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Caribbeana: Problems and Issues of the Seventies

INTRODUCTION

At the recent Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association meetings in Saskatoon (June 1979), a special session in "Caribbeana" was organized to commemorate the untimely death of Richard Frucht, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Alberta in Edmonton. Scholars from a variety of disciplines (anthropology, sociology, administrative studies-management) got together to pay tribute to Richard and his work and to discuss some of the major problems and issues that he examined in his many years of Caribbean scholarship. While the papers presented dealt with a wide range of research topics, thematically they were all united by their consistent focus on the material conditions of minority group relations in post-colonial Caribbean societies. Thus, it is befitting that this collection be dedicated to the memory of Dr. Frucht, an anthropologist whose own investigations centred primarily on how the material conditions of life — technology, economics, and the division of labour — structured the social and class relations of whites and blacks in Nevis, St. Kitts, and Anguilla.

More generally Dr. Frucht was interested in the political and economic dimensions of class struggle. He examined the organization of working class production strategies, migration patterns, and remittances from overseas. He was concerned with the relations between plantation systems and the structure of the family and had just begun a major field project on the agrarian system in Guyana. The five papers that are included in this Caribbean collection reflect his research and theoretical interests and at the same time they incorporate the results of first hand fieldwork in Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados.

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Strategies and Problems Among Economic Elites in Jamaica: The Evolution of a Research Focus

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article passe en revue les avantages et les inconvénients de l'observation par participation comme moyen de recueillir des données sur l'élite nationale des entrepreneurs en Jamaïque. On note aussi certains des problèmes, des conflits et des dilemmes que le chercheur a rencontrés sur le terrain. L'article conclut avec des remarques sur les responsabilités du chercheur vis-à-vis les sujets de l'étude.

There are still relatively few detailed ethnographies of "elite" populations.[1] For the most part, anthropologists have not "studied up" (Nader 1972). But the elite often play *dominant* roles in the political, economic and cultural affairs of the society. Thus, the paucity of studies on the dimensions of elite wealth, the networks of elite influence, the nature of elite cohesion and the characteristics of elite social organization makes for a rather narrow appreciation of the dynamics of power in complex societies.

Anthropologists can make unique contributions to the study of elites in society. This is primarily because of the method by which we gather a substantial portion of our data. The method is known as "participant observation" and stipulates that we must take an

[1] Some of the better known exceptions include: Gold (1975); González (1974); Karner (1969); Kovats-Beaudoux (1969); Leach and Mukherjée (1970); Leeds (1964) and Scheele (1956).

active part in the culture we are studying. Not only must we observe the behaviour of a community over an extended period of time, but we must also simultaneously participate in its social life (Freilich 1970). By stepping into the roles of those we study, we can experience and appreciate reality as our informants do. And, because we inevitably remain as "marginal natives" only periferally accepted and included, we can better perceive "those relationships, systems, and patterns of which an inextricably involved ... insider is not likely to be consciously aware" (Wax 1973: 3). Participant observation qualitatively enriches ethnographic research.

In general, there has been little published on the anthropology of dominant groups. Instead of thick descriptions of the "powerful", there are concentrated efforts to document the "powerless". While these studies are important for their elaborations of traditional ethnographic concerns — family and kinship relations, religious behaviour and beliefs, symbol systems, subsistence activities, community leadership and the like — they are by no means sufficient for the formulation of models of complex socio-cultural systems. This is true inspite of the fact that Malinowski (1930) and Gluckman (1940) both pointed out how traditional peoples could not be understood without taking into account their relations with the national level colonial administrators who governed them.

While ethnographies of elites are rare, those that do exist focus neither on the political economy of national elite power nor on the social and cultural consequences of this power as it relates to the non-elite majority segment. In addition, we lack systematic investigations of the structures and organizations that qualitatively differentiate the elites from the non-elites. These structures and organizations must be comprehended in order to understand the cultural matrix within which elite distinctiveness becomes manifest. There is a paucity of information on the nature of elite interrelations, institutional roles, networks of mutual self-help, conflicts, competitions, values and attitudes. And because of this informational gap, we are unfamiliar with the extent to which those in control of a society's major economic resources, influence the political decision-making that sets major situational contexts for the non-elite majority.

It was to begin to answer these questions that I undertook an examination of the political economy of the Jamaican "national

entrepreneurial elite",[2] with a special interest in the economic role and political participation of Jamaica's Jewish population (Holzberg 1977a). In 1974-75, the Jews constituted about 25 per cent of the personnel involved in the upper level organization, direction, and finance of those companies quoted on the Jamaica Stock Exchange. This was significant for two reasons: 1) the Stock Exchange Companies were reputed to be among the largest companies in the country, and 2) there were less than 500 Jews in Jamaica and the community as a whole made up less than 1 per cent of the total population.

Research on both the Jews and the national entrepreneurial elite — their business stategies, political and institutional affiliations, extended social networks, values, and cultural distinctiveness — was carried out first as a summer pilot study in 1973, and then again more extensively from January 1974 to February 1975.[3] A return visit was made from May through August of 1978.[4] The plan of this paper[5] is to discuss the methodological framework that guided the research and elaborate upon the strategies of data collection that facilitated or complicated gathering information in a complex society. To this end, the paper also considers the more personal problems and conflicts the researcher experienced while conducting investigations among an economically advantaged segment of an economically disadvantaged population. The fact that the ethnographer was a young "unattached" female at times amplified the difficulties. The paper concludes with a general discussion of the responsibilities that are shared by fieldworkers irrespective of the gender identity of the researcher, the setting of the research, or the population segment being studied.

[2] Political economy refers to the "dynamic and mutually shaping *interrelationship*" (Cardoso 1973: 142) between economics and politics. The Jamaican national entrepreneurial elite are made up of individuals who sat on three or more Boards of Directors for companies quoted on the Jamaica Stock Exchanges for 1971 and 1974.

[3] This portion of the research was funded by grants from the Canada Council, the Ministry of Education — Québec, the Canadian Foundation for Jewish Culture, and the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture.

[4] Summer work in 1978 was facilitated by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.

[5] This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Caribbean Studies Association meetings in Trinidad in January 1977. I would like to thank my colleagues Ros Vanderburgh and Janice Boddy for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

THE EVOLUTION OF A RESEARCH PROJECT

What eventually culminated in a doctoral dissertation (Boston University 1977a) on the political economy of Jamaica's "national entrepreneurial elites" began with a more traditional pilot study of Jamaica's Jewish community (Holzberg 1976). An investigation of the social organization, business activities, and political influence of Jamaica's Jewish population seemed like a relevant beginning because Jewish participation in island big business was reputed to be significant. Jamaica's Jews were also worthy of focus for another reason as well. They were locally perceived as *white* elites[6] and my interest in the relationship between economic power and political influence required an investigation of "white" economic power and the degree to which the members of the white minorities were in positions of politico-economic dominance. Though constitutional independence from Great Britain had effected a major redistribution of formal political power in Jamaican society — blacks were being elected and appointed to the majority of positions in the Senate and the Cabinet[7] — Jamaicans believed that the economy of the country was still largely in the hands of the white minorities. As the friendship, kinship, economic and political networks of the Jewish businessmen extended into the other white minority segments such as the Lebanese / Syrian, whites of European descent, and expatriate whites, an examination of the Jewish community would shed light on the political influence of white economic elites in general.

The pilot study was precipitated by an interest in "local" big business, and a research proposal to investigate the social composition and resource base of those native personnel in charge of organizing, directing, and financing large scale national economic ventures, i.e. the national entrepreneurial elite. But during the summer, I concentrated mainly on gathering data for an ethnography of Jamaica's Jewish community. Information on social organization, extra-community networks, ethnic markers, profes-

[6] Jewish presence on the Island dates back to the 17th century. Since their arrival, Jews have intermarried such that today a significant number of the community show evidence of African and Chinese ancestry.

[7] Rodney (1975: 17) suggests that this pattern is typical of the British West Indies. He writes: "Throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, the pattern is that a predominantly African (and mulatto) professional, beaucratic and careerist political element has strategic control over the state."

sional occupations, self-perceptions, and class membership was collated. Thus most of the examples I had of economic elite activity derived from the business activities, social interaction and cultural values of the Jewish population segment. However not all members of the Jewish community were economic elites, and in order to map the political economy of local big business in general it became conceptually imperative to widen the ethnographic focus. This meant gathering information on more than just a single ethnic enclave. I planned to extend the data base when I returned to the field again in January 1974.

I was interested in expanding the ethnographic data base for another reason as well. As it became evident that by such indicators as level of education, conspicuous consumption, multiple occupations, business and social networks, and access to foreign exchange 1) many Jamaican Jews could be identified as economic elites, 2) the majority of the Jewish families were members of the propertied class and 3) Jews were disproportionately represented in Jamaica's privileged social segment, I became apprehensive about the possible effects the study might have on the well-being of my informants. If the research findings were taken out of context, the study would provide the "system" with a convenient scapegoat upon which to blame contemporary social inequalities. This in turn might provoke anti-semitism and lead to acts of violence against individual Jews.

These fears were not entirely alarmist since Jamaica had experienced episodic waves of racial violence against the Chinese in the 1920's and the 1960's (Carnegie 1973) and social discrimination against the Lebanese / Syrians as late as the 1950's. Furthermore, cases of violent anti-Jewish feeling were common historically in the pogroms of nineteenth century Europe. As Aris points out:

> For centuries it has been the economic activities of the Jews that have been seized upon by the anti-Semites and used as a stick with which to beat them. The idea of the Jew as usurer and moneylender is so entrenched in popular mythology that even as respectable an authority as the Oxford Dictionary defines the Jew first as a "person of the Hebrew race" and secondly as an "extortionate usurer, a driver of hard bargains". "to jew", the dictionary says, "is to cheat, to overreach" (1970: 14).

The Jews in Jamaica were a powerful minority, disproportionately represented in the upper echelons of the country's big business sector. They enjoyed a high standard of living relative to the black majority. Their superordinate position however, was not

on account of their "Jewishness" *per se*. Rather, their success derived from a series of social historical factors. Some of these factors include their early presence on the Island in the mid-sixteenth century, civil and political discrimination until 1831 which forced them to band together as a community, and a pursuit of economic activities such as merchandising and commission agencies since they were not permitted to own more than 3 slaves in the pre-emancipation period (Holzberg 1976). At the turn of the twentieth century many of the Island's wholesalers and retailers expanded from merchandising to manufacturing. The Jews as part of the mercantile community followed suit. They were members of a larger white Jamaican business class.

METHOD OF ENTRY

As previously discussed, my investigations of local big business and white economic influence in the Jamaican political arena, began with an ethnography of the Jewish community. Theoretically, it could have begun with an ethnography of the whites of European descent or the Lebanese / Syrians because the participation of these "white" minorities in local big business was also reputed to be significant. However, for practical reasons I focused on the Jews. This was because I am Jewish and felt that a commonality of backgrounds would facilitate my entry into the white business environment.

Prior to my arrival I wrote letters to the rabbi, advising him of my interest in Jamaican Jewish history and of my intent to do research in the community during the summer. I also inquired about accommodation within a Jewish home. I pointed out that it had come to my attention that members of the community were ranked among the "most successful" and "well respected" citizens of the country and that my research would document how they had come to achieve such a position of social and economic prominence. I emphasized my awe and appreciation of the community's ability to sustain a vibrant and dynamic Jewish identity inspite of four hundred years of contact with non-Jews. In addition, I was very careful to point out that I too was Jewish.

It is clear that being Jewish facilitated my initial entrée into the Jewish community as a student fieldworker. But being Jewish made

me somewhat apprehensive in my initial contacts with the Lebanese / Syrian community. This anxiety receded as I came to understand the nature of Jewish-Lebanese relations on the island. Both Jews and Lebanese shared a commonality of interests that revolved around their similar business operations, common semitic heritage and, not infrequently, intermarriage. These ties were reinforced by Israel's political decision to aid the Lebanese Christians in Lebanon's civil war. As Jamaica's Lebanese community was of Christian descent, the general political conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the Middle East did not hamper my involvement with the Jamaican "Arab" population. A person interested in conducting research among Jamaica's Lebanese / Syrians would not necessarily have to be of Middle Eastern extraction though the ability to speak Arabic would be a distinct advantage.

An elderly Jewish couple responded to the rabbi's announcement of my arrival and arranged to have me live with them during the summer. My landlady told me that before I arrived her next door neighbor seemed apprehensive about taking in a boarder sight unseen. Mrs. M. assured me that she had informed her neighbour that there was no cause for alarm. After all, I came with a recommendation from the rabbi and that meant I was a "nice Jewish girl" from the United States.

The Jews were more than willing to detail their "prominent" and "progressive" roles in the island's political economy because they believed that they had been consistently overlooked in Caribbean history books. They invited me to their homes, took me on their week-end excursions to the country, invited me to their parties and family get togethers, and introduced me to their friends because they saw me as a chronicler of their achievements and contributions. I was identified as a social scientist who would set down their charitable contributions in print before the community totally disappeared from the island due to emigration, intermarriage and assimilation. But not all members of the community were equally receptive to my questions. Some were afraid the study would encourage anti-semitism and cause friction between the Jews and the non-Jews in the country. In fact, it took about nine months (out of a total of 18 months) of participant observation in the community before the secretary of the United Congregation of Israelites released the synagogue membership lists to me. He was appre-

hensive of some indeterminate calamity that might befall the members of the community "if the list got into the wrong hands"[8].

It is patently clear to anthropological fieldworkers that the nature of their research problem and their chosen methods of data collection will inevitably affect the general strategy of professional behaviour in the field and will unmistakably condition the kinds of information they are able to retrieve[9]. Furthermore, as anthropologists must often submit their research proposals to the host government, local university, and / or the community before entry visas are granted (Smith 1975: 9), it is often necessary for the fieldworkers to stress the "harmless" intent of their investigations (Barnes 1967: 199). I was worried that "my" community would misinterpret my research objectives and so I was always certain to emphasize the cultural, historical, and more traditional ethnographic aspects of the study while underplaying my interest in matters specifically political and economic. I was guided by the assumption that individuals might be less accommodating if they perceived the political and economic focus as threatening to their prominent social reputation. They relaxed when I assured them that I would not be disclosing any names or information received in confidence.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAMAICA'S NATIONAL ENTREPRENEURIAL ELITE: FURTHER METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Jamaica's Jews constituted less than one per cent of the total island population. It would have been intellectually myopic to ignore the larger population segment of which they formed a part or to gloss over the political and economic institutions which favoured their prominence and successful achievements. As it turned out, less than twenty-five percent of the national entrepreneurial elite was Jewish (that is 9 men out of 38). Though this figure was significant and raised questions about disproportionate Jewish achievements, it was evident that other individuals or ethnic-racial

[8] This kind of suspicion was evident to Aris (1970) in his study of the Jews in England. He points out how English Jews have preferred to maintain a low profile: "It is never good when Jews is news" (1970: 11).

[9] See Henry (1969) and Manners and Steward (1954) for further elaboration of this idea.

segments besides the Jews were represented among the island's economic elite. By high-lighting the extent to which Jamaica's white population in general exerted control over the economic and political affairs of the country, the study would transcend the limitations of a single community focus and document the national institutional frameworks that cut across ethnic and racial segments. This released me from the fear that because I had cited the Jews as my example of Jamaica's "typical" economic elite, others would use them as a scapegoat. The research orientation had therefore shifted from being narrowly ethnic specific to a more general investigation of those persons who directed 3 or more companies quoted on the Jamaica Stock Exchange[10].

The Jamaica Stock Exchange was selected as a focal point because the companies quoted were reputed to be the largest economic concerns on the Island, only second in scope and scale to the bauxite and sugar multinational interests. Annual reports and lists of directorates were secured from the forty companies quoted on the Exchange in 1971 and 1974. Companies were categorized in terms of gross function, that is, financial (including banks and insurance companies) vs. non-financial (including manufacturing, industrial, construction, real estate development, etc.). These in turn were ranked in terms of sales turnover. Sales turnover was chosen as the major indicator of size instead of declared profits because of the tendency of the corporations to channel their profits into internal purchases and dividends or reinvest their profits in plant improvements, physical expansion, new equipment, and the acquisition of subsidiaries. Often a company's annual report would show a decrease in profits for the fiscal year, leading to a suspension of dividends, while at the same time showing a simultaneous capital outlay of millions of dollars for corporate expansion and rationalization. When the companies were ranked in terms of sales, the scale of their activities correlated with their scope (level of diversification). In other words, those companies with the highest sales turnover tended to be the most diversified as well.

A comparison of the forty companies quoted in 1974 with the forty companies quoted in 1971 added time depth to the study. This

[10] The companies quoted are incorporated locally and for the most part are chaired and directed by native born Jamaicans.

diachronic emphasis was particularly necessary in order to determine the extent to which the People's National Party (PNP) had effected changes in the organization of corporate wealth, resources, and personnel since its advent to power in 1972. This question became all the more critical in 1974, when the PNP under the leadership of Prime Minister Manley declared an end to capitalism and began implementing a program of Democratic Socialism. Would the new political ideology lead to an attrition in the expansion of corporate concentration, protected markets, profit margins, interlocking directorates, government subsidies or foreign investment?

In order to determine the nature of change within the national economic sector, it was also important to examine the social characteristics of the company directors[11], that is to classify these individuals in terms of their racial and ethnic backgrounds, their country of birth, educational attainment, club memberships religious affiliation, family connections on the Stock Exchange company boards, and professions (skills) held in addition to being corporate executives. Were the "most active" directors (the ones who sat on the most boards) members of a socially cohesive class fraction? Did the national entrepreneurial elite operate as an effective lobby against state intervention in the national economy? Did the politico-administrators make unofficial use of the skills, talents, expertise, and connections of its most active national entrepreneurs by appointing these businessman as advisors and consultants to government? By gathering data on these questions, I was able to document the relationship between Democratic Socialism and large-scale local big business.

If in fact the national entrepreneurial elite and its private sector interests were to be made more socially relevant and responsible to the needs and welfare of the Jamaican population, would the directors of large-scale corporations continue to be recruited from a small segment of the population? Would this business elite continue to occupy such nominated and appointed para-political positions as chairmen of statutory boards, commissioners of inquiry, diplomats and "trouble shooters" in government negotiations for corporate

[11] I have written about this elsewhere (Boston University, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1977a). See also Munroe (1975) Phillips (1977) and Reid (1977) for further information.

"Jamaicanization".[12] If changes had in fact taken place, favouring black majority participation while restraining white involvement, one would not expect the white minorities to be so disproportionately represented in the higher circles of Jamaican big business.

My findings support the conclusion that the presence of the national entrepreneurial elite is institutionalized within Jamaican political economy despite the politico-administrative and formal ideological shift to Democratic Socialism. The national entrepreneurial elite are differentiated from the rest of the Jamaican population by phenotype — they are for the most part white — and by their degree of access to and control over a diversified resource base — capital goods and services, foreign investments, employment, foreign exchange and technical expertise. This suggests that white economic power is entrenched even though it may be "unofficial". Jamaica's white minorities are still in a position to exert influence, (sometimes as individuals and sometimes as representatives of their corporate interests) in national political administration and policy legislation (Holzberg 1977b).

The power of the white businessmen in Jamaica will continue as long as their corporations make significant contributions to the national economy. These contributions have increased in scale and scope since the industrial expansion of the late 1940's and despite the advent to power of the new socialist administration.

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF ELITE RESEARCH

a. *Holism*

A study of Jamaica's national entrepreneurial elite is primarily an ethnography of a particular segment of the Jamaican population set within the context of the larger society of which it forms a part. The dimensions of the ethnography entailed 1) collecting information on the values, personnel and social organization of the particular segment (community) and 2) describing the economic base (corporations) and the politico-economic relations (advisory capacities, para-political appointments) of the segment in relationship to the wider society. Together, both aspects of the research

[12] Jamaicanization refers to the localization of corporate ownership, that is, acquiring majority equity in foreign firms negotiated through purchase.

were to form a holistic picture of the personnel and institutions of Jamaican big business while yielding an adequate description of elite boundaries, that is, the mechanisms of recruitment and the restrictions for membership.

Previous studies of elite populations in Curaçao (Karner 1969) and Puerto Rico (Scheele 1956) were not sufficiently holistic. First, they took "eliteness" for granted, glossing over the political and economic factors which afforded their populations elite status. This made it extremely difficult to grasp the critical dimensions of elite power and resources. Second, both Karner and Scheele also neglected to detail the methodological problems and personal ambivalences they experienced while conducting their research among elites. This is unfortunate because it detracts from the "holistic" presentation of the entire field experience. The methodology for mapping the socio-cultural and politico-economic dimensions of Jamaica's national entrepreneurial elite has been outlined in the preceding sections of this paper. The rest of the paper will therefore address some of the more personal frustrations encountered while doing "elite" research and will raise questions about the moral responsibilities of the fieldworkers to informants.

b. *Chronic Culture Shock*

The shift in the focus of the research from an examination of the roles and participation of the Jews in the national economy (ethnic specific) to an examination of the roles and participation of the national entrepreneurial elite (non-ethnic specific) had the advantage of not only safeguarding my informants' identities but also of incorporating a wider range of information on a particular social class. No amount of widening the ethnographic context however, could temper the fact that in Jamaica certain population segments became rich and influential only to the extent that others did not. The propertied minorities seemed to live well only because the majority lived so poorly. The unofficial minimum wage stood at J 25 cents an hour in 1974. Status and prestige rankings were based on the level of conspicuous consumption, the number of servants in the household, taking extended business vacations, shopping abroad, and devoting time to charitable activities. Differences in class membership correlated with inequalities of access to health and sanitary facilities, education, housing, electricity, and other institu-

tional goods and services. The poor appeared trapped in a system which afforded them little opportunity for upward social mobility.

The more information I gathered on the nature of elite resources, networks and consumption differentials, the more I perceived differences in the standard of living between rich and poor. My informants, however, explained poverty in terms which "blamed the victim". They characterized the poor as indolent, ignorant, irresponsible, unmotivated, oversexed, and unskilled. Not only were the majority of the lower class illiterate they claimed, but they were perceived as being uneducatable for "no matter how many times you tell them something or show them how to do things, they never do it right". As an anthropological fieldworker, I diligently recorded these exclamations, in order to appreciate the country from the elite point of view. But in terms of my own personal feelings, I often felt very uncomfortable with responses that designated the majority of the Jamaican population as lazy and promiscuous ("they breed like flies").

This personal ambivalence or negative reaction to my informants' responses left me with a perpetual "disturbing feeling of disorientation and helplessness" (Bock 1970: ix) — a sort of chronic culture shock characterized by alienation, frustration, and a constant awareness of the difficulties involved in carrying out an objective, unbiased, and dispassionate ethnography of economic elites. These feelings persisted as I carred out "participant observation" immersing myself in as many elite situational contexts as possible. Jamaica's national motto "Out of Many, One People" was about as metaphorically real as the American myth of the "melting pot". And, as already mentioned many of my informants equated class and colour in an inverse relationship with intelligence, achievement, motivation, morality, abilities, capabilities, and potentialities.

c. *Presentation of Self*

I fundamentally disagreed with many of the attitudes and values of my elite informants, but I tried not to project these feelings. I constantly avoided sending out cues which could be interpreted as non-sympathetic. I hesitated to disclose that I had crossed the class-colour line by being friendly with those often scornfully described as "butus", radicals, communists, "monkey", and "Quashee". And, in order to get them to elaborate upon their

views, I would sometimes offer verbal reinforcements. It was not only because being at variance would have resulted in being socially outcast, but also that I was afraid of being dismissed as an ivory tower academic (like those "bearded radicals at the University of the West Indies") or as a "young and naive" female student. I was accepted by the elites and reinvited to their social gatherings precisely because I was thought to have such a "balanced, intelligent, and mature point of view for such a young woman".

Aside from the value conflicts, other problems consistently arose. On a student fellowship with limited funds available for wardrobe and cosmetics, I was anxious about the acceptability of my appearance. Elite research required that I be smartly attired and stylishly well-groomed in informal as well as formal social settings.[13] An excerpt from my journal written in preparation for the summer fieldwork project in 1978 will illustrate these feelings even though I was no longer a graduate student.

> In conducting the appropriate fieldwork preparations I have been taking extra-special care of my nails for the last four weeks... I have been trying to eliminate the jaundiced academic complexion by tanning in the sun for 15 — 20 minute intervals. I think it is important to look healthy and "unneglected"... I've had to break in a new pair of wedgie sandals, to learn how to walk in them for long periods of time and at fast speeds. The wedge makes it difficult to run, I've become prone to tripping and turning my ankle. These shoes will be a hindrance in mountain climbing, walking through mud or bush, and chasing after or running away from people... In order to achieve an appearance of elegance, I have dyed a blouse, reinforced torn hems, and packed away my best jewellery. My suitcase is now 30 pounds overweight and all my clothes are so crumpled and crinkled I hope Mrs. C. doesn't mind if I rush over and use her iron just as soon as I arrive (May 30, 1978).

A sloppy appearance was tantamount to being unfeminine. Yet in the tropics, under adverse conditions of heat and humidity, I always seemed to wilt. The "ladies" were always telling me to do something about my hair or to put on a bit more makeup. My male informants however never objected to the way I looked. Interestingly enough, as I did not spend all of my time with Jews or members of the economic elite, dressing like a rich white woman often made me highly visible amidst other segments of the popula-

[13] It is clear that one of the major reasons why the Jewish community voiced collective disapproval of its young new rabbi and his wife was because they frequently appeared in public very informally and inappropriately attired. The rabbi's contract was not renewed after his 9 months of office.

tion. To the lower classes, my "elite" appearance reinforced my image of not belonging.

d. *Situational Ambiguities and Conflicts*

Equally frustrating and tension-causing conflicts developed when I found myself participating in ambiguous situational contexts. Members of the Jewish community had told me time and time again not to ask any of the Lebanese / Syrians questions about their loyalties in the Middle East conflict between the Israelis and the Arabs. They were afraid that these sorts of questions might jeopardize their amicable relations with their Lebanese / Syrian friends. So when interviewing Lebanese / Syrian businessmen and the prominent women of the Lebanese / Syrian community, I always avoided bringing up the subject of the Middle East war. Similarly, when greeting my non-white friends while in the company of elites, I had to refrain from appearing overly friendly for fear of having to explain how I had come to know "those people". This also meant that I had to be careful of whom to invite to my home as many of my elite informants had an open invitation to drop in and visit at any time.

There were many dimensions to these personal conflicts that made fieldwork not only problematic but also challenging. Maintaining an optimum balance between compromise and principles was never easy. I came to realize that participant observation is often embued with a degree of covert research in that for expedience sake (so as not to offend anyone), the fieldworker can make only limited disclosures about the inventory of data collected. Sometimes these anxieties would translate into dreams of being arrested for engaging in revolutionary (counter-revolutionary?) subversion, of making news headlines as Jamaica's first *anthropologist non grata*, or being quietly disposed of one night in the gully of a lone country road. These dreams were precipitated by dividing my time among elites and the poor, by participating in mutually antagonistic life styles, and by coming to realize the nature of unequal access to Jamaica's social and material resources.

CONCLUSIONS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL HUMANISM AND THE ETHICS OF ELITE RESEARCH

In preparation for the fieldwork, my professors constantly reminded me that my behaviour in Jamaica would reflect upon

anthropologists in general and would inevitably be a decisive factor in granting entry permission to successive fieldworkers. I was told to be subtle and discreet as well as polite, to treat informant responses with utmost confidentiality, to avoid passing moral judgements, and not to reveal informant identities. My job was to be that of a system's analyst, not trouble maker. But research on the social organization and politico-economic activities of a society's business elite is neither the most "harmless" nor "neutral" scientific focus — especially as it touches on the often quite sensitive topics of inequalities of wealth, power and privilege. Probing for the dimensions of power often yields data which contradict the images elites have of themselves or those they attempt to convey through their coverage in the media. In addition, elite values, attitudes, and behaviours may sometimes be in conflict with those of the fieldworker.

The paper has examined some of the conflicts, ambiguities, and personal ambivalences experienced by this researcher in the investigation of Jamaica's Jewish community and its national entrepreneurial elite. By elaborating on the strategies that facilitated data collection and outlining the problems encountered, the paper humanizes the fieldwork experience. As Casagrande indicates, most anthropological writings are so,

> concerned with cultural patterns and norms, we are accustomed in articles and monographs to treat our data at a highly abstract level several stages removed from the vividness and immediacy of what we have experienced in the field. In our published work remarkably little is vouchsafed about personal reactions to the vicissitudes of field work and to the people among whom we have lived and worked (1960: xii).

