ANTHROPOLOGICA

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Tendances actuelles de la recherche en ethno-biologie

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SUMMARY

This article discusses two orientations on ethnosemantics: ethnobiology and folk biology. In recent years, the folk biology approach has taken on importance and its methodology has become more and more sophisticated. It now presents relevant hypotheses with regard to the evolution of ethnosemantic categories and to the link between these categories and their socio-cultural milieu. The field of folk biology is thus developing an approach of its own which depends less and less on linguistic models.

L'ethno-biologie[1] s'intéresse à trois dimensions précises: la classification, la nomenclature et l'identification des organismes vivants (Berlin 1973: 259). L'étude de la classification porte sur la découverte des principes sur lesquels des classes d'organismes vivants sont naturellement organisées. L'étude de la nomenclature s'intéresse à la description des principes linguistiques qui servent à nommer les classes d'organismes vivants reconnus conceptuellement dans une langue particulière. Finalement l'étude de l'identification se penche sur les caractères physiques utilisés lorsqu'un organisme particulier est inclus dans une classe déterminée.

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[1] Le terme anglais "ethnobiology" réfère au champ d'étude traditionnel à l'intérieur des sciences naturelles. Quant au terme anglais "folk biology", il met davantage l'accent sur l'étude des structures sémantiques. Pour une discussion portant sur cette différence, voir Hunn (1974).

L'ethno-biologie fait partie de l'ethno-sémantique[2] dont elle constitue actuellement une secteur de pointe où la recherche s'avère féconde et prometteuse. Historiquement deux tendances principales s'y sont dessinées. La première, celle de l'ethno-biologie dite traditionnelle, s'est développée à l'intérieur des sciences naturelles et elle s'est avant tout intéressée à la cueillette systématique des noms et des usages populaires des organismes vivants. Depuis les années cinquante, une seconde tendance a mis l'accent sur les structures sémantiques comme telles. Il s'agit en fait de recherches sur les structures discrètes,[3] les structures continues s'avérant plus rares et moins productives à l'exception des travaux effectués par Bright et Bright (1965). L'ethno-biologie à caractère sémantique s'est surtout développée aux États-Unis, principalement à une époque où en Europe les recherches structuralistes prenaient de l'ampleur, la synthèse entre les deux tendances n'ayant jamais été réalisée de manière systématique.[4]

Deux périodes majeures peuvent être distinguées tout au long de l'histoire récente de l'ethno-biologie, lesquelles incluent les deux tendances déjà mentionnées. La première période s'échelonne de 1950 à 1965, et, la seconde s'étend de 1965 jusqu'à nos jours. Fait important à souligner, l'influence de la linguistique connaîtra un sort fluctuant au cours de ces deux périodes. Prédominant dans

[2] L'ethno-sémantique couvre un champ beaucoup plus vaste que l'ethno-biologie. Elle inclut tous les aspects cognitifs tels les travaux portant sur la religion, la parenté, les maladies, etc... Le terme "ethno-sémantique" est parfois considéré comme l'équivalent d'ethno-science, de nouvelle ethnographie ou d'ethnographie de la connaissance (Kay 1970).

[3] L'analyse des structures discrètes a nécessité l'utilisation de trois concepts de base pour décrire les systèmes classificatoires comme tels: le paradigme, l'arbre et la taxonomie. Le paradigme est représenté par une clef dans laquelle une dimension donnée se trouve dans un seul niveau horizontal du diagramme, ce niveau ne contenant qu'une dimension. Un arbre parfait est représenté par une clef dans laquelle il n'y a qu'un seul niveau qui s'applique pour n'importe quelle dimension donnée. Une taxonomie parfaite est représentée par une clef dans laquelle chaque nœud correspond à un lexème. Le paradigme et l'arbre sont logiquement incompatibles mais l'un et l'autre peuvent se retrouver dans une taxonomie. En pratique, le concept de taxonomie est le plus utilisé des trois. Pour une discussion de ces trois concepts, voir Kay (1966).

[4] Dans la *Pensée Sauvage* (1962), Claude Lévi-Strauss mentionne quelques travaux de type ethno-biologique. Cependant le lien entre analyse structurale et analyse ethno-biologique demeure à être établi de manière précise. Les travaux de Bouchard et de Mailhot (1974) constituent un premier essai de synthèse des deux perspectives. Cependant toute synthèse se heurte à des problèmes épistémologiques sérieux.

la tendance dite ethno-scientifique, son rôle a été beaucoup plus effacé à la suite des critiques sévères formulées par Burling (1964), Vayda et Rappaport (1968) et Hunn (1974).

LA PÉRIODE 1950-1965

Deux tendances principales se manifestent clairement au cours de cette période[5]. D'une part, on assiste à la continuation des travaux en ethno-biologie traditionnelle et, d'autre part, on voit se développer une méthodologie ethno-biologique fortement dominée par l'ethno-science. Il convient de noter ici que les travaux de ces deux tendances se développent de manière parallèle sans qu'il y ait échange systématique entre elles. Les travaux d'analyse traditionnels portent principalement sur l'ethno-botanique et sur l'ethno-zoologie. Notons au passage les travaux en ethno-botanique de l'Océanie par Barrau (1950, 1962a, 1962b) et par Haudricourt (1960), en ethno-botanique de la Dominique (Hodge et Taylor 1951), en ethno-botanique navajo (Wyman et Harris 1951, Vestal 1952), en ethno-botanique des Îles Aléoutiennes (Bank 1952), en ethno-botanique karok (Schenk et Gilford 1952), en ethno-botanique des Pinatubos (Fox 1953), en ethno-botanique des Îles Gilbert (Luomala 1953), en ethno-botanique chinoise (Chao 1953), en ethno-botanique quechua (Vargas 1954), en ethno-botanique du Canada français (Rousseau 1955), en ethno-botanique esquimaude (Ostwalt 1957), en ethno-botanique de l'Afrique Centrale (Thomas 1959), en ethno-botanique laotienne (Vidal 1962, 1963a, 1963b), en archéo-ethno-botanique du Nouveau-Mexique (Kaplan 1963) et en ethno-botanique kaguru (Beildelman 1964). L'ethno-zoologie, pour sa part, s'est vue consacrer beaucoup moins de publications. Certains travaux importants méritent d'être soulignés, ceux en particulier touchant l'ethno-zoologie séri, suru et cora (Malkin 1956a, 1956b, 1958, 1962), l'ethno-zoologie pueblo (Beildelman 1956) et l'ethno-entomologie navajo (Wyman et Bailey 1964). Malgré l'indiscutable qualité des travaux réalisés lors de cette première période, il convient de souligner qu'ils n'autorisent guère de comparaisons systématiques portant sur la dimension sé-

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[5] Parmi les travaux d'ordre critique sur cette période, mentionnons ceux de Berreman (1966), de Harris (1968) et de Fournier (1971). Seule la critique de Fournier est pertinente et féconde.

mantique des lexiques obtenus. C'est ainsi que l'on ne peut déterminer s'il existe une logique universelle à partir des données obtenues. De plus des différences méthodologiques touchant la cueillette des termes eux-mêmes empêchent l'élaboration de comparaisons inter-culturelles valables. Soulignons enfin que la variation des termes employés pour désigner les organismes étudiés ne reçoit pas une attention soutenue chez ces chercheurs et qu'aucun effort systématique n'est fait en vue d'expliquer de telles différences.

Quant aux travaux mettant l'accent sur les structures sémantiques comme telles, ils s'avèrent relativement peu nombreux au cours de cette période. L'influence de l'Université de Yale, Conklin en tête, s'est faite profondément sentir (1954, 1957, 1962). L'article de Conklin intitulé "Lexical treatment of folk taxonomies" (1962) a alors joui d'une influence considérable à cette époque. Conklin cherche à y déterminer trois types d'unités de base qui pourraient être identifiées sans équivoque. Ces unités de base sont dénommées "lexèmes", leur signification n'étant pas déduite de leur structure grammaticale. C'est ainsi que l'on obtient les concepts de lexème unitaire et de lexème composé. Le lexème unitaire se présente comme simple ou comme complexe. Le lexème simple inclue des termes tels *oak, pine, dandelion.* Le lexème complexe se retrouve dans des termes tels *poison oak, pineapple, jack-in-the-pulpit.* Quant au lexème composé, il se rencontre dans les formes telles *white oak, pitch pine, Baldwin apple* (Conklin 1962: 122). De plus l'approche de Gonklin vise à délimiter des ensembles signifiants regroupant des unités sémantiques dans des domaines particuliers, cette délimitation étant faite au moyen de concepts tels ceux de contraste et de taxonomie. Au cours de cette première période, Frake (1962, 1964) reprend les mêmes thèmes en rendant plus opératoires les notions de contraste et de taxonomie. De plus, il souligne la nécessité de préciser les concepts de synonymie, de polysémie et d'homonymie.

Tout au long de cette période, l'influence des modèles linguistiques est soit inexistante comme c'est le cas en ethno-biologie traditionnelle, soit, au contraire, très importante comme c'est le cas de la recherche ethno-biologique portant sur les structures sémantiques. En fait, l'ethno-biologie traditionnelle vise à former

des lexiques à entrées simples, toute dimension taxonomique y étant ordinairement excluse[6]. Quant à la deuxième tendance, elle se plaît à copier les modèles linguistiques aussi intégralement que possible (Pike 1954, Chomsky 1955, 1957). Cependant plusieurs objections demeurent sans réponse en ce qui a trait à la classification, à la nomenclature et à l'identification des organismes vivants (Fournier 1971). Au niveau de la classification, il reste à formaliser les concepts de taxonomie et de contraste sémantique définis sommairement par Conklin et Frake. Au niveau de la nomenclature, la terminologie conklienne ne réussit pas à faire l'unanimité chez tous les chercheurs. Au niveau de l'identification, aucun travail d'importance n'est réalisé. Au plan théorique, il ne fait aucun doute que le vide creusé par l'utilisation inconditionnelle du modèle behavioriste ne peut que créer un malaise réel, d'autant plus que la méthodologie de recherche ethno-scientifique a eu tendance à dissocier les structures sémantiques de l'expérience vécue des informateurs.

LA PÉRIODE 1965-1975

Des changements lents et importants s'opèrent en ethno-biologie autour des années 1965 sans que l'on puisse parler pour autant de coupure radicale entre les deux périodes. Les deux mêmes tendances que précédemment se manifestent encore clairement. Cette fois il faut noter l'influence prépondérante de Berlin et de Kay et des autres chercheurs du *Language Behavior Research Laboratory* de l'université de Californie à Berkeley. Durant cette deuxième

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[6] L'ethno-biologie traditionnelle met l'accent sur la cueillette de l'information suivante: le numéro de collection, le nom scientifique, le ou les noms populaires, l'étymologie du nom, le nom de l'informateur, les utilisations du spécimen, l'endroit où l'information a été obtenue, la date de la collection, le nom du collecteur et les autres remarques nécessaires (Gilmore 1932: 326). Castetter note pour sa part que l'ethno-biologiste doit obtenir le maximum d'information sur les organismes étudiés pour parvenir à la conception et à la connaissance de la structure, de la fonction et de la méthode de classification des organismes (Castetter 1944: 168). Cependant, la dimension strictement sémantique ne reçoit pas l'attention nécessaire, la majorité des chercheurs en ethno-biologie traditionnelle s'en tenant à une information générale. En s'appuyant sur les travaux de Goodenough (1957) et de Lounsbury (1956), Conklin souligne la nécessité de s'éloigner des lexiques à entrées alphabétiques simples pour inclure une information sur le statut des lexèmes, sur les catégories auxquelles elles appartiennent et sur leurs attributs, le tout accompagné de chartes et de diagrammes explicatifs (Conklin 1962: 136).

période, les travaux se font de plus en plus nombreux et leur qua-
lité s'accroît de manière évidente, des comparaisons systématiques
pouvant alors être réalisées de manière rigoureuse.

Parmi les travaux les plus récents en ethno-biologie tradi-
tionnelle, notons ceux touchant l'ethno-botanique sibundoy (Bristol
1965), l'ethno-botanique quechua (Marin 1968, Gade 1967), l'ethno-
botanique de l'Océanie (Barrau 1967, 1970), l'ethno-botanique du
sud des Apalaches (Core 1967) et l'ethno-botanique guinéenne
(Portères 1966). Notons aussi les travaux en ethno-zoologie zina-
cantèque (Acheson 1966), en ethno-zoologie du Sahalin du Sud
(Austerlitz 1962) et en ethno-zoologie du groupe Fiore (Diamond
1966). Ces travaux continuent la démarche ethno-biologique tra-
ditionnelle sans toutefois offrir de renouveau méthodologique d'im-
portance.

Quant aux travaux se rapportant aux structures sémantiques
comme telles, il convient de mentionner les travaux de Bulmer
(1965a, 1965b, 1965c, 1968, 1970) et de Bulmer et Tyler (1968)
en ethno-zoologie de la Nouvelle-Guinée. La qualité des observa-
tions et la précision des analyses de Bulmer et de Tyler sont dignes
de mention. Il y a également les travaux réalisés en ethno-botani-
que navajo (Perchonok et Werner 1969), en ethno-botanique
ndumba (Hays 1974), en ethno-botanique des groupes indiens de
la Colombie-Britannique (Turner 1974), en ethno-botanique
quechua (Brunel 1975a), en ethno-icthyologie chinoise (Anderson
1967), en ethno-zoologie Tzeltal (Hunn 1974), en ethno-zoologie
montagnaise (Bouchard et Mailhot 1974). Cependant, Berlin,
Breedlove et de Raven, le premier anthropologue et les deux autres
botanistes ont largement dominé la scène au cours de cette période
grâce au caractère rigoureux et innovateur de leur méthodologie
(Berlin *et al* 1966, 1968, 1973, 1974).

Ethno-biologie versus ethno-science

Lors de cette deuxième période, une distinction fondamentale
se dessine entre ethno-science et ethno-biologie même si les deux
approches ont recours au modèle linguistique de manière systé-
matique. L'ethno-science met une importance considérable sur
l'utilisation d'une méthodologie rigoureusement linguistique (Black
1967, 1968, Black et Metzger 1965, Metzger et Williams 1966).

Une description ethno-scientifique ne devient adéquate sur le plan scientifique que lorsqu'elle rend parfaitement compte des critères imposés par les descriptions linguistiques. Identifié avec la nouvelle ethnographie, ce courant est victime d'une naïveté méthodologique face à la complexité de l'objet qu'elle doit étudier et qu'elle tend à dissoudre par des procédés qui ont l'air de recettes toutes faites.

L'ethno-biologie, pour sa part, s'intéresse à l'histoire naturelle partagée par l'informateur et l'observateur et elle entend obtenir des données à partir de l'observation des espèces biologiques aussi bien qu'au moyen de techniques d'explication inspirées de la linguistique. C'est ainsi que les techniques d'analyse componentielle utilisées lors de la première période perdent de leur importance car elles ne génèrent pas un modèle valable d'interprétation de la réalité psychologique sous-jacente. Selon Hunn, les critères se référant aux taxa obtenus en analyse componentielle sont davantage le produit de formes simples ou d'une gestalt abstraite de chaque image perçue plutôt qu'un ensemble de dimensions discrètes en contraste (Hunn 1974). Il ne fait donc aucun doute que cette distinction entre les deux tendances ne peut que s'accentuer au cours des années à venir.

L'influence des sciences naturelles

Cette période a permis aux sciences naturelles d'augmenter considérablement leur influence sur la recherche ethno-biologique touchant les structures sémantiques. L'ouvrage de Berlin, Breedlove et Raven intitulé *Principles of Tzeltal Plant Classification* (1974) constitue une contribution majeure en ethno-biologie. Composée de deux parties, cette recherche fait état des connaissances ethno-botaniques de la population de Tenejapa de la province mexicaine de Chiapas. La première partie traite des principes généraux de classification et de nomenclature en Tzeltal ainsi que de la méthode de collecte des plantes laquelle inclue des considérations sur leur morphologie et sur leur développement. Les auteurs accordent une importance toute spéciale à la question de la comparaison entre la bio-systématique tzeltal et la bio-systématique linnéenne. Pour ce faire, trois types de correspondance sont alors dégagés. Le premier type appelé "one-to-one correspondence"

porte sur la correspondance d'un terme linguistique à une espèce scientifique. Le second type appelé "under-differentiation" réfère à la situation où un terme linguistique correspond à plusieurs espèces scientifiques. Le troisième surnommé "over-differentiation" se présente lorsque deux ou plusieurs termes correspondent à une seule espèce botanique (Berlin *et al* 1974: 101). Les auteurs y soutiennent que 61% des taxa correspondent aux espèces botaniques scientifiques, un résultat qui coïncide avec ceux de Bulmer et Tyler (1968) et de Bulmer (1970). Dans la seconde partie de l'ouvrage, il est question de la flore elle-même regroupée en fonction des cinq catégories ethno-botaniques qui seront énumérées à la Figure 1, le tout conforme aux exigences des descriptions ethnobotaniques les plus rigoureuses.

Le renouveau méthodologique

Suscité par le *Language Behavior Research Laboratory,* le renouveau méthodologique s'applique principalement au niveau de la classification et de la nomenclature, la question de l'identification ne recevant pas une attention soutenue à l'exception des travaux de Hunn (1970). Au plan de la taxonomie, six catégories ethno-biologiques sont alors suggérées comme universelles: la catégorie initiale, la catégorie supra-générique, la catégorie générique, la catégorie spécifique, la catégorie sous-spécifique, et la catégorie intermédiaire. Ces six catégories ethno-biologiques sont organisées hiérarchiquement et les taxa assignées à chacune d'entre elles sont mutuellement exclusives sauf dans le cas de la catégorie initiale, laquelle ne possède qu'un seul membre.

Si l'on veut comprendre comment ces cinq catégories sont mutuellement exclusives, il convient de distinguer les concepts de taxonomie et de contraste sémantique. Critiquant la conception de la taxonomie définie par Gregg (1954), Kay suggère que la taxonomie doit comporter deux composantes et satisfaire à deux axiomes (1970). La première composante est un ensemble fini T de taxa, chaque taxon étant lui-même un ensemble non-nul, c'est-à-dire un ensemble qui possède des membres. La seconde composante stipule qu'il existe une relation d'inclusion stricte des ensembles laquelle est restreinte aux membres de T. De plus, la taxonomie obéit à deux axiomes. Le premier souligne qu'il existe un membre

FIGURE I

Domaine des plantes en Tzeltal

catégorie initiale Total: 0	non-nommée (?)

catégorie initiale
Total: 0 — non-nommée (?)

catégories supra-génériques
Total: 5 — te' 'ak 'ak' wamal non-affiliées ambiguës

catégories génériques
Total: 471 — 178 24 35 119 97 18

catégories spécifiques
Total: 237 — 80 9 4 10 127 7

catégories sous-spécifiques
Total: 8 — 2 6

(adapté de Berlin *et al* 1974: 37)

FIGURE II

Les quatre types de lexèmes

Lexèmes	primaires	simples ou non-analysables	: érable, lierre, cerisier, fougère.
		analysables	productifs: araignée, plante parapluie. arbre-à-pin, herbe-à-puce, plante
			non-productifs: piment de Noël, cloches du temple, langue de belle-mère, queue de renard.
	secondaires		: fougère de Boston, lierre suédois, érable floriflère, cerisier de Jérusalem.

du T qui inclut chacun des autres membres, celui-ci s'appelant la catégorie initiale. Le second axiome touche le concept de partition lequel stipule que l'on doit placer chaque membre de l'ensemble

dans un seul des sous-ensembles. Quant au contraste sémantique, il est alors défini comme l'ensemble de tous les taxa qui sont précédés par le même taxon. Il s'agit là de définitions beaucoup plus opératoires et logiques que toutes celles fournies jusqu'alors. Au plan de la nomenclature, quatre types de lexèmes sont définis: les lexèmes simples ou non-analysables, les lexèmes primaires productifs, les lexèmes primaires non-productifs et les lexèmes secondaires.

