ANTHROPOLOGICA

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From the Editors / Note des rédactrices

Naomi McPherson and / et Alicia Sliwinski

Conflict, civil war, strife, loss of life, refugees and more preoccupy our news headlines these days. Anthropologists have long engaged in the study of issues regarding peace, harmony, warfare and conflict in societies around the world. It is thus timely that this issue's Thematic Section should focus on anthropological analyses of how various South Pacific societies engage with "Ending War and Sustaining Peace." Several articles speak to conflict, war and peacemaking in Papua New Guinea (PNG), which has a popular, contemporary reputation (not wholly deserved) for belligerence, aggression and tribal wars. From a cache of archives, local memories and her own long-term field work, Kuehling explores three notions of peace in Dobu society to show the need for further theorizing this exceptionally complex concept of "peace." Lohmann shows how the Asabano, who lived in a pre-colonial situation of endemic warfare, have maintained 50 years of peaceful coexistence among themselves and their neighbours. Roscoe, on the other hand, argues that pre-colonial conflict has never ended in contemporary PNG, rather that the politics of tribal warfare have been transformed into "crime." Schwoerer argues that choosing active participation through their own agency in cargo cult movements that promised "new things to come" made it possible for all southern Fore groups to curtail war simultaneously.

For Micronesia, Petersen makes his case for thinking about societies as neither peaceful nor violent by considering how pugnacity and aggression may just hide a desire for avoiding conflict. Na'puti's study of Guåhan (Guam)—which remains an "unincorporated territory of the United States" and thus, in "political limbo"—lays out a theoretical framework to capture the complex and contradictory intersections between U.S. colonial ideology and Chamoru resistance rhetoric. Among another colonized people—the West Papuans in the Indonesian settler-state of West Papua (or Irian Jaya)—Webb-Gannon explores the concept of Papua *merdeka*, in the struggle for peace and social justice, which West Papuans understand to be contingent upon political independence from Indonesia.

But peace, social justice, independence and the struggle for identity are not easily won as is demonstrated in the recent Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings in Canada. Reynaud focuses on emotions

Conflits, guerres civiles, dissensions, pertes de vie, et réfugiés font aujourd'hui les manchettes de nos médias. Les anthropologues sont engagés depuis longtemps dans l'étude d'enjeux associés à la paix, à l'harmonie, à la guerre et aux conflits dans les sociétés humaines. C'est donc à point nommé que survient la section thématique de ce numéro réunissant des analyses anthropologiques faisant le point sur la façon dont diverses sociétés du Pacifique sud réussissent à « mettre fin à la guerre et à maintenir la paix ». Plusieurs articles parlent des conflits et du processus de guerre et de paix en Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée (PNG), pays qui s'est récemment taillé la réputation (pas entièrement méritée) d'un pays où dominent la belligérance, les agressions et les guerres tribales. À partir de l'analyse d'un fonds d'archives, de la mémoire collective locale et de son long travail de terrain, Kuehling identifie trois conceptions de la paix dans la société de Dobu, démontrant ainsi le besoin d'une théorisation plus poussée de ce concept exceptionnellement complexe de « paix ». Lohmann montre comment les Asabanos, qui vivaient à l'époque précoloniale une situation de guerre endémique, ont maintenu cinquante ans de coexistence pacifique entre eux et avec leurs voisins. Roscoe, de son côté, soutient que les conflits précoloniaux n'ont jamais pris fin en PNG contemporaine où les dynamiques de la guerre tribale sont converties en « crime ». Schwoerer explique comment tous les groupes de Fores du sud ont réussi, simultanément, à exclure de leur propre chef le recours à la guerre en choisissant une participation active dans des mouvements de culte du cargo qui promettaient « de nouvelles choses à venir ».

En ce qui concerne la Micronésie, Petersen nous invite à sortir de la dyade sociétés pacifiques/sociétés violentes, en considérant que la pugnacité et l'agression pourraient simplement cacher un désir d'éviter les conflits. L'étude de Na'puti sur les Chamorus de Guam – qui demeure un territoire « non incorporé » aux États-Unis et donc « dans les limbes politiques » – établit un cadre théorique qui permet de capturer les intersections complexes et contradictoires entre l'idéologie coloniale américaine et la rhétorique de résistance des Chamorus.

Mais la paix, la justice sociale, l'indépendance et la lutte pour l'identité ne se gagnent pas facilement, comme on a pu l'entendre lors des audiences récentes de la Commission de vérité et réconciliation du Canada. Reynaud considère les émotions comme des facteurs

as central to how conflicts happen and are resolved and in recapturing identities long assaulted by colonial authority and assimilation practices. (See also McKinley's review essay here on "Commissions.") Robinson explores how a personal and collective sense of Mi'kmaw identity works to resist colonial projects of assimilation and as a counter-discourse to settler notions of Aboriginal rights and what it means to be Mi'kmaw.

The concept of "identity" runs through several articles: Smith and Stavely present their research on mobility, transience and identity among youthful (and rather invisible) workers in the tourism industry in Banff; Asselin's study of Alberta military brats (which resonates well with this military brat) and oil workers' children looks at how children create a sense of place and belonging different from what we might expect; and De Burgos explores the relationship between traditional medicine and the process of ethnically distinct identity formation in Nicaragua. Identity is also present in issues of kinship and adoption in Polynesia and China (Leblic, Lockerbie), and, as Migliore and Dorazio-Migliore elicit, is central to a narrative life history of an elderly Canadian Sicilian woman and the impact that social suffering, loss and the aging process have on her identity.

This issue takes the concept of conflict full-on, whether it be tribal warfare in the highlands of PNG, the militarization of Guam, in small islands of Micronesia, in colonized West Papua, on a factory floor in Canada where a new immigrant works to survive in a new country, in Nicaragua where indigenous identity is under threat or at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where First Nations peoples bring their testimonies of abuse, assimilation, acculturation and identity regained as resistance. But so, too, is peace present here, since peace and peacemaking, as Lohmann argues, is "an active, political process rather than ... the mere absence of war." This issue is a richness of anthropological analysis of war and peace—weaving successes, failures, ongoing processes and hopes that peace, however complex a concept, will prevail.

centraux à l'émergence et à la résolution des conflits, ainsi qu'à la reconstruction des identités longtemps attaquées par les autorités coloniales et les pratiques d'assimilation (voir aussi la recension de l'essai de McKinley sur les commissions). Robinson explore comment le sentiment personnel et collectif d'identité micmaque permet de résister aux projets coloniaux d'assimilation et agit en tant que contre-discours vis-à-vis des conceptions coloniales des droits autochtones et de l'identité micmaque.

Le concept d'identité traverse plusieurs articles : Smith et Staveley présentent leur recherche sur la mobilité, la migration et l'identité chez les jeunes travailleurs (pour la plupart invisibles) de l'industrie touristique à Banff; Asselin s'intéresse aux enfants des militaires et des ouvriers du pétrole en Alberta, et il étudie la façon dont ils créent un sens du lieu et de l'appartenance inattendu; De Burgos explore la relation entre la médecine traditionnelle et le processus de formation d'une identité ethnique distincte au Nicaragua. L'identité est aussi présente dans des enjeux de parenté et d'adoption en Polynésie et en Chine (Leblic, Lockerbie). Et, comme le développent Migliore et Dorazio-Migliore, l'identité est centrale dans le récit de vie d'une Canadienne d'origine sicilienne qui constate les impacts de la souffrance sociale, de la perte et du processus de vieillissement sur son sentiment identitaire.

Ce numéro prend de plain-pied le concept de conflits, qu'il s'agisse de la guerre tribale dans les hauts plateaux de la PNG, de la militarisation de Guam, des petites îles de Micronésie, de la Papouasie occidentale colonisée, du plancher d'une manufacture au Canada où une nouvelle immigrante travaille pour survivre, ou de la Commission de vérité et réconciliation du Canada à laquelle les Premières nations ont déposé leurs témoignages pour mauvais traitements, assimilation, acculturation mais aussi de reconquête de l'identité par la résistance. Ainsi, la paix est présente là aussi, puisque, comme le développe Lohmann, elle est « un processus politique actif plutôt que [...] la simple absence de guerre ». Ce numéro offre de riches analyses anthropologiques sur la guerre et la paix entrelaçant les réussites, les échecs, les processus continus et les espoirs que la paix, pour aussi complexe qu'elle soit, l'emportera.

Thematic Section: Guest Editor R. I. Lohmann
Ending War and Sustaining Peace in Pacific Societies

Investigating the Causes of Peace to End War: An Introduction

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Abstract: Peace is an active, productive political process rather than the mere absence of war. This introduction to the thematic section, "Ending War and Sustaining Peace in Pacific Societies / Mettre fin à la guerre et assurer la paix dans les sociétés du Pacifique" presents evaluative summaries of the contributing articles. It argues that anthropology can assist in achieving a lasting peace among the world's peoples by documenting the forms peace takes and how it works cross-culturally and over time. This information aids in design and implementation of peace-maintaining strategies that are both tailored to particular cultural settings and more effective, lasting and adaptable across cultural divides.

Keywords: applied anthropology, peace, peacemaking, violence, war

Anthropology is in a position to fulfil some of the prerequisites to world peace if we direct research and communication efforts accordingly. If we wish to stop war and establish peace locally or universally, temporarily or indefinitely, we need to answer several questions of the sort that anthropologists, using the perspectives, data and tools of all four subfields—most effectively when these are integrated—are well positioned to address: What conditions motivate people to resort to organized violence between polities and how can these conditions be manipulated to diffuse conflicts before they escalate? Is peace established and maintained only and ironically through the threat of violence, or can a foundation of non-violent ideology be laid and kept up and, if so, how? Under which conditions are people able to make peace an actively maintained and indefinitely sustainable condition and not just the temporary cessation of warfare? The essays that make up this thematic section address these questions and more by way of documenting and analyzing a series of cases, showing ways that peace has been advocated and supported, with greater and lesser success and longevity, in a range of material, social and cultural contexts.

The case studies presented here illustrate that cultural variation in what people consider desirable and possible must be taken into account to answer these broad questions for humankind as a whole. The very notions that warfare should be abolished and that peace should be indefinitely sustained are cultural and therefore arbitrary creations, neither universally held nor facts of nature, however much we might be tempted to naturalize them. Similarly, the view that warfare is inevitable because it is an immutable part of human nature is also a cultural convention masquerading as fact (Sahlins 2008). Hating and loving, violence and non-violence, are courses always open to human beings, not instincts that trump all enculturation and agency. Nevertheless, people decide on values and courses of action based only in part on imaginations running free

while more or less channeled by the imaginative careers of their cultural predecessors. Human thoughts, behaviours and artifacts are also constrained by the physical conditions of reality that give rise to consciousness and agency itself, which direct both warlike and peaceful endeavours.

Sorting out the big patterns is a first step. Anthropologists can, for example, ascertain how the imagination and its contrivances have real-world consequences for making war and peace (Strathern and Stewart 2011), how scale and political complexity change the kinds of organized violence and peace maintenance that are possible (Fry 2005; Kelly 2000), how ecological and economic conditions influence phases and cycling of war and peace (e.g., Rappaport 1984), how beliefs and values promote war and peace (Sponsel and Gregor 1994) and how perceived cost-benefit calculations convince people to dovish and hawkish responses to perturbations (Helbling 2006). A second step is to determine how the specific goals and perspectives of would-be peace-retainers or combatants are at play in any given moment—including those that are outside of agents' awareness (Anderson and Wallace 2012). Understanding the unique constellation of such conditions at any given place and time is necessary in order to determine what actions can make a vibrant peace possible at that juncture. Such information is also needed to design a method of peace-maintenance that is sustainable and capable of diffusing across cultural boundaries. By taking into account what anthropologists know about cultural dynamics, peacekeeping recipes can be designed to enable a high enough fidelity of transmission and reception to help prevent them from being degraded or lost.

As an historical science, the multidisciplinary study of humankind deals with particular decisions, minds, events and cultural situations that, though constrained by the laws of nature, cannot be predicted and engineered precisely. Herein lies the challenge; but the technological and social achievements of our species over its long past provide ample evidence that goals that once seemed impossible—like politically uniting millions of people, flying to the moon or establishing lasting world peace—not only are worth working toward but also can prove to be possible, if we apply ourselves.

So, what is peace? Defining something is necessary if we are to avoid talking past one another, as I have pointed out in discussing the anthropology of supernaturalism (Lohmann 2003). As Brian Ferguson (2008:46–47) points out, "peace is more than the absence of war." This collection is part of a recurrent move in anthropology to explore phenomena that have been, in our tradition, implicitly defined as opposites or absences of things

that have held our attention and received sustained study. Allow me a short digression to illustrate this pattern with three other examples. First, feminist anthropology arose by making women central subjects for a field that had been defined as the science of "man," which implicitly made male-kind the central object of gaze to which the opposite female-kind stood as an adjunct at best or an excluded opposite at worst, that easily escaped notice in the background (Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974). By shifting perspective only slightly, *humankind* explicitly including females rather than the unintentionally exclusionary *mankind*, with its male prototype, became the protagonists of anthropology's accounts. The result was an improved understanding, not only of women but also of men. Similarly, anthropologists have often implicitly written off sleep as the absence of consciousness and sociality when, in fact, sleep is best understood not as a lack of waking life but, rather, as a phase of consciousness with its own distinct qualities. Until recently, this dismissive definition of sleep caused a dearth of research making sleep and the interaction of sleeping and waking life its object (Glaskin and Chenhall 2013). Just the same, atheism is only beginning to be addressed anthropologically (Lanman 2010), neglected in part because of our long habit of defining it as the lack of faith in the supernatural rather than the presence of a naturalist belief system that changes with the advancement of science.

Peace, too, shimmers as though it were a mirage into invisibility as a topic of study, insofar as we allow ourselves to define it merely as a condition when no violence is happening. When we direct our attention to peace as the presence of effective non-violent conflict management within or among polities, rather than the temporary absence of a supposedly normative or inevitably returning state of war, peace becomes visible and a legitimate object of study in its own right, with distinctive forms and dynamics (Galtung 1996). Certainly, we cannot fully understand peace without reference to that which it counters, but just as war is not merely the lack of peace, peace is not merely the lack of war; nor does the evidence support the Hobbesian notion that war, selfish greed or violence is the normative, default setting for the human mind in all places and times. Once peace rather than war is our point of reference, we suddenly see it everywhere and recognize its significance for humankind to be much greater than just a pale reflection of war. As Douglas Fry (2013:103) has recently observed, "we may be at the threshold of an evolutionary paradigm shift, which emphasizes that cooperation, sharing, helping, reconciliation and restraint against aggression ... have solid evolutionary bases." When we

look at peace from a general anthropological perspective, inclusive of the four subfields and other disciplines, we find that it is neither a boring period when nothing exciting is happening, nor impossible as a lasting condition. Rather, peace comes in many forms and styles and has a life of its own that is richly variable and worth documenting (see Gregor 1996b).

The present effort is not so wide-ranging as the admirable works cited earlier, being mostly limited to ethnographic, historical and linguistic research among our contemporary peoples in Oceania. Breadth is made up for with depth, as we describe how particular peoples face actual or threatened organized violence from within or without and have succeeded in reaching an end to war. These ends of war are themselves variable in their nature and degree of success. Just as it is tempting to stereotype war as an ultimate evil, the common inclination to idealize peace as a perfect good works against our understanding. A peace without a sense of justice (Na'puti, Webb-Gannon) or one hemmed in by fear of ongoing magical attacks (Kuehling) or one dependent on preparation for war (Petersen), or one in which war is replaced with crime (Roscoe) is not complete or ideal, but has been achieved in multiple cases. Similarly, a peace that comes at the expense of reliance on supernatural beliefs (Lohmann, Schwoerer) is not tenable where such beliefs are different, or where supernaturalism does not hold sway, but it can and does happen repeatedly in the ethnographic and historical records. These cases thus enable readers to attain a more sophisticated understanding of the forms peace can take and the conditions under which they arise.

Our descriptions and analyses have been improved by the participants' three-year engagement at annual meetings of the Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania. These commenced with an informal session in Alexandria, VA, in 2010, continued with a working session in Honolulu, HI, in 2011, and concluded at a symposium in Portland, OR, in 2012 titled "Ends of War: Causes of Peace in the Pacific." I organized these sessions in response to a challenge by my late father, Ivar Lohman, in our friendly conversations; he pointed out that warfare is a human tragedy and anthropologists should be in a position to discover how it can be prevented and ended. So we should. The sharp-eyed reader will have noticed that my father's name was spelled with one "n" while I spell mine with two. As it happens, the difference is the result of a war—in fact of World War I, which began a hundred years ago this year. As a result of resentment of the German Empire's attacks on the United States during the war, my German-American

grandfather dropped the second "n" from the family name so that it sounded less German. As a teenager with interest in my German ancestry, I restored the original spelling. This little story illustrates one of the trivial yet far-reaching consequences of war and intergenerational reconciliation that appear to us in droves when we look for them.

In the first essay of this collection, "The Converted War Canoe: Cannibal Raiders, Missionaries and *Pax Britannica* on Dobu Island, Papua New Guinea," Susanne Kuehling shows how different players in a colonial encounter understood military efficacy and pacification differently in a moment celebrated as the point when the people were converted and tribal warfare ended. A war leader's canoe, laboriously prepared for a revenge expedition, was touched by the missionary wife, leading the people to regard it as magically impotent through female contact. The owner, seeing his hope for status through revenge destroyed, rededicated the canoe from military to missionary journeys in hope of receiving "cargo"—spiritually provided material rewards—as a consolation for the loss.

Kuehling points out that magical violence between communities continued with the abolition of physical warfare. For them, the state of lasting peace that their missionary imagined Christianity had ushered in did not characterize Dobu Islanders' sense of intercommunity relations. Not only their belief in magic but also their concept of peace is incompatible with an ideal of a permanent pacification: Dobuans' term for *peace* extends the notion of a calm sea to human relations, implying both a temporary condition and dangers that may lurk below the surface of a friendly face. Despite their idealism of creating a bit of heaven on earth, the missionaries would probably recognize this pessimistic view of peace filled with contradictions waiting to burst a momentary calm as the earthly condition, which they imagine will be overcome only in the post-earth afterworld.

My own contribution, "A Cultural Mechanism to Sustain Peace: How the Asabano Made and Ended War," begins with a description of endemic warfare, its causes and horrific outcomes in the Om and Fu River valleys of central New Guinea. As I thread my way through the oral history and ethnography of war and peace between the Asabano and their neighbours, I reach the story of how war was more sustainably ended than ever before. A decade after the Australian colonial government temporarily repressed payback raids, Baptist missionaries introduced a belief system and ritual technique that enabled people to renounce violent revenge and entrust mediation to an imaginary agent—

God. In the 40 years that this ideological patch has been deployed, there have been no further wars between the Asabano and their neighbours.

I argue that the government-enforced peace was not sustainable because the state is unable to intervene when needed in remote areas, as resurgence of tribal wars in other parts of Papua New Guinea shows. The diffused and now enculturated belief that the Christian god forbids fighting and holds the sole right to revenge, combined with a ritual to pray to God to justly settle scores rather than initiating violent expeditions, has been successful in stemming warfare for these peoples because its prophylactic powers are internally available to all parties at all times as a result of being enculturated and accepted rather than externally imposed and enforced.

This case suggests that cultural scripts can promote either war or peace when they are appropriately tailored to existing cultural contexts. World peace that is not contradictorily enforced by threat of violence, therefore, is possible in theory; however, there is no one-size-fits-all cultural mechanism for ending war and indefinitely maintaining peace. To succeed, we must continually engineer and enculturate peace in every individual across all cultures in diverse and dynamic manners.

In "On Speaking the Language of Peace: Chamoru Resistance and Rhetoric in Guåhan's Self-Determination Movement," Tiara Na'puti analyzes the non-violent, rhetorical use of language among Chamorro activists countering undemocratic imposition of military installations on the people of Guam by the United States. She points out that, by using phrases in the Chamorro vernacular to bracket testimonies at the United Nations, these activists simultaneously express unity and distinction. They manifest feelings of sovereignty in opposition to the American state's colonial domination and use of Guam and its people as pawns to maintain its own sovereignty vis-à-vis other states.

Na'puti demonstrates the use of counterpublic theory in her analysis of testimonial texts to suggest its value for the study of people engaging in protest and conflict without engaging in violent struggle. When using warfare as a political means is untenable because of political, military or ideological imbalances between opponents, campaigners attract people to their cause by building common identity and agreement with core policies among those of their party, and by shaming contrary actions taken by the opposing party. Rhetoric with words and actions is equally important in war and peace relations.

Moving from the island of Guam to the broader region of Micronesia of which it is a part, Glenn Petersen presents "The Possibilities of Violence and the Skills to Avoid It: On Warfare and Its Absence in Traditional Micronesia." Petersen makes the case that the long-standing strategy of relations among the peoples of Micronesia has been neither one of peace nor one of war, in any pure sense. Rather, Petersen argues that by preparing for warfare, while recognizing it as an undesirable condition that is best avoided, the frequency and severity of warlike acts were suppressed. Instead of characterizing traditional Micronesian societies as either warlike or peaceful in some overarching sense, Petersen says they were both at once.

With their small islands, most of which are low-lying and subject to devastating storms, Micronesians have a long history of mutual reliance for assistance in times of need, enhancing the premium on making and maintaining good relations. On the other hand, meteorological disasters can provide opportunities for violent conquest. Petersen examines the evidence and concludes that an attitude of "peace through strength," to borrow former U.S. president Ronald Reagan's cold war phrase, dominated Micronesian foreign relations though the centuries.

In "The End of War in Papua New Guinea: 'Crime' and 'Tribal Warfare' in Post-Colonial States," Paul Roscoe reminds us that *war* is between polities and an expression of sovereignty, while *crime* is within a polity and a challenge to its authority, but classifying an act of aggression into one or the other of these ideal types depends on which polity or scale of polity one is using as the point of reference. Classification is further complicated because environmental factors can influence the form of aggressive acts. While there has been a resurgence of tribal warfare in the Papua New Guinea highlands that takes a similar form to pre-colonial battles, no such battles have arisen in the lowlands. Roscoe argues that the resurgence of warfare has also taken place in the lowlands, but it is described as crime rather than war because of its relatively small scale. His Yangoru informants in the lowlands consider today's attacks by criminals a contemporary expression of war rather than crime, because the attacks are directed at outsiders. Unlike in the highlands, pre-contact warfare in the lowlands consisted mainly of small-scale raids; hence the resurgence of "warfare" there manifests the traditional form of interpolity conflict in this region.

Roscoe brings a materialist perspective of physical geography into the equation, showing that, because of the heavy vegetation of the lowlands, pre-colonial warfare comprised individual attacks and raids rather than highly organized battles, which dominated in the open highlands. A lesson here is that peace maintenance faces different challenges and opportunities depending on geographic as well as social factors.

Tobias Schwoerer considers the role of incentives and perceived benefits of choosing war or peace in "The Red Flag of Peace: Colonial Pacification, Cargo Cults and the End of War among the South Fore." He reports that the South Fore regarded warfare as a defining activity for their own group as well as enemy groups, in which any member of an alleged wrongdoer's group could be killed in retribution. These tendencies in themselves, which recur in somewhat different forms cross-culturally, go a long way to explaining why people go to war as often as they do. Schwoerer draws our attention to the fact that people decide whether to pursue war only when they come to the conclusion that it is likely to improve or preserve their situation.

Incentives are also taken into account in choosing peace. Schwoerer's informants told him that the South Fore decided to pursue peace in the 1950s because they thought it was in their best interest. At a feast, a leader tied a red cloth to an unstrung bow and announced that if, in place of fighting wars, people would look at the red cloth, soon wonderful goods—cargo—would come. Wishing to receive these things was sufficient motivation to end war and maintain peace for decades.

Finally, Camellia Webb-Gannon considers the case of "*Merdeka* in West Papua: Peace, Justice and Political Independence." Merdeka is an Indonesian word used as a rallying call by campaigners for the independence of West Papua, the half of New Guinea controlled by Indonesia. Webb-Gannon considers its meanings, focusing on self-determination as a form of peace with justice. Echoing the passion of her many activist informants, she seems to place self-determination as the highest of human rights without reference to the fact that "rights" and their hierarchies are cultural inventions and conventions and moreover, that West Papuans can be considered "a people" or a "self" only in opposition to the Indonesian state and as a group in opposition to all others. Such a view does not recognize that the Melanesian population of West Papua is made up of hundreds of polities and cultures that predate colonial domination, first from the Netherlands and now from Indonesia. When all these were independent of any state not so long ago, this did not result in a peace with justice as current activists conceive of it.

What does become clear in Webb-Gannon's presentation is that peace in any political relationship between peoples or polities is easier to maintain when most people on all sides have a sense of justice or legitimate authority and order. These will not necessarily be defined in the same way, because they are enmeshed in diverse cultural contexts. West Papuan independence activists and representatives of the Indonesian state have both used peaceful and warlike strategies to resolve the conflict between them. Webb-Gannon demonstrates that an agreement between groups of people achieved by force of violence or threatened violence is fragile unless it is backed up or replaced by a peace that all interacting parties regard as sufficiently just.

So where does all this leave us in trying to define war and peace in order simply to understand them or to maximize the latter's prevalence? Douglas Fry (2007:16) directs us to two useful definitions of war, which capture his point that war is not an individual matter but one requiring a certain degree of political complexity to exist (tribal societies having the minimum level of organization to be able to undertake war, as opposed to individual violence, which is the sole form of violent intergroup exchange in bands). With increasing political and technological complexity, more expansive and destructive warfare becomes possible, though he argues convincingly that this is not a sufficient condition for warfare to exist. Capturing this, Keith Otterbein (1970:140–141) defines war as "armed combat between political communities." Roy Prosterman (1972:140) expands on this with his definition of war as

> a group activity, carried on by members of one community against members of another community, in which it is the primary purpose to inflict serious injury or death on multiple nonspecified members of that other community or, in which the primary purpose makes it highly likely that serious injury or death will be inflicted on multiple nonspecified members of that community in the accomplishment of that primary purpose.

If this is war, then for our purposes, peace can be defined as a group activity, carried on by members of one community toward members of another community, in which the primary purpose is to maintain mutual benefit by successfully deploying means for enhancing productive political relations and preventing violence, by either directing contacts with goodwill or avoiding one another with an attitude of acceptance. This positive definition of what peace is rather than what peace is not avoids the pitfall of negative definitions, which lead us to think of peace as the absence or opposite of war. As I have pointed out, negative definitions lead to a diminution of interest, attention and understanding in science and the humanities; it is therefore best that we avoid them. Another advantage of this definition is that it is compatible with the fact that peace is an active social process that creates an ambiance of favourable attitudes between communities, manages or transforms the conflicts that nevertheless arise to restore goodwill, and can include

strategies of engagement or separation to achieve these ends or, in Gregor's (1996a:xvii) terms, sociative, restorative and separative forms of peace. Both war and peace are political activities that set rules and strategies for engagement (including non-interaction) among polities in contact with one another. By learning and communicating what peace is, in all its variety in the ethnographic, historical and archaeological records, anthropologists can meaningfully contribute to ending war and sustaining peace as members of pacific societies within and beyond Pacific Oceania.

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Mettre fin à la guerre et assurer la paix dans les sociétés du Pacifique

Introduction : Interroger les causes de la paix pour mettre fin à la guerre

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Résumé : Voici notre introduction à la section thématique « Ending War and Sustaining Peace in Pacific Societies / Mettre fin à la guerre et assurer la paix dans les sociétés du Pacifique. » Nous présentons de brefs sommaires appréciatifs des articles pour étayer l'argument que l'anthropologie peut contribuer à l'établissement d'une paix durable entre les peuples du monde en documentant la signification et les variations des formes que peut prendre la paix, et son fonctionnement en mode transculturel au fil des époques. Ces données informent la mise en place de stratégies de maintien de la paix qui correspondent à des contextes culturels spécifiques et qui s'avèrent plus efficaces, durables et adaptatives.

Keywords: anthropologie appliquée; paix; maintien de la paix; violence; guerre

L'anthropologie est en position de remplir certaines des conditions préalables à la paix mondiale si nous dirigeons les efforts de recherche et de communication en ce sens. Si nous voulons mettre fin à la guerre et assurer la paix localement ou universellement, temporairement ou indéfiniment, nous avons besoin d'élucider un certain nombre de questions auxquelles les anthropologues sont bien équipés pour répondre grâce aux perspectives, données et outils de nos quatre sous-disciplines —, et ce, de manière encore plus efficace quand ceux-ci sont intégrés : quelles conditions motivent les humains à recourir à la violence organisée entre entités politiques et comment peut-on manipuler ces conditions pour désamorcer les conflits avant qu'ils ne s'amplifient? Et, paradoxalement, la paix doit-elle être établie et maintenue seulement au travers de la menace de la violence? Ou est-il possible d'établir et de soutenir une idéologie de la non-violence, et alors, comment le faire? Dans quelles conditions les humains sont-ils capables de faire de la paix une condition entretenue de manière active et durable à long terme plutôt qu'une simple cessation de l'activité guerrière? Les articles qui composent cette section thématique s'intéressent entre autres à ces questions en analysant une série d'histoires de cas qui montrent comment la paix a fait l'objet d'actions revendicatrices et de soutien, ayant plus ou moins de succès et de pérennité, dans divers contextes matériels, sociaux et culturels.

Les histoires de cas présentées ici montrent qu'il faut tenir compte des variations culturelles dans ce que les gens considèrent comme désirable ou possible, en vue de répondre à ces vastes questions pour l'humanité tout entière. La conception même qu'il faudrait abolir la guerre et soutenir la paix à long terme est culturelle, elle est une création arbitraire et non un fait de nature, et elle est loin d'être universellement acceptée, même si la tentation est forte d'en faire une conception naturelle. De la même manière, la perception que la guerre est inévitable parce qu'elle constituerait une part inhérente

de la nature humaine s'avère aussi une convention culturelle qui se donne des allures de fait établi (Sahlins 2008). La haine et l'amour, la violence et la non-violence sont des voies toujours ouvertes aux êtres humains, et non des instincts qui l'emportent sur toutes les formes d'enculturation et d'agencéité. Toutefois, les gens décident de leurs valeurs et de leurs actions en ayant que partiellement recours à leur imagination, tout en étant plus ou moins encadrés par les performances imaginatives de leurs prédécesseurs culturels. Leurs pensées, leurs comportements et leurs artéfacts sont aussi conditionnés par la réalité matérielle qui les entoure, laquelle génère la conscience et l'agencéité mêmes qui déterminent les entreprises de paix et de guerre.

La première étape consiste à trier les grands modèles. Les anthropologues peuvent, par exemple, vérifier comment l'imaginaire et ses ruses ont des conséquences sur le monde en termes de guerre et de paix (Strathern et Stewart 2011), comment les questions d'échelle et de complexité politique modifient les formes possibles de violence organisée et de maintien de la paix (Fry 2005; Kelly 2000). Ils peuvent évaluer comment les conditions écologiques et économiques influencent les phases et les cycles de guerre et de paix (par ex. Rappaport 1984), comment les croyances et les valeurs font la promotion de la guerre ou de la paix (Sponsel et Gregor 1994) et comment l'appréciation de calculs coûts-bénéfices convainc les gens d'adopter des attitudes pacifistes ou belliqueuses en réponse à des perturbations (Helbling 2006). La seconde étape consiste à déterminer comment les objectifs et les points de vue spécifiques des combattants ou des pacificateurs éventuels entrent en jeu — tout en tenant compte d'autres facteurs plus implicites, voir parfois même hors du champ de conscience des agents (Anderson et Wallace 2012). Il faut saisir la constellation unique des conditions, propres à un lieu et un temps donné, pour déterminer quelles actions peuvent amener une paix vibrante (ou des échanges violents) dans cette conjoncture. Ces informations sont nécessaires à la formulation d'une méthodologie de maintien de la paix durable et susceptible de se répandre au-delà des frontières culturelles. En tenant compte de ce que les anthropologues savent au sujet des dynamiques culturelles, des recettes de maintien de la paix dont la transmission et la réception sont assurées par un niveau de fidélité adéquat peuvent être développées pour éviter qu'elles ne s'altèrent ou se perdent.

En tant que science de l'histoire, l'étude multidisciplinaire de l'humanité s'intéresse à des décisions, des tournures d'esprit, des évènements et des situations culturelles particuliers qui, même s'ils sont contraints par les lois de la nature, ne peuvent être prévus et

orchestrés avec précision. Voilà à quoi tient le défi; mais les réussites technologiques et sociales de notre espèce au cours de sa longue histoire apportent de nombreuses preuves que des objectifs longtemps considérés impossibles — comme l'association politique de millions de personnes, des expéditions vers la lune, ou la création d'une paix mondiale durable — méritent non seulement qu'on y travaille, mais peuvent aussi s'avérer atteignables si nous nous y appliquons.

Alors, qu'est-ce que la paix? Nous devons définir quelque chose si nous voulons éviter de parler les uns par-dessus les autres, comme je l'avais souligné au sujet de l'anthropologie du surnaturel (Lohmann 2003). Comme le remarque Brian Ferguson (2008:46-47), « peace is more than the absence of war ». Cette série d'articles s'inscrit dans une tendance récurrente en anthropologie visant à explorer des phénomènes qui ont été implicitement définis comme des contraires ou comme des absences d'objets qui ont retenu notre attention pour être étudiés de manière soutenue. Permettez-moi une courte digression pour illustrer cette orientation par trois autres exemples. D'abord, l'anthropologie féministe a vu le jour lorsqu'on a fait des femmes l'objet central d'un domaine qui avait été défini comme une science de « l'homme », ce qui faisait implicitement de *l'hommanité* le foyer central des regards, alors que la *femmanité* opposée demeurait au mieux un corolaire ou, au pire, un contraire exclu, souvent inaperçu dans le paysage (Rosaldo et Lamphere 1974).[1] Par un léger changement de perspective, l'humanité, incluant dorénavant explicitement les femmes devint l'objet des recherches en anthropologie, remplaçant l'hommanité, avec son prototype mâle et son exclusion non intentionnelle. Il en résulta une meilleure compréhension non seulement des femmes, mais aussi des hommes. De la même manière, les anthropologues ont souvent défini le sommeil telle l'absence de conscience et de socialisation, alors qu'en fait il vaudrait mieux l'interpréter comme une phase de conscience ayant des qualités distinctes — et non pas comme l'absence de conscience éveillée. Jusqu'à récemment, cette définition réductrice du sommeil a entraîné une sous-représentation du sommeil comme objet de recherche (Glaskin et Chenhall 2013). Un dernier exemple : on commence seulement à s'intéresser à l'athéisme au plan anthropologique (Lanman 2010), et on peut attribuer cette lacune en partie à notre habitude de définir l'athéisme comme l'absence de foi dans le surnaturel plutôt que comme la présence d'un système de croyances naturalistes qui évoluent avec le progrès de la science.

En tant que sujet d'étude, la paix aussi ressemble à un mirage aux marges de l'invisibilité, dans la mesure où

nous nous permettons de la définir principalement comme une condition où la violence ne se manifeste pas. Quand nous dirigeons notre attention sur la paix en tant que présence d'une gestion non violente et efficace des conflits au sein ou parmi des entités politiques, plutôt qu'en tant qu'absence temporaire d'un état de guerre supposément normatif, la paix devient visible et un objet légitime d'études de son plein droit, adoptant des formes et des dynamiques distinctives (Galtung 1996). Certes, nous ne pouvons pas complètement comprendre la paix sans référer à ce à quoi elle s'oppose; mais tout comme la guerre n'est pas la seule absence de paix, la paix n'est pas la seule absence de guerre; et nous n'avons pas de preuves non plus pour soutenir le postulat Hobbesien que la guerre, l'avidité égoïste ou la violence constituent les a priori normatifs de l'esprit humain en tous lieux et en tout temps. Quand la paix plutôt que la guerre devient notre point de référence, nous commençons soudainement à la voir partout. Nous reconnaissons que sa signification pour l'humanité est beaucoup plus importante que celle d'un pâle reflet de la guerre. Comme l'a récemment observé Douglas Fry (2013:103), « we may be at the threshold of an evolutionary paradigm shift, which emphasizes that cooperation, sharing, helping, reconciliation and restraint against aggression ... have solid evolutionary bases ». Lorsque nous considérons la paix dans une perspective anthropologique générale, intégrant les quatre sous-disciplines ainsi que d'autres disciplines, nous constatons qu'à titre de condition de longue durée, elle n'est ni ennuyante ni impossible. Au contraire, la paix adopte divers styles et diverses formes qui lui confèrent une vie propre, aux riches variations, et digne d'être documentée (voir Gregor 1996b).

