centre, formant ainsi une triple hauteur. Les deux acrobates restant s'accrochent alors aux jarrets de celui qui est en position intermédiaire dans la "colonne" humaine tandis qu'ils sont soulevés par les pieds par les deux autres hommes de la base de manière à se trouver en position horizontale; trois hommes en soutiennent donc quatre; (3) c'est le même rapport qui est réalisé dans la pyramide suivante mais selon une figure différente: trois porteurs alignés servent de base à deux acrobates qui eux-mêmes en soutiennent chacun un autre debout sur leurs épaules, chaque "colonne" prenant appui sur deux des acrobates de la base; (4) deux hommes en soutiennent maintenant deux autres qui sont debout sur leurs épaules; un troisième grimpe au sommet et se tient debout en équilibre avec un pied sur chacun des deux acrobates; les deux hommes restant saisissent les deux porteurs aux jambes et aux bras et s'élèvent ainsi, la tête en bas et les pieds en l'air, des deux côtés de la pyramide; deux hommes en soutiennent donc cinq; (5) trois acrobates formant un triangle et se tenant par les bras en supportent maintenant deux qui en soutiennent eux-mêmes un troisième sur leurs épaules; c'est alors que le septième acrobate entreprend de faire l'ascension de cette pyramide et vient se placer debout sur les épaules de celui qui est en troisième hauteur formant ainsi une structure à quatre hauteurs; (6) dans la dernière figure, un seul porteur forme la base d'une colonne humaine de trois hauteurs à laquelle les quatre acrobates restant viennent s'accrocher, deux au porteur et deux à celui qu'il soutient sur ses épaules.

L'examen de ces figures successives montre que deux facteurs sont à l'oeuvre dans leur construction: d'abord, le rapport du nombre de porteurs au nombre de portés, ensuite le nombre de hauteurs comprises dans la construction. La combinatoire de ces variables permet de décrire formellement la progression des six

figures, allant d'une base de cinq à une base de un, mouvement qui consiste à inverser la pyramide qui, dans la figure finale, selon la logique de la métaphore, repose en quelque sorte sur sa pointe; le passage d'une stabilité assurée (base de cinq) à une stabilité précaire représentant un véritable défi (faire tenir une pyramide sur son sommet) se double d'une progression du nombre de hauteurs introduites dans les constructions (de deux à quatre), ce qui accroît d'autant les risques d'instabilité. Il arrive en effet que, soit difficulté réelle, soit "accident" mis en scène pour rehausser la difficulté de l'exercice, les deux dernières constructions—c'est-à-dire celles qui réalisent la hauteur maximale et la base minimale—"s'écroulent" au cours du premier essai. Il est à noter que, dans le numéro de la troupe Tangier, l'acrobate qui atteint le sommet de la pyramide, dans la cinquième figure est traité en héros, mais que, immédiatement après, celui qui dans la dernière figure soutient toute la troupe est présenté comme un super-héros; son nom est en effet annoncé avant l'exercice, l'attention du public est attirée sur la dificulté de ce qu'il va tenter, et tout un protocole préparatoire (comportement social, jeux de lumière, et accompagnement musical) en souligne l'importance. À la fin, le porteur reste debout au centre de la piste, les bras levés dans un geste de triomphe, tandis que les six autres acrobates viennent se répartir sur la périphérie de la piste et, genou à terre, saluent les spectateurs qui applaudissent.

La deuxième partie du numéro comporte douze sauts individuels, faisant alterner traversées diamétrales et parcours périphériques: (1) sauts (rondades) sur place au centre de la piste; (2) série de sauts périlleux sur toute la longueur du diamètre; (3) sauts autour de la piste (roue); (4) traversée avec série de sauts périlleux (sauts de lion); (5) traversée avec une série différente (sauts plongés); (6) sauts sur place au centre avec appui sur une main par le porteur unique de la sixième pyramide (À noter que celui-ci s'arrête, exige des applaudissements et se trémousse d'une manière obscène ou ridicule avant de terminer sa série); (7) tour de piste (roue) par un acrobate suivi de deux acrobates qui forment une roue "à quatre jambes" en s'agrippant mutuellement à la taille en sens inverse; (8) traversée d'un acrobate exécutant des "sauts groupés"; (9) tour de piste avec des "sauts arabes" (sauts périlleux groupés mais tournés latéralement); (10) traversée avec une série de sauts plongés très rapides à la fin desquels l'acrobate "perd sa culotte" (intermède comique); (11) tour de piste en sauts périlleux accélérés; (12) tour de piste par un acrobate, suivi de deux autres, puis d'un trosième chacun faisant des sauts différents. Enfin tous les autres se joignent à eux et chacun exécute sur place un saut particulier sur un rythme accéléré jusqu'à ce que tous s'immobilisent au signal du directeur de la troupe et saluent le public.

Comme on peut le constater aisément, cette seconde partie n'est pas moins construite que la première, mais l'effet de la construction en est tout différent. Les éléments qui la composent ne sont pas des figures stables et collectives, mais des événements individuels que peut résumer l'image de multiples roues en mouvement. Ces sauts, exercices "tournés" et réitérés, dont l'interruption est arbitraire, amenée essentiellement par la nécessité de faire place nette devant le sauteur suivant, sont caractérisés par le flux, l'indéfini, et l'individualité; le seul exemple de coopération prend la forme monstrueuse d'un être à quatre jambes. Anarchie apparente, absence concertée de synchronisation et pure diversité marquent l'ensemble. Les sauteurs s'y livrent à une forme de compétition, certains attirant même sur eux l'attention du public par des procédés qui contrastent avec l'étiquette qui règne dans la première partie. Enfin le tout se conclut sur un chaos visuel dans lequel chacun agit simultanément mais non harmonieusement puisque les actions y sont compétitives et non complémentaires.

Le contraste manifeste qui existe entre les deux parties articule une opposition binaire selon laquelle les traits distinctifs qui caractérisent la structure du groupe social formé par les sept acrobates sont inversés, quand on passe du premier ensemble d'exercices au second. Ces troupes étant composées en général exclusivement d'hommes parmi lesquels les seuls clivages perceptibles sont celui de l'âge (adolescents *vs.*hommes mûrs) et celui de la condition physique (relative massivité des porteurs *vs.* relative légèreté de ceux qui vont occuper les niveaux supérieurs des pyramides). Ainsi, la dimension pertinente du groupe qui est posée au départ est donc sa fonction d'équipe, c'est-à-dire que le groupe constitue un ensemble de talents complémentaires, coordonnés par des volontés individuelles dont les actions convergent vers une tâche commune. Les deux clivages notés plus haut, qui d'ailleurs se recoupent partiellement, dénotent en effet dans la première partie la complémentarité plutôt que la compétitivité sociale. Bien que les pyramides acrobatiques soient aussi des figures de la hiérarchie sociale, leur construction n'est pas l'objet d'une lutte mais prend la forme d'un enjeu collectif. Ce sont des variations formelles sur le thème de la stabilité des systèmes sociaux quel qu'en soit le principe, c'est-à-dire qu'ils soient perçus comme reposant sur une large base démocratique ou que tout l'édifice dépende pour la survie de sa cohésion de la force d'une seule personne. Un adolescent me fit part un jour de son admiration pour l'acrobate qui portait toute la troupe sur ses épaules, en utilisant le terme allemand "Mannlichkeit" plutôt qu'un terme qui aurait simplement dénoté la pure force physique. Il semble donc significatif que, dans le cas de ce spectateur, dont il est permis de penser qu'il est représentatif d'un ensemble, la valeur projetée par cet exercice de force se trouve connotée par l'autorité du père et la responsabilité du chef dans une perspective patriarcale.

Seulement, s'il est bien vrai que l'explicitation des oppositions binaires permette de construire le cadre conceptuel grâce auquel on peut rendre compte des effets de sens produits par les variations morphologiques, il n'en reste pas moins que le numéro se déroule dans un certain ordre qui n'est pas indifférent et qui inscrit une trajectoire particulière dans cette structure conceptuelle. C'est en effet au moment où l'on arrive à une limite de la stabilité sociale (figure de la pyramide reposant sur son sommet) que l'ordre se dissout en un chaos où s'affirment des volontés anarchiques, d'abord successivement, puis simultanément pour conclure. C'est un processus semblable qui se trouve à l'oeuvre dans les numéros de cavalerie. Mais sans doute sera-t-il plus intéressant ici de prendre en considération un autre numéro acrobatique appartenant à un paradigme proche de celui que nous venons d'analyser et dans lequel les valeurs socio-politiques sont explicitées et thématisées dans la performance elle-même par le moyen d'une caractérisation historique des acrobates. Il s'agit d'un numéro de tremplin élastique présenté dans le programme du cirque d'état russe (Russisch Staatscircus 1983) au cours d'une tournée en Hollande du 29 juillet au 27 septembre 1983. La description qui suit est fondée sur des observations faites les 9, 10 et 11 août à Amsterdam.

Le tremplin élastique permet d'exécuter des sauts semblables à ceux qui se font à partir du sol, à cette différence près que l'impulsion venue de la surface élastique projette l'acrobate à une altitude supérieure, lui donnant ainsi le temps d'exécuter des figures plus complexes ou encore de les répéter plusieurs fois. Le tremplin lui-même est généralement réduit à ses composantes strictement fonctionnelles, de même que les costumes des acrobates sont le plus souvent dans un style sportif plus ou moins coloré. La particularité de ce numéro du cirque d'état soviétique est sa thématisation historique et idéologique par l'accumulation de signes supplémentaires: d'une part, le tremplin est décoré d'un pourtour à motifs "historiques" (blasons, fleurs de lys, étendards) et surmonté d'un trône sur l'un de ses côtés; d'autre part les acrobates sont vêtus de costumes de style "ancien régime": roi et valet, marquis et marquises, mousquetaires, bouffons, et hussards). Le numéro débute par l'arrivée du roi, plutôt petit et ridicule, suivi d'un valet gigantesque qui lui présente cérémonieusement un verre de vin sur un plateau. Tout en gravissant l'escalier qui conduit au tremplin le roi vide plusieurs verres. Il saute alors sur le tremplin et se trouve projeté vers le trône dans lequel il atterrit assis, suivi du valet. Arrivent alors les autres acrobates qui successivement exécutent des sauts de plus en plus complexes sous les regards du roi qui continue de boire. La modalité générale est la compétition entre les courtisans, chacun faisant à tour de rôle montre de sa valeur—modalité renforcée par le fait que les deux marquises qui accompagnaient le mousquetaire à son arrivée l'abandonnent pour le hussard après que celui-ci a exécuté un

extraordinaire morceau de bravoure, le sabre au clair. Finalement, le roi s'écroule ivre-mort et son valet l'emporte dans ses bras. La soudaine vacance du pouvoir royal, déclenche une lutte forcenée entre les sauteurs qui cherchent tous à occuper le trône vers lequel ils se propulsent l'un après l'autre, renversant l'occupant d'un instant avant d'être éjectés à leur tour par le prétendant suivant, le tout agrémenté de remarquables cascades acrobatiques dont le tremplin décuple les effets. À la fin, tous réussissent à s'entasser les uns sur les autres sur le trône, formant une pyramide chancelante; c'est alors qu'un coup de feu retentit et que la pyramide s'écroule, chacun roulant à terre en un complet désordre. L'obscurité se fait alors dans la salle pendant quelques instants pour permettre aux acrobates de sortir de piste avant que le numéro suivant ne commence.

On voit donc que ce numéro (intitulé "Bal des fous sur le tremplin," par les Vladimitowy) met en jeu les mêmes oppositions fondamentales que celui de la troupe "Tangier," mais qu'il les actualise d'une manière bien différente, non seulement à cause d'un degré supérieur de caractérisation et de narrativisation, mais aussi et surtout par une série d'inversions. En effet, ce n'est pas l'ordre social qui, ayant atteint sa limite extrême, bascule dans la fragmentation anarchique des individualités, c'est l'état de compétition qui, atteignant son paroxysme grâce à la vacance du contrôle hiérarchique, se révèle incapable de construire un édifice social stable. La clef de la pyramide réussie est que chacun y occupe sa place et règle son action en vue de la stabilité de l'ensemble. Nul doute que, dans l'exemple du cirque soviétique, la thèse idéologique veuille démontrer à la fois les conséquences néfastes du pouvoir monarchique et les effets catastrophiques de la libre entreprise. Peu importe, ce qui est intéressant c'est que cette thèse puisse être articulée précisément par le moyen du paradigme acrobatique construit sur l'opposition existant entre sauts individuels et construction de pyramides humaines, qui séparément ne serait que des exercices physiques mais qui, par leur combinaison dans un même numéro permettent de désigner figurativement le rapport entre l'expression individuelle et l'intégration sociale.

L'hypothèse qui a soustendu l'analyse précédente est que les numéros d'acrobatie, dans la mesure où ils présentent des actions humaines conjuguées, permettent de métaphoriser des rapports sociaux de toutes sortes: structures politiques, division du travail, spécialisations fondées sur le sexe, systèmes de parenté, etc. Toutefois il est important de noter que ces "représentations" ne sont pas seulement, ni sans doute essentiellement, de simples reproductions ou reflets des structures sociales de leur contexte, mais des opérations sémiotiques effectuées sur ces modèles métaphoriques. Aussi bien dans le cas de la troupe "Tangier" que dans celui des Vladimitowy, le numéro est fondé sur la transformation d'un ensemble donné de relations en un autre ensemble de nature

différente. Ces transformations ne sont pas purement formelles mais portent sur des contenus socio-culturels qui sont pertinents dans les sociétés où ces "représentations" sont observées et où elles produisent des effets de sens déterminés. L'analyse du numéro aérien des "Burger Sisters" va permettre de préciser cette hypothèse par l'examen d'un cas limite.

Ce numéro, observé au Tower Circus de Blackpool (Angleterre) en juin et août 1978, comprend deux jeunes femmes, vêtues de manière identique, qui exécutent des exercices acrobatiques aériens à grande hauteur. La particularité du numéro est que les deux soeurs accomplissent les mêmes exercices en même temps sur deux appareils parallèles. Chaque appareil comporte un trapèze et une barre placée au dessus du trapèze et garnie de douze boucles. L'axe des trapèzes coupe à 90 degrés l'orientation des barres qui sont disposées de telle sorte qu'elles ne gênent pas le mouvement des trapèzes quand ceux-ci sont utilisés. Le numéro se déroule de la manière suivante: les deux acrobates font leur entrée et gravissent les échelles de cordes qui leur permettent d'atteindre les trapèzes. Une fois arrivées là, elles exécutent en même temps six exercices successifs d'une manière parfaitement synchronisée, puis chacune passe de son trapèze à la barre qui est fixée au dessus. À cause de la disposition des trapèzes par rapport aux barres, l'une prend position à l'extrémité gauche de sa barre, alors que l'autre se place à l'extrémité opposée de sa propre barre. Elles se suspendent alors aux deux premières boucles par les pieds (cous-de-pied) et, la tête en bas et les bras pendants, impriment à leurs corps un ballant grâce auquel elles peuvent, en dégageant successivement le pied de la boucle antérieure pour l'accrocher à la boucle suivante, progresser vers l'autre extrémité de leur barre. Cet exercice désigné souvent par "la marche au plafond" est très impressionnant car la vie de l'acrobate tient non seulement à la force de ses cous-de-pied mais aussi au calcul précis de l'amplitude du ballant qui lui permet d'atteindre la boucle suivante, et d'y assurer sa prise tout en se dégageant de la boucle précédente. Les deux acrobates progressent donc ainsi parallèlement mais en sens inverse. Soudain un incident se produit: la neuvième boucle de l'une des barres se casse net au moment où l'acrobate assure sa prise. Une mise en scène habile fait croire à un accident; la musique s'arrête, des hommes de piste se précipitent sous l'appareil comme s'ils s'attendaient à une chute. L'autre acrobate s'immobilise, incapable de porter secours à sa soeur dont le corps pend, impuissant, pendant qu'elle cherche à atteindre la boucle suivante en étendant la jambe au maximum. Elle réussit enfin, et les deux soeurs arrivent en même temps à leur douzième boucle, d'où elles saisissent l'échelle de corde et redescendent dans la piste. À première vue, il s'agit là d'un "chiqué," c'est-à-dire d'un échec contrôlé qui est introduit dans un numéro pour mettre en valeur la difficulté d'un exercice que l'on fait semblant de manquer au premier essai pour valoriser le succès qui couronne le deuxième. Mais en fait, cet incident introduit dans

le numéro ne correspond pas exactement à la fonction du chiqué, puisque ce dernier porte sur la compétence de l'acrobate et non sur la résistance et la fiabilité de ses accessoires. Dans le cas des "Burger Sisters," il s'agit d'une défaillance technique qui, si elle était réelle, (et n'oublions pas qu'elle est présentée comme telle et que les spectateurs éprouvent une angoisse réelle) appartiendrait à la catégorie de la fatalité ou à celle de la criminalité selon que la rupture de la boucle serait naturelle ou causée par un tiers. L'introduction concertée d'un incident "fortuit" de cette nature dans un numéro d'acrobatie soulève un certain nombre de problèmes théoriques en ce qui concerne son analyse structurale, puisque, comme j'ai tenté de le démontrer dans un autre essai (Bouissac 1982), la description ne peut légitimement inclure l'accidentel, mais que, d'autre part, l'analyse fait apparaître la nécessité logique de l'accident. Si l'on considère en effet que ce dernier rend présent la probabilité de la mort en tant qu'expression de la fatalité au terme d'un comportement qui se définit par le triomphe de la vie face à des obstacles extrêmement difficiles à surmonter, il convient de chercher dans le contenu sémantique du numéro la clef de cet événement paradoxal. Pour cela il est nécessaire de situer le numéro des "Burger Sisters" dans le contexte du paradigme de l'acrobatie aérienne et d'y examiner avec soin son statut particulier.

Le statut de ce numéro par rapport à l'ensemble des numéros aériens est en effet très particulier. Rappelons que ce genre de numéro comprend un appareil fixé au dessus du sol à une hauteur telle que toute chute peut être extrêmement dangereuse, et même mortelle. La structure de cet appareil varie selon la catégorie du numéro (trapèze, barre, anneaux, cadre métallique, corde volante, etc.). Les acrobates atteignent cet appareil par une corde lisse ou une échelle de corde, et se livrent à des exercices de force et d'équilibre qui impliquent une extraordinaire rapidité de mouvement et une grande fermeté de prise, puisque ce sont ces deux capacités qui assurent le comportement de survie qui prévient la chute. En outre, ces numéros se divisent en deux classes distinctes: ceux qui sont exécutés par une personne seule et ceux qui comprennent deux personnes ou davantage. Les premiers font la démonstration de leurs capacités en tant que héros solitaires, affrontant le danger sans bénéfice d'une coopération quelconque, affirmant la supériorité de leur courage et de leur savoir-faire face à la mort. La connotation de solitude tragique du héros est généralement soulignée par la musique d'accompagnement, qui, souvent empruntée au répertoire des mélodies associées à la déception sentimentale, évoque un comportement suicidaire. L'acrobate solitaire apparaît donc, à la limite, comme un héros tragique, anti-social puisque suicidaire, défiant la mort d'une manière totalement gratuite, c'est-à-dire ne s'exposant pas au danger pour le bénéfice d'autrui mais au nom de valeurs strictement individuelles. Dans un programme de cirque, il n'y a

en général qu'un seul exemple de cette catégorie, non seulement parce que ces numéros sont relativement rares et chers, mais aussi, et surtout, parce que la duplication de ce qui est présenté comme étant unique en réduirait d'autant l'effet escompté. Ajoutons que la tension et l'anxiété que ce genre de numéro produit dans la majorité des spectateurs ne rend pas souhaitable leur multiplication dans un programme. Ils y représentent un moment fort qui appartient à l'économie générale du spectacle de cirque et qui par sa nature même exclut la répétition. Notons que "la marche au plafond" appartient, en règle générale à cette catégorie et est donc le fait d'un seul acrobate.

L'autre catégorie de numéros aériens est au contraire caractérisée par la coopération de deux personnes ou davantage. La survie de chaque individu est assurée par la coordination des actions du groupe. La complémentarité des comportements et des spécialités est telle que ces numéros exemplifient avec une extrême netteté le concept de "division du travail" qui est à la base de l'organisation sociale. Cette catégorie revêt des modalités différentes selon que les deux acrobates sont du même sexe ou de sexes différents, appartiennent à la même classe d'âge ou non, exhibent un comportement érotique ou sportif, sont présentés comme étant un couple (Doris et Mario) dont il est spécifié qu'il est sanctionné par le mariage (les Geraldos, le duo Veress) ou qu'ils sont frères ou soeurs, ou frère et soeur; selon les cas la musique d'accompagnement varie des thèmes érotico-sentimentaux aux thèmes sportifs, martiaux et ludiques. Quand le numéro comprend plus de deux personnes, le groupe est présenté soit comme une famille, soit comme une équipe, une troupe, un clan (les Wallenda, les Flying Gaonas, la troupe Balkanski, etc.). Le succès des exercices est assuré par la solidarité du groupe et suppose une confiance mutuelle absolue; il faut en effet que celui qui lâche une prise soit assuré de rencontrer en un point précis de sa trajectoire les mains qui vont prévenir sa chute. On voit donc que, de la complémentarité sexuelle à la solidarité de l'équipe, ces numéros "représentent" tout l'éventail des rapports sociaux complémentaires orientés vers un but commun. Ce sont, en quelque sorte, des variantes dynamiques de la figure de la pyramide.

Or, si l'on revient aux "Burger Sisters," force est de constater que leur numéro présente des anomalies par rapport à l'organisation du paradigme des numéros aériens. En effet, d'une part, un numéro typique d'acrobatie solitaire est exécuté par deux acrobates en même temps, et, d'autre part, bien que ces deux acrobates soient présentées comme étant soeurs, elles ne forment pas un ensemble complémentaire, puisque non seulement aucun contact n'existe entre les deux mais qu'en plus, elles sont incapables de se porter secours lorsqu'un accident se produit. Elles réunissent donc deux transgressions d'une norme bien établie dans le code du cirque. Mais il y a plus, car ces

transgressions peuvent aussi représenter figurativement une violation de la norme sociale du contexte socio-culturel. C'est que ces soeurs ne sont pas des adolescentes mais des femmes. Le fait qu'elles soient présentées comme "les soeurs Burger" fait supposer qu'elles ne sont pas mariées, car dans le contexte où le numéro a été observé, le nom du mari oblitère celui de la femme et le statut conjugal repousse au second plan le statut de soeurs pour la définition de l'identité individuelle. Le statut familial réel de ces acrobates n'est pas ici en cause, mais seulement l'ensemble signifiant produit par la conjonction dans le numéro d'un ensemble d'apparences, de comportements techniques, d'informations données par la présentation verbale et écrite, la musique, la mise en scène, etc. L'inconscient, ou le subconscient culturel des spectateurs perçoit la relation entre ces composantes, et l'hypothèse qui peut alors être formulée est que la mort est inscrite dans cette configuration sémiotique.

En effet la conjonction entre l'état de "vieille fille," état socialement maudit s'il en est dans la société européenne traditionnelle, et l'absence de coopération au service d'une tâche commune, figure redondante de l'inutilité sociale, marque du sceau de la stérilité et de la répréhensibilité le comportement symbolique de ces acrobates. Naturellement, il serait possible de soutenir, à un niveau d'interprétation superficielle, qu'étant donné que le suspens du numéro est d'autant amoindri que deux personnes exécutent en même temps un exercice que l'on présente en général dans les spectacles comme étant extraordinaire et unique, il est nécessaire d'ajouter un élément dramatique pour rehausser la valeur spectaculaire du numéro. Toutefois cet argument, qui fait appel à des considérations rhétoriques, n'est pas incompatible avec la thèse soutenue ici puisqu'il tend à présenter "l'accident" comme une sorte de conséquence nécessaire de la structure particulière du numéro. Il consiste à dire: les choses étant ce qu'elles sont, un événement s'impose avant la conclusion du numéro de manière à compenser le manque d'intérêt progressif des spectateurs; or, le point important est précisément que cet événement n'est pas un accident comique (comme le serait la perte d'une perruque par exemple) mais une évocation très réaliste d'un accident fatal, dans tous les sens du mot.

Cette interprétation, qui procède d'une conceptualisation située au niveau du système, et non au niveau exclusif du vécu, ne saurait être validée que par sa capacité de généralisation, c'est-à-dire par la possibilité de formuler l'hypothèse sous forme de prédictions que l'observation de nombreux spectacles viendra ou non confirmer. Dans le cas présent, l'hypothèse peut prendre la forme suivante: si un numéro acrobatique comprend deux individus, ces individus se livreront à des exercices au moins en partie complémentaires; si ce n'est pas le cas, alors un événement sera introduit dans le numéro pour sanctionner la transgression que représente ce comportement social anormal. En

fait, de nombreux exemples viennent renforcer cette hypothèse. Avant de les examiner, notons toutefois qu'il convient de distinguer de ces numéros les mouvements d'ensemble, de type choréographique, n'impliquant pas de risques extrêmes ni de techniques très poussées, tels que les ballets acrobatiques aériens ou les évolutions de groupes de danseuses qui relèvent d'une autre logique identique à celle qui rend compte des présentations équestres en liberté (voir Note 3). Le degré avancé de technique et l'implication d'un risque semblent constituer des critères pertinents du domaine auquel s'applique notre hypothèse.

Le premier exemple est un numéro exécuté par deux jeunes femmes, élèves de l'école nationale du cirque (France) dans le programme du cirque Gruss présenté à Paris en juin 1981. L'appareil est une sorte de trapèze à trois places—la barre, d'une longueur équivalente à trois trapèzes étant soutenue par quatre cordes délimitant trois espaces sur la barre. Les deux acrobates montent à la corde et prennent place chacune sur l'un des espaces extrêmes, laissant libre la partie centrale. Elles entreprennent alors de réaliser simultanément la même figure acrobatique; puis, l'acrobate de droite vient s'accrocher par les jambes à la partie centrale de la barre, et, sa partenaire s'étant suspendue à ses mains, elles exécutent à deux un deuxième exercice; celui-ci terminé, elles retournent à leur position initiale sur les deux espaces extrêmes de la barre où, de nouveau, elles accomplissent en même temps un exercice identique. Elles font alterner ainsi successivement trois exercices solitaires et trois exercices complémentaires, en commençant le numéro par la première catégorie et en le terminant par la seconde. Cet ordre n'est pas indifférent, dans la perspective de notre hypothèse puisque la tension instaurée par la transgression qu'implique le parallélisme d'exercices identiques est immédiatement neutralisée par l'accomplissement d'une figure acrobatique qui requiert la coopération des deux partenaires. Il est intéressant de noter que la règle qui paraît à l'oeuvre dans cet exemple est d'une assez grande généralité culturelle puisque les cas suivants ont été observés dans des programmes de cirques indiens. Le premier, il est vrai, présenté comme un numéro inspiré par le cirque soviétique, faisait partie du programme 1984 du Venus Circus (30 novembre 1984, Cananore, Kerala). L'appareil est identique au précédent mais le numéro comprend trois acrobates, chacune occupant une portion de la barre. Pendant la première partie du numéro les trois trapézistes exécutent simultanément et de manière synchronisée six exercices classiques au trapèze; puis celle du milieu est saisie par les deux autres et accomplit de nouvelles figures acrobatiques tandis qu'elle est suspendue aux mains de ses deux partenaires. Autre exemple observé dans un cirque beaucoup plus modeste et traditionnel, The Great Jai Bharat Circus (2 décembre 1984, Kuttiadi, Kerala): deux jeunes contorsionnistes font les mêmes exercices côte à côte sur une table, mais à intervalle régulier se rejoignent au centre de la table pour y exécuter un exercice à

deux, soit que l'une serve de support à sa compagne, soit qu'elles combinent leurs contorsions dans un ensemble complémentaire.