This is an unfortunate gap in the literature, a gap which this paper has attempted to bridge.

While I found particular aspects of the fieldwork ideologically frustrating, it must be pointed out that I have established enduring friendships with many of my "elite" informants. Without their patience and assistance, this study would never have been done. Thus in setting down an operational model to facilitate future studies of elite minorities, it is perhaps best to keep in mind that members of the upper class are just as much the victims of a series of limited alternatives as members of the lower class. That the quality and degree of their victimization are different does not negate the fact that they too must operate in response to situational pressures and life crises. As individuals they are not consciously out

to harm their employees, nor are they motivated solely by self-gain. Recognizing their humanity does not compromise moral principles. Rather, it makes for a "more objective" analysis of their roles and positions in society devoid of ideological rhetoric.

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Economic Elites in Jamaica: A Study of Monistic Relationship

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RÉSUMÉ

L'étude des institutions d'affaires dans les sociétés post-coloniales se sont concentrées traditionnellement sur les activités économiques de l'entreprise. Ce texte montre qu'une telle approche est trop restreinte et que le comportement de l'entreprise ne peut pas être séparé des buts et des activités de ses propriétaires. On peut voir que l'affiliation ethnique, les groupements de parenté, les réseaux sociaux et les rôles de propriétaire sont fortement interdépendants. Les propriétaires d'entreprise en Jamaïque constituent un groupe assimilable à une élite politique et en exerçant leurs divers rôles, ils perpétuent un modèle de domination historique dans la société.

The extensive literature on economic institutions in the English speaking Caribbean shows an almost embarrassing absence of research on business activity, its impact and influence. This is unusual given the recognized prominence of businessmen as a class and the allusion to influence of the corporate firm as a social and economic unit. It is widely accepted and in fact, an underlying thesis of much of the studies by West Indian social scientists that the business sector has been a critical determinants of the development process (Stone, 1974; Munroe, 1973; Girvan, 1971; Beckford, 1971).

More recently two pioneering studies (Reid, 1976; Holzberg, 1977) have made a significant contribution to knowledge of the social structures and institutional mechanisms which facilitate the continued dominance of minority ethnic elites in the Jamaican nation state. These two studies are not only instructive in what they reveal about the activities of economic elites but more importantly

the implicit paradigms that structure their methodology. They follow in most respects a neo-Weberian view of seeing economic organizational forms as deeply rooted in the social system.

It is this implicit thesis that this paper seeks to explore, illustrating at the same time that the theoretical weakness in previous Caribbean economic research laid in their presumption of the existence of sufficiently socially differentiated units which deserve separate and individual analysis. The evidence shows that this approach is misleading and the presence of specialized social and economic structures merely obscures the wideranging and significant monistic relationships between elite groupings that dominate the political economy of a post colonial territory.

The research suggests that analysis of business as an institutional activity in a developing country must be concerned not only with the institutional responses and strategies for coping with environmental changes but even more critical, the institutional patterns of environmental control. The factors then that become crucial, given this approach, are the type of mechanisms and strategies which individuals who control these organizations use in defining, creating and shaping their environment. It is this consideration that explicitly allows one to treat the linkages between the enterprise and society as integrative and purposive in character. The business enterprise is seen as a tool, a resource designed and maintained by individuals to serve production, control, allocative and distributive functions. It is through the exercise of these functions that elites are capable of maintaining power.

So that there are present, two concerns: 1) how to conceptualize the nature of the linkages between the business enterprise and the society, and 2) the extent to which such linkages demonstrate elite relationships as monistic and indivisible. Such concerns rest on a systemic view of the social organization of corporate enterprises which recognize the existence of a complex of interrelated economic units and social institutions. Firstly, structures such as property and fixed assets; secondly, the labor and technology input; thirdly, structures and institutions which specialize in the supply of capital and the social mechanisms which give the basis for the relations among these structural units.

Both Reid (1976) and Holzberg (1977) have shown that the concentration of economic power and control in Jamaica lies in the

hands of minority ethnic elites and is mainly dispersed through 21 families and their interest groups. While both authors produced considerable evidence to show the pattern and dominance of family relationships in the political economy of Jamaica, the family and kindship structure was nevertheless perceived as some sort of a mediating variable. This perception as has been suggested earlier, not only needs to be made more explicit, but some of the research shows that the pervasive feature of Jamaican society is that the economic roles and activities of the elite groups tend to be subordinate and a function of kinship role.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT PRE 1945 PERIOD

Elite activity shows little discontinuity and reflects a long history. The genesis of the modern Jamaican elites laid in the early social organization of the economy. Beckford (1971) has cogently argued that the essential feature of the plantation society was the concentration of power among a small planter class and highly centralized political administrative structures. The evolution of business as an important institution in Jamaican society was predicated on the activities of the State in granting monopolies and providing a legal political climate which encouraged the emergence of the corporate enterprise (Mills, 1974; Swaby, 1974).

Indigenous enterprises and emergence of economic elites can be traced to the development of the sugar plantation and extension of colonial system of mercantilism which saw the colonies providing raw materials such as tobacco and sugar for the U.K. market and absorbing surpluses of articles produced in that market. Thus both the sugar plantation and the importer, existing either as manufacturer's representative or commission agency provided the basis on which the Jamaican corporate enterprise, as we know it, emerged. This is suggested as the normal pattern of corporate development in colonies, a thesis which has been supported by a number of writers (Clement, 1975; Tokman, 1973; Balogh, 1962; Baran, 1957).

Of the minority ethnic elites, Jews have one of the longest unbroken traditions of occupying important economic and political roles in the Jamaican political economy. Moses Delgado (whose descendants are still influential and who can be said to be part of the constellation of interests surrounding the present power elite)

presented a Bill in 1830 in the Colonial Assembly which gave the Jews of Jamaica enfranchisement and full citizenship rights before England did. As Schlesinger (1967) pointed out, "so rapidly were the advantages of this emancipation seized by the Jews of Jamaica that by 1849 they contributed a sixth of the members of the Colonial Assembly."

In 1834 the island's oldest newspaper was started by Joshua and Jacob deCordova, a family which still retains significant trading interests in the island and are still closely linked with another Jewish family, the Ashenheims, by marriage. Abraham Henriques, one of the earliest members of the Henriques family, had by the turn of the 18th century become one of the largest land-owners with some 3,000 acres of land. A direct progenitor of the Lopez line (at present one of the largest land-owners in Jamaica) was an important land-owner in early Jamaica with 500 acres of land in 1692.

A member of the Ashenheims, the precursor to the present powerful Jewish dynasty, joined the DeLevante Company Ltd. (an important commission agency) in 1929, and subsequently married a member of the family as did the Henriques. The Matalons, another Jewish family of more recent origin, emerged after the war with Commodity Service Company in 1946, another import agency which was later to evolve into Industrial Commercial Developments, one of the largest companies in the Stock Exchange. Other dominant economic families followed similar expansion paths. The Issa group of Middle East extraction began with a dry goods and haberdashery store in 1894, the D'Costa group with an import/export house of the Brandons becoming the largest importer of animal feeds by 1930.

Samuel Hart, founding father of the Hart wealth, had by 1916 achieved a turnover of £100,000 par annum in dry goods after being in business 36 years. That this was a sizeable business can be gauged from the fact that the Jamaican Government revenue for the same year was approximately £1,000,000. An early group of manufacturers, the Henriques Brothers, were the major engineering firms catering to the sugar industry by 1908. They pioneered the establishment of the Jamaica match industry, had exclusive dealership with Ford Motor Company and as owners of New Yarmouth Estate, a major sugar estate then and now, had an important stake in the industry.

This is sufficient to indicate that by the post-war period ethnic commercial interests had emerged, who had not only appropriated for themselves considerable financial leverage by virtue of ownership of land and property and domination of trade, but, who had also initiated a tradition in occupying important economic roles in the Jamaican community. That these interests wielded considerable power goes without saying, and some insight into the characters of their activities and the links between their interests will be shown.

THE POST WAR PERIOD

The post war period was accompanied by an influx of foreign capital and the emergence of a cash economy significant enough that sufficiently sizeable market for specific consumption goods that could be sourced by domestic manufacturing. The technology of the foreign firm obtained by licensing or minority stock-equity relationships was married to the distribution and marketing strength of the existing importing organizations controlled by the elite groupings. The emergence of facilitating institutions such as insurance companies and finance companies were related both to the need for specialized units to achieve economies of operation in transactions of this nature and to the change in strategic requirements for success.

Industries of two types were evident, capital intensive and labour intensive. Industries such as cement and flour required heavy capital outlays, and were likely to emerge as corporate institutions jointly owned across most economic elites with significant ownership by foreign interests. Light manufacturing concerns with more modest financing requirements tended to emerge directly from the importing agency and were more likely to be owned by a small group of families (Exhibit I). What is important to note is the continuity of ownership and control which is inherent in the structure of the corporate enterprise.

The historical development of the corporate sector and the emergence of commercial elites resulted in the concentration of resources in a few large companies. By 1965 the Commissioner of income tax's annual report showed that of a total of 1,483 companies assessed in that year only, accounting for 89.6% of total company income, 179 had pretax profits exceeding $40,000. In 1970 undistributed corporate profit and depreciation allowances ac-

EXHIBIT I

Evolution of Corporate Enterprise



IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

	pre 1950	1950-1970	Post 1970
Technical Skills	Low	Moderate	High
Financial Resources	High	Moderate	Moderate
Environmental Stability	High	High	Low

counted for 70 percent of gross domestic savings and was contributed by 41 firms out of 11,435 companies representing .4% of all companies active in Jamaica. More recent estimates by te author indicate that in 1973, 32 listed companies, not including utilities, accounted for nearly 18% of corporate profit tax revenue and 28% of all corporate income. It is these thirty-two companies which are controlled or effectively influenced by the elite groups that form the substantive basis of the corporate economy.

The above evidence supports the thesis of a pattern of dominance which family elite groupings are able to maintain, reproduce and reinforce over time through the business enterprise. Further it is difficult to separate the enterprise system from the political system both interwoven and running across national boundaries. While the political system specialized in generating rules as a separate activity but in support of the private sector, the enterprise system in its production of marketable goods was able to affect both the basis on which these rules were made and how they were executed (Munroe 1973; Mills 1974; Reid 1976). Exhibit II gives the main characteristics of elite activity identifying both control strategy exercised and the accompanying political ethos.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT, ELITE ACTIVITY AND THE STATE

For many manufactured goods, the size of the markets are considered a limitation on attracting direct investment and lead to a policy of large number of concessions such as tariff protection, state monopolies and different forms of direct and indirect subsidies. Given these parameters, investment under the guise of 'enjoying comparative advantage' arrives in a protective climate sponsored by the state and local elites. Foreign investment of a more or less permanent form, demands high rewards for high risks, seeks strategic resources and prefers a stable environment. Firms with natural barriers to entry fostering a monopoly industry and those which were mineral resource oriented were typical of foreign investment that entered. The latter remained firmly in the control of the multinational firm.

In order to retain a favourable social and political climate for their activity foreign enterprises adopted mechanisms which ensured accommodation with local elites through joint ownership, reciprocal

EXHIBIT II

Jamaican Elites and Strategic Characteristics

Development Stage of the Economy	*Elites and State Involvement*	*Characteristics of Elite Dominance*	*Characteristics of Enterprise*	*Control Strategy Exercised*	*Political Ethos*
Peasant Agricultural Economy	Direct control of state	Ethnic exclusive (Jews, Whites) ownership of land	Plantation and middlemen activity	Coercive	Oligarchic
Emerging Consumer Economy	Direct control of state	Ethnic exclusive, Jews dominant, ownership of land and capital	Emergence of capital intensive industry, financial and facilitating institutions	Manipulative	Oligarchic
Developing Consumer Economy	Reduced direct political involvement, greater direct economic involvement	Ethnic exclusive, expansion of state, ownership of land, capital, technical skills	Light manufacturing and technically complex	Combative	Accommodative
Significant Middle Class	Reduced direct political involvement, greater direct economic involvement	As above but coopting technical skills	Light manufacturing and technically complex	Accommodative	Combative
Significant Middle Class	Withdrawing from direct political roles	Ethnic exclusivity reduced, continued coopting of technical skills	Light manufacturing and technically complex	Combative	Accommodative
Future	Total withdrawal from overt political roles	(Greater control over expansion of state sector) increased coopting of technical skills	Light manufacturing and technically complex	Bureaucractic	Accommodative

relationships and minority control. Ability to use the machinery of the state was a necessary prerequisite to stabilizing control of the future. Social institutions of property, labour regulations, fiscal and economic policy were functions of the force of law generated by the state and served as a potential instrument for extracting privilege and preserving the status quo. The state in its institutional form and content itself evolved through a number of stages almost parallel with the corporate enterprise.

Three main stages can be identified in the emerging Jamaican state each representing different degrees of control as exercised by the economic elites. These stages are:

1. An oligarchic stage where political power is directly wielded by those who control the economic resources of the country, where power remained continuously in the same hands from generation to generation;

2. Quasi Oligarchic where apparent conflicts between a new industrial elite and the old commercial elite seem to be resolved through a system of power brokerage based on two party or multiparty systems and leads to complementary policies in the expansion of the state machines;

3. Transitional societies — where some element of discontinuity in power relationships exist because of transference of major political roles to new social groups and statist expansion serves the development of a managerial class (Exhibit II).

The stages are not necessarily evolutionary but each stage required particular responses and control strategies from the foreign investors. These included co-opting boards of directors from local elites, building state elite relationships with local commercial firms and legal enterprises and in some cases even intermarriage. Bearing in mind that one of the significant features of transition countries is the continued concentration of private national capital in a few hands foreign investment was quick to perceive the advantages of alliances with these groups.

> Of the estimated $3.4 million in capital requirements for the Jamaica Flour Company, the corporate foreign groups provided $760,000, less than a quarter of the total requirements, Jamaican shareholders put up a $1,000,000 and the Bank of Nova Scotia (Jamaican minority owned), made available a line of credit of $1.4 million from savings of Jamaicans.

"What these agreements mean... (technical assistance, royalties, and management fees)... was that for a cash overlay of $760,000 the foreign groupings were able to extract nealy $2,000,000 in fees and $500,000 in dividends... Jamaican shareholders benefited from a tax free yield of $820,000 over five years on an investment of $1,000,000; a handsome yield by any standards p. 13 (Reid, 1975). Arrangements of the sort noted above were conducted with open support and encouragement of an elected government which ideologically and institutionally mirrored the economic relationships between the family groupings and the society (Stone, 1973). With the emergence of a new post war industrial group who were primarily engaged in secondary manufacturing, superficial conflicts as to the direction of economic policy could be observed.

For example, state policy was used to directly protect the interests of the Desnoes & Geddes family owned concern (a brewery which was one of the largest firms in the island) from the competitive strength of a new entrant, a British multinational brewer; Guinness Ltd. One of the older commercial alliances of Jewish families (Ashenheims, Henriques, D'Costas) had the dominant local share ownership in a local subsidiary. The newcomer was restricted to an annual advertising expenditure of $250,000 (Jamaican) and a production target for beer and stout of 2.6 million gallons of beer and stout. Such restrictions could be interpreted as one of the more visible pieces of evidence of intra-group conflict.

However, such evidence of contradictions in a group strategy, as above, merely obscure the fact that ostensibly divergent policies were indeed complementary. The fact that, for example, older commercial elites engaged in the distributive trade were supporting free trade policies at the same time as they favoured such protectionist measures as import restrictions and tariff protection, only illustrated that they were of position to benefit from both policies. On the whole, the economic groupings pursued a consistent policy of group wealth maximization. This was so because of their interwoven economic interests through the device of the holding company with shared ownership at that level or through intracorporate linkages at the subsidiary level. Both types of linkages show (Exhibit III) where family owned firms and constellation families become interlocked and the functional arrangements which can arrise out of this form of ownership.

The relationship between this type of concentrated ownership and the ethnic domination of the major corporate institutions can be adduced from the symmetry between intercorporate linkages, overlapping directorates and the legal firm. Such a nexus shows the family as the primary mechanism for integration. One at this point wants to make the distinction between major elite groups and constellation elites. Major elite groups are principal family groupings who have been identified as being able to maintain, reproduce and reinforce over time, their position of control (Reid 1977). The constellation elites tend to be less dominant but no less influential and are intermarried with major elites, possess equity in the corporate institutions and provide additional source of skills to run the corporate enterprise.

OWNERSHIP, INTERLOCKS AND INFLUENCE

The major economic elites account for nearly one-third of number of directorships and board chairmen of the thirty-four listed corporate enterprises. Constellation elites share almost another third of these directorships, (Exhibit IV). These directors may either exercise the privilege of beneficiary ownership or may be directors in their own rights as representatives of proprietary interests.

Family elites are present in the country's major economic sectors and are particularly well represented in the corporate financial sector, the most recently developed and certainly one of the most sophisticated. What is noticeable is the degree of co-existence between national corporate interests and majority owned foreign capital. This type of symbiotic relationship is strategic, providing excessive returns for local interests who secured much of this investment finance and working capital from local savings and a concessionary climate for foreign interests in exchange for a partnership stake, foreign technology which was rewarded with high service payments and royalties (Reid 1975; Williams 1975).

The control exercised over the local environment was a feature that at times, frustrated powerful mutinationals.

> In 1919 we were appointed, agents for the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company... We are today the third oldest distributor for Goodyear in the world... Indeed this is the only country in the world where Goodyear has a factory, that they themselves do not distribute. (History of Bryden and Evelyn — Group Annual Report 1973)

EXHIBIT III

Examples of Intracorporate Linkages (Ownership & Functional)



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
Family Group =
Pension Manager
Matalon, Desnoes
Ashenheim, Henriques, D'Costa
Ashenheim, D'Costa
Matalon, Fletcher, Melhado
Industrial Commercial Development
Lascelles de Mercado
Distributor
Carribean Cement Company
Life of Jamaica
13.6%
53.6%
43.7%
distributor
Pension Manager
Western Terminals
Wray & Nephew
Caribbean Steel Co.
minority share
distributor
Esso Standard Oil
Guinness JA Ltd.

EXHIBIT IV

Distribution of Directorships in Major Corporations Between Family Groups

Directorships N = 34* (1976)

	Banks	*Insurance Companies*	*Other Corporate Institutions*	*Board Chairman*	*General Manager*
Ashenheims	1	1	13	5	2
Matalons	1	1	6	1	-
Henriques	2	1	14	2	1
Hart	1	1	7	3	1
Desnoes	1	1	5	1	-
Subtotal N = 56	6	5	45	12	2
Constellation families N = 47	13	10	24	5	5
Kinecon group = 103	19	15	69	17	
Total nos. of Directorship = 151	37	27	87	34	

* The sample is composed of all Jamaican companies whose stocks were publictly traded in 1976.

The existence of interlocking directorates (Exhibit V) illustrates both the considerable overlapping of family interests and the role of the legal firm as an integrative link between economic units where direct family influence in the form of board representation does not exist. The Desnoes family has a relatively low direct interlocks with other elite groups. When the representation of the family legal firm is considered, however, the extent of interlocking increases substantially. Similar conclusions can be drawn about the character of interlocks between the major family groupings, interlocks whose formal boundaries are delineated by legal firms which extend the community of power and interests into constellation families.

LINKAGES, LAW AND STRATEGY

Lawyers, legal firms and the law cannot be abstracted from the political or social context within which they exist. As the preemi-

EXHIBIT V

Extent of Direct Interlocking Between Family Groups

		Family and Family Legal Firm Interlock					
		Ashenheims	*Desnoes*	*D'Costa*	*Hart*	*Henriques*	*Matalons*
Direct Family Interlock	Ashenheims	–	.22	.22	.16	.30	.12
	Desnoes	.03	–	–	.16	.16	.16
	D'Costa	.12	–	–	–	.10	.03
	Hart	.06	.06	–	–	.16	.06
	Henriques	.18	.03	.09	.09	–	.03
	Matalons	.06	.02	.03	.03	.06	–

nent social institution for delineating the boundaries of economic institutions and protecting the concept of private property, it is not surprising that the legal systems of developing countries was dominated by an economic oligarchy.

The legal firm in the context of Jamaica corporate economy served two unique roles. It acted as an institutional link between polity and family group, since four of major elite groupings have family law firms which had a tradition of supplying members for important state appointments. Equally as important, it provided an institutional linkage of finance capital, land capital cementing statellite families through relationships which though not consanguinal, were equally as secure. (It also provided for the network of statellite relationships with other foreign interests whose operations for the most part were independent of the corporate sector.) In this way, a broad network of propertied interests coalesced in this particular institution, exerting significant influence. For example, six of the sixteen man committee who framed the Jamaican constitution were lawyers who had major partnerships in the legal firms represented in Exhibit V. During the early post war period which saw the establishing and expansion of most of the island's major manufacturing industries, viz. cement, flour, steel and consolidation of the distributive sector, the economic elites dominated the Legislative Council, which was responsible for passing legislation which set the terms of entry of foreign investment and the conditions under which it operated (Williams, 1975; Reid, 1975; Mills, 1974; Swaby, 1974).

The mechanics of institutional expansion required that elite groups, in the interests of their continued control, obtain critical positions under their direct influence. This was done through the legal firm. More than half of the directorships in the major corporations were distributed within ten legal firms, a third shared by the Ashenheim, Hart, Desnoes group (Exhibit VI). The legal firm sometimes not only provided directors but the company secretary as well. The Bank of Nova Scotia (Ja. Ltd.) (a majority-owned subsidiary of Bank of Nova Scotia and the largest corporate organization in Jamaica), is interesting in this respect. Of an eleven-man board of directors — four are direct members of the major elite families, the General Manager who is also on the Board is a member of one of the same families, the company secretary is a partner in one of the family owned legal firms and the banks' attorneys quite naturally are from the family firms. This is representative of the pattern of influence, information gatekeeping and gathering and proprietary interest in the corporate economy. What

EXHIBIT VI

Law Firms, Family, and Corporate Company Linkages

Family Group	*Family Law Firm*	*Nos. of Related Directorships N = 151*	*Nos. of Related Chairmen N = 34*	*Nos. of Companies Legal Representative N = 34*
1. **Ashenheim**	1) Milholland, Ashenheim, Stone	24	8	11
	2) Leslie Ashenheim			
2. **Hart**	1) Clinton Hart	18	4	4
	2) Manton & Hart			
3. **Desnoes**	1) Judah & Desnoes	10	-	6
4. **Constellation Families**	1) Lake, Numes & Scholefield			
	2) Myers, Fletcher and Gordon,	32	3	16
	3) Livingstone, Alexander & Levy			
		84	15	37*

* A firm may have more than one legal representative but none have more than two.

is noteworthy is that such a pattern even existed in a multinational owned organization.

EXPERTISE AND CONSTELLATION FAMILIES

As long as Jamaica remained a technically undeveloped society, the exercise of power by elites could be seen as essentially a process of coordinating the distribution of facilities and resources among themselves and their supportive groupings and maintenance of control over subordinates. However, as technology became more complex and knowledge intensive, two specific changes would be required in the exercise of power by the elites. Firstly, the imperatives of technical knowledge will force those in power to either relinquish some degree of control to 'expert' subordinates from outside their narrow social grouping or train their own members in such critical skills.

In the event the latter is impossible or difficult to achieve, then the recruitment process would be one designed to promote as many linkages as possible between the elite grouping and the new recruit. Co-optation as a continuing policy (in some cases underwritten by marriage) is a strategic appreciation of the fast increasing importance of diverse technical knowledge, a new factor of production. Such anticipation of and responses to environmental pressures placed a premium on functional business skills and experience, which were pre-requisites for control in such areas as accounting, finance and business administration. Elite members were now being trained in these areas as opposed to law and any shortage of such skills was supplied by members of the constellation families.

KINECON GROUP AND MONISTIC INFLUENCE

What has been shown so far is the existence of family elites, their interlocking control and dominance of major corporate institutions and the institutional mechanisms such as the legal firm and intracorporate ownership which serve to integrate economic interests. This integration is made more complete by the extensive consanguineal relationships fostered by marriage which form a community of interests represented in Exhibit VII. Such a network of linkages show the relatively small family groups which effectively control the corporate economy.

EXHIBIT VII

Simplified Schema Showing Major Linkages by Type Between Major Elite Groupings and Constellation Families



Within this context, viewing the evolution of specialized economic institutions as evidence of structural differentiation of the functions the elite family grouping performs is misleading. It would appear that there is no loss of direct control of kinsmen and the nuclear family over major economic institutions.

What is however noticeable is that the "extended" family or what Zeitlin (1974) has called the 'Kinecon' group where kinship ties, occupational roles and economic interests form a complex network is the dominant social formation in Jamaican economy.

The corporate family and its development is a dynamic response to perceived environmental changes which had the capacity to alter the existing links between the factors of production, land, labour, capital. The strategic response is the expansion of elite control over the most scarce and vital factor of production. Initially, it was land, after the war it was capital, more recently and for the future, it will be technology and its related skills. Corporate institutions and the extended family will remain tied to their monistic relationships by co-opting scarce skills or acquiring them in efforts to maintain their pattern dominance.

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Ethnicity, Ideology, and Class Struggle in Guyanese Society

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RÉSUMÉ

Pendant toute l'histoire coloniale de la Guyane, deux facteurs principaux ont créé et maintenu des barrières et des conflits ethniques à l'intérieur de la classe ouvrière. La classe dirigeante a appliqué une répartition inéquitable des bénéfices et des charges économiques entre les différents groupes ethniques de la classe ouvrière. Dans cet article, l'auteur tente de montrer que cette répartition inéquitable et cette idéologie raciste se perpétuent actuellement en Guyane et se reflètent dans les barrières et les conflits ethniques qui existent entre les travailleurs Indo-guyanais et Afro-Guyanais. Enfin, pour comprendre ces procédés, il est nécessaire de concevoir l'ethnicité comme une idéologie. Un examen des élections de 1973 dans la région est de la côte du Démerara fournira l'illustration de son point de vue.

In the first part of this paper, it is argued that ethnic boundaries, as defined by Frederik Barth, played a crucial role in the ideology of class and inter-ethnic conflict in former British Guiana. Specifically, it is shown that ruling class policies of disproportionate allocation of economic benefits and burdens led to the growth of social and economic disparities between working class ethnic groups. In this context, Portuguese, Afro-Guyanese, and Indo-Guyanese workers and farmers often used ruling class racial stereotypes to 'explain' their respective social and economic positions, and to blame each other, rather than ruling class exploitation, for their poverty and economic insecurity. In other cases, members of each major working class ethnic group used ruling class racial

stereotypes in attempts to improve their social and economic position at the expense of the others. These conflicts diverted the attention of workers from the actual causes of poverty, economic insecurity, and social and economic disparities between working class ethnic groups (viz., exploitation and differential allocation); also, these conflicts inhibited working class unity in political and economic struggles against the ruling class. At the same time, the ruling class belief in non-white inferiority was consistently used to justify existing power and property relations. Thus, ruling class policies of differential allocation, ruling class racial stereotypes, and the ruling class belief in non-white inferiority served as the basis for the maintenance of ethnic boundaries and conflict within the working class, and played an ideological role in the wider struggle between labour and capital in former British Guiana.

In the second part of this paper, it is argued that disproportionate allocation and racist ideology persist in contemporary Guyana, and are reflected in ethnic boundaries and conflict between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese working people. Specifically, it is argued that L. F. S. Burham's Peoples National Congress (PNP) Party retains the support of a core of Afro-Guyanese constituents by allocating a disproportionately large amount of economic benefits to them, and that this is made possible, to a large extent, by U.S. government support for the PNC regime. Evidence for this view is provided by an examination of the election of 1973.

ETHNICITY AND IDEOLOGY

Despres has distinguished recent approaches to ethnicity according to whether or not they focus on institutional differences, as most pluralist approaches do, or upon self-ascription and ascription-by-others, that is, the ethnic boundaries discussed by Barth (Despres, 1975: 127-129). Barth's approach does not focus on institutions or the cultural patterns exhibited by various ethnic groups, but on the boundaries that define the groups — i.e., the cultural and / or physical features that are used as definitive characteristics by members of interacting groups (see Barth, 1969: 13-14). This approach has the advantage of taking into account the possibility that criteria for self-ascription and ascription-by-others can change. It thus avoids the aura of permanence and immutability that can

result from tying ethnic identity to a list of institutional forms. Barth writes

> When defined as an ascriptive and exclusive group, the continuity of an ethnic unit is clear; it depends on the maintenance of a boundary....
>
> The critical focus of investigation.... becomes the *boundary* that defines the groups, not the cultural stuff that it enclosed (1969: 14-15).