Le présent numéro n'a pas une portée aussi vaste que les admirables travaux cités ci-haut, se limitant plutôt à des recherches ethnographiques, historiques et linguistiques auprès de nos contemporains en Océanie. Nous compensons l'étroitesse de notre portée avec plus de profondeur, quand nous décrivons comment des populations faisant face à des menaces ou à de la violence organisée réelle, endogène ou exogène, ont réussi à mettre fin à la guerre. Ces fins de guerre sont elles-mêmes variables dans leur nature et dans leur degré de réussite. De la même manière qu'il est tentant de stéréotyper la guerre comme un mal ultime, la tendance répandue à idéaliser la paix comme un bien ultime joue contre notre compréhension. Une paix sans sentiment de justice (Na'puti, Webb-Gannon) ou limitée par la peur d'attaques magiques continuelles (Kuehling), ou bien par la préparation par la guerre (Petersen), ou bien encore une paix dans laquelle la guerre est remplacée par le crime (Roscoe) ne constituent pas des réalisations complètes ou idéales, mais c'est du moins ce qu'on a pu atteindre dans plusieurs cas. De même, une paix qui vient au prix de recours à des croyances surnaturelles (Lohmann, Schwoerer) n'est pas durable quand celles-ci sont différentes ou quand le surnaturel n'a pas de prise, mais c'est une forme de paix que l'on rencontre de manière répétitive dans les archives ethnographiques et historiques. Ces exemples permettent ainsi au lecteur une meilleure compréhension des formes que peut prendre la paix et des conditions qui encouragent son éclosion.

Nos descriptions et analyses ont bénéficié de l'engagement sur trois ans de nos participants aux réunions annuelles de l'Association pour l'anthropologie sociale en Océanie. La première d'entre elles a eu lieu comme session informelle à Alexandria, Virginie, en 2010, suivie d'une session à Honolulu en 2011. Le tout s'est conclu par un symposium tenu à Portland, Oregon, en 2012, intitulé « Ends of War: Causes of Peace in the Pacific ». J'ai organisé ces sessions pour répondre au défi lancé par mon défunt père Ivar Lohman, dans le cadre de nos conversations amicales; il insistait sur le fait que la guerre est une tragédie humaine et que les anthropologues devraient se trouver en bonne position pour découvrir comment on peut la prévenir et y mettre fin. Ainsi, c'est ce que nous devons faire. Le lecteur attentif aura relevé que le nom de mon père ne contient qu'un seul 'n' tandis que le mien en a deux. Cette différence résulte justement de la Première Guerre mondiale dont nous commémorons le centenaire cette année. À cause de son ressentiment envers l'Empire germanique qui avait attaqué les États-Unis, mon grand-père germano-américain décida d'abandonner le deuxième 'n' de notre nom de famille pour en atténuer la sonorité allemande. Adolescent, j'étais fasciné par mon héritage allemand et j'ai réintroduit l'orthographe originale. Cette anecdote illustre combien une conséquence apparemment anodine de la guerre peut avoir des enchaînements intergénérationnels réconciliateurs.

Dans le premier article, « The Converted War Canoe: Cannibal Raiders, Missionaries and *Pax Britannica* on Dobu Island, Papua New Guinea » Susanne Kuelhing montre comment différents joueurs en contexte colonial comprenaient de manière distincte l'efficacité militaire et la pacification au moment célébré comme le point tournant où la population s'est convertie et où les guerres tribales ont pris fin. Le canot d'un chef de guerre, laborieusement préparé pour une expédition de représailles, fut touché par la femme du missionnaire, ce qui amena les gens à le considérer comme magiquement impuissant suite au contact d'une femme. Le propriétaire, constatant que son espoir de conquérir un statut par la revanche était anéanti, choisit de consacrer

le canot à des voyages missionnaires plutôt que militaires, dans l'espoir de recevoir du « cargo » — des récompenses matérielles d'origine spirituelle — à titre de dédommagement pour sa perte.

Kuehling souligne que la violence magique entre les communautés s'est poursuivie malgré l'abandon de la guerre physique. Pour les habitants de Dobu, l'état de paix continue que les missionnaires imaginaient avoir introduit avec le christianisme ne correspondait pas au sens des relations intercommunautaires des insulaires. Non seulement leur croyance en la magie, mais aussi leur conception de la paix est incompatible avec un idéal de pacification permanente : le terme Dobuan pour la paix applique la notion d'une mer calme aux relations humaines, ce qui implique qu'il s'agit d'une condition temporaire et que divers dangers peuvent se dissimuler derrière un visage amical. Malgré leur vision idéale d'avoir créé un coin de paradis sur terre, les missionnaires reconnaîtraient probablement cette version pessimiste de la paix, pleine de contradictions prêtes à faire éclater le calme temporaire des conditions terrestres, qui dans leur imaginaire ne trouvera sa résolution que dans un monde futur post-terrestre.

Ma propre contribution : « A Cultural Mechanism to Sustain Peace: How the Asabano Made and Ended War » commence par la description de guerres endémiques, de leurs causes et de leurs conséquences horribles dans les vallées des rivières Om et Fu en Nouvelle-Guinée centrale. En me frayant un chemin parmi la tradition orale et l'ethnographie de la guerre et de la paix entre les Asabanos et leurs voisins, je trouve le récit qui narre comment on a durablement mis fin à la guerre. Une décennie après que le gouvernement colonial australien eût exercé des mesures de répression temporaire contre les raids de représailles, les missionnaires baptistes ont introduit un système de croyances et une technique rituelle qui permettaient aux gens de renoncer à des rétorsions violentes et de confier la médiation à un agent imaginaire, Dieu. Dans les 40 années qui ont suivi le déploiement de ce stratagème idéologique, les Asabanos n'ont plus jamais connu de guerre avec leurs voisins.

J'avance l'argument que la paix imposée par le gouvernement n'était pas durable parce que l'État est incapable d'intervenir lorsqu'il le faut dans les régions éloignées, comme le montre la résurgence de guerres tribales dans d'autres parties de la Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée. La croyance en ce que le Dieu chrétien interdit les combats et détient en exclusivité le droit de représailles — combinée à un rituel consistant à prier Dieu pour qu'il fasse justice, et ce, au lieu de lancer des expéditions violentes—, a réussi à déraciner la culture de la guerre chez ces peuples. Ceci s'explique par le fait que ses pouvoirs prophylactiques sont disponibles pour toutes les parties, intérieurement et en tout temps, puisqu'ils sont acceptés et intégrés à la culture plutôt qu'imposés et mis en vigueur par une autorité externe.

Ce cas suggère que les scripts culturels peuvent promouvoir aussi bien la guerre que la paix quand ils sont correctement façonnés pour des contextes culturels existants. Une paix mondiale qui ne serait pas imposée de manière contradictoire par une menace de violence est donc possible en théorie; par contre, il n'existe pas de mécanisme culturel universel pour mettre fin à la guerre et maintenir la paix indéfiniment. Pour réussir, nous devons continuellement concevoir la paix et l'insérer dans la culture pour chaque individu au travers de toutes les cultures, de manières diverses et dynamiques.

Dans « On Speaking the Language of Peace: Chamoru Resistance and Rhetoric in Guåhan's Self-Determination Movement », Tiara Na'puti analyse l'utilisation rhétorique non violente du langage chez les activistes Chamorro contrant l'imposition antidémocratique d'installations militaires par les États-Unis sur la population de Guam. Elle souligne qu'en utilisant des phrases en langue vernaculaire Chamorro pour porter témoignage devant l'ONU, ces activistes expriment à la fois leur unité et leur distinction. Ils manifestent des sentiments de souveraineté en opposition à la domination coloniale de l'État américain et à son instrumentalisation de Guam et de sa population comme pions pour maintenir sa propre hégémonie vis-à-vis d'autres États.

En analysant les textes de ces déclarations, Na'puti démontre l'utilité de la théorie contre-publique pour l'étude des populations qui s'engagent dans des processus de revendication et de conflit sans recourir à la violence. Lorsqu'il devient impossible de maintenir la guerre comme moyen politique en raison de déséquilibres politiques, militaires ou idéologiques entre parties adverses, les activistes peuvent attirer des sympathisants à leur cause en créant une identité de groupe, des accords de principe sur des politiques fondamentales, et par là discréditer les actions de leurs opposants. La rhétorique des mots et des actions est également importante dans les relations de guerre et de paix.

Si nous quittons l'île de Guam pour la région élargie de la Micronésie, Glenn Petersen présente « The Possibilities of Violence and the Skills to Avoid It: On Warfare and Its Absence in Traditional Micronesia ». Petersen fait valoir que les relations coutumières entre les populations de la Micronésie ne se cantonnent ni à la paix ni à la guerre à proprement parler. Petersen défend plutôt l'opinion qu'en se préparant pour la guerre, tout en reconnaissant qu'il s'agissait d'une condition indésirable qu'il valait mieux éviter, la fréquence et la sévérité de

gestes guerriers diminuaient. Au lieu de catégoriser les sociétés traditionnelles de la Micronésie comme étant soit foncièrement guerrières ou pacifiques, Petersen écrit qu'elles sont les deux à la fois.

Sur leurs petites îles qui émergent tout juste de l'océan et qui sont sujettes à des orages dévastateurs, les Micronésiens ont une longue histoire d'entraide mutuelle en cas de besoin, ce qui rehausse la valeur accordée à la production et au maintien de bonnes relations. D'un autre côté, les désastres météorologiques peuvent s'avérer une opportunité de conquête. Petersen analyse les faits et conclut qu'une attitude de « paix par la force » — pour reprendre une expression typique de la guerre froide de l'ancien président américain Ronald Reagan — a dominé les relations étrangères des Micronésiens au cours des siècles.

Dans « The End of War in Papua New Guinea: "Crime" and "Tribal Warfare" in Post-Colonial States », Paul Roscoe nous rappelle que la guerre se fait entre entités politiques et constitue une expression de souveraineté, tandis que le crime s'actualise au sein d'*une* entité politique et constitue un défi à son autorité. Définir un acte d'agression dans l'une ou l'autre de ces catégories dépend de l'entité politique que l'on prend comme point de référence et de son échelle. Cette classification se complique davantage à cause de facteurs environnementaux qui peuvent influencer la forme des actes d'agression. Alors qu'il y a eu une résurgence de guerres tribales, adoptant des formes similaires aux hostilités précoloniales dans les hauts plateaux de la Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée, on n'a pas vu de tels combats dans les terres basses. Or, Roscoe explique qu'il y a eu une résurgence d'actes belliqueux dans les basses terres, mais qu'ils sont décrits tels des crimes et non comme des gestes guerriers dus à leur échelle relativement réduite. Ses informateurs Yangoru des basses terres considèrent les attaques criminelles d'aujourd'hui comme une expression contemporaine de la guerre plutôt que comme un crime puisqu'elles sont dirigées contre des étrangers. À la différence de ce que l'on voyait dans les hauts plateaux, l'activité guerrière de précontact consistait principalement de raids à petite échelle; ainsi, la résurgence d'actes « guerriers » ici manifeste la forme traditionnelle de conflits intercommunautaires dans cette région.

Roscoe introduit dans nos propos une perspective matérialiste issue de la géographie physique qui montre qu'à cause de la végétation dense des basses terres, la guerre précoloniale s'y actualisait sous forme d'attaques et de raids individuels, et non comme de grandes batailles organisées, caractéristiques des hauts plateaux ou-

verts. La leçon à tirer est que le maintien de la paix fait face à des défis et à des opportunités différentes selon des facteurs sociaux aussi bien que géographiques.

Tobias Schwoerer considère le rôle des facteurs incitatifs et des avantages perçus dans le choix de la guerre ou de la paix dans « The Red Flag of Peace: Colonial Pacification, Cargo Cults and the End of War among the South Fore ». Il rapporte que les Fores du sud considèrent la guerre comme une activité déterminante aussi bien pour eux que pour les groupes ennemis, car tout membre d'un groupe présumé malfaiteur peut être tué en représailles. Par elles-mêmes, ces tendances que l'on retrouve sous des formes sensiblement différentes au travers des cultures permettent d'expliquer pourquoi la guerre est si fréquente. Schwoerer attire notre attention sur le fait que les gens décident d'aller ou pas à la guerre seulement quand ils arrivent à la conclusion que cela améliorera ou protègera leur situation.

On tient aussi compte de facteurs incitatifs pour choisir la paix. Les informateurs de Schwoerer lui ont raconté que les Fores du Sud ont décidé de rechercher la paix dans les années 1950 parce qu'ils considéraient que c'était dans leur meilleur intérêt. Lors d'une fête, un chef a attaché un tissu rouge à la hampe d'un arc et a annoncé que si, au lieu de faire la guerre, les gens regardaient le fanion rouge, des bienfaits merveilleux — le cargo — s'ensuivraient bientôt. Le désir de recevoir ces cadeaux a constitué une motivation suffisante pour mettre fin à la guerre et maintenir la paix pendant des décennies.

Finalement, Camellia Webb-Gannon nous présente le cas de « *Merdeka* in West Papua: Peace, Justice and Political Independence ». Merdeka est un mot indonésien utilisé comme cri de ralliement par les militants pour l'indépendance de la Papouasie occidentale, soit la moitié de la Nouvelle-Guinée contrôlée par l'Indonésie. Webb-Gannon s'intéresse à sa signification et en particulier à l'autodétermination en tant que forme de paix dans la justice. Faisant écho à la passion de ses nombreux informateurs activistes, elle semble placer l'autodétermination comme le plus élevé des droits de la personne, sans référer au fait que les « droits » et leurs hiérarchies sont des inventions et des conventions culturelles et sans reconnaître que les Papous occidentaux ne peuvent être considérés comme « un peuple » ou « une entité » qu'en opposition à l'État indonésien et, en tant que groupe, qu'en opposition à tous les autres. Une telle perception ne reconnaît pas que la population mélanésienne de la Papouasie occidentale est composée de centaines d'entités politiques et de cultures dont l'existence remonte avant la domination coloniale, qui

fut exercée tour à tour par les Pays-Bas puis par l'Indonésie. Quand toutes ces communautés étaient indépendantes d'un État quelconque, et de cela il n'y a pas si longtemps, ceci n'avait pas résulté dans une paix avec justice comme les activistes actuels le conçoivent.

Ce que la présentation de Webb-Gannon illustre clairement, c'est que dans tout rapport politique entre peuples ou entités politiques la paix est plus facile à maintenir quand la majorité des gens ont un sens de la justice ou de l'autorité et de l'ordre légitime. Ces valeurs ne seront pas forcément définies de la même manière, puisqu'elles émanent de divers contextes culturels. Les militants indépendantistes de la Papouasie occidentale et les représentants de l'État indonésien ont tous deux utilisé des stratégies pacifiques et guerrières pour résoudre le conflit qui les divise. Webb-Gannon démontre qu'un accord entre groupes imposé par la violence ou par la menace est fragile, à moins qu'il ne s'appuie ou soit remplacé par une paix reconnue comme suffisamment juste par les parties en présence.

Alors, où tout cela nous mène-t-il dans notre tentative de définir la guerre et la paix avec l'objectif de mieux les comprendre ou de maximiser la prévalence de cette dernière? Douglas Fry (2007:16) nous suggère deux définitions utiles de la guerre, qui reprennent son argument à l'effet que la guerre n'est pas une question individuelle et qu'elle ne peut exister sans un certain degré de complexité politique (les sociétés tribales possédant le niveau minimal d'organisation pour être capables d'entreprendre une guerre, par opposition à la violence individuelle qui constitue la seule forme d'échanges violents intergroupes dans les bandes). Quand la complexité politique et technologique s'accroît, des actions guerrières plus étendues et destructives deviennent possibles, même si Fry défend de manière convaincante qu'il ne s'agisse pas là d'une condition suffisante pour que la guerre existe. Dans la même veine, Keith Otterbein (1970:140–141) définit la guerre comme « armed combat between political communities ». Roy Prosterman (1972:140) élargit cette définition lorsqu'il la décrit telle:

> a group activity, carried on by members of one community against members of another community, in which it is the primary purpose to inflict serious injury or death on multiple nonspecified members of that other community or, in which the primary purpose makes it highly likely that serious injury or death will be inflicted on multiple nonspecified members of that community in the accomplishment of that primary purpose.

Si l'on définit ainsi la guerre, alors pour nos besoins, on peut définir la paix comme une activité de groupe menée par les membres d'une communauté envers les membres d'une autre communauté, dans laquelle l'objectif principal est de maintenir des avantages mutuels en déployant avec succès des moyens de prévenir la violence, soit en habillant les contacts de bonne volonté soit en s'évitant mutuellement avec une attitude d'acceptation. Cette définition positive de ce qu'est la paix, qui ne met pas l'accent sur ce qu'elle n'est pas, évite l'écueil des définitions négatives qui nous portent à y réfléchir comme à l'absence ou le contraire de la guerre. Comme je l'ai souligné, les définitions négatives se traduisent par une baisse d'intérêt, d'attention et de compréhension dans les sciences humaines et sociales; il vaut donc mieux les éviter. Un autre avantage de cette définition est qu'elle est compatible avec le fait que la paix est un processus social actif qui crée un environnement d'attitudes favorables entre communautés. Elle permet d'apprécier comment la paix gère ou transforme les conflits qui surgissent malgré tout, afin de rétablir la bonne volonté et comment pour ce faire elle fait appel à des stratégies d'engagement ou de séparation, à savoir les formes de paix associative, restauratrice ou séparative, selon les termes de Gregor (1996a:xvii). Aussi bien la guerre que la paix sont des activités politiques qui établissent des règles et des stratégies d'engagement (y compris la non-interaction) entre des entités politiques en contact les unes avec les autres. En étudiant et en communiquant ce qu'est la paix, dans toute sa diversité à partir d'archives ethnographiques, historiques et archéologiques, les anthropologues peuvent contribuer de manière significative à mettre fin à la guerre et à maintenir la paix en tant que membres de sociétés pacifiques au sein et au-delà de l'Océanie Pacifique.

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Note

1 Note du traducteur : l'auteur utilise les termes « mankind » pour humanité, puis « male-kind » pour lequel je calque le néologisme « hommanité » et « female-kind » que je traduis par « femmanité ».

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The Converted War Canoe: Cannibal Raiders, Missionaries and *Pax Britannica* on Dobu Island, Papua New Guinea

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Abstract: This article examines an historic event of peacemaking: the moment in which warfare was given up by the Dobu Islanders of Papua New Guinea. I provide a larger context of the event by combining the detailed historical sources with local memories and ethnographic detail from my fieldwork over 20 years. This lets me compare three notions of peace: the systemic view of the colonial authority, the spiritual perspective of the missionaries, and the temporal and superficial peace of Dobu Islanders. Framed by newly emerging power relations, the event reminds us that peace is a complex concept that needs more theorizing.

Keywords: colonial history, Papua New Guinea, Methodist mission, peace, war canoe, Dobu Island

Résumé : Cet article s'intéresse à un événement historique de pacification : le moment où les habitants de l'île de Dobu, en Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée ont abandonné la guerre. Je présente le contexte élargi de l'événement en combinant les sources historiques détaillées avec des souvenirs recueillis localement et des détails ethnographiques tirés de mes vingt ans de travail de terrain. Cela me permet de comparer trois concepts de paix : la vision systémique des autorités coloniales, la perspective spirituelle des missionnaires et la paix temporelle et superficielle des insulaires de Dobu. Encadré par des relations de pouvoir récentes, l'événement nous rappelle que la paix est un concept complexe qui exige davantage de réflexion théorique.

Mots-clés : histoire coloniale, Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée, missions méthodistes, paix, canot de guerre, île de Dobu

Introduction

This article describes and analyzes a historic event that has become a trope for "the end of warfare" in Papua New Guinea: the 1891 conversion of a war canoe (*epoi*) into a peace canoe (Christianity canoe: *waga tapwalolo*) on Dobu Island.[1] According to the accounts of the first missionaries, this conversion initiated the successful establishment of *Pax Britannica* in the belligerent Massim region. A current Methodist website uses the story of this conversion to demonstrate the power of God, but the descendants of the canoe builders tell a different version based on local notions of magic and pollution. By discussing the different notions of peace that were driving the dynamics of this event, I show that peace may refer to various ideals and may be packaged in various metaphors for different purposes. The cultural construct of peace needs more attention, beginning with a clarification of our paradigms. What, exactly, are we striving for? Is it the end of warfare, internal peace of mind or only a moment of rest in an ocean of conflict?

Warfare in the Massim region refers to small raiding parties that ambush another village at night, burning houses, looting, killing and, sometimes, taking captives. This type of warfare was common in early contact times, but there were also particularly unwelcome raids against trade posts. Pax Britannica, in spite of its Latin meaning, only stopped the raids; it did not create a truly peaceful society in Dobu as the missionaries failed to bring the promised individual peace of mind. To Dobu Islanders, this failure was disappointing but ultimately not surprising, since their word for peace refers to a calm sea, a state that is desirable and admirable and yet superficial, temporary and potentially treacherous. This model, based on a different concept of personhood (Kuehling 2005), stands in contrast with the Methodist version and its idealized, rhetorically crafted peace through God.

We often seem to take the meaning of peace for granted, but when sociologist Milton Rinehart discussed the notion of peace in his graduate course, he was surprised that the students disagreed on the meaning of the term. They were divided between three concepts: the "absence of war," the idea of "justice" and a peaceful state of mind, of "being one with God" (Rinehart 1995). Almost two decades later, the meaning of peace continues to be unpacked and our discourse on "longing for peace" remains grounded in a fuzzy notion. Many of Rinehart's students agreed to the construction of peace as the absence, or management, of conflict (e.g., Kenneth Boulding, Gray Cox 1986, Johan Galtung 1981) that situates peace "outside the individual or his or her relationship to others and society" (383). Obviously, the structural-functionalist paradigm is still lingering, in which "peace is more the product of social systems (i.e., institutions) than of interactional patterns or subjective states" (383). To achieve peace or justice at the very least, structural changes need to be implemented. North American mainstream media use the terms *peace* and *justice* in this sense but, in a hegemonic context, the implementation of peace is obviously problematic. Can peace be forced upon others?

A second group of students regarded peace in a more encompassing and individual way, as "peace of mind" or spiritual peace (386). In this view, peace begins inside the individual and exists in interactional, subjective relationships (e.g., Peck 1987). Peace-building, in this view, is a process that fosters mutual respect and understanding, creating states of harmony, tranquility and oneness (Rinehart 1995:386). Bruce Bonta, for example, defines peacefulness as

> a condition of human society characterized by a relatively high degree of interpersonal harmony; little if any physical violence among adults, between children and adults and between the sexes; workable strategies for resolving conflicts and averting violence; a commitment to avoiding violence (such as warfare) with other peoples; and, strategies for raising children to adopt and continue these nonviolent ways. [Bonta 1996:405]

In a similar vein, Gray Cox (1986) argues that a solely negative definition of peace does not provide visions for more harmony and calls for a more positive, action-based peace-building through better understanding and communication. The proponents of this construction of peace have faith in the human capacity to live in harmony with others and the environment, assuming that some societies are equipped with sharper social tools to

eliminate conflict, based on interpersonal interactions. They argue that mediation and meditation, holistic strategies to resolve conflict, are present in numerous political and religious practices and continuously employed in negotiating conflict. This individual-based concept of peace leaves open questions, too. Is there a measuring scale for states of peace? What conditions and ideologies promote the success of peacemaking, and can such a process be communicated across societies or even implemented by outsiders? Galtung's call for "a very fluid, very flexible approach to peace" (1981:196), while certainly valid, did not, as yet, result in more peaceful relations. Neither, after all these years, is there a wealth of literature on different concepts of peace.

In the peacemaking event discussed here, both these constructions of peace—ideologically wrapped in colonial justice (structural, pessimistic, based on fear) and God's power (individual, optimistic, based on faith)—combined to end cannibal raiding and to assist in the establishment of colonial control. As I will demonstrate, they unknowingly encountered a third, Dobuan construction of peace as a surface phenomenon (social, based on magic). Did a more peaceful society emerge from this muddle of intentions, visions and instructions, unreflected by the whites and misunderstood by the islanders? By combining different types of data, historical texts from missionary sources and field notes, I provide a well-documented example for the different notions of peace used as strategies by the various parties. This leads me to argue that peace is a fluid concept that requires more scholarly attention, especially in regard to variety in its construction. The example also shows how power relations are interlinked with peacemaking negotiations, and how mutual misunderstandings can lead to unexpected outcomes.

Studying peace can lead to romanticizing and stereotyping and I am deeply sceptical of Bonta's category of "peaceful societies" (1996) and his argument that conflict and violence are not part of human nature.[2] The event that I analyze here concerns a situation where violence (cannibal raiding) was caused by a complex tangle of masculinity, lack of protein, revenge and power relations within Dobu society. The actual offshore enemy was not involved in the peacemaking in this interaction between key players on the island; however, it effectively ended cannibal raids led by Dobu warriors.

Peace, like war, is a product of politics. Bruce Knauft has emphasized that practices of tribal warfare in Melanesia were linked, in complex ways, with "larger political and regional patterns of social control and resistance," as well as "indigenous political systems"

(1990:292). The Dobu version of Pax Britannica, I argue, was possible because it concerned the hostile relationships only with those on distant shores. On the island itself, the end of raiding did not conflict with micro-level politics, as former warriors proudly wore British police badges and all islanders appreciated the new safety from enemy attack.

Peace, however, goes further than war; it concerns the whole society. Our academic fascination with war, from early accounts of "savages" and ecological explanations to more inclusive analyses of the position of warfare within larger political systems, often does not go beyond organized, male warriors and ignores the larger context of gendered violence and fear in everyday life. I agree with Knauft on the problematics of "studying only war when it is peace that is ultimately desired" (1990:292) and that the larger context of practical political systems needs to be taken into consideration. To understand warfare better, Knauft suggests paying close attention to "the articulations between cultural values and political control" (295). Polly Wiessner's recent analysis of Enga warfare is a good example for such a focus (Wiessner and Pupu 2012). A similar approach is instructive for the study of peace. I will now take a closer look at the actions of the missionaries and Dobu Islanders as the last raid was cancelled and Pax Britannica was imposed in July 1892.

Dobu, the "Savage Heart of the D'Entrecasteaux"

The small, volcanic island of Dobu lies nested between two large, mountainous islands named Fergusson and Normanby that are within sight and, when the tide is right, only an hour of paddling away. The people from these two larger islands resettled Dobu after its volcano erupted, sometime in the vaguely remembered but not yet recorded past. To this day, there are outposts of Dobuan villages on both Normanby and Fergusson, evidence of old relations and past conflicts that led to the splitting of matrilineages and of friendly relations built by intermarriages and other exchange relationships. Dobu Islanders were also involved in fights with people from Fergusson and Normanby. The island was, and in some ways still is, divided into several provinces, of which the area of 'Edugaula became locally famous as headquarters of the Methodist Mission in 1891 (see map in Appendix 1).[3]

This article is based on my ethnographic fieldwork of 18 months on Dobu Island (July 1992–January 1994) and subsequent shorter visits (1997, 2009, 2012), as well as on a wealth of documentation from a variety of historic sources—unpublished journals, letters, word lists

and full-fledged dictionaries of Methodists who worked on the island, the monograph of the first missionary, Bible School material, patrol reports from the British colonial administrator, expedition reports and scholarly texts.[4] The reason for this exceptionally rich coverage may be found in Dobu's image of being the "savage heart of the D'Entrecasteaux" (Young 1983:5; 1997:100).[5] The islanders were vilified and exoticized when white explorers, colonial administrators, missionaries and anthropologists used them to fill a "savage slot" (Kuehling 2005). Dobuans were portrayed as "a strong seafaring community of exceptional ferocity, who, as raiders and cannibals said to have drunk the blood of their victims, were the scourge of the coasts of a large area" (Brass 1960:21). The missionary William Bromilow reported that the islanders "were the only natives in south-east Papua who ate human flesh and drank human blood raw! Other tribes looked upon this as degrading, themselves practicing a 'higher' cannibalism" (1929:125). Today's islanders know from hearsay that their forefathers ate human flesh, both as part of a festive ritual dish (buyo) and as retaliation in special rituals called mebu (Bromilow 1910; Róheim 1954:487). The end of cannibal raiding on Dobu is now a well-known story, popular in church and at school, narrated to tourists and anthropologists. Here, I re-narrate the story to show that peace is a complex, political state that is locally, culturally and circumstantially constructed. Considerations of the actors created peace in this instance, as the advantages of accepting Pax Britannica clearly outshone the aspirations of warrior fame.

Combining the abundant historical sources with fieldwork-based data has enabled me to understand the course of events more deeply. My work benefited from being familiar with the locations, speaking the language fluently and knowing Gaganumole's descendants. Through fieldwork, I have gained first-hand experience with the islanders' stereotypes of white people, and I am confident in saying that the islanders did not differentiate as clearly between the colonial administration and the mission as others would. Many islanders generously shared their memories with me, most recently Mr Papu Pika from Mwemweyala—the place where the event happened. My previous analysis of the Dobu concept of personhood as consisting of a visible outside and a hidden inside (Kuehling 2005) guided me to see peace as a construct tied to fundamental questions about being human. Linguistic analysis confirmed my "gut feeling" that the Dobu term for peace is differently constructed from my own. Drawing from both literature and field notes, I now tell the story of The Converted War Canoe.

"Putting It Strongly": Preaching for Peace

On Thursday, July 7, 1892, 30-year-old Eleanor Walker, a missionary sister at the Methodist Mission on Dobu Island, wrote in her private journal her version of events that unfolded 13 months after the missionaries' first landing. Although Walker was not an eyewitness to the event that has become a key narrative of conversion and the case study of this article, her version may serve as a point of entry.

> July 7, Thur. There has been a great event today, Gaganumole's new canoe was launched this afternoon and named "Marama"[6] after Mrs. Bromilow. It has been years in preparation but finished just lately. The old chief intended calling it "Enute" the name of a village where his brother was killed, which of course meant that it would be ever in their memory and most likely in that canoe they would go to take revenge, but Mr. Bromilow persuaded him not to give it that name. So he said he would call it "Marama." [Walker 1892–93]

Bromilow himself tells the story in much more detail in his monograph *Twenty Years among Primitive Papuans* (1929). He wrote that one day, while wandering along the footpath, he came across festive cooking in nearby Mwemweyala hamlet. Always eager to learn new words and practices, he "joined the little crowd" (1929:144) and saw some men working on the hull of a canoe. He found out from Gaganumole that the canoe was to become the vessel for a raid to avenge the violent death of Gaganumole's older brother, Kasualibi. The missionary set out to discourage this plan

> by pointing out that these were new times, that it was a mistake to build a new vessel of war, since peace was coming soon to all these islands. One day, when a number were gathered in the neighbourhood of the canoe, I put it strongly: let Dobu set an example to all others; everybody knew how the 'Edugaulans were the greatest warriors of the Group, let them be first in peace as they had been in war; let the canoe have another name! [Bromilow 1929:145]

Instead of Eneute, the name of the enemy's village, some men suggested the canoe should bear Bromilow's nickname, which was Saragigi, referencing his denture (literally, to move teeth, *sara* with fingers, *gigi*), but he may have seen that as too much of a responsibility (or too inappropriate to enter history: imagine a canoe named Denture spreading the good word and distributing food to the needy).[7] He refused the honour: "I do not want my name on the canoe; choose another" (Bromilow 1929:144). A woman stood up and shouted that the canoe

should be named Marama, the title of his wife that had been used during his previous term on Fiji. That was a good choice, Bromilow continues in his account, and he and his wife watched with bliss the final steps of completion, contributing "a few gifts, including flags for the launching" (1929:145). The artful carvings and shell decorations showed a "revelation of native taste and skill" (1929:145) as they were carried out with "immense care"; but,

> before the final touches were added, the canoe was secluded in a shed specifically built for it and no woman, not even Marama herself, was allowed to see it. It was explained to me that a woman's touch or as much as a woman's glance would make the canoe so heavy that it would be impossible to paddle it. When I sought to get at the inwardness of this, the only reply given and probably the only possible one, was that such was *bubuna Dobu* (the custom of Dobu). [Bromilow 1929:145]

The completed canoe was "a noble craft of its kind"; Bromilow praised *Marama's* triumph over *Eneute*: "The 'Edugaulans are the Vikings of those seas, and many of their number must have felt that their glory had departed when this splendid canoe was to carry no warriors" (1929:145). At the end of the canoe launch, Bromilow observed a peacemaking gesture: a young man split a green coconut open with one strike and poured its water out into the sea. Gaganumole explained that this was the last step from war to peace, a final message of contempt to Eneute: "We do not mean to fight them. But if these times of peace had not come upon us and we had not become like women, we would have had our revenge. It is all over. We have said we will not fight them" (Bromilow 1929:148; see also Young 1980:95).[8]

Based on these events, Bromilow could now travel the region in the *Marama*, with Gaganumole as a guide, to visit some of the tribes and former enemies (Benjamin 1912:71). Together, they convinced people to give in to the new order and support the mission; they were evidently very successful. The Bromilows lorded over the station in extremely righteous ways, and Lily had "an iron hand covered with a velvet glove" (Walker 1892–93:46). The carpenter also noted that he "offended the Bromilows" repeatedly (Bardsley 1892:24, 25, 37, 78).

Within less than four years, the station was well established and visiting Administrator MacGregor was clearly pleased with the success of his institutional intervention in local politics by means of mission stations at the fringe of administrative reach in British New Guinea. He wrote that, in 1895–96, "all was found to

be well there, and the Rev. W. Bromilow had heard of no recent unusual occurrence in the district" (1897:3). Bromilow's simple method of pacification, in his own view, was persuasion and God's help: by talking to Gaganumole, he turned his mind from evil to good. A recent version on a Christian website describes the conversion of the canoe as if the warriors, hearing God's call, had themselves realized that it was immoral to engage in revenge raiding and cannibalism and were glad to receive Bromilow's advice on better purposes for the large canoe (Beacon Media, n.d). The conversion of the war canoe on July 7, 1892, in Dobu is now used as a moralistic device to give young children a sense of God's love.

Between Sister Walker's descriptive report in her private journal, Bromilow's paternalistic prose (for an analysis, see Young 1980:294) and the Dobuan versions of the story, the event had its positive outcome: the end of raids in Dobu. To the missionaries, there was also the benefit of a boat to support their work and reach out to other islands (Young 1980:92) and, in fact, as 'Edugaula's involvement in cannibal raids ended and mission stations spread, the wider region was pacified within the following decade and Methodism thrived (see Young 1977). The event was presented as a "sign of divine grace" (Young 1980:93) in Bromilow's autobiography, as an example of the slow but worthy process of conversion from cruel cannibal raider to reliable helper.

There were many more layers and players that were silent when this story became a well-known chorus in the hymn of conversion. The missionary's peace, an inner state that is displayed in non-violent behaviour, converged well with the colonial administration's interest in pacification as an institutional, structural change in the chain of commands. Gaganumole, on the other hand, agreed to end raiding for reasons that reflect his own sense of peace in a world of magic potency. If Bromilow believed in peace through prayer and MacGregor in peace by structural changes, Gaganumole's perspective was based on a different view, as I argue now by adding field data.

A Woman's Touch: Peace by Pollution

While Bromilow ascertains that the conversion was based on his words, the descendants of Gaganumole and his contemporaries told me their own versions of the incident. Cannibal raiding, I was told by Papu Pika, was initiated by Gaganumole only a few years before colonialization begun, as a reaction to the great famine that ensued after the volcano on Dobu had erupted (see Macintyre 1983:233 for the story of Gaganumole's youth). When the missionaries arrived, Mwemweyala and Losina were mourning Gaganumole's brother Kasualibi, who had been killed during a raiding expedition to Eneute

on the Miadeba side of Normanby Island. The Dobu warriors were ambushed when sneaking up to the enemy's village at night, and Kasualibi was too slow and the Eneute warriors caught him. Two of his affinal relatives, from Gaula and Warauya hamlets, managed to fight the Eneute men and carry Kasualibi's body back to the canoe for proper burial on Dobu.

Grief and social pressure to avenge his brother had driven Gaganumole to begin building a new war canoe (epoi). The preparations took years, even before the canoe tree was chosen, because larger yam gardens, several pigs and complex political arrangements were required. Gaganumole met the challenge, invested in his networks and devoted his time and energy to it. When the missionary party arrived, the canoe was almost completed, hidden from all eyes in its shed (joejoe) on the beach. Lily Bromilow was adopted into Mwemweyala hamlet as Gaganumole's "sister," so she was aware of the canoe and involved in the women's work for it.

Building a large war canoe, I was told, was a major enterprise, requiring the effort of many workers.[10] The different stages included various meetings in which Gaganumole, the master builder (tosamwana), distributed cooked food (buyo) and betel chewing ingredients, recruiting the volunteer workers needed for his project. After he announced the specific tree for the canoe (a red cedar, mwadawa), the owner of this tree (the tobwala'upwa, literally the "person who cuts the skin") and his helpers cut the tree and received gifts for their work. Gaganumole and his helpers stripped the bark (tagi or wagi) and gauged the future shape before they pulled the partly formed and hollowed log to its beach hut in Mwemweyala. There, in the shade of the hut, the men worked on shaping the canoe body (tala) and the cutting of additional sideboards (bwada'ai) and splashboards (lagimo, tabuye, edueduduna) from the board-like roots of the wapata tree. Gaganumole and his master carvers decided on details of the design of the lagimo board (dayasi) and the setting and tying up of the splashboards (a'asi). The carver of the designs of the lagimo splashboard was in charge of its protective magic (lagimo ana didiga, lagimo, "its fear"), which frightened away evil spirits and their dangerous storms. Magic and paint (saba) were a secret affair that took about two days, a period in which women and children were not allowed near the canoe. To prevent anyone from spoiling the magic and fresh paint, the canoe was covered with coconut mats. At last, the men lashed the outrigger (salime) and platform to the body. The workers always received meals and snacks provided by Gaganumole's wife and his sisters, who organized the cooking by women of both Losina and Mwemweyala hamlets.