Depuis 1978, année de l'observation et de l'analyse du numéro des "Burger Sisters," aucun exemple ne s'est présenté qui vienne infirmer l'hypothèse formulée plus haut. Certes, l'enquête n'a porté que sur une soixantaine de programmes, mais, ceux-ci étant répartis sur une vaste aire géographique comprenant l'Amérique du Nord, l'Europe et l'Inde, il semble bien que l'on puisse considérer que nous sommes là en présence au moins d'une tendance significative. Cela est d'autant plus vraisemblable, que l'ensemble observé ne présente aucun cas de numéro d'acrobatie aérienne exécuté par un acrobate solitaire, dans lequel soit introduit un "accident" du type décrit dans le numéro des "Burger Sisters."

Bien que la prudence s'impose dans ce genre de généralisations, et sous réserve de confirmations ultérieures, cette hypothèse ouvre une perspective intéressante pour l'interprétation d'autres numéros acrobatiques, tel ce numéro d'acrobates cyclistes observé en Inde (Apollo Circus, Bombay, 20-23 novembre 1984). Le numéro commence par l'entrée de deux cyclistes, chacune sur son vélo qui, tout en pédalant autour de la piste, exécutent en même temps les mêmes exercices. La vitesse qu'elles impriment à leur machine est constante, de manière à ce qu'elles soient toujours à des points diamétralement opposés de la piste. Les acrobaties consistent en plusieurs sortes d'équilibres montés sur le cadre, le guidon et la selle de la bicyclette pendant que celle-ci continue à rouler une fois l'élan donné. Dès que la vitesse diminue au point de rendre les équilibres précaires, elles accélèrent le mouvement en activant les pédales. Ces exercices finis, elles sortent de piste et une série d'épisodes d'un caractère particulier se succèdent: d'abord, un nain vient faire un tour de piste sur un monocycle géant; puis arrive un ours sur une motocyclette, phare allumé, qui fait plusieurs fois le tour de la piste dans l'obscurité qui s'est faite à son entrée; enfin le nain revient sur un vélo minuscule, les clowns l'entourent, lui arrachent le vélo qu'ils mettent en pièces, et commencent à danser en utilisant les morceaux de la machine comme s'ils étaient des instruments de musique (les roues deviennent des guitares, les tubes des flûtes, etc.); ils reconstruisent la bicyclette mais à l'envers en intervertissant la selle et les pédales si bien que le nain sort de piste en pédalant le derrière en l'air. C'est alors que la troupe d'acrobates cyclistes dont font partie les deux jeunes femmes du début, revient en piste et que se succèdent des exercices qui tous mettent en jeu un certain degré de coopération entre les artistes, soit qu'elles se tiennent par la main dans une ronde de monocycles, soit qu'une ou deux personnes se placent en équilibre sur les épaules de celle qui fait avancer la bicyclette en pédalant, soit enfin, et c'est là la figure finale, que les dix

membres de la troupe viennent construire une sorte de pyramide en équilibre sur la dernière bicyclette propulsée par l'acrobate la plus forte.

La transgression représentée par la non-coopération qui caractérise le premier exercice, serait ainsi sanctionnée par l'irruption d'une série d'anormalités et de monstruosités: nains, machines disproportionnées, obscurité, interventions chaotiques des clowns, confusions des catégories puisque les éléments de la bicyclette sont traités comme des instruments de musique et qu'un animal se présente dans un rôle humain. Mais si la trangression a déclenché un désordre "cosmologique," tout rentre dans l'ordre avec la restauration de la norme dans la seconde partie, c'est-à-dire la succession d'exercices reposant sur la complémentarité et la coopération, et se concluant, significativement, par une pyramide sur roues, figure qui nous ramène au point de départ de cet essai. Or, cela est d'autant plus intéressant que tous les autres numéros d'acrobates cyclistes observés en Inde au cours de la même enquête ne comportaient pas d'épisode du type "Burger Sisters" et se déroulaient "normalement," c'est-à-dire que leur structure rhétorique présentait une progression régulière de la difficulté des exercices et du nombre des personnes engagées dans l'accomplissement de ces exercices, sans interruption chaotique comme dans le programme de l'Apollo Circus.

Parvenu au terme de cette analyse portant sur quelques numéros représentatifs d'un paradigme acrobatique, il paraît évident que le désordre dont il est question est un désordre *représenté*. Il suffit d'assister deux fois de suite au même spectacle pour découvrir que ce "chaos" est en effet réglé presque dans les moindres détails. Certes, la mise en scène s'accommode de quelques variations fortuites ou concertées, mais celles-ci s'inscrivent dans une partition très stricte qui exclut des écarts individuels trop marqués. Des "accidents," dont le réalisme est soigneusement préparé, produisent sur le public un effet de sens qui ne peut être pleinement compris que si l'on replace l'événement dans le contexte sémiotique de tout le programme, et, au delà, dans le code même du spectacle de cirque. Comme nous l'avons fait remarquer au début de cet essai, la ligne de démarcation entre le public et le spectacle qui se déroule dans la piste constitue la règle d'or du système. Toute confusion entraînerait au chaos réel. Or, cette confusion est introduite, de manière très constante, dans la programmation du spectacle, sous forme "d'incidents" qui font passer dans le public le frisson de l'anomie. En effet, si l'étanchéité réelle entre les deux domaines n'était pas assurée, la subversion du système risquerait de devenir contagieuse. Mais la codification extrême des réactions à laquelle les spectateurs sont soumis par les contraintes culturelles de l'étiquette entraîne une tension que ces "incidents" permettent de relâcher symboliquement. Dans le spectacle du Great Rayman Circus observé à Calcutta (26 décembre 1984), un clown fait mine, à un certain moment, de lancer une

chaise sur les spectateurs du premier rang. Naturellement il retient la chaise qui ne quitte jamais ses mains. Toutefois le réalisme du geste est tel qu'un spectateur aux réflexes rapides tombe de sa chaise en voulant esquiver le coup et proteste bruyamment contre cette mauvaise plaisanterie. Une dizaine de minutes plus tard, le même clown qui est revenu en piste refait le même geste au même endroit alors qu'il vient de terminer son numéro. Le même spectateur se laisse de nouveau surprendre et, outragé, se lève, proteste, menace le clown, et quitte le cirque, comme il le fait à chaque représentation, drapé dans sa dignité offensée. Un "événement" de cette nature, c'est-à-dire mettant en relation directe spectacle et spectateurs, est quasi de règle dans tous les spectacles de cirque, mais l'interaction est toujours "jouée." Pour le spectateur *bona fide* "l'événement" prend des proportions considérables, à la mesure sans doute de la frustration qu'entraîne la passivité fascinée de son rôle. La participation ne peut alors prendre qu'une forme: se joindre au cirque, passer de l'autre côté de la barrière, devenir l'un d'eux. Si les difficultés matérielles et la pression sociale rendent cette décision très difficile à exécuter, elles sont impuissantes à réduire le rêve, et la fuite au cirque est l'un des thèmes les plus puissants de l'imagination populaire. Certains cirques l'ont si bien compris qu'ils ont réussi à codifier cette aspiration et à l'intégrer dans la performance elle-même. Le cirque Roncalli, par exemple, a introduit cette dimension dans son spectacle: à la fin de la représentation, les artistes viennent saluer le public dans la piste, puis, alors que les applaudissements, d'une grande intensité, leur répondent, ils invitent quelques spectateurs des premiers rangs à se joindre à eux dans la piste. L'orchestre entame une valse et des couples se forment spontanément, chaque artiste dansant avec un spectateur ou une spectatrice. La soirée s'achève ainsi par la réalisation du contact, illusion d'une transformation dont jouit par procuration le reste du public qui, lentement, s'achemine vers la sortie.

L'artificialité des "événements" qui canalisent ainsi l'investissement émotif des spectateurs ne doit pas faire oublier que cet investissement est bien réel et qu'il fait partie d'un ensemble complexe auquel le contenu cognitif des numéros est indissolublement lié. Le paradigme que nous avons examiné concerne, si notre hypothèse est correcte, l'un des dilemmes les plus profonds de l'existence humaine; l'intégration sociale et l'expression individuelle peuvent devenir mutuellement exclusives si elles sont poussées à l'extrême; mais, même si une situation d'équilibre est atteinte entre les deux, ce *modus vivendi* n'est jamais que le résultat d'une négociation entre deux principes divergents. En donnant à ce problème toute la netteté et le relief d'une formule, les numéros que nous avons passés en revue ne peuvent que réactiver les contradictions inhérentes à l'inconscient collectif et provoquer de puissants investissements affectifs dans les héros exemplaires qui se font les champions de

l'une ou l'autre voie; en actualisant le potentiel tragique du défi solitaire, certains acrobates soulèvent irrésistiblement l'enthousiasme intime de chacun et provoquent sans doute une transformation psychologique, plus ou moins durable, chez les spectateurs les plus impressionnables, c'est-à-dire dont l'intégration sociale est la plus fragile. C'est à ce point de l'analyse que deviennent pertinents les concepts associés à l'inlassable quête de Victor Turner pour comprendre le temps, ou plutôt l'homme dans le temps. Quelle signification attribuer à ces myriades de transformations locales, plus ou moins synchronisées qui se traduisent par des phénomènes collectifs, institutionnalisés et dont l'effet ultime ne fait que renforcer la stabilité des systèmes au sein desquels elles sont observées? L'intensité du vécu individuel au contact des seuils de tolérance, des marges, de l'autre bord du système pourrait se traduire par un basculement dans l'anomie, mais cela ne se produit généralement pas. Le danger est cependant présent, représenté, donné à contempler et à jouir. La seule transformation pensable, et qui se réalise parfois effectivement, est la "capture" d'un spectateur par "le monde du cirque," c'est-à-dire par un groupe spécialisé dans la production de ces effets de sens dont l'humanité est friande. Passage difficile certes, dont les rites n'ont encore été décrits par aucun ethnologue, mais dont le résultat est assez clair: l'apprentissage de techniques, parmi lesquelles les techniques de manipulation des symboles et des valeurs "liminoïdes" ne sont pas les moins importantes.

NOTES

1. Certaines des données sur lesquelles repose l'hypothèse développée dans cet article ont été recueillies en Inde au cours de l'automne 1984 grâce à une bourse de recherche de la fondation Wenner-Gren pour la recherche anthropologique.

2. Numéro de cascadeurs dans lequel chacun des huit acrobates se présente dans un costume grotesque représentant un personnage de la mythologie moderne populaire (Popeye, Batman, l'Ecossais, la vamp, le gros, etc.) et exécute des sauts en apparence désordonnés et comiques, avec l'aide d'un tremplin et d'un "cheval de bois" proche de l'appareil des gymnases.

3. L'opposition: mouvement d'ensemble vs. performance individuelle est à la base des numéros de cavalerie dit "de liberté." Voir le chapitre VIII de mon essai sur la sémiotique de cirque (1985) ainsi que l'article, "Le cirque: opérations et opérateurs sémiotiques" (1979).

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LIMINAL METAPHORS AND THE SECULARIZATION OF ROMAN CATHOLIC SISTERS

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Cet article aborde un aspect du processus d'interprétation de la vie religieuse ou cloîtrée amorcé au sein des communautés religieuses catholiques romaines dans les années '70. On avance que, durant cette période de transition, on a fait l'expérience d'un rejet massif du concept de "cloître" en tant que clôture au sens physique, en soulignant le fait qu'il y avait là plus qu'une simple modification de la pratique communautaire, axé sur une réalité transcendante de caractère utopique qu'on aurait voulu orientée en direction d'une expérience communautaire de caractère profane. En fait, ce type de rejet apparaît comme une transformation du concept de "cloître," ne niant point le fait de la continuité au niveau de l'identité communautaire. Les religieuses catholiques romaines ont eu recours à deux images de pointe: la fiancée éternelle du Christ et le clown, ou bouffon, du monde profane.

This paper examines one aspect of the interpretive process undertaken by religious communities of North American Roman Catholic sisters in the 1970s, or the redefinition of cloister. It is suggested that during this transitional period, widespread rejection of the concept of cloister *as physical enclosure* was more than a mere illustrative shift away from a communal paradigm stressing utopian transcendence, and toward a communal paradigm identified as profane. In fact, this rejection signaled a transformation in the concept of cloister that allowed for continuity in communal themes of identity across contrasting paradigms. To effect this transformation, Roman Catholic sisters contrasted two liminal images: the transcendent Bride of Christ, and the profane clown.

INTRODUCTION

Communities of Roman Catholic religious women may include nuns or sisters. Nuns are religious women who profess solemn vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, and who are members of religious orders. Sisters are religious women who profess simple vows and are members of congregations. Traditionally, nuns observed strict enclosure, while sisters observed a modified enclosure that allowed for restricted contact with secular people outside

of the cloister. In the 1960s, communities of Roman Catholic sisters in North America began a process that redefined their purpose and identity. During that period, the Council of Vatican II in Rome imposed two guidelines to achieve this transformation of purpose and identity. First, religious communities were given a twenty-year experimental period that held in abeyance all prior rules and customs regarding monastic lifestyle practices. In addition, they were cautioned to reexamine the intent and purpose of their founders in terms of present-day societal needs. Eventually, decisions based on these guidelines effected a shift in emphasis. The majority of religious communities rejected a communal paradigm based on medieval monasticism. They created new communal identities that permitted an identification with, and absorption of, secularism.

Research data for this paper were gathered by the author as a participant/observer from 1972 to 1976. In this paper, one aspect of the interpretive process undertaken by communities of Roman Catholic sisters in the 1970s—a redefinition of the concept of cloister—will be examined. The term *cloister* refers to a place of religious seclusion for either men or women, and connotes retirement from the world. With regard to women, the term *convent* is often used as a synonym for cloister. This paper suggests that widespread rejection of the concept of cloister as a physical enclosure during the transitional period of the 1960s was more than a mere illustrative shift away from a communal paradigm stressing utopian transcendence, and toward a communal paradigm identified as profane. Instead, this rejection signaled a transformation in the concept of cloister that allowed for continuity in communal themes of identity across contrasting paradigms.

Prior to the 1950s, the concept of cloister dominated the monastic perspective organizing communities of Roman Catholic sisters in North America. This concept was characterized by spatial enclosure within a convent, which effectively excluded outsiders from frequent interaction with sisters. The cloister was viewed as ensuring "separation from the world." In addition, it imposed a form of spirituality on members that internalized personal dependence on God alone.

This paper argues that while deconstructing the concept of cloister as a physical enclosure within a monastic context, communities of Roman Catholic sisters in North America reconstructed the concept of cloister as a symbolic enclosure within a secular context. Two liminal images were used to effect this transformation: the transcendent Bride of Christ, and the profane clown. Maintaining the theme of cloister as intrinsic to communal identity, the paradox of being "in the world, yet separate from the world" continued to be stressed as a strategy for interaction and service in the wider social context.

COMMUNITIES OF ROMAN CATHOLIC SISTERS PRIOR TO 1960: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The history of communities of Roman Catholic religious women in Western culture shows a gradual elaboration of the concept of cloister (Cita-Malard 1964). Very early in this history, the functions of religious women were explicitly mentioned in the New Testament (1 Timothy 5:3-17). By the fourth century, celibate religious women were given a public ceremony of consecration and were placed under the official direction of a Bishop (Reuther 1979). Towards the end of the fourth century, convents of women began to spread from the east to the west. In the sixth century, St. Benedict of Nursia introduced the concept of a religious life centered on the abbot/abbess and carried out within a monastery enclosure. The monastery was now forming a society independent of the outside world, and was both physically and spiritually self-contained.

The medieval Roman Catholic church saw the spread of mendicant orders over great distances. Members of mendicant orders beg for alms. The two largest mendicant orders established in medieval times time were the Dominicans and the Franciscans. In 1283, Pope Boniface VII established the cloister, with its walls and moats, as a protection against barbaric invasions of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The concept of cloister then flourished and assumed symbolic and religious meaning. As a result, members of all Roman Catholic orders (male and female) took solemn vows and lived in cloisters.

The early eighteenth century marked a critical turning point in the definition of cloister. During that time, communities were formed of religious women who defined themselves as primarily apostolic (Liebowitz 1979). Whereas contemplative orders of religious women functioned under solemn vows and observed strict enclosure, apostolic congregations of religious women functioned under simple vows and provided services outside of the convent. In *Quarnvis Justo* in 1749, Pope Benedict XIV showed tolerance, but not formal approval, of groups of religious women who were engaged in charitable work outside of their cloisters. At that time, many of the rules regulating the contact of cloistered women with outsiders were imposed upon apostolic congregations and incorporated into their constitutions.

The proliferation of communities of Roman Catholic sisters in North America occurred largely as a response to the tides of European immigration. In the period between 1870 and 1900, large numbers of immigrants from Ireland, Germany, and other countries led to tremendous growth in the Roman Catholic population of the United States (Herberg 1955). As a result, fifty-nine new congregations of religious women were begun during this period (Code 1937). At the same time, bishops expressed the need for Catholic schools, hospitals, and orphanages. This apostolic, rather than

contemplative, orientation created confusion over the type of vows that were appropriate for communities of sisters in the United States. Confusion over whether the vows of sisters should be simple or solemn, and hence the types of enclosures that bound them, extended into all areas of their lives (Ewens 1978:108). For example, in pre-Civil War America, the contemplative custom of rising at midnight for extended prayer, combined with arduous daily work schedules in classrooms and hospitals, often resulted in poor health for members of apostolic communities.

In the 1800s, the difficulty of living under the strict observance of cloister caused many religious communities in North America to seek modification of their European-based constitutions. Some sought autonomy by separating from their European foundations. The North American frontier required religious women to move out of their traditional environments and perform innovative works of charity. Thus, the rules of cloister were particularly detrimental to the interests of the Catholic church in North America at that time. Although the strict cloistering of contemplatives was viewed as impractical, a more moderate form of cloister continued to dominate the communal lifestyle of North American sisters until the late 1950s (Ewens 1979). As a consequence, the physical enclosure of communities of sisters was symbolically internalized by the individual. Thus, in nineteenth-century North America, privatization of the idea of cloister was reflected in the monastic metaphor of the Bride of Christ.

CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITIES OF ROMAN CATHOLIC SISTERS IN NORTH AMERICA

Prior to the 1960s, communities of Roman Catholic sisters in North America were utopian in nature. In her analysis of the Oneida Community, Carden stressed the primacy of values in the definition of a utopian community as an organization "founded specifically to implement in its social structure a particular set of ideals" (1968:xvi). In utopian groups, boundary maintenance is coupled with a strongly-focused ideological system. Kanter (1972) suggests that boundary maintenance is the critical requisite for such groups if they are to maintain their self-definition over time.

As privatized by individuals and structurally enforced by the monastic ideal, the concept of cloister provided strong boundary maintenance for all Roman Catholic religious communities. The Christian metaphor of death and resurrection became a central focus for the elaboration of a cloistered communal identity. Ebaugh (1977:15-18) describes the process of death to oneself and rebirth to God as summarizing the meaning behind modes of behavior that have characterized fifteen centuries of religious communities. This process sought a total reorientation and reorganization of each member's deepest attitudes. The result

was a radical restructuring of basic thought patterns, self-perceptions, and attitudes:

> If we wish nothing to interpose between us and God, nothing to hinder our union with Him, if we wish divine blessings to flow in upon our souls, we must not only renounce sin and imperfection, but moreover strip ourselves of our personality, in so far as it constitutes an obstacle to perfect union with God. (Marmion 1925:61)

In Roman Catholic religious communities, the process of death to self and rebirth to God sought to empty the soul of selfishness so that it could be reborn to a life of union with God. To be open to the supernatural movements of the Spirit, it was necessary to control and regulate human feelings and desires. For Roman Catholic sisters, the concept of cloister was an important factor in attaining this emptying of the self. In its external manifestations, the cloister effectively separated individual sisters from contact with the world. For example, lay persons were usually excluded from all convent areas except for a designated visitors' parlor. Visitors who were not relatives usually interacted only with the porter or the Superior. Relatives visited only at brief, designated periods. Sisters never ate with relatives, and many congregations customarily had two sisters in attendance in a visitors' parlor. An informant in her seventies recalled the effectiveness of rules of cloister as a way of maintaining separation from the world:

> In the 1950s, we were still monastic and had strict rules of cloister. Each day was very predictable. You knew what you were to do. You would rise at 5:00 am and meditate for an hour. After breakfast the teachers would go off to school. You were still under a rule of silence then and so you didn't speak. You went right to the classroom and began to work. We didn't eat lunch with the secular teachers in the staff room. Instead, we ate lunch with the other sisters. I was the only sister in that school, and so, I ate lunch alone in my classroom. Right after school, we left to go home. You didn't see much of the other teachers in those days. Most of your time was spent with the children or working in the classroom by yourself.

The privatization of the concept of cloister for Roman Catholic sisters presumed a radical psychological dependence on God alone. An informant in her eighties expresses this monastic ideal:

> I came to religious life in 1915 because I received a call from God to live my life entirely for Him. I gave up everything that I had in order to grow closer to

> God. The other women who came were the same. They came for the same reason. Everything you did in religious life was done to bring you closer to God. The monastic life and the Holy Rule helped you to do that.

The individual sister was to die to the self and live for God alone. This internalization of the concept of cloister complemented its external manifestations. Rules of silence illustrated this relationship, and aided recollection. To become increasingly open to the movements of the Spirit of God within her, a sister strove to be recollected at all times. The body attempted to mirror the state of the soul. Sisters walked quietly, with downcast eyes. Some areas in the convent enclosure were designated as more conducive to recollection than others. For example, strict silence was usually enforced in the chapel, refectory, and bedrooms. If speaking was necessary in bedroom areas, individuals stood at the threshold and spoke in subdued tones. The refectory area remained silent until the Superior gave permission to speak.

The structural enclosure of the cloister provided a mirror for communal reflexivity. This reflexivity drew attention to the core components of communal identity (see Babcock 1980). In other words, the cloister provided the necessity for personal intimacy with Christ. Thus, with its connotation of covenant intimacy, the metaphor of the Bride of Christ became one of the dominant self-images of sisters. They sought to be of one mind and heart with Christ through a process of self-development that imitated Christ's death and resurrection (Williams 1975:109, 123; Warner 1959:371-373; and von Hildebrand 1962:128). In both the Old and New Testaments of the Christian Bible, the marriage bond is a common motif representing a covenant relationship between God and His people. In the Old Testament, Sion is referred to as the Bride of Yahweh or God (Isaiah 62:4f), and adorns herself in bridal apparel (Isaiah 49:18). This image of Sion as the Bride of the Lord has been common since the Book of Osee in the Old Testament, which states that the prophets represent the Covenant between Yahweh and Israel as a marriage bond (Osee 2:16; Jeremias 2:2; Ezechiel 16:8). In later Judaism, the Canticle of Canticles was also interpreted in this sense. This imagery continues in the New Testament, with Christ representing both the bridegroom and the new Israel, while the church is the Bride (John 3:29).

The metaphor of the Bride of Christ is liminal in its connotation of transcendence, and has served as a key symbol in the creation of a contemporary identity for Roman Catholic sisters (see Turner 1967; Harris 1977). This metaphor was emphasized in a rite of passage that occurred when young women were accepted as novices into congregations. The ceremony was preceded by a ten-day retreat. With family and friends gathered in the chapel, the group of postulants entered, dressed in white bridal gowns and veils. While a traditional bridal chant was sung, they knelt

before the Bishop. The novices were then formally given the habit of the congregation, after which they retired to the sacristy of the church to exchange their bridal attire for the habit of a sister. Following this, the Bishop formally gave each sister a religious name symbolizing her new identity. Sisters often received male names, to indicate that sexual differences were no longer emphasized. In this rite of passage, the goal of religious life was explicitly stated. Franciscan Sisters traditionally wore a crown of thorns at the beginning of the rite. The crown was then replaced by the habit and religious veil of the congregation, and a crown of white roses.

Within the monastic paradigm, each Roman Catholic sister presented a liminal female form in her transcendence of the world and its values. Although work such as service to the poor placed sisters *in* the world, they were not to be *of* the world outside their convents. This paradox was highlighted by the dialectical tension of adhering to modified rules of cloister while simultaneously identifying the purpose of congregations as providing services outside of the cloister. As Roman Catholic sisters continued to experiment with nonmonastic lifestyle practices in the 1970s, rules of cloister were discarded. In their new constitutions submitted to the Vatican in the early 1980s, communities of sisters had rejected, either in part or in whole, the language of transcendence with its stress on separation from the world. In its place, Roman Catholic sisters had adopted language emphasizing the value of the immanently human and secular.

The secularization process initiated by the Council of Vatican II between 1962 and 1965 firmly rooted the identity of Roman Catholic sisters in the world. This process also mandated that sisters be profoundly of the world. In its decree on the renewal of religious life, the Council of Vatican II called for religious communities to adjust to both the changed conditions of the times, and the requirements of the cultures in which they lived and worked:

> Religious communities should be properly instructed in the prevailing manners of contemporary social life, and its characteristic ways of thinking and feeling. . . . Fresh forms of religious life . . . should take into account the natural endowments and manners of the people, and also local customs and circumstances. (*Perfectae Caritatis*:479, cited in Abbott 1966:466-482)

Guidelines for implementation of the decrees of Vatican II encouraged experimentation with diverse lifestyles, and permitted the formally-approved constitutions of both orders and congregations to be replaced by interim bylaws. The ensuing experimentation had radical effects on the lifestyles of most North American sisters. Three patterns of structural change emerged: (a) The form of government shifted from a hierarchy to a decentralized

body emphasizing collegiality; (b) As individual preferences replaced uniformity in dress and behavior, individualism became more pronounced; and (c) Removal of the physical enclosure of the cloister resulted in ambivalent boundary maintenance between convents of sisters and contemporary society. Throughout the 1970s, ambivalence became a central concern. Communities of Roman Catholic sisters continued to examine the essential components of a redefinition of communal identity. An informant in her early fifties recalled the difficulties this ambivalence raised:

> The most difficult aspect of change in the 1960s and 1970s was the degree of the breaking down of a sense of separation from the world. When we did away with the Holy Rule, many of our older women were confused. Some progressive communities moved too quickly into secular dress and secular jobs. And older women didn't have time to adjust. One of the main questions of the 1970s for religious communities was "How are we different from other Christian women who are not in religious life?" We had lived a monastic lifestyle as religious women for so long that we didn't know what our new identity as religious women in the world would look like.

Following Van Gennep, Turner (1967, 1969) clarified the transformational process by locating the critical moment of transformation that occurs during the liminal period: that point "betwixt and between" one context of meaning and another. Characteristic of this period is the appearance of marked ambiguity and inconsistency in meaning, plus the emergence of liminal figures who represent ambiguities and inconsistencies within themselves. One of the liminal figures that emerged when religious communities in North America reconstructed their communal identity around the value of the immanently human, rather than the explicitly transcendent, was the metaphor of the clown.

By appropriating the clown metaphor, North American sisters continued to elaborate two themes central to the concept of cloister: (a) Total dependency of the individual on God; and (b) Apostolic activity as an expression of the paradox of being "in the world, yet separate from the world." At the individual level, certain attributes of the clown were reinterpreted as spiritual virtues. Thus, the clown's simplicity and openness to the expression of the full range of humanity was viewed as analogous to the simplicity and openness required for total dependence on God. This attitude echoed the monastic theme of self-emptying reliance on God, which was central to the identity of the sister in the Bride of Christ metaphor. A young woman in her early twenties expressed the significance of clowning to acquiring this attitude of dependency:

> Last month, the novices from several communities got together for a two-day workshop on clowning. It was the first time that I did any clowning and I was surprised at how it helps you to center in on prayer. There is a freedom and openness—a vulnerability—that comes with clowning. Once you have created your own face and centered in on prayer, it's amazing the degree of freedom you acquire. I did things at the workshop that I never thought that I would do. At the end of the weekend we spent a few hours dressed up as clowns in a mall. There are no barriers between people when you are clowning.

