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Wechuge and Windigo: A Comparison of Cannibal Belief Among Boreal Forest Athapaskans and Algonkians

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RÉSUMÉ

Le mythe de Windigo, un monstre cannibal, est répandu chez les Algonquins des forêts boréales. Les Anthropologues ont appelé "psychose Windigo" le comportement associé à ce mythe. Cet article décrit un phénomène analogue au Windigo, Wechuge, chez les Beavers athapaska. Les significations contextuelles de ces deux phénomènes sont comparées. Pris dans son contexte, Wechuge apparaît comme une démonstration de pouvoir surnaturel. L'analyse remet en question le bien-fondé de la perception du Windigo comme psychotique: il s'agirait là d'une évaluation basée sur le contexte de l'anthropologue plutôt que sur celui des acteurs.

Belief in a cannibal monster known as Windigo has been reported by most students of boreal forest Algonkian culture. A number of authors (Cooper 1933; Hallowell 1955; Landes 1938; Parker 1960; Teicher 1960; Hay 1971) have linked belief in the Windigo monster to a behavioural complex involving threatened or actual cannibalism considered to be a culturally patterned form of psychosis. The literature on the Windigo phenomenon generally assumes that it represents psychological weakness and breakdown of the normally functioning personality. This diagnosis of Windigo behaviour as psychotic has not been seriously questioned in the literature even though all authors recognize that in none of the reported cases has there been first hand information on individual

case histories let alone analysis of subjects' lives by observers with experience in psychiatric diagnosis.

In reading through the literature on Windigo one is struck by a repetition of the following two statements: 1. The diagnostic feature of Windigo behaviour that automatically makes it psychotic is the intense unsocialized desire to eat human flesh and 2. Native explanation of the behaviour is that the person has been the victim of sorcery or possession by the Windigo spirit. Teicher (1960:5) says, "The outstanding symptom of the aberration known as windigo psychosis is the intense compulsive desire to eat human flesh. In many instances, this desire is satisfied through actual cannibal acts, usually directed against members of the individual's immediate family. In other instances, before authentic cannibalism takes place, the individual is either cured or killed... The individual who becomes a windigo is usually convinced that he has been possessed by the spirit of the windigo monster. He therefore believes that he has lost permanent control over his own actions and that the only possible solution is death." Hay (1971:1) says, "The windigo psychosis has long been regarded as a disorder specific to the people of the northern tribes of Algonkian-speaking Indians. The disorder is marked by the desire to eat human flesh — a desire to do something which is ordinarily extremely repugnant and horrifying to these people. ...To the Indians, the desire to eat human flesh was incomprehensible except as the result of sorcery or possession by the mythical windigo spirit." Parker (1960:603) describes it as "a bizarre form of mental disorder involving obsessive cannibalism" and regards the victim's belief in his possession by the Windigo spirit as an obsession "with paranoid ideas of being bewitched."

In the course of field work among the Athapaskan Beaver Indians (Dunne-za) of the Peace River area I have become acquainted with a form of cannibal belief and behaviour associated with this belief that are clearly related to the Algonkian Windigo and yet are central to a sense of cultural and individual strength rather than weakness. The cannibal figure, Wechuge, is as feared as the Algonkian windigo but because he has become "too powerful", not because he is in some sense psychotic. Comparison of the two phenomena leads to one to ask, 1. Are Athapaskan

and Algonkian cultures so different that the same cannibal monster belief can have almost opposite meanings in the two different contexts; 2. If the complex does indeed mean something different to the two groups why is this so? 3. It is possible that the idea of windigo as psychosis is more a function of our own categories of thought than that of the Indians themselves? This paper will describe the Dunne-za concept of Wechuge in terms of its meaning within the context of their ideas about supernatural power and then compare Wechuge to Windigo as it has been described, concluding with an examination of the three questions posed above.

WECHUGE AMONG THE DUNNE-ZA

Before I begin to describe Wechuge I must emphasize that the Dunne-za take it very seriously and believe that to discuss it frivolously is both foolish and dangerous to oneself and others. I trust that the reader will receive this information in the spirit of serious inquiry into the human condition in which it was received from the Dunne-za.

The idea of giant man-eating monsters is deeply engrained in Dunne-za mythology as it is in that of the Algonkians. Dunne-za myth cycles tell of a time when giant animals hunted and ate people. These animals behaved like people and the people were compelled to be their game. They are referred to as Wolverine Person, Spider Person, Beaver Person, Frog Person etc. Although they were all overcome and transformed into their present form by the culture hero their power is still in existence. Indeed, it is these giant People-eaters who confer supernatural power to the child on his or her vision quest. Contact with this power gives a person the ability to find and transform animals into food. In the context of an underlying belief that animals are sentient volitional creatures like ourselves the idea of Person-like animals who eat animal-like people is a logical transformation of the economic fact that people must eat animals in order to live. Both Algonkians and Athapaskans share a common mythical background of belief in giant Person-eating animals, a transformative culture hero and some form of association between supernatural power and the eating of creatures who are sentient and volitional.

The behavioural characteristics attributed by the Dunne-za to Wechuge are remarkably like those attributed to the various Person-eating giant animals of mythic times. The giant animals do not pursue their victims with inchoate frenzy but rather use artifice and a knowledge of their game's desires and weaknesses to bring them down. They hunt people with the cultural strategy and intelligence that people use to hunt animals. Similarly, Wechuge lives apart from the people and uses their desire for food to lure them to him. He is like one of the giant Person-eating animals of mythic times come back in human form. The following stories illustrate this quality of the Wechuge monster:

WECHUGE STORY TOLD BY JUMBIE

One time a long time ago a whole bunch of people were camped together. It was wintertime and lots of families camped one place. They didn't move around. There must have been about 100 people camped there. One night one young man heard somebody calling him outside his tipi. The person outside called in to him, "Somebody wants you to visit him." It was the middle of the night but the young man thought, "Maybe somebody got a moose. Maybe they want to feed me. That must be why they are calling me in the middle of the night." He got up and went outside.

Wechuge, the man who had called him, was standing there. Wechuge came forward and choked the young man so fast that he didn't have a chance to scream. Then Wechuge carried him back where he was coming from. Nobody knew a thing about what had happened. Wechuge was a badman. He didn't live with those people. He stayed by himself and then followed people's tracks.

The young man that Wechuge carried off was married. His wife had heard somebody calling her husband but she hadn't really woken up and she didn't go with him. Lots of time went by and her husband didn't come back. She began to worry. She went outside. It was still night time and there wasn't a fire in the camp. Everyone was asleep. The woman went to some people and woke them up. She told them, "Somebody called my husband and

then he went out. That was a long time ago. I don't know where he is."

They got up and started looking around. They woke up everyone in the camp, all the people, but they didn't find that man. Then they lit torches, big sticks and started looking for tracks. Soon they found the tracks of the big bad man, that Wechuge. They knew darn well that he had taken that man. "If he's taken one, he will take every one of us," they said. All the men and young men gathered together. They had to decide what to do. They are going to follow Wechuge.

One young man who was crazy thought that he was a little bit tough.

"I'll be the first one to go after that man," he said. One middle-aged man thought he wouldn't make it. He thought that the boy wasn't as tough as Wechuge. He said, "I'll try him first',, but the boy said, "No, I want to." So the middle aged man said "all right". He knew he would come second anyway.

All the men and boys went out after Wechuge. They followed his tracks. Not too far away they saw him. He was sitting by the fire, spitting the young man he had killed. He had opened him from neck to ass and taken out his guts, and he was roasting the whole man.

The men and boy circled around behind Wechuge in the bush. When they got close the young boy jumped on Wechuge's back. He took his shoulders in his hands and tried to pull him back. Wechuge sat there just like a rock. He didn't budge. Then he reached around behind his back with one hand and grabbed the young man's hand. Then threw him in the fire.

Just then the middle-aged man jumped on Wechuge. They wrestled for an hour. Then the middle-age man grabbed the cannibal by the neck and by the leg and broke his back. He threw him in the fire. But that Wechuge was tough. He didn't die from that. All his stomach and back had turned to ice. That's why they couldn't kill him easily. They could see the ice melting out of him as he lay on the fire. For the rest of the night and all the next day they kept the fire going. At last he died. Until all the ice had gone he still wanted to get up and kill people.

WECHUGE STORY TOLD BY AKU

I don't know this story well. There's someone I don't know. The people knew that one lake always had lots of fish. Whenever they were hungry or starving in the wintertime they would go to that lake. There was one man who was eating people. He was *Wechuge.* He knew that all the people would be coming to that lake so he went there and made himself a great wooden tipi and put holes through the logs so he could see when people were coming. He was a very tough man, big and tough. He didn't kill those people with a gun or bow. He would dream about dirty stuff. Then he would take green logs and carve plates and spoons and cups from them. Then he would carve something on them, monsters and things like that with a stone knife. When people came he would ask them if they would like to eat. The people were hungry so they would say yes. He caught lots of fish for them and he fed them from those plates. The people ate what he gave them. In not more than a minute they would be dead. That man was a good medicine man, really strong (mayine natsut). He went on like that, killing those people and eating them for a long time. He ate lots of people.

One summer one boy and his grandmother were really hungry. They had heard about the man who was eating people, but the only way that they could eat was to go to that lake. They decided to stay at a different place on the lake from the cannibal. The boy wanted to visit him all the same. "I think I'll go see that man," he told his grandmother. She told him, "Don't go," but he said, "I'm just going to visit him." Twice more she told him not to go. That boy knew something. Since he was a baby, the buffalo raised him. Finally his grandmother agreed and the boy went to the cannibal's camp.

The boy sat down and the cannibal offered him fish on a plate he had carved. The boy took the plate and finished it off. He didn't die. That boy was not really man. He was from the buffalos. He was half-animal, half-man, a different person. (gradi-dunne; achu-dunne). The cannibal told his wife, "You'd better give him another plate." So they gave him another plate filled with fish. The boy finished all the fish on his plate but still he

didn't die. "How come you don't die?" the cannibal said. "All the other people have died." The boy said, "Why, I'm not filled up yet." That old lady had found the boy in the buffalo hair. He was like Aghintosdunne. "Grandfather," he said, "I thought you were just feeding me, I didn't know you were trying to kill me."

The cannibal got his arrows. He couldn't kill him with the plates so he was going to kill him with arrows. The boy was still licking his plate. He told the boy, "You'd better throw up the food I fed you. I want to eat it." The boy made ready to throw up in the cannibal's hands. The only thing that came out in his hands was a little green frog. The cannibal swallowed that frog and sat down. The little boy sat down too. He looked at the man. He was sitting still, just looking at one spot on his foot. He didn't feel very well. The boy knew that was going to happen so he went back.

Not long after that, the cannibal's wife came after him. "Your grandfather tells you to come and fix him up. Something's the matter with him, I don't know what."

"I don't know either," the boy said, but the woman said, "Just come and take a look," so they went back. When they got to the cannibal he was lying still. He didn't know anything. The boy took some black sticks from the fire and put them on his neck. The black went right through him and he died. "I can't fix this man up. He's already dead," the boy said. That's how he killed fish man.

In the first story Wechuge is described as a bad man who "stayed by himself and followed people's tracks". In the second story Wechuge placed his camp along a well known people's trail. In other stories he makes a trail leading to his fortified camp by bending grass stems, the sign used by the Dunne-za to tell others who are hungry they have found food. Wechuge as portrayed in these stories is not a psychotic obsessed with the desire to eat human flesh but is rather a human who behaves like one of the man-eating animals of mythic times, hunting people by taking advantage of their desires and weaknesses. It is in this context of Wechuge as a person who behaves like one of the giant animals before the culture hero's transformation that the

common description of Wechuge as someone who has become "too strong" becomes intelligible. For a real person to become like Wechuge in the stories would be for that person to behave like the giant animal that is the basis of his supernatural power. Indeed, the cannibal in the story of Aku is called "Fish Man," implying that he is the giant animal in human form.

The Wechuge concept of the Dunne-za is more than a set of stories about people who act like the giant animals before the culture hero's transformations. There are times and circumstances when people actually begin to become Wechuge. I know of only one instance of more or less authenticated cannibalism and that was said to have occurred sometime in the late 19th century to a man named Tsegute. However, real people that I knew personally were said to have begun the transformation to Wechuge and been cured.

BECOMING WECHUGE

To become Wechuge is to become "too strong". Wechuge is not an unspecified Person-eater but is always the particular Person-eating monster that is a person's animal friend and the source of his supernatural power. The integration of Wechuge with ideas about supernatural power is very clear in Dunne-za thought and practice. Although Algonkian cultures also have a vision quest based concept of supernatural power the ethnographies do not give a clear picture about the degree of connection between belief in supernatural power and the windigo phenomenon.

The possibility of becoming Wechuge underlies every situation in which a Dunne-za person with supernatural power finds himself. Older people are generally acknowledged to have more power than younger people or at least give out more obvious signs of their medicine powers to those around them. The space around a powerful person is to be respected. One must learn the proper respect for the space around such a person so as not to violate one of the personal taboos that go with his power. These taboos are actions relating to the action of the giant animals who hunted people in mythic times. I learned about some of these taboos by

inadvertently violating them or seeing them infringed upon by other white people. I never saw one consciously violated by another adult Dunne-za but I was told of occasions when such a violation occurred. It was this type of conscious violation of a person's medicine taboos that was said to bring on the appearance of Wechuge.

Once in the camp of an old man named Jumbie a white woman who has lived in the Peace River area for many years and claims to know the Indian People well attempted to take a picture of the old man with a flash camera. She did not ask permission to take the picture and when the camera was raised some of the younger people in the camp told her not to take the picture. "Old man he don't like that kind." Although Dunne-za do not like to have their pictures taken without having been given the opportunity to give their consent, the issue in this case was more serious. It was the flash that the old man "did not like." The white woman persisted in attempting to take the picture, and Jumbie, seeing that she would not respect his personal space, dove beneath a sleeping robe in the back of the tent. To the white woman this was an act of fear and reinforced her belief that Indians are child-like and superstitious. To every Dunne-za present, however, Jumbie's action demonstrated his power, not weakness and bravery rather than fear. To have been exposed to the flash would have made him "too strong". It would have risked bringing down to earth the power of Giant Eagle whose flashing eyes still penetrate from heaven to earth in time of storm. The power would have compelled the man to become the Person-eating monster and the man would have lost his own will and judgement to that of the all consuming monster inherent within himself by virtue of his encounter with it during the experience of visionary transformation as a child.

On another occasion I was driving with the Dunne-za Prophet or Dreamer, Charlie Yahey and turned on the car radio to country and western music. A young man in the car with us reached over and turned off the radio, an action I found most unusual since most Dunne-za enjoy this kind of music and normally would not interfere with another person's choice. In reply to my question I was again told simply that "Old man he don't like that". I did

not understand the meaning of what had happened for more than a year. I was only able to learn that Charlie Yahey could not hear any sound make by a stretched string or hide and hence he could not hear guitar music. Indeed, once in town he had been in a cafe when the juke box began playing guitar music and he had begun to get "too strong". He was hustled out of town and into the bush where another person sang his medicine song to overcome the emerging monster within the old man. Just what this monster was became clear to me when I connected the events I have related with a story about Giant Spider Man who lured people to a mountain top by swinging a sort of bull-roarer around his head. The sound make by this stretched spider thread attracted the natural curiosity of passing humans and when they approached they were killed by the spider man who sucked their body fluids. To make a similar sound in a similar way would bring the mythic monster back from then and there to here and now. The Spider Man within the human would become too strong, and all the people would be in danger.

For every power there is a myth, and within each of these stories is the information relevant to the personal taboos demanded of a person who has encountered that power in a vision quest. To act in a way that evokes the behaviour of the mythic monster associated with a person's medicine is to activate the myth and bring it into reality. The space around a person with recognized supernatural power can not be taken for granted. One is expected to know and respect the mythic role into which he would be forced to step at the appropriate signal. Although at times I inadvertently violated personal taboos and thus became aware of them, these violations were not interpreted as intentional affronts and hence did not trigger the otherwise automatic response. My behaviour was viewed as that of a child. Certain missteps were accepted as part of the learning process.

Adult Dunne-za are reasonably expected to know the taboos and hence the supernatural powers of the people with whom they come into contact. When in doubt they are expected to ask if it is alright to act in a certain way or offer a certain food to a person whose powers are unknown to them. One person told me about the taboos associated with medicine power as follows:

> If I know something (i.e., have supernatural power), and you feed me meat and I know there's fly eggs in it I have to eat it. When Asa (grandfather) was alive Mom was always careful when she fed him. When we fed him we always told him, "Look through the meat". If there's fly eggs he doesn't want to eat it. If we don't tell him then he has to eat it. But lots of people make a mistake. That's why lots of people have gotten strong. They make a mistake. I wouldn't be like that, me. I wouldn't be like that now. I know it helps lots to know something but you have to watch all the time. People are scared of you. Even when I go down to Rose Prairie they're afraid to feed me. They have to ask me first if I like to eat that. Even Beaver meat, they ask me if I eat that kind of meat. I say, "Sure, I eat it." Lots of Indians are afraid of any kind of man. You never know if, me, if I know something. You wouldn't know. Just like that, you don't know with another kind of person.

Anyone other than a child or whiteman is expected to know and observe the medicine taboos of their fellow Dunne-za. To violate these taboos is to bring Wechuge among the people. The account quoted above came up because I had been told previously that the person's grandfather (Asa) had not too long before begun to get "too strong" after being given meat with fly eggs in it by some thoughtless people from another community. Briefly, the story as I was told it goes as follows:

Asa, a man in his early seventies, had been married to a woman in her early thirties about ten years previously and had had several children by her. Recently she had left him and taken up residence with a younger man in the same community. The old man now had his own house and was fed by whichever other family had fresh meat. His youngest daughter, a girl of about 5, lived with him and slept in the same bed. He was in a sense everybody's grandfather and was called Asa by most of the younger people. Whenever meat was being distributed the hunter's wife always made sure to send a portion over with some child to Asa.

As I was told the story, some people from another community were visiting the reserve where Asa lived. Perhaps they were from the group to which his ex-wife belonged, although I was never told outright who these people were. A woman or women among the visitors sent Asa some meat that had been hanging for a time. There were fly eggs on this meat. Because the meat was a gift and because he had not been asked by the visitors if he could

eat it, he had no choice but to accept the gift. He ate the meat and began to get "too strong". He was a tiny man, but his behaviour was frightening to the point of throwing the whole community into panic. The little old man had climbed up onto his bed and begun jumping up and down like a frog singing his medicine song. It was well known in the community that one of his medicine animals was frog. One sign by which they knew this was that he did not play drums and did not even like to hear the sound of drums. When the people were singing and dancing or playing the stick game, he would retire from the scene. His grandson told me:

> You know that a long time ago Asa didn't like even to hear the sound of drums. You know those frogs? Even now you can hear them gamble; one bunch of frogs up the river and one down the creek, you can hear them making lots of noise back and forth, and when some night the bottom stream they don't make any more noise, that's when they lose. That top one making lots of noise, they're the winners. It just goes back and forth. Old man told me about that. That's why he doesn't like to hear drums long time ago. Asa said "I've been staying with those people on the bottom of the lake." You can't beat me gambling." He heard that drum on the bottom of the lake long time ago. That's why he doesn't like to hear that drum. When he was younger he was like that. But when he got older he got used to it. He didn't like to hear the drum because he heard it down there. He couln't play the drum and he couldn't see people throw it. He stayed with them and they gave him his power. Those frogs gave him his power, their power, and they heard that drum up there in the same time. They play. Up here on land that's different. That's why he doesn't like it.

To the people in camp, the little old man bouncing up and down on his bed was becoming the Person-eating monster Wechuge. To an outside observer his behaviour would have appeared ridiculous and deranged, an object of pity rather than fear, but to his fellow Dunne-za he was becoming the Giant Frog, a warrior and gambler of superhuman power. The people could no longer relate to him as a person. Some gave way to their fear and prepared to flee from him. Unless the power growing stronger within him was returned to its proper place he would begin to eat his own lips. In this first act of the self-consuming monster the people would see themselves consumed, for he had been one of them. Once the flesh of his lips had lodged within his body he

would be the all powerful invincible Wechuge monster of mythic time and space. When children talk too loudly and out of place they are told "Naa-za wõtlõ", literally "your lips too much". The import of this everyday admonition is loosely equivalent to "shut up" but its more subtle implication is, "with your excess of lips you are consuming our common space." When he had consumed his own lips he would no longer be able to speak to them and could be reunited with them only by eating them. Once he had eaten his lips his internal organs would turn to ice, and he would be beyond them in power and cunning. Unless the Giant Frog could be sent back to its home beneath the lake the people would be in mortal danger.

The old man's frog-like performance began when only women and children were in camp. To attempt to cure him they turned to the person closest to his power, the 5 year old daughter who slept as he did under the medicine bundle containing, among other things, tiny images of frogs that were alive and moved when the bundle was opened. The young girl took down his medicine bundle and brought it close to him. She who had been closest to him physically and had slept under the influence of his medicine was able to approach him and gently pass the bundle over his body. As the story was told, this action had the desired effect and he began to grow calm. The cure that she began through the application of his own medicine was completed when other people arrived on the scene and used their own powers to bring him back. I was not told directly the logic of the cure, but it seems to have been that she was able to entice the power of the giant frog to leave his body and return to its place within the medicine bundle. Neither was I told exactly why giving the old man meat with fly eggs in it would cause him to go Wechuge. I do not know for sure if a taboo against such meat was something peculiar to his medicine power, but there is an obvious connection of eater-eaten between frogs and flies, so that it would make sense that to eat the eggs of flies, the food of frogs, would intensify his medicine power and effect his transformation into the giant frog whose flies were people.

I was told another story of the Wechuge performance that comes when a person's medicine is violated. In this case my

informant was a five year old girl who had been directly involved in the affair. All the other people were well known to me. One long-time member of the band in question was a lame widower in his early sixties. Because he had not taken up permanent residence with a woman his house had developed into a place where teen-age boys and young unmarried men stayed. One of his medicine powers was wolf, although it was unknown to me until I learned of it through the young girl's description of the wechuge incident. One of the young men who stayed with him from time to time, a grandson of the old man with frog power, had gotten into a pattern of violent, destructive and "crazy" behaviour. He was fascinated with guns and knives but disclaimed traditional medicine power. Some time after the events herein described he was killed in a fire.

On this occasion, for reasons unknown to me, he had taken the medicine bundle of the lame widower from where it hung above where he slept and hidden it somewhere in the bush. This happened when the people were camping in tents during the Summer. The lame man began to grow "too strong" at a time when most of the adults were in town for a stampede. On the afternoon in question he was alone in camp with three children under six years old. Because he did not often go out into the bush he was frequently called into service as babysitter.

During the afternoon the children, my 5 year old informant among them, saw him working quietly by himself sharpening something. They noticed uneasily that he was carefully filing a long nail to a sharp point. The children well knew the story of Giant Wolf whose teeth are like bright metal and who, when sent out to measure the extent of the world by the creator, came back with a human arm in his mouth.

According to my informant's account, the lame man then began to "act strange". He sang something over some water and then told a boy around 6 years old that he should drink it. He told the boy he would like it and it would make him strong. This is significant in that traditionally before being sent out on a vision quest the child must fast and particularly abstrain from drinking water. Water has a number of other symbolic associations in the context of supernatural power and medicine acquisition. The boy

drank the water and then he too began to "act strange". At this, the lame man seized him and drove the sharpened nail into his hand. The boy then went berserk, grabbed his father's rifle, loaded it, and began firing wildly around the camp. At this, the two little girls remaining fled the camp and went to where the grandfather of one of them was passing the time of day in a cafe on the highway. He returned to camp, disarmed the boy and overcame the lame man first with force and later with his own medicine song and coat acting as a medicine coat. (These are the traditional curative practices used when a child comes in from the bush after the vision quest unable to speak human language and shy like an animal of the human camp, when a person is sick and when a person has been brought back from a wechuge performance.)

Although I have never seen a wechuge performance first hand I have been told of episodes involving people I knew well. Perhaps these accounts were actually more meaningful that the impressions I would have had as an outside observer, since they describe the events in terms that are symbolically significant to the context of Dunne-za belief in medicine power. I cannot say what "really happened" in these two cases but I can clearly say more than that wechuge is caused by "possession by a cannibal monster".

Although I was not told this in so many words I think it would be an accurate abstraction from the nexus of events and symbols to say that Wechuge is seen as a return of the cannibal monsters of the mythic times. A person begins to act like the mythic animal (jumping up and down, making shiny metal teeth, etc.) when an action by others violates the taboos inherent in the possession of a particular medicine power. The sound of a stretched string will make a person with spider power too strong, eating fly eggs or contact with drums will make a person with frog power too strong, cooking food in an electrical storm, eating red berries, or seeing a flash camera will make someone with Giant Eagle power too strong, stealing or violating a medicine bundle will make its owner too strong. Snake medicine is an interesting case I do not have time to explain here, but part of the complex is that having daughters is the tabooed event that will make the person's power too strong.

In each case the violation of a symbolic taboo associated with the mythic charter of a medicine power will make the person possessing that power too strong, the first stage in becoming Wechuge. If the person is not cured and his power put back into the myth and the medicine bundle, he will begin to eat his own lips, which will turn to ice within him. From this point on it is believed that the person will have become the invincible wechuge monster that appears in the first two stories cited in this paper. Thus, the wechuge complex among the Dunne-za involves at least the following points of focus: 1. myths about the ways in which the giant animals of various species hunted and consumed people, 2. the mythically patterned experience of the vision quest, in which an all-powerful animal gives a human child the power to hunt animals, 3. violation of personal medicine taboo which activates power inherent in the myth, 4. transformation of a person whose medicine has been violated into Wechuge, a monster that eats people. These points of focus integrate into a meaningful symbolic pattern.

The myth of giant animals is a precondition for the transformation of the vision quest, and the transformation induced by a violation of the taboo brings back the myth. The myth is a charter for the vision quest transformation experience, subsequent taboo, and Wechuge performance. Both vision quest and Wechuge performance are transformations of a person's experience into the mythic mode but where in the vision quest the transformation must take place outside of the social circle, in the wechuge performance the transformation takes place in the presence of others. Alone, the child who must be fed by others is given the power to transform the lives of animals into the life of the people; within a social setting in which this power is not respected, the hunter turns upon the human beings (Dunne-za) who have become like animals to him. He becomes the hunter who follows the tracks of people. After meeting a giant animal in the bush on his vision quest the child returns to camp with his power. After meeting with this Power in camp the adult is forced to return to the bush.

The person becoming Wechuge is not demented but simply a person compelled to act upon the logic of his experience in the world. Certainly, his behaviour is motivated by a need to

validate a status claim that is being publicly challenged, but presumably for the person himself the mythically patterned experience of the vision quest is sufficiently authentic to validate his own belief in his medicine powers. The Dunne-za strongly believe that you cannot fake medicine power, and they do not practice its sale or transfer by inheritance or any other means.

I do not know the intricacies of interpersonal politics among the Dunne-za well enough to say why a challenge to someone's medicine power would be precipitated in the first place or how those said to have violated a taboo would feel in a group swept by real terror of a man-eating monster at large in their midst. The social drama of which the wechuge performance is but a small segment has other issues besides those to which I have addressed myself in this paper.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The summary and conclusion I draw from the scene among the Dunne-za I have described is as follows: The Dunne-za are a people who have long lived in large part from the bodies of animals they have hunted. In the round of Dunne-za experience people follow the tracks of animals, meet them, take their lives and take them into their own lives, the life of the camp (kwõ), a social as well as physical place. Animals are known to be creatures of volition and experience, and so their distinctive habits, preferences and specific behavioural characteristics are in many ways brought into the life of the camp. Diet, clothing, movement, and even mood are conditioned by the life experience of the animals. The myths provide examples of distinctive and recognizable animal behaviours transformed into cultural terms; the vision quest gives experiential instruction and validation of the connection between life in the bush and life in camp, the realms of animal and human social experience. Wechuge becomes "too strong" when the world of his everyday experience tips the balance into the animal mode of experience translated into human social terms. In the vision quest the person is alone and the animal medicine moves within him, the possession of a benevolent spirit. His subsequent return to the social circle will bring the power of the

benefactor's experience of life into line with the purposes of the people. If instead of receiving his return as the return of benevolent power to the camp, the people consume the space inhabited by his medicine power, it will come back to them only as image of self opposition. When a child's voice consumes the social space they say to him, "Naa-za wontlõ", "Your lips too much". When people within the group for whatever reason refuse to provide the social space within which a person's essence can manifest itself, the group consumes itself and projects this in the person of Wechuge, the role that must be played by the logic of the one whose taboo has been violated. Wechuge must consume them all unless a benevolent power once again befriends the person. Wechuge must consume his lips, his means of communication with the minds of humans and the bodies of animals. Wechuge must consume himself as seen in others unless others see themselves in him. Wechuge, myth and actor, is a performance required of the social logic in human (Dunne-za) experience.

There is no "Wechuge Psychosis"; even though every participant in the drama becomes somewhat crazed by the intensity of it. The wechuge performance is more terryfying than mere deviance. It is experienced as the reality of the social body consuming itself, the Giant Animal consuming the people in their childhood. It is a sickness borne by the people of the camp as a whole and cured only by the benevolent application of supernatural power from within the group. The ice within a person who cannot return to the social circle can only be overcome through his death and the application of fire, the symbol of camp life, to the remains. No one among the Dunne-za known to me had known a person who had gone so far, although the story of the cannibal Tsekute who was said to have eaten the parents of people known to me was still fresh on the people's lips.

The performance of the wechuge role seems to have been required more often when people from different groups came together. It seldom occurred within a group of people who were working smoothly together. One would suspect therefore that the incidence of wechuge performance would increase with any increase in the rate of movement of individuals from group to group. Any situation that brought together many people who were unknown

to one another or unused to living together would probably encourage the wechuge role to develop. It seems significant that the story of Tsekute, the only actual person said to have become Wechuge, occurred at a time of maximum social upheaval and was linked to the elaboration of the Plateau Prophet Dance as described by Spier (1935) among the Dunne-za. In every case of wechuge performer brought back within the social realm the precipitating challenge came from a person or persons in some sense outside the social circle. "Women from another reserve" brought meat with fly eggs in it. Hearing the juke box in town precipitated the appearance of giant spider. A young man fascinated by guns but unable to hunt brought on the wolf with shiny teeth. In every case Wechuge came as an outsider who threatened the group from within. Even the white person with flash camera or radio brought a response from the Dunne-za that the power must be respected.