At the day of conversion, the work was basically done. Gaganumole only had to announce the name of the new canoe to be written on its prow and stern. The name was to be "Remember Eneute" (*Nua'i'isi Eneute*), referring to the village whose men killed Gaganumole's brother. The naming (*esana sa'u*) was a major public affair followed by a festive meal and, contrary to Bromilow's version, the couple knew very well what was happening. They came to the beach of Mwemweyala where the canoe was lying, ready to be launched after some finishing touches of decoration and lashing. The men halted in their work when the missionaries arrived and politely listened as Bromilow began to enquire about the canoe and begged to have it for his mission instead of using it against Eneute. Gaganumole was not impressed by the proposal as he was considering his need for revenge, his own prestige and his debts to the helpers (which could be met once the canoe was in operation). At the same time, he was scared of the missionary's powers and the risk of punishment by the white men for raiding and killing. So far, he had escaped jail, but the tide had changed as Bromilow now seemed to command not only spiritual but also colonial power.

The reasons why Gaganumole let go of his new war canoe differ among the various Dobuan versions. I most often heard that Marama (Lily Bromilow), who was well informed about local custom because she spent all her time with the women, went ahead and touched the "nose," the *lagimo* splashboard of the new canoe, with her hand. With this act, Lily changed a powerful war canoe into a lame and potentially dangerous "lemon" of a vessel. After Lily polluted the brand-new canoe, Gaganumole burst into tears, "mourning his canoe until his tears were exhausted," and then he sat down and spoke. He said to Bromilow that he could have the canoe. "It is not good any longer; you can use it for yourself." In another version, which I heard less often, both Bromilows happened to be near at the right moment by sheer luck. When the canoe was pushed into the sea for the very first time, it accidentally tilted over and its "nose" touched the sand, causing Gaganumole to give in (or begin to listen to) the missionary's preaching. The canoe was called *Waga Lubi*, after Bromilow's daughter Ruve; all my sources agree on this name. This detail is curious—did Bromilow make up the entire discussion of naming the canoe *Marama* and not *Saragigi*? As a result of donating the canoe to the mission, cannibal raids were over and Gaganumole became a close friend of Bromilow and the captain of *Waga Lubi*. Pika told me Bromilow was very grateful that he had Gaganumole's support, and a short while later Lily Bromilow gave Gaganumole a police uniform shirt. This time, she touched

his head while helping him dress and thereby she cunningly polluted the warrior's magic just as she had polluted the canoe.

Peace and Power: Befriending the Missionary

A closer look at Gaganumole's person and some speculations about his aspirations may help to further flesh out the event of peacemaking. In the light of the Dobu versions, it is unlikely that any vision of peace was on Gaganumole's mind when he agreed to donate the canoe. He was devastated because the magic of his canoe was destroyed and he must also have been very angry; yet he only cried and keened. The course of events demonstrates his laudable self-control and strong ambition to maintain (or regain) a position of status under the new system of power that had imposed itself upon the islanders. I was told many times that he abandoned his plans for revenge because nobody wanted to take the risk of losing a new canoe or being sent to "gaol," and the missionary party's expanding sphere of influence made it impossible to practise all the necessary rituals in secret, to hide from colonial authorities and, certainly, to raid without being reported. To Gaganumole, the differences between colonial administration and mission must have remained enigmatic, but he knew that they were at least allies because he had witnessed (from the distance) Bromilow's arrival on June 13, 1891, which was "indeed an attack in force" (Bromilow 1929:61). Young describes the invasion of

> at least four ships containing, in addition to the 73 members of the missionary party, several resident magistrates, local village constables and interpreters, as well as the Administrator himself, Sir William MacGregor, together with his armed entourage. The Dobuans, one can well imagine, were suitably awed. [Young 1997:101]

The islanders must have been livid that their customary land rights were being violated so shamelessly. They had experiences with violent whites when, only a few years before, a blackbirding ship (named *Hopeful*) had abducted several islanders and killed those who tried to escape (Mackay 1999:5). Of those, only one or two had returned from plantation work in Queensland (Bromilow 1929:79). Usually, and even more so after this incident, foreigners who landed on their shores were not welcome. Dobu Island "was a closed preserve and trespassers would be prosecuted with the utmost rigour of the law, which was very rigorous indeed" (Bromilow 1929:71). While the missionaries settled down, they were closely observed and the islanders acknowl-

edged that they displayed extraordinary strength, evidenced by their sheer survival on the notoriously haunted land that they were given (a place formerly used to ritually wash skulls), as well as in the immediate neighbourhood of people who used harmful magic on a regular basis. "Underneath the surface of native life there is a constant silent war, a small circle of close kindred alone placing trust in each other. Treacherous poisoning is a common enough custom" (Fortune 1932:137).[11]

Gaganumole's pre-colonial prestige as a *tonidoe* (war leader) had already been slightly damaged by Pax Britannica when Bromilow arrived. At a previous visit, Gaganumole had been warned by Administrator MacGregor and "given authoritatively to understand that head-hunting must be no longer regarded by him as the sport of kings" (Bromilow 1929:115); but, since he had not changed his ways, he was wanted by the government, who repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to arrest him because Gaganumole fled and hid when a boat approached. From the prestigious role of war leader, Gaganumole had been reduced to a runaway and outcast, at least legally, and obviously tried to repair his status by befriending the missionary. The carpenter of the mission, George Bardsley, described a scene of encounter within the first month in his typewritten journal:

> The old chief is a picture. His frizzy head surmounted by a straw hat. His body covered with a jacket of print in many colours, check pants but only reaching to his legs which from the hip downwards are naked. In his hand is his constant companion, a lime bottle or Carafe, the cork of which is drawn out by a boar's tusk. A wooden pat or knife, with which he lifts the lime to his lips occupies the other hand. As I write he looks wonderingly at me and exclaims, "Oo. a!" signifying the astonishment he must express at seeing me write. [1892:12][12]

Bromilow writes that within the first few days, Gaganumole came as a messenger, a role that fell into his responsibilities as war leader, to talk to the missionary. He wore the same outfit, as presumably this was his uniform to meet Bromilow on similar textile grounds and symbolic eye level:

> He was wearing a white hat of the conventional, civilized brand, though very much the worse to wear—picked up from some trader—a highly coloured check shirt and the customary T-shaped waist garment. But more remarkable than his appearance was the fact that, in spite of it, he made an impressive and manly figure, a fine specimen of a savage chief. He was

accompanied by an interpreter—of a sort—who spoke some pidgin English, more pidgin than English; and, through this medium I was given to understand that he was glad to see us on the island, but did not want any more white people here. [Bromilow 1929:116]

Rather than humbly thanking him for the privilege, Bromilow responded in a royal fashion by granting Gaganumole full pardon for his past crimes, a power that had been bestowed upon him by MacGregor. Once Gaganumole understood, "he appeared not to believe the news" (Bromilow 1929:116), probably trying to figure out the new chain of command and realizing that this white man was going to become a major player in local politics. In a way, Bromilow had announced to him that he spared his life, a strong message for a warrior in a society where reciprocity for life and death is expected. There are many stories that Gaganumole and his men nevertheless were initially trying to kill the missionaries. Thune has published a typical story (frequently retold in Methodist sermons) that explains why the warriors did not succeed[13]:

> Gaganumole, Kedoukeda and Gabeiyani went down to the beach to fight him [Bromilow]. But they couldn't do it. Dr. Bromilow prayed and they became friendly with one another. At night the Dobu and Bwaiyowa [also spelled Bwaiowa, a coastline on Fergusson across the Dobu Straits] people gathered and wanted to kill him. But Dr. Bromilow turned the radio on. It was "speaking" while they were sleeping. The government representatives and Dr. Bromilow were fast asleep. Only the voice of the radio was to be heard. But the people said, "Let's return to our homes. There is a big crowd of people there and they are all talking." They said, "Perhaps he is sleeping but there is a crowd of people talking in there." [Thune 1981:3–4; see also Bromilow 1929:72]

In contrast to this version, Papu Pika told me recently that Gaganumole was actually protecting the Bromilows as exchange partners since they had come (so Papu said) from Ware Island and brought *kula* necklaces (*bagi*). In turn, Gaganumole presented a pair of valued shell ornaments (*mwali*) to the missionary (Bromilow 1929:129) and circulated the message that Bromilow was under his protection to his other *kula* partners in the exchange region. By adopting Lily Bromilow into his clan (Bromilow 1929:126–127), Gaganumole constructed the peace of matriliny around them both for their protection and his own profit—Lily's children would belong to Mwemweyala, and as maternal uncle, he was in a position of power over them.[14] According to Papu, it was Gaganumole's protection through *kula*

peace (see Fortune 1932:129) that made the mission possible.

Whatever the reason, Bromilow's party survived and within the first month the administrator, visiting on his return trip from a patrol, was pleased about the islanders' cooperation with the missionary party: "the natives, though rendering many strange suspicions with regard to the ultimate objects of their settlement there, were friendly and rendering good help to the missionaries in the work of building" (MacGregor 1893:565).[15] The first Sunday service, with music, choir and posters, attracted a curious crowd who heard the translator's threat that those who misbehaved would be locked up in jail (Bromilow 1929:73).[16]

The material wealth of the station, his obvious power over his staff and authority within the *dimdim* system, and his fast growing competence in the language and manners of Dobu provided William Bromilow with plenty of social capital, which he further upgraded with Victorian arrogance and Christian self-righteousness (see Young 1977, 1980), assuming a role of the *über*-leader by dominating the man he believed was the highest chief, Gaganumole.[17] The latter, in contrast, constructed the relationship as fraternal (within the *kanagala* clan), marked by equality, reciprocity and respect (see also Young 1977:153). Far from assuming an inferior role, Gaganumole clearly aligned himself with the new power structures so successfully that he later became the government chief of the district: "Truly, it is a far cry from champion headhunter to guardian of the Pax Britannica" (Bromilow 1929:124). Missionary and policeman became friends, debating and giving advice to each other, thereby trying to figure out each other's powers. "Gaganumole suggested to me that I should go out with my gun on a Sunday morning and shoot, by way of making examples of them, a few of the natives who were working instead of coming to church" (Bromilow 1929:117). Although he never converted, Gaganumole became a culture hero, a "brother" to the stranger-hero Bromilow (see Young 1997).[18]

The battlefield ideology and colonial arrogance, motivations and aspirations of the missionaries have found scholarly attention (see Douglas 2001; Eves 1996; Langmore 1989; Reed 1997; Young 1980). Michael Young called the canoe metaphor "a master stroke," both to convince the donors back home in Australia of the beneficial changes from war to peace that were accomplished with their funds and to design colourful sermons (1980:92, 94). The image of peace was instrumental to the narratives of the mission: as a trope for saved souls and proof of beneficial mission work. Individual peace, conversion from within, was supposedly achieved by replacing the institution of raiding with colonial rule, facilitated by

the mission; by removing the means for violence (the canoe), potential conflict was avoided. Peace, in its negative definition (absence of physical violence), was achieved by a combination of colonial power and missionary surveillance, which in the view of Dobu Islanders appeared as only one, *dimdim* (westerners) rule.

While we do not know how Gaganumole felt when he released the canoe, whether he was faithful (finding inner peace), fearful (of a jail sentence) or devastated (because his canoe was spoiled), it is likely that the latter emotion caused his tears and surrender. His concept of peace, built on *kula* hospitality, the effectiveness of magic and existence of witches, is essential for an understanding of his role in the donation of his canoe to the missionary. Gaganumole knew powerful magic to manipulate others and did not need the raids for his personal fame. He could be convinced to abandon the war canoe only because he believed in magic and that a woman's touch has polluting powers. To understand his mindset better, I will try to outline the beliefs that made Gaganumole vulnerable to Lily Bromilow's destructive act.

Peace in the Light of Magic: A Different Construction

The Dobu concept of peace has integrated notions of magical retribution (Kuehling 2005:220; see Róheim 1946). Most deadly illnesses and accidents are explained post hoc as the results of local conflicts and the politics of magical revenge, and village gossip routinely draws connections between bodily harm, envy and anger. Such practices are based on the belief that individuals inflict pain on others as revenge for social misconduct and thus have the practical effect of fear-driven attempts to be a "good person," helping to maintain social control in Dobu, where the authority of elders is limited and leadership is based on merit alone.

Most of the ethnographic literature has classified the fear of being killed by witchcraft or sorcery as "paranoia," a psychological condition. I have argued elsewhere that, in the light of the panoptic capacities attributed to witches, sorcerers, spirits and other beings, the fear of being caught doing wrong is realistic and not clinical (Kuehling 2005; see Stephen 1987 for definitions and discussions of the specific Melanesian view on magic). The existence of powerful beings that can enforce ethical rules informs the Dobu notion of peace as a desirable surface phenomenon; the vulnerability of persons to magical retribution cements their understanding of peace as a volatile and temporary state.[19]

Bromilow reported from the early days of the mission station that "women and the sorcerers were active in opposing the reception of the teachers [in various places on the island]" (1929:75). He caught the "danger-

ous undercurrent of feeling" that his presence caused but somehow managed to repel all magical attacks. Twenty-seven of his staff members, mostly Polynesians, suffered untimely deaths, however, that were credited to Dobu magic by the islanders. On Dobu, this complex belief system is based on the general assumption that every woman is a witch (*welabana*) and has received particular knowledge in her early childhood when she was swallowed by her mother and passed out again from "underneath her skirt" (*agalaunega*). Women always deny being witches, however, and it is an unforgivable insult to call a woman a witch (*awa welabana*), but this belief probably caused Gaganumole to tell Bromilow that "as for women understanding it [Methodism], the only way would be to beat it in with a mallet" (1929:116). The missionaries observed that the older women were most opposed to their work (Billing 1930:72; Tinney 1892–1902:24; Douglas 2001:51). Today, senior women are still believed to be the most powerful witches, greedy for human flesh and almost omnipotent in their state of *welabana*. They reproduce by magically swallowing a young girl and thereby transmitting "everything" (see Lithgow 1975). As other Massim researchers have noted, the witch is in many ways the antithesis of the ideal female gender role: destructive instead of nurturing, uncontrolled instead of disciplined in her emotions, immoral instead of moral (see, e.g., Kuehling 2005:116–142; Lepowsky 1994:204, 273; Macintyre 1995:39).

The political power of women based on the general fear of witchcraft has certainly not waned with Christianity. In Vanatinai (Sudest) (Lepowsky 1991) and neighbouring Molima (Chowning 1987:174), witches reportedly increased after colonial contact. In Dobu, every woman is still suspected to be a witch. To "show respect to God," people make attempts to give up sorcery, burn the notebooks containing spells and involve themselves in church activities. They fail to realize, however, that they continue to operate within the same parameters of belief, perpetuating the fear of witches and sorcerers by praying to be spared by them. Macintyre (1995:42) reports that on Tubetube there was only one man, who was also an atheist, who did not believe in witchcraft. People's accounts of "real" encounters with witches always mention the changed features of the witch in contrast to her normal face: the eyes become big and round, the nose grows much longer, the ears become large and the tongue hangs out of the mouth. All the witnesses who spoke to me about these matters reported their terrible fear; they described a feeling of coldness inside the body, a contraction of the stomach and cold sweat.

Sorcery, in contrast, is secret knowledge that is often attributed to men and passed on as a precious gift

(Kuehling 2005). *Nabwasuwa*, the general term for sorcery, refers more specifically to the sorcery of magical killing, known by very few people (but see Fortune 1932). Only three senior men, all my guardians and key informants, claimed success in killing witches by using *nabwasuwa*. There seems to be a range of techniques, such as symbolic killing by thrusting a knife into a banana stem after certain preparations and entrapment of a victim through contact with a bespelled object. As in most parts of Melanesia, personal leavings are vulnerable to sorcery. *Tabu*, the magical protection of property, such as fruit trees, is widely practised on Dobu and is a more commonly known method of inflicting sickness or death. Most men and women know only a few different spells and could only confirm that those on Fortune's list (1932:144) are likely *tabu* that might indeed be practised by some people. Common *tabu* are boils (*lalawa*), sores (*bonu*), skin diseases (*sipoma*), tooth loss and fevers. Each *tabu* spell has its counter-spell (*loulasa*), which enables its owner to remove an affliction from a thief once he or she has given an apologetic *ta'ona* gift and begged for pardon. As boils, sores, skin disease, tooth loss and fevers are commonplace occurrences on Dobu, they appear as evidence that sorcery is still thriving. During my fieldwork, I heard of no actual cases of killing by sorcery but many accounts of seduction of minds and afflicting with sickness. The people who died were secretly speculated to be murdered by witches, by women who were treated disrespectfully and took their revenge. My data do not support Fortune's view that the hamlet was considered a safe place (1932:137), which led Young to infer that "the Dobuan can feel comparatively secure in the bosom of his *susu*, which forms his residential base" (1971:134). Safety or peace of mind derives from "good conduct," especially through obedience and hard work, but it can never be complete as people know very well there are always tensions, usually constructed as envy or anger within the family or hamlet, that materialize as sickness and death.

Christianity, in the larger region around Dobu, did not pacify the magical violence of daily life; it just made the shores and seas safe for strangers to travel and to engage in commerce (see Kahn 1983). Pax Britannica emerged as a minimal form of peace, marked by the absence of organized physical violence by forces other than the state. Gaganumole, people believe, used sorcery in his job as policeman to threaten and punish, to find hidden objects and to divine the identity of culprits. To this day, most men and women do not jettison their sorcery and witchcraft; consequently, the Pax Britannica did not result in the end of magical violence. Bromilow told his superior, George Brown, that people were indeed questioning his notion of peace: "A child died the other

day and the friends were quite angry because the witches had not heeded the words of the lotu, i.e. the Christian religion Taparoro, and given up smiting the little ones. 'These are times of peace,' said they; 'why should the child die then?'" (Brown 1910:235). This complaint was based on Bromilow's promise of total peace in Jesus, not the islanders' own construction, since an all-encompassing state of harmony was (and is) not part of the Dobu category of peace.

Faith did not stop the children from dying, but fear caused the men to quit battling—their fear of using a slow canoe was likely more intense than their fear of getting caught by police. The islanders had hoped that prayers could cast aside magical spells and sorcery attacks, that witches were repelled by the Bible. Many people still hope they can protect themselves by reading the Bible, and, to this day, people see no alternative than Bible studies and prayer in times when they are frightened by witches or suffer from a disease they believe was caused by a neighbour as an act of retribution.

People also knew from direct observation that being a practising Christian does not guarantee permanent peace of mind. They certainly could feel the sparks that flew at the mission's household, well documented in the diaries of the carpenter (Bardsley 1892:25) and missionary sisters (Tinney 1892–1902:128; Walker 1892–93:46; see also O'Brian 2005). Deaths of missionaries were even better evidence for the imperfection of God's protection. As the islanders are pessimistic about each other's capacity to abstain from gossip and retribution, they expect undercurrents and hidden tensions at any given time. I now outline the wider meaning of the Dobu language term for peace, giving ethnographic flesh to my argument.

The Calm Sea: A Dobu View of Peace

The Dobu word for "peace," *siwalowa*,[20] refers to the calm sea. The image is of a beautiful early morning on a tropical island, when the sea appears a grey, pearl-shell colour and, with the first beams of sunlight, reflections like mercury dazzle the eye. The shining surface invites canoe travel, and, in a popular story, when the protagonist is asked why he approaches a distant shore, he responds honestly that "the calmness of the sea has attracted me so I just paddled." The metaphor of the calm sea also has a notion of "good conscience" in the sense of "good behaviour" or a "good name." It describes calmness of mind (*nuasiwalowa*), the absence of nagging or overwhelming feelings of anger, envy, guilt and grief, as well as of secret desires for morally inappropriate actions.

Semantically, the term is rich and well documented in Dixon's dictionary (n.d.:168). It was used in the old greeting formula: "*Aemuya siwalowa, matamuya buyo*" (at your feet be the calm sea, at your eye the cooked feasting food). *Siwa* refers to the pouring out of something and is connected with a qualifier in many verbs (see list in Appendix 2). *Lowa* is less clear; in everyday usage it commonly means "in the past," but according to Dixon (n.d.:117–118), it can also refer to "measurement from tip of finger to tip of finger with hands stretched out in line with shoulders," so *siwalowa* literally refers to a smooth surface of a liquid or the friendliness in a person's face and body language. In both cases, one never knows what is under the surface (see Weiner 1984).

The image of the calm sea presents the ideal surface appearance: a sea that is as tidy as newly swept ground,[21] as smooth as a person who is in control of her emotions. The sea, just like the land and the people, obviously consists of more than the surface; indeed, dangers are expected to emerge from the inside, hidden behind a smooth and clean façade. This construction builds on temporality: peace is but a short episode. The quiet calmness of the sea is never permanent as upcoming winds disturb the moment of peace and waves obscure the view down into the ocean and wash some rubbish onto the beaches. In fact, life on a small Pacific island bears a high potential for thunderstorms, cyclones and other natural disasters. Peace of mind, like the calm sea, is only temporarily achievable and conflicts are a natural part of life, just as the change of the seasons, winds and weather. This notion of peace fits into the concept of personhood in Dobu (see Kuehling 2005). Like the calm sea, a person should maintain a smooth and friendly surface, disregarding the feelings "on the inside." Shiny surfaces are regarded as beautiful on persons: the oiled skin of a dancer has received *siwa* with *bunama*-oil, and magic captures the shine of the pearl shell and transfers it onto a *kula* trader for better exchange results.

The Dobu concept of peace differs from the English term as it lacks both the optimistic tone of faith-based peace (inner harmony) and the strategic approach of fear-based restructuring (end of violence). It does not claim totality but leaves room for hidden emotions and silent agendas, as it is regarded as virtuous to hide hard feelings behind a friendly smile (Kuehling 2005). Peace, in Dobu, is multilayered, fluid, incomplete and temporal, vulnerable to magic and other invisible forces. Arguably, it is a window of opportunity rather than a vision of future happiness.

Conclusions

Pax Britannica, as this peacemaking event demonstrates, was a process that was based on different notions of

peace. Three constructions coexisted in the negotiations that led to the conversion of the war canoe: MacGregor's end of tribal warfare, Bromilow's peace on earth and Gaganumole's smooth surface of interaction with the *dimdims* that promised pardon, power and white men's cargo. The missionary tells a story about male leaders who come to an agreement, while today's Dobu Islanders recall female pollution as the driving force behind the end of cannibal raiding. In the Dobu construction of peace, Pax Britannica created a new layer on the surface (like an oil film, perhaps), probably submerging more conflicts into the magical sphere of punitive practices. This peace has seen many challenges, especially during World War II. More recently, armed pirates are frightening people in the region. Policemen are torturing captives until they admit to their crimes and jails are unsafe places. In everyday life, overt violence has become a matter of "bad conduct" that is supposedly punished by jail sentences, rather than sanctioned as a legitimate form of masculine power. Although domestic violence takes place, individuals are generally very restricted in their opportunities for open confrontation. My Dobu "sister" Kassanta (then in her twenties) made the interesting prognosis that "gossip and witchcraft will never stop." She could be interpreted as stating that "conflict, sickness, pain and death will always be with us." The Dobu concept of person supports this notion of eternal conflict and only temporal, superficial agreement in the construction of a private "inside" (Kuehling 2005). Dobu Islanders see shifts in their ethical principles, as during my most recent visit to Dobu (July 2012), many people agreed that, in the past, witches and sorcerers used to keep the social order in place but they are now more selfish, spiteful and unpredictable.

A well-known hymn ends, "When Jesus comes inside your heart, there is peace, happiness and generosity/ love" (*abo Iesu i rugu ategu ena, siwalowa, gwausoala, oboboma*; my translation and emphasis). This promise of individual peace still leads most people to prayer as a safety measure against evil forces and malevolent magic. Since people believe to this day that death is generally caused by brutality, old age or magic, peace remains constructed as a surface feature. While the missionaries stopped the male, prestigious, open fighting, they were unable to control the undisclosed, often female, retaliatory killing by magic. Having Jesus in the heart has not, so far, ended violence on Dobu, and many people told me that they may just not yet have worked out how this Bible-based protection actually works. The calm sea is a well-suited metaphor for the relative peace on the surface to the Dobu Islanders who believe that every untimely death is caused by someone well known—

a neighbour or relative, a notoriously envious witch or aggravated sorcerer nearby.

Knauft's historical analysis (1990) has shown that warfare is a complex issue, but I believe that peace is no less complex and needs more theorizing. Between fear and faith, optimism and pragmatic acceptance, fighting the various forms of violence in their various sites and hoping to help others find more peace, there is room for clarification on what kind of peace we desire and for whom. The word has been used in so many ways that it requires analytical cleansing. Missionary rhetoric was built on the juxtaposition of metaphors when describing "the transition from war to peace, 'darkness' to 'light' and 'ignorance' to 'knowledge'" (Young 1977:133). The idea of a "culture of peacefulness" (Bonta 1996) suggests that some societies live in harmony. Balance, the organic model of human society, apparently still has some currency outside of anthropology. Rather than accepting such absolute categories, we should, I suggest, engage in a deeper theorizing of peace: are we looking at the absence of war, a paradise-like state of trouble-free existence or the mere abolishment of physical violence directed at "outsiders"? Are we searching for peaceful institutions or societies? Can there be peace when violence is in the hands of the state? Or is peace momentary and ephemeral like laughter, as metaphors on Goodenough Island (near Dobu) suggest (Young 1977:130)? Is it like the silver surface of the ocean when the wind tires?

The Dobu notion of peace as the calm sea appeals to me as it builds on fluidity. The peacemaking event presented in this article demonstrates that a peaceful surface does not represent the total situation; peace is a rhetorical tool, an administrative facilitator, an excuse for outside intervention. Certainly, peace is not an innocent concept as it mingles with variables underlying constructions of personhood and forever shifting power dynamics.

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Notes

for fieldwork in 1997, as part of an Overseas Postgraduate Research Scholarship (1994–98), and parts of this article were drafted while enjoying the collegial exchange at what was then called the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies.

2 Based on my fieldwork in Dobu and Woleai (a neighbouring atoll, closely related to Ifaluk), I am confident to argue that Dobu Islanders are as peaceful as Ifaluk islanders of Micronesia (one of Bonta's "peaceful societies"), in spite of the former's representation as throat-cutting individuals (Benedict 1934; Kuehling 2005) and the latter's image as non-violent and tolerant (Bonta 1996:420).

3 Bruny-D'Entrecasteaux named the island Goulvain when he sighted it in 1793, but the local name was maintained by the British (see also Brass 1960; MacGregor 1893:22–23; Brown 1908:465–512; B. Thomson 1889; J. Thomson 1889; and Watson 1941).

4 See Fortune (1932); Thune (1981); and Young (1977, 1980, 1983, 1997); Ph.D. theses by Berde (1974) and Mackay (1999); further analysis of the material without local fieldwork by Eves (1996) and Douglas (1998); and honours theses in history by Syme (1985) and Errington (2006).

5 Missionary diaries mention cannibal raids on the coast of Fergusson just across the Dobu Straits ("Jerry a trader reports a cannibal feast on Boio-Fergusson island—on land opposite mission home" [Fellows 1883–1900, July 29]). Róheim believed that the last raids on Normanby Island happened around 1920, about ten years before his own fieldwork (1954:491). In times of dire famine, endo-cannibalism was reported in the wider region (see Jenness and Ballantyne 1920:82, also Young 1986 on hunger).

6 *Marama* is a Fijian word meaning "the light." It was used as a title for mission wives by the Methodists. I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out.

7 Róheim was told on Normanby Island that Bromilow put an end to the cannibal raids by pulling his denture out and telling his awe-struck audience, "This is what will happen to your teeth if you don't stop eating people" (1954:495).

8 Gender roles on Dobu discouraged women from using spears or playing an active role in fighting, but they are not disempowered or weak, as this statement could suggest.

9 I am here creating my own version, based on the various stories that I was told during my fieldwork on Dobu.

10 Ann Chowning's description of the neighbouring Molima people is recommended for its detail and images (1960); see Campbell 2002 for a fine study of canoe building on Vakuta.

11 While I would dispute the notion of constant war and complete distrust in the past, my fieldwork occurred under different circumstances than Fortune's (see Kuehling 2005), and in this case of a wealthy group of intruders, it is very likely that sorcery and witchcraft against the missionary party were indeed tried. While some group members died of malaria and other diseases, the overall message was that they had come to stay for good and that they seemed able to do so.

12 Missionary sisters, too, were amused:

> The chief's wife was loaded with mourning necklets and large shell ornaments. Being in mourning, she did not court attention but kept herself

almost hidden under a large mat, which also served the purpose of an umbrella. The old chief wore a white coat, loin cloth and turban. In many instances a white coat was the sole garment worn. One article of English clothing is sufficient to compose a native's full dress, and the self-satisfaction written on the face of the wearer is well worth seeing, and not to be wondered at when one notices the many admiring looks cast at him from friends and the covetous glances from strangers as the happy possessor of a coat, vest or shirt marches along. [Benjamin 1912:72]

13 Another version mentions that the bright light of Bromilow's lamp discouraged the warriors (Duigu N.d.). Raiding, as mentioned earlier, routinely involved surprise attacks in the darkest hours of the night and the killing of sleeping or sleepy victims. Pitched battles on land were to be avoided. Open fights could occur at sea, where the velocity and agility of a canoe were most important. Of course, the missionaries had no radio in 1891, but they had musical instruments, which may be at the root of this story.

14 Strictly speaking, the Bromilows should not have ended up belonging to the same clan.

15 Undoubtedly, there were many attempts of killing by sorcery and witchcraft, and whenever members of the party died that was seen as a success. Seven out of 42 of the South Seas teachers died of fever within the first 11 months (Fellows 1883–1900:6). Thanks to quinine, however, the endemic malaria did not affect the newcomers as badly as the locals and the missionary party could replenish their ranks.

16 Duigu writes at that time there was only one man from Ware Island, who knew a little Pidgin English and who translated his sermon into the Dobu language. His name was Mata Yan (my translation of "*Tauna tuta nina enaya togibui ebweu Ware enega ena Pigin tupwana i mwalato-nina, tauna Bromilow ina loguguya i gibunina ena Dobu enega. Ana esana tai nina Mata Yan*" (n.d.:2). Likewise, carpenter Bardsley mentions only "Matian the interpreter" (1892:23). There is no further mention of the two indented labourers who had returned from their involuntary trip with the *Hopeful* in Bromilow's account (1929:79). These individuals would have known some Pidgin.

17 Gaganumole, at any given time, held only one of three big men's offices: he was responsible for the outside world, be it in fights as war leader (*to'aladoe*) or in regard to exchange partners (as *to' elalasi*). The other two offices were leading the gardening processes (*to giyagiyaweta*) and leading the fishing processes (*to'amudoga*). It was part of Gaganumole's role to communicate with the missionary.

18 Most recently, in the weekend issue of Port Moresby's *Post Courier* that commemorated Bromilow Day 2008, Bromilow is stated to have "attributed much of the success of the introduction of Christianity on Dobu and the surrounding areas to his friend, Gaganumole, a great warrior, who was known as the chief headhunter" (Weekend Courier 2008).

19 Space is too limited for a discussion of non-human entities and their magical agency, but see Fortune (1932) and Kuehling (2005).

20 An alternative spelling is used in the older literature: *siwaroa*. The letters "l" and "r" are interchangeable; my informants preferred "l."

21 I am reluctant to offer linguistic speculations, but it seems very likely that the verb for sweeping / the noun for coconut broom, *siyayowa*, is an abbreviation of *siwayayoa* (also *siwa'auyayoa*. v.t. of tide rising and washing refuse from beach). See Appendix 2 and Dixon (n.d.:168).

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Appendix 1: Map of the Dobu Area, D'Entrecasteaux Archipelago, Papua New Guinea

Fergusson Island

6

Normanby Island

1234

Dobu
Island

5

1	Mission station
2	Nemunemu
3	Losina
4	Mwemweyala
5	Eneute
6	Bwaiowa

2 kilometers

Map by Susanne Kuehling, based on Google Maps.

Appendix 2: Semantics of *Siwa* and *Lowa* (Dixon n.d.: 168, 117–118)

Siwa

siwa. v.t. to pour water or food or artt. out of basket or bag. Siwa yaulei, to pour away; siwa uyosa, to pour and completely cover something. Matasitasiwa, full of overflowing; losiwa, to abound (of population); siwa also means to be fecund of animals, garden. siwalaga, to pour additional water into cooking pot; siwayauyaula, to pour water carelessly about.

siwaeteetete. v.t. to wash right over canoe, of waves.

siwaepwalala. v.i. to turn, of low tide. mwayaga 'i siwaepwalala.

siwaenoenoa. v.t. to mix one person's articles with another's; to mix fluids as in dispensing.

siwa'oya'a. v.t. to break over canoe, of waves; to place food, goods, up from ground or up from house, not on floor.

siwa'auyayoa. v.t. of tide rising and washing refuse from beach. Syn. siwayayoa.

siwaboa. v.i. to have drooping breasts, of unmarried women. adj. siwasiwaboa-. n. any single women with drooping breasts.

siwaboda. v.i. to cease bearing, of animals, syn. pwalaboda. v.t. of tide rising and cutting one off.

siwabu. n. tree, Calophyllum inophyllum. Syn. kwakwamo siwabu'oya.

siwaduba. v.i. of tide rising and receding from half way.

siwae'oya. v.it. to stack food in a mount.

siwaesuya. v.t. to unload from canoe, synn. etalasiwa, talasiwa, esiwaesuya.

siwa'oabu'oabuye. v.t. to place food round person as at sagari ceremonial; to pour water round base or plant.

siwaroa. n. calm sea, calm of mind (also nuasiwaroa). v.i. to become calm, ora i siwaroa, nuana i siwaroa. Syn. for siwaroa, mwade'oa. siwaroa'eda'eda, calm strip at sea lying bet. two rough patches.

siwaroro. v.t. to pour water on plant or obj., siwaroro kweukweu, v.t. to extinguish fire by pouring water on it.

siwaso'oso'o. Syn. siwauyosa. See under siwa.

siwasa'u. v.i. of high tide reaching its mark. 'Ebesiwasa'u, the high tide mark.

siwayayoa. See siwa'auyayoa.

siyayoa. n. and v.t. broom, to sweep. Idiom, used of people eating a meal and leaving nothing.

Lowa

lowa. adv. of time. Day before yesterday. recently. syn laitu.

lowa. n. measurement from tip of finger to tip of finger with hands stretched out in line with shoulders. i.e., height of man. Lowa measurement of fishnet is from hand to hand as above but with hands downstretched at back with net held and taken over the head.

A Cultural Mechanism to Sustain Peace: How the Asabano Made and Ended War

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Abstract: Peaceful coexistence has replaced endemic warfare among the Asabano and other Om-Fu River peoples in Papua New Guinea. An Australian patrol making first contact in the 1960s curtailed warfare through threats. A decade later, Christian missionaries successfully communicated a ban on fighting and a mechanism for dispersing the vengeful feelings that had maintained payback cycles through prayer. Institutions forbidding raiding and a ritual engaging a supernatural agent who demands exclusive rights to revenge have defused local warfare for 50 years. This case suggests that peace can be indefinitely sustained through enculturating appropriate beliefs and scripts that are tailored for particular cultural contexts.

Keywords: pacification, peace, religion, Melanesia, war, world peace

Résumé : La coexistence pacifique a remplacé la guerre larvée chez les Abasanos et d'autres peuples de la rivière Om-Fu de Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée. Une patrouille australienne qui fit les premiers contacts avec ces peuples dans les années 1960 mit fin à la guerre au moyen de menaces. Une décennie plus tard, des missionnaires chrétiens réussirent à interdire les combats et mettre en place un mécanisme pour désamorcer, par la prière, les sentiments vindicatifs qui nourrissaient les cycles de représailles. Des institutions interdisant les raids et un rituel invoquant un agent surnaturel qui exige le droit exclusif d'exercer une vengeance ont inhibé les guerres locales depuis 50 ans. Ce cas suggère qu'il est possible de maintenir indéfiniment la paix en inscrivant dans la culture des croyances et des scénarios appropriés, conçus pour un contexte culturel spécifique.

Mots-clés : pacification, paix, religion, Mélanésie, guerre, paix

Introduction: A Bad Thing

The Asabano are one of several groups with populations numbering from the tens to the hundreds living in the rugged Om and Fu River valleys of central New Guinea. Peaceful coexistence replaced former cycles of endemic warfare among these groups during the 1960s and was consolidated in the 1970s. Their stories of warfare include ambush killings, torture of captives, abductions of women and children, annihilation of whole hamlets and cannibalism of enemies. These events occurred before their conversion to Christianity, an era they call "the bad time." Like the similarly fight-ready Jalé of the West Papuan highlands, the Asabano regarded fighting as both a necessary and a "bad thing" (Koch 1979:201). Conventional wisdom advised against fighting, yet people fell prey to vengeful and violent desires. Combined with the burgeoning solidarity with their fellows and allies that normally accompanied such wishes, individual feelings and their violent expression were recurrently magnified into the tragedy of war.

Attacks ceased with the arrival of the Australian colonial government and its policy of imprisonment for fighting. However, elders attributed warfare's demise to the arrival of Christianity. This was made possible when all groups in the area accepted the principle that revenge is the prerogative of Christianity's universal god.