At the level of communal discourse, the clown provides a framework for reflection on the central issue of identity for religious communities. This central issue focuses on the nature and scope of apostolic activity. In contrast to the restrictions on interaction that are imposed by rules of physical cloister, clowns are not excluded from any arena of human activity. This attribute of the clown's performance has rich, liminal possibilities for religious women as they reflect on the appropriate areas for community ministry. An informant in her sixties notes:

> My community was formed primarily to teach in separate schools. But in the past twenty years the majority of sisters have moved out of education completely. Our ministries are more individualized now and we work in whatever area we feel that we are called to. This diversity has enriched our community but has also created a lot of difficult questions. As a group of religious women, we need to continually discern what new areas of ministry are appropriate for apostolic religious women. This is a difficult task that requires much risk-taking on the part of individuals and the group, because we have no prior models to fall back on.

This lack of enclosure enhances the role of the clown in aiding reflection on the meaning of the human context. As a collectively sustained symbolic structure, the performance of the clown is an acted document or an acted text (Geertz 1973:3, 14; Ricoeur 1973). As such, it is an imaginative work constructed out of social materials (Geertz 1973:448-449). Clowning invites audiences to explore the meaning of a clown's performance within the context of the world that is interpreted by the performance. Clowns often invite reflection on social reality by acting on the margins or at the intersection of social order, and inverting or negating that order.

This role is similar to that of a sister. Religious women point to the transcendent and invite reflection on the meaning of social reality through its relationship to a transcendent God. By deconstructing the concept of cloister as physical enclosure, communities of religious women created a range of possibilities

for the reconstruction of that concept as a symbolic enclosure within a profane context. Thus, the symbolic enclosure of contemporary sisters is often located by them at the intersections or inversions of social order. Nouwen discusses one possible image of the role of religious sisters within this profane context:

> Between the frightening acts of the heroes of this world, there is a constant need for clowns, people who by their empty, solitary lives of prayer and contemplation reveal to us our other side and thus offer consolation, comfort, hope and a smile. Rome is a good city to become aware of the need for clowns. This large, busy, entertaining, distracting city keeps tempting us to join the lion tamers and trapeze artists who get most of the attention. But whenever the clowns appear we are reminded that what really counts is something other than the spectacular and the sensational. It is what happens between the scenes. (1979:110)

Today, the metaphor of the clown causes sisters to confront the meaning of their adoption of the streets as their cloisters, while at the same time affirming their role between the scenes of world dramas.

Elaboration of the two themes associated with cloister assures continuity of two distinct, but related kinds of identity: (a) Individual identity as a sense of individual biographical continuity; and (b) Group identity as a sense of collective historical continuity (Myerhoff 1977). As religious women experienced communal renewal in the 1970s, they created new, secular metaphors which served as guidelines for the definition of the concept of community and, by implication, of themselves. The liminal ambiguity of the clown metaphor provides attributes to interpret continuity in identity across contrasting paradigms.

The metaphor of the Bride of Christ and of the clown overlap with a dominant spiritual image in Western Christian thought. This image is that of the *anawim* as representing the "poor in Spirit." In the Old Testament, the *anawim*, or poor of Yahweh (God), were represented initially as the weak or poverty-stricken (Leviticus 19:18). These *anawim* found themselves in humble circumstances and practiced resignation. Later, the term *anawim* referred to those who put their complete confidence in God. As the holy core of the nation, the *anawim* were totally submissive to God and disposed to do his will. Disinherited by this world, they relied on God alone rather than themselves or other people. It was to the "poor in Spirit" that God sent the Messiah (Isaiah 16:1-2; Luke 4:18-19). By contrast, the most radical image of the concept of the "poor in Spirit" in the New Testament was the death and resurrection of Jesus.

Throughout many centuries of Roman Catholic thought, the theme of the "poor in Spirit" has been reiterated through the imagery of the hermit, monk, and pilgrim. Recently, these attributes have been associated specifically with clowning. In the acclaimed Broadway musical, *Godspell*, the text of the Gospel of Matthew from the New Testament is used as a script for the enactment in parable of the death and resurrection of Jesus. Throughout the play, Jesus and his followers appear as clowns.

When Nouwen spoke to religious men and women in Rome in the late 1970s, the use of the clown metaphor was already widespread among religious communities in North America. Clowning, as an activity, is performed primarily by more liberal religious communities of women, which have progressively moved away from an explicitly monastic lifestyle. Within the context of these communities, clowning is usually restricted to a formal or informal ritual setting involving interaction of the clown(s) with a cross-section of the community. Two examples illustrate the nature of clowning in these settings.

An informant in her twenties describes one use of clowning in a liturgical setting:

> It was my turn to lead night prayers and everyone was assembled in Chapel. When it was time for the scripture reading to begin, I appeared as a white-face clown and acted out the parable of the Good Samaritan. I didn't know how the very senior sisters would react. But they were very welcoming of the clown. I thought the clown image was a good symbol of the Samaritan as well as a good image for our response in ministry.

An informant in her forties illustrates one community's use of clowns in an informal ritual setting:

> At the local and regional level, we had spent over five years as a community studying and rewriting our Constitution in order to send it in to Rome. Then the entire community assembled for a week in the summer and the Constitutional Committee presented the Constitution for our final approval or revision. When the Constitution was approved by the Assembly, we had a formal acceptance by the Community in a prayer service. The Constitutional Committee appeared in front of the Assembly dressed as clowns. The clowns distributed copies of the Constitution to each individual and then we celebrated.

In his speech, Nouwen called attention to four clown-like elements in spiritual life: solitude, celibacy, prayer, and contemplation. He noted:

> And slowly, I started to realize that in the great circus of Rome, full of lion tamers and trapeze artists whose dazzling feats claim our attention, the real and true story was told by the clowns. Clowns are not in the center of the events. They appear between the great acts, fumble and fall, and make us smile again after the tensions created by the heroes we came to admire. The clowns don't have it together, they do not succeed in what they try, they are awkward, out of balance, and left-handed, but . . . they are on our side. We respond to them not with admiration but with sympathy, not with amazement but with understanding, not with tension but with a smile. . . . Of the clowns we say, "they are like us." The clowns remind us with a tear and a smile that we share the same human weaknesses. . . . My growing love for the clowns in Rome made me want to speak of such foolish things as being alone, treasuring emptiness, standing naked before God, and seeing things for what they are. . . . (1979:2, 58)

The tone of Nouwen's observations reflect a post-Vatican II theological shift away from preoccupation with the language of transcendence and towards theological discourse that emphasizes personal human growth and experience. For an implicit theological anthropology, see Baum (1970), Kung (1976), Schillebeeckx (1968), and Tracey (1974).

Clowning provides rich, liminal metaphors for a spirituality framed in the profane rather than the transcendent. The clown has long been portrayed in Western history as the prototype of the immanently human. Murray noted that since the 1870s, there have been only two types of clowns: the whiteface and the august (1956:304). The whiteface clown is interesting to look at, has decent manners, and wears an expression created with red or black paint. The august clown has a big nose, baggy clothes, and huge shoes, is usually untidy, sometimes ragged, and often dirty. On occasion, the august clown may be impeccably garbed, but in that case, his clothes never fit. He carries gadgets that burn or explode, plus other ingenious articles that he finds perplexing and frustrating. He is always in the wrong. By appearing at inopportune times, giving incorrect cues, tripping over themselves, or messing up some vital prop, august clowns spoil the tricks of whiteface clowns. Significantly, whiteface and august clowns usually act in pairs. One is the foil for the other.

The interaction of whiteface and august clowns reveals both sides of our being. The clown exercises the potential to be both seriously ordered, as in the case of the whiteface, and playfully chaotic, as in the case of the august. In reflecting on the nature of clowning, the value of humankind is emphasized as a primary frame of reference for the identity of religious communities. During this process of recontextualization, Roman Catholic

sisters recognize themselves as immersed in the secular rather than the transcendent. Through recognition of themselves as secularized, sisters perform their roles in facilitating recognition of the transcendent.

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ON THE SPIRIT OF THE GIFT

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Le but de cet essai est de proposer l'intégration de deux attitudes épistémologiques à l'égard du don: la sociologie de l'échange et la phénoménologie de l'amour. La théorie occidentale de l'échange est tout d'abord présentée à partir du texte célèbre de Marcel Mauss, *Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques* (1924), dans lequel les diverses modalités du don sont perçues par rapport à une échelle de valeurs allant de l'altruisme fonctionnel au simple calcul égocentrique. Sont aussi examinées dans cette perspective, la théorie de l'échange généralisé de Claude Lévi-Strauss et les thèses sociobiologiques de E. O. Wilson concernant la signification de l'altruisme. Le commun dénominateur de ces attitudes épistémologiques est que le phénomène du don y est décrit "objectivement," du point de vue principalement matérialiste et en fonction d'un égocentrisme de base. Cette interprétation est alors comparée à l'approche phénoménologique selon laquelle le don est au contraire appréhendé de l'intérieur, par une intentionnalité et une expérience transpersonnelle qui aboutit à une réalisation existentielle. Cette attitude rejoint le point de vue des cultures et des sagesses orientales dont la compatibilité avec les concepts turnériens de "flux," de "drame rituel," de "totalité" et de "communitas" est soulignée. En conclusion, une théorie intégrative du don est suggérée, théorie dans laquelle à la fois les données sociologiques et les données phénoménologiques seraient prises en considération.

This essay is an exercise in merging two frames of reference: the sociology of exchange and the phenomenology of love. It first presents the modern Western theory of giving as found in the seminal essay by Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies* (1924/1969), where giving is perceived along a scale from functional altruism to ego-centered calculation. Lévi-Strauss's generalizations on exchange theory, as well as E. O. Wilson's explanation of altruism in terms of inclusive fitness, are also examined as parts of this general perspective which approaches the universal social behavior of giving from an objective, and mostly materialistic, egocentric point of view. This interpretation of giving is compared to and contrasted with the phenomenological approach where giving is experienced and intuited as an existential self-re-

alization. Giving and love in Eastern cultures is examined in exemplifying this attitude, whose congruence with Victor Turner's concepts of "flow," "ritual drama," "holism," and "communitas" is emphasized. In conclusion, an integrative theory of giving is suggested, which would merge both the sociological and phenomenological approaches.

> The obligation to give is no less important. If we understood this, we should also know how men came to exchange things with each other. We merely point out a few facts. To refuse to give, or to fail to invite, is —like refusing to accept—the equivalent of a declaration of war; it is a refusal of friendship and intercourse. Again, one gives because one is forced to do so, because the recipient has a sort of proprietary right over everything which belongs to the donor. This right is expressed and conceived as a sort of spiritual bond. (Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies* 1969:11)

INTRODUCTION

This essay is an exercise in merging two frames of reference: the sociology of exchange and the phenomenology of love. The essay explores the tantalizing question raised by Marcel Mauss (1969) concerning the connection between spirit and gift; for herein lies a key to understanding how a balance between the biologically natural processes of individualization and socialization makes society possible (see Burridge 1979). This exercise is particularly challenging, because all too often theorists have posed thoroughly materialist explanations of exchange while ignoring the psychological and cosmological implications of giving. Even where psychology is addressed, it is commonly seen as a rationalist psychology of decision making. By contrast, the incorporation of a broader, more transpersonal view of the psychology of exchange provides a much clearer perspective regarding the role of exchange in human social life. This is not an attempt to reduce materialist explanations to the psychological. Instead, it is an attempt to broaden the scope of inquiry and to incorporate concepts and data from both the sociology of exchange as encountered in anthropology, and from the phenomenology of love and giving as encountered in Western and Buddhist psychology.

The necessity for integrating these two frames of reference derives in large measure from different orientations of the author during anthropological fieldwork. From 1969 to 1970, research among the So of northeastern Uganda focused on the material aspects of human adaptation, especially those concerning exchange (Laughlin 1974a, 1974b). This orientation was adopted in

response to the fact that the So were undergoing severe deprivation due to drought. Later, the author concentrated on symbolism in neuroanthropology (Laughlin, McManus, and Stephens 1981), on symbolism in cognition (Rubinstein, Laughlin, and McManus 1984), and on symbolism in the phenomenology of Tibetan mysticism and meditation (Laughlin, McManus, and Webber 1984).

This essay begins by defining love and exchange in such a way that the two concepts can be linked. To accomplish this, the essay will at first move back and forth between two seemingly different frames of reference.

LOVE

In his book, *The Art of Loving*, Erich Fromm writes:

> Love is not primarily a relationship to a specific person; it is an *attitude*, an *orientation* of *character* which determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not towards one "object" of love. If a person loves only one other person and is indifferent to the rest of his fellow men, his love is not love but a symbiotic attachment, or an enlarged egotism. Yet, most people believe that love is constituted by the object, not by the faculty. In fact, they even believe that it is a proof of the intensity of their love when they do not love anybody except the "loved" person.
>
> . . . Because one does not see that love is an activity, a power of the soul, one believes that all that is necessary to find is the right object—and that everything goes by itself afterward. This attitude can be compared to that of a man who wants to paint but who, instead of learning the art, claims that he has just to wait for the right object, and that he will paint beautifully when he finds it. If I truly love one person I love all persons, I love the world, I love life. If I can say to somebody else, "I love you," I must be able to say, "I love in you everybody, I love through you the world, I love in you also myself." (Fromm 1962:38)

This essay focuses on the experience of love as unconditional beneficence toward one's fellow humans, as well as toward the rest of the world. As real and as fundamental to the human condition as this experience is, incorporating the phenomenology of love into scientific explanations of economic behavior may seem incongruous despite attempts by substantivists such as Marshall Sahlins (1965) and others to include the greater psychological dimensions of exchange in their theories. As Ashley Montagu states:

> It is curious that while so much has been written on love by poets, playwrights, philosophers, and theologians, social and behavioural scientists should have paid so little attention to so important a subject. The mention of the word in such quarters still seems to cause the kind of embarrassment that the word "sex" used to produce, not so many years ago, in "respectable" circles. Most social and behavioural scientists still tend to shy away from the subject, although there have always been some outstanding exceptions. (Montagu 1975:1)

The heavy commitment of anthropology to positivistic and materialistic procedures, in both observation and the construction of theory, has tended to inhibit the incorporation of more phenomenological data into models of social interaction, even when such data abound. It is now time for a more balanced treatment of materialistic and phenomenological aspects of interaction. In this vein, the notion of exchange will be examined using the classic works of Mauss and Sahlins. Following this, the phenomenology of love will be examined and the two perspectives will be linked together in such a way as to demonstrate the relevance of each concept to the other.

EXCHANGE

In his *Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques*, (1924; first published in English in 1954 under the title *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*), the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss defined the essential structure of exchange in society. Recognizing that the giving of gifts among people is culturally universal, Mauss reasoned that the act of giving must perform crucial functions both for society as a whole, and for the psychological well-being of each society's members. As a structuralist, Mauss looked beyond the surface details of gift giving. He knew that human beings will give each other an enormous variety of things ranging from money to houses, from food to parcels of land, from songs to services, and from goats to people themselves. *What* is given varies enormously, but *why* gifts are given is another matter. Mauss demonstrated that gifts are given to establish and maintain social bonds through mutual obligation. That is, if I give to you, you are then obliged to give to me.

Mauss' most famous student, Claude Lévi-Strauss, has reasoned that institutions such as marriage exist for the purpose of linking otherwise distinct and potentially quarrelsome kindreds together into cooperative networks (Lévi-Strauss 1969). If my daughter or sister becomes your wife, I am then obliged to provide you with certain goods and services, and you are likewise obliged to give to me. Because we are involved in these ex-

changes, we are less likely to resort to such extreme measures as feuding if we have a disagreement. But exchanges related to marriage can also be mere formalities, as in the case of the Nayar of southern India, where matrilineal groups were linked through the formalized "marriages" of their members. These formalized "marriages" may or may not have been initially consummated and never involved married couples living together, although a "husband" could later become one of his "wife's" many lovers (Gough 1961).

According to Marshall Sahlins (1965), there are three types of exchange: generalized exchange, balanced exchange, and negative exchange. The first type of exchange, or *generalized exchange*, occurs when there is giving with no expectation of immediate or equal return. Here, no one measures the reciprocal value of gifts given and received. Instead, there is giving in response to either the dictates of tradition or the recognition of need. The second type of exchange, or *balanced exchange*, involves giving with the expectation of relatively immediate and equal return, but without any profit motive. Concern is with the equality of reciprocity and with give and take rather than with getting the better of one's partner. The third type of exchange, or *negative exchange*, is giving with a profit motive. Here, each partner in the exchange is interested in coming out ahead in the transaction.

For a number of reasons, these three types of exchange can be seen as part of a continuum where generalized exchange is at one extreme, balanced exchange lies somewhere in the middle, and negative exchange is at the other extreme. The principal factors determining the type of exchange and its location on the continuum involve the psychology of the parties who are participating in the exchange. If the focus of consciousness is on cooperation, then giving will be toward the generalized pole. However, if the focus is more upon maximizing return to the giver, then giving will tend to be directed toward the negative pole. Thus, it is not surprising that human societies show correlations between type of giving and social and geographical proximity of the parties involved in exchange. Parties which are socially and residentially close are more likely to direct their giving toward the generalized pole. There is also good evidence that the incidence of each type of giving will vary in response to stress (Laughlin and Brady 1978). For example, people under severe drought conditions, such as the previously-cited case of the So of northeastern Uganda, may become increasingly more miserly until, in a real pinch, generalized giving becomes limited to the immediate family (Laughlin 1974b). There are also cases where societies have been so beset by deprivation that generalized exchange breaks down within the family, and those who are most at risk for survival (e.g., young children and old people) may be cast out to fend for themselves (see Turnbull 1972, 1978 on the Ik).

Cases involving extreme deprivation and hoarding are notable precisely because they seem to violate our sense of what it means to be human. It is human to give, and to give is to be human in the most fundamental meaning of the term (cf. Lancaster 1978). The sharing aspect of humanity is reflected in the fact that most societies place constraints upon how far a person may go in serving self at the cost of the commonweal. For instance, one of the common impediments to the spread of entrepreneurship among non-industrial societies has been the widespread social taboo against hoarding sufficient wealth to build capital.

Gifts to the Gods

It is important to note that a great deal of exchange in human societies takes the form of sacrifice, offerings, and alms given by living people to the gods, to the dead, or to classes of living persons, such as the clergy or the poor, who are seen as cosmologically auspicious. Although Marcel Mauss admits that his speculations are tentative and based upon partial data, he nonetheless makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the connection between this kind of giving and the more mundane kind of giving mentioned above (Mauss 1969:12ff). He explains this connection by viewing humans as a blend of corporeal existence and spirit. Humans incorporate the spirits of the dead and other supernatural beings into their own being. This is seen in cultures where living people bear the names of supernatural beings and dead ancestors, or where people enact the dead or the gods in masked ritual (ibid.:13). In such cultures, wealth is seen as owned by supernatural beings, and sacrifices or offerings give to the gods what is rightfully theirs in the expectation that the gods will look favorably upon humans and return such gifts with even greater abundance (ibid.:14). In other words, giving to the gods simulates generosity expected of the gods. Furthermore, the gods look favorably upon alms-giving because humans thereby transform sacrifice or offering into a redistribution of divine wealth to the poor and other auspicious classes (ibid.:15).

Counterbalancing the Human Ego

Socially sanctioned exchange is one of society's most potent mechanisms for counterbalancing the potentially involutional effects of the human ego. The concept of "ego" is not defined here in any strict Freudian sense, but rather as the set of natural adaptive processes developed by every human being for purposes of protection. Through its ego, the human organism views itself, its position in the world, its goals, and its wants and needs. As such, the human ego is *self*-serving, goal-directed, and aimed at maximizing means to ends. The ego protects the integrity of the human organism so that each individual is safe enough in the

world to grow and mature. But if unconstrained by society, the tendency of the human ego would be to take rather than to give, particularly under conditions of stress. This is because the human ego is developmentally motivated by, and is fundamentally a product of, *fear* and *desire*—as for example fear of individual dissolution, of non-being, and of death; and desire for continued existence, well-being, and nurturance.

The formation of the human ego is thus a natural and even biologically "wired-in" process. Throughout the thousands of millennia of our evolution as a complex social species, the human ego no doubt emerged and developed its adaptive functions within the greater context of social evolution. Tension has probably always existed between selection for a more advanced, self-serving ego and selection for a more advanced, other-serving sociability (cf. Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1972). Without counter-balance to the self-serving forces of the human ego, society could not exist. To see this, all one needs to do is compare the behavior of a minimally social animal such as the red fox with that of a highly social animal such as the wolf (see Fox 1975). Altruistic behavior is virtually absent among the former, but quite advanced among the latter.

Exchange as Ritual

Societies counter-balance the potentially involutional tendencies of the human ego by requiring that members participate in various exchanges. These exchanges often occur as ritual. By participating in the rituals of exchange, members of societies inculcate the structure of the gift, and perhaps even what Mauss refers to as the spirit of the gift. Ramifications of the structure of exchange reach well beyond the strict confines of ritual.

In *The Spectrum of Ritual: A Biogenetic Structural Analysis* (1979:28ff), D'Aquili, Laughlin, and McManus demonstrate that ritual is a type of formalized behavior which is specialized for its communicative functions. Although the rituals which are practiced by human groups are notably more complex, ritual is found among all the higher social animals. Structurally speaking, ritual is a form of communication which functions to facilitate social coordination. It is a process which involves both *intraorganismic* coordination (coordination of physiological and psychological events within each participant) and *interorganismic* coordination (coordination of events between participants) (ibid.: 30).

While interorganismic coordination always requires some degree of intraorganismic coordination, the latter entails regulation of affect. In other words, in order for people to participate effectively in ritual, some reorientation of feeling, along with perception, cognition, arousal, etc., must occur. This pro-

cess of reorientation is called *synchronization* (Chapple 1970). Among other processes, socially sanctioned exchange is a form of ritual involving the synchronization of affect which is necessary for increased sociability and decreased ego-centeredness.

The "Gimme" Society

A serious problem for modern mass society is an emphasis on the involutional ego combined with a dearth of social rituals which could synchronize a healthy balance between give and take. Compared to many other cultures, modern mass society provides a largely non-sharing or "gimme" environment. This emphasis on need gratification for the individual amounts to an over-balanced focus on negative exchange. In many other cultures, this would be appropriate only for the activities of a dependent child. As M. E. Seligman (1975) and others have pointed out, the socialization of members of modern mass society conditions us to an inordinate state of helplessness. This, in turn, exacerbates the fear/desire-driven, involutional, and self-serving activities of the ego.

Stated simply, members of modern mass society are placed in the position of being adult infants whose attention is perpetually focused on personal and psychological survival. This point can be illustrated by a story which Charles DeGaulle once told André Malraux. As a youth, DeGaulle asked his aging priest if he had learned anything after hearing confessions for fifty years. "Yes," replied the old priest, "there's no such thing as a grown-up." In fact, many current world crises, such as the arms race, are largely due to the synergistic effects of everyone taking as much as they can while giving as little as possible in return, combined with the perception that this is the proper way to behave.

But it is not so much our intention to condemn modern mass society as to understand its structure. The key to understanding this structure is sensitivity to the tension between self-serving ego-centeredness and other-serving sociability. Members of modern mass society tend to be encumbered by egos born of frustrated desires and fearful, often traumatic, stress. Such egos have typically developed in response to extraordinary pressures for achievement and social acceptance. As a consequence, individuals in modern mass society are encouraged to equate feelings of dependency and sexual desire with "love" and mature social intercourse. Because they tend to perceive the world through conceptual and affective filters commensurate with over-balanced ego-centeredness, they often lack the undifferentiated beneficence that is true and mature love. Many are perhaps unable to appreciate the significance of that state of consciousness in its compensatory role as mediator between ego and sociability.

THE SPIRIT OF THE GIFT

Western enculturation does not prepare scientists and others for serious comprehension of Eastern mystical tradition. As Carl Jung has repeatedly emphasized, Western enculturation concentrates upon the development of discrete ego identities, whereas Eastern descriptions of transcendental consciousness extol the essential, *egoless* nature of that experience. In order to study Eastern mysticism, anthropologists must seek a transpersonal state of self-knowledge that seems to be the exact opposite of the gimme-oriented ego of modern mass society.

Fromm notes that the full realization of love requires sustained and intense concentration (Fromm 1962:81). In addition, meditation upon love is central to many of the world's spiritual traditions (c.f. Johnston 1978 on the Christian mystical tradition). For example, Buddhists meditate upon the four *brahma viharas* or "divine abidings": love (*metta*), compassion (*karuna*), sympathetic joy (*mudita*), and equanimity (*upekkha*) (see Vajiranana 1962, or any translation of the *Visuddhimagga*, which in English is titled *The Path of Purification*). Using a number of techniques that predate Sakyamuni Buddha, meditators are led to generate and experience a state of love which can then be projected outwards to infinity. This love "energy" may be experienced as connecting all beings and objects in an undifferentiated field of benevolence. When able to hold this undifferentiated state of love, the meditator concentrates on the suffering of beings everywhere. This effort eventually leads to the realization of compassion. The meditator is then told to concentrate upon the development—including the growth, unfolding, and progress—of human beings. This practice leads to the realization of sympathetic joy at the unfolding of self and others. Finally, as love, compassion, and joy mature, one gains the realization of equanimity in the face of all phenomena arising in the human consciousness. Equanimity is a state of consciousness that is antithetical to the ego-dominated consciousness which is essentially reactive in response to phenomena.

The most auspicious state of consciousness for mystical exploration in the Buddhist tradition is held to be one of love-filled equanimity. Since a state of mature love disallows fear and greed, this is probably also the case for all mature spiritual paths. Thus, it may be reasoned on phenomenological grounds that the human consciousness ranges along a continuum from fear/desire-driven, involutional ego-consciousness at one end, to love-filled, equanimitous consciousness at the other. We may further suppose that the consciousness of most people in most cultures will normally fall somewhere in the middle, in what can be called the range of "traditional benevolence."

The degree of traditional benevolence which is characteristic of any person or group varies according to a number of fac-

tors, including appropriate responses to such circumstances as stress, social roles and expectations, pressures, sanctions, rituals, and personal awareness. Cultures have critical interests in controlling the range of states of consciousness and benevolence of their members. Together, cultures and socialization processes are so organized that few members will fall below the level of traditional benevolence which is needed for minimal social cooperation. This is why social groups place heavy emphases on mutual obligations. Nevertheless, socially-sanctioned cooperation and giving sometimes fail to reinforce social solidarity, as for example among the Ik described by Turnbull (1972, 1978). Even in the best of times, the more common forms of ritualized and socially-sanctioned exchange are limited in their capacity to evoke phases of consciousness which are permeated by anything like the mature love sought by Buddhism and other religions. Although Marcel Mauss was cognizant of the connection between gifts between humans and gifts from humans to the gods, his descriptions of various cultural interpretations of this connection are offered at the most concrete level of mythological realization. In addition, whether or not participants in cosmological and mythological rituals of exchange actually experience "higher" states of consciousness is a question which is not easily answered. This was certainly not a question commonly entertained by the sources available to Mauss. However, mysticism clearly states that when the human consciousness is permeated by a total state of love, people will give spontaneously out of intrinsic compassion, and do not require a conditioned sense of obligation. As one sage said, "Love and do as you will!"

It is inaccurate to state that socially-sanctioned exchange *replaces* love. People may simply go through the motions of exchange, but in most ethnographically documented cases it is useful to think of socially-sanctioned exchange as a ritual field of activity that is conducive to the evocation of love, even when love is limited and object-bound. This concept refers to the *spirit* of the gift or the "spiritual bond" mentioned by Mauss in the quotation at the beginning of this essay. Generalized and balanced exchanges may be interpreted as a mechanism which evokes and channels love-energized action. At the level of social action, this mechanism reflects the mutual feedback that exists between action and affect in the psychology of human events. That is, one may give out of a state of love, or one may give one's way *into* a state of love.