The latter point seems properly directed against those who attempt to define ethnic identity in terms of institutions, 'historical identity' (Schermerhorn, 1970: 12), 'peoplehood' (Gordon, 1964: 24), 'primordial identity' (Geertz, 1963), etc.[1] While the latter concepts seem abstract, and raise the problem of historical or generational continuity, Barth's notion of a boundary is concrete in the sense that it can generate research on the factors which determine the maintenance of particular ethnic boundaries over time (see Bartels, 1977: 399). Thus, Barth's concept of an ethnic boundary will be used in this paper, but with one important qualification: at least some of the features of self-ascription and ascription-by-others in an ethnic boundary must involve something that one is born with and cannot acquire or change, such as skin colour, descent through a particular line, etc. This requirement seems necessary in order to characterize the exclusiveness that ethnic identities in Guyana and elsewhere often involve.

An ethnic boundary can be treated as part of ideology of a particular class or ethnic group.[2] From a class perspective, the

[1] D. R. Aronson also rejects these concepts of ethnicity on the grounds that they do not "...separate ethnic group behavior from other group behavior", and that they do not "...distinguish ETHNIC group consciousness from other consciousnesses and identities" (1976: 11). Aronson also rejects Barth's notion of ethnic identities as "basic":

> ...individuals maintain a multiplicity of identities which are often only SITUATIONALLY specified as relevant, let alone "basic" (1976: 11).

If Barth claims that ethnic identities are "basic" in the sense that they determine behavior in *all* situations, then Aronson's criticism is correct. However, the fact that ethnic identity may not determine behavior in all situations does not lessen the utility of conceiving ethnicity in terms of "boundaries" in Barth's sense.

[2] Dolbeare and Dolbeare define 'ideology' as a system of beliefs which

> ...present a more or less coherent picture of (1) how the present social, economic and political order operates, (2) why this is so, and whether this is good or bad, and (3) what should be done about it, if anything (1971: 3).

Similarly, Nigel Harris has defined the beliefs and ideas used by people to explain their position in the social order, and to justify their roles in political and economic struggles, as ideology (1971: 43-44).

concept of ethnicity as ideology[3] provides a useful tool for explaining inter-ethnic conflict in former British Guiana.

In 19th and early 20th-century Guyanese society, perhaps the most important ethnic boundary was based upon the criterion of skin colour. The predominantly white, Northern European ruling class stood in contrast to the predominantly non-white working class. The ruling class belief in non-white inferiority was consistently used to justify existing power and property relations in the face of 'external' threats or actual or potential working class political and industrial action (see Bartels, 1978a). Thus, according to the definitions of 'ideology' cited above, the ethnic boundary based upon skin colour, with its concomitant connotation of non-white inferiority, constituted an ideology by virtue of its role in class conflict.

Ethnic boundaries also played a central role in the ideology of conflicts between working class ethnic groups throughout Guyanese colonial history. These conflicts, however, can only be understood in light of ruling class policy and ideology.

During the colonial period, a constant feature of ruling class policy was differential allocation of economic benefits and burdens to different working class ethnic groups. Instances of differential allocation in the 19th and early 20th centuries included stimulation of the Portuguese retail sector, while black and coloured retailers were ruined (see Moore, 1975); stimulation of the Indo-Guyanese rice sector, after the cooperative farming attempts of blacks had been smashed (see Bartels, 1977); exclusion of the children of non-Christian Hindu and Muslim i.e., East Indian) plantation workers from educational opportunities. This 'channeled' educated Afro-Guyanese into urban clerical, professional, and industrial occupations, and restricted most Indo-Guyanese to rice farming and plantation labour (see Bartels, 1979). Policies of differential allocation also played a major role in the political-ethnic conflicts of the 1950's and 1960's (see Bartels, 1978).

[3] D. R. Aronson also defines ethnicity in terms of ideology 1976: 14-15), but claims that the distinguishing feature of an 'ethnic ideology' is that it contains goals and values not shared by other groups. This concept seems inappropriate for distinguishing between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese ethnic groups whose members often share aspirations to a 'middle-class, Mid-Atlantic' lifestyle (see R. T. Smith, 1971: 424-435).

Ruling class policy-makers justified disproportionate allocation by citing racial stereotypes. Many accounts by plantation owners, plantation managers, colonial officers, and Christian missionaries characterized East Indians as (1) industrious and hardworking; (2) thrifty to the point of greed; and (3) lacking in Christian morals (see Payne, 1971: 67; Pearson, 1897: 1, 8-43; MacRae, 1856: 9, 65). On the other hand, Afro-Guyanese were often characterized as (1) physically strong, but lazy, carefree, irresponsible, financially improvident, and intellectually dim; (2) physically repulsive because of their facial features, skin colour, and hair type; and (3) child-like trusting, and easily misled by more intelligent, unscrupulous people (Rodway, 1895, 243; Pearson, 1894: 243-249; Bellairs, 1897: 288-289; Hudson cited in Moore, 1975, 12; colonial officials cited in Payne, 1971: 67).

The racial stereotypes used by the ruling class to characterize various working class ethnic groups were taken over by the subordinated populations — i.e., they became ethnic boundaries in Barth's sense. If these features were, in some respect positive, they were used as a means of self-ascription. If these features were negative, they were used as means of ascription by others. Thus, East Indians often came to see themselves as thrifty, industrious, and physically attractive in contrast to Afro-Guyanese, whom they saw as irresponsible, physically unattractive, and lacking in initiative. Afro-Guyanese, on the other hand, often saw themselves as physically strong, Christian, generous, and trusting in contrast to East Indian 'coolies' whom they regarded as greedy, clannish heathens. Working class ethnic groups used these stereotypes to 'explain' their social and economic positions, and to justify their roles in struggles against each other for economic ressource and political power.[4] In a context where the best economic resources were monopolized by the ruling class (see Despres, 1975), and where the working class was continually ravaged by ruling class exploitation and periodic economic crisis (see Bartels, 1978), such struggles were often bitter.

For example, the pervasiveness of ruling class ideology insured that many blacks 'explained' the success of Indo-Guyanese rice

[4] For an analysis of the beginning of this process in the 1840's, see Bartels 1977: 399-400).

farmers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in terms of ruling class racial stereotypes of East Indians as 'miserly' and willing to tolerate 'uncivilized' conditions (Payne, 1971: 49). And by the 1920's and 1930's, East Indian organizations were using ruling class racial stereotypes of 'lazy' blacks and 'industrious' Indians to justify allocation of agricultural Crown Land exclusively to Indo-Guyanese (see 'East Indian Intelligentsia', 1938).[5] Thus, ruling class racial stereotypes, transformed into ethnic boundaries in Barth's sense, played an ideological role in conflicts between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese.[6]

Such conflicts also played a role in the larger struggle between labour and capital insofar as they diverted the attention of workers from the actual causes of socio-economic inequalities between Indo-Guyanese, Afro-Guyanese, and Portuguese (viz., ruling class exploitation and differential allocation), and inhibited concerted action by working people in political and industrial struggles against the ruling class.

Conflicts between working class ethnic groups were seen by the ruling class as evidence that non-whites were "naturally incapable" of governing themselves peaceably. A corollary of this ideological position was the belief, held by members of the ruling class, that they had a "responsibility" to continue exercising power in order to insure that such inter-ethnic conflicts were held in check. At the same time, the ruling class racial stereotypes which portrayed all non-whites as inferior,[7] were consistently used by the ruling class in attempts to justify and defend the colonial social order against working class political and industrial action. To the extent that the features of self-ascription and ascription-by-others which defined (and continue to define) ethnic boundaries in Guyana played a role in class struggle, and in conflicts between working class ethnic groups, they were ideologies.

[5] For an excellent account of the policies of disproportionate allocation by which plantation owners and the colonial government ruined Afro-Guyanese agricultural co-operatives and later encouraged the growth of an East Indian rice sector, see Adamson (1972).

[6] For further examples of such conflicts, and the ideological role of ethnic boundaries, see Bartels (1978a).

[7] The ruling class ideology of non-white inferiority emerged from fear of slave revolts and from the struggle against abolitionism long before the introduction of Portuguese, Chinese, and East Indian indentured labourers to British Guiana in the 19th century (see Williams, 1945; Montagu, 1945).

ETHNICITY AND IDEOLOGY IN POST-COLONIAL GUYANESE SOCIETY

Tendencies toward inter-ethnic conflict based upon disproportionate allocation and racist ideology persist in post-colonial Guyanese society. Economic scarcity among Guyanese working people is still 'explained' in terms of the racial stereotypes of the former ruling class and its various allies. Ethnic boundaries continue to exist, and there is inter-ethnic conflict over scarce resources. As in the past, the basis of these phenomena is disproportionate allocation, but it is no longer practiced by a 'white, Northern European' ruling class overtly supported by British state power. Rather, the PNC regime practices disproportionate allocation in order to retain the support of a core of Afro-Guyanese constituents (see Hanley, 1975; Despres, 1975). Without such support, the PNC's power would be seriously jeopardized. This disproportionate allocation has sharpened ethnic boundaries and reproduced political conflict which follows ethnic lines. The interplay between ethnicity, ideology, and disproportionate allocation during the 1973 election will be described in the remainder of this paper.

On May 30, 1973, the PNC government proposed legislation to lower the voting age to 18. The opposition Peoples Progressive Party (PPP)[8] objected to this, in spite of the fact that the number of 18-21 year old Indo-Guyanese PPP supporters was probably greater than the number of 18-21 year old Afro-Guyanese PNC supporters, on the grounds that the PNC would manipulate registration of 18-21 year old voters in such a way that the PNC would get the vast majority of their votes (see J. Jagan, 1974, regarding methods of electoral manipulation in Guyana). The PNC responded by claiming that the PPP was being hypocritical on this issue since the PPP had

[8] The PPP initiated Guyana's struggle for independence, and commanded the support of most Guyanese working people from 1950 until around 1955. Its advocacy of socialism and strong ties with the socialist countries, however, provoked intervention from the U.S. and British governements which went far to splinter the party (and the country) along ethnic-political lines in the late 1950's and early 1960's. L. F. S. Burnham's breakaway faction eventually gained power with British and U.S. support, in 1964. It has retained power since that time, mainly through questionable electoral practices. Independence was achieved in 1966. The PNC's supporters are predominantly Afro-Guyanese, while PPP supporters are mainly Indo-Guyanese. For a fuller account of these events, see Henfrey (1972), Walton (1972), Radosh (1969), and Bartels (1978a).

proposed lowering the voting age to 18 while it was in office. The PNC also claimed that the PPP was afraid of giving young people the vote because so many of them were PNC supporters. After this exchange, Prime Minister Burham called an election for July 16, 1973.

PPP leaders decided to contest the election in spite of their expectation that it would be rigged in favour of the PNC. Some PPP activists believed that the massive rigging which would be necessary for a PNC 'victory' would destroy any remaining pretense of 'democracy' in Guyana, or that, along with minor opposition parties, they would command such strength that the PNC would not dare rig the election for fear of mass discontent and anti-government action.

Shortly after notice of the election was given, rumours began to circulate that the PNC 'expected' to win a ⅔ legislative majority which would enable them to change the constitution, outlaw all opposition parties, and turn Guyana into a one-party state. Presumably in order to dispell such rumours, Burnham declared that representatives of all political parties would be present during voting, transportation of ballots, and counting of ballots. There was a concerted PNC effort to win the votes of Afro-Guyanese in Georgetown who had been hit hard by inflation and banning of certain staples (e.g., 'English' potatoes) involved in the PNC policy of import substitution. PNC activists claimed that Afro-Guyanese PNC supporters in Georgetown might be so assured of Burnham's victory that they might not bother to vote.

PPP activists accused the PNC of corruption, incompetence, extravagance, racial discrimination against Indo-Guyanese, and subservience to Bookers[9] and the U.S. government. They drew attention to inflation, mass unemployment, deterioration of social services, labour problems, inadequate medical facilities, housing shortages, food shortages, etc., and claimed that a PPP government cound solve these problems by starting Guyana on the path of socialism. PNC activists, in turn, accused the PPP of hypocrisy on the issue of the voting age, fomenting racial politics, and sub-

[9] By 1920, almost all Guyana's sugar plantations and mills were owned by the London-based firm of Booker Brothers and McConnell. 'Bookers' controlled the Guyanese sugar industry, as well as several other significant areas of Guyana's economy, until its nationalization in 1975.

servience to Moscow. They also claimed that their government had made great gains in providing 'economic development' for Guyana.

There were no *overt* ethic appeals by PNC or PPP political activists. However, the historical context of the election campaign insured that practically every political appeal had covert ethnic overtones. The PPP was widely viewed as a vehicle for gaining scarce economic resources for its Indo-Guyanese supporters, and the PNC was widely viewed as a vehicle for gaining scarce economic resources for its Afro-Guyanese supporters. Many Indo-Guyanese claimed that the PNC government had systematically given government jobs and other sorts of economic resources to its Afro-Guyanese supporters while denying them to better-qualified Indo-Guyanese. They believed that a PPP government would redress this imbalance. Some Indo-Guyanese PPP supporters used former ruling class 'racial' stereotypes to justify their belief that the government should give more jobs to Indo-Guyanese.[10] They sometimes claimed that Indo-Guyanese, because of their allegedly 'superior racial characteristics', had built up Guyana economically, and therefore deserved to govern (i.e., to get the bulk of economic resources dispensed by the government). Similarly, many Afro-Guyanese justified the view that the PNC shoud favour Afro-Guyanese by arguing that Blacks had built up Guyana economically, but that the fruits of their labour had been stolen, first by colonialism, and later by Indians, who had been favoured by the colonialists. The former ruling class racial stereotype of Indians as 'stingy' and 'miserly' was often invoked to justify this argument. Despres writes,

> ...As an industry, the government generates 10 percent of the GDP and contributes 19 percent to the employed labor force. Thus, apart from agriculture, the government is the largest consumer of labor in the country. While all elements of the population look to the government for favors and support, the overwhelming majority of Africans view their control of the government as an absolute prerequisite of their economic survival. As a consequence, competition

[10] A distinction must be drawn between those who support the PPP because they view it as a vehicle for furthering the interests of Indo-Guyanese, and those who support the PPP because they see it as a vehicle for furthering the interests of all workers and farmers, irrespective of 'race'. During the past several years, the PPP leadership has attempted to eliminate the former ideological tendency from the party (see Bartels, 1978a). PPP leaders and activists, while alleging PNC favoritism toward Afro-Guyanese PNC supporters, have attempted to increase PPP influence in multi-ethnic and predominantly Afro-Guyanese trade unions and other working class organizations.

> for the government and for the resources which the government commands is fierce among Africans and Indians (1975: 99).

Newly-refreshed memories of the inter-ethnic and political violence of the 1960's added to the tension as the 1973 election drew near.

While the racial stereotypes cited above were never openly used in political speeches by PNC or PPP candidates, they were often repeated in private conversations *within* each major ethnic section. Indo-Guyanese PPP supporters would constantly complain amongst themselves that all government jobs and scholarships were given to blacks, while better-qualifed Indo-Guyanese were unemployed. While a few Indo-Guyanese workers in East Coast Demerara villages argued that Cheddi Jagan, the leader of the PPP, would provide more economic benefits for all "poor people", irrespective of 'race', most of them used the argument that a PPP government would redress inequalities in government allocation of scarce resources.[11] Afro-Guyanese PNC supporters, on the other hand, constantly warned each other that a PPP victory would mean that the economic benefits that the PNC had brought them (e.g., jobs and scholarships) would be taken away and given to Indians.

In a context where such arguments were constantly in the minds of voters, PNC and PPP political activity (e.g., speeches, posters, rallies, etc.) inevitably assumed ethnic overtones. And, as election day approached, a series of violent ethnic-political incidents sharpened ethnic and political tensions. Although several people were killed or injured in such incidents, major outbreaks of violence did not occur (see Bartels, 1978a).

Burnham and the PNC received a ⅔ majority in the election. According to the *Guyana Graphic* of July 20, 1973, the PNC received 243,803 votes (70.15%) and won 37 seats; the PPP received 92,374 votes (26.51%) and won 14 seats; other parties received a total of 11,633 votes (3.3%) and won 2 seats.

It was rumoured after the election that when the earliest election returns from the PNC 'strongholds' in Georgetown indicated that Burnham was doing poorly because of a high abstention rate, he ordered the predominantly Afro-Guyanese Guyana Defense

[11] Again, the distinction between those who see the PPP as an 'Indian party', and those who see it as a socialist party championing the cause of *all* working people, must be borne in mind.

Force (GDF) to rig the election in order to insure a ⅔ PNC majority. Documentation regarding widespread PNC rigging in the 1973 election is extensive, and need not be treated here (see J. Jagan, 1974).

In the light of the foregoing discussion, parallels can be drawn between disproportionate allocation, the ideological role of ethnic boundaries, and inter-ethnic conflict in the colonial and post-colonial periods. Throughout Guyana's colonial history, conflict between subordinated ethnic groups often stemmed from disproportionate allocation of economic benefits and burdens to different working class ethnic groups by the ruling class. The resulting differences in the social and economic positions of different working class ethnic groups were often 'explained' in terms of ruling class racial stereotypes. This pattern has continued in contemporary Guyanese political economy in the sense that the political strategy which promotes inter-ethnic conflict continues to be based upon disproportionate allocation of economic benefits among Indo- and Afro-Guyanese. Specifically, the PNC allocates a disproportionately large amount of scarce economic resources to a core of Afro-Guyanese constituents in order to retain their political support. As in many ex-colonies, these scarce resources include land, jobs, places in vocational training programmes, and government scholarships. Indo-Guyanese resentment of such disproportionate allocation figures prominently in contemporary Guyanese politics. As in the past, the different economic and social positions of different ethnic groups are often 'explained' in terms of the racial stereotypes that were used by the former ruling class.

While disproportionate allocation can no longer be practiced directly by a predominantly white ruling class, supported by British and/or U.S. state power, as it was during colonial times, the practices and policies of the U.S. government often make it possible for the PNC regime to practice disproportionate allocation. Specifically, the U.S. government, through various forms of 'economic aid', enables the Burnham regime to provide a disproportionately large amount of economic resources to Afro-Guyanese PNC supporters in order to retain their political allegiance. For example, in East Coast Demerara, many Afro-Guyanese youths from 'PNC families' have received PNC-sponsored training in the U.S. which was financed by the U.S. government. Scholarships for study at the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama are especially popular (see Vernon,

1972: 11-16). Most youths who are chosen by the PNC to study in the U.S. are assured of relatively high-paying government jobs upon completion of their training.

Even the 1971 nationalization of Alcan's bauxite extraction operation was financed, in part, by an $8 million (U.S.) loan from the Chase Manhattan Bank (see Despres, 1975: 98). Shortly after this loan was made, the World Bank granted a $10 million (U.S.) loan to the Guyanese government, and the U.S. government renewed Guyana's sugar quota (Jagan, 1972: 407). Furthermore, between 1946 and 1973, the U.S. government furnished $9.6 million (U.S.) to train and equip Guyana's security forces (North American Congress on Latin America, 1973: 26). Almost all of this aid has been furnished since Burnham came to power in 1964. The PNC regime has insured that such training and equipment are monopolized by Afro-Guyanese PNC supporters who make up the majority of army and police personnel.

Until its nationalization, Bookers' sugar estates also pursued policies which contributed to the maintenance of differential allocation of resources. On Bookers' sugar estates, unskilled, low-paid labourers were mostly Indo-Guyanese, and skilled, highly-paid labourers were mostly Afro-Guyanese. Until the early 1970's, these groups belonged to different trade unions. Bookers refused to recognize the Guyana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU), which commanded the support of most unskilled Indo-Guyanese sugar workers. Thus, the representatives of skilled Afro-Guyanese sugar workers could bargain with Bookers, while GAWU representatives could not. Bookers' refusal to recognize the GAWU was supported by the PNC government and several U.S.-controlled 'international' labour organizations operating in Guyana. All of these circumstances promoted the continuity of political-ethnic conflict and maintenance of ethnic boundaries between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese sugar workers.

These considerations show that, just as the policies of disproportionate allocation practiced by the ruling class during colonial times depended, to a large extent, upon support from British, and, later, the U.S. governments (see Bartels, 1978), so the present PNC policies of disproportionate allocation depend, to some extent, upon support from the U.S. government. Presumably, the U.S. government has provided this support in order to secure Burnham's

support upon various issues in international politics, and, more importantly, to keep the PPP out of power. Insofar as policies of disproportionate allocation promote the maintenance of ethnic boundaries and conflict, the latter phenomena cannot be fully understood without reference to the policies and practices of the U.S. government and ruling class with regard to Guyana.

In spite of the continuity of disproportionate allocation and inter-ethnic conflict described above, Indo- and Afro-Guyanese working people were able to unite in a squatters' movement to obtain unused, Bookers-owned residential land prior to the 1973 election (see Bartels, 1979).[12] The squatters' movement and the 1973 election period exemplify coexistence of the same tendencies toward working class consciousness with tendencies toward inter-ethnic conflict and racist ideology that characterized Guyanese colonial history. As with analyses of major instances of inter-ethnic conflict and working class unity in struggles throughout Guyanese colonial history, attempts to understand post-colonial Guyanese social and political processes must take such coexisting tendencies into account. Also, as in the case of Guyanese colonial history, class struggle, disproportionate allocation, inter-ethnic conflict, and the ideological role of ethnic boundaries cannot be understood without reference to the policies and practices of Anglo-American governments and ruling classes. The degree to which internal and external bourgeois control, racist ideology, and disproportionate allocation are eliminated is the degree to which the necessary conditions for overcoming inter-ethnic conflict are present.

Critics of the PPP sometimes claim that a PPP government would favor Indo-Guyanese over Afro-Guyanese despite claims by PPP leaders that the PPP is a working class party which champions all working people equally, irrespective of 'race'. It should be pointed out, however, that there have not been any recent opportunities to judge PPP government policy, since the PPP, despite support from a majority of the Guyanese electorate, has been kept out of power since 1964.

[12] This struggle can be seen as a continuation of previous struggles during the colonial period, where Afro-Guyanese, Indo-Guyanese, and Portuguese working people co-operated in political and industrial action against ruling class and colonial exploitation (see Bartels, 1978).

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"Recent Acculturation of Bush Negroes in Surinam and French Guiana"

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RÉSUMÉ

Le texte essaie de déterminer jusqu'à quel point les Noirs Réfugiés de l'intérieur du Surinam et de la Guyane française ont subi l'influence des développements urbains dans leur milieu. L'auteur procède en faisant une revue de leur histoire et en décrivant les différents secteurs de leur culture pour y voir des influences, soit de la tradition, soit des développements modernes avec lesquels ils sont en contact.

INTRODUCTION

This paper* assesses the extent to which the Bush Negroes, an Afro-Maroon society in interior Surinam and French Guiana, have recently been undergoing acculturation to the urbanized coastal society. After briefly describing the historical background and tribal organization of the Bush Negroes, the paper discusses research on African versus non-African influences on Bush Negro culture,

* This paper is based on talks by the author on "Bush Negro Communities in Interior Surinam, South America" (presented at a faculty/graduate seminar series in Sociology, University of Saskatchewan, November 19, 1975); "Afro-American Cultures: Haiti, the Guianas, and Brazil" (broadcast in the "Peoples and Places" series, CJUS-FM, Saskatoon, January 27, 1977); and "African Bush Negro Culture in Surinam, South America: Social Organization and Cultural Change" (presented in a lecture series sponsored by the Anthropology Students' Association, University of Saskatchewan, January 28, 1977, in conjunction with a display of Bush Negro and Carribean Creole artifacts in the Anthropology Museum). The author visited communities of several Bush Negro tribes and subtribes (the Cottica, Maroni, Lawa, and Tapanahoni Djukas and the Paramakas) in Surinam and French Guiana in 1972.



Reprinted from Hureault 1970.

successively examining social organization and kinship, religious beliefs and practices, the arts, and language. Focussing on motivation for culture change, the paper then assesses the acculturation effect of trade with the coast, temporary work on the coast, changing values and appearances, interior development, tourism, education and emigration, urbanization, and finally recent politicization.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

There is an extensive contemporary literature on the colonial history of the Guianas and on the historical development of Bush Negro communities in the interior (e.g. R. Price 1973d: 293-295; de Groot 1963, 1965, 1969; Bastide 1971; etc.), as well as various recent republications of informative archival materials, first-hand accounts of Bush Negro rebellions (e.g. Louis 1748, Stedman 1796, Coster 1866, King 1885, etc.).

One is tempted to write, not without some justification, that the primary colonial influence in western Guiana (i.e. present-day Guyana) was British, in central Guiana (Surinam) was Dutch, and in eastern Guiana (Guyane Francaise) was French. However, such a statement is at best a gross oversimplification. Not only has the political history of each of the three Guianas been a bewildering contest between British, Dutch, and French colonization (as was also the case for most eastern Caribbean islands), but also their social history has involved a very complex racial, ethnic, and cultural amalgam in the settlement process (for a detailed chronology, see Appendix I).

Our concern in this paper is not with this socio-political history nor even primarily with the historical background to the development of Bush Negro tribes. Rather, we are more immediately concerned with recent acculturation of Bush Negroes. Therefore we are obliged to be highly selective in providing only a brief summary of Bush Negro history.

For more than three centuries the Guianas have been a classic setting for the development and possible survival of Maroon communities. The evolution — and in some cases eventual dissolution — of these communities in the Guianas may be traced in six distinct stages.

First, following the initial period when the Guiana coast was explored and claimed by Spain, African slaves (largely from West Africa, particularly the Gold Coast) were brought to the Guianas during the seventeenth century, when Britain, France, and the Netherlands began to compete vigourously for control of this South American region.

Second, from the late seventeenth century through the mid-eighteenth, slaves began to escape in significant numbers from coastal plantations to the interior, where they eventually formed Bush Negro tribes.

Third, after half a century of brutal guerilla warfare waged by these Bush Negro tribes against colonial and European troops, a number of treaties — most of them short lived — were concluded between colonial authorities and several Bush Negro tribes, including the Saramakas, Aucas or Djukas, and other scattered groups.

In 1761 the Aucas, led by a Negro named Arabi, who was probably a Moslem, were granted the right by the Dutch to establish their own republic, provided that no further refuge be given to escaped slaves. The following year the Saramakas also won limited autonomy from the Dutch, with the caveat that a Dutch "adviser" would act in liaison with the tribal leader, the "gran man".

Fourth, renewed hostilities erupted in the late eighteenth century, resulting in further defection from the plantations and in the formation of new tribal allegiances. One group, the Bonis, led a migratory existence, waging border warfare with Dutch colonial troops and even attempting to extract extortion from other Bush Negro tribes, then finally sought refuge deep in the interior in territory claimed by the French. By the end of the eighteenth century the Maroons in British (western) Guiana, and many of those in the more accessible areas of French (eastern) Guiana, had been exterminated. Yet they survived as Bush Negro tribes in Dutch (central) Guiana and to some extent in remote areas of French Guiana.

Fifth, military and other pressure on the Maroons in the Guianas eased with the British abolition of the slave trade in 1807 (note that the British occupied central Guiana 1799-1816) and of slavery in 1833, and with Dutch abolition of slavery thirty years

later in 1863. These liberalizing policies, coupled with continuing economic recession further converted the coastal population into a multicultural melange. With the number of plantations declining rapidly, and the remainded facing the complete depletion of their labour supply, Chinese from Java and China (since 1850), East Indians (1873-1916), and Javanese (1890-1931) were imported as plantation workers to fill the void while now-freed Negroes augmented the urbanized "Creole" population. In the meantime, the Bush Negroes, profitting from being left alone, retreated into relative or complete isolation for over a century. Secure in their physical isolation, they had not succumbed to force of arms, nor did they now succumb to gradual assimilation into the coastal Negro society, at least not yet. In interior Dutch and French Guiana they were to remain lively sociocultural entities, virtual "states within a state", for decades.

Sixth, eventually acculturation did become increasingly noticeable among Bush Negroes, reflected in a de-Africanization of their culture and in integration into the national economy and politics, perhaps likely to increase as a result of independence being granted to Surinam in December, 1975. It is, of course, this sixth stage with which we will be primarily concerned in this paper.