In analyzing these changes, I seek to answer two questions based on the interviews I conducted 30 years after the last raids took place. First, how did the pre-contact sociocultural system perpetuate endemic warfare? Fresh acts of war after periods of peace were precipitated as much by developments within groups as by actions of future enemies. Initial attacks were reactions to sorcery supposed to originate from other groups or taunts of would-be warriors by others in their own communities. Where participating groups held up payback as a satisfying measure of justice and where organized ambushes were recognized as feasible, such catalysts

Table 1: Ethnic Groups of the Om Watershed Region

Self Designation	Asaba Designation	Telefol Designation	Language
Asabano	Asabano [Kienu River]	Duranmin	Asaba [Duranmin]
Asabano	Asabano [Om-Fu R.]	Sugamin	Asaba
Towale	Womolono	Akiapmin	Towale Ate
Telefolmin	Kibluno	Telefolmin	Telefol
Omai [or Menaubi]	Omaino	Mondubanmin	Omai
Opa	Beneyeneno	Emiapmin	Omai
Lembana	Kameablono	Efumin	Lembana
Oksapmin*	Silono	Oksapmin	Oksapmin
Saiyo	Seseno	Sisimin	Saiyo
Mianmin*	Kolino	Miyanmin	Miyanmin
Falamin	Yagamono	Feramin	Falamin

* The Oksapmin and Miyanmin had no traditional names for themselves as groups, but have now adopted the Telefol designations.

Table 2: Ethnic Groups of the Upper Wario River

Self Designation	Asaba Designation	Telefol Designation	Language
Baiyamo	Baiyamono	Yubaiyamin	Baiyamo (Paupe)
Kabiano	Abunakabeno	Unagabmin	Kabiano (Hewa)
Setiyale	Sideyale	—	Setiyale (Hewa)
Sumwari	Sideyale	—	Sitiyale (Hewa)

were able to incite attacks when the emotional pitch was sufficiently raised.

The second question I address is: how did changes in political control and religious ideology contribute to the end of warfare in this region? I find that enforced colonial pacification contributed an immediate disincentive to initiate new raids, but it did not result in a change in the retributive ideology that justified and encouraged tit-for-tat warlike outbursts. This latter was accomplished by the installation and virtually universal acceptance of a supernatural judge and enforcer. This belief, and the accompanying scripted response to perceived affronts—a ritual of prayer in place of directly avenging—stabilized the peace, which has remained for 50 years.

Material and structural causes of peace and war manifest and are apprehended in culturally distinctive ways, such that "beliefs and attitudes, though largely derivative, are still an essential part of the functioning of war systems. This opens the possibility that ideas developed by anthropologists may have an impact 'in the real world'" (Ferguson 1989:143). The value I intend for this essay is to show how the specifics of this case inform broader questions about the nature and causes of peaceful relations among societies across humankind, in all places and times. The scale of socio-political complexity of the societies engaged in efforts toward peace influences what kinds of peaceful alternatives to violent engagements are possible, since peace, like war, is a collective undertaking requiring political will and control. For peace to be sustainable, tailored cultural ideologies that provide viable alternatives to war must be distributed and maintained.

Pre-contact Warfare

Several small ethnolinguistic groups live in the remote and sparsely populated region where I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in 1991, 1994–95, 2005 and 2007 (see Tables 1 and 2 and Map 1). Before contact with globalized cultural flows during the mid-20th century, groups in this area converged and diverged, fought and established friendships, expanded and were reduced to extinction. Asabano elders, speaking in the mid-1990s of their relations with neighbouring groups before contact, reported that the Mianmin, the Oksapmin, the Baiyamo and the Towale were their consistent allies, while the Opa, the Saiyo and the Telefolmin shifted back and forth between being allies and being enemies. The Omai and the Kabiano were generally regarded as enemies, and the Lembana, the Setiyale and the Sumwari had little positive or negative contact with the Asabano. These generalizations, however, obscure the fact that even subgroups of the same people and other allies could be attacked or made the butt of an alliance with a third group, to deflect rapacious attention from themselves.

Warfare was a constant threat and occupation of the Asabano. Bows and arrows and long palm-wood hand

Map 1: Approximate Late Pre-contact Ethnic Territories. Redrawn by Candis Haak from Lohmann 2000:30.

Figure 1: War Weaponry of the Asabano (collected by author in 1994–95). Top to bottom: spear tipped with cassowary spur, club, barbed arrow, bow. Photo by author.

Figure 2: Omahu (right) and Baraiab Demonstrate Fighting Partners' Use of Bow, Arrows and Shield, 1995. Photo by author.

spears and clubs were the primary weapons, and every house had a large supply of ammunition (see Figure 1). Man-sized shields provided defence (see Figure 2; Craig 1988:41; 2005a, figure 27). The usual strategy for attack involved organizing a group of allies to meet on a certain day. The host hamlet would provide a feast cooked in a steam oven. Wuniod, an Asabano elder who served as a

multilingual interpreter based in Oksapmin during the colonial era, re-enacted for me a ritual he said warriors performed in the men's *nuwalemawbu* "secret/sacred house," where bone relics of male ancestors were stored, to prepare for a fight. A shield was laid face-up on the floor. Over the "heart" (the quadrangle at the centre of the carved and painted design; see Figure 2) they set one of the ancestral bones. Placing tinder over the relic, the men kindled a fire and held their arrows and bows above the fire, saying, "When I shoot these arrows, you hit their heart or their eye—kill them." Then the men would stand up and whoop, brandishing the weapons as they still do in celebratory drum dances. Similarly, Fraser Macdonald (2013:chapter 3) reports that the Oksapmin kindled such a fire on the bare chests of boys undergoing initiation.

The morning after arriving at the appointed settlement, the warriors would set off and camp near the hamlet they intended to attack. Before dawn they positioned themselves along the trail leading to the stream used for drinking water and shot the people as they came out of the house in the morning. One man would hold the shield while another would stand behind it and shoot arrows. Yalowad, who was an elder when I spoke with him in 1994, said that as a beardless boy he killed a Saiyo man. He was partnered with Wani, who later became the local Baptist pastor, and they took turns holding the shield. Yalowad shot the Saiyo man in the chest. He fell, but was not yet dead, so Yalowad ran up and finished him off by twisting his head back. I asked him how he felt about it at the time. He said he was really happy, as he had not killed a man before and this proved his manhood.

An Asabano man named Simolibo, in his thirties in the mid-1990s, recalled that when he was a small child, "the fathers used to say if a big rainstorm came at night it was a sign that enemies were close at hand and no one should leave the house in the morning" for fear of being attacked. He said sieges could last up to two weeks.

Figure 3: Belok Wearing a Wosaw and Holding a *Hawbu* (drum) for a Drum Dance at Yakob, 2005. Photo by author.

According to Bledalo, who was a mature man and an accomplished warrior before first contact,

> Before, in fighting times, we'd kill the parents and capture the children and look after them. Before, in the bad times, the fathers taught us like school that we mustn't be afraid of fighting. They would say, "If you run away I'll shoot you with an arrow!" So we would be afraid. "You must capture children and change them and look after them." They said it's good. I took an ancestor's bone in my net bag to raids, for power. Our ancestors didn't look after the bones well, so they would lose fights but, before I went to fight, I arranged all the bones in the sacred house, so I won fights.

When relations were positive, representatives walked for days to visit neighbouring groups and would honour them by donning huge *wosaw* feather head-dresses and long grass skirts, leading singing for drum dances that lasted from sunset to sunrise. The host hamlet provided food cooked in a steam oven. All groups in the Om River watershed and the Upper Wario River participated in this tradition. Drum dances provided an opportunity to cement alliances, meet possible marriage partners, pay debts, hear complaints and forge plans. They provided an evening of drama and beauty to punctuate the usual life of gardening and hunting (see Figure 3).

The Asabano and Telefolmin living near the Duranmin airstrip recalled a long period of hostility between their peoples that significantly reduced Asabano numbers. Namo, a Telefolmin living in a hamlet on the Upper Fu, who appeared to be in his seventies when I spoke to him in 1995, said, "Our ancestors finished off the Irigimin who lived at Eliptaman, and then came to Aremin land in the Upper Fu. One generation finished off both groups. My father and I fought with the Sugamin [Fu River Asabano]." Olimilai, who appeared to be in his eighties in 1995, lived among the Telefolmin on the Upper Fu but was born an Asabano at Kienu River. Telefolmin raiders captured him as a boy of about 12.

> Most of us fled during the night from Kienu River to Karu River. After fighting us at Kienu River, they followed us to Karu River. I ran with my father to a garden fence and we hid under it. Many Telefolmin came and surrounded the place. Then they found us and killed my father with a bow and arrow and captured me. They killed my mother, two sisters and my grandparents at the same time. My cousin-sister (*isade*) Nenemo, Levy's [a well-known Telefolmin businessman] mother, now living at Telefomin, was also captured and we were taken to Aiyam River, which joins the Fu. Then they separated us and the Telefolip people took her and the Eliptaman people took me. I was just a kid; I was not afraid or wanting to run away—I just went with them. They became my parents and were kind to me. I thought and worried about it some, but I was just a kid so I wasn't angry.

> Why did they fight? For land, sago, hunting land. When I went to stay with the Telefolmin, I grew up. Then there was another fight. I helped the Telefolmin fight with the Asabano. We stopped this fight before the Australians came.

Olimilai explained how peace was ceremonially re-established between enemy groups in recounting the ending of hostilities between the Telefolmin and Asabano before first contact.

> We used to come and stand some distance from the enemy village and call to them the intention to make peace. Then we would carry some red Cordyline inside the house and break it with an arrow before their eyes. This is the custom of both Asabano and Telefolmin to finish hostilities. The Kienu and Fu River Asabano saw when we did this, they killed a pig, we told stories together, smoked, ate and slept together and then the war was finished. Then white men came and finished fighting completely.

Asabano men told me stories explaining the origins of the decades-long fighting between themselves and the Telefolmin, in which Olimilai was captured. My genealogical data indicate that this long enmity resulted in heavy losses to the Asabano in killings and abductions. Sitting in the bush house at Aduduma, the location where it happened, a young Asabano man named Jim Alosi told one version in 1995.

> My grandfather Aliadi turned into a *mosidu* [eagle species], flew to Aduduma and sat down near some *kwobodu* nuts that pigs eat. He was watching for pigs. He heard a sago tree fall. He turned into an eagle again and flew and sat on a branch. He saw some Telefolmin had come to cut sago. Then he flew to his village and told them, as well as the people from Kienu [Asabano], Towale and some Falamin friends what he had seen. All these groups met and there were many people gathered. They slept at Wobusuma [a camp on the Fu] and early the next morning they surrounded the Telefolmin. They fought with them and finished all of them off, every one was killed except a little boy who escaped. He told his group and they came to fight with us. This is why we fought with them. Aliadi was the father of Abueli, my father. He could turn into an eagle—he had a feather that allowed him to do it.

Belok, an Asabano man in his thirties in the mid-1990s, told the story with a different emphasis.

> Long ago, our ancestor went to watch for wild pigs near some nuts. As he was waiting, he heard a tree fall. Investigating, he saw a group of Telefolmin cutting sago on their territory. He went back and told the people what he had seen.
>
> Meanwhile, the women had been talking about the men, saying, "Some of you have big cocks, but some of them are only little." They were saying all these taunting words and the men were mad about it, so they said, "You women have it too good, so we'll go kill those Telefolmin. We'll start a big feud and then you women won't have it so easy and make all this kind of bad talk." They got together lots of men, and made a big steam oven to cook sago and meat and said, "Tomorrow we'll go kill the Telefolmin." They gathered men from many areas.
>
> Next morning they left and in the morning they saw two men come walking and they shot them. One Telefolmin had gone to watch for pigs at the nuts and he called out "*Kwina, kwina!*" This is said when a man has been hit with an arrow and he thinks he will die. In Asaba language you say, "*Wanali, wanali!*" We say this if we burn our hand in the fire, too. So the Telefolmin group heard the man's call and they argued over if it had been a bird or a man. One man said,

"No, I heard it well—it was a man." He put his bow over his shoulder and took a piece of meat. Meanwhile the Asabano surrounded them and killed many of them but this man succeeded in shooting one of the Asabano in the mouth.

> He then flew away (he was a witch). The Asabano killed many men, and then went back to their village and had a celebration and drum dance all night. After that, the Telefolmin were very angry and attacked us repeatedly, killing nearly all of us.

The Telefolmin elder, Namo, and Katalim, a young man of mixed Asabano and Telefolmin parentage, who both live among the Telefolmin on the Upper Fu, told of another skirmish that happened somewhat later. This story shows how fragile alliances were and how easily closely related groups could betray one another. The Falamin used to own the upper Om River, from the Figi and Bi Rivers. The Kasangelmin (Ungeno in Asaba), a subgroup of the Fu River Asabano, had territory at the head of the Bi River. An ancestral woman, Katamoson, was a captive Fu River Asabano living with the Telefolmin. She was with a party that went to Aduduma camp on the Fu to cut sago. This was on her natal territory, so she went to visit her Fu River Asabano relatives who were at Igima camp, downriver from Wobusuma. She told her brother, "The Telefolmin have come and are cutting our sago; what are you going to do about it?" They got lots of tobacco and put a bamboo knife inside a bundle of it and gave it to her and told her, "Give this to your husband, and tell the Telefolmin to go and kill the Kasangalmin and Falamin who are on the other side of the river at Wobusuma. Then they will leave us alone." She did this and, after they smoked, they went and killed the Kasangalmin and Falamin.

The bundle of tobacco with a bamboo knife is symbol of alliance and the start of a war against a third party. By sending this to the Telefolmin, the Fu River Asabano saved themselves from the potential threat of the Telefolmins by instead directing them to attack a third group, who were their allies and spoke the same language.

Bledalo told of his youthful experiences fighting the Telefolmin.

> When I was a little kid, they had come to Karu River to sleep—we thought about killing them, but they got away. At this time, they killed Wani's mother and captured two of my cousin sisters [sisters/female parallel cousins]. At Kienu River they burned the men's house where we kept men's skulls. The Telefolmin closed the door and set it on fire and it was destroyed. I was very little at that time. After that, the men were really afraid of the Telefolmin and would hide if they saw signs of them.

The first time I fought, the Telefolmin came and fought with us. Then we were mad and I got a shield, and went to the head of the Fagai [Figi] River near the head of Frieda River. In one village we killed them all and burned their houses. There were many people there. I wasn't afraid; I didn't count them; I just wanted revenge. I didn't capture any women. We went with the Towale and Baiyamo. My friend and cross-cousin Ifauli said to me, "Let's go fight; they've hurt us; let's get revenge. I've slept at their village and I know what it's like." We killed everyone at a small hamlet with one house, too. The big village we destroyed had nine or ten houses. They came and hurt us a lot and I cried, so I killed women and children too. I had just a little beard and wasn't married yet.

The Omai, who occupied the Middle Karu River at contact, have vast territory along the Om as well. They were rivals of similar strength and close proximity to the Asabano, and relations cycled between feud and friendship—usually the former, driven mainly by the desire for payback. Fugod, an Asabano elder in the mid-1990s, told me how cycles of revenge ensured that fighting would continue.

My mother told me that my father cooked an Omai man in a steam oven after a fight. Then the Omai came to fight us when I was a baby. They killed my father, burned our house and captured my mother and me. Later our men came to pay back and, when the fighting started, my mother hid and ran away with me, back to our own people. Years later, when I grew up I had forgotten, but the older men reminded me of what had happened in the past and made me feel angry with the Omai and anxious to fight with them.

The desire for revenge inspired not only killing and capturing but also torture. Baraiab, an Asabano man of about 60 in the mid-1990s, witnessed as a child the de-fleshing of a captured Omai man at the head of the Karu River, at Tubale River.

We were very angry at the Omai for past raids. The fathers captured one of them and tied him to the central post in the community house. His hands were tied behind his back to the central post and his neck, waist and legs were also tied to the post. Inside the house women were grating taro in preparation for the steam oven. Then, amidst his horrendous, piercing screams the men proceeded to cut the meat off his body while he was alive. They started at the hips and removed the leg meat, then de-fleshed the arms, then the facial meat and then they got to his torso. Eventually there was nothing but bones tied up to the post. They kept doing it slowly, until the sun

went down and he finally died. Only the important men ate the meat. At another time the Towale did the same thing to a Telefolmin man.

"Once," Bledalo told me, "the Omai came and burned down the [Asabano] sacred house and with it, burned part of one of Iblukanawe's [a culture hero] femurs. Since then look, there are hardly any of them left, so I think Iblukanawe was angry with them."

The last raid conducted by Asabano was in aid of their sometime enemies, the Omai, against the Saiyo in 1963. The Saiyo live along the Strickland and Lagaip Rivers. They were alternately friendly and belligerent toward the Asabano. They were the primary source of shell money and phallocrypts for the Asabano. The Australian colonial administration learned of it and made first contact with the Asabano as part of their investigation, sending several men to jail (Marks 1963). Bledalo took part.

I was at Kienu River, and we went down to fight people at the Fu and Om—Saiyo and Omai people were there. They were mixed together in one village at that time. We were mad about a woman; there was a young woman we wanted to marry and if they wouldn't give her to us, we would go to fight.

I went to fight and I captured three women! Then the government came and made me give them back—I was really mad! They were all Saiyo. One of mine ran away in the middle of the night; we called after her but couldn't find her. I gave one of them to Fugod and they were married for two or three months. One of them was given to my little brother [brother/male parallel cousin] Taram, but both were taken back by the government. That was my last fight; the government put me in jail.

Shortly afterwards the Saiyo launched a retributive raid and killed some Asabano but this was their last experience of tribal warfare. Until that end came, armed men always accompanied women as they went to their gardens. Children were kept silent for protection from enemy raids that might come at any time. Houses were built high on stilts with ample supplies of arrows and firewood in readiness for siege. People lived in perpetual fear of attack, while often engaging in plans for their own attacks. Sometimes raids resulted in only one or a few deaths of men, women or children, as when lone individuals were ambushed on early mornings as they left their communal houses to bathe.

Older men admitted that in the past they were advised—in theory—to avoid warfare. "If you fight, you won't live long," their elders had said; yet people were nevertheless often drawn into fighting. Similar sayings

have also been reported elsewhere in New Guinea, as among the Enga (Wiessner 2009:181).

In the stories of past conflicts, every wrong is seen as a response to another wrong. A logic of retribution, which is widespread among peoples bearing exchange-centric cultures such as those of Melanesia (Trompf 1994), is obvious in this Asabano oral historic account of cycles of revenge. However, the period of peace that preceded the long feud with the Telefolmin is portrayed as having ultimately been broken not by a wrong from an external group that had to be avenged. Rather, according to storytellers, the start of it all was Asabano women—who did not themselves take up arms in pre-contact warfare—insulting their own men. The men did not reciprocate this verbal attack directly or in equal strength. Rather, they turned their fury on another group. While they justified killing these people because they were stealing Asabano property, again, the theft of some sago was out of proportion with this massacre.

In the story of the captive Asabano woman Katamo-son, who apparently sought to incite her people to attack her "captors-in-law" for stealing their sago, their response was instead to strike an alliance with them and direct them to attack their erstwhile allies to save themselves. Making peace by ritually breaking an arrow and establishing an allegiance by sending a bamboo blade in a bundle of tobacco were opposite points of view on the same deadly exchange. Peace was established by allegiance, which, however, simultaneously implied agreement to come to one another's homicidal aid against others when a new feud came about.

The Om-Fu peoples had no shortage of land. However, the expansionist Telefolmin had moved out from their homelands around Telefolip village and the current station of Telefomin in Ifitaman to conquer Eliptaman, the Upper Fu and parts of the Frieda and Wario River valleys (Craig 2005b:2; Jorgensen 2007:62–63). Similarly, land acquisition was one factor motivating war in the densely populated central highlands of New Guinea (Meggitt 1977). However, the groups in the Fu-Om watershed shared characteristics identified among other New Guinea groups engaged in endemic warfare. Hallpike (1977:275) observed in the Papuan mountains that a cultural model of sociality emphasizing individual agency rather than control of the civil group allowed the flaring of passions to motivate responses in line with the prevalent "ethos of aggression and destruction." Such groups are often unable to control individual members' aggression (211). These incidents inspired retaliations.

Loyal identity brought group members to one another's aid, and any enemy group member was fair game to receive revenge or compensation for an act committed by any other member—what Raymond Kelly (2000:47) calls "social substitutability." In one skirmish, the Asabano joined with their allies of the moment, the Omai, to attack the Saiyo, one of whom had been accused of causing an Omai death by sorcery. The expedition resulted in several killings and abductions, but the particular sorcerer deemed responsible for magically attacking the Omai was not sought out for retribution. The widespread Melanesian emphasis on evening scores by payback and compensation also plays into cyclical attacks (Hallpike 1977:197–198). When actors have a penchant for one-upmanship in a violent exchange relationship, each attack can motivate a more severe response, leading to periods of intensifying hostilities. It has been noted that warfare is usefully theorized as a kind of exchange between the social groups that find themselves in violent rivalry (Otto et al. 2006:17).

When the death of a person attributed to a foreign group's magic is a catalyst to war, making war and peace involves attempts to justly repair not only physically efficacious affronts but also imagined and culturally postulated ones. As such, the cosmologies of the parties making war or peace profoundly shape motivation. In Roy Rappaport's (1984:237–238) terms, there are "cognized" (emic) as well as "operational" (etic) elements of the social environment, which scholars should distinguish and understand. Thus for the Asabano and many other Melanesians, not only are sorcerers and witches regarded as endowed with real powers to kill but also all occurrences, even those that scholars would call "coincidences," are understood to result from intentional actions. In effect, in Asabano thinking there are no accidents and so any injury suffered by a group member results in a call to settle the score, often with a group, a member of which has been identified as the "real" cause behind a particular death (Goldman 1993; Hallpike 1977:192). At one drum dance I witnessed, where Telefolmin visitors were performing in an Asabano hamlet, Yalowad demanded that the visitors compensate him for his sorrow over the death of one of his friends among their people. This man's death seemed natural to me, but to the Asabano his death had resulted from insufficient care by his own people—it was the result of human decisions and actions (or inactions). Likewise, most deaths are understood to be caused by sorcery or witchcraft and traditionally would call for revenge. When the culprit was revealed, through signs or dreams, to be an insider, the diagnosis was witchcraft and the response was vigilantes executing the "killer" (Lohmann 2010:234). When the accused was of another group, warriors might assemble for a violent expedition against the cognized perpetrators, conceptualized as the entire group.

Initial Pacification through Colonial Domination

The Om-Fu peoples escaped from endemic warfare through a two-part process in which new social pressures and ideological elements were introduced. First, the Australian colonial government encapsulated all of the region's tribes. Its first act of making contact was to intervene when it learned, through its Telefolmin policeman Wasinau, that some Telefolmin, Asabano and Omai had attacked the Saiyo, killing and abducting several people. The administration sent a patrol into the region to arrest the aggressors (Lohmann 2000:166–171). The patrol brought them back to the government station at Oksapmin some days' walk away and thereafter flew them to the coastal town of Wewak to stand trial. A young Saiyo woman who had been captured and married off to one of the attacking men was returned to her people, and the men experienced the technological wonders of globalized culture and the breadth of the government's dominion in New Guinea. Pleading before the judge that, as a newly contacted people they were unaware of the colonial laws, they were released. Accordingly, the Asabano bore unavenged a final retaliatory raid by the Saiyo and did not conduct further raids. Realizing that the Australian administration did not have the wherewithal to stop raids before they happened or to provide immediate, on-the-spot mediation or conflict resolution, the people remained on their guard.

As Martin Zelenietz (1979:91) has observed, the pacification of Native Oceania cannot be understood merely as a matter of forceful imposition, because the people often actively embrace opportunities to end war. The Asabano, reduced in numbers from earlier fighting and an influenza epidemic, seized upon this potential for peace. The Asabano welcomed the Australian administration's patrols, the presence of the government and the security from future raiding that it promised (Lohmann 2000:173–174).

The lack of an overarching political structure in pre-contact New Guinea made it difficult for small-scale societies such as these to escape from violent exchange cycles (Hallpike 1973:454). Jürg Helbling (2006:131) singles out "political autonomy of local groups in an anarchic system and the dependence of local groups on locally concentrated resources" as causing "a warlike type of strategic interaction between local groups, which may be described in terms of game theory." According to game theory, although peaceful cooperation would be of greatest benefit to all, "a one-sided peaceful strategy is too risky, since a one-sided bellicose strategy brings the highest gains and a one-sided peaceful one the highest losses." If interpreted loosely to consider revenge as a resource and egalitarianism as a sort of anarchism, this characterization fits the situation faced during late pre-contact by the Asabano and their neighbours. Peace came when the autonomy of all interacting egalitarian local groups was overarched by church and state and when the semblance of restricted access to resources like revenge, women and children, pride and sago, which had formerly catalyzed warlike outbreaks, was disrupted by introduced structures and rituals.

Consolidation of Peace through Missionization and Conversion

Baptist missionization of the area began in 1974 and culminated in the mass conversion of the community in 1977. It provided the means to make permanent the hiatus in intertribal warfare. Men who lived as adults through the transformative period of the 1960s and 1970s made it clear one of the reasons they found Christianity compelling was that where Christianity went, peace followed.

The missionary Diyos, who brought Baptist Christianity to the Asabano, risked all, as his Telefolmin people had formerly inflicted great losses on the Asabano over decades of attacks (Lohmann 2007). Men vividly recalled to me his early visits, when he claimed to come in peace and led prayers to the new god, asking those present to close their eyes. Expecting him to attack, it took some time before all the men closed their eyes after they had seen his example and that of the Telefolized Asabano men who had been captured as children with their bilingual offspring. In the spirit of reconciliation, those Telefolmin who accompanied Diyos from Eliptaman to the west and the Asabano living on the Kienu and Karu rivers to the east both moved together to the frontier of their respective territories and settled in a common village on the Asabano side at the junction of the Ilim and Fu Rivers. Although this joint community did not last and the two ethnic groups quickly retreated to multiple hamlet sites on their respective sides of the border, their common religious identity and overall good relations remained.

Diyos preached that God is universal, disallows killing and reserves to himself the right of revenge. This countered the traditional ideology that revenge through human agency is just, by introducing a new imagined agent—the Christian god—who handles issues of life and death so that people may be released from the dangerous and destructive burden of exacting revenge.

In 1977, a Christian "revival" movement began in the joint Asabano-Telefolmin church, in which Holy

Spirit possession, glossolalia and dreams provided spiritual evidence that the missionaries' claims were true. Cumbersome food taboos for women and uninitiated boys enshrined in the old religion were labelled satanic. Older men, concerned that their gardens and hunting might fail if they abandoned traditional religious practices, made an experimental garden without traditional prayers and magic—which had included planting an ancestor's bone—praying to the Christian god instead. Rather than making offerings to sprites and carrying ancestral bones while hunting, they prefaced hunts with prayers to God. When the garden produced well and hunts were successful, they were satisfied. A Telefolmin-Asabano elder named Kafko said in 2005 that, while dream evidence was one way that people were convinced of Christianity, the end of the food taboos and warfare was more important because it increased abundance and goodwill and simply made life easier. The cessation of warfare was itself regarded as evidence for Christianity's truth.

Asabano men attributed the end of war to Christianity and described this as among its most attractive features. By joining in the same Christian moral community, individuals and groups came to share a common identity and support system, which could prevent conflicts from escalating. Vengeful feelings were to be given over to God, who alone has the authority to mete out ultimate justice. God became a sort of cosmic accountant, able to take over the odious task of settling scores. This idea was "assimilated" into pre-existing notions of retributive justice in Joel Robbins's (2004:10) sense of incorporating new ideas into existing categories. Witch executions and raids against foreign sorcerers' groups were replaced with praying to God that the witch or sorcerer abandon satanic magic and become a Christian. *"God bai bekim"* ("God will pay back [the homicide]") was how older men phrased in Tok Pisin their release from the pressure to avenge. Prayer removed the danger of undertaking payback raids and resolved the moral conundrum by which raiding was both urged for revenge and seen as leading to a short life. Christian prayer for one's enemy allowed one to take retributive action that would benefit both one's attackers and one's self.

This introduced prayer ritual defuses triggers perpetuating the cycle of payback raids by reminding the person praying of two possible outcomes that obviate taking revenge into one's own hands. First, the ritual affirms that repentant homicides can be rendered non-violent through conversion to Christianity—an outcome that the prayer encourages. Second, the prayer restates that the godly order ensures revenge in Hell for non-repentant homicides. God and other supernatural beings

are understood to have a peacemaking agency that is far more effective than government functionaries.

We have here an example, in a particular cultural belief system, of what William Walker (2009) has referred to as the practice of a supernatural agent in warfare—or in this case, in peacemaking. God fulfils for the Asabano the need for an intimate and immanent third party upon whom one may call for justice. This supernatural agent relieves pressures before they inspire violence better than the distant and increasingly ineffective agents of government can. This provides, in emic experience, a third, mediating party between disputants, the lack of which has been identified as responsible for endemic warfare in the New Guinea highlands (Koch 1974:26). Among the Manga of Papua New Guinea's Western Highlands, for example, "triadic mediation was extremely rare in the precontact system of conflict resolution and ... pacification was achieved when the government satisfactorily incorporated triadic relationships into the local Manga system of conflict resolution" (Pflanz-Cook and Cook 1979:182).

In the Asabano case, the mediating third party is, from an etic perspective, imagined, a projection of disputants' own minds, with copies enmeshed in the schemas of every person's mind. Therefore, it is better able than weakly enforced government institutions to prevent one person's rash violence or deaths attributed to sorcery from precipitating an organized violent response. The autonomy of individuals that is characteristic of small-scale, egalitarian societies, which Anton Ploeg (1979:177 n. 2) has identified as a barrier to enforcing a constant peace on all members, is more effectively controlled by an internalized non-violent ideology and practice than by external agents of either religious or secular orders.

Warriors carried ancestral bones so that the deceased might aid them. Many cosmologies posit the existence and potency of supernatural beings, and we must take these beliefs into account to understand their thought and behaviour. However, scholars must avoid the trap of tacit supernaturalism in our own models by attributing agency to objects and creatures of the imagination or including these in theoretical (etic) definitions of society, as Walker (2009:110) advocates, to prevent distortions of either emic or etic perspectives (see Lohmann 2003). As Jack Eller (2006:32) points out, "most human groups have approached the problem of violence with a prescientific and even specifically supernatural outlook," including notions such as witchcraft and other personifications of evil or destructive and constructive forces, such as immortal souls, demons and gods. These offer them explanations, motives, justifications and means of

war as well as peace. Such supernatural models, like the Asabano prayer ritual, defuse war differently than those cultural participants think they do; yet their earnest faith in them has operational efficacy by changing behaviour. While religious beliefs can generate war (Eller 2006:154), they can also engender peace.

Consider Douglas Fry's paradigm of conflict management techniques. His types include unilateral, bilateral and trilateral approaches. Bilateral techniques, enacted by the two combatant parties, include avoidance, toleration, negotiation and self-redress. Trilateral techniques involve a mediating third party who oversees a settlement, either through friendly or repressive peacemaking. Friendly peacemaking methods include separating and distracting, mediation, arbitration and adjudication, while repressive peacemaking relies on continual application of force or threat to prevent outbreaks (Fry 2007:82). Placing the Asabano Christian prayer ritual in this paradigm shows that, from an emic perspective, it is a trilateral approach, in which the prayer invokes God as a third party to act as a friendly peacemaker, separating and distracting the would-be combatants, adjudicating the conflict by deciding who is right and who is wrong. God is also emically understood to be a repressive peacemaker who enforces peace by determining the afterlife fates of the parties who cannot escape his notice or enforced judgement as they might reasonably hope to avoid government authorities in the weak state of Papua New Guinea. From an etic perspective, the prayer ritual appears to be a unilateral conflict management approach— the third party is imagined rather than an independent agent and what the ritual accomplishes in operational terms is avoidance, toleration and a form of self-redress through invoking a supernatural being (a mental model in the agent's mind) to mete out justice. Its unilaterality gives it significant strength through bypassing the need for complex negotiations and costly engagement of second or third parties before potential retribution can be stifled. Unilateral conflict management in the guise of trilateral conflict management also has particular efficacy in this cultural context for another reason: just like the imaginary and exaggerated offences that give impetus to attacks, it exists only in the minds of would-be aggressors.

Because the third party in this conflict management technique is imagined rather than a physical agent, it is continually available for immediate invocation in any person who has been enculturated to belief in "him." This illustrates that imaginary phenomena can be more "real" in efficacy than physical beings and forces, including military and police powers that, while an important factor in keeping peace, can be eluded in ways that

one's own mind cannot (see Strathern and Stewart 2011). Shared belief in a supernatural agent creates the semblance of social scrutiny that enhances cooperation, in this case, for peace maintenance (see Rossano 2007). This conflict management approach does not rely on an overarching and powerful political force, such as government law, police or courts, which have become weak and inconsistently available in the region. Rather, it relies on individuals in all of the groups in contact with one another enacting a common ideological and ritual system that removes organized violence from the human purview and places it in the hands of an imagined entity at the centre of a multi-ethnic moral community of devotees. Conflict management distributed in the minds of human actors through enculturation in a common ideology is much more effective at maintaining peace than the trilateral justice system made possible by external government institutions. Ironically, it is the imagined and not the physical third party that appears to have enabled people to consolidate the peace in the Om-Fu River region for 50 years after it was temporarily established by state force.

Identity Conditions of War and Peace

Donald Tuzin (1982) observed, in a paper characteristically titled "The Spectre of Peace," that war in small-scale societies is motivated by surges of emotion, which might begin with a heated individual but must be brought to a communal boiling point in a bloodthirsty version of Durkheim's (1965) "collective effervescence" to mobilize the collective will needed to undertake an organized attack. Tuzin suggests that in some cultural situations, war may be a prerequisite for peace, even exercised as a way to get to peace, by demonstrating the collective power and sovereignty of a group—a sovereignty that must partly be given up to exist in peace with another group. Tuzin echoes here Camilla Wedgewood's (1930) linking of war and sovereign identity in Melanesia. Margaret Rodman (1979a:143) questions this for the case of the Longana of Vanuatu, "because the autonomous political units in Longana were very small segments of a larger social group, raiding can hardly be viewed as encouraging the sovereignty of the district." Yet even in small tribal groups from which members can come and go, people develop a sense of common purpose, residence and ideals that they often trace back in myth and oral history to founding ancestors and events. That is, they have a sense of nascent ethnicity, around which sovereignty and warfare become possible with sufficient political organization.

In Tuzin's formulation, living in peace with neighbouring groups necessitates sacrificing war as a means

of attaining a unifying and energizing emotional tenor. Peace can seem a state of weakness, dullness and acquiescence, while war can seem a state of strength, excitement and assertion. Peace is a condition of isolation and disengagement from the collective, while war is one of ecstatic unity with the collective. Seen from this perspective, the attraction of war, which on the surface sounds like an oxymoron, becomes more apparent. Insofar as war provides an indispensable mental and social service, abandonment of war requires a replacement that can provide these same benefits. The Asabano may have been able to live in peace with their neighbours for so many years because prayer for would-be enemies, belief that God will repay good and ill, and common identity with all of Christendom have replaced narrower tribal identities. Their peacemaking strategy provides them with a sense of membership in an expanded sovereign entity.

A further insight we can derive from Tuzin's formulation is that war and peace tend to oscillate in a kind of exchange relationship with one another. Each provides the conditions needed for the other to arise; one sacrifices itself to the other in an endless turn-taking. What happens, then, when the oscillation between war and peace ends? Does this undermine a people's ability to revitalize their identity in relation to others through the recurrent novelty and feeling of movement provided by a pendulum swinging between war and peace? The Asabano case suggests that a sense of sovereign identity can be maintained and enhanced in far less destructive ways than an endless round of giving up the peace for a war and the war for a peace.

It might seem that the peace the Asabano and other Om and Fu River peoples have enjoyed since the 1960s represents a permanent sacrifice of their local sovereignty to, first, the colonial Australian government and its successor, the Papua New Guinean state and, second, to the apparently universal deity of Christendom. Sovereignty can, however, be based and asserted on collective actions other than war, as the non-violent resistance movements of Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. so aptly demonstrated. The structures of conflict resolution used or adopted in a society may serve as markers of participation in the just governance of one's sodality, polity or confederation. Even where revenge and honour-based interclan violence are central and long-standing traditional values, as among the Pathans of Pakistan, a leader in the movement for independence from Britain named Abdul Ghaffar Khan, gathered a substantial following promoting pan-Pathan sovereignty and political independence through embracing non-violence (Bannerjee 2000). This movement, far from an abandonment of sovereignty, called for Pathan independence through Pathan transformation—a case, perhaps, of Kenelm Burridge's (1969) "new man" who helps create a new moral order that need not come at the expense of pre-existing identities but can indeed celebrate and build on these. One thinks here, reaching farther back, to Ralph Linton's nativistic movements (Linton and Hallowell 1943) and, more generally, of Anthony Wallace's (1956) revitalization movements. The Baptist "revival" gave the Asabano the sense that they could go forward with pride as sufficiently independent members of a more broadly unifying movement in which killing was vanquished.