GIVING AND LOVE IN EASTERN CULTURES

The mutual inter-causality between love and giving is clearly acknowledged in the psychology of Eastern cultures, particularly in Buddhism. Although sacrifice may be carried out at solely a mundane level of awareness, Eastern cultures do not regard it as merely a transformation upon obligatory exchange. Rather,

there is an understanding that higher states of consciousness may be realized in the act of giving.

Gift and Giving in Hindu Tradition

By the time of the epic Hindu vedas around 2,000 B.C., people in that culture recognized a transcendent aspect to giving. For example, the epic *Raghuvamsa* tells of the king, Raghu, who carried out the high ceremony of giving after he had conquered all of his enemies. The text of the *Raghuvamsa* states that ". . . the acquisition of the noble-minded men is only for giving away, just like (the water of the) cloud" (Kalidasa 1977:91-92). It then goes on to describe benefits which befall generous people, including reconciliation with the kings Raghu had just conquered and who then freely prostrated themselves at his feet.

Similarly, the *Katha Upanishad* tells the story of a young man named Nachiketas who saw his father give only his least-prized possessions with an eye for gaining merit during a similar sacrificial ceremony (Mascaro 1965:55ff). Nachiketas then suggested to his father that he, himself, might be sacrificed. The father then became angry and gave Nachiketas to Death. During a subsequent dialogue with Death, unconstrained giving is portrayed as associated with wisdom, while craving and amassing wealth is associated with foolishness. Wealth is portrayed as impermanent, while Death is the final goal. Thus, the wise give everything in order to see the truth of immortality.

The epic *Rgveda* dates from about 3,000 B.C. and clearly associates giving with wisdom, and hoarding with ignorance:

To Dana (Charity or Liberality)

1. The gods inflict not hunger as a means to kill:
   Death frequently befalls even satiated men.
   The charitable giver's wealth melts not away;
   The niggard never finds a man to pity him.

2. Who, of abundant food possessed, makes hard his heart
   Towards a needy and decrepit suppliant
   Whom once he courted, come to pray to him for bread:
   A man like this as well finds none to pity him.

3. He is the liberal man who helps the beggar
   That, craving food, emaciated wanders,
   And coming to his aid, when asked to succour,
   Immediately makes him a friend hereafter.

4. He is no friend who gives not of his substance
   To his devoted, intimate companion:
   This friend should turn from him—here is no haven—

And seek a stranger elsewhere as a helper.

5. The wealthier man should give unto the needy,
Considering the course of life hereafter;
For riches are like chariot wheels revolving:
Now to one man they come, now to another.

6. The foolish man from food has no advantage;
In truth I say: it is but his undoing;
No friend he ever fosters, no companion:
He eats alone, and he alone is guilty.

7. The plough that cleaves the soil produces nurture;
He that bestirs his feet completes his journey.
The speaking *brahmin* earns more than the silent;
A friend who gives is better than the niggard.
(Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957:29-30)

Dana Yoga: The Yoga of Giving

Dana yoga, or the yoga of giving, is difficult to practice, and requires special qualities if practitioners are to reach anything like the full realization of its essence. The practice of this form of yoga requires perspective, patience, effort, discipline, perseverance, and awareness. These principles are carefully taught. For example, the yoga exercises themselves teach perspective; students learn that since the process of mastering *dana* yoga is developmental and takes time, it teaches patience; they know that since practice of the yoga involves a great deal of energy and concentration, it will take effort; that since action must be matched to aspiration, they will learn discipline; that since they must continue to practice the yoga through thick and thin, they will learn perseverance; and that since they must be prepared to recognize patterns as they occur in consciousness, they will learn awareness. Of these qualities, patience is often emphasized because it is recognized that the instructions for mastering patience do not immediately impart compassion in self-seeking individuals. Thus, the various versions of *dana* yoga seem to have a developmental orientation.

In order to see the inter-causality of love and giving in this type of yoga, it must be examined more closely. Because *dana* yoga requires a clear awareness of the dynamics of mind involved in giving, a certain degree of calm is required before learning can begin. Most people should develop a background of regular, well-disciplined, and calming meditation before attempting the yoga. Meditation on love (*metta*) is particularly useful as a preparation. Women who are experiencing the neuro-endocrinal changes associated with pregnancy and infant care have a special opportunity to deepen their realizations on the path of *dana*. When the nurturance which commonly arises during motherhood is

paired with awareness, the result can be profound leaps of insight regarding flow, relatedness, and totality. Although the actual practice of *dana* yoga is much more complex, we will imagine six initial stages of realization:

1. **Embracing the Spirit of the Gift.** The spirit of the gift begins with the realization that one is off-balance in the direction of involution and "gimme-ness." Recognition of the need to reverse this tendency in favor of growth and greater self-awareness leads to the intention to do whatever is required to effect this goal. There is then an increased awareness of the actual dynamics of consciousness involved in the process of giving. One becomes aware that even when giving, the real focus is usually upon what will be received in return and that one's interaction approximates negative exchange. In order for the practice of *dana* yoga to develop beyond this stage, students must drop any tendency to feel guilty for being what they are. Effort is expended only on the growing awareness of giving and the aspiration to reverse the predominance of "gimme-ness" in relation to the world.

2. **Projected Need Versus Real Need.** Practitioners of *dana* yoga soon realize that in order to give freely with giving rather than receiving in mind, they must be able to recognize the real needs of other people and become aware of the extent to which their own needs are projected upon others. The old story about six boy scouts helping an old lady across the street is relevant here. When the scoutmaster asked why this took six scouts, he was informed that the old lady did not want to cross the street. In *dana* yoga, one needs to see clearly who needs to go, and where, and then help them on their way as cleverly as possible. At minimum, this requires the realization that one ordinarily cannot discriminate clearly between projected needs and the real needs of other people. Although at this stage, taking predominates over real giving and an individual's ego is still heavily involved in the transaction, an awareness of the dynamics of giving and taking is increasing.

3. **Balanced Giving and Taking.** At this stage of the practice of *dana* yoga, students willfully impose and then realize a balance between giving and taking. They recognize that although the human ego still predominates, they must push the limits of giving outward so that they are giving in equal measure to what they are receiving. At this point, the practice of *dana* yoga begins to approximate the type of transaction which was defined earlier as balanced exchange. Practitioners are no longer interested in making a profit, but in equalizing flow between self and world. By the time this balance is attained, practitioners should be relaxed in their interactions with people and the world. They may ex-

perience freer give-and-take, and perhaps an increase in joyful states of mind, at least within the milieu in which the practice of *dana* yoga is being carried out.

4. **More Giving Than Taking.** At this point in the practice of *dana* yoga, the balance tips in favor of giving over taking. Practitioners are now more oriented toward giving than receiving, and their interaction with people and the world increasingly approximates generalized exchange in the sociological sense. But despite more giving than receiving, practitioners are aware that their egos still require something in return. They are now somewhat able to reverse such negative states of mind as selfishness, pique, envy, and jealousy by giving as freely as possible to the recipient of negativity. Thus, hostile and defensive states of mind are transformed into benevolent and open states of mind, as practitioners of *dana* yoga become more "open to the world."

5. **Giving with Giving as the Sole Reward.** Ultimately, the practice of giving leads to the realization that giving is its own reward. Practitioners of *dana* yoga discover that the state of consciousness which has evolved as a result of giving is more valuable than any conceivable reward received from the outside. Fully free giving becomes associated with great joy and bliss, and a child-like, free-swinging interaction with the world. The giver realizes that "it all comes back" and that the energy needed for giving is virtually unlimited; the giver experiences a kind of "second wind" phenomenon where a new and seemingly boundless source of energy is tapped. This energy feeds further giving, which leads to further energy, and so on in an ever-expanding cycle. At this stage in the practice of *dana* yoga, giving transcends realizations which are commensurate with prescribed, ritualized giving such as generalized exchange. In fact, social rituals may aim for this state of joyful and relatively projection-free exchange. At this level of consciousness, there is an awareness of the truth of cosmic totality and the realization that all beings are expressions of a greater being. Inherent in this realization is the knowledge that to give to any being as an aspect of the greater being is to give to the self. This stage in the practice of giving is equivalent to the full-on experience of love (*metta*) of the *brahma vihara* meditations described above. As a consequence, one understands that giving can be used to counter one's fear, that giving in the appropriate way leads to an increase in love, and that love counters fear. As mentioned previously, a human being experiencing full-on love is virtually fearless.

6. **Auspicious Giving.** The previous stage of giving was defined by the realization of the *spirit* of the gift. The next stage of giving, *auspicious giving*, is marked by the refinement of

the *wisdom* of the gift, or a higher esoteric meaning of the concept of *danadharma*, the "law of the gift," as noted by Mauss in his discussion of ancient Hindu exchange (Mauss 1969:53). Since this is an example of the anthropological interpretation of essentially esoteric processes couched in concrete, exoteric terms, it can be shown that such an interpretation misses the point of the native concept of giving.

At this stage in the practice of *dana* yoga, practitioners enter a maturity of giving. Through enhanced awareness, they learn to direct giving to those ends which are most auspicious to the development of the self and others. For instance, practitioners of *dana* yoga may realize that the giving of support, service, or aid to their spiritual teachers is equivalent to nourishing the development of that part of one's own self which is symbolized by the teachers. This may also be the case where giving is directed toward a group focused on spiritual development, as in the example where Gurdjief considered service to the group to be an advanced level of practice in "the work" (Walker 1972). Auspicious giving may even be termed "surgical giving" when it helps to heal neurotic splits in consciousness and ameliorate ambivalence toward other people. Likewise, phobic states concerning such nonhuman beings as snakes, dogs, or spiders may be eased by systematic giving to those beings. In short, many kinds of splits in consciousness which are energized or motivated by fear can often be eased by auspicious giving. This stage of the yoga of giving is equivalent to the realizations of both compassion (*karuna*) and joy (*mudita*) in the *brahma vihara* meditations. Although there are more advanced realizations in the yoga of giving, further discussion would not serve the purpose of this essay.

DISCUSSION

There are several points about the relationship between the sociology of exchange and more esoteric explorations of love which can enrich our understanding of social intercourse. These will now be considered.

Fear and Realization

As stated, egos are self-concepts which serve the process of adaptation. As such, egos are "creatures of fear and desire." Yet fear and love are antithetical to each other. Furthermore, it is impossible for fear to arise in a state of mature love, and it is difficult to love in any true sense while terrified. Responses to the world energized out of fear tend to serve the self rather than the commonweal, whereas responses energized out of love and

compassion tend to serve everyone. It is very significant that the greatest single block to the realization of advanced insights in *dana* yoga and other spiritual disciplines is fear. Nevertheless, persistence in the practice of *dana* yoga inevitably and lawfully reduces fear. Thus, it may be argued that the universality of socially-sanctioned and ritualized exchange in human societies is partially explained by reference to the causal relationship between love, benevolent cognition, and the act of giving on the one hand; and between fear, self-serving cognition, and the act of taking on the other. In that case, socially- sanctioned and ritualized exchange would significantly benefit the survival of human groups through promotion of the first type of behavior and control or minimization of the latter.

Biology and Altruism

We may further argue that there is a biological relationship between affect (love or fear) and action (giving or taking), and that this biological relationship has a genetic predisposition in the organization of various neuro-cognitive and neuro-endocrine systems. Because of the structural similarity of this organization among the higher social animals, the explanation linking ritualized exchange and feeling may also apply to similar rituals among nonhuman social animals. An example might be the "gift" ritual among wolves, where the leader of a wolf pack "will seize some food item or an interesting object such as a bone or a piece of caribou skin and parade with it before the entire pack; then he will approach the pack, drop the object, and leave it. The entire pack briefly investigates the 'gift' and then ignores it" (Fox 1974:39). Another example might be the chimpanzee ritual of meat exchange (Teleki 1973:146). For further examples and a more thorough discussion of this point, see Laughlin and McManus 1979.

By conceiving of the biology of exchange and affect in neuro-cognitive terms, the behavioral structures underlying exchange can be placed in a global perspective which involves human and nonhuman beings alike. At the same time, extreme explanations of biological determinism, such as E. O. Wilson's attempt to explain Mother Teresa's charity by reference to inclusive fitness (1978: 165), can be avoided.

Flow, Totality, and the Spirit of the Gift

The two characteristics which are most often found in descriptions of so-called higher states of consciousness are *flow* and *totality*. Flow is described as:

> . . . the holistic sensation present when we act with total involvement, a state in which action follows action according to an internal logic, with no apparent

> need for conscious intervention on our part. Flow is experienced in play and sport, in artistic performance and religious ritual. There is no dualism in flow. While an actor may be aware of what he is doing, he cannot be aware that he is aware, or the flow will be interrupted. Flow is made possible by a centering of attention on a limited stimulus field, by means of bracketing, framing, and often a set of rules. There is a loss of ego, the self becomes irrelevant. Flow is an inner state so enjoyable that people sometimes forsake a comfortable life for its sake. (Turner 1979:154; see also Csikskentmihalyi 1975)

The experience of flow (*jhana*, *samadhi*, or "absorption" in Buddhist psychology) involves both the unconstrained movement of energy through consciousness and a nondualistic connectedness with the world—i.e., precisely that state of consciousness which results from the practice of *dana* yoga. As the above quotation from Victor Turner states, there is an emphasis on loss of ego constraints. Since ego reaction is essentially dualistic and energized out of fear and desire, it is antithetical to the experience of flow. Ego reaction is associated with distress, flow is associated with bliss.

The experience of flow is commonly paired with the experience of totality (Chang 1971:12-13). Whether experienced as infinitely great or infinitely small, the universe is seen as a cosmos or unfragmented whole composed of microcosms within microcosms, all of which reproduce the essential nature of the macrocosm within themselves (see Bohm 1980). It is likewise possible to experience reciprocal intercausality between microcosms as well as between any microcosm and the macrocosm. In summary, the transformation of any part of the macrocosm is reflected by transformations in other parts and in the whole. Time is perceived as a characteristic of totality, and is equated with the experience of flow itself.

From this perspective, giving and the social institutions which are constructed around the act of giving are seen as "signposts" which point toward the potentialities of flow and totality in human experience (i.e., as the *real* spirit of the gift). Humans practice giving not so much to "establish social solidarity" or to "enact the ideal social order" as to directly experience the "solidarity" (flow and totality) which operates perpetually and is perceivable in the nature of the universe, as well as to gain an appreciation of the actual nature of the universe while carrying out their affairs.

Transpersonalism and Data on Exchange

Most ethnographic data display a systematic bias with reference to the relationship between ritual and states of consciousness. In general, ethnographies present copious details about the behavioral aspects of rituals while recording little or nothing about the states of consciousness which are being sought or attained by participants in the rituals (see Laughlin, McManus, Rubinstein, and Shearer 1985). Even where alternative states of consciousness are mentioned, they are often labelled as "trances," "possession states," "dissociative states," and the like. All of these labels are meaningless to the average researcher with limited experience with the alternative states of consciousness being recorded. Phrases such as "he entered a trance" or "she became dissociated" may actually be behavioral terms which label the peculiar or exotic behavior being observed while communicating little information about the actual experiences of the practitioners. These terms may gain transpersonal, scientific meaning when efforts are made to record practitioners' own reports of their experiences. It is quite clear from transpersonal data that the levels of experience realized by different participants in the same ritual may vary enormously. However, ethnographic descriptions often make it impossible to determine the levels of sophistication which are either intended by a ritual or experienced by participants.

Anthropological data on exchange present similar problems. Data on exchange are particularly vulnerable to observer bias, which can result in distortions of interpretation because it is precisely in the economic domain where ethnography and theory are often strongly materialistic. A classic example may be found in the data and theoretical interpretations of the potlatch among Northwest Coast Indians. In his reconstruction of the meaning of the Kwakiutl potlatch from secondary sources, Walens (1981:4-5) is sensitive to this point when he charges earlier ethnographers with being slanted towards materialist concerns while avoiding intellectual, philosophical, and religious concerns. Interpretations of the role of the potlatch in Northwest Coast society have rarely considered the experience of participants, and instead have tended to focus on social function (Barnett 1938) and ecological adaptation (Piddocke 1968).

The potential for transpersonal experience leading to the actualization of flow and totality is clearly implied in treatments of potlatch. Walens writes:

> Ultimately, Kwakiutl ritual results in a fundamental change in the role of humans in the world, for at some ineffable point they discover that they need no longer kill for food, no longer kill because they are hungry. Instead, a human kills because it is his responsibility to kill, his responsibility to eat, his responsibility

> to be the vehicle of rebirth for those beings, human and otherwise, with whom he has a covenant. (1981:162-163)

The "fundamental change" and "ineffable point" to which Walens alludes is far more than an intellectual choice. Perhaps the intent of a great deal of human ritual drama is a profound experience of the totality of the world, including the self (cf. Turner 1982:89ff).

The more transpersonal aspects of potlatching are evidenced in the reports of participants recorded in Ulli Steltzer's book, *Children of the Good People: A Haida Potlatch* (1984). Steltzer's book describes one of a number of potlatches given by a Haida artist named Robert Davidson, who in this case gave a potlatch to adopt his friend and fellow artist, Joe David, and to allow other people the opportunity to give traditional names to their children (Marjorie Halpin, personal communication). A number of comments from Steltzer's book are poignant indicators of the importance of experience in understanding the potlatch:

> It's the feeling of power and life, the energy and the love that Robert is sharing with me, that is around me like the light around the sun, and me bringing it to my people and shining in front of them, to give them that knowledge, that love, that energy, that's what it is all about. (Joe David in Steltzer 1984)

> . . . That's what you are there to do, to share that feeling with people. To strive for that harmony and unity is how you learn to be a correct human being. (Joe David ibid.)

> . . . At the potlatch you clean house and give gifts to all the people you feel indebted to from the past. You clean house and you have a fresh start. (Robert Davidson ibid.)

> We were broke after it was all over, but the return comes hundred-fold, as they say. Spiritually I feel really rich, rich to have experienced it. You open a door and there are ten more doors, and you open them and there are new ideas for new directions. (Robert Davidson ibid.)

This is not an attempt to understand potlatching by reducing it to transpersonal or psychological explanations. Instead, it is an attempt to interject a transpersonal perspective into an understanding of both the potlatch and all such institutions where such a perspective is appropriate. By understanding that potlatching involves transpersonal intentionality as well as social, economic, and ecological factors, a more complete interpretation

of the data on exchange relations among Northwest Coast peoples may be possible. In addition, it may be possible to gain a clearer understanding of the causal relationships between realms of experience, modes of cognition, and forms of action in the world. That is, it may be possible to see how interaction with the environment is related to knowledge about the world, as well as how knowledge is a function of experience. While experiencing the world as a nonfragmented totality may result in holistic cognition, holistic cognition may in turn result in action in the world which is appropriate to a nonfragmentary view. Potlatching may well have been a ritual drama which was intended to bring participants to such actualizations.

Fear, Ego, and Totalitarianism

A final implication of the ideas presented in this paper involves the causal relationships between giving, love, sociability, flow, and totality on the one hand; and taking, fear, ego response, and fragmentation on the other. Any social system which engenders fear as a predominant quality of consciousness in its members, particularly in the development of infants, children, and young adults, is unlikely to foster love. Hence, such systems will operate in ways which thwart the realization of compassion and other qualities associated with higher states of consciousness. If writers such as Czeslaw Milosz (*The Captive Mind* 1953) are any indication, this seems to be the state of affairs in any totalitarian system. Such systems would be expected to encourage a predominance of involutional ego-centeredness and selfishness over growth and benevolence. The spirit of the gift will not flourish under fear-engendering regimes. As a consequence, rituals of exchange that perhaps once counter-balanced the forces of ego-centeredness and made society possible begin to lose their functional efficacy. Rituals of social exchange are then replaced by increasing coercion by the state. Increased coercion reinforces the general level of fear, and this further erodes the spirit of the gift.

NOTES

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CLASSROOM SYMBOLS AND THE RITUAL DIMENSIONS OF SCHOOLING

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Au niveau du concept, il existe encore beaucoup de confusion sur le sens du mot "rites." En conséquence, dans le domaine de la recherche en science sociale, le statut de ce terme continue d'être ambigu. C'est particulièrement vrai des études portant sur l'analyse des modes d'existence des institutions modernes et des formes de culture contemporaines. L'article procède à l'analyse critique et à un nouvel examen du terme "rites," en vue d'élaborer un modèle conceptuel s'appliquant à la recherche dans le domaine de l'instruction scolaire. Sur la base de progrès récents dans les études concernant les "rites," une définition "prudente" du terme "rites" fait l'objet d'une expérience dans une école intermédiaire catholique de Toronto, au Canada. On y a identifié les modes dominants d'interaction, liés par voie d'analyse à une typologie des comportements ritualisés. On a mis tout spécialement l'accent sur l'utilisation pédagogique des symboles.

A great deal of conceptual confusion still surrounds the meaning of ritual. Consequently, the word "ritual" continues to have an ambiguous status in social science research. This is especially true of studies which attempt to analyze modern institutional life and contemporary cultural formations. This paper critically reexamines and reconsiders the term ritual in order to develop a conceptual model for the investigation of school instruction. Drawing upon recent advances in ritual studies, a "soft" definition of ritual is operationalized during fieldwork in a Catholic middle school in downtown Toronto, Canada. A number of dominant states of interaction are identified which are analytically linked to a typology of ritual forms. Special emphasis is placed on the pedagogical manipulation of symbols.

INTRODUCTION

Ritual and Schooling

> What is an educational system after all, if not the ritualization of the word (Foucault 1972 *in* Giroux 1983:207).

This paper argues the primacy of understanding schooling from the perspectives of culture and ritual performance. Its major themes grew out of an empirical application of the concept of ritual to school settings, especially events and conditions which provide the context for classroom instruction (see Note 1).

The idea of combining the concepts of teaching and ritual in a unified framework grew out of fieldwork in St. Ryan Catholic School (a pseudonym) in downtown Toronto, Ontario, Canada. St. Ryan had been described as the "toughest" Catholic junior high school in the city, and had a population of primarily Portuguese students. Fieldwork was confined to a total of three Grade Seven and Grade Eight classrooms.

My efforts to give grounding to this investigation of ritual in a contemporary school setting are based on the following beiefs: (1) that schools serve as rich repositories of ritual systems; (2) that rituals play a crucial role in a student's whole existence; and (3) that the variegated dimensions of the ritual process are intrinsic to the transactions of institutional life, and to the warp and woof of school culture. For educators to be able to speak intelligibly and with insight about human behavior in the school milieu, the concept of ritual must be examined in all of its complexity and multiplicity. Moreover, this concept must be reconsidered and reexamined from a different theoretical starting point, or one that links gestural display and symbolic meaning to reality *construction* rather than simply to reality *reflection*. The concept of *ritual* will be enlarged beyond what may be considered prototypical classroom rites (e.g., morning prayer, opening exercises, or school assemblies) in order to locate the dynamics of the ritual process both in the performative characteristics of daily lessons, and in various resistances to instruction.

An examination of schooling as a ritual performance provides a strong basis for understanding the *modus operandi* of the pedagogical encounter. Relevant to this investigation is the understanding that rituals symbolically transmit societal and cultural ideologies, and that it is possible to know how ideologies do their "work" by examining the key symbols and root paradigms of the ritual system.

The Treatment of Ritual in the Social Sciences

The concept of ritual does not fit easily into the intellectual climate of present-day social science. There is a noticeable lack of analyses which link ritual to explanatory models in social science. Particularly in industrial settings, the analysis of ritual has been damagingly narrow and continues to labor under various theoretical handicaps. "Ritual," laments Mary Douglas,

"has become a bad word signifying empty conformity. We are witnessing a revolt against formalism, even against form" (1973:19).

Anthropologists who are hostile to the ambiguity of the term "ritual," who willfully ignore the concept in their own research, and who are apt to dismiss ritual as "useless" because it fails to provide an adequate description of social activity in modern, secular society, have banished the analysis of ritual from serious scientific consideration. These scholars tolerate investigations of ritual as long as they are limited to anthropological studies of societies which are more compact and unified than our own. Such scholars would describe modern rituals as symbolic wrap-arounds that live in the cloakroom of culture (meaning a place where anthropologists rummage through society's outer garments). The idea that rituals form the foundations of modern society is regarded as a naïve attempt to mix religion and science. Mainstream social scientists are prone to classify ritualists as people who perform external gestures without any commitment to the values and ideas which are being expressed. Ritual is regarded as superficial, and the primacy of ritual in contemporary society is underestimated. If unchecked, this perspective could destroy the concept of ritual.

According to some critics of the study of ritual, there is no useful purpose in studying this behavior. I believe it was Dietrich Bonhoeffer who once wrote: "If you board the wrong train, it is no use running along the corridor in the opposite direction." Are researchers who use the term "ritual" as a conceptual category in their research really "boarding the wrong train"? Jack Goody has suggested that, to a certain extent, they are. Recently, he has issued a stern warning against using the concept of ritual in research (1977:25-35). A number of Goody's warnings and some of his sanctions against the use of ritual as a theoretical tool are reasonable. More importantly, none are insurmountable. Goody's attack on how ritual is defined is more autopsy than exegesis, and has by no means exhausted the debate on the utility or richness of the concept. To date, there has been no definitive refutation of ritual as a worthwhile conceptual tool.

What a Ritual Is

The concept of ritual is not simply an arcane or religious idea. Instead, ritual extends far beyond the human religious heritage. Nor is this concept necessarily linked to "mysterious" experiences. Contemporary ritologists (see Note 2) have dissolved the mystical halo surrounding ritual and have stated that rituals constitute everyday human life, including secular activities.

Rituals are not abstract norms and ordinances to be enacted apart from the individual roles and relationships of daily life. Rather, they are inherently political and cannot be understood in

isolation from biographical and historical traditions of mediation (e.g., gender, home environment, peer group subculture, and clan). Within the framework of private and institutional life, rituals become part of the socially conditioned, historically acquired, and biologically constituted rhythms and metaphors of human existence. Although rituals tend to sprout anywhere that humans gather in groups, they become most intricate and textured in the area of religion, where humans adorn their experience with the rich symbols of transcendence and cultivate rituals as dramas of the divine.

Rituals often serve normative functions, and are governed by categorical imperatives or "oughts" that are rooted in the psychic structures of social action via the process of continuous socialization. Cultural forms which constitute our industrial life are tacitly shaped in terms of, and are therefore dominated by, both the parabolic and the discursive contexts which are provided by ritual symbols and metaphors. Yet, regardless of how much the human mind focuses on the ritualizing process, we are seldom consciously aware of the extent to which rituals structure our perception and behavior.

Ritual and Symbolic Meaning

Grimes (1982a) has stated that rituals are forms of symbolic action which are primarily composed of gestures (i.e., the enactment of evocative rhythms which make up dynamic symbolic acts) and postures (i.e., a symbolic stilling of action). Ritual gesture is formative, is related to everyday action, and may oscillate between randomness and formality. The apparent simplicity of this concept of ritual is deceiving. For example, critics of ritual may claim that the assertion that ritual is a symbolic act is a tautology. Other critics might say: "If ritual is a form of symbolic behavior, and if all behavior is symbolic, then is all behavior ritual behavior?" This concept of ritual provides a rationale for almost any explanation of social and cultural process. It is also a way of refining the concept to the vanishing point. Furthermore, I may be accused of using circular logic to provide an explanation of ritual which lacks theoretical rigor but has evocative rhetorical appeal. The answer to this is that not all symbolic behavior is ritualized behavior. To be considered ritualistic, symbols *must evoke gestures* (Grimes 1982a:61). Furthermore, not all ritual meaning is symbolic. Within a ritual, the relation between a signal and its referent may also be indexical or self-referential (Rappaport 1979:175-183). Finally, in addition to inscribing and displaying symbolic meanings or states of affairs, rituals also *instrumentally bring states of affairs into being*. The argument that a ritual merely reflects meaning in an *ex post facto* manner trips philosophically over the same stumbling block that has impeded many students of ritual over the years. Moreover, this viewpoint separates the medium of ritual

from its message. Rituals do not merely reflect; they also *articulate* (Delattre 1978:38; see Note 3). Ignoring this aspect of ritual undermines an understanding of contemporary cultural forms.