BUSH NEGRO TRIBES

The total Bush Negro population in the Guianas may be estimated at almost 50,000. The most recent census data available give 39,000 in Surinam (9% of the total Surinam population) and about 8,000 (13,4% of the total population) in French Guiana. These Bush Negroes are perhaps the largest concentration of well-defined Maroon descendants in the Americas retaining a largely African culture (Price, 1973a: 293), contrasting with smaller pockets of more assimilated Maroons in Caribbean islands and Brazil.

There are two principal Bush Negro tribes, the Djukas and the Saramakas, each numbering 15 - 20,000; plus three smaller tribes: the Bonis or Alukus, the Paramakas, and the Matawais, each numbering approximately a thousand; and a sixth, very small tribe, the Kwintis, numbering only a few hundreds; as well as minor scatterings of Maroon descendants such as Negro refugees from Brazil on the Oyapok River. The larger tribes are sub-divided into

sub-tribes and kin lineages. The main body of Djukas are along the Tapanahoni, lower Lawa, and upper Maroni Rivers (mostly in Surinam, although those east of the Maroni and Lawa are in French Guiana). These Djukas are separated from their co-tribesmen along the lower Maroni and in the Cottica marshlands by the Paramaka people, claiming the central portion of the Maroni (on the Surinam — French Guiana frontier). A small number of Djukas are also found along the Sarakreek, between the Tapanahoni and the van Blommesteinmeer. The Saramakas are primarily concentrated along the upper Suriname River, separated from the Creolized Saramakas of the Afobaka-Brokopondo area and upper Commewijne, as well as from a few along the lower Maroni. The Bonis live mainly in French Guiana, along the upper Lawa on the Surinam frontier; some have resettled far downriver along the lower Maroni. The Matawais and other small groups of Bush Negroes (such as the Matuaris, Koffiemaccas, Coeroentis, etc.) are found along the Saramacca, Coppename and other rivers in central Surinam.

These tribes and sub-tribes tend to be basically quite similar due to their original formation under like historical and ecological conditions. But significant variations can exist in, e.g., language, diet, dress, marital customs, art, community organization, attitudes toward wage labour, etc., especially between the Saramakas and Matawais, on the one hand, and Djukas, Bonis, and Paramakas on the other hand.

There is an ample literature (in English, French, and Dutch) on specific Bush Negro tribes or sub-tribes in Surinam and French Guiana, some of it quite dated but much of it fairly recent (for a comprehensive bibliography, see R. Price 1972, 1974). Extensive research on aspects of Bush Negro culture has been conducted among the Tapanahoni and Maroni Djukas by, for example, van Lier (1919, 1940), Kahn (1928, 1931a, 1931b), and more recently by de Groot (1965, 1969), van Velzens (1966, 1972) and van Wetering (1966, 1972, 1973), and among the Cottica Djukas by Kobben (1967a, 1967b, 1968, 1969a, 1969b, 1973). For four decades M. J. Herskovits provided detailed descriptions of the retention of African culture traits among a wide variety of Afro-American and Afro-Caribbean societies (1941, 1966), including the Bush Negroes in Surinam, particularly the Saramakas (1930, 1934, 1936b); later these studies would be updated by Richard Price (1970a, 1970b, 1973a, 1973b, 1973c, 1973d). Jean Hurault has written extensively

on the art, social organization, and traditions of the Bonis (1960, 1961, 1965, 1968, 1970); one could also note reference to the Bonis in the earlier description of the history of French Guiana by Henry (1950), as well as recent commentaries within more comprehensive works by T. J. Price (1970) and R. Bastide (1971).

BUSH NEGRO CULTURE: HOW AFRICAN?

There can be little doubt that traditional Bush Negro culture retains many African elements. Writing in the 1930s, Herskovits rated this culture as "purely African" with reference to social organization, institutions, religion, magic, folklore, and masks; and "strongly African" with reference to technology, economic life, art, and language (Herskovits 1930, 1934, 1936b; Bastide 1971: 12-14). Herskovits considered Bush Negro culture to be more African in most respects than backcountry Haitian society, and far more than in other distinctive Afro-American cultures, such as among Jamaican Maroons, rural Trinidadian culture, various Cuban sects, Virgin Islands and other Afro-Caribbean cultures, and African survivals he noted in the American South, such as among the Gullah Islanders off the South Carolina coast (Herskovits 1941, 1966).

More contemporary writers would still seem to largely concur with Herskovits. For example, Richard Price has written (1973d: 293) that the Bush Negroes of Surinam "have long boasted (with the possible exception of Haiti) the most highly developed independent societies and cultures in the history of Afro-America." Lowenthal has further commented (1972: 186) that "...unlike most Creoles ...Bush Negroes take pride in their African ancestry and believe that most elements of their culture stem from Africa... In this they separate themselves from the Creole mainstream more deliberately than even the Amerindians. But Bush Negro self-esteem requires not ties of fellowship with the wider Black world; still determined to keep to themselves, they rely on traditional bonds of community to resist creolization, nationalization, and modernization. In this endeavour the Bush Negroes surpass the Jamaican Maroons, thanks to greater numbers, tribal cohesion, territorial remoteness, ethnic segregation, and economic viability."

According to Bastide (1971: 12), "it is above all among the Bush Negroes ...that we find Fanti-Ashanti Gold Coast culture in

its purest form." Other African influences on Bush Negro culture include Kromanti and Akan, also from Ghana, Nago and Fon from Dahomey, Baoulé from the Ivory Coast, etc. The Bush Negroes are somewhat distinctive in the primacy of Fanti-Ashanti influence; other Afro-American cultures tend to be derived primarily from different African cultures: Haitian from Dahomean Fon with some Nigerian Yoruba influence, Brazilian from Yoruban with some Dahomean, Jamaican Maroon from Kromanti, Trinidadian and Cuban from Yoruban, etc.

However, despite the strength of African elements in Bush Negro culture still emphasized by anthropologists and other social scientists, this culture should not be viewed as unchanging, nor has it always been completely African. As Lowenthal has explained (1972: 188):

> Bush Negroes are in no sense purely African. New World life and culture contacts have profoundly altered them. Even their rebel slave forebears were partly creolized. By the time their tribal organization was firmly fixed, almost all Bush Negroes were Creole-born. Tribal anomalies reflect Guianese geography and military exigencies, along with African institutional modes, and in ways that they are all alike Bush Negro tribes often diverge markedly from Africans. Thus the matrilineal and matrilocal character of Bush Negro society, both more rigorous and more uniform than the wide range of ancestral African forms, may reflect local reactions against coercion, 'pushing to its logical conclusion', in one scholar's view, 'an attitude prevalent among the Negroes of the New World in general.' In the authority of headmen, in the divisions of labour between men and women, Bush Negro tribal systems are not Old World retentions, but responses to New World conditions. Indeed, the market-place activity of Paramaribo is more reminiscent of West Africa than are the trade patterns of Bush Negro settlements.

Of course, the de-Africanization and acculturation of Bush Negroes has assumed two directions: First, Bush Negroes have acquired certain aspects of their culture from neighbouring Amerindians (Arawaks, Kalina / Galibi, Wayana / Roucouyennes, etc.), such as hunting and fishing techniques, preparation of foods and types of foods eaten, some crafts, weaving, canoe-building, some aspects of religion and magic, etc. (Bastide 1971: 61-62; Lowenthal 1972: 188). Nor are some Bush Negroes completely racially distinct; on the one hand, closer to the coast some amalgamation with racially hybrid Creoles has occurred (Lowenthal 1972: 186), and on the other hand, in the interior some fusion took place between Bush Negroes and Amerindians, creating Black Indians known as "Saca-

tras" (Bastide 1971: 75). Second, Bush Negroes have become increasingly acculturated to coastal society in many ways.

ASPECTS OF CULTURE RETENTION OR CHANGE

a. *Social Organization and Kinship*

Much attention has been devoted in the literature on Bush Negroes to their social organization and particularly their complex patterns of kinship (for details see, for example, R. Price 1973a, 1973c, 1973d: 295; Kobben 1967b, 1968, 1969a, 1969b; Bastide 1971: 52-57; Hurault 1970: 8-12, etc.; Lowenthal 1972: 189). It is, of course, somewhat misleading to refer to a single Bush Negro culture, because, as we have already noted above, differences may exist between tribes or even sub-tribes, including variances in social organization, kinship practices, and marriage customs.

To generalize, though, each tribe is headed by a paramount chief ("gran man"), serving as a civil authority and sort of high priest, assisted by an assistant head man ("gran fiskari"). Some sub-tribes are in turn headed by lesser chiefs, and most villages by a headman and often also a assistant headman, who are responsible to the "gran man". It should be noted, however, that villages range from principal, fairly large and permanent ones to seasonal, temporary encampments; the former, averaging two hundred people each, consist of a core of matrilineally related kinsmen, spouses and lineage descendants, whereas the latter are unstructured. Matriliny dominates Bush Negro kinship, with matriclans (assuming various forms in each tribe or sub-tribe) forming the basic unit of social organization. Each sub-tribe, or smaller tribe, is divided into totemic matriclans (called "lo") headed by a "gran kapiting", and each "lo" is further divided into matrilinear extended families which were traditionally (but no longer) polygamous. Each "lo" has its own territory, although a single "lo" may be found in several villages, while there are usually several "lo" within a particular village. Villages are divided into specific kin quarters. In keeping with the prevalent practice of matrilocality, a husband resides in his mother's village, his wife in that same village, living separately, or in her mother's village. It is not unusual for villages in one sub-tribe to be closely affiliated with kinsmen in a village in another geographically distant sub-tribe; for example, Langa Uku, a Cottica Djuka

village, is closely linked with Loabi, a Tapanahoni Djuka village (Kobben 1967b).

These patterns of social organization and kinship would seem to have remained primarily African, with limited Amerindian and modern coastal acculturation. The typical Bush Negro double descent pattern is found in Fanti-Ashanti culture: a child inherits his / her mother's totem and taboos but also certain taboos relating to his / her father and his "obia" (magical objects). Clan exogamy and various matrimonial regulations, which vary from tribe to tribe, but which are prevalent, for example, among the Bonis and Saramakas, can also be traced back to Africa. Other African traditions relating to kinship include the Fanti-Ashanti naming of children according to the day of the week on which they were born; these names are virtually identical for males or similar for females in Ghana and Guiana (Bastide 1971: 55-56). Some sexual practices (including promiscuity among females when husband is away hunting), and a rather casual attitude toward marriage and divorce, are largely West African in origin, as are many strict regulations governing sexual relations and ultimately marriage between kin and non-kin.

b. *Religious Beliefs and Practices*

Following the early lead of Herskovits (1941, 1966) and others, recent writers have continued to stress African influence on Bush Negro religious beliefs and practices (e.g. Hurault 1961, 1970; Bastide 1971: 57-61; R. Price 1973a, 1973d: 295; Lowenthal 1972: 187-188; van Velzen 1966; and particularly van Wetering's detailed studies of witchcraft among the Tapanahoni Djukas: 1972, 1973).

Bush Negro social organization is reinforced by a prevalent belief in social order, but this is counterbalanced by a strong respect for oracles, spirit possession, divination and witchcraft. A complex series of shrines and cults serve as foci for groups of residentially dispersed kin. Traditionally, most Bush Negroes share a belief in a supreme being referred to as "nana" (an Agni word from West Africa used by the Djukas), "masu gadu" (a Fon word used by the Bonis), "kompon" or "nyane" (Fanti-and Ashanti words used by the Saramakas). However, they are also pantheistic, believing in numerous gods, spirits, and totems imported from Fanti, Ashanti, Fon, Yoruba, and other West African cultures. They tend to believe

in the struggle between "white" versus "black" magic, and in spirits such as the "akra" (similar to the Fanti-Ashanti "kra") throughout lifetime and the "winti". Belief in the latter accounts for elaborate mourning ceremonies and the long (18-24 months) mourning period after death. Witchcraft has remained a significant feature of Bush Negro beliefs to recent times. In a single year (1961-1962), at least eighty people were denounced as witches after their deaths; at least thirty murders among the Tapanahoni Djukas were due to witchcraft; and "boto feti" — canoe expeditions against kin suspected of witchcraft — are still common (van Wetering 1972).

Yet despite the obvious similarity between Bush Negro beliefs and West African, some acculturation away from Africanisms is apparent. Bush Negroes have long shared with their Amerindian neighbours a profound respect for the rivers along which they have settled and a deep feeling for nature-spirits (jungle, animals, etc.). On the other hand, with increasing contact with coastal society and more generally the outside world, Christian influences are affecting Bush Negro beliefs, morals and life-styles. Moravian missions have become prevalent in several Bush Negro communities, notably Langatabbetje, the chief village ("zetel opperhoofd" in Dutch) of the Paramaka "gran man".

c. *The Arts*

Far more attention has been devoted to the study of the fine arts — woodcarving and decorating — of Bush Negroes than to their other art forms: music, folklore, etc. Their intricate woodcarving (of plates, haircombs, utensils, etc.) with simple instruments, and elaborate decorating (of hut portals, canoe paddles, drums, etc.) in colourful geometric designs, have long captured the attention of visiting European and North American scholars: Panhuys (1912, 1930), Kate (1929-1930), Herskovits (1930, 1934, 1936b, 1941), Kahn (1931b), Dark (1951, 1954), Hurault (1961, 1965, 1970), R. Price (1970b). Herskovits, concentrating on the Saramakas, stressed the African influence on their fine arts, whereas Hurault, later studying the Bonis, concluded that their art was essentially a recent and indigenous innovation; while Bastide has compromised in commenting (1971: 61) that at least Boni art "nevertheless remains African in spirit". Bastide (1971: 61 and 171-190) agrees with Herskovits (1936b) that Bush Negro folklore is essentially African,

particularly Fanti-Ashanti, in origin. Bush Negro ceremonial music — singing, drumming, dancing — to date remains very African, although Bush Negro communities are within easy radio contact with coastal broadcasting stations.

d. *The Language*

We have noted above that Herskovits believed the language of the Bush Negroes, at least the Saramakas, to be strongly African (slightly less African, perhaps, than dialects spoken in Yoruban cults in Bahia, Brazil or in Cuba, but more African than dialects spoken in rural Haiti or Jamaica). Herskovits pointed out the remarkable similarity between dialects used in many far-flung Maroon settlements, even between the Gullah Islanders in South Carolina, for example, and the Bush Negroes (1941: 275-291). Yet more recent authors (Bastide 1971: 61; R. Price 1973b) have pointed-out that there is no simple Bush Negro language but a wide variety of dialects and pidgins, collectively called "taki-taki", infused with words not only from several African languages but also from the two official colonial languages — Dutch (for most Bush Negroes) and French (for the Bonis) — and even from English and Portuguese. Perhaps one might expect some degree of linguistic standardization among Bush Negroes in the not-too-distant future with increasing education, mobility, and contact with the coastal society.

MOTIVATION FOR CULTURE CHANGE

a. *Trade with the Coast*

Some degree of acculturation resulted from the long standing tradition of brief trading trips to the coast. Bush Negroes had won a monopoly over the Amerindians and others in river transport during the eighteenth century; their contemporary descendants still dominate trade between the interior and the coast. A number of writers have commented on the resulting increasing dependence of Bush Negroes on the coastal society for such manufactured items as textiles, kitchenware, some canned foods, tools and plastic products, weapons, outboard motors, etc. (R. Price 1973d: 293, 295-296; Lowenthal 1972: 187).

b. *Temporary Work on the Coast*

For many decades the traditional Bush Negro economy of hunting, fishing, gathering and swidden horticulture has been supplemented not only by the river trade but also by periodic male wage labour on the coast (R. Price 1973d: 295; Lowenthal 1972: 187, 189; Hurault 1960: 76-137). The opportunities for such temporary labour have been increasing in recent years, with the employment of Bush Negroes in major bauxite-mining "company towns" such as Moengo and Paranam, and in construction and other day labour. The huge Moengo development, as well as the Afobaka hydroelectric development which supplies power to Paranam, are situated in close proximity to Bush Negro settlements. Lowenthal has written that "in supplementary subsistence agriculture with temporary mining and construction jobs, Bush Negroes continue to thrive, despite primitive technology, soil exhaustion, and economically restricting ritual observance" (1972: 187).

c. *Changing Values and Appearances*

Increasing contact with the coastal society has already been having, and will certainly increasingly have, a profound affect on traditional Bush Negro culture. A marked reorientation toward materialism and a mercantile economy, and away from a more autonomous existence, is becoming more and more apparent. A feeling of artistic and cultural superiority over coast Creoles is being offset by admiration for a rising standard of living and for materialism (R. Price 1973d: 295-296; Lowenthal 1972: 189; Hurault 1965; Neumann 1967).

While most huts in interior villages are still constructed in the traditional (African-Amerindian) manner, using only palm thatch and local woods, the number of huts, or more substantial houses, with corrugated metal rooves seems to be increasing, as does the proportion of dugout canoes now sporting outboard motors. However, one peculiar feature of this transition may be noted: if some Bush Negro homes have quite a collection of metal kitchenware, it does not seem to be used in day-to-day cooking; the hand-carved wooden bowls, plates, and stirring paddles are used while the metal pots and pans (sometimes as many as twenty or thirty) are hung on the walls as decorative status-symbols!

Apart from the effect of contact with the coastal society and a monetary economy on a reorientation toward materialistic values, traditional Bush Negro culture, values, and life-styles are also being affected by education and the infiltration of Christian, particulary Moravian, values. The church has of course discouraged pantheism and witchcraft, thereby affecting the traditional Bush Negro social structure and perhaps even the veneration felt for nature-spirits. Perhaps the church will also promote a rather inappropriate modesty; the present author noted that in some communities where Moravian presence was felt young women were donning bras and other articles of "European" clothing (in this steaming jungle, just north of the Equator, the customary garb for adult females is a skirt, for younger females simply a string of beads around the waist, and for adult males a brief loin-cloth; "European" clothing is sweaty and cumbersome).

d. *Interior Development*

Aside from their temporary or permanent migration to the coast, an increasing proportion of Bush Negroes are engaged in interior development, which can only serve to further hasten erosion of their traditional culture. They have long been heavily engaged in logging and balata export (R. Price 1973d: 295). In recent years Bush Negroes have supplied approximately half of Surinam's lumber needs, though their involvement seems to be diminishing with the advent of mechanized logging (Lowenthal 1972: 187). In addition to the above-mentioned major bauxite mining operations at Moengo, adjacent to the Cottica Djuka territory, and Paranam, close to the Brokopondo Saramakas, extensive mining operations have opened up deep in the interior, such as gold at Maripasoela-Benzdorp, on the French Guiana-Surinam border in Boni country. As the interior is rich in bauxite, gold, platinum, manganese, iron ore, diamonds, and beryllium, it is only a question of time before large scale mining operations invade the formerly relatively isolated Bush Negro country.

Clearly the interior is rapidly becoming more accessible from the coast. Not only have outboard motors on rivercraft speeded up river travel and made access possible up rivers often swollen with heavy rainfall, but also other more rapid modes of transportation are coming into existence. During the 1970s roads have been

extended from coastal areas deep into the territory of the Saramakas on the upper Suriname and of the Matawais on the upper Saramacca. By 1972 at least fourteen airfields were already operating in Bush Negro country in the interior (three in the Boni country, three in the territory occupied by the Tapanahoni, upper Maroni, and lower Lawa Djukas, four in the upper Suriname Saramaka country, three in Matawai and one in Coppename territory). Doubtless this development of transportation will serve to increase Bush Negro mobility and to lessen their isolation in the once-remote interior. Even by motorized dugout, the Tapanahoni Djuka villages were a good two or three days, travelling upriver, of hard work fighting rapids from the coastal port of Albina downriver; but these communities are only 180 kilometers by air from the major coastal city of Paramaribo.

While interior development may provide employment opportunities for Bush Negroes, it is not always in their better interest. For example, construction of the Afobaka Dam on the Suriname River during the mid-'60s (as part of a gigantic hydroelectric project to supply power to the ALCOA development at Paranam) resulted in the flooding of almost half of the Saramaka territory, the removal of an estimated six thousand tribesmen without consultation, and the separation of the Brokopondo group from the main body of Saramakas upriver (R. Price 1973d: 296; Lowenthal 1972: 189; Mathews 1966).

e. *The Impact of Tourism*

Despite the relative difficulty, and even danger, of tourists visiting Bush Negro communities in the interior by hiring a dugout canoe expedition, many such expeditions have been organized, and in recent years even occasionally advertised by travel agencies in, for example, Toronto and New York. Moreover, an increasing number of tourists are flying directly into the interior by charter aircraft. Given the sensitivity of Bush Negro culture to outside influences, it is perhaps unfortunate to find the government of Surinam collaborating with travel agencies and expedition organizers in promoting tourism instead of carefully protecting Bush Negro communities. While visiting Bush Negro communities in 1972, the present author was most impressed with the Bush Negroes' sense of courtesy, hospitality, simplicity and relative non-

commercialization; this could all change rapidly with an increased volume of tourist traffic.

f. *Education and Emigration*

The education of Bush Negroes has enhanced their ability to emigrate permanently out of the interior. While most of the educated emigrants have headed for Paramaribo, some have studied and worked in the Netherlands (a flow which may be lessened with the granting of independence to Surinam) or France. The background to this emigration is the supplying of educational and medical services to remote Bush Negro areas (R. Price 1973d: 295). Unlike their Amerindian neighbours, Bush Negroes have suffered little from tuberculosis, and perhaps also less from malaria (some Amerindians live in swampy areas whereas most Bush Negroes do not, with the exception of the Cottica Djukas and some small central groups), which fact, combined with the medical attention they have received, accounts for their having the highest rate of natural increase for any ethnic group in Surinam (Sausse 1951a, 1951b; Schaad 1960). But progressive depopulation due to emigration, particularly of males, has become a problem for Bush Negro settlements in recent years (R. Price 1973d: 295). Contact with the outside world is confined to men, according to Lowenthal (1972: 189); women tend to remain at home, where they control inheritance, dominate ritual, and maintain tribal integrity.

g. *Urbanization*

The urbanization of Bush Negroes has assumed two forms: on the one hand, they have become "creolized", or acculturated to the coastal Negro population, in fringe areas most affected by culture change; on the other hand, they have migrated into Paramaribo and other urban centres on the coast.

The Afobaka Dam project compelled many Bush Negroes to relocate nearer the densely inhabited coastal belt. In the new communities of the Brokopondo group of Saramakas, tarpaper wooden shacks with electricity and running water have replaced the former palm-thatched, dirt-floored huts, "benefits" secured at the cost of increased dependence on the central government (Lowenthal 1972: 189; Mathews 1966: 333-337, 365-366). Similar extensive "creolization" is likely to occur, or has already progressed, at

Albina (to which port many Djukas and some Bonis have migrated), around Moengo (particularly in the closest Cottica Djuka villages), at the interior mining centre of Maripasoela-Benzdorp (affecting the Bonis), and in the remaining Saramaka and Matawai villages now reached by road. All along the road between Albina, Moengo, and the Javanese settlements immediately east of Paramaribo may be seen "creolized" Bush Negro communities with housing representing varying degrees of acculturation.

As for the urban migrants to Paramaribo, Lowenthal has suggested (1972: 189) that "money is not the only attraction; the bright lights, shops, movies and reputed sexual license of the city entice young men from the Bush Negro villages. Many are also pushed out for breach of law or custom, often for contravening rigid tribal sexual codes."

Some writers (Herskovits 1936; Lowenthal 1972: 32, 92, 178, 186, 189) have suggested that urban Bush Negroes continue to regard themselves as distinct from Creoles (the general urban Negro population), on the one hand choosing to remain aloof and to live by themselves, yet on the other hand being obliged to segregate themselves. As Lowenthal and Lamur have explained, "many Creoles vaunt a "European' superiority toward Bush Negroes, whom they chide for being deliberately 'primitive' and 'African'. Bush Negroes in Paramaribo, underpaid and overcharged, are shunned and derided as 'stupid', 'heathen', and 'naked'" (Lamur 1965; Lowenthal 1972: 190).

The effect of urbanization on certain particular aspects of Bush Negro culture have been discussed by Bastide (1971: 101) on the basis of earlier research conducted in Paramaribo by Herskovits (1936):

> Certain important features of the Maroons' culture have completely vanished, in particular the carrying round of the dead: one can see how this custom was bound to be lost in the big cities, where funerals and burials were strictly controlled by law. Other practices, however, including magic and divination, have assumed even greater importance than before. Here again, the development is understandable. In a city, the security of the inhabitants is less assured than in a close — and united — community. The problems which arise are far more numerous, and can seldom be solved by purely rational methods; thus people have perforce to turn to magic when they are looking for a house, or a new job. Lastly, the atmosphere of a big city is conducive to erotic freedom. In bush villages, sexual activities were under social control; the anonymity of urban life removes all such restraints. As a result of all these factors,

the diviners (lukuman) and sorcerers (wisiman) have a more important role to perform among the Creoles than they do in Bush Negro society.

h. *Politicization*

Surinam was a self-governing colony within the Union of the Netherlands from 1922 to December 1975, when it became fully independent. The new country is based on a rather shaky alliance between the large Creole and East Indian minorities, forming equal proportions within the total population, with the Javanese, Bush Negroes, Amerindians, and other ethnic groups holding the Balance of power (for details on ethnic proportions in the population of Surinam, compared to French Guiana and Guyana, see Appendix II). To tip the balance of power in their favour, Creole politicians have been paying court to Bush Negroes, accepting the urban ones as never before, referring to the rural ones as "Bush Creoles" now, and urging Black solidarity against a likely Asian alliance between East Indians (some of whom are Moslems) and Javanese Moslems (Lowenthal 1972: 190).

Richard Price has appropriately concluded (1973d: 296):

> Today, Bush Negro societies are facing pressures for socio-cultural change. While it may once have been easy for them to maintain a world view rooted in isolationism and in a belief in their superiority over both whites and coastal blacks, the recent rise in the standard of living on the coast has made them increasingly aware that their societies have, in some respects at least, been left behind. The construction by ALCOA and the Surinam government of a giant hydroelectric project was only the most dramatic of many recent events to stress to Bush Negroes the need for more effective accommodation to the outside world. Having now become involved, almost in spite of themselves, in the party politics of Surinam, and finding themselves dependent on the decisions of corporations based thousands of miles away, some Bush Negroes are beginning to realize that their traditional isolationist strategy holds little promise for the future. At the same time, it seems clear that, while beginning to make the difficult adjustment to a new role as part of a larger, developing nation, Bush Negro societies are still managing to retain (and will continue to maintain for a long time to come) much of their traditional individuality and vitality.

Hopefully we can share Price's optimism about the survival of Bush Negro culture. Yet it might seem realistic, given the many pressures for change described in this paper, to conclude that much of this culture is likely to be lost in the near future.