In conclusion I should like to return to the question of comparing the cannibal theme in Algonkian and Athapaskan cultures. I do not know from the available ethnography if the cannibal monster belief and behaviour "windigo psychosis" is symbolically linked to the vision quest, medicine power and mythic man eating monsters in Algonkian cultures as it is among the Dunne-za. The literature tells us only that cannibal monsters existed in myth and behaviour in Algonkian societies that were also known to have the vision quest and medicine powers.

Perhaps the behaviour described as "windigo psychosis" was not integrated into cannibal monster myth, the vision quest and a belief in medicine power among the Algonkians in the way I have described for the Dunne-za. The Dunne-za themselves articulated differences they perceived between themselves and the Cree. Cree medicine could be bought and sold, for instance, but in the only case I knew of where a Dunne-za bought medicine from a Cree the purchaser (who was the very same Asa whose medicine was frog) was thought to have been swindled.

Within the context of boreal forest cultural adaptations there must of course be considerable variation in the ways homologous elements of culture are integrated, but I would be very much surprised to find an element of belief and practice as basic as

the cannibal theme to be simply un-integrated into the mythical and metaphysical nexus of Algonkian culture. Supposing that it had at some time been integrated into myth and medicine in a way somewhat similar to that of wechuge among the Dunne-za, then one might look to history to explain the apparent differences between windigo and wechuge. In general the Algonkians have experienced a longer period of disruptive influence from contact with Europeans than the Dunne-za and have particularly undergone more pressures that caused mixing of populations. Given an aboriginal system of meaning like that associated with wechuge one would therefore expect an increase in wechuge like incidents and perhaps an ultimate deterioration of the concept from strength to weakness. In time, fear of the performance might become more compelling than the reintegration of its cure.

I return to the questions posed at the beginning of this paper. Are Athapaskan and Algonkian peoples of the boreal forest so different from one another that the cannibal monster belief has opposite meanings in the two contexts: If the meanings are different why is this so? Is the idea of "windigo psychosis" an interpretive projection from our own categories of thought? In light of the preceding detailed description of wechuge and its place within an integrated set of symbols and meanings I can offer the following suggestions.

1. Athapaskan and Algonkian behavioural adaptations to the boreal forest are similar in general outline. Both cultures include a concept of medicine power, the vision quest, and myths about giant animals transformed by a culture hero. Descriptions of Athapaskan and Algonkian social organization and personality indicate a general similarity. Differences with respect to ownership of hunting territories have been shown to be largely a product of different acculturative experience. In both areas human patterns of life must be integrated with the patterns of animal life. Observers have described the cultural psychology of the two groups of people in similar terms.

It may be, however, that from similar natural and cultural environments the Algonkians and Athapaskans developed a common image of the cannibal in two equally possible but different

directions. Among the Dunne-za Wechuge is truly feared and must be killed if he cannot be cured, but a person's performance of the wechuge role is a sign of his medicine's strength, not of his personal weakness. It is the role that is feared rather than the person acting in it. It may be that Windigo is feared because in it the role of cannibal has consumed the person of the actor. Such a shift in emphasis could perhaps account for the apparently greater incidence among the Algonkians of violent death as an outcome of a windigo incident. It may also be that the Dunne-za pattern of behavioural taboo relating myths about giant animals, the vision quest, and the performance of a cannibal role, is simply not part of the Algonkian complex. Perhaps the similarities between windigo and wechuge result from an integration into Dunne-za conceptual terms of specific elements of the windigo complex, (eating of the lips, ice in the gut, burning of the body). The comparison of wechuge and windigo points out a lack of information on the symbolic integration of Algonkian myth, vision quest, and belief in supernatural power.

2. I have suggested that if the meanings of wechuge and windigo are different in the two contexts the divergence could have come about either through a lengthy movement of the cannibal image in two equally possible but different directions within the two traditions or through a more rapid shift in the meaning of windigo due to recent acculturative influences. The latter hypothesis seems the most economical and may account for a large part of whatever real difference in meaning exists between the two cannibal images. Although windigo may never have been performed specifically upon the violation of a medicine taboo in the way I have described for wechuge it seems likely that it was at one time a role performance somehow connected to a concept of medicine power and that the flux of history changed it as it changed the aboriginal system of land use into what has been described by a variety of western observers as an overpowering fear of the cannibal monster appearing among the people. It is well known from other parts of the world that the dislocation of stable social relationships, systems of meaning, and ecological adaptions is often accompanied by an increase in witchcraft activity and related breaches in confidence.

3. The literature on windigo starts from an assumption that it is a culturally patterned form of psychosis. It attempts to explain the relatively few instances of cannibal behaviour and the more common fear and anxiety about it by reference to generalizations about underlying Indian personality characteristics. The assumption that windigo belief and behaviour is psychotic has gained a kind of tacit acceptance because of our own culture's willingness to reify the labels we have become accustomed to using to describe a phenomenon we do not otherwise understand.

Windigo behaviour may indeed prove to be a sign of personality disintegration among Algonkian peoples. There certainly is a commonsense reaction that tells us you have to be crazy to want to eat your friends and relatives. The element of compulsive desire and craving for human flesh that appears in many of the windigo cases may point to a "psychotic" breakdown of normal emotions, motivations, and satisfactions in people who kill or are killed as cannibal monsters, but although contorted, even aberrant, windigo behaviour differs from most psychotic behaviour in our own culture in that it is believed to be genuine and real by the members of society as well as by the afflicted individual. People believed to be psychotic in our culture believe themselves to be actors in situations the reality of which is not subscribed to by normal members of society. Normal people do not accept the psychotic's claim that he is Napoleon in our society, in contrast to the Algonkian situation in which the person who acts like a cannibal monster is genuinely believed to be one. Our labelling system when applied to the windigo phenomenon breaks down on close examination. We label the behaviour of the windigo actor as psychotic but not the beliefs of these who accept his role as real.

I conclude that any understanding of either belief or behaviour must emerge from an understanding of its context be that culture history or case history. We can only understand belief or behaviour as a meaningful element in articulation with other elements of meaning. I think I know enough of the Dunne-za wechuge performance in the context of its relation to vision quest experience, myth, and medicine, to distinguish it from behaviour I have seen labelled as psychotic in our culture and to question the labelling of Algonkian windigo as psychotic by the culture of anthropology.

I trust there are those among us who will be in a position to respond to some of the questions raised by this comparative essay, and we should be fortunate to hear from them of their knowledge.

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Mediating Roles in Ritual and Symbolism: Northwest Mexico and the Pacific Northwest

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RÉSUMÉ

Les pouvoir reliés à la personnification cérémonielle, aux pitreries rituelles, au fripon, et à d'autres rôles mythico-rituels sont présentés comme enracinés dans leur capacité de médiation. Les modes d'analyse développés par Levi-Strauss, Leach et Victor Turner sont utilisés pour étudier les rôles des protagonistes dans les cérémonies de Pâques des Mayo, du Nord-Ouest du Mexique, et d'autres rôles analogues au Sud-Est et au Nord-Ouest de l'Amérique du Nord. On y distingue les médiations et les médiateurs métaphoriques et métonymiques. On détermine le rôle principal du médiateur dans la transformation mythique et rituelle.

INTRODUCTION

Several years ago I (Crumrine 1968, 1969, and 1974) considered alternative explanations of ceremonial impersonation and ritual clowning, especially in regard to the Mayo Indian Easter ceremonial, Northwest Mexico. Although psychological and sociological explanations are valid and productive, culturological understandings seemed to be a potential and little developed area for research. Since that time a number of thought-provoking studies have been published or called to my attention. Among others, Alfonso Ortiz (1972) and Louis Hieb (1972) have generated additional insights into Pueblo Indian ritual drama and ritual clowning, Victoria Bricker (1973) has examined ritual humour in Chiapas, Mexico, and Fernando Benitez (1970) has published detailed information on the Cora Indian ritual of Northwest Mexico. Edmund Leach

(1961, 1964) and Mary Douglas (1966) have examined cultural categories and taboos associated with category mediators. Laura Makarius has summarized a great deal of data upon ritual clowns, tricksters and cultural hereos, and blacksmiths (Makarius 1968, 1970, 1973) and has published a rather sharp attack (Makarius 1972) on my *Note* discussing the use of the mask in Mayo ritual impersonation (Crumrine 1968/69). Although her reduction of these roles to an original violation of blood and incest taboos is questionable, her attempt to discover parallels unifying these ritual roles and mythical actors provides a very useful direction for future research. Rather, in my opinion (Crumrine 1974), the enduring power of such ritual roles and mythical characters is rooted in their liminal nature or ability to mediate oppositions and link and fuse conceptual categories and discrete classes. Thus they embody a means for the generation of transformations. This same theme runs through a number of articles which appear in the Symposium, "Forms of Symbolic Action" as organized by Victor Turner (Spencer 1969) and appears in his own publications (V. Turner 1967, 1969, 1974). In this paper we shall continue the discussion of the structure, meaning and function, of mediating figures. The dramatization of mediation exemplifies broadspread if not universal distribution among human groups. The problem, why this process often involves clown and trickster type figures and highly ritualized behaviour, provides the theme of this paper.

In order to suggest the importance of this ritual role, we turn to a transformational formulation as suggested by Lévi-Strauss (1963) and applied by the Marandas (1962 and 1971), Mary Foster (1973), Crumrine and Macklin (1974), among others. I refer to the "law" of mythology as suggested by Lévi-Strauss (1963:228).

> ...Although it is not possible at the present stage to come closer than an approximate formulation which will certainly need to be refined in the future, it seems that every myth (considered as the aggregate of all its variants) corresponds to a formula of the following type:
>
> $F_x(a) : F_y(b) : F_x(b) : Fa^{-1} (y)$
>
> Here, with two terms, *a* and *b*, being given as well as two functions, *x* and *y*, of these terms, it is assumed that a relation of equivalence exists between two situations defined respectively by an inversion of *terms* and *relations*, under two conditions: (1) that one term be replaced

> by its opposite (in the above formula, a and a^{-1}); (2) that an inversion be made between the *function value* and the *term value* of two elements (above, y and a).

With repeated examination of the article, Lévi-Strauss' complex concern with the achievement of mediation and the role of the mediating process and the mediating figure, expressed as b in his "law", becomes clear. In achieving the mythic transformation, b plays the anomalous role which involves the incorporating power of a somewhat positive function, F_y, and a somewhat negative function, F_x. Throughout the article Lévi-Strauss discusses a range of mediating roles and mythic figures such as mist, scalp, corn smut, ashes, "Ash-Boy", Cinderella, and several series of mediating figures as well as deities or paired supernaturals which are capable of taking on both positive and negative attributes. Thus, like Ash-Boy and Cinderella, the trickster also is a mediator.

> Since his mediating function occupies a position halfway between two polar terms, he must retain some of that duality — namely an ambiguous and equivocal character. (Lévi-Strauss 1963:226)

For the purpose of this paper, the "law" of mythology focuses our attention upon the unusual role played by the mediating figure. This focus embodies one of the major contributions of the transformation formulation of Lévi-Strauss.

The Marandas (1971:36-37) also have emphasized similar permutational and mediational aspects of this model or "law" of mythology.

> ...In this formula, (b) is the mediator; (a) is the first term, which expresses, in connection with the socio-historical context, a dynamic element (specifying functions f_x) under the impact of which the item unfolds. The other function, f_y, which is opposed to the first one, specifies (b) in its first occurrence. Thus, (b) is alternately specified by both functions, and thus can mediate opposites.
>
> While analogy is specifically 'linear,' Lévi-Strauss' formula is 'non-linear,' i.e., it implies a permutation of roles of functions and of terms, since (a), which is given as a term, becomes, once inverted, a^{-1}, a sign of function, and y, which is given a sign of function, becomes, (y), i.e., a term which is the final outcome of the process. The permutation is necessary, according to our interpretation, to account for structural patterns in which the final result is not merely a cyclical return to the point of departure after the first force has been nullified but a helicoidal step, a new situation different from the initial one not only in that it

> nullifies it but also because it consists of a state which is more than a nullification of the initial. In other words, if a given actor (a) is specified by a negative function f_x (and thus becomes a villain), (b) is capable of assuming in turn also the negative function, which process leads to a 'victory' so much more complete that it proceeds from the 'ruin' of the term (a) and thus definitely establishes the positive value (y) of the final outcome. This time as a term, (y) is specified by a function which is the inverse of the first term. To put it metaphorically, the inverse of, say, a loss which expressed the actual impact of a negative power is not only a loss nullified or recuperation, but a gain so that
> $fa^{-1}(y) > f_x(b)$.

However, the Manrandas utilize the formulation in a much more dynamic rather than static sense. Going somewhat beyond the original article by Lévi-Strauss they see the formulation as implying a permutation and a process which leads to a "victory", a "gain", or achievement which is greater than a simple negation of the original state. Very simply they emphasize that state one is transformed through a permutational mediating process into state two. In his original article Lévi-Strauss suggests that myth is both dynamically bounded by time and exists beyond time as an underlying structure as revealed in his permutational model or "law" of mythology. While utilizing the structural formulation, the Marandas have suggested a more satisfactory means of incorporating the dynamic aspect of mediation and the mediating role in achieving the resolution of opposed end states. Thus the mediating role and anomalous figure of folk narrative receives a great deal of emphasis in their formulation of the mythic transformational process. In this paper we shall apply these insights to the analysis of ritual and of ritual and mythic mediators.

THE DATA: THE RITUAL CLOWN AND TRICKSTER

In several other contexts, I have discussed the form, meaning, and role of the Mayo Indian masked impersonator, the Chapakoba (see Crumrine 1968, 1968/69, 1969, 1970, 1974). In many ways, the youth who wear the Chapakoba masks and take part in the Easter ceremonial in the lower Mayo River Valley, Sonora, Mexico, can be seen as participating in a rite of passage from youth to manhood. As the result of a cure from a serious illness, they

promise to serve for three years as Chapakobam. They act as the soldiers (soldados) in the Parisero sodality which consists of a set of ranked statuses; the Pilato (head), Capitan (captain), Kabo (corporal), Flautero and Tampalero (flute and drum players), and Chapakobam. Their role mediates a range of oppositions and condenses a number of opposed traits and behaviours into a single fascinating character, the Chapakoba. Their grotesque appearance as well as their behaviour adds to spectator interest and excitement. Besides impersonating and burlesquing very serious aspects of Mayo life, such as praying, curing, marriage, and sexual intercourse, they are responsible for maintaining traditional norms and ritual procedures. I have divided their behaviour into three major axes (see Crumrine 1969). First they are expected to protect the customs and are known as the *kostumbre ya ʔ ura,* the chiefs of the customs. During processions they enforce the proper kneeling form, and drive horsemen and other non-participants off certain sacred procession paths. The second behavioural axis includes working on the ceremonial because the parisero sodality is responsible for its production. The Chapakobam must accomplish much of the physical labour associated with the making of the ceremonial. The most striking behavioural axis is that of ritual impersonation and burlesquing activities. First, in several complex ways the Chapakobam are associated with death and the dead. Any dead animal they may find interests them and will become a prop in their burlesquing games. Ultimately on Good Friday they are participants in the crucifixion of Christ and on Easter Saturday, they and the masks are burned up and quite literally become one type of dead. Just before the masks are burned, the impersonators are baptized, becoming men. Second, their behaviour is often backwards, which is probably symbolic of the world of the dead and is definitely symbolic of behaviour associated with witchcraft. When they shake hands or cross themselves, they use their left hands. Or they show extreme disrespect for sacred objects or occasions, for example pretending to defecate on crosses and sacred objects. Third, they often pantomime the eating of food and more often of "feces". They "gather" the "feces" by holding cans or bottles up to the anuses of other Chapakobam or participants in the procession. Fourth, sex and sexual behaviour fascinates them. Chapakobam can often be seen hugging, pressing their

masks together in kisses, dancing together, and pantomiming both human and animal sexual intercourse. Many also carry carved wooden male phalli or female nude pin-up pictures which they are happy to show to each other or to members of the processions. These burlesquing activities are definitely atypical and opposed to general mores as traditional Mayos are rather prudish about these types of behaviour. Without going into further detail about the Chapakoba role, I wish to select two of the behavioural axes or sub-axes for further discussion. In order to tie the Chapakoba figure together with other mediating roles, we shall concentrate upon the oppositions of live vs death and of sexuality vs non-sexuality (abstinence). And in fact, the latter may be a special case or a reduction of the former. Even though Makarius (1970, 1972) argues that such mediating roles originate in a violation of a blood taboo and especially the incest taboo, this seems to be a simplification of the Mayo Chapakoba figure (Crumrine 1974). Although recognizing the death of Christ and the destruction of the Chapakobam, Mayo emphasis is placed upon the cycle of crucifixion and resurrection, the funeral and return of Christ, the mediation of the life-death opposition. In spite of the Chapakobam sexual burlesques, complete sexual abstinence is expected and enforced during Easter week. Thus Christ and the Pariserom (Chapakobam) are mediating figures providing a solution to the life-death opposition and a context for two rites of passage; male initiation and the funeral ritual.

Although it is not generally possible to collect highly integrated mythical statements concerning the origin and meanings of the Mayo Easter ceremonial, the following quote represents a rather typical explanation of the Easter ritual. In this discussion which I have presented in previous contexts (see Crumrine 1973, n.d.), the material in brackets are questions which I asked and the remaining materials represent the explanations of one Mayo man.

> (Where did the Chapakobam live? Aren't there stories about them?)
>
> It is a custom, they imitate what happened with Itom Achai (Our Father God). They imitate the time when Jesus appeared and the Pilatos killed him.
>
> (But what do the Chapakobam signify and why the masks? Why do they have this form?)

They require it because they have paint. They paint themselves on their body with red paint which symbolized the blood of Christ.

(But I still do not understand why they need the masks?)

A long time ago in that time they were like Kaifas. And Kaifas was truly very hairy. Kaifas, when Our Lord was taken prisoner, when they took him prisoner in order to kill him, Kaifas was truly very bearded, very hairy. The masks are like this, are an imitation of this beardedness.

(I do not known anything about Kaifas?)

Kaifas is God's opposite, contrary. He is God's enemy.

(He isn't the Devil?)

Exactly, he is the Devil. Kaifas is not baptized, not a Christian, he is the Devil, Lucifer.

(And does he have soldiers?)

Certainly he has soldiers.

(Are the Pariseros and the Chapakobam in his army?)

Certainly.

(Today where is Kaifas?)

Today Kaifas is ashamed because Our Lord arose from the dead at Gloria in such a manner giving life to sinners. Kaifas has retreated to the forest. His soldiers have been killed, are dead but Kaifas still lives.

(Is it possible to see Kaifas in the forest?)

Of course... Kaifas is the Devil, he is dangerous, bad. He does bad things. He tries to gain, to win, good men. It's diabolical... The Chapakobam (Pariserom) imitate the story of Itom Achai (God), of his death, burial and resurrection. In the end they ask pardon of Itom Achai. They make the ceremony of Itom Achai. They do the passion of Itom Achai.

(One year later) (When I was here last year you told me about an enemy of God. His name was Kaifas. But I still do not know who Kaifas was?)

There are two roads, a good one and a bad one. God takes the good road, and Kaifas takes the bad one.

(A long time ago, were Itom Achai and Kaifas friends?)

In that time when this world commenced, Itom Achai began to make hens and all the other things which exist. God made things correctly. The very close, very intimate friend of Itom Achai, Kaifas, began to imitate God. Kaifas began to imitate God. When El Señor

> (God) made the hen, the hen saw the world and liked the world. The hen was happy, gay, because El Señor gave the hen breath. And Lucifer, this Kaifas, also began to make hen. This hen he made of clay (barro). In clay, Kaifas began to make a hen. Instead of a good hen coming out, a tecolote (owl) came out. Kaifas made an owl (mu?u Mayo). Kaifas imitated El Señor. But this was not yet the sin which Kaifas was going to commit against El Señor. This wasn't much. Nothing much because Kaifas had equal power with El Señor. He controlled equal power to that of God. Kaifas was able to use the power, but he used it for bad purposes, for evil. And El Señor made the light of day and saw everything was good. In the light of day everything was good. People, men, he made. Because he foresaw them, saw that they were going to live in the world. Kaifas also made men, people. But the people Kaifas created were just like similar to him. They were equal to Kaifas. That is to say they were the Chapakobam, the Pariserom. When Kaifas made men, they came out equal to him, that is bad. To turn to the understanding of the Good and the Bad. The Bad is to act in excess. Many, many of the men especially those of Kaifas wouldn't do because a man needs to have respect, value for all other people. One can sin with only a few words when they are about another. This danger converges in the tongue, the mouth, when a person talks of another. This is very bad, dangerous. Because to speak much about people who are not at fault, that is to say, to speak badly of a person is a sin which God will not pardon...

Following suggestions of Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963:223) that one means of mediating contradiction involves "a double set of dioscuric pairs" and of Mary Foster (n.d.) "I would wonder if they (Chapakobam) don't represent Christ", we can unravel one of the themes of this mythical statement. The divine pair of very close friends, God and the Devil (but in the Mayo case not twins) create two paired sets of natural and supernatural creatures; Christ (and man) and the Chapakobam on the supernatural level, and the hen (domesticated animals) and the owl (wild animals) on the natural level. Thus the Chapakobam represent Christ in the sense that they complete the opposition yet from the opposite direction. The members of the Parisero sodality are in the service of Christ, and their promise is to serve Him, and to make his ceremony. Some of the members of this sodality explain, "Christ became tired of this world and wished to return to the world of his father. Thus the Pariserom have permission to kill him so he may return. They have his permission to make the ceremony." The Chapakobam represent the resurrection or the means of transcending death, the

dead living. In the resurrection (Christ) and in the yearly return from the forest to political power (Pariserom), both Christ and the Chapakobam represent a "living" denial of the life/death categories.

In Leach's (1964:39) terms, the opposition between life and death is reduced to that between this world, with both life and death, and the other world with eternal life.

> The gap between the two logically distinct categories, this world/other world, is filled in with tabooed ambiguity. The gap is bridged by supernatural beings of a highly ambiguous kind-incarnate deities, virgin mothers, supernatural monsters which are half man/half beast. These marginal, ambiguous creatures are specifically credited with the power of mediating between gods and men.

In the Mayo Easter ceremonial, both Christ and the Chapakobam play this mediating role (see also Leach 1961).

In referring to Lévi-Strauss' "law" of mythology, I (Crumrine n.d. and Crumrine and Macklin 1974) have tended to focus upon its transformational aspects and the transformation of the youth, who play the role of the Chapakobam, into adults. In this case the young men as Chapakobam act as the first term in the "law", Christ provides the mediating role, and the destruction of the Chapakobam and baptism of the participants as adult men produces the final resolution. However, linking the figures of Christ and the Chapakobam as mediators and focusing upon the mediational and anomalous nature of the Chapakoba role requires a basic shift in emphasis and an expansion of the formulation of the original "law" of mythology. In order to incorporate two different mediating roles, the following logical expansion is suggested. A second mediator or term is added (c), which can equally take on both relations (f_x and f_y). This produces $f_x(c)$ and $f_y(c)$. The second mediator is slightly less flexible and more elaborately modified by the transformational process. The second mediator (b) can take on both relations (f_x and f_y) but in the former case both relation and term are shifted modifying the mediator. (b) occurs as $f_y(b)$ and $f_b(x)$. The third term (a) is transformed not only from a term to a relation but also from a term to its inversion (a^{-1}). Thus the formula suggests three levels of transformation; a cyclical shift of relations, a cyclical

shift of relations and of term and relation, a shift of relations and a transformation in the term itself.

$$f_x(a) : f_y(b) : f_y(c) :: f_x(c) : f_b(x) : f_{a-1}(y).$$

This logically expanded formula proves useful in perceiving the structure of the Mayo Easter myth and the relations between men, Chapakobam, and Christ. Our data fit the expansion:

$$f_{\text{death}}^{\text{(mortal man, youth)}}: f_{\text{life}}^{\text{(Chapakobam)}}: f_{\text{life}}^{\text{(Christ)}} :: f_{\text{death}}^{\text{(Christ)}}: f_{\text{Chapakobam}}^{\text{(death)}}: f_{\text{immortal, adult}}^{\text{(life)}}$$

Mortal man faces death and youth lacks adulthood and must symbolically die and be reformed. The Chapakobam are formed and given life by the Devil and reflect him while Christ is created by God. Christ is killed by the Pariserom and returning from the dead he leaves man and goes to live with his father. Thus Christ equally represents the living and the dead. The Chapakobam are burned up by the fire, the punishment of God, and become the function of death, the living dead. Metaphorically Christ alternates between the death and life functions whereas metanymically the Chapakobam become or take on the function of death. Thus both metaphorical and metanymical mediation is involved in the anomalous roles of Christ and the Chapakobam. Through this mediation, mortal man and youth are transformed into immortals and adults, as illustrated in the following figure:



This analysis clarifies the mediational roles and rituals of the Mayo Easter ceremonial. In Leach's sense these two anomalous

figures open up the life/death binary antithesis by introducing the 'other world' which is opposed to 'this world.' The Chapakobam emerge from the mysterious world of the devil, of the woods, and of death and kill Christ, the Son of God. They have his permission to commit murder because he wishes to return to the "other world'. In doing so he achieves the mediation and attains eternal life for mankind in the 'other world'. The Mayo concept, "the Easter ceremony is the funeral ritual for Christ", makes sense when the Mayo funeral ritual is compared to the Easter ritual. This comparison reveals that Christ's funeral is the archetype for all Mayo funeral ritual (see Crumrine 1964, 1974).

The "twin" deities, God and the Devil, create offspring, humans and Chapakobam. Human reproduction is fertile life producing and ultimately resulting in the birth of Jesus, due in part, to a second divine creative act. Chapakobam reproduction is unclear, however they would appear to be created by the Devil without fertile life-giving powers. Without a doubt, they act as the instrument of death and by killing Christ they mediate this world/other world opposition and make everlasting life a possibility in the other world. The "dual" sons of God and the Devil mediate the life/death opposition in two different ways which complement each other. Thus both are required and supplement each other's mediating powers. Jesus, characterized by a life-giving fertile birth, was a powerful curer during the time when he lived in the Mayo River valley. Jealous of his power, the Pariserom killed him and he went to the world of the dead. Yet early Easter Saturday morning he returned to life and went to live with his Father. Thus Christ's mediation of the life/death opposition takes the form of the cycle; life → death → life. The Chapakobam who are created from the dark dense forest areas by the Devil, become a kind of living dead and are burned up on Easter Saturday in the fire which represents the power of God, the Sun. The Chapakoba's mediation of the life/death opposition reveals the opposite form of the cycle; death → life → death. Thus both figures mediate the opposition, however in opposed cycles. Although both act as mediators of the life/death opposition, the role of the Chapakoba proves to be additionally anomalous. Returning to the suggestions of Leach (1961, 1964) the Chapakoba data reveal supporting

evidence. Leach's article (1961:132-136) "Time and False Noses" treating rites of passage, masquerade, and role reversal suggests an even more specific parallel between his argument and the Mayo data. Generally Mayos refer to the Chapakobam as Pariserom, however I tend to use the rather less common term Chapakoba to distinguish masked members from the officers of the Parisero sodality. Mayos and Yaquis, living directly north of the Mayo, also use the term Chapayeka. "Koba" in Chapakoba means head and "yeka" in Chapayeka means nose. Indeed many of the masks have long prominent noses or "false noses." The meaning of "chapa-" is unclear. Not only the term but also the masquerading and role reversal which Leach speaks of as elements of the liminal and post-liminal stages in rites of passage, exist within the Chapakoba role. According to Leach, these special rituals mediate or bridge the opposed closed categories, sacred/profane.

Mary Douglas (1966) and Leach (1964) conceive of cultural systems as composed of consistent and exclusive categories. Such categories organize the world and are learned early in life. Since categories never are perfect, the in between phenomenon is culturally denied either through strong taboos or highly sacred rituals. These taboos and rituals logically remove the anomalous from everyday life, firming up the reality of the cultural categories. Insofar as they act as anomalous figures, Christ, and especially the Chapakobam are powerful because they symbolize the mediating powers of the in between. Victor Turner develops a similar argument for "ritual symbols" (Turner 1967:19-47) and for liminal roles (Turner 1967:93-111), which I have applied to the role of Chapakoba (Crumrine 1968, 1969, and 1974). Ian Hamnett (1967) suggests that riddles involve a similar process. Riddles establish two opposed sets of classifications or categories which are mediated through the ambiguity of the answer (Hamnett 1967:381-383):

> ...riddles are one form of ambiguity or ambivalence, and... they can be understood in the light of the social and cognitive function of ambiguous or ambivalent utterances, concepts and actions. An ambivalent word, concept or item of behavior can be considered as belonging to any of two or more frames of references, according to the interpretation brought to bear upon it, or indeed to several or all such frames at once. It can therefore operate as a point of transition

> between these different frames of reference or classificatory sets. It can, indeed, mediate between sets that are not only different, but in many aspects opposed, and in this way it can form the basis for a differing system of classification, or allow contrasting classifications and conceptual frameworks to co-exist at the same time... inconsistency, ambiguity or ambivalence may be thought of either as simply 'vague' or, what is not quite the same, as *indeterminate*. It is the second aspect that is important here. A reference is 'vague' if is points to an insufficiently specific area of discourse; and this is perhaps a kind of ambiguity. But it can be ambiguous not only because it is vague for lack of specification but also because it fails to indicate which of two (or more) references is intended, though each possible reference may be fairly specific in itself.

The Chapakoba ambiguity or ambivalence is both "vague" in some cases and "indeterminate" in others. Like riddle answers, they mediate opposed terms and frames of reference. On the other hand the figure of Christ tends towards perfect fit to specific categories and reveals indeterminacy or vacillation only between the life and death poles of that opposition. Showing a fascination for death and dead things, the Chapakobam are indeterminate, a kind of living dead. They also pantomime animal intercourse and human marriage and intercourse acting the parts of both male and female. The observer is never sure which Chapakobam represent males and which ones females until one places a rebozo (woman's shawl) over its head and portrays the female part in the "marriage ritual" and "intercourse" which follows. Appearing somewhat dull, the Chapakobam are unable to perceive the proper categories. Their clumsy attempts to take part in the sacred rituals turn the sacred occasions into profane burlesque. They are responsible for the production of the sacred Easter ceremonial, yet their clumsy impersonations turn their own ceremonial into a profane joke. Not perceiving the categories of sacred/profane and clean/dirty, they pantomime the defecation on the crosses of the Way of the Cross and pretend to eat trash or feces which they "collect" in cans from the anuses of other Chapakobam. In this sense, the role of Christ characterized by a nearly perfect fit to traditional categories, excepting the life/death one, contrasts rather sharply to the Chapakoba role which reveals indeterminacy in a number of categories: life/death, male/female, sexuality/non-sexuality, sacred/profane, clean/dirty, etc. Thus both in riddle and ritual, mediators' indeterminacy plays a crucial role.