Ritual gestures are always concerned with the genesis of action. As such, they "constitute a class of mediating actions which transform the style and values of everyday action, thereby becoming the very ground of action itself" (Grimes 1982a:61). In fact, rituals may be seen as gestural embodiments of the inner cognitive or affective states of performers. Grimes claims that since gestures are metaphors of the body, they display the identifications of performers. A "virtual" gesture may generate corresponding patterns of thought and feeling and reinforce particular values. It can also be argued that, at least in part, rituals are the gestural embodiments of the dominant metaphors of social structure.

The idea that ritual is simply a routine or habit is a distortion which has accompanied the development of high technology. In actual fact, a routine or habit may be a genuine form of ritualized behavior. Routines are more than ritual surrogates, and habits are more than the psychoanalytic stepchildren of routines. But while routines and habitual actions are categories of ritual, they must be considered as lesser forms of ritualization. "Habituation," says Grimes, "is the bane of ritualization . . . imposed in the form of ought-filled, unmindful heteronomy, and then the secret of this imposition is glossed over" (1982a:38). Some scholars treat routines and habits as subrealms of ritual. For example, Barbara Myerhoff distinguishes rituals from habits and customs by their use of symbols, and states that rituals are significant beyond the information which they transmit. While ritual symbols accompany routine or instrumental proceedings, they also point beyond themselves and give routines and customs a larger meaning (1977:199-200).

What a Ritual is Not

Though humans long for permanence, our social life and ritual systems are always mutable. A ritual may be seen as a series of encoded movements that must oscillate between excessive randomness (high entropy), and rigid structure (high redundancy). High entropy means that an energy system may be arranged in a variety of ways (cf. Campbell 1982). This echoes Turner's concept of anti-structure. On the other hand, the rigid structure of redundancy means that there are few ways of arranging a system. Sally Falk Moore (1975) refers to redundancy as the process of regularization. By amplifying the uniformity and symmetry of social process, ritual gestures with high redundancy draw together and link various symbolic events in a meaningful pattern. Ritual actions with high entropy draw attention to the tenuousness and

arbitrariness of social life (e.g., the carnival or rites of inversion).

Non-ritual action may be seen as a form of "gestural noise" where entropy is so high that all possible meanings for the gesture are equally probable. Gestural noise results from random movements which lack predictability, codes, syntax, or patterns of meanings. Gestural noise is similar to Brenneman, et al.'s "first-form of bodily awareness, a form in which body consciousness is so close to itself that, like the serpent eating its own tail, it consumes itself" (1982:112). Such movements are "self-possessed," "premeaningful," and "presymbolic." They are also "sporadic, compulsive, and lack the rhythm that is the basis for a symbolic, and later, a meaningful gesture" (ibid.:112).

On the other hand, ritual gestures are more self-reflexive and "possess within themselves a tendency to place greater stress upon the 'pointing beyond' function of the symbol. That which is pointed to soon becomes the 'meaning' of the gesture, and gains greater importance than the gesture itself" (ibid.:113).

Nascent rituals have greater randomness or variance than formal liturgies and carry more information. That is, they allow participants to resolve a great deal of uncertainty. Nascent rituals are composed of gestures which are often encoded by the performers themselves. These codes are improvised as the ritual transpires. Thus, nascent rituals are more idiosyncratic and less static than formal liturgies. Participants in the more precise formal liturgy conform to a series of acts which they themselves do not encode (Rappaport 1978). Communications theorists state that information is the reduction of uncertainty between two equally likely alternatives. Thus, actions at both poles on the continuum of gesture (total entropy or gestural noise and total redundancy or invariance) convey no information. Unlike gestural noise, a formal liturgy may still be seen as ritual because (following Rappaport) although it contains little or no information, this lack of information is due to invariance and conveys a sense of certainty, unquestionableness, and sanctity.

A Working Definition of Ritual

Ritual is a diffuse and often impalpable concept which has long been haunted by problems of definition. Strong taboos interfere with seeing ritual as a coherent process. Most contemporary descriptions of ritual are inadequate and need to be replaced by ideas which locate ritual in a developing epistemology of gesture, symbol, and metaphor. Since ritual is the principal protagonist in cultural dramas, we must try to provide it with some epistemological anchor points or determinants of character and meaning. The term "ritual" must also be divested of its derisory connotations.

Victor Turner advocated a reevaluation of the definition of ritual and was adamant that the "flat view" of ritual be discarded (1980:162). By "flat view," he meant the perspective of functionalist anthropologists who refer to rituals as mere reflections of social structure. Instead, Turner attributed a paradigmatic function to ritual and claimed that as a "model for," ritual "can anticipate, even generate, change"; while as a "model of," ritual "may inscribe order in the minds, hearts, and wills of participants" (1980:163).

Grimes attempts to correct the limited or "flat" perspectives on ritual by stating that there are both *hard* and *soft* ways of defining ritual. He distinguishes between the two types of definitions as follows:

> A "hard" definition is an abstractly stated consensus established by a tradition of usage and calling attention to what is in bounds. A "soft" one typically congeals around nascent phenomena and calls attention to the bounding process itself or to the spaces *between* boundaries. It operates like a naming rite and develops largely in the basis of images. A hard definition of ritual is a "model of" (Geertz 1966:7) properties of known rituals. A soft one is a "model for" attending to what is yet relatively unknown about them. Hard definitions attempt to establish a clear figure. Soft ones aim at surveying and connecting adjacent fields. (1982a:55)

A hard definition raises the question that ritual is only (or mainly) a bounded, circumscribed, and somewhat frozen act (see Note 4). On the other hand, "hard" definitions define ritual in terms of its middle phases and neglect the incubatory, emergent, and decaying phases. In contrast to hard definitions, which may become trapped in an Aristotelian view of causality, soft definitions enable a researcher to "catch" the processual dimensions of ritual as they occur in field sites.

I shall now offer a minimal definition of ritual in the "weak" or "soft" sense (see Note 5). This definition is concerned with process and not with pre-specified behavior or extrinsic outcomes. It is designed to capture ritual in its nascent state and is framed at a generalized level in order to allow meaning to accumulate within a specified context:

> Ritualization is a process which involves the incarnation of symbols, symbol clusters, metaphors, and root paradigms through formative bodily gesture. As forms of enacted meaning, rituals enable social actors to frame, negotiate, and articulate their phenomenological existence as social, cultural, and moral beings.

The Fieldwork

In the latter part of 1982, I spent three months at "St. Ryan" Catholic School in Toronto, Ontario, Canada as a participant observer (the name of this school has been changed to protect its privacy). During this period, I used a mixture of ethnographic field techniques which included, but were not limited to, grounded theory methodology (Glaser and Strauss 1967).

THE RITUAL SYSTEM

St. Ryan's cultural field was an intricate ritual system of various symbols, ethos, world views, root paradigms, and forms of resistance. A key feature of this cultural field was the way the teaching staff organized and carried out instruction. Classroom instruction was analyzed as a ritual system, and the following typology was constructed:

Rituals of Instruction

1. The Micro Ritual

The *micro ritual* consisted of individual lessons that took place on a day-to-day basis in the classroom.

2. The Macro Ritual

The *macro ritual* consisted of individual classroom lessons as they appeared collectively over a single school day (including the periods between lessons and immediately before and after the lessons).

Micro and macro rituals can be seen as variations on rites of passage (cf. Van Gennep 1960). Although the rite of passage model may be loosely applied to both micro and macro rituals, it is most relevant to the overall passage of students through the school system. For example, students at St. Ryan may pass from the status of Grade Seven students in September to that of Grade Eight students in June if they pass the year. Academic failure is a risk which all student initiands face, both on a random daily basis (e.g., through homework assignments, "spot" questions, and "surprise" tests), and during more formal times throughout the school year (e.g., pre-specified term tests and final exams).

3. Rituals of Revitalization

Rituals of revitalization may be described as processual events which give participants renewed commitment, motivations, and values (cf. Wallace 1966). At St. Ryan, staff meetings were often revitalization rites where authority figures, such as the principal or vice principal, attempted to boost staff morale and strengthen commitment to the values of Catholic education. Classroom rituals of revitalization usually took the form of emotional discussions between teachers and students about the importance of mastering course work and school objectives. For some students, school-wide masses and confessions served as rituals of revitalization which formally linked the values of school and church.

4. Rituals of Intensification

Rituals of intensification are a subtype of revitalization rituals which emotionally recharge students or teachers. They unify the group without necessarily reinforcing the values or goals of ritual participants (cf. Wallace 1966). Rituals of revitalization and intensification may take the form of either micro and/or macro rituals.

5. Rituals of Resistance

Rituals of resistance are a series of subtle and dramatic cultural forms with many of the characteristics of "symbolic inversion." Invariably, these rituals resist the dominant authoritative tenets and codes of conduct which have been established by the teacher. Rituals of resistance may be seen as a type of ceremonial "destructuring" (cf. Grimes 1982b). In other words, they turn our view towards the dark side of culture and they are "agnostic," meaning that they are rituals of conflict. Within these rituals are the seeds of Turner's third phase of the social drama: redressive ritual and symbolic action. Space here does not permit a description of the full range of Turner's theory of social drama. Suffice it to say that rituals of resistance transform students into combatants and antagonists, while mobilizing hidden grudges and tensions for the purpose of rupturing school rules and subverting the grammars of mainstream classroom discourse. Resistance, as I am theorizing it, refers to the power to contest meaning through the corporeal nature of symbols and gestures. There is a liberating pleasure resulting from the "surface" of ritual, as well as within its condensed, symbolic layering. Resistance operates within the realm of meaning and subjectivity as much as in the more overt realms of social and political behavior. Resistance is played out as part of a cultural politics of the body and a geography of desire; as such, it deals in the currency of signs, symbols, and gestures. Among other things,

it is an unfixing of signifiers among relatively stable constellations of discourses, as well as an attempt at exploiting the polysemy of the symbol in order to pry open a space for articulating one's own lived meaning. It thereby creates a subject position that operates from strength rather than weakness, and is better able to resist a culture of lived subordination.

Often, rituals of resistance attempt to "purify" the contaminated and fragmented world of institutionalized social structure. These rituals take two distinct forms: (1) active-resistance rituals; and (2) passive-resistance rituals. Active-resistance rituals are intentional attempts by students to sabotage teacher instruction and the rules and norms established by school authorities. Passive-resistance rituals sabotage the normative codes of the dominant school order and are less demonstrative than active resistance rituals. Although rituals of resistance are part of the overall instructional system (e.g., serve as a form of ritualized feedback), the term "rites of instruction" generally refers to macro and micro rituals.

INTERACTIVE STATES

Unlike many other educational settings, the classroom rituals at St. Ryan did not accommodate either derisively unspontaneous or unapologetically improvisational teaching patterns. At St. Ryan, the tendency to maintain traditional protocol sanctioned a positivistic approach to schooling. Teachers worked predominantly within an ultraconservative, "old school" pedagogical format, and the majority of instructional forms could be linked to a "museum mentality." Although classrooms were structured in the "open area" format usually regarded as ideal for progressive teachers, there was a noticeable lack of newer, more innovative teaching.

At St. Ryan, rites of instruction included two interactive states: (1) the streetcorner state; and (2) the student state.

The word "state" is not used here to suggest a trance or state of consciousness in the clinical or psychological sense of the term. Rather, it suggests styles of interacting with both the environment and other people which might be labelled behavioral clusters or complexes. States of interaction are not simply groups of abstract events. Instead, they are organized assemblages of behaviors which give rise to a central or dominant system of *lived* practices.

The Streetcorner State

Before the beginning of school at nine o'clock in the morning, students at St. Ryan enter into particular roles and statuses and engage in distinctive behaviors which might be called the "streetcorner state." Heralded by the physical setting in which they find themselves, the streetcorner state consists of behavior which students exhibit on the street (e.g., "hanging around" the local neighborhood). Yet this behavior is not confined to the street and extends into adjacent areas such as the school playground, the nearby park, vacant lots, video arcades, the plaza, and abandoned buildings. By contrast, the student state includes most student behavior inside the school building (listening to a lesson, taking notes, writing an exam, etc.).

The streetcorner state consists of a cluster of attributes which constitute a particular *manner* of relating to settings, events, and people. Actions in the streetcorner state seldom conform to predictable scenarios. While engrossed in this state, students collectively "own their time." They also play out roles and statuses which reflect the dynamics of peer relationships and identities, regardless of whether these are forged in the street or on the playground. The schoolyard or street becomes a stage where individuals act out dramas of apotheosis, revenge, resistance, or revitalization. While in this state, students often unleash pent-up frustrations. Thus, the streetcorner state is cathartic, and its ritual forms are often under-distanced (cf. Scheff 1977).

In the streetcorner state, students are indulgently physical and freely exuberant. Activity in the streetcorner state may closely resemble a primary experience where bodies often twist, turn, and shake in an oasis of free abandon, as though locked in a state of non-differentiation. There is often a great deal of physical contact. Behavior in this state has *ad hoc* and episodic characteristics, and often seems to be unbound and ungoverned. Yet it is a mistake to think that lack of formality makes such behavior innocuous as a ritual mode. Instead, the streetcorner state most closely approaches ritualization associated with biorhythms and psychosomatic patterning, including such tacit ritual elements as personal habits and interaction rituals (cf. Grimes 1982a).

In the streetcorner state, bodily movements may carry overtures of merriment and diversion, and generally lack the demarcations of precise gesture (cf. Brenneman, et al. 1982). Here, the boundaries between spaces, roles, and objects are more plastic, adaptive, and malleable than in the student state. Students in the streetcorner state also seem to be more unpredictable and to make more noise than in the student state.

In the streetcorner state, students frequently exhibit exaggerated kinesthetic activity with irregular sequences of action and pronounced changes of posture. There are also more instances of irregular speech and body rhythms (e.g., spontaneous expressions of emotions). Often, sensuality is stimulated and relationships between individuals approach intimacy.

In the streetcorner state, time is relatively unstructured or polychromatic (cf. Hall 1973). In other words, since various activities take place simultaneously, they may overlap. Individuals are often able to "create" their own schedules.

The behavioral correlates of the streetcorner state emphasize personal functions, some of which, although usually controlled in the student state, are more permitted in the streetcorner state (for example, bodily emissions, idiosyncrasies, and eccentricities). Students are frequently motivated by such symbols as the bully, the clown, the weakling, and the slut. These symbols often appear to be iconic (cf. Courtney 1982).

Cultures (and subcultures) have distinct "moods." The mood of the streetcorner state is the "subjunctive" described by Turner, meaning a mood that embraces fantasy, experiment, hypothesis, and conjecture. In this mood of "maybe," metaphors flourish and in turn promote novel cultural forms (cf. Paine 1981:187-200). Because students do things at their own pace, there is apt to be more "flow" in matching skills and abilities (see Csikszentmihalyi 1975a, 1975b). Although students in the streetcorner state spend time experimenting with different roles and playing "as if" they were others, they are most decidedly themselves.

In the streetcorner state, students who are under intense emotional stress due to personal or family problems are better able to confront their emotions, and they also have greater opportunities to share their emotions with close friends and peers. The prevailing ethos is consumerism. For instance, students at St. Ryan frequently talked about buying cars, color television sets, motorcycles, leather garments, and "ghetto-blasters" (radio-tape recorders).

In the streetcorner state, individuals bathe in the ambience of working-class and ethnic cultural forms, yet remain unencumbered by the values and obligations of the student state. For instance, Portuguese is occasionally spoken, and students listen to rock music and engage in other recreational activity. Spontaneous communitas is frequently present, and this state could be said to possess a liminal or liminoid dimension. The ethos of the streetcorner state is ludic, or of the nature of play.

The Student State: The Structure of Conformity

After entering the school building, students at St. Ryan realign and readjust their behavior, and in the process, shift from the natural flow of the streetcorner state to the more formal and rigidly segregated "student state." Here they yield to the powerful enforcement procedures of teachers, including controls which allow teachers to dominate students without brute force. Students move "offstage" from where they are more naturally themselves to the foreground of the classroom, where they must undertake student roles which conform to the teacher's master script. They thus move from the "raw" state of streetcorner life to the more "cooked" or socialized state of the school existence. In reality, in both the streetcorner and student states, students are already "cooked," meaning that their roles are backed by social experience where they sustain a set of social standards expected of them by both their peers and the authorities. While it is safe to say that the streetcorner state is much more "raw" when compared to the student state, this does not mean that individuals exist as *tabulae rasae*. Rather, they enter a more "visceral," informal, and natural state of interaction.

The student state includes the adoption of manners, dispositions, attitudes, and work habits expected of "being a student." Teachers regard emotional displays as "antisocial," and the major theme is that students must "work hard!" Control mechanisms of teachers constitute the boundaries between the streetcorner and student states. These boundaries are permeable only during prescribed times, such as between classes or during recess. As a rule, students are compelled to enter the student state through a highly ritualized and institutionalized reward-and-punishment system which curbs the open emotionality and activity of the streetcorner state.

In the student state, youngsters are generally quiet, well-mannered, predictable, and obedient. Their gestures are pronounced and systematic. The mood of this state is "indicative," meaning that it prevails in the world of actual fact as described by Turner (1969). Metonymy is prevalent, and helps to produce predictable and restrictive cultural forms (cf. Paine 1982). Symbolization occurs mainly through the use of signs and religious symbols (cf. the terminology used by Courtney 1982). Time is segmented and monochromatic (cf. Hall 1973), and movements are often rigidified into gestures (cf. Brenneman, et al. 1982). There is little physical movement unless cued by teachers. A distinct separation exists between mind and body, and the work ethic is stressed. In the student state, ritual forms are usually invariant and conventionalized. Communitas is rare, as are the elements of liminal or liminoid ritual genres.

FORMS OF STUDENT INTERACTION

Street State	Student State
Tribal	Institutional
Emotional, nonrational	Cognitive, rational
Random, imprecise gestures	Nonrandom, precise gestures
Ludic	Serious
Forms of symbolization (icons, symbols)	Forms of symbolization (signs)
Play (ritual frame)	Work (ritual frame)
Spontaneous action	Teleological
Tapping own inner resources (right-lobe emphasis)	Imitation of teachers (left-lobe emphasis)
Away from formality	Formal, technical
Sensuous	Mechanical
Multi-signifiers (hyperintensity)	Multi-signified (low intensity)
Cathartic	Frustrating, tension-inducing
Whimsy, frivolity	Task-oriented
Status determined by peers	Status determined by institution
Liminal/liminoid	Hierarchical
Communitas (repartee)	Anomie, anxiety
Subjunctive mood	Indicative mood
Flow	Flow-resistant
Ritual forms (elastic, flexible, haphazard, improvisational)	Ritual forms (conventionalized, stereotyped, formal)
Motion	Gesture

Street State	Student State (cont'd)
Polychromatic Time	Monochromatic Time
Informal space	Fixed-feature space
Pediarchic	Pedagogic
Analogue	Digital

Students spend approximately seventy-six minutes of each school day in the streetcorner state, including time spent between classes, during lunch, and during recess. By contrast, they spend 298 minutes of each school day in the student state.

RITUALS OF INSTRUCTION

The Macro Ritual

The macro ritual consists of instruction over one day. It consists of a bastardized version of Van Gennep's rites of passage—a similar mutation or refined variation of the classical ritual process. The performative sequence of separation (preliminal), threshold rites (liminal), and rite of reaggregation (postliminal) is structurally and qualitatively altered. As in Van Gennep's three-part scheme, transformation from one state to another involves "separation" and a change of status and behavior for students. But the change from streetcorner state to student state is a change from a more natural state with characteristics of spontaneous communitas to an institutionalized state with uncomfortable, painful, and oppressive characteristics which are often associated with initiation rites.

In passing from the streetcorner state to the student state, students move across a threshold into a quantitatively different cultural realm. This movement is accompanied by a parallel passage in space from street and schoolyard to school building, together with a parallel passage from polychromatic to monochromatic time.

In the final phase of incorporation, the rite-of-passage model breaks down where initiates are supposed to return to a relatively stable and well-defined position in the social structure. Incorporation or re-aggregation from the streetcorner state to the student state, or vice versa, is never complete and seldom occurs in such a way that pre-ritual ties are completely severed. Some, but not all students may be temporarily incorporated into

the student state. Furthermore, the tendency toward incorporation occurs in two directions at once. There are two simultaneous "pulls" on the students: (1) a force pulling the students into the streetcorner state; and (2) a force pulling the students into the student state. Those students whose identities and statuses are reinforced by the streetcorner state will struggle to extend this state in class.

The streetcorner state is more seductive and symbolically tantalizing than the student state. Symbolic roles which are acted out in the streetcorner state include the bully (villain), the hero (a student who defeats the villains), the champion (a sports hero, break-dancer, etc.), the Madonna (often an attractive female teacher), the slut (a girl who is known for having sex with boys), the coward, and the rebel. On the other hand, informally-sanctioned symbols of the student state, including the "browner" (a student who plays up to authority figures), the teacher's pet, and the good Catholic worker become ashes in the fire that forges the visceral and often volatile ritual symbols in the crucible of the streetcorner state.

Passage from the streetcorner state to the student state frequently involves a distinct contradiction. As students undergo ritual instruction that tries to bring them into symbolic agreement with the restrictions of the student state (the rubrics of "being a student"), they may become re-confirmed in the streetcorner state by either resisting instructional rituals, or by making the most of the streetcorner state between class periods or during lunch—if, in fact, they ever really leave the streetcorner state. When a ritual lacks liminality as its most distinctive ingredient, students may try to fake passage by pretending that they are in the student state or the streetcorner state. Nevertheless, a counterfeit rite of passage is a contradiction in terms. Because many students find it more comfortable—and often more exhilarating—to be pulled along by the liminal ingredients of the streetcorner state, it is easier to pass from the student state to the streetcorner state. In contrast, it is difficult to fake passage from the streetcorner state to the student state unless students have mastered the codes, indexical clues, symbolic cues, and kinesthetic routines of the student state.

THE MANIPULATION OF SYMBOLS

One of the most powerful ways of symbolizing and sustaining order in the classroom was through religious icons and symbols—a profuse hemorrhage of signifiers, thick with meaning. Religious symbols are powerful precisely because their ambiguity leaves them open to many interpretations (cf. Cohen 1979:103; Eco 1982: 28-29). But rather than being the random choices of individuals, symbolic meanings are deeply cultural.

Throughout St. Ryan and its classrooms, religious symbols served as visual reminders of powers or external forces that were thought to be part of some heavenly community beyond the ordinary dimensions of space and time. Religious symbols make the transcendent qualities of God concrete. If they are not burdened by oversanctification, they make students see reality through a variety of interpretations.

Religious symbols purvey continuous messages. Through the structural characteristics of multivalency, multivocality, and polysemity, these symbols point to a reality beyond what they signify, thus enabling students to participate in that reality (cf. Tillich 1956:41-54). Depending on their location and the context in which they appear, religious symbols function in a variety of ways. For example, they may support the prevailing ethos of "becoming a worker" or "becoming a Catholic" (see Note 6). They can also cause these dominant ethos to become problematic by throwing them into states of contradiction or conflict. In the latter case, there may be ambiguity about how classroom culture will be defined—a situation with both functional and dysfunctional implications for preserving religious symbols within the framework of the dominant parent/teacher culture.

Religious insignia at St. Ryan included a large photograph of the Pope in the main hall, a painting of the religious founder of the school in the main lobby, a plastic statue of the Virgin Mary in the library, crucifixes in every classroom and office, logos of the Separate School Board on stationery and official documents, and school crests and uniforms worn by high school students who shared the building with students from St. Ryan. In one classroom, a hand-written Act of Contrition and the words of the Canadian national anthem, "O Canada," were mounted on the wall beside a crucifix.

Students at St. Ryan could easily identify the school's religious symbols. Written responses showed varying ambivalence regarding the significance of these symbols: some students seemed overwhelmed by the power of the symbols, while others said they were not influenced at all. A majority of the students testified that the symbols merely served to remind them that "they were Catholics." Nevertheless, a significant number of students said they felt Christ was present "in" the religious icons, and that he was "watching to see how we behave."

> The crucifix is there to keep us all holy and to keep the school holy.

> They [the religious symbols] mean that God is here with us.

> What they mean to me is what God's done for us, and

every time I look at the cross, I always feel that Jesus is staring at me, telling me to behave.

Although perhaps disconcerting, it is significant to cite the remarks of a staff member who claimed that the "bloodied and emaciated" figure of Senhor Santo Cristo represented "the general outlook of the Portuguese on the world." A description of the Azorean crucifix provided by this teacher recalled images of the tortured Savior which are often found on fifteenth-century crucifixes.

Staff Member: Life is hard . . . it's drudgery for them. They distrust institutions just like they distrusted the government of Portugal. They won't believe you if you tell them learning can be fun. They only understand things that are tough, hard, and practical. Just look at their crucifix . . . The first thing that I noticed was that strange attachment they had to this emaciated figure of Jesus Christ, whom they called Senhor Santo Cristo (see Note 7). It was a blood-spattered, disfigured Christ, and he symbolized much of their lives. And they basically see life as tough, harsh, and unrewarding . . . The other side of life is going to church and seeing these beautiful, paradisiacal images of an afterlife—the Virgin Mary with candles—and it's kind of dreamy . . . But all this comes as a reward for toughing it out in this life.

Rules for the "correct" interpretation of religious symbols were provided by teachers, administrators, and priests who occasionally visited the classroom to speak to students. Codes and terms for interpreting the symbolic order of the school were constructed by teachers. In other words, teachers "nudged" the connections between symbols and referents which had to be made if one were to be a good student and a good Catholic. The natural ambiguity of the symbols (e.g., Christ as a humble savior, a rebel, or an ethereal spirit) meant that teachers could unconsciously manipulate these symbols according to their own interests.

On one occasion, a staff member chastised a number of boys who had laughed and jeered at a visiting administrator from a nearby high school:

Staff Member: Some of you were just awful. But there were a few of you who behaved—God bless those who listened!

Although misbehavior was regarded as sacrilegious, students who behaved "like good Catholics" earned a blessing from the teacher. When teachers blessed good behavior, they used the sacred status of the Church to reinforce their remarks and to align the domain of the sacred with the policing function of teachers.

Although teachers never proclaimed themselves to be a type of educational militia, blessings were symbolic clubs which forced students into line and dragooned them into an agreed-upon sense of propriety and respect for classroom law and order. Like symbols, blessings were convertible to many uses.

When symbols were given specific meanings (e.g., God loves good listeners; Jesus likes neat work; Mary appreciates politeness), the remarks of teachers often became pestles which pulverized the power of these symbols into a sterile powder.

The syncretic nature of classroom symbols was neatly demonstrated at one point when an image of the Pac Man video game monster appeared on a wall adjacent to a crucifix. Given this juxtaposition of the absurd against a vision of holiness, what were students to think? Though I was reminded of a portrait by Salvador Dali of a beautiful blonde baby clenching a sewer rat between his teeth, classroom life may or may not be surrealistic drama.

Bound up with sacred symbols at St. Ryan was an inescapable "ought" or prescription. These symbols often carried ethical meanings which were partly the result of their opacity and multivalency. The characteristic of multivalency permitted religious symbols to be instruments of both social control and liberation. For example, Christ could be seen as a conservative who supported existing power structures, or as an activist who wanted the government overthrown. By operationalizing sacred symbols, instructional rituals could include both authoritarian and utopian dimensions.

In general, classroom rituals translated a broad range of Catholic symbols into graphic and readily-comprehensive messages with a compelling view of reality.