This case is just one more piece of evidence against the maxim that warfare is inevitable and inescapable for our species. Marshall Sahlins (2008) documents an old thread in Western thinking famously taken up by Hobbes that, without social restraint, humans descend into self-centred chaos. In critiquing this notion, Sahlins notes that what is considered self and other, hence the unit of selfishness, varies cross-culturally. Notions that hominins in general or human males in particular are inherently warlike can no longer be supported because war relies on political organization not found in the band-level society that characterized most of the human past. Moreover, not merely aggression but also cooperation is emotionally rewarded by our instinctual system and has been enhanced by our species' gene-culture co-evolution (Bowles and Gintis 2011). As Douglas Fry (2007) strains to remind us, warfare is not universal in humankind: both the archaeological and the ethnographic records attest to this. Individual violence can escalate to warfare only when the political organization needed for any collective undertaking is sufficiently sophisticated. According to R. Brian Ferguson (2006:473), "war seems absent in the Paleolithic and emerges first among more settled foragers (although most of them are peaceable)." Steven Pinker (2011) argues that with the triumph of social complexity the destructiveness of war has begun to diminish, although his focus on the civilizing influence of European cultural reach has been criticized for underplaying "the sometimes deadly and exploitative conditions under which 'Western civilization' originally reached distant shores and penetrated native lands" (Kim 2012:246). Moreover, this self-congratulatory view elides the evidence that paleolithic life was more profoundly cooperative than violent. The option of warfare requires political unity, organization, the presence of other polities and relatively high population densities associated with growing social complexity—a relatively recent development for our species (see Kelly 2000). Civilization offers social technologies that may be directed

toward enhancing either peace or war—often both in oscillation. Though states appear to rise in violence, they can offer institutional support of peace maintenance, and the promise of this potential certainly adds to their appeal. For example, Polly Wiessner and Nitze Pupu (2012:1652) document how inter-group warfare among the Enga of Papua New Guinea initially declined following the arrival of Australian colonial power and then accelerated with the introduction of high-powered guns following the arrival of the Papua New Guinea state. After two decades of tremendous loss of life and security, fatigue and economic distress motivated people to dramatically reduce organized feuding with the aid of church institutions and village courts that draw on indigenous peacemaking methods under the arms-length sanction of the state. As John and Theresa Topic (2012:3–4) recently pointed out in their reconstruction of ancient Andean conflict resolution practices, "Scale, both in terms of geography and demography, is an important consideration. How conflict is resolved within the family or between members of a very close knit community, where people deal face-to-face with each other on a daily basis is very different from how a community deals with an invading army."

In the Om-Fu River Valleys of the 20th century, the greater reach and power of the government and mission compared to the pre-existing tribal polities and religious institutions enabled a moment of peace-directed domination and internalization that proved pivotal. Their overarching and more-or-less benevolent assertion of a new ideology that peace is possible, with a recipe for long-term success that relied on enculturation and acceptance rather than continual imposition, actually created lasting peace in one formerly violent corner of the world.

Cycles of violence can be interrupted when the right material, political and ideological factors combine. What makes these factors right for a particular case are, however, distinctive to the cultures and the social organizations of the erstwhile combatants. To be effective, measures to make and sustain peace must be shaped to prevailing cultural conditions, as Roland Bleiker and Morgan Brigg (2011) have also pointed out. This can be illustrated by comparing the present case of pacification with that of Santa Isabel, Solomon Islands. According to Geoffrey White (1979), on Isabel, a similar combination of colonial military might and religious ideology provided conditions that local people were able to use to end runaway headhunting. "Raiding was eagerly abandoned by Isabel people because it had become a distinct burden" (1979:110). Like the Om-Fu River region, the entire island of Santa Isabel was quickly converted and the correlation of the arrival of Christianity with the cessation of raiding appeared to be evidence for the power of the new religion, such that peace and Christianity strengthened one another (1979:123, 125). However, unlike the relatively egalitarian Asabano and their neighbours, Santa Isabel had a big man complex in which men who organized their people for military domination and mutual protection earned relatively high status. Peace came through the strategizing of competing big men. In contrast, the Asabano and their neighbours took advantage of conditions for peace in a much more diffuse, consensus-based process. Each individual internalized Christianity to indefinitely maintain his or her newfound peace.

Can something like world peace be established and maintained? It would appear that structural conditions providing a hiatus of warfare are a precondition to instituting ideological and ritual means for maintaining peace. However, militarily enforced peace is inherently temporary, since it continually highlights organized violence as a culturally legitimate option, upon which its agents rely to control their own people and defend themselves against competing polities. Furthermore, even while it lasts, military domination cannot be immediately present to coerce each person everywhere and all the time. While universal principles to promote peace can be and have been identified, these must be continually tailored to the broader cultural, social and material conditions in which would-be combatants find themselves. The prayer solution that has kept the peace between the Asabano and their neighbours for 50 years, for example, relies on faith in a particular supernatural being. Therefore, it would not work for atheists or for people who had different religious beliefs. We know that cultures continually change, so periodic updating of any cultural mechanism to maintain peace is necessary.

Toward the Good

> We should view violence as a problem to be solved, the difficulty is that humans are creative in their uses of materials, ideas and strategies. Actions related to dominance, power, and violence are always going to be on the menu. When interests collide and when forms of physical or social survival are at stake, a Pandora's Box filled with instruments of violence, coercion and physical force will still be sitting off in a corner of the room, always ready to be culturally reassessed and revisited, to be employed again regardless of how much dust has accumulated on its cover. Our best hope is that most of us are willing to expend energy in constructing durable institutions and frameworks for peace—that we deem it necessary for the well-being and survival of our species and planet. [Kim 2012:264]

It is tempting to view pacification as mere colonial oppression compelling a people to "cede control over the use of military force to a group perceived as more powerful" (Rodman 1979b:1). Yet when people are convinced that a newly imposed order is just and can resolve conflicts peacefully, they are inclined to incorporate and identify with it. Pacification efforts become more successful by promoting a non-violent ideology that is backed up with ritual means—whether secular or religious—to defuse the various triggers to war. For the Asabano and their neighbours, these conditions were met by the imposition of a colonial political force prohibiting war among its subject peoples, combined with their mutual acceptance of a supernatural mediator and a prayer ritual that replaced violent response. The first stage created a hiatus in tribal warfare that was not sustainable. The second stage created a means of preventing tribal warfare from flaring up that is sustainable so long as it remains congruent with local cultures, promptly adjusts to cultural changes and is able to find purchase among those peoples who come into contact and conflict with the Om and Fu River populations.

As Fry (2007:213) reminds us so plainly, "we must abolish war before it abolishes us." The solution, he suggests (2007:222), lies in instituting, on a global scale, the kind of overarching authority that has the political power, the mediation and conflict resolution structures and practices, and the non-violent ideology that made a lasting peace in the Om-Fu River valleys possible. Robert Dentan (2008:47) is sceptical of the possibility of creating lasting peace on a global scale through institutional means: "since bureaucratic hierarchies run on frozen violence always threatening to melt ... putting them in charge of keeping the peace is like putting the fox to mind the chickens." Our challenge, then, is to build such an authority or set of authorities that does not in fact use and hence model the threat of violence, that shapes peacemaking strategies to multiple local and changing cultural conditions and that relies on people enculturated with these peacekeeping strategies to put them into nonviolent force.

What I think we can take away from the Asabano case is that the overarching government did not sustainably end war—its contribution was a hiatus in hostile exchanges that, on its own, could not last, as the resurgence of tribal warfare in other parts of Papua New Guinea has shown (Roscoe 2014). Rather, when each person internalized a non-violent ideology and practice that meshed with existing culture and replaced the catalysts to war, continuous and immediate prophylaxis against organized violence was engaged. Important as

they are as potential game-changers, imposed political institutions can only temporarily enforce a peace tinged with warlike posturing, as Tiara Naʻputi (2014) shows for the case of American domination of Guam. An enforced peace without justice, as Camellia Webb-Gannon (2014) shows, breeds simmering unrest that threatens its undoing. Understanding the role of enculturated ideologies and scripts, on the other hand, has the potential to provide the means for establishing sustained world peace, because they direct the reactions of individuals and groups by providing templates for response to perceived insults. Ideologies and scripts relevant to the cost-benefit calculus by which agents decide whether to initiate war or peaceful conflict resolution operate according to logics that vary cross-culturally, but can be modified. Attacks can be discouraged by dubbing peace a precondition for supernatural rewards (Schwoerer 2014), by preparing for war while acknowledging interdependence with potential enemies (Petersen 2014), or by exploiting magical beliefs to undermine would-be warriors' confidence (Kuehling 2014). Culture can encourage and provide the means for either organized violence or peaceful conflict resolution. Only through appropriate enculturation for the latter is sustainable peace possible.

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Speaking the Language of Peace: Chamoru Resistance and Rhetoric in Guåhan's Self-Determination Movement

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Abstract: Chamorus (Chamorros) evince peaceful contestation through testimonies to the United Nations. These rhetorical practices highlight language as a form of political power-making for the Chamoru within that local struggle. Chamoru testimonies demonstrate the importance of non-violent opposition to militarization and colonialism, which have a profound impact on the inherent collective rights of indigenous peoples. This essay offers a unique approach that informs broader inquiries of U.S. military policy toward the Pacific and provides a significant contribution to interdisciplinary work aimed at understanding how to abolish militarization and war to maintain peace throughout the region.

Keywords: Chamoru, Chamorro, Guam, United Nations, testimonies, militarization, resistance, rhetoric

Résumé : Les Chamorus (Chamorros) déploient une contestation pacifique en portant des témoignages devant les Nations-Unies. Ces pratiques rhétoriques mettent en valeur le langage en tant que forme de prise de pouvoir par les Chamorus dans leurs luttes locales. Les témoignages des Chamorus démontrent l'importance de l'opposition non-violente à la militarisation et au colonialisme, qui ont impact profond sur les droits naturels collectifs des peuples indigènes. Cet article s'appuie sur une approche unique, qui sous-tend des enquêtes plus larges sur la politique militaire américaine à l'égard de la région Pacifique, et apporte une contribution significative au travail interdisciplinaire visant à comprendre comment abolir la militarisation et la guerre afin de maintenir la paix dans toute la région.

Mots-clés : Chamoru, Chamorro, Guam, Nations-Unies, témoignages, militarisation, résistance, rhétorique

Introduction

In 2014, Guåhan (Guam) remains an unincorporated territory of the United States and is one of the "oldest colonial dependencies in the world" (Van Dyke et al. 1996:625).[1] For the island and its inhabitants, this designation perpetuates the colonial relationship that began in 1521 when Ferdinand Magellan docked on the shores and was more formally established in 1668 when Spanish Jesuit missionaries embarked on religious conversion of the island (Palomo 1984:59–63; Rogers 1995:45). Centuries later, Spanish control was transferred to the United States in 1898. An imperial war of U.S. expansion, the Spanish-American War set "the regional grounds of what would constitute U.S. global hegemony in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (Grosfoguel and Cervantes-Rodríguez 2002:xiii). With the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the United States claimed ownership of Cuba, Guåhan, Philippines, Puerto Rico and parts of the West Indies. Congress then granted the Department of Navy administrative authority to establish a military government in Guåhan (Hofschneider 2001:18). During World War II, Japan seized Guåhan from the United States in 1941 and maintained a short but brutal period of military rule before the United States recaptured the island in 1944 (Gailey 1988:1–7). Since then, the island has remained under U.S. control, with Guåhan now considered to be the most strategic military outpost in the Pacific Rim (M. Perez 2001:97; Natividad and Kirk 2010). For over a century, U.S. military, political and economic considerations have converged to hold Guåhan in a state of political limbo.

The Organic Act of Guam, which ended Naval control and afforded civil and political rights and protection to Guåhan, was passed in 1950 and still continues to govern the island (Hofschneider 2001:155). However, those who received citizenship through the Act do not enjoy full protections under the US. Constitution (Gutierrez 2003:123). Furthermore, the Act declared Guåhan as an

unincorporated territory of the United States, a designation that afforded Guåhan an ambiguous political status, even as the issue of sovereignty remains a contentious one (M. Perez 2005:172). By recognizing only "states," the legal umbrella of the U.S. Constitution excludes Guåhan and, consequently, the island remains exterior to the American nation, while simultaneously failing to be a nation or state on its own. Guåhan is afforded a political status that can be characterized as both/neither. Guåhan is represented as "both" a political landmass with citizenship status afforded to the inhabitants and a government with local elections and a delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives. Yet it is also characterized as "neither," because the U.S. citizenship rights granted to Guåhan's inhabitants are not full citizenship rights in practice. Citizens of Guåhan are restricted to voting only in the local plebiscite and prohibited from presidential elections, and the elected delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives is a non-voting member. Thus, "it is from this ambiguous political status that the island is poised in a tenuous relationship with the U.S." (Stade 1998:47).

These interests have formed the basis of U.S.-Guåhan relations, which are characterized by the primacy of U.S. colonialism and framed in overtly militaristic terms (Camacho and Monnig 2010:150). Waves of conquest have left an enduring legacy of colonization and militarization that continues in contemporary society, and have had a significant impact on the inherent collective rights of the Chamoru (Chamorro) indigenous people.[2] The Guåhan population comprises roughly 160,000 people who represent a variety of demographic groups; the population is made up of an estimated 37 per cent Chamoru, 26 per cent Filipino, 11 per cent other Pacific Islander, 7 per cent European, 6 per cent Asian, 2 per cent other ethnic origin and 10 per cent mixed.[3] Against this backdrop, Chamorus have formed a small yet determined self-determination movement to challenge the forces of military dominance (Bevacqua 2010:35).

In this article, I explore the intersection of colonial ideology and peaceful resistance rhetoric operating within the Chamoru self-determination movement. I examine Chamoru testimonies at the United Nations (UN) and examine the discourses about demilitarization that the movement deploys peacefully in relation to the U.S. state. Examining such discourses of demilitarization can provide theoretical insights for peace studies and understanding constructive conflict resolution from disenfranchised communities. In particular, I use counterpublic sphere theory (Felski 1989; Fraser 1997) to conduct a rhetorical analysis of UN testimonies from 2005 to 2010 and consider how peace can be maintained in situations of militarization. I argue that the self-determination movement functions as a subaltern counterpublic and is constituted by an indigenous rhetoric of resistance. Ahead, I detail some of the issues of organizational history and the trajectory of the self-determination movement to situate the present inquiry and better understand the efforts at peaceful contestation. Examining these testimonies, I seek to answer this question: How can counterpublic theory facilitate an understanding of self-determination movements when addressed in transnational forums? This examination informs broader efforts at decolonization and contributes to an understanding of the rhetorical tactics used to engage in struggles over freedom from colonial rule and promote causes of peace. First, I provide a political, social and economic context of Guåhan and indigenous social movements. Next, I review the counterpublic sphere literature to establish a theoretical framework for understanding the Chamoru counterpublic. Then, I apply this lens to the UN testimonies and contemporary movement discourse aimed against the U.S. state. Finally, I discuss the implications of this self-determination movement upon broader efforts at peaceful resistance to militarization in the Pacific.

Situating Chamoru Movements

In the U.S. media and news coverage, there is a complete lack of regard for Guåhan and no significant media attention directed toward island issues. Thus, the Chamoru self-determination efforts and the peaceful opposition on the island to an ever-increasing military presence are largely invisible from the mainstream news media outlets on the U.S. mainland.

Despite its status as one of the last official colonies in the world, increased militarization on Guåhan has registered little to no protest on an international or national level (Bevacqua 2010:33). Subsequently, Chamoru struggles must be examined within the historical context of colonial and neocolonial projects, which have established a political economy of stratification. Understanding the political, social and economic context of the movement allows contemporary struggles to be viewed as a continuation of past conflicts.

As early as 1901, Chamorus began their call for peace by demanding an end to military rule and recognition of civil rights. During the first half of the century, indigenous leaders petitioned to receive political recognition; they continued these pleas for U.S. citizenship and changes to the Naval government structure for several decades. After the island's occupation by Japan during World War II, the petitions for political rights continued. But it was not until after World War II ended that the United States actively considered granting

citizenship to the native inhabitants of Guåhan. A limited form of citizenship was granted in the 1950s with the passage of the Organic Act of Guam (Camacho and Monnig 2010:150). Since then, Guåhan has had a considerable history of engagement with the American political process. In 1980, the Guam Legislature established the Commission on Self-Determination. In 1982, the first self-determination plebiscite was held; there was not a majority vote, which led to the top options of Commonwealth and Statehood moving to a run-off and Commonwealth prevailing. Through the 1990s tensions soared as the movement remained divided over whether to sever ties with the United States or to maintain a closer relationship (Camacho and Monnig 2010:151). In 1997, local law created the Guam Decolonization Commission, which replaced the Self-Determination Commission.[4] The Guam Decolonization Commission is tasked with researching and conducting plebiscites on the three internationally recognized options for self-determination: Statehood, Independence and Free Association. A plebiscite was anticipated for November 2000 and 2002, requiring a registration of at least 70 per cent of qualified "inhabitant" voters. However, because the Guam Election Commission was unable to establish the required voter registration, the plebiscite was rescheduled (Gutierrez 2003:124 n. 20). The Commission on Decolonization was then inactive for eight years, until Governor Eddie Baza Calvo convened the Commission on September 23, 2011. This meeting coincided with the governor's letter to U.S. president Barack Obama officially announcing Guam's Commission on Decolonization and detailing the islanders' intentions to seek political self-determination pursuant to the UN charter and UN resolutions 1514 and 1541 (Kerrigan 2011).[5] The revitalization of the Commission on Decolonization is an important step in the contemporary efforts to achieve self-determination for Guåhan.

Today, a diverse array of opinions and competing political interests operate among the Chamoru population (Na'puti 2013:2–3). In spite of these differences, the contemporary movement has positioned itself in opposition to U.S. military buildup activities that have quickly become a trend since September 11, 2001 (Lutz 2010). John Beverley explains that movements create legitimacy by asserting political and cultural rights and agency; this often entails "both a critique of hegemony and a possibility of a new form of hegemony" (2001:49). Establishing a critique of hegemony is particularly prudent given the United States' aggressive agenda of privatization on the island—a project that represents one of the largest efforts at resource privatization on U.S. soil, which first entailed siphoning off the electricity and telecommunications sectors and now focuses on out-

sourcing waste and water system management to private companies (J. Aguon 2006b:45–47). The current efforts at privatization are inextricably linked with the larger scheme of militarizing the island. The expansion of the military requires more extensive privatization of natural resources and public services for personnel and their dependents inside the fence.

The people of Guåhan are still pursuing their internationally recognized right of self-determination. In particular, "this movement is composed of numerous organizations, some of which have been fighting for decades, such as *I Nasion Chamoru* or Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (OPI-R) and some created just recently, such as *Famoksaiyan*" (Bevacqua 2010:35). We Are Guåhan is another significant group in the contemporary movement; it emerged in 2009 around the release of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) that outlined the Department of Defense's (DoD) plans for the U.S. military buildup. We Are Guåhan is one of the most highly visible groups on the island and carries a strong Internet presence that reaches well beyond the territory. The organization's goals are to "educate the public on the impact of the proposed military buildup, provide the people of Guam with a voice in the buildup process; and, promote a sustainable future for Guam."[6] When the DoD announced plans to build a firing range at Pågat Village, We Are Guåhan galvanized strong public opposition to the buildup. This resistance to the military buildup plans culminated in the organization's joint efforts with Guam Preservation Trust and the National Trust for Historic Preservation to file a lawsuit against the DoD in November 2010 (M. Aguon 2010). In 2011, one year after the lawsuit was filed against the DoD for breaking the law in its selection of Pågat Village, the DoD admitted it must prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) and give the public an opportunity to comment on its plans during scoping meetings (Ridgell 2011). The group maintains a website that provides information about the military buildup issues, events, news and opportunities to get involved and take action. They also host an open public forum page on Facebook and express their organizational goals: "We Are Guåhan aims to inform and engage our community on the various issues concerning the impending military build-up. We Are Guåhan aims to unite and mobilize our people to protect and defend our resources and our culture."[7]

These organizations and others have focused on grassroots educational campaigns and protests at both the local and federal level, testifying at the UN, and have built "solidarity with other indigenous peoples around the world and those struggling under the weight of Amer-

ican militarism or colonialism" (Bevacqua 2010:35). The case of Guåhan parallels that of Puerto Rico, which also endures political and economic subordination to the United States and has experienced impediments to self-determination and decolonization under the legacy of colonial rule. The strategic security of Puerto Rico has provided the rationalization for continuing U.S. military authority there and has led to persecution of Puerto Ricans advocating the legal right to self-determination (Rodríguez Orellana 2002:425–429). Chamoru movements also correspond with sovereignty struggles throughout Native America and Latin America and inform the sovereignty struggles in Hawai'i and other territories around the world (Meijknecht 2001:132–133; M. Perez 2001:109).

A Review of Counterpublics Literature

Jürgen Habermas's theory of public sphere argues that individuals are assembled in a public body, guaranteed to all citizens and understood as an arena for producing rational-critical discourse capable of providing a check upon the state (Habermas et al. 1974:52; Habermas 1991: 28–29). Contemporary theorists have guided Habermas's conception of the public sphere toward a more subversive framework.[8] For example, Rita Felski argues for a counterpublic sphere as "an oppositional discursive arena" within late capitalism that offers a key for analyzing diverse cultural and political practices of movements. This model focuses on communicative networks and economic, political and social structures that produce and disseminate ideologies (1989:9). Unlike the Habermasian model, the state is not necessarily the primary audience for counterpublic activities. A counterpublic is excluded in various ways from the dominant means of political discourse and suffers from a lack of political power (Asen and Brouwer 2001:3). Turning to the state is not an option in many cases, especially when individuals lack rights, resources or responsibilities granted through state power or when individuals are outright denied state protections (Asen and Brouwer 2001:15–16). For Chamorus, turning to the state is not a viable option due to the lack of full political rights and opportunities for engagement in the United States in spite of their citizenship status. Nancy Fraser explains that subaltern counterpublics are "parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs" (1997:123). The subaltern counterpublic provides a locus for expressing alternate ways of knowing; it is a space where cultural and political rights to difference are legitimated and oppressed groups are not viewed as objects but are understood as subjects of discourse (Felski 1989:171; Stephenson 2002:101). These discursive arenas deploy communicative practices that resist the control of dominant groups and include a range of standpoints, social movements and marginal populations (Asen and Brouwer 2001:7).

By emphasizing cultural significance, identity, communicative networks and social movement practices, Felski's and Fraser's work on counterpublics offers a useful framework for examining the oppositional discursive space of the Chamoru self-determination movement. Since counterpublics are directly intertwined with issues of identity, politics and governance, they provide "conceptual resources" for expressing oppositional cultural identities and an understanding of how groups critically engage in the practice of democracy (Fraser 1997:70; Stephenson 2002:100). In particular, counterpublic theory provides a distinctive lens for viewing the discursive elements of peace maintenance and a mechanism for analyzing the resistance rhetoric operating within the movement. This offers a useful vantage point for scholars to engage rhetoric that has emerged from the context of globalization and hegemonic neoliberal practices. Such peaceful resistance in the face of increased militarization and privatization establishes unique political and cultural agency for change.

A Chamoru Counterpublic Emerges

A subaltern counterpublic sphere emerges when public discourse is considered singular and overarching, resulting in the exclusion of particular groups. Counterpublics formed by these subordinated social groups are structured sites of collective deliberation and contestation; they engage their dominant counterparts through oppositional argumentation (Fraser 1997:125). The dominant discursive arena on Guåhan is predominately controlled by U.S. military interests and industries; it is an arena that operates through the exclusion of Chamorus from full U.S. citizenship rights. The interests of the U.S. mainland are made manifest throughout the island, exacerbating an already perplexed and contradictory political position for Guåhan. As a result, Chamoru self-determination "continues to be attacked on constitutional grounds, while claims to U.S. economic and political benefits are often challenged" precisely because Guåhan is neither fully part of the United States nor a completely self-governing entity (Stade 1998:47). From this precarious political location, Chamorus have found it difficult and often problematic to voice opposition to the exclusionary practices and policies of a territorial ruler that maintains colonial ever-presence, even from a distance. However, as Keith L. Camacho and Laurel A.

Monnig observe, in Guåhan "processes of decolonization have developed despite and, some argue *because of*, the intense militarization of the island" (2010:150). Thus, the historical exclusion of Chamorus and the increasing militarization of their land have marked the emergence of the subaltern counterpublic that builds community and expresses opposition to U.S. governance.[9]

To understand the Chamoru self-determination movement as a subaltern counterpublic, one must recognize its characteristics (Felski 1989:171). First, it is a site for expressing alternate ways of knowing. Claiming subaltern knowledges is particularly important for Guåhan, where cultural alteration has taken its toll as a result of the U.S. education model, which has enforced an English-only policy and suppressed indigenous knowledge for more than 60 years. Assimilation in this form has fragmented indigenous identity and may push the Chamoru language to the edge of extinction within the next 20 years (J. Aguon 2006a:55–56). By recognizing my social location and incorporating the writings, work and testimonies of the indigenous group, this article draws from and extends Chamoru epistemology that currently operates within the counterpublic. Second, the movement legitimates rights to difference by articulating cultural and political agency in the context of globalization and U.S. militarization.

Finally, the self-determination movement allows for members to shift from the margins of dominant discourse to establish their own centre for discourse production. This view recognizes Chamorus as subjects of discourse rather than passive recipients or mere objects of discourse for academic research. Recognizing Chamorus as indigenous subjects informs an understanding of the critical engagement and oppositional discourse deployed against the dominant U.S. counterpart. Such peaceful resistance in the face of increased militarization and privatization establishes unique political and cultural agency for change.

The Chamoru counterpublic still faces the difficulty of expressing opposition to the United States across such an expansive spatial distance, a situation that is intensified by the tenuous condition of states and publics. As Asen and Brouwer argue, the dual forces of globalization and civil societies have placed the state under duress—sparking transformations in the state itself, and causing a "growing trend toward international decision-making bodies" (2001:16). In many ways, the Chamoru counterpublic must both disengage from and engage with the U.S. nation state. This has been an uphill battle for Chamorus. Because of its political status, efforts to engage the U.S. nation state simultaneously manifest as disengagement from the nation. The movement engages the state through an antagonism centred on the United States' colonial and militaristic control over the island. But to express this opposition to the United States, the counterpublic must raise the question of self-determination, which requires a disengagement from the nation state. In the peaceful struggle for self-determination, there have also been many roadblocks preventing direct engagement with the United States. Thus, the movement turns to the UN and uses the framework of international law and human rights to seek redress. Human rights rhetoric has been a resource for consciousness-raising and has demonstrated that, "despite combating the internalized colonialism crippling the majority of Chamoru minds and consequently our progress, Chamorus committed to a human rights agenda managed to wield a position of honor and acumen" (J. Aguon 2006b:35). Focusing on an agenda of human rights, Chamorus speak to the international governing body of the UN as a conduit for directing oppositional argumentation in a peaceful manner against the United States. By continuously voicing resistance to the United States within the transnational political space of the UN, the Chamoru counterpublic maintains a mechanism for expressing nation-state opposition in a platform that welcomes collective deliberation and engagement with the nation state.

Toward a Transnational Frame: Politics, Governance and Counterpublics

The actions and activities of the Chamoru movement demonstrate Fraser's argument that counterpublic space in a globalizing world does not perfectly align with state-like powers (2009:157). Habermas's public sphere configuration that correlated publics with political citizenship and a sovereign territorial state has been challenged by the long history of colonialism and neocolonialism (Fraser 2009:80, 157). Conflating membership with affectedness has been the justification for "the progressive incorporation, as active citizens, of the subordinate classes and status groups who were resident in the territory but excluded from full political participation" (2009:24, 95). Today, using citizenship as the primary factor for membership and public opinion formation is problematic. Instead, Fraser seeks a new understanding of legitimacy where legitimate public opinion is achieved as a result of "a communicative process in which all who are jointly subjected to the relevant governance structure(s) can participate as peers, *regardless of political citizenship*" (Fraser 2009:96).

Contemporary public spheres trespass the boundaries of territorial states (Fraser 2009:155). This fluidity presents the need for the creation of new transnational

public powers that are made "accountable to new, transnational public spheres" (2009:98). Moving toward a transnational conceptualization of public sphere theory enables scholars to account for non-state-centred public spheres, challenge state-centred frames and account for counterpublics comprising individuals regardless of political citizenship. The transnational frame encourages us to explore how the primacy of nation states has shifted toward international decision-making bodies. It also challenges the assumption that publics and counterpublics neatly map onto civil society and, in turn, provide mechanisms of accountability for the state.

Chamoru exclusion from full political participation and Guåhan's status as neither a stand-alone nation nor U.S. state have influenced the turn toward international governing bodies (Stade 1998:47). International law recognizes self-determination as a mechanism of recourse for determining the legitimacy of control over particular geographic space and populations (Hendrix 2008:17). As a result, Chamorus have resorted to diverse modes of engagement with established international law to practice their inherent right of self-determination. The shift toward the transnational arena of the UN can be considered another forum for democratic engagement and a site for expressing oppositional discourse against the United States. However, turning toward the UN is a forced choice for the Chamoru counterpublic. As a strategically valuable U.S. possession with an obscure political status, Guåhan's appeals to the UN for local autonomy have been to no avail (M. Perez 2005:81). Due to the fiduciary relationship with the United States as administering authority of Guåhan, Chamorus require U.S. cooperation to exercise the right to self-determination. "It is unrealistic and a violation of the obligations outlined under Article 73 [of the UN Charter], to expect a dependent people to unilaterally engage in self-determination without the support of their administering power. Yet this is precisely the situation in Guam" (Cristobal 1993:153). After decades of colonial rule by the United States and successive failures when positioning demands upon the U.S. state, the self-determination movement's shift to the UN signals an effort to maintain efficacy in a transnational arena that provides a check upon states and holds the power of accountability for international law violations.

In Their Own Words: Chamoru Testimonies to the UN

The data collected for this article include 30 testimonies presented at the UN on the question of Guåhan from 2005 to 2010. These testimonies were given at the UN Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee), the Special Committee on Decolonization and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. After a lull in visits before 2005, this time period represents the resurgence of UN testimonies motivated by the impending U.S. military buildup and the necessity of raising the critical issue of Chamoru self-determination. These testimonies carry the legacy of more than 20 years of Chamorus appealing to the UN on behalf of human rights for Guåhan (Anonymous 2009).[10] These testimonies demonstrate one of the fundamental ways that the Chamorus have created collective deliberation, generated contestation and mobilized people to address self-determination.

The delegations of Chamorus representing interests of Guåhan at the UN strongly connect with other self-determination efforts manifesting on the island. These local efforts include the creation of public education organizations, community engagement in the public hearings and scoping meetings surrounding the U.S. military buildup, joint legal action against the DoD over its proposed firing range at Pågat Village and engagement of issues of decolonization in schools, villages, webspaces and beyond. The international and local activities highlight the emergence of the Chamoru counterpublic poised against the dominant discourse of U.S. territorial rule and create a cultural community that critically engages important debates and issues about Guåhan. Rather than be content with their marginalized political position, Chamorus have found, in the self-determination movement, an outlet for political critique and a facilitator for peaceful discussion and high-level criticism and debate (Quimby 2011:378–79).

The testimonies presented from 2005 to 2010 deploy several rhetorical tactics and engage various themes. In each testimony the witnesses situate themselves as individuals belonging to the Chamoru indigenous group and as supporters of self-determination. This move signals the primary rhetorical tactic of identity formation, which occurs through the strategic deployment of the Chamoru language and provides a distinctive vernacular discourse. Testimonies also reference the legacy of the Chamoru culture and people, and the history of Chamoru petitions for decolonization and self-determination at the UN. By referring to Guåhan as a "colony" or "colonized" space, these testimonies illuminate the problematic nature of U.S. military governance on the island. This naming process discursively transforms the island from a marginal U.S. territory into a geographic space that merits urgency in both the international and U.S. political arenas. These tactics present in the testimonies spur identity formation among members of the counterpublic and beyond and rhetorically highlight the impact that

U.S. policies have on the culture, language and identity of the Chamoru people.

Utilization of long-standing cultural practices provides continuous reminders of an identity distinct from that imposed upon a group by an outside power; among such practices are the culturally grounded discourses that construct ties of solidarity while reminding the people of their identity. Gerard Hauser argues that such discourses are *"recursive* social action whose continuity provides stability to national identity while simultaneously promoting instability within the larger society" (1999:120). The Chamoru language represents a culturally grounded discourse that draws attention to the identity and solidarity of the indigenous people of Guåhan. While the Chamoru language is recognized as one of the official languages on the island and is used on government documents and websites, the language is threatened by extinction within the next generation (J. Aguon 2006a:55–56).[11] Thus, language usage is an important component of the resistance waged at the UN and functions as a mechanism for Chamorus to assert their inherent right to self-determination as a people. This linguistic and cultural identity is placed in stark contrast to the hegemonic U.S. identity that is connected to forces of military buildup, environmental degradation, displacement and cultural erosion. In their statements from 2005 to 2010, petitioners use the Chamoru language to displace the normalcy of U.S. governance and establish a case for self-determination, to call attention to the purpose of testimony and to give appreciation for the opportunity to address the UN forum on the important issues relating to Guåhan. Senator Vicente Cabrera Pangelinan, a member of the Guåhan Senate, offers an example of vernacular discourse in his testimony when he says,

> Ginen y anti y espiritu yan y man fotna na taotao Guåhan na hu presenta este na testimonu, yan u fan libre y taotao pagu. It is from the soul and the spirit of our ancestors that I present this testimony today for the liberation of the people today. [Pangelinan 2008]

The Chamoru language is used to call attention to the purpose of testimony and to show appreciation for the opportunity to address the UN forum on the important issues relating to Guåhan. This is evidenced throughout most of the testimonies where vernacular discourse is used to provide unifying identity among Chamoru language speakers. The testimonies of Michael Tuncap and Josette Marie Lujan Quinata, from 2008 and 2010 respectively, demonstrate this format and discursive mode:

> *Hafa Adai yan buenasi!* (Hello and good day) Your Excellency Mr. Chairman Jorge Aguello, and distinguished members of the Fourth Committee: *Dangkolu na si Yu'os ma'ase* (sincere thank you) for your invitation to participate at this important testimony for the remainder of the Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism in the 21st century. [Tuncap 2008]

> *Hafa Adai* distinguished members of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) and Chairman, H. E. Mr. Chitsaka Chipaziwa. *Dankolo na si yu'us ma'ase* (thank you very much) for your time in allowing me the opportunity to address this esteemed international body. *Guahu si* Josette Marie Lujan Quinata and I am a proud Chamoru daughter of Guåhan. [Quinata 2010]

From these examples, the vernacular discourse can be seen as creating unity as well as peaceful division. The testimonies offer recursive social action by following the Chamoru language up with English translations that establish sharp resistance to continued colonial formations on Guåhan and point toward the purpose of testifying as one of producing a peaceful alternative to U.S. territorial rule. In addition to identity formation, the testimonies also focus on particular themes such as self-determination, militarization, political participation and opposition to the United States. The testimonies argue that self-determination is an inalienable human right established by international law that the United States has consistently denied to Guåhan. Witnesses argue that the UN must act on behalf of Guåhan to combat this injustice. As Craig Santos Perez (2008) argues, the issue of self-determination must be given priority and direct action in international legal proceedings to grant Chamorus their established political right:

> The Fourth Committee must give top priority to the fulfillment of our inalienable right to self-determination, as affirmed by General Resolutions 1514 and 1541 and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Other testimonies connect the issue of self-determination with international law and emphasize it as a fundamental characteristic of humanity and the foundational basis for political enfranchisement:

> I fight the same fight that took the lives of Ron Rivera and former Senator and founder of I Nasion Chamoru Angel Santos. Our message has been loud and clear—the Chamoru people of Guåhan deserve to exercise our basic, inalienable human right to self-determination. [Leon Guerrero 2008]

The massive militarization of our island home under-mining our human right to self-determination before we even had the chance to vote on a political status is being coupled with an aggressive privatization agenda being pushed by the local Chamber of Commerce, which is dominated by US Statesiders. [S. Perez 2008]

These testimonies evince the self-determination rhetoric of the Chamoru counterpublic, and demonstrate the ways in which human rights discourse is bound up with the overarching rhetoric of self-determination. Using the discourse of rights seems apropos when petitioning about guarantees codified in international law within the transnational forum of the UN. However, scholars have critiqued the discursive formation of rights and argued that, although testimony is a useful form of documentation and rights language bears rhetorical power, "the human rights field has little to offer in terms of either 'remedies' for victim or insights for prevention" (Heise 1994–95:1210). The criticism should be tempered with any discussion of the transformative and subversive capacities of self-determination rhetoric in the context of the UN.