Moving south of the Mayo along the Pacific coast of Mexico, the Cora of Nayarit also produce an elaborate Easter ceremonial with masked Judeos much like the Mayo Pariserom and Chapakobam (see Fernando Benitez 1970, Thomas Hinton 1964). As in the Mayo case, the life/death and especially the sexuality/non-sexuality oppositions are explicated in the role of the Cora Judeo.

Moving north of the Mayo area into the American Southwest, the Pueblo Indian ceremonialism also includes ritual clown figures. Alfonso Ortiz (1972), in one of the most recent articles published on the Pueblo ritual clowns, relates Pueblo world view and the ritual clown. He shows that the clown is active during lulls in the ceremony and also during solstice ceremonialism which symbolize the death and rebirth of the sum and of the ceremonial cycle. Thus the Pueblo clown seems to mediate at points of fragmentation in Pueblo world view and, in fact, at one point Ortiz (1972:160) suggests that the sacred clown almost mediates the sacred and the profane. "Perhaps one cannot go so far as to claim that the sacred clowns fuse the sacred and profane dimensions of existence, but they do at least serve to make the sacred relevant to the everyday." Also Ortiz discusses sex role reversal, erotic behaviour, gluttony, etc. in regard to Pueblo sacred clowns and their ability to mediate oppositions in the world view.

In summary, Cora, Mayo, and Pueblo sacred or ritual clowns have the power to mediate oppositions and aid in the achievements of transformation in (1) the lives of individuals and in (2) the maintenance and growth of religious and social systems. In these ways the ritual clowns show striking parallels to Oedipus and the tricksters mentioned by Lévi-Strauss.

BUKWUS, THE NORTHWEST COAST MEDIATING FIGURE

Bukwus, the wild man of the woods, proves to be an extremely interesting mediating figure among the Kwakiutl of the Northwest Coast. Diane Persson (1974) has collected and analysed the masks, rituals, and myths associated with Bukwus. Her (Persson 1974:ii) structural analysis of the myths reveals "a move from disequilibrium to equilibrium achieved by the mediating role of

Bukwus." Among other interesting hints, the most productive myth about Bukwus was collected and published by Boas (1902) and is reprinted in Persson. This myth is much too long to be presented here, however, it represents Bukwus as the head of the land of the drowned dead. He has the power of impersonating humans and of recreating Indian villages, servants, and animals. Impersonating her lover, he carries away an Indian maiden and binds her to the land of the dead by feeding her imitation salmon which, in reality, is rotten wood. An Indian man makes his way to the land of the dead and is aided by the maiden. He is warned not to eat Bukwus' food offerings and told how to escape from Bukwus' enchantments. The Bukwus has the power of driving people silly, wild, or mad. Ultimately he is rescued by his people and returns to humanity with Bukwus' secrets and songs, or, in other words, with his power. In other myths Bukwus is portrayed as a wild man eating shellfish and living in the woods. In some cases he makes bird-like sounds and gives songs and power to Indians.

Persson (1974) presents photos of many of the masks which she had available. She hoped to find a Bukwus transformation mask which would reveal the multiple personalities of Bukwus as a mediating figure. Thanks to her completed work, when I found a transformation mask in the Lipsett Collection of Vancouver, the significance of the mask was beautifully clear. This Bukwus mask transforms from a human face on the outside to a skeleton face on the inside. Thus both the mask and the figure of Bukwus mediate the life-death opposition. A Bella Coola myth presents the Wild Man of the Woods as sexually highly endowed and recounts a story almost identical to that told of the Pueblo hunchbacked flute player (McIlwraith 1948:60-61). Thus Bukwus appears to be involved as a mediator in both the life/death and the sexuality/non-sexuality oppositions. Without going into other examples of the trickster mediator, I wish simply to suggest parallels between Bukwus the trickster, the ritual clowns, and Oedipus.

Also, trickster mediating figures occur in other types of ritual narration or drama; for examples see James Peacock's work on the clown figures in the ludruck plays of Java (Peacock 1968, 1969). One of the Mayo saints, San Cayetano (see Crumrine and Crumrine

1974) is a mediating trickster figure to whom one makes a promise in reverse. He is spoken of as mestizo and very male and is said to carry a knife and enjoy the fights which sometimes occur at dances in his honour. Since dances are a part of both mestizo and Mayo life, San Cayetano bailes (dances) mediate the Mayo-mestizo opposition and provide social situations where Mayos and mestizos interact on an equal basis. Symbolically as a powerful curer, he mediates the life-death opposition, and as a mestizo male he is also involved in the sexuality-non-sexuality opposition. At San Cayetano bailes, young couples are said often to run away together so his influence is definitely not in the direction of abstinence in contrast to the Chapakobam who display sexuality but enforce abstinence.

To carry our argument one stage further, let us turn to the legendary hero, Oedipus. Although a number of the articles in *Forms of Symbolic Action* (Spencer 1969) focus upon mediating roles and related anomalous figures, Terence Turner's (1969:26-68) "Oedipus: Time and Structure in Narrative Form" deals with the specific question which we are considering. Turner objects to the position of Lévi-Strauss on the question of the time variable in myth and argues that in spite of his time-timeless concept of myth, Lévi-Strauss reduces myth to a timeless structure. According to Turner (1969:33-34) Lévi-Strauss has minimized the narrative or the story element of myth.

> Traditional narrative genres such a myth, tale, and legend typically begin with an action or event that violates or mediates the structure of the prevailing order, giving rise to a situation in which actors and elements stand in ambiguous or contradictory relationships to each other. The "plot" or narrative sequence proceeds from this point through a series of permutations of the relations between these actors and elements toward a final state of equilibrium in which all elements again stand in unambiguous (synchronic) relations to each other. The beginning-middle-end phase structure of such traditional narrative genres thus manifests itself at the level of content as a dialectical alternation between synchronic order and diachronic disorder. The story is bounded at both ends by implicit or explicit assertions of synchronic order. The narrative itself, however, represents a complex temporal mediation of this framework of timeless order, necessitated by the eruption of conflict or confusion in the relations of actors or elements of the initial synchronic order. The sequence of events, in other words, takes the form of a dialectic between the antithetical forces of order

> and disorder, the latter like the former taking on specific content through its concrete manifestation in the actions and events of the story. The temporal form of the narrative is thus a synthetic product of two antithetical tendencies: synchronic order and diachronic (disorderly) change.

Very generally, Turner is suggesting a mythic pattern not absolutely different from that of Lévi-Strauss. An initial situation which is then somehow negated (F_xa) is mediated producing a final synchronic order ($F_a^{-1}(y)$). Turner's main interest focuses upon the diachronic or mediating phases of the myth (F_yb and F_xb). In much of Turner's analysis the mediating role (b) is taken by Oedipus who is seen as an initiate moving from boy to man and taking his adult role as husband and king. The tragedy in Oedipus' case involves oppositions which cannot be successfully incorporated in a single role (F_yb and F_xb). Turner argues that the individual and his or her movement through transitional periods in the life cycle tends to negate the initial synchronic structure (F_xa). Through a series of negations the liminal or mediating figure breaks down the original structure thus producing a transformation or resynthesis into the final structure ($F_a^{-1}(y)$) or the "victory" of the Marandas. Denied his rightful inheritance, Oedipus, during his passage from youth to adult, seeks his appropriate adult status. In order to avoid conflict with his supposed "parents" he leaves on a pilgrimage seeking a "vision" in the form of the oracle. Unrecognized by Oedipus, he kills his father and marries his mother, all individual negations of the proper social structure (F_xb). On the other hand, Oedipus is also positively characterized (F_yb). In attempting to avoid conflict with the parental generation and ultimately patricide, Oedipus does not return to Polybus and to Corinth but he goes to Thebes where he successfully rids the city of the destructive Sphinx by providing the answer "man" to the Sphinx's riddle. According to Turner, Oedipus thus achieves the difficult transition to "man" or adult status and becomes for a time a successful king of Thebes. Ultimately the oppositions overpower the role, Oedipus discovers his true history and removes himself from a public role. Turner suggests that the narrative process as well as the role of Oedipus present, negate, disintegrate, and reintegrate two structural principles or oppositions: (1) transmission and opposition between generations and (2) kin as opposed to non-kin in terms of fertile sexual

relations. We may rephrase these oppositions in a slightly more general sense as (1) life and health vs. murder and death and (2) sexuality and fertility vs. non-sexuality and infertility. Myth and ritual especially rites of passage become crucial times for and means of symbolizing and dramatizing these structural principles and oppositions.

> The points of transition between the three phases of the life cycle defined by the Sphinx's riddle are times at which the negation and reformulation of existing kin relations is necessary. The relationships in question must be polarized into one element which is affirmed as a principle of continuity and another which is rejected: in the passage of a youth into manhood, for example, his relationship as child to his parents must be repudiated, while the more generalized ties of descent and filiation must be reaffirmed in the new context. This polarization also involves a "reversal of subjective orientation," in that repudiated element of the relationship is essentially a passive orientation toward the parents, while the new orientation with which it is replaced is essentially active and away from the parents (toward the individual's new family of procreation). Because of the incest taboo, of course, the whole process must be mediated by the formation of a new relationship with a person of opposite sex (the spouse) from the category of non-kinsmen. (Turner 1969:64-65)

The existing structure must be pulled apart and reintegrated. Often the liminal initiate or the anomalous mediating role or mythical character incorporates contradictory elements drawn from the existing structure or fuses oppositions. Or these elements and oppositions may coalesce in pairs of opposed characters called by Turner (1969:62) *bifurcation of characters.* "According to this principle, the generation of complementary oppositions between a pair of general structural categories tends to be expressed in terms of the creation of *dramatis personæ* who represent opposite aspects of the same essential characteristic..." As mentioned earlier, Lévi-Strauss (1963) discusses the creation of mediating twin supernaturals, and we observe the same process in the creation of the Mayo Christ and Chapakobam. Like Christ and the Chapakobam, Oedipus provides an especially powerful example of a mediator, both at the individual and societal level.

> ...His destruction *as a member of society* represents a conservative assertion of the continuing moral and structural invulnerability of the traditional aristocratic order of society. Yet Oedipus transcends his own personal destruction by embodying in himself both of the anti-

> thetical forces that were tearing Greek society apart. In encompassing both sides of the historical dialectic of Greek society, and thus catapulting himself to a liminal Archimedean point outside it, he achieves a sort of reconciliation of these forces by simultaneously embodying the negation of each by the other. The union of opposites Oedipus achieves thus transcends the level of family structure and extends to the highest level of the historical contradictions of the *polis*. It is the manner in which Oedipus combines this second, macrosocial level of *coincidentia oppositiorum* with the juxtaposition of incompatible familial relationships that made him, I suggest, the object of such passionate interest for the Greeks, down to and beyond the time of the tragedians. (Turner 1969: 60)

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, although the work of Lévi-Strauss, the Marandas, Ortiz, Leach, T. Turner and Crumrine does diverge on numerous points, it also converges upon at least one crucial point, the major role of the mediator in mythical and ritual transformation. This common insight provides the basis for the present discussion of "Mediating Roles in Ritual and Symbolism." These ritual roles and mythical figures which have a broad if not near universal distribution among human groups, mediate the life-death opposition and relate to the sexuality/non-sexuality opposition. Through mediation they achieve transformation by dismantling elements, incorporating opposed elements within their anomalous and indeterminate structures or personalities, and resynthesizing elements into new forms. Thus ritual clowns and tricksters deal with cultural and world view syntheses and transformations.

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Back to Square One: A Re-Examination of Tsimshian Cross-Cousin Marriage*

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RÉSUMÉ

Le but de cet article est d'évaluer les différentes explications du mariage Tsimshien. En particulier, on examine deux modèles opposés: les modèles matrilatéral et patrilatéral du mariage des cousins-croisés. Étant donné que les modèles sont structuraux, la validité de l'utilisation des données empiriques devient une question de première importance. En plus des taux des différents types de mariage, on examine la terminologie de parenté, les relations impliquées dans l'imposition des noms, la position des participants au potlatch, les règles d'héritage, la mythologie et les déclarations de préférence.

I

The Tsimshian have variously been described as having matrilateral cross-cousin marriage (Lévi-Strauss 1967:24-28; Rosman and Rubel 1971:10-33), patrilateral cross-cousin marriage (Ackerman 1973, 1974, 1975; Campbell 1973, 1974, 1975) and marriage inconsistent with either form of exchange (Adams 1974; Kasakoff 1970, 1974). In addition to the substantive problem, the Tsimshian case is of interest at a more general level. The competing representations have been expressed as mechanical models, which raises the questions of verifiability and usefulness of such models for understanding single cultures. In this paper, both issues will be addressed by focusing on the Tsimshian evidence, and how it

* I am obligated in two ways for anything positive about this paper. First to Charles Ackerman and Bradley Campbell for teaching me how to think about the problem. Second to George MacDonald and Richard Inglis for the use of the facilities and resources of the National Museum of Man.

can be used, to determine which model is appropriate to that context.

Any attempt to evaluate mechanical models requires an understanding of their purpose. As Rossi (1973:51) states, they are designed to represent the relational properties of systems. These properties *may* be manifested behaviorally, but the usefulness of that kind of evidence is restricted. Lévi-Strauss (1968:350) argues that "...a cross-cousin marriage rate of 20 percent is amply sufficient to imprint the society with a given structure". The reason for such potentially low correlations is that actual marriages are more likely to be made on the basis of contingent factors. Rates of marriage appear only to be useful when comparing mechanical models of the same phenomenon in the same society, where it can be assumed that the contingencies are constant. In that situation, a "skewing" of marriages in conformity to one set of properties can be expected (Kasakoff 1974:161).

The existence of a skewed pattern is, however, just one kind of fact. An underlying structure may be manifested through conscious models (Lévi-Strauss 1963:281-282), and in domains not directly referenced by the models employed. In using facts as a basis of evaluation, one should use all of them that can logically be connected to the properties of the models concerned (Rossi 1974:92-98). The best model will be the one to account for the widest range of evidence.

Before turning to the Tsimshian evidence, three qualifications have to be made. The first relates to the properties of the cross-cousin marriage models, which differ in terms of direction and duration of exchange. An MBD model represents asymmetrical exchange in which the position of each unit as giver and receiver is constant relative to other units. An FZD model represents a system of exchange which is symmetrical over time, due to generational alternation of those positions. The second refers to the units engaged in the exchange. On the basis of scale and parsimony, those units are matrilineal phratries — the largest membership units that are explicitly exogamous (Rosman and Rubel 1971:10). The final qualification concerns cross-cousins. At the phratic level, cross-cousin is a theoretical rather than ethnographic category. It neither refers to an actual first cousin nor necessarily to classificatory cross-cousins. It is the more general category of

persons of the opposite sex, who belong to the phratry of either ego's father or his mother's brother's wife.

II

One of the interesting features of the Tsimshian marriage controversy is the range of evidence that has been employed. In addition to actual marriages, inferences have been made from kinship terminology, preferential statements, potlach invitations, inheritance rules, naming relations, mortuary totem poles, and mythology. In this section, thoses bases will be re-examined to determine the degree of support for the competing models.

A. *Totem Poles and Actual Marriages*

Ackerman (1975:78-79) presents an unusual source of data on Tsimshian marriage found in the carving of mortuary totem poles. Using Barbeau's statement (1929:11) that the carver of the deceased's pole is a member of father's phratry, combined with the equation of the deceased's and his mother's phratry, Ackerman extrapolates to actual parental marriages in the Gitksan subdivision of the Tsimshian. That record, taken from Barbeau (1929), is shown in Table 1.[1] On the basis of the exchange relations, which

TABLE 1

Exchanges Among Phratries on the Basis of Barbeau's Data

		Deceased's/Mother's Phratry			
		Eagle	Frog-Raven	Wolf	Fireweed
Carver's/ Father's Phratry	Eagle	0	3	0	0
	Frog-Raven	4	5	11	14
	Wolf	0	6	1	5
	Fireweed	0	11	2	2
	Unknown/ Ambiguous	3	15	10	5

Source: Barbeau, 1929

[1] Table 1 differs slightly from Ackerman's (1975:80) due to separating out all ambiguous cases.

are predominantly symmetrical, Ackerman concluded that the marriage system is FZD.

There are reasons, though, why that symmetry may be more apparent than real. If Table 1 is examined closely, it is clear that the system is basically triadic since one phratry has a peripheral position. The Eagle phratry gives all of its women to Frog-Raven, and receives only from them. Barbeau (1929:156-157) states that the Eagles were recent immigrants to Gitksan territory and were only found in one village. If the data is re-presented as proportions of women given by each phratry in the basic triad, a slightly different picture of the exchange system emerges (see Figure 1).



Figure I. Proportions of women given by phratries from Barbeau's data.

Although the *pattern* is totally symmetrical, the *proportions* are somewhat more ambiguous. Thought of in ideal terms, with no contingincies, the proportions would differ depending on the

underlying structure. In an MBD system, a phratry would give 1.00 of its women to one other phratry, and receive 1.00 of its women from the third. Over time, in an FZD system, a phratry would give 0.50 of its women to each of the other phratries, and receive 0.50 of its women from each. Given contingencies the notion of skewing can be substituted for these ideal proportions. Since any deviant case would shift the ideal proportions expected from one model in the direction of the other, the discrimination point for determining symmetry and asymmetry in a triadic system is 0.75. An FZD model fits the range from 0.50 to 0.745, and MBD is consistent with the range 0.755 to 1.00.

If each combination of phratic exchanges is taken separately, as given in Table 2, they can be classified as to symmetry or asymmetry. As the results show, it is difficult to make any conclusions about the overall system. At best, it is weakly symmetrical which is supportative of an FZD model. It should be noted that these proportions would be most compatible with a simple rule of exogamy.

TABLE 2

Phratric Exchange Combinations and Types of Relations

COMBINATIONS	PROPORTIONS	RELATIONS
Wolf → Fireweed	0.15	strongly asymmetrical
Wolf → Frog-Raven	0.85	
Frog-Raven → Fireweed	0.65	strongly symmetrical
Frog-Raven → Wolf	0.35	
Fireweed → Frog-Raven	0.74	weakly symmetrical/
Fireweed → Wolf	0.26	inconclusive

The presence or absence of generational alternation of exchange relations between phratries is also important. Only four

unambiguous sequential marriages could be found in Barbeau's material (1929:66, 87, 90, 108), and three of them indicated non-alternation. This aspect of the totemic data is weakly supportative of an MBD model.

The only other systematic body of information on Tsimshian marriage, also for the Gitksan, was collected by Kasakoff. From a statistical analysis of actual marriages, using a nonphratic definition of cross-cousin, she concluded that neither form of marriage was statistically significant and that skewing was only slightly in favour of FZD (Kasakoff 1970:61, 1974:147-149). A re-examination of her summary data on phratric exchanges (Kasakoff 1970:203) permits a different interpretation to be made.[2] As Figure 2 presents, all of the exchange sets are strongly symmetrical which is consistent with FZD marriage.



Figure 2. Proportions of women given by phratries from Kasakoff's data.

[2] The triad is real in this case due to a fusion of Wolf and Eagle phratries (Adams, 1973:23).

A common feature of Barbeau's and Kasakoff's data is the triadic nature of the exchange system, which is important for the possibilities of patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. As Needham (1958) has pointed out, there are inherent contradictions built into an FZD system when only three units are involved; which are only overcome by the addition of a fourth unit and avunculocal residence (Lane 1962:493).[3]

The number of phratries in the exchange system depends on the frame of reference adopted. Tsimshian culture is made up of three linguistically distinct sub-divisions: Gitksan, Niska, and Coast Tsimshian. If marriage is thought of at this level, the triad is appropriate. As is the case for the Gitksan, one phratry is peripheral in the other sub-divisions. For the Niska, that phratry is Frog-Raven, and for the Coast Tsimshian is Wolf.[4]

If the wider definition of Tsimshian is employed, a quadratic structure seems to be more applicable. Marriages do take place across sub-division boundaries, and no single phratry is marginal overall. More importantly, McNeary suggests (1974:74) that in native thought "...it is ideologically satisfying to have four phratries".

As Thomas (1976:155-160) points out, there is some controversy over the Tsimshian residence rule. There is evidence to suggest that it may be patrilocal, matrilocal, or avunculocal. The more probable rule is avunculocality, though residence does change through a male's life cycle. As a child, he will be raised in his patrilocus, but he is expected to reside avunculocally as an adult. After marriage he may live for a brief period of time with his wife's parents, though the couple will ultimately return to his avunculocus (Ackerman 1973; Drucker 1963:86; McNeary 1974:86; Rosman and Rubel 1971:182). Given a quadratic exchange system, and the predominance of avunculocal residence; the necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for patrilateral cross-cousin marriage can be said to occur in Tsimshian culture.

[3] Rosman and Rubel (1971:185) argue that FZD can be understood triadically, but that four units are needed to make the system work.

[4] The Niska and Coast Tsimshian pattern were taken from data on totem poles (Barbeau, 1959) and naming relations discussed later in this paper.

B. *Terminology and Inter-Tribal Classifications*

The use of kinship terminology to discover the form of marriage is problematic (Needham 1973:12-24). Predictions, however, can be made from the properties of the competing models as to probable equivalences and distinctions. The most basic, for either model, is differentiation of matrilateral and patrilateral cross-cousins. Although the Tsimshian do separate mother's side *(wilnadal)* from father's *(wulaisx)*, their cross-cousin term *(txaa)* does not (Boas 1916:493; Durlach 1928:124; Kasakoff 1970:152).

Ackerman suggests (1975:67) that there may be a special term for patrilateral cross-cousin *(kwutxa'w* or *gwuthra'w)*. His conclusion is questionable since it relies on two specific usages (Durlach 1928:150; Barbeau 1929:150). Furthermore Hendel and Rixby (1973:58) and Sapir (1920:263) state that it is applied to both types of cross-cousin.

A second basic distinction, based on a structural identity or non-identity, is the existence of different terms for father's father and mother's mother's brother (Fox 1967:250). The Tsimshian do not make this distinction, the term *niye?e* is applied to both (Kasakoff 1970:24) which is consistent with an FZD model.

If just these two features of Tsimshian kinship terminology are used, the most probable system is bilateral cross-cousin marriage. Given greater structural similarities between bilateral and patrilateral forms, an argument could be made for FZD (Ackerman 1973; Campbell 1973:23-37).

A difficulty exists, however, at the level of social organization. Bilateral cross-cousin marriage is associated with moieties, and the Tsimshian have four phratries. Ackerman (1973) and Campbell (1973:35) assert that the Tsimshian do have an implicit moiety division on the basis of statements made by Boas about inter-tribal marriages (1916:521). The Haida and Tlingit, who marry with the Tsimshian, pair its phratries as shown on Figure 3. The argument is made more cogent by the fact that the three tribes share a co-tradition (MacDonald 1969:243-244), and that the Tlingit-Haida have FZD marriage (Rosman and Rubel 1971:34-68).

If internal marriages also conform to this moiety division, there would be grounds for assuming its relevance. Unfortunately,



Figure 3. Moiety divisions of Tsimshian phratries.

the data is scanty and conflicting. Barbeau (1929:155) mentions that there may have been a marriage prohibition between Fireweeds and Wolves, which would fit the moiety division. Adams (1973:23) points out a more recent marriage prohibition, and merger, between Eagles and Wolves, which is contrary to expectations. Given the weakness of the evidence, the assumption of a submerged moiety system is tenuous. To further infer FZD exchange patterns from that division would be almost totally unfounded.

C. *Statements of Preference*

The most obvious conscious expressions of an underlying marriage system are rules and preferential statements. In the Tsimshian case, the expressions are preferential and the most common is for marriage to a cousin (Kasakoff 1970:24; 1974:148). The possible inference that *either* cross-cousin is acceptable is born out by informants. McNeary (1974:79) states the Niska view either marriage as proper, though the ideal for chiefs is mother's brother's daughter. In contrast, some of Kasakoff's informants gave a preference for marrying a woman of father's phratry (1970:25; 1974:148).

Other preferential statements are not phrased in terms of cousins or sides. To discover their implications, it will be necessary

to map their consequences through the logic of the competing models. One such preference is for the marriage of persons whose maternal grandparents were brother and sister (Garfield 1939:232). As Figure 4 indicates, one set of grandparents could be siblings under either system.



Figure 4. Marriage of persons whose maternal grandparents are brother and sister.

A third is for marriage to a grandfather, who Kasakoff claims would be someone of mother's father's or father's father's phratry (1970:24; 1974:148). According to Figure 5, neither model is



Figure 5. Marriage to a grandfather.

appropriate if the preference applies to both sexes. If it is sex specific, then FZD would fit males and MBD females. Given the sex of the grandparent, the more plausible reference is to a female ego, which would support an MBD model.

The fourth statement is that a husband's father and wife's father should be of the same phratry (Kasakoff 1970:25). This preference is odd if it is assumed that both fathers married the same way, since the consequences would be incestuous for their offspring. It would only make sense if the fathers married differently, which could only occur if the system were FZD. The fathers could be of different generations structurally, though of the same generation empirically.

The final statement is provided by Adams (1974:171):

> ...the most general rule is that no two people who share rights to the same resources can marry each other... everybody in this culture has rights to resources from both his (or her) mother's and his (or her) father's group...

This rule is not explicit, but rather derived from an examination of actual marriages (Adams 1976). The rule cannot be applied to phratries since they are not the units which control resources (Rosman and Rubel 1971:10), hence it has no direct relevance for the models concerned.

The Niska comment cited by McNeary points out a factor that might account for the ambiguity in the data so far examined. Cross-cousin marriage, or a form of it, may be status specific. This notion is born out by other marriage rules. Garfield (1939:232-233) and Kasakoff (1970:14) state that marriage is ideally status endogamous; similarly, chiefs are expected to marry out of their villages and commoners within (Adams 1973:40; Drucker 1965:54; Kasakoff 1970:25-99).

D. *Inheritance and Succession*

The relation between marriage and inheritance was first raised as a query by Boas (1916:440):

> Very puzzling is the remark that a prince is to marry his mother's brother's daughter in order to inherit his uncle's house. This sounds as

> if the recorder considered this marriage essential in order to secure the succession.

The remark is puzzling for Boas because he assumes that avuncular inheritance and matrilateral cross-cousin marriage are Tsimshian norms; which, if true, would make the above statement unnecessary. Two factors make this comment intelligible at a strategic level. The first is that although inheritance is *ultimately* avuncular, the preferred inheritor is a younger brother (Boas 1916:499; Garfield 1939:179; McNeary 1974:71). He is more likely than a sister's son to have some of those characteristics deemed necessary for chieftainship, such as age and experience (Adams 1973:33; Garfield 1939:180). As McNeary (1976:11) notes, "if a man's heir must come from his brother-in-law's household, a marriage of heir and daughter at least helps to bind the heir to the family". Similarly, it could be argued that marriage to uncle's daughter is a way of creating an additional bond that could influence his choice of a successor.

Beynon (1916:51) and McNeary (1974:78-79; 1976:10) mention that chiefly families are often concerned with establishing long term alliances which keeps wealth and knowledge within a restricted sphere. Boas (1916:510) gives an association between the holder of the names Legex and Dzebasa which was maintained, or reflected, through sister exchange. Over time, marriages of this kind would be bilateral and fuse mother's brother's daughter and father's sister's daughter. Again, at a strategic level, the requirement to marry a mother's brother's daughter is intelligible; through only as an expression consistent with matrilineal descent, since the same person is also a father's sister's daughter.

There are grounds to suggest that MBD marriage is deviant. Since it involves an *actual* mother's brother's daughter in relation to the inheritance statement, there are conflicts with other marriage rules. If sister's son were residing with his uncle before marriage, it would conflict with village exogamy for chiefs. It would also make unnecessary the rule that a man live with his wife's parents for a period of time after marriage. The "remark" mentioned by Boas may be necessary since it is deviant, and appropriate to chiefs since they have the power to violate the rules in pursuit of their own interests.

Ackerman (1975:75-76) provides a less tenuous use of inheritance principles for evaluating marriage. He uses a comment made by Boas (1916:412):

> It is true that in the case of cousin marriage, as was customary among chiefly families, a man's property would eventually be inherited by his son's son.

Ackerman's analysis is based on the assumption that the above statement and that of avuncular inheritance are both valid. Although they obviously would be in cases of bilateral marriages, for unilateral cross-cousin marriage their validity has definite implications. As shown on Figure 6, father's father and mother's brother could only form a chain of inheritance under an FZD system in which father's father and mother's mother's brother are equated.

Before Ackerman's conclusions can be accepted, one issue must be resolved. There are grounds for querying the accuracy of Boas' comment about inheritance from father's father. Given that he tended to incorrectly restrict *txaa* to matrilateral cross-cousin (Ackerman 1967:67; Lévi-Strauss 1967:44), the same may be true for *niye?e* and father's father. The problem is compounded in that a successor ideally has four 'grandfathers' who were also chiefs — father's father, mother's father, mother's mother's brother, and father's mother's brother (Kasakoff 1970:24). Of these four, only FaFa and MoMoBr could be involved in inheritance by ego, as shown in Figure 6.

If MoMoBr is the appropriate grandfather in Boas' comment, then either model is plausible. If FaFa is correct, then only the FZD model fits. The only other evidence is ethnographic. Adams (1973:32) states that claims are put forward on the basis of a mother's mother's brother being holder of a title; and Kasakoff (1970:51-52) implies that a claim through father's father would only be used if the intervening inheritor were somehow improper.

E. *Potlatch Invitations*

Rosman and Rubel (1971:10-33) and Campbell (1974:7-8) posit that the Tsimshian potlatch reflects the underlying structure of marriage, since the participants are hosts and their affines. Common

to both their arguments is that the guests stand as either wife givers or receivers in relation to the hosts. The main criterion that



Figure 6. Four grandfathers and the lines of inheritance.

could be used to determine the form of marriage is that of alternation of the guest's positions in successive potlatches by the same line of hosts, but such data is lacking.

