ANTHROPOLOGICA

N. S. Vol. IV, No. 1, 1962

LE CENTRE CANADIEN
DE RECHERCHES
EN ANTHROPOLOGIE
UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA

THE CANADIAN RESEARCH
CENTRE
FOR ANTHROPOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

Power in Complex Societies in Africa

NUMERO SPECIAL ISSUE

ANTHROPOLOGICA

N.S. VOL. IV, NO. 1, 1962

sommaire — contents

*La présente livraison d'*Anthropologica *comporte un certain nombre d'innovations et de changements. Mentionnons d'abord que c'est notre premier numéro spécial. Nous remercions vivement le professeur Ronald Cohen de l'Université McGill d'avoir bien voulu s'occuper de préparer cette livraison et de l'avoir dirigée. Nous espérons pouvoir être en mesure de publier d'autres numéros spéciaux dans un avenir assez rapproché.*

On aura remarqué que la couverture de la revue est nouvelle; nous suivons en cela une mode qui veut qu'on renouvelle de temps à autre la présentation de la marchandise qu'on offre au public; les revues dites sérieuses ne peuvent pas se soustraire à cette exigence. M. Norman Hallendy nous offre une couverture sobre et attrayante. Qu'il en soit très chaleureusement remercié. Les symboles qui apparaissent sur la couverture représentent l'homme, la femme et l'enfant, donc la famille dont l'anthropologie a fait un objet privilégié d'études.

Dorénavant, tout article de la revue comportera un résumé, soit en français, soit en aglais, selon que l'article lui-même aura été écrit dans l'une ou l'autre langue.

Dans la prochaine livraison, nous commencerons de publier des chroniques sur de larges secteurs de l'anthropologie; chaque chronique fera le point sur ce qui s'est publié d'important sur une période de plusieurs mois dans des domaines aussi variés que ceux de l'évolution culturelle, de l'Anthropologie théorique, de l'ethnographie du Canada, de l'anthropologie appliquée et de plusieurs autres.

Les auteurs qui soumettront des manuscrits voudront bien se guider sur la façon dont la bibliographie est présentée dans ce numéro-ci; nous croyons nous conformer à la pratique courante en adoptant ces modifications au système que nous avions établi.

S'il est d'usage pour les numéros spéciaux de demander des manuscrits aux auteurs, nous comptons, en revanche, pour les

numéros ordinaires que les auteurs soumettront d'eux-mêmes leurs articles à la revue. Rappelons que nous acceptons des articles qui se rapportent à l'Anthropologie canadienne ainsi qu'à tout autre sujet anthropologique présentant un intérêt descriptif ou théorique certain.

Nous espérons que ces innovations nous aideront à garder les lecteurs qui nous ont été fidèles jusqu'à aujourd'hui et à nous en gagner de nouveaux.

Marcel Rioux,
rédacteur en chef

Power in Complex Societies in Africa

BY RONALD COHEN
Guest Editor

This special issue on Africa is offered as our contribution to one of the central research traditions in African studies, and indeed in anthropology as a whole. Partly because of this tradition, and more importantly because of the nature of field work conditions in Africa, political organization has always attracted a great deal of the anthropologist's attention no matter what part of the continent he has elected to study. The colonial situation and the movement towards independence of new nation states has only tended to exacerbate this prominence, first of all by bringing to Africa other research workers like the political scientists who are devoted to dealing solely with political organization, and secondly by involving millions of people in political movements and political issues under the banners of national leaders and their political parties.

It has been our intention in this volume to obtain as representative a sample as possible of superior-subordinate relationships in complex African societies. The original invitation to contributors pointed out that superior-subordinate relationships could refer to hierarchical relations within one institution in a society such as kinship, government, religion, or economics. On the other hand it could also refer to hierarchical relations cutting across several institutions in one society such as class or caste distinctions, or more elaborately, writers might wish to compare superior-subordinate relationships among a group of African societies. Using this frame of reference contributors have been left free to focus on any aspect of power at whatever level of scale they wished using any theoretical approach considered to be adequate to the task. It was also decided to limit the studies to those dealing with "complex" societies. This term refers to con-

temporary societies having greater internal organizational complexity than those dealt with under the Group B rubric of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940: 5) or more recently the segmentary societies dealt with by Middleton and Tait (1958). This leaves a very large group of societies of several different varieties; a good deal more various in fact than would be assumed from the original Group A category of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940) which they use to cover all societies that "have centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions..." (1940: 5). Certainly all the societies dealt with here do, in fact, have some kind of centralized government, however they are sufficiently different from one another in certain respects to merit some form of sub-division.

In the present issue, complex societies are represented by three basic types. First there is the indigenous African state, now often a part of a larger national entity. The Emirates of Northern Nigeria, and the state societies of Uganda represent such a variety. Secondly, there are societies organized as states either aboriginally or in the contemporary setting, or both, which are characterized by superior-subordinate relations between separate ethnic or racial groups. This quality is one of the primary factors in the organizations of the political relations within the state. Examples of this type would be Ruanda-Urundi (with Tutsi and Hutu in the superior and subordinate positions, respectively), or the Rhodesias and South Africa where the racial split is a well-known feature of the state. Thirdly, there is the urban configuration, which may actually have characteristics taken from the previous two types, but which also has separate and special problems of political organization because of its high population density.

Our coverage of these types both geographically and in terms of each type is not nearly as complete as we would like it to be. The general reader is invited to expand his understanding of these problems by referring to the book review section which has been planned with a view to discussing contemporary work already completed on superior-subordinate relations in complex African societies. The specialist reader is invited to comment critically on our various approaches and to carry on where we

have left off, using his own data on these types of societies to formulate better typologies, and perhaps even a general theory for this important research area.

Unfortunately, the issue is already too long for the inclusion by the editor of a detailed analysis and comparison of the various contributions. This will however be published separately in the near future. Suffice it to say here that this issue documents over and over again the necessary and stringent dichotomy that must be maintained in our thinking between sociological and cultural reality on the one hand, and the ideology or idealization of the society and its culture on the other, which may exist in the people's minds only as a formalistic over-simplification of their own society. The ideal or formal structuring of social relations which may exist as part of the tradition of a society is only one stimulus among a vast array of others to which people respond in hierarchical social systems. Primary among the stimuli affecting people is the locus of real coercive power and the demands, formal and informal, of those holding this power. In other words, superior-subordinate relationships can only be fully understood when these real loci of power are isolated and described. Among social scientists it is the anthropologist with his intensive field work techniques who can provide the basic framework of data and theory concerning this kind of political life at the local level; without this basis, it is impossible to penetrate in any comprehensive way, the political evolution of Africa.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the contributing authors who have helped to bring this issue out in its present form. Professor Marcel Rioux, the permanent editor, and Father Joseph-E. Champagne, O.M.I., the president of the Canadien Research Centre for Anthropology have given invaluable help in processing the manuscripts, and more basically in offering us space in the journal for this special issue on Africa. I am also indepted to Professor J. W. VanStone who has acted as book review editor, and given much encouragement and advice from his own editorial experience.

McGill University

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L'organisation politique et l'accord de clientèle au Burundi[1]

PAR ALBERT TROUWBORST

SUMMARY

Relations between superiors and inferiors in Burundi were determined by at least three structures, a political structure, a clientship structure and a caste structure, the first two of which are examined in particular. The political structure determined the relations between rulers and subjects; the latter constituting territorally based communities. Political relations were hierarchical and presupposed the recognition of hereditary rights. The clientship structure, on the other hand, regulated the relationship between two individuals only, was not hierarchical, and did not recognize hereditary rights. The distinction between these structures is necessary if one wants to explain the political organization of Burundi.

It is often supposed that Burundi was governed by a ruling aristocracy of Tutsi herders, whose power was based on the institution of cattle clientship. In fact, the real rulers in Burundi were called Ganwa, people of royal descent, deriving their power from territorial appointments. Their wealth in cattle was a political complement to their power to freely give grants in lands, and the latter right was certainly just as important to their role as their cattle.

It is true that the Ganwa were deeply involved in patron-client relations and that their positions much resembled that of feudal lords, the king being little more than a *primus inter pares* among them. The relations between subjects and rulers were interpreted as relations between patrons and clients, and for the rest often cut across territorial limits. Many people living in a certain territory were not subjected to the authority of the local chief or headman. In other respects, however, the chiefs were the real subordinates of the king, whose superior status in the country was not just symbolic. Moreover, part of the inhabitants of a chiefdom were clients of their chiefs in name only, and not connected with them in a formal client-patron relationship.

[1] Nous tenons à remercier l'Organisation Néerlandaise pour la Recherche Scientifique qui a subventionné nos recherches au Burundi en 1958. Sur le terrain, nous avons pu profiter de l'inestimable assistance du Docteur J. Vansina, à ce moment chef du Centre de l'I.R.S.A.C. à Astrida, Ruanda. Messieurs les Professeurs Gilles Lefebvre et Asen Balikci ont bien voulu corriger le texte français.

The real subjects of the state, mostly Hutu farmers, were the backbone of the national economy of Burundi and constituted the stable part of the population. It is significant that the administrative centers of Burundi were situated in the densely populated agricultural regions. It is significant also that the rituals of kingship were conducted by Hutu dignitaries whose functions were hereditary. The real clients of the state were mostly Tutsi. Frequently moving about in the service of their superiors, they could gain much influence by giving out cattle, but their power depended ultimately on the protection of the territorial chiefs.

Introduction

L'organisation politique du Burundi revêtait un caractère très composite. Plusieurs structures basées sur des principes différents déterminaient les comportements des acteurs dans la vie politique. Deux de ces structures en particulier seront le sujet du présent article; à savoir la structure politico-territoriale et la structure de clientèle. La structure de castes également très importante sera discutée lorsque le contexte le nécessitera. Le seul élément que les trois structures avaient en commun était qu'elles portaient toutes sur une distinction entre supérieurs et inférieurs. Cela implique que l'opposition supérieur-inférieur, si caractéristique du Burundi (Albert 1960a), ne se laisse pas formuler simplement en termes d'une opposition entre chefs et sujets ni entre patrons et clients. Etre le supérieur de quelqu'un avait une autre signification dans le cas de relations basées sur un accord de clientèle ou sur la structure de castes. Il est évident que la distinction n'était pas toujours facilement applicable. Un seul individu pouvait assumer, par exemple, les trois rôles de chef, de membre de la caste royale et de patron. Lequel des rôles était exécuté à un certain moment dépendait de la situation concrète. Un prince, par exemple, était l'égal d'un autre prince lorsqu'il partageait avec lui le même chalumeau à boire, ce qu'il ne pouvait pas faire avec les membres d'une caste inférieure. Il y avait toutefois d'autres situations où ce même prince pouvait être son inférieur.

C'est pour cela qu'une interprétation en termes d'une de ces structures seulement ne suffit pas dans le cas du Burundi. L'accord de clientèle, par exemple, en ne définissant que les relations entre deux personnes, laissait dans l'obscurité le carac-

tère de beaucoup d'autres relations. Si tous les Rundi avaient été vraiment des clients du roi, comme le voulait l'idéologie (Trouwborst 1961), ils n'auraient pas pu être en même temps les clients ou sujets d'un chef. Cela est évident lorsqu'on se rend compte de la position des véritables clients du roi habitant dans le territoire d'un chef. Ceux-ci n'étaient pas soumis aux ordres du chef local et n'étaient pas en ce sens ses subordonnés. Pourtant, une partie des habitants d'une chefferie, quoique en théorie des clients du roi, agissait comme des sujets du chef local.

Ce caractère composite de l'organisation politique avec son inclusion de l'accord de clientèle au Burundi n'est pas du tout exceptionnel. La plupart des sociétés des Bantous interlacustres par exemple, semblent se ressembler de ce point de vue (Maquet 1954, 1961; Mair 1961; Fallers 1956; Richards 1960). Maquet distingue pour le Ruanda, ancien, deux structures politiques, à savoir militaire et administrative et une structure de clientèle, qu'il appelle aussi structure féodale. Ce système de clientèle occupait selon lui une position intermédiaire entre les sphères politique et privée. Il ajoute que de nombreuses relations politiques semblent avoir pris pour modèle la relation client-patron (1954: 165). Il montre aussi l'importance de la structure de caste dans l'organisation politique du Ruanda (ibid. 157). Le même auteur a affirmé dans un article récent que le Ruanda ancien constituait une "oligarchie très puissante tempérée par des institutions féodales" (1961: 299). Il n'hésite plus à appeler la féodalité franchement un régime politique (ibid. 295).

Il est dommage que l'auteur ne précise pas si la manipulation des terres au Ruanda revêtait aussi des caractéristiques féodales. Il y avait peu de raison d'appeler la féodalité ruandaise un régime politique, si le caractère féodal de l'organisation politique au Ruanda dérivait uniquement du système de l'*ubuhake*, qui, selon sa description, ne portait que sur des vaches. Un régime politique règle, selon Maquet même, les relations entre gouvernants et gouvernés, et il semble être clair que l'*ubuhake* ne faisait pas cela.

Le fait d'être le client d'un Tutsi ne voulait pas dire qu'on était gouverné par ce dernier. Maquet reconnaît lui-même qu'il y avait des Tutsi ordinaires qui n'étaient pas des gouvernants

(1954: 176). En outre, les données que l'auteur nous procure ne nous permettent pas de conclure que les gouvernants du Ruanda étaient en même temps de véritables patrons de tous leurs sujets.

D'autre part, il faut admettre que la situation au Ruanda différait assez de celle qui existait au Burundi. Tous les Tutsi du Ruanda semblent avoir été des patrons et ils étaient dans n'importe quelle situation les supérieurs des Hutu, de sorte qu'on pouvait opposer les Tutsi en tant que groupe aux Hutu en tant que groupe. Au Burundi par contre, il pouvait y avoir des situations où un Hutu était le supérieur d'un Tutsi (Albert 1960).

Une autre différence entre les accords de clientèle des deux pays consistait en ceci qu'au Ruanda il était presque obligatoire et indispensable d'entrer dans un tel accord, chaque homme ayant besoin d'un protecteur dans la personne d'un patron (Maquet 1954: 156; Mair 1961: 315).

Au Burundi, c'étaient surtout les princes et la plupart des Tutsi qui participaient aux accords de clientèle. Ces derniers avaient toutefois la liberté de se choisir leurs propres patrons qui pouvaient être nombreux. Beaucoup de Hutu n'étaient pas impliqués dans des accords de clientèle formels, mais ils avaient toujours la liberté de se présenter chez un patron. Aussi ne peut-on pas appeler l'accord de clientèle sous forme de vaches le principal instrument de la domination des Tutsi, comme il semble l'avoir été au Ruanda. L'*ubugabire* au Burundi était plutôt un instrument de mobilité sociale, dont les patrons aussi bien que les clients pouvaient se servir (comparer Mair 1961: 325).

L'accord de clientèle, au sens plus large que nous avons employé dans un article précédent (Trouwborst 1961), ne se limitait pas non plus au Burundi seulement. Mair compare par exemple, les rapports existant entre le roi et les chefs et ceux qui existaient entre gouvernants et sujets dans quelques sociétés interlacustres. Elles semblent supposer que l'existence du "passive clientship" à savoir la relation entre chefs-patrons et sujets-clients en l'absence d'un accord de clientèle formel est caractéristique des sociétés prédominamment agricoles comme les Ganda et les Soga. Rappe-

lons toutefois, qu'on peut à peine appeler les Burundi une société prédominamment agricole.

Mair emploie, suivant la terminologie de Fallers (1954), le terme de "client chiefs" pour désigner des chefs non-héréditaires roturiers qui au lieu des princes aidaient le souverain à gouverner le pays. Ce qui est remarquable est que ce terme "client chiefs" pourrait bien être appliqué aux chefs Rundi, malgré le fait que ces derniers fussent membres d'un groupe héréditaire de nobles. Il y a là quelque chose qui semble être une particularité du Burundi.

Plusieurs auteurs (Mair 1961; Fallers 1954; Richards 1960) ont insisté sur cette tendance très générale dans la région interlacustre, à savoir que le souverain essayait de s'assurer de l'appui de clients personnels roturiers, les chefs-clients, dans son conflit d'intérêts avec les membres de son propre linéage ou avec d'autres groupes héréditaires. Au Burundi, la situation était différente: les chefs-clients y étaient les plus proches parents du roi. C'est cette circonstance qui explique pourquoi l'institution de la clientèle n'y était pas un facteur stabilisateur comme c'était le cas chez les Soga (Fallers 1954: 128).

Il ressort de ces quelques remarques comparatives que l'accord de clientèle au Burundi revêtait quelques caractéristiques très particulières en ce qui concerne son intégration dans l'organisation politique. Le but du présent article est d'analyser ces caractéristiques, ce qui nous donnera en même temps l'occasion de corriger plusieurs conceptions erronées sur l'organisation politique du pays en question.

Une de ces conceptions, encore très répandue, veut que les Tutsi constituent une caste gouvernante de pasteurs au Burundi et dans d'autres pays de la région interlacustre de l'Afrique Centrale. Ainsi, Murdock a écrit récemment (1960: 257) que les Tutsi dans cette région constituaient partout "a ruling aristocracy of herders" et qu'ils vivaient presqu'uniquement des produits de leur bétail. On suggère également dans un autre livre récent (Richards 1960: 29-31) que les Tutsi au Burundi étaient une dynastie gouvernante de pasteurs.

La réalité est beaucoup plus complexe. En effet, les Rundi

eux-mêmes distinguaient entre les véritables gouvernants du pays, les Ganwa, qui étaient des princes de sang royal parmi lesquels on choisissait le roi, et les Tutsi dont les pouvoirs politiques étaient assez modestes. Les rapports historiques entre ces deux groupes ne sont pas très clairs et il n'y a rien qui prouve que les Ganwa étaient d'origine Tutsi. La situation est compliquée aussi par le fait que les Rundi distinguaient entre Tutsi nobles et Tutsi/Hima parmi lesquels les premiers jouissaient d'un statut beaucoup plus élevé que les derniers. En outre, on ne peut pas dire que la domination politique au Burundi se fondait sur la possession du gros bétail. La base du pouvoir était territoriale, les gouvernants du pays étant des chefs de provinces sous la direction du roi. Il est vrai que les accords de clientèle portant sur les dons de bétail jouaient un rôle important dans la vie politique, mais ils ne conféraient pas automatiquement de pouvoirs politiques au donateur.

La littérature ethnographique se référant au Burundi même exprime assez bien ces nuances. Il y a déjà longtemps que plusieurs auteurs comme Rijckmans (1926), Smets (1949), Meyer (1916) et Simons (1944) avaient reconnu la base territoriale des pouvoirs politiques dans ce pays et la position dominante des Ganwa. Dans leurs publications on trouve aussi des descriptions détaillées de l'accord de clientèle sous la forme de vaches, qui permettent d'établir l'importance de cette institution, sans la confondre avec l'organisation politique comme telle.

Il faut constater toutefois que toutes ces publications négligent d'examiner les rapports qui existent entre l'organisation politique et l'accord de clientèle, et que les auteurs ont eu tendance à sous-estimer l'importance des dons sous forme de terres et les accords de clientèle qui y sont associés. Nous nous sommes limités nous-mêmes à indiquer dans un article précédent (Trouwborst 1961) que les relations politiques aussi bien que les relations entre un supérieur et un inférieur dans un accord de clientèle portant soit sur des vaches soit sur des terres, se fondaient toutes sur le modèle d'un accord appelé *ubugabire*. Les rapports entre les différentes formes de clientèle et leur importance relative dans l'organisation politique n'ont pas été analysés. Avant d'aborder ce sujet ici, nous nous proposons de discuter d'abord trois problèmes qui y sont associés, à savoir:

1. l'importance relative du gros bétail et des terres dans l'économie;
2. l'importance relative du gros bétail et des terres dans les sentiments des Rundi;
3. les divers emplois auxquels le gros bétail et les terres pouvaient être destinés.

L'importance relative du gros bétail et des terres.

Les Rundi ne mangeaient pas de poisson autrefois sauf en quelques petites zones-frontières qui n'étaient pas considérées comme vraiment faisant partie du pays. Il y avait aussi peu de chasse surtout dans les régions très peuplées de l'intérieur où on ne voyait presque pas de gibier. La cueillette n'avait pas beaucoup d'importance économique non plus. (Van der Burgt 1903: 99 et 425-427; Meyer 1916: 36-40; Simons 1944: 246-247). Les principaux moyens de subsistance étaient l'élevage et l'agriculture. D'ailleurs les seuls Rundi qui mangeaient la viande des bêtes sauvages étaient les pygmoïdes Twa.

Les Rundi élevaient des vaches, des chèvres, des moutons, des poules, des abeilles et des chiens. A l'exception des Twa, ils ne mangeaient toutefois que la viande du gros bétail et ils ne buvaient que le lait des vaches[2]. Ils ne mangeaient pas d'œufs. Les chèvres et les moutons étaient élevés pour leurs peaux, et le fumier qu'ils procuraient était utilisé à des fins religieuses.

Les vaches étaient donc de loin les plus importants animaux domestiqués. Elles procuraient du lait, de la viande, du fumier, du sang, des poils, des nerfs et des cornes. Une partie du lait était destinée à la fabrication du beurre, avec lequel on s'enduisait le corps. Il est impossible en ce moment d'estimer quantitativement la contribution du gros bétail à l'économie ancienne, mais on peut quand même constater que cette contribution était importante. Selon des estimations citées par Meyer (1916: 116 et 6), il y avait avant 1908 à peu près 500.000 têtes de gros bétail au Burundi pour une population de plus d'un million et demi. Ces

[2] Il est possible que les Hutu mangeaient de la viande de chèvres et de moutons autrefois, malgré le fait qu'ils étaient supposés ne pas le faire (ALBERT 1960 b, 49).

chiffres ne peuvent pas être très exacts, mais ils donnent une impression qui n'est probablement pas trop éloignée de la réalité. Il est donc possible que l'affirmation que les Tutsi buvaient autrefois beaucoup de lait soit vraie.

D'autre part, il est certain qu'aucun Rundi ne vivait des produits de son bétail seulement. Même les riches propriétaires de vaches consommaient des quantités énormes de bière de céréales ou de bananes et mangeaient d'autres produits agricoles. En outre, il y avait des régions très peuplées où peu de gens possédaient des vaches. Cela nous permet de conclure que l'agriculture avait du moins la même importance que l'élevage, et que la possession de champs était aussi importante que la possession de vaches. Cela vaut pour l'économie totale du pays comme pour l'individu. Pourtant, on pourrait s'imaginer le cas d'un homme riche qui se contenterait de s'occuper seulement d'élevage et qui se procurerait des produits agricoles en échangeant ses vaches ou leurs produits. En réalité cela ne se faisait jamais.

Tout d'abord il est clair que même un pasteur avait besoin de terres pour y construire sa hutte et pour les utiliser comme pâturages pour ses vaches. S'il était vraiment riche il ne dirigeait jamais ses vaches dans les pâturages communaux, mais se réservait des pâturages privés en donnant des cadeaux à son chef. Puis, il n'y avait aucun Rundi qui ne disposât pas de terrains agricoles. Il est vrai qu'un homme se procurait pas mal de produits agricoles comme contre-prestations à des vaches données à ses clients, mais cette source n'était pas assez sûre, régulière et suffisante. N'oublions pas qu'un homme riche devait être très généreux et devait pouvoir entretenir beaucoup de visiteurs et donner beaucoup de fêtes. Aussi, un homme véritablement riche n'avait pas seulement beaucoup de vaches mais aussi beaucoup de terres. Ces terres étaient cultivées par ses femmes et par des serviteurs qui habitaient sur son domaine. L'homme riche était alors beaucoup plus sûr de la disponibilité suffisante de produits agricoles nombreux.

L'importance relative du gros bétail et des terres dans les sentiments des Rundi.

Les Rundi savaient bien que la véritable richesse consistait

à la fois en vaches et en terres. Leur évaluation de l'importance relative des deux biens pouvait différer seulement selon les régions où ils habitaient. Dans les régions agricoles par exemple, où les vaches étaient rares, ils tendaient à accentuer l'importance des terres en tant que biens impérissables. C'est dans les régions de pasteurs que la richesse en bétail était surtout estimée. La population y était moins dense, on y trouvait de vastes pâturages et l'importance économique du bétail y était beaucoup plus élevée.

Cependant, malgré ces différences régionales, les Rundi s'attachaient partout beaucoup plus à leurs vaches qu'à leurs terres. Tandis que les vaches faisaient l'objet d'une forte affection, le sol était aux yeux des Rundi quelque chose de neutre et de nature purement utilitaire.

Un homme se réjouissait de ses vaches, se glorifiait de leurs qualités, se souvenait de leurs généalogies et composait des panégyriques adressées au seigneur qui les lui avait données. Il y avait du bétail qui jouait un rôle dans le culte royal comme dans le culte familial. Le traitement des vaches était entouré de multiples précautions dont la négligence pouvait causer des désastres.

Il n'en était pas ainsi quant aux terres. On ne trouvait pas au Burundi de cultes du sol ni de fonctionnaires qui lui étaient dédiés. Il y avait bien des cultes agricoles, mais ceux-ci n'avaient rien à faire avec les terres comme telles. Un Rundi ne s'attachait pas à ses terres. Il était heureux d'en avoir beaucoup, mais il l'était à cause des revenus qu'il en pouvait extraire.

Il n'était donc pas indifférent devant les valeurs que représentaient ses terres. Il s'opposait violemment à toute infraction à ses droits fonciers. Egalement, si quelqu'un lui donnait des terres il lui était très reconnaissant mais sa gratitude ne s'exprimait pas d'une façon exubérante comme dans le cas des dons de vaches.

Cette attitude expliquait le prestige dont jouissaient les Tutsi et Ganwa en tant que riches propriétaires de vaches. Ce sont les Tutsi qui, selon la tradition, furent les premiers à élever des vaches et qui sont encore considérés comme les plus habiles

éleveurs. On les associait toujours avec les vaches qui manifestaient, plus que toute autre chose, la richesse de quelqu'un. Le passage d'un grand troupeau de vaches était aux yeux des Rundi quelque chose de plus impressionnant que la vue d'une grande propriété foncière. En outre, tout le monde disposait de terres, tandis que le privilège de posséder des vaches était moins général.

Cependant, les Rundi portaient grand intérêt à certains produits des terres, en particulier le sorgho et les bananes. La seule fête nationale annuelle des Rundi se concentrait sur le sorgho. C'était la fête appelée *umuganuro,* la fête des semailles du sorgho, qui atteignait son point culminant lorsque le roi mangeait un peu de sorgho spécialement cultivé pour cette occasion (Gorju 1938).

L'importance sacrale du sorgho et d'autres produits agricoles venait de la croyance que le futur roi était né en tenant dans ses mains quelques graines des différentes cultures du pays. Pour faire des offrandes aux grands esprits et aux esprits des ancêtres on utilisait de la bière fabriquée de sorgho et de bananes. Beaucoup de coutumes étaient associées à la culture et à l'usage de produits agricoles (Zuure 1929).

La bière de sorgho ou de bananes jouait un rôle important aussi dans la vie sociale. Les Rundi raffolaient de la bière et il y avait peu d'occasions où l'on n'en buvait pas. Un homme riche avait beaucoup d'amis de la bière (Trouwborst 1961) avec lesquels il échangeait souvent de la bière. Lorsqu'il donnait des fêtes il y avait toujours un très grand nombre de visiteurs, ce qui contribuait énormément à son prestige. Pour devenir un arbitre il lui fallait donner beaucoup de bière à plusieurs fêtes consécutives dont chacune l'élevait en rang.

Un homme obtenait beaucoup de satisfaction à toutes ces occasions et aimait à voir autour de lui des gens qui buvaient de sa bière. Il devenait un homme connu et important dans les environs, et à qui l'on se référait avec beaucoup de respect.

Malgré cela, le Rundi ne s'attachait pas à ses cultures comme à ses vaches. Elles restaient impersonnelles pour lui et étaient trop transitoires pour qu'elles pussent lui donner une satisfaction

d'ordre émotionnel comme les vaches qui étaient personnellement connues de lui et se trouvaient toujours là.

Il est en somme peu surprenant que cette prédilection des Rundi eux-mêmes pour leur vaches ait influencé l'opinion des Européens qui ont visité leur pays et qui ont cru pouvoir constater que les vaches étaient les biens les plus importants. Nous avons vu comment cette opinion ne correspond pas à la réalité. On pourrait même dire qu'une analyse de l'importance relative des différents biens est artificielle. Dans la vie de tous les jours, les Rundi ne faisaient pas de comparaison et il n'était pas question de choix. Un homme aimait à posséder non seulement beaucoup de vaches, mais il aimait également pouvoir disposer de beaucoup de terres, ce qui lui permettait de distribuer beaucoup de bière. L'un n'allait pas sans l'autre.

Les divers emplois auxquels le gros bétail et les terres pouvaient être destinés.

A côté de l'utilisation directe du bétail et des terres dans la consommation, il y avait de multiples emplois auxquels le Rundi pouvait destiner ses richesses.

Parlons d'abord des vaches. Les plus riches propriétaires de vaches étaient sans doute les fonctionnaires politiques, en particulier le roi et les chefs. Ceux-ci les obtenaient en percevant des taxes et des amendes et en recevant des dons de la part de leurs sujets. Comme il a été indiqué ailleurs, tous ces transferts de biens au roi et aux chefs étaient appelés *ingorore* (Trouwborst 1961), et pouvaient être caractérisés comme des contre-prestations à des dons du type *ingabire*.

Il est évident que le roi et les chefs n'avaient besoin que d'une partie de leurs troupeaux de vaches pour l'entretien de leurs ménages. Cela rendait nécessaire une grande redistribution de bétail. Une distribution annuelle se faisait à la fête des semailles du sorgho, l'*umuganuro,* mais pendant l'année aussi beaucoup de vaches étaient données. Les rois et les chefs donnaient des vaches comme signe d'amitié et pour rémunérer des services. Dans les deux cas, le but principal était de resserrer les liens

entre le supérieur et l'inférieur, ou de s'engager dans de nouvelles relations. En ce qui concerne les dons de vaches comme rémunération, il pouvait s'agir d'une récompense de services ou de prestations traditionnelles régulières ou d'une récompense de services spéciaux. Il arriva souvent qu'un fonctionnaire d'un rang élevé recevait des vaches au moment où il terminait son service. Egalement, les gens qui étaient chargés de fournir des produits spéciaux à la cour du roi et celles des chefs, pouvaient être payés en vaches. Ainsi, le roi donnait des bêtes de boucherie aux porteurs de miel. Il faut noter toutefois que ces dons de la part du roi et des chefs n'étaient pas obligatoires et qu'ils ne se faisaient pas toujours. Cela dépendait de la bienveillance du supérieur et de la réputation de l'inférieur.

Les chefs donnaient des vaches aussi pour entreprendre de nouvelles relations. Tous les chefs avaient des clients hors de leurs territoires partiellement dans l'espoir de se les attacher comme des sujets.

Cette coutume était probablement très répandue. En 1941, on a essayé de l'abolir en décidant que chaque chef ne pouvait exercer des droits que sur les vaches se trouvant dans son propre territoire. Cela voulait dire qu'un chef devait abandonner ses droits sur des vaches données à des clients qui n'étaient pas ses sujets. On a dû révoquer la mesure puisqu'elle s'avérait très injuste. Les chefs règnant dans des régions très peuplées avec peu de bons pâturages, et qui avaient placé de très grands nombres de vaches dans d'autres chefferies plus appropriées à l'élevage, devaient maintenant céder aux chefs locaux (Goffin 1951: 70).

Des vaches *ingabire* étaient données aussi par des personnes privées qui n'étaient pas des fonctionnaires politiques. Là se trouvait cependant une grande différence. Dans le cas d'une vache donnée par un chef, les contre-prestations de la part du bénéficiaire n'étaient pas le principal motif de l'accord.

Le chef avait toujours d'autres moyens de s'enrichir et ne dépendait pas uniquement de ses clients pour avoir de la main-d'œuvre. Surtout lorsqu'il s'agissait de clients qui étaient en même temps ses sujets, l'accord de clientèle ne représentait qu'un aspect de ses relations avec eux. Par contre, lorsqu'une personne privée,

donnait une vache, les contre-prestations étaient très importantes et se faisaient presque toujours. Le bénéficiaire était tenu de rendre du moins un des veaux de la vache donnée, devait donner de la bière à son patron et devait régulièrement travailler pour lui. Un homme riche pouvait s'assurer ainsi de considérables revenus supplémentaires, se dispenser de travailler lui-même et pouvait diminuer les aléas économiques. Quant au dernier motif, il entrait en jeu lorsque le patron avait perdu beaucoup de ses vaches à cause d'une maladie ou de la foudre et que ses clients devaient l'aider à reconstituer ses troupeaux. Les règles qui gouvernaient l'accord de clientèle, quoique pas très précises et dépendant beaucoup des relations particulières entre un patron et un client, étaient donc observées d'une façon beaucoup plus stricte si le patron était une personne privée. On les relâchait seulement si les partenaires de l'accord étaient de la même famille, de bons amis ou par exemple, si tous les deux étaient de riches propriétaires de vaches.

Le fait d'avoir beaucoup de clients augmentait sans doute le prestige et l'influence d'un patron, mais ne lui donnait aucun pouvoir politique. En fin de compte, il ne pouvait même pas forcer son client de s'acquitter de ses obligations sans l'appui tacite ou actif des autorités politiques. Ces derniers eux-mêmes se servaient sans doute des vaches comme d'une instrument politique mais elles ne constituaient pas la base de leurs pouvoirs.

A côté de l'*ubugabire,* il y avait beaucoup d'autres manières d'utiliser des vaches. Les sujets devaient en réserver tout d'abord un certain nombre pour payer leurs taxes annuelles et pour en présenter à une autorité récemment installée: c'était la coutume de l'*ingorore*. Ce terme générique d'*ingorore* s'appliquait d'ailleurs aussi à d'autres prestations faites au roi et aux chefs. Un homme riche voulant disposer de pâturages privés devait donner des vaches à son supérieur politique. Egalement, lorsqu'on voulait devenir un arbitre, il fallait donner des vaches. Lorsqu'on était riche et avait commis un crime ou lorsqu'on s'était brouillé avec son chef, on pouvait expier au moyen de ses vaches. Il était très normal aussi qu'un homme donnât des vaches dans l'espoir d'obtenir un commandement politique.

Un autre moyen de disposer de ses vaches était de les confier temporairement à un bon éleveur. Ainsi le roi et les

chefs avaient-ils leurs *abatongore,* leurs "dépositaires", qui devaient élever leurs vaches et profitaient des produits du bétail. L'avantage pour le "dépositaire" était qu'il pouvait joindre ses propres vaches au troupeau seigneurial et que tout le troupeau ainsi constitué était inviolable contre toute infraction de ses droits. Un chef ne pouvait pas se saisir des vaches qui broutaient avec les vaches du roi. Le roi ou le chef prenait régulièrement une vache laitière du troupeau de son dépositaire mais pouvait également donner une vache en *ingabire* comme rémunération. Il ne s'agissait d'ailleurs pas toujours de grands troupeaux. Nous avons vu dans le sud du pays un grand nombre d'anciens *abatongore* qui affirmaient n'avoir eu en dépot qu'une seule vache et un bœuf. L'effet restait le même. Ces *abatongore,* étant sous la protection d'un chef puissant, étaient plus ou moins invulnérables vis-à-vis leurs supérieurs locaux, soit les chefs dans le cas d'*abatongore* d'un roi, soit les sous-chefs dans le cas d'*abatongore* du chef.

Des personnes privées aussi pouvaient confier des vaches à des dépositaires. Le plus souvent il s'agissait alors d'une ou quelques têtes de bétail seulement. Comme dans le cas du roi et des chefs, un des motifs était que le propriétaire cherchait un bon éleveur qui pouvait bien soigner les vaches et disposait de bons pâturages. Le dépositaire profitait du lait et du fumier de la vache ou du fumier seulement dans le cas d'un bœuf et espérait recevoir à la fin de l'accord une vache en *ingabire* comme récompense. En général, le dépôt ne durait pas très longtemps et pouvait être annulé par le propriétaire à tout instant. L'effet de la coutume était que les produits du bétail se trouvaient à la disposition des gens moins aisés sans leur donner de droits permanents. C'était aussi un moyen pour un riche propriétaire de vaches d'augmenter son prestige.

Nous ne pouvons pas manquer de signaler que les dons de mariage incluaient souvent des vaches remises au père de la femme. Cette coutume n'existait pas partout dans le pays. A l'intérieur, par exemple, on donnait le plus souvent des houes, du sel, des perles ou des chèvres au beau-père et le fait de donner une vache était un signe évident de richesse. Dans d'autres régions, on donnait toujours des vaches comme c'est la coutume encore aujourd'hui.

Dans le cas du roi et des chefs, le fait d'avoir beaucoup de femmes était un signe plutôt qu'une source de richesse. Elles leur coûtaient beaucoup de vaches sans donner de rendement sous la forme de main-d'œuvre. Les vaches qu'un homme donnait pour la fille d'un roi ou d'un chef constituaient au contraire un bon investissement. Le beau-fils d'un tel fonctionnaire pouvait compter sur un commandement politique qui lui donnait pas mal de profits. Un homme ordinaire d'une richesse modeste avait aussi avantage à se marier avec plusieurs femmes. Celles-ci n'étant pas des femmes nobles travaillaient dans les champs et procuraient à leur mari des moyens d'entretenir beaucoup de visiteurs. C'était impératif alors que l'homme disposât de beaucoup de terres, ce qui montre encore une fois que vaches et terres étaient des richesses complémentaires.

Cette remarque nous conduit à une discussion de l'emploi des terres au Burundi.

Comme il a été indiqué dans l'article déjà cité (Trouwborst 1961) les nominations des fonctionnaires politiques au Burundi étaient considérées comme des dons de territoires. Il n'y a aucun doute qu'il s'agissait là des plus importants dons à remettre. Les autorités territoriales étaient les gens les plus puissants et les plus riches du pays et avaient le monopole du contrôle sur les biens. Cette remarque peut sembler superflue, mais il faut se rappeler qu'on croit souvent que c'étaient les vaches qui conféraient tous les pouvoirs et constituaient la seule forme de richesse dans cette partie de l'Afrique. Si cela avait été vrai, la situation aurait pu être décrite comme Paulme le fait; selon elle, ce qui suit serait vrai de toute la région de l'Uganda jusqu'au sud de la Zambèze: "Un chef ne contrôle pas un territoire, mais un nombre plus ou moins considérable de bétail, les frontières n'étant là que pour éviter des querelles au sujet des meilleurs pâturages et distinguer entre les troupeaux" (Paulme 1959: 76). En réalité, il n'en était pas ainsi. Vu l'importance socio-économique de la propriété des terres, contrôler la distribution de ces terrains signifiait accéder à un certain état de richesse et de pouvoir politique.

Le roi et les chefs distribuaient des terres pour les mêmes raisons qu'ils distribuaient des vaches. Le but était aussi le même à

savoir de se créer un cercle de favoris et de clients. La différence était seulement qu'un client qui avait reçu des terres habitait toujours dans le territoire de son seigneur et pouvait mieux être contrôlé par ce dernier. Les contre-prestations à un don sous la forme de terres étaient également appelées *ingorore* (Trouwborst 1961) et comportaient tout ce qu'un sujet donnait à ses supérieurs, quoiqu'il y avait des termes spécifiques pour les différentes catégories.