Connected to the issue of human rights discourse are issues of militarization and political participation. The testimonies explain the denied political rights of Chamorus in contrast to the increasing political rights of the U.S. military on and off the island. By directly addressing the issue of political participation, witnesses argue that U.S. military influence threatens to push Chamorus even further into the marginal space of engagement and participation in the decision-making process of their island. The testimonies exemplify oppositional discourse surrounding the political disenfranchisement of Chamorus:

> In this time of great need for Chamorros and Guam, with the overwhelming burden of inequality accumulating, the expediting of the current US militarization, the huge conflicts of interest of those entrusted with preserving our human rights and their subsequent disregard for it, it is essential to ensure that all the accomplishments of our forebears on behalf of decolonization and self-determination be maintained. [S. Perez 2007]

> This hyper-militarization poses grave implications for our human right to self-determination because the US currently asserts that its citizens—this transient population—have a constitutional right to vote in our plebiscite. [C. Perez 2008]

Here, the issue of political rights is inextricably linked with self-determination while noting that projected plans

for U.S. military expansion on Guåhan will exacerbate an already grave situation of political marginalization. In addition, the authors of this testimony critique the double standard of U.S. voting rights and citizenship. By discussing political rights for Guåhan in the framework of group identity, this testimony argues that electoral and constitutional rights should be granted only to the Chamoru population and should not be extended to the transient population of the military personnel. Other testimonies voice opposition to continued U.S. militarization, which threatens to trample the political right of self-determination afforded to Chamorus:

> The sum effect of U.S. cultural hegemony and militarism is to permanently deny Chamoru people our long and uphill struggle for self-determination. The military buildup we speak of today and the scheduled relocation of tens of thousands of additional US military personnel is the latest act of negligence and abuse on the part of the US as the official Administering Power of Guam. The General Assembly must pass a resolution condemning this mass military relocation and buildup of Guam. The Fourth Committee must take direct action to stop the military occupation of Guam. [Lacsado 2006]

> Instructive here is the statement made by the Deputy Commander of US Pacific Command, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Daniel P. Leaf in his visit to Guam in September 2006 who stated that U.S. troops have a US Constitutional Right to participate in Guam's local elections. If this is an example of US policy regarding local governance, then Chamorro self-determination is gravely endangered. Moreover, this military buildup of Guam goes against the Administering Power's moral and legal obligations to protect our human rights. [S. Perez 2008]

Once again, the issues of self-determination, political rights and human rights are linked together. In addition, terms such as *our* and *Chamorro* establish division between the citizens of Guåhan and those who simply occupy the military bases on the island. Finally, the lack of political participation on Guåhan is exposed as a problematic and unjust situation:

> We, the people of Guam, recognize that race continues to define the boundaries of the nation and the constituents of a militarized territory. Why are the American people in the Marianas denied the right to vote? Why are there American bases in Guam if the people lack political voting rights? What role has race played in the political relationship between the United States and their Chamoru territories? [Tuncap 2008]

Overall, the testifiers are emphasizing how militarization affects their ability to self-determine as a people. It is through their discourse of demilitarization that they establish a foundation for peacemaking based on their inherent right of self-determination. The language prevalent in the testimonies is very standardized in many respects. First, each speaker begins by acknowledging the Fourth Committee and often specifically acknowledges the committee chairman. Second, many of the testimonies use the term *administering authority* rather than saying the *United States* or making a direct reference to the United States. Many of the testimonies also make appeals based on the organizational support for the implementation of a decolonization agenda. This discourse places focus on external sources of support and shifts the call for action from the individuals providing testimony to the public interests of the people they represent. Senator Vicente Pangelinan was the first elected official from Guåhan to submit a testimony to the UN in several years; the prepared testimony was read by a Chamoru attorney on the senator's behalf. The presence of the senator's testimony demonstrates a tension between political participation and exclusion. While Senator Pangelinan stands to represent the people as an elected official in the Guåhan Senate, he is denied the right to vote in U.S. federal elections. His testimony is juxtaposed against U.S. representative democracy, which outwardly extends representation for Guåhan in Washington, DC, through the presence of an elected delegate in the House of Representatives while denying full participation. The testimony is also juxtaposed against the transnational governing body of the UN, which is heavily influenced by U.S. veto power.

Assessing the UN as a Transnational Frame

The Chamoru movement's engagement with the UN has not yet translated into success in terms of achieving political rights or sovereign status. By directing public attention in an issue-specific and temporary manner, the UN operates within the established format of national public spheres (Habermas 1998:177). In this way, the UN has been challenged as a "weak" public, since it lacks the institutional power to compel states to act and its international laws have historically lacked enforcement mechanisms (Fraser 1997:134). The problems of enforcement mechanisms can be connected with the primacy of the ideal of absolute sovereignty for states (Mater 2001:218). The world is characterized by a global political realm, in which "nation-states must justify their actions to a global public because of the discourse produced by NGOs and other transnational governing institutions" (Mater 2001:215–216). Although NGOs and

transnational organizations attempt to hold states accountable, they may still comprise "weak" publics in relation to the U.S. state. This phenomenon can be better understood when considering that conventional arenas, such as the UN, have historically dominated the process of decolonization and the actions of social movements. Through legal bureaucracy, constitutional lawyers and their categories of analysis have diverted attention from key issues of decolonization (Bertram 1987:17). The enforced norms of discourse and established formats for UN hearings seriously hinder the deliberative potential for witnesses who enter the forum as activists for social change. Similar observations have been made regarding the limitations of U.S. congressional hearings; controlling mechanisms can include the content of hearings as well as the modes of expression (Brouwer 2001:92–93). As a "weak" public, the UN does not afford any decision-making power to witnesses. Certainly a major obstacle for witnesses remains their inability to "directly participate, through voting, in the final determination of policy proposals" (Brouwer 2001:93). From this understanding of the transnational forum of the UN, we can better understand the limitations and possibilities it offers for self-determination movements that utilize peaceful means for achieving their self-determination goals.

The Chamoru case demonstrates some limits of a transnational frame. Counterpublics facilitate the creation of oppositional discourse; yet, for the Chamoru movement, the decision to direct such discourse to the transnational public of the UN has diluted the transformative potential of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee in favour of U.S. territorial interests. By using the UN as a medium for communicating opposition to the United States, the Chamoru counterpublic is relying upon a "weak" public to channel its discourse against U.S. territorial rule. Positioned within a transnational political arena, the movement is subjected to human rights violations, colonialism and nationalism. Such positioning for indigenous rights struggles is often troublesome because, on the one hand, it reflects an appeal to the global logic of nations and peoples and, on the other hand, it necessitates dependency upon a state or transnational structure to guarantee particular rights (Stade 1998:48).

Such scepticism exists toward appealing to conventional means for achieving decolonization for Guåhan. Some contend that the decolonization question should not be asked solely in standardized terms set out by the UN, international treaties, laws or U.S. conceptions of democracy (Camacho and Monnig 2010:149). On the one hand, the UN testimonies represent a forced choice for Chamorus, who have been continuously denied recourse

by the United States. Conversely, by turning to the "weak" transnational public of the UN, the Chamoru counterpublic is positioned within standardized international discourse that lacks the decision-making authority needed to transform opinion formation into concrete political influence on the United States. In this sense, both the UN committee and the Chamoru counterpublic function as "weak" publics.

Despite the creation of international laws with enforcement mechanisms, international regimes and transnational agreements, the issue of decolonization has yet to be included in the international governing documents from the UN. Thus, building the case for decolonization and self-determination through the UN presents an uphill battle when U.S. interests so heavily saturate the transnational forum. Although the UN has provided a place for Chamorus to voice concerns and facilitate opinion formation, they still lack voting rights and direct action capacity with regard to the U.S. violations of international law. As a result, the Chamoru decolonization movement is haunted by past conflicts, which manifest in the present and require new methods of engagement in the struggle against political exclusion.

In a transnational era when public spheres do not neatly line up with state entities, the creation of strong publics becomes much more salient. From blogs to Chamoru zines and testimonies, the counterpublic offers a unique arena for public opinion-formation regarding self-determination and decolonization issues for Guåhan. The existence of this counterpublic facilitates consciousness raising and the creation of oppositional discourse that has since been translated into petitions and testimonies to the UN. Although problematic in many respects, for the Chamoru counterpublic the shift toward the transnational forum provides a contemporary example of how counterpublic theory must be expanded to consider the diverse mechanisms of engagement for challenging colonial powers in a post-Westphalian world. The Chamoru counterpublic certainly deploys a variety of tactics for engaging dominant political discourse; however, the movement is limited by culminating its efforts in appeals to a transnational organization in which the United States has veto power. In this configuration, the status of the counterpublics and their relationship to the state remains tenuous.

Ultimately, the transnational public sphere requires unique configurations to yield both opinion formation and decision-making authority. While the appeal to transnational entities holds the promise of such authority, the case of the Chamoru counterpublic demonstrates the limits of such engagement. In calling for a turn to a transnational frame, Fraser argues that theorists must reconsider the core premises of public theory with regard to efficacy and legitimacy of public opinion. Heeding this call is necessary for public sphere theory to maintain its critical and political edge and the promise of contributing to struggles for emancipation.

Conclusions and Future Directions

I have put forth a theoretical framework for understanding the complex and contradictory scene that lies at the crossroads between colonial ideology and resistance rhetoric. I have argued that this intersection shapes and produces Chamoru subjectivity and their subsequent acts of peaceful resistance. Chamorus are suggesting an alternative to U.S. dominance and subverting the confines of the UN system through the use of the Chamoru language in their UN testimonies. From this case study, peace is a foundation for Chamoru resistance. The testimonies and the emergence of the counterpublic sphere coalesce around expressing opposition to U.S. territorial rule and the impending military buildup with the express purpose of maintaining peace through constructive conflict resolution throughout the foreseeable future. This lens offers several advantages for current mobilization efforts and future research. By uncovering political texts that ideological constructs have attempted to bury deep beneath the surface, this perspective brings attention to the underrepresented arena of U.S. territories within communication scholarship.

Calling attention to this area of the world is essential, both for engaging the wider American public that remains largely unaware and uninterested in territorial issues and for acknowledging the efforts of colonized peoples to organize and peacefully resist injustices within their lands. As this case study has shown, it is necessary to think about colonization and self-determination efforts as the 21st century unfolds. Given that colonization subjects peoples to ideological relationships, understanding the discourses of self-determination offers a necessary step on the path toward true peace. In addition, as a method of rhetorical analysis, counterpublic theory informs broader ideological criticisms and an understanding of social movements while turning to the imperative issues of self-determination, decolonization, cultural preservation and peace in the Pacific. Given the political status of the island, the efficacy of these efforts remains to be seen. Understanding how dominant political discourse serves the foundations of colonial ideology is a crucial recognition for social movements seeking to build solidarity and voice their demands for a decolonized future. From this understanding, peoples worldwide are in better positions to find their emancipatory

potential, to challenge, resist and wage peaceful forms of protest against the insidious forms of colonial violence throughout the world.

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Notes

1 Throughout this essay I refer to the island *Guåhan*, which is the indigenous name for Guam. I also use *Chamoru* rather than *Chamorros* to avoid the Spanish and U.S. colonial terminology and spellings imposed by external authorities, and stand in solidarity with contemporary indigenous struggles. As a member of the Chamoru diaspora, I have made a conscious political decision and strategic choice to follow other Chamoru and Pacific scholars and take ownership of otherwise borrowed, legally sanctioned names for the island and its indigenous inhabitants (J. Aguon 2006b:12–15; Dames 2003:379; Monnig 2007:27–31).

2 The Chamorro Language Commission changed the spelling of *Chamorro* to *Chamoru* in 1994; however, the spelling has not been officially adopted (Dames 2003:379 n. 4).

3 Demographic data from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census Bureau figures. Reports available from http://www.census.gov.

4 Public Law 23-147 created the Commission on Decolonization.

5 The full text of Governor Calvo's letter is available for review and highlights the significance of the self-determination issue for the Calvo Tenorio administration.

6 http://www.weareguahan.com/about-weareguahan/. The organization presented a series of "grey papers" that summarized the concerns. Papers provide an important set of texts on the core issues for the local community with regard to the buildup.

7 At the time of writing, the Facebook forum has a total of 3,266 open members and is an actively updated page that informs the Facebook community about the U.S. military buildup and other pertinent issues facing Guåhan.

8 Asen and Brouwer critique the Habermasian model for creating a strict separation between the public sphere and the state and for ignoring the possibility that individuals could face exclusion from participation (2001:3–13). See also Michael Warner (2002).

9 Community building occurs through a web-based arena, where blogs, websites and alternative media publications address issues of decolonization and self-determination for Guåhan. This online presence functions as a catalyst for political opinion formation within the Chamoru counterpublic. Blogs connect to alternative news coverage of military planning, interviews with decolonization activists and publicity for Chamoru cultural events both on the island and across the United States.

10 The 2008 testimonies from the Guåhan delegation at the UN have been compiled in a document called Hita Guåhan, published in the December 10, 2008, edition of the Chamoru zine called *Minagahet*.

11 A report conducted by the Haya Cultural Heritage and Preservation Institute in 2005 assessed the level of Chamoru language usage and the status of the Chamoru language according to the number of fluent speakers (J. Aguon 2006a:55–56).

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The Possibilities of Violence and the Skills to Avoid It: On Warfare and Its Absence in Traditional Micronesia

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Abstract: This article explores some of the ways in which traditional Micronesian societies used the threat of warfare as an impetus to non-violence or, in other words, as a deterrent. Typically, Micronesians spent a good deal of time preparing for battle; war loomed large in their mytho-history and valour was a key cultural value. But these societies in fact depended heavily upon their dispersed matriclans for a range of alternative options to actual combat. Drawing upon this material, I argue that societies are not necessarily either peaceful or violent and that the appearance of bellicosity can mask deep commitments to avoiding open conflict.

Keywords: Micronesia, violence deterrents, peace, war

Résumé : Cet article explore certaines des manières utilisées par les sociétés micronésiennes traditionnelles pour brandir la menace de la guerre comme incitation à la non-violence ou, en d'autres mots, comme un moyen de dissuasion. Habituellement, les Micronésiens passaient beaucoup de temps à se préparer au combat. La guerre occupait une grande place dans leur histoire/mythologie, et le courage constituait une valeur culturelle clé. Mais ces sociétés dépendaient largement de leurs matriclans dispersés pour offrir une variété d'options alternatives aux combats proprement dits. À partir de ce matériel, j'amène l'argument que les sociétés ne sont pas fondamentalement pacifiques ou violentes et que des attitudes en apparence belliqueuses peuvent masquer un engagement profond à éviter les conflits ouverts.

Mots-clés : Micronésie, dissuasion de la violence, paix, guerre

Introduction

In writing about the ends of war and the causes of peace, one might well begin at the grossest level of generalization, by observing that approaches to war and peace often dichotomize into arguments about whether organized violence is unremittingly inherent in the human condition and thus a natural expression of "man's inhumanity to man" or is instead something humans create out of their cultural capacities (and I gloss over the point that cultural capacities are central to human biology). Again at a level of gross generalization, we confront the timeless dichotomy between Hobbesian and Rousseauian outlooks, notions about some original war of all against all, as opposed to notions about an original golden age that was shattered by the corrupting influences of civilization. From the perspective of those who consider organized violence as "natural," yet another dichotomy distinguishes between, on the one hand, perspectives that see violence as a simple manifestation of certain physiological facts, particularly of testosterone or of neural "wiring" (as being "in our DNA" or, in a phrase I am partial to, "testosterone poisoning") and, on the other, perspectives that view violence as a relatively adaptive (or "reasonable") response to the frustration of drives (i.e., it is "natural" but manifests itself only when survival is at issue).

Most thoughtful scholars interested in such issues are in fact more likely to hold ideas and do research at points somewhere between the polar extremes. Arguments put forward by those whose works occupy various locations along the length of the continuum that links the extremes, however, do tend to place priority somewhere closer to one end or the other than to the middle ground. That is, most scholarship posits that humans are either in some significant measure more naturally prone to violence but culturally capable of avoiding it or more naturally peaceful and only culturally provoked into forsaking our nature. In this article, I stake out an

argument—hardly novel, to be sure, but one that never-theless calls for endless reiteration—that sees the two alternatives as being more evenly matched. In it, I describe ways in which Micronesians employ capacities for organized violence as deliberate means of maintaining peace.

I realize that I am to some extent talking about what may be called a deterrent and am extremely wary of doing so. In our contemporary world, deterrents consist primarily of weapons of mass destruction and are cause for real terror (i.e., the states that possess such weapons are, in my mind, as culpable of terrorism as anyone else who deliberately seeks to change collective political behaviour by violence or threats of violence). But the fact is that there have probably always been deterrents, just not of the sort embodying such overwhelming threats. One taking an historical look at peace and war needs to keep this in mind.

I see in traditional Micronesian social life tendencies to glorify both male bravado and culturally channeled, organized violence of the sort we usually call warfare.[1] But I have also come to understand that these patterns do not simply portend violence; they also serve to remind Micronesians of what lies in store for those who do not work conscientiously at avoiding armed conflict. And, more pertinently, I see great swaths of Micronesian sociocultural life dedicated to maintaining patterns and relationships that preclude or obviate a need for violence. The main points of this article are as follows.

In Micronesian societies, violence and the avoidance of it are intertwined and the upshot of this is that many warlike behaviours actually result in a marked diminution of organized violence or war. Actual warfare and other forms of violence are by no means absent in traditional Micronesian society, but they are much less prevalent than might otherwise be, if people did not work so hard at avoiding them. As I understand it, traditional Micronesian social organization offers an overarching alternative to organized violence but Micronesians do not suppose that the mere existence of this viable alternative to violence will necessarily prevail, and so they instead prepare quite conscientiously for combat, as a means of ensuring that their neighbours and rivals are more inclined to pursue all the myriad alternatives to it.

I argue that traditional Micronesian societies were both warlike and peaceful. Because considerations of war and peace invite rhetorical excess, it is tempting to say that these two contradictory statements are mutually exclusive and that either one or the other of them must be true or at least truer than the other. I think, though, that many seasoned ethnographers, setting rhetoric aside

and acknowledging complexity, nuance and ambiguity, will recognize the absurdity of taking an either/or position here and seek, instead, to understand how two opposing possibilities can and do coexist. The ethnological work of Boehm (2012) and Ferguson (2008) bears this out. My intent is to push this notion further, to consider the ways in which a widespread commitment to appearances of organized violence as a central cultural emblem provides underpinning for an equally serious commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict. And I thus conclude that Micronesians' devotion to warlike activities and demeanours cannot be separated from their intense skill and devotion in avoiding violent conflict as often as they do.

My underlying assumption here is that what I am describing as Micronesian cultural choices are in fact rational. The British historian Michael Howard argues in his celebrated essay "The Causes of War" (1983) that, throughout history, war has been a normal means of conducting disputes between political groups. He doubts that this has much to do with innate aggression per se or other drives specified by sociobiologists but is instead largely a consequence of "almost a superabundance of analytic rationality"—that is, leaders are inclined to engage in careful calculations before going to war (14). The odds of victory being what they are, such decisions have about as much chance of being wrong as they do of being right. "Wars begin with conscious and reasoned decisions based on the calculation made by both parties that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace. Even in the most bellicose of societies this kind of calculation has to be made and it has never even for them been an easy one" (1983:22). In the ethnographic data I lay out ahead, it is my intent to demonstrate that Micronesian calculations are inclined to balance careful preparations for warfare with social practices precluding the need for warfare.

Life and Social Organization in Traditional Micronesian Societies[2]

Most Micronesian islands are fertile and well watered. Breadfruit varieties abound and provide an abundant source of healthy carbohydrates. Most of the islands have extensive coral reefs and large lagoons well stocked with marine resources. Under normal conditions, these are nearly ideal places to live and easily support large populations, relative to their limited physical dimensions. On the other hand, El Niño–driven climatic shifts (more properly the El Niño-Southern Oscillation or ENSO) lead to occasional prolonged droughts. While the larger volcanic islands are not as susceptible to

these, the small coral atolls are easily devastated by them.

Micronesia encompasses the spawning grounds of the North Pacific's typhoons. Its islands are subject to the recurring strikes of typhoons, including some of phenomenal proportions. A direct strike by a typhoon is likely to destroy virtually all the vegetation (and structures made from vegetation) in its path. Coral atolls (i.e., the overwhelming majority of all the Micronesian islands) are especially vulnerable, since the storm surge—the wave of seawater being pushed before the storm—is ordinarily much higher than an atoll, which at its highest is usually no more than 4.5 metres above sea level. When an atoll is struck, it is entirely inundated and its gardens are saturated with salt water and rendered unusable until they have been laboriously rehabilitated, a process that can take several years. The most powerful storms have been known to demolish some of the coral islets that make up atolls. Even on the high islands, such as Guam, Yap and Pohnpei, low-lying taro gardens will be flooded and ruined and breadfruit trees uprooted and overturned.

The frequency and intensity of typhoons vary by location, but the people of every island know that they will be hit. The Central Carolines atolls experience these storms more frequently than other areas at present; some are struck every 20 years or so. Tsunamis can wreak the same destruction, and, again, although atolls are most vulnerable, all islands are susceptible. We have no record of how often tsunamis strike, and they do not occur as frequently as typhoons, but they are certainly to be reckoned with.

The point here is that these small, productive islands are well worth inhabiting but they experience recurring natural disasters. Because most of the islands are widely separated (roughly 320 kilometres on average, though there is considerable variation) and have staggered latitudes and the tracks of individual typhoons are idiosyncratic, devastation on one island does not mean that its neighbours will be equally damaged. These are seafaring people (although the populations of some the largest islands lost many of their voyaging skills over the centuries), and their exceptional navigation skills make it possible for survivors of natural disasters to travel to adjacent islands.

Among the most likely options available to those who have been beset by catastrophe are the following: they can travel elsewhere as indigent supplicants; they can travel elsewhere as desperate raiders; or they can travel elsewhere seeking freely given succor. If they pursue the first option, their vulnerability means they stand a chance of being slain or enslaved (and I am by no means arguing this is necessarily what will happen—it is merely a significant possibility). If they pursue the second option, their weakened condition does not bode well for their success as invaders. Moreover, if this were a regular occurrence, the spotting of outsiders on the horizon would almost invariably mean that an island's population would rapidly mobilize itself to repel the invaders. The third option, however, enables vulnerable people to trust that they will be received kindly and provided with timely aid and comfort and allowed to abide until they have managed to rehabilitate the gardens on the home island they were forced to abandon. This last scenario is what characterizes Micronesian social organization.

On smaller islands, it can be difficult both to produce and to store surpluses, but on the higher islands, feast-making and preparations for feast-making, which are central to the dynamics of lineage and community activities, are almost perpetual concerns; they function not only as aspects of interpersonal relations and avenues for the pursuit of individual and group prestige but also as viable mechanisms for the production of surpluses that can help support families, lineages and communities through catastrophe-induced shortages.

Past generations of Micronesians existed, then, in a world that was not merely threatening and potentially dangerous—catastrophic storms and droughts actually did beset them. Micronesians organized themselves to engage in an array of interpersonal frameworks that provided cultural and moral meaning through acknowledgment of and reliance upon the peoples of other islands. Rather than being disoriented to the point of incapacitation when disaster struck, they instead acted in accord with a host of cultural and social imperatives and moved in with relatives residing elsewhere or invited relatives to move in with them and then went about reconstituting and reconstructing their gardens and homes, their lineages and their lives. I am not suggesting that Micronesians did not experience these catastrophes for the personal tragedies they were. Much of Micronesian emotional life is focused upon fears and worries of deprivation and devastation (Lutz 1988). Rather, I am saying that the tragic force of these events, as they impacted upon both material conditions and psychological states, was an experience that Micronesians dealt with as a part of their social and cultural heritage. To be Micronesian, that is, meant being prepared for the worst.

Traditional Micronesian societies were, and to a considerable extent still are, characterized by a shared, highly distinctive form of social organization known as dispersed matrilineal clans. The clans were above all else, I suggest, a means of systematizing what I have

described as the third option for survival. Membership in them is primarily, though by no means entirely, based upon birth—an individual is born into his or her mother's clan. With only rare exceptions does one's membership in a clan change—it has little to do with where or with whom one lives. It is viewed as being essentially biological and therefore permanent but nevertheless moral and social in character. Because the clans are dispersed, all individuals and families have relatives on multiple other islands in the region, a point to which I shall return. In times of danger, hardship or disaster, Micronesians are able to pick up and move elsewhere, secure in the knowledge that under most circumstances they are going to be received with open arms.

Embedded in Micronesian culture and social life is an awareness both that natural disasters continually loom just beyond the horizon and that Micronesian social organization provides exquisitely adaptive means of grappling with and surviving these disasters. That is, as long as Micronesians continue to act according to traditional Micronesian precepts, they are prepared to survive. Life in traditional Micronesian societies is organized around a series of principles and practices thoroughly adapted to surviving repeated catastrophes. Micronesian communities are frequently devastated by natural forces. The simple fact of destruction or, for that matter, loss of a substantial part of one's community is experienced as a fact of life, as a tragedy, to be sure, but one that can be overcome in stride, in the existential act of being Micronesian.

These descent groups are organized in a hierarchical, nested fashion. The clans are the largest, most inclusive level and are geographically dispersed, with branches on many islands and in multiple communities on the larger islands. Clans contain multiple subclans, which are usually restricted to only a portion of the geographical range of the larger clan. Subclans in turn comprise multiple lineages, which tend to be highly localized—that is, most members of a lineage are likely to live together or nearby one another. The lineages are relatively small, ordinarily including less than 50 people, and directly control and farm specific plots of land. Members of the larger clan and subclan, of which a lineage is a part, have certain moral rights of access to the lineage's land. Lineages, subclans and clans are exogamous—individuals must marry outside their own lineage, subclan and clan. Individuals who live with their spouse's lineage (frequently, but by no means always, men living with their wives) remain members of the clan and lineage into which they were born but are often casually referred to as members of the lineages with which they reside.

Lineages and their individual members are symbolically, emotionally, morally and cognitively identified with their land. People derive a significant part of their sense of themselves from their land, as well as from their lineage. In some cases, a single term can refer to both a lineage and its land—that is, people and the place where they live are conceptually merged. Because individuals are members of both localized lineages and dispersed clans, they tend to conceptualize themselves as rooted within a specific group and upon a specific plot of land, even while remaining existentially connected to clan mates in other places.

While Micronesians are deeply tied to their lineage's land, the deeply embedded character of an individual's clan ties to people in other places, it should be stressed, also underpins an awareness of and appreciation for the importance of mobility. It is highly likely that an individual will travel elsewhere to live for a time at some point in his or her life and that people from elsewhere will come to live for a time with his or her own lineage. And, while there is a pronounced ideological emphasis on matri-ties in land tenure patterns in many parts of the region, in actual practice, land rights are accessed through both matri- and patrilines.

The relevance of this is that every Micronesian is by birthright a member of both a land-owning, politically enfranchised local lineage *and* a larger clan with lineages dispersed among a multitude of communities and islands. Every Micronesian has the right, therefore, to seek refuge and succor in another community or on another island when catastrophe strikes and the duty to invite clan mates from other islands to reside and work on his or her own lineage's land when they are in need. While this aspect of Micronesian social structure is most directly a product of adaptive processes, it also holds highly significant meaning for the broader flow of all cultural life in the islands.

Micronesian communities feature two closely related and intertwined but nonetheless distinct forms of government, one territorial-based and the other kin-based. Each clan present in a community has a senior or leading lineage, and, according to local political theory, the senior lineage's genealogically senior member (who is usually an older male, but sometimes a female or younger man) is its chief.[3] Each community has members hailing from several different lineages and clans, and one or another of these clans and lineages is conceived to be the senior or leading descent group (though just which one is sometimes a matter of dispute) of the entire community. Everyone in a community recognizes a single territorially based chief but everyone also recognizes

their own kin-based chief. Micronesians are thus led or governed both by the chiefs of their communities and by their own clan and lineage chiefs. Clan chiefs are also recognized as having important political status by members of their clans residing on all the other islands where the clan has a presence.

I want to expand this into a broader point. In modern European history and among most of the contemporary world's countries, variants of the so-called Westphalian system of international relations are in effect. This is a system of sovereign states. People who reside within the borders of these states are conceived of as constituting a single nation. Thus a "nation state" is thought of as a single political system organized around both a specific place—that is, the state—and a specific group of people—that is, the nation; the nation and the state are thought of as one.[4] The allegiances of all the people within the state, it is widely held, should be directed, first and foremost, to the state within which they live. But in traditional Micronesia, this is not the case. People live in and belong to a place or community and recognize and participate in its government; but everyone also belongs to a dispersed descent group and recognizes and participates in its own chiefly system. All Micronesian societies, then, have two related, but separate, systems of government. Everyone has dual allegiances and two distinct political systems to which they are responsible and upon which they may call when in need.[5]

Furthermore, within these communities there are multiple kinds of chiefs and multiple ways of becoming chiefs. Some are purely hereditary, some are organized around military or religious or political roles, some are based upon age and gender and some are based upon competitive, meritocratic criteria. These different systems of chieftainship sometimes run parallel to one another, and sometimes cross-cut one another. And communities also possess councils. In some, the right to a voice in matters of state is allocated to representatives of lineages; in others, everyone has a right to speak. But in every case, chiefs are expected to listen—to other chiefs, to lineages and to respected individual older men and women. There are, moreover, hierarchically organized, multiple levels of chiefly government—that is, there are chiefs of smaller portions of a larger community (local chiefdoms) and chiefs of multiple communities (paramount chiefdoms or federations). These nested, hierarchical levels are quite similar in organization and function to federal systems. There is a central government and there are local governments and endless discussions about who is in charge of what. As a consequence, Micronesian societies have many political offices and

roles and clearly manifest aspects of what political theorists term mixed government and extensive systems of checks and balances.[6]

I have thus far stressed the peaceable aspects of Micronesian political systems. To some extent they worked as well as they did because Micronesians were always willing to go to war.

Micronesian Warfare

It was always possible, of course, for members of one community or one island's population to invade another community or island and seize and occupy their land. Many Micronesian mytho-historical accounts describe such invasions, and there are several historical accounts of these as well. Important aspects of the Micronesian social-cultural repertoire are in fact organized around martial ideas and practices. The clan and lineage system itself is organized around chieftainship. Chiefs have many roles and serve many functions, but one of their most important tasks is to serve as the focal point for the military organization of the community. Chiefs are often elderly and are not necessarily great warriors themselves, but their prestige, influence and supernatural status (mana)[7] are all central to the task of ensuring that the community is appropriately organized to defend itself from invasion.

This said, however, it is equally the case that, while the threat of attack is never far from people's minds, most social activity is actually focused on non-violent means of moving people from areas of resource shortage to areas of resource availability. Patterns of both land inheritance and adoption, as well as great flexibility in post-marital residence, made it possible for most people to gain access to land through peaceable means. Micronesians respect warriors and battles and martial skills, to be sure, but they have far greater admiration for generosity of spirit, the congenial and efficient discharging of one's duties to one's kin and the ability to produce food stuffs and other goods in quantities that make gift-giving and feasting possible. On Pohnpei, doing service as a warrior is known as *tautik* or "little service," while doing community service, providing labour and feast goods year in and year out, is honoured as *taulap*, "great service."

While concerns about armed conflict played a notable part in a wide range of Micronesian sociocultural activities, in the current context the significance of these activities lies in the role that continual awareness of the possibilities for violence played in motivating Micronesians to pursue means of avoiding open outbreaks of hostilities, both within and between communities. A warrior ethos permeated the fibre of Micronesian social

and cultural life, and participation in combat was expected of all mature men. Warriors were full-grown men and active political players, not youths. Indeed, young Micronesian men today sometimes assert that they seek to serve in combat with the U.S. military for just these reasons. Nevertheless, warfare was not nearly as prevalent as it is often portrayed, nor was it always as violent as it is made out to be when it did take place. But always there was potential for real havoc.

Accounts of traditional warfare must be understood within local contexts. Pohnpeians, for example, explain that in the old days combatants often faced off against one another, but did little more than exchange insults and abuse and hurl occasional spears and sling-stones. And on Yap the outcomes of combat were sometimes prearranged. This is not to say that there were no episodes of homicide but, rather, that a battle did not necessarily entail much violence. And because of the emphases upon warrior codes of honour, non-combatants were rarely endangered, except in specific, individual acts of vengeance.

The role of chief was very much focused on channeling the aid of the supernatural world (including deities and ancestral spirits) to defend the community from external threats, whether natural or human in origin, and to provide it with the appearance of a socio-political hierarchy effective enough militarily to successfully defend the community from invaders.

This appearance of order was intended especially to convince outsiders who might threaten a community with possible attacks to reconsider. It had its internal or domestic purposes as well, but these were in some ways subordinate to the larger purpose of generating propaganda for external consumption. Virtually every fine-grained ethnography of Micronesian societies provides evidence that, although people readily acknowledge and celebrate the potency of their leaders, they are also inclined to ignore their chiefs when they disagree with them or find their strictures burdensome. Most Micronesians are quite capable of insisting upon the sacred character of their leaders and upon their readiness to obey their own chiefs unhesitatingly, even while nonchalantly going on to do quite as they choose.[8]

Because traditional Micronesian political process was highly participatory, it was in fact difficult to order warriors into battle. Why, then, the discrepancy between earlier reports of authoritarian, warlike societies and the analyses of modern ethnographers? I should note at this point that the traditional society of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia's easternmost archipelago, has in fact been subjected to analysis as part of an attempt to establish the mathematical truth of the "democratic peace hypothesis." Unfortunately, the ethnologists who contributed to this effort were unable to provide any context for the data taken from early German accounts. They uncritically report that the Marshalls' "chiefs (along with the nobles) controlled the land and its products and provided 'dogmatic' leadership. Both paramount chiefs and the lesser chiefs were described as having autocratic powers and the power of life and death" (Russett 1993:113). As I have noted elsewhere (Petersen 2007), the outlooks of many of these early German scholars (some of whom were missionaries) were highly compromised; recent, more nuanced ethnographic work has made it abundantly clear that the term *autocratic* has no merit whatsoever when applied to Micronesian political process.

These early accounts came, for the most part, from the reports of outsiders representing powerful and potentially disruptive forces, including explorers, traders, missionaries, the military, colonial administrators and anthropologists. Micronesians believed it crucial to convince these outsiders that their communities were well organized and capable of defending their interests.[9] Thus, the older data available to us tend to emphasize the authority of chiefs, which is why we encounter repeated assertions that the word or the rule of the chief is "absolute" in early ethnological accounts of Micronesian societies. Moreover, the autonomy provided by land tenure systems that place most direct control over lands in the descent groups that occupy them ensures these groups access to resources that enable them to disregard or even defy the local chief. Claims of successfully authoritarian chiefs and frequent violent combat do not at all accurately portray the political dynamics of these societies.

It is also important to emphasize that, despite the important roles chiefs played in the defence of their communities, they were not themselves warriors or war leaders. In most Micronesian societies they tended to be rather elderly and many of these societies possessed special war leaders: in the Marshalls, for instance, there were *leatoktok*, in Chuuk *itang* and in Yap *tagac*. Warfare in Yap has been described as "a method of political maneuvering" used by leaders to consolidate political power and giving "chiefs powers that the ideology of Yapese culture denies." Thus, chiefs did not themselves commonly engage in combat but instead "prearranged the war's outcome" (Lingenfelter 1975:110, 171, 175).

Given the prevalence of storms and droughts, life was already precarious enough in the islands, and Micronesians did not deem it a good idea either to kill those

upon whom they might later need to depend or to lose potential allies who might in time help defend them. Instead, cultivating warlike demeanors coupled with effective means of defusing and preventing or at least limiting war seemed more effective. This does not mean, of course, that such strategies always succeeded, or were unfailingly pursued.

Micronesia does abound with accounts of institutionalized, culturally esteemed warfare. Mytho-historical legends of great battles, invasions and extraordinarily heroic warriors are recounted everywhere. Many of the mytho-historical charters for chiefly descent groups are rooted in conquest. And, perhaps most tellingly, dance performances from all over Micronesia rely extensively on martial themes. Among the earliest accounts we have of the Carolinian atolls are detailed descriptions of elaborate spear and stick dances (Barratt 1988:71). Much of Micronesian aesthetics and recreation is focused on these dances, which are basically choreographed hand-to-hand combat, and, in some communities, they provide one of the readiest forms of release for pent-up or repressed emotions. In societies where a great premium is placed on disguising or concealing hostility and other negatively charged emotions, as most Micronesians societies do (Lutz 1988; Petersen 1993), occasional frays or more frequent dance practices and performances provide an important emotional outlet. Indeed, it might be argued that some of the emphasis laid upon the warrior ethos is intended to accomplish precisely this—to allow a channel for repressed interpersonal conflict.

Pohnpeians, like other Micronesians, also possessed spells meant to bind up ruptured social relations and restore calm, even where injured sensibilities still remained. I know directly of one case, several decades ago, when a particularly ugly murder led to a near outbreak of violence; local elders successfully enlisted a sorcerer, whose strong binding spells restrained people from pursuing quick and deadly vengeance. And perhaps most significantly in this context, Pohnpeians today maintain that in the past, when a community member was killed by someone from another community or part of the island, the culturally approved practice was to determine the clan membership of the perpetrator, select someone from the victim's community of this same clan and then have him avenge the killing by taking the culprit's life. This was done deliberately, to have the act of vengeance carried out between members of the same clan, thus bringing the dispute swiftly and directly to closure. Similar tactics were employed elsewhere in the region.

Pohnpeians continue to place great importance on a sort of fierce stoicism. Men are expected to be able to undergo great physical pain without showing any awareness of it, and various aphorisms refer to men's readiness to throw away their safety and even their lives when duty calls. Other maxims warn about dangers of underestimating individuals whose demeanor is understated; one is the saying, *"Nennen sarau kommwad,"* which might be translated either as "the quiet of the fierce barracuda" or "the bravery of the quiet barracuda." Pohnpeians say that while they respect sharks, they fear barracudas, which are given to hanging motionless in the water and then striking suddenly, without warning. Quiet persons should not be taken lightly—there may be much more to them than meets the eye.