If symbols have great connotative powers by being fissile, ambiguous, multivalent, incongruous, and polysemous, one may legitimately ask: if reality is "up for grabs" in the sense that everyone interprets it differently through symbols (echoing Vico's *verum ipsum factum*), how do symbols systematically motivate groups of individuals? Victor Turner answers this question, at least in part, by saying that through the functions of their orectic and ideational poles, the mixed feelings of dominant religious symbols are "averaged out into a single ambiguous quantum of generalized affect" which is "deflected to . . . more abstract values and norms. . . ." (1978:575).

At St. Ryan, religious symbols and instruction focused mainly on self-denial, endurance, and one's own individual faults and inadequacies. Simple rituals of entry and departure from the school included paying respect to the Supreme Deity through the morning offering, and giving thanks for both material sustenance (grace before meals) and spiritual sustenance (the Act of Contri-

tion). Through these simple rituals, students participated in events which further established respect for teachers, contributed to the sanctification of instruction, and reinforced cooperation in the varied academic activities of the "sacred" workplace of the school.

Jesus was always symbolically present in classrooms at St. Ryan, where he constantly peered down at students from crucifixes mounted on the walls. His teachings were continually discussed in religion class, and his name was invoked when teachers blessed students for striving hard, for postponing gratification, and for academic stoicism during the discomfort of tests and assignments.

In response to a questionnaire, a large number of students felt that Jesus would not approve of their conduct at St. Ryan. Thus, students often exhibited intolerable feelings of guilt which made them submit more readily to control, and if necessary, to the forces of punishment meted out by teachers and priests as the educational representatives of Christ.

> I feel Jesus would sometimes like our performances but at other times not like them.
>
> I think Jesus would feel sorry for me.
>
> I think Jesus feels that I am rude and I like to fool around a lot.
>
> I feel that Jesus would be mad at me.
>
> He would not like it [the way the students behave] because of all the answering back, all the foul language, and all the fighting. Also because he sees no love between the students.
>
> I feel that Jesus would think we are terrible.
>
> I think Jesus would feel unhappy. I feel that at home, I am a very different person than when I'm at school.
>
> Well, I think if He was my father, He would slap my face, because that's what my father would do if he ever saw how I act in school (which isn't so bad). But at lunch I talk to guys and my father doesn't like that, and I sometimes act weird around my friends, and I don't think Jesus would be too pleased.

Daily prayers and religious activities were metaphors linking Catholic ideologies to the real "material" of instructional rituals and follow-up activities. Prayers and religious activities "spiritualized" the plodding of the school day and sanctified the order of classrooms. In the sense of "what goes with

what," prayers functioned to give students meaning within the Catholic world view. Prayers also established the religious/secular context for instructional rituals that followed them in the sense of "what follows what." Clearly, prayers and religion classes defined a distinct cosmology which students were powerless to reject.

The strength of ritual's ideological force is that it often erases its own traces from that on which it has an impact. This process enables us to understand how socialization works invisibly through the bodies and subjectivities of students. As enacted metaphors, rituals embody what they mean (cf. Grimes 1984). At St. Ryan, students enacted metaphors and embodied rhythms that were both embedded in the cultural capital of teachers (see Note 8) and transmitted through rites of instruction.

Throughout the process of schooling, culture is continually made and remade without revealing the source of its legitimizing power. It remains a smile without a face; a kiss without lips.

An understanding of the dynamics of the ritual dimensions of schooling uncovers possibilities for understanding how socialization "works" through dominant structural arrangements and human agency. Socialization is not a form of unidirectional domination. Neither is it merely a system of cultural or ideological constraints imposed from above. Instead, socialization is constructed from the many outcomes of negotiations between symbolic meanings, some of which may be antagonistic. These meanings are continually mediated by socioeconomic conditions, relationships of power and privilege, and the diverse ways students engage the world.

CONCLUSION

While the ritual demeanor of schooling at St. Ryan was more muted than, for example, the dramatic ritual symbols of the Catholic mass, the school had a complex medley of ritual forms. Instructional rites carried or "nested" the dominant epistemes, root paradigms, and symbols which created and sustained student world views. Instructional symbols and paradigms oscillated between two general states: (1) the physical "streetcorner state"; and (2) the cognitive "student state." Much of each student's day was spent negotiating between the experiential contradictions of these two states. In the streetcorner state, students related to each other emotionally and viscerally. In the student state, teachers encouraged students to develop relationships which emphasized "rationality."

Instructional rites at St. Ryan gave students coded messages which promoted behavioral norms and fashioned dominant cognitive frameworks. In short, these instructional rites provided blue-

prints for "thinking" and "doing." Students were thus taught to think of the world in certain ways and were motivated to act upon their world according to prescribed examples and ritual symbols.

An important question throughout this discussion of ritual and schooling has been: Do classroom rituals implacably control the destinies of both teachers and students? Although a definitive answer to this question is not yet possible, we must recognize that students are less harmed by classroom rituals than by being persuaded that these rituals are natural and inviolable.

NOTES

1. For an extensively revised and expanded version of this discussion, which was accepted for publication in *Anthropologica* in 1984, see Peter L. McLaren, *Schooling as a Ritual Performance: Towards a Political Economy of Educational Symbols and Gestures*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (scheduled for publication in 1986).

2. Ronald L. Grimes has coined the term "ritology" to mean the study of ritual. His work could have a profound influence on the way ritual is seen in the social sciences. For a further discussion of ritology, see Ronald L. Grimes, 1982a, *Beginnings in Ritual Studies*, Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America. See also "Victor Turner's Social Drama and T. S. Eliot's Ritual Drama" by Ronald L. Grimes in this volume of *Anthropologica*.

3. The work of Roland Delattre (1978, 1979) has influenced my understanding of ritual. Delattre argues that ritual rhythms (or motions through which individuals commonly engage the world) are paradigmatic of how humans construct reality and develop their moral attributes. Thus, Delattre stresses the humanity-shaping and reality-constituting powers of ritual. His thesis articulates a sense of reality for individuals as they are engaged by ritual rhythms (a process that he claims is as influential as exposure to the ethos, mythology, ideology, or world view of a prevailing culture). Delattre states that ritual *articulates* rather than expresses our humanity. Since a ritual is more than a simplified symbolic expression of something which already exists, it creates something which would not otherwise exist. In essence, this means that a ritual cannot be said to express something precisely because there is no "thing" that can be expressed outside of the ritual itself. If we say that a particular ritual expresses something, *we fall into the trap of trying to separate the content of a ritual from its form.* Delattre follows Hofstadter's (1965) idea of articulation as creating forms and joints and building up an organized product with interconnected members, whereas before there was only the

potential for this. A living impulse works itself out through the process of articulation (Delattre 1979:38).

4. A strict definition of ritual appears in another publication (see Note 1).

5. Grimes's soft definition of ritual, which he terms "ritualization," reads: "Ritualizing transpires as animated persons during crucial times in founded places" (1982a:55).

6. For a discussion of the two prevailing root paradigms of instruction, see McLaren as cited in Note 1.

7. "Senhor Santo Cristo" is a Portuguese term for Christ.

8. Cultural capital refers to educational events and artifacts, such as different sets of linguistic and cultural competencies, that individuals inherit within the class-oriented boundaries of their families. Cultural capital also refers to sets of meaning, qualities of style, modes of thinking, and types of dispositions that are given a certain status as a result of whatever the dominant class or classes regards as most valuable (Giroux 1983:88).

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

FIGURE 1: THE RITUAL TREE

VICTOR TURNER'S LAST ADVENTURE

Richard Schechner
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Dans ses derniers travaux, Victor Turner a examiné les liens que l'on retrouve entre le processus rituel, les structures mentales, les fonctions, et les jeux. Il s'acheminait vers une synthèse de la sociobiologie et de l'anthropologie humaniste. Quoi qu'il soit advenu, ces recherches ont dissimulé un "voeu religieux": un désir de résoudre par acte de "foi" la question apparemment insoluble de la relation entre la "culture" et la "nature." Le rite peut tracer les grandes lignes, fournir une espèce de trame grossière, des comportements qui commencent avec les insectes et qui, éventuellement, s'étendent à la forme plus ou moins libre des activités sociales, religieuses et esthétiques. Vu sous cet angle, le rite est à la fois conservateur et créateur, avec un futur humain distinct qui est défini dans la mesure du passé éthologique. Le lieu de rencontre de ce passé et de ce futur se développe toujours dans l'esprit humain.

In his later work, Victor Turner examined links among ritual process, brain structure and function, and play. He was moving toward a synthesis of sociobiology and humanist anthropology. However, these investigations concealed a "religious wish": a yearning to resolve by means of "faith" the apparently intractable question of the relationship between "culture" and "nature." Ritual can be mapped out as a thickening nexus of behaviors which originates in insects and eventually branches out into the more-or-less free forms of human social, religious, and aesthetic behaviors. When seen this way, ritual is both conservative and creative, with a distinctly human future which is just as definite as its ethological past. The meeting place of this past and future is the still-evolving human brain.

INTRODUCTION

In his later work, Victor Turner posed some extremely challenging questions. A trademark of his generous genius was that he never stepped back from thinking *into* a problem merely because he had no clear way out. His admirable "not-yetness" and "unfinishedness" forces those who become interested in his work to wrestle through the night, much as Jacob wrestled with-and-

against his angel. More mundanely, he and I and whoever else was there (and often there were others) frequently sat around his kitchen table in Charlottesville, North Carolina, talmudically and histrionically arguing.

By itself, the word "ritual" is perplexing. Ritual has been so variously defined as concept, praxis, process, ideology, yearning, religious experience, and function that it means very little for the simple reason that it can mean too much.

A survey of the literature reveals that the "scientific" analysis of ritual can be divided into five categories: (1) ritual as part of the evolutionary development of organisms—including, but not limited to, the development of the brain; (2) ritual as a structure, meaning a thing with formal qualities and relationships; (3) ritual as a performance process: a dynamic system or action with both diachronic and synchronic rhythms and/or scenarios; (4) ritual as experience—as in what people feel individually or as part of a collective; and (5) ritual as a set of functions in human individual and social life.

The word "scientific" is placed in quotation marks because the above categories and the definitions they yield are not so much testable hypotheses as opinions belonging mostly to the domain of social and/or artistic criticism. But as Derrida (1978) and the second line of deconstructionists remind us, the boundary between scientific thought and criticism is fuzzier than blurry. In our emergent neo-medieval world, a new species of religious/artistic thought is replacing what was formerly called pure science. The placement of the word "scientific" in quotation marks is an act of respect in what is meant to be an essay in the domain of criticism. And although an attempt will be made to avoid the religious as such, it permeates discussions of ritual.

RELIGION IN WHAT GUISE?

Religion permeates discussions of ritual as the overt or covert assertion that ritual is good for people, necessary, or even biologically built-in, and that religion is a kind of divine right of ritual. To use Dostoevsky's metaphor, it seems that people are forever seeking to lay down their little bundles of liberty at the feet of some savior—someone or some concept that will "decide" for them and relieve them of that awful, not to say awesome, burden of choosing for themselves. For all I know, this view of life is correct, since the history of a long, multicultural obsession with religion is not a fantasy, but a recognition that people need superhuman authorities to guide them. This statement is ambivalent because there is no choice but to agree with history and regard ritual as at least necessary and maybe even "good for" people. What troubles me is that the anti-structural outbursts of a Buddha, a Jesus, or a Marx are soon taken up

by their "disciples," who are, in turn, interpreted by the "church" so that it is not long before things are turned upside up again.

RITUAL, PERFORMANCE, AND SCIENCE

My feelings are divided about this. As a director of performances, I have certainly done my share of deconstructing/reconstructing. Although I have tried to be honest in my manipulations, who knows? When spectators danced with each other in *Dionysus in 69*, ducked for cover in *Cops*, or followed the stars around the room in *The Tooth of Crime*, my intention was to give them accurate metaphors in their bodies of the *mise-en-scene*—something they couldn't get by just looking. And when I asked performers during a preparatory improvisation for *The Prometheus Project* to consider whether, if they were given a half-hour's warning of nuclear attack, they would go to ground zero to be painlessly and instantly vaporized, or choose to survive in a condition of nuclear winter, I was building an understructure with the performers for the whole performance. This is a performance that does not "oppose" nuclear holocaust so much as meditate on the problem of why, when everyone opposes nuclear war, human societies seem hell-bent on trooping into the collective furnace. Could it be that Zeus was right and Prometheus was wrong?

My performances have always had a ritual quality. They have played on and with the repetition of rhythms, including harmonically incremental intensities of both sound and gesture, the multiple ambivalences of sharing space among spectators and performers, and the condensation and relocation of actions taken from both ordinary life and elsewhere. As I have pointed out in other writings (1985 and in press), the "performance process" and the "ritual process" as outlined by Van Gennep (1960) and brilliantly elaborated by Turner (1969, 1974, 1982, 1985, and in press) are strictly analogous. What intrigues me most is the troublesome area where "characterization" leaves off and the "real person" begins. Although I can direct a play where characters are neatly confined within lines written by playwrights and move elegantly on stages designed by architects, what has always appealed to me about the theater is its unavoidable tension between "artificiality" and "real-lifeness." As the English playwright Heathcote Williams said, "On the ladder of artificiality theater is on the lowest rung" (1973:vii). Therefore, theater is always playfully and dangerously tumbling back into the actual, the contingent, and the absolute here and now. Whether theater artists are directors, actors, or perhaps scenographers, our job is to articulate this tumbling and to confound everyone—performer and spectator alike—concerning the location of "reality." As we shall see, difficulty in locating reality and in giving it a specific place is a key problem in Victor Turner's later work. This categorical

inability to locate reality suggests a radical relocation or dislocation of fate; not only Oedipus, but the actor playing Oedipus could have chosen differently, and can still do so—but only in play, and only as make-believe. The "character" doesn't exist except as the player plays him; and the player exists as character only in the realm of play. Yet even as they play, the performers cannot entirely leave behind their own contingent personal and social selves. So, when those performers choose ground zero or nuclear winter, they are choosing both as themselves and as characters. They are participating in being double agents: they are at once actors and spectators of their own actions. These performed actions give spectators the chance to meditate between (un)realities and to consider nuclear war without having to experience it. I would guess that a function of ritual is always this subversion of experience—to substitute or undermine ordinary experience with another hyper-experience. This hyper-experience is not abstract, but just the opposite: it is made of definite sensuous items to do, smell, hear, see, and touch. More than any other kind of art or entertainment, ritual is synaesthesis. There is also a corresponding set of skills known to the ritualists for operating the performances.

It is not important that the ordinary spectator or participant know all of this, any more than a medical patient needs to understand what a drug is or how it works. Possibly even more than physicians, shamans emphasize the necessity of keeping the secrets of the trade to themselves; performers of Noh drama likewise, not to mention people of the circus. There is something peculiarly unscientific about performance, including the performances of scientists. The stated purpose of science is to "get at" and/or "test" a/the truth. The means of this "getting at" is a shared body of knowledge, while the purpose of performance is to "play with" and "make fun of/out of" experience. Yet I believe performance is the larger category, and that performance contains science. Scientists no less than artists have never lost touch with the trickster, the alchemist, the wizard, the conman.

RITUAL AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

How far back all this goes. The unintentional (not thought out, not subject to change or alteration) deceits of nonhuman animals become the playful arts and sciences of people. And these deceits—transformations, condensations, alterations of behavior and body structure—are what ethologists call ritual.

Ethologists use the term ritual without quotation marks, but if there are similarities between animal rituals and human arts, there are also important differences. Although the patterned "waggle dance" of bees may look like dancing to a choreographer like Jerome Robbins, the bees are not "emically" dancing. Where everything is genetically determined, there can be no learning or

improvisation. And where there is no contingency, there can be no lying, but only deceit; the difference being precisely the player's consciousness concerning her/his range of choice. Even a ballet dancer can choose one night simply not to go up on point even though the choreography tells her to do so. She may lose the role, or even her job, but she can still choose to dance flat-footed. Not so with the "dancing" bees; if they go wrong, there is something wrong with their DNA. Human performance art is paradoxical, a practiced fixedness founded on pure contingency: the weird delight people have in going up on point, or in watching a trained trapezist make three-and-a-half somersaults, or even in applauding the choreographed ineptitude of clowns.

The development of ritual among our species can be diagrammed as a tree (see Figure 1). This figure shows how the specific functions and properties of human rituals are built, but are different from those of other animals. It was this link and those differences—the participation of ritual in the evolutionary process—that occupied Victor Turner at the end of his life. This might seem to those who followed Turner's earlier work on "ritual process" to be an odd turn. Why should someone who put so much stock in ritual's anti-structure, including its creative and generative force in individual and cultural life, suddenly seem to embrace sociobiology?

Turner laid out his evolutionary approach to ritual only once, in "Body, Brain, and Culture" (1983), while his work on ritual process, liminality, communitas, and anti-structure populated most of his writing after *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* (1967). Still, had he lived, I think Turner would have gone on with this investigation because it promised to clarify the crisis (= crux, cross, crossing, decisive meeting place) of ritual, religion, and science.

Surely Turner was aware of this crisis. He begins "Body, Brain, and Culture" by saying: "The present essay is for me one of the most difficult I have ever attempted. This is because I am having to submit to question some of the axioms anthropologists of my generation—and several subsequent generations—were taught to hallow. These axioms express the belief that all human behavior is the result of social conditioning" (1983:221). Turner then reviews some of the most current theories of ritual and ritualization, which are different to the degree that ritual is the performance and ritualization is the process yielding such events. He emphasizes his own position that "ritual is not necessarily a bastion of social conservatism; its symbols do not merely condense cherished sociocultural values. Rather, through its liminal processes, it holds the generating source of culture and structure" (1983:223). But these "liminal processes" are precisely those which are undercut by the ethological viewpoint.

Turner sees this and recognizes that his own position is apparently contradicted by the classical ethological position where, again in Turner's words, ritual is treated as "genetically programmed behavior" (1983:224). Turner reconciles his position with that of the ethologists by appealing to both brain structure and brain function. For him, the human brain is a liminal organ operating somewhere between the genetically fixed and the radically free. According to Turner, the development of the neocortex in humans, with its extreme bilaterality and complicated interactions with the brain stem and limbic system, seems to enable humans to step outside of ordinary evolutionary constraints—almost.

Turner outlines the "triune" brain proposed by neuro-anatomist Paul MacLean (1973, 1976), who asserts that there is an old "reptilian" brain controlling movement, a newer "limbic" brain concerned basically with emotions, and a relatively very recent "cerebral neocortex" brain of cognitive thought. The recent cerebral neocortex is divided into left and right lobes, each with distinct functions. These three brains are interdependent. "The highest and newest portion of the cerebral cortex has by no means detached itself from an ancient 'primitive' region, but functions as it does precisely 'by virtue of its relationship to the old emotional circuitry'" (1983:225).

Then Turner poses the decisive question:

> What is the role of the brain as an organ for the appropriate mixing of genetic and cultural information in the production of mental, verbal, or organic behavior? . . . To what extent is the upper brain, especially the neocortex, which is the area responsible in mammals for coordination and for higher mental abilities, on a longer leash in terms of control by the genotype or genome, the fundamental constitution of the organism in terms of its hereditary factors? Does socioculturally transmitted information *take over* control in humankind, and, if so, what are the limits, if any, to its control? Does the genotype take a permanent back seat, and is social conditioning now all in all? The picture thus built up for me was of a kind of *dual control* leading to . . . a series of symbiotic coadaptations between what might be called culturetypes and genotypes. (1983: 225)

But isn't Turner begging the question? He is saying that humans have evolved a brain that has all but freed itself from genetic restraints, and that humans are in effect genetically determined to be free, or at least genetically determined to be "coadaptive." This idea puts into scientific language a fundamentally religious idea, classically stated by Milton in *Paradise Lost* as "sufficient to stand but free to fall," where standing

and falling refer to divine grace and to the ultimate destination, in Christian terms, of each individual soul. In its contemporary guise, this idea asserts that human behavior is "to a degree" genetically determined. The sociobiologists think that this is a high degree of determination and the humanists think that it is a low degree. Turner resolves the contradiction between the ethological (sociobiological) viewpoint and his own earlier work with:

> . . . if ritualization, as discussed by Huxley, Lorenz, and other ethologists, has a biogenetic foundation, while meaning has a neocortical learned base, does this mean that creative processes, those which generate new cultural knowledge, might result from a coadaptation, perhaps in the ritual process itself, of genetic and cultural information? (1983:228)

Movement and feeling, the first two of MacLean's triunity, are to a high degree genetically based, while cognitive functions are less so. The special kind of performance called "ritual" is the interface between these—the cultural arena where the reptilian and old-mammalian brains meet the neocortex. Not only is the contradiction healed, but Turner's "ritual process" is firmly strapped into the driver's seat of evolution—an evolution in which humans will codetermine what is to happen to them socially and biologically. Furthermore, the main arena of evolutionary development is displaced from within individual human beings (the genotype) to collective human cultural action (the ritual process).

As a theater director, I ought to like this model if I want my art to be central to the future of humankind. In this model, those who understand the ritual/performance process are at the hub of coadaptive evolutionary development.

The fate or future of the collective—of humans as a species, and probably of many of our sister species as well—may depend on the kind of "coadaptation" Turner speaks of. Experiments in the areas of recombinant DNA, cloning, and artificial intelligence are yielding precise methods of elaborating on, and perhaps even controlling, evolution. It is still an open question whether this represents an advance in freedom, or a deep kind of mindlessness posing as free choice. Surely humans, both positively and negatively, consciously and without forethought, are influencing evolutionary patterns everywhere on the globe. Norman Myers estimates that intervention will result in the extinction of "at least one-quarter of all species . . . , possibly a third, and conceivably even more. With so many plants and animals gone, there will be a fundamental shift in evolution itself, as evolutionary processes go to work on a vastly reduced pool of species and as a few new species arise to fill in the gaps" (1985:2).

Although this is "coadaptation" with a vengeance, it is not the kind Turner is talking about—or at least the outcome is radically different than the one Turner hoped for. In fact, Turner's idea of how the brain works in relation to evolution has two different scenarios. In one scenario, he focuses on the collective, coming close to embracing a notion of a superbrain, an overbrain, "a global population of brains . . . whose members are incessantly communicating with one another through every physical and mental instrumentality" (1983:243). In the second scenario, he follows a more conventional evolutionary theory in which variation in the genotype, working on a strictly individual basis, accumulates changes in enough individuals to alter the species.

It is also not exactly clear why Turner speaks of a triune brain. There are really four, or even five, brains in his model: the three brains described by MacLean (1973, 1976), an extra brain for the lateralized neocortex, and the overbrain of the "global population of brains." Thus, each human has or participates in the following brains: (1) reptilian; (2) old mammalian; (3) right frontal lobe; (4) left frontal lobe; and (5) collective overbrain. As for the attraction of the metaphor of the triune brain, it is interesting to speculate how many parts of the brain there would be in cultures whose sacred number is four. Perhaps Christianity ought seriously to consider a Trinity plus two—the traditional Father, Son, Holy Ghost, plus the Virgin and . . . ?

However many brains there may be, Turner's evolutionary process is fundamentally the orthodox process where accumulating individual changes lead to changes in the species. The question is: Why should this change be positive, as Turner assumes it will be? The answer may be in Turner's acceptance of traditional Christian values. Without stating this directly, Turner hopes that each individual will love his/her neighbor as him/herself, and when abused, will be able to turn the other cheek. For the evolutionary emancipation of the brain to work constructively and not destructively, people's day-to-day values as they are lived will have to approximate the values preached by and to them. But the tendency of modernism, especially in its nineteenth and twentieth-century phase of extreme nationalism and materialism, has been anything but loving—not to mention the long and often bloody history of Christianity.

Finally, there are examples such as the dark shadow of Hitler's "eugenics"—including the unspeakable experiments of Mengele—threatening any positive outcome of coadaptation. If we are to "improve" our species at the genetic level, who will determine what is good and what is bad, and how will this be determined? Again, the only answers appear to be religious—that is, in the realm of consciously articulated ethics founded on an acknowledged scheme of superhuman authority such as God, science, or the collective. A yearning for this kind of authority by many people in many cultures under stress has given rise to a variety

of "fundamentalisms" in Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and more recently, Maoism and its most crazed offshoot, the Khmer Rouge emptying Cambodia's cities (cf. Wallace 1956).

Victor Turner was not a fundamentalist, nor was he dogmatic or tolerant of dogmatists. As I knew him, he always prized and lived the fluid, the dynamic, and the processual anti-structural generation of new ideas and new ways. Here I am referring not to what Turner himself felt or thought, but to a dark twist that could be given to some of his ideas. Intrigued as I am by coadaptation, when I turn over its implications—as if arguing with Turner around his Charlottesville kitchen table—I think that coadaptation may be his utopian wish—a wish that I, a left-handed person through and through, see the sinister side of.

EXPLAINING RITUAL

Turner next explains the experience of ritual—the celebrated feeling of "spontaneous communitas"—as the simultaneous excitation of the two hemispheres of the cerebral cortex. In offering this explanation, he is following the work of Fischer (1971) and d'Aquili, Laughlin, and Lex (1979). Referring to d'Aquili et al., Turner states:

> In particular they postulate that the rhythmic activity of ritual, aided by sonic, visual, photic, and other kinds of "driving," may lead in time to simultaneous maximal stimulation of both systems, causing ritual participants to experience what the authors call "positive, ineffable affect." They also use Freud's term "oceanic experience," as well as "yogic ecstasy," also the Christian term *unio mystica*, an experience of the union of those cognitively discriminated opposites typically generated by binary, digital left-hemispherical ratiocination. I suppose one might also use the Zen term *satori* (the integrating flash), and one could add the Quakers' "inner light," Thomas Merton's "transcendental consciousness," and the yogic *samadhi*. (1983: 230)

Turner's speculations fit nicely those of Carl Jung, and also parallel the most recent work of the theater director and theorist Jerzy Grotowski (1968; see also Kumiega 1985 and Osinski [in press]). Grotowski is trying to do what Jung wrote about, namely to identify and perform "archetypes" of human ritual action. There is a clear outline for Grotowski's "objective drama" project which is currently underway at the University of California at Irvine. Working with "masters of ritual" performance from Haiti, India, and other parts of the world, Grotowski, his students, and the professional performers are trying to find, learn, and perform definite rhythms, sounds, and gestures that seem to

"work" in a number of the world's rituals. Rather than starting from a basis of meaning, Grotowski and his fellow researchers begin with strictly "objective" elements, including tempo, iconography, movement patterns, and sounds. This research is not historical, and does not concern itself with, for example, how "Om" and "Amen" may both be based on near-Eastern mantras. Instead, the research is concerned with such questions as how the open "uh" sound followed by a "hummed" closure might not only be an "objective correlative" of Indo-European and Semitic ritual, but may also be founded on brain structure and function. If that is the case, this sequence of sounds will be found elsewhere on earth, arising not from diffusion or cultural convergence, but from archetypes in the human brain. Ultimately, Grotowski wants to make a new performance bringing together the performative expressions of these archetypes. If the theory of objective drama is correct, this new work should be extremely powerful. And if Turner had lived long enough to go on with his last adventure, he would have been very interested to find out if a Grotowskian performance made from ritual actions, which were in turn derived from a number of different cultures, shared with the source cultures certain attributes at the level of brain activity—autonomic nervous system responses, brain waves, and so on. Furthermore, since Grotowski is working cognitively—that is, theatrically—with brain stem and limbic materials, Turner may have seen Grotowski's experiment as a paradigm of coadaptation.

It would be foolish to undervalue the work of two such visionary pioneers as Turner and Grotowski—even more so where their work independently converges. But I note that in the past, great works of art and effective ritual performances have always been very definitely situated in a given culture, while efforts to transcend or to accumulate cultures finally fail at precisely the point they want to make: creating actions as powerful as, or even more powerful than, the sources. In whatever performative or literary redaction, anthologies of cultures such as Frazer's *The Golden Bough* (1890) strike me as either premature or pollyannaish efforts at one-worldness or, worse, expressions of Western hegemony: attempts by Western minds to synthesize—that is, to bring under Western dominance—all of the world's cultures.