Adams (1973:51-56) does mention one piece of information that can be used instead. He classifies the participants in contemporary Gitksan mortuary potlatches non-affinally. The categories used are members of the deceased's phratry who act as hosts, members of the deceased's father's phratry who perform burial services, and witnesses. If it is assumed that both sets of distinctions (affinal and non-affinal) are valid, some inferences can be made to cross-cousin marriage, as presented in Table 3.[5]

TABLE 3

Affinal and Non-Affinal Categorizations of Potlatch Guests

	Wife Givers	Wife Receivers
Fathers	FZD	MBD
Witnesses	MBD	FZD

Focusing on witnesses, they could be either wife givers or receivers. Rosman and Rubel (1971:26) hold that a distinction is made between father's phratry and the deceased's wife phratry, which would be consistent with the MBD combinations. This is supported by Adams (1973:73) who states that spouses, "...put in a contribution which is regarded as a ritual joke, and which is immediately returned to them in the distribution of cash to witnesses". The only qualification is that the triadic nature of contemporary Gitksan may have led to a fusion of witnesses and

[5] Adams (1973:73-74) states that Rosman and Rubel's affinal categories are inappropriate. Since the problem addressed in this paper is marriage and not property rights *per se*, the two sets of categories were used.

affines which might not have occurred in a quadratic system, though this would not change the argument for MBD.

F. *Naming Relations*

Sapir (1915:27), Boas (1916:507), and Garfield (1939:221) discuss an important characteristic of Tsimshian personal names, which is their cross-phratric reference. Although names given to children belong to their matriline, they may contain references to their father's phratry. Rosman and Rubel (1971:18) use this feature to argue for "the continuing alliances of wife-givers and wife-takers".

Using the names owned by Niska and Coast Tsimshian phratries, Ackerman (1975:78-79) challenges Rosman and Rubel's conclusion that the alliances are matrilateral in type. Since cross-phratric references indicate symmetrical exchanges, Ackerman holds that the system is FZD. However, if the composite includes Gitksan as well as Niska and Coast Tsimshian (Barbeau 1915-1942; Boas 1916:507-508; Duff 1959; Garfield 1939:221-224; McNeary 1974:117-120; Sapir 1915:22-25), as shown in Figure 7, the pattern



Figure 7. Phratric exchanges from naming relations.

is best expressed by the rule of exogamy since each phratry owns names referring to every other phratry. In addition, if names are nothing more than indicators of past marriages which remain in the pool over generations (McNeary 1976:7), and the marriages reflect contingent as well as structural properties, symmetry may be an illusion.

Campbell presents a second naming relation which can be used in conjunction with the earlier one (1975:89-90). This is taken from Boas (1916:507):

> ...ordinarily a boy would be given the name of his mother's mother's brother... a girl that of her maternal grandmother...

If both naming relations are valid, then it follows that a boy's father and his MoMoBrFa would be of the same phratry, and that a girl's father would be of the same phratry as her MoMoFa. As Figures 8 and 9 show, they would be appropriate in either system of marriage.

The final piece of evidence involves a preferential marriage statement (McNeary, 1974:79):

> ...it is good for a chief to marry a woman who holds the same name as his predecessor's wife, that is, the names A and B should be linked down through the generations.

The first part of this statement implies that wife's father will be from the same phratry as mother's brother's wife's father. This could occur with either form of cross-cousin marriage (see Figure 10). The second part of the statement refers to ego as well. If the generational linkage is taken to mean *every* generation, then the system must be that of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage.

G. *Mythology*

According to Boas (1916:440), "The normal type of marriage, as described in the traditions, is that between a young man and his mother's brother's daughter". The source of that tradition for Boas was Tsimshian mythology. Although five of the myths that he cites do discuss MBD marriages, two refer to FZD. Further, two versions of the same myth presents the alternate forms of marriage.[6]

[6] Lévi-Strauss (1967:44) assumes that the FZD version is a mistake. Ackerman (1975:67) argues more cogently that it is not an error using the speaker's position and actual phrasing of the marriage statement.



Figure 8. Naming relations for males.



Figure 9. Naming relations for women.

MBD



FZD



Figure 10. Naming relations for wives and preferential marriage.

The co-existence of both forms of marriage in Tsimshian mythology creates a dilemma. Either both are acceptable, or myth does not accurately reflect reality. It is the second conclusion that is reached by Lévi-Strauss (1967:30) when he states that myths:

> ...do not seek to depict what is real, but to justify shortcomings of reality, since the extreme positions are only *imagined* in order to show that they are *untenable.*

If correct, mythological evidence about marriage can only be used if one can determine which form is "imagined" and which is "real". One method is to examine the consequences following from a marriage (Ackerman 1975:72-75, 83-84; Cove 1975:12-13). To communicate to an intended audience that a marriage is untenable would seem to require that the character in the myth be negatively sanctioned; while normative marriages should have neutral or positive outcomes. In Table 4, the consequences of the eight myths are provided.

TABLE 4

Type of Marriage Mentioned	Consequences
FZD	did not occur
FZD	positive
MBD	husband dies for marrying (not specific to MBD)
MBD	positive
MBD	did not occur (woman punished for not marrying FZS)
MBD	none
MBD	did not occur
MBD	positive

Source: Boas, 1916.

As Table 4 indicates, there is no clear pattern. This is not surprising if one holds that one of the major contradictions in

Tsimshian social life is between matri and patri affiliation (Ackerman 1975:71-75; Campbell 1975:105; Lévi-Strauss 1967:25). These mythological statements may constitute nothing more than idioms for expressing that which cannot be resolved.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The Tsimshian evidence is almost equally supportative of both models. That ambiguity is in itself of interest. Rather than assuming that the data is problematic in reference to mechanical models, it may be that the elements used in these particular models are inadequate. Whereas units such as clan or phratry may be appropriate to some primitive societies, where they constitute the sole basis for membership and identity, the same is not true for the Tsimshian. Minimally, phratric identity is cross-cut by status, and the two are to an extent mutually denying.

Status considerations in this sense are not contingent, but structural. Using chiefly status as a vantage point, there are two related problems for which marriage provides a partial solution. These problems are access to resources and control over labour. Cross-cousin marriage preference can be understood by analogy to other marriage statements. Village exogamy for chiefs has the consequence of expanding alliances and access to resources, while village endogamy for others is restrictive. Similarly, status endogamy maintains that differential access and inhibits changes in alligiance. If cross-cousin marriage is thought of in the same terms, then bilateral and matrilateral would be closer to endogamy in consequence; while patrilateral is more like exogamy (Lane 1962). MBD marriage would therefore be appropriate to those of non-chiefly rank, while bilateral and patrilateral would be consistent with those of chiefly status. Bilateral cross-cousin marriage would apply to those families of the highest rank interested in restricting access to their resources, and patrilateral to those families concerned with increasing their positions.

In conclusion, the ambiguity about which cross-cousin is actually preferred may be the most important characteristic of the system. It not only legitimizes a wide range of possible marriages, but avoids a number of potential dilemmas. It leaves

unrecognized inherent conflicts between competing principles of identification and interest (patri verses matri-filiation) (phratry verses status); and provides a degree of flexibility in keeping with a society that was highly competative and that was frozen between a primitive and intermediate form of social organization.

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Religion and the Anthropologists 1960 - 1976

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article passe en revue des manuels récents d'anthropologie de manière à faire ressortir la façon de voir la religion chez les anthropologues contemporains. Cette première partie présente une analyse sommaire des problèmes qu'ils rencontrent dans leurs tentatives de définir la religion et conclut que le concept de "surnaturel" est un élément central de la plupart des définitions offertes. La religion, la magie et la science sont encore contrastées les unes aux autres, même si leurs relations ne sont pas présentées de la manière dont elles l'étaient chez les anthropologues du XIX^{e} siècle. Quelques anthropologues retiennent la distinction entre le sacré et le profane. Les mythes et les rites, qu'on retrouve dans toutes les religions, constituent un domaine problématique pour les anthropologues contemporains; plusieurs d'entre eux soulignent l'importance du symbolisme pour la compréhension des croyances et des pratiques religieuses.

Part I

THE DEFINITION AND NATURE OF RELIGION

In 1959 the late professor E. E. Evans-Pritchard, in an essay unique in anthropological literature, complained that anthropologists in general have been somewhat negative in their attitudes towards, and in their evaluation of, religious beliefs and practices. Their attitude, he wrote, "has been for the most part bleakly hostile." (1964:153) The early scholars who influenced anthro-

pological thought on religion for over a century were often motivated by a desire to discredit the claim to revealed religion and to show, by numerous comparisons, how relative were all beliefs. In the background of 19th century evolutionary theory, the founders of the discipline of anthropology tended to regard religion as both "untrue and useless," thus liable to be supplanted, or at least to have its influence reduced and its prestige diminished, by scientific progress (p. 159). Confronted by the universal presence of religion in human history, they tried to explain what they considered to be an illusion by some theory of psychological or sociological causation. Evans-Pritchard further asserted that most of the prominent anthropologists of our era have adhered to no religious faith since all belief was deemed to be fallacious (pp. 161-162). In a more recent publication, the same scholar stated that much of the early anthropological views regarding religious beliefs and practices are "still trotted out in colleges and universities," even though most of the same opinions have been shown to be erroneous or at least doubtful (1965:4). It is certainly not surprising that many scholars of religion have refused to consider anthropological theory and method and to apply it to their study of religion because of the reductionistic tendencies often manifested in anthropological literature (Eliade 1969:66-67).

Since Evans-Pritchard published his reflections on religion and the anthropologists, the educational market has been flooded with anthropological textbooks,[1] all of which contain one or more chapters on religious beliefs and rites. It is the aim of this study to examine these texts in some detail and to arrive at some conclusions about anthropological views of, and attitudes towards, religion.[2] The main concern, therefore, is not to evaluate anthropological literature itself,[3] but rather to deduce the anthropologists' way of handling a subject to which they have paid great attention ever since anthropology became an established academic discipline in the latter part of last century. This study will restrict itself to

[1] We refer here to introductory texts on social and/or cultural anthropology.

[2] Anthropological monographs on particular religions and the many articles on specific religious beliefs and rituals are, therefore, not included in our considerations.

[3] This has sometimes been done by anthropologists themselves. See, for instance, Bharati, 1971.

those texts published in English between 1960 and 1976.[4] It will direct itself to four major areas of inquiry. 1) How have anthropologists defined and described religion? 2) What are the main constituents or elements of religion which receive prominence in anthropological literature, and how are these features distinct from other aspects of human behavior? 3) What do contemporary anthropologists say about the origin and functions of religious beliefs and practices? And 4) What theory and method do they follow in the study of religion? It is hoped that such an examination will lead to conclusions about anthropological attitudes towards religion as well as to the contribution which social and cultural anthropology can make to the academic study of religion.

THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION

Anthropological definitions of religion are legion. As Collins (1975:418) has aptly put it, there are as many definitions as scholars. It is evident, even to a superficial reader of anthropological textbooks, that there has been no explicit agreement among anthropologists on a precise definition of religion, and that, till recently at least, a widely acceptable one had not emerged in anthropological literature (Harris 1975:546; Schwartz and Ewald 1968:347). Several anthropologists note that religion is one of the most difficult aspects of human activity to demarcate or categorize in orderly statements (Wells 1971:118; Taylor 1973:389; Ember and Ember 1973:417-418; Pelto and Pelto 1976:367-368). While this initial problem is not always specifically discussed,[5] a number of anthropologists wisely alert their readers from the very start to the fact that the area of investigation is beset with definitional hazards which bring into question the whole treatment of what have been called "religious beliefs and practices." Murray Wax (1968:228;

[4] Research note: The following sources have been used to trace the textbooks: *Library of Congress Catalogue* (1960-1975); *Cumulative Book Index* (1960-1975); and *The British National Bibliography* (1960-1974). Some of the major anthropological journals, including *American Anthropologist* and *Man*, were consulted for the reviews they carried of several of the textbooks consulted for this paper. Thanks are due to the many publishers for the complimentary copies received, expecially of those textbooks published in early 1976.

[5] Thus, Schusky, 1975, does not even make his reader aware of the issue.

Mair 1965:202-205), for instance, observes that "religion" is a folk category on the Western Judaeo-Christian tradition. The issue which students have to face is how to transform it into a scientific and universal category suitable for research. He suggests that Redfield's distinction (1956:67-104) between "Great Tradition" and "Little Tradition" may be a better terminology. Jacobs (1964:253-254) takes the approach that one should not start with a definition or even with a list of minimal features or characteristics which are supposed to have cross-cultural import. He advises his students to begin with the Western view that religions are concerned with powerful beings and then to test that position by intensive empirical research. Some anthropologists, equally weary of the words "religion" and "religious" have applied terms like "ideology," "worldview" and "systems of beliefs" which, being less encumbered, at least in appearance, with Western connotation, may be more suitable for cross-cultural research.[6]

In spite of all these cautious overtones, no anthropologist can proceed and summarize anthropological approaches to religion without first having determined what general features and elements of human belief and activity deserve inclusion under that heading. The vast majority of anthropological texts, with some notable exceptions, use the words "religion" and "religious" in their chapter titles and subtitles (Lienhardt 1966; Crump 1973; Hammond 1971; Bock 1974; Black 1973). It is, therefore, legitimate to ask whether, even when an anthropologist eschews defining "religion,"[7] there is a common anthropological assumption on what religion is, an assumption which determines, explicitly or implicitly, the content and mode of anthropological deliberations on the subject.

Richards has rightly observed that one of the more common anthropological interpretations of religion is that religious beliefs and activities are colored by the assumption that a whole world of the supernatural exists separate from the rest of the visible, empirical world (1972:260; Brown 1963:121; Schwartz and Ewald

[6] See the section on "World View" in the second part of this study (forthcoming).

[7] Some anthropologists are careful not to be very definite about defining religion. Harris omits in the second edition of his textbook (1975) a section entitled "A Maximum Definition of Religion" which had appeared in the first edition of his work (1971).

1968:347). Many recent anthropological definitions of religion attest to the prominence of the "supernatural." The following definitions are typical of anthropological textbooks:

> Religion is the cultural knowledge of the supernatural that people use to cope with the ultimate problems of human existence (Spradley and McCurdy 1975:424).
>
> Religion is simply a belief in the supernatural, together with the mental attitudes and patterns of behavior that follow from it (Wells 1971:118).
>
> Religion we can define as beliefs in the existence of supernatural beings and practices associated with relating to them (Collins 1975:418).
>
> Religion is a system of transcendental beliefs and practices through which people establish relationships with the supernatural (Hunter and Whitten 1976:304).
>
> Religion. A system of beliefs relating to supernatural beings or forces, and the ritual or other behavior accompanying such belief (Stewart 1973:472).
>
> We will define religion as any set of attitudes, beliefs, and practices pertaining to *supernatural power,* whether it be forces, gods, spirits, ghosts, demons, or any other imagined power (Ember and Ember 1973: 417).

The supernatural dimension is thus judged to be the deciding factor marking off religious from non-religious belief and behavior (Plog and Bates 1976:228). Several anthropologists rely heavily on Wallace's (1966:107) and/or Norbeck's (1961:11)[8] definitions, both of which place supernaturalism as the key element in defining and distinguishing religion from other human values, beliefs and actions (Anderson 1976:295-296; Kottack 1974:183; Holmes 1971:310-311; Gropper 1969:82). Such a definition, however, has not escaped criticism from several anthropologists who argue that words like "supernatural" and "supernaturalism" require some very precise analysis and meaning before they can be used cross-culturally in a universal definition of religion (Richards 1973:260-261; Birket-Smith 1965:338-339). Some anthropologists use the word "supernatural" as synonymous with "spiritual" (Swartz and Jordan 1976:650). In this case we are close to Tylor's famous definition of religion as "belief in spiritual beings" (1958:8), a

[8] In a more recent publication, Norbeck (1974:6) refers to the current definitions of religion which avoid the word "supernatural." While he takes note of the objections to its use, he still opts for it.

definition which, according to Ashely Montagu (1964:123; Middleton 1970:501), "is as sound as it ever was." It would seem, however, that most anthropologists use the term "supernatural" to refer to both personal and impersonal forces and not just to spiritual powers (Haviland 1975:310). Supernaturalism in contemporary anthropology seems to refer to Marett's "animatism" rather than to Tylor's "animism." Most, if not all, of those anthropologists who define religion in terms of the supernatural fail to analyze this concept which is so central to their whole treatment of the subject under investigation. The reader is, therefore, at times bewildered by the way in which different concepts, like magic, witchcraft, fetishism, spirits and gods, are lumped together under the label "supernaturalism" without any attempt to clarify the issue.

Anthropological dissatisfaction with the way in which religion has been, and still is, defined and treated, is reflected in some of the more recent textbooks. Plog and Bates (1976:228) acknowledge this malaise and state that "recently some anthropologists have defined religion as any system of beliefs, symbols and rituals that makes life meaningful and intelligible." Definitions which assume that religion is basically an ideology, or a value system, or a worldview, tend to avoid some of the pitfalls which the word "supernatural" brings with it. Thus, for example, Friedl (1976:310) defines religion "as a belief system which includes myths that explain the social and spiritual order, and rituals through which the members of the religious community carry their beliefs and act out the myths." Religion can thus be considered as "a symbolic expression of human life that interprets the universe and provides motives for human action" (CRM Books 1971:292). One of the more popular definitions of this nature is that of Clifford Geertz. His insightful, though somewhat complex, definition is endorsed by a number of contemporary anthropologists (Schusky 1975:208; Hoebel 1971:56ff.; Keesing and Keesing 1971:303; Hunter and Whitten 1976:305).[9] Geertz (1966:4), in a major article discussing the definition of religion, writes:

> Religion is a system of symbols which act to establish powerful, pervasive, and longlasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence, and by clothing these

[9] Most of these authors quote Geertz's definition in full.

> conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic (1966:4).

The major, and sole, critique of Geertz's position comes from Marvin Harris (1975:546-547) who objects that it is too inclusive, incorporating science within it as well. While it has to be admitted, as Hockett (1973:546-547) warns us, that definitions should neither be too restrictive, nor too narrow, Geertz's approach contains more advantages than disadvantages. It provides a "comprehensive understanding of religious behavior" (Schusky 1975:208) not just in terms of the outside scholar but also, to some degree, in language acceptable to believers themselves.

Of all the textbooks published in the last fifteen years or so there are a few which stand out as trying a different approach to the definitional quandary. They concentrate on describing systems of beliefs and values and avoid as much as possible the word "religion" and its derivatives. Peter Hammond (1971:255) starts by defining ideology as "the several component aspects of every people's system of beliefs about themselves and the reasons for their being...". His efforts, however, fall short of expectation because he then goes on to distinguish two kinds of ideology, namely, one which is "supernaturally based" and one which is secular in mentality. Philip Bock (1974:306) is more successful than his peer. He broadly defines ideology as "any set of more or less systematized beliefs and values shared by the members of a social group". He probably stands alone in anthropological literature to refrain from dedicating a chapter of his *Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* to religious beliefs and practices. He forcefully explains his position:

> The topic of religion has not been treated in any one place in this book. Religious roles, techniques, and beliefs have been discussed, respectively, in relation to the social, technological, and ideological systems of which they are a part. This is somewhat unconventional, but it has been done to stress the point that, in most societies, religion is not a separate category of experience or action. There is, rather, a *religious dimension* to every part of life, and the Western contrast between 'natural' and "supernatural' is simply not relevant to the understanding of such societies (1974:319).

While there is the obvious advantage in his approach that the mentality of primitive peoples is more faithfully reproduced,

one is still left with some serious misgivings. His approach seems to exclude some of the world great religions, Christianity in particular, from consideration. Besides, he does not specify clearly what the "religious dimension to every part of life" is.

The ethnoscientific bent of Bock is presented in fairly complete outline by Mary Black (1973) in her excellent summary of the ways in which anthropologists have for decades approached belief systems. Like all anthropologists who concentrate on belief systems, she brings out the philosophical aspects of religious beliefs, practically identifying belief systems with systems of knowledge. It is unfortunate that this line of approach is difficult, testing the logical perspicacity of the reader to its fullest. Because it forms one of the major theoretical frameworks in contemporary anthropology, we will have to return to it further down.

Black takes the position, with many anthropologists, that it is practically impossible to treat religion as a universal category because its forms and manifestations are too many and too varied — a stance expressed in a few of the surveyed textbooks (Holmes 1971:310; Keesing and Keesing 1971:302). The concept "religion" is thus too narrow to serve as a universal category. Any definition of religion may thus end up by being too arbitrary and subjective (Holmes 1971:310; Titiev 1963:505; Richards 1972:261). Whether this broader approach adds to, or minimizes, the confusion as to what religion means is not very clear (Wax 1968:226-227). It does, however, raise the question of whether religion is something *sui generis,* consisting of attitudes, beliefs, and practices which are uniquely different and above the rest of human life, or whether it is just one dimension of life, engulfed in and inseparable from, the rest of culture.

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

Even when anthropologists have avoided giving a precise definition of religion, they have not succeeded in staying clear of discussing its nature and of describing some of its main features. The constitutive elements of religion have frequently been seen in terms of opposites. Anthropological literature tends to dichoto-

mize between magic and religion, religion and science, supernatural and natural, and sacred and profane.

Magic and Religion

Most of what anthropologists have to say on magic, religion and science is a rehash of the views of Frazer, Malinowski and Durkheim. It is necessary to recapitulate briefly their respective views because the reader of anthropological textbooks is likely to be baffled by the material presented. Some writers do not always make it clear as to whose particular view they are propounding or endorsing.[10] Others repeat the pioneer attempts to distinguish religion from magic without reference to their sources (Collins 1975:419-420; Taylor 1973:393-394). While a few criticise and reject these old views (Beattie 1964:206-207; Kottack 1974:187), the majority of anthropologists leave the reader with the impression that, with some slight modification, Frazer's and Malinowski's positions are still acceptable in current anthropology.[11]

James Frazer, in his classical work, *The Golden Bough,* dedicates a whole chapter on the relationship between magic and religion (1922:56-69). His position was that magic is a form of control, albeit mistaken, of nature, while religion implied a supplication or propitiation to gods or spirits, and hence an indirect admittance that the belief in man's power to control nature had been heavily shaken. He insists that between magic and religion there is a "radical conflict of principle" (1922:60). He further admits that this antagonism was late in the history of religion and that a confusion of magic and religion has survived in primitive societies and among the uneducated classes in modern Europe. He then goes on to propound his historical theory that magic preceded religion, and to explain how primitive man lost his confidence in his own manipulative powers and started propitiating the gods.

Malinowski amplified Frazer's views and explained that magic was a practical art consisting of acts which are only a means to

[10] Thus, for instance, Pearson (1974:256) gives a short outline of Frazer's view and ascribes it to Tylor.

[11] Haviland (1975:312-313) and Ember and Ember (1973:433) seem to accept Frazer's view without reservation, while Stewart (1973:347-348) opts for Malinowski's.

a definite end expected to follow later on. Magic indicated man's power to bring about results by spells and rites; religion, on the other hand, was "a body of self-contained acts being themselves the fulfillment of their purpose" (1954:88). Religion did not, unlike magic, deal with direct quantitative events but rather with fateful happenings and supernatural forces and beings. Malinowski disagreed with Frazer in the latter's historical reconstruction and concentrated on the functions of magic and religion in the lives of the people he studied.

Finally, Durkheim (1965:58-60) insisted that there is a repugnance of religion for magic and a hostility of magic for religion. Religion, for him, was basically a group affair; it united people into a church, sharing common beliefs. In magic, the church dimension was absent. Unlike the priest, the magician functioned on his own with an individual clientele.

As a rule, anthropologists have followed Malinowski and Frazer in distinguishing magic from religion, adopting the theory that magic refers to control and religion to the persuasion, by prayer and sacrifices, of the supernaturals (Lienhardt 1966:127; Richards 1972:260; Pelto and Pelto 1976:370; CRM Books 1971:294-295; Cone and Pelto 1969:92). Very few of the texts surveyed give Durkheim's view on the subject. Anderson (1976:295) is, therefore, indulging in wishing thinking when he states that "Anthropologists generally avoid the issue (i.e. of the distinction between magic and religion) by speaking of the magico-religious." While it is true that several anthropologists have preferred to use the phrase "magico-religious" (Wells 1971:119; Montagu 1964:131; Beattie 1964:212; Anderson 1976:294-296), one can hardly deny the fact that contemporary textbooks exhibit the same "compulsion," which their forerunners manifested, to distinguish between magic and religion.

Most anthropological textbooks, with a few noteworthy exceptions,[12] start with Frazer's distinction and then cautiously soften it by stressing that in practice a sharp distinction or

[12] Hunter and Whitten (1976), Bock (1974) and Schusky (1975) are among the best examples.

dichotomy between them is either very difficult or impossible to draw (Beals and Hoijer 1971:457; Downs 1973:303; Aceves 1974:219; Schusky and Culbert 1973:147; Barnouw and Hermanson 1972:52; Wells 1971:119; Brown 1963:122; Pelto and Pelto 1976:369-370; Swartz and Jordan 1976:669).[13] Magic and science, it is often stated, do not exist in isolation (Mair 1965:264; Anderson 1976:294-296; Montagu 1964:131; Fuchs 1964:220); both are found side by side in the same rituals. Magic is also a technique of religion, an aspect or subsidiary element of it (Spradley and McCurdy 1975:424-440; Schwartz and Ewald 1968:364; Montagu 1964:131). Religion and magic blend into one another and form a kind of continuum (Cone and Pelto 1969:92; Brown 1963:122; Hoebel 1972:574). How two opposite and contradictory principles form such a continuum is not explained. Besides, it is asserted, magic and religion share similar metaphysical principles (Aceves 1974:219; Mair 1965:203). Both are based on the concept of the supernatural and have the function of alleviating stress and crises when empirical means fail (Hammond 1971:284). No anthropologist suggests that such a distinction has ever been found in primitive societies. "No primitive man," writes Stewart (1973:349; Hoebel 1972:580), "would analyse the difference between magic and religion." If this is the case, one wonders why anthropologists have reaffirmed the need or usefulness of sticking to Frazer's analytical distinction (Hammond 1971:284; Montagu 1964:131; Beals and Hoijer 1971:457-458).

It is difficult to understand why anthropologists have not studied in depth the relation between religion and magic in Western culture before applying the concepts to primitive society and suggesting that they have some kind of cross-cultural validity. With the recent revival of witchcraft as a religion in Western Culture (Ellwood 1973; Tiryakian 1974), the problem may require analysis with different analytical tools than those of 19th century Victorian England. Anthropologists have shown little originality in this matter. It is indeed doubtful whether our understanding of religion has improved by continuing to distinguish it from magic in almost the identical terms of Frazer or Malinowski.

[13] Pearson (1947:255) states that magic and religion are clearly separate phenomena.

Religion and Science

There seems to be more agreement in anthropological literature on the rejection of Frazer's view that magic is akin to science and of the former's precedence in time. Most anthropologists today are more likely to oppose both religion and magic to science. Science implies the possibility of verification. Religious beliefs are beyond testing and revision; they rest on faith rather than, as in the case of scientific theories, on systematic observation, prediction and empirical experimentation (Lienhardt 1966:141; Holmes 1971:327; Friedl 1976:265; Pelto and Pelto 1976:368-369). Thus Hockett writes:

> The soul doctrine is not a theory in the scientific sense, not because it is false (it may be true) but because there is no socially shared way of disproving it. In contrast, a scientific theory is supposed to contain within itself specification of the conditions under which it must be rejected or modified (1973:250).

Some anthropologists have observed that magic, science and religion exist today in all societies (Friedl 1976:266), while others have noted that scientific and religious behavior are at times quite indistinguishable (Holmes 1971:327). Harris (1975:547; Aceves 1974:232-233) has acutely remarked that "many scientific beliefs are held religiously."

The most common anthropological distinction between religion and science is expressed in terms of belief and knowledge. Religion comes in when scientific knowledge is lacking; it explains what technology does not (Brown 1963:134-135; CRM Books 1971:292; Friedl 1976:266; Titiev 1963:517). Religion is an explanatory device for things and events for which there are no commonly known answers (Beattie 1964:227; Bohannan 1963:344; Mair 1965:187; Wells 1971:120; Crump 1973:119). This suggests that the advances in scientific knowledge are bound to limit and diminish the value and applicability of religious tenets. "Man's everyday knowledge," we are told, "is inversely proportional to the level of technological development of his society" (CRM Books 1971:217; Hammond 1971:265; Pelto and Pelto 1976:367; Ember and Ember 1973:426). And again: "Rational explanation and science replaces myths, legends and beliefs" (Kessler 1974:152). The Frazerian view that the Age of Science can take over the Age of Religion is still

in different forms well entrenched in anthropology, even though not a single anthropologist propounds the three-age scheme of Frazer (Taylor 1973:397).

Several anthropologists, however, are not so sure of this rather simplistic view that makes religion useless in a scientific era. Religion still persists even in an age noted for scientific knowledge, and may not be easily or totally dislodged. Beattie (1964:239), for one, admits that there are areas "beyond science". Though religion has in the past explained events and experiences for which there is no scientific answer, it is quite possible that religion accounts for some areas of human life which science cannot and never will. The human person is concerned with the meaning of his experiences and, as Collins suggests (1975:420-422),[14] this area of knowledge is of a different level than that subsumed by science. "Religious and magical practices," notes Lienhardt (1966:142), "are often concerned with the searching out of truths which... go beyond common knowledge or purely rational deduction." Haviland (1975:308-309) goes as far as to assert that science has brought with it a religious boom. New problems and new anxieties, he states, have come in the wake of the scientific and technological explosions — problems and anxieties for which only religion might be able to offer some explanation and alleviation. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the contrast between religion and science can lead to a satisfactory answer to the nature of religious belief.

The Natural and the Supernatural

Another dichotomy employed by anthropologists in their pursuit of the nature of religion is that between the supernatural and the natural. Many textbooks,[15] with few exceptions (Lienhardt 1966, Bohannan 1963; Barnouw 1975), actually base their whole chapter on religion on this distinction. The supernatural is taken to be the main element of religion or the key word in its definition

[14] The same position seems to be held by Cone and Pelto (1969:91), Beals and Hoijer, (1971:434), and Downs (1973:306).

[15] The works of Titiev (1963), Schwartz and Ewald (1968), Ember and Ember (1973), Jacobs (1964), Pearson (1974), Schusky and Culbert (1973) and Beals and Hoijer (1971) are all typical examples.