Le lexème primaire comprend la classe des formes unitaires linguistiquement distinctes telles les taxa *érable, cerisier, lierre, fougère.* Le lexème secondaire groupe les expressions comprenant les membres du premier groupe auxquels s'ajoute une forme modifiée v.g. *érable floriflère, cerisier de Jérusalem, lierre suédois, fougère de Boston.* Fait à souligner, les lexèmes primaires sont sous-divisés par la suite en lexèmes non-analysables et lexèmes analysables. Le lexème analysable, à son tour, peut être considéré comme productif et non-productif. C'est ainsi que les termes *arbre-à-pin, herbe-à-puce, plante araignée, plante parapluie* sont rattachés à des catégories supra-génériques telles *arbre, herbe, plante.* Le lexème primaire non-productif pour sa part ne se rattache à aucune catégorie supra-générique comme telle. Des exemples incluent *piment de Noël, cloches du temple, langue de belle-mère, queue de renard.* Il est évident que *piment de Noël* n'est pas une sorte de piment, que les *cloches du temple* ne sont pas une sorte de cloches. Il en va de même pour *langue de belle-mère* et *queue de renard.* Notons que l'on a recours ici à la taxonomie pour distinguer entre les divers types de lexèmes alors que la démarche conklienne conteste cette façon de procéder[7].

Le problème de la variation

À peine esquissé comme problématique lors de la première période, un intérêt très net s'est manifesté pour la question de la variation en ethno-biologie (Gal 1973, Hays 1974, Turner 1974,

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[7] Selon Conklin (1962), il n'existe pas d'isomorphisme entre nomenclature et classification. Selon Kay (1966), les deux ne sont pas strictement séparées. Selon Berlin *et al* (1974), la nomenclature est le guide parfait pour la découverte des structures taxonomiques.

Bouchard et Mailhot 1974, Brunel 1975a, 1975b, 1976). Si l'ethno-biologie traditionnelle n'a pas manqué de souligner la richesse des taxa obtenus d'une région à l'autre et souvent à l'intérieur d'une même région, l'ethno-biologie à caractère sémantique a souvent eu tendance à considérer la variation comme sans intérêt. Si la variation est reconnue comme telle, deux voies deviennent alors possibles. La première dite du plus petit dénominateur commun considère comme représentatifs les taxa partagés par tous les membres d'une communauté. La seconde voie vise à considérer comme légitimes les taxa reconnus par au moins un informateur. On parvient alors à l'union des compétences individuelles alors que dans le premier cas, il est question uniquement de l'intersection des compétences individuelles (Werner 1969: 333). Cependant ces deux approches négligent d'accorder à la variation toute l'importance qui lui revient en construisant des émetteurs-récepteurs idéaux dont les connaissances sont moindres ou dépassent considérablement les compétences de chacun des informateurs (Hays 1974, Brunel 1975a). L'utilisation de modèles probabilistes pourrait permettre de réaliser des progrès substantiels dans ce secteur où l'ethno-biologie a pris un certain retard.

L'évolution des catégories ethno-biologiques

Cette période a vu naître des recherches sur l'évolution des catégories ethno-biologiques. Il faut mettre cette recherche en parallèle avec celle entreprise par Greenberg (1966) sur les universaux et par celle touchant l'évolution des termes de couleur (Berlin et Kay 1969). L'analyse démontre que le vocabulaire a tendance à augmenter avec le temps et que cette augmentation se produit avec des régularités qui permettent certaines généralisations. Notons qu'il s'agit de la mise à jour de certaines régularités et non de la recherche des mécanismes qui causent l'évolution des termes eux-mêmes (Berlin 1972).

Dans l'histoire de chacune des langues, chacune des six catégories ethno-biologiques se trouve dans un ordre fixe. Les termes génériques apparaissent en premier lieu suivis par les termes supra-génériques et spécifiques. Puis viennent les termes intermédiaires et les termes sous-spécifiques et finalement la catégorie initiale, cette dernière n'étant pas présente dans toutes les langues.

FIGURE III

Ordre de développement des catégories ethno-biologiques

Catégorie supra-générique — — — Catégorie intermédiaire

Catégorie
générique

Catégorie
initiale

Catégorie spécifique — — — Catégorie sous-spécifique

Ces six catégories sont des classes ouvertes puisqu'elles permettent l'acquisition de nouveaux taxa à travers le temps, sauf pour ce qui a trait à la catégorie initiale. Dans l'état actuel de la recherche, cette hypothèse n'est pas encore entièrement démontrée. Une des difficultés actuelles réside dans l'absence de documents écrits qui permettraient de reconstituer le développement des catégories ethno-biologiques dans les langues naturelles. De plus, l'absence de données portant sur la classification empêche que des progrès substantiels soient réalisés dans l'étude de l'évolution des catégories ethno-biologiques.

L'importance culturelle des données obtenues

Une des caractéristiques de l'ethno-biologie de la deuxième période réside dans un souci plus prononcé de situer les données obtenues dans leur contexte social. C'est ainsi que la mise en corrélation des plantes avec leur importance culturelle a permis de dégager des résultats fort prometteurs. Ceci est illustré par les travaux de Berlin, Breedlove et Raven qui font figure de pionniers. Afin d'établir cette corrélation, ils suggèrent deux indices: le premier touche la structure interne des termes génériques et le second se réfère à la polytypie des termes génériques.

Le premier indice se manifeste de la façon suivante: les plantes possédant des termes génériques désignés par des lexèmes simples possèdent une plus grande importance culturelle que celles qui sont désignées par des lexèmes productifs et non-productifs. La figure IV tirée de la langue Tzeltal, illustre bien cette hypothèse.

On peut y observer une forte corrélation entre l'importance culturelle des plantes et le type de lexèmes en Tzeltal. On peut

FIGURE IV

Type de lexèmes et catégories d'importance culturelle

Types de lexèmes	Lexèmes simples	Lexèmes non-productifs	Lexèmes productifs	
Importance culturelle				Total
ÉLEVÉE Plantes cultivées	21	5	1	27
↑ Plantes protégées	18	10	7	35
Plantes avec				
↓ importance minimale	49	67	61	177
FAIBLE Plantes sans impor-				
tance culturelle	13	44	85	142
Total	101	126	154	381

(adapté de Berlin *et al* 1974: 98)

noter que 21 des 27 plantes cultivées reçoivent des lexèmes simples alors que 18 des 35 plantes protégées sont désignées par des lexèmes simples. On note que 49 des 177 plantes ayant une importance minimale sont désignées par des lexèmes simples et que finalement seulement 13 des 142 plantes sans importance culturelle sont désignées par des lexèmes simples. On peut observer une forte corrélation entre l'importance culturelle et le type de lexèmes en Tzeltal. En effet, les plantes cultivées reçoivent des lexèmes simples alors que les plantes avec moins d'importance culturelle sont désignées par des lexèmes non-productifs et productifs.

Quant à la polytypie des termes génériques, il convient de souligner que les taxa polytypiques augmentent directement avec l'importance culturelle des plantes (Geoghegan 1973). Ce principe se vérifie dans plusieurs langues dont l'aguaruna, le tzeltal et le quechua.

Le rapport entre expérience vécue et structure sémantique

Le rapport établi entre expérience vécue et structures sémantiques tel que défini par les ethno-biologistes a parfois été pris à partie. C'est ainsi que certains chercheurs en écologie culturelle ont critiqué vivement l'approche ethno-écologique et, par le même biais, l'approche ethno-biologique. À titre d'exemple Vayda et

Rappaport (1968) ont soulevé une double objection touchant le rôle et l'utilisation réelle des structures sémantiques en ethno-écologie. La première objection considère qu'il est impossible d'obtenir des procédures universelles pour étudier les relations à l'intérieur d'un système écologique. De fait l'ethno-biologie n'a jamais prétendu étudier toutes les relations à l'intérieur d'un système écologique mais elle tente de mettre en relief certaines relations d'ordre cognitif qui ont un rôle important à l'intérieur du système en question. Cette première objection oppose à tort l'analyse des systèmes écologiques et la démarche ethno-biologique alors qu'il y a complémentarité entre les deux.

La seconde objection formulée par Vayda et Rappaport touche la présence de fonctions latentes ou inconscientes lesquelles jouent un rôle de premier plan dans l'interprétation scientifique des systèmes écologiques. L'ethno-biologie n'implique pas au point de départ la négation de règles inconscientes, même si elle s'est surtout spécialisée dans la description du niveau conscient à l'intérieur des systèmes écologiques. Sans remplacer les fonctions inconscientes, les règles conscientes doivent être également mises à jour. Les travaux de Harvey Feit en ethno-écologie des Indiens Waswanipi démontrent bien la possibilité d'une telle intégration entre règles conscientes et inconscientes (Feit 1971, 1972).

Perspectives d'avenir

Vu les développements importants survenus au cours de la seconde période, il est possible d'affirmer que la méthodologie ethno-biologique est de plus en plus rigoureuse et permet des comparaisons systématiques entre les divers travaux. L'ethno-biologie traditionnelle continue de se développer en suivant ses méthodes et techniques mais en marge de l'approche sémantique.[8] Quant à

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[8] Les travaux en biosystématique ne manquent pas d'influer sur le courant ethno-biologique. Les travaux de Burma sur la réalité, l'existence et la classification touchant le concept d'espèce méritent d'être soulignés (1954). La recherche de Bartlett sur l'histoire du concept de genre, (1940), celle de Cain sur le rôle de la mémoire et de la logique dans la classification linéenne et sur les méthodes post-linéennes (1958, 1959a, 1959b, 1959c), ceux de Mayr sur la définition du concept d'espèce (1957a, 1957b) et ceux de George G. Simpson sur la taxonomie (1961) ont beaucoup influencé le courant ethno-biologique.

l'ethno-biologie à caractère sémantique, elle a clarifié ses concepts de base et a permis l'élaboration d'une méthodologie rigoureuse. Elle s'est débarrassée d'un carcan trop axé sur la linguistique[9] et sur le modèle behavioriste afin de permettre à la fois l'intégration des structures sémantiques et de l'expérience vécue, cela malgré des objections de toutes sortes dont celles de Vayda et Rappaport. Quant aux milieux où l'ethno-biologie s'est développée, il convient de remarquer que ce sont les sociétés agraires qui ont été favorisées. Cette lacune devrait se corriger au cours des recherches à venir. Il ne fait aucun doute que seules des analyses effectuées dans des sociétés de collecteurs-chasseurs et dans des sociétés industrielles permettront de faire la preuve du caractère universel des découvertes touchant la classification, la nomenclature et l'identification des espèces biologiques. C'est là que se situera à long terme le test véritable de l'ethno-biologie.

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[9] L'utilisation de modèles de décision pourrait être utile dans une telle démarche. Pour l'utilisation des modèles de décision dans un contexte ethnosémantique, voir Geoghegan (1968, 1969, m.s.).

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The Political System and Aggression: A Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis of Cross-Cultural Variables

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RÉSUMÉ

On a fait l'hypothèse que l'ouverture sociétale et l'intégration politique sont les variables les plus susceptibles de permettre de prédire l'agression. Une analyse de regression multiple a été faite sur les données de 44 sociétés. L'ouverture sociétale est la variable clé pour prédire trois aspects de l'agression (ethnocentrisme, l'antagonisme à l'intérieur du groupe, et la guerre) et la quatrième meilleure variable pour prédire l'agression par l'humour. L'intégration politique est la meilleure variable pour prédire l'agression par l'humour et la deuxième meilleure variable pour prédire l'ethnocentrisme. Les autres variables indépendantes utilisées sont la socialisation, la structure familiale, la stratification et les croyances surnaturelles.

Several cross-cultural studies have demonstrated relationships between social structure and the expression of aggression. Some of these studies have shown that child-rearing practices are related to the expression of aggression, while others have shown that social-structural variables such as family organization, level of political integration, and the economy affect aggression. Yet other studies have developed more complex models which show that social-structural variables affect patterns of child-rearing, which in turn affect the expression of aggression. One study (Bolton 1973) has taken a sociobiological approach and has shown that the Andean Quolla, who are a very aggressive society, are hypoglycaemic.

Child-Rearing and the Expression of Aggression

Whiting (1959a: 184) has shown for a sample of 31 societies that low indulgence during infancy is related to fear of ghosts (p < .01), and that for low indulgence societies severe socialization concerning the expression of aggression is related to fear of ghosts at funerals. Boram (1973) argues that hostile child-rearing patterns among the Kutchin Athabascan Indians causes quarrelling and aggressiveness. Lambert, Triandis, and Wolf (1959: 164-5) for a sample of 62 societies have shown that all of the following variables are related to aggressive supernaturals (p < .05): pain from nurturing agent; training for self-reliance and for independence; punishment for dependence and low self-reliance; children's behavior is self-reliant and independent; pressure for self-reliance and independence; low nurturance; and rigidity in child-rearing (measured by the total scores for punishment). Otterbein and Otterbein (1973: 1679) for 20 caretakers in the Bahamas bringing up 48 children and grandchildren, verified Lambert, Triandis and Wolf's hypothesis that those who most fear the supernatural are those who rely on painful childrearing methods. Triandis and Lambert (1961: 643) have shown for a sample of 60 societies that verbal aggressiveness is related to frequent sacrifice to the gods (p < .02). Bacon, Child, and Barry (1963: 295) found for 48 societies that theft was related to concern to socialize children to be responsible, self-reliant, obedient, and achievement-oriented, and crimes against the person were related to concern to make children independent.

Family Structure, Child-Rearing, and the Expression of Aggression

Several direct relationships between family structure and the expression of aggression have been recorded. Bacon, Child, and Barry (1963: 294) showed that exclusive mother-child sleeping arrangements were correlated with theft and crime against the person and interpreted crime in this context as an attempt to express a thwarted masculine identity. LeVine (1962: 41-44) found that societies with polygamous households maximize jealousy between co-wives and thereby produce a belief in sorcery (sorcery being interpreted as a form of aggression).

The Political Structure and the Expression of Aggression

Otterbein and Otterbein (1965: 1476-8) took 129 societies both in the HRAF and Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas and studied the first fifty societies with the most information. In societies with a low level of political integration, war and internal feuding tend to be associated. In societies with a high level of political integration, war and feuding are inversely related, and this finding is interpreted as evidence for control of feuding by a central political authority wishing to reserve aggressive energies for external warfare. Cohen (1961: 351-386) has argued the concept of inalienable friendship occurs in societies with closed and highly solidary communities. Whiting (1950) has similarly shown that belief in sorcery (viewed as the imputation of aggressive motives to others) occurs in societies with no delegation of authority for punishing crime. Obeyesekere (1976) argues that resort to sorcery occurs in Ceylon where the local institutional structure does not punish offences. Bacon, Child, and Barry (1963: 296) showed that politically integrated societies with complex social controls had fewer crimes against the person.

Aberle has advanced the following reason why political integration should promote the inhibition of aggression within a society, and why the absence of political integration should promote the expression of aggression (1961: 395-6):

> Bands, which lack any clear-cut authoritative structure, and tribes, which consist of small territorial units cross-cut by sodalities or clans, but lacking either strong local authority or overarching authority above the local unit, are likely to have well-developed systems of reciprocity. Chiefdoms, where there is some centralized authority but no ultimate central control of legitimate use of force, and pre-industrial states, where legitimate use of force is the property of the government, are the domain of various redistributive systems. ... In tribes and bands, two conditions normally prevail: individuals are highly interdependent and leaving the group is difficult, or family units are relatively autonomous and egress is easy. With no central control of aggression, the former situation seems to promote inhibition of aggression; the latter permits or encourages it. If this impression is correct, the aims of socialization with respect to aggression should vary with these conditions.

The following hypotheses may, therefore, be stated:

> (1) In a closed society, where there is little chance of escaping the bonds which bind the individual to the society, or of surviving

physically outside the society (especially in geographically isolated areas), child-training will emphasize the inhibition of aggression against in-group members. High socialization anxiety will be incurred over the expression of aggression in childhood and adult life.

(2) Socialization anxiety will be projected in the form of fear of others, ghosts, and spirits.

It may be expected, therefore, that in a closed society in-group antagonisms will typically be settled by quasi-legal means or formal restitution. If such societies do not permit the direct, physical expression of aggression, then if the aggression is not abreacted in some way, it may be expected that it will find outlet in verbal form, especially in jokes with hidden malice, a method of cloaking aggression in a non-physical form. If such societies also frequently experience high socialization anxiety concerning sex as a disruptive element in a closed in-group, aggression may also be disguised in the form of sexual jokes. In an open society, on the other hand, warlike behavior will be more frequent. In-group antagonisms will often be expressed in violence. There will be less expression of aggression in the form of jokes with strong sexual overtones or hidden malice, but rather jokes for taunting and open ridicule, or those dependent upon physical abuse will be more common. There will be relatively less fear of others; and fear will less likely be displaced onto ghosts and animal spirits.

The third hypothesis therefore, is:

(3) In closed societies there will be less expression of physical aggression towards in-group members than in open societies, and jokes will have sexual overtones or connote hidden malice; whereas in open societies jokes will be concerned with taunting, ridicule or physical abuse.

An example of each of the two kinds of societies, drawn from the Human Relations Area Files and Whiting and Child, may well be appropriate at this point in order to indicate the kind of data necessary for the confirmation of the hypotheses. The Abipone of the Gran Chaco are an example of a fairly open society. They have a very loose form of political integration, and they come into contact with other societies within the large land area thay they inhabit. The function of the *cacique* or leader is not that of a judge or permanent focus of authority, but that of a war chief.

It is he who decides when war is to be made and when to collect recruits for the purpose of war. If the warriors feel that the *cacique* is not sufficiently warlike, they may well beat him for his lack of aggressiveness. The degree of political integration is, in fact, so loose that warriors may even refuse to fight in a particular battle. The Abipone seize on the smallest insult as an occasion for war, and women are warlike. The old women who, in addition to an official juggler, are the augurs for war, will tend to fight over which of their predictions concerning the outcome of battle is correct. They have, moreover, a low aggression socialization anxiety index (7 on Whiting and Child's scale ranging from 0 to 24). Their humour is without sexual overtones and is not directed with malice toward other members of the in-group. Thus the Abipone are an open society with low aggression socialization anxiety who express their aggression directly.

A good example of a historically closed society is the Ainu, closed both by virtue of political structure (it was dependent on the Japanese political system) and for ecological reasons (it was possible for them to migrate to other small islands, which they had done in the past, but not out of their area). There has been only one war in their recorded history, which was fought against the Japanese and involved fishing rights. Both the Japanese and the Russians tried to make the Ainu warlike, the Japanese encouraging them to attack the Russians and vice versa. The Japanese were so surprised when an Ainu actually killed a Russian on Sakhalin Island that he was made a samurai and permitted to wear a sword. In general, however, Japanese attempts to train the Ainu in bow and arrow warfare failed. The Ainu were rated by Whiting and Child as high on aggression socialization anxiety (16 on a scale ranging from 0 to 24); and disputes were settled under the aegis of a judge who usually decided that a fine be paid to the offended party. If, however, the matter was very serious, the judge might decide to allow the offended party to hit the guilty one on the hip with a club until blood was drawn. It was very rare for serious injury to occur in this formal restitution. The Ainu, therefore, may be described as a closed society, high on aggression socialization anxiety, who do not express hostility directly against either the in-group or the out-group.