Turner was not such a synthesizer. He was always urging people to look for the "minute particular" and to experience the intrinsically unique flavor of this or that culture, subculture, or individual. He delighted in the unique. But "Body, Brain, and Culture" (1983) signals his passionately felt need to locate, or relocate, a universal or global basis for the ritual process. I think he believed the future of the world depended on it—as well it might. Near the end of his essay he said:

> I am really speaking of a global population of brains inhabiting an entire world of inanimate and animate entities, a population whose members are incessantly

> communicating with one another through every physical and mental instrumentality. But if one considers the geology, so to speak, of the human brain and nervous system, we see represented in its strata—each layer still vitally alive—not dead like stone, the numerous pasts and presents of our planet. . . . Each of us is a microcosm, related in the deepest ways to the whole life-history of that lovely deep blue globe swirled over with the white whorls first photographed by Edwin Aldrin and Neil Armstrong from their primitive space chariot, the work nevertheless of many collaborating human brains. (1983:243)

Much as I admire Turner's work and the adventurer's risks he was always willing to take, I am uncomfortable with his attempt to relocate, and thereby resolve, the "problems" of ritual action in the workings of evolution, or more specifically, the human brain. Having said this, I will also say that I am attracted to these very ideas which I expounded in my own way in "Magnitudes of Performance" (in press), and which also animate Grotowski's active performance work. It is clear that the problems I am working on constitute a bundle of troubles for me as well as for Turner. This essay is as much a statement to myself as about Turner. I am poorer for the fact that Turner cannot directly respond and move the dialogue ahead another step.

If it is too easy to relocate ancient problems of "free will" versus "fate," either as classical Marxism (all collective free will) or sociobiology (all genetic fate), Turner's coadaptive compromise seems overgenerously Christian. Does it solve anything to give Edward O. Wilson what is Wilson's and Marx what is Marx's? However one parcels out responsibility, what, if anything, guides the human future remains obscure in the extreme. The forces within and without human individuals, societies, and environments are more than we understand.

PLAY AND TRICKSTERS

Turner possibly felt this same uneasiness, for he slipped a few pages about play into "Body, Brain, and Behavior." "As I see it," he wrote, "play does not fit in anywhere: it is a transient and is recalcitrant to localization, to placement, to fixation—a joker in the neuroanthropological act" (1983:233). Right on. But play can't be exiled so easily; certainly it is as much "in" the brain as ritual, and its ethological evolutionary roots can be as surely traced. Yet what Turner says about play cannot be understood neurologically or in terms of orthodox evolutionary theory. In "locating" play, Turner reverts to his own classical definitions, which have little to do with either ethology or neurobiology.

> The neuronic energies of play, as it were, lightly skim over the cerebral cortices, sampling rather than partaking of the capacities and functions of the various areas of the brain. . . . Play is, for me, a liminal or liminoid mode, essentially interstitial, betwixt-and-between all standard taxonomic nodes. . . . As such play cannot be pinned down by formulations of left-hemisphere thinking—such as we all must use in keeping with the rhetorical conventions of academic discourse. Play is neither ritual action nor meditation, nor is it merely vegetative, nor is it just "having fun"; it also has a good deal of ergotropic and agonistic aggressivity in its odd-jobbing, *bricolage* style. . . . Like many Trickster figures in myths (or should these be "anti-myths," if myths are dominantly left-hemisphere speculations about causality?) play can deceive, betray, beguile, delude, and gull. (1983:233-234)

This brings Turner back to his own earlier work—the twenty years or so he spent delving into the "ritual process," "liminality," "anti-structure," the "subjunctive mood," and the "performative genres." The Trickster play gives Turner a ticket out of the brain as a locked-in system. This Trickster is forever shuttling between hemispheres, among the three parts of the triune brain, and in between categories. As such, play is an activity that has not yet been defined—or, in Turner's terms, play is categorically uncategorizable, the "anti-" by means of which all categories are destabilized. This Trickster is the artist, the performer, the playful anthropologist, the adventurer.

> [Play] has the power of the weak, an infantine audacity in the face of the strong. To ban play is, in fact, to massacre the innocents. If man is a neotonic species, play is perhaps his most appropriate mode of performance. (1983:235)

In finding a place for play in-and-out of the evolutionary neurological program, Turner feels that it plays "a similar role in the social construction of reality as mutation and variation in organic evolution" (1983:236). To do this, play had to be "detached" from the nervous system's "localizations," thus enabling "it to perform the liminal function of ludic recombination of familiar elements in unfamiliar and often Auite arbitrary patterns" (1983:236). Some of these patterns might prove adaptive, culturally speaking. Thus, play is for Turner a dynamic model of the brain itself: free to move, to find its own ways, and to actively contribute to the evolutionary process. Finally, Turner's model is not structural, but audaciously processual.

CONCLUSION

From an orthodox viewpoint, the difficulty with all of this is that Turner is moving too freely between strict, analogous, and metaphoric thinking. But these contradictions are only surface phenomena, and I am not overly disturbed by them. What is actually happening—and what is so exciting to work from—is Turner's eager searching for appropriate ways to integrate his life's work with data which are new for him concerning the brain. One should not treat "Body, Brain, and Culture" as the fruit of that search, but as its first seeding—or more properly, as an early exploratory voyage, a first rehearsal.

Turner was very much a man of the theater. He would try, take it again, work out another way, fix a routine, and then run it in a new context. He was forever polishing his act. But he was not slick, and he enjoyed most the deconstructive process of workshop followed by the myriad possible reconstructions of rehearsal. He was not shy about showing work in progress. In fact, he was fascinated by the progressive method of working, and it was those areas of human experience that are most processual—pilgrimage, ritual, theater, and dance—all of which are performative genres, that occupied his mind and body.

Still, this does not tell us what, except for the sheer dazzling restlessness of his spirit, brought Turner to attempt a synthesis between his own brand of speculative humanistic anthropology and sociobiology. Again, I think the answer is religion. Like so many of us, Turner was an optimist in terms of his own life, but much more pessimistic when contemplating the future of the species, including life on earth. Troubled by the state of the world, he may have been seeking a synthesis not mainly between two scientific viewpoints, but between science and faith.

If God (or whatever it is) is the very formulation of the world, than this formulation ought to be most strongly present in the brain, the world's most complicated and sophisticated organ. To put it in Hindu terms, if Atman (the innermost, impersonal Self) and Brahman (the Absolute) are one, then by examining the brain—the very seat of Atman—humans might learn a great deal about Brahman. They may even find "where" Brahman is—not where in the sense of Broca's area or the hippocampus, but in the system of relationships and neuro-electronic-chemical exchanges among each individual's several brains. Or, humans may discover that Brahman has no individual basis, but exists only in the coordinated work of many brains. Or that the same collectivity—the same "triune" existence—as there is within each brain transcends all individuals.

Such contemplation is two steps from the ultimate metatext. The first step is within human grasp: an independent artificial intelligence. The second is contact with superior nonhuman be-

ings: the extraterrestrial connection. I am saying what I think Turner might have been coming to. He realized that an organ of contemplation such as the human brain is not capable of absolute self-examination. If forced to contemplate itself, the human brain will go crazy (or mystically fuzzy) dealing with too many layers of metatextual reflexivity. But the brain might either create an exterior organ of thought or actively seek to come into contact with nonhuman others with whom it could communicate. Many experiments point in these directions. And it's not only with apes and dolphins that we want to talk. It would seem that if humans are to survive, the next step is communication with some genuinely thoughtful other.

Here, science fiction, popular literature, and film is far ahead of science, but not ahead of religion. For has it not been religion's project from the very beginning of human history to locate, establish, and keep contact with nonhuman beings? And do not those who believe in gods think of these beings not as "symbols," but as actually existing others? Part of the anthropological romance has been to go to far-away places and live with people who daily communicate with and experience divine (or demonic) others. Especially for "positivists," this has been a heady/hearty encounter. And now, as positivism fades, even scientists of the first order want to meet nonhuman others themselves, first-hand, face-to-face, brain-to-brain. How, or if, this will be accomplished is not yet clear.

From this perspective, Victor Turner's last adventure is a trope modeling his desire to contact those others we humans need to negotiate fate with.

Science fiction? Fiction as science? Or coadaptation in a most definite, concrete way?

NOTES

1. This essay was accepted for publication in *Anthropologica* in 1984. Another version was subsequently scheduled for publication in *The Anthropology of Performance* by Victor Turner, New York: PAJ Publications (Division of Performing Arts Journal, Incorporated; in press).

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VICTOR WITTER TURNER: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1952-1975)

Henry G. Barnard, compiler
Library School, National Library of New Zealand

INTRODUCTION

This bibliography was originally developed for students of the anthropological study of religion at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand and at Auckland, Massey, and Otago Universities.

Although all of Victor Turner's major publications and many of his minor ones between 1952 and 1975 have been included in this bibliography, it is possible that some of his shorter reviews have been overlooked. The principal method of compilation was bibliographic coupling; that is, working from the references in one source to those in another. Sources consulted included *The Social Sciences Citation Index, Sociological Abstracts*, the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index, Abstracts in Anthropology, Current Anthropology*, and the *Book Review Index* (for reviews by and about Victor Turner). In addition, the indexes of a number of journals in anthropology and the comparative study of religion were examined.

Whenever possible, reviews of Turner's major works by other authors have been included. This list of reviews is by no means comprehensive, and is meant only as a guide. Abstracts of articles and references to reprinted works have been included whenever possible, although these are likewise not necessarily comprehensive.

The arrangement of the main section of the bibliography is chronological by date of publication. Although this format is meant to show the development of Turner's ideas and the changing nature of his interests, it must be treated with caution since delays in publication, reprinting, and other factors have resulted in an imperfect chronological framework.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO VICTOR TURNER'S WORK

The work of Victor Turner is now recognized as among the best arising from the discipline of anthropology in recent decades. Although Turner's influence has been principally in the study of religion, his works on political anthropology have also been the basis of wide discussion.

Victor Witter Turner was born in 1919 in Glasgow, Scotland. In 1949, he completed an honors undergraduate degree in anthro-

pology at the University of London under Professors Daryll Forde and Meyer Fortes. Between 1950 and 1954, he was a Research Officer at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Rhodesia (now Zambia). During that period, he conducted fieldwork among the Lunda-Ndembu people in northern Rhodesia. In 1955, he received his Ph.D. from the University of Manchester, and in 1957, his thesis was published as a book titled *Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life*. From 1954 to 1960, Turner worked at the University of Manchester, first as a Senior Fellow and later as Senior Lecturer. During that period, Professor Max Gluckman, a former Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute whose theories influenced Turner, especially in the initial stages of his work, was head of the Department of Anthropology at Manchester. Around Gluckman grew up what came to be known as the "Manchester school" of British social anthropology. Members of this school included John Barnes, A. L. Epstein, Clyde Mitchell, and Dorothy Emmet as the school's "mascot" philosopher. Turner was first identified with this school, and his later interests and ideas continued to be linked to the school's influence.

In 1961, Turner was appointed a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California. This opportunity was used to write *The Drums of Affliction: A Study of Religious Processes Among the Ndembu of Zambia*, published in 1968. Although Turner returned to the University of Manchester a year later, he remained deeply attracted to the free-wheeling, multi-disciplinary atmosphere of American academic life. In 1964 he accepted a position as Professor of Anthropology at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York and remained in this post for four years, conducting three months of fieldwork among the Gisu of Uganda (July-September, 1966).

In 1969, Turner joined the six-member Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago. Colleagues on the committee included the novelist Saul Bellow, the philosopher Hannah Arendt, and the art critic Harold Rosenberg. In 1977, Turner was appointed William R. Kenan Professor of Anthropology at the University of Virginia, a post which he held until his death in December 1983. During the 1970s, Turner also conducted fieldwork on pilgrimage in Mexico and Ireland. His latter years were devoted to studying the interplay between ritual and contemporary drama theory.

This brief sketch of Victor Turner's academic and professional career is meant as an introduction to the major themes which developed in his work. The origins of these themes were multifarious, and were as much related to his personal history as to the influence of his background. First, there is the theme of "society" as an evolutionary mechanism which exists to combat humankind's "innate and universal drives whose complete gratification would result in a breakdown of (social) control" (*The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* 1967:37). Turner also

spoke of the "forces of disorder that . . . inhere in man's mammalian constitution" (*The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* 1969:93). This Hobbesian view of *bellum omnes contra omnes* is a theme which pervades his work and is more often than not implicit. This is not to say that Turner consistently thought through the consequences of this idea. Indeed, since the consequences of the idea were taken for granted, they evaded his scientific scrutiny. The result is that at times, he seems to suggest that "self-interest" is a significant factor in understanding capitalist societies, and that at other times it is significant for all societies. But he also sometimes suggests that it is society itself that is disruptive. In this vein, he speaks of the "failure . . . of the secular mechanisms to redress and absorb conflicts that arise in and between local and kinship groups" (*Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life* 1957:289), and of "the social forces working in the opposite direction" from that of societal unity (ibid.:295). This idea culminates in his statement that "structural differentiation, both vertical and horizontal is the foundation of strife and factionalism" (*The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* 1969:179).

The second theme that runs through Turner's work is related to the first. Turner saw ritual as one of the principal mechanisms that society has evolved for maintaining the social order. He stated that "in the course of a ritual, symbols and verbal behavior are manipulated so as to discharge tensions in the social system" (*Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life* 1957:316), and that "ritual is situated near the apex of a whole hierarchy of redressive and regulative institutions that correct deflections and deviations from customary prescribed behavior" (*The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* 1967:45). To discover how ritual fulfills its function, Turner explored various methods of analyzing rituals and ritual symbols. This exploration suggested a number of other themes.

Victor Turner stressed not only the need to analyze rituals and ritual symbols by looking at their external forms, observable characteristics, and sociological contexts, but also the need to take into account the interpretations offered by native specialists and laymen—that is, native exegesis. By using all of these data, Turner discovered three properties of ritual symbols: (1) *condensation*—the ability of ritual symbols to "stand for" or "represent" many things and actions in a single formation; (2) *unification of disparate significata*—or the idea that very different categories and actions are often held together in one symbol by the common possession of analogous properties; and (3) *polarization of meaning*—how the various "meanings" of a symbol can be spread out on a spectrum or fan from a *normative pole* to a sensory or *orectic pole*. The meanings of a given symbol at its normative pole are seen as usually connected with principles of

social behavior, while the meanings of symbols at their sensory poles are usually seen as physiological characters.

It is this last property of ritual symbols which provides Turner with another of the major themes in his work, namely, the ability of ritual symbols to unite intimately the moral and the material by conflating the normative with the sensory. Thus "an exchange of qualities may take place in the psyches of the participants under the stimulating circumstances of the ritual performance, between orectic and normative poles; the former, through its association with the latter, becomes purged of its infantile and regressive character, while the normative pole becomes charged" with the power of the grossly physiological (*The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* 1967:54-55).

Turner was interested in analyzing both the semantic and sociological dimensions of rituals and ritual symbolism. Since he saw ritual as a phase in social process, he developed a "dramatic" mode of analysis which stressed the "processual" nature of social life. This analysis was an especially strong theme in *Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life* (1957), where he attempted to extract the formal properties of ritual processes, including breaches of norms, crisis resolution or dissolution, and other such categories.

Turner's emphasis on "process" also led him to examine the "processual" nature of rituals themselves, leaning heavily at the start on Van Gennep's "rites of passage." Following Van Gennep, Turner discerned three phases in rituals: separation, margin (or limen), and aggregation. Concentrating on the liminal phase of rituals, Turner described and evaluated the common symbolic features of rituals. His concern with the properties of "liminal" phenomena provided the major theme for such works as *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (1969), and *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* (1974). Eventually, Turner moved from an analysis of the symbolism of the liminal phase of "primitive" rituals to the analysis of liminal phases in such broader social processes as millenarian movements and pilgrimage processes. Here, he discerned similar structural and anti-structural characteristics and was led to the development of the concept of *communitas*, or society seen as a relatively unstructured, undifferentiated commitatus, community, or even communion of equal individuals.

Since the themes which occupied the focal point of Turner's interests were "liminal" and "communitas" phenomena on a worldwide scale, he eventually sought these themes not only in social processes, but also in art and literature.

AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF VICTOR TURNER (1952-1975)

N.B.: Unless otherwise noted, the following works were authored by Victor Turner.

1952 The Lozi Peoples of North-Western Rhodesia. Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Central Africa, Part Three. London: International African Institute Press.
Reviews:
Trouwborst, A. A.
1954 Man 54:61.
Wylie, T.
1954 The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal 17:58.

1953 Lunda Rites and Ceremonies. Rhodes-Livingstone Museum Occasional Papers Number Ten. Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia): The Rhodes-Livingstone Museum.

1954 A Revival in the Study of African Ritual: Review of *Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa* by Max Gluckman and of *African Worlds* by Daryll Forde. The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal 17:51-56.

1955 A Lunda Love Story and its Consequences: Selected Texts from Traditions Collected by Henrique Dias de Carvalho at the Court of Mwatianvwa in 1887. The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal 19:1-26.
Abstract:
1956 African Abstracts 7:120.

1955 The Spatial Separation of Adjacent Generations in Ndembu Village Structure. Africa 25:121-137.

A discussion of the separation of two halves of a roughly circular village into adjacent generations, including the relation of this principle of social organization to virilocal marriage, succession to chieftainship, and the relationship between the sexes and the kinds of work they do. Adjacent generations treat each other with respect, whereas alternate generations treat each other with familiarity and good humor.
Abstract:
1956 African Abstracts 7:128.

and E. L. Turner
1955 Money Economy Among the Mwinilunga Ndembu: A Study of Some Individual Cash Budgets. The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal 18:19-37.
Abstract:
1956 African Abstracts 7:40.

1957 Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, University of Zambia. A new edition of this book published in 1968 includes a new preface.

A detailed analysis of the social organization of the Ndembu of Zambia. There are chapters on the history of the tribe, the ecology of the environment, and demography. The main principles of Ndembu social organization (matrilineality, virilocal marriage, the spatial separation of adjacent generations, and succession to headmanship) are first discussed in brief, and then in greater detail using a new type of analysis which concentrates on showing how the major principles of Ndembu social organization—as well as psychological, ecological, and economic factors—interact, conflict, and support each other through a series of social dramas. These social dramas are concerned with the activities of both individuals and groups in one particular village, and how they try to exploit various principles and values to their own ends. The pervasive theme of the book is conflict and the resolution of conflict, and there is a chapter on the politically integrative functions of ritual.

Reviews:

Richards, A. L.
1959 Africa 29:88-90.

Stanner, W. E.
1958 Continuity and Schism in an African Society: A Review. Oceania 29:208-217.

Tuden, Arthur
1958 American Anthropologist 60:1222-1224.

Wilson, Monica
1959 Man 59:55-56.

See also:

Carlston, Kenneth S.
1968 Social Theory and African Tribal Organization: The Development of Sociological Theory, pp. 425-434. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

Chock, Phyllis P.
1967 Kinship and Culture: Some Problems in Ndembu Kinship. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 23:74-89.

1960 Muchona the Hornet: Interpreter of Religion. *In* In the Company of Man: Twenty Portraits by Anthropologists. Joseph B. Casagrande, ed. pp. 333-355. New York: Harper and Brothers. Reprinted in 1967 in *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* by Victor Turner, pp. 131-150. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

In Muchona, an elderly Ndembu diviner, Turner found a kindred spirit with whom he could converse on a professional level about the ritual structure of the Ndembu. Muchona was Turner's best informant on these matters, and Muchona's descriptions were enhanced by his obvious delight in speculating about his own religious world and the meanings of its symbols. Muchona's wit found a ready response in Turner, who spent eight months in exhilarating, quick-fire talk with Muchona and an Ndembu school-teacher named Windson. In this article, Turner also describes Muchona's social and psychological background as a marginal man and tries to explain why Muchona became a diviner.

Review (of Casagrande, ed.):
Keesing, Felix M.
1961 American Anthropologist 63:138-141.

1961 Ndembu Divination: Its Symbolism and Techniques. Rhodes-Livingstone Papers Number 31. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. Reprinted in 1969 by Manchester University Press for the Institute for Social Research, University of Zambia. Reprinted again in 1975 with a new Introduction in *Revelation and Divination in Ndembu Ritual* by Victor Turner, pp. 205-342. Symbol, Myth, and Ritual Series, Victor Turner, ed. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

For Ndembu diviners, the items of their divining apparatus are more like signs than symbols, and the diviners' knowledge of the meanings of the items are more esoteric and conscious than those of ordinary laypersons. In this case, a sign is an analogous or abbreviated expression of a *known* thing, whereas a symbol is the best possible expression of a relatively *unknown* fact which is nevertheless recognized or postulated as existing. The Ndembu diviner discloses what has already happened and does not foretell future events. He is a member of society who is called upon in moments of crisis to isolate the physical and social causes of misfortunes. As an agent of redress and social adjustment, he locates tensions in the contemporary social structure. By exonerating and accusing individuals, he brings moral norms to the surface and restates them, and also prescribes actions which will dissipate tensions that have accumulated in the social structure. Turner exemplifies these ideas with detailed case studies of divinations which he observed.

1961 Ritual Symbolism, Morality and Social Structure Among the Ndembu. The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal 30:1-10. Reprinted in 1965 in *African Systems of Thought: Studies Presented and Discussed at the Third International African Seminar in Salisbury, December 1960.* Preface by Meyer Fortes and

G. Dieterlen. Meyer Fortes and G. Dieterlen, eds. pp. 79-95 (résumé en français). London and New York: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute (see also "Ritual and Symbolism: Introduction to the Section on Symbolism" 1965). Reprinted again in 1967 in *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* by Victor Turner, pp. 48-58. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Symbols make beliefs, ideas, values, sentiments, and psychological dispositions that cannot be directly perceived visible, audible, and tangible. Symbols are also multivocal, standing for many things at the same time. The meanings of symbols can be spread out on a continuum or fan from the orectic (biological and emotional) pole to the cognitive pole. Turner considers this polarity to be a universal feature of ritual symbols of any semantic complexity. Through this polarity, an exchange of qualities takes place between the two poles of a symbol: (1) the orectic pole is purged of its anti-social elements through its association with the cognitive and normative; and (2) the normative pole is charged with the biological and emotional effects of the orectic. In brief, a single symbol represents both the obligatory and the desirable, a union of the moral and the biological.

Abstract:

1963 African Abstracts 14:83-84.

1962 Chihamba, the White Spirit: A Ritual Drama of the Ndembu. Rhodes-Livingstone Papers Number 33. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. Reprinted in 1975 with a new introduction in *Revelation and Divination in Ndembu Ritual* by Victor Turner, pp. 1-204. Symbol, Myth, and Ritual Series, Victor Turner, ed. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

The main features of this ritual have already been outlined in Turner's *Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life* (1957). Here, in concentrating on the various performers, the objects used, and explanations which the performers give for both their actions and the objects they use, Turner gives a step-by-step account of the ritual. Unlike his other analyses, he does not go into the social setting of the ritual, but instead concentrates on the content of its meaning. He isolates Kavula, one of the male nature-spirits, for special attention and explores the meaning and function of Kavula in his ritual setting. Then, through a cross-cultural comparison with other isolates from different cultures, such as Jesus and Moby Dick, he attempts to give a theological explanation of the ritual. He also criticizes his previous analyses of ritual, maintaining that they obliterated the qualitative distinction between religious and secular cus-

tom and behavior. This work represents one of Turner's key statements on the essential irreducibility of religion.
Review:
Horton, Robin
1964 Ritual Man in Africa. Africa 34:85-104.

1962 Review of *Lugbara Religion: Ritual and Authority among an East African People* by John Middleton. Man 62:43-44.

1962 Review of *The Social Organization of the Gwembe Tonga* by Elizabeth Colson. American Anthropologist 64:868.

1962 Themes in the Symbolism of Ndembu Hunting Ritual. Anthropological Quarterly 35(2):37-57. Reprinted in 1967 in *Mythology and Symbolism.* John Middleton, ed., pp. 249-269. Garden City, New York: The Natural History Press. Reprinted again in 1967 in *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* by Victor Turner, pp. 280-298. Ithaca: New York, Cornell University Press.

For the Ndembu, hunting is a religious activity in addition to a search for food which is given an importance far beyond the physical needs which it fulfills. Turner analyzes various ritual symbols, especially the *chishinga*, and reveals the multivocal nature of these symbols from three levels of interpretation: (1) the exegetical; (2) the operational; and (3) the positional. These symbols act as unitary powers which conflate all the powers that are inherent in the activities, objects, relationships, and ideas which they represent.
Abstracts:
1963 African Abstracts 14:133.
1964 Sociological Abstracts 12:747.

1962 Three Symbols of *Passage* in Ndembu Circumcision Ritual: An Interpretation. *In* Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations by Daryll Forde, Meyer Fortes, and Victor W. Turner. Introduction by Max Gluckman. Max Gluckman, ed. pp. 124-173. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press (distributed in North America by the Humanities Press, New York).

An exposition of the author's method of analyzing ritual symbols with particular reference to three symbols, all of which are trees and all of which occur in *Mukanda*, the circumcision rite of the Ndembu. This article stresses a structural analysis as well as the tools used to extract the meanings of symbols at the exegetical, operational, and positional levels. Turner concludes with a brief comparison of circumcision with sacraments in the Western religious systems. He states that "There are religious

depths here that cannot be fathomed by the analysis of observational data."
Reviews (of Gluckman, ed.):
Douglas, Mary
1963 Africa 33:271-272.
Firth, Raymond
1965 Man 65:88-89.
Mandelbaum, David G.
1964 American Anthropologist 66:1182-1184.

1963 Review of *The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia: Social and Religious Studies* by Elizabeth Colson. Africa 33:276.

1963 Review of *Shona Religion* by Michael Gelfand. Man 63:136.

1964 Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in *Rites de Passage. In* Symposium on New Approaches to the Study of Religion: Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society. June Helm, ed. pp. 4-20. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press for the American Ethnological Society. Reprinted in 1967 in *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* by Victor Turner, pp. 93-111. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Reprinted again in 1972 in *Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach.* Third Edition. William Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, eds. pp. 338-347. New York: Harper and Row. Reprinted again in 1979 in *Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach.* Fourth Edition. William Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, eds. pp. 234-243. New York: Harper and Row.

"In his seminal essay *The Rites of Passage*, Arnold Van Gennep characterized a class of rituals with three successive and distinct moments in ritual time: separation, margin, and aggregation. Working within Van Gennep's framework, Turner concentrates on the properties of the hitherto neglected, and supposedly amorphous, period in rites of passage, the marginal or liminal period. Initiation rites have particularly well-marked liminal periods, where neophytes typically are removed, secluded, darkened, hidden, without rank or insignia; in terms of social structure, neophytes are invisible. In effect, the initiate is 'betwixt and between,' neither here nor there, no longer a child and not yet an adult. During this period of transition between states symbolic themes characteristically concern death and decomposition, or gestation and parturition, referring to the culturally defined person the initiate has been and will become. Because of the economy of symbolic reference, the opposed states—the having been and the becoming—may be represented by a single object, act, or phrase. Turner's originality lies in uncovering the potential richness and cultural significance of what

all too often is dismissed as a residual category, an interstructural phase which does not bear much study" (Lessa and Vogt 1972:338).

1964 Lunda Medicine and the Treatment of Disease. Rhodes-Livingstone Museum Occasional Papers Number Fifteen. Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia): The Rhodes-Livingstone Museum. Reprinted in 1967 in *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* by Victor Turner, pp. 299-358. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

The Ndembu conceive of disease as a species of misfortune caused by mystical forces which are directed by conscious agents. To counter these forces, diviners are employed to diagnose and recommend curative rituals. Misfortune is considered to be a black state, and the rituals which are used to restore a normal state of affairs are full of the symbolism of color. This article includes an inventory of diseases and their treatments for everything from bilharziasis and leprosy to backache and abscesses. An analysis of the symbolism of these rituals shows how they are influenced by ultimate and axiomatic values of Ndembu religion and ethics. A major point of the paper is how their beliefs about diseases and cures give the Ndembu a false sense of confidence about their ability to cope with disease.