(Kottack 1974; and Taylor 1973). It refers to "the belief in the existence of gods and spirits who have greater powers than human beings" (Collins 1975:418). It has also to be equated with what is non-natural, what is strange, mysterious and inexplicable. It is a realm outside the natural, ordinary, everyday world (Collins 1975:420-221; Kottack 1974:183). It might also connote the non-empirical, the spiritual, or the transcendantal (Swartz and Jordan 1976:650; Hunter and Whitten 1976:302).

In spite of this common use of the term supernatural and its frequent explicit or implicit opposition to the natural, anthropologists are almost unanimous in stating that such a distinction is a definite product of the West and cannot be universally applied to primitive societies (Otterbein 1972:95; Aceves 1974:229; Downs 1973:308; Beattie 1964:203; Schwartz and Ewald 1968:348-349; Ember and Ember 1973:417; Gropper 1969:82; Harris 1975:518; Hockett 1973:133-134; Crump 1973:116; Richards 1972:260-261).

But if the majority of peoples do not make such a dichotomy and if many religious and magical acts are considered to be quite 'natural' by those who practice them, then one wonders why anthropologists have continued to use the rather ethnocentric word "supernatural" at all. If the contrast is "simply not relevant" (Bock 1974:319), or if it "begs the ethnographic question" (Bohannan 1963:328), then it would be more advisable to drop the terms and search for more meaningful and realistic ones.

A number of anthropologists have tried to justify the use of the term "supernatural." Harris (1975:514) points out that religious beliefs in many cultures are analogous to what is meant in the West by supernatural. Since he fails to specify where exactly lies the analogy, the reader is not enlightened by his assertion. Mair (1965:187) states that the most commonly used distinction between the natural and the supernatural "has certainly never been a cause of misunderstanding." But if the majority of primitive societies do not know of such a distinction, how can its use not lead to misunderstanding? Would not the use of such words by Western scholars tend to mislead those who want to grasp the conceptual framework of an alien people? Plog and Bates (1976:228) assure us, in their recent textbook, that "it is accurate to say that a supernatural dimension of one sort or another is common to all

religions." Maybe if the authors had listed and expounded the different sorts of supernatural dimensions, then the reader would have been led to some cross-culturally valid terminology. But Plog and Bates offer no solution to the impasse.

What is really surprising from an anthropological viewpoint is that anthropologists have shown little or no concern to analyze the concepts of "supernatural" and "natural" in Western culture where their meanings are embedded. Few, if any, anthropologists seem aware that the distinction has not been consistent even in those societies which make it (Richards 1972:260-261).

The Sacred and the Profane

A somewhat similar confusion exists in the anthropological treatment of the sacred/profane distinction. For Durkheim (1965:52), whose position is still endorsed by several anthropologists (Maranda 1972:263; Friedl 1976:268-269; Mair 1965:201; Hoebel 1972:561-562; Schusky and Culbert 1973:142; Downs 1973:309-310; Keesing and Keesing 1971:306; Beals and Hoijer 1971:437), the division of the world into two heterogeneous and frequently antagonistic domains, the sacred and the profane, is "the distinctive trait of religious thought." Some anthropologists equate the profane with the natural, the sacred with the supernatural (Hoebel 1972:561-562), others look at the profane as being the instrumental feature, while the sacred as the transcendental feature of religion (Hunter and Whitten 1976:311); still others equate the profane with the normal, the sacred with abnormal (Crump 1973:117); and finally there are some who assert that the profane is the common and the mundane, while the sacred is the special, the mysterious and the awesome (Downs 1973:309). Several anthropologists criticize and reject Durkheim's theory (Plog and Bates 1976:228; Wax 1968:229-231; Bohannan 1963:328; Beattie 1964:203; Jacobs 1964:279ff.); many others seem to ignore it.[16] Plog and Bates point out that the distinction between the sacred and the profane is characteristic of stratified societies (1976:234-235). The dichotomy

[16] Thus Kottack (1974), Taylor (1973), Pearson (1974), CRM Books (1971), Pelto and Pelto (1976) and Spradley and McCurdy (1975) give practically no acknowledgement to Durkheim's contribution to the study of religion.

is certainly present in some of the universalistic religions, Islam being an excellent example (Harris 1975:520), and perhaps also in several primitive societies.[17]

Such blatant disagreement among anthropologists highlights the problem of understanding alien religious thought. It is indeed doubtful whether Western concepts formulated by the pioneers of anthropology can contribute to such understanding. The fact that they have failed to do so after decades of use by anthropologists is not a healthy recommendation for their continued usage in anthropological manuals.

THE MAIN FEATURES OF RELIGION

There is agreement in anthropology on the fact that religious customs are found in all cultures and that, therefore, religious beliefs and practices are a universal human characteristic (Taylor 1973:389; Kottack 1974:183; Downs 1973:310; Barnouw and Hermanson 1972:51; Maranda 1972:264; Hockett 1973:130; Hammond 1971:223; Pelto and Pelto 1976:388). Though some early anthropologists thought that pritimive societies lacked religion, ethnographic evidence gathered over the course of the last hundred years suggests quite the contrary. Religious beliefs and behavior can often be quite complex and profound, even in societies which are simple in their social organization and economic structure. Many anthropologists would also assert that myth, ritual and symbolism are probably the three more common religious features found in all religious systems. Magic tends to be more often than not incorporated into the religious system. Not all anthropologists give equal importance to these characteristics; in fact one or more of them has been frequently left out of, or relegated to secondary place in, textbook surveys. Taken as a whole, however, anthropological textbooks suggest that the student would be led to understand a religion by looking into its myths, rituals and symbols.[18]

[17] Hoebel (1972:546) states that the world view of the Navaho Indians contains this opposition.

[18] Some of the textbooks surveyed do not include "myth" in their chapters on religion, but rather under "The Arts." Cf., for example, Haviland (1975:337-340) and Beals and Hoijer (1971:531-532).

Myth

A traditional anthropological discussion has centered around the relation of myth to ritual (Malefijt 1968:187-189). Many 19th century anthropologists, influenced by the intellectualist approach of Frazer and Taylor, thought that myths came first; ritual were a kind of dramatic enactment of the stories related in the myths. The position was later reversed and the so-called ritual view of myth become popular. This maintained that myths came later in history as an explanation of rituals which were already part of a people's cultural heritage. There is virtual agreement by anthropologists that both these views are somewhat naive and both are quite untenable (Jacobs 1964:284). While a few anthropologists (Mair 1965:228) still tend to give mythology a secondary role, if not historically at least ideologically speaking, the majority of anthropologists would agree with Collins (1975:435) that historical questions about the precedence of myth over ritual or vice-versa are not open to testing and are thus insoluble. What is indeed important is that myth and ritual are inter-dependent and that both form an integral part of any religion.

Another discussion which is often mentioned in anthropological literature is the issue of a myth's validity. A number of anthropologists insist that myths are accepted as historically true by those people who relate them as part of their belief system (Stewart 1973:470; Montagu 1969:197). Consequently, Lucy Mair (1965:227) can state quite categorically that the statements that anthropologists call myths are certainly untrue. There seems to be a lot on anthropological confusion on the matter. It has to be admitted that in Western tradition, which has a strong sense of history, many myths were, and still are, held to be literally and historically true. The rise of the Biblical Criticism especially in the second half of the 19th century led to the abandonment of many Bible stories as historical events (De Vries 1962). Whether the same process occurred in all societies is not clear at all; because we are not sure what kind of concept of history, if any, primitive peoples possessed before they felt the impact of Western civilization. And whether primitive peoples ever asked the question about the relationship between myth and history remains, therefore, an enigma. It might be more plausible to examine what is happening

in the changing world of non-literate societies today and to find out whether concepts like myth and history have become part of their ideology. Anthropology textbooks give no indication that this has been done.

The common definition of myth equates it with falsehood or with some ill-founded belief held uncritically.[19] Such a definition is not the anthropologist's (Anderson 1976:282; Dundes 1968:117). Surely, the mythical story can be partly or wholely false. But this is hardly the main question to ask; on the contrary it is possible that the question of a myth's truth or falsehood is simply irrelevant (Pelto and Pelto 1976:400; Middleton 1970:504). Myths may lie beyond historical truth or falsehood. Their importance and validity are not based on their historical accuracy or verification. A myth can have a validity and truth of itself — a truth which is not of the historical order (Maranda 1972:266; Friedl 1976:275; Bohannan 1963:329).

Anthropological definitions of myth, when given, are somewhat vague. "Myths," we are told, "are stories about the past that are intended to justify some features of the present life of a people" (Pelto and Pelto 1976:400). Such a description, though sometimes found in anthropological literature, is practically useless. More revealing are those definitions which emphasize the element of the sacred, or of the supernatural, as the distinguishing feature of the mythical story. Thus, according to Swartz and Jordan, myth is "a story that embodies values of a culture and that has an aura of sanctity" (1976:671; Taylor 1973:397; Spradley and McCurdy 1975:443-444; Hoebel 1972:563; Collins 1975:435; Beals and Hoijer 1971:531; Mair 1965:228-229; Dundes 1968:117). In contrast, folklore is characterized by its secular dimension (Dundes 1968:118; Taylor 1973:431-432; Titiev 1963:546).

Anthropological interest in mythology has clearly shifted from the issue of its historical validity to that of its functions, structure and symbolism. The influence of Malinowski's functional analysis of myth is still strong in anthropological literature. Malinowski (1954:97) had insisted that myth cannot be an idle, aimless

[19] See *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield: Meriam Co., 1974).

cultural accretion; nor could it be symbolic or explanatory, for such an interpretation would ascribe to primitive peoples qualities they have not yet developed. Myth had rather a practical function. As Malinowski himself expressed it in his persuasive style:

> Myth fulfills in primitive culture an indispensable function: it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man. Myth is thus a vital ingredient of human civilization; it is not an idle tale, but a hard-worked active force; it is not an intellectual explanation or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom (1954:101).

Without necessarily denying some explanatory and symbolic dimension to myth, many anthropologists have accepted with little question Malinowski's view that myth is a social charter (Swartz and Jordan 1976:671; Friedl 1976:268; Schusky and Culbert 1973:151; Maranda 1972:266; Mair 1965:227; Brown 1963:126; Gropper 1969:86; Collins 1975:439; Schusky 1975:186; Wells 1971:125-127; Montagu 1964:132).

Anthropologists in fact ascribe both sociological and psychological functions to myth. Myths cater for all kinds of human needs. They give security in the face of the discomfort and problems of life by justifying actions and by giving meaning to unexplainable phenomena. Hardships are met with courageous action because of the mythological assurance of the outcome. In many ways myths can lessen anxieties, thus contributing to the psychological well-being of the individual (Pelto and Pelto 1976:400; Jacobs 1964:274; Montagu 1969:198; Collins 1975:435). Another function is that some myths provide an institutional outlet for social norms. The mythical stories reveal human frustrations and attempts to escape the regulations and restrictions of society by retreating into a world of fantasy (Dundes 1968:126; Collins 1975:440).

Many sociological functions are performed by mythical accounts. Myths reinforce social norms and communal ways of behavior. They safeguard and add weight to the particular moral code of a people. Often myths have an instructive and educative function of task. Children are taught their cultural norms, values and customs by the narration of mythical stories (Hoebel 1972:562; Hunter and Whitten 1976:314; Schusky 1975:185; Collins 1975:

435 and 440). Most anthropologists seem to agree that several, if not all, of the functions of myth can exist side by side and it has become common to give psychological and sociological functions equal validity in the anthropological assessment of myth.

There is still mention in anthropological literature of the explanatory function of mythology. Myths sometimes explain the origins of the universe and of a people's way of life. They show how important social institutions and mores came into being and they give answers to the riddles of life (Bock 1974:311-312; Wells 1971:125; Holmes 1971:312; Gropper 1975:86). Not many anthropologists, however, would subscribe to Montagu's view that the main function of myth is explanatory (1969:198). When they mention this function the insistence is on the human effort to understand and bring order and value into the natural world (Bock 1974:320). Myths of origin, therefore, give meaning to the universe at large and to a man's place in it. Lienhardt (1966:136) insists that the social function of myth is to create a "coherent pattern of meaning, in terms of which the worshippers understand the order of the world and their relation to it".

Contemporary anthropologists have made two basic advances which go beyond the functional analysis of myth. They have investigated 1) the symbolic or expressive character of myths and 2) the structural make-up of mythological accounts. Those anthropologists who have followed the recent emphasis on symbolic studies (Firth 1973) have noted that myths are vehicles through which "a society expresses its beliefs about things it holds sacred" (Friedl 1976:274). The mythical stories embody and symbolize the morality and the basic value system of society (Swartz and Jordan 1976:671; Holmes 1971:332-333; Brown 1963:126; Gropper 1969:86; Hunter and Whitten 1976:68; Schusky and Culbert 1973:151; Dundes 1968:117). Thus the study of myth can be pursued because the mythical stories "reveal cognitive and ideological assumptions" (Maranda 1972:266). In such an investigation the anthropologist must go beyond what the myth says at face value and must try and unearth the implicit values about life itself. This stress tends to minimize the relation of the myth to the social order and draws attention to the philosophical and theological assumptions about reality which the myths portray in dramatic form (Keesing and

Keesing 1971:310). While a few anthropologists point out the Freudian interpretation of myth that it expresses unconscious desires or wish-fulfillments (Wells 1971:125-126; Stewart 1973:373; Montagu 1969:197), the majority tend to eschew such psychological explanations.

Another symbolic approach to mythology is to relate myths to symbolic transformations in society. This is Victor's Turner view. He observes that "Myths are *liminal* phenomena: they are frequently told at a time or in a site that is betwixt and between" (1968:576). In other words, the transition stages in social and religious being are highlighted by the teaching and recitation of mythological accounts. Turner's position stresses this fact and then concludes that the symbolic nature of myth refers to the process of change. Many myths can, therefore, be only understood within the framework of the cultural, social and religious transformation. Hoebel (1972:562), who endorses Turner's view, states that anthropologists today "relate myths more to symbolic transformations in which change and establishment of a new order of things is of more interest than origins." This is obviously an overstatement. There are only a handful of textbooks which even allude to Victor Turner's studies. And those which give prominence to initiation rites and to other rites of passage very rarely draw the reader's attention to the symbolic transformatory nature of the myths recited or enacted in this context.

Finally, the anthropology student is bound to come across Lévi-Strauss structural analysis of myth. In spite of the influence of Lévi-Strauss on contemporary anthropological thought, only a handful of textbooks dwell on his structural analysis of myth. His approach to mythology focuses on the general problems of human existence that cannot be resolved. His view holds that myths unconsciously express in binary opposition the contradictions which man experiences in his ordinary life. Much of his work is judged to be somewhat vague and untestable, requiring further research before it can be universally applied.[20] His explanation of myth at

[20] The following textbooks offer some critique of Lévi-Strauss: Plog and Bates (1976:230), Swartz and Jordan (1976:680-681), Ember and Ember (1973:211 & 463), Schusky and Culbert (1973:151-152), and Keesing and Keesing (1971:311-312).

times appears to be so far removed from what the believers hold that one wonders how subjective it is. The anthropological reaction to Lévi-Strauss's theory of myth is very cautious. Few textbooks propound it with much enthusiasm.

Ritual

Ritual is, like myth, an essential constituent of every religion. The study of ritual may appear less fraught with difficulties because it can be easily observed and described. Gestures, postures and actions performed within a religious framework are open to a kind of observation which no myth is. The understanding of ritual behavior, however, is not rendered easier that the analysis of myth. This becomes clear when one studies the various ways anthropologists have attempted to define ritual behavior and to specify more directly what ritual may be considered religious. The assumption in practically all anthropological works is that ritual, that is, patterned, repetitive behavior, need not always be religious. Some anthropologists have distinguished between ritual and ceremony, ascribing religious connotation to the former but not to the latter. Ritual would thus be "a form of stereotyped sequence of acts performed in a religious or magical context" (Mair 1965:200). This approach seems common among British social anthropologists. Beattie (1964:205), for instance, gives prominence to ritual in his analysis of both magic and religion and explains that ritual deals with human problems expressively and symbolically rather than scientifically and experimentally. Mair (1965:200-201) denies that rites (and ceremonies) have any practical and technological effects and endorses the view of Leach that ritual refers to the sacred (religious) rather than to the profane aspects of human life. Ritual is, like religion, opposed to science and technology. It has symbolic value with effects in the psychological and sociological realms and any practical results are incidental.

Such a clear-cut, apparently simple, theory is not a reflection of what most anthropological textbooks have to say on the matter. The distinction between ritual and ceremony is very rarely brought into the picture. Several anthropologists (Hammond 1971:258-259; Collins 1975:425; Hoebel 1972:456) identify ritual with ceremony, others look on ceremony as "a given complex of rituals associated

with a specific occasion" (Tylor 1973:377; Anderson 1976:283; Middleton 1970:502). Most anthropologists do, however, describe ritual in religious terms. Thus Friedl states that ritual is a prescribed way of carrying out religious activity, such as prayer, an act of worship, or a sacrifice (1976:278; Beals and Hoijer 1971:462; Gropper 1969:90). Ritual refers, in the words of Collins, to "supernatural practices" (1975:425). It is a means through which persons are related to the sacred (Haviland 1975:317).

Ritual has also been defined in much broader terms. Thus Hunter and Whitten (1976:302) assert that it "consists of culturally prescribed, periodically repeated, patterned sequences of behavior." Many anthropologists,[21] perhaps wisely, steer clear of any definition; and still others[22] avoid any explicit treatment of ritual behavior. A partial solution to the problem is to talk of ritual behavior in a religious context and to treat ritual and belief as one unit, very much as Marvin Harris has done. The student would, therefore, limit his investigation to that kind of behavior which is performed in the context of shared belief. There is anthropological agreement that the kind of behavior, called ritual, has a certain number of features or characteristics, namely it has to be repetitive, stereotyped, formal, standardized and patterned (Anderson 1976:283).

Anthropological studies on ritual have drawn attention to the functions ritual performs in the total life of a culture. These functions could be religious, psychological or sociological, or a combination of these various dimensions. Ritual reinforces and strengthens belief (Friedl 1976:278; Hammond 1971:259; Brown 1963:129); it paves the way for a better understanding of the supernatural and for an improved relationship with the spiritual world (Swartz and Jordan 1976:649; Haviland 1975:317; Hammond 1971:259; Beals and Hoijer 1971:461-462). It brings a sense of personal transcendence. It may also be a way of controlling supernatural power. Several anthropologists endorse Victor Turner's view that ritual is a means of transformation from one status, religious and/or social, to another (Taylor 1973:380; Hunter and

[21] Thus Swartz and Jordan (1976), Haviland (1975), Ember and Ember (1973) and Harris (1975) are the most obvious examples.

[22] Pelto and Pelto (1976), Spradley and McCurdy (1975) and Downs (1973) are surprisingly reticent on the subject of ritual.

Whitten 1976:306; Plog and Bates 1976:230). Ritual leaves also many psychological benefits on those who participate in it. It relieves or reduces psychological tension, stress, and frustration (Haviland 1975:317; Cone and Pelto 1969:92; Taylor 1973:379). It has the therapeutic value of reducing anxiety and thus calming the practioner (CRM Books 1971:298; Barnouw 1975:266; Gropper 1969:90; Beattie 1964:208). Ritual can also be looked upon as a safe outlet for emotion, giving reassurance and feelings of security (Bohannan 1973:330; Taylor 1973:379; Jacobs 1964:283; Haviland 1975:317). Most anthropologists seem to agree that, among the sociological functions of ritual, social integration, solidarity and control have a leading place (Cone and Pelto 1969:92; CRM Books 1971:298; Anderson 1976:290; Honigmann 1963:168). By engaging in ritual the participants acquire and reenforce their sense of belonging to the group; they also channel and control conflicts between individuals and between groups (Jacobs 1964:283; Plog and Bates 1976:238). These social effects have their repercussion especially on human values. Ritual behavior upholds and validates the acceptable system of values of a society. Collective sentiments are enhanced and stressed (Brown 1963:129; Beattie 1964:210; Taylor 1976:380; Gropper 1969:90). Ritual may also have the social function of educating and entertaning people (Barnouw 1975:266).

The tendency among anthropologists is to ascribe to ritual most of these functions, stressing at times the sociological or the psychological aspects. Generally speaking, there is almost unanimous agreement that these functions are positive and beneficial both to the individual and to the group. A few anthropologists mention some negative functions, such as creating anxiety, causing tension and strain, and inhibiting the creation of better practical techniques to handle human problems.[23] Hockett (1973:252) points out that ritual sharply reduces unpredictability and thus it relieves people of the emotional burden of making decisions. But even those anthropologists who alert their students to some dysfunctional effects of ritual behavior, list also the many beneficial results of the same rituals. No matter how bizarre the ritual may be, the beneficial results of its practice seem to outweigh its negative effects.

[23] Examples are Beattie (1964:208); Taylor (1973:380), CRM Books (1971:298). Barnouw (1975:266) refers vaguely to some dysfunctions of ritual.

The emphasis on the functions of ritual is based on the works of Durkheim, Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. This approach to ritual has the advantage of interpreting and explaining human behavior from the point of view of its usefulness. While such an investigation may be satisfactory to the outside, it may, however, not receive much attention from the genuine, believing participant who accepts rites as part of his heritage. To the participant the content of the rite is more important than its sociological and psychological functions. The functional view tends either to ignore the content or to regard it as a secondary element in the study of ritual. A number of anthropologists, notably Turner (1969), Douglas (1966), and Beidelman (1966), have thrown into relief the importance of examining the content of the rite, that is the actual gestures performed and the ritual objects used. They are working with the underlying assumption that the meaning of the rite can only be grasped if one understands the content, which is a set of symbolic representations of beliefs, meanings and values. Hence the nature of ritual symbols can become a major focus of one's research (Keesing and Keesing 1971:312-313). While several anthropologists have held that rituals are expressive and symbolic, they have been inclined to notice mainly the social and/or psychological values manifested in ritual behavior. Beattie (1964:239) thus writes that "ritual is a language for saying things which are felt to be true and important but which are not susceptible of statement in scientific terms." But he does not go much beyond the social symbolism of Durkheim and Radcliff-Brown. More recently, Taylor points out that ritual is an economical means of expressing feelings about things that are difficult to communicate succinctly in words, or almost impossible to express more directly and less symbolically. He is one of the few anthropologists who gives ritual a symbolic definition. "Ritual," he writes (1973:377), "is defined here as the symbolic affirmation of values by means of culturally standardized utterances and actions." Such a definition is not restricted to the sociological and psychological functions, nor does it include the contrast between the scientific and the non-scientific. It directs one's attention to the very content of the rite, implying that ritual utterances, gestures and actions may themselves contain a meaning.

This new direction in ritual studies is in part influenced by the ethnoscientific method and the developments in linguistics. Nancy Munn, summarizing much of the work done on ritual in the last 15 years or so, shows how this trend is based on the initial work of Radcliffe-Brown and others and then points out that ritual can be seen from the "inside out" rather than from the "outside in," the latter being the typical functional approach. "Ritual," she writes (1973:579) "can be seen as a symbolic intercom between the level of cultural thought and complex cultural meanings, on the one hand, and that of social action and immediate event, on the other." Ritual thus becomes not just an action having conscious and unconscious results on its participants, but also, and perhaps mainly, a system of communication. The analysis of ritual on a linguistic model becomes rather complex, as Munn's essay shows; and this may explain why it has received little attention in most contemporary textbooks.

Symbolism

Anthropologists have reacted with mixed feelings to the recent stress on symbolism. Most contemporary textbooks give no indication that the study of symbols is an important factor in understanding a religion.[24] Some anthropologists, however, are adamant in their assertion that "in all cases beliefs about the supernatural are embodied in symbols" (Plogs and Bates 1976:229). As a matter of fact one way of communicating with the supernatural involves the use of symbols (Ember and Ember 1973:433; Aceves 1974:219-220), and therefore an analysis of these symbols seems necessary to understand what is being said and done.

The study of symbolism in anthropology textbooks is often mentioned briefly. Not many of these texts, however, make a serious attempt to enlighten the reader on what symbols are. Beattie (1964:69-71) is probably the best example of an anthropologist who clarifies the term "symbol" and then relates it to religious belief. He admits that the word "symbol" is often used

[24] Among the best examples of textbooks who apparently ignore the recent advances in symbolic studies are Hunter and Whitten (1976), Harris (1975), and Pelto and Pelto (1976).

too widely to be applied to a special field of inquiry. He starts by defining "signs" as objects, things, etc. that stand for something else. Signs are then distinguished into signals and symbols. The former give information about the state of affairs, past, present, or future; they convey a specific message. Traffic lights are quoted as a typical example of signals. Symbols differ from signals in three important ways: i) signals may be quite conventional; but symbols have an underlying rationale which explains their appropriateness; ii) symbols commonly stand for or imply some abstract notion; signals, on the other hand, refer to some event or concrete reality; and iii) symbols always refer to what is valuable and as such are always charged with some emotion. Signs need have no emotional significance and are often accepted as a matter of fact convenience. With this distinction in mind, one can understand the insistence that while both humans and animals use signals, only humans are capable of symbolic expression. Beattie then goes on to suggest that symbolism can be studied on at least two levels: i) on the level of meaning and ii) on the level of functional analysis. In other words, the social anthropologist has to find the meaning which symbols convey to the native people and their values expressed in symbolic forms. The second level, that of functional analysis, is the anthropologist's endeavor to grasp the symbols in a wider, more general, frame of reference.

Spradley and McCurdy (1975:516-521) also deal at some length with signs and symbols in their chapter on language and speech. They examine the relationship between signs and symbols with the same care that Beattie does, but arrive at different conclusions. A sign is defined as "any object that represents or refers to something else." Three kinds of sign are then mentioned, namely i) an index, that is, a sign which is naturally associated with its referent ii) an icon, that is, a sign that has a formal resemblance to its referent; and finally iii) a symbol, which is a sign having an arbitrary relationship to its referent. Unlike Beattie, they note only one characteristic distinction between sign and symbol, namely that of arbitrariness. Consequently they can state, in opposition to Beattie, that some of the higher non-human primates can use symbols. In similar fashion, Swartz and Jordan, state that symbols differ from signs in their arbitrary nature. They describe symbols,

or "extrinsic symbols" as "representations that depend upon convention for their reference" (1976:244-245; Downs 1973:199-200). Signs, on the other hand, are "extrinsic symbols" which operate through direct representation. Swartz and Jordan also ascribe some symbolic ability to animals.

What is of interest in these authors is that, unlike Beattie who describes signs and symbols in his chapter on belief and values, they fail to show their readers how a study of symbolism can enhance our understanding of belief systems. The way most textbooks handle the concept and practice of "sacrifice" is a clear illustration of this weakness. In spite of the fact that sacrifice is almost a world-wide institution (Beattie 1964:234), and that it occupies an important place in the ritual practices of many religions, few textbooks give it much consideration. Those who do are concerned mainly with listing the beneficial, material and spiritual results sacrifice is supposed to bring with it. Thus sacrifice is said to be a rite performed to insure good hunting and crops, to ward off evil, disease and all kinds of injury, to acquire victory in war, to honor ancestors and to please, influence or persuade a god (Hunter and Whitten 1976:295; Ember and Ember 1973:187 and 229; Harris 1975:543-544; Pearson 1974:258-261; Hammond 1971:259). Beattie is the only example of a lenghty treatment of the symbolic aspect of sacrifice. He rightly points out that the symbolic aspect of sacrifice is intrinsic; that is, there is no way one can understand this ritual without examining the various symbolic meanings it depicts. He insists that symbolic behavior is not to be understood as a means of achieving something (1964:235; Haviland 1975:319). We can only understand sacrifice, he writes, "if we ask not only what the people who practice it are trying to do, but also what they are trying to say, and in what language they are trying to say it" (1964:237). Nancy Munn, who summarizes some of the important studies on symbolic ritual, draws attention to this same point. She starts from the work of Hubert and Mauss who saw sacrifice as a means of communication between the two worlds of the sacred and the profane. She then describes the "interstitial" properties of the sacrificial ritual as shown in Evans-Pritchard's study of Nuer religion. Applying Lévi-Strauss's structural analysis, she concludes that "the sacrificial action synthesizes the specific disturbance referable to particular events and individual

biographies with non-specific, pervasive contradictions inherent in Nuer life situations, encapsulated in the sacrificial symbolism" (1973:601-602). The sacrifice, thus, not only brings into the open, in symbolic form, the problems and contradictions of life, but also communicates to those involved in it some kind of religious solution. A sacrifice for rain, for example, will convey to the anthropologist not just the possible fact that the sacrifice is believed to bring about the necessary downpour. Rather it tells the place and importance of rain in the total life of the people, how they conceive it as a problem, and in what way they can go about solving it. The solutions may be there even if rain does not come after the sacrifice has been offered.

It has to be admitted that symbolic representation is found not only in the religious sphere but in most aspects of cultures. In order to understand symbolism it is not enough to look at it mainly as a form of arbitrary representation, omitting or deemphasizing the elements of communication, meaning and value. By neglecting these features many scholars end up by minimizing symbolic activity in religion. In so doing they become limited in their studies and observations to repetitive functional statements. They close up several avenues to the many interesting questions which the study of symbolism brings with it (Keesing and Keesing 1971:313-314), and often end up with a narrow understanding of religious belief and practice.

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The Role of Intermarriage in the Acculturation of Selected Urban American Indian Women

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RÉSUMÉ

Les histoires personnelles de dix-sept amérindiennes, résidentes de la région métropolitaine de New York, servent à élucider les relations entre les mariages inter-ethniques et l'acculturation. Les données ont été recueillis à l'aide de trois techniques: des entrevues où s'expriment les sentiments et les attitudes, l'observation par participation du comportement, et un questionnaire sur la démographie et le statut socio-économique. Les données obtenues ont permis de répartir les individus selon trois niveaux d'acculturation. Les résultats soutiennent l'hypothèse que les mariages inter-ethniques peuvent être utilisés comme mesure indépendante du degré d'acculturation.

INTRODUCTION

Anthropological studies of American Indian peoples, which are based upon firsthand observations of process and change within urban areas, are increasing in number. These studies investigate the phenomenon of acculturation to gain further insight into the problems encountered by the incoming migrant as he/she enters a new cultural and personal milieu. Generally, researchers measure acculturation by utilizing such socio-economic factors as level of education, occupation, standard of living, and social integration. However, there is another factor that has not been systematically investigated — intermarriage as a means or an end in the acculturative process.