La plupart des terres étaient distribuées par le roi et les chefs. Les sous-chefs avaient aussi le droit de donner des terres, mais seulement lorqu'il s'agissait de terrains incultes. Ils ne pouvaient pas, comme les chefs, expulser quelqu'un de son enclos et y installer un protégé, sauf avec la permission de leur supérieur. De la même façon, ils ne pouvaient pas disposer librement d'une propriété foncière laissée par un homme décédé qui n'avait pas de proches parents. Une telle propriété revenait au chef. Le sous-chef qui était le fils d'un chef avait plus de pouvoirs qu'un sous-chef ordinaire mais lui aussi était en fin de compte subordonné à son père. Il est évident que la donation de terrains incultes avait beaucoup moins de valeur qu'une donation de terres cultivées, et ne se faisait qu'à des gens de peu d'importance qui n'en tiraient pas d'autres avantages.

Des personnes privées avaient peu de possibilités de donner des terres. Seulement les grands favoris du roi et des chefs en recevaient assez pour en faire profiter d'autres gens. Ils admettaient sur leurs terres deux catégories de clients: les *abagererwa* et les *abashumba*, dont le statut social était très bas. La principale différence entre les deux était que les premiers recevaient assez de terres pour satisfaire à leurs besoins et obtenaient le droit d'y construire leur hutte. Ils ne travaillaient qu'à temps partiel au service de leur patron. Les *abashumba* recevaient au plus quelques petits lopins et travaillaient la plupart du temps pour un patron qui devait les nourrir. Ils habitaient dans l'enclos même de leur patron. Les *abagererwa*, aussi bien que les *abashumba*, ne pouvaient pas entretenir de relations directes avec les autorités politiques. Leur patron payait les taxes pour eux et agissait comme leur représentant. Ils vivaient donc dans un état de dépendance presque complète; d'autant plus que le patron avait le droit de les chasser de ses terres. D'autre part,

les relations entre le client et son patron étaient souvent très bonnes et sont comparées par les Rundi avec celles existant entre un fils et son père. Un bon patron ne donnait pas seulement des biens matériels mais accordait aussi de la protection à ses clients. Outre le prestige que conférait au patron le fait d'avoir des *abagererwa* et des *abashumba* dans son service, ceux-ci lui procuraient aussi de la main-d'œuvre régulière dont il pouvait être beaucoup plus sûr que dans le cas de clients de vaches.

Un homme qui possédait beaucoup de terres avait également la possibilité d'y installer plusieurs femmes. Celles-ci travaillaient pour lui et lui permettaient ainsi d'augmenter ses ressources en produits agricoles.

Finalement, un homme riche pouvait louer une partie de ses terres et recevait en contre-prestation quelques cruches de bières Cette forme de revenu était toutefois peu importante et avait en général un caractère temporaire. Comme nous avons constaté pour les vaches, l'emploi principal auquel on pouvait destiner les terres était de les donner selon le modèle de l'accord de clientèle.

A côté des ressemblances entre les dons sous forme de vaches et sous forme de terres, il y avait toutefois aussi une grande différence. Les accords de clientèle sous forme de terres étaient associés directement à une structure politico-territoriale où les rapports entre supérieurs et inférieurs n'étaient pas les mêmes que ceux entre patrons et clients. Le roi et les chefs en tant que distributeurs de terres n'étaient pas seulement des patrons mais en même temps aussi des autorités territoriales. Ce qui constitue cette distinction est le problème auquel le paragraphe suivant sera consacré.

La structure politique et la structure de clientèle au Burundi.

Deux auteurs surtout ont systématiquement étudié l'organisation politique au Burundi: Rijckmans (1926) et Albert (1960b). Leur principale conclusion est semblable, à savoir que l'état de Burundi constituait une monarchie féodale dont les règles ambiguës de la succession à des commandements politiques étaient la cause d'une instabilité constante. Le roi n'était qu'en théorie

un monarque absolu. En réalité, il était le *primus inter pares* parmi les princes de sang royal. Les unités territoriales au Burundi étaient mal définies. Selon Albert (1960: 52), le concept territorial était même absent dans le système traditionnel. Rijckmans insiste sur le fait que beaucoup de gens qui habitaient dans les chefferies et les sous-chefferies n'étaient pas soumis aux ordres des autorités locales, mais dépendaient directement du roi. Les véritables sujets d'un chef n'étaient que ceux "à qui le chef a(vait) le droit de demander des prestations" (Rijckmans 1925: 38). Albert a en outre mis l'accent sur le fait qu'une hiérarchie nettement définie n'existait pas au Burundi, puisqu'il n'y avait pas une correspondance systématique entre certains rangs et les pouvoirs et obligations qui y étaient associés. Les relations entre supérieurs et inférieurs étaient très personnelles et de nature féodale. L'analyse de M^lle^ Albert se laisse résumer dans son affirmation, qui s'applique d'ailleurs au Ruanda aussi, selon laquelle: "la possession de biens et en même temps le droit de les distribuer et de les reprendre à volonté était la base de l'ordre hiérarchique" (Albert 1960b: 50).

Nous avons indiqué nous-mêmes (Trouwborst 1961) que les propres concepts des Rundi exprimaient l'idée que les relations entre supérieurs et subordonnés étaient des relations entre donateurs et bénéficiaires selon le modèle de l'accord de clientèle appelé *ubugabire*.

Il y a beaucoup de vrai dans toutes ces analyses. Le territoire d'un chef ne constituait pas un grand bloc, mais se composait de plusieurs parties éparpillées un peu partout dans le pays. Le chef n'était pas la seule autorité sur son territoire. Un certain nombre de gens qui y habitaient étaient soumis immédiatement aux ordres du roi. Il s'agissait de clients personnels du souverain, ou de gens travaillant dans des domaines royaux, et il y en avait toujours à l'intérieur des territoires des chefs (Rijckmans 1962: 38). A part cela, il se trouvait des sujets liés par l'accord de clientèle à d'autres chefs.

Le roi ne s'occupait pas en général de ce qui se passait dans le territoire de ses chefs. Il était par exemple très important que les chefs eussent le droit de former leurs propres armées. Les chefs nommaient aussi leurs propres sous-chefs. Il y avait

parmi eux leurs propres fils, ainsi que des sous-chefs roturiers. Les premiers jouissaient de beaucoup d'indépendance, et leur position ressemblait beaucoup à celle existant entre leur père et le roi. En ce qui concerne les sujets soumis vraiment aux ordres du chef, ils ne constituaient pas un groupe homogène. Beaucoup parmi eux étaient des clients personnels du chef, qui jouissaient de toutes sortes de privilèges. De tels clients n'étaient pas soumis aux ordres des sous-chefs.

On peut se demander toutefois si l'ancienne organisation politique du Burundi se laisse expliquer uniquement en termes de féodalité ou de l'accord de clientèle. La question aussi se pose de savoir si l'instabilité seule caractérisait la vie politique de jadis. L'état de Burundi continuait à exister malgré tout et le roi continuait à être reconnu comme le souverain du pays. Les chefs étaient des subordonnés du roi comme ils avaient eux-mêmes des subordonnés. Il y avait donc sans doute d'autres éléments dans l'organisation politique que ceux sur lesquels on insiste toujours. Afin de pouvoir répondre aux questions posées il est utile pour les besoins de l'analyse de bien distinguer entre deux structures déterminant le caractère de l'organisation politique au Burundi: la structure politique et la structure de clientèle. La structure politique était à la base des relations entre des groupes de subordonnés et leurs supérieurs, les derniers étant des gouvernants des territoires où habitaient les premiers. La structure politique présupposait donc une communauté à base territoriale, la communauté politique. La structure de clientèle déterminait les relations entre deux personnes seulement: le patron et son client. L'ensemble des clients d'un patron ne constituaient pas un groupe mais simplement le total des individus; chacun entretenait des relations très personnelles avec un seul autre individu. Une autre différence entre les deux structures était que la structure politique était hiérarchisée tandis que la structure de clientèle ne l'était pas. *Les relations de clientèle excluaient l'intervention d'un troisième intéressé.* Le patron d'un patron n'était pas le patron du client de ce dernier même s'il s'agissait d'une chose donnée par lui. Une dernière différence entre les deux structures était que les relations basées sur un accord de clientèle n'étaient pas héréditaires et pouvaient être rompues à chaque

instant. Elles devaient formellement être renouvelées à la mort d'un des partenaires.

Ces différences entre les deux structures se manifestaient continuellement dans la vie politique du Burundi où un homme avait toujours au moins deux rôles à jouer, soit celui d'une autorité politique ou d'un patron, soit celui d'un sujet ou d'un client.

Il est évident que notre distinction implique que l'accord de clientèle n'est pas considéré par nous comme une institution politique. Il ne pouvait revêtir des aspects politiques que lorsqu'un ou deux des intéressés était un fonctionnaire politique. Ce caractère non politique de l'accord de clientèle se laisse le mieux étudier dans le cas d'un accord entre deux personnes privées. Lorsque A donnait une vache à B, et B donnait cette vache à C, A n'était pas considéré comme le patron de C et C ne se trouvait pas sous les ordres de A. Si B. par exemple refusait de donner un veau après quelques vêlages de la vache, A ne pouvait pas aller chez C pour réclamer directement le veau. Nous connaissons même des cas où un patron ne savait pas que son client avait donné la vache reçue à une tierce personne et ne s'en était aperçu qu'après quelque temps. Egalement, un client ne savait pas toujours qui était le patron d'un patron. Un client ne pouvait pas faire appel à des droits héréditaires lorsqu'un patron voulait reprendre une vache. La seule considération était les rapports qui existaient entre un patron et son client à un moment donné. Le fait que les clients d'un patron ne constituaient pas un groupe ressort d'une autre caractéristique de l'accord de clientèle, à savoir que les obligations d'un client étaient fixées dans chaque cas individuel. Un homme avait comme clients des parents, des amis mais aussi des étrangers pauvres et ses relations avec les représentants de chacune de ces catégories différaient beaucoup.

La situation était à peu près la même quant aux relations entre un patron et un client lorsqu'il s'agissait de terres données. La différence était seulement que dans ce cas le patron d'un patron était toujours une autorité politique, puisqu'un homme privé ne pouvait jamais donner les terres reçues d'un autre particulier à une tierce personne. Cela s'explique ainsi: le client, dans un accord de clientèle entre personnes privées portant sur des terres, avait toujours un statut très bas et n'avait aucun

droit sur les terres reçues, sauf des droits limités d'usufruit. Le patron d'un patron d'un client foncier pouvait, en tant qu'autorité politique, intervenir plus facilement dans l'accord de clientèle à cause de ses pouvoirs supérieurs. Tout de même un tel client n'entretenait pas en général des relations directes avec le chef de son patron. Il n'était même pas un sujet proprement dit dans la constellation politique. Il ne payait pas d'impôts et il ne travaillait pour les autorités politiques qu'au nom de son patron. Ce dernier avait le droit de le chasser de ses terres sans consulter personne et sans que le client pût faire appel à des droits héréditaires.

Les accords de clientèle n'impliquaient donc pas des relations politiques selon les critères employés ici. Ils ne conféraient des pouvoirs au patron que pour autant que ce dernier était soutenu par les autorités locales. Lorsqu'il y avait des disputes entre le patron et son client, c'était l'autorité territoriale qui devait juger l'affaire, et qui avait les pouvoirs de sanctionner sa décision. Les accords de clientèle étaient donc ultérieurement garantis par l'organisation territoriale.

Quant aux accords de clientèle concernant les vaches ou les terres données par des autorités politiques à des personnes privées, il y a là quelques facteurs qui en compliquent l'analyse. Le cas le plus clair étaient les vaches données par des chefs à des clients hors de leur territoire. Il est évident qu'il ne s'agissait pas alors de relations politiques. Tout ce qu'on peut dire c'est que les chefs devaient à leur fonction politique de posséder autant de vaches à donner. Cette coutume est un exemple très net du fait que l'accord de clientèle pouvait opérer indépendamment des divisions politiques territoriales. Pas mal de gens habitant dans une certaine chefferie étaient les clients d'un autre que le chef local, soit les clients ou les dépositaires du roi. Cette situation était une des causes des guerres fréquentes entre des chefs. Le chef local n'acceptait qu'à contre-cœur que la loyauté de ses sujets fût partagée entre lui et un autre chef.

Quant aux autres vaches qui se trouvaient dans le territoire d'un chef, il y en avait trois catégories: 1) les propres vaches du chef même se trouvant dans ses kraals ou chez des dépositaires; 2) les vaches du chef données comme *ingabire* à des clients/sujets;

3) les vaches héritées, achetées ou acquises d'une autre manière par ses sujets.

En ce qui concerne la première catégorie, on ne peut pas considérer ces vaches comme une sorte de trésor de la chefferie, mais plutôt comme la propriété personnelle du chef. Le chef les avait héritées de son père ou les avait reçues sous la forme de *ingorore* de ses sujets. Il pouvait faire ce qu'il voulait avec ces vaches. Le fait même que son installation était l'occasion de multiples dons de vaches *ingorore* de la part de ses sujets montre aussi que cet important revenu était un revenu personnel. Lorsqu'il quittait la chefferie et si le nouveau-nommé ne l'en empêchait pas, il amenait ses vaches. En outre, il n'y avait pas de distinction terminologique entre les vaches privées d'un chef ou d'éventuelles "vaches de la chefferie". D'autre part, il est indéniable que la richesse des chefs était due à leur position comme autorités politiques. Il est intéressant de ce point de vue d'analyser aussi les droits du chef sur les autres vaches de sa chefferie, celles des catégories 2) et 3). Nous avons montré ailleurs (Trouwborst 1961) qu'on pouvait considérer les vaches de la troisième catégorie comme s'il s'agissait de vaches *ingabire* de la part du chef. Cependant, il y avait une différence entre les vaches formellement données comme *ingabire* (catégorie 2) et les autres pour lesquelles il n'y avait pas eu un transfert formel. On appelait ces dernières tout simplement *inka zanje* ("mes vaches") plutôt que *ingabire*. Les vaches *ingabire*, véritablement données par le chef, liaient le bénéfiaire tout particulièrement à son supérieur. Ce bénéficiaire les avait reçues à une occasion spéciale et pour une raison spéciale. Les autres détenteurs de vaches n'entretenaient pas de telles relations personnelles avec le chef. Leur position comme clients du chef était très vague et peu spécifique. Leur statut de sujets prévalait et ils étaient traités sur le même pied que tous les autres habitants de la chefferie, sujets aussi de la même communauté politique. Le chef avait certainement le droit de disposer de leurs vaches comme si elles étaient des *ingabire*, mais il perdait ce droit aussitôt qu'il quittait la chefferie. Ces vaches étaient donc associées à la chefferie où elles se trouvaient et pas au chef personnellement. Il en était autrement en ce qui concerne les vaches réellement données comme *ingabire*. Le chef continuait

à exercer des droits sur ces vaches à moins que le nouveau chef ne l'empêchât de le faire. Il est vrai que cela arrivait assez souvent dans le passé, mais il n'en reste pas moins que les droits du chef étaient théoriquement reconnus.

Il y avait également une distinction entre les terres formellement reçues d'un chef comme *ingabire* et les autres terres sur lesquelles les habitants exerçaient depuis longtemps des droit d'usufruit. Il y avait pour les terres aussi une relation très personnelle entre les clients et leur chef dans le premier cas et une relation plus impersonnelle dans le deuxième cas. Comme pour les vaches, la différence pourrait être formulée en termes d'une différence entre clients et sujets. Ces derniers, en théorie eux aussi des clients, constituaient un groupe très important auquel les spécialistes ont accordé trop peu d'intérêt... En accentuant avec raison la mobilité et les fréquents déménagements des Rundi, il ne faut pas oublier qu'il s'agissait alors d'un groupe assez restreint. C'était pour la plupart des fonctionnaires d'un statut assez élevé comme des trayeurs, des bergers et des guerriers parmi les Tutsi, et des cuisiniers parmi les Hutu qui se déplaçaient souvent au service de leurs chefs. Il y avait cependant à côté de cette catégorie une autre catégorie beaucoup plus nombreuse, pour la plupart des Hutu, qui restait pendant des générations fixée au même habitat. Dans les régions agricoles du pays surtout, on pouvait et on peut trouver des collines presqu'entièrement habitées depuis longtemps par les mêmes familles. Les chefs avaient en théorie le droit de les dépouiller de leurs terres mais ils étaient prudents dans l'emploi de ce droit. Ils respectaient les grandes familles et leur accordaient même une certaine influence politique. Ils choisissaient parmi les membres de ces familles des arbitres et des sous-chefs. La situation typique au centre du pays était qu'il y avait deux catégories de gens à chaque colline parmi les sous-chefs et les arbitres, à savoir des protégés du chef ou du roi et des membres d'anciennes familles locales.

La plupart des arbitres que nous avons rencontrés dans le Kirimiro, au centre du pays, étaient des représentants de telles familles Hutu et des descendants d'anciens sous-chefs ou d'autres fonctionnaires importants. Les quelques Tutsi qu'il y avait dans cette région étaient tous des fils de nouveau-venus ou étaient

des nouveau-venus eux-mêmes, installés par le roi ou par des chefs. Par contre, le seul arbitre Hu i important que nous ayons connu dans une partie de la chefferie Bunyambo au sud du Burundi où il y avait beaucoup de Tutsi, avait été lui-même le client personnel d'un chef.

L'importance de la partie stable de la population du Burundi ne peut pas facilement être exagérée. En effet, le système économique du Burundi n'aurait pas pu fonctionner si la grande masse paysanne avait été constamment disloquée et déplacée. Aussi longtemps que les déplacements restaient limités, l'économie nationale n'en subissait pas de graves conséquences, mais un véritable abus des droits fonciers des autorités politiques aurait amené un désastre. Il était dans l'intérêt des autorités même de respecter leurs paysans Hutu, surtout en ce qui concerne les membres des grands lignages.

Il est impossible maintenant d'établir avec quelque exactitude la proportion de l'élément stable de la population. Il y avait d'ailleurs des différences assez considérables sous ce rapport entre les diverses régions. Comme il a déjà été dit, il y avait dans les régions agricoles des collines entières habitées par des familles Hutu depuis un temps immémorial. Par contre, nous avons constaté que dans la chefferie de Bunyambo, la population, composée par des Hutu et un bon nombre de Tutsi, était d'origine très diverse et pour la plupart établie dans la région assez récemment. La raison de la mobilité caractéristique de cette région était sans doute que l'agriculture y était moins importante que dans le centre du pays[3]. Il y avait très peu de bananiers au Bunyambo et c'était justement dans les bananeraies que les Rundi investissaient beaucoup de travail; en conséquence, ils n'aimaient pas les abandonner. D'autre part, il y avait de vastes pâturages sur les hauts plateaux de cette région où les Tutsi pouvaient laisser brouter beaucoup de vaches. L'élevage y était donc très important; ce qui rendait les habitants moins dépendants de l'agriculture et en même temps plus mobiles.

Il est significatif que l'ancien centre administratif se trouvait

[3] Nous ne nous référons ici qu'à cette partie de la chefferie de Bunyambo qui avait un caractère pastoral et ressemblait beaucoup aux régions de pasteurs plus à l'Ouest.

au milieu du pays près des grandes régions agricoles. C'était là que le roi était sûr de l'appui d'une grande masse de Hutu sédentaires, ses plus loyaux sujets. Il est vrai que le roi, comme aussi d'ailleurs les Ganwa, se servait des Tutsi surtout en tant qu'instruments politiques, mais il n'en reste pas moins que la présence des Hutu leur était indispensable. Il faut conclure qu'en gros les Tutsi constituaient la partie instable des véritables clients des gouvernants. L'idéologie des Rundi eux-mêmes exprimait mal cette réalité. Pour les Rundi, le fait d'être un subordonné était équivalent à la qualité de client (Trouwborst 1961).

Cela s'applique aussi au statut des autorités politiques elles-mêmes. Les chefs et les sous-chefs étaient considérés avant tout comme les clients de leur supérieur et non comme des fonctionnaires dans une administration hiérarchique. Les chefs recevaient de pleins pouvoirs dans leurs territoires, reçus comme des dons, et n'étaient pas contrôlés aussi longtemps qu'ils restaient fidèles à leur souverain. Le roi semblait être le *primus inter pares* parmi eux plutôt que leur souverain. Cependant, il n'y a aucun doute que le roi était malgré tout considéré comme l'autorité suprême dans le pays et comme le symbole de l'unité nationale. C'était lui qui possédait les tambours et les lances sacrées du pays, et c'était lui seul qui parmi les Ganwa officiait dans la cérémonie de la fête des semailles du sorgho.

Avoir de pleins pouvoirs dans leurs territoires signifiait pour les chefs qui'ils avaient les mains libres en ce qui concerne la nomination et la destitution de leurs sous-chefs, la distribution des terres, la formation d'une armée, la perception de taxes et l'administration de la justice. Comme clients, ils devaient céder seulement une partie de leurs revenus au roi, l'assister en cas de guerre, lui permettre d'avoir ses propres clients dans leurs territoires.

On retrouve ici les mêmes libertés dont jouissait un client qui avait obtenu des vaches. Toutefois, certains aspects de la relation des chefs avec leur roi montrent qu'elle non plus n'était pas uniquement de la nature d'un accord de clientèle. Il apparaît par exemple, que le roi envoyait ses propres messages pour percevoir des taxes dans les territoires des chefs,

qu'il intervenait parfois dans la nomination de sous-chefs et que son tribunal constituait une cour d'appel à des décisions prises par les chefs. Il est remarquable aussi qu'on rendait partout la justice au nom du roi en l'invoquant constamment pendant les palabres.

La position des fils de chefs, sous-chefs de leur père, ressemblait à celles des chefs eux-mêmes. Ils s'appelaient d'ailleurs aussi des Ganwa. En ce qui concerne les autres sous-chefs, ceux-ci étaient plus clairement des subordonnés hiérarchisés. Malgré le fait que leurs devoirs et obligations ne fussent pas bien définis, ils étaient en général dépourvus de certains droits que les chefs s'étaient réservés eux-mêmes. Ils ne pouvaient pas percevoir l'*ingorore* et n'avaient pas le droit de déposséder des gens de leurs vaches ou de leurs terres ou de prononcer la sentence de mort, sauf avec la permission de leur supérieur. Cela s'applique aussi aux sous-chefs installés dans les domaines du roi. L'idée de relations hiérarchiques n'était donc pas tout à fait étrangère à la constellation politique au Burundi, mais elle était mal définie, comparée à la notion de clientèle.

Le principe politique et le principe de clientèle s'exprimaient l'un à côté de l'autre aussi dans la succession des autorités politiques. Quant au roi par exemple, on aurait l'impression qu'il était choisi en tant que *primus inter pares* parmi les chefs présents à l'installation. (Simons 1944: 195). Cependant, il existait une tradition selon laquelle le futur roi était désigné dès sa naissance par l'intervention divine. En outre, l'installation accentuait le caractère unique de la position du roi en tant que souverain de tout le pays. La procédure de la succession des chefs était ambiguë aussi. C'était le roi qui avait en théorie le droit de nommer et de destituer les chefs, et qui devait autoriser un fils à succéder à son père. Il se créait alors toujours une nouvelle relation personnelle entre le roi et le chef. En réalité, la succession impliquait aussi la reconnaissance de certains droits héréditaires. Il y a toujours eu plusieurs générations de descendants de chefs qui restaient en fonction dans la même chefferie.

La potilique suivie dans la nomination des chefs et les conséquences qu'elle avait s'explique plus facilement lorsqu'on étudie ce qui se passait après la mort du roi. Rijckmans (1926)

et Albert (1960 b) ont donné une excellente description de cette période d'instabilité et de confusion, et il suffira ici d'en relever les principaux points. Le roi, comme le voulait la tradition, était encore jeune et célibataire au début de son règne et était dominé par ses régents qui profitaient de l'occasion pour s'emparer de tous les pouvoirs. Dès le moment où le jeune souverain était capable de gouverner lui-même, il y avait une nouvelle période de changements et l'installation de nouvelles autorités politiques. Tout cela ne se faisait pas sans amener des guerres acharnées qui menaçaient même la position de l'occupant du trône. Les principaux adversaires dans ces guerres étaient les membres des différentes branches de la caste royale dont les plus anciennes risquaient d'être complètement expulsées de leur territoires.

Il y avait donc régulièrement un remplacement d'autorités qui entraînait en même temps une redistribution de terres jusqu'aux niveaux les plus bas de la société; la destitution d'un chef comportait la démission de ses sous-chefs et l'expulsion de ses plus intimes protégés.

Ce qui nous intéresse du point de vue adopté ici, c'est que cette politique de nomination manifeste clairement le caractère personnel des relations entre supérieurs et inférieurs dans la hiérarchie politique et la position des chefs en tant que clients. Etant donné l'indépendance dont les chefs jouissaient, il était très dangereux de les maintenir au pouvoir dès que leur parenté avec le roi devenait si éloignée qu'il n'était plus sûr de leur loyauté. Il fallait les remplacer, ce qui nécessitait généralement l'emploi de la force.

L'indépendance des chefs se manifestait entre autres dans le fait qu'ils nommaient leurs propres sous-chefs, et que leur succession était une affaire dont le roi ne s'occupait que rarement, pourvu que le nouveau chef ne fût pas déloyal. Les fils des chefs agissaient dans les territoires à eux accordés par leur père, comme de véritables chefs. La rivalité entre eux était très forte. Il était normal pour eux de se battre férocement après la mort de leur père, chacun essayant de se maintenir dans le territoire où leur père les avait installés. Il est vrai que l'héritier principal désigné par le père avait le plus de chances de

vaincre. Il succédait comme chef dans le territoire où son père n'avait pas installé des membres de sa famille, mais seulement des simples Tutsi ou Hutu. Cela n'empêche qu'il y avait pas mal de cas où quelques frères réussissaient à se maintenir, ce qui produisait un morcellement graduel de chefferies.

Il est instructif de suivre dans les grandes lignes l'histoire de quelques branches de la caste royale pour montrer l'extrême morcellement des chefferies qui se produisait autrefois et l'étendue des hostilités entre les chefs. Nous prenons comme exemple les descendants de trois fils de Ntare, l'arrière grand-père du roi actuel. Une généalogie simplifiée, dans laquelle ne sont représentés que les principaux chefs, facilitera notre exposé:



(Des chefs arrivés au pouvoir après la venue des Belges n'ont pas été inclus. La seule exception est Bigana.)

Les mieux connus dans l'histoire sont Ndivyarihe et ses descendants qui ont été les plus dangereux rebelles contre leur frère le roi Mwezi. C'est avec beaucoup de peine qu'on a pu soumettre Mbanzabugabo, bien après la mort de Mwezi. Leurs terres furent confiées à Ntarugera, un fils de Mwezi. Busumano et Rwasha semblent avoir été des loyaux chefs au service du roi Mwezi et l'avoir même aidé à supprimer plusieurs révoltes.

Cependant, leurs descendants se sont battus d'autant plus entre eux, en particulier Ruhaba et Mugwengezo et leurs descendants contre Nteturye et Rugambagiza. L'histoire mentionne aussi des guerres fréquentes et sanglantes entre Rusabiko et Muzazye (Van der Burgt 1903: 181).

Busumano et Rwasha, aussi bien que Ndivyarihe, possédaient des terres étendues. Le plus grand territoire de Ndivyarihe se trouvait à Bweru dans le nord-est du pays où il avait pu acquérir une indépendance presque complète. Rwasha possédait des terres à Buyogoma, dans le Mugamba et dans l'actuel territoire de Rutana. Ces derniers territoires avoisinaient les territoires de Busumano, qui à part cela était installé aussi à Buyenzi.

Nous ne disposons pas de tous les détails sur la répartition des terres après la mort des trois grands chefs. Nous sommes mieux renseignés toutefois en ce qui concerne les fils de Busumano. Rwamatore a pu se maintenir à Buyenzi, tandis que Ruhaza et Mugwengezo ont partagé le territoire à Bunyambo (Rutana). Mugwengezo, qui semble avoir été le principal héritier de son père a mis la main sur le territoire de son père à Mugamba aussi. Cette succession a causé beaucoup de guerres entre Ruhaza et Mugwengezo. Un coup d'œil sur lee reste de la généalogie, où ne sont notés que les plus importants chefs, suffit pour se convaincre que le morcellement des chefferies doit avoir été considérable. A cela s'ajoutait que la position des protégés des chefs était instable aussi. Un ancien sous-chef Tutsi de Mugwengezo nous a affirmé par exemple avoir été destitué comme sous-chef par trois chefs différents. Deux fois, la cause de sa destitution avait été que les fils du chef qui l'avait installé voulaient se débarasser de lui.

Il faut rappeler aussi qu'il y avait à côté des fils des chefs qui réussissaient à se maintenir dans leur territoire, d'autres fils qui étaient tués ou expulsés pendant les guerres de succession. Cela continua même après la venue des Belges. Le chef Bigana, par exemple, a réussi à expulser la plupart de ses frères et des protégés de son père Mugwengezo, mort en 1925, et à installer ses propres fils et protégés (comparer Rapport 1926). Il n'y a pas d'indication que le roi intervenait souvent. Il semble que le roi essayait parfois de réconcilier les chefs combattants; (Trouwborst 1959: 795) un informateur nous a affirmé par exemple avoir assisté à un conflit entre deux chefs, conflit qui fut terminé par le roi. On nous a raconté aussi l'histoire d'une guerre entre Rugabe (voir généalogie) et Matabi, au cours de laquelle le dernier fut appuyé par une armée du roi. De tels

cas sont des exceptions. Le roi ne pouvait tout simplement pas s'occuper de toutes les querelles entre ses chefs.

L'instabilité politique, dont la cause était l'indépendance des chefs, avait des avantages aussi du point de vue de la continuité de la royauté. Le morcellement des chefferies et les guerres continuelles entre les chefs affaiblissaient énormément la position de ces derniers et permettaient au roi de se maintenir malgré tout. La situation vers la fin du règne d'un roi était telle que son successeur avait une chance raisonnable d'affirmer son autorité et de remplacer les anciens chefs par ses propres favoris (Ryckmans 1925: 39-41).

Ces faits manifestent clairement les deux tendances de la vie politique au Burundi. D'une part, les chefs agissaient comme de vrais clients ayant la main libre dans l'administration de leurs terres; d'autre part, il y avait une certaine reconnaissance de leur soumission au roi. Cela n'empêche que le rôle du roi vis-à-vis les chefferies était prédominamment celui d'un patron, plutôt que celui d'un souverain. Il ne pouvait se maintenir que grâce à la supériorité de sa propre armée et des armées de ses chefs loyaux.

En ce qui concerne l'appui des différentes castes sur lequel le roi pouvait compter, il est intéressant de réexaminer le rôle que jouaient les Hutu dans la vie politique.

Nous avons vu déjà que leur rôle était surtout celui de sujets et que c'étaient eux qui donnaient un sens à la conception des unités territoriales au Burundi. L'importance des Hutu de ce point de vue est d'abord illustrée géographiquement. Les régions agricoles à forte population de Hutu ont constitué toujours le centre administratif du Burundi. En 1956, plus de la moitié de la population y était concentrée (Rapport 1957). C'était dans ces régions situées dans les territoires actuels de Kitega, Ngozi et Muramvya que le roi se réservait la plupart de ses propres domaines et où étaient installés les principaux chefs. C'étaient, à la fin du règne de Mwezi, les fils de ce roi Ntarugera, Karabona, Nduumwe et Rugema qui y dominaient (comparer Meyer 1916: 171).

Cette situation constituait en même temps une menace. Les mêmes chefs qui appuyaient le roi qui les avait installés étaient les rivaux du successur de celui-ci. Les principaux adversaires de Mwezi par exemple ont été son frère Ndivyarihe et ses descendants établis au Bweru. Mwezi les avait remplacés par son fils Ntarugera, qui, à son tour, devenait plus tard l'adversaire de Mutaga, le successeur de Mwezi.

Quoi qu'il en soit, le centre du pouvoir se situait dans la région agricole du pays, justement là où habitait la majorité des Hutu. C'était là que se décidait l'avenir du royaume et d'où l'on pouvait avec le plus de succès gouverner le reste du pays. L'importance statégique de cette région s'explique par le fait que c'était seulement dans une région de forte densité de population que le roi et les chefs pouvaient entretenir leurs grands menages et leurs grands cortèges de clients personnels d'où dépendait leur influence politique. Une telle région abritait en même temps un grand réservoir d'hommes où les gouvernants pouvaient puiser lorsqu'ils voulaient recruter les nombreux serviteurs et guerriers dont ils avaient besoin.

La loyauté des Hutu n'était pas inconditionnelle, ce qui est prouvé par le fait qu'il y a eu dans le passé quelques cas de rebelles Hutu. Il était donc nécessaire pour être sûr de leur coopération qu'on ne les exploitât pas sans leur offrir des récompenses. Pour se ménager la loyauté des Hutu, il ne fallait pas les tenir dans un état de complète servitude. On leur donnait plutôt plusieurs occasions de participer d'une façon active à la vie politique du pays. Nous avons vu qu'on trouvait des Hutu parmi les juges et les sous-chefs du roi et des chefs. Une partie des Hutu s'associait même au roi et aux chefs en tant que clients et guerriers et recevait des vaches et des terres en compensation. Les quémandeurs (*abasavyi*) qui se présentaient aux cours du roi et des chefs dans l'espoir d'obtenir des faveurs et de devenir des clients, n'étaient certainement pas uniquement des Tutsi. Nous avons décrit ailleurs (Trouwborst 1959: 792) le cas d'un Hutu présenté par son père à un chef et accepté finalement comme le suivant du petit-fils de ce dernier.

Il est intéressant de noter que même cette catégorie de Hutu-clients semble avoir été plus stable que la catégorie des

clients Tutsi. Nous avons constaté dans les régions de Muramvya et de Kirimiro en particulier, que les clients Hutu continuaient souvent à vivre sur leur colline même après le départ ou la mort de leur chef-patron. D'une autre façon encore, les Hutu étaient associés au roi et aux chefs. Cette fois il s'agit d'un aspect de la position des Hutu, qui peut mettre en lumière leur contribution au maintien de l'unité nationale ainsi que l'influence stabilisatrice qu'ils exerçaient Les Hutu, à l'opposé des Ganwa et des Tutsi participant surtout à l'exercice des pouvoirs profanes, se voyaient confier des pouvoirs religieux considérables. C'étaient eux qui en accomplissant certains rites assuraient le bien-être de de tout le pays. La fête nationale était une fête agricole où les principaux officiants étaient des Hutu (Gorju 1938; Simons 1944: 248-253) en qualité de gardiens des tambours, des lances et des vaches sacrées du roi. Notons aussi que les gardiens des tombeaux des rois, des reines-mères et des chefs étaient également des Hutu. En général, tous ceux qui faisaient l'acte de *kuterekera* ("faire des offrandes aux esprits") au service du roi et des chefs étaient des Hutu.

Le roi était assisté également par des devins Hutu, qui devaient le conseiller lorsqu'il y avait des décisions importantes à prendre. Cette institution remonte à une tradition depuis la fondation du royaume et c'étaient en partie des descendants du premier devin qui continuaient à exercer leurs fonctions. Le roi confiait à ses devins comme à ses autres fonctionaires religieux le commandement de territoires; on en trouvait partout dans le pays. Notons que toutes ces fonctions étaient héréditaires et survivaient aux vicissitudes de la vie politique. Il est vrai que l'influence politique exercée par les officiants religieux, à l'exception peut-être des devins, était minime, mais il ne faut pas sous-estimer l'importance symbolique de leurs pouvoirs religieux. Le caractère divin du roi était justifié et maintenu par l'action de Hutu. Le roi, en tant que représentant terrestre de Dieu, était responsable du bien-être du pays. Il n'accomplissait toutefois que rarement des rites lui-même mais en chargeait des Hutu, qui, en tant que conservateurs des institutions royales, étaient intimement liés au souverain. Cette fonction donne un sens à certaines traditions selon lesquelles le premier roi Ntare était un

Hutu, se mariait avec des femmes Hutu et qu'il était assisté par des devins, des juges et des serviteurs Hutu.

Il est peu surprenant que ce fussent les Hutu plus que n'importe quelle autre caste qui renforçaient la position du roi dans sa qualité de symbole de l'unité nationale et de l'être suprême du pays. Ils étaient le seul élément de la population sur lequel le roi pouvait compter sans avoir trop à craindre leur compétition. Les Ganwa et les Tutsi par contre, rivaux potentiels dont la loyauté était toujours douteuse, s'intéressaient peu à cet aspect de la royauté et au maintien de l'unité nationale. Leur intérêt était surtout de maintenir leur propre indépendance vis-à-vis du roi, ou de s'associer avec n'importe qui comme clients.

Ni les Ganwa ni les Tutsi n'étaient bien préparés à exécuter une tâche qui devait valider la position du roi comme individu indiscutablement supérieur à n'importe qui. Le roi, en tant que gouvernant profane, avait peu de traits qui le distinguaient de ses chefs. L'élément décisif de sa supériorité était qu'on le considérait comme le représentant de Dieu, et il s'appuyait en tant que tel sur les Hutu. Ainsi se confirme notre opinion que les Hutu étaient avant tout les véritables sujets du roi et que c'était vis-à-vis d'eux que le roi était un véritable souverain[4].

On peut se demander alors comment expliquer que les Hutu fussent toujours prêts à suivre les chefs qui se révoltaient contre le roi. Il y a peu d'indications que les Hutu se soient jamais opposés aux intentions de leurs chefs, ce qu'on aura pu supposer de loyaux sujets. Cependant, la grande masse des Hutu ne participait jamais activement aux révoltes, ce qui était l'affaire de leurs chefs et des clients de ceux-ci. En outre, après qu'un chef rebelle avait été destitué et avait quitté la chefferie suivi de ses clients, il y restait la partie de la population qui n'avait été que légèrement impliquée dans la révolte. Le nouveau fonctionnaire, nommé par le roi, n'avait pas alors beaucoup de difficultés à se faire accepter.

[4] La participation des différentes castes à la vie politique du Burundi était élaborée dans une classification symbolique sur laquelle nous espérons revenir dans une édition élargie de cet article.

Notre conclusion reste ferme, à savoir que les Hutu en tant que sujets contribuaient considérablement à l'unité et la stabilité de l'état du Burundi, lequel, sans leur assistance, se serait sûrement effondré. Les vrais clients du roi et des chefs étaient les Tutsi et les Ganwa.

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Power in Ruanda

BY HELEN CODERE

RÉSUMÉ

L'organisation sociale et politique de la société ruandaise d'avant 1959 est ici étudiée en terme de pouvoir, pouvoir étant défini: l'habilité d'un individu à infliger un dommage physique à un autre ou à le déposséder. Cette vie sociale et politique était caractérisée par un monopole du pouvoir exercé par la minorité aristocratique des Tutsi, tandis que la caste des Hutu, formant quatre-vingts pour cent de la population, était opprimée et exploitée, demeurant quand même soumise par nécessité. Ce tableau de la société ruandaise diffère de celui tracé par Maquet. Il s'écarte aussi des vues de Fortes, de Radcliffe-Brown et d'Evans-Pritchard sur le type de système politique au Ruanda.

En 1959 et en 1960, ce pays subit une révolution qui renversa l'ancienne structure de pouvoir. Ce furent l'administration européenne et l'évolution sociale et culturelle qui, directement ou indirectement, amenèrent ce renversement ainsi que la prédominance des Hutu. Les enquêtes sur place, durant cette période, et particulièrement les réponses et commentaires aux questionnaires sont ici utilisés pour expliquer (a) la nature de l'ancienne et de la nouvelle conception du pouvoir, (b) la classification de vues opposées sur le pouvoir, selon l'appartenance aux castes Tutsi, Hutu ou Twa, (c) la présence, dans chacun des groupes mentionnés, d'attitudes traditionnelles et anti-traditionnelles relativement au pouvoir.

L'interprétation de la société ruandaise à partir de la notion de pouvoir semble bien expliquer sa continuité et ses changements, même ses changements révolutionnaires. Ce serait donc une interprétation fonctionnelle.