APPENDIX I

Integrated History of the Guianas

Late 15th century	— explored by Spain
1593	— claimed by Spain
1630	— central Guiana temporarily settled by English
1643	— French settled eastern Guiana
1651	— wealthy exiled English royalists from Barbados established British colony of Surinam with Jews driven from Brazil by Portuguese (1665)
1667	— central Guina catured by Dutch, traded for New Amsterdam (New York City)
1668	— central and western Guiana ceded to Netherlands
1676	— eastern Guiana occupied by Dutch
late 17th C — early 18th C	— slave rebellions in central Guiana
1760	— treaties with Bush Negro "tribes"
1773	— Amsterdam stock exchange crisis and fall in prices for tropical produce; 150 year recession followed (800 plantations in operation 1800; 10 in mid 20th century
1796	— western Guiana ceded to British
1798	— political prisoners sent to eastern Guiana (official penal colony not established till 1854)
1799 - 1802 and 1804	— British occupation of central Guiana; during Napoleonic Wars captured by British, returned 1816
1802-1803	— western Guiana ceded to Netherlands
1803	— western Guiana occupied by British
1807	— abolition of slave trade in western Guiana
1815	— western Guiana ceded to Great Britain
1808-1817	— Portuguese occupied eastern Guiana
mid 19th century	— colonization by Dutch small farmers
1833	— abolition of slavery in western Guiana
1863	— abolition of slavery in central Guiana; plantations faced total extinction re labour supply, so Chinese from Java and China contracted (since 1850) — but tended not to voluntarily extend contracts, so limited immigration from Barbados
1873	— major East Indian (Hindu and Moslem) migration — halted due to pressure from Indian government 1916

1890-1931	— major recruitment of Javanese laborers
1922	— Surinam integral part of Kingdom of Netherlands, as self-governing member of Union of the Netherlands
1935	— last shipment of convicts to eastern Guiana; 1944 decree abolishing penal colonies; last penal colony abolished 1946 and 2800 convicts repatriated; French Guiana made overseas dept. of France
1966	— independence of Guyana (formerly British Guiana)
1975	— independence of Surinam

APPENDIX II

The Guianas: Population Profile by Ethnic Groups (1975)
(figures rounded to nearest thousand)

Guyana			*Surinam*		
"East Indians"	50.2%	381 (thou.)	"East Indians"	35%	151
"Africans"	31.5%	239	"Creoles"	35%	151
mixed "Creoles"	12.1%	92	Javanese	15%	64
Amerindians	4.6%	35	"Bush Negroes"	9%	39
Portuguese	0.7%	6	Amerindians	2%	9
Chinese	0.6%	5	Chinese	2%	7
Other Europeans	0.3%	2	Europeans	1%	4
total	100%	760	Jews & Lebanese	1%	4
			Others	-	1
			total	100%	430

Guyane française			*Total Guianas*		
"Creoles"	75%	35	"East Indians"	42.6%	532
"Bush Negroes"	13.4%	8	"Creoles"	23.0%	288
Europeans	6.6%	4	"Africans"	19.1%	239
Amerindians	5%	3	Javanese	5.1%	64
total	100%	60	"Bush Negroes"	3.8%	47
			Amerindians	3.8%	47
			Europeans	1.3%	16
			Chinese	0.9%	12
			others	0.4%	5
			total	100%	1250

Explanation of terms

"East Indians" refers to Hindus and Moslems descended from immigrants from the Indian subcontinent. "Creoles" are largely of African Negro descent,

mixed to greater or lesser extent with other ethnic origins. "Bush Negroes" figures refer only to descendents of escaped African slaves (Maroons) claiming affiliation to specific Bush Negro tribes.

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Extra-Marital Mating Patterns in Caribbean Family Studies: A Methodological Excursus

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RÉSUMÉ

Ce texte traite de deux problèmes reliés aux recherches socio-anthropologiques dans les Caraïbes. D'abord, il met en doute certains des postulats qui ont conduit à des conclusions sur les «causes» de formes maritales trouvées dans certains secteurs de la société caraïbe. Dans ces conclusions on assume que les autres segments de la société ont d'autres formes maritales sans avoir vraiment vérifiée cette hypothèse. En second lieu, le texte conteste les méthodes de recherche utilisées: on devrait utiliser davantage du matériel d'archives.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is an attempt to fill in some theoretical and methodological gaps in socio-anthropological studies of mating patterns and family structures in Caribbean societies in the hope that the discussion will lead to a re-assessment of the conventional theoretical perspectives often advanced to explain contemporary marital practices and extra-marital births in the region.

The paper questions some of the major theoretical assumptions that have generally formed the bases for research, as well as conclusions, in respect to "causal factors" for the mating patterns and other sexual practices among certain segments of Caribbean societies. The paper questions whether the incidence of "illegitimate" births can be adequately understood solely from the perspectives of "maternity" without a consideration of "paternity" and its social

and ethnic correlates. Pre-marital sexual practices and mating patterns do not only involve dyadic relationships between individual males and females, they also implicate the general societal ethical/value system within which such behaviours occur (Manyoni 1977: 418; Mintz & Price 1976: 14-15; R. T. Smith 1971: 463).

Most research on "family structures" among Caribbean societies has so far been sectionally oriented. This raises the question, whether the resultant conclusions drawn from such narrowly focused approaches can be epistemologically valid as *reflections of a given Caribbean society, qua society, without comparable research being also conducted among other segments of the same society.*

A number of Caribbeanists have recently indicated an awareness of this shortcoming. Vera Green (1973: 17) has aptly pointed out that 'there are few studies of the Caribbean which cover existing variations between rural and urban sectors, and between the various classes and racial groups'. Green further notes that the bulk of the studies have 'concentrated primarily on the Negroid elements of the population in areas where class and ethnic heterogeneity is [sic] often obvious' (*ibid*). (See also Rubin, 1960: 119-120; Mintz, 1965; Hoetink, 1967; M. G. Smith, 1965.

Similarly, Raymond T. Smith (1971: 471) has complained that previous work on the study of Caribbean family structure raises 'a host of general theoretical problems' than are answered. I suggest that one of these "problems" is *methodological,* and entails serious implications not only for theoretical issues, but also for analytical conclusions derived therefrom. The 'host of general theoretical problems' that Smith suggests, can at once be specified as: marital attitudes, patterns and practices; extra-marital sexuality; pre-marital births (the legitimacy-illegitimacy dichotomy) and the historical factors influencing the evolution of these behaviours (Manyoni 1977: 417-427). The historical factors ineluctably loom pre-eminently in any consideration of socio-anthropological problems posed by contemporary mating patterns in Caribbean societies.

It is the thesis of this paper that present-day sexual attitudes, behaviour and mating patterns, family structures and value systems among West Indian societies are a consequence of the historical forces deriving from the pervasive socio-economic plantation system of the 17th to the 19th centuries. By "plantation socio-economic

system", I mean the *total* social structure encompassing all the component groups of white, coloured, and black segments; and masters, servants and slaves whose relations were shaped by, and dependent upon, the plantation productive enterprise. These segmental relations were neither random nor by chance, but were structurally regulated by legal prescriptions and customary conventions. I propose to show how the patterns of sexual behaviour, mating habits, and extra-marital births traditionally associated with the slave and former slave sector in the Caribbean are inextricably bound up with the *value system shared by the whole society* in which these manifestations are evident.

The paper is thus by implication a critique of the "African derivation thesis" which attempts to account for the prevailing mating patterns and family structures among Afro-Caribbean peoples by ontological reference to their African origins (vide Herskovits & Herskovits, 1947: 287-317. See also M. G. Smith, 1954: 17-21 for a critical discussion of this issue). This leads to the methodological concerns of this paper which question the adequacy of field-research methods and techniques conventionally employed in Caribbean socio-anthropological studies.

METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS

Much of the research conducted in the Caribbean region has been by means of the traditional "survey / interview" method, or "selected case-study" method. Few studies have utilized the extensive archival data readily available in local and metropolitan depositories. Even where analysts employ sophisticated statistical data to support their assumptions about marital patterns, they fail to utilize the most reliable of such statistics — the official Registers of Marriages and Births which furnish all the vital information about the parties concerned, e.g. age, occupation, civil status, religion, number and status of babies born. Such data tell us more about the actual state of affairs than survey data collected by the researcher from respondents who, more often than not, state *normatively expected* behaviour or the ideal form of marital practice (*vide* R. T. Smith, 1956: 259).

What we need to do is to separate pre-marital sexuality and child birth from common-law co-habitation. Two different aspects

of the mating problem are involved here — the one relating to *sexual* behaviour and the other to *marital* behaviour. There is no necessary connection between the two forms of behaviours even though they may be related sequentially. Several writers (Henriques, 1953; Simey, 1946; Kerr, 1952; Goode, 1960; 1961; Rodman, 1971) have attempted to link these behaviours to what they term "lower-class normative system". Blake, (1961: 110-114) questions the validity of the "normative explanation" and shows that the protagonists of the "lower-class normative system" — even by the evidence of their own data — fail to support their claims that 'the loose association of concubinage is preferred by many women' among this sector. The explanation, Blake suggests, should be sought in structural factors such as economic and historical factors, sex-ratio and lack of pressure on men to marry. Similarly, de Vaal Malefijt & Hellerman (1973: 118-119) hold that the dual system of mating is perpetuated and maintained by cultural factors such as values and attitudes toward males and females, and the economic dependence of females and children. Greenfield (1973: 44) also settles for the "structural" explanation to account for the variation in domestic patterns prevailing in the Caribbean region.

The "African cultural origins" thesis advanced by some Caribbeanists has not provided a fuller and satisfactory explanation as to why the alleged cultural traits could have survived transplantation and slavery, and why they persist in contemporary Caribbean societies. The "African genesis" explanation ignores three fundamental facts pertaining to Caribbean societies — the cultural variability among the enslaved imported African populations; the "structural ethos" of plantation slave society; and the historical conditions under which mating patterns and marital regulations developed.

It is the argument of this paper that all these factors are fairly well documented in a number of primary sources in local and metropolitan archives to provide adequate and reliable bases for an explanatory analysis of contemporary practices. Later on in the paper I provide detailed analysis based on such documentary evidence and statistical data from various official sources covering more than three centuries[1].

[1] The documents examined include calendared entries of State Papers from 1630 covering the entire slavery period; Parliamentary Papers relating to slave colonies

In the English-speaking Caribbean, there are no socio-anthropological studies comparable to a recent work on Hispanic 19th century Cuba relating to the study of racial attitudes, sexual values, marriage, class and colour in a slave society done by Verena Martinez-Alier (1974). The work is a fine demonstration of the utility of the documentary method in socio-anthropological research in these societies.

Martinez-Alier has utilized extensive documentation of marriage cases provided in the files of administrative and judicial proceedings in cases where parents opposed a given marriage on grounds of deviation from the normative system as perceived by 19th century Cuban society. In her analysis of the marriage pattern, ideal normative behaviour and deviation therefrom, she shows through extensive documentation how Cuban 'racial perception was a direct consequence of the degree to which slavery and its exigencies had affected the *total social structure*' (1973: 2. Italics added). Thus the norms established by the dominant sector pervaded all sectors of the society so that 'At every point a coloured person whether slave or free, was forced to shape his behaviour in accordance with the actions and expectations of *the dominant white sector, who, in turn also had to adjust to the presence of the non-whites*' (*ibid.* Italics added). The work is studded with unassailable documentary evidence reflecting the dominant attitudes and concomitant behaviour current at the time.

The present paper aims to show how a diligent utilization of archival materials may contribute to a more reliable explanation of the origins of some contemporary practices among the Afro-Caribbean segment. The material also throws light on the attitudes and practices that were current among the rest of the society, as well as on the degree to which the political and religious establishments were implicated in the persistence of these practices. It is not intended to suggest that some of the historical factors, e.g. African origin, slavery, race and class — were by themselves deterministic in the continuance of contemporary behaviours. Rather the view

which include "Returns" of valuable statistical data and "Reports" on slavery conditions in the West India plantations; Records of church correspondence relating to slavery and christianization; Parochial Registers of Baptisms, Marriages and Burials; Registers of Births, Marriages and Divorces; Blue Books (Colonial Reports); Census Returns; Legitimacy Registers, and Royal Commissions of Inquiry Proceedings and Reports.

advanced here is that they were all jointly influential in shaping the societal ethos that subsequently developed among the respective Caribbean societies with regard to mating patterns and pre-marital sexuality.

Several Caribbeanists have questioned the adequacy of explanations based on the first two factors — African origin and slavery (i.e. the cultural and economic determinants), and have pointed out that while these factors may have been a *necessary* condition for the emergence of certain forms of mating behaviours, they are not a *sufficient cause* for their persistence (see R. T. Smith, 1957, 1971; Solien, 1960; Sherlock, 1966; Schlesinger, 1968a, 1968b; MacDonald & MacDonald, 1973; Green, 1973; Manyoni, 1977). I would like to focus on the thesis advanced by the MacDonalds to show that even where the authors are correct in rejecting cultural and economic determinism implied in African genesis and slavery, they fail to adduce the sort of documentary evidence (advocated here) that would buttress their alternative explanation (the ethnic family ideology). The MacDonalds rightly argue that 'West Indian matrifocality cannot be derived simply from West African matrilinearity [sic] because many of the West African people were patrilineal...' (1973: 192). However, the MacDonalds fail to adduce the necessary historical data to explain their argument that 'the contemporary Negro family-household is not just a carry-over from institutions imposed by slavery and plantation labor' (1973: 188).

To be sure, matrifocality in Caribbean family and/or household patterns derives less from African genesis than from locally imposed conditions under slavery, which in the course of time became a legally enforced prescription at least in some islands. For example, the Prevention of Bastardy Act No. 666 of March 1838 passed in Barbados[2] ensured the *continuance of the matrifocal system* after Emancipation. It stipulated that children born out of wedlock were to "follow the settlement of their mother and be maintained by her until 16 years of age. If the mother marries then the husband will be responsible for all the children illegitimate or not'. As the historical record on marital patterns, mating behaviours and pre- and extra-marital births clearly shows, and contemporary

[2] See Clauses 7 and 8. The full title of the legislation is 'An Act for the Government and better Ordering of the Poor in this Island and the Prevention of Bastardy', *Parliamentary Papers: Justice in the West Indies,* Vol. 15, 1825.

research affirms, it requires no great sociological imagination to see that the majority of households will at any time consist mainly of mother-centred domestic units. Almost a century later the practice was further supplemented by the passage of the Legitimacy Act No. No. 3 of 1930, which made legal provision for the incorporation of a woman's (occasionally a man's) "illegitimate" children into a subsequent marital house.[3] It is also clear from the record of contemporary practices during slavery that *the domestic unit always consisted of a mother and her children irrespective of who their genitor(s) or father(s) may be.* It should be noted that the genitor of any given black or coloured woman's children could be another slave (black or coloured), or a white servant or a white master, but it made no difference in the domestic affiliation of the progeny.[4] The only man with the right to exercise *patria potestas* over such mother-centred units was the white master, (M. G. Smith, 1965: 108).

M. G. Smith (1965: 31) has rightly warned that it is 'unsatisfactory to attribute peculiar New World Negro family types to "historic conditions of slavery" without making a far more detailed comparative analysis of these than has yet been attempted'. In the almost one decade and a half since this caveat was sounded, none of the studies done during this period has attempted to utilize the record of those "historic conditions" (as distinct from mutual citations of "collegial" published sources) to make such comparative analysis or even on a local basis.[5] It seems to me quite nonsensical for a contemporary researcher to assert, without palpable documentary evidence, that 'Sexual promiscuity was a means whereby the slave could experience a moment of pleasure as well as defy the authority and wishes of his master. Because men greatly outnum-

[3] The Act came into force on July 1, 1931. *Laws of Barbados Vol. V. 1928/5 — 1942/8,* Bridgetown, 1944.

[4] Convincing evidence of this practice may be gleaned from a contemporary record of a Barbados parish (1793-1825) on the 'children of Martha Luke, a Xtian Slave belonging to Mrs. Mary Gibbes (St. James) baptized on 13 May 1794', and gives a list of 8 children born between 7 December 1775 and 25 February 1794, most probably sired by the Master. — Register of Baptism: Coloured People, St. James, 15 April 1793 — 10 December 1825 P. 806, BDA.

[5] See for example recent studies in: Lambros Comitas, *The Complete Caribbeana* 1900-1975 Vol. 1, Chapters 8 and 9, New York, KTO Press, 1977; and the recent Essay by Sidney W. Mintz & Richard Price, *An Anthropological Approach to the Afro-American Past: A Caribbean Perspective,* Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia, 1976.

bered women there was no opportunity for them to pair off in a "natural" manner. Thus sex became a heightened form of recreation and play' (Erickson 1962: 110). The author adduces no concrete evidence either from local conditions or on a comparative scale to corroborate both the moral allegation and the demographic assertion. Comparative census data and other statistical evidence on sex ratios in Caribbean populations would tend to contradict Erickson's assertions. As early as the 1670's the sex ratio was already in favour of females as Table 1 shows.

I shall now want to discuss the relationship between the evolution of mating patterns, marital prescriptions and extra-marital sexual behaviour on the one hand, and the "normative thesis", on the other. The literature on the subject has been well summarized and annotated by Schlesinger (1968a, 1968b), and I shall here focus on the documents hitherto unincorporated in any of the published sources. The "normative" argument appears to me to be inextricably linked with the development of all those aspects of plantation society which constitute its social ethos, that is to say, socio-economic status, relations of production, race, colour and religious orientation. From almost the inception of the plantation slave system, two fundamental moral issues consistently dogged the slave holding regimes — christianization of the slaves and recognition of slave marital status.[6] Much of the social fibre and mores of Caribbean slave societies for almost 200 years became enmeshed by these two issues, and the "normative system" that subsequently developed affected *all segments* of the society.

MATING PATTERNS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The historical record relating to mating patterns under the plantation slavery system indicates that formal marriage was primarily a prerogative of the upper- and middle-class white minority. However, the formal institution of marriage existed concomitantly

[6] The moral dilemma slavery posed for the planter regimes is attested to by the long list of exchanges of correspondence, regarding the civil status of the slave, between local planter interests and metropolitan authorities from the mid-17th century to the very end of slavery. Details are contained in various calendared *State Papers* and from Colonial Office Records. Valuable information is available on SPG correspondence with their Barbados Codrington Plantations in: Bennett (1958) and Klingberg (1938).

TABLE 1

Population of Barbados 1673

Complexion	*Males*	*Females*	*Total*
Whites	12,874	8,435	21,109
Blacks	15,063	17,121	32,184

SOURCE: Compiled from information furnished by the Council of Barbados to the Council for Trade, May 28, 1673 — *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1669-1674,* No. 1101. See also Ligon 1673: 46-47.

NOTE: Two centuries later The Barbadian Legislature felt proud to report that 'in this Island,... for many years the sexes have been pretty nearly equal, or if there has been any difference, the female sex has preponderated...'. *House of Assembly Debates, Barbados,* 1816-1818, p. 496. BDA.

with the system of concubinage which was widely practised by all sectors of the society. Thus, concubinage as a system of mating and domestic arrangements became sufficiently pervasive to be a socially, if implicitly, acceptable manner of procreation outside formal wedlock. The pervasiveness of these behaviours has been noted by many contemporary observers during the 18th and 19th centuries (Dickson, 1789: 92-93; Southey, 1827: 198; Thome and Kimball, 1838: 76; Schomburgk, 1848: 88-90; Sewell, 1862: 68-70; Davy, 1854: 78-79, 93; Caldecott, 1898: 37-39).

The lowest ranks of the population, the blacks, were in all slave societies considered *outside* the formal institution of legal matrimony. In this respect, both State and Church[7] shared a strong disapproval of slave marriages, a situation that continued unmitigated until the eve of emancipation. From about the mid-17th century, West Indian planter / legislators had persistently objected against metropolitan attempts to extend christianization to their slaves, and consequent recognition of their matrimonial rights. Barbadian planters, for example, had addressed memorandum after

[7] The failure of the (Established) Church to stand up to the iniquities of the slavery system is well documented to raise any doubts about its role. It should be recalled that the Church of England was itself a substantive slave-owning institution in Barbados — see Frank J. Klingberg, "British Humanitarianism at Codrington", *Journal of Negro History* 23, 1938 pp. 451-486; and J. Harry Bennett, *Bondsmen and Bishops: Slavery and Apprenticeship on the Codrington Plantations of Barbados, 1710-1838,* 1958.

memorandum to the Council of Trade and Plantations in London expressing fears that the conversion of the slaves would 'destroy their property, [and] endanger the island, inasmuch as converted negroes grow more perverse and intractable than others, and hence of less value for labour or sale' (*Calendar of State Papers: Colonies,* 1677-1680, No. 1535). In addition, to supplement a law of 21 September 1676 passed specifically to prevent Quakers from having 'Negroes at their meetings... and to have negroes as hearers of their doctrine and taught in their principles, whereby the safety of the island may be hazarded', the Barbadian legislature urged informants to report on Quakers bringing negroes to their meetings.[8] The slaves were considered 'a sort of people so averse to learning that they will rather hang themselves or run away than submit to it. Conversion will impair their value and price, and injure not only the Planters but the African Company...'[9]

Similar opinions were expressed by planters in other slave territories. Judicial and ecclesiastical arguments were brought to bear on the issue. Writing from Nassau (Bahamas) Attorney-General William Wylly, gave as a legal opinion that '...from the very nature of slavery, it is evident that no slave can enter into a valid contract. It follows, that a marriage between a slave and a free person is a mere nullity. But the consent of the owner would materially alter the case; and... may probably be considered as amounting to an emancipation'.[10] Taking the opposite view, the Reverend Dr. John Stephen of Nassau, addressed a lengthy exposé on the subject to Governor Charles Cameron in May 1816, and part of his thesis deserves generous quotation. Stephen raises basically two questions: 'Whether the marriage of slaves is, or is not, conformable to the principles of our laws? And, whether a slave, if married with his master's consent, could, on proof of that circumstance, ground a claim for his liberty?' After attesting to the beneficent consequences of legal matrimony, Stephen questions whether the suggested alternative by the planters and the state

[8] *Calendar of State Papers, Colonies: America and the West Indies, 1677-1680,* October 10, 1680 No. 1535; and Journal of Assembly of Barbados, July 10, 1677 in *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1677-1680* No. 319.

[9] Assembly of Barbados to Board of Trade and Plantations, March 30, 1681, *Cal. State Papers, Col.* 1681-1685 No. 59.

[10] Wylly to Governor Charles Cameron, January 26th, 1814, *British Parliamentary Papers: Slavery and the West Indies 1818-1823,* Correspondence — Marriage of Slaves, p. 218.

would in any respect restrain the slaves from 'the most licentious and illicit intercourse with one another...' because of, *inter alia,* 'the prevalence of bad example [which] may prompt or impel them'. The suggestion made was that 'every benefit of lawful marriage may be secured, and all the evils of promiscuous intercourse between the sexes prevented among that class of people, by encouraging them, and perhaps obliging them, to live in a state of concubinage, or of cohabitation without marriage...' Stephen then alludes to the very ambiguity of plantation slave society. 'But indeed the very mention of cohabitation as a substitute for marriage, is a plain admission that marriage... is indispensably necessary to the happiness of society. Why, then, that union should be denied the same sanction of law, and the same privileges, in one class of people, that it receives in another, it would be difficult to explain on principles of right reason...'[11]

In Barbados, the planter / legislators when urged by the metropolitan authorities to extend christianization to the slaves, voiced their objections in no uncertain terms: 'We are ready to do anything for the encouragement and good usage of Christian servants, but as to making negroes Christians, their savage brutishness renders them wholly incapable'.[12] The frequency of these objections prompted the Lord Bishop of London in 1680 to formally advise the Council of Trade and Plantations at Whitehall that there were no grounds for the 'apprehensions of the planters that the conversion of slaves may deprive the owners of their present power and disposal of [the slaves]'.[13] The principle of religious freedom and civil rights proved to be incompatible with the institution of slavery. Metropolitan intentions and colonial opinion continued to differ radically in respect to the exercise of civil rights including religion and marriage among the slaves. In their "Instructions of Commission to Sir Jonathan Atkins" as Governor of Barbados in 1673, the Lords of Trade and Plantations had stipulated: 'That persons of different opinions in religion may not receive any discouragement;... and in

[11] Stephen to Cameron, May 2nd, 1816, enclosed in Cameron to Earl Bathurst, July 12th, 1816, *Brit. Parl. Papers... 1818-1823,* pp. 217-227.

[12] *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1681-1685,* No. 59, Assembly of Barbados in reply to Governor Dutton's speech.

[13] Bishop of London memo to Council of Trade and Plantations, August 28, 1680, *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1677-1680,* No. 1488; Also *op. cit.* No. 1563, October 30, 1680, Instructions to Sir Richard Dutton.

no case to suffer any man to be molested in the exercise of his religion'.[14]

Nonetheless, Governor Atkins and his Council of Barbados went ahead and passed a severely restrictive law aimed specifically at the Quakers, and the reasons are not hard to find. On submitting the new Act to the London authorities, Atkins sent along an explanatory letter which made no secret of the real motives of the Barbadian planter / legislators. 'The Act made expressly against the Quakers seems severe', Atkins informed their Lordship, 'but it is necessary [for]... they drew hundreds of Negroes to their meetings', a situation which if not checked, 'might have brought... the ruin of the place'.[15] The original Act No. 64 of 1676 deploring the fact that 'many Negroes have been suffered to remain at the meeting of Quakers as hearers of their Doctrine and taught in their Principles' was further strengthened 'with additional and very severe clauses' by Act No. 69 of 1678, and 'made perpetual by No. 71, passed in 1681'.[16] The authorities at Whitehall tacitly acquiesced to this flagrant disregard of their injunction to Atkins, no doubt to avoid any conflict likely to interfere with the smooth operation of plantation trade.[17].

I have already suggested that the explanation for the irregular mating patterns among especially the black slaves may be found in the prevailing attitude and practices of both the civil and religious authorities of the time. There is sufficient documentary evidence that both authorities connived to deny legal matrimony and / or to recognize marriage bonds between slaves. One of the most illuminating pieces of evidence is contained in a lenghty formal communication from Beilby Porteus, then Lord Bishop of London, to the West Indian planter interests dated 2nd April, 1788.[18] The

[14] Lords of Trade and Plantations to Sir Jonathan Atkins, December 19, 1673, *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1669-1674,* No. 1186.

[15] Sir Jonathan Atkins to Lords of Trade and Plantations, January 31, 1678, *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1677-1680,* No. 592.

[16] Lucas MS volumes, Barbados Public Library, Bridgetown, pp. 392-393. See also *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1677-1680,* No. 661, April 16, 1678. Journ. of Assembly of Barbados.

[17] This is verified by a Minute of a Council of Trade and Plantations' meeting of October 8, 1680: 'Their Lordships think it best to leave the Governor, Council and Assembly [of Barbados] to find out the best means for converting the negroes without injury or danger to property...' — Journal of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1677-1680,* No. 1535.

[18] "A Letter to the Clergy of the West India Islands, 2nd April, 1788," (15 pp. printed), Rhodes House Library, Oxford.

letter reveals all the ambiguities of the slave's status in the eyes of the Church, and the ambivalence of the authorities towards him.

> The first [matter] of importance is, the instruction of the Negro Slaves in the principles of morality and Religion, compassion, justice, Christian charity, evidently require this kind of office at our hands, towards those who, though they are of a different colour, are of the same nature with ourselves; created by the same God, descended of the same common parents, ...and equally entitled to the benefits and promises of that Gospel which was intended to bring salvation to all men, and by the express command of its divine Author, was to be preached to every creature (p. 4).

In order to allay possible planter fears liable to result from such apparently "revolutionary" ideas, Porteus adds an important assurance designed to convince the planters that the Church was not about to overturn the *status quo* of plantation society.

> The Gospel enjoins everyone to be content with that state of life to which it hath pleased God to call him; to be faithful, honest, sober, and diligent in business. It enjoins servants of all kinds, and Slaves among the rest, to be obedient to their masters, and to please them well in all things; with goodwill doing service, as to the Lord, and not men. [Negroes were to be] carefully instructed in these duties, and... taught to perform them under pain of God's displeasure and future punishment (p. 6).

In his second "Letter to the Governors, Legislatures and Proprietors of Plantations in the British West India Islands", of January 1, 1808,[19] Porteus expresses considerable concern about what he calls 'the promiscuous and unbounded illicit commerce of the two sexes, in which the Negro Slaves are permitted to indulge themselves without any check or restraint'. But the Bishop's main concern is for 'the increase by births of the native Negroes... sufficient to keep up that stock of Negroes which the cultivation of the islands requires' (p. 6). There is little doubt that what Porteus is advocating is not the amelioration of the slave condition but a more efficient and assured continuation of slavery under Christian conditions. His Lordship claims, that if his plan for the 'conversion of Negro youth' is adopted, then 'The planters will in a few years *at a very trivial expense* to the Proprietors raise up a race of Christian Negroes, who will amply repay their kindness by the increase of their population, by their fidelity, their industry, their honesty, their sobriety, their humility, submission, and obedience to their masters, all of which virtues are most strictly enjoined, under pain of

[19] The Letter is dated January 1st, 1808, (25 pp. printed), Rhodes House Library, Oxford.

punishment by divine religion in which they will have been educated' (pp. 13-14, italics original).

Earlier I suggested that christianization, education and marriage for the slaves were three closely intertwined problematic issues that encumbered the planter regimes throughout slavery. Porteus took full account of the longstanding fears of the planters 'that it will be extremely dangerous to give them [the slaves] this qualification [to read]; because it will enable them to read newspapers and pamphlets, filled with the most pernicious doctrines, hostile to all good government, and incite them to insurrection, rebellion, and disobedience to their masters.' (p. 19). To assure the skeptical and intransigent planters, Porteus stresses that 'there is no intention of teaching the Negro children to *write* but only to *read;* which will always be a strong mark of discrimination, as wall of partition, between them and the white inhabitants; will always preserve a proper distinction and subordination between them and their superiors, and present an insurmountable barrier against their approaching to anything like an equality with their masters' (pp. 21-22, italics original).[20] Porteus then supports his contentions by citing St. Paul's injunctions to the various congregations of Ephesus (vi: 6), Colossus (I, iii: 22), and I Peter iii: 8 regarding the duties of servants to masters (p. 24). Porteus ends his Letter with the ominous comment that the planters 'have obtained the most absolute dominion' over 'both body and soul' of the slave (p. 25).