A survey of the literature suggests that although an awareness of this factor has long existed, few anthropologists have explicitly dealt with intermarriage as an additional facet of acculturation that can be measured as an independent variable.[1] A number of models have been developed which indirectly involve this factor. For example, Spindler (1955) identifies different levels of acculturation as "native-oriented, transitionals, lower-status, and upper-status acculturated." In this typology, individuals are classified on the basis of selected sociocultural criteria. Similarly, Thomas (1958) classifies Indians as "conservative, generalized, rural white, and middle class." This model is based upon individual adherence to the differing world views and value orientations of the white and Indian societies.

However, a somewhat different line of inquiry is introduced by Vogt (1957) which suggests that amalgamation (biological miscegenation or intermarriage) would be one fairly good index of acculturation. He notes that intermarriage would probably lead to profoundly different behavior patterns in the acculturation continuum. Roy's (1961) formulation incorporates the index of amalgamation as one of three stages in the assimilation process.[2] The other two are acculturation (acquisition of white culture traits) and social integration (participation in white formal social institutions). These stages need not follow in this sequence and, in fact, may be interchangeable.

While Roy's study of the Spokane Reservation Indians includes amalgamation as an independent variable, it is not mainly concerned with it as a process having latent and manifest consequences. For example, if an Indian girl desires to identify with and be accepted by the dominant culture, then she will deliberately select a white husband. Intermarriage, then, can be a means to acculturation in that it provides new cultural models and reference groups. Thus, acculturation is a manifest consequence. However, the Indian girl may not want to give up her

[1] See Roy (1961) for a discussion of this point.

[2] Roy acknowledges the fact that he uses the term "assimilation" approximately as the term "acculturation" is used by anthropologists and he defines the term "acculturation" as the adoption of white culture traits. However, in my typology and discussion, the term "acculturation" is used as it generally appears in anthropological literature. Furthermore, amalgamation, miscegenation, and intermarriage are used almost synonymously.

own culture, but may select a white husband anyway. In this instance, intermarriage with a particular individual is the desired end in that she is not seeking new cultural models and reference groups. Hence, acculturation (if it takes place at all) would be a latent consequence of intermarriage. This latent consequence of marriage has proved to be an extremely effective, although inadvertent, force in absorbing Indians into the general population, judging by the number of white families who claim Indian ancestors.[3]

Urban Profile

Today in New York State there are approximately 26,000 Indians. Of these, about 10,000 reside in the New York metropolitan area.[4] The only known group to form a substantial enclave (of almost 1,000) are the Mohawks. They cluster together in the same general neighborhood of the Gowanus and Flatbush sections of Brooklyn. However, for most Indians who represent many of the different tribes from many different parts of the country, there are no functioning communities in New York City into which they could fit and where they could secure technical assistance, emotional support, and identification. Their reference groups are, therefore, usually limited to one or two individuals.

The New York City Indians appear to differ somewhat demographically from Indians in other urban areas in three significant ways: the great distance between New York and most heavily populated Indian centers; the largest tribal group in this city, the Mohawks, tend to be skilled, highly paid, unionized employees in "high steel"; and New York may tend to attract the more educated, ambitious, or adventurous individuals. However, New

[3] The Bureau of the Census Estimates reported a thirty percent increase in Indian population in 1970 compared to 1960. This rate of increase is sharper than the available statistics on Indian birth rates, infant and adult mortality rates would indicate (Wax 1971:221-27). One way to account for this excessive rate of increase is that in the past few years Indians have been receiving a better press and are generally being viewed more favorably than in previous decades. Hence, many individuals of varying degrees of Indian blood have come forth, particularly in urban areas, and identified themselves as Indian.

[4] Preliminary Report to the Director of Indian Services for State of New York, *U.S. Census: Count of Persons by Race,* New York State Counties, 1971, Table 1 (Mimeographed).

York City Indians resemble other urban Indians in organizational membership. In general, Indians tend not to be "joiners" (Ablon, 1964).

A problem arises in urban studies of trying to discover who is an Indian, or who is what "kind" of Indian. Those at both extremes of the socio-economic scale may seek, for very different reasons, to avoid being identified as Indians except under special circumstances such as the distribution of a tribal estate (Wax 1971:157). The "visible" Indians in the city tend to be those in the stable working class and those who maintain active participation in Indian affairs on a formal or informal basis — that is, through voluntary associations or friendship networks. On the whole, Indians in New York City are best approached as aggregates of discrete individuals manifesting different life-styles, while at the same time attempting to preserve a particular ethnic identity as they perceive it.

For this study, eight of the seventeen informants were selected from members of various Indian voluntary associations, whose meetings were attended by this investigator during the years of 1969 to 1971. The balance were referred by either Indian or non-Indian acquaintances. All the informants selected were or had been married and all were at least one-half Indian who had been born and lived on reservations until at least early adolescence.

Method

This paper does not contest but rather seeks to expand upon Roy's findings that intermarriage is an independent, primary measure of assimilation. The data presented in this paper were gathered in the course of a more inclusive study conducted in 1971 to investigate persistence and change in culture subsequent to migration to the urban environment of the New York metropolitan area (Wagner 1972). Since this was an exploratory study based upon life histories, the number of cases was limited to seventeen women.[5]

[5] For an excellent discussion on the use of small samples, see Melvin Ember and Carol R. Ember (1971:594, footnote 4).

Using a molecular approach, various aspects of the acculturative process were traced through the use of a variety of data. The broad topics of investigation fell into three major dimensions, the cultural, the social, the personal. The main body of the data was obtained from expressive autobiographic interviews, which furnished materials in depth on value orientation and social roles, with particular attention given to items reflecting actual ties with parental family; reservation; views of the roles of wife, mother, and social participant; and attitudes and life style of the informant's parents and extended family. Data on role performance were obtained by participant-observation in Indian homes, formal and informal gatherings, and voluntary association meetings. A socio-cultural schedule for each of the seventeen women presented supplementary data on specific material values; items in this schedule elicited information relevant to both social and cultural changes occurring in the various groups. Such items included: education, occupation, place and type of residence, income, attitude toward material possessions, visits to Indian reservations, types of friendships (Indian and/or non-Indian), and organizational affiliations. Other items provided information regarding demographic features including "percent Indian blood," age of migration to the city, length of urban residence, type of husband (Indian or non-Indian), knowledge of tribal lore, and Indian language.

Information obtained from all these sources was used to place each informant into one of three categories of acculturation. The distinction of these groups was based upon the extent and kind of cultural integration and content.[6] The categories are: (1) Tradition-oriented (those who adhere to traditional values, including a de-emphasis of material possessions, and seek to preserve or revitalize their culture); (2) Transitional (those who identify with their ancestral group but evidence more of the values of the dominant culture than of their traditional culture); and (3) American middle-class (those whose cultural identification is with the dominant society but who identify themselves as Indian).

[6] The socio-cultural categories are an adaptation of those formulated by Spindler (1955) and Voget (1952).

Findings

On the basis of the expressive interviews and the responses to the prepared schedule a profile of each of the seventeen women was developed. Four of them were identified as tradition-oriented; they presented evidence of strong ties to their families, their particular reservations or tribes; their values were distinctly Indian; their social lives centered almost exclusively around other Indians; and their role-identification as wife, mother, and/or social participant was similar in basic respects to that of their parents, tribe, or to that of, in their view, all Indians.

At the other end of the scale, two of the seventeen women were identified as American middle class. These two, who were very different in their personal lives (one was a successful executive in a large corporation, divorced, and living in a tasteful, expensive Manhattan apartment; the other was a suburban housewife of moderate means), had only recently come forth and identified themselves as Indian. Their material values were representative of the dominant white culture. Their views of the role of wife and mother showed changes from those of their parents and Indian background, and their social relationships were entirely with whites.

Between these two extremes the remaining eleven women showed a wide variation in the characteristics studied.

The data demonstrated that the association existing between most of the socio-cultural items or activities — religious affiliation, knowledge of tribal lore and language, etc. — and the level of acculturation in these women is low. This lack of correlation can be understood when viewed in the historical perspective. What one must keep in mind, when speaking of Indians in cities, is that the flow of white traits had been uneven and was experienced under varying circumstances in the communities from which the individuals had come. Another factor to be considered is that the length and persistence of the acculturative processes impinging upon Indian communities will tend to eliminate certain aspects of their culture.

However, the data revealed a high association between frequency of an individual's contact with her Indian community and

her level of acculturation. Home visiting, more than the other items which have been influenced by the press of external forces on the Indian community, is based upon individual preference. The criterion of contact with the reservation is important, because it is independent of pressures for change and increasing involvement with the dominant culture. As such, it affords insight into the subjective evaluations and attitudes of the women.

Another important indicator of the extent of acculturation was the subject's choice of Indian and/or non-Indian relationships in social groups or on an individual intimate friendship basis. The decisive factor in determining patterns of social interactions appears to be that of identification with a reference group, either an actual one or one aspired to, as a point of reference behavior. The choice of companionship on the formal and informal levels reveals an individual's preferences and aspirations in regard to participation in the dominant society. In this study, the tradition-oriented women tend to associate with and actively seek out other Indians. The tendency, then, is toward ingroup relationships, which seem to give positive reinforcement to their ethnicity. At the other extreme, the most acculturated women have not sought membership in Indian organizations nor do they socialize with other Indians aside from their immediate kin.

The results of the study also indicate that degree of "blood" is not a significant factor in acculturation. Furthermore, a glance at Table 1 of the distribution of types of husbands (Indian or

TABLE 1

Type of Husband in Relation to Degree of Wife's Indian "Blood"

	Wife			
	Fullblood	*¾ or More*	*½*	*Total*
Indian husband	1	5		6
White husband	5	3	3	11
Total	6	8	3	17

white) throughout the groupings reveals that there is no close correspondence between degree of blood and intermarriage.

Intermarriage

Before examining the data on intermarriage among the women in this study, it seems appropriate to discuss briefly the incidence of Indian-white amalgamation. No systematic investigation encompassing all tribes has yet been undertaken, but generalizations based upon studies of specific reservations can be made. From indirect evidence, it appears that amalgamation dates back to the first contacts with whites (Shapiro, 1942). In the eastern states where frequent contacts occurred earlier in history and where Indians lived in small aggregations, intermarriage became more common than elsewhere. The Indian tribes that have preserved the greatest degree of "full-bloodedness" are found in the Southwest and parts of the Northwest (Eggan, 1966). Here opportunities for mixed marriages have been relatively restricted; these communities are larger and relatively more self-contained.

There are various social factors which serve to generate and support the incidence of intermarriage. One element is the presence of a white model in the family — a parent or grandparent — who is important in cultural transmission (Bruner, 1956). Perhaps, then, an Indian girl who knows she is part white would be favorably disposed toward white ways and a white husband.

Intermarriage, however, is not in itself a sufficient condition for replication of this pattern of behavior in the issue of such a marriage. It does, on one hand, create the possibility that cultural elements of the dominant society will be transmitted, but on the other, the actuality of transmission depends upon the overt effort of the white parent. Burner (1956:617) observes that some of the white men who married Indian women may well have preferred to assimilate to Indian ways and accordingly made no attempt to socialize their children to white ways.

Both of these behavior patterns were reported by women in this study in regard to a white grandparent or parent, though, as Table 2 illustrates, in all three cases where the father was white, the children married whites. Several informants described their

TABLE 2

Relationship of Parental Marital Status to Informants' Marital Status

Parent Status	*No.*	*Father's Ethnic Origin**	*No.*	*Informant's Status*	*No.*	*Husband's Ethnic Origin*	*No.*
Married	12	Indian	9	Married	5	Indian	3
						White	2
				Divorced	4	Indian	2
						White	2
		White	3	Married	1	White	1
				Remarried	1	White	1
				Divorced	1	White	1
Divorced	5	Indian	5	Married	5	Indian	1
						White	4

* All mothers were Indians.

non-Indian husband's attitudes as "like an Indian" or said, "he in very Indian."[7] Thus these women have expressed the fact that their husbands accept (to some degree at least) and some even participate in Indian ways, rather than impose their dominant culture upon the family unit.

Of the seventeen informants in this study, six had been married to Indians and eleven to white men. As shown in Table 3, all four members of the tradition-oriented group had Indian husbands. In the transitional group, there are two cases of inter-tribal marriages, and nine mixed marriages. In the American middle-class category, both members experienced mixed marriages.

The questions, "Did your parents express any particular preference in regard to your going out with Indian or non-Indian

[7] When several informants have used the expression "very Indian" or "like an Indian" in referring to a non-Indian, they explained that this person was characterized by all or some of the following traits: restrained in emotional bearing, nonmanipulation of others, concern for others in their group, generosity, and straitghforwardness in personal dealings.

TABLE 3

Types of Husband in Relation to Social Category

	Wife			
	Tradition-Oriented	*Transitional*	*American Middle-Class*	*Total*
Indian husband	4	2		6
White husband		9	2	11
Total	4	11	2	17

boys?" and "Do you have any special feeling as to whom your children date?" elicited quite informative responses. Answers not only disclosed parental biases and those of the women, but also the types of accommodation to western ways and values of both generations.

One tradition-oriented informant revealed her anti-white bias when she stated that, "Somehow I wasn't attracted to anybody but an Indian when I went out with boys." But in speaking about her chilren's dating with non-Indians she said she felt "...awful. The moment they did this my heart was broken. But I didn't interfere — you should never choose for other people." Then, in a more cheerful mood, she related that her youngest son was married to "a sweet young Indian girl."

Another tradition-oriented woman admitted to having finally overcome her objections to her white son-in-law, whom her daughter had met at an Indian affair. She related that, "He used to follow the Indians around. He has always been interested. He's up to date on everything with the Indians and their art work."

The comments of a young woman in the transitional category, who is married to a white man, summarize the various factors that may influence mate selection:

> It probably depends on what she is going to do with her life. If she is going to stay at home, she will be more comfortable with Indians.

> It's where you are and what you are involved with and as to what you do that determine who you date. When I was in high school the only boys that I dated were Indians, and they were the only ones I felt comfortable with. Then, when I went to nursing school in Wisconsin there weren't any Indian boys to date, so I dated non-Indians. If I had stayed home [Oklahoma] or gone to California, I would have married an Indian, because I would have dated Indians.

A strong feeling that there should be more Indian endogamy was expressed by four women in the transitional category who had married white men. Three of these women were "fullbloods," two of whose marriages had ended in divorce. The third woman, who is happily married, described her husband as being "like an Indian" and never thinks of him as otherwise. Her attitude toward dating and marriage have changed now that she has children: "As a matter of fact I would encourage my children to marry other Indians to try to build up our Indian blood and hold on to our heritage. There aren't many fullbloods left."

Nonetheless, the presence of a white model in the home has had some influence upon the family. Two of her sons had heard this part of the discussion and the younger boy commented, "I'll marry who I want." The older son stated that he had no special preference, but that, "...after all, mom, look who you married!"

The attitudes toward dating expressed by one fullblooded Indian married to a white man and her standard of living would have classified her as American middle-class. However, the factors of frequency of reservation visits, participation in Indian activities, and deliberate transmission of her tribal heritage to her child tend to keep her in the transitional group:

> I never found an Indian boy who was up to what I wanted. It didn't mean that I didn't have crushes on them; I did. They were the really true Indian boys who... didn't want to have any part in the white man's way of life.
>
> I didn't want to be that way. I wanted to be both ways...

The father of a fullblooded Indian in the American middle-class category had placed two restrictions upon her in regard to dating — no Indians and no Mexicans. Her father insisted that she date only white boys in order to "get somewhere in this world." In addition, he had removed the family from the reservation.

The distribution of the places where the women first met their husbands also shows a wide variation. Ten of the seventeen informants met their husbands while living in an urban milieu. Five of these women stated that they had met their husbands, who were on military duty in the United States, at social functions. An intertribal marriage resulted from one such meeting at a U.S.O. dance. One woman met her husband at an all-Indian school. Other intertribal marriages resulted from meetings through either relatives or other Indian friends. Three women married fellow students (non-Indian) at the colleges they were attending.

Clearly, greater involvement with the larger society in the spheres of education and economics, which in turn affects relocation from Indian communities, presents a variety of opportunities for Indian-white contact. For example, in the case of several women from tradition-oriented homes with minimal socialization to white values, there was an expressed predisposition to marry into white society. The idea was conceived, according to these informants, while attending a mixed Indian-white school or after moving to an urban area free of discrimination against Indians.

Thus, various factors, operating singly or in combination, influence the selection of a husband: parents' biases and pressures may precondition the individual, presence of a white model in the family, temporal and spatial location, and chance encounters. For Indians today, two additional factors with seemingly contrasting influences are assuming increasing importance. Mass media depict visually and audibly what is desirable and available in the dominant culture. As a countervailing force, Pan-Indianism provides a social and cultural framework within which acculturating Indian groups can maintain their sense of identity and integrity while selectively accepting or rejecting white cultural elements and social relationships.

For the urban Indian, relationships with whites may be determined by such factors as personal preference to partake of the alternatives available in the larger society, and constraints molded by his or her cultural background. Since the choice ultimately rests with the individual, the fact of marriage to an Indian or non-Indian is a significant determinant of the degree of acculturation.

CONCLUSIONS

In the interplay of contrasting cultural values and social roles certain white American "cultural maximizers" and Indian "cultural modifiers" seem to be operating as sometimes oppositional, sometimes complementary, and sometimes neutral social forces.[8] Several maximizing forces have been identified which appear to have a major bearing upon the achievement of particular life styles, while specific modifying forces have been found to operate as countervailing influences. One potent maximizing agent was the presence of a white father or grandfather who funnelled core values of the dominant society into the home. Another maximizing agent was an Indian parent who deliberately chose to abandon his cultural heritage and socialized his children to "think white." Other maximizing agents were white school teachers and schoolmates, and in many cases, white clergy. Finally, a white husband probably represented the most powerful maximizing agent, since a marital relationship involves intense and direct dyadic social experiences.

The most obvious and significant Indian cultural modifiers were extended family relations. Although urban and reservation families are separated spatially, they may be linked together in social, psychological, and economic cooperation. This network of relationships then serves as an agent of further socialization. Thus, contact with reservation kin may operate as a resistant or modifying force in an individual's adaptation in an urban milieu.

As an urban resident, the Indian woman is relatively independent and mobile, having much leeway in her personal choices and in individual association. The knowledge of an alternative seems to crystalize conflicts in certain areas: the choice of a spouse and the related question of the autonomy of the will of the married couple in the continuance of cultural traditions and also of identity. Several informants, who are married to white

[8] According to Henry (1968-31), the function of "cultural maximizers" is to maintain or push further the culture's greatness or integration. "Cultural modifiers" are those social structures, value orientations, or personal agents which resist change. In this connection, see Waddell's (n.d.) discussion of the Papago Indians.

men, actively strive to retain some cultural ties through contact with reservation kin, participation in pow-wows, and teaching their children tribal language and lore. White spouses of these women reportedly play wholeheartedly their role of "quasi-Indian."

Although far short of establishing the range of variation for idiosyncratic adaptations, there are some central tendencies about the relationship of urban living to Indian adaptation that can be established from the data. In this study, those women who fell into the tradition-oriented group had all married Indians. Those women who had married white men fell into the transitional or American middle-class categories, depending upon factors such as emphasis upon conspicuous consumption and amount of interaction with their Indian community. Thus, from these findings, we may tentatively conclude that intermarriage, while related to the other items — material possessions, value orientations, and personal identification as an Indian — can be considered as an independent measure of acculturation.

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Coast Salish Summer Festivals: Rituals for Upgrading Social Identity[1]

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RÉSUMÉ

Quoiqu'on ait étudié plusieurs aspects de la culture moderne des Salish côtiers, peu d'attention a été portée aux fêtes estivales des courses de canoë. Ce mémoire a pour but d'étudier ces fêtes estivales en tant qu'événements rituels servant à valoriser l'identité sociale des Amérindiens. En tant qu'institution de rechange vis-à-vis la "danse des esprits", les fêtes permettent aux groupes et aux individus qui sont orientés vers la culture blanche d'atteindre un rang social et des buts culturels. L'essor des fêtes estivales est une réponse à l'interaction culturelle accrue entre les Amérindiens et les Blancs depuis 1945, interaction sans changement de la perception blanche en ce qui concerne le rôle de l'Amérindien.

INTRODUCTION

Every summer throughout the United States and southern Canada, many Indian peoples hold various types of annual, public weekend celebrations or "pow-wows". Some whites who attend

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these celebrations smugly dismiss them as commercial imitations of a once rich and exotic culture, romantically close to nature, but now lost for all time. Perhaps for similar reasons anthropologists have neglected until recently to study "pow-wows".

Although "pow-wows" have been part of modern Indian life for at least the last fifty years, few anthropologists have written about these events in a systematic or rigorous manner. One usually sees in the literature brief discussions within the contexts of larger issues, particularly plains Pan-Indianism. Pow-wows are usually seen as events which reinforce group solidarity and maintain or express "Indian identity" (for example, Howard 1955; Lurie 1968:201; Thomas 1968:83; Corrigan 1970:253; Lurie 1971:450-1). Few attempts, however, have been made to clarify the nature of "Indian identity" and its relationship with contemporary ceremonialism in a specific social context.

During the summer of 1968 I gathered data on Coast Salish pow-wow-like celebrations known locally as "canoe races", "sports days", and rarely, "pow-wows". In the literature they have been called "summer gatherings" (Suttles 1963:521), and referred to as examples of "neo-Indian culture" (Duff 1964:104). But since none of these terms characterizes the events as wholes, they have been called "festivals" in this paper. The festivals expressed a constant theme not found in other Coast Salish celebrations — namely, the direct expression of an Indian identity to large numbers of assembled whites. This expression of identity has been reported in a general manner by other observers (Verma 1956:124-5; Suttles 1954:90; Suttles 1963). A recent study by Kew (1970) describes some summer festivals and relates them with other Coast Salish ceremonialism to status, identity, and deprivation theory. However, the interrelationship between specific aspects of Indian social identity, the summer festivals, and Indian-white interaction remains to be examined in detail and in historical perspective.

The examination here argues that, unlike contemporary Coast Salish ceremonial institutions which focus largely on relations within the native community, the summer festivals address themselves largely to Indian-white relations. In this respect the festivals are social rituals in which Indians who have internalized white-middle class values, but who are at the same time rejected

by their white reference group, improve their self-images and upgrade their social identity in the eyes of whites and Indians. This is done by acting favourably toward whites within the expectations of an Indian social identity perceived similarly by both whites and Indians. The development and growth of summer festivals since 1945 is seen here as a response to increased Indian-white interaction, but with little or no change in white expectations of the role of Indian.

INDIAN SOCIAL IDENTITY

The approach taken in this paper, like the "interactionist" analyses of Erving Goffman (1963) and Bernard James (1961, 1972), sees social identities as the underlying assumptions of role expectations in social interaction and as cognitive categories reinforced by social interaction. Consequently, an examination of identity expression and management should reveal certain motivations.

A social identity is the "complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural" for members of a particular social category (Goffman 1963:2). These attributes are not confined to socio-economic criteria such as social status or occupation, but also include personal traits such as honesty, intelligence, and appearance. Extreme statements of social identities are called stereotypes. In established or routine settings, the attributes of social identity become normative expectations anticipated by all interacting parties. For Indians, the expectations of their social identity underlie interaction with whites.

The "complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural" for the Coast Salish and neighbouring Indian peoples has been noted by several observers (Hawthorn *et al* 1958:70-71, 381-82, *passim;* Lewis 1970:213, 215-6; Colson 1953:130-133). These attributes, defined by whites and in terms of white values, are largely negative. Indians are seen as childlike and simple. They are believed to lack the potential to develop as rapidly as whites socially, economically, educationally and morally. Whites expect Indians to be dirty and unsanitary. Indians are deemed amoral, irresponsible, lazy and ambitionless. They are thought to live for the present, especially for satisfaction of their immediate needs and desires.

They are expected to have a weakness for drink, an inability "to hold their liquor."

The above identity results from white judgments of an unfortunate reality. As an ethnic group the Salish probably have the lowest socio-economic status in the area. Their position in the general economy and in any specific occupation is marginal. Salish men tend to work in unskilled or semi-skilled occupations such as fishing, logging, mill work, longshoring, construction and general labour (Verma 1956:106-7; Robinson 1963:89-93; Kew 1970:49-56). Some of these jobs, especially in the fishing and lumbering industries, are seasonal, so that men may be unemployed for long periods of the year. The proportion of unemployment among the Coast Salish is much higher than in the nearby white communities. Consequently, a considerable portion of each Salish reserve depends on welfare, unemployment insurance, old age pensions and family allowances. On one of the more prosperous reserves in March 1967, 27 out of 62 households were entirely dependent on welfare payments (Kew 1970:54). Such families often supplement their income slightly from sales of home-produced handicrafts, particularly Cowichan sweaters and small carved totem poles.

Salish participation in white-dominated occupations is hindered by a general low level of formal education and lack of vocational training. In the late 1950s few Vancouver Island Salish graduated from high school, very few completed vocational training, and none had graduated from a university (Robinson 1963:91). Educationally, the Salish appear to conform well to the trend of British Columbia Indians as a whole. In 1966, twenty-six Indians — only one in 1600 of the total registered Indian population of the Province — attended university, in contrast to one in 60 of the non-Indian population (BCIAC 1967:16). Those Salish who do remain in school are often oriented to acquiring specific occupation skills, and set their goals on the minimum grade requirements for entrance to vocational schools. In the 1960s Indian enrolment in vocational programs increased steadily, with courses in logging, heavy duty mechanics, and automotive mechanics being the most popular (BCIAC 1961-1968).

The Coast Salish awareness of their disadvantaged condition is heightened by the close proximity of reserves to the more

prosperous, comparatively immense non-Indian community. The Salish who sponsor the festivals live mainly in southwestern British Columbia and in the northeast Puget Sound region of Washington. These people occupy scattered reserves within or near to cities such as Vancouver (population, 1966 census, 410,375), Nanaimo (15,188) and Victoria (57,453). The governments of such cities provide recreational facilities and social welfare programs superior to those on the Indian reserves, but the Salish can take advantage of these only marginally, because on-reserve Indians are not municipal tax payers. Compared to the large surrounding non-Indian population, the Coast Salish under discussion numbered in 1968 only some 7300 persons in British Columbia (calculated from DIAND 1975) and a much smaller number in Washington.

Facts of the disadvantaged condition of the Salish and resulting Indian behaviour support white perceptions of the negative attributes of Indian social identity. Whites visiting poor reserves are often struck by the inferior quality of housing, facilities, and clothing (see Lewis 1970:115-118). News media sometimes report extreme cases of neglect, squalour, accidents and drinking on Indian reserves. Some whites visit beer parlours to watch the antics of drunken Indians; for this reason one such beer parlour in the fieldwork area was known locally as "the zoo".

The disadvantaged condition of the Salish has been the concern of white patrons: missionaries, school teachers, social workers and government officials. The ideal goal of these white agents is to bring about a reserve life style compatible with white standards and expectations. In attempting to do this, white patrons empirically verify Indian inferiority to Salish and whites.

Conventional wisdom of the 1950s and 1960s suggested various ways of reforming the disadvantaged condition. For many whites the panacea of Indian problems was education. The Salish were encouraged to complete secondary school (grade 12) or enough grades for entrance to a vocational or technical school. Some whites maintain that social welfare should not be given so readily to Indians (and other poor) because it breeds apathy and laziness. Others see the reserve system as the root of Indian problems, and advocate abolition of the reserves. Some people recommend that more Indians, especially young people, should move off the reserve

into the greater non-Indian society. Such widely held platitudes show little insight into contemporary Indian life. They are based on the assumption that when the Indian is assimilated into middle-class white society his socioeconomic problems will disappear.

Coast Salish who emulate whites also perceive themselves in terms of the negative social identity. When interacting with whites, Indians may explain their behaviour, or excuse themselves, within the identity framework. For example, a Salish lady avoided an interview situation during my fieldwork, by stating matter-of-factly, "I don't know much about these things. I'm just a dumb Indian."

Most often, Indians and whites use an exemption mechanism to deal with the negative aspects of social identity. Indians will show that in their cases the negative attributes do not apply. These Indians as individuals meet or have tried to meet white expectations: their houses, clothing and persons are clean; the husband works steadily; they don't drink or drink only moderately; and their children are well along in school — unlike some other families on the reserve. Such persons may also echo the solutions to Indian problems as perceived by whites. Similarly, whites may extoll Indian friends or Indians they have known by pointing out the Protestant-ethic virtues of these individuals.

Another means of reducing status differences between whites and Indians is to appeal to the positive, redeeming attributes of Indian social identity. These are also recognized by both whites and Indians, but often overlooked by whites. The positive attributes are embodied in the ideal of the romantic redman who was everything he is not today: noble, proud, warlike, aggressive, energetic, sober, unspoiled, and close to nature. Although whites seldom express these romantic attributes, except perhaps during celebrations evoking the white pioneer past, white residents in the area hold notions of the romantic ideal. Many whites believe that Indians are close to nature, and therefore comprehend the habits of fish and game, and seasonal changes better than whites. More complex romantic notions of Indian identity have not yet been documented for white residents in the area, but such beliefs undoubtedly exist. For example, during a study of Coast Salish canoe building in 1965 I went into a hardware store to purchase a roll of paper for tracing wooden templates used by a canoe

builder to gauge the symmetry of his race canoe hull. I mentioned to the hardware store owner that I was studying a canoe under construction nearby. He then remarked how amazing it was that Indians require no training and no measuring device for making canoes, because Indians build canoes from "instinct".

The Salish also believe in the romantic aspects of their social identity in a general sense. Some will express the notion that Indians were without disease and serious want before the arrival of whites, who destroyed that way of life. Notions of the romantic past are probably reinforced today by continuations of traditional patterns, especially in winter ceremonials involving spirit dancing, displays of prerogatives and potlatching.

Because the past romantic ideal is the only aspect of Indian social identity acceptable to both Indians and whites, both peoples appeal to it in reducing status differences in various situations (see for example, James 1961). A white politician attempting to relate to Indians may point out that he has Indian ancestors (Deloria 1969:10-11), or is an "honorary chief", or has an "Indian name". White anthropologists especially attempt to establish favourable relations by appealing to the romantic past. But most appeals to the romantic ideal are made by Indians, who are usually of lesser status in Indian-white social contexts and generally discredited in relation to whites. Indian appeals range from reminding whites of Indian closeness to nature (for example, Cardinal 1969:78-79), to giving whites "Indian names", and to wearing ceremonial costumes when confronting white politicians, as in the presentation of the "Citizens Plus Paper" or "Red Paper" to the Canadian government in 1970.