The Sample

The sample is composed of all those societies in Whiting and Child (1953: 48-9) which were also in the Human Relations Area Files and in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas (1967). Whiting and Child's sample was chosen because each society in it had been rated by two expert psychologists on an aggression socialization anxiety index and the authors qualified their judgements by also indicating three degrees of confidence in their findings. However, their sample is biased because they took the 65 societies from the (then) Cross-Cultural File and 10 others for which the most data was available. Whiting and Child have also compiled ratings of fear of others, fear of ghosts, and fear of animal spirits for each of the societies in the sample. Murdock's "World Ethnographic Sample" and "Ethnographic Atlas" provide ratings of the societies on structural factors such as family type, political organization, and type of economy. The Human Relations Area Files were used to compile the data on aggression and humour.

Of the seventy-five original societies in Whiting and Child, nine were dropped either because the authors indicated that socialization ratings had low inter-coder reliability or aggression socialization anxiety ratings were not reported. Twenty-two societies were dropped because there was insufficient information on aggression or joking in the HRAF. Thus, forty-four societies were retained which occurred in each of the HRAF, Whiting and Child, and Murdock.

Coding

Where variables were coded from the HRAF (Table 2), the codings were done independently by the two researchers. Sentences were copied indepently to support each coding. Where codings disagreed, the sentences were compared and a further independent search of the HRAF was made and the item recoded. If agreement was not reached, the literature both cited in the HRAF and elsewhere was searched. Initial agreement on codes was 73%.

Measurement of the Independent Variables

Political Integration was measured using Murdock's ratings in the "World Ethnographic Sample". Murdock classified societies

as Autonomous Communities (if their population was less than 1,500), as Minimal States (population above 1,500 but less than 10,000), States (with a centralized control of the legitimate use of force), Dependent Societies (those which were part of a larger society and which were politically dependent on it), Peace Groups (societies which met only to make peace, and had no other supra-governmental structure than that), and as Societies without Political Integration.

Societal Openness was measured using the Human Relations Area Files which were searched under the headings 133 (Topo-graphy) and 167 (Immigration and Emigration). Societies were grouped into closed (physically by mountains, deserts or seas; *and* closed to emigration); intermediate physically closed *or* closed to emigration); and open (physically open *and* emigration possible).

Extended Familialism was measured because it was hypo-thesized that polygynous or polygamous households could be a source of conflict in the society due to inter-spouse conflicts. Using the codings in Murdock's *Ethnographic Atlas* (1967), the societies were classified into *either* polyandrous and polygynous (independent sororal, independent non-sororal either residing in the same or separate dwellings); *or* independent nuclear families, large extended families, small extended families, or minimal extended or "stem" families in which monogamy was the general practice and polygyny was at best an occasional practice.

Patrilocality was measured as it was hypothesized that the residence pattern could similarly affect the possibility of intra-societal conflict and tension, and, following Murdock (1967: 118) the sample was grouped into either uxorilocal, matrilocal, neolocal, ambilocal, and no common household established; or patrilocal, virilocal and avunculocal.

Subsistence technology was measured as it has been argued by Lenski (1970: 177-8, 247, 270-2) that there are major differences in degree of stratification between societies with different subsistence technologies, and he has proposed that in hunting and gathering societies there is more equality and smaller differences in value orientations then in agrarian societies where there are marked inequalities, aristocrats may despise peasants, and tension-producing value discrepancies are general between social classes.

The sample was then classified using Murdock's codings (1967) into either hunting and gathering and shifting agriculture; or intensive horticulture and intensive agriculture.

Stratification was measured for the same reason as Agriculture. Following the codings by Murdock (1967), the sample was classified into either no stratification and stratification based only on age grades; or complex stratification (three or more classes or castes exclusive of slaves), hereditary aristocracy, and stratification based on wealth.

Dependent Variables

Fear of other human beings and fear of spirits were both measured by Whiting and Child (1953: 263-5 and 286) on a scale ranging from 0 (low) to 6 (high). For each society these two scores, individually arrived at by the two psychologists, were combined to give a possible score of 12, and were then summed to give an over-all index of fear of others (ranging from 0 to 24).

Fear of ghosts was similarly measured by each psychologist on a scale ranging from 0 to 6, as was also fear of animal spirits. Whiting and Child did not combine these last two scales. For the purpose of the present paper, however, they were combined to form a scale of fear of ghosts and animal spirits; which, when the scores of the two raters for each scale had been added together, yielded a scale ranging from 0 to 24.

Warfare[1], in-group antagonism, and ethnocentrism were coded as in Table 1.

Humour was measured using the following scale (Table 1): joking mainly for fun and without sexual overtones was coded

[1] Malinowski (1941: 522) has proposed that warfare be classified according to a sixfold scale reflecting the nascent aims of the tribe-state, but this is an index of increasingly complex and organized forms of primitive warfare, and does not correspond to the peacefulness-bellicosity continuum sought in the present study.

Speier (1941) classifies wars as absolute, instrumental, or agonistic. Absolute wars are those in which the enemy is seen as sub-human, his rites and customs sacrilegious, and is a threat to the enemy society. War is then fought à l'outrance and with treachery. Instrumental war is fought to gain possessions. Agonistic warfare is carried on with chivalry. But this typology does not correspond to a bellicosity-peacefulness continuum sought for this study, as instrumental war could equally be conducted in an aggressive or non-aggressive manner.

TABLE I

INDICES OF AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR

HRAF Categories Searched	Index of Aggressive Behaviour	Code
	I. *Warlike Behaviour*	
702 Recruiting and Training	Little or no warlike behaviour	1
721 Instigation of War	Warfare primarily for defense or because of economic necessity	2
726 Warfare	Warfare because of direct provocation (e.g. bride-stealing, encroachment of boundaries,	
728 Peacemaking	insults), for plunder, for the glory of the common soldier, or for the power and prestige of the group	3
	II. *In-Group Antagonism: Mode of Settlement*	
578 In group antagonism	Largely legal settlement or formal restitution	1
	Low degree of personal aggression allowed (antagonism often resolved through argument)	2
	Medium degree of aggression (much verbal insult and/or limited physical violence permitted)	3
	High degree of aggression allowed (frequent resort to physical violence)	3
	III. *Ethnocentrism: Treatment of the Out-Group*	
186 Ethnocentrism	Little or no verbal or physical abuse of out-group individuals	1
	Low degree of aggression (e.g. insulting names used for out-group members)	2
	Medium degree of aggression (i.e. much verbal insult and limited physical abuse)	3
	High degree of aggression (i.e. frequent physical abuse of out-group members)	4
	IV. *Humour**	
522 Humor	Jokes mainly for fun	1
	Jokes with strong sexual overtones, involving insult, veiled malice, or disapproval	2
	Jokes for taunting and ridicule, or those consisting of physical abuse and pranks	3

* If more than one form of joking was common, the higher rank was assigned.

(1), as this form of humour seemed to express little or no indirect aggression; joking with sexual overtones and jokes with especial malice or insult directed towards an individual was coded (2) as a mode of expressing moderate aggression; and jokes for taunting and ridicule, or those involving physical pranks and abuse, were considered the most aggressive and were coded as (3). An institutionalized joking relationship was not regarded as automatically indicating a particular degree of aggression, although it did, of course, draw attention to a focus of tension in the society.

Results for Political Organization, Aggression Socialization Anxiety, and the Projection of Aggression

Hypothesis No. 1:
There was a direct relationship between societal closedness and socialization anxiety over aggression ($r = 0.36$, $p < 0.01$, $df = 37$), but no relationship was found between level of

TABLE II

FOUR ASPECTS OF AGGRESSION: CODINGS BASED ON THE HRAF

Society	World Ethnographic Sample Culture Area	Ethnocentrism	Index of Aggression		
			In-Group Antagonism	Humour	Warfare
World Ethnographic Sample Ethnographic Region: Africa					
Chagga	NE Bantu	1	3(4)	1	3
Thonga	Southern Bantu	1(2)	4(3)	1	3
Dahomeans	Guinea Coast	1	1(2)	2	3
Ashanti	Guinea Coast	2	4	1	3
Tiv	Nigerian Plateau	2	1(3)	3	3
Masai	Upper Nile	4	4	3	3
Azande	Eastern Sudan	2	1	1(2)	3
World Ethnographic Sample Ethnographic Region: Circum-Mediterranean					
Lapps	NE Europe	1	1	1	1
World Ethnographic Sample Ethnographic Region: East Eurasia					
Ainu	Arctic Asia	1	1	1	1
Lepcha	Himalayas	1	1(2)	1	1
Andamanese	Indian Ocean	1	2	1	2(3)
Tanala	Indian Ocean	2	1	2	3
Lakher	Assam and Burma	1(2)	2(1)	2(1)	3

Society	World Ethnographic Sample Culture Area	Ethnocentrism	Index of Aggression		
			In-Group Antagonism	Humour	Warfare

Society	World Ethnographic Sample Culture Area	Ethnocentrism	In-Group Antagonism	Humour	Warfare
World Ethnographic Sample Ethnographic Region: Insular Pacific					
Bali	Western Indonesia	2(1)	1(2)	1(2)	1
Dusun	Western Indonesia	1(2)	3(4)	2	3
Alorese	Eastern Indonesia	1	2	3	3(1)
Murngin	Australia	4	4	1(2)	3
Yungar	Australia	3(2)	1	1	3
Wogeo	New Guinea	3	3	3	2(3)
Kiwai	New Guinea	3	2	1	3
Marshallese	Micronesia	1	2(3)	1(2)	2(1)
Palaung	Micronesia	1	1	1	1
Manus	Western Melanesia	3(4)	2	3	3(1)
Trobrianders	Western Melanesia	2	2(3)	2	2(3)
Dobuans	Western Melanesia	4(2)	3(4)	3	3
Ontong-Javanese	Western Polynesia	1	1(3)	2	2(3)
Samoans	Western Polynesia	1(2)	1(3)	1(2)	1
Tikopia	Western Polynesia	2	1	2(3)	1
Pukapukans	Western Polynesia	2	2	2	1
Maori	Eastern Polynesia	3(2)	2	1(2)	3(1)
Marquesans	Eastern Polynesia	2	2	1(2)	3(1)
Ifugao	Philippines and Formosa	2	4	2	3
World Ethnographic Sample Ethnographic Region: North America					
Comanche	Plains	4	4	3	3
Teton	Plains	4	4	3	3
Taos	Southwest	2	1	1	2
Hopi	Southwest	4(2)	1	3	1(2)
Navaho	Southwest	3(2)	2	1	3
Zuni	Southwest	2	2	1	3(1)
Papago	Northwest Mexico	2	1	1	2
Omaha	Prairie	2	3	2	3
Kutenai	Great Basin and Plains	1	2	1	1
World Ethnographic Sample Ethnographic Region: South America					
Siriono	Interior Amazonia	1(2)	2	1(2)	1
Jivaro	Interior Amazonia	4	3	1	3
Abipone	Gran Chaco	2(3)	4	1	3

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* Codes in parentheses are other possible codes for other periods of the society's history (e.g. the Maoris had both peaceful and warlike periods), or codes possible if particular sentences in ethnographies are stressed. The researchers achieved 73% agreement on first coding and complete agreement on final coding.

political integration and socialization anxiety over aggression
(r = 0.09, N.S., df = 37).

Hypothesis No. 2:
In regard to socialization anxiety over aggression being
projected as fear of others, ghosts and spirits, the hypothesis
is only confirmed for fear of animal spirits (r = 0.41, p <
0.005, df =37).

*Results for Political Organization, and the Expression of Aggression
in War, In-Group Antagonism, and in Joking*

Hypothesis No. 3:
The third hypothesis predicts that open societies and those
with a low level of political integration will express considerable
aggression towards members of the in-group, and that joking
will take the form of taunting, ridicule, or physical abuse rather
than consisting of sexual jokes or hidden malice.

Table 3 shows that the hypothesis is supported in the case
of societal openness, with partial correlations with ethnocentrism
of 0.46, with aggression in humor of .34, and with warfare of .35,
although there was no correlation with in-group antagonism.[2] For
political integration, the hypothesis is supported for two of the four
dependent variables, with partial correlations of —.33 for ethno-
centrism, and —.44 for aggression in humour.

Another approach to the study of the expression of aggression
is to ask which variables best predict the various expressions of
aggression. The statistical technique best suited for this purpose
is stepwise multiple regression.[3] With this technique a computer
programme constructs a regression equation, using as the first

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[2] It is not a tautology to perform correlations of societal openness with
the indices of aggression, as even though a society may be in the closed
category, it has some neighbours with whom they have traded or carried on
at least defensive warfare.
[3] Multiple regression is regarded in most statistics texts as requiring in-
terval data. Of particular relevance to anthropological data is a demonstration
by Labovitz (1970) that widely differing ordinal scoring systems intercorrelate
so highly that little error is introduced by treating ordinal data with powerful

ṁdependent variable entered in the equation that variable with the largest zero-order correlation with the dependent variable. Subsequent independent variables are added to the regression equation in declining order of their contribution (multiple R^2) to explaining the variance in the dependent variable. The computer programme stops adding variables to the regression equation when the variance explained (R^2 change) declines to an arbitrary small level (1%).

Tables 4-7 show that societal openness is the best predictor of three of the four dependent variables, namely ethnocentrism,

TABLE III

ZERO-ORDER AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS OF SOCIETAL OPENNESS AND LEVEL OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION WITH MODE OF EXPRESSION OF AGGRESSION

| | Mode of Expression of Aggression | | | |
	Ethnocentrism	In-Group Antagonism	Humor	Warfare
SOCIETAL OPENNESS				
Zero-Order	.39**	.47***	.28*	.35**
	df=37	df=38	df=37	df=39
Partial@ (df=22)	.46**	.30(p < .08)	.34*	.35*
POLITICAL INTEGRATION				
Zero-Order	—.37**	—.25*	—.40**	—.10
	df=37	df=38	df=37	df=39
Partial@ (df=22)	—.33*	—.04	—.44**	.08

* p = .05   ** p = .01   *** p = .001

@ Controlling for Aggression Satisfaction Potential, Aggression Socialization Anxiety, Fear of Human Beings, Fear of Spirits, Fear of Ghosts, Fear of Animal Spirits, Extended Familialism, Patrilocality, Agriculture, and Stratification. When Societal Openness was the independent variable, Level of Political Integration was introduced as an additional control; and when Level of Political Integration was the independent variable, Societal Openness was introduced as an additional control. N is less than 44 as information for some variables is not available.

interval statistical techniques. He generated 20 scoring systems randomly on a computer with scores ranging from 1 to 10,000 conforming to a monotonic function. These scoring systems, when applied to 36 occupations classified by NORC prestige scores (ordinal rankings) correlated very highly with each other. Of 190 correlations, all were .90 or better, and 157 were .97 and better.

in-group antagonism, and warfare, and the fourth best predictor of aggression in humour. Political integration is the best predictor of the remaining dependent variable, aggression in humour and the second best predictor of ethnocentrism. The eleven independent variables are able to explain the following percentages of the variance (Multiple R^2) in these dependent variables: aggression in humour (48%); in-group antagonism (47%); ethnocentrism (39%); and for warfare a disappointing 24%. Thus 76% of the variance in the occurrence of warfare is not explained by these variables, social psychological variables have little explanatory role[4], and future research should focus on political and economic variables.

TABLE IV

STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF SELECTED INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES AGAINST ETHNOCENTRISM

Independent Variables in Order of Stepwise Multiple Regression	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change*	Zero-Order Correlation
Societal Openness	.39	.15	.15	.39
Political Integration	.51	.26	.10	—.37
Patrilocality	.54	.29	.03	.12
Fear of Spirits	.56	.32	.03	—.01
Agriculture	.57	.33	.01	—.04
Fear of Animal Spirits	.59	.34	.01	.37
Aggression Satisfaction Potential	.60	.36	.02	.12
Fear of Human Beings	.61	.37	.01	.20
Extended Familialism	.61	.38	.01	—.11
Stratification	.62	.38	.00	—.06
Fear of Ghosts	.62	.39	.01	.02

* R^2 change does not decline smoothly in this and subsequent tables due to statistical rounding.

[4] It may be of help to future researchers to know that these psychological variables from Whiting and Child explained less than 1% of the variance in any aggression variable: future studies should focus more on political and economic aspects of cross-cultural aggression. Satisfaction Potential (oral, anal, sexual, dependence): Socialization Anxiety (oral, anal, sexual, dependence); age at weaning; age at beginning toilet training, modesty training, heterosexual play inhibition, independence training; explanations of illness (oral, anal, sexual, dependence, aggression); performance therapy (oral, anal, sexual, dependence, aggression); avoidance therapy (oral, anal, sexual, dependence, aggression). Aggression and Fear variables were good predictors of the aggression indices.

TABLE V

STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF SELECTED INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES AGAINST IN-GROUP ANTAGONISM

Independent Variables in Order of Stepwise Multiple Regression	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Zero-Order Correlation
Societal Openness	.47	.22	.22	.47
Patrilocality	.60	.36	.14	—.37
Fear of Spirits	.64	.40	.04	—.29
Agriculture	.65	.42	.02	—.35
Fear of Human Beings	.66	.44	.02	.18
Fear of Ghosts	.67	.45	.01	—.15
Aggression Satisfaction Potential	.68	.45	.00	—.15
Political Integration	.68	.46	.01	—.25
Extended Familialism	.68	.46	.00	—.19
Stratification	.68	.47	.01	—.21
Aggression Socialization Anxiety	.68	.47	.01	—.21

TABLE VI

STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF SELECTED INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES AGAINST AGGRESSION IN HUMOR

Independent Variables in Order of Stepwise Multiple Regression	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Zero-Order Correlation
Political Integration	.40	.16	.16	—.40
Patrilocality	.48	.23	.07	.20
Fear of Human Beings	.57	.32	.09	—.15
Societal Openness	.63	.40	.08	.28
Fear of Ghosts	.65	.42	.02	—.20
Fear of Spirits	.66	.43	.01	—.06
Extended Familialism	.67	.45	.02	—.21
Aggression Socialization Anxiety	.68	.46	.01	—.06
Agriculture	.68	.46	.00	—.08
Fear of Animal Spirits	.68	.47	.01	.05
Aggression Satisfaction Potential	.69	.49	.01	.17
Stratification	.70	.48	.01	—.13

TABLE VII

STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF SELECTED INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES AGAINST WARFARE

Independent Variables in Order of Stepwise Multiple Regression	Multiple R	Multiple R^2	R^2 Change	Zero-Order Correlation
Societal Openness	.35	.12	.12	.35
Aggression Satisfaction Potential	.37	.14	.02	.18
Aggression Socialization Anxiety	.42	.18	.04	—.07
Fear of Ghosts	.46	.21	.03	.09
Fear of Human Beings	.47	.22	.01	.13
Stratification	.48	.23	.01	—.06
Fear of Spirits	.48	.23	.00	—.06
Fear of Animal Spirits	.49	.24	.01	—.06
Political Integration	.49	.24	.00	—.10
Agriculture	.49	.24	.00	—.17
Patrilocality	.49	.24	.00	—.03
Extended Familialism	.49	.24	.00	—.15

Discussion

It has been shown that closed societies have the highest socialization anxiety over the expression of aggression. We argue that this is because in a closed society the expression of aggression must of necessity occur mainly towards in-group members, and therefore, must be carefully controlled through socialization in infancy if the group is to survive. Open societies, however, need be less concerned about socializing their members to limit the expression of their aggression, as targets for the expression of aggression can be found in either verbal or physical attack on members of out-groups. This approach is confirmed by the findings related to the third hypothesis which showed that open societies felt freer to express aggression towards out-group members, towards members of the in-group (presumably because any tension generated by in-group aggression can be abstracted by projecting the aggression on out-group members at crucial times), and in aggressive humour towards in-group members.