Apart from the policy of keeping the institution of marriage out of reach of the slaves during the seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries, it would appear that Barbadian authorities had problems also with regulating marriage practices among the white sector of plantation society. It could be inferred from the language of a law of 1st October, 1734, entitled "An Act for Preventing Clandestine Marriages", that the matrimonial habits of the population were far from satisfactory. The Act was necessitated by a concern that 'divers marriages have been clandestinely consumated in this Island, without knowledge, consent or approbation of parents and other relations, and often to the utter ruin of the

[20] About 158 years earlier that astute observer of 17th century Barbadian slavery, Richard Ligon (1673: 50) noted that the planter opposition to the christianization of the blacks was a device for maintaining rigid social distinctions among the various status groups in plantation society. See also *ibid* pp. 52-53.

persons thereby running themselves into unsuitable matches'. The Act acknowledges that 'It has been customary and usual here to marry in private houses, and not in the Churches' and further forbade on pain of heavy fines any 'master, mistress or owner of any house' to permit any clandestine marriage 'to be celebrated in his or her house, or in any backside yard, garden or other place belonging thereto'.[21]

Many observers during the 18th to the 20th centuries noted the prevelence of "loose" unions or concubinage among all sections of the plantation society. 'Many [whites], William Dickson had observed during thirteen years of residence in Barbados, 'are not ashamed to live in such habits of intimacy with the female domestic slave...' (1789: 92-93). Similar observations were recorded by Bishop Caldecott (1898: 37-39) who says that the majority of white men 'consorted with the Negro women without restraint, either from their own corrupted consciences or from public opinion', and that when coloured concubines adopted christianity, 'their renunciation of base connections gave the greatest offence to the white community'. Caldecott is of the view that family life in Barbados was retained only among the upper rank, 'and even with them it was too frequently married... by the presence within the house itself of coloured "mistresses" and their offspring'.

Fifty years earlier, Sturge and Harvey (1838: 142, 148) had noted that while 'concubinage is now considered discredible, and marriages are now fast increasing among the coloured and black population' (p. 142); it was the whites who complained of 'the change which had taken place in the sentiments of the coloured people, and the presumption of the coloured female in aspiring to marriage (p. 148). Sewell (1862: 68) reports finding intercolour loose sexual unions being 'very general, and illicit intercourse... sanctioned, or at least winked at, by a society which utterly

[21] Act No. 26, 1734: *Laws of Barbados Vol. I, 1648-1858,* London 1875, pp. 26-27. As early as 1676 Governor Atkins had informed the London authorities that: 'As to marriages, for seven years past [he] finds no rule to guide him, or any living [person] to inform him, all who conform to the Church of England are either married by license or asked three times in Church...', Atkins to Lords of Trade and Plantations, July 4-14, 1676, *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1675-1676,* No. 973. See also Council of Trade and Plantations to Sir Richard Dutton, October 30, 1680 (regarding their Lordships' concern for the prevalence of incestuous marriages among the white population) — *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1677-1680,* No. 1563; *quod vide* No. 1488, August 28, 1680.

condemns and abhors a marriage between two people of different color'. These mating behaviours were part of the general ethos of plantation slave society which continued beyond the termination of the slave-based socio-economic organization. As Thome and Kimball (1838: 76) noted, 'colored ladies have been taught to believe that it was more honorable, and quite virtuous to be the kept mistresses of *white gentlemen,* than the lawfully wedded wives of *colored men*' (italics original). Thus the documented historical record makes it abundantly clear that we cannot begin to provide adequate explanation for what is now considered the sociological problem of contemporary mating behaviour and family forms among the so-called lower-class black West Indian sector, without due consideration of the prevailing ethos of the total society as the context of behaviour.

CASE STUDIES: BARBADOS AND OTHER SLAVE COLONIES

In Barbados for almost two centuries, the planter-dominated legislature had doggedly fought against the principle of christianization of the slaves for economic, social and security reasons. Slave christianization (baptism) and marriage were deemed incompatible with the economics of plantation slavery and any effort to alter this relationship was construed as tantamount to "destruction of property". This chattelization of the blacks had been assured by the Acts No. 82, August 8, 1688, "for the governing of Negroes", and that of 29 January, 1674, which declared 'slaves to be "Real Estate" and absolute property of their owners'.[22] Security reasons were often cited as justification for denying both education and baptism for the slaves. In their petition to the Board of Trade and Plantation on 8th October, 1680, the "Gentlemen Planters" of Barbados argued that 'the disproportion of blacks to whites being great, the whites have no greater security than the diversity of the negroes' languages, which would be destroyed by *conversion,* in that it would be necessary to teach them all English' (*Calendar of State Papers Colonies,* 1677-1680 No. 1535, Italics added).

[22] *Cal. State Papers, Col. 1669-1674,* No. 1214, and Richard Hall, *Acts Passed in the Island of Barbados From 1643 to 1762,* (London, 1764), re Act No. 82 of August 8, 1688.

Apparently planter apprehensions about possible slave insurrections were dramatically confirmed by a slave rebellion of 14 April 1816 which was nipped in the bud. In the aftermath of that disturbance, the Council of Barbados staunchly defended the planters' continued opposition to the christianization of slaves on the ground of 'self preservation and security against slave insurrection motivated by misplaced Christian principles'.[23] It does not appear to have ever occurred to the slave owners that threats of insurrection may have been due to their own intransigency in ameliorating slavery conditions. Barbadian planters were absolutely convinced that they were 'humane, kind and provident' towards their slaves. They saw themselves as the victims of 'prejudices, interested views, blind fanaticism and abused by falsehood', holding that slavery 'is not condemned by Divine authority.'[24]

Between 1818 and 1826 a continuous tug-of-war ensued between the metropolitan authorities in London and the local legislature in Barbados revolving around three issues vital to planter interests — slave marriage, baptism and emancipation. At last the Barbadian legislature conceded the principle by presenting a Bill (No. 2, 17 October 1826) designed to be 'An Act for the Encouragement of Baptisms and Marriages amongst the Slaves and for the Observance of the Lord's Day...' and passed it as Act 82, 1826. As will be seen in the provisions of this Act, the planter-legislators did not fail to provide for safeguards against the newly-permitted slave conversion from 'destroying their property'. The Act begins quite innocuously by enjoining 'all owners or possessors of Slaves, and their agents, attornies, and representatives in this Island [to] endeavour to instruct their Slaves in the principles of the Christian religion, and shall cause to be baptized by any clergyman of the established Church of England, all their Slaves hereafter to be born, and also all such of their Slaves already born, as shall be made sensible of the duties of the Christian faith' (Clause I).[25]

[23] "Report of a Committee of the Council of Barbados to enquire on the Condition of Slaves 1824" — West Indian Slavery: *Selected Pamphlets 1816-1827,* pp. 30-31.

[24] *Op. cit.* pp. 11-12. See also "Report from a Select Committee of the House of Assembly appointed to enquire into the origins, causes, and progress of the late Insurrection", Bridgetown 1816.

[25] See *Parliamentary Papers relating to the treatment of Slaves in the West India Colonies 1827,* pp. 205-206, and *Parliamentary Papers 1826: Slave Legislative Acts 1823-1825.*

These apparently noble intentions were designed to conceal the centuries-old intransigency harboured by the planters against the very sort of action the new law purported to be changing. The first stringent proviso the Act lays down in Clause 2 is that the intending slave parties to a marriage should be 'the property of the same owner', and that the marriage be solemnized by a 'clergyman of the established church [conditional] on the said Slave's producing the consent in writing of the owner, his or her attorney, agent, or representative' authorizing its celebration.

On submission to the Colonial Office, the Act was rejected on precisely those provisions restricting freedom of marital choice. The reasons advanced by the Colonial Secretary are illuminating and deserve generous quotation:

> On the subject of marriage, I regret to say that the provisions of this Act [No. 82 / 1826] are very defective. The consent of the owner is an indispensible [sic] condition in every case, however capricious or unjust may be his refusal. It is necessary also that the slaves to be married should be both the property of the same person. No provision is made for the very numerous cases where the same person may own one or two slaves only in his domestic service, or where from consanguinity or other causes, intermarriage between the slaves of a small gang may be impossible. Nor can it be permitted that any class of His Majesty's subjects should be deprived of the power of performing matrimonial connexions, except upon conditions which may often be revolting to the feelings, and injurious to their moral character. It is difficult also to perceive the policy of confining the right of celebrating marriages to the clergy of the Established Church, nor why other teachers of religion should be deprived of the salutary influence over the minds of the slaves which the enjoyment of this power should confer.[26]

It was not until 1838 / 1839 that the Barbadian legislature at the behest of the Colonial Office came up with a comprehensive marriage law that took into account the anomalous position of the ex-slave population in the post-emancipation period. Some of the clauses which Lord Bathurst had strongly criticised in the 1826 Act were still very much evident in the 1839 Act apart from a slight tempering in the wording. The new Marriage Act No. 689 of 6 March, 1839,[27] among a number of other matters relating to

[26] Under-Secretary of State, W. Huskinsson to J. B. Skeete, President of Council of Barbados, October 18, 1827, *Parliamentary Papers 1828-1829,* Vol. 76, p. 55.

[27] *Parliamentary Papers 1837-1841.* See also "The First Report of the Commissioners on the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice in the West Indies" *Parliamentary Papers: Justice in the West Indies,* Vol. 15, 1825.

matrimony, provided for the recognition of slave marriages; that is, marriages which were already solemnized were to be declared valid; and that *de facto* marriages were to have retroactive effect if solemnized within one year of the passing of the Act. The declared intent of the Act was to remove 'doubts... as to the validity of certain marriages contracted and solemnized previous to the abolition of slavery between slaves, and between parties one of whom was a slave and also in some cases between free persons of colour, and since the abolition of apprenticeship, and other persons of free condition'.

Yet the so-called "doubts" existed more in the minds of the planter / legislators rather than among the people involved since these "doubts" were of the legislature's own making, issuing directly from its constant refusal to recognize the validity of slave marriages conducted by, as it bluntly declared, 'Ministers of the Christian religion, other than clergymen of the United Church of England and Ireland [the Established Church]'. This had been the case since the 1630's. However, by now the legislature had thought it 'expedient and necessary that all such doubts be removed, and such marriages and reputed marriages should be ascertained and confirmed'.

It was thus pressure from the Colonial Office rather than due to a change of heart on the part of the planters that led to the apparently uncharacteristic *volte face* in respect to recognition of non-*white* and non-*Anglican* performed marriages. The planter / legislators now appeared contrite and motivated by a concern for social justice especially where children were involved: 'Many marriages, *de facto*', they declared, 'have taken place between persons, one or both of whom were in the condition of slavery, but which marriages *de facto,* have never been sanctioned by any public ceremony or formally registered, and in many such cases the parties have had offspring...'. The Act would now correct this situation and enable 'such persons to confer upon their children the benefit of children born in lawful wedlock...' (Clause XVI).

Given the planters' resolute tenacity of conviction in their opposition to slave conversion and marriage, it is a matter of little surprise to find these sentiments embodied in the final clause of the 1839 Marriage Act admitting slaves into the state of legal matrimony. Having accorded the ex-slaves the right to marry, the Act nonetheless re-affirmed the existing fetters on them. 'Nevertheless...

such marriages shall not confer on the parties or their issue, *any rights inconsistent with the duties which Slaves owe to their owners or to the government,* are by law entitled to assert over the Slaves and their progeny...' (italics added).

I shall now want to discuss specific marital cases from Parochial records and State Papers hitherto not subjected to sociological research and analysis in current Caribbean studies. These cases should go a long way to disprove the untenable explanations based on "African cultural origins" and "lower-class negro normative system". The cases further confirm that contemporary mating patterns are squarely rooted in slavery, and their explanation must be sought in those conditions.

CASE STUDIES: BARBADOS

The Marriage Registers of all Parishes in Barbados appear to confirm the claim made by some observers that prior to 1826 marriages between slaves were neither solemnized nor accorded any official recognition.[28] In St. John's Parish, special registers were kept for slave marriages from May 1827, and the first recorded marriage is dated 3 May, 1827. It was that of 'Sam William and Betty Colia, both of this Paris[h], and Slaves of the Society's Estate were married in this church by banns with consent of both parties, this third day of May one thousand eight hundred and twenty seven by me John Packer. This marriage was solemnized between us in the presence of J. H. Gittens, Rector and Robert Clarke' (and followed by 'The X of Sam William, The X of Betty Colia').

The second and last marriage for the year 1827 was conducted some three weeks later between one 'Joseph Blackman of the Parish of St. George, Free Coloured male, and Sussanah Bonham, of the Parish St. George, Slave on Lemon Arbour Estate', who were married in the Parish Church of St. John 'by License with consent of her owner, the Honb. — J. A. Holder'' on 27 May 1827. No further marriages are recorded for that year.

[28] See, e.g. Frank J. Klingberg, "British Humanitarianism at Codrington" *Journal of Negro History* 23, 1938 p. 467, and J. Harry Bennett, *Bondsmen and Bishops: Slavery and Apprenticeship on the Codrington Plantations of Barbados 1710-1838,* 1958, p. 116.

Some slave owners (who included clergymen) appear to have taken an active interest in the marital welfare of their slaves. On 30 June 1830 'Sanso and Mary both slaves of Joseph W. Harris' of St. John were married before Curate B. J. Nurse of St. Mark's in the presence of owner Joseph Harris himself as a witness. On January 7, 1831, the Rev. John Hothersall Pinder joined in marriage his male slave, Fabricious, with Betsy Maria, another slave of the Society's Plantation. Some of these early marriages were between slaves and free persons. The Rev. J. H. Gittens joined in marriage 'John Richard Holder and Thomazin Millington, the former, slave of J. H. Nurse of Todd's, the latter free', on 4 July 1831 in the Parish Church of St. John. The following table summarizes the total number of "slave" marriages in the Parish of St. John from 1827 to 1848.[29]

TABLE 2

Slaves and Apprentices Marriages in the Parish of St. John 1827-1848

Year	*Number*	*Year*	*Number*
1827	2	1838	14
1829	4	1839	36
1830	6	1840	30
1831	10	1841	20
1832	11	1842	12
1833	22	1843	8
1834	97	1844	2
1835	53	1845	1
1836	44	1846	2
1837	14	1847	2
		1848	2
		Total: 412	

SOURCE: Compiled from the *Parochial Register of Marriages* for the Parish of St. John 1827-1848, pp. 17-39. BDA.

[29] Detail extracted from *Parochial Register 1827-1848*, St. John's Parish, Barbados, (Marriages of Slaves solemnized in Parish of St. John in the Island of Barbados) pp. 17-39, Barbados Dept. of Archives.

The first few years of legal marriage for the slaves indicate a significantly slow beginning as only 2 marriages were celebrated in 1827, 4 in 1829 and 6 in 1830. From 1831 the figures rapidly increased, doubling with every subsequent year. The notable decline in marriages after 1843, may be attributed to a number of reasons. One palpable reason is the change of Ministers. It appears that the Rev. Thomas Watts, Rector of St. John, had relinquished office in 1843 and was replaced by the Rev. E. H. Parry who does not seem to have had the same enthusiasm as Watts. During the Watts' ministry, the annual marriage figures were significantly high. Parry managed to solemnize only 8 marriages between 1843 and 1847. Another reason may have been the decline of interest as the novelty wore off among the apprentices themselves. Also with the termination of slavery perhaps the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG) was under less pressure from its critics at home to exercise its responsibility for the moral rectitude of its own slave population at Codrington.

The year 1834 saw the largest number of marriages between slaves, an unprecedented high of 97, most of which conducted by the progressive Thomas Watts up to January, 1836. From 1835, with a total of 53 marriages, the numbers rapidly declined to a mere 2 in 1848. Only 1 marriage is recorded for 1845 between ex-slaves in the Parish of St. John.

Apart from the fluctuation in numbers of slave marriages, there was a notable increase in *inter-plantation* mobility, and in marriages between slaves belonging to different owners or Estates. The marriages that took place after 1834 show a number of grooms and brides to have come from different Estates. Interesting sociological information about the marital patterns that were developing at this time may be gleaned from a number of slave marriages recorded in some Parishes. On February 12, 1831, 'Jacob and Mercy Ann [both of St. John] the former a free Blackman, the latter a Slave of Mrs. Margaret Goddard were married' by banns before the Rev. J. H. Gittens. Also 'married by banns on 10th April 1834' were 'Jackey belonging to Mrs. Bascom and Selah belonging to Mr. Lyder'; then on 27th July, 1834, 'Tom Francis belonging to Mr. George Tunney' married 'Phibba Bess belonging to Mr. Long'. And 'Married in this Chapel by Banns this second day of August A.D. 1834, [was] Abel of Cliff Cottage to Hagar, Apprentice labourer of Mrs. Harding'. On August 23, 1834, 'Jack of the Bath Estate, St. John, married

Phillis of Fortescue's in St. Philip's'. The Rev. Thomas Watts joined in marriage 'Richard of Palmer's Estate to Peggy of Mount Pleasant on February 20, 1834'; and a month later united 'Jack Firebrass of Thicket Estate with Susan Boucher a free coloured Woman on 23 March 1834'; and so was 'Exeter of Society's plantation married [to] Hannah Moll of Sealy Hall on April 6, 1834'. A few days later Watts solemnized a marriage between 'Andrew of Bath plantation and Peggy of Society's plantation on April 10, 1834'.

In the Parish of St. Thomas[30] a rather interesting marriage took place between 'Samuel Bennet (commonly called Sammy Watson) belonging to Mrs. Rebecca Batson of the Parish of Christ Church, and Sattice Ann, belonging to Elizabeth Willoughby and

TABLE 3

Summary of Interplantation Slave Marriages — 1832-1834

Date	*Groom*	*Location*	*Bride*	*Location*
8.9.32	George	Lemon Arbour	Harriet	Steward Hill
18.1.33	Sammy	Colleton	Molly Blossom	Society
2.8.33	Samuel Bennet	Christ Church	Sattice Ann	St. John
5.12.33	Philip Jordan	Clermont	Elizabeth Princess	Welches
31.12.33	Money John	Colleton	Benniba	Society
20.2.34	Richard	Palmer's	Peggy	Mt. Pleasant
27.2.34	John Prince	Mt. Pleasant	Mary Bess	Steward Hill
6.4.34	Exeter	Society	Hannah Moll	Sealy Hall
10.4.34	Andrew	Bath	Peggy	Society
16.5.34	Jemmy	Haynes Hill	Betty Henry	Society
12.6.34	Jack Mingo	Society	Annie	Sealy Hall
17.6.34	Hary Jones	St. Joseph	Jenny Rose	Society
11.7.34	Scipio	Haynes Hill	Mary Princess	Sealy Hall
30.8.34	Cudjoe	Bath	Patience	Society
23.8.34	Jack	Bath	Phillis	Fortescue

SOURCE: Compiled from various *Parochial Registers of Slave Marriages*, BDA.

30 Details extracted from *Parochial Register of Slave Marriages for St. Thomas 1828-1834*, pp. 409-413 BDA.

Sarah Willoughby, minors, under the charge of Mrs. Elizabeth Ann Watson, widow, of this Parish... in this Church by banns and with consent of the Parties this Twenty second day of August in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty three' before John Packer, the Rector. It is probable that the groom was scion of Mrs. Elizabeth Watson's deceased husband.

Before emancipation all the Parishes lagged behind St. John in the encouragement and performance of slave marriages. St. Thomas and St. Peter appear to have been particularly tardy in performing slave marriages. In all only 16 marriages between slaves were conducted in St. Thomas in the period September 1828 and July 1834. St. Peter fared even worse with a record of only 1 slave marriage in the entire period 1825-1834. Only the Parish of Christ Church appears to have approximated the record of St. John's performance.

The first slave marriage in Christ Church[31] was celebrated between 'Jeffry Nurse, slave of Richard Nurse and Lucy Turpin

TABLE 4

Marriages of Slaves and Apprentices: Christ Church 1826-1838 Barbados

Pre-Emancipation		*Apprenticeship*	
1826	1	1835	41
1830	3	1836	72
1831	1	1837	115
1832	4	1838	222
1833	3		
1834	34		
Total	**46**	**Total**	**450**

SOURCE: Compiled from *Parochial Register of Marriages: Slaves, Christ Church, 1826-1838,* BDA.

31 Details extracted from *Parochial Register of Marriages: Slaves 1826-1838,* Christ Church, BDA.

slave of Sarah Turpin' before Dr. T. H. Orderson on 15 June 1826. Nothing further happened until 1830 when 3 slave marriages were conducted, followed by only 1 in 1831 between 'Sancho Daniel, free blackman and Rosetta Pilgrim slave'. In 1832, two marriages were celebrated and recorded in the parochial register reserved for slaves and freedmen; and only 3 are shown for 1833, 2 for slaves and 1 for free blacks. A tremendous increase occurred in 1834 when 34 marriages were conducted in the Parish betwen slaves or between slaves and freedmen. The last marriage described as between slaves is that of 'Billy Bourne a slave on Maxwell's Estate and Peggy Assah slave of Dorcas Lashley' on 31 July 1834 by Christopher Gill. Thereafter, the phrase "attached to" is employed to designate civil status of the parties. The first marriage after emancipation is an entry of 7 August 1834 for the marriage of 'Benjamin and Jenny Rose attached to the Ridge Estate'. From 20 February 1835 the parties are identified as "Apprenticed Labourer" of such and such Estate. The progressively upward trend in marriages between ex-slaves can be seen from the comparative annual figures for the period before emancipation and that covered by the Apprenticeship System as shown in Table 5.

One of the crucial issues about the civil status of the slave was his capacity to legally witness any action. Legal matrimony tended to modify this capacity at least in matrimonial proceedings. In St. John slaves who had already been joined in marriage were sometimes invited to act as witnesses to the marriages of their confreres. For example, we find that Jacob of the Society's Plantation who had been joined in marriage by Thomas Watts to Sue in January 1832 was later one of the two witnesses at the marriage of "Christmas and Betty Bella of Society Plantation" on June 8, 1833. Jacob's own marriage had earlier been witnessed by another slave called Primus.

Similarly, Scipio who had been married to Kate Joan by John Packer on 28 May 1830 was invited to attest the marriage of Rita and Kate Hannah who were joined in marriage on 30 August 1833. Also Cuffy College (of the Codrington Estates) acted as a witness to two slave marriages during 1833. When the Rev. John Watts joined in marriage "Hector and Cooba on January 4, 1833," and later also "Quashy Howard to Mary Ann on 16 August 1833", Cuffy was the official witness on both occasions.

TABLE 5

Marriages in 9 of 11 Barbados Parishes 1825-1830 by Ethnic/Social Categories

		Year						
Parish	*Category*	*1825*	*1826*	*1827*	*1828*	*1829*	*1830*	*Total*
St. Michael	White	26	28	32	37	42	24	189
	Couloured	9	11	11	18	15	8	72
	Slave	–	–	–	1	–	3	4
		35	39	43	56	57	35	205
Christ Ch.	White	12	12	8	3	13	7	55
	Couloured	–	1	–	2	2	1	6
	Slave	–	1	–	–	–	3	4
	Sub-total	12	14	8	5	15	11	65
St. Thomas	White	7	2	7	5	5	2	28
	Couloured	–	1	–	–	–	1	2
	Slave	–	–	–	1	–	–	1
	Sub-total	7	3	7	6	5	3	31
St. Andrew	White	2	7	10	14	8	4	45
	Couloured	1	–	1	–	1	1	4
	Slave	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
	Sub-total	3	7	11	14	9	5	49
St. Lucy	White	7	4	6	3	5	6	31
	Couloured	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
	Slave	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
	Sub-total	7	4	6	3	5	6	31
St. George	White	Details not available						69
	Couloured							2
	Slave							5
	Sub-total	–	–	–	–	–	–	76
St. James	White	Details not available						25
	Couloured							–
	Slave							3
	Sub-total	–	–	–	–	–	–	28
St. Joseph	White	Details not available						40
	Couloured							–
	Slave							–
	Sub-total	–	–	–	–	–	–	40
St. Philip	White	Details not available						52
	Couloured							6
	Slave							2
	Sub-total	–	–	–	–	–	–	60

SOURCE: *Parliamentary Papers: Extinction of Slavery*, 1832, (Extracts from Returns relating to the Slave Population: Barbados, pp. 24-30).

In other cases we find a slave who had previously acted as a witness in the marriage of a slave couple while he was still single soon getting married himself. Quasho Bob was one such case. Quasho had performed the role of witness to the marriage of John Bull to Cooba which took place on July 12, 1832. By April 12, 1833 we find Quasho Bob himself before the altar being joined in marriage to Lubba Rose.[32]

OTHER SLAVE COLONIES

The question of slave marriages was a troublesome one for all the slave colonies before 1825. While in some plantation colonies like Barbados the restrictions were formalized into law and largely observed by the compliant clergy, in others the non-performance was left much to customary neglect by the clergy of the Established Church of England.[33]

In Antigua this would appear to be the case rather than the active opposition of the planters. Rector George Collins of the parish of St. Philip put the matter in a nutshell in a letter to Governor Sir Benjamin D'Urban on 14 September 1821: 'I beg to inform your excellency that during the space of thirty years I never knew or heard that marriages were ever performed by clergymen of the church of England in this Island between slaves. I have been Rector of the Parish of St. Philip about eighteen years, and have never been applied to, to officiate at the marriage of slaves.' Furthermore he had 'married no free black or coloured persons' between the years 1808 to 1814. He celebrated the first marriage between a 'Free Coloured couple' in 1818, another one in 1817 and the last two in 1820 one of which was between a 'Fair man and a black woman'. (p. 50)

In St. George's parish, Rector James Coull similarly reported on September 26, 1821: 'During forty-two years and nine months that I have been Rector and Incumbent of the Parish of St. George, I had never been called upon to marry any slaves, till, on the 29th, April 1820, the honourable and Reverend Richard Burgh Byam

[32] Collated from information in *Parochial Register of Marriages 1827-1848*, St. John's Parish, BDA.

[33] All data and information quoted hereafter are extracted from *Parliamentary Papers relating the Slave Population in the West India Colonies* Vol. I, Part II, 1823.

wrote to me, requesting me to publish the banns of marriage between two mulatto slaves, belonging to the estate of William Byam Esq., his father... I complied with his request, and published the banns. But on due consideration that neither of the parties had applied to me to marry them, and being assured, by undoubted authority, that the woman was twice the age of the man, of a licentious character, and been faithful to none of several husbands, for while she had a mustee husband she had a child by a black man, and afterwards when she had a coloured husband, she had another child by a white man; and a third child, all of different colours, and was remarkable for her infidelity; and no marriage being lawful here unless solemnized by a minister of the church of England, and he cannot marry a free person to a slave under penalty of 50 (pounds). No beneficed clergyman had ever married any slaves. I have had only two marriages of coloured and black free persons at St. George during an incumbency of nearly forty-three years and none in St. Peter's of which I have been Rector ten years'. (p. 51)

For the parishes of St. John and St. Paul, Rector Samuel W. Hartman was less self apologetic as he wrote to the Governor on the subject: 'Your Excellency will perceive that there is not any marriage of slaves in either Return; there is not a single instance of any such occurrence on record in either register, the circumstances having been invariably considered as illegal; nor is it easy to see how so solemn and binding a contract can possibly be entered into by persons who are not free agents'. (p. 51).

MONTSERRAT: Rector Joseph Gerrald reported a total of 19 marriages between "Free Black or Coloured Persons" during the period 1808 to 1821, and none for slaves (p. 63).