INTRODUCTION[1]

The theme of this African issue of *Anthropologica* is incomparable in its relevance and importance for an understand-

[1] The fieldwork on which this article is based was carried out in 1959 and 1960 with the support of a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship and a Vassar College Faculty Fellowship. In Africa the auspices of IRSAC (l'Institut pour la recherche scientifique en Afrique centrale) were invaluable in furnishing a base of operations and I am in especial debt to Jan Vansina, Marcel d'Hertefelt and André Coupez, all of IRSAC, for their help and intellectual stimulus. My greatest debt is to my Ruandese assistants: Nelson Rwagasore, Léocadie Mukamusoni, Gidéon Ntaganzwa, Gérard Ngarambe and Jean Gakwaya.

ing of Ruandese society in the past and in its present turmoil. Dominant-subordinate relations in Ruanda are examined in the present paper as power relationships. This view involves an interpretation that differs from previous interpretations of Ruandese society, best exemplified by the work of J.J. Maquet (1954), and from the views of Fortes, Evans-Pritchard and Radcliffe-Brown on the nature of the general type of African political system to which Ruanda would be assigned. (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1958). However, field data collected during 1959 and 1960, Ruanda's revolutionary year, seem to demand such a reinterpretation of Ruandese social and political structure.

A period of great tension and turbulence in a society has rarely been the setting for anthropological fieldwork, and it was necessary to find or modify field techniques that would avoid or lessen the difficulties and profit by any advantages such a period presented. With thoughts and feelings of sufficient force and clarity to be translated into novel and even violent action it follows that there might also be an outpouring of words and a desire for listeners. Ruanda burst into articulateness. It was possible to get information, life histories, responses to two questionnaires, one of which was projective in character, and thousands of notebook pages written by literate Ruandese, from Ruandese men and women of each of the three castes and of every occupational group, level of schooling and age. Like every anthropologist who has worked in the country I had Tutsi assistants the major part of the time, a consequence of the great disproportion between educated Tutsi and Hutu and of the near monopoly of Europeanized jobs by the Tutsi. However, my chief assistant, Nelson Rwagasore, became interested in every shade and bloc of opinion and influenced the training of the other assistants — I can recall as one of the most reassuring moments of the work the time when with Rwagasore taking the lead we teased a new assistant asking him what kind of brain-washed Hutu he had been talking to in order to come out with such and such a report. Apart from the articulateness of the Ruandese and their desire to be heard they seemed also to like the consideration they received in having everything they said recorded. Excepting one or two early experiments and a per

page payment for notebooks filled in at home no information or time spent in giving it was paid for. Some of the field data gathered will be presented as documentation for the interpretation of Ruandese social and political structure in terms of power.

Following a summary of background information on Ruanda's geography, history and population groupings the topics of the paper will be: the classical interpretation of political and social structure by anthropology; power; vassalage in Ruanda (*ubuhake*); other power relationships in Ruanda; the revolution in Ruanda; field data bearing on power relationships in Ruanda; and conclusions.

THE SETTING[2]

Ruanda in east central Africa is bordered on the north by Uganda, on the east by Tanganyika, on the south by its twin kingdom of Urundi and on the west by the Congo. In spite of closeness to the equator — from 1° to 3° latitude South — the climate is largely temperate since the altitude of the Nile-Congo crest in the west of Ruanda goes to 3,000 meters and the greater part of the country is not less than 1,500 meters in elevation. With an area of 26,338 square kilometers and a population of 2,452,737 the population density of somewhat over 93 persons per square kilometer is the highest to be found in Africa south of the Sahara and even exceeds that of France.

The pre-history of Ruanda has only been sketchily investigated but the similarity of Ruandese finds to those recovered by scientific archeology elsewhere in Africa makes it probable that Ruanda has been occupied for some half a million years, or since the emergence of Man. Archeological periods from the early Stone Age to the present are represented.

The present population of Ruanda is composed of three groups, the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi. The Twa pygmoid forest dwellers entered Ruanda from that region many centuries ago. The Hutu, Negroid Bantu-speaking agriculturalists were next to settle the country. The Tutsi pastoralists, who are Ethiopoid

[2] The figures in this section are drawn from the latest official handbook, *Le Ruanda-Urundi* edited by l'Office de l'Information et des Relations Publiques pour le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi, Bruxelles, 1959.

in race, entered Ruanda from the north some time before the 15th century, and established themselves as the ruling group just as Hima groups related to them established themselves throughout Inter-lacustrine Africa.

Occupational specialization, cutural differences and endogamy justify the use of the term "caste" for each of the three groups. The Hutu agriculturalists also did all manner of menial services for the Tutsi; the Tutsi monopolized all administrative positions and were warriors as well as being pastoralists. The Twa were hunters or potters but in addition they performed a number of special services for the Tutsi: royal dancers and choreographers, musicians, torturers and executioners, pimps, commando raiders, messengers and jesters. Marriages between members of the different castes were extremely rare, and, although there has been sufficient intermixture to blur racial lines, the majority of each caste is racially distinct. In stature, for example, the differences are striking: the average stature of the Tutsi is 1 m. 75; the Hutu 1 m. 66; and the Twa 1 m. 55.

A fact of critical importance is the disproportionate size of the caste groups. Today the Hutu are an overwhelming majority of over 83 per cent of the population; the Tutsi 16 per cent and the Twa less than 1 per cent. It seems probable that a similar proportion has held for centuries.

European intrusion into Ruanda was at a late date. It is less than 70 years since Van Götzen entered the country in 1894. The first missions were founded in 1900; and the first seat of German administration was established in 1907. In 1919 Ruanda passed to Belgian administration under a mandate of the League of Nations which was converted in 1945 to a Trusteeship agreement under the United Nations Organization. European contact has had important effects on Ruanda for little more than a generation.

THE CLASSICAL INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE BY ANTHROPOLOGY

The classical interpretation of Ruandese social and political organization is so much in accord with the general point of

view of both American cultural anthropology and British social anthropology that any conflicting interpretation must survive the rigours of exposure of a Spartan child. However, field data gained during a year of turmoil and articulateness in Ruanda seem to force the issue and override reluctance to oppose established views.

In brief the general classical interpretation is that Ruanda, or any society, is a functioning whole continuing in time through its mutually reinforcing structures and institutions and its vast web of reciprocities which benefit and obligate every one of its members. Thus (1) any institution or practice, though seemingly destructive to some or even many members of the society, will be seen to have an overall positive value for the whole society and its whole membership, and (2) inequities in the balance of benefits and obligations are never so great that any group or individual has mostly the one and scarcely any of the other.

This view of society seems to apply satisfactorily to most primitive societies. It has been the framework for interpreting Ruanda and for interpretations of a lengthy list of African societies. It seems so difficult as to be impossible to apply it with success to either all contemporary industrial societies or to their historical forerunners. The reason for this may well be the unmanageable complexity of such societies. It may well be — and this will be the argument of this section of the present study and the basis of the reinterpretation of Ruandese social and political organization — that anthropologists, perhaps out of their feelings of responsibility in speaking for a defenceless group of societies, have not wished to see or acknowledge that any of them could be based upon the monopoly of power by a minority without the consent but with only the resignation or submission of the governed.

The central fact of politics is power or physical force, but even when this has been acknowledged by anthropologists power has been put in its place in the larger society, has been bound and controlled by the rules and reciprocities of the functioning whole. It has been denied that any enduring social order could depend on the ruthless use of power by a minority which monopolized it. These views are clearly put in *African Political Sys-*

tems, one of the few specialized works in political anthropology. (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1958) In his preface A.R. Radcliffe-Brown states (xxiii): "The political organization of a society is that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with the control and regulation of physical force," and "In studying political organization we have to deal with the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force." (xiv) Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, the editors of *African Political Systems,* go into more detail and make the position more explicit:

> A relatively stable political system in Africa presents a balance between conflicting tendencies and between divergent interests... The forces that maintain the supremacy of the paramount ruler are opposed by the forces that act as a check on his powers. (11)
>
> Looked at from another angle, the government of an African state consists in a balance between power and authority on the one side and obligation and responsibility on the other. Every one who holds political office has responsibilities for the public weal corresponding *to his rights and privileges. The distribution of political authority* provides a machinery by which the various agents of government can be held to their responsibilities. A chief or a king has the right to exact tax, tribute, and labour service from his subjects; he has the corresponding obligation to dispense justice to them, to ensure their protection from enemies and to safeguard their general welfare by ritual acts and observances. The structure of an African state implies that kings and chiefs rule by consent. A ruler's subjects are as fully aware of the duties he owes them as they are of the duties they owe to him, and are able to exert pressure to make him discharge these duties. (12)
>
> In our judgment, the most significant characteristic distinguishing the centralized, pyramidal, state-like forms of government of the Ngwato, Bemba, etc., from the segmentary political systems of the Logoli, the Tallensi, and the Nuer is the incidence and function of organized force in the system. In the former group of societies, the principal sanction of a ruler's rights and prerogatives, and of the authority exercised by his subordinates, is the command of organized force. This may enable an African king to rule oppressively for a time, if he is inclined to do so, but a good ruler uses the armed forces under his control in the public interest as an accepted instrument of government — that is, for the defence of the society as a whole or of any section of it, for offence against a common enemy, as a coercive sanction to enforce the law or respect for the constitution. The king and his delegates and advisers use organized force with the consent of their

> subjects to keep going a political system which the latter take for granted as the foundation of their social order. (14)
>
> The sanction of force is not an innovation in African forms of government. We have stressed the fact that it is one of the main pillars of the indigenous type of state. But the sanction of force upon which a European administration depends lies outside the native political system. It is not used to maintain the values inherent in that system. ... For as we have seen, in the original native system force is used by a ruler with the consent of his subjects in the interest of the social order.
>
> An African ruler is not to his people merely a person who can force his will on them. He is the axis of their political relations, the symbol of their unity and exclusiveness, and the embodiment of their essential values. ... Into these sacred precincts the European rulers can never enter. They have no mythical or ritual warranty for their authority. (16)
>
> It should be remembered that in these states there is ony one theory of government. In the event of rebellion, the aim, and result, is only to change the personnel of office and never to abolish it for some new form of government. (13)

Thus we see that in Fortes' and Evans-Pritchard's view power in primitive societies is yoked submissively to the social order; it is at the service of the governed and with their consent; it can get out of hand only briefly, and infrequently; it is not a separate factor as it is in European states; the principles of its distribution among the members of society are never questioned or opposed. The authors ask a question at the end of their introduction that is astonishing in view of the position they have already taken that power and political organization are subsumed to the social order: "Herein lies a problem of world importance: what is the relation of political structure to the whole social structure?" (23)

POWER

Based on the case of Ruanda the position arrived at in this study is that power can be held and exercised by a minority against the interests and without the consent of the governed; that this state of affairs can last for long periods of time, that power is a factor that can be independent of the social order or capable of shaping a kind of social order that becomes the only

kind known to the people; and lastly, that revolution is a possibility. Such a position is empty of all novelty in relation to historical or contemporary European societies. It should not, given the great body of anthropological findings, prove a novelty if some "primitives" are seen to resemble us on still another score.

Power is used in this account of power in Ruanda with reference to the ability of one individual to inflict physical harm or deprivation on another. (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1958: xxiii) As Radcliffe-Brown says "There is no such thing as the power of the state; there are only, in reality, powers of individuals — kings, prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and voters." Those who possess power can use it or refrain from using it, while those who do not are in no position to take it or leave it. The powerful might exercise their power over or within a range of possibilities from caprice and terrorism to the acceptance of ethical controls of great benevolence; from ferocious frequency and intensity to a seemingly irreducible minimum. The powerless can accept the uses of power in ways ranging from masochistic joy or hopeless or angry submission to approval grounded in a social ethic to which the individual is attuned. Power must always, however, be accepted by the powerless; the only initiative open to them is to act toward the powerful in some way that may influence whether they use their power or how they use it.

There are ways in which power can be maximized by the holders of power: they can maintain superior communications and solidarity as a group and can break down communications and solidarity among the powerless; they can maintain evident and covert cultural distinctiveness through the socialization of their children and this can increase, demonstrate and perpetuate their solidarity; they can use their power with maximum frequency and to maximum intensity; they can multiply positions of power so that the powerless are subject to multiple relations with the powerful; they can pretend that chances of having power or influencing its exercise exist for the powerless when, in fact, such chances are virtually non-existent; they can develop and propagate ideologies, myths, cults and symbols that glorify and support established power.

The methods listed as ways of maximizing power are simply

generalized from those actually used by the Tutsi minority in old time Ruanda. The Hutu man or woman with a hoe had little chance against them.

VASSALAGE - UBUHAKE

Vassalage[3] was a pervasive form of power relationship in Ruanda. Only the king or Mwami was vassal to no one, but from him down, the chain of vassalage extended through those who were at one and the same time vassal and overlord to those, making up the bulk of the population, who were only vassals.

In Ruandese the institution of vassalage was called *ubuhake;* the overlord, *shebuya;* and the vassal, *umugaragu.* The institutionalized relationship was begun when a man appeared before a superior and pronounced any one of several formulas: "I ask for milk," Make me rich," "Think of me always," "Be my father" or "I shall be your child." (Maquet 1954: 151) The overlord could accept or refuse a man as a vassal, although no man, again excepting the Mwami, could avoid vassalage to some overlord. The vassal had to fulfill the commands of the overlord and had to be subservient in manner; over and above that he did well to be as skillfully ingratiating as he could and to bring his overlord presents as often and of as great a value as he could manage. A further proof of his loyalty and worthwhileness as a vassal was his ability and willingness to furnish useful information to his overlord, including information about the conduct of other vassals. In return the overlord granted the possibility of mediating with other powerful personages in his behalf and gave him the care and the milk production of one or more cattle. Either one could in theory terminate the vassalage but this was most often done by the overlord who then took back the cows and any offspring they had engendered; the vassal was seldom in a position to terminate the arrangement, for to do so he would

[3] Maquet's usage of "clientèle," "client" and "patron" (1954: 151-52) has not been followed. Maquet frequently speaks of Ruandese society as feudal and terminology drawn from medieval feudalism seems more appropriate than that drawn from Rome in the first and second centuries, B.C. The *clientes* of ancient Rome seem to have been in a freer relationship to their *patroni* than vassals to their overlords.

require the help of another and more powerful overlord. The insubordination or disloyalty of a vassal justified his torture or death and a second and new overlord might thus punish a vassal even when the second had profited by the vassal's betrayal of the first.

In spite of the isomorphic character of *ubuhake* in Ruandese relationships there were really two *ubuhakes,* one for the Tutsi and one for the Hutu majority. The two castes, Tutsi and Hutu, were subjected to different exactions as vassals and had quite different chances to profit from the system or manipulate it in their own interests.

The Hutu, the great majority of the people, were mere vassals and almost never overlords. Cases in which a Hutu was ennobled by the Tutsi and taken into their ranks were so rare as to be almost non-existent. As vassals Hutu were given heavy, menial and despised work: agricultural labour, repairing the lord's house and courtyard fence, and a host of menial tasks like carrying the lord in a litter, being his nightwatchman, or cutting wood and carrying water for his household. A man's vassalage could also include that of his daughter or unmarried sister who were demanded as concubines by the overlord or as houseservants by his wife. He could be dismissed because poor health decreased his usefulness as a vassal, because of incompetence or alleged incompetence, on grounds of suspect loyalty, or for no reason at all, and he could be severely punished or killed. He was bound to the soil and was immediately suspect if he appeared any distance from his proper district. He had one chance to escape the worst that might happen to him, and that chance came through the constant power struggle among overlords. His overlord might be brought low, despoiled and replaced by another less exigeant one. An appeal to the chief of his army or a more powerful overlord might be successful depending upon their enmity to his overlord or their assessment of his power. The more powerful a man's overlord the more protected he was against the exigences of other, mostly governmental authorities, that impinged on him, but the more he was completely under his power. The Ruandese proverb is explicit, "You fear a dog's master, not his fangs." (Kagame 1954: 271)

Not all Tutsi were overlords and some, especially in regions in which the Tutsi proportion of the population was very high, might be like Hutu in many of their life circumstances, but, in general, even a poor Tutsi had an opportunity to profit through his kinship with some Tutsi overlord. In *ubuhake* a Tutsi of the meanest condition would have honorable cattle herding and dairy tasks. A young Tutsi with any connections would be given the task of carrying his master's pipe and tobacco, a task that gave him valuable education in the ways of Tutsi society and politics. Vassalage for many, however, meant only a social, and especially, a political alliance and political services one of the most important of which was gaining information and transmitting it to the overlord. Instead of the one cow a simple Hutu was most likely to have received from the overlord a Tutsi might receive, depending on his power connections, from several to a whole herd. He could then become an overlord in his turn. The struggle for power within the Tutsi caste was severe and unremitting, but it could lead to great rewards. The power of the Tutsi in *ubuhake* was supported and reinforced by the administrative and military structure of the society. These structures will be described later. Here it is sufficient to point out that the Tutsi monopolized political and military office as they did overlordships in *ubuhake,* and that the holders of such offices were always greater or lesser overlords. Vassalage guaranteed the Tutsi the status, occupations and affluence of a leisure class. They cultivated the arts, especially the art of witty and elegant conversation, and, save for engaging in activities pertaining to war, they exerted themselves physically only in sex where their exploits were formidable. The Hutu found a simple explanation for Tutsi sexual prowess — "They are not tired from working in the fields." (Maquet 1954: 97)

The comparison of the Tutsi with European feudal aristocracy is so close in many respects that it has not gone unnoticed by some Tutsi themselves. One day while driving past a tileworks with a Tutsi assistant, I idly wondered aloud in my ignorance about what *une tuilerie* had to do with *Les Tuileries,* My assistant said with both a laugh and a shudder that he did not want to think about anything having to do with the French Revolution.

The Twa who constituted an extremely small minority of the population were a special sort of vassal and were rather apart from *ubuhake*. They were considered the Mwami's vassals, though they were often attached to one of the high nobility (Kagame 1954: 283), and they performed a number of specialized tasks: choreographers and trainers of dancers, musicians, buffoons — and, on the darker side — assassins, torturers and executioners and searchers out of girls that might interest their lord. They received gifts for their services, particularly animals to butcher and eat. Probably as many Twa were ennobled as Hutu, although the latter outnumbered them by more than eighty to one. Thus, although some of the Twa hunted periodically for their own consumption needs and some made pots which they exchanged for foodstuffs, the Twa also gained from the exploitation of the Hutu by the Tutsi in *ubuhake*.

The place of cattle in the system of *ubuhake* is of interest. Certainly a Hutu vassal received something of economic value when he was assigned a milkcow, although, considering the very small production of Ruandese cows, he would not have received anything like adequate compensation for having in effect paid out much of his entire surplus in foodstuffs, labour and gifts to his Tutsi overlord — the rest of the surplus going to various Tutsi governmental authorities. According to the writing on Ruanda, cows were not valued according to their milk production or for any other economic reason, but rather for such aesthetic features as the grandeur and grace of their horns. My data indicate, however, that while such a view was typical of the Tutsi the Hutu were far more utilitarian. Expressing the Tutsi point of view the abbé Kagame said on looking over a European herd in their stalls, "Elles ne sont pas les vaches, elles sont les bêtes qui donnent du lait." The Hutu would be less contemptuous of high milk production since they stressed again and again that one of the major inequities of *ubuhake* was the small economic compensation received for much labour and many dues and gifts of produce. As part of the cattle culture the Tutsi brought with them into Ruanda there must have been a body of values and attitudes about cattle, but, while it is tempting to consider how these values were imposed and modified by the conquest of the Hutu, no such reconstruction is necessary to

see them functioning in power terms. Cattle were the symbol and currency of power. It is no wonder, then, that the Tutsi should have glorified them so greatly and for so many non-economic reasons that their sheer economic importance was diminished. The Tutsi composed and recited panegyrics to cattle, the ceremonial parade and glorification of cattle was a feature of court life, cattle were the basis for most of the figures of speech of dynastic poetry and of elegant speech — both Tutsi arts, Tutsi standards of feminine beauty, standards no Hutu woman could ever measure up to, were analogized from the form and carriage of cows. The development of the most elaborately detailed descriptive vocabulary for every possible bovine physical feature both enriched Tutsi literary art and performed the useful function of helping them keep track of their most priceless possession. The Tutsi did nothing to increase the economic worth of cows to the Hutu since Tutsi pasture rights guaranteed a superior nourishment to cows in Tutsi hands. That the Hutu shared attitudes magnifying the importance of the cow is undeniable but just as they were left out of the cultivated literary appreciation of cattle — their version of the language was considered uncouth — they could not feel the same exultant identification with the symbol and currency of power as those who possessed and controlled it.

OTHER POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN RUANDA

A series of power relationships other than *ubuhake* show such similar features as monopoly of power by the Tutsi, great inequity in power in relationships between Tutsi and Hutu, and ruthless use of power by those who held it. In going through the list of power relationships, many of which are between Tutsis in various relative positions of power, it can be said that the Tutsi lived and died not only by the power they exerted over the Hutu but also by the power they struggled for among themselves. In fact the use of power among the Tutsi was frequently of such ferocity that it should have served to further intimidate the Hutu, if they required anything more of the kind. A remarkable feature of Tutsi government was the multiplication of positions of power and the consequent over-lapping of jurisdictions. This both built Tutsi power struggles into the system and multi-

plied the authorities to whom the Hutu were subject, guaranteeing maximum surveillance of the Hutu and the fullest possible removal of their agricultural surplus. Without the Tutsi power struggle the system might have had far less viability, for a man in an unchallenged position of power might become casual in its use. This hypothetical danger did not, however, even exist for the Mwami.

The Mwami was the absolute power in Ruanda. He headed the administrative, military and feudal structures and his power was exerted to the advantage or disadvantage of every Ruandese. Only the Queen Mother or Mwamikazi could be said to be secure because of her close identification to him during his lifetime; otherwise no chief or councillor was safe from possible deposition, despoilation, torture or death. Even the *abiru* or guardians of dynastic traditions and holders of the secret of the Mwami's choice of his successor could be removed from office by him if he doubted their loyalty. Usually the Mwami had a favourite or succession of favourites among the greatest chiefs and the burden of blame for fearful and arbitrary punishments and the constant replacement of individuals in office often fell on him rather than on the Mwami himself. While the clan of the Abanyiginya monopolized the kingship the death of a mwami was frequently the occasion for an intra-clan or fraternal power struggle and coup d'état, and the opening of a reign was insecure even for the Mwami. A remarkable feature of system was the formal alternation of peaceful and warlike reigns. During the latter the expansion of the boundaries of Ruanda was sought. During the peaceful reigns the aim was the consolidation of the internal power structure of the country. Mwamis bearing the names Mutara (or Cyiirima) and Yuhi in the cycle, Mutara, Kigeri, Mibaambwe, Yuhi, were proscribed from crossing the Nyabarongo river which had a course surrounding the central provinces of Ruanda (d'Hertefelt 1959: 47). Ruanda was divided into about eighty administrative districts and in all of them in the center of the country the Mwami maintained a residence which was placed in charge of a wife or a concubine during his absence. Her chief task was to receive all taxes and dues and to turn them over to the court. The dynastic history preserved by the Tutsi themselves documents vicious and constant

intrigue among the Tutsi at the court and ferocious and equally constant use of his power on the part of the Mwami against fellow Tutsi. Such histories are little concerned with the physical violence the Mwami might even personally direct against Hutu but European reports of the reign of Musinga, the last king whose reign included any period free of European interference, document horror in unbelievable measure. The royal symbol was Karinga, a drum decorated with many bundles containing the genitals of conquered Hutu kinglets and regional chiefs and black caked with beef blood applied in recurrent ceremonies. It was an appropriate symbol.

Next in power to the Mwami were the great district chiefs, the chiefs of the army, and the direct vassals to the Mwami drawn from the Tutsi nobility. A wife of the Mwami in charge of his district residence was at about the same level of power. All were interested in gaining and holding the favour of the Mwami by the size of the gifts they made him and, excepting his noble vassals who did not at the moment hold administrative or military positions, by the size of the taxes they turned over to him chiefly in the form of milk, cattle or agricultural produce. They were in competition with one another; from the point of view of the Mwami they counteracted one another so that it was made difficult for any one of them to gain too much power and become unmanageable; from the Hutu point of view it was subjection to multiple claims on their labour and its fruits. The survival of this group of administrators in their position of power, and sometimes their very survival, depended upon their unremitting use of power and their ability in intrigue.

The civil administration stemmed from the great district chief in a hierarchy of power descending first to a Chief of the Land and a Chief of Cattle of about equivalent power to Chiefs of the Hill — Ruanda's thousands of hills made natural geographical divisions for administration. Under them were the Chiefs of Neighborhoods, then the Lineage Chiefs, the Family Chiefs and lastly the individual male adult members of the family. (Maquet 1954: 163)

Under the Chiefs of the Army were two groups at again an approximately equal level of power, the Warriors and Chiefs

of the Lineage and the Pastoralists and Chiefs of the Lineage. As in the civil administration the next levels down were the family chiefs and individuals.

Each functionary in the system had the right to retain a third of the taxes he collected from those below him in the hierarchy.

Although it was a very rare occurrence, a Hutu could be a Chief of the Land, with somewhat less rarity a Chief of the Hill or the Neighborhood. It was, however, the fate of almost all Hutu to be powerless, to be, as the abbé Kagame called them "contribuables ordinaires." The opportunities of the Twa were even further circumscribed. A Twa could only be a Chief of the Hill; very rarely a Twa might be ennobled and taken into the Tutsi caste. (Maquet 1954: 127)

This account of Ruandese power structure has been based on Maquet (1954). He considers that the system was a functioning one made possible for the Hutu by a series of compensating features: (1) The Hutu had the protection of his overlord in *ubuhake,* and his overlord could help him in his relations with administrative authorities. (2) Often the overlord was at the same time a governmental authority in which case his gifts, dues, and services would probably not be doubled. (3) The duplication of civil and military authorities, each with judiciary functions made it possible for a man to get the aid of one, especially the military authority, in dealing with the other. On the other side, however, Maquet notes that: (1) The command of organized physical force was exclusively Tutsi. Only Tutsi were trained as warriors; the Hutu had service and mob tasks in warfare. (145) (2) The governing Tutsi group was enabled by long experience to judge exactly the degree to which exploitation could go and still be supported, but that in the case of individuals the limits might well be exceeded by those in power. (127) (3) From the point of view of power

> La caste Tutsi pouvait, en tant que groupe, infliger un grave dommage aux groupes Hutu ou Twa, et n'importe quel individu Tutsi pouvait exercer une forte pression sur n'importe quel Hutu ou Twa, quelles qu'aient été par ailleurs leur qualités personnelles ou leurs possessions individuelles (158).

The major part of Maquet's conclusions should be reproduced at this point. The conflict evident in his statements seems to justify a "power" interpretation of Ruandese social structure as much as it does a "functional" one.

> Dans les chapitres précédents, les différentes structures politiques ont été analysées d'un point de vue fonctionnel... Ce qui était "immobilisé" par l'organisation politique était le contrôle de pouvoir qui appartenait presque exclusivement à la caste et aux gouvernants Tutsi. Ils l'utilisaient pour l'exploitation, par quoi nous entendons ici la satisfaction de besoins par pression et non par une production économique. ... Il serait évidemment complètement faux d'affirmer que l'organisation politique rouandaise avait pour seule fonction la préservation de l'exploitation des Tutsi. Par la structure politique, comme nous l'avons montré, les castes inférieures jouissaient de sécurité. Collectivement les paysans étaient protégés contre les expéditions de pillage des voisins et contre une exploitation illimitée et trop arbitraire. Individuellement, dans toutes les circonstances difficiles ou dangereuses de la vie, un Hutu pouvait s'appuyer sur la protection de son seigneur, de son chef d'armée et de ses chefs administratifs, s'il ne pouvait ou ne voulait pas demander l'aide de son lignage.
>
> Devrions-nous alors parler de contrepartie et interpréter les privilèges des Tutsi comme une rétribution pour le soin qu'ils prenaient du bien commun et de l'ordre public? Nous ne le pensons pas. L'organisation politique au Ruanda remplissait plusieurs fonctions. On ne peut pas dire que l'une est la contrepartie de l'autre simplement parce qu'elles profitaient à différents groupes. Il se faisait que deux fonctions différentes étaient remplies par le même ensemble d'institutions. En conséquence, nous ne pensons pas que la notion de contrepartie doit être incluse dans la description de la fonction de l'organisation politique rouandaise.
>
> En résumé, ce système politique était un moyen de maintenir un certain ordre social dans lequel le groupe des gouvernants et leur caste s'appropriaient la consommation d'une partie considérable des biens du pays sans avoir à intégrer leur travail dans les processus de production. (1954: 181-183)

The conclusions reached by Reisdorff seem more clearly in accord with the data and are particularly to the point in discussing the compensatory features of the system to which Maquet attaches such importance. Reisdorff reaches his conclusions after examining a series of legal cases involving land rights in Ruanda. They are in agreement with the conclusions reached in a later section of this paper which are based on the

responses of a sample of Ruandese population that includes as many Hutus as Tutsi.

> L'intérêt de la présente enquête réside dans ce qu'elle met en relief l'époque de fer que connut le Ruanda avant l'arrivée des Européens. Le droit ne s'appliquait qu'aux grands et à ceux qui avaient su se ménager un protecteur. Les petits étaient infailliblement la proie des puissants. Il était pratiquement impossible à un muhutu sans protecteur de se faire rendre justice lorsque la partie qui l'avait lésé était un mututsi.
>
> Le chef guerrier défendait ses gens mais il n'intervenait que pour ceux qui avait sa faveur — quand ce n'était pas lui-même ou un de ses apparentés qui était l'auteur de la spoliation.
>
> Le recours du suzerain vacher (shebuya) était possible à condition qu'il s'intéresse au sort de son umugaragu et que l'adversaire de celui-ci ne soit pas de ses amis ... ou un personnage trop influent pour être mis en accusation.
>
> De toute manière un procès durait plusieurs années. Il fallait donc disposer de moyens de subsistence importants (vivres, lait) pour poursuivre une action devant son suzerain ou son chef guerrier.
>
> Encore la partie perdante refusait-elle souvent d'exécuter les décisions prises par les autorités — celles-ci pouvaient alors envoyer un mandataire (UMUHESHA) chargé de faire exécuter la sentence — mais celui-ci pouvait encore être acheté par la partie récalcitrante.
>
> En résumé, le Ruanda vivait sous le signe de la force. C'est elle qui créait le droit, dont les principes n'étaient d'application que pour celui qui était en mesure de se faire justice à lui-même. (1952: 148)

THE REVOLUTION IN RUANDA[4]

The revolution in Ruanda that began in November 1959 and that is continuing up to this moment according to a September 3rd issue of the *New York Times* (1961: 14) is too complex a series of events to be analyzed for some time. International partisanship with Russia and the pro-Russian nations favouring the Tutsi has done nothing to diminish the complications. But in spite of these difficulties some statements can be made.

[4] The reader is referred to the United Nations Trusteeship Council publication of the Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960. Report on Ruanda-Urundi (see bibliography) for an excellent and detailed account of the events of the revolution and their background.

First, Ruanda has been undergoing a genuine social and political revolution. Not only has the old order that has been described been overthrown but also Tutsi domination will not continue in any qualified or modernized form in which, for example, a Tutsi monopoly of educational opportunities would lead to a monopoly of economic and political opportunities in a Europeanized Ruanda. There have been irreversible shifts for both the Tutsi and the Hutu in fundamental attitudes, in social relationships and in access to economic benefits and to political power.

Second, it is a Ruandese revolution. While a host of factors connected with the presence of Europeans in Ruanda during the past six decades enabled the revolution to take place, the revolution was neither inspired, created nor engineered by outside forces, Belgian, United Nations, African, or any other. Various measures enacted by the Belgians had a direct effect on Ruandese social and political structure — although it might be years from the date of the measure to the instance of any effective or general enforcement of it. For instance, a 1917 ordinance required a Tutsi who deprived a Hutu of his property to make double restitution; in 1923 domestic slavery was abolished and traditional dues in labour and service to an overlord was lessened; in 1954 *ubuhake* was to be abolished in a series of progressive stages. Various other European measures had an indirect and, perhaps, in many cases inadvertent effect: for instance a network of roads had political and economic implications in breaking down Hutu isolation, in increasing their economic opportunities, and in enabling escape from difficult situations with their overlords or local administrators. Perhaps the Belgians would prefer the Russian or the Tutsi charge that they were guilty of engineering the revolution to my exoneration of them on the grounds that they did not foresee anything that occurred or have any accurate notion of timing, form, location or extent of participation of the population in any revolutionary development, at least from July 1959 to June 1960 during my stay in Ruanda.

Third, the revolution is the attempt on the part of the majority to achieve a political and social order based on their consent. While the Hutu have been guilty, as have the Tutsi, of cruel acts of violence, their most typical revolutionary act

has been to fire the houses of the Tutsis in their neighborhood, usually after due warning so the occupants could leave in advance, and usually without pillage, or any act of violence against persons. The United Nations Visiting Mission Report (1960: 84) lists 22,000 Tutsi refugees by April 1960. Most of those had been chased from their homes in the way described. Burnings have continued intermittently and the recent *New York Times* article (Sept. 3rd, 1961: 14) speaks of twice that number of refugees. The same United Nations Visiting Mission Report (1960: 82) states that there must have been many more fatalities than the total of 200 reported by the Belgians, but the highest number of deaths I have seen quoted — in the same *Times* article — does not exceed 1,000 and that figure includes some 300 deaths in July and August, 1961. Many Hutu are included among the dead; perhaps the largest number killed at any one time was a group of sixty Hutu who were murdered when an irresponsible and ignorant Belgian officer arrested them for house-burning and left them under armed Tutsi guards. In other words, in proportion to a population of two and a half million the amount of violence done does not suggest that the Hutu desire vengeance or a guillotine period of excess. Belgian patrols reduced the amount of violence done in 1959 and 1960, but it is doubtful whether they have done or could do much about it even with the helicopters they are now using in Ruanda's difficult terrain, if the spirit or the objectives of the Hutu were different. The Hutu wish to end Tutsi domination and to govern Ruanda. Many Tutsi are understandably irredentist, but recent personal communication indicates that many feel that even the institution of the Mwami will never again be accepted by the Hutu majority of the population.

These remarks on Ruanda's revolution will prove sound or worthless as time will give perspective for analysis as well as the opportunity to correct the garbled and incomplete reportage of current events.

SOME FIELD DATA BEARING ON POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN RUANDA

The field data presented here are but a sample of the total collected. Since these data are a sample in harmony with the

whole and since they are systematic, they are useful in documenting many of the points that have been made and in illuminating how social and political change, even of a revolutionary order, exists not only in the minds and in the shifts in thoughts and feelings of the generality of the members of a society but also in the range, consistency and weight of opinion to be found within each of the important groups making up the society.

The data under discussion are the responses of 356 Ruandese to three questions, only one of which bears directly on the matter of Tutsi dominance and Tutsi-Hutu power relations. The forty-question questionnaire was individually administered in at least an hour's time and most took longer than an hour with a few running to three hours or over. Some questionnaires were administered in French, but the overwhelming majority were done in Kinyarwanda which even most "évolué" Ruandese found a more congenial tongue in which to give their opinions and commentaries. Kinyarwanda also contains a formal affirmative and negative nuancing that is happily made to order for opinion questionnaires: *cyane* [cani] = emphatically yes; *yee* [ye] = yes; *oya* [oya] = no; and *ashwi* [asgwi] = emphatically no. Commentary, usually giving the reason for the response to a particular question, was freely offered. Most questionnaires have at least a page or two of accompanying commentary, and, while few individuals commented on every one of the forty questions, as many as twenty-five pages of commentary accompany some questionnaires. The comments proved invaluable in the control of the questionnaire and in illuminating the meaning of the affirmative and negative responses. Most of the questionnaires (323) were done after November 1959, which means after the outbreak of the revolution and after the results of various tests of strength were no longer merely a matter of hopeful or despairing speculation. Nineteen per cent of the individuals who did the questionnaire came and requested to do it on their own initiative, because they heard about it or because they saw it being given.

Facts on the caste, sex, age, occupation and schooling of the individuals who answered the questionnaire can best be presented in tabular form. [See Table I] It should be pointed out

TABLE I.

Ruanda Questionnaire I.
Respondents by Caste, Sex, Age and Type of Occupation[1]

CASTE		OCCUPATION		AGE		
		Traditional	Evolué	15-29	30-44	44-
TUTSI						
Men	111	40	71	52	36	21
Women	55	24	32	42	7	6
	167					
HUTU						
Men	142	68	74	60	59	22
Women	34	30	3	18	10	5
	176					
TWA						
Men	9	9	–	2	2	5
Women	4	4	–	2	1	1
	13					
TOTAL	356	176	180	176	115	60

[1] Ninety-two per cent of the questionnaires were done after the beginning of Ruanda's revolution. Almost a third of the respondents are cultivators. Men are 64% of the sample and women 36%. Totals for occupational and age categories do not reach 356, since data are lacking in a few cases. On the accompanying charts four age-breaks are used rather than three in order to gain detail.

that there are more Hutu than Tutsi in the sample and that women are represented, Tutsi women making up over 15 per cent of the total and Hutu women just under 10 per cent. The Twa are poorly represented with but nine men and four women. However, their commentaries are useful. In the questionnaire used by Maquet women were not represented, but, of far more vital importance for his topic, he had too few Hutu or Twa to allow the use of their responses in his results.[5] I believe, however, that until 1959 when there was a visible reversal in Tutsi-

[5] "Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, les personnes les plus compétentes sur l'organisation politique furent les Tutsi et, en fait, plus de 90% de nos informateurs furent des Tutsi. Comme le nombre de Hutu et de Twa était trop restreint pour avoir aucune signification (il n'y avait en fait qu'un seul Twa), leurs interrogatoires ne furent pas pris en considération dans la calcul des résultats... En fin de compte, le nombre des interrogatoires utilisés fut réduit à 300." (MAQUET 1954: 15)

Hutu power relationships, it would have been almost impossible to obtain candid Hutu statements on many subjects. If the data presented are biased, it would be largely because my Tutsi assistants might be expected to know some Hutu who were friendly or obligated to them, or they might have edited some of the Hutu responses in ways my limited knowledge of Kinyarwanda could not catch. Considering the possibility of bias in this pro-Tutsi direction the predominance of anti-Tutsi responses made by the Hutu must be given full weight. The nature of the commentaries is, however, sufficient evidence that my Tutsi assistants were seeking the truth with me in spite of the fact that what we learned made harsh demands on them while it only fulfilled my demand for data.

The forty questions of the questionnaire were designed to elicit opinions having to do with cultural and social change. While they were not arranged by subject in the questionnaire, they fall into categories concerning attitudes about: the past and the future; innovations and change; European and Ruandese medicine; the place of women in education, politics and trade; cows and husbandry; towns; outsiders such as Hindus; Congolese and Europeans; and Tutsi-Hutu relations. While perhaps half of the questions would yield numerical results or commentaries related to the subject of this paper, only three will be presented and discussed. One was chosen because of its direct bearing on dominant-subordinate or power relationships: "Tutsi and Hutu are racially different; the Tutsi will always be the dominating race and the Hutu the dominated race." The other two questions were chosen because they contribute indirectly to an understanding of power relations; the questions, themselves, do not determine that power relations be considered. The two questions are overlapping and very similar: "A hundred years ago the Banyarwanda were more honest and nicer to one another," and "Before the Europeans came the Banyarwanda had fewer problems and found life happier."