The redeeming quality of the romantic ideal and success in meeting white standards are the bases of Indian-white interaction. They are a constant theme expressed in a circuit of several week-end festivals held annually throughout the area each summer.

THE CONTEMPORARY SUMMER FESTIVALS

The summer festivals begin in early May of each year and continue until late June or early July. However, occasional festivals or festival activities may also be held in August or even during

the Labour Day weekend. In 1968 the festivals held in the area were as follows:

Festival	*Place*	*Date (1968)*
1. Corpus Christi Indian Sports	Quamichan Lake (Duncan, B.C.)	May 11-12
2. Saanich Indian Water Sports	Tsartlip reserve (Brentwood Bay, B.C.)	May 18-19
3. Coal Tyee Day	Newcastle Island (Nanaimo, B.C.)	May 25-26 (May 24th week-end)
4. Squamish Indian Potlatch	Mission reserve (North Vancouver, B.C.)	June 1-2
5. Cultus Lake Indian Festival	Cultus Lake, B.C.	June 8-9
6. Lummi Stommish Water Carnival	Lummi reservation, Wash.	June 22-23
7. Indian Day	Stanley Park, Vancouver, B.C.	July 13-4
8. Makah Day*	Neah Bay, Wash.	August 26 weekend

* This is a non-Salish festival included here because of Salish attendance and ties with the Salish discussed later in this paper.

Festival organization

Each festival is organized and directed by a committee usually representing a single Indian band, or in some cases, a few nearby bands. The committee is formally structured according to the model of local white middle-class social or service "clubs" with elected executive officers of chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and treasurer. They set up subcommittees to take charge of specific tasks such as advertising and water sports, etc. People volunteer to serve on the various committees, or are appointed to them by the executive officer.

Effectiveness in relating to whites appears to be a criterion for committee membership. Most festival organizers and enter-

tainers are frequently band councillors, ex-band councillors, and their kinsmen. Such persons had or have dealings as band councillors or occupationally with whites, and emulate the more affluent white middle-class standard of living. The festival organizers often hold their positions year after year, and may belong to other white-designed or white affiliated organizations on the reserve. For example, one festival chairman was also a band councillor, chairman of the band's Canadian centenary celebrations, head of community planning, head of a church sodality, and head of the alcoholics anonymous (Baxter 1967:19).

Another basis of recruitment for offices and tasks is kinship ties. Of the seventeen persons belonging to the 1968 Cultus Lake Indian Festival committees, only four different surnames were represented, and nine persons had the same surname. Reciprocity between kinsmen appears basic to recruiting people for undertaking tasks.

An important white-oriented organizational feature is patron-broker ties with the white community. These take two forms. A white patron, often the reserve priest who attempted to establish athletic or social clubs that developed into the festival, encourages white businesses and organizations to support the festival by contributing prize money, trophies, or services. This kind of relationship was formerly more common, but now Indians have generally replaced such go-between white patrons. These whites now tend to play marginal roles as advisors and sometimes as festival treasurers, because the whites have no kinship ties in the Salish community, and therefore are not subject to monetary and other demands of kinsmen.

The second form of patron-broker relationship occurs between the festival committee and a municipal office or non-Indian community organization that sponsors a large national or civic celebration locally, and seeks to integrate the Indian festival or festival activities into the program. This relationship provides better monetary support and publicity for the Indians than the other relationship. Reasons for white support are not entirely clear, but it appears that whites value the colourful festival activities for attracting tourists.

Festival goals

The official or ideal goal of each festival is to improve social and recreational facilities on the reserve by raising money for construction of a recreation centre or community hall. (Although such facilities are greatly needed on most reserves, festival committees do not deal directly with other pressing matters such as overcrowded housing, education upgrading programs, or native land claims.) The primary source of festival funds is profits from sales of barbecued salmon dinners and refreshments at Indian concession stands set up at the festivals. Sales of programs and raffle tickets also bring in some income. Sometimes souvenirs and handicrafts are sold. Bingo is sometimes played. White visitors may be charged admission or parking fees. At the Lummi Stommish a small sideshow gives the festival a percentage of its profits.

However, these means of raising money simply cannot produce the thousands of dollars required to build a modern community hall or recreation centre. Despite the varied sources of income over many years, no festival has come remotely near to attaining its official goal. Usually the committee manages to cover the expenses of the annual festival, and have some money left over for next year's festival. This appears to be the practical goal of most committees.

Festival presentations

The festivals focus on a series of "Indian" entertainments in a non-traditional context oriented toward both Indians and whites. For Indians the festivals are like small country fairs. They attract Indians throughout the Coast Salish area and some from the Interior Plateau as both onlookers and participants. Foot races and novelty races with small cash prizes are held for Indian children. Frequently baseball, soccer or lacrosse matches between different reserves are held. The principal events, long exciting races in "war canoes" from specific reserves, are followed intensely by Indians and whites. Other major events are the "Indian princess" contest and "Indian dancing" with interspersed speeches from performers and a master-of-ceremonies. Some Salish attend

primarily to play slahal, a traditional gambling game. In the evening Indian teenagers may attend a rock 'n' roll dance held in a nearby hall. For most Salish the festivals are occasions for get-togethers; people go among cars and houses, renewing ties with kinsmen and friends. This visiting, often involving many small parties, goes on during the day and well into the night.

Although Indians put on the festivals and attend in large numbers, festival presentation in both general setting and primary events is strongly oriented toward whites. Large festivals advertise through posters, newspapers and local radio stations to attract white visitors. Most festivals sell programs and attempt to follow closely their program schedule. An Indian master-of-ceremonies selected for his ability to speak English well explains to whites the significance of entertainments. These are presented as distinctly "Indian" and traditional, but in fact only a few are performed in an exclusively Salish context, and most have no context outside the festivals.

Orientation toward whites is for reasons of financing and status. Indian attendance alone is usually insufficient for food concessions to make enough profit to cover expenses. In order to cover the expenses of the present and following festival and contribute to the recreation centre fund, large numbers of white visitors are required. Depending on the weather and extent of advertising, a few hundred to a few thousand whites will turn out over a weekend. A financially successful festival demonstrates the effectiveness of the committee in realizing the practical goal of holding the festival, and supports the ideal, long-term goal, thereby raising the status of festival personnel on the reserve.

Orientation to whites also appears to result from social and psychological needs of the Indian organizers. These persons, who tend to interact more with whites than other band members and emulate the more affluent white life style, feel a need to upgrade their social identity in relation to whites. The Indian controlled festivals, unlike usual Indian-white situations with Indians in an inferior relationship, provide an optimum situation for upgrading identity. Within the festival situation speakers and performers address whites in terms of the "exemption mechanism" and the

romantic ideal. We will now examine status and identity upgrading in specific festival presentations.

White dignitaries

To promote public relations the festival committee invites white dignitaries as special guests at the festival. These persons are political or business patrons, or potential patrons, of the band(s) sponsoring the festival. Persons who the committee believes have improved the general well being of the band are also considered as guests.

The dignitaries include a wide range of whites. In 1967 the Lummi Stommish committee invited a local congressman and the public relations man from the International Aluminum Company which at that time employed about thirty men from Lummi. In 1968 the Lummi invited the attorney general of Washington State, who was then running for the office of governor. In 1967 the Coal Tyee Club of the Nanaimo band invited Arthur Laing, then minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to attend Coal Tyee Day and receive an "Indian name". In 1960 the British Columbia minister of Public Works and the priest to the Cowichans were invited to open the Corpus Christi Indian Sports, and were made "honorary Indian chiefs" (BCIAC 1962:18). Other dignitaries invited to festivals have included members of Parliament, members of the Legislative Assembly, local mayors, aldermen, and high ranking clergy such as the bishop of Victoria.

The dignitaries are usually asked to make a brief speech to open the festival proceedings. Sometimes dignitaries are made "honorary chiefs" or given "Indian names". These acts enable both dignitaries and Indians to share the favorable romantic aspects of Indian social identity embodied in a chief or Indian name, thereby removing status differences between powerful dignitaries and less powerful Indians.

Also, the association of the dignitary with the festival committee members increase their status before their people. If the dignitary consents to open the festival, he implicitly accepts it, and by extension approves the work and goals of the festival committee.

Indian "war canoe" races

The most thrilling aspect of festival afternoons and the main attraction for both whites and Indians is the "war canoe" races. They include several events that focus on fifty-foot long cedar dugout canoes. These are raced over a three or four mile-long course by crews of ten paddlers and a steersman. The crews are usually organized in a sports or athletic club representing a reserve. Other canoes, however, are individually owned, and recruit crews from kinsmen and friends. Many canoes also have a women's or "kloochman" crew of young women, who, directed by a male steersman, race the large canoe over a shorter course in a novelty race. Other races frequently held include a six-man event in the large canoes, and races for small individually owned one-man or two-man canoes. Winning canoes receive cash prizes of up to about $10.00 per paddle for the first canoe. Several festivals also award trophies, usually donated by local white merchants, for the major race events.

The present pattern of canoe racing developed from indigenous response to white influences. During white settlement of the area in the late 19th century, centres of Victoria, Vancouver, and La Conner celebrated national holidays such as Victoria Day (May 24), Dominion Day (July 1), and the Fourth of July, by organizing field sports and regattas sponsored by local white merchants and yacht clubs. At these celebrations special events were set up exclusively for Indians. In water sports these included various canoe races with cash prizes of set amounts per paddle for winning canoes. For years the races used conventional Indian work canoes. However, a few years after oared racing shells and sculls were introduced into the white regattas in the 1890s, the first "war canoes", essentially copies of racing shells with added prow and stern pieces like those on Nootkan or "Chinook" canoes, appeared. During and following World War I the popularity of regattas and white sponsorship of Indian canoe races declined, and so did canoe racing. In the 1930s and especially following World War II canoe racing throughout the area experienced a revival. Since the late 1950s the number of race canoes in the area has slowly increased through restoration of old, damaged, or abandoned canoes and by construction of new ones, so that in 1968 as many as twenty-two

large canoes were entered in races at the large festivals such as the Lummi Stommish and Cultus Lake Indian Festival. This revival has occurred largely within the contexts of the summer festivals, and can be understood in terms of factors later discussed here that generated the growth of summer festivals among the Coast Salish.

It should also be noted that despite white influence many indigenous patterns remain in the canoe racing. For years, perhaps until the mid-1950s, canoe teams devoted much more time to training, and observed a greater body of canoe lore and religious practices. These included purification with cold water baths, emetics, continence, and observance of menstrual taboos. Today comparatively few teams train in a very traditional manner, and most have a short training period of a few weeks before the racing season. Some crews still take magical precautions to ensure success and to ward off spells, and have associated with them an elderly person skilled in such matters.

The canoe racing is especially important for upgrading Indian identity, because in the fieldwork area canoe racing is distinctly Indian sport evoking the favorable romantic ideal of the Indian of old. Most Salish are proud of the races and their canoes. Sometimes Salish will refer to the large dugouts as "war canoes" before whites, and consequently bring to mind the favorable ideal.

Indian dancing

More than any other festival event, Indian dancing presents an image of the favorable romantic ideal to whites, not only in terms of costumes worn by the dancers, but also by the commentary between dances. The image presented relies on features that whites identify with the general category of "Indian". Little attempt is made to present an *ethnic,* Salish image. Consequently very few performances and only some costume items are traditionally Salish, like those used in contemporary indigenous ceremonials such as winter spirit dancing.

Indian dancing consists of a series of songs and dances often performed by small family troupes of less than a dozen people who may range in age from grandparents to pre-school children. A few single performers with their own repertoires and costumes

usually entertain as well. The attire of the troupes and single performers from the Coast Salish area varies considerably. Some men wear buckskin outfits and headbands, but more wear the Coast Salish black paddle shirt of the initiate winter spirit dancer, and a plains-like feathered headdress and beadwork. Mock initiate spirit dancer headdresses and real spirit dancer "hair hats" or "feather hats" are seen rarely. Small children wear plains-like costumes adorned with feathers and beads. Women wear moccasins, headbands, and buckskin dresses or long, similarly patterned cloth dresses. Musical instruments used are small tambourine drums from winter dances and slahal, rattles, sticks and drumming planks.

The songs and dances performed by the Coast Salish dance troupes, for example, the "dance of the serpent", the "war dance", the "dance of the salmon", the "maiden and warrior dance", "love songs" and "farewell songs", come from various sources. Many appear to be slahal songs. Other songs and dances appear to be borrowed from Plateau or Plains tribes. Still other performances are obvious inventions, some of them comic.

Performers express or imply a long traditional continuity of their songs, dances, and costumes, but this has little basis in fact. Performers do not sing the individually owned spirit songs of winter dancers which do have a traditional context. And, although parts of spirit dance outfits, such as paddle shirts or feather hats, may be worn by performers, *complete* authentic spirit dancer costumes (see Barnett 1955: plate XXVII; Hawthorn 1967: figs. 200, 202) are absent from the festivals. In short, the performances, except for the masked dance or swaihwe (phonetics in Barnett 1955), are executed only in situations involving white audiences.

The swaihwe (see Barnett 1955: plates XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX) is a prestigeful ceremonial prerogative used for purification at life crises. But in recent years some swaihwe dancers have also performed for white audiences in situations involving very prestigeful whites. At the 1968 Indian Day swaihwe dancers opened the Indian dancing shortly after the lieutenant governor of British Columbia completed his speech opening the festival.

Some dance troupes at the large festivals come from outside the Coast Salish area and put on dances which may have different

contexts than those of the Salish. At the 1967 Corpus Christi Indian Sports, dancers in Plains regalia came from Warm Springs, Oregon, and from Saskatchewan to take part in a dance competition sponsored by the festival committee, which also paid for part of the troupes' travel expenses. At the 1968 Indian Day, a Kwakiutl dance troupe from Alert Bay and a mixed Plains-Plateau Salish troupe from Seattle entertained hundreds of whites in Stanley Park.

Whether the performances are by Coast Salish or by visiting dancers, they follow a common pattern and express notions of Indian identity, usually by stressing the traditional, romantic aspects of identity in the commentary between numbers. Each dance or song is introduced by the troupe leader, single performer, or master-of-ceremonies, who announces the name of the dance, for example, the "war dance", and explains its significance.

> There's some of my people are here from my reservation. They're gonna wonder why I'm doing this [dance], but nevertheless, that I belong to the people that took care of one another by havin' their ceremonial dances which the God has given to the people before the Lord's time. Before the Lord's time it was a good many centuries that God came upon my ancestors and many other people that's here. Their ancestors was in the same place. That this dance I'm givin' is really a ceremonial from God. And, not only that, but they used it as a protection when they went out to war to go to different tribes, and they used it when they danced before they leave.

A Lummi dance troupe leader, who was the most outspoken performer at the festivals, emphasized the continuation of a noble, unique tradition by means of his dance troupe, thereby associating the favorable attributes of the romantic past with contemporary people:

> ...our people here in Lummi will remember, and always remember, the meaning of the feather, the heritage that was handed to our people. We here in Lummi still exercise the Treaty Day, when the Great White Father sent to our lands a man speaking on his behalf to the Indian people. While our people were meeting with that man, they put on the feathers and wore them proud with honor and dignity, that the marks they placed on this paper that was sent from Washington was gonna be honored and respected among the people, that, whenever our Indian people was in need of help, again he was gonna send another person to come and speak on his behalf.
>
> ... I'm glad and proud of our Indian people here in Lummi. Especially the young people that are standin' wearin' the feathers,

rememberin' the meanin' of these feathers and livin' it, and showin' their people that they still understand and will carry on the tradition that is theirs. We haven't borrowed this. This is ours. And, I'm proud of each one that comes to dance and perform the Indian dance of their peoples.

So, you see, ladies and gentlemen, what our Indian people do is real in their lives, because they have this thanksgiving that they show [in their dances], that is portrayed each time that they're called upon the winter or summer to portray the life of the Indian people.

Occasionally performers assert Indian identity by telling jokes or relating anecdotes based on cultural and social differences between Indians and whites. At the 1968 Indian Day Pageant, one elderly Salish performer told the following anecdote:

I'm very pleased that I can talk your language [English]. Your language was a hard thing for me to learn in my olden days, ladies and gentlemans. I think I'm a young guy — 79 years of age, now. [Crowd applauds.] I'm gonna tell you, ladies and gentlemans, that I'm pleased to talk your language. In my days I didn't understand one word of English. They tooked me into school. When I was in school I could not understand nobody that talks to me over there.

When I started learning how to talk English, the first word I learned... was "no". The second word... "yes". And everytime I say, "yes", I say, "yes!!!" [Enunciates strongly.] Now, ladies and gentlemans, I learned those two words in English. Finally a boy come along a lot bigger than I was. He asked me if I wanted to fight. I said, "yes!!".

Then I was cryin' and cryin', when the teacher come along. He asked me, "what are you crying for?". Well, the little Indian that speaks my language told to the teacher, he says that a big boy come along and asked if he wanted a fight. He said, "yes!!" And the teacher says, "well, you know better not to tell him. Next time, you say, 'no'."

Well, I took that, ladies and gentlemans. I kept that in mind: "no!!". And a couple of days later on I met the same boy. He asked me if I got enough the other day. I said, "no!!". [Laughter and applause from the audience.]

A visiting performer from Washington State told a short ethnic joke based on Indian identity:

Well, a little Swede boy and a little Indian boy got together one day, and the little Swede started bragging about his Swedes. He said, "we have doctors, we have lawyers, we have politicians, we have writers, we have — oh, we have... Everything you name, we got."

So, the little Indian boy says, "we're kind of famous, too. We're proud of ourselves. When you go down the street and you see little

kids playing around, did you ever see them playing cowboys and Swedes?"

At Lummi the "war dance" in the Indian dancing prompted the master-of-ceremonies to make the following remark emphasizing his Indianness.

> You know, where I work, whenever the fellows, the [white] people that I work with — if they offer me any trouble, I say, "watch it, we might have a little racial problem here." And whenever they get a little huffy toward me, I tell them, "you better not give me any trouble, unless you have enough wagons to make a circle."

Occasionally the master-of-ceremonies and other speakers will make much more explicit statements regarding their people and identity in relation to whites. They will point out that Indians, like whites, are also human beings, and have an equally worthwhile culture.

> If you have been somewhat reluctant in the past to come to the Indian country because you may have had some fears about what makes an Indian tick, let me assure you that we are a friendly group out here at Lummi. When the first whiteman came to this country our Indian people from Lummi went out there on Bellingham Bay and gladly escorted those people to the beaches, not knowing, of course, what the future was going to be for us descendants. Our people have been continually plagued since that time by misunderstanding, by lack of interest, by misjudgments, by hearsay. The Indian people are emerging and joining the society to which they belong. We have a great culture in this country. I think if you know the history of this United States, you'll find that many of the foods that you eat were first introduced to the people by Indian people of this country. Many of the finer things have been retained by society, that was started by the Indian people. If you don't think we're sometimes proud of these things, ask an Indian that knows these things, and he will tell you.

One elderly lady performer in a Lummi dance troupe emphasized that Indians, like whites and other peoples, were human too:

> And this is the first year that I am going to say these things [she begins to weep], but nevertheless we look forward to one another, no matter what colour, no matter what tribe, no matter where they come from, but they're all human beings! [sobbing] God created this world for each and everyone to live and carry on, no matter what religion you belong to, but still you belong to your race of Indian, white, coloured, or any colour, but still we're human beings! We all have the same kind of hearts, and the same kind of ways of doing things.

More rarely, a speaker will refer to definite white injustices toward Indians, such as establishing Indian reserves without compensating Indians for the loss of their lands:

> ...the Indian had so much, now he's barely hanging. One time the Indian people used to live throughout the land. They didn't have no boundaries. Today the Indian is placed in a situation where they have to be in a small, little place. The government gave the Indians that land. How do you like that? Not only here in B.C., but also in the States.
>
> In the States not too long ago, a whiteman stepped up to me, and he told me that he was an American. I said these words: "If you're an American, you'd be speaking my language."
>
> Every once in awhile I'd step out in the field with the very old people to help fight the Indian cause over here in B.C. ... in the Indian cases [establishment of Indian title to white occupied lands] that's coming up, the decision will be made against the Indian.

On another occasion the same speaker from Lummi pointed out to whites that Indians have a distinctive social identity which they would not like imitated:

> Anyone that does have a tape recorder now, I will ask you to please turn them off, because this is all that the Indian people have left of their tradition, their heritage, their life. It has been proved in Seattle today, the Boy Scouts of America is dancin' the Indian dance. This is why [recording is not permitted]: these are family songs and family owned, and we would like to have them because of the young people that is comin' behind.

The Indian princess contest

Linked with the Indian dancing is the presentation of the winner of the Indian princess contest which resembles local white beauty contests of forty years ago. Teenage contestants, their families, and sponsoring clubs, if any, sell raffle tickets in support of the festival. The girl with the most ticket sales in her name becomes the "native princess" or "Indian princess". The two girls with the next highest ticket sales are also usually acknowledged as well. Dressed in a long buckskin or similar cloth dress, headband, and mocassins, the princess and runner-up contestants are presented to the festival audience. The princess may receive a small gift or a warbonnet symbolizing her status as princess of the

festival. She usually makes a brief acceptance speech before the festival audience, and is given a seat of honour. The master-of-ceremonies and dance troupe leaders praise the princess and the other contestants for their efforts, and hold up the girls as models of industry and achievement for other young people to emulate.

In recent years two large festivals which have gained strong publicity and other support from the white community have patterned their princess contests after the local contemporary beauty contest by adding official sponsors, talent criteria, and judging committees. In the 1967 Corpus Christi Indian Sports, princess contestants represented certain clubs on the reserve, and made short speeches judged by the mayor and council of Duncan at a tea held in a local hotel.

In 1968 the princess contest at Indian Day, integrated with the Vancouver Sea Festival, was for the Indian Princess of British Columbia. The winner would represent British Columbia in the competition for the National Indian Princess held later that summer in North Battleford, Saskatchewan. All Indian Day contestants, except for a girl from the Tsimshian area and another from Chase in the Interior Plateau, came from the Coast Salish festival area. Each contestant was sponsored by an Indian organization or band. A committee of mainly Indian judges evaluated the girls on personal criteria. Contestants had to be single, between 18 and 25 years of age, and "native girls" of Indian status living either off or on the reserve. They had to have "good character", "poise", and a "pleasant personality". The girls were expected to have achieved "a reasonable standard of education" and the ability to express themselves well. They also had to have their own "Indian costume" and some knowledge of their Indian language and their own community. Each contestant was required to demonstrate the above criteria by giving a brief talk on an Indian topic of her choice before the judges and the audience.

The above criteria are especially important for upgrading social identity in that they stress qualities which most whites believe are lacking in Indians: good character, poise, ability to express oneself well in English, and educational achievement. At the same time the girls also demonstrate by means of their costumes and expressed Indian lore that they have retained traditional culture,

and therefore should be associated with the favorable attributes of the romantic ideal.

Internalization of the unfavorable identity attributes is especially understood in the girls' speeches. Most sounded very apologetic, and resemble testimonials in that contestants stand before pro-white Indian judges and a white audience to demonstrate how they as individuals are exempt from the negative attributes of their social identity, because they have met or tried to meet white expectations socially and educationally. The Indian topic presented often includes a discussion of Indian problems in platitudes used by whites: the reserve system holds Indians back; welfare makes the Indian ambitionless; Indians should move into the white community; and education is the solution to Indian problems.

The first contestant, sponsored by the *Native Voice,* an Indian newspaper in Vancouver, gave a lengthy talk:

> Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the Sea Festival Indian Day Princess Contest... I had a very much different upbringing than a good many Indian young people. I have never lived on an Indian reservation, but that does not mean I have been completely out of touch. I lived in West Vancouver most of my life. I am now twenty years of age, and I lived there for — oh — approximately sixteen years. Living so close to my friends on the reservation, I was able to meet and contact with the Indian people and their way of life. I attended --- Secondary School in Vancouver, where I graduated in 1966. While I was there I was engaged in many activities. And since the school had such a wide range of socio-economic levels, I fell that I had a very broad outlook on life, and because of this broad outlook, I am able to draw opinions and make decisions on a very large number of things... I completed high school with a 75 percent average, and entered university at U.B.C. [University of British Columbia] in arts, and continued in the next year in the faculty of science. I have now been accepted into a program of dental hygiene in the faculty of dentistry. I will study for a few years on this program, and then I will be qualified to work in public health or in a dental office.
>
> After that I would like to study my Indian culture and learn the languages, traditions, and dances of the Indian people from all over B.C., and learn about Indians in the rest of Canada. I had a slight opportunity to do this last summer by attending the Canadian Indian workshop at U.B.C. This was sponsored by the Canadian Indian Youth Council and was a six-week program studying sociology and anthropology ... We studied Indian history, culture, and gave our own opinions on the Indian outlook on life and the hope for Indians in the future.

> My best success, so far, has been getting through school. I was involved in many service organizations... I feel athletics are an extremely good way of expressing myself, because I have the opportunity to travel from Vancouver through British Columbia as far east as Montreal. And several other trips have taken me to San Francisco and points between ... I have also won myself several honours. Recently I was awarded the --- Award as the outstanding Indian athlete in this region.
>
> And now for my opinions on Indian life in general. I would like to see the Indian youth continue to move away from the reservation. I am merely saying I would like to see them experience life in a non-Indian community. I think they should also take advantage of the many opportunities for education and employment. It has been my experience that if you go forward with desire and a pleasant personality, that people are willing to give everything they have to help you out. And it would be ideal for Indian students, youths, and all other people involved with Indians to go forward and give everything they have to develop a well-balanced, happy relationship between all people: the Indians, non-Indians, Europeans, people of every walk and nationality.
>
> I would like to thank the *Native Voice* for being my sponsor, and wish you happy days here at the Vancouver Sea Festival. Thank you.

The next contestant, Miss Musqueam, began her speech with a legend explaining how the name of the village of Musqueam originated, and then presented her views on modern Indians:

> In those days [when Musqueam originated] survival and the economic welfare of the tribe depended on the cooperation and support of the neighbours. The advancement of the Indian today is awful dependent upon the harmony and cooperation among non-Indian people. Higher education is provided for by the Indian Affairs Branch... We need an education to adapt to off-reserve life. This year, over one quarter of our people are living off the reservation. We need an education to promote the economic development of many of our reserves. No one becomes a financial genius overnight. We need an education... to learn a more historically and accurate background of our people. We must not be content with second best standards. We must improve in all with the welfare of others. Service and the concern with others in all we do is our only solution.
>
> My personal ambition is to complete high school and to take a course in hotel and motel management at the British Columbia Institute of Technology. I realize my success will be my own responsibility as a human being. Being an Indian will not affect it in any way. I must walk freely and gladly with my fellow Canadians...

The master-of-ceremonies thanked Miss Musqueam, and then presented Miss Squamish, who began by describing her background:

I was raised partially in Squamish and in the State of Washington... various fields I have come across are cashier, waitress, short-order clerk, trainee in electronics and aircraft within the past year. I participated in nursing school, looking after children to and from school. I had the privilege to be a sub-teacher at times which I enjoyed. In between times I took up-grading this past year. I would like to accomplish my future goal in the field of electronics. I am also a Homemaker member. My interests are reading: autobiography, medical, history, and Indian culture; sewing and the outdoor life: swimming, hiking, horseback riding, and travelling around the potential locality in Squamish near my hometown which has become well known throughout the world for the ski resort of Whistler Mountain. I like traveling also, and can mingle with various peoples of various nationalities which I had the opportunity of meeting across Canada as far as Montreal, Quebec. Recently to the south, of Long Beach, California, and throughout Oregon and back through the State of Washington as a member of the head of Howe Sound [the location of Squamish].

Our history descends from there. The word "Squamish" means strong north wind. Our people were of a kind heart, were of a friendly nature, who met and welcomed Captain Vancouver, the first explorer on the shores of our sacred hunting grounds, which is now Stanley Park. The hand of friendship was extended from that day 'till now. The change of our times is great, and in them, progress to all people. We feel with pride the first Indian princess, Pauline Johnson, who became part of Canada as a poetess of Indian lore, a monument that became part of history in Stanley Park. [Pauline Johnson's ashes were scattered on Siwash Rock in Stanley Park.] May we all remember the honour she has brought to our people, to the present day of the Indian Friends Society.

In my opinion of the Indian people, I'd like to see the younger generation who is now in their youth to continue on and have a better education to help one another as a brother between other nationalities, and that we'd all be one. I'd like to see more participants interested in the Indian culture which I myself am interested in.

The following contestant, Miss Chase, made a brief, barely audible speech which related without apparent bitterness the estrangement she felt as a child in the public school system and in white society now. She regrets dropping out of school, and wants to continue her education somehow.

The master-of-ceremonies thanked her, and introduced Miss Vancouver Indian Centre, a Tsimshian girl who has moved into Vancouver. She wore a long brown dress decorated with a large frog formed of buttons.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the Indian Sea Festival. I am honoured to be here today, representing the Vancouver Indian Centre at the B.C. Princess Pageant. My name is ---, an Indian, otherwise known as Kwinsebas. We do not have an English translation for that. I was born on the Kitwanga reserve of the Tsimshian tribe.

The Tsimshian tribe has three main clans: the Eagle, Wolf, and Frog. As you may have seen from the design on the front of my dress in buttons, I myself belong to the Frog Clan... The Frog God warned of danger by croaking, and if one of the gods or demi-gods was on the verge of doing wrong, it [the Frog] would croak and the god would stop immediately. The totemic frog holds this symbol as a teacher of truth and honesty.

I am twenty-one years old and I have been living on the reserve 'till I was around ten years old. From there I spent a year each in Prince Rupert and Terrace, attending a country school. Again, I moved close to my village, living with my grandmother until I completed my grade 11. For my last year of high school I boarded in Hazelton where I held a part-time job as a sales clerk in the Hudson's Bay Company, and also held a position of social representative in the latter part of my last year. Prior to graduation I moved to Vancouver for five months and took a general commercial course in the Vancouver Vocational Institute. After completing my course I moved on to ... Prince Rupert, and worked as an engineering clerk in the Columbia Cellulose Company. During my year in Prince Rupert I bowled in a few of the Company leagues and was also a member of the Native Benevolent Association. The purpose of the club was to provide entertainment for young adults living in Prince Rupert. I again moved closer to home and worked as a admitting clerk in the --- Hospital in Hazelton. Although Hazelton didn't offer much in line of entertainment I played softball for the hospital team and sang for the nurses residence. Three months ago I moved to Vancouver, and am now working as a general office clerk for the firm of ---. The last three months I bowled in the league for the --- Tyros United Church group. I am again playing softball for the same league.