Another political variable, political integration, appears to have a different effect on the expression of aggression. It has been shown that societies with high political integration control the expression of aggression, whether towards members of out-groups, towards the in-group, or towards the in-group in the form of aggressive humour. Otterbein (1970: 22-29) has shown that the more centralized a society, the less likely war can be initiated by any member of the community, the more likely it is to be conducted by professionals, and to involve subordination. Otterbein (1968: 287) has commented that "a strong relationship between war and the absence of feuding was found in centralized political systems... Apparently officials in centralized political systems interfere to prevent the development of feuding only when the society is engaged in war..." (cf. also Otterbein and Otterbein 1965: Table 13,1478). We argue similarly that not merely do politically integrated societies limit aggression in the form of feuding, but they also limit expressions of ethnocentrism, in-group antagonisms, and aggressive humour directed towards the in-group.

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Migration chez la population indienne de la Baie James: une étude de cas *

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SUMMARY

This study attemps to look at the migration behaviour of the Indian population in the James Bay area. The data used here are taken from a demographic survey carried out in 1968 in six villages located around James Bay: Moosonee, Fort Albany, Attawapiskat, Moose Factory, Rupert House and Fort George. Using place of survey and place of last previous residence, it is possible to estimate migration streams from one village to another. The main conclusion is the strong north-south direction of migration.

INTRODUCTION

La Baie James, longtemps ignorée, est devenue depuis quelque temps une région qui soulève beaucoup de discussions, de débats et d'émotions. L'intervention gouvernementale récente dans cette région a certes modifié la vie des populations cris qui y habitent. Pour un sociologue ou un anthropologue, l'étude de cette population ne peut plus dorénavant ignorer les effets de cette intervention extérieure. Sans savoir qu'un jour la Baie James allait devenir une préoccupation nationale, nous avons entrepris en 1968, grâce à des subventions des Missionnaires Oblats et du Conseil des Arts, une enquête socio-démographique auprès de la population indienne de 6 villages situés sur les deux côtés de la Baie James.

Certains résultats ont déjà fait l'objet de publications et concernent d'une part la méthodologie de l'enquête[1] et, d'autre part, les niveaux et les facteurs de la fécondité[2] de même que la réaction du comportement procréateur devant la modernisation[3].

Devant ce tourbillon actuel d'activités dans cette région, il n'est pas inutile de prendre un certain recul et de retourner environ sept ans en arrière pour voir comment ces populations réagissent devant leur situation économique et sociale d'alors. Plus particulièrement, nous allons examiner leur comportement migratoire, conscient que ce comportement s'avère très symptomatique de la situation économique et sociale d'un groupe. Les questions fondamentales auxquelles nous pouvons tenter de donner réponse sont: les Indiens se déplacent-ils beaucoup et où vont-ils? Les données utilisées ici souffrent de plusieurs limites: elles ne sont représentatives que des six villages enquêtés et les nombres sont parfois petits. Il s'agit donc d'une étude de cas restreinte mais qui fournit quand même une indication intéressante sur les mouvements migratoires des populations indiennes enquêtées *avant* l'intervention dramatique des gouvernements[4].

SOURCE DES DONNÉES ET DÉFINITIONS[5]

Les données utilisées ici proviennent d'une enquête socio-démographique effectuée dans la région de la Baie James durant l'été

[1] Victor Piché et Anatole Romaniuk, "Une enquête socio-démographique auprès des Indiens de la Baie James: 1968", *Anthropologica,* Vol. XIV, n⁰ 2, 1972, pp. 219-230. Voir Département de démographie, Collection de tirés-à-part, n⁰ 27.

[2] Anatole Romaniuk, "Procreative Behaviour of a Small Native Indian Community in Canada", Communication présentée au Congrès annuel de la Population Association of America, New York, avril 1974.

[3] Anatole Romaniuk, "Modernization and Fertility: The Case of the James Bay Indians", *Revue canadienne de sociologie et d'anthropologie,* Vol. II, n⁰ 4, pp. 344-359.

[4] Le retard dans la publication de nos résultats n'est dû qu'à un manque de fonds. Nous tenons à souligner que malgré les sommes énormes, pour ne pas dire incroyables, investies dans les aspects *techniques* du développement de la Baie James, sommes dont une grande partie est donnée à des firmes étrangères, la Société de Développement de la Baie James n'a pas cru bon de fournir à deux chercheurs de chez nous une somme aussi modique que ridicule pour terminer leurs travaux. Voilà une bonne indication du grand intérêt que l'on porte aux aspects humains du développement!

[5] Pour plus de détails, voir Victor Piché et Anatole Romaniuk, *op. cit.* (ci-dessus note 1).

de 1968. Le questionnaire utilisé couvre cinq domaines: la composition du ménage, la fécondité, l'histoire matrimoniale, la migration et la mortalité. L'enquête a eu lieu dans six villages indiens, trois de chaque côté de la Baie James: du côté ouest, Moosonee, Fort Albany et Attawapiskat; du côté est, Moose Factory, Fort Rupert et Fort George. La population totale enquêtée s'élève à 2678 individus dont 2323 (1128 hommes et 1095 femmes) font l'objet de notre étude sur la migration (en fait, ce total exclut les visiteurs).

L'analyse présentée ici se fonde sur deux questions provenant de la première section du questionnaire, soit, la composition du ménage[6]. Les deux questions sont: 1) depuis combien de temps l'individu réside-t-il dans le village; et 2) quelle était sa dernière résidence antérieure? Les réponses à ces questions fournissent les données de base pour estimer les volumes et les flux migratoires en utilisant deux méthodes différentes.

Il s'agit en fait d'examiner la migration interne telle que vécue par la population indienne des six villages enquêtés. Pour les fins de la présente étude, une migration est définie comme un changement de résidence (de village) à l'intérieur de la Baie James. Un immigrant est quelqu'un qui vient d'un autre village alors qu'un émigrant est quelqu'un qui a quitté son village de dernière résidence. Le solde migratoire net est donné par la différence entre l'immigration et l'émigration; ce solde peut être nul, positif (un gain pour le village) ou négatif (une perte pour le village).

MÉTHODES D'ANALYSE

Deux techniques d'analyse sont utilisées ici. D'abord, la technique de la "dernière résidence antérieure"[7] permet d'identifier les personnes ayant vécu ailleurs dans le passé: ce sont les migrants (y compris les migrants-à-vie et les migrants de retour). La procédure d'estimation de la migration consiste essentiellement à classer la population selon la dernière résidence antérieure et la résidence actuelle (voir tableau 1). L'absence d'une référence tem-

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[6] La section "migration" du questionnaire n'est pas encore exploitée.
[7] Pour plus de détails voir: United Nations, *Methods of Measuring Internal Migration*, Population Studies, no. 47, New York, 1970, p. 18.

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porelle précise constitue la limite la plus importante de cette approche. La deuxième technique d'estimation s'applique aux données sur la durée de résidence[8]. Dans ce cas, les migrants comprennent tous ceux qui se sont déjà déplacés, y compris (i) ceux qui sont nés en dehors du lieu d'enquête et (ii) ceux qui sont nés dans le lieu d'enquête mais qui, à un moment ou l'autre, ont changé de résidence (les migrants de retour). La valeur principale de cette approche vient de l'information additionnelle sur la localisation dans le temps du dernier déplacement. Les données fournies par l'approche durée de résidence donnent la distribution des immigrants à vie selon la date de leur dernière arrivée au lieu d'enquête, ou, en d'autres mots, un classement par cohortes de migrants: à une période spécifique de durée de résidence correspond en fait une période d'immigration. Par exemple, dans notre étude, nous utiliserons trois périodes de durée de résidence:

Durée de résidence	*Période d'immigration correspondante*
Moins de 5 ans	1964-1968
De 5 à 9 ans	1958-1963
10 ans et plus	1957 et avant

En interprétant les données de ce type, il ne faut pas oublier que les migrants dans ce cas représentent les survivants des cohortes réelles qui ont migré dans la période en question. Deux facteurs ont décimé ces cohortes: une ou des migrations subséquentes et la mortalité.

MÉTHODE DE LA DERNIÈRE RÉSIDENCE ANTÉRIEURE

Le tableau 1 donne le classement de la population indienne selon le lieu de l'enquête et la dernière résidence antérieure.

Le nombre d'immigrants est donné en soustrayant du nombre total de personnes résidant dans le village d'énumération (totaux horizontaux) ceux dont la résidence actuelle et la dernière résidence antérieure coïncident (les non-migrants selon notre définition). Le nombre d'émigrants s'obtient en soustrayant des totaux

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[8] United Nations, *op. cit.,* p. 14-15.

TABLEAU I

Population indienne selon la résidence au moment de l'enquête et la dernière résidence antérieure, les deux sexes réunis, Baie James, 1968.

Résidence actuelle	Dernière résidence antérieure						Total
	Moosonee	Moose Factory	Fort Albany	Fort Rupert	Attawa- piskat	Fort George	
Moosonee	234	12	76	9	58	0	389
Moose Factory	2	335	31	58	3	3	432
Fort Albany	1	4	209	0	26	0	240
Fort Rupert	0	0	1	361	0	0	362
Attawapiskat	11	1	3	0	292	0	307
Fort George	0	1	0	3	1	588	593
Total	248	353	320	431	380	591	2323

verticaux ceux dont le village d'origine est le même que le village d'enquête. Le solde migratoire net est la différence entre les immigrants et les émigrants. Les résultats sont présentés au tableau 2 pour toute la Baie James et pour chacun des six villages.

Étant donné que seules les migrations entre les villages enquêtés sont retenues (les autres seront considérés plus loin), il va de soi qu'une immigration dans un village de destination est une émigration d'un village d'origine. Pour l'ensemble de la région, le solde migratoire net doit être égal à zéro. Bref, ce qui nous intéresse ici c'est le volume et les directions des migrations entre les six villages en question.

Selon le tableau 2, il y aurait en tout un total de 304 migrants, soit 13.1% de la population enquêtée. Deux villages, Moosonee et Moose Factory, ont des soldes migratoires positifs importants (+141 et +79 respectivement)[9]. Tous les autres ont des soldes soit négatifs (Fort Albany, Fort Rupert et Attawapiskat), soit presque nuls (Fort George). Par ordre d'importance, c'est Fort Albany qui subit la perte la plus importante (—80), suivi d'Attawapiskat (—73) et de Fort Rupert (—69).

[9] Le chiffre pour Moose Factory est légèrement sous-estimé: voir la section sur les "autres migrations".

Il est intéressant de savoir d'où les villages d'accueil reçoivent leur population et, vice versa, où les villages perdants envoient leur

TABLEAU II

Immigrants selon le lieu d'origine, émigrants selon le lieu de destination et migration nette, population indienne de la Baie James, les deux sexes réunis, 1968

Lieux d'enquête	Lieux d'origine et de destination						Total
	Moosonee	Moose Factory	Fort Albany	Fort Rupert	Attawa-piskat	Fort George	
Baie James							
Immigrants	155	97	31	1	15	5	304
Émigrants	14	18	111	70	88	3	304
Migration nette	+141	+ 79	— 80	— 69	— 73	+ 2	0
Moosonee							
Immigrants	—	12	76	9	58	0	155
Émigrants	—	2	1	0	11	0	14
Migration nette	—	+ 10	+ 75	+ 9	+ 47	0	+141
Moose Factory							
Immigrants	2	—	31	58	3	3	97
Émigrants	12	—	4	0	1	1	18
Migration nette	— 10	—	+ 27	+ 58	+ 2	+ 2	+ 79
Fort Albany							
Immigrants	1	4	—	26	0	0	31
Émigrants	76	31	—	3	1	0	111
Migration nette	— 75	— 27	—	+ 23	— 1	0	— 80
Fort Rupert							
Immigrants	0	0	1	—	0	0	1
Émigrants	9	58	0	—	0	3	70
Migration nette	— 9	— 58	+ 1	—	0	— 3	— 69
Attawapiskat							
Immigrants	11	1	3	0	—	0	15
Émigrants	58	3	26	0	—	1	88
Migration nette	— 47	— 2	— 23	0	—	— 1	— 73
Fort George							
Immigrants	0	1	0	1	3	—	5
Émigrants	0	3	0	0	0	—	3
Migration nette	0	— 2	0	+ 1	+ 3	—	+ 2

population. Pour cela, il faut examiner chacun des villages séparément (voir tableau 2). D'abord Moosonee: ce village reçoit des migrants de tous les villages. En fait, c'est Fort Albany (+75) et Attawapiskat (+47) qui perdent le plus dans l'échange avec Moosonee: ils représentent respectivement 53% et 33% de la migration nette vers Moosonee.

Moose Factory aussi gagne dans l'échange migratoire avec tous les autres villages sauf Moosonee où le solde est négatif (—10). C'est Fort Rupert qui perd le plus de migrants: il en envoie 58 et n'en reçoit aucun. Quant à Fort Albany, le seul solde migratoire positif concerne l'échange avec Attawapiskat (+23). Enfin, Attawapiskat et Fort Rupert perdent des migrants en faveur de tous les autres villages.

Fort George fait exception aux tendances décrites ci-haut. En effet, ce village frappe par son caractère fermé avec ses 5 immigrants et ses 3 émigrants. Il semble bien que les Indiens de Fort George se déplacent à peu près pas.

Certes, un certain nombre de déplacements ont eu lieu sans qu'ils ne concernent les villages enquêtés.

Le tableau 3 montre qu'il y a eu en tout 141 déplacements qui originent des autres villages à l'intérieur de la Baie James et

TABLEAU III

Immigrants selon le lieu d'enquête et la dernière résidence antérieure classifiée comme "autre à l'intérieur" et "autre à l'extérieur" de la Baie James, 1968

Lieux d'enquête	Dernière résidence antérieure		Total
	Autre à l'intérieur	Autre à l'extérieur	
Moosonee	16	39	55
Moose Factory	70	25	95
Fort Albany	19	1	20
Fort Rupert	16	3	19
Attawapiskat	15	0	15
Fort George	5	6	11
Total	141	74	215

74 dont l'origine se situe à l'extérieur de la Baie James. Les migrants venant de l'extérieur de la région viennent surtout du sud (Timmins, Cochrane, Matagami, etc.). Comme c'est la migration interne qui nous intéresse surtout, il faut donc tenir compte des migrants venant des villages situés à l'intérieur de la Baie James. Or, Moose Factory semble sérieusement affecté par ces déplacements: 70 immigrants proviennent d'autres villages, soit 42% de tous les immigrants. Quant à Fort Rupert, alors qu'il ne reçoit qu'un seul migrant de Fort Albany, il en reçoit 16 des autres villages non enquêtés. Un examen des villages d'où viennent ces migrants à Moose Factory a montré que 63% provenaient de Eastmain et 18% de Paint Hills[10], deux villages au nord de Moose Factory. Étant donné la direction nord-sud très prononcée des déplacements, ces 70 immigrants peuvent en fait représenter des gains nets, ce qui donnerait un solde migratoire net d'environ +149, un chiffre plus comparable à celui de Moosonee (+141).

Une façon de récapituler l'analyse précédente est d'exprimer la matrice migratoire en terme relatif, c'est-à-dire en calculant des "rapports de migration". Certes, il existe un problème spécial dans le calcul de ces rapports, associé au fait que pour chaque déplacement (numérateur) il existe deux régions — l'origine et la destination (dénominateur). En ce qui nous concerne, nous allons calculer des rapports d'immigration et d'émigration en utilisant comme dénominateur la population de chaque village. Ainsi, pour un village "i", l'immigration est la somme de tous les courants "entrant" (M.i) et l'émigration la somme de tous les courants "sortant" (Mi.). Les rapports sont calculés comme suit:

— immigration: $\dfrac{M.i}{Pi}$ x 1000   (Pi = population du village i au moment de l'enquête)

— émigration: $\dfrac{Mi.}{Pi}$ x 1000   (Pi = population du village i au moment de l'enquête)

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[10] Comme le village de Paint Hills a été fermé, il s'agit en fait d'une migration forcée à sens unique, c'est-à-dire avec l'impossibilité d'y retourner. Si ce biais peut affecter l'interprétation de l'échange entre Paint Hills et Moose Factory, il n'affecte pas l'interprétation générale compte tenu du petit nombre de cas en cause.

Deux remarques sur ces rapports: (1) nous n'incluons ici que les échanges migratoires entre les six villages; et (2) ces rapports doivent s'interpréter comme un indice de l'impact relatif de l'immigration et de l'émigration sur chacun des villages.

TABLEAU IV

Rapports d'immigration et d'émigration*, population de la Baie James, 1968 (pour 1000 habitants)

Lieux d'enquête	Rapports (%)	
	Immigration	Émigration
Moosonee	398.4	36.0
Moose Factory	224.5	41.7
Fort Albany	129.2	462.5
Attawapiskat	2.8	193.4
Fort Rupert	48.8	286.6
Fort George	8.4	5.0

* Voir texte pour définitions.
Source: Tableau 1 pour les dénominateurs et
        Tableau 2 pour les numérateurs.

Selon le tableau 4, les résultats présentés plus haut deviennent encore plus apparents. Moosonee et Moose Factory ont les plus hauts rapports d'immigration et les rapports d'émigration les plus faibles (en excluant Fort George). Fort Albany possède le plus haut rapport d'émigration (462.5 pour mille).

RÉCAPITULATION

Neuf observations se dégagent des analyses précédentes:

a) *Volume*

1 — Moosonee et Moose Factory sont les seuls villages gagnants en terme de migration nette.

2 — Fort George fait figure de village fermé, ne donnant ni ne recevant presque aucune personne.

3 — Les 3 autres villages perdent leur population en faveur de Moosonee et Moose Factory.

4 — D'une façon générale, environ 78% des personnes (y compris les "autres migrations") n'ont jamais quitté leur village.

b) *Directions*

5 — Le principal village d'origine pour Moosonee est **Fort Albany** et pour Moose Factory, **Fort Rupert**.

6 — Moose Factory reçoit également plusieurs migrants de Eastmain et Paint Hills (voir note 10).

7 — Bref, les déplacements ont lieu dans une direction exclusivement nord-sud: Attawapiskat vers Moosonee; Fort Rupert, Eastmain et Paint Hills vers Moose Factory.

8 — Il est frappant de constater qu'il n'existe aucune migration inter-côte: Moosonee sert de milieu d'attraction par excellence pour les Indiens de la côte ouest alors que Moose Factory remplit la même fonction pour ceux de la côte est de la Baie James.

9 — Comme Moose Factory est situé en Ontario, le Québec perd de sa population indienne au profit de l'Ontario.

MÉTHODE D'ESTIMATION PAR LA DURÉE DE RÉSIDENCE

Avant de tenter une interprétation des résultats obtenus avec la technique de "la dernière résidence antérieure", il est possible d'ajouter une autre dimension de la migration en exploitant les réponses à la question sur la durée de résidence des immigrants. Cette information permet de localiser dans le temps le moment de la dernière migration. En effet, les courants migratoires observés jusqu'à maintenant ne tenaient pas compte de la dimension temporelle: ces courants peuvent être très anciens ou au contraire très récents.