Question number 22, "Tutsi and Hutu are racially different; the Tutsi will always be the dominating race and the Hutu the dominated race," is ,in effect, a brief statement of the central fact of Ruandese culture as it has been described by writer after writer. The most important analysis of Ruandese culture

has been done by Maquet, and he makes "la prémisse d'inégalité" (1954: 184) the principle from which other facts of Ruandese culture can be deduced in a way that corresponds to the important role in analysis played by such concepts as "configuration," "sanction" or "theme" in the work of other anthropologists. The form of the premise of inequality in Ruandese culture as Maquet described it is that birth into the Tutsi, Hutu or Twa caste predetermines physical and psychological qualities and subordinate or superordinate social and political position. Thus race in Ruandese thinking gives the Tutsi their intelligence, refinement, courage, cruelty and ability to rule. It gives the Hutu the qualities that make them both useful to their Tutsi overlords and in need of their commands, the qualities of vassals: physical strength, mediocre intelligence, lack of guile, coarseness, and the capacity to work hard and to be obedient. (Maquet 1954: 188-189) The responses, then, to question 22 are responses to what was alleged to be the Ruandese rationale of Ruandese society up to recent times. As this paper has already claimed, the true "premise" of Ruandese culture seems to have been the possession of power by the Tutsi. That a racist rationale of power was also developed is incontrovertible. The responses to question 22 are clarifying. They demonstrate, first, that the *fact* of the possession of power as the critical reality in social relations is recognized by all but a few of the Tutsi (8%) and Hutu (7%) with only most of the Twa of the opinion that the Tutsi would always rule and the Hutu never. Chart I shows the numerical results in percentages, and it shows the overthrow of the "premise of inequality" supposed to have been the basis of Ruandese society. Neither age, general type of occupation (traditional or évolué, by which is meant a job with some European features), or membership in the Tutsi or Hutu caste makes for any significant differences in the results. The commentaries show why the proposition thought to have been the very premise of the society was denied by every group in the society excepting the Twa. It was because power was seen as no longer being in Tutsi hands after the revolution. The commentaries that follow represent every characteristic in the sample including that of years of schooling which is not included on the charts because the sorting and tabulation of the IBM cards is not yet completed. It seems best at this point to present the commentaries to question

22 and the charts and commentaries for the two other questions.

QUESTIONNAIRE COMMENTARIES

Key to the identification of each commentator:

T = Tutsi	M = Male	Numbers = years of age	S followed by a numeral or numerals = years of schooling	E or T	(1) = YES!
H = Hutu	F = Female			T = traditional occupation	(2) = yes
Twa = Twa				E = European-ized occupation	(0) = no response
					(3) = no
					(4) = NO!

Thus the first commentary (T M 30 SO E (1) was given by a Tutsi man of thirty who had had no schooling, was in a Europeanized — if only somewhat Europeanized — occupation, and who agreed emphatically with the statement of question 22 that "Tutsi and Hutu are racially different: the Tutsi will always be the dominating race and the Hutu the dominated race." In some cases the occupation is named.

REPRESENTATIVE COMMENTS — QUESTION 22: Tutsi and Hutu are racially different; the Tutsi will always be the dominating race and the Hutu the dominated race.

T M 30 S0 E (1) No, they are not two different races; but it is necessary that the Tutsi dominate at any price. Even within the family the father chooses one to be the chief over the others. It is thus for the Hutu and the Tutsi.

T M 52est. S0 T (3) The father being the same, all the children must love one another — Gahutu, Gatutsi, Gatwa.

T M 21 S? E (3) Tutsi and Hutu are not different races — they are brothers because we know from our ancestors that Gathutu and Gatutsi are descended from the same father. The Hutu were never enslaved by the Tutsi. Formerly Hutu even exercised authority and lived in a very fine entente with the Tutsi.

T M 20 S6 E (3) That depends on the ability and the intelligence of the dominant and of the subordinate race. One will choose those who are capable and able to exercise the power given to them whatever their race.

T M 18 S0 (3) Because of evolution the once dominated class has begun

FIGURE 1. RESPONSES TO QUESTION 22 : TUTSI AND HUTU ARE DIFFERENT RACES ; THE TUTSI WILL ALWAYS BE THE DOMINATING RACE AND THE HUTU THE DOMINATED RACE



to see things clearly and to insist on their rights; that is to say that there will be Hutu chiefs in the administration of the country.

T M 19 S6 ? (3) Because with democracy the wish is that everyone has a say and participates in power the moment they are capable of doing so.

T M 20 S6 T Cultivator (3) It is heartbreaking! At this time the Tutsi have no longer a monopoly in ruling. How many Hutu chiefs and subchiefs have been set up by the [Belgian] administration contrary to custom in order to put down the Tutsi? How many more will be imposed to the detriment of the Tutsis?

T M 28 S6 E (3) Kanyarwanda, the father of Gatutsi, Gahutu and Gatwa... Whichever one is capable and wants to do so will dominate.

T M 42 S0 T Cultivator (3) There will be more chiefs from the Hutu side than from the Tutsi. It has begun already. The Tutsi once dominated and that put into the thinking of the Hutu the fact of being dominated. For instance, if a Hutu had some accident and he saw no matter which Tutsi, he would explain it to him and want him to judge it. All that is going to finish after all this long time as I see it.

T M 23 S9 E (3) That is already begun and a year from now the Tutsi will be dominated.

T M 50 S6 TE (3) Tutsi and Hutu are not different races but different names. For a long time the most intelligent of the Batwa, Batutsi and Bahutu dominated.

T M 43 S0 T Cultivator (3) The rich will dominate whether they are Tutsi or Hutu.

T M 36 S3 T Cultivator (3) Only because the force of the European government is behind the Hutu; otherwise the Hutu could expect to have no power on their own. The Tutsi alone are able to rule — only the Tutsi.

T M 26 S3 T Cultivator (3) Actually it is the Hutu who now dominate. The Tutsi dominated the Hutu when they had many cows and when a Hutu asked for a cow and had to pay court to them for it. And then, the Tutsi were more favoured by the whites than the Hutu. It was the Tutsi alone who formerly went to school and because of that they dominated with their intelligence.

T M 24 S4 T Cultivator (3) The two races will both rule after the elections. This is not to say that the Tutsi will be dominated as the Hutu once were rather the greater number dominant will still be Tutsis.

T M 42 S6 T (3) Why ask this question any more. Now it is the Hutu who dominate.

T M 30 S3 E (3) Because the Hutu knew he was the inferior of the Tutsi and the Tutsi knew just as well that he was the superior of the Hutu, there was no race question that obliged them to hate one another.

T M 21 S9 E (4) Tutsi and Hutu are not of different races; they are both Ruandese. Furthermore the Tutsi will not stay in the dominant position, because civilization is not something just for them, it is for everyone in Ruanda, Tutsi, Hutu, and also Twa.

T M 18 S6 E (4) In the future the Tutsi alone ought not to exercise authority, because the country does not belong to them alone. If there are capable Hutu, surely power will be exercised by them and not by Tutsi — that is Hutu are really capable and conscious of their duty.

T F 19 S8 E Monitrice (2) The Tutsi ought always to be the dominant race because they have given proof for centuries of their ability to rule the country.

T F 23 S0 T (3) The present troubles in Ruanda are that the dominant class has been put in prison and the dominated class has seized the occasion to take over souschefferies and even chefferies. That shows that the dominant class has become the dominated class and the other way round.

T F 26 S0 T (3) Evolution has turned everything upside down, and the voice of the Hutu claiming the right to participate in power rings in the air. Logically and practically they demand something they have never had or known, while the spirit of organization is something born into the Tutsi.

T F 25 S? (3) The Tutsi no longer dominate the Hutu, but the Hutu will never dominate them. No one will dominate someone more intelligent than he is.

T F 25 S5 T (3) In all justice all Banyarwanda of the two races should govern together, but the Hutu do not know how to command.

T F 21 S5 (3) But all that is caused entirely by the whites. Many chiefs and subchiefs have been dismissed because of hate and not because of incapacity; so that means that the Hutu would never refuse to be the subjects of the Tutsi.

T F 55 S0 T (4) There is the flaw. Always before the Banyarwanda were brothers under the Mwami who alone was able to advance or degrade anyone. Now all that is changed and we are divided.

H M 65 S0 T Cultivator (2) The Tutsi were good to many people. To keep them from having power when they once had it without question would be to commit a crime.

H M 40 S? T Cultivator (2) Because there are those who have run Ruanda for years and years. They know how to do it because they are used to it.

H M 70 est. S0 T Cultivator (2) The Tutsi always surpassed the Hutu. They really knew how to do well by their servants. The Hutu ought to be dominated. The one who is strongest and most intelligent dominates.

H M 48 S? T Cultivator (2) It would be good for the government to always be in Tutsi hands.

H M 26 S? T Cowherd (2) As long as the Tutsi are rich they will rule. Now rich Hutu will also rule.

H M 24 S0 E (3) The country is developing. The Hutu also go to school. Therefore capable Hutu will also direct the country.

H M 23 S4 E (3) In the future everyone will be on the same equal footing. Besides that is already begun since the Hutu are exerting their rights and there are quite a few Hutu who have recently been named as chiefs and subchiefs.

H M 25 S: T Cultivator (3) Before the Hutu could not get into the schools which were reserved for the Tutsi. Now everyone Hutu and Tutsi goes to the same schools. I think that it is thanks to schooling that capable and intelligent Hutu will share in the running of the country.

H M 45 S0 T Cultivator (3) The whites have separated us. We shall no longer be dominated by the Tutsi but, rather, we wish to be independent with only the Mwami having power over us. Thus the Tutsi will not dominate us any more but we shall get along together.

H M 46 S0 T Cultivator (3) The Tutsi dominated us as long as they possessed the great benefice of cows. Now none of them have very many and we Hutu have some. The way it is can be understood — Bahutu-Batutsi.

H M 34 S13 E (3) With evolution and education the Hutu and the Tutsi will find positions according to their ability without regard to race, and the uneducated Hutu and Tutsi will be dominated by the educated Hutu and Tutsi.

H M 38 S0 T Cultivator (3) They will get along together. Those who did not go to the Mwami were dominated. Now both the Hutu and the Tutsi go to Mwami.

H M 50 S4 E (3) Because the Hutu no longer respect the Tutsi as they once did. We only respect chiefs and subchiefs.

H M 20 S8 E (3) In justice the Tutsi ought not to have priority over the Hutu nor the Tutu over them. It would be better for both to be on the same level.

H M 40 S13 E (4) Different — yes — but as for saying that the Tutsi will remain the dominant race and the Hutu the subject race — no. All are men; no race is destined to dominate another.

H M 53 S0 E (4) No, the Tutsi cannot stay in power for they have governed badly. They gave people tasks and did not pay them for what they did. They did all kinds of bad things. If that came back the country would fall into misery.

H M 31 S0 T Cultivator (4) In dominating us the Tutsi did us great harm.

H M 42 S0 T Cultivator (4) All that has changed. Rather they will live as equals and with more fraternity.

H M 40 S0 T Cultivator (4) You can see it for yourself. The Tutsi are no longer in their high position.

H M 39 S3 T Cultivator (4) Their kingdom is destroyed; they will no longer dominate. That finished with the year 1960.

H F 50 S0 T Cultivator (2) The Tutsi knows how to govern but the Hutu does not deserve to govern.

H F 36 S0 T Cultivator (2) It is the Tutsi who have the manner of ruling.

H F 21 S7 E Monitrice (3) What would you want — the Tutsi to stay the dominant race? Now they are taking away their power. That proves that the roles are going to be reversed and the once dominant race will become the dominated one.

H F 20 S0 T Cultivator (3) For many years the Tutsi exploited the country, now the Hutu must rule the country in their turn.

H F 38 S0 T (3) Hutu are as capable of ruling as Tutsi, but the Tutsi don't let the Hutu do it.

H F 26 S3 T Cultivator (4) I think this is a fable or a legend. I can't see events differently, and you know about them as well or better than I do. You see rather that the Tutsi have become servants.

H F 40 S0 T Cultivator (4) You ask me about what you yourself can see — the Tutsi no longer rule.

Twa M 60 S0 T (1) Because the spirit of organization is an hereditary Tutsi trait that the Hutu cannot acquire.

Twa M 60 S0 T Potter (2) But they will all be equal.

Twa M 80 S0 T (2) The Tutsi ought to rule but now the Europeans have given our country to the Hutu... But it is inconceivable that the Hutu could possibly run the country.

Twa M 28 S0 T (3) Those who are capable whether they be Tutsi or Hutu will take part in the running of the country.

Twa M S0 T Potter (3) We want there to be Hutu, Tutsi and Twa capable of ruling.

Twa M 40 S0 T Potter (3) No, that is all changed. The Europeans have turned everything upside down —. But in spite of it the Tutsi will always be nobles.

Twa F 60 T (2) If everything goes well it will be that way because it is the Tutsi who have made them rich. It is thanks to the Tutsi that the Hutu are even human.

REPRESENTATIVE COMMENTS — QUESTION 14: A hundred years ago the Banyarwanda were more honest and nicer to one another.

T M 30 S3 E (1) The Hutu were not happy, but there were not the sort of troubles we are having today.

T M 25 S5 E Moniteur (1) Really you meet a Tutsi or a Hutu and he says "Ah that one is an Aprasoma or a l'Unarist...". As the history of Ruanda is not unknown to me, I know truly that formerly there were no jealousies or other things contrary to Christian humanity.

T M 30 S6 E (1) They were nice to one another, the great ones and the ordinary people...

T M 30 S0 E (1) They are separated because of the evil administration. The authorities want those who were great to become little and those who were little people to become great and that is the source of the trouble.

T M 50 S? T (1) Ruanda never knew insubordinate Hutu to revolt against the power of the Mwami, to be chiefs of a chefferie or even chiefs of a family! Now extraordinary permission has been granted to them to attack the properly constituted authority. Formerly Ruanda was better governed and directed.

T M 33 S0 E (2) I don't want to say that everyone was happy and contented, but Ruanda was independent. I know the Hutu suffered a lot but it was because they were poor. Even in Europe, I believe, not everyone is content; some want to be richer than they are and there are also the poor.

T M 23 S6 ? (2) These are the old principles which are giving way as they encounter democracy.

T M 26 S3 T Cultivator (2) Formerly they got along better than they do now because a Hutu who was the servant of a Tutsi was respectful and completely polite, while now the Europeans have allowed the Hutu to do everything they can against the Tutsi and have prevented the Tutsi from defending themselves. But what would you expect, they only have Hutu support.

T M 20 S6 E (3) There were too many abuses and injustices on the part of the rulers and against the subordinates. From that comes the hatred between the races.

T F 17 S5 ? (2) I was not yet born but I have heard that they got along together very well. You could order a fellow to do something without paying him for it.

T F 49 S0 T (2) They were nicer and more honest because anyone who did not respect his superior was ruthlessly punished.

H M 40 S0 T Cultivator (1) A child is honest and nice to his superiors.

The superior is honest and good towards the child. The development of being impolite did not exist before. This development is to say that I can go accuse you before the tribunal even if you are my superior.

H M 70 est. S0 T (2) They were honest and nice to one another, more than today. Today a Tutsi says "No one is going to order me around" and the Hutu says the same thing. Isn't our kingdom in which people respected one another in danger of being destroyed?

H M 30 S0 T Cultivator (3) But they were not all happy, only some of them were, the Tutsi and some Hutu who paid court to them.

H M 30 S5 E (3) Actually they were evil to one another, now they no longer hide what is in their hearts.

H M 30 S10 E (3) How so, it was only the Tutsi who enjoyed life; the Hutu worked as if they were machines.

H M 26 S0 T Cultivator (4) The stronger oppressed the weaker. Now people in the same condition of life whatever their race can drink together when before it was impossible to do so.

H M 40 S0 T Cultivator (4) In the old times it was terrible. When one of the great Tutsi met to drink with another he would ask him the loan of a Hutu to kill saying he would return another Hutu in his place. Since the Europeans arrived everything has been better but in olden times the Tutsi did terrible things.

H F 49 S0 T Cultivator (3) Most of the Hutu were treated like savage beasts and they were unable to defend themselves as they do today.

H F 40 S0 T Cultivator (3) I think that the ones who are complaining now are not the ones who trembled in times past. I think that one hundred years ago there were those who were not contented with their lot just as there are some like that today.

Twa M 54 S0 T (1) The Banyarwanda had more trust and honesty in them. They saw only that they had a single ruler who ruled them and contributed to their prosperity. Now there are too many authorities, too much division of power, and that causes the trouble and mistrust among the inhabitants of the country.

Twa M 40 S0 T Potter (1) But certainly, because they had a Mwami who was master of all.

REPRESENTATIVE COMMENTS — QUESTION 27: Before the Europeans came the Banyarwanda had fewer problems and found life happier.

T M 24 S4 T Cultivator (2) Because before the coming of the Europeans

all the Banyarwanda loved one another more than they do today. I have never heard about Ruanda's being divided into political parties as it is now. They were all in their proper places.

T M 24 S8 E (3) Before the Europeans horrible sicknesses devasted the population; there were periodic famines that ravaged the land; there were wars and terrible injustices suffered by the masses of the people because of the caprice of the monarch.

T M 18 S8 (3) Injustice reigned and it was committed by the Tutsi chiefs.

H M 30 S8 E Monitor (1) Some were chased from their property and despoiled of their cows because they were despised by those greater than them.

H M 25 S4 E (3) The Europeans have delivered us from the yoke of the Tutsi. What abuses, injustices and murders we suffered before the arrival of the Europeans!

H M 25 S3 T Cultivator (3) The Tutsi did not treat the Hutu as if they were reasoning human beings, so, although the Tutsi were content, the Hutu were not.

H M 38 S2 T Cultivator (3) Life was not happy for us since the Tutsi used us as slaves.

H M 30 S0 E (3) How could you say life was happy when the masses had no say about what they wanted.

H M 58 S0 T Cultivator (3) There was no equality among all the Banyarwanda.

H M 50 S4 E (4) The Ruandese lived in misery. The powerful killed the little people. You yourself know about the sword of Nyiraguhi.

H M 30 S10 E (4) But the Tutsi used the Hutu as if they were animals. European civilization has gradually advanced Ruanda.

H M 27 S8 (4) Before their arrival there was nothing but injustice night and day.

H F 26 S3 T Cultivator (4) No! Instead, if the Europeans had not come, we should still be in misery; but thanks to the Europeans we Hutu are in the same rank as other Banyarwanda.

Twa 70 est. S0 T Potter (1) There was nothing but brotherhood. All this liberty, this pride did not exist. Everyone was subject to the Mwami and that was that.

The responses to questions 14 and 27 show that while neither age nor occupational category accounts for any significant differences in the responses, caste is everything. Almost 85 per

FIGURE 2. RESPONSES TO QUESTION 14: 100 YEARS AGO THE BANYARWANDA WERE MORE HONEST AND NICER TO ONE ANOTHER



FIGURE 3. RESPONSES TO QUESTION 27 : BEFORE THE EUROPEANS CAME THE BANYARWANDA HAD FEWER PROBLEMS AND FOUND LIFE HAPPIER



cent of the Tutsi men and 87 per cent of the Tutsi women felt that "a hundred years ago the Banyarwanda were more honest and nicer to one another." Of these 42 per cent of the Tutsi men and 46 per cent of Tutsi women agreed emphatically. They were loyally supported by the Twa; only one of the thirteen Twa in the sample said "No" to the proposition. However, the Hutu, both men and women, denied the proposition over half the time. As was the case with question 22, a matter of fact is involved. The events of the revolution gave evidence enough that the Banyarwanda were not at the moment being "honest or nice to one another." But even with the evidences of vicious rumourmongering, hostility and brutality, the Hutu often had a second thought, and, as the comments show, took a broader view that included what they had known or heard about the past. The comments also show how much the thinking of Hutu and Tutsi is alike in power terms.

The responses to question 27: "Before the Europeans came the Banyarwanda had fewer problems and found life happier" show a similar pattern, as would be expected when the questions themselves are so similar. Of the Tutsi 52 per cent of the men and 73 per cent of the women affirm the statement. While among the Hutu 73 per cent of the men and 79 per cent of the women deny it; 25 per cent of the Hutu men and 30 per cent of the women deny it vehemently. Again the Twa response is special, three of the nine Twa men deny it, but all the others affirm it with all four Twa women affirming it with vehemence. The list of commentaries is limited for reasons of space but it seemed especially interesting to show how this question elicited Hutu ideas on power and politics.

The questionnaire responses show not only the results but also some of the causes of Ruanda's revolution. Many questions, like Question 22, "Tutsi and Hutu are racially different: the Tutsi will always be the dominating race and the Hutu the dominated race," stated propositions of traditional Ruandese culture and society. To disagree with Maquet's view that the racist premise of inequality was the true basis of Ruandese society is not to deny that a racist rational for social, economic and political inequality was a feature of traditional Ruandese culture. A more detailed examination of the responses and commentaries

to Question 22 shows how a traditional view may be overthrown. The processes, though complex, seem to be those that contemporary social science would force us to hypothecate: (1) that no proposition, however important in any society, would be held by all adult members of that society in the same way, for the same reasons or with the same interest and intensity; (2) that variations would exist not only because of the inevitable variety of individual human experience but also because of the individual's membership in one or another of the social groups into which the society was divided. A review of the commentaries to Question 22 does not show why one young Tutsi man or woman expresses the old traditional racist view and another an essentially democratic and anti-traditional view; or why one elderly Hutu cultivator is in accord with tradition and another set against it. It does not show how it came about that even two of the Twa express anti-traditional notions. What can be seen is (1) the ordering of conflicting views in Ruandese society according to the caste social grouping of the society; (2) the continuity of traditional views in each of the three caste social groups; and (3) the presence of new, anti-traditional views. The view predominant in the society, and the view the anthropologist will use in describing the society, is the view, *in force,* that is, the view held by those in power in that society. If some 90 per cent of the Tutsi and Hutu alike now deny the traditional proposition that the Tutsi will always dominate the Hutu, it is because the Tutsi are no longer in power, and are no longer in a position to assert their rationale for holding power. The Tutsi are quite correct in blaming the Belgians for the reversal of power that has occurred, but not in their charge that the Belgians engineered the revolution to overthrow them. The commentaries of some of the Tutsi show Tutsi ranks to have been infected to some degree with a European rationale of power-holding and with equally anti-traditional ideas of social justice. When along with some Tutsi and many Hutu even two of the Twa speak of equality and the need for everyone, Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa, to participate in government, this means that either European ideas have had a profound and widespread influence or there has been some point to giving open expression to views that were formerly suppressed. The present analysis

cannot go beyond the fact that the questionnaires were given after the revolution of 1959, but it does not seem incautious to say the equalitarian views held by various individuals were probably not formed after the revolution. Otherwise there should not have been a revolution. True, after the revolution there was confirmation of the fact that the Tutsi no longer dominated the Hutu, and this fact was certainly damaging to the rationale of Tutsi dominance, but it is equally credible that long before the revolution the Hutu and the Tutsi saw Tutsi dominance and its rationale in different ways. Evidence, especially from the life histories, will be brought to bear on this point at a later date and it seems likely that the problem can be worked out historically in terms of Tutsi and Hutu ideas and feelings, the influence of European ideas and the influence of actual changes in living conditions brought about through the European occupation of the country.

CONCLUSIONS

The data and arguments presented seem to support a power interpretation of Ruandese social and political organization. By power is meant the ability of one individual to inflict harm or deprivation on another. Power relations seem to have been the basis of Ruandese social and political structure and the outstanding feature of Ruandese society was the monopoly of power by the Tutsi minority. Constant power struggles among the Tutsi did not break their monopoly of power as a group or diminish its effectiveness. Thus Ruandese society is not seen as a network of reciprocities in which power carried obligations and lack of power had its real compensations, or as a society in which the common weal was of paramount importance and everyone of its members believed in and consented freely to the systems that supported it. Rather than this Panglossian state of affairs the more powerful oppressed the less powerful or the powerless, power was used to the hilt by those who possessed it, and fear and insecurity perpetuated the system.

A question that must be raised at this point is whether a power interpretation of any society can be a functional inter-

pretation. Can a society based on power work? Can it be viable and perpetuate itself? One answer to this question has already been indicated. We know of historical and contemporary societies that existed or exist on a power basis with power in the hands of a minority which is neither chosen nor controlled by the majority. Are all "primitive" societies, some of which, like Ruanda, form organized populations larger than those of European states known to us at present or in the past, to be considered in a different category? As is well known the organizational development and political sophistication of many African states invite comparison with non-African states while inviting contrast with all the societies of native North America, excepting Inca, Maya and Aztec, or with "primitive" societies elsewhere. It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, for one African society, in any case, to have been based on power.

Ruanda seems to have *functioned* on a power basis and there seems no problem about a power interpretation of Ruandese society. It seems to be as "functional" as the "functional" interpretations of Maquet, Fortes, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard that have been reviewed. Their interpretations have involved an assumption that "The sanction of force upon which a European administration depends lies outside the native political system. It is not used to maintain the values inherent in that system... For as we have seen, in the original native system force is used by a ruler with the consent of his subjects and in the interest of the social order." (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1958: 16) This assumption has caused Maquet evident difficulties as has been shown. His summarizing interpretation contains conflicting points and his search for the compensatory features of the Ruandese system for the Hutu seems hardly fruitful when such few and unconvincing ones could be turned up. For example, his presentation of the compensatory advantage to a Hutu of having a Tutsi overlord in order to give him protection from the exactions and oppressions of other Tutsi is such as to deserve a description in more forthright terms. "Protection" in such a sense deserves the quote marks it is usually given in describing U.S. gansterism in the 1920's. Ruanda seems much better explained functionally without making any assumptions about power that prevent seeing it in anything but positive and pleasant

terms. How the system could work for the powerless is all too clear. The Hutu were oppressed and terrorized and accepted what they had to accept as they did what they had to do. How the Tutsi maintained their dominance needs some further discussion, since the power struggle they were engaged in among themselves seems on the face of it diccicult to explain functionally when it appears to be against their interests in maintaining their power monopoly in relation to the Hutu. The Tutsi power struggle seems, however, completely functional in maintaining Tutsi dominance and the old order, and, of especial interest, the lessening of the intra-Tutsi struggle seems to have contributed its measure to the loss of Tutsi power in recent years. The fears and insecurities of the Tutsi in the old regime make it understandable why many of them were able to apply whatever power they held with unremitting ferocity and with consequent success as far as the submission of the Hutu was concerned. Had the Tutsi been merely a comfortable and secure aristocracy they might well have developed slack and easy-going ways, but the brutal and relentless struggle for power among them kept them harsh and undistracted in their use of power, and thereby maximized the power they held as a group. Depositions from many Tutsi, including one of the overseers of the Mwami's cattle — a noble traditional office — are criticisms of the ancient system for its lack of security. A Tutsi lived in constant anxiety lest he be demoted from whatever position of power he held and suffer deprivation of property, status, or even life itself. It had been the ambition of the informant mentioned to have at least thirty children so he could rebuild his once great lineage which had nearly been wiped out by other Tutsi at the level of baronial machinations, denunciations to the Mwami, and assassinations. The revolution loosened Tutsi as well as Hutu tongues and in stating their position Tutsi after Tutsi, however intransigent in general about the evils of some of the changes that had occurred in Ruanda, said that an evil feature of the old system was its insecurity for them and gave illustrations from some of the dark incidents in their own family histories. Again the analysis of the data is incomplete, but it seems probable that they were not adverse to European policing of their power struggle and the softening of its consequences for the loser. The interactions that

such a change would set in motion could then prove to be a Tutsi contribution to Ruanda's revolution and the tracing of these interactions could contribute to the understanding of the revolution in functional terms.

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The analysis of conflict in hierarchical systems:

AN EXAMPLE FROM KANURI POLITICAL ORGANIZATION[1]

BY RONALD COHEN

RÉSUMÉ

L'auteur propose ici un modèle de comportement qui s'applique au rôle de Chef de District chez les Kanuri de la Nigérie du Nord. Ce modèle prend comme point d'appui le conflit résultant de vues divergentes dans un société dont le comportement est basé sur les faits suivants: manières d'agir si opposées qu'il devient impossible de satisfaire à des exigences majeures sans, en même temps, enfreindre d'autres règles tout à fait valables; ambiguité des buts à poursuivre; application selective de la loi, de manière à ce que certaines lois seulement soient observées dans un cas donné.

Le Chef de District Kanuri vit nécessairement dans un système où ces trois conditions se retrouvent et sont, en droit comme en fait, associées aux facteurs suivants: (1) Impossibilité pour le Chef de District de se soumettre aux règles, d'une part; et variété de ses solutions, d'autre part; (2) sa simulation des règles; (3) sa tendance à se trouver des échappatoires, le cas échéant; (4) sa conscience de la pauvreté de son information politique et de la précarité de son maintien au pouvoir; (5) le fait de vivre dans un système où il est toujours préférable pour lui d'ignorer l'infraction aux règles pour que la vie puisse continuer (car il y a tellement d'infractions); (6) le changement des normes d'action avec le temps; (7) innovations facilement engendrées et facilement acceptées, grâce au mécanisme d'application sélective de la loi.

En insistant sur le CONFLIT comme base d'organisation sociale dans un système politique, et en considérant le comportement politique comme une réaction à la pression plutôt qu'aux règles, on obtient un modèle dynamique du processus politique. L'auteur pense que cette conception est plus réaliste que l'ancienne qui considérait le processus social comme un espèce de schéma "moyen-fin" ou encore comme le "fonctionnement d'une structure".

[1] Revision of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Kingston, Ontario, June, 1960.

— I —

Up until recently much of the descriptive work of the ethnographer, especially of those dealing with African societies has been carried out by placing a great deal of reliance on the, often implicit, assumption that action follows from institutionalized patterns. Because many of the institutions in the African societies are unfamiliar and exotic, it has always been a primary responsibility of the anthropologist to discover what these are, and to describe them in a systematic fashion. This is often an arduous task, and requires detailed observation and long, hard, hours of analysis. By the time it is completed, however, the anthropologist is often oriented to the social behaviour he has observed in terms of the institutions he has outlined.

Several factors have conspired to turn the attention of anthropologists in other directions. Studies of African peoples are now much more common, and the overall structural types of the segmentary and non-segmentary societies are widely understood. This has allowed us to concentrate more attention on the details of social life within these now familiar types of social structures. Furthermore, the rapid social change taking place in Africa is pointing our attention more towards the behaviour of persons in new situations, rather than at the varieties and interrelations of traditional institutions. Finally at the theoretical level a number of workers in both anthropology and sociology have been discussing the limitations of the social system model in which man lives in a group with a tradition such that the rules are functional and the entire system is a nicely balanced, self-supporting, integrated whole.[2] Social life in this model revolves around the internalizing of norms so that the individual can take his place in the system and play out the part that tradition has ordained for him. Activity not functionally directed is labelled deviant, dysfunctional, or disequilibrating, and used as a source of stimuli for social change. However as Buckley (1958) has pointed out, this carries with it a danger that we

[2] See for example, DAHRENDORF (1959), EPSTEIN (1957), and LEACH (1954).

may negatively evaluate change since the model stresses stability and persistence in its analytic perspective. Because change is separated from the integrated model as a kind of irritant which forces the system to adjust, it is difficult to use it in a rapidly changing situation where change is a primary characteristic of the social situation under observation. What is needed then is a theoretical perspective which attempts to order the changing situation *while it is changing.*

To make a beginning at such an approach it is necessary to assume that the institutionalized social structure is only one among many facets of social reality which determines the course of social life.[3] This leads us to a more complex, but perhaps more realistic, view of social process in which man is seen as an actor who acts and reacts in relation to a multitude of pressures and stimuli; internal and external to himself in origin; traditional and novel in time depth; interpersonal, supernatural, and material in substance. In this paper we shall deal with only one facet of these stimuli — that of the exigencies or pressures, and the reaction to these, which result from a hierarchical political organization.

The situation that has been chosen is one in which there are conflicts among the standards governing behaviour. This forces us to pay attention to the adjustive responses of the actors instead of looking out for the "functional" or "integrative" qualities of the cultural norms which pertain to behaviour. If an actor in a given context is institutionally enjoined to behave in a certain way, and not to behave in this manner all at the same time, then a description and analysis of the rules governing behaviour cannot give us any adequate predictive conclusions about the resultant action. What is obviously necessary is an analysis of the resultant behaviour itself.

The analysis to follow has been organized with the aid of a theoretical schema first put forward by Frank (1959) as a

[3] Compare this with RADCLIFFE-BROWN's (1952: 180) assumption that "the social life of the community is here defined as the functioning of the social structure." A more extreme example of this approach can be seen in LEVI-STRAUSS' (1953: 538) statement that social anthropology consists "exclusively of the study of rules."

method for the description and analysis of conflicting standards. He developed the theory as a result of his interest in the Russian industrial system, but suggests that it is more widely applicable. The following discussion therefore has a twofold purpose. First, to present material on the Kanuri political system using a new approach, and secondly, to test the applicability of Frank's theory to an entirely different cultural context.

The theory

Frank (1959) feels that if three conditions are present in a social situation, it is possible to predict a series of behaviours which are of necessity associated with them. These conditions are (a) conflicting standards, (b) ambiguous goals, and (c) selective enforcement.

Conflicting standards are rules or prescriptions for conduct which are enforceable through formal or informal sanctions. The distinctive feature of such standards is that they pertain to rules or prescriptions which cannot be satisfied simultaneously, since compliance with one involves the failure to meet another equally enforceable standard.

Goal ambiguity refers to the state of affairs in which it is difficult for members in the system, or indeed for any observer viewing the system in part or as a whole, to ascertain clearly what are the desired ends towards which everyone should be striving. Thus the social structure cannot in any empirical sense be made to resemble a simple means-ends schema.

Selective enforcement is the process by which the model is put into operation. It postulates a differential enforcement over time of the total gamut of enforceable standards so that not all standards must be conformed with to the same extent.

Frank (1959: 11) puts it this way:

> Multiple and at least in part conflicting standards are set by superiors for subordinates. More than one hierarchical channel of communication is maintained. Conflict may arise among standards set within each hierarchy as well as among those set by different hierarchies. Subordinates are free to decide which of the conflicting standards to meet, if any. However subordinates are responsible to

> superiors for their performance with respect to all standards; and subordinates may be held accountable for failure to meet any standard. The relative importance of standards is neither well, nor completely defined, nor is it entirely underfined. The priority among standards is ambiguous. Subordinates make their assessment of priority to guide their decision-making and task performance. Each subordinate appeals to those standards which are most in accord with his incentives and the circumstances of the moment and to those which are most likely to be invoked by superiors in evaluating his performance. Superiors in turn make their assessment of priority to guide their necessarily selective evaluation of subordinates' performance and enforcement of standards. The entire process is continuous; superiors modify the set of standards to comply with their changing objectives; subordinates adapt their decisions to changing standards and to changing circumstances; superiors enforce standards in accordance with changing priority.

The author of the theory goes on to suggest that if the above conditions are present, then the following behaviour can be observed.

A. Member Behaviour

The more the system relies on conflicting standards organization, the more the members will:

1. Fail to meet all standards and exhibit differences in selection of the standards they do meet.

2. Change the selection over, time, of the standards they do meet.

3. Simulate or feign meeting of standards.

4. Provide themselves with safety-factors for contingencies.

5. Have recourse to (and become) intermediary dealers in information, influence, and any other organizational resource which enhances a particular member's ability to meet standards by eliminating some of the conflict (for him) among standards.

B. System Organization

The obstacle to formal rationality entailed by conflicting standards suggests that:[4]

6. The more the conflicting standards, the more will the system be oriented toward substantive rationality.

The system will also exhibit:

7. Changing standards for members.,

8. Ready adaptation to changes of environment by system members at the system-environment boundary.

9. Widespread member initiative as a possibility (but not a necessity). Where this is not expressed in a standard, Frank suggests that a "let sleeping dogs lie" policy can be expected.

10. Widespread information about standards and system goals among members.

11. Strong incentive to, and evidence of, member use of information and attempted compliance with standards.

C. System Change

The flexibility of a conflicting standards system, particularly changing standards and initiative (hypotheses 7 and 9, respectively) should:

12. Permit substantial change or variability within the given systemic structure.

13. Render a conflicting standards system continuously receptive and responsive to external pressure for systemic change; and,

[4] Frank uses the Weberian terms *formal rationality and substantive rationality* to mean roughly what anthropologists imply by the terms *ideal* and *real* respectively.

ceteris paribus, to change by small steps, rather than (pressure having built up on the outside and finally breaking through) by a few big steps or by evolution rather than revolution.

The possibility of institutionalizing initiative (hypothesis 9):

14. May result in internally (as well as externally) generated system change.[5]

— II —

Turning now from the theory to the data it is necessary first to indicate the context in which the conflict takes place. It is then established that the three premises of the theoretical model are present in this context, and finally data are presented to illustrate the presence or absence of the theoretically predicted behaviour said to be associated with the premises.

The Context[6]

The Kanuri of Bornu province of northeastern Nigeria have been organized as a Muslim Emirate in the Chad basin for many centuries. Their language classification by Greenberg (1954), early Arabic sources, and the scattered work of a few interested scholars, supports the notion of their continuity in the region, with possible origins somewhere to the northeast of their present habitat. The pre-colonial Emirate kept up continual trade and cultural contacts with the Maghreb during its long history as an organized state.

[5] These hypotheses have been taken, for the most part, verbatim from FRANK (1959: 13).

[6] The field data were collected in Bornu Province, Nigeria, between January 1956, and August 1957, with the financial assistance of the Ford Foundation Area Training Fellowship Program. Unless otherwise specified in the text, the materials presented refer to this period in which Bornu was still under the British Colonial administration. The author would like to express his thanks to Professor C. W. M. Hart under whose guidance field research among the Kanuri was planned and carried out. Professor A. G. Frank has read and commented on previous drafts of this paper. The writter would like to express his appreciation to Professor Frank for many useful hints and suggestions.

The Kanuri number about one and a half million with a population density of fifty to sixty per square mile. There is no pressure on farm-land which can be extended simply by clearing new bush areas farther away from the population settlements. The majority of the people are farmers who carry on three analytically separable economic activities. These consist of (1) farming, primarily millet and guinea corn, supplemented by maize, beans, squashes, cucumbers, and groundnuts, (2) cash cropping, mostly groundnuts, and (3) a dry season non-farming activity connected with the market. Market activities are in turn divided into craft work, sales of agricultural products, and a complex middleman trade between markets. There is much variation in the dependence of each household upon farming as compared to market activity, although some farming is carried on by almost everyone except a few full-time specialists.

In pre-colonial Bornu the Kanuri were ruled by a monarch, the Shehu, and his nobles. These latter were given fiefs. Taxes were levied, and men conscripted for wars which involved punishing or subduing vassal states, and/or taking slaves to be used for agricultural labour and servants. There were courts and an independent or specialized judiciary, although all political leaders served in a judicial capacity as well. Stability was maintained through the tight control exerted on the society by the Shehu and his followers. All followers who were titled fief holders, except one — the Galidima was almost a vassal lord of his own sub-state — had to remain in the capital under the eye of the monarch, while the fiefs were run for them by subordinates. Internal political instability resulted from the competition for kingly office which followed the death of a Shehu. Segments of the royal lineage and their followers became factions in the state and vied with one another for the supreme power. Stability ensued when a faction emerged whose members were able to organize a strong central government under their royal leader.

The society has been stratified for a long time, with status differences based on tribal membership, occupation, birth, age, wealth, and, to some extent, urban residence identifications. The people recognize two major class divisions — the upper or ruling class *(kəntuoma)* and the broad base of the peasant class *(tala)*

under the autocratic hegemony of the rulers. This is complicated by the recognition that there is a royal group within the nobility, and the low status of slaves which may however vary and cross-cut other rankings through achievement and appointment to high office. In analytical terms the stratification system is a highly complicated resultant of the interplay of status determinants. Rosman (1958) uses eight separate categories of social status in his work on Kanuri acculturation. Cohen (1959) has used status gradients and their interrelationships to explain social differentiation, upward mobility, and class structure.