DEMARARA: Reverend W. T. Austen of St. George's Chapel wrote on February 4, 1822 that 'No entry of marriages appears on the register of St. George's Chapel, previous to 1812, between the classes of persons beforementioned (i.e. Free Coloured and Black Persons); and there is reason to think that no *such* marriage was ever solemnized before that date. The marriages of slaves is a thing unheard of in this colony, and I humbly conceive this holy institution to be altogether incompatible with the state of slavery under existing laws and regulations.' However, Austen was able to

account for a total of 44 "marriages solemnized between Free Coloured and Black Persons from the year 1812-1821". (p. 81)

An interesting and revealing letter was written by a non-Anglican clergyman Rev. Rickard Elliot to Government Secretary R. Chapman of Demarara on December 13, 1821: '...I beg to observe that I am not of the Established Church, marriages solemnized by me would not be legal; I have therefore refused to comply with the requests of the free black and coloured people, and have not married any of them: but as the slaves have no legal inheritance, they could suffer no loss or inconvenience from their marriages not being considered legal; and knowing by experience that marriages among negroes promote morality, economy, and domestic happiness, I have married a great number of them, but have not kept a regular list of marriages until the last two years; which is as follows: In 1820... 124, 1821... 100 total 224).' (p. 81)

Presbyterian Reverend Archibald Browne of St. Andrew's Church Demarara expressed some concern about the definition of "coloured people": 'In the... Return I have comprehended under the head "Coloured People" all who are descended by one of their parents from the race of Free Indians, as well as those that are of Negro extraction. Besides these intermarriages between persons of the same class, two young women of colour have been united by me in lawful wedlock to white young men...

As for slaves I should not consider myself justified in celebrating marriage between them without previous assurance, obtained from competent authority, that such practice is conformable to the existing laws of the Colony; and, moreover, without being certified in each particular case, that the owner of such slave or slaves did not object to that sort of union'. Browne could still show a total of 19 marriages between free coloured persons from 1819-1821. (p. 82)

Evangelist John Davies of an unidentified denomination wrote to say that as he was not of the established church of England. 'I have not considered myself authorized to solemnize marriages in a legal sense;" but quickly added, 'though, with a view of rendering the negroes who attend my ministry more morality & c. I have required them to make a solemn promise of fidelity, & c. to each other; which a great many of them have done...' (p. 82).

Missionary John Smith of Bethel Chapel, returned a total of 96 marriages he had celebrated among slaves between 1817 and 1821. He had conducted 5 in 1818, 3 in 1819, 27 in 1820 and 6 in 1821. (p. 82)

TRINIDAD: In all slave territories the low record of slave marriages was consistent, and Trinidad was no exception. Between 1808 and 1821 a total of 448 marriages were celebrated between "free coloured people" (p. 121) and only 3 for slaves as shown in Table 6.

TABLE 6

Marriages of Free Coloured and Slaves 1808-21: Trinidad

Year	*Free Coloured*	*Slave*	*Year*	*Free Coloured*	*Slave*
1808	28	-	1815	39	-
9	20	-	16	34	-
10	23	1	17	76	1
11	21	-	18	17	-
12	33	-	19	47	-
13	20	-	20	42	-
14	25	-	21	23	1
				448	3

SOURCE: Compiled from information extracted from: *Parliamentary Papers relating to the Slave Population in the West India Colonies* Vol I, Pt. II, 1823, P. 121.

ST. VINCENT: On December 5, 1825 the local legislature passed an Act providing for the christianization of slaves and for their intermarriage by the Established Church of England, by consent of the owner or deputy. This new concession was conditional in that 'such marriage shall not confer on the parties and their issue any rights inconsistent with the duties which Slaves owe to their owners'. Such a slave marriage was not to be construed as a means 'which might destroy the rights or injure the property of their owners'. Similar provisions abound in legislative Acts of other colonies as well.[34]

[34] See 'Consolidated Slave Act, 16 December, 1825' in *Parliamentary Papers 1826*, p. 80.

CONCLUSION

I have endeavoured in this paper to show how sociological research of archival material may be utilized to shed considerable light on some of the troublesome sociological problems respecting mating patterns among Caribbean societies. The materials adduced here to show the connection between contemporary mating behaviour and antecedent factors suggest a re-assessment of our methodological approaches to Caribbean research. However, space does not permit me to deal either with the rest of the slave colonies or with the post-emancipation era, a period of which valuable statistical data are available. I shall conclude this discussion with a generous quotation from the previously mentioned document in which the Rev. John Stephen deliberates on the subject of slave marriage in its social context to further prove the inadequacy of sociological explanations based solely on "negro lower-class normative behaviour" and "African cultural origins".

Stephen's observations apply equally well to all West India plantations slave colonies: Stephen argues that were the slaves 'Freely allowed, and properly encouraged, to enter into lawful wedlock, they would then learn to set a proper value on the virtue of chastity... Could the... objection to the marriage of slaves be admitted to have any weight, it must be allowed to have equal weight against the marriage of free people in this part of the world; for it is well-known that infidelity to their husbands is by no means unexampled among females of that condition, *white* as well as *black*... Men in this part of the world have long been accustomed to see slaves, and coloured people in general, living in that illicit and licentious manner in which they do,... they seem never to reflect... that this very circumstance [the licentious manners of the female negroes, arising from the difficulty of obtaining lawful marriage] is the grand instrument of corrupting the manners of the white population, by affording the male part of them the ready means of gratifying their most depraved appetites, without much degrading their character in the opinion of their fellow-citizens, and the natural consequence is, that marriages are thereby rendered less frequent, and the sanctity of marriage is less strictly regarded, even among *them*, than they would otherwise be... If any necessity then exists for denying [the slaves the privilege of marriage], it is entirely a necessity of our own making...'. (pp. 224-225 italics original)

The paper has thus shown how socio-anthropological research in Caribbean societies may be methodologically improved by a proper utilization of archival material pertaining to the slavery period. The thrust of my argument has been to place the contemporary mating practices squarely in the social context in which they developed, and to show how these practices were perpetuated by legal prescriptions and social conventions of the dominant segment of plantation society. The paper has demonstrated the need for a more cautious approach to facile explanations of extra-marital mating patterns among the so-called lower-class negro segment of these societies. I have argued that in the absence of comparative research results on other segments of the same society, partial sociological explanations based on exogeneous influences (e.g. African cultural origins) will remain inadequate and will continue to vitiate field research.

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Marriage and the Family in a White Caribbean Elite

The Impact of Descent for the Ethnic Persistence of the Sephardic Jews in Curacao

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RÉSUMÉ

Les juifs sepharad de Curacao forment une petite élite exclusive qui a préservé son identité ethnique beaucoup plus longtemps que les groupes comparables en Amérique. L'article montre comment le critère de filiation a été actif chez ce groupe et comment il a marqué le mariage et la famille.

The present paper is another example of the increasing interest in white minority groups in the Caribbean which developed in the late sixties and the seventies. Some of those whose work shows evidence of this interest are: Hoetink, 1967; Holzberg, 1977; Karner, 1969; Kovats-Beaudoux, 1969; Mintz, 1965; Patterson, 1975; and Sheppard, 1977.

Although the number of Sephardic Jews in Curacao is decreasing dramatically, they still occupy high status positions completely out of proportion to their numbers. It is a small elite that has preserved its ethnic identity longer than comparable groups in the Americas. In this paper I will try to sketch how *descent* has greatly contributed to this ethnic persistence and how it has, largely, shaped marriage and the family.

In the plural societies of the Caribbean economic goods are not primarily distributed according to a process of competition, but largely through membership in an ethnic or privileged status group,

or by violent expropriation by such groups of others. Theories that view ethnicity as a major factor in the acquisition or maintenance of power, status, and income seem especially relevant for an understanding of these societies (see Cohen, 1974 and 1974a; Nisbet, 1975; Daniel Bell in Glazer and Monihan, 1975: 141-174; Young, 1976; Despres, 1975).

In these societies a system of ascribed statuses exists along with a separate status system in which individuals are socially differentiated according to their particular achievements. These two status systems are interwoven but not coterminous. Hoetink has focused on the differences between socioeconomic and ascriptive stratifications. He states (1973: 50) that

> The members of the dominant racial group owe their position, of course, to the economic, social, and cultural power that, as a group, they already possessed at the moment of the inception of the multiracial society and that they have preserved since. But this observation, which often is taken as the explanation of socioracial structure and mobility in such a society, is not that at all. It is neigher more nor less than an a priori condition for the formation of a horizontally layered, multiracial structure. To state that such a structure (or for that matter, any hierarchical stratification) can be explained by a difference in power is a tautological exercise since the definition of such a structure already presupposes a power differentiation.

Without denying that the dominance of one socioracial or sociocultural group in a society is ultimately based on economic power, Hoetink focuses on the ascriptive criteria which foster or hinder such power. The four criteria which he discusses (1975: 9-25) are: 1. territoriality (or nationality), 2. notions of common descent (of which somatic traits are attributes), 3. language, and 4. religion. He points out that the presence of only one of these four ascriptive criteria is necessary in order to create what Barth terms an "ethnic group".

Of these four ascriptive criteria, at least three apply to the Sephardic Jews of Curacao.

The first Sephardim settled on the island in the 1650's. It was a very clear notion of common descent that created a community from people who had come from various countries and different backgrounds. Their sense of ethnic distinctiveness was based primarily on the idea that the individual was linked to the larger chain of Jewry through descent in the female line, but they were not religiously homogeneous; Some had received a thorough religious

education in families where Jewish scholarship was held in high regard, while others had been Marranos who still had to learn the most basic things of Judaism. Through the terror and confusion of the Inquisition, the two formal criteria of Jewish identity, matrilineal descent and Jewish faith had been separated.

Nevertheless, a strong and vigorous religious organization emerged, with the synagogue as the center of the group's religious and social life. While Portuguese was the group's official language, Hebrew was retained for religious use.

Hoetink points out that the ascriptive criteria of descent, language, and religion may not only emerge through geographical isolation but in a situation of social isolation as well, where such isolation — voluntary or otherwise — is imposed through a rigid stratification of society. This was indeed the case in Curacao, which until the 1920's was characterized by caste-like relations between its three populations, the Dutch Protestants, the Sephardic Jews, and the Blacks.

Group membership was accorded at birth, and each group had a distinctive conception of its own place in the social structure, as well as a clear conception of the characteristics of the other group (see Sofer, 1954). The isolation of the Sephardim can thus be ascribed to both the ritualistic segregation characteristic of Judaism (Weber, 1952: 336-343), and the rigid stratification of Curacaon colonial society.

In the social hierarchy of the island, the Dutch planters and bureaucrats, representatives of Dutch authority and culture, occupied a higher place than did the Sephardic merchants, who were considered foreigners (and called "members of the Portuguese nation") until in the 19th century. But these merchants soon acquired the monopoly of the large-scale international trade and shipping, cornerstones of the island's economy (agriculture never flourished, and plantations were often only a status symbol). The Jews were quite aware of their economic superiority. As early as 1721, when some problems with greedy and jealous island officials arose, they directed a letter to the authorities in Holland pointing out that, "It is we who keep the business going with our vessels, as among the Christians there are hardly any who engage in shipping; heaven help the land (Curacao) if we are not here." (Emmanuel, 1970: 112)

One of the factors contributing to the group's striking economic success was their vast, extended commercial networks and connections with other equally successful Jewish merchants (many of them being kinsmen) in Europe and the Americas, as well as the information circulating within these networks. What formed the basis for these international networks was a combination of descent and the particular economic ethos associated with Judaism. The mutually strategic position of Jewish commercial communities has been described by historians such as, for instance, De Sola Pool, Marcus, Freund, and Sombart.

While Portuguese is no longer used, and the importance of religion has greatly declined, descent as interpreted by economic interests still plays an important role. I shall now deal with the ascriptive criterion of descent that has largely shaped marriage and the family of the Sephardic Jews of Curacao.

Endogamy

Hoetink points out that the idea of common descent in a geographically isolated system is only the consequence of such isolation. In a rigid horizontally stratified system, however, it is both cause and consequence; there is a functional relation between the monopoly of power allocation and endogamy, as well as between the rigid outcaste-like exclusion from certain positions and endogamy (1975: 22).

The Sephardic Jews, who, because of religious law *and* the caste-like Curacaon society, had to marry within their own group, recognized the importance of endogamy for the group's survival as a religious and ethnic unit from the beginning of their settlement on the island. Marriage and the founding of a family have always been regarded as a religious social obligation among Jews, and the significance of this duty was strongly emphasized in Curacao. The great value placed on private property encouraged a high esteem for the family (see Ariès, 1962), and Judaism reinforced the importance of the institution by making it a center of religious observance.

As the originally ascriptive group also became a group with well-defined economic interests, with a monopoly in international trade and shipping, the materialistic aspects of the marriage contract acquired increasing importance. Clements (1975: 35) observes

that "kindship acts as a mechanism of class continuity whereby families are able to pass on their accumulated advantages intergenerationally..." and Banton points out: "it is much easier for a group to preserve its identity if it enjoys a monopoly and can reward successive generations for making endogamous marriages, thereby resisting assimilation in the most critical respect." (1970: 53).

Marriage was not considered a union between two individuals, but rather an alliance between two families. The partners in a marriage formed a pact in which love and companionship were not required, and heads of families who carried primary responsibility for marriage arrangements tried deliberately to serve the interests of their family by seeking an optimal combination, i.e., one in which an alliance between bride and groom would unite the largest possible amounts of property, power, and social esteem. Thus, in addition to the religious dictates of endogamy excluding non-Jews as potential marriage partners, the isolation of the Curacaon Sephardim also acted to promote marriage within their own community. Moreover, by further restricting the ideal of a good marriage to one between cousins or other relatives, most parents severely limited the already narrow range of acceptable partners. Karner observes the development of two patterns:

> The first one is cross as well as parallel cousin marriage within one's famiya[1], the second is marriage between members of the extended families. The former consolidated the family position and at the same time safeguarded its material possessions from dispersal. The latter solidified the entire group. ...most of these Sephardic families were linked to one another at least once, several many more times, and yet others exhibited a definite criss-crossing tendency with another family. It is not surprising, then, that during the period from the late seventeenth through the nineteenth century, extremely few new family names appear, while the original surnames keep recurring over and over again. ...the whole Sephardic segment might be considered to be one family. (1969: 11-12)

Endogamy resulted in a social cohesiveness that promoted a strong group identity, yet the group was highly stratified according to wealth, power and status. With each family trying to bring together the greatest possible combination of capital, business information,

[1] Famiya. "Under this term we understand all recognized relatives on one's mother's and on one's father's side, along with the kinsmen of one's spouse. The anthropological term is "kindred", the expression used in Brazil to denote such a group is Parentela." Karner, Frances, 1969: 11.

and commercial networks through marriage alliances, family ties became a most valuable resource in itself. The wealthiest families were obviously the most demanding in the selection of marriage partners for their children, and it was especially among these families that cousin marriage flourished.

Demography and the state of business

Describing economic life at the end of the 19th century, Gomez Casseres (1976: 109-111), points out that in international trade capital was highly concentrated in the hands of a small number of family-firms: "The type of commerce upon which the island depended... promoted an oligarchical organization... international commerce was carried out by relatively large, multi-faceted firms, with significant capital endowments and exclusive international ties." This is the case for the centuries preceding the nineteenth as well; it is evidenced in tax lists, estate holdings, lists of ship owners, dowries, etc...

The Jewish community was thus highly differentiated according to wealth and the power and status that went with it. Besides those who have been described as "merchant princes" and "the Rothschilds of the Caribbean", there were always some who depended for their survival on financial support from the community. Whenever this group grew too large (especially in proportion to economic conditions), some of these individuals or families were encouraged to leave the island and try their luck elsewhere.

The oligarchical commercial organization put limits on the group's size through migration and careful control over the age of marriage and the marriage rate. Family relationships (associated with the family-owned firm that had spanned generations) predominated over all other relationships. Within the community, the rich families formed the ruling elite, often dominating religious as well as non-religious affairs. As a consequence, emigration was not always completely voluntarily: pressure might be put on those receiving funds from the community chest. This is illustrated by the following example revealing problems of marriage as well as emigration.

> In 1737 Rachel, the orphan daughter of Abraham Aboab, wanted to marry Isaac Salas. Her widowed mother applied for the amount customarily bestowed upon an orphan as her marriage portion. The parnassim forbade the wedding,

> because they did not approve of a young man who had no means to earn a living.

Salas left for Surinam and Rachel never married. (Emmanuel, 1970: 117).

Because dowries depended on the state of business, marriage rates and the economy were closely related. The effects of economic ups and downs on the group's numbers are clearly indicated by Emmanuel's studies. An economic depression resulted in a decline in the number of Jews in Curacao, from 1500 in 1750, to 1200 in 1775. With the onset of the American Revolution, Curacao became a supplier of arms and amunition for the American armies. The island became "a small paradise of terrestial abundance" and family life flourished. "Men bestowed on their children and sisters dowries running sometimes as high as nine, ten and fourteen thousand pesos, colossal figures in an age when a married couple could live comfortably on 300 pesos a year." (Emmanuel, 1970: 262) During this period the marriage age went down, and the average number of children per family increased. Emmanuel exults that "It was not rare to see grandmothers at thirty five." But lean years followed after 1781. Men emigrated, and the existing surplus of women increased. In 1810, for example, there were 386 females and 263 males (children and adolescents are omitted in this account). Fifteen years later there was another wave of emigration which the parnassim encouraged by paying for passage and a sum equal to the relief which the indigent would have received from the community over a six-month period. "This exodus continued until 1850, and is confirmed by the total absence of marriages in the community from August 24, 1847, to January 17, 1849." (Emmanuel, 1970: 347) After 1850, another period of great affluence occurred, which was later also to be followed by material losses and emigration. And thus the cycle continued.

The value of women

In his study of the ethnic allegiance of the Chinese in Jamaica and Guyana, Patterson (1975: 338-339) observes that "choice of mate has become of vital importance for the maintenance of the continued congruence of the sets of social and economic networks which constitute the sociological raison d'être of the group..." and "Women have become the means whereby wealth is exchanged, shared,

consolidated, and kept within the group. As such they have become highly valued and jealously guarded."

Among the Curacaon Sephardim, women were highly valued both for their dowries and as perpetuators of the group. The family whose function was to transmit property, life, and 'names', depended on them. They preserved the purity of blood lines and the dignity of the male patriarchy; they were, as Pescatello expresses it, "sacred vessels". A woman's virtue was closely associated with the honor of her family, and as Wolf (1968: 8) points out rank in society "refers back to the ways in which people handle their domestic affairs."

It is obvious that women were not valued in their own right, but rather as objects of genetic, social and economic transmission. The heated conflicts and lawsuits about dowries in this small community support the assumption that in some cases women themselves were being considered as economic goods.

During socialization they were rigidly trained to maintain the facade of perfect adjustment by accepting and acting out the role which was defined for them. Saffioti (1978: 227) notes that

> women's socialization is guided by values which invest her with the role of upholder of the status quo and defender of a family structure and moral order in which a boy is expected to grow up like his father and a girl like her mother. Brought up in this way, it is not surprising that domestic life represents a woman's major aspiration...

Two serious obstacles to marriage, however, were the indispensable dowry and the very low sex ratio.[2] As men travelled extensively, and occasionally emigrated and married abroad, there was always a considerable surplus of women. Emmanuel repeatedly refers to this problem (1970: 234, 268, 182): "Marriageability of a girl depended on her dowry", "...finding suitors for the girls has always posed a serious problem...", "...the untold sacrifices and privations endured by parents in raising dowries for their daughters", etc. etc.

Their isolation, dependency, and total lack of options made Sephardic women the embodiment of conservatism. Karner has shown the striking continuity in marriage patterns and in the naming of children over the centuries. Moreover, there was a perpetuation of

[2] Sex ratio is depicted by presenting the number of males per 100 females.

the same life-style. Social life and the family were preserved without significant changes until in the 20th century.

Concubinage and Illegitimacy

Arranged marriages promoted the double standard, concubinage and illegitimacy, which were in any case encouraged by colonial conditions. Men sought love and sexuality outside marriage. While wives were socialized to pretend complete ignorance about their husband's sexual affairs, male peers were not only tolerant, but encouraged such behavior. Sexual activities were believed to be highly beneficial for a man's mental and physical well-being, and having a reputation as an irresistable seducer would add to his status among his peers.

It appears that a wide scale of relations existed, from a single fleeting, exclusively physical contact to more enduring forms of concubinage. It was customary for mature and older men of means to install one or more women in their own separate houses. This practice, which was institutionalized under the name of "companá" (see Abraham-Van der Mark, 1973: 68-73), was much more prevalent among the Sephardim than among the Dutch Protestants (the other white elite on the island). The rigid endogamy of the Jews, their greater affluence, and the accepted maintenance of mistresses and illegitimate children — institutions which they had known for ages in Portugal and Spain — may have contributed to the popularity of companá among them. The term companá means companionship, and the partners in it are called "companions", which suggests that the role of the mistress may be seen as contrasting with that of the wife, of whom companionship and sex for pleasure instead of prorecreation seem to have been expected to a much lesser degree.

It seems that for many Sephardic men the companá served as a second family, a more emotional unit in which different needs and desires were fulfilled than in the legal marriage. Thus, the upper-class family was definitely polygynous.

In this caste-like society one of the very few ways for a black woman to acquire upward mobility was through having a sexual relationship with a white man. But only a small minority of those who were sexually exploited ever reached the status of compana or mistress; and for most of these, life was rather difficult. They often

became relatively isolated from their own group, at the same time that it was necessary for them to remain "invisible" with regard to their lover's social group. The male role in the relationship often seemed more that of a patron and benevolent protector than that of a partner. Moreover, the same absolute faithfulness expected of a legal wife was also demanded of the compana. Nevertheless, these women were envied by their sisters because of their more comfortable material existence and their light coloured children. For indeed, the children of these unions might receive more education and acquire better positions in society, and this would have served as the mother's reward.

In general, the mistresses of wealthy Sephardim were raised above the social stratun to which they had belonged before the companá had started. And if such a relationship was discontinued because the women was later rejected by her white lover, she often made considerable sacrifices to keep up a life-style that accorded with middle class values of morality and respectability in order to promote the social mobility of her children.

Generally, illegitimate children of Jewish fathers got much better treatment than those of Dutch Protestants. Hoetink points out that one of the reasons for this was the fact that bright sons were most useful as reliable employees in the Sephardic family businesses. Quite often they were given their father's name, which is attested by even the most superficial inspection of the current telephone directory of Curacao. Because of the principle of matrilineal descent, together with the ruling that black people could not become members of the Jewish religious congregation (a practice that has only recently been changed), these illegitimate children were never perceived as a threat. Because the rules of descent defined by Judaism served to protect the legitimate heirs, the illegal descendants of Jewish males could never inherit; they might, however, contribute to the accumulation of their father's capital by working for him.

According to the degree of relatedness to a Sephardic male, the black population refers to the illegitimate offspring as Yu di Judio (child of a Jew) or Nieto di Judio (grandchild of a Jew). Someone who is related to the Sephardic segment, but neither as child or grandchild, is characterized as "e tin sanger di judio" (he or she has Jewish blood). This is an expression that can also be applied to

someone who is not related to the Sephardim but is conspicuously successful in business.

From among the numerous illegitimate children of Sephardic fathers, a group has come into being, the *Yu di Judio,* who used to socialize and marry among themselves. They lived together in a particular area of town, and even in the beginning of the 18th century a number of them reached remarkable prosperity Hoetink, 1958: 83). Hoetink emphasizes the importance of the combination of a light skin and a Sephardic father, who might help a promising son to set up his own business and / or give him agencies.

The Yu di Judio are all Roman Catholics (as their mothers) and because of their higher socioeconomic status they have always been in demand as godparents by the black population (which is over 90% Roman Catholic). Even today some of the older Yu di Judio have over hundred godchildren. Thus, through compadrazgo (godparentage) they built up large networks of personal relations with black families.

Through industrialization and modernization the 20th century has brought radical changes in all spheres of life. These changes are felt not only on the political level of international dependencies, but they also influence the position of women and the family structure. Thus, by the 1930's companá as an institutionalized form of concubinage with its particular characteristics among the white elites was on its way out. The main reason behind the disappearance of this form of concubinage between white men and black women together with the hypergenation (see Van Den Berghe, 1970: 56) which was associated with it, is the economic prosperity and full employment for black males following industrialization. Since then, it is no longer per se "better" to be the concubine or illegitimate child of a white man than the wife or legitimate child of a black man. (see Slater, 1977: 224-249)

The youngest and last generation of the Yu di Judio born in this century are now in their fourties. Although some of them are businessmen and women, more have attained high positions in politics, the bureaucracy and in the cultural sector, where they are disproportionately represented. This relatively privileged group has been quite conservative, supporting the status quo rather than radical social change. Although some of them are sincerely concerned about the fate of the black lower strata, whatever they have

done for people in this category has occurred in the context of a highly personal, often rather paternalistic relationship.

Through their extensive networks within the black population the Yu di Judio have functioned as intermediaries helping to prolong and safeguard the interests of their fathers' group. As the stratification system of the island has undergone considerable change — entailing a reinterpretation of ascribed and achieved statuses — the Yu di Judio as a group have also been reevaluated and in a sense adopted by the Sephardim, who lacked sufficient legitimate children to occupy the positions to which they have access.

Intermarriage and hypogamy

Despite the fact that the most affluent families consistently married within their own, small clique because of the scarcity of males, some men did marry upwards (hypogamy). Emmanuel mentions cases of hypogamy that caused problems, such as a husband taking off with his wife's dowry, or one who squandered a good part of his father-in-law's fortune, which was considered a valid reason for divorce. It was only in the 20th century, however, when intermarriage had become common, that hypogamy became a striking phenomena. The seeds of change within the Sephardic community had already been planted in the last three decades of the 19th century, even if changes in the family itself did not become manifest until the 20th. By this time several steamship companies connected Curacao with Europe and the USA (companies which were nearly exclusively represented in Curacao by the Sephardim), and the women started accompanying their husbands on long trips abroad. Although these voyages were still "programmed" by the group (whether in Paris, London or New York, Sephardic families stayed in the same hotels, ate at the same restaurants and saw the same shows), these trips represented a break from the omnipresent social control of the island community.

In the very beginning of the 20th century the age-old custom of giving children biblical names was broken and, more important for the group's continuity, the birth rate declined drastically (see Karner, 1969: 45) as Sephardic women practiced birth control. Moreover, it was now felt that the cousin marriages which had previously been customary were not without danger: children born

from such unions might be sick and weakly. It seems plausible that this sudden disapproval of the long preferred cousin marriage was actually a rationalization for the rebellion against the stifling custom of endogamy. In the beginning of the century several people remained unmarried because of a lack of suitable partners. But as change occurred, some married women insisted on getting a divorce, while some men made it clear that they were hardly interested in the other sex, and alliances which had earlier seemed "impossible" now took place. As more men emigrated and married abroad, many of the remaining women married foreigners who had come to Curacao. This was especially true in the thirties and fourties, during and after the Second World War. The foreigners were mostly non-Jewish, Dutch professionals and naval officers.

If one evaluates all 20th-century marriages in the Sephardic community, it becomes obvious that the vast majority are typical cases of hypogamy. Moreover, a scarcity of sons resulting from the low birth rate led to women inheriting the fortunes of several families. Generally speaking, hypogamy increases the power and authority of the wife, because it is she who brings status and wealth. In the case of the Curacaon Sephardic community this is obvious. And because in this group it is not customary to marry in community of property, it is the men of these hypogamous marriages who are in a vulnerable position: divorce may threaten their status and high standard of living.

The offspring of these unions bear non-Jewish names, but nevertheless belong to the Sephardic group and the Jewish community through descent in the female line. As members of this group they also have access to its privileges and they will largely determine the group's fate in the coming decades.

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Book Review Article — Recension

The State of Spatial Economic Research on Haiti: A Selective Survey

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During the past five-year period, two excellent little books by Georges Anglade (1974, 1977), which deal with the economic geography of Haiti, written for use in Haitian schools, have appeared. These books constitute the only attempt to date to summarize and synthesize some of the information regarding the spatial features of Haiti's economy. This is a non-satisfactory state of affairs, for however excellent and useful Anglade's books may be (and they very definitely are), the fact that they are schoolbooks necessarily puts a limit to the type of material which can be presented. Thus, the spatial dimension of the Haitian economy remains one of the least known. So far, little systematic research on spatial and regional problems has seen the light of day. This is not, of course, to say, that no information on the regional dimension exists, but that the problem is that this information is hopelessly scattered in an enormous number of documents which are in turn scattered themselves among a host of official and unofficial organizations and libraries inside and outside Haiti.

One possible reason for the neglect of the regional / spatial dimension is the presumption that such a small country would display relatively little regional variation. However, this presumption is likely to prove incorrect in the case of Haiti. A second and perhaps more important explanation may be found in the degree of centralization of the "Republic of Port-au-Prince", as the country is sometimes jokingly labeled. Virtually everything of importance to the ruling parties is concentrated in the capital: governmental institutions themselves, higher education, communications, the bulk of industry, the

bulk of the urban population and last, but not least, the elite themselves. The capital has always come first in Haitian life, and the rest of the country, including the secondary cities, appears much as a hinterland in comparison to Port-au-Prince and its suburbs.