Le tableau 5 donne le nombre et le pourcentage d'immigrants selon le village d'énumération et la durée de résidence. Dans l'en-

TABLEAU V

Distribution des migrants selon le lieu d'énumération
et la durée de résidence, Baie James, 1968

Lieux d'énumération	Moins de 5 ans	Durée de résidence 5-9 ans	10 ans et plus	Total
Moosonee	64 (31.1)	64 (31.1)	78 (37.9)	206 (100)
Moose Factory	72 (37.9)	44 (23.2)	74 (38.9)	190 (100)
Fort Albany	10 (16.4)	5 (8.2)	46 (75.4)	61 (100)
Attawapiskat	12 (40.0)	2 (6.7)	16 (53.3)	30 (100)
Fort Rupert	9 (56.2)	2 (12.5)	5 (31.2)	16 (100)
Fort George	6 (42.8)	1 (7.1)	7 (50.0)	14 (100)
Total	173 (33.5)	118 (22.8)	226 (43.7)	517*(100)

* Ce total comprend tous les migrants, y compris ceux qui viennent des "autres" villages ou de l'extérieur de la Baie James.

semble, 44% des migrants vivent dans leur village depuis au moins dix ans: en d'autres mots, ils ont migré avant 1958. Ensuite, 23% ont migré durant la période 1958-1963 alors que 33% sont des migrants récents (1964-1968). Il est intéressant de constater que les villages perdants, surtout Fort Albany et Attawapiskat, ont reçu la plupart de leurs migrants il y a au moins 10 ans. Par contre, plus de 60% des migrants vers Moosonee et Moose Factory y sont arrivés au cours des dix ans précédant l'enquête. Bref, un peu plus de 50% de tous les migrants se sont déplacés dans la décade 1958-1968 indiquant ainsi un mouvement migratoire relativement récent.

ESSAI D'INTERPRÉTATION

Les données de l'enquête exploitées ici ne permettent pas d'aller au-delà de la mesure. Il est toutefois possible de tenter une interprétation des résultats sur la base de sources indirectes d'information telles que les observations faites sur le terrain et les interviews informels. Une conclusion s'impose parmi toutes les autres: la prédominance de Moosonee et Moose Factory comme

points d'attraction dans la direction nord-sud des courants migra-
toires. Qu'est-ce qui explique cette migration à sens unique?
Pourquoi Moosonee et Moose Factory exercent-ils autant d'attrac-
tion sur les migrants? Enfin, pourquoi les Indiens de la côte est
préfèrent-ils Moosonee et ceux de la côte ouest Moose Factory?

Géographiquement, on aurait pu s'attendre à plus d'échanges
entre Moosonee et Moose Factory. En effet, ces deux villages ne
sont séparés que par une très courte distance de canot sur la ri-
vière Moose. Donc, théoriquement, les deux villages auraient pu
constituer un centre combiné d'attraction. Une hypothèse est à
rejeter, celle des frontières entre l'Ontario et le Québec. Si les vil-
lages d'émigration de la côte ouest sont tous situés en Ontario
et ceux de l'est situés au Québec, les deux villages d'immigration,
eux, sont situés en Ontario. Donc, les migrants en direction de
Moose Factory doivent de toute façon traverser la frontière, alors
pourquoi ne pas se rendre jusqu'à Moosonee? Une hypothèse
plausible pourrait être le facteur religieux. Historiquement, il
semble y avoir eu une division du territoire, l'Église catholique
se réservant la côte ouest (Ontario) et l'Église anglicane la côte
est (Québec), y compris Moose Factory. Selon notre enquête,
presque tous les Indiens d'Attawapiskat, Fort Albany et Moosonee
se sont déclarés catholiques alors que Fort Albany et Moose
Factory sont le fief des anglicans.

En 1968 du moins, il était frappant de constater comment la
vie sociale des Indiens des villages de Attawapiskat, Fort Albany
et Moosonee était centrée autour de la mission catholique. D'ail-
leurs à Attawapiskat par exemple, les seuls bâtiments en dehors
des habitations des Indiens étaient la Compagnie de la Baie d'Hud-
son, l'hôpital catholique, l'église catholique et la résidence des mis-
sionnaires. On peut peindre le même portrait de Fort Albany.
Quant à Moosonee, l'Église catholique, en plus d'un petit hôpital,
y a installé son archevêché. Par contre, Moose Factory a été évan-
gélisé par les missionnaires anglicans. Ainsi, il semble que Moosonee
reçoit la partie catholique de la population alors que Moose
Factory reçoit la contrepartie anglicane. Là où la plus grande
partie des activités, qu'elles soient religieuses ou sociales, sont
centrées autour de l'église (films, bingos, etc.), il n'est pas éton-
nant que le facteur religieux joue un rôle important, non pas tant

dans la décision de migrer, que dans le choix du lieu de destina-
tion.

Comment expliquer maintenant que Moosonee et Moose
Factory siphonent les villages du nord? On peut faire l'hypothèse
qu'il s'agit d'un phénomène de concentration des ressources dans
les deux villages. Les villages situés plus au nord se caractérisent
par leur pauvreté et leur manque d'activités économiques et ré-
munératrices: la source principale de revenus de ces populations
est fournie par l'assistance gouvernementale. De plus, dans la
plupart de ces villages, il n'existe pas d'écoles, sinon une école du
niveau primaire. Par contre, à Moosonee et Moose Factory, plu-
sieurs facteurs d'attraction existent. D'abord les possibilités d'em-
ploi sont plus grandes: travail de construction, le chemin de fer,
la base aérienne, la mission catholique, les hôpitaux, les écoles,
les touristes durant l'été, la compagnie de la Baie d'Hudson, etc.
Il faut toutefois ajouter que dans bien des cas, ces possibilités de-
meurent limitées dans la mesure où les "Blancs" du sud se sont
appropriés les emplois les plus rémunérateurs, laissant le "cheap
labor" autochtone s'occuper des travaux moins importants (et
moins intéressants). Enfin, il semble que Moosonee soit devenu
le centre (genre de métropole) des activités pour les Indiens du
nord de la Baie James: il ne faut pas oublier que Moosonee est
le point de contact avec le monde extérieur avec lequel il est lié
par le chemin de fer qui d'ailleurs s'arrête là.

CONCLUSION: MIGRATION ET DÉVELOPPEMENT

En 1968, les estimations des volumes migratoires dans les six
villages enquêtés sur les deux côtes de la Baie James montrent
que 519 personnes étaient classées comme immigrants, soit 20%
de la population indienne enquêtée. Ce pourcentage est relative-
ment élevé compte tenu qu'il comprend aussi les hommes et les
femmes de moins de 15 ans. Les courants migratoires s'effectuent
presqu'exclusivement du nord au sud, les Indiens du côté ouest
se dirigeant vers Moosonee et ceux du côté est se dirigeant vers
Moose Factory. Selon les premières indications fournies par le
questionnaire migration (non exploité ici), il semble bien que la
migration soit familiale plutôt qu'individuelle et que la cause en

soit surtout économique (recherche du travail rémunérateur). Toutefois, selon nos observations sur le terrain, les emplois à Moosonee et à Moose Factory sont rares, les "bons" emplois étant bien sûr réservés aux "Blancs". Pourquoi les Indiens continuent-ils à migrer vers ces centres? Quelques hypothèses peuvent être avancées: 1) les villages d'origine sont tellement démunis que les facteurs de répulsion l'emportent sur les facteurs d'attraction; il faut dire que ces villages d'émigration (Attawapiskat, Fort Albany, Fort Rupert) sont très isolés, surtout pendant l'hiver, et les moyens de communication demeurent le canot à moteur ou l'hydravion pour les plus fortunés; 2) Moosonee et Moose Factory sont de gros villages qui offrent plusieurs services: écoles, hôpitaux, loisirs, contacts avec le sud (grâce au chemin de fer et à l'aéroport de Moosonee), etc.

Malgré tout, il n'est pas certain que le déplacement vers le sud améliore la condition des migrants. En 1968, les conditions de logement à Moosonee étaient comparables aux situations de bidonville que l'on rencontre dans plusieurs villes du Tiers-Monde. Même en faisant abstraction du "projet du siècle" du gouvernement actuel, on pouvait déjà prévoir en 1968 une accélération du mouvement migratoire vers le sud. Certes, la génération plus âgée se sentait condamnée à sa condition de dépendance étant donné son manque de qualification professionnelle et son incapacité à parler la langue des Blancs (cette hypothèse est fondée encore une fois sur les réponses à une question concernant les intentions de migrer et les obstacles à la migration). Mais il était bien évident que la majorité des jeunes tentaient de sortir de cette situation de dépendance: un grand nombre fréquente les écoles secondaires du Sud (Cochrane, North Bay, Matagami, etc.) et la plupart ne reviendront plus habiter dans leur village natal.

Le projet d'aménagement hydro-électrique dans la Baie James produira certainement un impact sur les volumes et les courants migratoires dans cette région. Toutefois, compte tenu du peu de cas que l'on a fait de la population indienne, les retombées risquent d'être minimes pour elle. Plusieurs hypothèses mériteraient l'attention des chercheurs: 1) le projet hydro-électrique va augmenter la situation de dépendance de la population indienne; 2) les Indiens, par leurs déplacements importants vers les centres d'amé-

nagement, fourniront une main-d'œuvre à bon marché et constitueront le prolétariat de la Baie James; enfin 3) les conditions de vie des migrants indiens ne s'amélioreront pas significativement et on risque d'assister à la construction d'autres bidonvilles-à-la-Moosonee.

En terminant, il est difficile de ne pas faire un rapprochement entre le processus migratoire dans la Baie James et celui des populations de plusieurs pays sous-développés: l'exode des villages, l'attraction des centres urbains, la constitution de bidonvilles, chômage urbain, etc. Mais ce ne sont là que des symptômes d'une situation de dépendance où les décisions cruciales en matière de développement sont prises à l'extérieur du groupe et le plus souvent au détriment de celui-ci. Le rapprochement doit donc aller plus loin: il concerne également la conception même du développement. Dans les deux cas, les projets de développement, conçus et financés de l'extérieur, mettent l'accent sur les aspects techniques (aménagement hydro-électrique, forage de puits, etc.), la population affectée par ces projets devant les subir sans pour autant jouir des bénéfices. La conception capitaliste du développement fait donc ses ravages, non seulement dans les pays sous-développés, mais aussi dans les "enclaves" sous-développés des pays soi-disant développés et modernes. C'est là tout un projet de recherche.

Cognitive Processes in Navigation: the Pacific and the Mississippi

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RÉSUMÉ

Les descriptions de la navigation dans le Pacifique par Thomas Gladwin sont comparées à celles de Mark Twain portant sur le Mississipi. La similitude essentielle des processus à l'œuvre dans les deux cas est expliquée par les caractéristiques de la pensée dans les sociétés traditionnelles. On suggère des conséquences possibles de cette analyse dans le domaine de l'éducation.

Thomas Gladwin, in his interesting and thought-provoking article "Culture and Logical Process", explores the ways of navigation in the Pacific island of Truk as compared with those of modern European navigators. In his book "East is a Big Bird" he returns to this subject at greater length and gives a detailed description of the ways of navigation as learned and practiced in another island in the same area, Puluwat. By means of investigating the ways of navigation in these islands, Gladwin tries to uncover the processes of thinking characteristic of the Pacific navigator, and reflected in his ways of learning and action. The purpose of Gladwin's study, as stated in the opening pages of his book, and again in chapter 6, was to use the knowledge gained to throw new light on the problem of class-differences in cognitive functioning. By describing navigation as it is studied and practiced in the Pacific, Gladwin shows clearly that behavior which is undeniably intelligent, such as finding the way to distant islands and back,

can be the outcome of cognitive processes essentially different from those accepted in the West. Gladwin contends that this fact has important implications for the education of lower-class children in modern industrial societies.

Looking, as Gladwin says in his introduction, "to another culture for perspective on processes which are at work in our own", is common procedure in anthropology. In this article I shall try to show, that this other culture is not necessarily located at the far corners of the earth. Sometimes it may be found quite near to home. In his book, Gladwin mentions "the Mississippi river pilots of Mark Twain's day" (E, p. 152)*; it is but a fleeting allusion to an expressive image used by Twain. But happening to re-read Mark Twain's "Old Times on the Mississippi" after having read Glawin's "East is a Big Bird", I was struck by the close resemblance, in general as well as in many details, between navigation in the Pacific and on the Mississippi. It may be interesting as well as profitable to compare Gladwin's descriptions to those of Mark Twain.

Before starting on a point by point comparison of the two descriptions, it will be useful to mention some of the differences between the two texts. Gladwin is an anthropologist; he went to Puluwat to study the theory (not the practice) of native navigation, and his book is a systematic description written according to the standards of scientific composition. Mark Twain's text is a work of literature. He wrote it for a wide public, intending to recall the glories of the past, when huge steamboats carried freights and passengers along the Mississippi, guided by the sure hand of the pilot. Stress is given to the action, to the practice of piloting. But as the description is quite detailed, most of the points in Gladwin's book can be matched by similar ones mentioned by Mark Twain, as is shown in the following table.

As the table shows, the study of navigation and its practice, as well as the basic cognitive processes involved in them, are essentially the same, despite the great difference in cultural setting

* The following abbreviations will be used: C — Gladwin's "Culture and Logical Process"; E — Gladwin's "East is a Big Bird"; MT — Mark Twain's "Old Times on the Mississippi".

and period (Mark Twain wrote his description in 1875). Of course, there are some differences; part of them are to be explained by the difference between navigation on the open sea and on a river.

A COMPARISON OF PACIFIC AND MISSISSIPPI NAVIGATION ACCORDING TO GLADWIN AND MARK TWAIN

	Pacific	*Mississippi*
Reliance upon a large body of organized knowledge	Formal lectures on shore: "navigation stars, star courses, wave systems and navigation when tacking" (E, p. 203). *Difference:* inclusion of esoteric knowledge, such as mythical, sea-marks, thought important although useless in practical seafaring (E, p. 130).	All learning on board, but besides seeing and doing, presentation of rules in short lectures, e.g. on the height of banks, effects of a rising of the water-level (MT, pp. 29-32).
Learning by listening	"most of the instruction was verbal" (E, p. 138).	(MT, passim).
Learning by doing	As Gladwin did not actually learn to navigate (E, p. 141), there is no description of performance. But obviously, "a slight increase or decrease in pressure on the steering paddle" (C, p. 171) can only be learned through guided practice.	The master-pilot: "...'Stand by — wait — wait — wait ... *Now* cramp her down! Snatch her! snatch her!' He seized the other side of the wheel and helped to spin it around..." (MT, p. 23).
Use of study-aids	Employment of charts and diagrams of stars and islands, made of pebbles on the sand (E, p. 129).	Use of a note-book to help in memorizing lists of names and facts (MT, p. 13, p. 16a).
Memorization the central part of the learning process	"Formal instruction ... demands that great masses of factual information be committed to memory" (E, p. 128).	"There is only one way to be a pilot, and that is to get this entire river by heart. You have to know is just like ABC" (MT, p. 13).

	Pacific	*Mississippi*
— memory of details	The navigator has to know by heart the stars, their positions and courses, the shapes of waves, the look of reefs in light and shadow, the habits of homing birds used for location of islands (E, pp. 130, 140, 197). He should be able to "rattle off the stars both going and returning between that island and all the others" (E, p. 131).	The pilot had to learn every name and every detail in the river and on its banks; to know the form of each bend and bar and the location of every sunken wreck (MT, pp. 10-16 d). He should be able to "reel off a good long string" of names of islands, towns, bars, etc. along any stretch of the river (MT, p. 17).
— great mass of information	Knowledge of all the special marks for 55 different searoutes, some of them several days long (E, p. 131). All details, such as sea reefs or sun positions	Knowledge of every detail on the route from St. Louis to New Orleans — about twelve hundred miles long (MT, pp. 26, 29). All details, such as the form of river banks and the position of plantations
	had to be learned in both directions, at all times of day and night, in all kinds of weather. (E, pp. 130-131, 165).	(MT, pp. 11-22).
— not simple rote-learning	"all this information is learned so that each item is discretely available" when required (E, p. 131).	When the relieving pilot came up for his watch, he was expected to know the position of the boat immediately, even in the middle of a dark night (MT, p. 20).
— manner of instruction	Much time was devoted to repetition and testing. (E, p. 131).	(MT, pp. 11-12).
Training of other faculties of thought: Comparing	Every situation had to be compared with all learned facts and with all remembered observations of the navigator (C, p. 172).	Comparing the height of bank to its remembered height on a past trip enabled determination of the water level at points to be passed, a long distance ahead (MT, pp. 29-30).

	Pacific	*Mississippi*
— close atten- tion to details	The navigator should con- stantly watch the direction and the rate of the current, the form of reefs or islands as they appear to his eyes from various distances or angles of approach (E, pp. 160-162).	The pilot should discern every faint mark, though it be a black object against a black background (MT, p. 16c).
Importance of sense impressions	"Puluwatans steer by the feel of the waves under the canoe"; they sense the speed of the wind and the direction of the waves (E, pp. 171, 128, 143). The motion of the canoe at night indicated the presence of reefs. Verification was effected through sounding. (E, pp. 177, 162)	Many things on the river could not be explained by words: the pilot had to sense them (MT, p. 26). He had to watch the movements of the boat at night, in order to detect low places. (MT, pp. 23, 39)
Continuous calculation of position	"... while on the way ... the canoe must be held steady on its course and a running estimate main- tained of its current position" (E, p. 147). "Each bit of information... is integrated into a cumu- lative but changing knowl- edge of position and travel thus far" (C, p. 173).	The 'cub' pilot asks, in exasperation: "... 'what I ... want to know is, if I have got to keep up an ever- lasting measuring of the banks of this river, twelve hundred miles, month in month out?' — 'Of course!' (MT, p. 30). The signs to be watched in order to determine position include chutes, cracks, stumps, etc. (MT, p. 31).
Need for judgement	Weighing of alternatives, interpretation of marks (E, p. 204).	Deciding whether to take a risk (MT, p. 16d). "Good and quick judgment and decision" are higher qualities even than mem- ory (MT, p. 49).

Various techniques used by the Pacific seafarers, involving appropriate mental operations and constructs (e.g. E, pp. 181-189), are necessary in sea travel unaided by instruments, because of the always threatening danger that the island of destination may be totally lost. Not so on the river, where the banks constantly give direction and furnish many clues to the determination of position. Other, minor differences can be accounted for by the fact that Gladwin did not actually go through the whole, practical, course of training, and therefore omitted some points mentioned by Mark Twain, such as the kinesthetic element in the teaching process; or by the relative brevity of Twain's description. If Gladwin writes of the pragmatic bent of the Puluwat navigator, and his lack of interest in theoretical problems or systematic thought without practical implications (E, pp. 141-143, 153), whereas Mark Twain does not mention a similar attitude, the reason seems to be not in any difference between the two cultures, but in the difference between the two texts: Gladwin gives a fuller and a more methodical account of cognitive functioning than does Twain, who after all did not try to write a treatise in cognitive anthropology. One point on which the two writers do not seem to agree regards transfer of training. According to Gladwin, Pacific navigation "depends upon features of sea and sky which are characteristic only of the locality in which it is used". In other areas other principles of navigation have to be used (E, pp. 144, 146); it would follow that transfer of training is restricted. Mark Twain tells about a Mississippi pilot, who went to work on the Missouri, "and learned more than a thousand miles of that stream with an ease and rapidity that were astonishing" (MT, p. 47). Comparison between the two descriptions is difficult, on account of their different aims and manners of writing. Firstly, Gladwin generalizes, whereas Twain gives a particular instance. Moreover, the situations may be different, as it is quite possible that the divergences between various parts of the Pacific Ocean are greater than those between the Mississippi and the Missouri. Lastly, Gladwin's statement is an inference, based on his knowledge of conditions of navigation in different parts of the Pacific, but not on an actual experiment involving, for example, the transference of a Puluwat navigator to the island of Truk. Whereas Twain's example is, or purports to be, a statement of fact.