Today, the Shehu (King or Emir) of Bornu lives in his capital city of Maiduguri. There is a courtly life with titled nobles, including *Ajia* or District Heads who live in their own District capitals as sub-rulers of twenty-one segments of the Emirate under the Shehu. District Heads in turn have under their jurisdiction a group of contiguous Village Area units headed by *Lawan* or Village Heads. Under these latter are Hamlet Heads, *Bulama,* in charge of small settlements of contiguous compounds. Peasants call themselves the peasants of such and such a *Lawan.* Today the Native Administration departments have their personnel stationed throughout the Districts. Along with the District Head and his chief followers, they form an urban upper class living in the Districts throughout the state.

— III —

Establishment of the Theoretical premises

In order to establish that "goal ambiguity", "conflicting standards" and "selective enforcement" do occur in Kanuri society, it is necessary to take a detailed look at behaviour in the system. Although these processes are present at all levels of Kanuri social organization, documentation of this contention would carry us well beyond the limits of one article. Therefore, our attempt to establish the relevance of the premises of the theory to Kanuri society will concentrate on the role of the District Head. The same purpose would have been served just as well, however, by focusing on the role of District Officer, Native Administration Official, Village Area Head, or indeed of the Shehu (Emir) himself.

The District Head

The appointment of District Heads is officially made by the Shehu in consultation with his Waziri (chief minister) and Council. In practice it is agreed upon by both the Native officials and the British administrative personnel present in the area. This means that a District Head owes his appointment to both these sources. Furthermore, the deposition or restationing of a District Head can be traced to complaints coming from either of these central agencies.

Traditionally, the District Head collected taxes, and raised militia for his superior from his fief. Taxation was a form of tribute in kind given to superiors for the privilege of holding office. The subordinate raised enough to support himself and his dependents as well as passing on a surplus to those above him in the hierarchy to whom he owed security of tenure. During 1956-1957 although direct evidence was scarce, tribute was referred to as normal by the population at large, by junior Native Administration officials, and among several close associates of District Heads, throughout the Emirate. Periodic gifts of horses, foodstuffs, and cash were the items most often referred to by informants as the kinds of tribute normally sent by District Heads to powerful Kanuri leaders above them in the hierarchy. One high placed Kanuri official at the capital told the writer that all District Heads are "corrupt" (he used the English word). However during the same interview, this official received and accepted a presentation of several goats and sheep, and two bags of millet sent to him by a District Head.

The office of District Head is a pivotal one in the political structure of the Emirate. Although others at the District level, such as the Native Administration departmental personnel, and the Village Area Heads are also responsible for carrying out various aspects of Emirate governmental action, the District Head is the person to whom all attention at the capital turns if something goes wrong. This is reflected in the dependence that local Native Administration officials have upon his cooperation. Thus a young agricultural extension worker found that he could not obtain any participation in his departmental programme in the District until the District Head sent word to the Village Area

Heads concerned, to the effect that they must arrange for a certain number of household heads to take part in the programme. When programmes fail, officials at the centre, knowing of the widespread power exerted by the District Head in his own domain, tend therefore to suspect him of either active or passive disobedience to the central organization of the state.

Difficulties in the system are reflected in the rate of turn-over of District Heads per District. Figures from four of the twenty-one Districts of the Emirate indicate that in the six decades of colonial rule, the range of District Head tenure is between five and nine years in any one District, for two-thirds of the cases, even though tenure is potentially for life. Of the thirty-eight persons who held the post of District Head in each of the four Districts during the colonial period, three retired, five died, fourteen were dismissed, and sixteen were transferred to other Districts. In other words, seventy-nine per cent of all turn-over was due to dismissals or tranfers. The figures are probably higher for the Emirate as a whole when it is realized that retirement is often "suggested" by the senior British officials, as a means of replacing a District Head.

Dismissals for the position of District Head are always due to some continued infringement of rules, and follow a series of warnings by the colonial and Native Administration officials at the center. Thus between 1929 and 1932, a District Head was warned continually to stop using followers as Village Area Heads instead of the officially recognized ones. These followers were raising their own taxes and levying court fines for adjudication. Finally, the British officials recommended to the Shehu and his Council that this particular District Head be dismissed, and the Bornu annual report of 1932 stated that the Shehu-in-Council had deposed the District Head in question. During 1956-1957 the writer observed the series of warnings by British District Officers delivered to one District Head because of tax irregularities. He was warned that a recommendation for his dismissal might have to go to the Shehu-in-Council if the irregularity continued. Letters from the area since that time indicate that he was sent to a "punishment station."

District Head salaries are a function of the tax receipts and

population size of their Districts, standardized at some date and adjusted from time to time. Districts are ranked in the minds of District Heads and their subordinates, as well as by a large part of the population, as "better" or "worse" in relation to one another. Transfer from a high paying District to a low salary one is seen as a punishment, and referred to as a "punishment station," while movement to a higher salaried District Headship is seen as a reward. British officials agreed with this interpretation and felt the same way about District Head tranfers. Thus the high turn-over of District Heads due to transfers and dismissals is associated with action by superiors in terms of rewards and punishments in relation to standards of District Head performance.

Orientation and Goal Ambiguity

It is now a commonplace in the acculturation literature to think of culture contact as involving some ambiguity or ambivalence, and writers like Fallers (1955) and Mair (1958) have emphasized this point for the African chief. The term orientation is used here to refer to a syndrome of goals derived from one cultural tradition. Bornu displays two major orientations, derived from differing cultural backgrounds. The British conceived of political behaviour as involving a very high degree of public responsibility, personal integrity, and slow but steady progress in economic and social development. Consequently, they looked forward to decreasing corruption and introduction or extension of Western schooling, productivity, democratic government, and all the paraphernalia required by Western European sociocultural values. In contrast, the Kanuri think of their political organization in feudal and Muslim terms. The social order is regarded as the result of divine will; and attempts to change it, although conceivable, are not morally defensible. Thus, the opposition party in modern Bornu is regarded not merely as a result of the new contact situation but also as an heretical group whose aims are said to be the perversion of the moral universe of traditional society. Kanuri concepts of social interaction, from the Shehu down to the lowly peasant, are feudal; loyalty and obedience are exchanged for various economic and political functions performed by the superior. District Heads, like other

political functionaries in Bornu, occupy roles which combine these diverse British and Kanuri orientations.

Possibly less obvious, and we suggest insufficiently emphasized in the above cited literature on the African chief, is the ambiguity of orientation and the conflict among standards *within* each of the cultural traditions. The British administration was committed to the "peace, order and good government" of the area. The exact meaning of this phrase is open to various interpretations. On the one hand, much was said officially and privately about "progress" and "economic and political development," while *slow,* steady, but *well considered,* progress was held to be better than rapid growth. Initiative and innovation were often approved officially, and privately condemned. Or again, while publicly colonial officials accepted eventual self-rule, many of them privately admitted to the belief that the Nigerian (including the Kanuri) was unable to govern himself.

Kanuri leaders are committed to the political and economic development of the area, but they value their traditional political system and their religion and hope to keep these unchanged now that self-government has been achieved. Although most political leaders fervently wanted an end to colonial rule, they did not intend to abandon the political structure of colonialism. Many young Western educated Kanuri, as well as high-placed officials, said that self-government will not mean an end of District Officers, Residents et. al. It will mean, merely, that these jobs would be filled by the Kanuri themselves.

These ambiguities within and between orientations and many others not mentioned here, mean that the Bornu political organization cannot be seen in terms of a simple means-end schema in which the entire system is committed to a simple set of formally stated ends or goals. The orientations are not clear cut; the inconsistencies tend to make the objectives of the political structure vague and indistinct. Thus "progress" is often discussed by both British and Kanuri leaders in terms which sound as if it should be negatively valued, while at other times it is obviously positively valued.

District Heads being Kanuri, are variably committed to Kanuri value orientations. However, they are also committed

to maintaining their prestigeful roles and minimizing the danger of dismissal or transfer to a less prestigeful district. This means that all District Heads are aware, again to a greater or lesser extent, of the ambiguities in objectives present in Bornu politics. In day to day terms, these ambiguities are translated into action through the conflicting standards under which District Heads operate, particularly in their relations with the capital.

Conflicting Standards

There are three agencies at the capital which exert pressure on the District Head in his rural district. These are the Native Administration, the colonial administrators, and the colonial government technical departments. At the top of the Native Administration is the Shehu, the traditional head of state, and his council. This council under the chairmanship of the Waziri forms a cabinet, with the Waziri as chief minister and with each cabinet member serving as the nominal head of one of the Native Administration civil service departments in the Emirate.

The differences in orientation between British and Kanuri culture are reflected in the conflicting standards of performance which govern the behaviour of the District Head. Perhaps the most common of these is the clash between British colonial and Kanuri feudal standards of tax collection. The British regard the District Head as a salaried agent of government who performs a public service by collecting taxes. Many members of the Kanuri hierarchy at the capital see him as a feudal fief holder who collects tribute and passes surpluses to his superiors in the organization. Since delivery of taxes to anything but the Native Administration treasury is illegal under colonial law, payment of tribute to the Shehu and other members of the royal family, as well as to other high ranking officials, is conducted in secrecy. But failure to meet either of these tax standards could lead to punishment.

Much conflict in standards of performance emerges for the District Head because of the colonial orientation towards Western democracy. Thus, he is pressured to introduce and support "democratic" elections and local councils which violate traditional standards of autocratic political behaviour. Similarly, some of

the British disapprove of chiefs rather than the Muslim judges adjudicating legal cases, even though adjudication is part of the chief's traditional power. The British pressure him to reduce his large group of followers fearing he may have to embezzle tax funds to maintain this group. These and many more standards of performance are promoted and enforced by the British. If the District Head submits to these demands, he is also contributing to weakening his traditional role and thus making the job of political control more difficult for himself.

Consistent with the British orientation, colonial officials demand that the District Head maintain his tax receipts at a constant or rising level. The British do not officially recognize subordinates of the District Head to be active members of the revenue collection system; and yet to be able to collect taxes at all, he must support these men and their families and give many of them horses. These men ride out annually over the district in several groups to collect *Jangali,* the cattle nomad tax which accounts for approximately two-thirds of all Emirate tax revenues. If the District Head succumbs to British demands to reduce his following, the efficiency and numbers of his tax collectors, and therewith his total receipts, decline.

To add to the incongruity, the British expect that District Heads should periodically put on large displays. If the Queen or any senior colonial official from outside the province visits the area, District Heads are called to the capital to take part in a large "durbar," (a horse show, and parade). Competition among District Heads for prestige demands that they spend a good deal more on these occasions than the allowance allotted for such exhibitions. The British thus discourage large followings on the hand, and demand them as part of the local scene on the other, without, however, affording the District Head the necessary support for this traditional institution.

As was noted earlier, conflict among standards is not confined to differences between the colonial and native administrative demands; conflict is similarly common among standards set *within* each of the administrations — as well as, indeed, within some of the minor administrative organs. Conflicting standards often arise from the partial separation of the various departments

of the colonial government. For instance, technical service officers try to enforce their own programme objectives in public works, education, or agricultural improvements, while at the same time the administrative officers demand that the necessary resources be devoted to meeting other objectives. Thus, the Education Officer may want more children in the District school during the several months of the tax collection period, while the District Head has to draw on the same group of followers to meet these demands.[7]

In the Native Administration, constant transfers, dismissals, arrests, and retirements produce changes in the personnel of superior/subordinate relations. Village Area Heads, although formally subordinate to their local District Head, often have ties to other District Heads in the Emirate.[8] In one District five Village Area Heads were strongly loyal to a previous District Head, and the present office holder enforced his authority with great difficulty. He could not easily get rid of these five, since their real superior belonged to a very powerful faction in the state that could bring pressure to bear on the District Head. On the other hand, he could not allow the five complete freedom since he is officially responsible for the affairs of the District. Somewhat the same thing occurs at the capital. The District Head carefully cultivates personal relationships (through gift-giving and tribute) with high placed officals at the center. He hopes these will protect him against other leaders in the Native Administration and/or the British. However, rapid turn-over of personnel operates to counteract this process, leaving the District Head constantly to search for supporters in the capital.

Social and cultural change has also introduced conflicting standards into the District Head's role in the Native Administra-

[7] In parts of Bornu the District Head must force parents to give up their children for Western schooling because of the unpopularity of the schools, especially for girls. To do so, the District Head's followers ride out over the District and obtain a few children by methods that are most aptly described as capture.

[8] The British set up this conflict at the biginning of the colonial era by appointing Districts Heads on the advice of the Shehu, and Village Area Heads on the basis of some hereditary claim to local leadership. Traditionally, District Heads appointed their own Village Heads, thus making sure of a loyal political machine in their fiefs.

tion. This is easily exemplified in the literacy campaign strongly supported by high placed officials at the center. The District Head knows that he must support literacy campaigns and uses the Native Administration propaganda when doing so. This propaganda, originally inspired by the British, tells of the benefits to be gained from learning to read. The peasant is told that literacy will allow him to check on District Heads and Village Area Heads who give tax receipt slips indicating a smaller amount than the actual tax collected. But peasants believe that this practice is widespread among chiefs. Thus the District Head must persuade peasants to learn to read in order to enable them to undermine his customary tax collection procedures.

Another conflict in standards occurs when Native Administration personnel come to the District. Each District has its complement of young semi-educated civil service personnel from the various departments of the Native Administration. Traditionally, a fief holder controlled his fief completely; and everyone in the area was ipso facto his political subordinate. The Native Administration personnel, however, are less easily turned into subordinates. They have departmental responsibilities as well as traditional links of loyalty and respect for the positions of the District Head. Thus a District Head might find that his attempt to win the affections of nomad cattle herders in the area is being subverted by the ardor of a young Native Administration member from the Veterinary department who is condemning many of the cattle in the area and forcing herders to give up some of their stock for quarantine.

Not all pressures exerted upon the District Head originate from his superior in the political organization. The District Head is a local potentate and must act like one. He lives in a much larger compound than other people in the District, and supports a large number of dependents and their families. He must maintain his own band of praise-singers and his own group of Koranic *malams* (teacher-priests). Periodically he feeds the local Native Administration personnel and gives out money to wandering players who come into his town to entertain the populace and to sing his praises. His dependents, many of whom he supplies with horses, must have dress costumes for ceremonial occasion and gifts from him at

times of *rites de passage* in their families and at annual religious festivals. All of these things must be done and done "well" if the District Head is to be judged by himself and others as a successful chief. Common people, Native Administration personnel in the bush, and District Heads often discussed or made allusions to the relative merits of one District Head's chiefly attributes as opposed to another. Since widely known cultural values define what is meant by "good" District Head behaviour, the person in this role constantly feels pressure, both from his own values and the demands of those under him, for proper chiefly activity.

In sum, it should be realized that the salary given to the District Head by the Native Administration is never sufficient to allow him to maintain his social role. He must give gifts to many above and below himself in the political structure; he must support a large following and he must live in a style which befits his high ranking position in the State. As a result, he must constantly devise means of support which lie outside the formal rules of the political organization and reliance on which makes him vulnerable to criticism at all times.

Selective Enforcement

Although many of the standards of performance to which a District Head must accede conflict with one another, all standards are not equally enforced. Personnel changes in both the Native Administration and the colonial government produce changing emphases among the District Head's superiors. One District Officer may be interested in roads, while his predecessor pressed for an improvement in the tax collection system. Others might keep aloof from innovation and simply carry on what they think are the current policies of the agency. Furthermore, as time passes, both the Native Administration and the colonial government recruit their staff from approximately the same age range, and from slowly changing worlds. The young colonial servant of today, and his Native Administration counter-part even more so, have somewhat divergent views from those of their respective forbears at the turn of the century.

It should also be realized that Bornu Emirate is only a part of a much larger political unit. The government of Northern

Nigeria and the Federation of Nigeria has been moving towards self-government for some time. With this development new bodies of African legislators, cabinet members, and high level bureaucrats are all vying for the furtherance of their pet schemes. In such a rapidly changing situation it is often difficult to maintain consistency among all directives coming into the province. For the District Head this means that he is made to experience unequal pressures from the capital, not only as a result of the personnel priorities of superiors, but also because of the demands made on these superiors themselves.

— IV —

Kanuri Political Organisation: The Test of the Hypotheses

Having established that goal ambiguity, conflicting standards, and selective enforcement occur in Bornu political organization, it is now possible to test whether or not the limitations they impose on individual behaviour and the social consequences they produce are those hypothesized by the theory. Since the hypotheses are given in full above, they are referred to below by number. It should be noted that, for the sake of clarity in presentation of the data, the original order has not been adhered to in the test. Several of the hypotheses have been found to allude to similar behaviours, and these have therefore been treated together.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Selection and Change of Standards that are Met)

One of the most obvious responses among District Heads to Bornu political organization is the widespread practice of simply not living up to all standards of performance. All District Heads attempt to collect enough taxes to keep their superiors happy. Some accomplish this objective by maintaining large groups of horsemen, some by working in close collaboration with Village Area Heads, and some work out close ties with Fulani headmen and agree on cattle counts below the actual number but in excess of the District Head's treasury commitments. Others use all these

methods. One District Head decided to reduce the number of his followers and thus lower his own expenditures. He also hoped that by complying with administration demands on the size of his following, he would avoid pressure from this source and be congratulated for complying with official demands. Instead his tax receipts fell drastically which brought threats of dismissal from his superiors. The following year he reversed his decision and worried about tax collections rather than the size of his following. Some District Heads station followers in each of the district towns in order to ensure some measure of control when they have no long term superior/subordinate relations with the Village Area Heads of the district. This is illegal and several District Heads do not use their followers in this way. Nevertheless no one can possibly meet all standards in such situations, and breakage of certain rules has become almost a commonplace occurrence. Consequently, all District Heads mulct some tax money or they could not possibly afford to maintain their social position or the organization necessary for tax collection. For the same reason, all District Heads adjudicate cases, levy court fines, and accept tribute from the people of their district.

Hypothesis 3 (Simulation of Standards)

One of the most widespread kinds of behaviour among District Heads, and indeed among many of the Native Administration officials, is feigning or simulating British standards of performance. Whenever the author met District Heads or other top Kanuri officials for the first time, attitudes towards standards of performance and goals were universally fairly accurate reflections of the official colonial government policy in the area. Besides the dangers implicit in not simulating British standards, it should be noted that in traditional Kanuri society it is considered bad manners to disagree with superiors. Thus when a District Head speaks, listening persons keep repeating *nam, nam* (yes, yes) to show their assent and unanimity. When the District Head is in the presence of his superiors in the political organization, he behaves in the same way.

Another example of this simulation of standards occurs in the

District Council meetings. In order to maintain their autocratic leadership and yet comply with the British standards of parliamentary procedure, some District Heads rehearse the meeting before the British official, who is to witness it, arrives in the district. Others run a second meeting after the official leaves, re-arranging a few of the decisions, and ordering out of, or into, existence other matters which have been democratically accepted or declined at the formal meeting. This helps maintain the District Head's status as an autocratic leader and gives traditional force to unaltered decisions of the "democratic" council.

Hypothesis 4 (Safety Factors)

District Heads also tend to provide themselves with safety factors for unforeseen emergencies. Excuses like sickness are often used. Thus one District Head often had a "fever" on occasions on which he anticipated some threats from his superiors. At a ceremony, another District Head announced to a District Officer that it was now time for him and the other Kanuri present to go into another courtyard and say their prayers. The District Officer politely excused himself and a part of the ceremony which involved the giving money to the District Head continued without the District Officer present.[9]

The operation of safety factors can also be seen in the contacts that many District Heads maintain among the wealthy traders. These relations are due partly to the traders' desire to be friendly with a political leader who often borrows money from them. However, another aspect of these links is their possible usefulness to a District Head if he is dismissed or retired from his political position. Several ex-District Heads in the capital are making a profitable living from trade. One of these remarked on several occasions that most of his present suppliers of goods and credit were men whom he had known and befriended during his years as a District Head.

One of the most interesting safety factors is that of factional membership. District Heads not only cultivate office holders in

[9] I am indebted to Professor A. Rosman for this information.

the capital but also maintain traditional links with segments of the royal lineage. Groups of District Heads, like other high status nobles of the realm, inherit relationships to one or another of the living male heirs to the throne. Tribute in cash and kind is delivered by District Heads (not all) to their royal faction leader whether or not this person holds a Native Administration office. It is believed that the royal person argues for, and helps protect, his faction members in the higher councils of the Emirate. Although the evidence is far from clear on this point, it may be that the linkage of some District Heads to their royal factions is maintained as a safety factor resulting from inability to obtain protection and permanent or stable factional links with other high ranking officials at the capital, because of the high turnover of these latter personnel.

Hypotheses 10 and 5 (Information and Dealers in Information)

One of the important ways in which a District Head alleviates the tensions inherent in conflicting standards and ambiguous goals is to have as many sources of information as possible. Indeed, information in Bornu is a valuable commodity. District Heads lavish hospitality on messengers, native police, and Native Administration officials from the city who pass through the district. Touring British officials are listened to intently so that currently stressed goals and standards may be discerned. One District Head knew English but kept this knowledge to himself in order that he might appear ignorant and catch stray pieces of information from local and touring Europeans. Each District Head keeps a compound in the city with a *Wakil* (chief follower) heading up a group of his subordinates. A major task of these followers is to maintain a steady flow of information on town affairs to the District Head out in the bush. One District Head kept a follower continually travelling back and forth from city to bush. This man visited town houses of other District Heads, the Shehu's Court, the Shehu's Council, and houses of rich traders, picking up information for his superior about the state of politics in the Emirate. Almost everybody in Bornu seems to be in the information business; and all peasants know that every follower of a District Head is an informal seeker of information for his superior. Very often persons who are not District Head

clients but have aspirations in that direction, or who are hoping for some other favour from him, try to win his affections by bringing information of a political nature to him.

The results of all this are twofold. First, most news travel quickly throughout the Emirate. Indeed, the transfer or dismissal of a District Head is usually known before the event occurs, because of leaks in and around high places in the Native and Colonial Administrations. A Kanuri messenger working for the Colonial Administration is a man cultivated by many of the richest and most successful District Heads, especially if he has some knowledge of English. Secondly, gossip and rumour about the goals and enforcement of standards of political behaviour in the state can be heard at almost every level of society. As much of the information is false as it is true, and a successful District Head tries always to check and recheck a piece of information before relying on it. This widespread interest in political news and the endless search by District Heads for information gives to Bornu political life a strong quality of intrigue. However, underlying this surface quality is the lack of adequate information in the system, and the end result of this fact is that the District Head with the most reliable sources of information is able more accurately to predict what standards are most likely to be enforced.

Hypothesis 11 (Incentive to Use Information and Comply with Standards)

Related to the widespread scarcity of information and its use by District Heads is the strong incentive to obtain and use good information. This varies from one District Head to another. Some may have very good sources of information already, and are only mildly interested in additional knowledge from new sources. Others felt the lack of information about policy enforcement by superiors so strongly that, after very little acquaintance with the anthropologist, they would move the conversation towards a discussion of goals and standards and future enforcement by this or that agency at the capital. In these situations it was difficult to tell who was conducting the interview, the anthropologist or the District Head. One District Head asked a

District Officer, who had threatened him with transfer, to "Tell me what to do, and I will do it," when the Officer hinted that punishments might ensue because of the lowered tax revenues in the area. The District Officer replied that it would be wise for the District Head to go out and tour his district on horseback as well as sending out his followers. A few days later the District Head left on the proposed tour.

Hypothesis 9 (Sleeping Dogs and Initiative)

One of the most widespread consequences of conflicting standards and scarce information is the widespread acceptance by everyone in the Bornu political system of a policy of "let sleeping dogs lie." British officials know that local troubles require reports to their own superiors in the regional capital, followed by multitudes of questions and often some sort of inspection and increased supervision of the local scene. A senior official explained his own aversion to trouble by saying that "agitators" were everywhere. Any irregularity could therefore, he claimed, reach "international proportions" and would undoubtedly be distorted if given any publicity. On the other hand, no trouble can always be alluded to as "steady progress" in reports. Furthermore, colonial officials and senior officers in particular are often held responsible (officially or unofficially) for any sizable disorder within their jurisdictional area. Thus a recently retiring officer in Bornu was described by one local District Officer as having "left somewhat under a cloud" because of the political riots which broke out just before his last days in a senior position. Native Administration officials, including the District Head all recognize that any trouble may bring an investigation by the colonial administrators who, although reluctant to start anything really serious, will enforce their standards when matters are brought to their attention. This always opens the possibility that more trouble will result. In 1956 a Native Administration treasury official, angry over organizational matters, suddenly took the Bornu treasury records to the colonial administration. Before very long an investigation was ordered which was followed by a long series of dismissals, arrests, and jail sentences which reached into every department of the Native Administration. The British attitude to this kind of apprehension

was summed up by one British official who claimed that all Kanuri are "corrupt," i.e. that they do not believe in British standards of political responsibility in public office. Since there are few educated Africans it would be folly, he said, to be investigating all the time since "corrupt" officials would only be replaced by less well trained ones who were also "corrupt." Nonetheless, initiative by District Heads towards the realization of the policy objectives of the center government is formally encouraged. Speeches by visiting officials, and the official literature of the Northern Nigerian government constantly stress the District Head's role as a progessive leader. He is regarded as the link between the past and the future, as a man who has a place of traditional leadership and who should also lead the way towards higher living standards, modern democracy, and the spread of western education. On the other hand, as a result of goal ambiguity and conflicting standards, (some of which are not even officially recognized) initiative is dangerous unless it is carried out under the aegis of extremely good information. Generally speaking, only highly acculturated District Heads can afford the luxury of initiative towards official goals. Only those persons who can diccriminate which goals can be achieved without any danger from the relinquishing of other goals are safe. One District Head has previously been Headmaster of the European School in the capital; he knew much about both Kanuri and Western culture. Consequently, he knew that his project to improve the water supply in the District, which he had cleared with the proper authorities, was unassailable by any one. Most District Heads do not have this clear an understanding of what they can and cannot do; as we have seen, information is scarce and goals and standards are often difficult to pin down and/or reconcile with one another.

Furthermore, like officials everywhere, the colonial government personnel, especially the older ones who are in the more senior positions, resent disturbances. Initiative can very often be confused with disturbance or at least the unsettling of the *status quo*. Thus several young officials complained to the writer that they had been squelched in development schemes because they had not consulted higher-ups first before going ahead with their plans. Higher-ups were angry at such initiative since the

junior members of the political organisation were subordinates, and it would be the responsibility of higher-ups if anything went wrong with the plans.

Hypotheses 7, 12, and 14 (Changing Standards and Internal Variability)

Changes in colonial government staff are frequent. District Officers and technical staff are often moved from one part of Northern Nigeria to another every time they start an eighteen month tour of duty. Indeed ,in several instances colonial officials were re-stationed within one tour. Previous writers have commented on this practice so that we can safely assume that it has been a characteristic of Nigerian administration for a long time (Perham, 1937). It is beyond the scope of this present paper to discuss the pros and cons of this mobility; for our purposes it is sufficient to mention its presence and note one of its major effects — the variation in standards and their emphases resulting from the continuous movement of colonial personnel.

In Bornu a young energetic official can easily institute innovations by simply proclaiming his goals widely and making sure that none of his superiors disapprove of his actions. Because District Heads are used to changing standards and selective enforcement, they are generally receptive to new pressures from the top of the political structure. More emphasis on schools, roads, or taxation can easily be instituted. Some of these trends once begun are not terminated even when pressures ease off due to the transfer of the official originally responsible for the innovations. New roads built under pressure from one particular official must be maintained in the future, as do schools and medical dispensaries.

It is becoming more and more common among District Officers to narrow down the broad general range of their duties and specialize in only one or two branches of administrative work. Thus, one District Officer in Bornu specialized in local government, another in fiscal policy and revenue collection, and so on. Furthermore, young Assistant District Officers often attempt to initiate changes in various sectors of the Emirate government under their jurisdiction.

One young District Officer started a race track up in a bush district as his pet project. The local District Head approved of the idea, probably because it kept the Officer busy. As a distraction for touring officials from the capital and for local entertainment, the race track has become a local institution. This same District Head institutes formal, and public, Friday services no matter what District he is stationed in, and no matter what the previous practices in the area have been. On the other hand, others merely continue to stress those areas of administration programme about which their superiors on the local scene are enthusiastic. One District Officer carried on the policy of his superior concerning the alleviation of cruelty to animals. Because of the constant shifts in personnel, it is not always a simple matter for the District Head to know far ahead just what part of administration goals will be stressed, since the emphasis can quite easily change with the personnel.

In the technical departments one Education Officer may spend more of his time at the provincial capital looking after matters there; others spend much time going around the province. Both tasks are performed by all officials, but stress on one or the other area of work varies. This means that with changing personnel, the District Head must expect changes in the amount of pressure applied locally by the technical officers. When an Officer spends more time in the capital, power is delegated to the Native Administration officials and much of the departmental pressures felt by the District Head comes from the Native Administration. If the Officer tours out in the Districts a great deal, then his personal policy preferences become more important pressures.

In the Native Administration, center officials tend to exhibit constant and often unpredictable job turnover. Only three of the dozen or so chief councillors of the Emirate retained their positions during the period 1956-1957, and letters from the area since then indicate that the rate of personnel shifts and depositions has remained much the same. Illicit practices, which come to light periodically, can bring a quick series of removals, and even a jail sentence to what seem to be a random assortment of positions throughout the Native Administration.

Hypotheses 8 and 13 (Adaptability to Externally Initiated Change)

As a result of the high amount of conflict in the Bornu political organization, social and cultural change has an ever-ready route into the society. It has already been noted that goals as well as the enforcement of standards may change over time.

A major change was the very introduction of British rule itself and the Kanuri political system's adaptation to that externally induced change. The colonial era has served to complicate the traditional obligations of District Heads to members of the hierarchy. That the District Head should pay heed to the wishes of officials at the center such as the Shehu, the Council members, and other high placed persons in the Native Administration departments is easily understood since these persons are engaged in tasks that require the cooperation of the District Head and these responsibilities are backed up by the colonial officials. It is somewhat surprising however to find other nobles who like the top Native Administration personnel also receive gifts but who have no officially recognized high office in the contemporary political organization. Thus the writer having promised his kerosene refrigerator to a District Head at the end of the field trip was asked to deliver it to a member of the Bornu royal family who has no Native Administration position whatsoever. This is explained by the fact that the District Head under discussion has a client relationship which he inherited from his father with this particular segment of the royal lineage. That is to say, this District Head feels that he is a part of the faction in the state as a whole which is allied to a particular heir to the throne. The District Head also feels that this royal person is still a power in the state and will help protect him against other factions and authorities in the political organization. To a certain extent this is true. When this District Head is to be disciplined for some misdemeanor, the head of his faction pleads his case before the Shehu and as many Council members as he can contact. Thus the older traditional factions and their leaders still perform some political functions in the Emirate, in addition to the officially recognized Kanuri hierarchy above the District

Head at the capital. Lack of support by all these people or at least a majority of the most powerful among them leads to easy punishments when District Head misdemeanors are apprehended. On the other hand, informants feel that delivery of gifts to faction leaders as well as to high placed Native Administration officials ensures the District Head of some support by traditionally powerful persons as well as the official hierarchy recognized and supported by the colonial government.

Externally originated change still finds ready reception in Bornu today. A Kanuri agricultural officer, after travelling to Israel and Pakistan, has decided that Bornu, especially its southern portions, can support a citrus growing industry. By utilizing the British inspired goal of economic development and his own authority, as well as his friendship links with both British and Kanuri leaders, he has been able to introduce citrus growing into the Bornu economy. That is to say, Kanuri leaders, whether they be District Heads or other officials, can usually find some goal or standard which gives jural support to the acceptance of innovations brought in from the outside world. It should be noted at this point that all of the top Kanuri leaders spoken to during the field trip are to a variable degree committed to the goal of economic development. Many of them feel that the biggest blocks to this end are (a) the poverty of the area, and (b) the conservatism of the senior British officials. They are not at all worried over the traditionalism of the people. This is due to their own stated understanding that innovation is not excessively difficult in a system in which people react to pressures more often than to rules.

Hypothesis 6 (Substantive Rationality)

The discussion of Bornu political organization indicates that jural rules are hardly the primary guides for individual conduct, or the sources of social integration in the system. In Frank's Weberian terms, the Kanuri do not place substantial reliance on formal rationality. District Heads who do, usually get into some kind of trouble, and are either punished or eliminated. One District Head is reported to have behaved as if there were no conflicts in the system. He ruled his District autocratically,

extorted large amounts of excess taxes from its inhabitants, and even tried to buy up the surplus millet at low harvest prices to sell later in the year. He was soon apprehended and transferred out of the District. He is said by those who have worked under him to be contemptuous of modern times, and to prefer traditional pre-colonial rules of political behaviour. Most District Heads know that they must accomodate to the real system rather than any idealization of it, and in so doing the sets of jural rules (derived from Kanuri and British orientations) governing their political roles become merely a backdrop against which a real system of political action is played out. In this "real" system it is pressures and information that form the basis for active political response and initiative. Thus in more theoretical parlance the structural features of the political system in terms of its formal rules are less important than its constituent interpersonal and hierarchical relations.

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Conclusion

This paper has dealt with the organization of political activity among the Kanuri of Northern Nigeria by approaching the behaviour of one political role, that of the District Head, as if this person's actions were responses to a series of conflicts. In so doing, we have demonstrated that conflicts do in fact exist in the situation, and that the activity of persons occupying political roles is predictable within the limits outlined in a theory of conflict derived from a study of Russian industry.

Concerning the theory itself, Frank's schema has come from empirical data, but it is in itself a deductive system in which certain behaviours follow logically from the basic premises. In using it, we have found that several of the predicted behavioural correlates associated with the premises actually deal with the same events. Thus, hypotheses ten and five dealing with information and dealers in information refer to the same area of political behaviour in the District Head's role. Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, all hypotheses dealing with change

focus on the same mechanism, the response to, and desire to comply with, known pressures from higher-ups, rather than any idealization of the traditional rules. This is due to Frank's (1959: 13) deductive separation of the hypotheses into levels of "member behaviour" and "system" consequences, when in fact the only material available for study is the response by members of the hierarchy to conflicts among standards. Recently Berliner (1962: 60) has commented that anthropology has no detailed theories of self-generating internal change such as the economists have in their conceptualization of the dynamics of the business cycle. A close look at the way in which change has been treated in this paper indicates that the change mechanism being discussed is indeed "internal" and "self-generating." Because actors in the hierarchy are more concerned with compliance to superiors than they are with the essentials of tradition, there is a ready avenue for change to enter the society, from within or without, at all times. The rate will be determined by the differences in orientation of superiors to subordinates, by the differences in interests among superiors, and by the rate of turn-over among superiors. The greater any of these factors are, then the higher will be the rate of change. Furthermore, the distinction between internal and external in terms of the system under analysis is of minor importance, since the political hierarchy itself ranges across a number of societies and cultures in the modern situation. It is not important *where* an innovation comes from for our purposes, but rather *how* it enters into the local scene. In this case, whether it originates from outside or inside Kanuri society, the method of its acceptance by the society is the same for the changes being introduced through political activity. As I have pointed out elsewhere, (Cohen: 1962) the comprehensive in clusion of all facets of society within a social system boundary may tend to warp our view of social life in general.

It is also of note in view of contemporary interests in evolution, that this method of presenting data and analysing it approaches in some respects a genetic model of evolution. Although there are more or less stable orientations of tradition present in Bornu, conflicts in the political organization produce a variability of response by the actors upon which selective pressures exerted by superiors in the political hierarchy may operate

to bring about innovations and changes that are incremental in their nature, i.e. evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Summing all of this up, we can now restate the theory in light of its submission to the Kanuri material.

If it is established that there are present in any hierarchical social situation differences in cultural orientation which create goal ambiguity, and/or goal ambiguities are present for any other reason, as well as conflicting standards, and selective enforcement of these standards, then the following may be predicted to occur:

1. Members (of the hierarchy) fail to meet all standards, exhibit differences in selection, and change the selection over time of standards they do meet.
2. Members simulate or feign the meeting of standards.
3. Members provide themselves with safety-factors for contigencies.
4. Information is a scarce and positively valued commodity in the hierarchy, and members are motivated to use any and all methods to obtain information on enforcement policies. This may or may not become institutionalized so that professional information seekers may of may not be present. If not, then the social organization takes on an atmosphere of intrigue.
5. Widespread member initiative is possible; but unless it is incorporated into standards, individuals will "let sleeping dogs lie." That is to say, the failure to comply with some standards is widely known within the hierarchy, and members are prone to overlook this fact for the sake of making the organization work on a day-to-day basis.
6. Standards change continually, thus re-orienting and possibly changing the organizational form of social life.
7. Conflicting standards generate innovations and selective enforcement provides for their acceptance.
8. Conflicting standards and selective enforcement make for ready adaptation to changing circumstances.

One final conclusion of a practical nature emerges from this analysis, especially from hypothesis nine above. Many observers of the modern Nigerian scene attribute a conservative, anti-progressive character to the Emirates of Northern Nigeria. If our analysis is correct, these Emirates have within themselves well-devoloped mechanisms for their own transformation. That is to say, it is predictable that given a continuation of conflicting standards, and selective enforcement, along with changing and more modern goals emanating from the top of the political hierarchy (which is a very likely occurrence), then these societies will incorporate and accept modern developments. This means that it will not be necessary to change and modernize the northern Emirates by a drastic revolutionary measure, but merely by continued and constant pressure, to which, as has been shown, they are definitely responsive.

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The development of local government in a Nigerian township

BY SIMON OTTENBERG

RÉSUMÉ

La municipalité d'Abakaliki dont la population est d'environ 17,000 personnes est située dans le comté de Ibo, au sud-est de la Nigérie. C'est une municipalité qui, en ces dernières années, a grandi rapidement en raison de l'introduction de la culture du riz, de l'accroissement du commerce des bestiaux et du développement d'un centre administratif gouvernemental. Sa population est formée en grande majorité d'Ibo d'origine étrangère, les Ibo indigènes ne jouant qu'un rôle effacé dans les affaires urbaines. Comme c'est le cas pour tant d'autres cités africaines, le gouvernement local est de date récente et sa forme est déterminée par une organisation politique supérieure à celle de la municipalité. Il se compose essentiellement d'un conseil et de conseillers permanents. Durant les quinze dernières années, ce conseil a subi plusieurs modifications. En 1960, les conseillers, à l'exception d'un seul, étaient tous des hommes; plusieurs d'entre eux étaient d'âge moyen et la plupart, chrétiens. Aucun des conseillers n'était né dans la région; ils avaient, en général, un peu d'éducation, mais, à l'exception de quelques-uns, aucune expérience dans l'art du gouvernement.

Les activités du conseil sont essentiellement régulatrices et comportent le contrôle des constructions, la règlementation du marché local ainsi que la responsabilité des mesures sanitaires. Le Conseil n'a pas de ressources suffisantes pour développer l'éducation, les écoles ou d'autres entreprises. Il est financièrement dépendant d'autres agences du gouvernement. Ainsi n'a-t-il pratiquement aucun plan d'ensemble d'améliorations des conditions locales. Bien qu'en principe il jouisse d'une autonomie assez grande, en pratique, cependant, il n'a que très peu d'autorité, vu qu'il est sans ressource suffisante. Il faut ajouter que le conseil ne représente qu'une très petite unité dans une administration provinciale ou régionale sans cesse grandissante. Or, c'est précisément sur ce plan que s'exerce de plus en plus, le contrôle des affaires municipales.