1964 An Ndembu Doctor in Practice. *In* Magic, Faith, and Healing: Studies in Primitive Psychiatry Today. Foreword by Jerome D. Frank. Ari Kiev, ed. pp. 230-263. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe (Macmillan). Reprinted in 1967 in *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* by Victor Turner, pp. 359-393. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

This is a description of the activities, character, and social role of an Ndembu ritual specialist or doctor, with a detailed description of the sociological context of the performances of the rituals in which the doctor was a specialist. There is also a detailed description of the rituals themselves. Turner states: "Emotion is roused and then stripped of its illicit and antisocial quality, but nothing of its intensity, its quantitative aspect, has been lost in the transformation. Ndembu social norms and values, expressed in symbolic objects and actions, are saturated with this generalised emotion, which itself becomes ennobled through contact with these norms and values. The sick individual, exposed to this process, is reintegrated into his group as, step by step, its members are reconciled with one another in emotionally charged circumstances."

Review (of Kiev, ed.):
Stainbrook, Edward
1968 American Anthropologist 70:173-174.

1964 Symbols in Ndembu Ritual. *In* Closed Systems and Open Minds: The Limits of Naïvety in Social Anthropology. Max Gluckman, ed. pp. 20-51. Chicago, Illinois: Aldine Publishing Company (also published in 1964 by Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London). Reprinted in 1967 in *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* by Victor Turner, pp. 19-47. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Reprinted again in 1970 in *Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis*. Dorothy Emmet and Alasdair MacIntyre, eds. pp. 150-182. London: Macmillan.

This is one of Turner's major statements on the study of ritual symbolism. Ritual is prescribed, formal behavior for occasions not given over to technological routine, and it refers to beliefs in mystical beings or powers. Symbols are things which the general consensus regards as naturally typifying, representing, or recalling something either by possession of analogous qualities, or by association in fact or thought. Ritual symbols can be analyzed from the standpoint of three classes of data: (1) the external form; (2) the native interpretation; and (3) significant contexts worked out by the anthropologist. These symbols can be further classified by their properties: (a) condensation or multivocality; (b) unification of disparate significata; and (c) polarization of meaning. Rituals adapt and periodically readapt the biophysical individual to the basic conditions and axiomatic values of human social life. Because of their properties, ritual symbols make the obligatory desirable. Since rituals are part of broad social processes, they should be studied as forces in a field of social action, and not merely as part of an abstract unitary system. Turner eschews psychological interpretations of ritual symbolism not because they are irrelevant, but because he thinks that an anthropologist cannot pass judgment "in a field of inquiry in which he has neither received systematic training nor obtained thorough practical experience."
Abstract:
1971 Sociological Abstracts 19:710.
Reviews (of Gluckman, ed.):
Beattie, J. H. M.
1965 Man 65:158-159.
Middleton, John
1967 American Anthropologist 69:386-388.

1964 Witchcraft and Sorcery: Taxonomy Versus Dynamics. Africa 34:314-324. Reprinted in 1967 in *The Forest of Symbols:*

Aspects of Ndembu Ritual by Victor Turner, pp. 112-127. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

In this review of "Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa" by Middleton and Winter (1963), Victor Turner criticizes the contributors for not employing more sociological methods of analysis in their study of witchcraft beliefs and for their overemphasis on the cognitive and cultural aspects of these beliefs. In so doing, he reveals his own predilection for analyses that accommodate "biotic, ecological, and intergroup as well as intra-group developments."

1965 Ritual and Symbolism: Introduction to the Section on Symbolism. *In* African Systems of Thought: Studies Presented and Discussed at the Third International African Seminar in Salisbury, December 1960. Preface by Meyer Fortes and G. Dieterlen. Meyer Fortes and G. Dieterlen, eds. pp. 9-15. London and New York: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute (see also "Ritual Symbolism, Morality and Social Structure Among the Ndembu" 1961).

A summary of the discussions on ritual and symbolism at the Third International African Seminar held in Salisbury (Harare), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in 1960. The divergent perspectives of British and French anthropologists are pointed out; the former stress the sociological aspects of religious behavior and belief, while the latter stress the semantic, cognitive, and systematic aspects of this same behavior and belief.
Reviews (of Fortes and Dieterlen, eds.):
Douglas, Mary
1967 Africa 37:352-353.
Maquet, Jacques
1966 American Anthropologist 68:246-248.

1965 Some Current Trends in the Study of Ritual in Africa. Anthropological Quarterly 38(3):155-166.

Literature on the study of ritual in Africa can be broadly classified into purely descriptive studies and analytic or interpretive studies. The latter type of studies can be further subdivided into those which focus on traditional, cyclical, and repetitive systems, and those which focus on radically changing systems. Two types of analysis are applied to both systems, one concentrating on the ideological structure of religions, and the other on social situations where religious beliefs and practices significantly affect behavior. Turner suggests that these extremes can be brought together by seeing society as "a process with some systematic characteristics." He advo-

cates urgently-needed research in traditional cultures which are little affected by modernization, with particular reference to the collection of exegetical texts.
Abstracts:
1966 African Abstracts 17:153.
1968 Sociological Abstracts 16:419.

1966 Anthropological Epilogue. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences 251(772):521-522.

A very brief summary of the main problems raised by the dialogue between ethologists and anthropologists with regard to the study of ritual in animals and man. Both ethology and anthropology are characterized as "behavioral" sciences.

1966 Colour Classification in Ndembu Ritual: A Problem in Primitive Classification. *In* Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion. Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth Monograph Number Three. Michael Banton, ed. pp. 47-84. London: Tavistock Publications. Reprinted in 1967 in *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* by Victor Turner, pp. 59-92. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

This paper was first delivered as a contribution to a conference on "New Approaches in Social Anthropology," sponsored by the Association of Social Anthropologists in 1963. The revival of interest in primitive forms of classification is pointed out. Turner found that among the Ndembu of Zambia, every form of dualism was contained in a wider, tripartite mode of classification relating to the colors white, red, and black. He describes the use of these colors in rituals among the Ndembu, Ngone, and other African societies, and extracts the meanings of these colors in those societies. Turning to comparative materials from Africa, Malaya, Australia, North America, and India, as well as to data from archaeological literature, he points out the universality of the meanings of these colors. He also attempts to link the cultural meanings of these three colors with their "natural" symbolism in a socio-physiological hypothesis. "By representing forces or strands of life by colour symbols in a ritual context, men have felt that they could domesticate or control these forces for social ends, but the forces and the symbols for them are biologically, psychologically, and logically prior to social classification by moieties, clans, sex totems and all the rest."
Review (of Banton, ed.):
Rivière, P. G.
1966 Man N.S. 1:406-407.

1966 Political Anthropology. Marc J. Swartz, Victor W. Turner, and Arthur Tuden, eds. Chicago, Illinois: Aldine Publishing Company.

The introduction to this book (pp. 1-41) discusses the concepts of politics, force and coercion, legitimacy, power, and other related terms. The value of processual forms of analysis, such as those found in Turner's *Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life* (1957), are emphasized.

Reviews:

Jayawardena, Chandra
1968 American Anthropologist 70:764-766.

La Fontaine, J.
1967 Man N.S. 2:644.

1966 Review of *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function* by Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss. Translated by W. D. Halls. Man N.S. 1:116-117.

1966 Review of *Theories of Primitive Religion* by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. Man N.S. 1:256-258.

1966 Ritual Aspects of Conflict Control in African Micropolitics. *In* Political Anthropology. Marc J. Swartz, Victor W. Turner, and Arthur Tuden, eds. pp. 239-246. Chicago, Illinois: Aldine Publishing Company.

Society is a process with some systematic characteristics rather than a closely integrated system. Disputes in society have a life cycle, successive situations of this cycle being characterized as "political," "ritual," or "economic," depending on the routines, procedures, and symbols used in the situation. A social situation is a critical point or complication in the history of a group, and intervening situations leave their imprint on subsequent patterns of behavior. Turner demonstrates these ideas by describing the struggle between two factions of a vicinage to fill the role of senior circumciser at a performance of the Mukunda circumcision ritual. He shows how when the situation was defined politically, it was the modernist group that seemed to have the upper hand, whereas when the dispute entered its ritual phase, the traditionalists became paramount.

1966 Sorcery in Its Social Setting: A Review Article. African Social Research 2:159-164.

In this review of M. G. Marwick's *Sorcery in its Social Setting: A Study of the Northern Rhodesian Cewa* (Manchester University Press 1965), Turner commends the author for the use of detailed case histories, for his detailed ac-

count of Cewa social structure, and, in general, for his sociological approach to the study of sorcery. However, Marwick is criticized for his tendency to use the case method as "apt illustration" rather than to probe the properties of spatio-temporal continua. Marwick has failed to provide an in-depth study of the vicissitudes of life in one community over an extended period of time. Nevertheless, this work marks the culmination of a passing epoch in anthropological research.

1966 The Syntax of Symbolism in an African Ritual. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences 251(772):295-303. Reprinted in 1971 (with the last two paragraphs omitted) in *Structural Analysis of Oral Tradition.* Publications in Folklore and Folklife Number Three. Pierre Maranda and Elli Köngäs, eds. pp. 125-133. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

This article was delivered as a contribution to a symposium titled "A discussion on ritualization of behavior in animals and man." Here, Turner once again describes the analytical tools he has developed for the study of religion, the various dimensions of significance (exegetic, operational, and positional), and the way the meaning of symbol is built up in the exegetic dimension (on the nominal, artifactual, and substantial basis). He demonstrates the use of these concepts in an analysis of the mukula tree, which exudes a dusky red gum from cracks in its bark. Using this analysis, he demonstrates the complex relationship between innate human propensities and cultural mechanisms.

Review (of Maranda and Köngäs, eds.):
Gossen, Gary H.
1972 American Anthropologist 74:1446-1449.

1967 Aspects of Saora Ritual and Shamanism: An Approach to the Data of Ritual. *In* The Craft of Social Anthropology. Arnold L. Epstein, ed. pp. 181-204. London: Tavistock Publications (distributed in North America by Barnes and Noble, New York).

Verrier Elwin's book, *The Religion of an Indian Tribe*, is criticized for its lack of a sociological dimension in its analysis of Saora ritual. Elwin sees Saora religion "as an attempt to make the mystery and horror of the unseen more bearable." Turner states that this explanation might be adequate for the theologian or the psychologist, but not for the anthropologist. Using Elwin's data, he tries to extract the social elements of Saora religion, but is hampered most of the way by the lack of relevant material in Elwin's work. Only after the sociological and

psychological factors influencing religion have been closely examined can one reflect on the "numinous" element in religion.

Reviews (of Epstein, ed.):
Parkin, David
1968 Africa 38:478-479.
Reining, Conrad C.
1968 American Anthropologist 70:770-771.

1967 The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

With one exception (see below), all of the essays in this book have been published before. The book's introduction contains a very general description of the social and ritual organization of the Ndembu of Zambia.

Contents:
"Muchona the Hornet: Interpreter of Religion" (1960).
"Ritual Symbolism, Morality and Social Structure Among the Ndembu" (1961).
"Themes in the Symbolism of Ndembu Hunting Ritual" (1962).
"Witchcraft and Sorcery: Taxonomy Versus Dynamics" (1964).
"Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in *Rites de Passage*" (1964).
"An Ndembu Doctor in Practice" (1964).
"Symbols in Ndembu Ritual" (1964).
"Lunda Medicine and the Treatment of Disease" (1964).
"Colour Classification in Ndembu Ritual: A Problem in Primitive Classification" (1966).
"Mukanda: The Rite of Circumcision" (1967; see below).

Reviews:
Beidelman, T. O.
1968 Africa 38:483-484.
Peacock, James
1968 American Anthropologist 70:984-985.

1967 Law, Primitive. New Catholic Encyclopedia 8:560-564. New York: McGraw-Hill.

In this article, "primitive" means technologically simple. Radcliffe-Brown and others argued that where there is no state, there is no law, implying that various stateless societies such as the Nuer and Cheyenne would have no law. On the other hand, Malinowski states that law is that branch of custom which enforces rules of conduct. Nadel defines the presence or absence of law in terms of force. Turner recommends studying law as a part of social process, where certain phases of this process are called legal because of the kinds of activities they involve, including the settlement of disputes, etc.

1967 Mukanda: The Rite of Circumcision. *In* The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual by Victor W. Turner, pp. 151-279. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

This article is the only new piece in Turner's collection of essays titled *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual* (see above). It is another detailed, step-by-step account of one particular ritual—in this case a life-crisis ritual, which is to be distinguished from rituals of affliction. Unlike Turner's analysis of Chihamba ritual (see *Chihamba, the White Spirit: A Ritual Drama of the Ndembu* 1962, above), he returns to a sociological explanation of ritual behavior and symbols. The social background of the ritual performance and detailed genealogical and spatial studies are provided. In this essay, Turner is concerned with "the power relations between the real groups in the field, and the shifting balances between groups and between individuals."

1967 Religion (in primitive culture). New Catholic Encyclopedia 12:247-250. New York: McGraw-Hill.

This article is a brief review of main trends in the development of theories about religion, from evolutionist hypotheses (Tylor, Frazer, Freud, and Durkheim) to functionalist and current hypotheses. The "meaning of religion" is stressed, and there is a brief discussion of some of the principal religious ideas and practices in primitive societies, including cults of the dead, the High God, and polytheism. Attention is given to the development of Judaism as a unique religion and as a precursor of Christianity.

1968 The Drums of Affliction: A Study of Religious Processes Among the Ndembu of Zambia. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press and the International African Institute.

This work begins with a discussion of ritual in the broad terms of its symbolic structure, its aims, and its implications for social relationships. Some background information about Ndembu cosmology, social structure, and the dynamics of social cohesion and conflict is provided. This is followed by an extended description of the basic concepts of Ndembu divination (for more detail, see *Ndembu Divination: Its Symbolism and Techniques* 1961) by which the Ndembu determine the various causes of misfortune, and hence the kind of ritual to be used in removing this.

The main body of the book is divided into two sections. The first section describes a set of rituals of affliction in the context of an extended case history of those involved. This is then compared to other sets of Ndembu rit-

ual with the same afflictive character. The second section describes a set of life-crisis rituals involving female initiation. A brief conclusion summarizes the theoretical implications of both lengthy accounts.

Reviews:

Beidelman, T. O.
1969 Africa 39:91-93.
Janzen, John M.
1969 American Anthropologist 71:525-527.
White, C. M. N.
1969 African Social Research 8:615-619.

1968 Mukanda: The Politics of a Non-Political Ritual. *In* Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives. Marc J. Swartz, ed. pp. 135-150. Chicago, Illinois, Aldine Publishing Company (also published in 1969 by University Press, London, England).

This article is a word-for-word repetition of the last section of Turner's article on "Mukanda: The Rite of Circumcision" (1967; see above) with one and a half additional paragraphs relating the analysis to the work of Karl Deutsch.

Reviews (of Swartz, ed.):

Cohen, Ronald
1970 American Anthropologist 72:112-115.
MacGaffey, Wyatt
1969 Man N.S. 4:663.

1968 Myth and Symbol. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 10:576-582. David L. Sills, ed. New York: Macmillan.

The liminal aspect of myths has two dimensions: (1) they are often narrated and are most effectively known in liminal situations of rites of passage; and (2) they themselves refer to passages, of "how things came to be what they are." They are not merely charters of the social order in positive or negative ways; rather they are "deep mysteries which put the initiand temporarily into close rapport with the primacy or primordial generative powers of the cosmos." Turner points out that many authors, including Malinowski, Jung, and Eliade, have each stressed the reality of myths in their own way.

1968 Religious Specialists: Anthropological Study. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 13:437-444. David L. Sills, ed. New York: Macmillan.

A religious specialist is one who devotes himself to a particular branch of religion or of a religious system. Various categories have been devised and contrasted, in-

cluding the priest and the prophet (Weber), the priest and the shaman (Lessa and Vogt), the shaman and the medium (Firth), the diviner, the doctor, and others. In most societies, religious specialization is also intimately linked with political specialization.

1968 Review of *Ethnologie et language: la parole chez les Dogon* by G. Calame-Griaule. Social Science Information 7(6):55-61. Reprinted in 1974 as "The Word of the Dogon" in *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* by Victor Turner, pp. 156-165. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

In the Dogon mythico-cosmological system, every element is interwoven with every other in a fine tapestry of symbols and ideas. This tapestry is the result of a set of correspondences between "the human form divine" and the rest of the universe. As Calame-Griaule says, "Man seeks his reflection in all mirrors of an anthropomorphic universe." Calame-Griaule's work stresses the order to be found in process and structure. Turner says that the social order he sought and found through his own fieldwork was seen as the result of social action rather than of knowledge, the latter varying with social situations. He confesses that he might have been extreme in his stress on the systematizing effect of social processes and admits that he has now found more order and consistency in Ndembu expressive culture. However, he suggests that Calame-Griaule has gone to the opposite extreme, and by stressing the cognitive or intellectual level of Dogon culture, has neglected the study of the social processes which make "day-to-day social adjustments possible."

1968 Review of *Thresholds of Initiation* by Joseph L. Henderson. American Anthropologist 70:1193-1194.

1968 The Waters of Life: A Study of Zionist Water Symbolism. *In* Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough. Studies in the History of Religions, Supplements to Numen: International Review for the History of Religions, Number Fourteen. Jacob Neusner, ed. pp. 506-520. Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill.

In this article, Turner returns to themes raised in previous articles, principally his work on color symbolism and liminality. First, from a comparison between symbols used by a traditional Zulu diviner in a ritual performed on one side of a river with those employed by a Zulu Zionist prophet in a ritual at the same time on the other side of the river, Turner abstracts the common properties and meanings of the symbolism of the color white and of water. He then compares these to similar symbols in ancient reli-

gions. This comparison points out a remarkable constancy in basic values ascribed to the symbolism. Three questions are raised, discussed, and tentatively answered: (1) Why does whiteness, which represents, *interalia*, purity, and purification, also have connections with sexual and bodily fluids such as semen and maternal waters? (2) What connection, if any, does symbolism maintain with social structure? and (3) What is the relationship between clusters of symbols used in traditional religious systems in stable societies and in similar clusters of symbols in new religious movements where societies are undergoing rapid change?

1969 (1970) Forms of Symbolic Action: Introduction. *In* Forms of Symbolic Action: Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society. Robert F. Spencer, ed. pp. 3-25. Seattle, Washington and London, England: University of Washington Press for the American Ethnological Society.

This introduction to a symposium on symbolic action is one of Turner's most complete statements on his theoretical position regarding the analysis of ritual symbols. His method of analysis in previous articles is once again presented here. Society is seen as existing to counter the forces of disorder that are inherent in the mammalian constitution of humans—Hobbes' *bellum omnes contra omnes*. Rituals put these very forces of disorder at the service of order, uniting the normative and the orectic through key symbols. There is also a discussion of the various papers presented at the symposium.

Review (of Spencer, ed.):
Leach, Edmund
1971 American Anthropologist 73:824-827.

1969 The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure. The 1966 Lewis Henry Morgan Lectures at the University of Rochester. Chicago, Illinois: Aldine Publishing Company (also published in 1969 by Routledge and Kegan Paul, London).

Moving from detailed analyses of rituals among the Ndembu of Zambia to a discussion of millenarian movements, marginality, rituals of reversal, communes, and much more, Turner introduces and expands the themes of liminality and "communitas"; that is, society when it manifests itself as a relatively unstructured, undifferentiated comitatus, community, or even communion of equal individuals. These are themes which Turner briefly touched on in previous works, and which occupied the central position in the development of his ideas from the moment they were published here. This book is full of briefly-stated theories about the symbolism, dialectics, and meaning of the concepts of

liminality and communitas. The book has a "seminal" character of which Turner was probably conscious. His hopes that students and colleagues would develop (and exemplify) aspects of the theory have been largely fulfilled.

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Gardener, Peter M.
1971 Journal of American Folklore 84(334):450-451.

Leslie, Charles
1970 Symbolic Behavior. Review of *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* by Victor Turner. Science 168(3932):702-704.

Lewis, I. M.
1971 Man N.S. 6:306-307.

Schwartz, Theodore
1972 American Anthropologist 74:904-908.

Willis, R. G.
1971 Africa 41:70-71.

1969 Symbolization and Patterning in the Circumcision Rites of Two Bantu-Speaking Societies. *In* Man in Africa. Mary Douglas and Phyllis M. Kaberry, eds. pp. 229-244. London: Tavistock Publications (distributed in North America by Barnes and Noble, New York).

A comparison of key symbolic features of the rites surrounding male circumcision in two widely-separated Bantu-speaking societies, the Gisu of Uganda and the Ndembu of Zambia. Turner uses data from his own fieldwork among the Ndembu and from Dr. Jean La Fontaine's studies of the Gisu. He compares the ritual employment of "two symbol triads": finger millet yeast, chyme, and mud by the Gisu; and three species of trees, with their typical excretions, by the Ndembu. As is the case elsewhere in Turner's work, the meaning of these symbols must be found by "considering them in their operational social settings," and as indices and agents of social change. Turner carefully analyzes the circumcision rites of the two societies and the symbols they use in the context of contrasting social tensions. He concludes that Gisu circumcision rites serve to assimilate all other principles, including principles of consanguinity, affinity, and territoriality, to the central Gisu principle of patrilineality. At the same time, these rites liberate the novice from specific paternal authority. Among the matrilineal but virilocal Ndembu, circumcision rites sharply separate bonds between men from bonds between men and women. Ndembu circumcision rites stress paternity of a "maternal" rather than an authoritarian kind as a mediating link between local family ties (such as a matrilineage) as well as between the broader unities of vicinage and tribe.

Reviews (of Douglas and Kaberry, eds.):

Argyle, W. J.
1970 Man N.S. 5:146.

Beattie, John
1970 Africa 40:172-175.
Ottenberg, Simon
1970 American Anthropologist 72:1114-1116.

1971 An Anthropological Approach to the Icelandic Saga. *In* The Translation of Culture: Essays to E. E. Evans-Pritchard. T. O. Beidelman, ed. pp. 349-374. London: Tavistock Publications (distributed in North America by Barnes and Noble, New York).

In this essay, early Icelandic society is discussed in sociological terms using Icelandic literature of the saga period as a source, and with the aid of other historical studies of the period which make use of philology, archaeology, and other such tools. Turner's own study of the Ndembu of Zambia is used comparatively to describe and explain conflicts that arise from tensions within the social structure of Icelandic society.
Reviews (of Beidelman, ed.):
Davis, J.
1974 Man N.S. 9:638-640.
Epstein, David G.
1973 American Anthropologist 75:399-400.

1971 Themes and Symbols in an Ndembu Hunter's Burial. *In* Themes in Culture: Essays in Honor of Morris E. Opler. Mario D. Zamora, J. M. Mahar, and Henry Orenstein, eds. Quezon City, The Philippines: Kayumangii Publishers.

The relationship between cultural themes and ritual symbols is discussed with particular reference to an Ndembu hunter's burial ritual. Once again, the characteristics of ritual symbols and ways of analyzing them are presented. It is shown that as well as being significata of other symbols, cultural themes are significata of ritual symbols and are expressed in ritual symbols. Themes are energized through their embodiment in symbols which combine a physiological or orectic pole of sensory referents with many normative or evaluative significata in the structure of a system of semantic reference.

,ed.
1971 Profiles of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule. *In* Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, Volume Three. Edited and with an introduction by Victor Turner. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

A collection of essays by anthropologists on the colonial situation in Africa.

1972 Foreword. *In* Function, Purpose and Powers: Some Concepts in the Study of Individuals and Societies. Second Edition. Dorothy Emmet, ed. pp. vii-xi. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press.

Dorothy Emmet is a philosopher who was very involved with the seminars of the anthropology department at Manchester University in the 1950s while Turner was there. Turner was influenced by her, and relied on her for philosophical justification of his own excursions from the mainstream of anthropological theory. Her formulation: "A society is a *process* with some systematic characteristics, rather than a closely integrated system like an organism or a machine," was particularly congenial to Turner's own thought, since he had rebelled against contemporary structural-functionalist approaches to the study of society.

1972 Passages, Margins, and Poverty: Religious Symbols of Communitas. Worship 46(7):390-412 and 46(8):482-494. Reprinted in 1974 in *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* by Victor Turner, pp. 231-271. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

A theoretical discussion of the terms "communitas," "structure," "liminality," "outsiderhood," "marginality," and "structural inferiority," including the relationships between all of these. There is also a discussion of the symbols that typify these social states, with examples drawn from a wide field ranging from rock music and messianic movements to characters from Shakespearean and Chekhovian literature.

1973 The Center Out There: Pilgrim's Goal. History of Religions 12(3):191-230. Reprinted as "Pilgrimages as Social Processes" in *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* by Victor Turner, pp. 166-230. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

While focusing on pilgrimage systems in the major historical religions, this article examines the specific types of ritual symbols associated with religious pilgrimages and introduces the comparative study of pilgrimage processes. Although the article mainly deals with Christian pilgrimages (Mexico) and Hindu pilgrimages (Pandharpur), several others are mentioned. The work continues Turner's examination of social phenomena which are characterized by their liminality and the "communitas" in their social relations.

1973 Reply to "Analysis of Ritual: Metaphoric Correspondences as the Elementary Forms" by James Fernandez (Fernandez's

comments on Turner's "Symbols in African Ritual"; see below). Science 182 (4119):1366-1367.

1973 Symbols in African Ritual. Science 179(4078):1100-1105. Reprinted in *Symbolic Anthropology: A Reader in the Study of Symbols and Meanings*. Janet L. Dolgin, David S. Kemnitzer, and David M. Schneider, eds. pp. 183-194. New York: Columbia University Press.
Review (of Dolgin, Kemnitzer, and Schneider, eds.):
Parry, Keith
1979 American Anthropologist 81:955-966.

This article can be regarded as the ultimate synthesis in abbreviated form of Turner's work on African rituals. Rituals are pervasive in Africa and can be classified as: (1) seasonal or (2) contingent, including (a) life crisis and (b) rituals of affliction. Each African society has its own finite number of rituals drawn variously from these categories. Symbols in the rituals have the following attributes: (1) multiple meanings; (2) unification of apparently disparate significata; (3) condensation, where many things are represented simultaneously; and (4) polarization of significata, where the meanings are on a continuum from a normative or ideological pole to an orectic or sensory pole. These symbols may represent a number of themes. Symbols that are extremely multivocal and central to a ritual are called dominant symbols, and tend to recur from ritual to ritual. Whichever of the many meanings of a symbol is the theme of a particular ritual depends on its relation to other symbols in the whole situation. Actors in a given ritual experience symbols as powers and meanings. These symbols have three dimensions: (1) the exegetic; (2) the operational; and (3) the positional. They also vary in the degree to which they correspond with each other from culture to culture. Among West African cultures such as the Dogon, everything is a symbol of everything else. However, social action in response to material pressures is always the systematic and systematizing factor. These ritual symbols are still efficacious in contemporary culture, as is witnessed by the imagery to be found in the writings of modern African novelists and in the rhetoric of politicians.

1973- on Symbol, Myth, and Ritual Series. Victor Turner, ed. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
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1973 Australian Religions: An Introduction. Foreword by Victor Turner.
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Deshin, Shlomo, and Moshe Shakeid
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NOTES

1. Many of Victor Turner's books and articles have been translated and reprinted in the following languages: French, German, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, Spanish, and Russian.

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N.B.: Unless otherwise noted, the following works were authored by Victor Turner.

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and Edward M. Bruner, eds.
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NOTES

1. Many of Victor Turner's books and articles have been translated and reprinted in the following languages: French, German, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, Spanish, and Russian.

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