The essential similarity of thought processes reflected in navigation in two societies so different from each other is not accidental; nor does it arise out of the very nature of navigation, as is shown by Gladwin in his comparison of the ways of Trukese and modern European navigators (C, passim). The reliance on orally transmitted knowledge, on memory and repetition, on sense impressions; the attention to details, the lack of innovation — all are characteristic of thought in traditional societies. Much the same qualities can be shown to exist in the modes of thought of primitives peoples, of medieval Europeans and of the lower classes in Western countries today. Gladwin's procedure was to study a very distant culture in order to learn something about cognitive functioning in the modern West. Such a roundabout way has its uses, as it is often easier to look in an unprejudiced way at cultural and sociological phenomenae not involving one's own society. But it may be even more useful to show that processes at work in the lower class in our time, are essentially the same as those of former generations in Western society. After all, many of the forefathers of the American middle class thought along the same lines as the pilots described by Mark Twain, whether they were sailors or farmers, miners or craftsmen. The direct influence of education and reading, and the more indirect effects of living in a literate culture, changed traditional ways of thought in the middle class (Cf. Stahl). The same processes are now exerting their influence upon the lower class; the study of cognitive processes characteristic of people living in the pre-industrial West may be equally enlightening as studies of more remote groups, and perhaps more directly relevant.

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Religion and the Anthropologists
1960 - 1976

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RÉSUMÉ

L'anthropologie consacre maintenant beaucoup moins d'attention à établir les diverses étapes de l'évolution religieuse. Son centre d'intérêt se situe très souvent au niveau des fonctions psychologiques, sociales ou économiques de la religion. Un autre domaine d'intérêt se trouve au niveau des relations entre religion et société. On ne s'entend pas sur ce que seraient les concepts les plus appropriés pour l'étude de la religion. La principale méthode d'investigation anthropologique, l'observation par participation, est analysée et les difficultés qu'elle présente sont soulignées. On conclut que, même si l'attitude des anthropologues vis-à-vis la religion est parfois négative, les chercheurs dans beaucoup de domaines peuvent bénéficier des travaux anthropologiques sur la religion.

*Part II**

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

In tune with the spirit of the time, the 19th century anthropologists were interested in the origin and development of religious beliefs and practices. It was assumed that discovering the process whereby humans became religious and tracing the stages through which religious beliefs and practices went through, would lead to a better understanding of the nature of religion. Such an assumption might well be true. But by the first quarter of the 20th century the conflicting theories of origin were being seriously challenged. Today there is agreement in anthropology that none of these

theories can be maintained; they have indeed "become curiosities, survivals from anthropology's early history" (Honigmann 1963: 181; Downs 1973: 296; Schusky 1975: 202; Barnouw 1975: 242; Wax 1968: 226). The large majority of anthropologists,[25] however, have not only abandoned the 19th century theories of religious origins; they have discredited and rejected the validity of the quest itself. Any theory about the origin of religion is bound to be very conjectural and speculative; it would be by nature unverifiable (Montagu 1964: 126; Wells 1971: 119; Kottack 1974: 194; CRM Books 1971: 296). The search for origins is therefore a futile one. It is thus not surprising to find that anthropologists have simply lost interest in origins (Harris 1975: 520; Schusky and Culbert 1973: 153; Haviland 1975: 310). In fact several anthropology textbooks do not discuss these theories at all,[26] and others hardly care to allude to them.[27]

In spite of the critique levelled against the early theories of origin, some anthropologists still maintain that a few vague generalizations on the origin and evolution of religion can be made from the data collected from various types of contemporary cultures (Plog and Bates 1976: 234). Thus, for example, Pelto and Pelto (1976: 388) remark that religion arises from the practical adaptation of the people to their environments. They fail, however, to specify the process. The concept of monotheism is taken by some to be a relatively late development in human history.[28] Ancestor worship, we are assured, gave rise to ethnic religions (Pearson 1974: 269). According to Hunter and Whitten (1976: 296-297), the cultural remains of our ancestors point to the evolutionary trend from simple belief systems to the complex theologies of today's religions. They postulate that "instrumental belief systems" (the religion of 'home erectus') preceded "transcendental belief systems" (the religion of 'homo sapiens'). Their presentation

[25] There are, of course, several exceptions. See Schusky (1975: 203), and Hoebel (1972: 592 ff.).
[26] Among the more typical examples are Mair (1965), Schwartz and Ewald (1968), Keesing and Keesing (1971), Beattie (1964), and Beals and Hoijer (1971).
[27] Such are the quoted works of Friedl (1976), Pelto and Pelto (1976), Holmes (1971), and Anderson (1976).
[28] See Brown (1963: 126) who seems to take this for granted. Fuchs (1964: 221) seems to be the only author of a modern textbook who subscribes to Wilhelm Schmidt's views on the origin of religion.

of this scheme is confusing and contradictory, to say the least.[29] It is probably less convincing than the theories of Frazer and Tylor.

This limited revival in anthropological interest in the origin and development of religion is due largely to the work of two sociologists, namely Guy Swanson and Robert Bellah. Their theories are described in several textbooks (Stewart 1973: 370; Plog and Bates 1976: 235-236; Ember and Ember 1973: 422-426; Kottack 1974: 193-194; Hunter and Whitten 1976: 297-298; Barnouw 1975: 268-269). Swanson (1960) accept, in spirit if not in detail, Durkheim's position that religion is a symbolic expression of society and then goes on to outline the different religions and societies which go together. Accepting Durkheim's idea that humans create their gods in the image of their own society, Swanson tries to put it to the test by studying fifty religions, chosen as representative of many different cultures. He concludes that a number of clear correlations between religion and society emerge from his work. Briefly, he concludes that a belief in ancestral spirits is likely to be found where kin groups are important decision making groups; that animism is related to societies where the nuclear family is the largest kin group; that polytheism is found with social classes and occupational specialization; and that monotheism is associated with political complexity; that is, a belief in a high god is likely to flourish where the political system has three or more levels of decision making groups. He also observes that his analysis points to a correlation between the intervention of the gods in the moral behavior of people and the varying degrees of wealth found within the society. Thus, for example, where private ownership is present, the gods are linked with social sanctions. Swanson has thus four main stages of evolution: ancestor worship, animism, polytheism, and monotheism. Each stage is paralleled with a social condition. There is a genuine evolutionary relationship between social and religious forms. Durkheim's theory that religion is but a reflection, an epiphenomenon, of the prevalent social system is taken for granted and no attempt is made to show more specifically how religious beliefs and practices come into being. To what degree

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[29] The sacred in their scheme is identified with the transcendental, the profane with the instrumental. Hence it follows that pre-neanderthal man had a profane belief system, while Neanderthal man had a sacred one.

Swanson relied on selected examples which tend to support his hypothesis is not easy to determine. None of the universalistic religions, like Buddhism, Christianity and Islam, are considered in his treatment.

Robert Bellah's outline (1970) of the stages of religious evolution is, in certain aspects, more ambitious than Swanson's, because Bellah concentrates not on specific religions, but rather on broad religious trends. He deals with religion rather than with religions. Further he incorporates some of the great religions into his scheme. Unlike Swanson, he does not restrict his interest to the relation of religion to society. In the five stages he draws up he considers four main features: a) the symbol system; b) the kind of action it generates; c) the form of social organization in which particular religious stages are embedded; and d) the implications for social action that religious action contains. The five stages are labelled 1) primitive, 2) archaic, 3) historic, 4) early modern, and 5) modern. Bellah, like Swanson, sees a growing complexity of forms, as well as growth of freedom, individualism and objectification from the earliest stage to the most recent one. Unlike Swanson he does not overemphasize the Durkheimian position that religion is but a reflection of the social system. Probably the most noteworthy contribution of Bellah's scheme is his inclusion of some of the great religions, especially Christianity. His last two stages in particular are open to historical verification.

Both Swanson's and Bellah's schemes reflect a general anthropological trend which insists that religion did not come into being out of attempts to explain the world through individual introspection and intellectual reflection as Tylor and Frazer maintained (Haviland 1975: 313). One must note, however, that there has been a slight revival of late in the explanatory side of religion which has created some debate on Neo-Tylorianism in contemporary anthropology (Horton 1968; Ross 1971).

It is also of interest to note that Swanson's and Bellah's works are mainly attempts to delineate the evolution of religion from the earliest times and not theories purporting to explain how religion came into being. There is, however, the underlying assumption that religion is man-made, directly or indirectly. The views of both scholars are open to the same critique which so

many anthropologists have levelled at the 19th century theories. The evolution of religion is a matter of speculation and curious deduction (Hunter and Whitten 1976: 297). While their theories may be plausible, they stand beyond verification, subject to being displaced by other unprovable hypotheses. Because of this uncertainty, it is legitimate to ask whether the search for origins and for the early stages and development of religion will help towards understanding the many religions of mankind (Brown 1963: 119).

THE FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION

Anthropologists have, to a large extent, given up efforts to find out how religion came into being and how it developed in early human times; they have directed their efforts instead to understanding its functions (Taylor 1973: 397). The influence of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown in this respect is still overwhelming. Malinowski's concern was with the needs which religion, consciously or not, satisfies, while Radcliffe-Brown's concentration was on the relation between religion and the rest of culture. Generally speaking, anthropologists see five major functions, or needs, which religion serves, namely, explanatory, emotional, social, validating, and adaptive.[30]

Explanatory functions

Religion offers explanations, interpretations, and rationalizations of the many facets of human existence. It satisfies the cognitive and intellectual needs of human beings by giving sure and definite answers (Keesing and Keesing 1971: 303; Swartz and Jordan 1976: 670; Richards 1972: 249; Schusky and Culbert 1973: 151; Bohannan 1963: 331; Taylor 1973: 397). It accounts for the inexplicable and provides solutions to those matters which humans do not quite have within their grasp (Beattie 1964: 205; Holmes 1971: 312). Religion acts as a problem solver — it unravels those issues which are not, or cannot be, elucidated by any other means. Illness, death, accidents, disasters, and all kinds of evil are explained

[30] Since the functional approach has been applied also to the study of myth and ritual, anthropologists tend to be repetitive when outlining the functions of religion in general.

by religious beliefs (Maranda 1972: 264; Schwartz and Ewald 1968: 367; Aceves 1974: 223-224; Plog and Bates 1976: 237; Downs 1973: 306; Brown 1963: 133; Crump 1973: 121; Honigmann 1963: 45-46; Spradley and McCurdy 1975: 424). Religion furnishes an organized picture of the universe and man's relation to it.[31] Religious beliefs provide value systems and give meaning and coherence to human experiences (Hammond 1971: 258; Hunter and Whitten 1976: 295; Haviland 1975: 308; Spradley and McCurdy 1975: 426; Plog and Bates 1976: 237). "A religion," writes Lienhardt (1966: 134), "provides a distinctive pattern of experience, a map of the psyche and the world which, for believers, is held to represent the situation of man in true proportion and scale."

Emotional functions

The most common psychological functions assigned to religion are emotional. Many anthropologists affirm that religion, by giving the person identity, security and courage, reduces, relieves and allays anxiety, fear, tension and stress (Richards 1972: 274; Gropper 1969: 82; Harris 1975: 524; Kottack 1974: 194; Keesing and Keesing 1971: 303; Honigmann 1963: 49; Pearson 1974: 279; Beals and Hoijer 1971: 465; Beattie 1964: 205; Bohannan 1963: 331). Besides, religious beliefs and practices help the individual cope with life, especially with the unknown and uncontrollable aspects of human living (Friedl 1976: 270; Aceves 1974: 223-224). Because religious beliefs dispel the uncertainties and incongruities of life, especially those relating to death and the unknown, humans have comfort and confidence when facing the difficulties they encounter (Swartz and Jordan 1976: 670; Wells 1971: 119-120; Stewart 1973: 344; Crump 1973: 127; CRM Books 1971: 292). Religion has thus been allotted the positive psychological function of emotional integration (Hunter and Whitten 1976: 304-305).

Social functions

Following Durkheim, a majority of contemporary anthropologists concur that religious beliefs and practices are instrumental

[31] Beals and Hoijer (1971, p. 465) think that this is the primary function of religion. Cf. also Gropper (1969, p. 82) and Hoebel (1972: 563 ff.).

in maintaining, if not creating, social solidarity (Swartz and Jordan 1976: 675; Kottack 1974: 194; Beals and Hoijer 1971: 468; Plog and Bates 1976: 238). Religion is a force of integration, a unifying bond, binding and cementing together the members of a particular group (Gropper 1969: 82; Kessler 1974: 144; Wells 1971: 119; Hunter and Whitten 1976: 304-305; Taylor 1973: 398; Richards 1972: 274; Aceves 1974: 223-224; Titiev 1963: 535). Social stability is often sustained by religious beliefs and rituals, which tend to minimize conflict and promote social control (Plog and Bates 1976: 238; Crump 1971: 127; Titiev 1963: 524; Haviland 1975: 308; Schwartz and Ewald 1968: 373). Religion also plays a part in the socialization process. It is an instrument for accepting attitudes and activities which are not necessarily learned from experience, and a device for preserving knowledge (Plog and Bates 1976: 238; Beals and Hoijer 1971: 468).

Validating functions

Another function of religion, closely linked with the social functions, is that of validating cultural values. Religious beliefs and practices support, at times with sanctions, the basic institutions, values, and aspirations of a society (Keesing and Keesing 1971: 303-304; Taylor 1973: 398; Holmes 1971: 317). More precisely, religion inculcates social and ethical values; it justifies, enforces and implements a people's ideological assumptions and the way of life of a group (Richards 1972: 274; Gropper 1969: 82; Schusky and Culbert 1973: 151; Beals and Hoijer 1971: 468).

Adaptive functions

More recently, several anthropologists have emphasized the adaptive functions of religious beliefs and rituals. That religion is related to the environment does not require much proof; expressions of belief systems are made in materials locally available (Kessler 1974: 145). But the relation between religion and the environment is more instrumental. Through religious beliefs and practices humans have been able to adjust and utilize the environment for their needs. Such beliefs and activities have "real effects in the extraction of energies and materials or defence of a culture" (Anderson 1976: 290). In other words, they are not merely sym-

bolic; they can also bring about or create concrete effects on the way of life of a particular people. Religious rituals may thus have ecologically relevant results (Kottack 1974: 199). Some anthropologists have called religion "a tool for survival" (CRM Books 1971: 297). One of the leading proponents of this view is Marvin Harris (1975: 548) who points out that "even beliefs and rituals that appear to be irrational, whimsical, and maladaptive often possess important positive functions and are explicable in terms of recurrent adaptive processes." Probably the best example of such adaptation is the case of India's sacred cow. Harris (1966) argues that the taboo against cow slaughter in Hindu India is beneficial to the Indian ecosystem. The religious doctrine of ahimsa, therefore, has contributed to the basic agricultural and other economic needs of the Indian subcontinent.[32]

Another instance of religion's adaptive function is provided by Rappaport in his study of the Tsembago of New Guinea (1967). The main focus of his work is the ecological significance of their ceremonial slaughter of pigs. He concludes that such rituals, though apparently wasteful, are means of regulating the relationships of people to their habitat and to groups with which they are in contact (Anderson 1976: 292-293; Kottack 1974: 201-203).

Divination, the ritual waste of yams, and revitalization movements have all been examined for their adaptive functions (Anderson 1976: 290-291; Plog and Bates 1976: 240; Kottack 1974: 198). Kottack has suggested that Australian totemism, which has usually been seen as a way of maintaining social solidarity, might have aided the Australian aborigine population in adapting to their material environment. Taboos against killing certain animals might have protected some species which would have otherwise died out, while ceremonial rituals controlled their increase (1974: 196).

As a rule, therefore, anthropological works stress the positive fulfillment of human needs achieved by religious beliefs and rituals. A few dissident voices point out that concepts of the super-

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[32] Harris's view is accepted by Kottack (1974: 196-198); Kessler (1974: 151); Ember and Ember (1973: 436-437); Schusky (1975: 140-141); and Plog and Bates (1976: 242). None of the surveyed books explicitly reject his view which is still a subject of debate in anthropological circles.

natural have increased human anxieties rather than alleviated them. Religion, some note, can also create conflicts; it can cause disintegration, especially in pluralistic societies (Pearson 1974: 279; Stewart 1973: 344; Richards 1972: 276-278; Harris 1975: 514).

RELIGION AND SOCIETY

Following the lead of Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown, anthropologists have studied in depth the relations between religion and the rest of culture. Known as the structural/functional approach, this method is still common in anthropological studies of religion (Malefijt 1968: 290-328). Radcliffe-Brown had opposed Malinowski's functionalism because the latter argued that rituals tended to allay anxiety. Radcliffe-Brown insisted that the explanation of religious rites shoud be found on the sociological level. Negative and positive rituals existed side by side because they are part of the mechanism which maintains society in existence. Today most anthropologists see the views of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown as compatible, and textbooks describe with approval both the functions which religion fulfills and its relations with social life in general (Hunter and Whitten 1976: 312-313).

In general terms it is stated that religion reflects the unique culture and experience of each society (CRM Books 1971: 292). Particularly in primitive cultures, religion and society are so intertwined that they cannot be easily separated. Hence to distinguish religion, say, from politics and economics, would be somewhat artificial (Kessler 1974: 145; Bock 1974: 326; Titiev 1963: 502).

Many of Swanson's correlations between religion and society referred to above, find acceptance in current anthropological thought (Plog and Bates 1976: 235-236). Religious beliefs and practices are associated with particular kinds and levels of social structure. Anthony Wallace has outlined a fourfold classification of religious systems, namely, individualistic cults, shamanistic cults, communal cults, and ecclesiastical cults. They are found existing in uniformity with certain types of social organization (1966: 86-88).[33] Thus the supernatural order is to some extent modelled on

[33] Wallace's scheme is adopted by Harris (1975: 522-523).

human social relationships (Keesing and Keesing 1971: 308). There is remarkable correspondence between the government of the universe and that of human society, between the structure of the world of the gods and the world of man (Bock 1974: 315 and 343; Ember and Ember 1973: 425-425). Religious beliefs and values can be deeply embedded in the social structure, as the caste system in Indian would seem to indicate (Collins 1975: 351-352; Friedl 1976: 275-276; Hunter and Whitten 1976: 343-344; Mair 1965: 55-56). Even beliefs in an afterlife may be patterned on the way society is constructed and conceived (Schwartz and Ewald 1968: 349 ff.). Harris (1975: 554-556) goes as far as to interpret revitalistic movements as a dramatic example of how closely related are religion and social conditions.

There is also a close relation between religion, politics, and economics. Belief in a high god is associated with social and political complexity. The nature of the deity may reflect the economic level of a culture (Otterbein 1972: 96; Holmes 1971: 317-318; Montagu 1964: 123).[34] Thus, in those societies where a chief has priestly functions, sacred and political power are usually equated (Titiev 1963: 510). The rise of specialized religious practioners is linked with the increase in economic and political specialization (Schwartz and Ewald 1968: 364). Economic surplus led the way to all kinds of specialists who now no longer need to work directly for food production and/or distribution (Pearson 1974: 261; Beals and Hoijer 1971: 450).

The most common distinction between the various types of religious practitioners is that between shamans and priests. The activities and statuses of both these religious specialists fit into different social structures. Priests, who are qualified to act in a religious capacity by the office they hold after a period of training, are found in relatively advanced agricultural societies. The organization of the priesthood, often consisting of a bureaucratized hierarchy, is common in highly structured and socially stratified societies. Shamans are more individualistic religious specialists who receive their power and ability directly from the supernatural. They belong to no organized religious group, propagate no

[34] The only dissenting view seems to be that of Fuchs (1964) who still follows Wilhelm Schmidt's theory.

explicit, party-line theology, and usually practice their healing skills as individuals and not as representatives of a priestly authority. They flourish in hunting, fishing and gathering societies. They represent the simplest expression of social differentiation. While the notions of priest and shaman depicted here are ideal concepts, leaving room open for some overlapping in both role and function, there seems to be little debate in anthropology about the basic relationships between these two religious specialists and the societies of which they are members (Wells 1971: 123-125; Taylor 1973: 395-397; Collins 1975: 422-426; Gropper 1969: 84; Kessler 1974: 146-147; Schusky and Culbert 1973: 147; Downs 1973: 303-306; Jacobs 1964: 280-282; Beals and Hoijer 1971: 450-457).