Une branche locale du parti politique national exerce quelque contrôle sur la sélection des candidats au conseil, mais n'impose aux conseillers aucune idéologie spécifique. Dans les disputes relativement à ce contrôle, le conseil se divise en deux factions dont l'une représente la majorité, et l'autre,

l'opposition. Ces divisions ont entravé le travail du conseil, mais non sérieusement. Les quartiers de la municipalité peuvent parfois exercer une influence sur la nomination des conseillers. Il n'y a pas en Abakaliki de groupements qui pourraient exercer une pression économique sur le conseil.

La plupart des conseillers ont surtout connu le système relativement égalitaire du contrôle politique traditionel, mais se sont rapidement adaptés à la nouvelle forme de gouvernement local, bien qu'ils ne l'aient pas choisie et que leurs fonctions et activités soient très limitées et de plus en plus dominées par une organisation politique à un niveau supérieur.

Urbanization is a common phenomenon in Africa, and it has been analysed from many points of view (International African Institute 1956; Little 1959). While there is disagreement among scholars as to the nature of the urbanization process it will be accepted here that it involves a high population density where this has not existed before, and greater labour specialization, class distinctions, and cultural heterogeneity among the urban dwellers than in the rural hinterland around the urban center. Furthermore, sooner or later some system of authority and government develops in the urban center which exerts control over its inhabitants. This report will be concerned with a description of political authority in Abakaliki Township, Southeastern Nigeria, as an example of developing urban government in its early stages within the framework of a relatively egalitarian traditional cultural background.[1]

One characteristic of urban government in Africa that sets the framework for the analysis to follow is that its development has generally been guided from above, through governmental organizations above the urban level such as regional, national, or colonial administrations. These have determined the basic structure of the urban government and often have maintained permanent controls over it once it has been established. While there is also some local evolution of authority and leadership, it is often secondary or external to the formal

[1] Field work was carried out at Abakaliki between June and December, 1960 on a research grant from the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. I wish to thank the Councillors and staff of the Abakaliki Urban County Council, and the many administrative officers and townspeople in Abakaliki who helped me in this project. Dr. K. O. Dike, Director, Nigerian National Archives, was kind enough to permit me to see certain unpublished materials in the National Archives in Enugu.

government structure. Further, in those urban centers in Africa in which the control of the newly formed government is not mainly in European hands, the Africans who come to form the government, or a major portion of it, come from cultural heritages in which they are generally familiar with a different structure of government and with traditional patterns of authority. These are frequently persons of middle age who in their younger and more formative years were familiar with traditional structures of government as modified by colonial rule. This is particularly true in the newly developing African cities today, and it is certainly so for the urban centers of southeastern Nigeria, including Abakaliki, none of which are of great age or have ever had a large European population. A central problem in these cases, therefore, is how persons socialized in a traditional and colonial rural culture adjust to a new urban government, the structuring of which they have had little or no control. Further, it is relevant to consider what attempts to change the new formal structure occur, and what modes of decision-making develop within it.

This is not, however, an essay on the influence of tribalism on urban government. Following Gluckman (1960) it seems fruitful to approach the problem of urban government in terms other than the influence, or lack of influence, of tribal patterns on urban authority. Traditional cultural factors play important roles in social change, and this is certainly true in Abakaliki, but the nature of the urban setting seems to demand the development of certain government functions irrespective of traditional factors. Rather than tribalism as a basis for study, the problem of change will be approached in terms of how the past experiences of persons are brought to play and are modified by the nature of the urban political scene.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Abakaliki settlement was founded in 1905 when, in the course of the pacification of the northeastern part of Southern Nigeria, troops under British control formed a station there and the Southern Nigerian Government established an administrative center for the area. At this time there was no town at Abakaliki,

but its good water supply and command of the surrounding countryside afforded a convenient place for a government post within range of three large Ibo groups, the Izi, who controlled the settlement area, the Ezza, and the Ikwo, as well as a number of smaller Ibo and non-Ibo groups. Members of these three culturally and historically related groups lived in small hamlets dispersed about the countryside. These Northeastern Ibo (Jones 1961), who form a part of the large and politically dominant Ibo-speaking people of Eastern Nigeria, were and are today primarily yam farmers, growing some of the largest and finest yams in the region, and trading them to neighbouring groups.

Abakaliki became a typical Nigerian rural administrative center with a small government staff consisting of a few Europeans and some African clerks and labourers, who administered the area known as Abakaliki Division, composed of some half million persons, and who sent out patrols from time to time to "pacify the natives." The troops, who were stationed in Abakaliki until about 1935, were mainly Hausa and other Northern Nigerian Moslems, though they also included some Yoruba from Western Nigeria. Practically no Ibo belonged to the force at this time. Wives and children of the troops soon settled with them in the barracks area. Hausa and other Northerners came as petty traders, prostitutes, and hunters, and formed a separate community at the edge of the Government Station. No administration was established over this community, called Abakpa, the common name in southeastern Nigeria for Northerners' quarters, and these Moslems came to have their own traditional ruler, Sarki, and to settle their problems among themselves.

About 1925, when the population was something over 1,000 persons, there was a period of road building in the area, and roads connecting Abakaliki with Afikpo to the south, Enugu to the west, and Ogoja to the east, ended the isolation of the Government Station. Many Ibo came to Abakaliki as road workers, and they settled in their own community, Kingsway, in back of the Station. The road contractors and overseers were mainly stranger Ibo and they generally hired persons from their home area, so that workers came from Afikpo, about forty miles

to the south, Udi about forty miles to the west, and from the Awka and Onitsha areas eighty miles and more to the southwest. Many of these Ibo eventually settled in Abakaliki and became tradesmen, government workers, or farmers. Izi and other indigenous Ibo were relatively uninterested in road work and they took little part in it, but continued to follow their traditional ways while the Station developed in their midst.

No local administration was established over the growing Abakaliki settlement, but gradually, as the system of Native Authority developed in the Division, the Moslem and Ibo strangers came under the control of the Izi Native Authority, and they remained so until the 1950's, particularly in terms of the system of courts and tax collection.

The population of the Abakaliki settlement remained small, numbering only a few thousand, until after the Second World War. During the war the Nigerian Government introduced rice growing into the area, and rice production has expanded until today it is the major rice producing area in the Eastern Region. Ibo from the land-starved overpopulated Awka, Onitsha and Owerri regions to the southwest came in large numbers to grow rice, some settling in the rural areas but others in Abakaliki itself, in Abakpa and the surrounding region. (As a result of the expansion of the Government Station after the Second World War, Kingsway was closed and its inhabitants resettled in Abakpa and the area surrounding the Station.) These farming Ibo hired Izi, Ezza, and Ikwo labourers to do much of the hard work of rice growing, and themselves engaged more and more in rice milling and trading and in other businesses in the town. Other Ibo came as bicycle repairmen, prostitutes, barbers, tinkers, carpenters, petty traders, and middlemen in the yam trade, buying yams from local Ibo farmers and shipping them to Enugu, Awka, Onitsha and other densely populated areas to sell. The town became a milling and trading center for rice, and today ships milled rice as far as Lagos and Calabar by lorry. These stranger Ibo, who came from more acculturated areas of Ibo country than the local inhabitants were used to travelling, and maintained contact with their home country though they brought families with them and they married women from the home area. They

considered the indigenous Ibo of the area, who spoke a distinctly different dialect, to be conservative land-bound people lacking in opportunistic drive. As the stranger Ibo settlement expanded they gradually absorbed the indigenous Ibo hamlets, a process which still continues today.

A second major postwar development was the growth of Abakaliki as a cattle market along a major cattle route from the tsetse-free areas of Northeastern Nigeria, and from Bamenda in the Cameroons. From Abakaliki the route splits, one branch heading south to Afikpo and the southern cities of Umuahia, Aba, Port Harcourt, and Calabar, and the other branch going westward to Enugu and Onitsha. The cattle trade, which has continued to increase as urban centers in southeastern Nigeria develop, has brought a new flow of Northern Nigerians to Abakaliki. Many of them, however, are transient Fulani cattle herders.

A third major development since the Second World War has been the rapid growth of the Government Station, so that today, including daily paid workers, there is a staff of about one thousand persons who are employed by the Divisional headquarters (The District Office), the Provincial Office, the Hospital, Police, Prison, Post Office, Public Works Department, Veterinary Department, the Abakaliki Urban County Council, and other government agencies. This development is part of the growing enlargement of government services in southeastern Nigeria, and there is nothing atypical about Abakaliki in this regard, except that it has recently become a Provincial headquarters and certain new offices have been established there.[2]

Originally most of the African staff in the administration were Yoruba and Bini from Western Nigeria, but by the 1920's Ibo had started to enter the public service and now the administration is mainly Ibo, with a smattering of other groups represented. Characteristically, very few of the Ibo are indigenous

[2] Abakaliki Province was formerly a part of Ogoja Province, whose headquarters was at Ogoja, though certain government departments, such as Agriculture and Education, were always centered at Abakaliki. In 1959 Ogoja was divided into Abakaliki and Ogoja Provinces to facilitate their administration. Abakaliki is also the headquarters of Abakaliki Division, one of the three Divisions which together form Abakaliki Province.

to the area; they come, as in the case of traders and rice farmers, from the more acculturated Ibo areas to the west and southwest. By the time of Nigerian Independence, in October, 1960, this administration, with the exception of the important post of Provincial Secretary, was Nigerianized, and there was at Abakaliki a small group of well-educated senior civil service officers who were mainly Ibo.[3]

A fourth impetus to the development of Abakaliki town after the war was the exploration of the lead-zinc deposits in the area, particularly in the Nyeba area, about fifteen miles south of Abakaliki. The mines at one time employed several hundred Nigerians, mainly stranger Ibo, some of whom lived in town while others were quartered at the mines. These workers helped to stimulate business in Abakaliki. The mines were closed at the time of research.

By 1960 the population of Abakaliki Township was estimated to be about 17,000 persons.[4] The population in 1953, when the last census was taken, was 9,687 (Nigeria. Census Superintendent 1953:11). Since that time new areas have been incorporated into the township and there is considerable evidence of population growth. Like many young urban centers Abakaliki has a considerably higher male than female population, and a preponderance of young adults, with few elders.

The population now consists of four main groups.

1. The Northern Nigerians, about 1,000 persons, who control the cattle trade, and are also petty traders, tailors, and prostitutes. They live together in the original Abakpa settlement

[3] Expatriates living in the area included a number of Dutch engineers, working on the Ogoja road, who lived with their families in the Government Station at the time of this study, and an American poultry expert lived and worked at the Agricultural Farm in the township. Two missionaries, one Scottish and one American, and an English mine manager lived within a radius of fifteen miles of the township. A number of Irish Catholic Priests lived in the township.

[4] This figure is partly based on the number of taxable males in the town and partly on a rough estimate of population growth since the 1953 census. Census figures for the township are not accurate, as some persons living in town were counted in their home areas or in the hinterland farmland areas, where they sometimes also had homes, and some, particularly mobile traders, were never counted at all.

with their own mosque and their traditional religious leader, Liman, as well as their own chief, Sarki. In addition, one of their oldest residents, a Mallam, who speaks English and Ibo, has for many years served as this group's representative in dealing with the administration. He is at present a member of the Urban Council.

2. The stranger population, mostly Ibo, composed of more than 10,000 persons, are traders, farmers, rice mill owners, contractors, and labourers who live around Abakpa and the Government Station. Coming mainly from the Awka and Onitsha areas, they also include persons from other sections of Ibo country, particularly Aro Chuku, Owerri, Umuahia, and Afikpo. These Ibo groups vary somewhat from one another in custom and language, but they unite as a group in considering themselves different from the local Ibo and the Moslems. Members of some of these groups tend to live together, so that there is, for example, an Afikpo "quarter", but residence is on the whole quite variable.

3. The government workers, who number about 1,000, and their families, are, on the whole, better educated than the stranger Ibo just discussed, and except in the course of their official duties they generally take little interest in town affairs. They are transient, being subject to government transfer, and most of them live separately from the townspeople, generally in better quarters and with higher living standards. Their offices and quarters are mainly on the Government Station. This area is Crown Land, now under the control of the Eastern Region, Ministry of Town Planning. The land has a separate legal status from that of the rest of the township, a difference of some importance in Abakaliki local government. While Government workers can vote for Councillors they cannot, as civil servants, run for Council offices or take an active part in township politics.

4. The indigenous Ibo population, several thousand strong, live mainly on the periphery of the township, scattered about in small hamlets, and as the town expands outwards they generally lease their homes and land and move out of the urban area. Most of them work as farmers and labourers. They have never had much influence in the town, and few of them are active

traders or artisans, or hold clerical or teachers' positions. They have benefited from the rice industry, in that they lease their farmland to strangers, hire themselves out as labourers, sell firewood (used in processing rice as well as in cooking) in the town, and so on. The indigenes living in town look outward to their rural leaders and councils and do not take an active part in township affairs.

Some class distinctions have developed in the township within all these groups. Among the Moslems there are a few prominent cattle traders in addition to the Sarki, Liman, and the Mallam who is a member of the Urban Council. Among the Izi there are a few prominent persons; and among the stranger Ibo and other groups there are a number of contractors, lorry owners, traders, and other businessmen who appear distinctly above the average economically, socially, and in political influence. In the case of the Government workers there are the educated elite of the senior service. There is some contact between influential persons in these four groups, particularly the government elite and the businessmen, but class distinctions are loose and ill-defined, and home ties and friendships cut across nascent class lines, so that a member of the elite may include among his personal friends a labourer or a tailor.

Most of the persons residing in the town have a sense of identity with it and enjoy living there. There are some who even though they have retired have chosen to remain rather than to return to their home community. While almost all the strangers in town retain strong ties with their home, they also have a sense of belongingness in the township, with its way of life and its attractive expanding economy. However workers in the government civil service frequently do not share these views, and some who have worked or lived in large cities consider Abakaliki to be quite small and rural in outlook.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Between 1905 and 1946 there was apparently no government organization or council concerned with the Abakaliki settlement area. It fell, as has been indicated, within Izi jurisdiction and was subject to what few powers the Izi Warrant Chiefs, and

later the Native Authority possessed. In fact, however, it appears that the Moslems and Ibo settled many of their problems themselves and the Izi in the settlement followed traditional law and custom.

In 1946 an enterprising District Officer at Abakaliki, O.P. Gunning, initiated the Abakaliki Township Advisory Board, which lasted until sometime after 1950. For the first two years the Board had twelve members: in 1948 it was enlarged to twenty-five and in 1949, to thirty-five. The members were elected by unions or "meetings" representing the various ethnic groups and subgroups in town (Abakaliki Township Advisory Board n.d.). Such unions serve stranger groups as mutual-aid, loan and burial societies (Ottenberg 1955; Little 1957; Coleman 1958: 211-14) and they developed in the town from about 1925 onward. Their members include civil servants as well as other townsmen. Some of them were formed on the basis of provincial or divisional boundaries, but most were based on clans or village-groups. A few were tribal organizations. The Board representatives chosen by the unions were invariably prominent members of the unions. There was no Moslem union, the Sarki choosing his own representative, and there were no members from the indigenous Izi, Ezza, or Ikwo, who had no unions.

The Board held a preliminary meeting once a month in the house of its Secretary to draw up an agenda and then met with the District Officer. It had no financial resources and no real authority; rather, it functioned to guide and advise the District Officer on township matters and to act as a sounding board for administration policy. It also concerned itself with a number of problems that were developing in the growing urban area, which could not be effectively handled through the Native Authority. These included the laying out and leasing of new plots in Abakpa, the development of a new market site, the erection and rental of market stalls, and the selection of a market master. The Board was also concerned with control over housebreaking and other forms of burglary that were rampant at this time, and with clearing "undesirables" from the town. Other questions involved the removal of the public cemetery to a more distant location, the erection of latrines and incinerators, the development of a water supply, the building of a cattle pound,

and the naming of the streets. While the Council had little authority, it provided an opportunity for the development of some form of government to meet specifically local urban conditions. Some of the Advisory Board members have become prominent politicians in the Division since that time.

By 1948 there was talk of eventual Nigerian independence, and a drive was begun by the Government to reorganize the Native Administration in the Eastern Region, following the model of English local government (Anonymous 1950; Stevens 1953; Livingston Booth 1955; Akpan 1955; Harris 1957). This first took the form of the development of Divisional Councils throughout the East, which obtained legal status by the 1950 Ordinance (Nigeria. Eastern Region 1950). By 1955 Local Government was fully introduced into the East through the 1955 Local Government Law (Nigeria. Eastern Region 1955), which was subsequently amended many times and has recently been replaced by the 1960 Local Government Law (Nigeria. Eastern Region 1960a). The purpose of these laws was to develop, throughout the East, a uniform procedure for democratic local government councils which were to possess considerable local autonomy, though they were to be guided by the Regional Government through local administrative officers (Nigeria. Eastern Region 1957).

Between about 1950 and 1955 the attention of the Abakaliki administration seems to have been focused mainly on the development of a Divisional Council, the Abakaliki Native Authority Divisional Council. This was organized as early as 1947 to serve the half million persons in the Division, including the township which had two representatives on this Council. The power to act as agent for leasing land and certain powers over road building and building codes gradually passed to this Council, though other administrative and tax matters affecting the township remained under the control of the Izi Native Authority Council. The Advisory Board gradually disappeared from the scene, with the result that there was no effective local government between about 1950 and 1955. The Divisional Council, predominantly rural in its membership and mainly concerned with rural development, was unable to administer the urban area,

with its special problems, and the District Office at Abakaliki seems to have carried much of the burden of urban administration.

Toward the end of 1954, in anticipation of the formation of a local government in the township, plans were made in the District Office to establish a temporary council. In December, 1954, thirty-eight councillors were selected from seven wards which had been established in the town by the administration to form the Temporary Abakaliki Town Council. Voting was rather informal, each ward holding a meeting and bringing forth its chosen candidates to the election officials. This Council was replaced by a twenty-one member Council about March, 1955. Its members were chosen by having electors in the wards whisper their votes to election officials. This second Council became the Abakaliki Urban District Council in October, 1955, by instrument of the Regional Government. These early councils established working committees and prepared the way for the regular Urban Council which was to come in 1956, but they were too short-lived to accomplish anything notable.

In March, 1956, a new nineteen-member Council was elected by secret ballot from nineteen wards created for this purpose by the District Office with six new members. One of these replaced a member who had died. The Council, according to the 1955 Local Government Law, was to serve a three-year term, but preparations for the Federal election of 1959 delayed the election until April, 1960, when the present Council took office. This latest Council was called, by 1960 Local Government Law, the Abakaliki Urban County Council. It is this Council that we are primarily concerned with in this study. However, two points of interest concerning the earlier Councils should be mentioned. First, the Abakaliki Divisional Native Authority Council gave up most of the controls it had taken from the Advisory Board upon the establishment of the new Urban Council. This Divisional Council itself was reorganized in 1955 as the Abakaliki County Council and lasted for four years. This Council did not collect rates, as the Urban Council came to do, but had the right to obtain sums by precept from the Urban Council and the three Rural District Councils in the Division. The Urban Council elected one of its members as its representative to this

larger Council. The latter was primarily concerned with educational matters, but proved ineffective, and was disbanded, along with sixteen other County Councils in the east, by the Regional Government (Nigeria. Eastern Region 1960b). There has never been a Local Government Council superior to the Urban Council with powers over the latter since that time.

Second, the 1956-1960 Council worked out the basic pattern of operation that has been followed by the present Council. It had, however, a poor reputation in the township, and some persons felt that there was considerable mismanagement of funds and corruption on the part of the Councillors and the Council's office staff. As we shall see, this led to considerable changes in Council membership after the 1960 election which in effect brought in a reform government. However the basic pattern of the Council meetings, and of the committee and staff organization was established by 1960.

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE COUNCIL

Background of the Councillors

The members of the Abakaliki Urban County Council are, on the average, middle aged. There are a few senior persons of influence, but it is the kind of group that in traditional Ibo society would have too many young persons in it to have much influence. Similarly, there is little, if any, pattern of deference to age in Council meetings, as would be the case in the traditional society. This is perhaps one reason why the meetings take a long time to reach decisions; there are few checks on the Councillors' speaking out.

There is only one female member, the first ever elected to an Abakaliki Urban Council. Her husband was formerly the Councillor from their ward, and after he resigned to become a judge in the newly created court of the Council she was elected despite much critical and anti-feminine opposition. Her husband and family were influential in her election, though she is also a popular female leader in town. But the general orientation of the townspeople is that politics is not a women's affair, or that

the most appropriate political activity for them is to take part in the women's branch of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), the major political party in the township.

All the Councillors claim to be Christians except for the Moslem member and one Ibo who come from a Catholic background but is a "traditionalist," that is, he likes to follow traditional ceremonies and rituals, and goes home from time to time to take part in these activities. The Moslem represents the main Moslem ward in town and is one of the oldest citizens of the town. Of the nineteen Councillors nine are Protestants (six Anglican, two Methodist, and one Presbyterian) and eight are Catholics. Not all are churchgoers, though several are elders or hold other positions in their church. The proportions of Catholics and Protestants on the Council seem roughly to mirror those of the population. Differences between them have not been a serious factor in Council decisions so far, though there is some suspicion between the two groups, and Protestants feel that in general matters the Catholics are favoured in the Province, the rural areas being predominantly Catholic. The issue came somewhat into the open over the possibility of the Council's supporting a Protestant secondary school in the township, but other factors, such as the evident inability of the Council to finance the project, were in the end much more significant in the Council's decision not to operate the school than were church rivalries.

The Councillors generally belong to the church they or their parents joined in their home areas, both Anglican and Catholic missions being active in the regions from which most of the members came. None of the members belong to any of the nine small fundamentalist or faith-healing churches that have come into the town in the 1950's (Assemblies of God, Apostolic, Apostolic Faith, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists, Faith Tabernacle, Church of Christ, Cherubim and Seraphim, Holy Band of Bethel). Members of these churches are generally at a somewhat lower socio-economic level than the Awka-Onitsha Ibo strangers, are of more recent origin in the township, and in many cases come from Ibo areas other than the Awka-Onitsha region.

The ethnic origin of the Councillors reflects the dominance

of stranger Ibo in town. Eighteen are stranger Ibo, while one is a Hausa from the North. Seven Councillors come from the Awka area, and of these three are from one village-group, Enugu Ukwu, and two are from another, Adazi. There are six from the Onitsha area, mainly from communities around Onitsha Town. Two members are of Aro origin, belonging to the famous Ibo trading and travelling group (Ottenberg 1958), two are from the populous Owerri area, and one is from Udi, only about fifty miles west of Abakaliki. There are no representatives of the indigenous Ibo on the Council. These persons are scattered about the town and do not participate actively in town politics, preferring to join in the activities of the rural Councils. In the former Urban Council there was one Izi, who did not run again in 1960, but instead ran for the Izi District Council. He became its Chairman and is now a member of the Eastern House of Assembly and a Parliamentary Secretary in the regional capital, Enugu. A young man, he is one of the few literate Izi who are active in politics.

None of the Councillors were born in Abakaliki. They seem to come from small towns or rural areas, and not from the larger cities of Eastern Nigeria such as Onitsha, Enugu, or Aba. They are from areas where schools and missions have existed for a long time and European culture has made inroads into traditional custom and belief. It is the only Council in the Division in which English is regularly used at meetings and several of its members have had some secondary school training. Not all Councillors are schooled, however, and there are about five whose English is poor and who take little part in the Council's debates.

The Councillors have lived in Abakaliki for an average of about eighteen years, which is probably longer than most Abakalikians, the oldest, the Moslem representative having dwelt there about forty years and the youngest, about five years. The Councillors are well established in business and trade in the township, and while some of the most affluent townsmen are not on the Council the Councillors are, on the whole, well off. Like many others from the town they are usually involved in a number of business activities at once. For example, one of them is a yam farmer and contractor, and he controls plots (house lots) and farmland. Formerly he was a petty trader and a lorry owner.

Another owns a rice mill and trades in rice and yams that he himself grows and that he purchases from others. Typically the Councillors are traders of some sort, do some contracting (usually housebuilding), have some farms which are worked partly by hired labour, and control a few plots of land in the town which they rent. Despite the fact that the rice industry is a major one (there are more than one hundred small mills in town), only a few Councillors own or have financial interests in rice mills, and while there is an Abakaliki Rice Mill Owners Association, it is not a very powerful group.

The Councillors' level of government experience is low. Ten of them were elected to a Council for the first time in 1960 and apparently had not previously held political office. Only one, the Moslem representative, served on the Abakaliki Township Advisory Board. The Chairman of the present Council, himself a new Councillor, was for many years a Court Clerk in the Abakaliki Divisional area. A few of the Councillors have had experience in the local party organization, the N.C.N.C., but most of the important party officials are not Councillors. Many Councillors hold positions within their ethnic unions and have gained leadership experience and a following in this matter. However, for most of them the Council is a new and complex political organization in which they are feeling their way.

Though the Councillors have not had a great deal of direct political experience they come to the Council with expectations based partly on their experiences at home during their formative years and partly on certain principles of political action that developed during the colonial period and are still operative in their home areas and in Abakaliki.

The majority of the stranger Ibo come from the area classified by Forde and Jones (1950: 30-32) as the Western or Nri-Awka group of the Northern Ibo. This includes the Awka and Onitsha Ibo. It is an area of Ibo country which has had contact with European missionaries, traders, and administrators for about one hundred years. It is very advanced educationally, for Nigeria, and has produced many of Nigeria's prominent politicians.

This traditional culture (Forde and Jones 1950: 30-32; Basden 1938; Thomas 1913; Jeffreys 1935; 1936) is characterized,

like most of Ibo country, by the presence of a considerable number of relatively independent village-groups (Forde and Jones list thirty-two) which are politically autonomous and in which patrilineal clans and lineages form the framework of the organization of the society. These independent traditional political units vary in population size from several thousand to more than fifty thousand persons. The area is thickly populated, the people being yam farmers and palm-wine tappers with some palm fruit production. There is a long tradition in the area of the seasonal migration of blacksmiths, farmers, and diviners. There are four categories of traditional leaders: certain title holders (the titles are frequently achieved rather than inherited), certain priestly chiefs, lineage and clan heads, and elders who represent villages or village-groups. The extent to which these categories are important and to which authority is centralized varies from one autonomous unit to another, but all four seem to play some role everywhere. Decisions are not usually reached until there is considerable discussion among the leaders and elders, and they may take a considerable time to make. There is great respect for seniority of age in public speaking, decision-making and in most aspects of social life. Political favours are usually paid for in money and/or food and palm wine. The leaders expect these payments, and it is considered proper that they should receive such things for the work they do. These Ibo societies are not highly autocratic and they are relatively open politically, like other Ibo areas (Ottenberg 1959). There is considerable emphasis on individual initiative in the economic and political fields and possibilities for social and political advancement exist for most men, though the position of women is much more limited. Factionalism within and between lineages, clans, villages and village-groups, and centering around influential leaders, is endemic. There is no traditional state or super-governmental organization binding the autonomous Ibo groups together (though today, of course, this exists through modern political organizations), and politics is essentially localized. The leadership system in other sections of Ibo country does not differ greatly in general principles from those described above. It is this kind of political background that Councillors bring to Abakaliki from their own traditional culture.

The modifications brought about by the colonial system cannot be discussed here, but they have brought into being an added set of expectations concerning governmental operations. These include an awareness of the centralized authority of the colonial system, now the national and regional system, and of the great power of a few individuals, such as District Officers, formerly European, now mainly Nigerian. There is also a realization that within the administration there are channels of bribery and that contacts are made and jobs or contracts secured by working through officials or more especially their subordinates, and that this is a common practice in Nigeria. The question is not so much whether one should or should not give or accept favours but how one should do it. There is a strong sense that rewards exist within the political system beyond the ordinary salaries and that some sort of favours or presents are necessary to get things done effectively.

There is also a surprising familiarity with debating and parliamentary procedures on the part of many Ibo in Abakaliki, partly gained through the use of modified Robert's Rules of Order in ethnic union meetings and other modern voluntary associations.

While not all Councillors consider the Council as an avenue to more lucrative political positions, some of the more ambitious ones do. The fact is that Council positions in Eastern Nigeria are a recognized step in the political system. The case of the former Abakaliki Councillor who became a Parliamentary Secretary has already been discussed and is well known in Abakaliki; there are others who have gone from the township area to important regional and federal positions within a few years. The Abakaliki area, and most of Eastern Nigeria, is an open society politically. The traditional Ibo political system was also open, but the present-day rewards are much greater in prestige, salary, housing, and in other ways. There are politicians in the Abakaliki Divisional area, for example, who have gone from political positions paying less than £ 100 per annum to positions paying more than £ 1,000 in a very short time. The relatively classless nature of the township accentuates the "openness" of the political system: it is available to nearly all males, not just a certain group or class.

Council Meetings

The Council normally meets toward the end of the month, following the monthly meetings of its four committees, whose minutes are sent to the Councillors to read before this general meeting. The Council also holds extra meetings to discuss special matters such as the preparations for the Independence celebrations, or to greet an august visitor, for example, the Premier of the Eastern Region. The Chairman conducts the meeting according to the Council's own Standing Rules. A number of other persons are usually present, including the Council Secretary (also called the Town Clerk), who explains office actions and answers questions from the Councillors, with reference to whether or not specific decisions the Council had previously approved have been carried out. There is also a clerk who records the minutes, a Treasurer who explains budgetary matters when called upon to do so, a Building Inspector, and a Lands Clerk. In addition, the Local Government Commissioner may be present to introduce a new matter, to get the Council to act on some issue, or to present some plan to the members. This Commissioner is not part of the Council Staff, but he is normally a District Officer or an Assistant District Officer in the Divisional administration who is attached to the Council, though he carries out other duties as well. He is the representative of the Eastern Region Ministry of Local Government in Enugu to the Council. He is in charge of guiding the Council's affairs, as will be indicated below, but he usually does not bother to remain for the whole Council meeting. Since the organization of the Urban Council the Commissioner has sometimes been an Englishman and at other times a Nigerian. Few visitors other than an occasional reporter appear at meetings, even when it is known in advance that major issues may be discussed. Townspeople prefer to make their feelings known at the local level of the ward or through a 'watchdog' organization, the Abakaliki Tax and Ratepayers Association, rather than directly by coming to Council meetings and talking with their Councillor there. By Local Government Law Government minutes of the Council's meetings are supposed to be available through the Council's office, but they are not usually accessible to the public and there is virtually no demand for them.

Townsmen occasionally read their Councillor's copies, but most often they prefer to speak to their Councillor directly.

Attendance at meetings during the period of research was high; there were rarely more than one or two members absent. The Councillors receive a sitting fee of 10s per meeting, including committee meetings, which is their only salary, though the Chairman receives a yearly allowance of £156 (£180 in 1961-1962). Councillors generally feel that the sitting fee is insufficient, that this kind of work takes a good deal of their time away from regular business activities or trade.

There is no emphasis on dress and pomp in the Council; some members wear European clothes and others African, and status symbols are virtually absent. Unlike many rural Councils in the East, there are no chiefs or special members in this Council. It has the right, as do all eastern Nigerian Councils, to recommend the appointment of certain persons to the Council as traditional rulers, and the Council has discussed this several times, but it has reached the conclusion that there are no indigenous traditional chiefs in the urban area.

Monthly Council meetings usually last all day. The main business is, first of all to approve the minutes of its past meeting, and second, and more crucial, to approve the minutes of the Finance and Staff Committee, the Health Committee, the Works and Roads Committee, and the General Purposes Committee. It is in these four committees that much of the legislation and other activities of the Council is carried out, and by approving the committees' minutes the Council formalizes their recommendations. The minutes are therefore scrutinized very carefully, the Chairman of the committee under discussion is carefully questioned, and portions of the minutes may be amended or rejected. The Council rarely takes up an issue on its own and makes a final decision on it there and then. It is more common to refer the matter to a committee for examination. Issues may originate with the Councillors, but they frequently come from the Local Government Commissioner, from some regional ministry, or through letters from private citizens or special interest groups. If a matter is a delicate one the Council may "go into committee" to discuss it, that is, exclude the public and staff, except the

Secretary. This is frequently done for matters affecting the Council's staff.

There is freedom for all members to talk, and the meetings are usually loud, animated with much discussion, and decisions are only slowly reached. It is not that the Chairman is ineffectual, rather there is an expectation, which has a background in traditional Ibo society, that every member should feel free to express his opinions before they attempt to arrive at a decision. There is a majority group, led by the Chairman, and an "opposition" led by the Chairman of the previous Council; most issues are discussed in terms of the points of view of these two groups. The basis of this factionalism will be indicated below, but it should be noted that the majority is a clear one, that many votes in the Council follow this division to some extent, and that this split permeates almost all the Council's activities.

Among the problems that concerned the Council in its meeting during 1960, the following are indicative of the Council's interests and activities:

1. There was considerable nudity among indigenous women in the Abakaliki Divisional area, and the Ministry of Local Government suggested to all four Councils in the Division that anti-nudity by-laws be passed, particularly in view of the impending Independence celebration, in which it was felt that strangers or reporters visiting the Division might receive a poor impression of it. The Ministry provided the Urban Council with a model by-law which it quickly passed.

2. The Council's role in the Independence celebrations, in which it staged a ballroom dance, sports events, and traditional dance contests, as well as other festivities, was discussed.

3. The Council, unlike most of the rural councils, has no schools under its jurisdiction, and it does not support pupils attending any of the six mission primary schools in the township. The Council discussed a plan, initiated by the Christian Council of Nigeria (the Presbyterian, Anglican and Methodist missions were involved) for a secondary school in the township supported by the Council but it did not have the funds to undertake such a venture.

4. The Council discussed the location of a new trenching ground for night-soil deposits, the old one being too near an area which was to be developed.

5. A great deal of attention was given by the Council to changes in the rating system, and to the General Services Rate, the Water Rate, and the Property Rate. The possibility on an Education Rate was discussed. Some changes and recommendations were made. The Council also discussed the system of rate collection but did not make any basic changes in it.

6. The Council was concerned with building codes as well as the regulation of leases in the township and spent a good deal of time discussing possible changes in the building regulations and how to shorten the period of time required to have a leasing arrangement legalized by the Council.

7. The Council argued at great length over the arrangement and allocation of new market stalls, and it agreed on the building of a new shed for the market master. It discussed the failure of the poundmaster to impound enough animals during his working hours.

The Councillors show very great interest in their meetings in questions concerning how projects should be carried out, for example, whether by direct labour of persons employed by the Council or by contract, in questions concerning the hiring of personnel, and in matters affecting the arrangement and leasing of market stalls, petrol stations and other businesses, and most Councillors expressed definite opinions as to how these should be done.

Every year the Council must approve the budget, which is prepared by the Finance and Staff Committee with the assistance of the Council's staff and the District Office. Furthermore, the Council chooses its Chairman and its committee members every year. This is usually arranged by the Council members in private, before being brought up in April at the first Council meeting of the new financial year. Every Council member is appointed to one committee, the Chairman being a member of all of them. Committee meetings are not normally open to the public.

The Committee System

Each committee annually selects its Chairman and Vice-Chairman from among its members. The Secretary of the Council generally attends meetings, and occasionally the Local Government Commissioner comes to them as well, particularly during the period when budget estimates are being prepared. From time to time the Chairman of the Council is present as well. There is a tendency for the committees to overlap in function, and matters may be referred to two or three of them for discussion before coming to the Council floor.

The Finance and Staff Committee. This is the most important of the four committees. It has two main functions, (1) to prepare budget estimates for the coming year, (2) and to recommend the appointment or dismissal of personnel, the upgrading of staff positions, and salary adjustments. These must be approved by the full Council and Ministry of Local Government, and generally by the Local Government Commissioner. The committee is also concerned with special allowances and uniforms for staff, with Council equipment, and with Council rates and their collections, as well as with market-stall fees and fees from hotels and bars, timber sellers, unhulled-rice sellers, and so on. This committee keeps a check on supplies on hand and on the operating budget of the Council.

The Health Committee. This committee is involved with a variety of activities directly or indirectly related to health conditions. Its meetings are usually attended by the Health Superintendent, who is not a member of the Council's staff, but of the Provincial Administration. He plays an important role in this committee's discussion and guides the work of the Council's Health Overseer and Sanitary Labourers. He also has authority to prevent the Council from carrying out any action that he considers unhealthful, such as poor location for a new public latrine. The committee is concerned with sanitation services, public latrines, trenching grounds, incinerators, the town cemetery, and the problem of suitable quarters for the rice mills and the disposal of waste from the milling process. It is also concerned with stall arrangements in the two markets, the placement of sellers, market congestion, and so on. The committee regulates conditions in

eating houses and the meat market. It receives monthly reports from the Council's Building Inspector on the progress of new buildings, from the Market Master on the condition of the market, and from the Health Superintendent on the approval of new building plans.

Works and Roads Committee. The committee is concerned with the construction and maintenance of all Council properties, including offices and staff quarters. The construction and development of the town's markets, lorry park, and streets are under its care. Its most crucial task is to invite tenders (bids) for construction work and to award contracts. Although the Council collects water rates the committee and Council are not in charge of the town's pipe-borne water supply, which is under the control of the Public Works Department of the Eastern Region. The committee makes recommendations for placing new pipe stands, but the P.W.D. determines when and where they will actually be placed. Similarly, the town's limited electricity supply is under the jurisdiction of the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria, a Federal agency.

General Purposes Committee. Designed to handle any activities that do not fall within the strict purview of other committees, this committee has a number of important duties. One is to approve the leasing of land in areas of the township that are not Crown Land (that is, outside of the Government Station and Agricultural Farm). The township lands are owned by indigenous inhabitants. By law they cannot be sold to townsmen, but leases up to ninety-nine years are arranged between the representatives of the indigenous owners and the townspeople. These leases must be approved by the committee, which inspects the site and makes sure that the arrangement is a voluntary one and that the correct parties actually sign the lease. The leases are kept in the Council's files by the Lands Clerk, who is in charge of their preparation. The leasing system functions to protect the indigenous inhabitants against land seizures and to cut down land litigation. The committee is also responsible for the allocation of trading stalls in the market and elsewhere in the town. The demand for stalls is usually greater than the

supply, and strong pressures are placed on Councillors to provide them.

The Council Staff

The staff, in November, 1960, consisted of about seventy labourers and an office staff of about thirty, divided into seven sections or departments: Secretary, Treasury, Court, Works, Market, Motor Park, and Health. The office staff were either selected by the Council or were there as a result of being transferred from another Council by the Ministry of Local Government of the Eastern Region. These are permanent employees of the Ministry; they cannot be dismissed by the Council without the Ministry's approval and they are subject to transfer by the Ministry from one Council to another. Their salaries are paid by the Council, however, which also provides them with staff quarters for which they pay a stipulated rental. Most office staff are stranger Ibo. While it is not possible to consider the operation of the staff in detail, certain features may be briefly mentioned.

The Secretary is responsible to the Council and the Local Government Commissioner for the effective control of the staff. If matters go awry the Council members sometimes become quite critical of him, and there is frequent criticism, by members, of office procedures. The Secretary attends Council and committee meetings and is responsible to see that minutes and other notices are circulated in time. The Treasurer, among other duties, is responsible for the maintenance of the records of rate collection as well as being in immediate control of the Council's finances. Within his department is the Lands Clerk, whose task it is to prepare and file leases, a position that is quite demanding in time and energy.

A Court was established under the Council about 1958 because of difficulties with the previous system whereby cases involving the stranger population in town were being tried in the rural Izi courts. There is a Court Clerk and five Court Messengers. The three judges of the Court, who are appointed by the District Officer, are not paid a regular salary but are given a block payment which they divide equally among them-

selves. Two of the judges are Izi, and represent the two major Izi groups in the township; and the third, the Court President, is an Aro Ibo who represents the stranger Ibo. Although Moslems are involved in court matters they have no representation at all. Proceedings are in Ibo. The Court tries only petty cases, more serious charges appearing before the Magistrate's Court, which is under the control of the Ministry of Justice of the Eastern Region, and over which the Council has no control.