This cultural emphasis on stoicism is by no means limited to male behaviour. Maureen Fitzgerald was told "that for Pohnpeian women it is a sign of honor not to cry or make a noise during labor and delivery; other women may cry out but not Pohnpeian women ... If a Pohnpeian woman cries out it will bring great shame to the family" (2001:77). Many years ago I drove a young member of the Pohnpeian family with whom I lived to the island's hospital, over what were in those days very difficult—at times seemingly impassable—roads, where she gave birth just a few minutes after we arrived. When I later expressed to her my surprise at how quickly she delivered, since she had been so calm and collected during the drive, she replied that she wished she could have been screaming, the way American women do. And as Marshall (1978), Lutz (1988) and Throop (2010) have shown, this stoic theme appears widely in contemporary Micronesian societies.

While Micronesian governments were to some extent organized around warfare and related activities, then, and Micronesian culture celebrates aspects of the warrior's role, the fact is that traditional Micronesian societies possessed a full repertoire of ways in which violence and open warfare could be staved off. My central point here is that the extensive means of avoiding open hostilities at Micronesians' disposal, coupled with the elaborate cultural emphases on warrior roles, make it clear that violence was always perceived as possible and not always avoidable but force was not the primary manner through which governments conducted their community's political affairs.

Foreign Relations in Micronesia

To the extent that war, as Clausewitz famously maintained, is the continuation of politics by other means, Micronesian chiefs were responsible for that which warfare continues: foreign relations. This is not the sort of terminology ordinarily applied to political practices in small island societies, but there is no good reason to

deny them the respect due their diplomatic skills. In Micronesia, foreign relations were almost by definition as much the province of descent groups and their leaders as they were the mandate of territorial chiefs. The very nature of Micronesian societies, organized as they were around lineages nested hierarchically within clans and subclans, hinged upon the notion that interactions among groups of people living in different places were simultaneously the task of dispersed branches of descent groups and of territorial leadership. When these relations are managed by members of different branches of the same extended descent group, we tend to speak of them in terms of kinship; when they are dealt with by territorial leaders, we lump them with politics. Both sorts of interactions, however, were utterly crucial to survival in the islands, and both can rightly be referred to as foreign relations.

At the core of everything essentially Micronesian is the web of ties between and among communities and societies spread across their seas.[10] Relations linking together dispersed branches of descent groups ensured individuals, families and lineages that they would be able to obtain aid and succor from kin residing in areas less affected by storms, droughts and other sorts of trials, whether visited upon them by natural or social forces. On the other hand, foreign relations in the charge of the chiefs of places—of communities or islands—were focused more upon defence of the entire community; they were intended to demonstrate that a community or island was capable of coordinating the efforts of all its localized descent groups in an effective enough manner to repel outside attempts at invasion or conquest.

In dealing with these foreign relations—relatively large-scale, formalized interactions between communities or islands—chiefs were not viewed as the heads of specific descent groups but as leaders of entire communities. They were, in the terms of international relations theorists, sovereigns and were treated as such in the course of interactions between island societies. On many islands paramount chiefs were explicitly charged with the conduct of external or foreign relations as their principal responsibility—for example, Ettal (Nason 1974:126) and Ulithi (Lessa 1966:34; Figirliyong 1977:12).

Such relations could be quite complex, inasmuch as members of one or another of a community's localized descent groups might find themselves in a position of being expected to defend the community from an invasion by distant relations—that is, members of their own clan. But it was precisely this interweaving of multiple sorts of ties that provided Micronesian societies with bonds strong enough to ensure survival in often-tenuous environments. By having two complementary sets or

sorts of social organization, one based on co-residence in a specific place and the other on kin ties among people residing in widely separated places, they provided themselves with enhanced opportunities both to reach out to communities in other places when in need and to defend themselves from other communities when they were threatened.

What is more, these two discrete but relatively complete and competent sets of socio-political relations served equally to establish checks against any who might seek to abuse their authority. As Alkire points out in his discussion of Lamotrek's complementary chiefly systems, "even though the rights of a chief derived from the multiple sources of kinship and territoriality, the decision of one chief would not often come into conflict with that of another" (1989:68). The dual systems did not ordinarily overlap but, instead, enabled individuals and lineages to play one off against another when they believed it to be in their interest.

Nearly every aspect of Micronesian leadership involved some degree of duality or multiplicity of chieftainship. Despite the hereditary aspects of chiefly succession and the powers ascribed to the chiefs, Micronesians managed at every turn to place checks in the way of anyone who would abuse his authority. Foreign relations were likewise conducted along these two tracks. Much of what needed to be done was accomplished by localized lineages maintaining relations with members of the same clan or subclan residing elsewhere. The entire community benefited from these relations because goods and services circulated constantly through communities. At the same time, however, all the localized descent groups in a community, in recognizing a common chief of the place, guaranteed themselves the means of mounting a coordinated defence in times of danger.

In short, Micronesians well understood that their dispersed clans and chiefly politics provided them with the best chance they had to survive the exigencies of island life in the home of the typhoons. Perhaps there is something we can learn from them.

Peace, Democracy and Pacific Islands Politics

This Micronesian material can be set in a more comparative framework by drawing on several key concepts drawn from classical republican theory.[11] First, aspects of pluralism—that is, mixed governments and separation of powers—have long been viewed as providing some of the important checks and balances that simultaneously empower a community's leaders and yet prevent them from abusing their powers. Second, systems of land ownership that ensure groups security of tenure

make it possible for them to resist central authority. Third, where nearly every adult male is a warrior—that is, much of the population serves as members of the militia—the people are even more empowered to resist abuses of authority. These precepts have traditionally been seen as central to securing participatory democracy.

I would like to think that the Micronesian examples I have been describing are evidence that democracy can take many forms and that traditional societies with histories quite distinct from the precedents of the classical Greeks have been able to maintain political systems that functioned democratically, even if they appear on the surface to be entirely different from what we have come to expect of democracies. Ballot boxes and written constitutions are what we anticipate, and in their absence many are inclined to see nothing but blind tradition or, as one writer put it, "traditional society, in which vast masses live an unpolitical life, embedded in customs and usages they need not understand" (Merkl 1967:208).

It is my contention that the characteristic Micronesian system of dispersed descent groups, however quaint it may seem, provides us with a worthwhile example of what small-scale, traditional societies can tell us about some of the lesser-known possibilities for peace and democracy. It is not that they did not know war—clearly they did. But they used organized violence sparingly, as a means of reminding themselves of what could happen when they did not make good use of the options their ancestors developed as adaptations to the uncertainties of life in their islands. Their political systems intertwined one single kind of governance, chieftainship, in two distinct realms. At home, within communities, chieftainship provided the focal point for a wide variety of culturally meaningful activities that integrated nearly everyone into participatory roles. But chieftainship worked equally to link together people in communities dispersed over a wide region. Micronesians used a single, albeit nuanced and complex, political model to accomplish two distinct tasks, both making communities work efficiently and assuring them of security vis-à-vis their neighbours.

Ideas about hierarchy and martial organization are central to chieftainship, and provide stable templates for connections among island communities. At the same time, however, chieftainship entails so much participation and good will in its day-to-day operations that it actually promotes a high degree of equality, participation and peace. This is hardly peculiar to Micronesia.

Peace and War Can Occupy the Same Space

Questions about the nature of war as a general phenomenon in human history and, more specifically, about its character in societies without centralized political organizations (i.e., "states") to monopolize the use of violence or armed force have long concerned anthropologists, even if they have rarely occupied the discipline's centre stage. I turn now to a brief consideration of how my Micronesian perspectives intersect with broader anthropological theory. I draw here on two representative works, out of the greater sweep of anthropological literature.

Writing in 1903, in a classic essay simply entitled "War," William Graham Sumner observed that 18th-century thinkers saw the primitive state of humankind as one of peace, joy and contentment, while in the 19th century, humans' original state was thought to be one of universal warfare. Believing himself to be an objective student of the available ethnographic data and unswayed by currents of popular opinion, Sumner surveyed "the least civilized men" still surviving in the contemporary world and found that "they are not warlike and do not practice it if they can help it" (1965:200). Marshalling pages of rather unsystematic ethnological examples, he found the data "show we cannot postulate a warlike character or a habit of fighting as a universal or even characteristic trait of primitive man" (1965:204). Placing this material in historical perspective, Sumner concluded that "militancy and peacefulness have existed side by side in human society from the beginning just as they exist now" (1965:224). In Sumner's view, then, the issue is not whether humankind is inherently more warlike or peaceful; he instead focuses on the interrelationship between the two extremes.

In *War before Civilization*, Lawrence Keeley also points to the broader climate of intellectual and popular opinion, arguing that in modern anthropology a central tendency reflects a widespread notion in contemporary western culture that warfare is not the natural human state.[12]

> In intellectual and popular culture, war has come to be regarded by many as a peculiar psychosis of Western civilization. This atmosphere of Western self-reproach and neo-Rousseauian nostalgia is prevalent in the views espoused by many postwar anthropologists.

> The pacification of the past now epidemic in anthropology is just the latest turn in the long struggle between the myths of progress and the golden age, between Hobbesian and Rousseauian conceptions of the nature of primitive societies and the prehistoric past. [1996:23]

To the extent that anthropologists do acknowledge the existence of war in the ethnological record, he continues, they downplay its importance, attempting to "save the Rousseauian notion of the Noble Savage, not by making him peaceful (as this was clearly contrary to fact), but by arguing that tribesmen conducted a more stylized, less horrible form of warfare than their civilized counterparts waged" (1996:9). According to Keeley's reading of the literature, anthropological views of "the pacified past claim or imply that peaceful societies were common, fighting was infrequent and active participation in combat was limited among prestate people." But, he concludes, "on the contrary, the available evidence shows that peaceful societies have been very rare" and "that warfare was extremely frequent in nonstate societies" (1996:25–26).[13] He repeatedly emphasizes this view that it is only fashion that blinds anthropologists to the data in front of their collective noses and concludes that technology aside, warfare in human societies has always and everywhere been both prevalent and seen as a scourge.

> The facts recovered by ethnographers and archaeologists indicate unequivocally that primitive and prehistoric warfare was just as terrible and effective as the historic and civilized version. War is hell whether it is fought with wooden spears or napalm. Peaceful prestate societies were very rare; warfare between them was very frequent. [1996:174]

Keeley does acknowledge that "if it were not so difficult to design social systems" that fostered it, "peace would be a far less scarce commodity" (1996:178).

There is, to my mind, a critical semantic issue here, one that lies close to the centre of the issues I see myself grappling with in this article. As I have already explained, my understanding of traditional Micronesian societies leads me to the conclusion that terms like *peaceful* and *warlike* (or whatever synonyms one wishes to employ, such as *pacifistic* or *bellicose*) may not be useful guides to true comprehension of any given society's character. This is partly because peoples' values and actions do not necessarily coincide and because peoples' views of themselves do not necessarily correspond to others' perspectives. This is by no means peculiar to Micronesian societies. Distinguishing between violence and aggression, Karl Heider describes the Dani of western New Guinea as "peaceful warriors." He acknowledges the "apparent paradox if one contrasts the picture of the individual Dani as gentle, nonaggressive people who withdraw from conflict, with the picture of their warfare, which demands instant engagement and often homicide on the part of these same people" (1997:115). In *The*

Anthropology of War, Keith Otterbein discusses "peaceful societies," which by his definition, "lacked both military organizations and war" (2009:57), but such an extreme position, it seems to me, makes being "peaceful" almost by definition impossible. In a similar vein, many contemporary American citizens see no contradiction between their deeply held beliefs that the United States is the most peace-loving nation state on the planet and the fact that their government spends more on its military budget than do the rest of the world's governments put together.

If the people of a community or a polity spend the overwhelming majority of their time and efforts engaged in activities meant to avoid or curtail organized violence and only a small portion of their time engaged in actual fighting, are they "peaceful" or "bellicose"? If they are kind and gentle with those with whom they interact most of the time—that is, their family and neighbours—but occasionally fierce in dealing with outsiders, are they "aggressive" or not? If they espouse humanitarian principles in their rhetoric but treat others ruthlessly, how do we categorize them (beyond acknowledging their hypocrisy)? If they speak softly but carry a big stick, or vice versa, what conclusions can or should we draw about them?

Conclusion

As I said at the beginning, organized violence in traditional Micronesian societies can be seen as a deterrent. That is, occasional warfare can serve to bring about and preserve peace in the longer run. In modern urban, industrial societies, especially those possessing weapons of mass destruction, the concept of a deterrent may strike terror into the hearts of some and yet there are those who would point to the efficacy of these armaments. "Society may have accepted killing as a legitimate instrument of state policy," writes Michael Howard, "but not, as yet, suicide." It is for this reason that he doubts the abolition of nuclear weapons would be an unmixed blessing. "Nothing that makes it easier for statesmen to regard war as a feasible instrument of state policy, one from which they stand to gain rather than lose, is likely to contribute to a lasting peace" (Howard 1983:22). In an era when thoughtful, rational people view the existence of nuclear weapons as a welcome check to the ambitions of leaders, the notion of violent deterrents rightly unsettles us. But under other conditions, in other times and places, the existence of deterrents may be a more complex matter.

The title of this essay, "The Possibilities of Violence and the Skills to Avoid It," reflects my sense that this is

precisely what traditional Micronesians were up to. As Sumner observed over a century ago, "Make up your mind soberly what you want, peace or war, and then to get ready for what you want; for what we prepare for is what we shall get" (1965:234). Micronesians were adept at preparing for both, and in doing so, it seems, managed to spend considerably more time at peace than at war.

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Notes

1 A common framework for organizing social life proved so successful that it was adopted throughout the area and retained for a very long time. It is this shared pattern, characteristic of all Micronesian societies in the 19th century, when most European contact got underway, to which I refer when I speak of "traditional Micronesian social life."

2 This is perhaps no more than an old man's grumpiness, but I've come to think that in the past couple of decades Micronesia has been increasingly dismissed or at least forgotten as an integral part of Oceania. To that end I am providing a summary of some basic aspects of Micronesian ethnology; those who have a more classical training will know all of this already, but I suspect it may provide a useful introduction to at least some of you. Data in the following account are fully referenced in *Traditional Micronesian Societies* (Petersen 2009).

3 In reality, a good deal of practical politics is involved in establishing who will be chief, but Micronesian political ideology almost invariably states that the chief should be the group's genealogically senior member.

4 It is for this reason that countries with multiple acknowledged language groups, say, for instance, Belgium or Canada, are widely thought of as somehow peculiar and countries with many language groups, say India or virtually any African country, are thought to be at a distinct historical disadvantage when it comes to "nation-building."

5 Imagine, if you will, that Kurds were legally, officially allowed to be equally attached to the Turkish or Iraqi state and to all their fellow Kurds, wherever they live.

6 The title of my book *One Man Cannot Rule a Thousand* comes from the comment of a chief who was explaining to me why his community had split apart into two chiefdoms. There were just too many people (in reality a little over two hundred) and not enough chiefs, he said, and the community broke in two in order to create positions for many more chiefs (Petersen 1982).

7 Nuclear Micronesian languages possess some cognate form of *mana*; on Pohnpei, for instance, it is *manaman*.

8 I am hardly suggesting that this is in any way peculiar to Micronesians.

9 I recognize that there are situations where some may think that taking a dependent or supplicating role or position might work to their advantage.

10 The preamble to the Federated States of Micronesia's constitution states in part, "The seas bring us together, they do not separate us."

11 I have elaborated connections between republican theory and Micronesian socio-political life elsewhere, including Petersen 1990, 1995 and 2009:146–147.

12 Keeley hedges. He writes, "War has come to be regarded by *many* as a peculiar psychosis of Western civilization" (1996:23, emphasis added), but his book is grounded on the premise that this negative attitude on war is central to contemporary thought. In the wake of the reactions to the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the U.S. Defense Department's headquarters in the Pentagon and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, I find it difficult to believe that this is so. Douglas Feith, undersecretary of defence for policy in George W. Bush's administration and one of the primary architects of these invasions, expressed the outlook of official Washington succinctly: "The kind of people who put bumper stickers on their car that declare that 'war is not the answer,' are they making a serious comment? What's the answer to Pearl Harbor? What's the answer to the Holocaust?" (Goldberg 2005).

13 Michael Young, commenting on a 1936 Bronislaw Malinowski lecture, "Culture as a Determinant of Behaviour," pointed out that in his preparatory notes Malinowski reminded himself to " 'indicate how the craving for the singular and exotic and romantic leads us to over-emphasize these elements' and neglect the humdrum, the dullness of daily life" (Young 2010). I would suggest that the prevalence of warfare is likely to be exaggerated in ethnographic data precisely because of both informants' and ethnographers' desires to accentuate "the singular and exotic and romantic."

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The End of War in Papua New Guinea: "Crime" and "Tribal Warfare" in Post-Colonial States

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Abstract: The contemporary Pacific is a region of colonial and post-colonial states, the nature of which poses challenges to envisioning "the end of war." Although prevailing global discourses commonly equate post-colonial and nation states, differences in the evolutionary dynamics and histories of the two differ in ways that cast doubt on whether pre-colonial war ever really ended in many post-colonial polities and how easily it might be brought to an end. These issues are discussed with reference to "crime" and "tribal warfare" in contemporary Papua New Guinea.

Keywords: war, violence, crime, post-colonial states, Papua New Guinea, Pacific

Résumé : La région Pacifique contemporaine est une mosaïque d'États coloniaux et postcoloniaux, dont la nature constitue autant de défis à la possibilité de voir une « fin de la guerre ». Même si le discours mondial prédominant tient généralement pour synonymes États-nations et États post-coloniaux, les histoires et les dynamiques d'évolution comportent des différences qui jettent le doute sur le fait que les guerres précoloniales aient bel et bien pris fin avec les institutions politiques postcoloniales, et sur la facilité avec laquelle on pourrait y mettre fin. Nous discutons ces enjeux en référence au « crime » et à la « guerre tribale » en Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée contemporaine.

Mots-clés : guerre, violence, crime, États postcoloniaux, Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée, Pacifique

Introduction

War is one of the more terrible plagues of humanity, and putting an end to it is so desirable a goal that it is difficult to pay the issue too much attention. In considering the ends of war in the contemporary Pacific, however, the task carries a burden that I do not think has been adequately addressed. Contemporary Oceania is a region of colonial and post-colonial states, and, where the latter creations are concerned, there is a problem with the very idea of "the end of war." Although prevailing global discourses commonly equate post-colonial and nation states, differences in the evolutionary dynamics and histories of the two differ in ways that cast doubt on whether pre-colonial warfare, which "pacification" appeared to terminate in many post-colonial states, can really be said to have ended.

To detail this argument, I shall consider the decline and subsequent resurgence of "tribal warfare" in parts of highland Papua New Guinea (PNG) and its apparent decline, post-pacification, in parts of the lowlands.[1] Appearances notwithstanding, I argue that war is actually resurgent in these parts of the lowlands but the fact is disguised by politico-jural schemas embedded in Euro-American definitions of the state. To recognize what is going on—and to appreciate the difficulties associated with an end to war in PNG—closer attention needs to be paid to differences in the structure and developmental dynamics of post-colonial states like PNG and other kinds of states, notably those that colonized and imposed upon them their own structural forms.

The Return of Tribal Warfare in Highland New Guinea

To go by surface appearances, the *Pax Australiana* had very different effects on highland and lowland Papua New Guinea. In many parts of the highlands, pacification and the statehood project essentially failed. Although the region saw a few decades of post-pacification peace, the middle to late 1970s saw a sudden resurgence of

tribal warfare in regions such as Enga, Simbu and the Eastern, Southern and Western Highlands (Burton 1990; Gordon 1983; Podolefsky 1984; Strathern 1977, 1992; Westermark 1984; Wormsley 1987). This contrasts with the country's lowlands, which have seen little in the way of resurgent warfare since pacification and certainly nothing to rival the conflicts that have periodically devastated parts of the highlands.

The resurgence of war in the highlands took much the same form that it had in pre-colonial times. Contact-era New Guinea warfare assumed three main forms: small-scale surprise attack, which I shall call *ambush* or *ambushing*; large-scale surprise attack, hereafter *raid* or *raiding*; and *open battle*, in which combatants simply confronted one another across an open battlefield, leaving the element of surprise moot. The particular combination of these forms that any one community deployed and the emphasis it placed on each, however, varied markedly. Along the southwest coast, for instance, the principal form of Marind-anim warfare involved huge headhunting raids into the interior, though from time to time travellers from beyond Marind-anim territory and even members of other Marind-anim villages might be ambushed (van Baal 1966:676–764; Vertenten 1923). In the Maprik region, by contrast, ambush was the primary form of war, interspersed with the occasional set-piece, open battle.[2]

In most areas of the highlands where tribal warfare has resurged, warriors reversed the Maprik combination: open battle was the principal form of war, with ambush a supplementary form.[3] In contrast to many other areas of New Guinea, where warfare was a permanent state of affairs, warfare in these highland areas was also episodic, periods of fighting alternating with periods of peace. Cutting into this cycle at a point when peace prevailed, war would first loom on the horizon as an atmosphere of rising tensions and conflicts between particular individuals or, more usually, descent-group factions within two larger political communities. In Enga and the Western, Central and Southern Highlands, tensions might then escalate to provocation and self-redress. Provocation might involve, as Bergmann (1971, vol. 1:183) notes for the Central Chimbu, something as superficially trivial as "indecent behaviour in word and deed" or something more serious, such as thievery, the abduction of a pig or an assault on a woman.

Sometimes, provocation or self-redress progressed rapidly to full-blown, pitched battle; at other times, it might be followed by a series of reciprocal ambush killings—often in the middle of the night—until hostilities had so proliferated that the entire membership of one or both communities had been pulled into the conflict and

one side or the other called for or decided upon the signature form of highlands warfare, open battle.[4] The precise manner in which a battle opened varied, but, however it started, the two sides soon ended up facing and firing at one another from the farther range of their projectile weaponry, closing from time to time to fight at closer quarters.

Rarely did a single day's combat decide a war. Usually, battle followed battle in an extended sequence, commonly interspersed with attempts at ambush. Combatants might return to the field on as many as four consecutive days, but hostilities could then lie fallow for as long as a month or two while participants attended to the funerals of fallen warriors, other rituals or their neglected gardens.[5] A war usually lasted for at least several days, but progressing in fits and starts it could last as long as a year or, occasionally, longer.[6] It ended in one of two ways. It could end decisively if one side managed to muster a marked numerical superiority or pull off a brilliant tactical manoeuvre on the field, putting the other side to flight. The victors would then chase the vanquished back to their settlements, attempting to massacre whomever they could, put the rest to flight and, with the help of their wives and other non-combatants following behind, destroy the losers' settlements, gardens and other property.[7] More commonly, though, a war dragged on indecisively, battle following battle, week after week, month after month, until the two sides had had enough and concluded a peace.[8] In the Eastern Highlands, war sequences were similar, though in some areas raiding was practised along with ambush and open battle.[9]

The wars once again being fought in the contemporary highlands resemble their pre-colonial antecedents in many respects but differ in some others. As in days gone by, wars are episodic rather than permanent. The largest confrontations are open battles that typically involve whole tribes or alliances of tribes on each side, and they can last for months, occasionally even years. As in earlier days, open battles are supplemented with periodic ambushes and, in some areas, large-scale raids. And they can still end in massacre, destruction and large-scale flight, though far more commonly the outcome is indecisive, the two parties agreeing to peace negotiations and peacemaking ceremonies that produce a tenuous peace (e.g., Burton 1990; Gordon 1983; Podolefsky 1984; Strathern 1977, 1992; Westermark 1984; Wiessner 2006; Wormsley 1987).

The main differences between the battles of old and those of today are that the range of motives for waging war has expanded; pacification can induce a false sense of security, allowing one side to attack another unex-

pectedly; and firearms (including M19s and AK47s) have entered the armoury, along with novel tactical adaptations, some imported from scenes in the Rambo films. Burton (1990:226–227) witnessed a contemporary confrontation in the Wahgi valley (see also Muke 1993:229–262) that illustrated some of these changes:

> The date: 11 December 1989. The place: Minj Station and District Office, inside Konumbka territory. The occasion: a Kondika war party descends from an overlooking ridge and swoops down on an unarmed crowd, firing guns on the run. Two hundred people flee for their lives. Some are forced to dive full length to avoid shotgun pellets. One old man falls into a ditch and the Kondika front line warriors jump over his outstretched body. The police, out-gunned and out-numbered, withdraw in their blue vehicles. For ten minutes the station area is at the mercy of the attackers, who circle round shooting in the vague direction of the Konumbka heartland across the old airstrip but, on this occasion, they don't have the numbers to hold the position. The Konumbka are surprisingly slow to react, but finally group together in sufficient numbers to run the Kondika off the station and back into their own territory ... Perhaps twenty gunshots have been fired ... It is just fifteen minutes since the raid began.

The Return of the Ambush: War in Lowland New Guinea

Although warfare has reappeared in the highlands, there appears, on the surface at least, to have been no parallel development in the lowlands. To be sure, lowlanders have sporadically ambushed one another, occasionally provoking open confrontations, but there is nothing to match the scale, frequency and deadliness of renascent warfare in the highlands. Why should this be so? Why should lowland PNG have seen the "end of war," yet not the highlands? These questions are seldom addressed, and if we take them at face value, they have no obvious answer. Are highlanders somehow more warlike than lowlanders? Do they have interests in waging war that are absent from the lowlands? Is state control somehow weaker in the highlands than in the lowlands? Is the answer a combination of these factors? A convincing case has yet to be made for any of these possibilities.

In the early 1990s, however, during my third field trip to lowland Yangoru, I came to doubt the surface appearance. War, it seemed, was resurgent in the lowlands just as it was in the highlands but the manner in which states (and their post-colonial progeny) conceptualize the state, war and crime had led non-Melanesian observers—and the jural architecture of the PNG state—to identify

as crime in the lowlands what they were identifying as war in the highlands.

In interpreting physical violence, states bring two distinctive conceptions to bear (Roscoe 2004). The first is a conception of the state as an autonomous entity that claims a monopoly on physical force within a particular territory (Weber 1968:56, 905)—an idea that seems accurate enough so long as we are "careful to accentuate 'claim'... and ... recognize that the territorial element may be quite ill-defined" (Giddens 1985:18–19). The categorization of physical force as war or crime then follows. The deployment of (organized) physical force *between* states or other forms of autonomous polity is war (e.g., Malinowski 1941:522; Mead 1968:215; Otterbein 1973:923); the deployment of physical force *within* a state is a challenge to the state's monopolistic claims to force and is therefore defined as a crime. The second conception that states—or European states, at least—have of physical violence sees war as open battle. Indeed, the set-piece, open battle is commonly designated "the Western way of war," with military historians in particular enthusiastically linking its adoption to the rise of Western civilization (e.g., Carman 1999:40; Hanson 1989, 2001; Keegan 1993).

Modern PNG inherited these conceptions as part of the state apparatus imposed on it by its Australian colonial masters. Confronted with the return of large-scale, open battles in the highlands, therefore, it sees war; more specifically, it sees civil war, civil unrest. For one thing, these confrontations take the form that the state tacitly recognizes as real warfare; for another, they are symmetric confrontations, acts of will on the part of two large political factions that manifestly no longer recognize themselves as parts of the same political entity. From the perspective of the state, these battles may not constitute war per se, but they resemble civil war, the kind of war that breaks out once a state has fissioned from a single entity into two separate entities.

The forms of pre-contact warfare in the lowlands were the reverse of those in the highlands, and this difference has significant implications for how a state would recognize and respond to it if it were to reappear. Whereas highlanders practised open battle, supplemented in most places by small-scale ambush, lowlanders relied mainly on small-scale ambush or (in some lower-density areas) raiding, with open battle a subsidiary form at most. Many lowland societies, in fact, did not practice open battle at all, and even those that did placed greater emphasis on surprise attack.[10] Had warfare resurged in the lowlands, therefore, it would have taken the form of small-scale ambush and it is doubtful that the state would recognize and respond to it as war or civil war.

Because it is small-scale violence, because it does not resemble the state's way of war, because it is asymmetric, offensive warfare by one side rather than a mutually agreed upon act between two, and because it is an act internal to the state, the state would likely recognize it as crime, not resurgent warfare.

This, it seemed to me, was what happened in lowland Yangoru in the early 1990s. Not long after the resurgence of tribal fighting in the highlands, Yangoru experienced a sudden and dramatic rise in criminal activity or *raskolism*—a term derived from the Tok Pisin word *raskol*, meaning "criminal." As Harris (1988) notes in his examination of raskolism in the country's capital, Port Moresby, the term first emerged in the mid-1960s to describe young male migrants to urban centres who were given to spontaneous, high-spirited acts of petty crime. Though the term's English overtones of youthful scampery are still applicable to some *raskolism* today, nowadays it captures a more unfortunate reality, referring to a member of a predatory gang given to organized thieving, rape and murder (e.g., Hart Nibbrig and Hart Nibbrig 1992; Dinnen 2001, ch. 4).

The history of raskolism elsewhere in PNG is poorly known, but, by the mid-1980s, to judge from newspaper accounts, raskolism had appeared in Wewak, the capital of the East Sepik Province, about 40 kilometres east-north-east of Yangoru. By 1990, highway robbers were operating along several stretches of the East Sepik Highway, attacking police trucks and ambulances, as well as private cars and public motor vehicles (PMVs), and around the same time *raskolism* reached Yangoru (Roscoe 1999).

In the legal architecture of the post-colonial state, the rise of raskolism was not seen as a resurgence of lowland warfare. As small-scale violence internal to the state, it was classified as crime, the kind of interpersonal violence exemplified in Euro-American nations by soccer hooliganism, gang warfare and organized crime. But this was not how it appeared in Yangoru: here, it resembled a return of the ambush. To begin with, raskol attacks were mounted in much the same way as the surprise attacks of old. Ambushes occurred either at dawn or during the day. Attacks at dawn were targeted at enemy housing. A small band of attackers would infiltrate the settlement under cover of night, strike its target in the grey light of dawn and then flee before defenders had a chance to rally and cut off its lines of retreat (Roscoe 1996). Daytime ambushes targeted enemies when they were out and about their daily routines. Attackers would lie in wait on forest paths to catch enemies going about their daily rounds or move surreptitiously up on an unsuspecting party at work in its gardens or groves.

As in highlands fighting, there are both continuities and differences between the ambushes of old and the raskol attacks of today. Just as some ambushes were launched at enemies en route to their gardens or their relatives, so raskols (*ol raskol* is the plural form in Tok Pisin) today attack people walking the tracks of the Yangoru Subdistrict or travelling on PMVs along the East Sepik Highway. Just as other ambushes targeted houses, so raskols attack hamlets or bottle shops. And just as ambushes prompted revenge attacks in the past, so raskol activity can provoke retaliation today. In 1990, after the PMV belonging to my field village had been held up several times on the East Sepik Highway, three truckloads of young men from my village descended on the settlement of the offending gang, vandalized a tradestore and some houses and beat up one of the gang member's fathers. Furthermore, just as members of the same war confederacies aided one another in the past, so they may do today. A year after my field village had taken its revenge on one highway village, its PMV was again attacked and robbed by another. Within 24 hours, a third highway village leaked the names of several of the culprits. Its reason for supplying the intelligence was its common membership with my own village in the Samawung war confederacy, the confederacy that in the old days opposed the Lebuging confederacy to which the village of the robbers belonged.

There are certainly differences between ambushes and modern raskol attacks. Raskols favour firearms rather than the spear or war club and, if they can get their hands on them, walky-talkies or cell phones, rather than coded bird whistles. Raskol attacks frequently occur over a longer range. Whereas in the past, enemies usually lay less than a mile or two away, raskols sometimes operate against targets several miles away. As in contemporary highlands warfare, moreover, the motives for raskol attacks have expanded from those that motivated ambush in earlier days. Rather than to avenge a theft, seduction, rape, murder or other social delict or offence or to demonstrate bravery and prowess in the field, raskol ambushes are launched primarily to procure western material goods and cash and only to a lesser extent to rape, avenge a killing or gain prestige. The fact remains, however, that raskol attacks represent the same sudden and surprise deployment of violence for instrumental purposes as did the ambushes of old.

The most important similarity between the ambushes of yesteryear and the raskol attacks of today, however, is that, to Yangoru, they resemble war rather than crime because they occur across polity boundaries rather than within them. The quandary for a post-colonial state like PNG is its hybrid structure. In the space of a few

generations, the numerous, warring sovereign worlds and identities that existed before colonialism are by colonial fiat suddenly supposed to become a unified entity and single national identity. What were once thousands of "us's" and "thems" are, with the wave of the colonial wand, supposed to become a single united "us." In practice, of course, sovereign worlds and identities are not so easily erased. Andrew Strathern points to the implications:

> In contrast to many African societies, the small-scale societies of Papua New Guinea tended to be politically acephalous, and in the Highlands there were no established centralized chiefdoms which could have been used to graft indigenous politics onto the introduced colonial state. Big-men were leaders of groups, coalitions and factions in pursuit of competitive ends. When populations of this kind are introduced first to colonial and then to post-colonial power, we cannot expect them to invent overnight a respect for hierarchical authority. They obeyed the colonial power out of a combination of fear and self-interest. When fear is no longer there, they will continue to pursue the self-interest part of the equation unless curbed. In short, the national government, inheriting the colonial state apparatus in 1975, was not initially equipped with automatic legitimacy in the people's eyes. [1993:719]

This is not to deny that multiple agents and processes are at work in the post-colonial state of PNG, attempting to mediate or broker the contradictions between colonial and local structures. Developments in transportation and communication technologies and the expansion of lingua francae, for instance, link people together to a degree that was impossible in the past, innovations that both enable and are driven by other developments. Political relations expand in scale, offering local politicians and leaders novel opportunities to mediate the imposition of state forms and altering, in turn, the scale of people's political models. Economic developments and expansions of communication motivate and facilitate modernist cultural processes that recruit advertising (Foster 1995), national sports, the artwork on postage stamps and public buildings and so on to the job of forging a national identity.

The rise of raskolism in Yangoru occurred in just such a post-colonial milieu, a system that had only just begun a transition from pre-colonial forms. Prior to contact, the Yangoru polity was the village, an autonomous political community that attempted through diplomacy to maintain a precarious peace with a handful of other neighbouring village polities. The result was a landscape of allied polities permanently at war with other nearby sets of allied polities. As raskolism emerged in Yangoru,

this structure still deeply influenced views of the social universe. In the wake of pacification, traditional peace-making procedures had expanded the circle of neighbouring communities that were at peace with one another. But, beyond that expanded circle, people still viewed one another in much the same terms as in the past: with grave suspicion at the best of times and as targets of retaliation in kind under provocation.

The authority of the post-colonial state, meanwhile, had made limited inroads on these views and behaviours. "Who does he think he is?" demanded the councillor of my field village, when I told him in 1981 that the officer (Tok Pisin: *kiap*) at Yangoru Government Station, a national, would take a dim view of me overstaying my research visa by remaining in the village. "We talk here! If he objects, he can just roll up his blanket and leave!" Almost everyone in Yangoru knew they were affiliated to an entity they called "New Guinea—Papua," but beyond the educated minority, understandings of its architecture, its place in the world system and its implications for their lives were badly garbled. During the 1980 national parliamentary elections, for instance, people understood they were voting to select a "boy" (i.e., prime minister) who would periodically venture down to Sydney, the land of the dead, to receive the country's "orders" from the spirits of the dead. Seven years later, the national election was being described as the "last" election, the one that would institute "Fritan Independens," a millennial era in which the black and white peoples of the world would settle down together in equality. In the early 1990s, young people subscribed to a theory that Michael Somare (PNG's first prime minister) had gained control of "*blak paua*," which they understood to be some kind of magical stone or material with the power to usher in the end times.

In this post-colonial milieu, raskolism had a meaning that did not match the western category of *crime*. The effective political structure was still a set of allied, largely autonomous polities, the authority of the state little more than a brown-paper-and-string wrapping that kept things together in name only. In this milieu, crime was an offence against members of one's own village and, by extension, those to which it was allied. Beyond that realm, however, what the state defined as crime was, in Yangoru, categorized as fighting (*giau*), in effect an act of war. As long as raskols struck beyond the local political universe—something they were usually (though not always) careful to do—they were to their home community the structural equivalents of warriors rather than criminals. Conversely, raskols from other political universes that struck the home community were the structural equivalent of enemies, against whom one took

revenge if one could. Just as the open battles currently fought in the highlands are a form of tribal warfare, in other words, the rise of raskolism in Yangoru represented the return of the ambushes of old.

Aggressors, Defenders and Open Battle in the Lowlands

One further circumstance has conspired to obscure the resurgence of war in areas of the lowlands such as Yangoru: the effects of lowland terrain on the capacity to wage open battle. Although open battle was not a pronounced form of pre-contact warfare in the lowlands, it will be remembered that it did occur in some places. If resurgent warfare in the lowlands had taken this form rather than raskolism, we would have no hesitation in dubbing it war. Why then have we not seen open battles reappear in the lowlands?