It is, however, still a debated issue in anthropology to what degree do social conditions determine the belief system. The tendency to accept Durkheim's view, that religion is but a symbol of society, is sometimes mitigated by the observation that religion itself leaves an impact on all other aspects of a culture. Religion is therefore not a mere passive reflection of the rest of culture. On the contrary, religious beliefs and rites can often play a leading role in social change, dictating the course of cultural evolution and revolution. Religious movements in particular can be a driving force of change (Kottack 1974: 195; Harris 1975: 548; Schwartz and Ewald 1968: 347), or a process of cultural revitalization.[35] Keesing and Keesing (1971: 310) reflect that even after having observed all the parallels and resemblances between religion and the rest of culture, one cannot legitimately argue that religion is nothing more than a projection of social life. Religion is not simply an epiphenomenon of social life (Bohannan 1963: 338).

Though it is still well entrenched in anthropology, the functional approach is not immune from critique. It tends to be very repetitive and is frequently too far removed from the every-day attitudes and values of the believers themselves. Brown (1963: 133) is, therefore, somewhat optimistic when she asserts that "the religion of any people is best understood in terms of its functions,

[35] This is Wallace's view (1966). Several anthropologists, in particular Hunter and Whitten (1976: 304-305); Friedl (1976: 386); Ember and Ember (1973: 437-439), and Plog and Bates (1976: 239-240) have made use of it.

i.e., what it means to and does for its adherents, and the part it plays in the total life of the community. The statement that the function explain why people believe, why they prefer to adhere to some religious meanings and practices rather than to others, is not a self-evident proposition (Swartz and Jordan 1976: 670). Believers do not, as a rule, conceive of their religion in terms of the psychological and sociological needs it helps them satisfy, nor in terms of the relations their beliefs have to their own society. In fact the functional/structural approach which regards religion simply as a device for interpreting a social system has one serious disadvantage; namely, it would all but empty religion of the meaning it has for the participants (Wax 1968: 235). Aceves's remark on the functional approach is incisive and to the point. "This approach," he writes (1974: 223), "is somewhat simplistic and outmoded, but it does provide a framework upon which we can build a discussion of what religious beliefs do."

THE STUDY OF RELIGION

The abandonment of the evolutionary approach to religion and the partial bankruptcy of the functional method have de-celerated the progress in anthropological studies of religion. Many students of religion seem to realize that there are many more questions to ask about religion besides the needs it satisfies and the relations it has with the rest of culture (Mair 1965: 198). The interest in religion as a symbolic and intellectual system has thus been increasing over the last two decades. Such studies, however, as Schusky has rightly observed (1975: 182), have been hampered by the fact that anthropological theory about religion is probably the least developed. His complaint (p. 202) that little attention has been given to the study of religion by 20th century anthropologists may not be subscribed to by all his peers, but it certainly contains a grain of truth. Even in the recent development of the structural method, myth and ritual have been the subject of intensive research, but religion itself has almost been passed by unnoticed. The textbooks of the last fifteen years give ample evidence that the functional interpretation is, by and large, still the dominant theory in the anthropological understanding of religion.

Difficulties in studying and understanding religion

Some anthropologists have been able to specify the area a student seeks to study when he approaches religious data. Lienhardt (1962: 128), for one, thinks that the main interest lies "in the nature of belief and knowledge, and of the symbolic action and expression in specific social contexts." Swartz and Jordan (1976: 646), emphasizing the fact that religion is part of culture and can only be understood as such, maintain that an anthropologist "wants to know how shared understandings about religion are related to other shared understandings and how religious statuses are related to other understandings and statuses." There is a further interest in the relation between personality and religious beliefs. Many anthropologists stand squarely and solely within the functional framework. Others suggest that the first area of study should be how people view the world and organize their experience (Wax 1968: 235).[36]

From these somewhat divergent opinions on what is the area of religious study one can perhaps understand why anthropological theory of religion has lagged behind most other areas of culture. Schusky (1975: 182) thinks that this is so because much of religious behavior is based on emotions and hence is not constant and regular as are other forms of behavior. His reasoning seems erroneous on two counts. First of all, religion is not the only area of human life where the emotions play an important role; kinship and politics being typical examples. Secondly, even emotions can be, and often are, standardized and institutionalized. That religion offers unique problems to the student is admitted by several anthropologists. Normative beliefs are not easily expressed and far from readily grasped by outsiders (Gropper 1969: 86). The religious beliefs of an alien culture are always the most difficult aspect of their lives (Swartz and Jordan 1976: 646; Hunter and Whitten 1976: 302; Birket-Smith 1965: 337). Misunderstandings are, therefore, more likely and more frequently to abound in religious matters than in any other aspect of a culture (Bohannan 1963: 339). It is

[36] Crump (1973: 117), in a rather muddled paragraph, might have had the same idea in mind.

hard for a student, as Ember and Ember point out (1973: 417; Middleton 1970: 500), to agree whether a particular custom in our own society is religious or not; it may even be harder to do so with many customs of primitive societies where religious institutions are more closely related to the rest of culture than they are in Western civilization (Friedl 1976: 264). Ethnocentricity is also an obstacle to any scholar who is limited by his own beliefs or preconceptions about religion (Friedl 1976: 268). People may also find it hard to confide their innermost beliefs and experiences to outsiders. Further, unlike most areas of culture, religious beliefs and rites are directed to non-empirical realities which cannot themselves be studied directly (Titiev 1963: 506; Mair 1965: 186).

Granted this awareness of specific difficulties in the understanding of religion, it is strange that anthropologists have not yet developed a theory and method which are more appropriate to the understanding of religious beliefs and practices. It is even more perplexing to note that several anthropologists assume that the same or similar theory and/or method can be applied to all areas of anthropological research including religion (Schusky 1975: 202 ff.; Schwartz and Ewald 1968: 346; Bohannan 1963: 330-331 & 338).

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY

Anthropologists have in the past created many conceptual tools for analyzing, classifying and interpreting religious phenomena. The early anthropologists made up a whole list of terms under which religious beliefs and rituals were neatly labeled. Animatism, animism, mana and totemism are among the more well-known terms found explained in most current textbooks. In the past anthropologists vied with one another as to what "religion," animatism, etc., was the most primitive, that is, the most simple and ancient, in the evolution of mankind. These terms and the ideas they conveyed became part and parcel of anthropological jargon. Few of the contemporary anthropological textbooks have overcome this early influence and shed the use of these concepts with the erroneous meaning they so often convey. Animatism, the preanimistic stage concocted by Marett (1909) denotes "an im-

personal, supernatural power of force that can be associated with animate or inanimate objects or persons or places" (Stewart 1973: 463). Or it could be looked at as the "doctrine that certain objects or natural phenomena that we consider inanimate are themselves capable of sentiment action and movement" (Beals and Hoijer 1971: 442). Animatism is always linked with the supernatural (Ember and Ember 1973: 421; Wells 1971: 121). Pearson (1974: 244) does not throw much light on its meaning when he affirms that the concept "is quite close in many ways to modern science." The term, as Richards (1972: 257) observes, is so similar to animism that it has plagued generations of students.

Marett had based his formulation of animatism as the earliest stage of religious consciousness on the concept of mana which Codrington (1891)[37] had described in his work on the Melanesians and which Marett and Durkheim made popular. Mana has, since then, become a household word in anthropology textbooks. It is usually described as a kind of force, an impersonal, undifferentiated, supernatural power (Friedl 1976: 309; Swartz and Jordan 1976: 663). It is really amazing how many textbooks have accepted Marett's idea that mana is similar or analogous to electricity (CRM Books 1971: 293; Brown 1963: 123; Taylor 1973: 391; Barnouw 1975: 244; Spradley and McCurdy 1975: 435-436; Plog and Bates 1976: 228-229; Downs 1973: 298; Richards 1972: 258; Pearson 1974: 245; Barnouw and Hermanson 1972: 51; Kottack 1974: 185; Schusky and Culbert 1973: 142). Harris's (1975: 518) interpretation goes even farther. He maintains that certain attitudes in Western society towards electricity, gravity and atomic energy "may be considered as manifestations of a belief in mana." Mana, however, as Codrington himself realized, is always linked with some person who controls and directs it and it seems to be more related to "virtue, prestige, authority, good fortune, influence, sanctity and luck" (Haviland 1975: 312).[38] Hammond (1971: 282) is probably close to its meaning when he relates the concept to "baraka" or

[37] The word "mana" was not brought into the English language by Malinowski after his studies in the Trobriand Islands as Stewart confidently asserts (1973: 346).
[38] See Codrington's own description of the word (1891: 119 ff.). Some change has undergone in the usage of the word "mana" as several textbooks seem to indicate; cf. Wax 1968: 236-237; Pearson 1974: 245-246; Montagu 1964: 126-127.

holiness among the North African Muslims and to the Christian veneration of saints. Some light may be shed on the notion if it is compared to the Christian idea of "grace" (Evans-Pritchard 1965: 110).

Tylor's influence on the anthropology of religion lingers most decisively in the anthropological usage of the term animism.[39] Animism is described as "the belief that objects, (including people), in the concretely perceivable world have a nonconcrete spiritual element" (Hunter and Whitten 1976: 302). Or more simply, in Tylor's words, as "the belief in Spiritual Beings" (1958, vol. 2, 8-9).[40] Some anthropologists still look favorably on his theory that animism is the simplest and most ancient religion of mankind and consider it to be "highly plausible" or to enjoy "a high degree of probability" (Stewart 1973: 345; Hoebel 1972: 576; Schusky and Culbert 1973: 152).

Most of these terms are described in anthropological textbooks with little or no critical evaluation. The reader is likely to conclude that they are still viable and useful concepts for understanding religious beliefs and practices. The plain fact, however, is that they are not. The textbook material tends to be somewhat contradictory here. For while accepting the above mentioned concepts as religious, they seem to reject the religious meaning once ascribed to "totemism." Totemism, in fact, receives mention either in relation to social groups (Harris 1975: 534-535; Mair 1965: 192; Schwartz and Ewald 1968: 392-394; Lienhardt 1966: 145; Richards 1972: 276-277), or to its symbolic features (Beals and Hoijer 1971: 467; Schusky 1975: 76; Hoebel 1972: 629-630; Plog and Bates 1976: 239). One hastens to agree with Crump (1973: 110) tha the history of totemism in anthropological studies is very confusing. No wonder so many anthropologists refrain to include it in their chapter on religion. One might also add that this confusion overflows to all other categories, like animism and animatism, which early anthropologists invented to classify religions and to determine their stage in the grand evolutionary scheme. Anthropologists appear, under

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[39] The word itself was not invented by Tylor, as he himself admits; cf. 1958, vol. 1: 9 (footnote 1).

[40] The dependence of contemporary anthropologists on Tylor's definition is still fairly obvious; cf. Anderson 1976: 294; Beals and Hoijer 1971: 442; Swartz and Jordan 1976: 664.

the influence of Lévi-Strauss (1966: 15-32) to have abandoned the "totemic illusion," but they still suffer from the "animistic illusion" and the like. About fifty years ago Robert Lowie (1952: 172) referred to such concepts as "animism," "animatism," and the like, as "meaningless catchwords." Contemporary anthropologists have, in their textbooks, not yet been able to break loose from these slogans and consequently from the misunderstandings they lead us into.

World View

Many anthropologists have been aware that the early anthropological concepts of religion are at best imperfect and unsatisfactory tools to study religious beliefs and rituals. Probably the most successful notion used to replace them is the idea of world view. Developed originally by Robert Redfield, several anthropological texts have used it effectively to describe the beliefs and values of primitive societies. World view or ideology is a concept which includes what is normally labelled under "religion," but is much broader in content. Several textbooks have chapters both on "religion," and "world view" (Spradley and McCurdy 1975; Hoebel 1972), but the two concepts overlap.

World view refers to the basic outlook towards life which most people in a particular society hold in common (Friedl 1976: 138 & 153). In includes the native's point of view, the values, attitudes, and moral principles which are implicitly or explicitly adhered to. Under world view are listed cosmology, the relations man has towards the rest of the universe, and ideas or assumptions about the human personality and human relations. In other words a people's world view will contain statements about the nature of the world, the nature of man and the place he has in the universe (Taylor 1973: 421; Jacobs 1964: 366). "The cognitive view of life and the total environment which an individual holds or which is characteristic of the members of a society is the world view or ideology" (Hoebel 1972: 542). By the concept of world view the anthropologist attempts to discover and describe the way "a people characteristically look upon the universe" (Spradley and McCurdy 1976: 465). The concept of world view, though an obvious Western idea, depicts expressively the component elements of the indigenous

approach to life and its problems. It conveys a kind of native philosophy of life. The world view of a people can be presented as the organizing principle of the "bewildering chaos of experience" (Hoebel 1972: 541) — a position based on Lévi-Strauss's view of myth as a resolver of contradictions.

The anthropologist who uses the concept of world view assumes that the native's view of life is structured; that all the attitudes, values and beliefs form an organized whole, or an integrated system (Hoebel 1972: 542; Keesing and Keesing 1971: 315). Religion is thus studied as a belief system (Bock 1974: 344-346). In other words it is assumed that religious phenomena have an underlying pattern or structure (Middleton 1970: 500). This is a basic assumption of cognitive anthropology. While the individual components of a world view may be the native way of looking at reality, the assembling of these components, the drawing up of the structure, is the anthropologist's work. Spradley and McCurdy (1975: 465; Anderson 1976: 280; Bock 1974: 309) assure us that "a particular world view cannot usually be stated or formulated with precision by the people." This may be correct, but one must also bear in mind that anthropologists themselves have had difficulty expressing primitive world views accurately.

By studying religious beliefs and practices under the category of world view the scholar should be able to see religion as a system in itself; that is, as a unified structure which can make sense on its own without constant reference to social institutions and without analysis of the functions religious statements and rites might satisfy (Middleton 1970: 507). Since the concepts of ideology, world view and system include both supernatural and natural elements, the student can describe a world view without necessarily making the distinction himself. He could thus rely more on the distinctions, categories and classificatory notions the indigenous people use. The student has in this way a better chance of achieving an objective perspective of the society he is studying.

METHOD AND TECHNIQUE

One of the greatest contributions of anthropology to the study of mankind has been the fieldwork approach. This procedure

implies that the scholar is trained to make his or her abode among the people under study, to assimilate part of their culture and life-style, and to elicit direct information about their culture. Two general problems face the fieldworker: i) one must determine what exactly are the goals of the study. The researcher must decide whether the end result is to be a description of the native's point of view, or a scientific analysis in pre-established concepts commonly accepted in the Western academic world. This problem has been articulated in terms of the emic and the etic viewpoints; ii) one must apply the method of participant-observation in the study of religious beliefs and practices which are foreign to one's way of thinking, believing and acting.

Etic and Emic

One of the contemporary debates regarding method has centered around the issue whether the anthropologist should look at his data from an etic or an emic viewpoint. Briefly, the etic approach analyses a culture with notions developed and tested within the Western tradition. Terms like animism and the like are a good illustration of this methodology, for these categories are an obvious importation from the academic background of the anthropologist and have no direct basis in the way many non-literate people conceive of their beliefs. Functional studies typify the etic standpoint since the concepts used to understand and explain religious beliefs and practices are, more often than not, foreign to the native's world view. The anthropologist who adopts the etic outlook is interested in interpreting the data with little regard to the understanding which people have about what they are doing and thinking (Swartz and Jordan 1976: 618). This method has also been labeled the analytical perspective, that is, the scientific viewpoint of the outside observer (Hunter and Whitten 1976: 20).

The emic position, employed by ethnoscientists and cognitive anthropologists, attempts to understand a culture or a religion from the native's own point of view (Plog and Bates 1976: 30). In studying other peoples, therefore, the anthropologists endeavor to sketch the way they envisage the world they live in. The very categories of the indigeneous people are chosen as the principles

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for organizing the data (Swartz and Jordan 1976: 618). Hence the emic approach represents the folk perspective, the viewpoint of the observed rather than that of the observer (Hunter and Whitten 1976: 20). Ethnoscientists claim that to describe the structure of a people's own conceptual world by using Western labels like politics, economics and religion can be worse than misleading (Keesing and Keesing 1971: 320).[41]

Both the etic and the emic views may have their uses (Plog and Bates 1976: 30), but it is doubtful whether the analytic, etic outlook can make much headway by itself. Friedl (1976: 138) has remarked that the world view can only be perceived correctly from the insider's perspective. This would imply that religious concepts and ideas can be understood more faithfully in the framework of a particular people's categories of thought. This is a difficult task. Hunter and Whitten (1976: 306) are right on the mark when they observe that one of the difficulties in applying the emic approach to religion is "lack of shared perceptions or perspectives among the people we are studying." This raises the issue whether an anthropologist without any religious belief of his own will be hampered in his study of religion.[42]

This problem is further aggravated by the technique which anthropologists have developed from their field experiences, namely, the method of participant observation. The importance of such an approach is now being recognized by scholars in other fields. Ninian Smart (1976: 614), a historian of religions, writes:

> The matter of coming to understand the inner side of a religion involves a dialectic between participant observation and dialogical (inter-personal) relationship with the adherents of the other faith. Consequently, the study of religion has strong similarities to, and indeed overlaps with, anthropology.

Participation in religious beliefs and rituals is certainly not easy and may not come naturally to a researcher. It may require no special effort on the part of the student to attend religious rites and to conform outwardly to the behavior of the believers. But this is outward, superficial participation. It lacks the essential

[41] Bock (1974) avoids even labeling chapters with such titles as "Politics," "Kinship," etc.
[42] I have discussed this problem elsewhere; cf. Saliba, 1976: 144 ff.

quality which the adherents of a particular religion have. The feelings and rationale often associated with attendance at public rites are unique to the believer, and no unbeliever can possibly share them. The same can be said about sharing religious beliefs. Sympathetic understanding, though necessary, is no substitute for actual sharing. The anthropologist who has no beliefs of his own would not even be able to find common grounds of belief with the people whose religion he is studying. Not many anthropological textbooks give any indication that anthropologists are aware of the problem. Hunter and Whitten (1976: 301) again touch on the core of the problem when they expound on the difficulty inherent in participant observation. They write:

> For that matter, anthropologists, as a specialized subgroup of our society, have their own specific beliefs that they learn as part of their training. One of them is that they should enter fully into the lives of the people they study, using the technique of participant observation. It is thought that this task should be accomplished to the point where anthropologists come to see and understand the world in the manner of the people they are studying. However, very few (if any) anthropologists claim to have achieved this perspective, and the goal remains the ideal rather than an accomplished fact. Precisely because cultures are such complex systems of belief and behavior, it is doubtful that any anthropologist will ever be able to enter into every aspect of another society's way of life. Thus anthropologists usually settle for partial understanding of fragments of the belief systems of the people they are studying.