The Works Department includes a Stores Clerk, a Driver, and the Road Overseer, the last-named being responsible for carrying out any construction that the Council performs by itself. The Health Department includes the Health Overseer, the Pound Master, and the Building Inspector. The last is one of the most important positions in the Council; he is responsible for approving building plans for every structure erected outside the Crown Land area and for approving the finished building. The Health Superintendent of the Provincial Administration must also approve the plans, as well as the Abakaliki Town Planning Authority (see below). Use of Crown Land is the concern of a different Lands Clerk in Abakaliki, who works under the Lands Division, Eastern Region, Ministry of Town Planning. This man is under the immediate authority of the Provincial Secretary, Abakaliki. The Council has nothing to do with Crown Land, as has been previously stated.

Staff-Councillor Relations

Most of the senior office staff of the Council consider themselves experts in their field and feel that the Councillors sometimes discuss matters at general or committee meetings in an inexpert way, that they do not understand the operation of the Council's office, and that they do not always make the best appointments or pass necessary regulations in time. Some of the staff members are uneasy about the decision-making powers of the Council and prefer contacts with the Local Government Commissioner and the District Office staff, who they feel understand their roles more clearly. Also, several dismissals from the office for mismanagement of funds and files in recent years have created uneasiness among the staff. The Councillors, on the

other hand, are sometimes critical of staff operations. They do not see why a particular letter was not answered by a certain date, why leasing arrangements take so long, why the rating records are not precisely up to date, and so on. It is perhaps inevitable, given the respective tasks of Councillors and staff, that these feelings should arise, but they are not serious. The Chairman, who has a desk in the staff office area, frequently consults with the Secretary and other staff members, and on the whole, the staff-Councillor relationships is one of mild hostility at worst.

Council Finances

The Council had a revenue during the 1960-1961 financial year of about £ 20,000. Of this about 8 per cent comes from the general per capita rate (the General Services Rate of 7s 6d for a taxable population of about 4,300), 10 per cent is derived from property rates, and about 7 per cent from the Eastern Region Government as reimbursement for the operation of the local court. A fairly large proportion, about 18 per cent, comes from the Regional Government as a block grant on the basis of the total population of the township to be used by the Council as it sees fit. Twenty-one per cent comes from the collection of the Water Rate, but this is money allocated to the Public Works Department for the operation of the pipe-borne water system, and the Council has no control over its use. Another 23 per cent comes from a variety of fees, which include fees from leases, the market, slaughtering, vehicle licenses, hotel licenses, native liquor licenses, the motor park, and rent of the Council's property and the Sport Stadium. An additional 8 per cent comes from court fines and fees. The remainder is from miscellaneous sources. The Council has changed the rate structure for the 1961-1962 financial year, but it will not vary the over-all picture of the Council's finances a great deal. Virtually all the Council's revenue is spent on normal operating expenses and salaries, and very little is available for major projects, such as tarring the streets or the development of a secondary school. The Council is reluctant to increase rates beyond their present level, which comes to a basic minimum of £ 1 2s 6d for adult males. In the past the Council has received special funds for projects, for

example, a loan of £ 800 from the Ministry of Local Government for rebuilding the main township market. Such loans and special grants are difficult to obtain, and the result is that the Council cannot engage in major work projects or educational programmes at the present time. It can and does continue with normal controls of the markets, trade, roads, land leasing and control over house building. It has been unable to plan for new layouts for underdeveloped areas of the township. One layout has recently been developed by private entrepreneurs in town, and a second, in the Government Station, by the Government administration in Abakaliki and the Ministry of Town Planning.

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON THE COUNCIL

Other Governmental Agencies

A great deal has already been said concerning the extent to which external governmental authorities influence the Council. The regional Ministry of Local Government must approve the Council's budget and the hiring and dismissal of established staff, and it has the right to transfer staff without Council approval. It suggests necessary by-laws, which it also must approve. The Ministry functions through its Local Government Commissioner, who maintains direct and personal contact with the Council. Other external controls over the Council are almost too numerous to mention. The Court is under the control of the regional Ministry of Justice; the police under the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs; health matters are controlled through the Health Supervisor, who is under the regional Ministry of Health; the water supply is regionally controlled; and the electricity supply is under a Federal agency. As has been mentioned, the Council has no authority over the Crown Land within the township, though it forms an integral and major portion of the town; and the Abakaliki Town Planning Authority, a non-Council body, though having Council representation on it, has final authority over land problems and new layout areas in the non-Crown Land areas. In the past twelve years the authority structure of the town has changed from one of considerable centralization of authority in the hands of the local District

Officer, with an Advisory Board, to a complex organizational pattern in which the Council has quite limited autonomy and where there is a proliferation of controls, mainly emanating from regional ministries, which prevent the extension of local authority. The growth of these external controls has been so great and so rapid that few Councillors understand the over-all organizational pattern of which they are a part. It is true that the Council is represented by its Chairman or other person or persons on a number of external committees, such as the Hospital Advisory Board, the Leprosy Advisory Board, the Provincial Road Safety Committee, and the above-mentioned Town Planning Authority, and thus has a hand in the decision-making processes of these organizations, but the Council itself does not control them and has no authority over them. In addition, the Council lacks the financial strength to initiate major improvement programmes, and it has functioned mainly in terms of land leases, house construction, control of traders and markets, basic sanitation measures, and road maintenance. It is essentially a regulatory agency rather than an organization with strong planning functions or one which initiates new programmes.

The Councillors are aware of their lack of autonomy, and sometimes become quite angry at the Local Government Commissioner, or at a government agency which takes actions in matters the Councillors consider to be their own province. The regional government and its ministries can justify external controls on the basis of better knowledge of what is occuring in all Councils throughout the area, on having trained specialists (for example, in health matters) which the Council cannot provide, and in terms of years of experience in administrative matters. These external government sources also claim that the Councillors have had little training and experience with planning, and that this is one of their major weaknesses which must be compensated by other Government agencies. Furthermore, though this Council has a good reputation in the township, it, like other Nigerian Councils, may show a tendency toward mismanagement or corruption unless external controls over budgeting and expenditure are applied.

The Council is caught between two positions: the members want autonomy and resent external controls, yet they are aware

that the Council needs assistance in financial matters, such as preparing budget estimates, in obtaining grants or loans for development purposes, in preparing by-laws and other regulations, and in legal matters that it may be involved in. Thus while there is sometimes strong resentment toward the Local Government Commissioner, there are other times when there are positive requests for specific assistance from him. This ambivalent attitude of the Councillors, which is quite evident at Council meetings, is a major characteristic of this Council.

Non-governmental Forces

There are a few non-governmental organizations which influence the Council and its decision-making processes. The three major ones, and these are involved in a network of inter-relations, are the ward organizations, the Abakaliki Branch of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), and the Abakaliki Tax and Ratepayers Association.

At least five wards have a regular men's ward organization, and about eight others have some sort of irregular meeting, the remainder having no meeting or organization at all. In the wards that are organized the men meet once a month, or more if necessary, with their Councillor to discuss township affairs and to hear of the activities of the Council. There is usually a Secretary and a Chairman of the organization. During election periods the candidates attempt to capture the support of the ward organizations, some of which have been in existence since the early days of the Council. The ward organizations are not under the control of the N.C.N.C. and seem to have evolved gradually.

In other wards the Councillor calls a public meeting in the ward when some special issue arises, or he calls together a number of influential persons in the ward to discuss Council matters. There are a few wards in which the Councillors rarely call anyone, or at most a few personal friends, but simply feel confident to take the initiative and make their own decisions. In general there is a rough spatial distribution between the degree of organization of a ward and its location in town. The older, more established areas have the more organized ward meetings,

and this becomes less so as one goes out to the periphery of the township, where there is a larger indigenous Ibo population who are indifferent to local politics, and where residences are more scattered. While the Government Station is incorporated into the town's ward system, its personnel do not usually take part in ward activities, and they are forbidden to enter into politics, as mentioned previously. The one predominantly Moslem ward has no organization at all; its representative in the Council merely meets with the Sarki and perhaps a few of the wealthy cattle traders to discuss Council matters.

Thus for many of the wards there is a way in which popular sentiment can develop, and the meetings also serve the Councillor in providing him with an opportunity to present his views on the Council and to ingratiate himself with his ward. Some Councillors are very anxious to maintain this kind of rapport; others seem indifferent to it. The Councillors are also rate collectors in their own wards, a task assigned to them by the administration but which they heartily dislike, and there is some danger of antagonizing ward members by pressing too hard for the collection of rates. Some Councillors avoid this by delegating the task to another ward member (rate collectors receive fees for this work).

The local branch of the N.C.N.C. was firmly founded in 1951, after several earlier starts going back to 1947. Similar branches also developed in neighboring areas in the early 1950's. The party dominates the Eastern Region, particularly the Ibo areas; controls the regional legislature and ministries; and together with the predominantly Moslem Northern Nigerian party, the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.), forms the coalition government for the Federation of Nigeria. There has never really been any opposition group in the Abakaliki urban area, and all of the Councillors claim N.C.N.C. membership, except the Mallam, who is N.P.C., but who cooperates with the N.C.N.C. Councillors as do the two parties nationally. The Council is thus nominally controlled by one party. The local branch of the N.C.N.C. is in charge of a Chairman who is in the Federal House, and is controlled mainly by non-Councillors, politicians in the Federal and Regional Governments, and some

prominent local businessmen. The party does not seem concerned with the particular issues at stake in the Council, and it does not tell the Councillors how to vote on urban issues; indeed it is indifferent to most local issues. It is, however, concerned with the selection of party candidates from each ward, and, in fact, chooses them.

The role of the N.C.N.C. in local politics cannot be fully understood without reference to the Abakaliki Tax and Ratepayers Association. This group, which started about 1948, seems similar to like-named bodies which have developed in other Eastern Nigerian cities, though it is independent of them. The association was formed by local businessmen and traders to pressure for improvements in the township and to keep the rates from rising. It has become, since its inception, a basis for organizing ward sentiments in the township outside the N.C.N.C., and also a refuge for dissident elements within the party. For over five years there has been a split within the local N.C.N.C. chapter. This is due to political rivalry for control of the chapter between two stranger Ibo and their followers. The dispute is not essentially ideological. Rather it centers around the question of control of the local party machinery, that is, to determine who will nominate Councillors, and help choose regional and federal representatives to stand for election, and who will be in a position to serve on certain governmental agencies which are patronage positions. One faction has been in control for most of this ten-year period, and the opposition group has captured the Tax and Ratepayers Association and attempted to use it to improve its local political position. This opposition also, for a time, controlled two affiliated N.C.N.C. organizations, the Zikist National Vanguard and the N.C.N.C. Youth Association, local chapters of national organizations which have a reputation for being militant and radical but which seem never to have been very active in Abakaliki. A third local organization, the Women's Wing of the N.C.N.C., has remained outside this dispute.[5] The Tax and Ratepayers Association and the opposing factions of the party have attempted to gain support from political elements in the

[5] For a discussion of the background of the N.C.N.C. and its affiliated organizations, see COLEMAN (1958).

regional capital, and in a few cases the Association has tried without success to have Council's decisions revoked by the Minister of Local Government.

The split within the N.C.N.C. had relatively little effect on the 1955-1960 Council, probably because it was not so serious in 1955 when the early Council elections were held. In the present Council there is now a majority and an opposition as a result of this party dispute, which has never been resolved despite attempts of party officials in the Eastern Region to settle it.

By the time of the 1960 Council election there was a great deal of local resentment against the Urban District Council of 1959-1960. Charges were made of bribery in leasing arrangements, allocations of stalls and arrangements for petrol stations, and of general mismanagement of the Council's funds. Whether these allocations were justified or not, there was some feeling at the ward level that certain Councillors should not be renominated by the N.C.N.C. The party insisted on its right to control the selection of candidates running under the party symbol. Thus the N.C.N.C. selected nominees for each ward and renominated some Councillors whom certain townspeople believed to be associated with the mismanagement of the Council. Some of the wards, particularly those in which there was a regular ward organization, objected because they were not consulted, and the opposition group within the N.C.N.C., using ward sentiment, was able to put up candidates of its own, supported by the Tax and Ratepayers Association, under whose banner they ran in the election against the N.C.N.C. while still claiming to be N.C.N.C. members. In some wards the election was hotly contested; in others the Tax and Ratepayers Association approved of the N.C.N.C. party candidate and did not present an opposing candidate. A few candidates also ran as independents. Eight former Councillors, N.C.N.C. candidates, including the Chairman, were re-elected, as well as the N.P.C. representative, who was not involved in this dispute. Four representatives of the Tax and Ratepayers Association and six new N.C.N.C. candidates were elected. When the Council came to choose its new Chairman, the former Chairman was defeated by a coalition of the Tax and Ratepayers Councillors, all but one of the new N.C.N.C.

Councillors, and the N.P.C. member. The former Chairman and five old and one new N.C.N.C. member then formed themselves into a minority group within the Council; it has been divided since April, 1960, according to this split on most major issues. The Tax and Ratepayers Association Councillors claim to be N.C.N.C. (persons in Abakaliki say, "We are all N.C.N.C. here") but along with other townsmen who sided with this group, they are not recognized as being so by the N.C.N.C. It is clear, therefore, that the Council has been affected by ward sentiment on the one hand and the rivalry within the party on the other, and that these two aspects of local political pressure were merged in the last election.

This division is clearly evident at Council meetings. While most Councillors deny the existence of a formal opposition, it actually does exist. The opposition members question the accuracy of the minutes, attempt to reopen matters settled at previous meetings, and frequently insist on a 'division', that is, having their names recorded as a minority vote rather that merely having the clerk of the Council record the total vote: and they walk out of the proceedings when they feel that they have been unjustly treated. They attempt to ridicule the Chairman and show that he is not capable of performing his duties. The Chairman and the majority try to show their effectiveness and their ability to pass meaningful regulations, and they attempt to keep the minority under control. There is nevertheless a good deal of joking among Councillors at meetings, and the atmosphere is rarely a very bitter one.

Other organizations in the township have had some influence on the Council though of a minor nature. The rice-mill owners and some of the operators, through their Rice Mill Owners Association, have asked the Council to set aside a new site for them outside of the present milling area, which is in the residential section, where they may relocate and where there will be more economical disposal of the mill waste. The Council has designated an area for them but, specific plans to move there had not been formulated by 1960. Unions representing ethnic or tribal groups sometimes petition the Council to name a street after their home area. In the case of a few of them that have an occupational

basis, such as the Mgbowo and the Okposi unions of palm-wine sellers, these have asked the Council for specific sites in the market at which to sell their wares. So have a number of informal trading groups, for example, a womens' cassava-trading organization. The Council is not always sympathetic with requests of such a special nature.

The role of the Catholic and Protestant church groups in the township has already been discussed with reference to the proposed secondary school. Catholic-Protestant factional and political rivalries, such as are found in the Onitsha area have not developed in Abakaliki, but it is likely that they will grow in the future as the political stakes in the township become more important.

Two private associations are closely linked with the Council. The Local Government Association, which is found throughout the Eastern Region, brings together Councillors from different areas at monthly and national meetings to discuss mutual problems, and it is concerned with maintaining the influence and autonomy of the Councils in the east and with preventing regional government decisions from being made which would be detrimental to them. The Urban Council is a member, paying regular dues and having representatives at the Association's meetings. Another group, the Nigerian Association of Local Government Employees, a union of Council staff workers in the Eastern Region, has a local chapter. When the Association recently held a region-wide strike for higher wages, some of the Abakaliki staff members joined in but the Councillors and the Local Government Association were unsympathetic. The strike resulted in some adjustments in salaries throughout the region but was not, on the whole, effective, and it was certainly not in Abakaliki.

There are also a number of well-known local businessmen and traders who, through personal contacts with Councillors, sometimes have some influence on Council affairs. In addition there is a newly created Government position of Provincial Commissioner which straddles both government and political party. The Commissioner is appointed, essentially by the N.C.N.C., from among the five members of the Eastern Region House of Assembly from Abakaliki Division. He tours the province and

keeps an eye on its administration and development, including its Councils. He makes recommendations to the Provincial, Divisional, and Urban staffs on possible laws or governmental changes, and he tries to obtain development money, educational funds, and other special monies from the regional government. In addition, he is, as one might suspect, an influential person in the local branch of the N.C.N.C. In terms of the Urban Council he has several times made suggestions concerning desirable regulations. He has also attempted, in his party role, to end the dispute in the township and Council, but without success. His influence on the Council is both governmental and non-governmental, and his relationship to both the Abakaliki administration and to the local party organization is a fluid one.

Thus, while some pressure groups do exist in the township, they are not very strong or effective in influencing the Council, with the exception of the wards, the Tax and Ratepayers Association, and the N.C.N.C. Even in these cases the issues are ones of personnel, not ideology, and the Council is not committed to specific doctrines or platforms, the N.C.N.C. political orientation being broad enough to permit great latitude in Council actions.

CONCLUSIONS

The Abakaliki Urban Council was brought into being to serve the needs of the strangers' community in Abakaliki during a period of general re-organization and growth of the local government system in Eastern Nigeria. It has never developed much autonomy and is essentially a regulatory government agency in a complex evolving political system in Eastern Nigeria, and in Nigeria, in which many governmental agencies have controls over its activities. The Councillors are ambivalent toward these external controls and are attempting to define their roles within the larger government system, which they only partially understand. Non-governmental external pressures, particularly the influence of the N.C.N.C. and the wards, are not ideological but concerned with the control of the political positions. The conflict of local autonomy and more centralized authority between

the Council and the other government agencies is mirrored in the conflict between the centralized party machinery in town and ward autonomy in the selection of candidates for the Council.

The Councillors are not only finding their way in attempting to develop their roles in the Council but some of them are seriously concerned with the furtherance of their own political careers through serving on the Council. The political system is an open one in which those Councillors who are effective politicians will probably rise to higher government positions. This, of course, accounts partially for the pressure to be nominated for election by the ruling party for Council posts that are nominally poorly paid.

The Councillors bring into the Council a background of traditional cultural experience as well as expectations concerning political behavior that arose out of the colonial system and its modified modern national and regional governments. The Councillors come from a relatively egalitarian cultural background, where public debate, factionalism, and personal rivalries are common, and from a people who are used to physical mobility. One is struck, in viewing the Council, not with how well traditional cultural elements have been able to adjust to the present political scene, but how rapidly traditional elements have seemingly become unimportant. In the present Council, age distinctions are not significant; chieftancy, kinship, and title matters are unimportant; and religious and ritual elements are virtually lacking. Tribalism is also insignificant, even though rivalries exist between some of the communities represented on the Council. There is, of course, considerable tribalism between the stranger Ibo and the indigenous Ibo in the area, but because of the nature of the Council's representation this does not appear in the local government sphere. Furthermore, the townsmen have readily taken to party politics, party identification, and party factionalism. The factionalism of traditional Ibo society, which is partly a concomitant of its relatively open political system, is carried over into the modern party system, which is still relatively open, though the party system does differ in many formal essentials from traditional political organizations.

Nonetheless, traditional features have persisted. Examples of these are the idea of adequate payment for political tasks, the need for extended debate and the consequent slowness in reaching decisions, the difficulties over long-range planning that is not generally a factor in traditional life, and the attitude toward women taking part in political life. We cannot deal here in detail with the problem of why certain traditional elements have been retained and others have rapidly disappeared. The significance of kin ties, titles, chiefly and religious elements have been disappearing as aspects of political life because they can be replaced by other more meaningful modern devices even though they were convenient approaches to political power in the traditional society. In short, the basic cultural drive is one for power in which the kinds of elements involved — titles, religious leardership, and so on — can be replaced by others. This is certainly clear if one observes the great variation in leadership symbols and positions that occurred within the different subgroups of the traditional Ibo speaking peoples, yet without there being much actual variation in basic authority patterns. The indifference to age can be explained partially by the lack of many senior men in the town, partially by the lack of a traditional age-grade system, though it is clear (and true of many rural areas) that the drive for influence and power, even in the presence of these features, mitigate their importance under modern conditions. The retention of the attitudes toward payment for political services is clear, for why should politicians give it up under modern conditions when the rewards are so much higher today than before and the checks so ineffectual? The attitude toward women is similar, if only in a negative sense, for why disturb a successful sex-authority relationship when there is little to be gained by it on the part of the men and there is little drive in that direction within the emerging culture and none in the traditional?

The Councillors and townsmen have made a very rapid adjustment to a new political system which is not of their choosing, but which they have come to relish. The "open" quality of the traditional society is a key to understanding the rapid adjustment; the drive for power and prestige continues though new positions replace old ones, and age distinctions are swept

away in the press for advancement. These "explanations" of political change are perhaps *post hoc,* but they do suggest that an overemphasis on the study of form in local government studies may lead one astray and that a consideration of basic attitudes toward political achievement and authority, and some understanding of the culturally learned drives associated with politics, in which formal elements can then be placed, may be of value. In the literature on African local government there has certainly been a very great emphasis on form, with the result that there is considerable shallowness in analysis.

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Accommodation and conflict in an African peri-urban area

BY PETER C. W. GUTKIND

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article est basé sur une enquête menée par l'auteur à Mulago, un faubourg de Kampala, Uganda.

Un nombre sans cesse croissant d'Africains vivent aujourd'hui dans des conditions bien différentes de celles de leur vie traditionnelle. Il résulte de là que les groupements de personnes non apparentées prennent désormais une plus grande importance. Il semble que les anthropologues aient jusqu'ici trop exclusivement centré leurs études sur l'aspect tribal de la société africaine, ce qui n'est pas de grande utilité dans les conditions de changements rapides et d'hétérogénéité qui caractérisent les nouveaux milieux urbains. Il faut ajouter que les anthropologues déplorent l'évolution de la communauté vers des formes d'associations modernes. Cela apparaît clairement dans les études sur les changements sociaux qui s'expriment presqu'exclusivement en termes de détribalisation, d'individualisation et de commercialisation. La plupart du temps, on a ignoré les conséquences positives et fonctionnelles de l'urbanisation et de l'immigration. De plus, la concentration des études anthropologiques sur l'évolution des formes et des fonctions institutionnelles a fait négliger l'étude des changements de structures à l'intérieur des systèmes sociaux ou de leurs parties constituantes. L'auteur avance que la société urbaine (africaine) comprend un grand nombre de sous-groupes hiérarchiquement ordonnés, et que les problèmes d'adaptation et d'intégration des nouvelles communautés urbaines réflètent la tension qui existe entre ces sous-groupes, et qui se manifeste dans le commerce et les occupations, ainsi que dans l'administration politique et juridique.

L'auteur conclut qu'on pourrait expliquer la structure de la société urbaine de l'Afrique par une série de propositions sur l'ethnocentrisisme en-groupe et hors-groupe qu'il considère comme un important mécanisme d'adaptation fonctionnelle.

Introduction

Today, an increasing number of Africans pass a good part of their life in an altogether new setting — in the emerging industrial, commercial and administrative centers most of which,

certainly those of East Africa, are the product of European colonization. Increasingly, too, urban Africans in particular are part of a new community reaching far beyond the cultural, political and economic frontiers of their traditional life. For example, as many urban Africans are young unmarried migrants without local family ties, non-familial associations assume particular importance. Tribal associations and settlements, neighbourhoods, lodgings, factory and office centered associations, recreation groups, savings and friendly societies, new political groupings and the like, and religious associations have resulted in very major structural changes at the level of basic and traditional relationships.[1]

In recent years anthropological studies in Africa, as elsewhere, have concentrated on the changes in institutional forms and functions brought about by situations of contact. However, this cliché-ridden conceptualization has largely obscured the fact that change has primarily resulted in structural changes *within* social systems rather than basic change of the system as a whole.[2] As such, it yet remains to be documented that norm change must precede social change. It is far more likely (and far more clearly documented) that new norms are incorporated in the established patterns of life and as such receive indirect sanction by the society among whose people change is taking place. Furthermore, a great deal of urban African research has concentrated on the documentation of basically vital demographic facts as these have been brought to light by a large number of surveys.[3] While this has provided us with the basic documentation upon which hypotheses and further research must be based, until recently we could draw upon a few attempts setting out theoretical for-

[1] See, for example, SOUTHALL (1961: 4) who writes: "But apart from generalizations about individualism, weakening of sanctions, secularization and commercialization, no clear picture has emerged of the trend of structural change within tribal communities at the fundamental level of family, neighbourhood, and small group relationships."

[2] It now appears to be fully recognized that this is so even in such instances when contact resulted in the introduction of previously unknown economic, political and religious systems such as cash cropping and plantation economies, indirect rule and new forms of local government (or imposed political offices), monotheism and other Western ideologies and practices.

[3] While literature has become extensive, yet of uneven quality, the most extensive coverage has been achieved in FORDE (1956) and SOUTHALL (1961).

mulations. However, the recent publication of a series of papers introduced and edited by Southall (1961) is an important point of departure. The introductory summary by Southall is a closely argued theoretical formulation attempting to draw together a considerable body of literature.[4]

Finally, anthropological studies have traditionally been concerned with 'tribalistic' studies which frequently had two negative consequences. First, an isolated entity, generally referred to as "the tribe" and "tribesmen" have been the starting point of analysis. But this approach often totally neglected that tribal boundaries lacked definition and that tribes were frequently on the move and hence in contact with other groups. Secondly, all too frequently, anthropological studies have focused on and repeatedly put forward the concept of 'detribalization' as a major theoretical orientation. While it is evident, as Gluckman (1961: 69-70) has pointed out, that the "moment an African crosses his tribal boundary to go to town, he is 'detribalized' out of the political control of the tribe", it is more significant that new norms and forms of social relationship emerge. Yet certain tribal norms, particularly on the level of small group behaviour, have often a remarkable tenacity of survival (Mitchell 1959). Certainly one of the less insightful interpretations which have accompanied certain studies of social change is the view that changes of traditional political authority, the rise of nationalism, of the emancipation of women, of subsistence changes and of the new migration to urban areas has a major detrimental and negative effect on the African population as a whole. However, certainty in the face of ignorance is not alien to scientific inquiry. Certainly, both Van Velsen (1960) and Watson (1958; 1959) have given us new and creative insight into the positive and functional consequences of rapid change particularly in regard to migration.

I.

The proposition is frequently put forward that the differences between urban and rural social structure are considerable.

[4] See also SOUTHALL (1956: 557-578; 1957).

Below I set out what have frequently been considered major differences.

Accomodation and Conflict in an African Peri-Urban... by Peter C.W. Gutkind

Rural	*Urban*
1. Particularistic	1. Univeralistic
2. Low mobility	2. High mobility
3. Restricted role function	3. Multiple role function
4. Ascribed status	4. Achieved status
5. Close solidarity	5. Diffuse solidarity
6. Institutionalized functions	6. Non-institutionalized functions and considerable social anomie
7. Relatively homogeneous groupings	7. Considerable heterogeneity and composition
8. Considerable integration, stability and unity	8. Overall minimal integration, stability and considerable diversity
9. Norms, sanctions and structure supported by traditional political authority and kinship roles	9. Changing norms and structures, unpremeditated action, idio-syncratic conduct and structural differences

The reason for introducing such a typology is to point out that in rural social organization membership for individuals and groups is defined in terms of belonging to a number of particularistic yet over-lapping and interdependent sub-groups and structural divisions which order kinship, political, economic and ritual spheres all of which are highly institutionalized. However, in urban society individual and group relations tend to be marked by participation in relatively isolated sub-systems contained within the urban configuration. It is one of the propositions put forward in this paper that in urban society the strains and lack of stability are consequent not merely upon problems of integration *within* the constituent groups comprising the sub-systems but that the problems of accommodation and conflict in heterogeneous urban societies reflect tensions primarily *between* the main sub-groups and categories of people of which such (African) urban societies are composed.

II.

The densely populated area surrounding the predominantly non-African municipality of Kampala has been reported on by Gutkind (1960) and Southall and Gutkind (1957). A marked feature of this all-African area, which is under the control of the

Buganda Government, and which exercises its political authority through a cadre of minor chiefs is that the African inhabitants of this area comprise an extremely heterogeneous group of between thirty to forty ethnic groups. Each of which may be treated as a sub-system ordered hierarchically according to cultural, language, occupational and social characteristics. It is the hierarchical ordering of these sub-systems in the context of a heterogeneous urban society that results in considerable tensions of accomodation and integration which, in the case of Ganda versus others, can be seen in terms of an in-group out-group relationship.

A closer analysis of the parish of Mulago, one of twelve sub-divisions of the (sub)county surrounding the municipality will clarify this interpretation.

The area from which my data is taken comprises some sixty-seven acres most of which is densely settled with a population of 1339 people. The focal point of the area is the market and commercial area where the small retail Ganda traders (some seventeen of them in January 1954) predominate. While some non-Ganda occupy modest stalls only two non-Ganda traders were successful in carrying on small retail trade in the main street. Between 1953-1955 seven non-Ganda traders (four Luo and three Rwanda) started small shops of which three lasted between two and four months, and two from four to nine months. While no doubt small-scale African enterprise faces special difficulties unconnected with the specialized division of labour along ethnic lines, in every one of the five cases the non-Ganda shopkeepers gave place to Ganda who received preferential treatment by Ganda land owners and house owners. In 1953 a Ganda Association of Shopkeepers was formed with a view to "protecting Ganda trade in Mulago". This organization brought considerable pressure on Ganda land and houseowners to lease their property to Ganda only. Indeed, during 1954 this Association approached a number of Asian wholesalers in Kampala with the request not to supply non-Ganda shopkeepers in Mulago with commodities. As the capital which the majority on non-Ganda are able to sink into their enterprise is generally very small, Ganda traders with their greater wealth can operate better shops

which are often well stocked. While non-Ganda residents patronized non-Ganda traders as much as possible, the greater range of commodities in Ganda shops attracted non-Ganda trade. While commercial activity does not exist in isolation, the Ganda traders may be viewed as a distinct sub-system upon which other ethnic groups are dependent, a fact which not infrequently was brought out by non-Ganda who claimed that Ganda shopkeepers were cheating on weight, measure and change. In turn, Ganda shopkeepers not infrequently insulted and refused to serve non-Ganda.

Administratively the area is under the jurisdiction of a paid minor chief (Southall and Gutkind 1957: 183-185) who appoints half a dozen or so unpaid ward headmen who not infrequently are local landowners or their stewards (Southall and Gutkind 1957: 185-189). The power of the local chief is deeply entrenched in rather undefined traditional powers confirmed under the Uganda Native Authority Ordinance of 1919 (Uganda Laws 1935). It is the local chief and his assistants who jointly carry out various administrative and legal functions. The chief is charged with maintaining law and order and seeing to it that the instructions from the Buganda Government are carried out, the most important of which is the collection of various taxes.

It is this important function which places the Ganda chief in a politically dominant position which is, if not rejected outright, the cause of endless suspicion by non-Ganda who insist that as "visitors" they do not benefit from such taxes. Furthermore, non-Ganda claim that they alone are subject to special pressures in meeting their tax obligation but that many Ganda pay if and when they feel like doing so.

Apart from tax collection, the Ganda chief and ward headmen meet once a week at which time they constitute themselves as a "court" and hear "cases" laid before them. As the chief's judicial authority is not clearly codified in law his authority is limited to arbitration based on the consent of the disputing parties and their willingness to lay complaints before him. In this way a large number of minor disputes are settled relieving the (sub)county court and judges of a vast number of petty cases. Before disputes, acts of violence or thieving are laid before the

chief, the ward headmen try to arbitrate and thus further relieve the chief of many hours of patient listening.

It is below the level of the ward headmen that non-Ganda make special efforts to solve their own disputes by laying these before elders or appointed leaders of their tribal group. Non-Ganda not merely insist that a Ganda chief does not understand their customs and procedures of dealing with a wide variety of difficulties which arise, but that they are often handicapped linguistically when pleading their case before him. Furthermore, they claim that should their disputes involve Ganda residents their chances of a reasonable hearing and fair arbitration are very small indeed. Thus, there has come into being an informal system whereby various tribal groups attempt to resolve their own disputes, a procedure which in turn works against the uniform execution of law and order so vital in an urban locality that in any event has grown up with the minimum regimentation in a number of vital areas where control is normally considered essential.

Once before the Ganda chief, non-Ganda must follow the procedures laid down by Ganda tradition. Both plaintiff and defendent must prostrate before the chief. Ganda are invariably heard first. The use of Swahili by non-Ganda is frowned upon. Arbitration is offered in terms of Ganda tradition. For example, in a case when a non-Ganda complained that a ward headman had treated him with abuse after the former had received help to catch a thief, the case was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff would not have been so abused had he observed the Ganda custom of rewarding the headman with a gift in kind or in cash Complaints against a Ganda thief are frequently not upheld on the allusive ground that the more educated Ganda are not given to stealing particularly from non-Ganda who are merely "visitors". Violation of non-Ganda women by Ganda men is frequently also dismissed on the ground that non-Ganda are merely visitors and their womenfolk are compensation for Ganda "bearing the burden of an invasion by foreigners." The Ganda chief and the ward headmen take every opportunity to point out to non-Ganda that the only way for them to solve the problems arising from their immigrant status is by "acting like Ganda"

and talking like them. Yet even for those who are firmly settled, entry into Ganda society is prevented by Ganda ethnocentrism, i.e. the tendency of Ganda to judge other cultures by the standards of their own prevailing culture. To the Ganda, as to non-Ganda, ethnocentrism becomes an important instrument of *internal* social control within the group. Indeed it is important to recognize that for non-Ganda, in the heterogeneous setting in which each tribal group finds itself, ethnocentrism becomes an important device whereby the out-group adapts itself to the economic and political environment created by the dominant Ganda.

This point is seen more clearly when analysing the spatial distribution of the heterogeneous population (Gutkind 1961). It will then be found that the parish of Mulago comprises a series of tribal settlements with the Ganda dominating the dense commercial area and the smaller non-Ganda groups spaced peripherally around the market and main street. Such settlements, usually comprising a group of closely spaced houses, have their own internal political and social structure which reflects tribal custom. This is particularly reflected in dietary habits and not infrequently in the mode of dress, the arrangement of living space, the rearing of children and widely different sanitary standards. Not infrequently such ethnic enclaves stand in considerable isolation being surrounded by small plots. Depending on the degree of isolation the residents will feel either free or constrained to follow certain traditions such as occasional feasts and dances. The chief and his ward headmen rarely intrude in these ethnic enclaves but if this occurs they are treated with a mixture of suspicion-cum-politeness. Depending on the nature of the business calling for such a contact, it is customary for members of the tribal group to designate one or two of its members as spokesmen.

In the eyes of the Ganda such tribal settlements are ordered hierarchically. Certain groups are virtually compelled to isolate themselves because of the low status ascribed to the tribe by the Ganda. This is particularly true of those people whose customs and habits are treated with scorn by the Ganda, i.e. those who decorate or mutilate their body and those who eat certain food never taken by Ganda or those whose jobs are considered

extremely menial. Members of such tribal groups are treated as scapegoats in many situations. Women members of such groups are invariably designated as prostitutes and men as thieves and trouble makers.

Apart from these tribal settlements, perhaps the most distinctive feature of the adaptation made by the sub-groups in the larger urban setting are the various friendly societies, tribal associations, socio-cultural, recreational and occupational associations which have come into being in recent years (Little 1957). The objectives and organization of these "traditional-modernized" associations and their policy of ethnic exclusiveness of their membership renders them at one and the same time a functional adaptation emphasizing the in-group's ethnocentrism while acting as a deterrent to the rapid integration of the sub-groups in an urban milieu. To many a newly arrived immigrant, the tribal association becomes the only point of anchorage in an alien urban environment.

III.

In summary: the problems of accommodation and conflict in heterogeneous African urban society can be best set out in terms of a number of propositions about in-group and out-group ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism might well be viewed as an important functionally adaptive mechanism. While no doubt there is a correlation between in-group ethnocentricity and conflict with out-groups, as the result of the in-group's internal solidarity and conformity of its members, there is also a functional and positive association between in-group ethnocentricity and solidarity and adaptation not merely to the exercise of political and economic power by a dominant group vis-à-vis a large number of sub-groups but also as an adaptive mechanism between hierarchically ordered sub-groups. In as much as this functional adaptation leads to withdrawal from interaction with members of other sub-groups the emergence of an urban society whose members have a commen understanding and loyalty is hindered.

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Recensions - Book Reviews

The Politics of the Developing Areas. Gabriel A. ALMOND and James S. COLEMAN (editors), Princeton University Press, 1960, xii, 591 pp. $10.00.

Although this book is written primarily for political scientists interested in non-Western areas, its theoretical goals are more broadly based in that a general approach to the study of political behaviour is introduced and utilized, to some extent, by the various contributing authors. The book is divided into seven sections, only three of which will be treated in this review — those dealing with theory, and the section on sub-Saharan Africa. The reviewer feels that the limitations of his own competence, plus the specialized nature of this issue of the journal preclude any worthwhile assessment of those parts of the book dealing specifically with Asia and Latin America. Parenthetically, if the accounts of Asia and Latin America are as comprehensive and accurate as the one on Africa, then they are immensely valuable reference guides to the contemporary political life in these areas. Certainly they make good reading, even if it is impossible to gauge the accuracy of qualitative judgements and generalizations without specialized areal knowledge.

In the long introduction, one of the editors (Almond) lays out a conceptual and systematic approach to the study of politics based on "functions". These are said to be properties of political activity universally present in all societies and it is assumed that there may be more or less articulated and specialized social structures through which these functions are carried out in any given social milieu. This obviates the need for any state/stateless dichotomy, and lays the way open for comparative work. The functions themselves are as follows: (1) political socialization and recruitment, (2) interest articulation, values, attitudes, and claims which may or may not develop into political activity, (3) aggregation, the means of "aggregating the interests, claims, and demands which have been articulated by the interest groups of the polity" (pages 38-9), (4) political communication, the communication of information dealing with political activity, (5) governmental functions, under three sub-headings (a) rule-making, (b) rule application, and (c) rule adjudication. The first four of these are called input functions and the fifth is conceived as output in the political system. It should be noted that all functions are not thought of as being at the same level of abstraction, e.g. communication takes place from, to, and between all aspects of politics. However the categories are thought of as mutually exclusive areas of political behaviour which represent possible pathways

for the development of separate institutions, such as political parties, labour unions, legislatures, judiciaries, the press, and so on.

In a fairly extensive chapter (pages 247-368) Coleman describes and analyses "territorial" (national) and "regional" (delineated sub-sections of national states) in Africa south of the Sahara. He first describes the traditional political systems and classifies them into large-scaled states, centralized chiefdoms, dispersed tribal societies and small autonomous local communities. He then describes briefly how these different traditional backgrounds affect national modern politics and generalizes on the subject. His most interesting suggestion here is that there is a tendency in some areas of Africa for the nationalist leaders to come from smaller tribal societies, or autonomous local communities rather than larger traditional political entities because these people represent groups that do not threaten others in the emerging nation. Coleman then classifies African states into European controlled, transitional, and African controlled, dividing the last category into three sub-types, historic African states, new states, and emergent states. He uses this classification to describe the changes occurring in political activity in each of the three types by the action of urbanization, the commercialization of land and labour, and the impact of Western education. A number of generalizations about change emerge, among them an interesting one on education. Coleman suggests that colonial rulers placed so much emphasis on education, that the educated African is now convinced that "the educated have a divine right to rule" (page 283). The processes of change have also brought rapid social mobility to a few at the top during the period of emergent nationhood, and a general spread of secularism as well as an almost religious belief in the inevitability of progress, on the part of the political elites. The author also reviews political parties and interest groups in the various African states, treating each of four types of party systems separately. He comments (pages 315, 362-3) that in most of colonial Africa the administrators did the governmental work, and "politics" was always considered somewhat "seditious". This bureaucratic legacy portends "the continued application of rules by a distinctive bureaucratic structure, but one highly responsive to, if not the personal instrument of, the political leaders in power" (page 363).