Although I have moved away from my reserve for the last four years, I would not help but feel and see the problems endured by our Indian people today. First, lack of education. A great majority of our population has never completed or continued their education further than our Indian day-schools which offer classes to grade seven. Our parents did not go much further, but seem to get along. But what about our young generation? They need encouragement, but fail to receive any from home, because as long as Indian Affairs is here to provide us welfare, they will never realize the meaning of education in today's standards of living. Our main problem seems to be the

reluctance to leave home and face the outer society. We feel self-conscious ... and scared to go. And yet, we cannot be blamed for it, because sheltered in one small community, no means of communication, and our only people Indian people to associate with, we are scared of the outside society. It would be just like getting a man of a different race and bringing him to the reserve. I'm sure that he will feel out of place because he is not used to living this way.

Last, our lack of employment. Most reserves do not offer any means of employment other than seasonal fishing. For villages near a city, they seem to lack the qualifications that is needed for employment. This may not come true to ... reserves, as they are situated in the south. But my village, where I come from, it is a matter of 80 miles to the nearest city. To prove my point, I would like to take my village. It has a population of around 300, and as far back as I can remember, there has only been three of us that have graduated from the village. I was the last one to graduate, three years ago. Out of a population of 300 or more that isn't right.

Finally, the last contestant and winner, Miss Duncan, was presented. She began her speech with a greeting in Halkomelem:

...in my language that means "how are you?" If you feel the same way I do, you must be pretty cold. Before I tell you about myself, I'd like to tell about how our reserve started a long time ago. The first man who was dropped on the mountains near Duncan was Gjalituk. He was dropped on the mountain... now known as Mt. Prevost. While he dropped the earth trembled. The Good Maker supplied him with a great deal to eat. He had berries, fish, and wild animals. But, being that he was alone, he became lonely. One night he had a dream of a maiden. The next day he looked for a wood stump and carved an image of the maiden that he dreamed of. He thought of a way of trying to make this wood come to life, so he built a big fire and placed the stump beside the fire. Looking at the stump, he realized that there was something missing. He then made a blanket from goat wool.

From this fire, people from the south noticed the flames. Two girls had noticed, and their parents had noticed. The parents said to the girls, "which one of you is going to travel to find this man, and make him your husband?" Both girls began their journey over the mountains and came to Swehwis. When they got to Gjalituk's camp, they saw what he had made, so they pushed the wooden image into the fire, and as they did this, it screamed. Gjalituk heard this and ran back to his camp, and found they had destroyed his mate. He then asked why they had done this. The oldest one scolded him for trying to make an image which only the Creator could do. The oldest one then said to Gjalituk, "I will be your mate." But Gjalituk would not

> accept this. After coaxin' he accepted, which left the younger sister to journey to the next mountain to look for Gjalituk's younger brother... This is how Duncan started. The families grew and grew, 'till finally, here I am.
>
> My name is Cukcukalwitz, or --- ---. I come from Duncan and have lived there most of my life. I was educated in Duncan, where I graduated. In between that time I have gone to school in Mission City [St. Mary's Indian Residential School] and Victoria, at St. Ann's Academy [an integrated girls' convent day and boarding school]. I graduated at --- Junior High School, and was offered a job as a teacher's aide at the old ... [Indian day] school for an orientation class. Since I liked my work so much and children, I plan on continuing next year. If I feel I can take the responsibility as a teacher, I will continue and become a teacher. And I hope to see more Indian youths continue on with their education, for Indians I feel are one of the most beautiful people, and I imagine you feel the same way about your own people. Thank you very much.

An unusual departure in princess contests was the bestowal of an Indian name on the 1968 Lummi Stommish princess as a brief event included in the afternoon Indian dancing. This event is described here in detail because of the value of the speeches and the ceremony itself in throwing light on Indian identity. Although the naming was included with the Indian dancing, it apparently was not a festival performance or a scheduled part of the proceedings. While the ceremony lacked the elaboration of contemporary name givings in the big house (cf. Kew 1970:173-180), it was certainly not just another dance event, and was probably a real naming with significance in the Coast Salish community. The naming was arranged by the princess's maternal grandparents. A speaker came forward, called forth several witnesses, and explained the history of the name. He began by explaining to whites the significance of an Indian name:

> Probably some of you are wondering why this has to take place. Well, let's face the fact. The day is upon us when the lowly Indian has to prove his identity. Our fishing rights is at stake. That's the only thing that the Indian has got left of what he possessed. The wealthiest people on earth — today, that's all they've got — just a portion of their fishing rights. And the day is upon us when we, the Indians, are going to be required: can you prove your identity? Do you have an Indian name? Do you carry on your Indian culture? Can you do them? Can you exercise them? Those are some of the things that is upon us. And so, therefore, the grandparents of this young lady saw to it that before this girl goes to wherever she's going to go [on

scholarship to France for part of the summer to study French] she will be able to prove her identity by having an Indian name.

You know, anyone can be a Dan, Swanson, Johnson — whatever he might be. But it takes an Indian to be given an Indian name from way back — four or five generations. Only those people that inherit that right can have that Indian name and possess it. So, therefore, that's what this ceremony is going to be about. So, therefore, it's generally customary that witnesses be called to witness the naming ceremony, so that no matter where this girl will travel among the Indians, she will be known by that Indian name from these witnesses. So, should at anytime that this girl be in your presence, and if you don't know her Indian name, you call upon these witnesses. And these witnesses are supposed to know her Indian name.

Then the speaker called out the Indian and English names of several persons, and asked them to come forward to be witnesses. Those named came from a wide range of reserves in the area: two people from Lummi, one from Nooksack, one from Penelakut, one from Somenos (a Cowichan reserve), one from Tsawout, and two persons from unmentioned locations. When those present among the called witnesses had assembled near the speaker, he continued the naming ceremony.

And, now to you witnesses and everyone that's present here, to you Indian people, it's customary that when an Indian name is brought out like this, you must know the background of the Indian name that's being given, so that there'll be no question about the Indian name. No one will be able to step out and say, "well, that Indian name belongs to me. It belongs to my family." And, so therefore, this ceremony must take place. These witnesses must listen to the background of these Indian names, so that if they hear of anyone claiming a right to that Indian name, then they will verify that they were present, and there was no one requesting clarification on the Indian name. And, so therefore, these witnesses are going to listen to what is about to be said.

This Indian name that is to be given to this girl belonging to [the girl's MoMoFaSi] ... [the maternal grand-mother's] aunt, a sister to her father. That lady left no one. I understand a little bit that she did have grandchildren, but they're completely lost to our race. No one knows their whereabouts, and so therefore... [the grandmother] has decided that she would give this Indian name to her granddaughter — which is right in as much as it was her aunt. You witnesses, this Indian name that you're going to hear belonged to ... [the grandmother's] aunt, who was a sister to her father. And so, therefore, she has the right to bestow that Indian name to the next of kin. So, therefore, she has chosen that their granddaughter will have this Indian

> name. This Indian name is Skwheel-tee-uk. Skwheel-tee-uk! That's a Skagit name, Skwheel-tee-uk. In English it was translated, Falling Star, Skwheel-tee-uk! Skwheel-tee-uk! So this young lady is Princess Falling Star in the English. In the Indian, it's Princess Skwheel-tee-uk.
>
> Thank you, witnesses, should at anytime anyone question what is that young lady's Indian name. So therefore, I take pleasure in introducing the one that is receiving this Indian name. I present to you, Princess Skwheel-tee-uk or Falling Star. Thank you. [Applause from audience.]
>
> Princess Skwheel-tee-uk or Falling Star ... will be able to prove her identity: I am Princess Skwheel-tee-uk of the Skagit and Lummi. Thank you. [Applause from audience.]

Then the witnesses went over to the princess to congratulate her, and were paid, thus completing the naming ceremony.

The Indian baby show

The "Indian Baby Show", formerly a special event only at the Corpus Christi Indian Sports, is worthwhile mentioning as an event for upgrading social identity. The baby show, partly initiated by the Indian Affairs health nurse, was set up in 1949 to promote better child care among Indian mothers. Several classes of baby contestants were set up and judged by a doctor and nurse as to which child was the healthiest. Parents of winning children received a trophy and prizes donated by local businessmen. In the early 1960s businessmen reportedly did not donate enough prizes to support the show, and the festival could not afford it, so the show was discontinued. The baby show was obviously a response to a commonly held white belief that Indian parents neglect their children and that Indian children in particular suffer from poor nutrition, inadequate clothing and poor hygiene.

Slahal

Slahal, also called the "stick game" or "bone game", is a gambling game often played at the festivals. Since the mechanics of the game, its strategy and setting are described in detail elsewhere (Dewhirst n.d.:7-12; Kew 1970:297-310), they will not be discussed here.

Slahal, unlike other festival events, is not geared to entertain whites, and no efforts are made to explain it to white onlookers.

It is an Indian game for Indians. Several experienced players attend the festivals primarily for opportunities to play slahal and win money. Usually a side of players largely includes persons having close affinity by reserve and kinship. At the 1968 Cultus Lake festival, largely Cowichans played Lummis and Yakimas. At Neah Bay in 1968, Salish consisting largely of Cowichans played their Makah hosts.

Slahal relates to upgrading identity very limitedly. It is sometimes advertised on festival posters and in programs. The beautiful singing and drumming and crowd around the plays provide interest for white onlookers, but little entertainment value.

Summary

The above material shows that although the contemporary summer festivals are put on by Indians for Indians, the celebrations focus on Indian-white relations at several levels.

The festival committees ideally address themselves to the relative deprivation of Indians compared to whites. Festival organizers, often past and present band councillors and their relatives who emulate an affluent white middle class life-style, attempt to realize this on the reserve by raising money for construction of a recreation centre. For this reason and practical considerations of covering festival expenses, the festivals are oriented toward attracting many white visitors to make a good profit from concession sales.

Festival committees also cultivate ties with current and potential white patrons who include politicians, businessmen and clergy. These patrons are invited as guests of honour to the festivals, where they interact with festival chairmen in an Indian-controlled situation which reduces status differences between Indians and white patrons. The association of festival organizers with white patrons maintains or increases the status of the festival committee in the eyes of Indians, and makes the festival goals and efforts more credible.

Festival presentations challenge commonly held white notions of Indian inferiority. Indian speakers and performers operating within the social identity framework attempt to upgrade Indian

identity. They show that Indians are exempt from negative judgments by meeting white standards of achievement and character. Although performers profess to display traditional culture, they present a non-traditional, distinctly Indian image which evokes the favourable romantic attributes of Indian social identity.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUMMER FESTIVALS

All the contemporary summer festivals have developed as a ritual institution centred around Indian-white patron-broker

TABLE 1

The Development of Summer Festivals

Festival	*Origin Date of Precedent Event*	*First Year of Festival*	*Year of Organization Change*
1. Corpus Christi Indian Sports	ca. 1932 (*Cowichan Leader*, 17 May 1934)	ca. 1946 (estimated from respondent's data)	ca. 1953 (estimated from respondent's data)
2. Lummi Stommish Water Carnival	?	1946 (from respondent)	ca. 1955 (estimated from respondent's data)
3. Cultus Lake Indian Festival	no precedent event	1958 (*Chilliwack Progress* 10 June 1959)	?
4. Saanich Indian Water Sports	mid-1950s (from respondent)	1960 (BCIAC 1961: 17)	1963 (estimated from respondent's data)
5. Squamish Indian Potlatch	?	1960 (*The Citizen* 20 May 1964)	1961 (*The Citizen* 11 May 1961)
6. Indian Days Pageant	Capilano Indian Pow-wow ? ca. 1948 (Verma 1956: 123-4)	1963 (BCIAC 1964: 15)	?
7. Indian Day	Indian Days Pageant? 1963	1968 (?)	?
8. Coal Tyee Day	no precedent event	1967 (from respondent)	1967 (from respondent's data)

relationships since 1945. White individuals and institutions played a major role in starting and supporting all the festivals. However, Indian-white festival relationships have moved gradually toward Indian organizational autonomy with a general shift from mainly a few on-reserve patrons to various off-reserve white patrons and supporting institutions. This shift and the growth of festivals among the Coast Salish since 1945 (Table 1) accompany increased socio-cultural interaction between the Salish and the dominant white society.

Festival histories

Most festivals originating before 1960 were initiated and supported by white patrons in on-reserve institutions. These were social or athletic clubs controlled or influenced by whites, often missionaries who promoted white middle class norms among the Indians in an effort to salvage them spiritually and socially. Social-athletic clubs were a means of teaching young Indians organizational skills and leadership based on the white "club" model. The organization and activities of the clubs under white influence were precedents that developed into the contemporary form of festival with complete Indian control. This pattern can be seen in four festivals: the Corpus Christi Indian Sports, the Saanich Indian Water Sports, the Squamish Indian Potlatch, and the Cultus Lake Indian Festival.

The oldest continuing festival, the Corpus Christi Indian Sports, is essentially a gradual addition of sports and other features to the annual Corpus Christi celebrations first held at Quamichan in about 1889. Through the efforts of the priest, war canoe races with prize money and trophies were added to the celebrations in the early 1930s. In about 1943 an Indian became chairman of the Corpus Christi Sports committee, and the resident priest who had been chairman remained as treasurer. In 1946 the committee decided to make a profit from white attendance to construct a community hall, and food concession stands were introduced for earning money. In 1962 a princess contest was introduced. In 1967 the festival received even greater support from the white community, and featured dance troupes and a parade through Duncan.

By this time patrons included prominent politicians and businessmen in the white community.

The Saanich Indian Water Sports, probably influenced by the example of the Corpus Christi Sports, began in the early 1950s as a school picnic at Tsartlip, where Indian children from the four bands on the Saanich Peninsula attend an Indian day school operated by the Catholic Church. Through the Catholic Youth Organization, a Church sponsored social-athletic club for young Indians, the missionaries had canoe races and concession stands added to the picnic, and encouraged the development of the festival. In the early 1960s the priest gave up his role as secretary-treasurer of the festival committee, which became an all-Indian committee representing the four Saanich reserves.

The Squamish Indian Potlach first took place officially in 1960 (*The Citizen* 20 May 1964; 26 May 1966). It was reportedly started by the parish priest of St. Paul's Church on the Mission reserve (*The Citizen* 20 May 1964). The aim of the festival was to raise money for the restoration of St. Paul's Church. By 1961 the priest ceased to be "executive director" of the celebration, and assumed the position of treasurer; a committee of Indians of the Squamish band then appears to fully run the festival (*The Citizen* 11 May 1961). By 1963 the festival had expanded and developed a wide range of entertainments: canoe races, salmon barbecues, souvenir sales, Indian dancing, folk dancing, marching bands, a parade, and circus rides (*The Citizen* 23 May 1963). In 1964 and in 1966 the festival was opened by the mayor of North Vancouver (*The Citizen* 20 May 1964; 26 May 1966), which suggests that by this time the festival received considerable support from the local white community. Attendance for 1964 was estimated at 3000 persons (*The Citizen* 20 May 1964).

The Cultus Lake Indian Festival officially first took place in 1958 as a contribution of the Stahlo bands in the Chilliwack area to the British Columbia centennial celebrations (*Chilliwack Progress* 10 June 1959). Newspaper accounts show that in at least the first few years of the festival a priest served as an advisor and spokesman of sorts for the festival (*Chilliwack Progress* 7 June 1960; 6 June 1961). The festival appears to have been an immediate

success with estimated attendance ranging between 3000 and 8500 during the first eight years (*Chilliwack Progress* 1958 to 1965).

In contrast to the festivals just described recent festivals were initiated and sponsored by non-reserve white patrons, often committees or societies acting in the interests of cities or municipalities. Their goal is less to improve the lot of Indians and more to promote tourism. The main promotion device is the romantic image of the Indian, which is not only exotic in itself, but also evokes for whites romantic notions of their own pioneer past. Consequently the non-reserve patrons have initiated festivals or festival-like activities during important anniversary and centennial years.

Although off-reserve white organizations initiated recent festivals whites tend to have played a minimal part in directing and organizing them. Shortly after the festival was set up, the Indians became more or less autonomous of white influence. Off-reserve white support of the recent festivals and continuing old ones has enabled festival committees to realize a greater profit and to increase their status due to better white publicity, attendance, and sponsorship. Examples of this pattern are the Indian Days Pageant, Indian Day, and Coal Tyee Day.

In 1963 the Indian Days Pageant was first held on the Capilano reserve of the Squamish band. It was the first effort of the Northwest Indian Cultural Society incorporated in February, 1963, by a group of Indians and non-Indians "concerned primarily with bringing about a greater unity between the tribes of the Province and with promoting better understanding and appreciation of the ability, skills, and traditional culture of the Indian people" (BCIAC 1964:15). The last newspaper coverage of this festival was in 1967 (*The Lionsgate Times* 10 August 1967). Judging from the similarity of events, personnel, and white patrons, the 1968 festival appears to have been integrated into the Vancouver Sea Festival, and called "Indian Day".

Indian Day, held in Stanley Park, Vancouver, B.C. was integrated with (and presumably heavily sponsored by) the Vancouver Sea Festival committee, which organizes an annual week-long celebration to promote mid-summer tourism. Consequently,

the Indian program was geared primarily for the entertainment of whites. It emphasized Indian dancing by polished troupes from Seattle, Alert Bay (Kwakiutl), and Burrard (another Salish reserve). A canoe race and the contest for Indian Princess of British Columbia were held. Other performers, speakers, and organizers came mainly from the Squamish band. Indian participation and sponsorship also included city Indian organizations such as the Vancouver Indian Centre and Nasaika Lodge for Indian Girls.

Coal Tyee Day was initially organized and sponsored by the Empire Day Society in charge of the 1967 Victoria Day (May 24) celebrations for Nanaimo. The publicity and financial support from the Empire Day Society and additional finances from efforts of the Nanaimo band members made the first Coal Tyee Day a great success with an estimated attendance of 6000 persons. After expenses there was enough money to finance Coal Tyee Day of 1968 and some recreational activities for the Nanaimo band. Unlike the gradual and painful beginnings of other festivals Coal Tyee Day became a success immediately because of good support from the city of Nanaimo.

In 1968 the most recent development in the summer festivals was the Makah attempt to participate in the Coast Salish festival circuit. Although the Makah are a non-Salish people they have intermarried with Salish groups on both sides of the border since before the mid-19th century, thereby having some intervillage ties which are one of the bases of association at the festivals. In the spring of 1968 the Makah Tribal Council paid a Salish canoe builder to build two "war canoes" at Neah Bay. The Makah set up a canoe club, and began hard training for the Salish canoe races. The Makah also invited the Salish to attend the 1968 Makah Day, where canoe races and other events were scheduled.

Makah Day of 1968 expressed a different relationship to the Salish guests in contrast to that expressed to whites in the Salish festivals. The celebration did not attempt to make money or appeal to whites. Most people who attended were Indians. Indian visitors were given free lodging and free meals. Unlike the Salish festivals, Makah Day expressed an *ethnic,* Makah identity to the Salish, rather than a general Indian social identity. Nearly all the dancing sessions proudly presented Makah songs, dances, and costumes,

and emphasized that they were "Makah", instead of "Indian". I saw no warbonnets, no Plains-like dances, and very few white visitors. However, according to Colson (1953:135, 257) such features were present in the early 1940s when a sudden influx of whites in military and construction projects made the ratio of white to Indian residents of Neah Bay roughly equal. Today Makah residents of Neah Bay outnumber whites, and did not emphasize a stereotyped romantic Indianness to whites at Makah Day in the manner described by Colson (1953:135).

In other respects Makah Day resembled Salish festivals. A princess contest took place, as well as canoe races and sports, but in the form of logging contests and motorcycle races. In the future the Makah may commercialize their festival to raise money for construction of a community swimming pool. Apparently a tendency toward commercialism in promoting white attendance had existed during the early 1940s (Colson 1953:111, 189).

So far, this paper has examined festival development largely at the level of the festivals themselves. However, festival development appears related to broader, concurrent contexts of cultural change.

Festivals and increased Indian-white interaction

The development and growth of summer festivals parallels increased cultural, social and political interaction between the Salish and the dominant white society since World War II. Most notably, many socio-political restrictions which maintained a more isolated reserve subculture have been relaxed or removed, resulting in changes in reserve life and increased interaction with whites. A general response to this among the Coast Salish has been a movement toward group solidarity. This is generated in contemporary ritual institutions such as the summer festivals and winter spirit dancing.

Before the late 1940s the social and political life of the Canadian Salish was more confined to the reserve than it is today. Indians were not legally permitted to consume liquor, and were consequently more restricted in their social relations with whites. Indians were also not permitted to vote in national and provincial

elections, and therefore had little to offer white politicians. Political representation to the outside society was largely through the Indian Affairs Branch, which advised the bands on legal, technical and business matters. Education was acquired in segregated Indian day schools or residential schools, both operated by clergy. This restricted society was maintained directly by three officers: the superintendent or "Indian agent", the priest, and the hereditary chief. Although the dynamics of interaction between each officer, the band and the dominant white society have not been described, they strongly suggest patron-broker models similar to those presented recently (Paine 1971). The power of these patrons, especially the priest, diminished as a result of socio-political changes and increased interaction of Indians with whites.

These changes began in 1949 when Indians in British Columbia were allowed to vote in provincial elections; in 1960 they obtained national suffrage. In 1951 the revised Indian Act provided for band chiefs to be elected as opposed to continuing with the tradition of hereditary chieftaincy. Also, Indians were permitted to consume liquor in public drinking places, but still could not legally have it in their homes. In 1962 restrictions on sales of alcoholic beverages to Indians in British Columbia were removed.

Educational reforms also took place. In the early 1950s, Indian children began to be integrated into the British Columbia public school system. The general extent of integration for the Coast Salish under discussion, who account for about one-sixth of British Columbia registered Indians, is suggested by the following figures for the Province as a whole. In 1949 only an estimated 82 Indian children, roughly 0.32 percent of the registered Indian population, attended non-Indian schools (BCIAC 1960:8). But, by 1967, 57 percent of the Indians attended public schools (BCIAC 1968:16). This continuing program of school integration has resulted in more Indians staying in school longer and completing more grades.

More and more Indians are gradually moving into non-Indian communities. In 1961, 17 percent of the total provincial Indian population lived off the reserve, in contrast to 26 percent in 1967 (BCIAC 1968:10. Cf. Stanbury 1975:301). Figures for the Coast Salish are significantly lower, but nevertheless reflect the trend

to off-reserve living. In 1962, 9.0 percent of the Coast Salish lived off the reserve, in contrast to 16.8 percent in 1967, and 30.2 percent in 1973 (Stanbury 1975:301). The lower percentages for the Coast Salish are probably due to the proximity of their reserves to urban centres, which means that many urban advantages can be enjoyed without relocating one's household. Hence, the Coast Salish percentages likely indicate more interaction with whites than would appear, and may reflect even higher interaction than the physically higher percentages of off-reserve persons reported by Stanbury (1975:301) for native cultural groups in rural areas.

There may also be an increase of Indian membership in non-Indian organizations off the reserve. Data on this point are not available, but increased Indian enrolment in the British Columbia Girl Guide Association suggests integration into other non-Indian associations. In 1969 only 36 Indian girls belonged to the Association (BCIAC 1961:14). By 1964 that number had grown to at least 200 children and 11 adult Indian leaders (BCIAC 1965:19).

As institutions in the outside society have provided more and more services and as interaction with the white society has increased, the power of white patrons in the pre-war and early post-war reserve society was undermined and reduced. Indian bands now deal more directly with the outside white society than through white patrons of the reserve society. Today the enlarged "outside" patrons and brokers include: members of Parliament, members of the Legislative Assembly, representatives of nearby city governments, civic officials, school trustees, school teachers, real estate brokers, consultants and contractors. The festival guests described earlier also indicate the range of outside patrons.

Despite increased interaction with the dominant white society, the stigmatized Indian social identity underlying Indian-white interaction persists (for example, see Lewis 1970:215-216). The urban setting appears to involve, for yet undetermined factors, most negative experiences for off-reserve Indians in British Columbia. Stanbury's study based on 1971 field data reveals that highest perceived discrimination occurs in towns of more than 25,000 people (Stanbury 1975:323). More of the off-reserve Coast Salish sample reported negative experiences with stores, cafes,

government offices and landlords than off-reserve Indians of other cultural/linguistic groups; the Coast Salish sample contained the second highest percentage of native people reporting negative experiences with the police (Stanbury 1975:323). Stanbury's data strongly suggest that more negative judgments from whites accompany increased Indian interaction with whites in more urbanized settings. This increases the need to define a more acceptable social identity and more favourable self-images.

A general response to this problem is a movement toward increased group solidarity, which is expressed in different ways and in different social contexts. In the white dominated public school system, Salish children tend to band together and develop a sense of group consciousness or group identity (Lewis 1970:213; Kew 1970:83). Adults demonstrate and maintain group solidarity through ceremonial institutions, especially winter spirit dancing and the summer festivals — both of which have flourished since 1945. These institutions promote group solidarity in different contexts.

Winter spirit dancing which combines traditionally based guardian spirit dancing and potlatching (see Suttles 1960, 1963; Robinson 1963; Kew 1970) maintains ethnic solidarities and expresses tribal or *ethnic* identities *within* the Salish community (Suttles 1963:519-520; Kew 1970:204-209). The winter dances are a Salish institution, exclusively for members of the Salish community. Whites are absent or attend in small numbers only by invitation from Salish friends. The dances receive wide support and varying extents of participation from most persons in the Salish community, even from those prominent in the summer festivals. Such persons tend not to become spirit dancers, but may potlatch and support kinsmen who are dancers or Indian name recipients.

The winter dances appear not to meet many new personal and community needs brought about by growing acculturation and urbanization. Persons emulating a white middle class life style have difficulty participating fully in the winter dances. Seclusion as an initiate dancer for the duration of the dancing season, from roughly mid-November to mid-April, could result in a man losing his job unless arrangements were made for him to work during

the day; even then, it would be difficult to work effectively. Full participation would also require greater distribution of wealth, which by white values, should be saved to better the individual and his immediate family. Furthermore, someone wishing to participate completely and successfully in the winter dances would have to be able to speak or at least understand Halkomelem, the language used in most speeches and rituals. An active involved participant would also require a good knowledge of family histories and prerogatives.

This traditional knowledge is often lacking in young people. In the last three decades there has been a growing failure to pass on traditional knowledge. The number of persons raised in the ways of the last century has declined. Migratory jobs and compulsory formal education in residential schools for large portions of the year removed young people from the influence of elders, especially during adolescent years when ritual knowledge, names, family histories and prerogatives would be learned. Salishan languages are rapidly declining; most young people use English almost exclusively.

Stanbury's study of the growing phenomenon of off-reserve life gives some indication of cultural decline. Of five major cultural/linguistic groups in the province, the Coast Salish sample was lowest in speaking their language at home (3.9%) and in teaching their language to their children (34.6%) (Stanbury 1975: 228-229). Paradoxically, the Coast Salish rated highest for visiting their reserves, attending Indian ceremonies, belonging to Indian organizations and reading Indian publications (Stanbury 1975: 232). This behaviour would appear to reflect the movement toward Indian solidarity in response to increased Indian-white sociocultural interaction.

The summer festivals, in contrast to the winter dances, offer another alternative for persons who can participate only limitedly in the winter dances because of acculturation and cultural decline. The summer festivals, however, address themselves to a different social context: Indian-white relationships and Indian social identity, rather than ethnic identity. The festivals provide a ritual framework for promoting the solidarity of *Indians* vis-a-vis whites.

The festivals replace some of the lost indigenous culture with Salish and distinctly "Indian" folk materials (songs, myths, dances,

costumes, etc.) explicitly to counteract white cultural influences and the negative Indian social identity. Although the folk materials are no longer integral to the indigenous cultural system, they do engender a sense of pride and favourable self and group images, particularly in young people. The chairman of the Lummi Stommish explained that Indians were taught to be ashamed of their culture; they were regarded by whites as "thieves" and "savages", and were "not given a fair shake in history." He claimed that Indian culture has been "chopped off for one hundred years", and that the dance troupes give young people some cultural background which is generally lacking. Other respondents and festival performers expressed feeling pride in the "Indian" festival activities.

The Salish themselves believe that the festivals promote solidarity on the sponsoring reserves and generally among the Salish community. One chairman believed that his committee and the festival did a lot toward bringing people on the reserve together. Another chairman stated that the sports and festival activities give purpose and meaning to young Indians.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Rather than viewing the Coast Salish summer festivals as survivals or vestiges of traditional culture in an isolated social system, this paper has examined the social manifestations of the festivals in both contemporary and historical perspectives. Whereas traditional Salish institutions, especially the winter spirit dances, are concerned with relations and solidarity within the Salish community, the festivals focus on asymmetrical Indian-white relations in which the Indian is usually socially, economically, politically and morally inferior. In the festivals Indians upgrade their inferior status and identity in relation to whites by presenting to whites, and to themselves, favourable romantic attributes of Indian identity and evidence of attaining white standards. The improved identity presented in the festivals counteracts white cultural influences on highly acculturated young people who lack meaningful identity symbols and a positive identity vis-a-vis whites. The festivals also serve as an impression management and status upgrading device in dealing with white patrons, and as means of attaining higher status and socio-cultural

goals for persons who emulate the more prosperous white middle class life style.

The general effect of all these functions is to promote social solidarity among Indians in relation to the white world which sees the Indian negatively. The development of festivals and increase in indigenous ceremonialism such as spirit dancing since 1945 are aspects of a general movement toward solidarity among the Salish. This is in response to increased white cultural influences brought about by removal of socio-political restrictions which once kept reserve societies more isolated from the white world. Today the Coast Salish are exposed to greater white cultural influences and more frequent Indian-white interaction with more negative experiences than before World War II. This has increased the need for greater solidarity and a more positive social identity.

Little data on contemporary "pow-wows" among other Indian peoples are available for comparative purposes. Quite likely many aspects of the Coast Salish example also apply to "Pan-Indian" pow-wows on the Plateau, Plains and mid-West. As long as Indian-white interaction increases with social barriers to Indians remaining, summer festivals and other rituals for upgrading social identity will probably increase among the Coast Salish and other native peoples.

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