Participant observation seems to imply some involvement, that is, a recognition that there is an element of truth or reality in the religion under study, no matter how bizarre and incredulous the rites and beliefs might be. Middleton (1970: 502), however, asserts than an involved person would have difficulty recognizing that a belief which one holds to be true may have a social function quite apart from its religious one. This may be the case, but understanding a social function of a religious belief or ritual does not necessarily imply understanding the religion itself. The participant observer whose main interest in a religion is its social functions may do an admirable job at observation, but could hardly be called a participant. For real participation in religious matters by believers either ignores the sociological functions or places them secondary in importance. Middleton would have clarified the issue had he explained how a scholar could assent

to a faith without believing it. His further statement that the fieldworker can accept the "as if" attitude or criterion is equally taken for granted (Aceves 1974: 218). What does attending and participating in a religious rite with the mental outlook of one who acts as if one believes mean? The genuine participant perceives his own religion with a set of inner feelings, attitudes and convictions which are not a mask for the occasion. The method of participant observation implies that the scholar has to adopt some of the inner experience of the believing participant. The only way out of this impasse is to state, as Middleton does, that religious phenomena are, from an anthropological viewpoint, symbolic representations of social relations. In other words, social relations are symbolized in ritual or religious terms. This position, however, would in no way be close to the participant's point of view. Besides it seems to deny that the core of religious beliefs and rituals is some kind of experience which is *sui generis*. The anthropological tendency to see in religion nothing else but a symbolization of social behavior leads directly to the charge of reductionism.

Religious Experience

The above discussion may show why anthropologists have been rather reluctant to study and discuss religious experience. In fact textbooks either omit mentioning such an experience,[43] or else indirectly deny it (Plog and Bates 1976: 238; Downs 1973: 293-294; Bock 1974: 319; Harris 1975: 525). Those who refer to religious experience identify it with the experience of the supernatural, or with the feeling of awe or of the sacred, or with the emotional state of the participant that goes beyond ordinary experience (Jacobs 1964: 288; Holmes 1971: 316; Schusky and Culbert 1973: 147; Pearson 1974: 257; Harris 1975: 514-520; Downs 1973: 309; Hunter and Whitten 1976: 311; Spradley and McCurdy 1975: 426). Visions, especially those of shamans, are frequently taken as examples of religious experience. Anthropologists differ in their interpretations of the shaman's experience, but most seem to prefer a rather negative explanation: the shaman's experience is indicative of suggestibility, or of emotional instability, or of hallucinatory

[43] Examples of such neglect are Anderson (1976), Titiev (1963) and Beals and Hoijer (1971).

conditions (Harris 1975: 527; Hoebel 1973: 585; Barnouw 1975: 247-249). Others give a more positive explanation and see it as an experience of cognitive and emotional reintegration (Hunter and Whitten 1976: 310). No anthropologist seems to have tried to analyze the experience at any depth.[44] The reader of anthropological textbooks could easily be left with the impression that anthropologists are not at home with the concept and are not aware of the state of consciousness the experience implies.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL ATTITUDES

The anthropologist who prepares for his field experience in an alien culture requires some intellectual and emotional training in order to be able to understand and interpret the phenomena he is studying. The difficulties encountered on the field are not easily overcome. For many beliefs will appear foolish and impractical; religious rites may at times appear ludicrous; and magical attitudes often leave an aura of irrationality (Swartz and Jordan 1976: 646; Downs 1973: 297; Otterbein 1972: 105). The average anthropologist does not believe that the supernatural powers are at work in shamanistic curing rites (Swartz and Jordan, 1976: 659). Sometimes one wonders whether the average anthropologist believes in anything at all.

Such attitudes may so affect the scholar's frame of mind that objectivity and impartiality may be seriously hampered. Consequently, the anthropologist must develop a mental attitude which will enable him to observe, study and interpret all religious phenomena without letting his own position on religion influence the outcome of his work and distort his conclusions. The anthropologist is first trained to accept human belief as a matter of fact. The ability to believe is a trait of human nature and one can approach all religious behavior as an expression of what humans can do (Downs 1973: 297). Besides the anthropologist is aware

[44] Most anthropologists are not interested in the varieties of religious experience in the same way than pioneers like William James were. In general, psychological works related to religious experience are neglected and the reader of most anthropological textbooks is left with the impression that this area of investigation is not an anthropological concern.

that religious beliefs and rituals are important and meaningful to
the believers and they may also have some practical uses (Hunter
and Whitten 1976: 295; Otterbein 1972: 105). Consequently, the
anthropologist is trained to respect the sincerity of the believers
(Downs 1973: 294). He maintains his objective stance as a scholar
by remembering that his task is not to search for truth or false-
hood in the religious beliefs and practices of the world (Downs
1973: 310). In other words, the issue of the metaphysical reality
of supernatural beings is a problem for philosophers and theologians
and not for anthropologists. For the latter scholars, whether gods,
for instance, really exist outside the human consciousness or not,
is finally irrelevant (Aceves 1974: 218; Lienhardt 1966: 147). The
anthropologist's objectivity consists in trying to understand the
function of religious phenomena irrespective of their philosophical
truth and theological validity (Middleton 1970: 502).

Swartz and Jordan (1976: 646), elaborating on the anthro-
pological perspective to this problem, state:

> As a private individual, the anthropologist may be interested in
> philosophical truths. He may also be motivated to bring about a change
> in what he sees. As an anthropologist, however, his concern is not with
> whether what people believe is or is not philosophically valid or whether
> their beliefs would or should be exchanged for the beliefs he holds. As
> an anthropologist, he wants to know how shared understandings about
> religion are related to other shared understandings and how religious
> statuses are related to other understandings and statuses. He is interested
> in the interplay between religious beliefs and personality variables. None
> of these questions depend on any particular view of the validity of one
> or another religious system.

Abstaining from making statements on the truth or false-
hood of religious phenomena implies some kind of relativism.
Anthropologists have stated openly that "reality" is a culturally
relative phenomenon (Hunter and Whitten 1976: 301-302). "Cultural
relativism," writes Aceves (1974: 218), "is a must for the student
of religion." The anthropologist is not concerned with establishing
which is the best religion. He is, however, interested in finding
out why religion is found in all cultures (Ember and Ember 1973:
418). Since he can only explore the human manifestations of
religion, he takes it for granted that all religions are on an equal
plane or footing and can thus be studied in the same way (An-
derson 1976: 272; Hunter and Whitten 1976: 298-302). By

adhering to cultural relativism, the anthropologist is not making the philosophical statement that everything is relative and nothing is absolute. He is rather stressing the fact that in order to understand the diversity of human cultures and religions, the scholar should not start with a definite position absolutizing one particular culture or religion at the expense of all others.

Not all anthropologists, however, have refrained from making explicit or implicit judgments on the existence of supernatural beings. Men, we are told, invented the spirits and the gods (Ember and Ember 1976: 420; Pelto and Pelto 1976: 391). Supernatural beings or spirits are considered unreal; they exist only in the minds of the believers (Aceves 1974: 222). They are projections of the human mind or symbolical ways of coping with human problems (Beattie 1964: 227; Pelto and Pelto 1976: 391). Such affirmations contradict the previous statements about objectivity and impartiality. They seem to indicate that anthropologists are still trying to explain more systematically and plausibly phenomena they have already evaluated as illusory. This attitude would explain, at least partially, the neglect or denial of genuine religious experiences, which may have some other source besides the prevalent social conditions or the psychological state of the individual. Thus in spite of the endeavor to achieve some objectivity in summarizing anthropological views of religion, contemporary textbooks still exhibit some judgment on what religion is — and this judgment is not always positive.

CONCLUSION

The anthropological study of religion may not have made great strides since the days of Tylor and Frazer. It would, however, be unfair to state that no progress has been made over the last hundred years. Fieldwork studies have produced a wealth of reliable descriptive records about religious beliefs and rituals which early anthropologists never matched. Several textbooks have included examples of these studies, thus enhancing their work and demonstrating how interesting the study of religion can be (Hoebel 1972: 566-573; Swartz and Jordan 1976: 640-645). The functional approach, in spite of its flaws, does broaden our view of the uses

of religion. While a complete understanding of religious beliefs and actions is not attainable through functional analysis, few would doubt that it contributes to our apprehension and inter- pretation of religious data. Structural functional studies have raised serious questions on the nature of religion and its relation to social life in general — questions which are of interest also to normative disciplines, like philosophy and theology. Besides anthropological concern with the many primitive religions and emphasis on comparative studies have prepared the way for an understanding of religion as a universal phenomenon persisting in time and in space.

The anthropological insistence on the human creative element in the formation of religions is probably one of the most debatable tenets, especially from the point of view of the believer. Yet drawing attention to this human component has the advantage of providing a plausible, albeit incomplete, explanation of the variety of religious manifestations. Such human intervention may also be at play, unconsciously, in the process of religious change. The anthropological interest in religious change which can be substantiated by historical research is also important because it could point to contemporary evolutionary trends which might throw light on the nature of religion and its place in human life. In fact there is room for a new sub-discipline of anthropology, namely, "Applied Anthropology of Religion," which many social and religious reformers, among others, might find interesting and useful.[45]

In short, anthropological studies of religion, in spite of their shortcomings, contradictions and disagreements, open up new perspectives, leading the student to raise issues and try solutions which have so far been neglected. The limitations of anthropology of religion are twofold. Firstly, some aspects of religious phenomena are not open to the kind of empirical investigation which other aspects of human life might be. Secondly, anthropologists have, by their method and theory, restricted themselves to very speci- fically defined areas of research. Anthropology, therefore, cannot give a completely satisfactory interpretation and explanation of

[45] Many textbooks contain chapters on "Applied Anthropology," but such an application does not, as a rule, cover religion.

religious phenomena. Taking the above mentioned confines into consideration, it is still legitimate to conclude that anthropologists are responsible for a more valuable contribution to the study of religion than scholars in other fields are inclined to acknowledge.

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Recensions — Book Reviews

Ethnics and Indians: Social Relations in a Northwestern Ontario Town. By
David H. STYMEIST. Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1975. pp. viii $\#$ 98.
$8.95.

Stymeist's monograph is on ethnic relations in Crow Lake, a fictitious
name for a town whose real name one may discover after a five-minute
scanning of a decent Canadian atlas. His special interest is in the relationship
between the Indian people of the area, not many of whom reside permanently
in the town itself, and what he calls the 'white ethnics': Chinese, French,
Italians, Ukranians, etc. In effect, 'white ethnics' are those who are not
Indians. The monograph is a contribution to the Canadian Experience Series.
Contributors to the Series are expected to make explicit their methodology
and research techniques and to write in such a way that non-professionals and
students in the social sciences find the analyses comprehensible. Stymeist's
monograph fulfills these expectations.

Crow Lake began as a rail center during the first decade of the present
century, became slightly more diversified during the 1930's with the establish-
ment of a creosote plant and large sawmill, and eventually became what it
is today, a bureaucratic administrative and service center for a large hinter-
land region. Stymeist traces the connections between the ethnic make-up of
Crow Lake and its division of labour as the town passed through these
economic phases. In the early period ethnic origin coincided closely with
placement in the town's occupational and social status systems. However, over
the years 'white ethnicity' has declined in importance as a key feature of
social organization. People still recognize and have little influence on inter-
action, intermarriage, job allocation and the like.

While this process goes on among the non-indian townsmen, the distinction,
indeed cleavage, between them and the Indians remains as strong as ever.
The exclusion of Indians from certain spheres of town life, in particular the
economic, is documented by Stymeist. Anyone who thinks that prejudice and
discrimination are un-Canadian, felt and practiced only by a minority of people
with twisted personalities, will have their eyes opened by reading this book,
for it demonstrates how prejudice and discrimination against native people
are normal, are built into the system, to use a cliche. It is a cruel irony that
the town is heavily dependent on the Indian presence in the region, for
about 25% of its total jobs are directly connected to Indian health and other
services.

The scholarly literature on ethnic relations in Canada is criticized by
Stymeist for attributing an importance to ethnicity in Canada as a whole
which he found did not jibe with the situation in Crow Lake and for failing
to explain why natives are at the bottom of the Canadian totem pole. On

the first count, it is not much of a contribution to say, in effect, that what some writers have observed about the significance of ethnic differences in places X and Y does not hold true for Crow Lake. That the relations between, say, the Italians and French in Montreal are fraught with tensions and ambivalences which the French and Italians in Crow Lake do not experience is hardly surprising. On the other count, pertaining to the cast-like native and non-native relationship, Stymeist cites non of the Canadian literature which is perhaps most relevant to his enterprise. Studies of communities in the Arctic document the native and non-native split and attempt to explain the dynamics of it. To name a few recent authors, Nelson Graburn, Derek Smith, and Hugh Brody use one or another variant of the plural society model originally applied to colonial situations. As in the case of Crow Lake, so in these accounts we find that the ethnic differences among the 'white ethnics' pale in significance in the context of the overwhelming cleavage between native and non-native.

Despite these and a few other minor shortcomings, the monograph is very good and deserves a wide readership.

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Thomas R. BERGER. *Le Nord, Terre Lointaine, Terre Ancestrale,* Rapport de l'enquête sur le pipe-line de la vallée du Mackenzie, vol. I. Ministère des Approvisionnements et Services, Canada, 1977.

Le rapport Berger fait un répertoire explicite des arguments justifiant un refus de la construction d'un pipe-line à travers le Yukon du Nord. En même temps il recommande un délai de dix ans quant à la perspective d'examiner en termes plus adéquats l'implantation d'un tel projet dans la vallée du Mackenzie, à partir du delta du fleuve jusqu'à la frontière de l'Alberta. L'ambivalence de cette attitude réside dans la difficulté a-priorique de concilier les facteurs en présence:

    a. promotion d'un projet d'exploitation du Nord;

    b. respect des populations locales;

    c. préservation de la nature sauvage.

Il y a nous semble-t-il dans une perspective anthropologique de ce document, un plan implicite où sont focalisées des lectures complémentaires possibles; ce lieu est celui de la capacité que nous avons d'y voir notre propre pensée. Car, sujet de l'interrogation (le projet doit-il voir le jour?), moyens d'action et surtout décision à prendre, tout cela c'est nous, les Hommes Blancs du Nord Américain en cette fin du XXe siècle. Nous sommes en ce projet d'expansion vers le Nord, le seul terme réellement actif, opérationnel.

Face au milieu naturel nous nous imposons; notre mythologie d'un équilibre homme-nature n'est que la projection naïve et démocratique d'une mythologie plus ancienne et plus répandue: celle du retour aux origines.

Mais il y a aussi la confrontation avec nous-mêmes en présence des autres; les populations locales du Nord, autochtones et métisées. Ici, le contexte se charge des implications appartenant à un autre ordre, les arguments acquièrent un autre statut. Ce n'est plus un dialogue homme-nature, mais un dialogue entre hommes. Du moins essayons-nous de nous présenter la circonstance comme telle. Nous demandons aux hommes habitant le Nord leur avis sur l'intervention à faire. Voilà, je crois, le lieu où le face à face nous renvoit le mieux notre propre image.

Cette intervention, par qui est-elle pensée?

De sa réalisation qui est celui qui se charge?

De ses implications à brève ou à longue échéance, les Nordiques sont-ils conscients? Même si en ce moment historique ces hommes étaient *pour* le projet, agiraient-ils en pleine connaissance de cause? La question que nous leur posons s'adresse-t-elle véritablement à eux?

Dans cette action nous devons nous voir clairement. Nous faisons partie de ce groupe de l'humanité actuelle qui propose à la planète "son" modèle culturel. Les mutations qui se produisent aujourd'hui, même si parfois avec des variantes considérables, restent à l'intérieur de ce modèle. La dimension principale de notre "faire le monde" est peut-être en ce moment encore l'expansion. L'Homme Blanc est partout, avec ses techniques, avec ses idéologies. Que nous venions de l'Est ou de l'Ouest, nous présentons de manière flagrante les mêmes symptômes culturels.

Pour une autre caractéristique de notre culture, je prendrais le fait que pour nous le "modèle" ne se trouve ni dans la tradition, ni dans l'imitation. Pour notre culture le modèle se trouve dans le changement. Notre "être" n'habite plus une spatio-temporalité nécessaire; les "ici" et les "ailleurs", les "maintenant" et les "jadis", ainsi que les "venir", nous les avons traduits en acte. En acte de contemplation de notre pouvoir-faire. Avec fébrilité nous forgeons dans les "réalités" le visage de notre génie, avec angoisse nous lui demandons de nous confirmer. Tout cela sur les fondements d'une doctrine relativiste.

Le rapport Berger fait mention d'une frontière; celle du Nord. On pourrait lui attribuer des appellations multiples; la frontière de l'expansion économique; celle du maintien du milieu naturel; ou encore, la limite actuelle de la colonisation directe, etc. À propos de la colonisation, il me vient à l'esprit la réaction de M. René Lévesque, le Premier Ministre de la Province de Québec, face à la proposition faite lors du dernier congrès de son parti, concernant l'annulation des droits des Indiens sur les terres qu'ils habitent. J'avais eu alors l'impression que cet homme, au-delà de sa position politique, reculait avec appréhension devant l'idée de la promotion continue d'une politique de dépossession des autochtones, et qu'il faisait cela tout simplement en qualité d'Homme Blanc d'ici, concerné par le contenu éthique du dialogue.

En tant qu'anthropologue, je tiens cette frontière du Nord pour une frontière de pensée; de notre pensée. La question que je me pose n'est nullement

un défi: devant cette limite, serons-nous aptes à produire une pensée innovatrice? Serons-nous donc conséquents par rapport à notre propre modèle, ou bien allons-nous le traiter dans les paramètres d'un positivisme simpliste en le vidant de toute essentialité? Car on dira que dans une perspective "utile", l'expansion vers le Nord sera inévitable et munie de tous les attributs du concept de progrès. Reprise dans un langage politique, cette même expansion aura les avantages d'une avance sur les autres Blancs en compétition. Devant cette frontière il nous faut nous voir et nous dire tels que nous sommes et tels que nous voudrions être. Allons-nous monter de toutes pièces une mythologie humanitariste qui a pour but d'atténuer la contraditction vécue entre une tendance éthique et la croyance dans un progrès? Allons-nous jouer franchement?

Le rapport parle avec compétence et sens des responsabilités de "l'impact cumulatif" de la construction du pipe-line à travers le Yukon du Nord. Il nous est dit sans équivoque, que les implications futures de la réalisation d'un tel projet sont parfaitement prévisibles; qu'elles vont dans le sens de la modernisation de ces territoires. Le rapport nous signale le fait que ces implications ne sauraient être contrôlées ni maîtrisées dans leurs conséquences désastreuses, c'est-à-dire l'éclatement des structures spécifiques naturelles et culturelles du Nord.

Mais qu'est-ce qu'une culture et pourquoi tant en parler? La culture n'est-ce pas la marche en avant de l'homme? N'est-elle donc pas ce que nous sommes? Oui, une culture est aussi cela, car elle est une façon de concevoir le monde et la vie, une façon de les faire, de les créer en permanence, de les assumer, de les traverser. Une culture c'est la capacité de l'homme de produire des sens, de les vivre. Mais même si nous voulons soutenir l'unicité de notre connaissance du monde et sa "vérité", au nom de quels principes de notre intégration à la vie et à l'histoire pouvons-nous les imposer aux autres, alors que l'"être" de ces autres se situe différemment dans cette même histoire?

Toujours en tant qu'anthropologue, je réfléchis à ce problème; si une pensée culturelle n'est pas capable, ou bien si elle n'est plus capable, de produire des sens assimilables à son système de valeurs profondes, se trouve-t-elle en position viable? Ou bien fabrique-t-elle des contradictions impossibles à résoudre quel que soit le plan où elles sont formulées? Dans ce cas, cette culture vit-elle une regression?

Devant le problème de l'expansion vers le Nord allons-nous nous cantonner dans une pensée culturelle égocentriste? Ou bien serons-nous capables de transposer l'interrogation dans un code d'éthique humaine plus englobante?

<div align="right">
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