In the final chapter of the book, Professor Coleman difines the word "modern" in operational terms and sums up the underdeveloped areas as having relatively low social and geographic mobility, lack of integration or cohesion as territorial units, and a large gap between the traditional mass and the essentially Westernized political elite who are in control, or who will be shortly. He then tests the general hypothesis first developed by Lipset that there is a positive correlation between economic development and political competitiveness (as opposed to some form of one-party or no-party totalitarianism). Except for a few anomalies such as Cuba (pre-Castro), the United Arab Republic, and Venezuela, the correlation seems to be substantiated by the data presented in this book. He then reviews each of the functions outlined by Almond, and generalizes about the con-

ditions affecting the development of modernity in each one of them. Here again, this reviewer sensed a definite amount of repetition and marshalling of evidence to suggest that highly centralized bureaucratic states were the point towards which many of these systems are evolving.

It is difficult in the space of a short review to comment critically and responsibly on as much work as there is in this book. The theoretical approach, the hunches, and the generalizations which develop from it are fascinating. Professor Coleman's ability to systematize, describe, and analyse are so prodigious that any criticism should be tempered with admiration. The African material is exceedingly well presented. Anthropologists might well quibble about a point or two, but in general Coleman's concentration on classification before discussion narrows the possibility of over-generalization even when he is aiming at a level of social scale at which most anthropologists would find generalizations hazardous. It may be unfair to comment about the use of theory, since we are told in the preface (page viii) that the functional system (*qua* system) was worked out in detail after the area sections were completed. However, the section on sub-Saharan Africa seems to be divided into two parts. The first section deals with groupings of African polities and the second considers the material, some of it repeated from the first section, using Almond's functional categories. This gives the analysis greater depth from the areal point of view, but is somewhat regrettable from a theoretical standpoint, since it is difficult to see whether the theory can stand on its own feet as a method of describing and analysing political activity.

The theory and its application point up a difference in emphasis that is of importance to social anthropolgists, especially those interested in political organization, although it has much deeper consequences for our discipline as a whole. Almond and Coleman have decided to ask questions about the nature of political activity. In doing so they are making political behaviour, attitudes, values, and demands the independent variable, and political structures the dependent variable. If there is any implied causality here, then structure seems to be more a result than a cause. Much of the work in social anthropology seems to be the converse, in that behaviour and functions in terms of attitudes, values, or pre-requisites of the system, to speak in a Malinowskian manner, are implied to be more often than not, the result of structure. There is, of course, some truth, in both these approaches; activities, attitudes, goals, etc. do produce structures and structures do in turn determine and limit behaviour. However this reviewer would contend that a different kind of study results from a theoretical approach which stresses first of all function as opposed to one that starts with structure. The latter type of analysis was given to us by the followers of Radcliffe-Brown, the latest version of which is in Middleton and Tait's *Tribes Without Rulers*. Now Almond and Coleman have shown us, at a different level of scale, what a stress on function can produce. It is this reviewer's bias that the functional stress rather than the structural will in the end

prove more fruitful, but only time and the continued research efforts of workers using both approaches will give us the answer.

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Government in Zazzau: A Study of Government in the Hausa Chiefdom of Zaria in Northern Nigeria from 1800 to 1950. M. G. SMITH, international African Institute, London: Oxford University Press, 1960, xii, 371 pp., 3 maps. $7.50.

Government in Zazzau is a detailed analysis of historical changes in the administration and power structure of the kingdoms of Zaria, Northern Nigeria, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The author, M.G. Smith, one of the leading anthropologists of the area, sets himself a nobly complex task: to analyse the historical data, to account for detectable changes, and in so doing, to set forth a general theory of government. It should be said first that Smith makes as fine a scrutiny of the data as one could wish. Second, the explanatory theoretical framework is forcefully, if somewhat elaborately, argued. And third, Smith fails to convince this reviewer, at least, that his general theory of government is sufficiently self-sustaining to permit the exclusion of data other than the kind which the author so competently presents and analyses. This may be so because both the data and the conceptual framework are overwhelmingly concerned with the rulers, and not the ruled.

Smith is fortunate in having two sources of data. These are, first, statements of Hausa-Fulani informants gathered during Smith's own extensive experience in Zaria Province. Smith judges this data to be reliable because of the high degree of internal correlation of statements gathered from different informants in different contexts. This material was gathered incidentally to the major focus of his 1949-50 fieldwork, which was a socio-economic survey of Zaria Province — a survey which resulted in the publication of a classic study in economic anthropology.[1] At the time, Smith writes, he was mainly interested in the Fulani-Zaria (= "Zazzau") government as a "self-contained system, the development of which could be studied in isolation to determine continuties of governmental form and process from the Fulani conquest until the present day" (p. 13).

The second source of data for the present work is independent of Smith's own fieldwork. These data are contained in the account by Mallamai Hassan and Shu'aibu of the governmental system of the kingdom of Abuja in Zaria. This kingdom was established by the Zaria Habe (= "Hausa speakers"), following the conquest of the area by the Fulani in 1804. The statements of Smith's own Hausa-Fulani informants, already credited with

a high degree of internal consistency, are further substantiated by, and themselves tend to substantiate, the description of Abuja by Hassan and Shu'aibu. Neither of these authors claim that their account pertains to more than a description of the Habe government at Abuja since the time of the Fulani conquest. Smith makes the assumption, however, that the account by Hassan and Shu'aibu can be treated as a "provisional account of the government of Habe Zazzau in the previous century" (p. 11). The rationale for this assumption is as follows: (a) the Habe who fled from Zaria to Abuja probably would have required a conservative government, i.e., one preserving their former institutions and unity in order to continue to successfully resist the new Fulani kingdom in Zaria; and (b) "more prosaically, these were the institutions best known to them" — the Habe (p. 12).

This assumption is tested by Smith in a series of detailed comparisons of the *sarautu* (= "titled offices") of both Habe Abuja and Fulani Zaria. Changes in the Habe system of government which took place after the Fulani conquest, as well as changes in the Fulani system itself, involve Smith and the reader in a logically complex and often brilliant analysis of the systemics of government and governmental change. Suffice it to say here that Smith (p. 14) sees government, in general, as consisting of the political administration of public affairs. Political and administrative systems are "analytically distinctive and essential components of government as a structure and as a process". Changes in sources of power and authority are detected by scrutinizing the changing relationships between the *sarautu*. A great virtue of Smith's explication is that theories and concepts never stand in the way of the presentation of substantive material, limited as these data may be to the formal and systematic aspects of Hausa and Fulani governments. Smith makes the point that he is dealing with a continuous process of change, thereby helping to avoid "the difficulties which beset comparative studies of change in unrelated or dissimilar systems" (p. 294).

By adopting a common frame of reference, Smith analyses out seven persistent features of Habe government, and then notes the changes which have taken place in their order of precedence and logical priority. Further analysis leads to the postulation of three laws of structural change: (a) "the law of differential resistance" (changes in the form of a system are variably resisted according to whether they impinge on administrative or power structures); (b) "the law of self-contradiction in change" (attempts to change the form of a system by instituting changes of content are self-defeating — a corollary Smith derives by examining unsuccessful changes, or changes which failed to be institutionalized); and (c) "the law of structural drift" and its corollary — given stability in its context, the structure of a governmental ssytem changes as a function of the political action it generates internally. That is, structural change is never unilateral; the internal dynamic of structural change is the redistribution of power relationship.

Any summary of Smith's theoretical position risks grave injustice to the author by misrepresentation and over-simplification. Frankly, this is not

only because his argument is complex, but also because of its presentation — which, to this reviewer, appears somewhat over-elaborate. The postulational method, as a method, has no virtue except clarity, and the reader's impression may well be that what Smith has to say — and it is well worth while listening to — could be said more simply.

A more serious criticism may be directed at the kinds of data Smith admits to scrutiny. For example, Smith notes (p. 12) that the "Habe who settled in Abuja, far from copying the political institutions of their subject Gwari, Koro, and Bassa populations, have supplied these tribes with models which have been extensively copied, even if poorly understood". What more the reader learns of these subject populations is largely in terms of the personal adventures and fortunes of the different holders of the titles in the kingdoms of Zaria and Abuja. That this point of view is one which would predominate in the accounts by Smith's Zaria Fulani informants and by Hassan and Shu'aibu is entirely expectable and understandable, but it seems a curious limitation for Smith to set himself as an anthropologist, expertly familiar with these subject populations.

For instance, eunuchs made up one of the four basic status-groups comprising the titled officials of Abuja. According to Smith (p. 37), these eunuchs "were recruited by the king from certain villages." How? By force? By payment? Was the production of eunuchs one of the "poorly understood" features of the Abuja kingdom copied by the subject population? In subsequent pages, the importance of these eunuchs is underscored again and again — but always in terms of rank within their status group, their duties as titled officials, as advisors to the king himself, from the point of view of their personal fortunes and misfortunes in the political history of the Abuja and Zaria kingdoms, and according to changes in their administrative and/or political competences. What Smith has to say about all of the foregoing is forceful, compelling, and highly detailed — from the point of view of a ruling system, of its structure, organization, and functions. Again, we learn much about the ruling system, which used eunuchs, but little of the subject populations who presumably supplied them, or the social conditions which made their supply possible. The point of this criticism is, simply, granted (for the sake of argument only) that the governmental systems of the subject populations had little effect on those of their rulers, Habe and Fulani, cannot changes in social organization(as distinct from political organization) effect changes in social structure and hence political structure? If this is the case, are then Smith's laws and corollaries sufficiently self-sustaining, both logically and empirically, to permit the inclusion of a wider range of data than that which he employs? This is not an unfriendly question with which to end a critique. Smith himself describes (p. 331) his study as containing "two adventures in theory" — the development of a conceptual framework and theory of structural change. If the framework and the theory prove too narrow, their confinement may stimulate the exploration of new frontiers.

The plan of *Government in Zazzau* is excellent. A preface and Introduction initiate the reader to the history of the work, the general setting of Zaria, and the nature of Smith's data. There immediately follows a chapter on theory — the nature of government, and the conceptual framework used for its analysis. The five following chapters are again theoretically oriented. A series of appendices, including Smith's own annotated translation of part of the work by Hassan and Shu'aibu, make much of the data readily available to the reader — lists of offices and duties, titles and associated fiefs, tax payments, official transfers and promotions. Lacking is a glossary of Hausa-Fulani terms (liberally sprinkled throughout the text), but this deficiency is somewhat offset by a fairly comprehensive index. There are three maps and charts. In both plan and execution, author and publisher are to be congratulated.

[1] *The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria.* Colonial Research Studies No. 16. Published by Her Majesty's Stationary Office For the Colonial Office. London, 1955.

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Nigerian Perspectives. Thomas HODGKIN, London: Oxford University Press, 1960, 540 pp. $ 4.50.

To the non-specialist who opens this book, it comes as a surprise. Who would have thought that there was such a wealth of documents about the past of this "new" nation? Yet there is, because if the nation is new, the peoples living in it have an old and brilliant history, as can already be seen by a look at the first illustration, "a Nok culture figure, probably made during the last few centuries B.C." The author has been well aware that Nigeria's past is a past of many states and many peoples and has concentrated accordingly on five main themes: Kanem, Bornu and its dependencies, the Hausa states and their southern neighbours, the Fulani empire, the Oyo empire, the Benin empire, the Delta states and their Ibo hinterland. For each of these themes he has arranged his texts in chronological order by century or half century. This arrangement has left out some of the Eastern and Western areas of Nigeria and most conspicuously the middle-belt of so-called "pagan tribes" and the Borgu kingdom. The only sources for the middle belt are oral traditions and they have not been collected yet, so they were not available. But a text on Borgu could have been included with profit. It also strikes the reader that the XIXth century has been allotted half of the available space, whilst he, at least the reviewer, would have liked to see more about earlier centuries. But then the defense of the author will be, I suppose, that his proportions correspond to the proportions of the available documentation.

The texts themselves have been carefully chosen. They touch on every possible subject from slave-trade to the education of women and from the coming of Islam in Kanem to the coming of motor-cars in Nupe. The sources represent also every possible type of historical document with the exception of accounts and laws. Both of these could have been included. But here are documents from Arab geographers, European travelers, traders, missionaries, skippers and even journalists, from African rulers and their followers, from Nigerian historians about their society or their history. There is poetry, there are traditions of origin, there are letters, treatises, and books. All biases, all particularities of the different types of sources one encounters in dealing with African history are represented. And this is certainly a feat.

But the author deserves special praise for his inclusion of oral traditions and texts of persons such as Antera Duke, Equiano, Uthman dan Fodio, Mohammed Bello, Al Kanami and Baba of Karo, which give us an African appreciation on the society of their days and help us to feel the bias present in all Arabic and European descriptions. For the reviewer it is only regrettable that the author could not include more letters by Africans in his final XIXth century sources. As for the other selections the historian will recognize such old friends as Richard Burton, Ibn Khaldoun, Olphert Dapper, De Barros, Leo Africanus, Merolla de Sorrento, who have travelled over wide portions of the continent or at least reported about them. He will be delighted to make new acquaintances in far greater number than he thought possible. And, although the author defends himself for having written a source-book, he has provided us with a guide to nearly all the important sources of Nigerian history. And that will make his work invaluable for students and teachers alike.

How does such a book strike anthropologists? I suppose that many of them who will read it, will be startled and I hope it will be a healthy shock. Too many of them have neglected the historical dimensions of the problems they are studying, thinking that there was no history, that there were no sources to be consulted. Here one can discover that Barth was a great anthropologist. His famous passage about the foreign trade on the Kano market in 1850 is a masterpiece. One realizes the descriptive power which emanates from many sketches such as those by Mary Kingsley or Richard Burton, a quality which conveys many data on the culture described in a straightforword fashion. Authors like Van Nyendael or Drapper remind one that everybody is biased even if he writes about social structure. The declarations of the inhabitants of Warri that theirs is the only country in the world worth speaking of are a typical example of the ethnocentrism for which an anthropologist in the field usually falls, but which he must overcome just as he overcame his previous ethnocentrisms. The texts of Bello and Al Khanami show that ideologises are involved in the makings of history and offer part of an explanation, even for the founding of an empire. Finally what is a better illustration of acculturation problems than the

dialogue, p. 248? *Mr Schön* (the missionary), "There is but one God." *Obi* (the king), "I always understood there were two."

Anthropologists can be very valuable to historians if they include historical depth in their own studies. For one, they are generally better equipped to collect and interpret oral traditions than historians are. A good instance of this is given by the text of Nadel included in this book. They have a technique to worm autobiographies out of people, see *Baba of Karo,* and they can use history as a dimension for their own studies as M.G. SMITH did in his *Government in Zazzau.* All of this and much more, one hopes will strike the anthropologist who is made aware of the fact that after all, Africa has a history.

As for this book, one of the urgent needs of the "new" nations in Africa is the publications of national histories and collections of historical texts. Nigeria is fortunate in having an anthology now, which is varied in its contents, nearly complete in its scope and honest and objective in the choice of its content.

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The New Nigerian Elite. Hugh H. and Mabel M. SMYTHE. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960. xii, 196 pp., index, map, notes, 22 tablets. $ 5.00.

Independence is being won for African countries by a small group of persons, often called *élites* or *évolués.* There has been a great deal of speculation about these persons but little is really known about them. Hugh and Mabel Smythe, in their book, *The New Nigerian Elite,* have attempted to answer some questions about one of these groups, the new elite of Nigeria. Our authors lay the groundwork for their study by giving a good resume of Nigeria's ethnography, its traditional and post-conquest history and the struggle of its people for self-government and independence. This methodology includes the compilation of a list of 276 Nigerians on 1) the basis of the frequency with which their names appeared in the local papers, 2) their election to *Who's Who in Nigeria,* and 3) on their relative renown among Nigerians in high status positions. From this initial sample, the Smythes selected 165 persons for study, and finally interviewed 156 of them. In an attempt to round out their study they interviewed 500 other persons.

It is the contention of the Smythes that the emergence of a new elite in Nigeria was influenced by three main factors: "1) urbanization, 2) westernization, and 3) political development" (p. 44). They describe the influence of these forces on elite formation in the following terms: "...the city provides the circumstances for rapid and extensive changes. It is a place

where many persons are at a distance from their extended-family and village roots. It is a place where temptations and opportunities motivate individual ambition. It is a place where the value of education is demonstrably high. Finally, it is a place where one daily sees examples of individual achievements on the basis of personal skills and competences" (p. 57).

The city was also the place where "the complex and sometimes contradictory cultural patterns and ideas loosely referred to as 'Western culture' [were] transmitted to Nigeria through the several media by which they could be spread. Elite status came to be identified with at least a degree of westernization in living patterns and standards, particularly in the South" (p. 58). Into these cities also flowed a number of young Nigerians eager and willing to start their education or to continue the education which many of them had received in mission schools in the rural areas. From here many of these young people went on to Britain or America for higher education or to Ibadan university when it was created. University training increased the westernization process of the elite and led to a blurring of "memories of life in the villages and hamlets from which they came." Foreign training further alienated the elite members from their roots, and very often resulted in their rejection of the tenets of "bush society," and the adoption of "an urban, westernized social order." The Smythes concluded that western ideals, associated as they were with elite status, "became an integral part of the new self" (pp. 63-64). In the opinion of our authors, political development in Nigeria influenced the formation of a new elite. The old traditional leaders, bound by traditional loyalties that kept each ethnic group to its own ways, could not serve the needs of modern Nigeria. This resulted in the creation of a new elite made up of individuals who could serve the new political needs of their respective communities.

The 156 who formed the "core" of the Smythes' sample revealed the following characteristics: First of all, they are quite young. More than 91% were born after 1900, and of these 75% were born between 1910 and 1939. Thus, most of these persons were born during the period of British rule. Secondly, almost all of the members of this sample had gone to western type schools. All had gone beyond primary school, and about 70 of them had taken degrees from foreign universities. A third important characteristic of the elite was that medicine, law and education were among the most common occupations found among them. Only about 12% were businessmen, suggesting to our researchers that "first, business is at present under-evaluated as a social function; second, that business in Nigeria is, in general, so small that there are few businessmen of distinction who deserve recognition on a par with others of the elite group..." Of interest here is the fact that regardless of profession, 113 among the 156 persons in the sample were employed by, or connected with the Colonial government. This finding led the Smythes to conclude that "the surest occupational road to top elite status is to obtain professional training and then seek public office" (p. 83). A fourth characteristic of the sample was that some ethnic

groups in Nigeria were more heavily represented among the elite group than others. For example, 39.2% of this elite sample was Yoruba, 31.4% was Ibo, and about 14.8% was Hausa-Fulani. Interestingly enough, many of the elite in this sample sought to discourage the interviewers from attaching too much importance to tribal affiliation, and about 14 persons declined to give their own ethnic affiliation.

The Smythes made a number of socio-cultural generalizations about the elite members of their sample population. They found elite members gregarious within the confines of their nuclear families, and within their own group. They also found that entrance into the social group of the elite was not difficult, and social mobility fairly easy. The only difficulty in this area was "tribalism" which according to our authors reduces the social mobility of elite members who live outside their ethnic areas. Nevertheless, the Smythes insist that elite members did not wish to abandon their tribal affiliations, and felt so strongly about the value of these relations that they believed that tribal allegiances were "tough enough to stand changes in cultural patterns" (p. 111). In contrast to the general gregariousness within the elite group, elite members were very formal and circumspect with outsiders of equal status with whom they occasionally socialized. They did not socialize with the masses, and according to our interviewers there was a "psychological separation" between the elite and the masses. They add: "In a sense, the elite are heirs to the British colonial officials in this respect; they show little tendency to identify with the masses, except on occasional broad political issues" (p. 167).

The Smythes reported a great ambivalance in the attitude of their elite respondents to the British. They pointed out that while "the British, along with other Europeans, served, as the top elite in non-indigenous functions and activities and were both a model of elite class patterns and ... the major means of developing in the direction of elite aspirations ... their exclusiveness, their color bar, their rigid class lines (which in Africa coincides with racial boundaries), and their reluctance to accept educated Nigerians all set limitations to the growth in status of the emerging westernized elite" (p. 121). Moreover, the British functionaries, being uninformed about the customs and values of the elite, impatient with them, and amused at their inability to approximate European behavior, stimulated educated Nigerians to write anti-colonialist tracts discussing their grievances, and spear-heading "demands for greater participatin in government" (p. 123). The Smythes reported that at the time of this study (1957-1958) there was still little personal relationship between the Nigerian elite and the British expatriates. Nigerians were still being only admitted to "European" clubs on a token basis, and Europeans still refrained from patronizing Nigerian clubs. Moreover, many of the interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with the slow rate of the Nigerianization of the governmental services, and criticized fellow Nigerians for being still too subservient to Europeans. The Smythes concluded that while their elite respondents wanted an end to colonialism, they

did not look upon the Britishers as demons. Furthermore, the more sophisticated among the persons in the sample took the "objective" view that the British did accomplish something for Nigeria even if this came about as a result of satisfying their own wants.

Surprisingly enough, the Smythes devote only about four pages to the political views of the members of their elite sample. They report that many members of the elite were early followers of Zik and the political radicals. However, they felt that conditions had so changed at the time of their study that: "contemporary Nigeria is now in a state of development which provides little seed for radical fervor, any elite person identified with radicalism automatically eliminates himself from certain opportunities available to one of his qualifications... With a prevailing atmosphere of satisfaction with political progress, and with individuals absorbed in the quest of personal advancement, the political radical finds little to nourish him in Nigeria today" (p. 119). Moreover, they report that while many of the persons in their sample felt the need to be the "leaders of a holy crusade to freedom and independence — to salvation, if you will" these same individuals wished to obtain for themselves the salaries and emoluments that came with their status as elite. The result was, according to our researchers, a contradiction of ideals. The elite members became "the leaders of the people and wielders of power; yet they are as alienated from the masses as were their predecessors, the British" (p. 119).

The Smythes have made a valuable contribution to our knowledge of a significant segment of the populations of the newly-independent African countries. They have also given us the opportunity to judge the applicability of sociological principles developed in western societies to social phenomena in non-western ones. The Smythes were aware of the many pitfalls involved in their study, and admitted their biases. Having done so, however, they felt justified in ignoring many of the problems involved. The result is that much of their findings can be predicted from their biases. Many sociologists might question their use of newspaper files, and the listings in *Who's who in Nigeria* as adequate sources for the knowledge of elite membership in Nigeria seeing that most Nigerians do not know what *Who's Who* is, and a large number of them are illiterate. Moreover, strict methodologists might have liked to examine some profiles of the questionnaire used by the Smythes and know about the way in which their additional 500 persons were interviewed.

The Smythes' treatment of the whole question of *elitism* needs some discussion. They stated, with some justification, that this concept is a dynamic and operational one, and should not be belaboured. For them 'elite' now implies in modern societies a broader and more flexible stratum of people who, for whatever reason, claim a position of superior prestige and a corresponding measure of influence over the fate of the community of which they are a part" (p. 14). My contention here is that the way in which the concept of elite was used in this study made certain results

predictable. The Smythes chose to emphasize the attributes of elite status in Nigeria rather than the relationship between the elite and the society in which it emerged.

If the members of the Nigerian elite were seen primarily in terms of the colonial structure in which they developed, rather than as a result of certain attributes of colonialism (urbanization, westernization and political development) the Smythes might have drawn different conclusions from their data. For example, if one takes the factor of westernization among the elite, it might become quite clear that this occurred because the Nigerians were subjected to a colonial regime which used cultural superiority as one of its weapons of dominance. Those Nigerians who became westernized gained prestige because they became the possessors of weapons which could be used against the colonizers. It is important to note that the elite did not receive their status from the British, who for the most part ridiculed their "westernization," but from the Nigerian masses. Seen in these terms, one could well inquire as to the meaning of westernization itself. As far as the Nigerian elite was concerned, westernization here is best seen as "pseudo-westernization," an operational weapon in a dialectic process. The feeling of "tribalism" which the Smythes found among the Nigerian elite is also best explained in these terms. The elite felt that "tribalism" was the hallmark of a backward society, a society which "needed" tutelage, and they did not wish their interviewers to stress tribalism. Nevertheless, "tribalism" was still "tremendously" important to these same disclaimers of the importance of tribalism. "Westernization" was important for obtaining political independence and had to be stressed; "tribalism" could retard this process and had to be denied.

Again, if we see the new Nigerian elite as essentially a product of a colonial system rather than of the process of "westernization", we gain a deeper understanding of its occupational affiliations and preferences. It was certainly no accident that the vast number of elite occupied government positions, and that they all felt the surest road to elite status was through a profession to public office. Political control is the central fact in the lives of colonized men; and as a result elite status is more easily won by men who are engaged in government and who thereby have some influence: "over the fate of the community of which they are a part." The reason that only 12% of the elite members were businessmen was not as the Smythes maintain, because business was "undervalued" or because there were few businessmen. It was because within a colonial context Nigerian businessmen *qua* businessmen were not involved in fighting for the political kingdom. It might well be that in a colonial setting, elite status could only go to those individuals who are *engagé* politically with or against the colonial regime, primarily against it.

Finally, it sems to this reviewer that it was the colonial situation rather than status differences which determined the relations between the elite and the Nigerian masses. The Smythes stated repeatedly that the elite were "alienated" from the masses; were "heirs to the British"; were "replacing the

British"; and that they showed little tendency to identify with the masses, except on occasional broad political issues." This treatment makes the elite appear to be bourgeois *gentils hommes* within the structure of a non-colonial society. The Nigerian elite could not replace the British, could not fall heir to British power, and could not be alienated from Nigerian society primarily because they could never have become British colonizers. The British, it must be remembered, dominated Nigerian society but were alien to it; the new elite are organic, if prestigeful, members of the colonial society. The prestige of the elite came from their usurpation of political power from the British — a usurpation which excluded the British. It is significant that the British in Nigeria became expatriates when they began to lose political power. The tendency of the elite or rather their ability to identify with the masses only on broad political issues, must be seen in terms of the colonial nature of Nigerian society. British rule in Nigeria came under attack because the British were alien to the masses. The new Nigerian elite gained prestige because their "alienation" from the masses better abled them to serve the interests of Nigerian society in general.

These comments no way detract from the usefulness of this book for students of Africa. It is valuable for an understanding of those new social groups arising in African countries. It is my hope, however, that future studies of Africa elites pay more attention to the important methodological problems which arise in studying problems in this area.

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From Tribal Rule to Modern Government. Raymond APTHORPE (Editor), Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Lusaka, 1959, xix, 216 pp. 10s Od.

This publication is the result of a conference on political change sponsored by the Rhodes-Livingstone Instute. The conference was attended by civil servants, professional anthropologists and the Institute's research staff and the format of the book reflects this diversity of participation. Following a theoretical introduction by the editor which sketches some of the major problems of political change, there is a fifty page discussion of colonial policy, nine case studies of political change and a review of the papers. As can be expected from a symposium, the articles and sections vary in theoretical sophistication, depth and quality and quantity of material. The introduction and some of the articles are heavily influenced by methods and concepts not traditionally employed by British anthropologists, but which are derived from the Parsonian school. The degree of political adaptation, the vulnerability of the political systems and a critique of typologies are topics of research. Other articles are the traditional ethnographic studies.

The first section reviews those policies which provided a rough and ready guide to the British colonial administrators in Africa. Much of the writing is hindsight guessing and ruminations laced with nostalgia, but despite the meandering, a few points arise. One administrator unconsciously reflects a basic bias when he recounts the ease and culture fit of the British administrators when dealing with centralized kingdoms and well-defined political roles, the ease of maintaining control and imposing new regulations, and conversely, the difficulties which arise when dealing with a decentralized political system. Fosbrooke, a colonial officer and anthropologist, treats the inherent difficulties an administrator encounters when attempting to anchor a bureaucracy, modified as it was, in Tanganyika, around the typical diffused role of a magico-religious leader. While there is no systematizing on features of a political system which impedes political transference, it is evident that in many decentralized political systems, the political processes were not continuous, but operated intermittently, usually in crisis situations, dealt with a narrow area of the political functions and rarely encompassed the duties envisaged by local government — all features hardly compatible with modern governments. These points open an area which might be fruitfully explored: the oft-stated fact of the ease in adding new functions and another level in superior-subordinate relations in a pre-existing system, and the apparent resistance to the creation of new political roles. It is unfortunate, but for one or two new minor points, this section is the weakest. A large number of studies of indigenous political systems exist and there are a smaller number of studies describing change, but very few studies focus on the administrators as the nexus between the two. Any formulation of political change in colonial territories would benefit from detailed information on the innovators, the administrators who are the locus of power and who are able to enforce changes.

The second section, nine case studies of political change drawn from Central, East and West Africa, is the core of the work. Although it is too much to expect a conference to produce an integrated group of papers attacking a similar problem with a consistent methodology, one focus does emerge: the papers attempt to organize their material around the problems of adaptation. However, adaptation as presented in these case studies is an abbreviated version of the total concept of adaptation, and represents to a striking degree, political stability with remarkably little concern about change. A note of surprise permeates the papers as instances of the continuation of the tradational system is recorded; one paper documents a revival of the previous political patterns when the colonial pressure is withdrawn. The political systems in their broadest sense are not analysed. In the study of change, the emphasis is upon leadership roles and decision-making, the basis of leadership, sanctions and external relationships are referred to only in passing. For example, Apthorpe links the major unit of Nsenga society, the clan, to political processes of recruitment of leadership, and stresses a political aspect of kinship societies and a relationship between political roles and social units, thus showing that political authority in this situation depends

upon membership in a clan. Leadership among the Nsenga is representative and egalitarian. As such, a factor in the lack of adaptation is the rejection and conflict engendered by the lack of representation of certain clans within the Native Authority, resulting from the removal of some clan chiefs and the hierarchical concept of the Native Authority. These actions make it impossible for some members of the Nsenga tribe to be affiliated with modern government. Argyle, treating another Central African tribe, the Soli, emphasizes another facet of political change. Even though some of the traditional leaders are anxious and willing to implement political change, the more aggressive chief who adheres to the proscriptions of European officialdom loses favour with his own follwers and becomes linked with European officials, and emerges as a leader without followers. Maquet shows the tenacity of superior-subordinate relationships among the Tutsi in Ruanda-Urundi. The political dimension of a caste relationship is retained even though elections were introduced, and the Tutsi still fill the traditional political roles. White continues his publications on the Luvale and stresses the retention of the jural function of lineages. St. John describes the traditional acephalous system of the Ibo who featured the village unit as the focus of political loyalty, a council as the major political instrument, slow consensus decision-making and reliance upon informal pressure or supernatural sanctions, and how these features re-emerged in 1955.

While other papers deal with the tenacity of the political system, Lewis' article on the Somalia presents a different but similar facet of political change, how the political system re-interprets and adapts incoming changes to its own culture and needs. In this case, traditional interest groups, competing lineages and tribes, are represented in the adherence to different nationalistic movements, a pattern which has been repeated throughout Africa and Asia. but as yet has not received the attention it deserves.

An evaluation of the work as a contribution to the systematic study of political systems finds it wanting. A note of caution to any potential reader: the publication as it stands was not proof-read and there are missing pages, and inserts of typographical errors, both of which cause slow reading and irritation. The hasty publication also led to the inclusion of some appallingly poor material and a discussion section which sounds like garbled tapes. All this could have been prevented with careful editing and time for rewriting. As a preliminary step toward a theoretical and substantive contribution, the publication moves in the right direction. It is now time for another work to break new ground, tying together studies of changing political systems and searching for trends in political change. If this is not forthcoming, anthropologists who have initiated studies of political change in non-Western areas will soon find their concepts out-moded and their area pre-empted by other social scientists.

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B. BERNARDI: *The Mugwe, a failing prophet.* A Study of a religious and public dignitary of the Meru of Kenya. London, New York, Toronto 1959, xiv, 211 pp., ill., map. Published for the International African Institute by the Oxford University Press. Price $3.75.

Father Bernardi's study is based on a tour of nine months of fieldwork among the Meru, but the author has had previous contacts with this people while being attached to the staff of a Roman Catholic Mission. His enquiry has involved visits to all nine Meru sub-tribes, each of which, with the exception of a few small ones, has its own Mugwe.

The Mugwe, or prophet as he is called by Bernardi, is regarded as the national leader and symbol of the unity of his people. His main functions are religious. He is believed to promote the well-being and prosperity of his people by his blessings and his prayers directed to God. Being the representative of God by whom he is inspired, he is equally the representative of his people. The function of the Mugwe is hereditary and the actual Mugwe is claimed to be the descendant of the first Mugwe who led his people into their present country.

Of particular interest is the connection of the Mugwe with the institution of the age-classes. It is the Mugwe who controls the initiation and formation of new age-classes and who gave his consent to military expeditions undertaken by the young initiates. No raid was organized without the blessing of the Mugwe on which success depended. In some sub-tribes, the Mugwe is replaced when a new age-class assumes power and the previous one retired. In other sub-tribes, he remains in office during his whole life.

The Mugwe is considered to be the father of his people. In this respect his position resembles that of the elders who are also called "fathers". The Mugwe, however, is very much superior to them, and has to sanction the final decision in important matters taken by their councils.

The best chapters of the book are those dedicated to a discussion of the religious conceptions of the Meru in connection with the Mugwe and the mythological justification of the office. The author succeeds in demonstrating convincingly that the unique position of the Mugwe as the spiritual leader of his people is fundamental to the unity and cohesion of the Meru sub-tribes. The only objection that one could make is the use of the term prophet, this might create confusion with the spiritual leaders of messianic movements elsewhere in Africa who are commonly called prophets too. Moreover, while it is true that the Mugwe is inspired by God, his powers of prediction seem to be limited to such as the issue of a military raid or other minor events.

The author's statements on the political role of the Mugwe are less

clear. The Meru are governed by councils of elders in which the Mugwe can exercise considerable influence. The voice of the latter is decisive in matters regarding the age-classes, warfare and the passing of the sentence of death. The Mugwe does not seem to have much to do with the regulation of small daily affairs. His assistance is invoked only in matters of great public interest when his supernatural sanction are felt to be needed. Bernardi does not specify however what the character of these matters can be and to what extent the Mugwe can enforce his own decision. Neither does he say if there ever was any opposition to the authority of the Mugwe and what precisely is meant by the statement that the political character of this dignitary "could be exploited by strong personalities" (p. 48).

The shortcomings of Bernardi's work in this respect can partly be explained by the fact that the author had to make his enquiries at a time when the position of the Mugwe had considerably declined. One wonders, however, if he could not have obtained more information on the political aspect of the problem if he had limited his investigation to a smaller number of subtribes instead of visiting them all.

On the other hand, the political role of the Mugwe is not the most important one. Bernardi states that the legislation and juridical authority of the Mugwe is not stressed by the Meru. The Mugwe is first of all the spiritual leader of his people, and Barnardi has made it sufficiently clear that he was justified in concentrating most of his attention on the religious functions of this dignitary.

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Notes bibliographiques - Book Notes

Caconica Valley. Emanuel ANATI. Translated from the French by Linda ASHER. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961. 261, X pp. Distr. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd. $6.75.

La vallée de Camonica est située dans les Alpes italiennes au nord de Brescia entre le lac Iseo et la frontière suisse. C'est là que l'Auteur découvrait, il y a cinq ans plus de 15.000 gravures faites à même les parois de la montagne. Ces gravures représentent la vie ordinaire d'une communauté alpine. Ce livre, très abondamment illustré, nous fournit les explications de ces découvertes.

Family Structure in Jamaica: The Social Context of Reproduction. Judith BLAKE. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. X, 262 pp. $6.00.

La structure familiale des Jamaïquains est ici étudiée en vue de découvrir leur attitude par rapport à la vie sexuelle et au mariage.

Four Thousand Years Ago: A World Panorama of Life in the Second Millennium B.C. Geoffrey BIBBY. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961. XIX, 398 pp. Distr. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd. $8.00.

Ce livre veut reconstituer l'histoire du second millénaire A.C. Appuyé sur les recherches archéologiques récentes, l'Auteur nous présente un panorama mondial de la vie et des événements de ce temps là.

Life and Ritual in Old Siam. Phya Anuman RAJADHON. Translated and Edited by William Gedney. New Haven: Human Relations Files, 1961. 191 pp. Distr. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co. Inc. $4.50.

L'auteur a réuni ici les trois études suivantes sur la vie et les coutumes des Thais de l'ancien Siam: I - La vie du fermier Thai; II - Le Bouddhisme populaire au Thailand; II - Coutumes rattachées à la naissance de l'enfant.

The Lolo of Liang Shan. Lin YUEH-HUA. Translated by Ju-Shu-Pan. Edited by Wu-Chi-Liu. New Haven: Human Relations Files, 1961. 191 pp. Distr. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co. Inc. $3.00.

Rapport basé sur une enquête de l'Auteur chez les Lolo (Chine). L'étude est centrée sur la famille et le clan, mais aborde aussi d'autres aspects connexes.

Mapuche Social Structure. Institutional Reintegration in a Patrilineal Social of Central Chile. L.C. FARON. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961. XVI, 247 pp. $3.00.

La conquête par le Chili des Indiens Mapuche eut pour résultat de réduire leur territoire ancestral aux dimensions d'une simple réserve et de déclancher une évolution sociale profonde. Malgré tous les changements et toutes les pressions exercées sur elle, la société mapuche ne s'est pas désintégrée. Au contraire, elle a su assimiler les nouveaux éléments culturels pour constituer une société plus complexe et mieux structurée.

Old Africa's Last Secrets. Lawrence G. GREEN. London: Putman, 1961. 278 pp. Distr. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd. $5.50.

L'auteur de ce livre est un africaniste bien connu qui a passé sa vie à parcourir l'Afrique en tous sens. Il nous rapporte ici ses aventures, ses découverte, et surtout l'explication d'un grand nombre de légendes et de mystères du continent africain.

Pharaohs and Mortals. Torgny SÄVE-SÖDERBERGH. Translated from the Sweedish by Richard Oldenburg. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1961. 318 pp. $8.50.

Ce livre est né d'une série de causeries radiophoniques, revues et regroupées sous la forme présente. L'Auteur fait revivre sous nos yeux l'ancienne civilisation égyptienne du temps des Pharaons. Replaçant le vie culturelle dans son contexte naturel, il en dégage l'esprit et nous montre l'individu tel qu'il se réflète dans diverses situations et différents milieux.

Philosophical Aspects of Culture. Bertraam NORRIS. Yellow Springs: The Antioch Press, 1961. 302 pp. $7.00.

L'Auteur examine les notions de culture, de normes et de valeurs et les applique aux activités politiques et artistiques du monde moderne. Comme le titre l'indique, ces problèmes sont traités d'un point de vue philosophique que ne devraient pas bouder les anthropolgues.

A Prologue to the Study of African Arts. Alan P. MERRIAM. (Antioch College Founders Day Address N. 7) Yellow Springs: The Antioch Press, 1962, 38 pp.

Il s'agit d'une conférence sur les relations entre sciences sociales et humanisme dans la civilisation africaine. Les sciences sociales sont indispensables pour comprendre l'Afrique, mais c'est l'humanisme qui nous introduit au cœur de sa civilisation.

World Prehistory: An Outline. Grahame CLARK. London: Cambridge University Press, 1961. XII, 284 pp. Distr. The Macmillan Company of Canada. $2.45.

Ce livre est un sommaire de préhistoire montrant le développement de l'homme dans les différentes parties du monde.

AUX COLLABORATEURS DE LA REVUE

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INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

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C.P.S. (1955)

IMPRIMÉ AU CANADA
PRINTED IN CANADA