Whether this situation continue or it will be changed remains to be seen. One cannot exclude the latter alternative, however. It ought to be pointed out that when the second five-year plan for national development was formulated in the mid-seventies, regional problems were given much more consideration at the highest level than at any time hitherto, and the President, during the preparation of the plan, in a speech to the officials of CONADEP (the national planning body), repeatedly pointed to decentralization as a cornerstone in government development policy (Donner, 1977: 10-11).

A serious attempt to decentralize government and to foster regional economic development instead of concentrating on the capital and its surroundings requires economic information, however, and it is the purpose of the present paper to survey some of the existing works which deal specifically with regional and spatial problems. The paper is divided into four different parts, covering (1) studies dealing with all of Haiti's regions, (2) studies of particular regions, (3) studies of spatial aspects of the agricultural marketing system and, finally, (4) studies of external and internal migration. No attempt of completeness will be made. The intention is only to point to the major achievements in each of the four areas.

STUDIES DEALING WITH THE ENTIRE COUNTRY

The first modern, somewhat unsystematic, attempt to deal with regional economic problems in a comparative fashion was made by Paul Moral, who devoted a chapter of *Le paysan haïtien* (Moral, 1961) to such issues. Moral wrote during a period when the relative isolation of the countryside was being eroded by the gradual penetration of the *camion* to hitertho more or less inaccessible districts. Still, he felt that the peasants by and large "remained locked up within their familiar horizons," (Moral 1961: 123) their main contact with the outside being via the local marketplaces. Thus, regional differences could be important, and Moral proceeded to describe these. He identified nine different geographical regions, described their topo-

graphic and climatic characteristics, attempted to determine some of their more important economic differences, and gave a summary account of the adaptation of farming to population and natural resources, His perspective was partly historic — often extending all the way back to the colonial period.

Judged with the wisdom of hindsight, the main deficiency of Maral's work on the regional economy is that emphasis is too much on description, while few analytical points are made. The same type of criticism may be directed against another monograph which appeared in 1962: Richard Schaedel's *An Essay on the Human Resources of Haiti* (1962). Schaedel who did not deal exclusively with regional matters) chose a somewhat different approach. Instead of attempting to cover entire regions in general terms, he picked particular communities in each of Haiti's five traditional *départements* and assumed that these represented "typically distinct cultural adaptations and adjustments" (Schaedel, 1962: 111).

Such an approach can be defended basically in terms of research economy, and provided that the communities chosen may actually be considered as "typical" for each particular region, some interesting differences and similarities may very well be uncovered. In Schaedel's case, the method does not work, however. Schaedel, while providing some interesting information, failed to select the communities studied carefully, i.e. in a way which allows comparisons to be made, both from the point of view of the communities picked and when it comes to the matters analyzed. Thus, his discussion of the Artibonite valley, for example, is heavily concentrated on a description of a rural *lakou,*[1] while in the South and North, a social survey was made of two small *towns.* The discussion of the Northwest, again, centers upon a rural *commune,*[2] while in the case of the West, finally, the *arrondissement*[3] of Belle Anse is dealt with in very general terms, and a very brief comparison is made of contemporary Mirebalais with the same community as described by Herskovits in the latter's classic study from the 1930s (Herskovits, 1971). Finally, an appendix presents tables of average cash farm incomes and outlays for four of the

[1] "The *lakou* or yard is used to describe the members of one large extended family (usually including 3 or 4 generations), having a common physically demarcated residence" (Schaedel 1962: 25).

[2] There were 116 *communes* in Haiti at this time.

[3] Haiti contained 27 *arrondissements* in 1962.

five *départements,* unfortunately without giving any details regarding the method for constructing the series.

In addition to the arguments already advanced, Moral and Schaedel may be criticized for another weakness: their failure to ask sufficiently specific questions. Narrowing the scope of the investigation is frequently a good strategy, as exemplified by Wolf Donner's attempt (1975) at regionalization of the Haitian territory. Donner's approach resulted from an appreciation that erosion was the major problem of Haitian agriculture. The task of agricultural planning, according to Donner, should be the physical defense and development of the territory, i.e. protection and controlled use of the natural resources. This, in turn, necessitated a "synopsis" of the items generally known as "land": soil, soil fertility, soil chemistry and physics, manipulation of soil fertility, natural vegetation, crops grown, and the whole hydrological and climatological complex. "These single phenomena have to be seen in their interrelation. They may be studied separately, but in nature they all interact withint the framework of a *watershed* or a *hydrological basin"* (Donner, 1975: 44).

Hence, Donner chose to base his regionalization on the concept of watershed. A catchment area should be conceived of as an entity "because of the close interdependence between soil and water, slopes and plains, natural vegetation and crops grown" (Donner, 1975: 49). Seven agricultural regions were identified according to two criteria:

1) Extensive watershed areas could be regarded as agricultural regions.

2) So could extensive plains which with their adjacent bordering slopes and their catchment areas would permit the establishment of integrated development plans.[4]

From here, Donner could go on to outline a regional development strategy for each of these regions.

The importance of asking specific questions is also clearly brought out in the study by Clarence Zuvekas (1978: 124-131) which is much more restricted in scope than those discussed hitherto. Zuve-

[4] These physiographic criteria constitute the cornerstone of the approach, but certain magnitude were applied as well to ensure that the regions demarcated did not turn out to be too large or too small. (Donner, 1975: 50) Finally, for practical reasons, an adjustment to the boundaries of the existing *arrondissements* had to be made.

kas surveys the available data with respect to the regional distribution of income in Haiti. From the point of view of statistical accuracy, the material leaves a lot to be desired. It is patchy, unsystematically collected, and is not homogeneous with respect to the date of collection. Individual margins of error are necessarily large. Still, by concentrating on one particular problem and by casting the analysis within a strictly comparative framework, Zuvekas manages to "confirm" some of the impressionistic views generally held as to which areas are the wealthiest ones (mainly the fertile plains) and the poorest (the Northwest and the adjacent islands). This is an important step in the right direction, for it allows the formulation of hypotheses which can be made subject to more rigorous testing at a later stage.

To sum up: the comparative study of Haitian regions has barely started. Naturally, in the beginning, we should, perhaps, expect much of the work to be of a fairly descriptive nature, but even so, it is surprising to learn that there have been so few attempts at spatially disaggregated *analysis*. It is futile to attempt to arrive at meaningful regionalization schemes without at the same time identifying the objectives of such disaggregation. Future comparative regional research in Haiti should begin by clearly specifying those objectives.

STUDIES OF PARTICULAR REGIONS

One year before the publication of Moral's book (1960), the first detailed study of a particular region, the Southern peninsula, by John Street (1960), appeared. Street's neglected contribution, which includes natural and economic (historical and contemporary) geography, primarily aims to "describe the agriculture of the peasants of southern Haiti and to determine its origins and its relationship to the physical environment" (Street, 1960: 10).

Street spans a wide variety of issues. Geology, climate, soils, and vegetation are all dealt with in the section on natural geography, and the contemporary (1952 and 1953) economic geography of Haiti south of the Cul-de-Sac plain is presented. The physical setting is described as are techniques for planting, crop protection and harvesting, the methods of growing and uses of no less than 95 different plants, from abricotier to vetiver, and the domestic animals and their use. Street's monograph also deals with small-scale industries (in-

cluding crafts), forestry, fishing, transportation, stores and marketplaces, housing, settlement patterns, malnutrition, disease, literacy, land tenure (unfortunately far too briefly) and cooperative labor. Some of the best parts of Street's work are to be found in the historical sections in which he traces the island's history back to the Indian and Spanish periods and deals extensively with the French colonial period with good descriptions of technology and production methods which reveal a thorough familiarity with the historical material. It is also in the historical section of analysis that Street makes his major contribution. He shows that little from the pre-Columbian period or the Spanish period remains in today's rural Haiti, an exception being the livestock introduced by the Spanish. The French influence, on the other hand, is evident everywhere. All but a few of the crops cultivated by today's peasants were introduced by the French, and so were many of the production techniques. In principle, the contemporary peasant cultivates the same crops as he did in 1790, employing the same methods.

The breakdown of the plantation system during the nineteenth century is described, and an account of the changes in technology is given, pointing toward technological retrogression in certain cases.[5] Street also describes the changes brought by the American occupation (especially in communication where a vastly improved road network led to less isolation in the countryside) but also the decay after the departure of the Americans. He attempts to trace certain agricultural practices to West Africa and compares Haiti with the Dominican Republic in terms of pupulation and farm size (Palmer, 1976).

Another study of a particular region — in this case the *Département du Nord* — was reported in 1961 and 1963 by Harold Wood: of "something very close to the maximum productivity possible, in a variety of types of land" (Wood, 1963: 11) (the North being the most densely populated department of the most densely populated country of Latin America). Thus, Wood in a different way deals with the same problem as Street: that of obtaining a picture of man and his economic activities in relation to natural resources.

His main point here deserves to be stressed: Whatever differences that we are likely to find in the utilization of the natural resources by the human element derive from differences in the former — *not* the

[5] This issue is discussed in some detail in Lundahl (1979), Chapter 12.

latter. On the regional level, the observable differences are not large. Peasant cultivation dominates the scene, with plantation agriculture constituting an exception. As we focus on the local level, however, differences in cropping patterns emerge, and to explain these adequately, reference must be made to "variations in elements of the physical environment, such as the texture, fertility, and drainage of soils, the depth of the overburden, the gradients, and the amount and seasonal distribution of precipitation" (Wood, 1963: 126). The human factor, on the other hand, is comparatively constant: "In few parts of the world will one find so homogeneous a culture and so classless a society as in rural Haiti" (Wood, 1963: 22)

Thus an important hypothesis emerges: "...it is possible to appreciate the relations between the land and its people both qualitatively and quantitatively. Rock, soil, months of wet weather, and months of drought can be expressed in terms of the crops which will grow, the proportion of the land which can be cultivated, the number of people who are able to gain their livelihood from each square mile, and the occurrence of seasonal food shortages" (Wood, 1963: 141). Wood goes on to detail such differences. This is his main contribution to the regional economic geography of Haiti.

The third detailed regional study differs from the two previous ones in the sense that it was undertaken with a practical purpose in mind. In 1977, Wolf Donner completed a survey of the Northwest (including the Gonaïves area). This survey, which covered one of the seven agricultural regions identified by Donner in 1975, was to serve as a factual basis for agricultural planning in the region. Here, as in the studies of the Southwest and the North, emphasis is on descriptive economic geography while no economic analysis is made.

Basically, Donner divides his study into three different parts: physical, social, and economic. The first one involves topography, climate, geology and soils, hydrography, and, finally, vegetation. The social description deals with population (especially the economically active population and internal and external migration), education, health, family planning (one of Donner's favorite topics), and peasant community organization. The economic section leans heavily towards a physical interpretation of the economy (while the tools of economics are not used). Under the heading of agriculture, the situation with respect to arable land, land tenure, and agricultural production is described, and livestock, forestry, fishing, industry, transports and

communication, trade, and energy all receive treatments of varying length.

The Northwest study constitutes a formidable catalogue of information regarding that area. It should be mentioned that the purpose is not only to study a particular area of Haiti, but also to provide a methodology which can be used for regional studies in the rest of the country. It is only to be hoped that such studies will actually be undertaken in the future, since the careful descriptive studies of each of Donner's seven regions along the lines sketched by him would organize the material which is now scattered among a multitude of national and international organizations. The Northwest study should be an indispensable tool in any planning situation, with the shortcut it provides to information which is otherwise difficult and time-consuming to get access to.

Summing up: When we move from comparative regional studies to monographs dealing with one particular Haitian region, the few studies undertaken appear more meaningful. The emphasis continues to be on detailed description of the regions under study, but one can at least see the beginnings of regional analysis here. It is quite possible and perhaps even probable that no meaningful comparative work will be undertaken until the separate building blocks, in the form of studies of all the particular regions are available. It may very well be that one of the most important questions to be asked is to what extent it is really warranted to cast the analysis of the Haitian economy in regional terms. Are the existing regional differences important, or is it generally sufficient to deal with the country as an entity?

SPATIAL ASPECTS OF THE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SYSTEM

The best documented spatial aspect of the Haitian economy is the system of agricultural commercialization. A major survey made by the *Institut Interaméricain des Sciences Agricoles* (IICA) in 1975 identified 519 state-controlled marketplaces. (La Gra, Fanfan & Charleston, 1975: 3) These regular markets have been extensively described in the literature on Haiti, and several attempts of classification have been made. Officially, a distinction is upheld between *urban* and *rural* marketplaces. To be classified as urban, a market must be located in a community where there is a communal magistrate (La Gra, Fanfan &

Charleston, 1975: 10). Only urban markets are officially allowed to stay open more than one day a week (Moral 1959: 74), and only urban markets may possess warehouses and speculation posts (Moral, 1961: 240). In 1954, there were 106 urban and 188 rural markets in Haiti (Moral 1959: 74), and in 1975, the corresponding figures were 152 and 367, respectively (La Gra, Fanfan & Charleston, 1975: 7).

The theoretical differences between urban and rural markets are not observed in practice. Of the 188 supposedly rural markets in 1954, 35 were open more than one day every week, and seven of them every day (Moral, 1959: 74). Such discrepancies have led various authors to propose other classifications that better correspond to reality. These according to various criteria establish a hierarchical order of markets. Table 1 shows five such classifications. On the lowest level we find what has been termed local, intraregional, or semi-rural markets. This is the most common type of organized market in Haiti. No less than 426 of the markets in the IICA survey were classified as semi-rural (La Gra, Fanfan & Charleston, 1975: 7).

Although the characteristics of the local or semi-rural marketplace vary somewhat from author to author, some common characteristics emerge. Hence, the local market only touches the locality where it is situated. Its radius of action is limited to one or two kilometers. The trade that takes place there is either between peasant women from the local community or between peasant women and traveling intermediaries (*Madam Sara*) that are bulking foodstuffs to be brought

TABLE 1

Classifications of the Haitian Marketplace System

Author	*1 (highest)*	*2*	*3*	*4 (lowest)*
Paul Moral	sea coast	regional	town	local
Sidney W. Mintz	—	strategic	captured	local
Harold A. Wood	port	interregional	—	intraregional
E. A. J. Johnson	port city	major inland assembly and wholesale	—	local
Jerry La Gra et al	urban	regional	—	semi-rural

SOURCES: Moral (1959: 74-78), (1961: 241-47); Mintz (1960: 51-53); Wood (1963: 130-40); Johnson (1970: 83-92); La Gra, Fanfan & Charleston (1975: 10-13).

into urban areas. The latter also dispose of peasant necessities of urban or imported origin in these markets.

On the next level we find Moral's town markets, and Mintz' captured markets. The main difference between this type of markets and the purely local markets is that more bulking appears to go on on the former level. These markets are also somewhat more advantageously situated than the local markets (which are either points of origin or termini in the marketing process) in that they join plains and mountains or two different mountain ranges, i.e. they join producers and consumers from different economic environments.

Yet another step up the ladder are the regional or interregional marketplaces ("strategic" marketplaces in Mintz' terminology). Their influence extends over a wider area than that of the town markets, in extreme cases across almost the entire country. Larger and more varied quantities of good are bought and sold here. Staples come in from different regions, some of which are bulked by the large number of Madam Sara usually present to be taken into the largest cities, and yet another part is subdivided to be distributed and sold to the local communities in town markets and local markets. Some consumers may also buy directly in these markets to take advantage of the wide range of goods displayed there.

On the highest level in the hierarchy of marketplaces, finally, are the urban markets — the large sea ports and the department capitals. These are the points of final consumption for much of the peasant produce. The transactions that take place in this type of markets are mostly between consumers and middlemen and between different categories of middlemen before the goods reach the final consumer. These markets, if situated on the sea, are also the points where imported peasant necessities reach the country and undergo the first bulk-breaking operations.

The picture that emerges from the above classification of marketplaces is one of an essentially hierarchical system.[6] Most of the trade in this system is *vertical* in nature, i.e. the goods move between different categories of markets rather than between markets belonging to the

[6] E. A. J. Johnson calls this type of market system a *dendritic* system. (Dendrites are processes of a nerve cell extending from the cell body that transmit incoming impulses to the cell body.)

same category. This of course is not to deny that goods move also horizontally, but in principle for an item to move between two markets on the same level of the hierarchy, especially on the lowest level, it must also pass a market which is "above" or "below" these two markets. This, in turn, may be interpreted largely as a consequence of the geographical specialization of the intermediaries.

The *Madam Sara,* in order to develop as tight-knit a network of reliable trading partners as possible tend to stick to a given geographic route, moving upwards and downwards in the hierarchy of marketplaces rather than sideways or in circles. This usually gives them more opportunities of using the same contacts both as buyers and sellers than would horizontal or circular movements that always entail a certain amount of horizontal movements between markets supplying the same type of goods and with consumers with essentially the same needs.

Also when it comes to the special features of the marketing system, our knowledge is rather good. Thus, a great deal of information with respect to regional variation in the prices of different agricultural products exists, though until fairly recently it has not been made available to researchers. For many years data have remained more or less buried in the government organizations which have collected them, but due to the efforts of the IICA project, the best of these price data for the 1965-74 period have been published together with a discussion of their reliability (La Gra, Charleston & Fanfan, 1975; IICA, 1975a, 1975b).

Very little has been done to analyse this price information though. Only a rudimentary beginning has been made by James Johnson and Jerry La Gra (1975), who made use of six products for the 1971-74 period. Their main conclusions were that no significant price differences seem to exist between the three types of marketplaces defined by IICA, and that for each product the geographical price differences were large. Johnson and La Gra finally also identified which marketplaces and regions generally had the higher prices. It must be pointed out, however, that their study is severely limited by the fact that only *average* (yearly) prices were used in the analysis, It is therefore possible that their conclusions need to be revised, or at least qualified, when a more detailed analysis, involving seasonal patterns as well, has been made.

Related to the compilation of price data is also an analysis of the taxation of marketplaces which was carried out by Verdy Duplan and Jerry La Gra (1974), who checked how agricultural goods were taxed in Port-au-Prince. Not surprisingly, their main finding was that the taxation system was totally arbitrary, and that it led to abuses by the tax collectors in the form of highly unequal levies on the intermediaries in a way which created manifest ineffeciencies in the marketing system. This study was highly successful in the sense that it led to the suppression of these taxes by presidential decree in 1974.

The physical movement of goods has been subject to fairly detailed scrutiny, with emphasis, however, on movements to Port-au-Prince, and to a lesser degree, to Cap-Haïtien. Thus, Duplan and La Gra have undertaken two studies of transportation of agricultural products into the two largest cities, Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien. The authors provide information on the mode of transportation used to bring the products into the cities (generally motor vehicles when the distance traveled was large, while the merchandise was as a rule carried on the head when it came from the immediate surroundings), where the products go once inside the urban areas, and during which week-days most intermediaries enter.

Two papers, by Locher (1974) and by Werleigh and Duplan, (1975) respectively, discuss in detail how the goods move inside the cities before they reach the final consumer. Murray and Alvarez (1973) analyze the commercialization chain of a particular commodity — from the producers in a community in the Cul-de-Sac plain to the consumers in Port-au-Prince, and René Dorville (1975a) has made a similar effort with respect to vegetables (produced in a zone near the capital). Girault and La Gra (1975) discuss marketing chains for various products, Verdy Duplan (1975) surveys the marketing system for agricultural inputs, Fatton (1975) covers sisal, and a team from the JWK International Corporation does the same for coffee (1976). None of these studies, however, is concerned mainly with spatial issues. Ira Lowenthal (1974) has checked how different actors involved in marketing understand and utilize the internal marketing system. Lundahl, (1979) finally, provides an overall evaluation of the economic efficiency of the commercialization of coffee and subsistence crops as well as a short account of the transportation system as an obstacle to increased competition in the marketing system.

It is not as easy to sum up the results of the research on the market systems as it is to provide an evaluation of most other spatial

aspects of Haiti's economy. One should, however, not lament this, since the reason simply is that our knowledge with regard to markets is greater than with respect to other areas. The main marketplaces have been identified, and their relationships have been described, even if we do not yet know in detail how and in what quantities goods move from market to market within and between particular regions. What we do have is a good grasp of the competitive aspects of marketing, although existing price data have not yet been analyzed in detail. We also know with some accuracy how the physical distribution of goods takes place, and what the commercialization chains for a number of important goods look like. Thus, in a sense, the topics for future research differ here from what we found in the first two sections. While in the latter, research is still very preliminary and exploratory in nature, when it comes to the marketing system we have often reached a sage where main hypotheses are already formulated and where future research will be able to yield also systematic quantitative data of the sort economists generally prefer to work with.

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL MIGRATION

The last spatial aspect of the Haitian economy to be dealt with in the present survey is migration, which in Haiti takes two forms. On the one hand, people migrate from the countryside to urban areas and in particular to Port-au-Prince. On the other hand, a steady flow of Haitians leave the country permanently or temporarily to make a living abroad.

The directions of the migratory currents are known with a fair degree of accuracy. Migration is not a phenomenon which is new to the country. Georges Anglade (1972, 1974) has described the earliest migratory movements: those taking place in the wake of the independence from French sovereignty in 1804. During the Spanish and French colonial periods, the best areas in terms of soil fertility had been occupied: the coastal plains, the river plains, and the mountain flanks surrounding these plains — basically the Northeast, the plains around Port-au-Prince and Léogâne, and the Cayes area, respectively, all of which were excellently suited to cultivations of sugar and coffee (the latter on the mountain slopes).

After independence, the population of Haiti slowly expanded and established new settlements in less fertile and less accessible areas. The

Plateau Central and other districts which had not been occupied and cultivated to more than a limited extent were now incorporated into the economy. This movement continued through most of the nineteenth century, until during the last quarter of the latter virtually all the arable land was either cultivated or claimed by some owner (Murray, 1977: 410). At this point, new migratory currents were triggered off, while some poor peasants pressed on to marginal lands, others turned back to the areas which had been populated during the days of the colony — to look for jobs in urban areas. Finally, a number of Haitians for the first time began to look for opportunities abroad.

Temporary or permanent emigration has become a major characteristic of contemporary Haitian life. The rise of American domination in the cuban sugar cultivation after 1898 and the subsequent displacement of some Cuban sugar interests to the Dominican Republic created a need for cheap labor during the sugar harvest in these countries, and this demand to a large extent was satisfied by organized or unorganized migration of Haitians for longer or shorter periods.[7] While the exodus of Haitians towards Cuba practically came to a standstill after Castro's rise to power, emigration to the Dominican Republic has continued more or less uninterrupted since the beginning of the present century, in spite of Trujillo's massacre on up to 25,000 Haitians in 1937 and in spite of the fact that the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic has been officially closed most of the time.

In the 1950s, the Bahamas became a third important recipient of Haitian emigrants (Wingfield, 1966: 101-109; Segal, 1975). To serve the rising number of tourists to the Bahamas in the 1950s, unskilled labor was in great demand, and Haitians willingly rushed in to meet this demand. The last two decades have seen a further enlargement of the area of inmigration of Haitians. A number of other Caribbean islands now regularly receive Haitian immigrants (mainly illegally), but also, and perhaps more importantly, the United States and Can-

[7] See Lundahl (1979), Epilogue, for a summary view. Migration to the Dominican Republic is discussed by Moral (1959: 40-41), Wingfield (1966: 96-101), Hernández (1973), Segal (1975), Palmer (1976: 136-44), Díaz Santana (1976) and Zuvekas (1978: 75-76). As of recently, the living conditions of the Haitian cane cutters in the Dominican Republic have been brought to the attention of the UN. (See Anti-Slavery Society (1979).) Studies of the migration to Cuba are scarce. Moral (1961) devotes less than three pages to the issue, and Castor (1971) gives us about as much. Cf. also Wingfield (1966: 93-96).

ada are turning into important endpoints for Haitian migrants. It is thus rather certain that after Port-au-Prince, New York is the largest "Haitian" city in the world.

Altogether, an estimated 0.4 percent of the total Haitian population migrate abroad every year (Lundahl, 1979: 628), though this is believed by some authors to be a gross underestimate. In fact, the magnitudes involved in the migration currents are not known accurately. Estimates of their geographical distribution (summarized in Table 2) are subject to particularly wide margins of error.

TABLE 2

Estimates of Haitians Residing outside the Country

	Country and Year				
Source of Estimate	*Dominican Republic*	*Bahamas*	*Cuba*	*United States*	*Canada*
Schaedel (1962)	18,772 (1950)	—	27,543 (1953)	—	—
Rotberg (1971)	300,000 (1968)	11,000-20,000 (1968)	50,000 (1968)	75,000 (1968)	10,000 (1968)
Díaz Santana (1976)	42,142 200,000 (1970)	—	—	—	—
Dorville (1975: 2)	—	38,000 (197?)	—	—	—
Segal (1975)	100,000 (1975)	20,000 (1975)		200,000 (1975)	15,000 (1975)
Palmer (1976)	—	—	—	21,466	—
Joseph (1976)	300,000-500,000 (1976)	—	—	—	—

SOURCE: Zuvekas (1978), p. 75.

Our knowledge of internal migration currents is not quite as that of movements abroad. Thus, the census figures for 1950 and 1971 indicate that the urban population grew at approximately 4 percent during the 1950s and 1960s, with the capital displaying a growth rate of more than 6 percent per annum (Ahlers, 1978: 2). It also appears as if this high rate of migration into urban districts is a fairly recent phenomenon, while before the 1950s, and especially before 1920, the rural population was much less mobile (Lundahl, 1979: 629).

In examining the motivation for external and internal migration, presumably a distinction must be made between different categories. It has been estimated that some 80 percent of all Haitian professionals were living abroad in the mid-1960s (Rotberg & Clague, 1971: 245) oversupply of qualified manpower, due to a previous decline in real salaries for professionals, and due to the unattractive political conditions prevailing in Haiti at the time (Suvekas, 1978: 73-74). These conditions have, however, subsequently improved, so that today the share of Haitian professionals residing abroad ought to be lower (Zuvekas, 1978: 74).

The great majority of the emigrants and *a fortiori* the migrants from rural to urban districts within the country are, however, not professionals, but rather people with their roots in the peasant community. What causes this group to migrate? Most explanations, or rather hypotheses, offered, one way or another center upon the poverty of rural areas as the main determinant of migration (Lundahl, 1979: 625-34). The existing evidence is, however, not so simple to interpret. Thus, while it appears plausible that perceived differences in incomes between rural and urban districts à la Harris and Todaro (1970) should play an important (perhaps the *most* important) role, one important group of migrants may be those who move to town to get an education, and these elements in turn, frequently come from the better off parts of the rural population (Moral, 1959: 34; Ahlers, 1978).

Another interesting question in relation to migration which so far has not received any satisfactory answer is whether migration from rural areas to Port-au-Prince takes place in steps or directly. A pattern thought to be common is that of a person first moving from the countryside into the nearest town, thereafter to the province capital, and finally to Port-au-Prince. However, the most ambitious study of rural-urban migration so far undertaken, that of Theodore Ahlers, failed to provide definite support for the hypothesis. It rather appears as if the poorer migrants have to bypass the small towns entirely, since they are in immediate need of employment, and this they will probably not find, unless they move to the capital (Ahlers, 1978).

A final topic connected with migration, and one which has hardly received any attention at all, is what impact migration has on the areas left by the migrants and on the urban districts where they end up (except for the highly visible creation of vast slum areas). Of

special interest here are the remittances from Haitians abroad, which are believed to be somewhere in the order of 5 percent of the gross national product — a figure which should be sufficient to help ensure the subsistence of hundreds of thousands of Haitians (Segal, 1975).

CONCLUSIONS

Our survey of spatial economic research on Haiti conclusively shows that we really know very little of the regional and other spatial dimensions of the Haitian economy. In the field of regional economics proper hardly anything — with the exception of three geographical monographs on particular regions — has so far been achieved. The marketing system has been far better researched, although quantitative data to permit tests of the main hypotheses are often lacking. In the field of external and internal migration, finally, we are in an 'intermediate' position. Many of the patterns are known (while others have hardly been researched), but not in much detail, and all attempts at quantification remain utterly uncertain.

There remain many issues which we have not dealt with at all. The most important of these is concerned with systematization of the patchy information on spatial problems hidden in general works on Haiti. Something of this kind has been started in the two works of Anglade cited at the beginning of the present survey. May we hope for a continuation in the future, but on a more ambitious scale?

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