For open battle to occur, it is commonly supposed, the combatants must agree to it. "There can be no engagement," von Clausewitz (1976:245) declared, "unless both sides are willing." According to Keeley, "*All* battles take place by mutual agreement" (1996:60). These claims, however, obscure a vital point. To say that battle is mutually agreed is not to say that it is the result of mutual *inclination*. If battle is to occur, one side at least has to want combat. But there is no necessary reason why the other side should feel equally inclined. One side might be spoiling for a fight to avenge a loss, for instance, but this does not mean the culprits are similarly provoked; all things considered, in fact, they might just as soon prefer to stay home, savouring their victory. One side might be so confident of rallying a numerical superiority that it is eager to press battle but, under these circumstances, the other side would have good reason to want to avoid it.

It follows that there are two paths to open battle. The first is via a mutual will to do battle, the path envisioned by the scholars cited earlier: if both sides are mutually agreed *and* mutually inclined, then provided there is also some mutually acceptable place where they can meet one another, battle will result. But what if just one party is inclined to battle? Under these circumstances, battle can occur only if two conditions are met. First, the side wanting battle—let us call it the aggressor—must be in a position to press battle on the reluctant side: it must be able to advance on the target of its ire without exposing itself to undue risk in the process. Second, the target has to agree to do battle even though it might not wish to.

This second path to the battlefield merits attention because the ability of a New Guinea aggressor to unilaterally impose battle on a reluctant foe depends on the military implications of the landscape over which the fighting will be prosecuted. Specifically, firm, open landscapes of the kind typical of the highland valleys allow an aggressor to impose battle unilaterally. By contrast, densely vegetated, rainforest terrain of the kind that characterizes most of the lowlands allows a reluctant foe to refuse battle even though its antagonists may be fuming at its metaphorical gates. On these landscapes, battle can occur only by mutual agreement and prior arrangement.

The key to these differences is the dangers that an obstructed terrain like a rainforest present to an aggressor bent on imposing battle on its enemy. On firm, flat, open terrain, an aggressing army can advance on the enemy's settlements with its lines of sight unobscured and its mobility unimpeded. It can do so in full, organized battle array, its fighting capacity optimized, and it need not fear that its enemy may be laying hidden, waiting to attack it at a propitious spot. There is no danger that a forest path or canyon will funnel its advance into a single file, allowing the enemy to block its path or, worse, box it in and annihilate it from above or in its flanks. On an obstructed landscape, such as a rainforest, matters are entirely different. An aggressor force must advance along narrow forest paths enclosed by dense vegetation on either side. With its line extended, its advance can then easily be blocked by a small party of enemy warriors, rather like Horatio at the bridge. Worse, the line is exceptionally vulnerable to attack. The enemy need only lie hidden in the vegetation on either side of the path, then block its advance at the appropriate moment and pour fire from cover into its flanks. And suppose the aggressor somehow beats back such an attack and the enemy retreats. The aggressors cannot be sure that their foes have not simply regrouped ahead of it and are again lying in wait. Indeed, it cannot even be sure that they have not faked their retreat to draw it on, surround it and destroy it.

To summarize: firm, open terrain of the kind that characterizes the highland valleys where tribal warfare is today resurgent allows an aggressor unilaterally to impose battle on an enemy. In contrast, the heavily obstructed landscapes of the lowlands exert a friction, so to speak, on an aggressor's desires. In the highlands, we find that battles began in one of three ways: with a massed invasion, the aggressor army pouring into enemy territory as night lifted (e.g., Meggitt 1977:85–99; Pospisil 1994:117); with one side unilaterally setting out toward or into its enemy's territory, prompting the enemy either to move out and meet it in open battle or flee (e.g., Vial 1939:17; Vicedom and Tischner n.d.:298 [cf. comment by Stürzenhofecker and Strathern in Strauss 1990:221]); or with one side marching to within

Figure 1: Vegetation Cover and the Onset of Battle
Sources: **Abelam (Central)**—Huber-Greub 1988:109, n. 113; Kaberry 1973:67; **Abelam (Eastern)**—Forge n.d.:4; **Arapesh (Ilahita)**—Tuzin 1976:47; **Arapesh (Mountain)**—Fortune 1939:32; **Au**—Philsooph 1980:143; **Auyana**—Robbins 1982:185; **Boiken (Yangoru)**—Roscoe n.d.; **Awa (Ilakia)**—Newman 1972:152; **Awa (Tauna)**—Hayano 1974:286; **Chimbu (Central)**—Bergmann 1971, vol. 1:189; Vial 1939:17; **Dani (Dugum)**—Broekhuijse 1967:254; Gardner and Heider 1968:136; Heider 1970:107; **Dani (Ilaga)**—Larson 1987:230; **Dani (Northern)**—Draper 1958:9; **Enga (Kyaka)**—Bulmer 1960:415; **Enga (Mae)**—Meggitt 1977:85–99; **Gadsup**—Du Toit 1974:83; **Gende**—Fitz-Patrick and Kimbuna 1983:132; **Gnau**—Craig et al. 2008:254; **Kapauku**—Pospisil 1994:117; **Manambu**—Harrison 1993:39; **Maring (Jimi)**—Lowman 1973:10; **Maring (Tsembaga)**—Rappaport 1968:119; **Melpa (Central)**—Vicedom and Tischner n.d.:298; **Melpa (Northern)**—Strathern 1971:75; comment by Stürzenhofecker and Strathern in Strauss 1990:221; **Narak**—Cook 1967:266; **Tairora (South)**—Hays 1971–72:1; Mayer 1987:67; **Urat**—Allen 1976:53–54.

sight of its enemies' settlement and then challenging them to come out and do battle (e.g., Mayer 1987:67; Robbins 1982:185).

On the obstructed landscapes of the lowlands, however, it would be folly for an aggressor to act in any such fashion. Here, if their enemies are disinclined to meet them, aggressors can only stay at home and fume. Battle is likely to occur only if *both* sides are disposed to fight—in other words, if the desire for confrontation is mutual. Moreover, if it is to occur, it must be pre-arranged (e.g., Tuzin 1976:47–48). The two sides must agree on a *time* to meet and a *place* for the confrontation. Absent such an agreement, a disgruntled side can simply refuse to appear, leaving its antagonist with an unappetizing choice between returning home or advancing on the enemy through the rainforest, which, as we have seen, is folly.

In the literature on small-scale warfare, the idea that open battle can be scheduled like a soccer match has commonly been taken as a signature of ritualized battle, a sign that "primitive" warfare (as it is frequently called) is more a game than the real or true warfare that supposedly occurs between states (e.g., Divale 1973:xxi; Gat 1999:572; Keegan 1993:99; Naroll 1966:17). This is simply wrong. Figure 1, which displays the manner in which battle began in 27 New Guinea communities, shows that prearranged battle was a function of terrain. Black bars are communities where open battle could be imposed—that is, where battle began with an invasion, an advance or a challenge to battle. White bars are communities where battle was prearranged. As Figure 1 shows, open battle could be unilaterally imposed on terrains with up to about 65 per cent of vegetation cover; above that level, the practice became too dangerous, and battle occurred only when it was prearranged.[11]

This relationship between vegetation and the onset of battle is strong and highly significant (the point-biserial coefficient of correlation is 0.80, $p < 0.0001$).[12] The importance of this relationship is its differential implications for the resurgence of war in lowland and highland New Guinea. Put simply, it means that aggressors in the firm, open valleys of the highlands can act on an

impulse to attack an enemy. In the heavily vegetated landscapes of the lowlands, they can do so only if their enemy is willing to join them. It is considerably easier, in other words, for battle to break out in the highlands than the lowlands.

The differences in terrain that affect the frequency of open battle also affect the devastation that it can wreak. In the highlands, the absence of military obstructions on the land allows a side that is victorious on the battlefield to follow up on its triumph, massacring its enemies and destroying their property. On the heavily obstructed landscapes of the lowlands, however, the same features that make an advance into enemy territory hazardous make pursuit of a defeated enemy equally dangerous. In dense rainforest, for instance, victors can never be sure that their fleeing enemy has not halted and regrouped and is lying under cover in wait. Indeed, they must worry that their enemy has not faked its flight with precisely this end in mind. In the lowlands, consequently, victors are well advised to content themselves with chasing the vanquished off the field and then going home. Not only is battle harder to prosecute in the lowlands than in the highlands, but also the potential rewards are minimal. Little wonder, then, that open battle has returned to the highlands but not the lowlands!

Conclusion

If the argument I have made for Yangoru is generalizable, then we have put an end to war in parts of PNG by inartfully defining it as "crime." Yangoru and, by extension, other urban and rural settings have seen a return to warfare in the guise of raskolism, but, through the lenses and legal frames of a state, it has been recognized and treated as crime, not warfare. The resurgence of warfare in the highlands, by contrast, has been recognized for what it is because it conforms to Euro-American concepts of how physical violence articulates with the structure of the state and because it takes the form of open battle, the Euro-American idea of what war should look like. Open battles were also part of the pre-colonial military repertoire beyond the highlands. They were not the primary form of war, as they were in the highlands, however, and their resurgence was checked by the military friction imposed by densely vegetated terrain. It is interesting to speculate whether, if this were not the case and open battles had once again appeared in the lowlands, the lowland ambushes currently defined as crime might not have been seen in a different light, viewed as they are in the highlands as ancillary acts in a resurgent tribal warfare.

This analysis has some relevance to a broader debate in the social sciences stimulated by Fearon and Laitin's (2003) claim, based on their analysis of a large cross-cultural data set, that the apparent increase of civil wars after the end of the Cold War was a consequence not of increasing ethnic or religious factionalism but rather of weak (mostly post-colonial) governments that have little in the way of political and military control to resist insurgencies or rural guerrilla warfare in rural areas. Fearon and Latin's conclusion that motives such as ethnic grievances and economic inequality mattered little in the generation of civil unrest attracted considerable criticism. Using another large data set, for instance, Cedermann et al. (2011) showed that grievances based on horizontal inequalities between politically relevant ethnic groups and states at large did promote civil war. The point I draw from the PNG case is that both motive (grievances) and opportunity (the weakness of post-colonial states) are relevant in accounting for civil unrest and war. Tribal warfare would not break out in the PNG highlands if the groups involved had no grievances against one another. The ambush would not have returned to the lowlands if it were not motivated by material, sexual and, occasionally, revenge motives. At the same time, in a state that exerted greater control over its periphery, the parties involved in these acts might think twice before acting on their grievances or other motives.

The broader point, perhaps, is that these discussions fail to engage the dysfunctional structure of the post-colonial state and the implications of its dislocated political topography for understanding both the generation of grievances within and the weaknesses of the post-colonial state. On the one hand, a post-colonial nation is a contrivance, an arbitrarily bounded agglomeration of quasi-autonomous polities that not so long ago were often at war with one another but are now expected somehow to get along. On the other, the political structure commanding them to unity is a foreign imposition, limited in the political and military control it can exercise.

What lessons might we draw from the PNG case? The first is disconcerting: in post-colonial states, the resurgence of war may be even more widespread than we suppose, embracing so-called "crime" as well as civil unrest. Second, in light of this, it may be more fruitful to consider the end of violence rather than the end of war. Third, to end violence in post-colonial states—or, to be more realistic perhaps, to reduce this violence—we need to consider both law-and-order, the political and military control of government and processes of individual and collective identity formation. Policy discussion is primarily focused on the former, even though

much of the problem arises "from structural factors and processes whose origins lie well beyond the law and justice sector" (Dinnen 2009:255). In an entity where the agents of state control are themselves subject to a collective identity problem, moreover, strengthening state control can easily have unintended consequences that exacerbate the problem, creating precisely the horizontal inequalities that Cedermann et al. (2011) find to be generating the rise of civil unrest since the end of the Cold War. In the long run, then, it may be more effective and less fraught to focus on the root problem, the decentralized identities that often characterize postcolonial states and processes that might bolster national identity and nationalism.

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Notes

1 The categories *highland* and *lowland* New Guinea are capacious in the number of cultural groups they embrace and poorly defined in terms of the divisions they suppose. Because space constraints prevent a comprehensive documentation and analysis of these regions as a whole, I here restrict my empirical focus to certain parts of the highlands and lowlands. In talking of the highlands, my principal exemplars are Enga, Simbu and the Eastern, Southern and Western Highlands; my lowlands data come primarily from the Sepik. Though based on circumscribed data sets, the conclusions I draw should nonetheless be broadly applicable to New Guinea as a whole.

2 **Abelam (Central)**—Huber-Greub 1988:109, n. 113; Kaberry 1939–40:67, 1941–42:344, 1973:67; **Abelam (East)**—Forge n.d.:4–5; **Arapesh (Ilahita)**—Tuzin 1976:46–49; **Boiken (Yangoru)**—Roscoe n.d.

3 **Chimbu (Central)**—Bergmann 1971, vol. 1:193, 195, 1971, vol. 2:74; Vial 1939:18; **Chimbu (Upper)**—Criper 1967:179; **Enga (Kyaka)**—Bulmer 1960:414–418; **Enga (Mae)**—Meggitt 1977:16–21, 30, 34–36, 40, 44, 74–76, 85–91, 96; **Melpa (Central)**—Ross 1936:347; Strathern 1972:36–39; Vicedom and Tischner n.d.:279, 283–285, 297–299, 306; **Melpa (Northern)**—Strathern 1971:75; Strathern and Stewart 2000:45; comment by Stürzenhofecker and Strathern in Strauss 1990:221; **Mendi**—Ryan 1958:249, 1961:228–235; **Wahgi (North)**—O' Hanlon 2000:49; **Wahgi (South)**—Muke 1993:88, 102.

4 **Chimbu (Central)**—Brown and Brookfield 1959:41; **Dani (Ilaga)**—Larson 1987:6, 164; **Enga (Mae)**—Meggitt 1977:71.

5 **Dani (Ilaga)**—Larson 1987:288; **Kapauku**—Pospisil 1958:92; **Mendi**—Ryan 1961:235.

6 **Chimbu (Central)** ("days or weeks")—Vial 1942:8; **Chimbu (Upper)** ("a few days to a few months")—Criper 1967:179); **Dani (Ilaga)** ("2 to 6 months"; "seldom ... more than three months")—Larson 1962:33; 1987:288; **Enga (Mae)** ("weeks or months")—Meggitt 1977:169; **Kapauku** ("a few days" to 11 months)—Pospisil 1958:89; 1994:121; **Wahgi (South)** ("several months or even years")—Muke 1993:112.

7 **Chimbu (Central)**—Bergmann 1971, vol. 1:187, 193–194, vol. 4:75–76; Vial 1942:8, 17; **Chimbu (Upper)**—Criper 1967:173; **Dani (Ilaga)**—Larson 1987:245, 428; **Enga (Kyaka)**—Bulmer 1960:416; **Enga, Central**—Kyakas and Wiessner 1992:145–146, 148, Wiessner and Tumu 1998:150–152; **Enga (Mae)**—Meggitt 1977:89–90, 111–112; **Huli**—Glasse 1959:285; **Kapauku**—Pospisil 1958:91; 1994:118–119; **Melpa (Central)**—Vicedom and Tischner n.d.:197, 302–303, 307, 309–311, 313–314; **Melpa (Kaugel)**—Bowers 1968:167; **Melpa (Northern)**—Strathern 1971:67; **Mendi**—Ryan 1961:146, 231; **Wahgi, South**—Muke 1993:241.

8 **Chimbu (Central)**—Bergmann 1971, vol. 1:192; **Chimbu (Upper)**—Criper 1967:179; **Dani (Ilaga)**—Larson 1962:33; **Enga (Mae)**—Meggitt 1977:115–116; **Huli**—Glasse 1968:98; **Kapauku**—Pospisil 1994:118; **Melpa (Kumdi)**—Brandewie 1981:164; **Melpa (Central)**—Vicedom and Tischner n.d.:275, 315, 330.

9 **Auyana**—Robbins 1982:185–188, 195–204; **Awa (Ilakia)**—Newman 1972:152, 263; **Awa (Tauna)**—Hayano 1974:286, 291, n. 6; **Bena Bena**—Langness 1964:105; 1972:178, 1973:306; **Gadsup**—Du Toit 1974:82–84; Flierl 1932:21; Nurton 1934a:1–2; 1934b:14, 17–18; **Gahuku-Gama**—Read 1965:19; **Huli**—Glasse 1959:92, 285; Taylor 1938–39, App. 5:15; TRI 1-52/53:27; **Tairora (Northern)**—Watson 1973:235, 237; 1983:31, 102; **Tairora (Southern)**—Hays 1971–72:1, 1981:4–5, 9; Mayer 1987:68–67, 70–73.

10 In referring to open battle, I refer to confrontations between enemy communities. Restrained forms of skirmishing that resembled open battle occurred in many lowland communities but, in contrast to open battle, these confrontations took place within a community or between allied communities; their aim was not to kill but only to wound; and they took a highly stylized form—for example, each side might alternate in throwing a projectile at the other.

11 For PNG, the extent of vegetation cover was measured using MapInfo GIS software from the Papua New Guinea 1:100,000 topographic series. For West Papua, it was measured from satellite images of varying resolution. For several reasons, the West Papua figures are likely less accurate than the PNG measurements.

12 The Dugum Dani are the one glaring exception to this generalization. Dugum Dani territory had only about 40 per cent vegetation cover and yet its battles were famously prearranged. The Dugum Dani, though, are the exception that proves the rule. Although their terrain was not heavily obstructed by vegetation, it was—in contrast to almost everywhere else in highland New Guinea—a waterlogged environment, a terrain that, as I have explained in more detail elsewhere (Roscoe 2011), presents the same kind of military obstacles as dense vegetation to the unilateral imposition of battle.

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The Red Flag of Peace: Colonial Pacification, Cargo Cults and the End of War among the South Fore

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Abstract: Warfare among the South Fore ceased quickly after first contact in 1949. Three aspects of the process of colonial pacification profoundly changed incentive structures for local warfare: punishment by force of those groups continuing acts of aggression, incentives for giving up warfare and the emergence of hybrid forms of judicial institutions to peacefully settle conflicts. The Fore stress their own agency in ending warfare, mainly through participation in cargo cult movements with promises of valuables and "new things to come," which made it possible for all groups to end war at the same time.

Keywords: pacification, war, cargo cult, conflict settlement, Fore, Papua New Guinea

Résumé : La guerre a pris fin rapidement chez les Fores du Sud, après les premiers contacts en 1949. Trois aspects du processus de pacification coloniale ont profondément modifié les structures d'incitation à la guerre locale : la répression par les autorités des groupes perpétuant des comportements d'agression, des mesures incitatives à l'abandon de l'activité guerrière, et l'émergence de formes hybrides d'institutions judiciaires visant le règlement pacifique des conflits. Les Fores rappellent leur propre rôle d'acteurs dans la cessation de la guerre, particulièrement leur participation dans des mouvements de cultes du cargo, avec leurs promesses de récompenses et « de nouvelles choses à venir », qui ont permis à tous les groupes de mettre fin simultanément aux activités guerrières.

Mots-clés : pacification, guerre, culte du cargo, règlement de conflit, Fore, Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée

Introduction

Among the South Fore, situated at the southern edge of the Eastern Highlands of Papua New Guinea, the inter-group conflicts that formed a fundamental part of their society and culture ceased within a surprisingly short time after the first Australian government patrol reached the area in 1949. In contrast to the case of the Asabano (Lohmann 2014), Fore people are not univocal in their view of why fighting ceased: some attributed it to the working of the colonial government and a few to the coming of the missions, but many of the elders I interviewed emphasized their own role and agency in ending wars once and for all. They mentioned leading or participating in cargo cult movements with promises of valuables and new things to come and saw this expectation as a decisive factor for why people no longer took recourse to warfare. In their account, a pivotal moment was the raising of a red flag by one of the cargo cult leaders, symbolizing the coming of the red-skinned people (the Australian colonial officers) and the wealth that was supposed to arrive with them, if warfare was given up for good.

Based on participant-observation and oral history interviews in the South Fore villages of the Purosa area, I first give a short account of the cycle of pre-colonial warfare that dominated the region and demonstrate some fundamental underlying principles and incentive structures that perpetuated it. I then account for the quick elimination of warfare in the area, based on the view of the Fore, documents of the colonial administration and interviews conducted with former colonial officers. I concentrate first on the history of the cargo cults that had such a critical impact in ending warfare and then place these in the larger setting of colonial pacification. Since pacification can be sustained only if inevitable conflicts within and between local groups can be settled peacefully, I put special emphasis on emerging and hybrid forms of conflict settlement involving local leaders and colonial institutions. In doing so, I would like to

highlight important aspects that contribute to peace-making in general and the end of warfare among the Fore in particular.

Fore Society and Pre-colonial Warfare

Warfare among the Fore consisted of open field battles, ambushes, surprise raids and hit-and-run attacks. In open field battles, the bulk of warriors of one local group and their allies moved onto the no-man's land separating them from the enemy local group. As they advanced, they sang, danced and called out obscenities and insults directed at the enemy, who, at this point, also mobilized and moved into position. The warriors from both sides faced off against each other in long, loosely stretched out lines. Armed men carrying large wooden shields formed the first line. Following a little behind them were men holding only bows and arrows. The lines from both sides engaged each other first over a certain distance and then manoeuvred back and forth along with the intensity of the fight. The fighting usually took the larger part of a day, always interrupted by conventional breaks, in which both sides would retreat before starting the fighting again. Fighting ceased in the late afternoon and started again the next day. The wars could last for months on end, with respites of several weeks in between. This type of fighting did not cause a lot of deaths, since fighting took place over a certain distance and arrows could be avoided or deflected by the shields (see Robbins 1982:185–188 and Hayano 1972:192–194 for similar accounts of warfare among the neighbouring Auyana and Awa).

Much more lethal forms of warfare were the stealthy raids, conducted by a sizeable force against enemy settlements mostly at the crack of dawn, in which the men's houses were encircled and set on fire, and the hit-and-run attacks and ambushes by just a few fighters against enemy men, women or children in their gardens or on footpaths. Tactics of stealth could also be employed during open field battles, with a handful of warriors trying to catch the unsuspecting enemy from the side or from behind. Such tactics were not usually employed as a first reaction against a perceived wrong (except against long-standing enemies), but formed part of a secondary level of escalation after initial field battles. If a party suffered several casualties during open field battles, they then usually took recourse to these stealthy tactics because only these could offer some certainty to bring about an adequate revenge (see Robbins 1982:185–187 and Watson 1983:64 for the Auyana and Tairora).

War among the Fore took place on the level of what I refer to as the local group. A local group was the larg-est politically significant social and economic aggregate of people, even though it could at times dissolve into its composite units. In addition, membership of local groups was constantly subject to fluctuation. Previous anthropologists in the area called such local groups "parishes" (Glasse and Lindenbaum 1971) or "districts" (Berndt 1962), to stress the importance of territoriality and co-residence over kinship as the defining organizing principle. Conflicts between members of the same local group were generally settled amicably; only in rare cases did a conflict within local groups escalate to armed violence.

These local groups consisted of two to four hamlets, which were named after nearby landmarks. A hamlet consisted of usually one or two men's houses and numerous individual women's houses, surrounded by a stockade and thickets of underbrush or reeds. The hamlet was the closest support group for warfare and thus the effective political body. Usually several lineages co-resided in a hamlet. These lineages are genealogical units, although not all members of a lineage are related through patrilineal descent to each other and agnates are not terminologically distinguished from non-agnates (Glasse and Lindenbaum 1971:368–369). These lineages belong to named exogamous clans that are dispersed over several local groups in the Purosa area and beyond. There is a certain notion of ancestral coherence among lineages of the dispersed clan, and if lineages had to flee, they usually sought refuge among clan members in other local groups. The internal composition of a local group was equally complex, with lineages from different clans often co-residing.

According to my informants, warfare was what made local groups stand out. Warfare was always perceived as a defining interaction among different local groups, even if only a few of its constituent segments actually participated. As soon as a member or a segment of a local group was attacked from outside, the local group mobilized as a unit and fought the aggressor. The local group can therefore be considered the unit of defensive warfare, even though it was not a permanently stable unit and the decision for collective defence always rested on its constituent members (Berndt 1971:392–393; Glasse and Lindenbaum 1971:365–368).

If a war broke out, the initial attack sometimes took the form of a secret raid rather than a pitched battle. These initial raids were conducted by only a small number of men from a local clan segment or co-residing in a hamlet. The hamlet can therefore be considered the tactical unit of offensive warfare. The local groups, however, were still considered the main contestants in

warfare. This makes sense, as not only did warfare between lesser units often rapidly escalate and quickly involve whole local groups, but also because the local group was the juridical unit in the sense that any individual could be held responsible and killed for the wrongs committed by a member of the same local group (Glasse and Lindenbaum 1971:368; Lindenbaum 1979:40).

Causes and Basis of War

Deaths that were attributed to sorcery were often the main reason given for acts of retaliation against other groups that led to war. Other, less common reasons were conflicts between local groups over the rights over women or about the killing of runaway pigs. If a person died under suspicious circumstances, showing a range of symptoms attributed to sorcery—for example, loss of flesh, swelling or sudden collapsing—a detection ritual was arranged. In this ritual, people would hunt and kill marsupials in the forest, then place them in several bamboo containers, bestow upon each of them the names of people suspected of sorcery and roast them over a small fire. If the liver of a marsupial in one of the bamboo containers was not thoroughly cooked, this was a clear indication of guilt (Lindenbaum 1979:69–71). This did not mean, however, that a physical attack was immediately launched against the group harbouring the sorcerer. Sorcery might be countered by sorcery, and I collected the story of a case in which two local groups were engaged in just such a cycle of sorcery and counter-sorcery, without it leading to an escalation into warfare.

Triggers for wars then appear to be less significant in explaining the occurrence of warfare than general deliberations on whom to attack at what time. Sorcery suspicions are full of strategic considerations: the main suspects are usually those other groups with which the relationship was already strained, and from among these groups suspicion is mainly directed against smaller groups who are deemed weaker and might thus resort to sorcery as their only chance to right a wrong. A review of all collected cases of warfare in which sorcery accusations led to warfare has shown that it was typically the numerically stronger groups of Mugayamuti and Ketabe that leveled such accusations against weaker groups and started wars. That these groups were at the time numerically and militarily stronger than their opponents or at least of even strength is demonstrated in four cases when they were able to rout enemy hamlets, local clan sections or whole local groups, which then dispersed and fled elsewhere. In all other cases, the wars started by these stronger groups ended in a stalemate,

usually because the smaller local groups mustered enough allies. But never were these bigger groups themselves routed in such a conflict.

That strategic deliberations were indeed behind many decisions to start a war is also exemplified by the case of the "war over taro." This particular war started after the Wanitabe clan segment of Weneru, which had been chased away a few years previously by the Ketabe local group, returned and attached itself to the Mugayamuti local group. Together with a bountiful harvest of taro, a food crop that could be easily turned into more alliance relations with other groups in the system of food exchange common in the South Fore area, this became a great threat to the Ketabe-Ai alliance. The leaders of the Ketabe local group then hatched a plan that they would start a new war against the Wanitabe clan under a pretext, so that they could steal the taro from the Wanitabe gardens and thus actively deny them the fruits of their labour while starting a long-simmering conflict again.

The foregoing cases tie in convincingly with the theory of warfare in tribal societies elaborated by Helbling (2006a, 2006b), wherein political autonomy and territorial immobility of local groups are the two central preconditions for the emergence of a warlike form of strategic interaction between local groups. Without the existence of a superordinate authority that could sanction and enforce bilateral agreements between such groups, with the aim of peacefully settling emerging conflicts, the involved groups can never be sure that the other group is indeed honouring such an agreement. Using concepts from game theory, this situation can be described as a prisoners' dilemma, in which a peaceful strategy (cooperation) cannot assert itself because it is too risky. A unilateral strategy of peace can be interpreted by other groups as a sign of weakness and encourage them to attack. The groups are caught in a perpetual security dilemma: unable to trust each other and fearing the other side's aggressive potential, they had to immediately address by forceful means each perceived slight to uphold a reputation of strength and retaliation for the sake of deterrence. At the same time, groups cannot move away from conflicts because they are tied to locally concentrated resources. Moving away from conflicts would mean that they would lose their land and their harvest, in effect risking starvation.

These structural preconditions—namely, the lack of a superordinate authority and high opportunity costs in case of movement—explain why wars may break out at any time. They do not explain, however, why some conflicts lead to war and some do not. It can be argued that

a local group will hardly start a war if it cannot expect to improve its own situation or at least avoid a deterioration of its current position. As has been shown in the case of the local groups of Mugayamuti and Ketabe, a stronger group will try (as long as they are still stronger) to attack a (still) weaker local group before it is too late. However, the relations of force between local groups can quickly change: through a change of group size (by group splitting or by immigration) or through a shift in alliance relations (i.e., loss of allies or recruitment of new ones). Therefore, according to Helbling (2006a, 2006b:126–127), when success is foreseeable or when worse outcomes have to be averted, local groups will attack other groups in opportune moments to decimate or rout the enemy groups or at least to weaken them and thus lessen the risk of being attacked themselves in inopportune moments.

While I have been describing local groups as collective actors, it has to be emphasized that, ultimately, Fore wars are the result of decisions taken by men as members of a local group. The decision to start a war or not is reached through a delicate process of negotiation among all male members of the local group. As in all decision-making, the men's house was the focal point of deliberations and discussions. Since local groups were composed of members of different lineages and clans, different age levels and differing political influence, their interests did not always overlap, and there could be "hawks" clamouring for retaliation and "doves" trying to avert open hostilities (Helbling 2006a:532–537). As success and prowess in warfare were among the main qualifications for political status (Glasse and Lindenbaum 1971:372), there were ample incentives to start wars for reasons of political gain, especially for young men aspiring to become leaders (see Wiessner 2010 for a similar case among the Enga), but also for established leaders trying to defend or bolster their status.

On the other hand, war was associated with high costs. War mortality among the Fore was typical for New Guinea highlands societies (for an overview, see Hanser 1985:186). I have collected the names of 115 people who died in warfare over a 25-year period until the last war ended in 1952. With a population size of 750–800 people for the whole Purosa area (six local groups), this results in a yearly war mortality of 5.75–6.13 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants. In addition, hamlets and local groups were often chased away or had to flee during wars. With the men fighting for weeks or months on end and the women unable to tend to their gardens for fear of ambush, hunger was a constant threat.

Peacemaking

In this cycle of recurring events of warfare brought on by strategic deliberations, institutions of peacemaking also existed. South Fore informants said they always saw peace as a desirable state but a state that had to be established and reinforced constantly and thus was more akin to a process than a lasting state. Groups on friendly terms would regularly invite each other to feasts, and the hosts would prepare special food items (pork, but also taro, yams or winged beans) for their guests to consume on the spot or to take home with them (Sorenson 1972:360–361; 1976:63–68). Through this system of intergroup exchange, village leaders strategically funneled agricultural surplus into alliance relations with friendly groups and thus increased their own political clout.

When a war broke out, both sides agreed from its onset on a few men on both sides to serve as institutionalized go-betweens, called *pako*. These were usually older men who had relatives on both sides and were relatively safe to carry messages back and forth. They were not to be killed and this was widely observed. Older women with kin connections with the enemy were also quite free to visit, and they and the *pako* informed the other side on deaths caused by the fighting, to keep a record of the tally. If the leaders on one or both sides planned peace overtures, usually when both sides had a similar number of casualties or when both sides were exhausted, these messengers would be sent to bring a *daka* (betel pepper) leaf to the leaders of the enemy side.

If both sides agreed that the fighting should cease, they would plan to hold a ceremony a few days later. On the morning of that day, the go-betweens would plant *daka* on the main field on which the fighting took place and then both sides would assemble in lines. Warriors on both sides carried their decorated fighting shields and weapons and gathered on both sides of the battlefield. Then the older, influential women would go first toward the middle, carrying sugar cane and *daka* leaves. They would stop a short distance from each other and deposit the sugar cane. The influential war leaders then followed and met in the middle, holding a length of sugar cane, cutting it in half with a stone axe and commensally chewing it (for a similar ceremony among the North Fore, see Berndt 1962:235–236). The sugar cane was deemed to hold cooling qualities, and thus the war was "cooled down." Afterwards, the sugar cane skin was all heaped upon one mound—to signify that both groups were at peace—and leaders of both sides held speeches, agreeing that the fighting was over and that both sides

would no longer escalate conflicts but concentrate their efforts on raising pigs to compensate their allies.

Two to three years after this ceremony, when sufficient pigs were raised for slaughter, both sides would meet again at a prearranged time on the former battlefield. On both sides, the men of the main local groups involved in the fight would contribute one or two pigs each, the leaders sometimes up to ten pigs. According to Sorenson (1976:68), up to 100 pigs could be slaughtered during these peace rituals. The pork was cooked in earth ovens and distributed mainly to those allies who assisted the main protagonists in the war, with especially generous portions going to the relatives of men from allied groups killed in the fighting and to men who excelled in fighting and were responsible for killing an enemy. A smaller portion of pork was also exchanged with the enemy, thus cementing the peace.

In late 1953 or 1954, such a pig feast was underway. It was to bolster the peace after a fight between two large alliances of Purosa and Ivaki local groups that lasted for several months and involved a network of alliances encompassing a significant portion of the South Fore. Hostilities ceased in 1952, and it eventually turned out to be the last war in the greater Purosa area. During this feast, one young, reputed leader from the Purosa side unstrung his bow and fastened a red piece of cloth on its tip, held it aloft and told everyone present that the time of fighting had ceased once and for all. Together with other village leaders he announced that people from this time onward had to look up to this piece of red cloth and no longer fight in wars and that soon good things would come their way, novel and valuable things—*mono'ana*. This event was claimed by several informants to have effectively stopped warfare from ever recurring because everybody was keen to receive *mono'ana*. But what induced this man to act this way? And what is understood by this concept of *mono'ana*?

A History of Change

This momentous turn in peacemaking was ushered in by almost 20 years of constant changes, rumours and novel events affecting the villages of the Purosa area. The first portents of things to come were artifacts, such as steel axes, pieces of cloth, ceramics or mirror shards that reached the villages of the Purosa area from the south through long-distance trade networks from the Purari river area and the Gulf coast. Through these networks, the Fore traditionally acquired shells that were the main indigenous valuables in exchange for tobacco. Knives and axes were especially coveted goods, since their superiority over traditional stone and bamboo tools was soon discovered. All these goods were associated with the

spirit realm and deemed to hold supernatural powers. The influx of such goods dramatically increased from the 1930s onward, when the first missionaries, gold prospectors and government patrols reached Kainantu, north of the Fore area. This caused a reversion of traditional trade flows. Groups in fringe areas, like the South Fore, who were traditionally in a favourable middleman position between the coast and the highlands, suddenly found themselves at the periphery of a trade network radiating out from the government and missionary posts in the highlands (Boyd 1975:42; Lindenbaum 1979:76–79).

In the mid- to late 1930s, the first airplane was sighted. People were horrified and scared by the noise and went into hiding. The plane was believed to be a huge bird and the name Kukube was attached to this plane, which in variations (Kukumbe, Kubukabana, Pupumbayo) was also given to this plane by the neighbouring Awa and Auyana language groups, indicating that there was a path of communication probably extending all the way to Kainantu, where planes landed on an airstrip for the first time in 1932. Together with those trade goods, artifacts and airplane sightings, rumours reached the villagers in the Purosa area that men with red skin were sighted in the North around Kainantu. The purpose of their appearance was unknown, but they were variably believed to be spirits from the land of the dead or even returning ancestors. Among the North Fore, some rumours predicted the death of all pregnant women or of all black-coloured pigs (Berndt 1952–53:50–56), while others had it that the returned ancestors were handing out large quantities of shells and iron tools. As a matter of fact, shells and western goods did arrive in larger quantities at around the same time and so indirectly confirmed these rumours.

The first white man who crossed through the Purosa area from Kainantu en route to the Gulf coast probably did so just at the onset of World War II. People of Purosa told me that they experienced this visit as a surreal event and people from everywhere came to look at this strange red-skinned being. The white man and his company of Papua New Guinean cargo carriers pitched their camp for a night, distributed some salt and then moved on, leaving everybody to wonder what kind of being just visited them. Some precautions were taken to ward off evil; a special leaf was put on the path on which the white man walked and then cooked with vegetables and eaten. It is believed that some of those who did not eat from this dish later died of a dysentery epidemic. A while later, two other white men with a sizeable escort came through the Purosa area, who, based on the informants' account, forced the people to construct a

shelter by whipping them with canes, shooting off guns and intimidating them but, again, also distributed salt. It is not possible to pinpoint with certainty who led these two patrols, although it is known that two gold prospectors, Tom Fox and Ted Ubank, each on his own, evacuated toward the Gulf coast taking this general route at the onset of World War II, and Patrol Officer G. F. Neilsen led an army patrol through the area in 1943. The first government patrol after the war reached Purosa only in August 1949.

With the advent of World War II, the speed of exogenous events increased. Suddenly whole squadrons of airplanes were flying over the area, and again they were believed to be birds and given names. Some people reported seeing men in these flying contraptions, and there were rumours coming down from the North that there was a big war going on. That men were indeed flying these planes was confirmed when a plane crashed at Awande in the North Fore and a few people from Purosa went there to examine the bodies of the crew. A little bit later, a Japanese bomber crash-landed near Awarosa, just on the other side of the mountain to the east of the Purosa villages. In an attempt to break apart the wreck for metal that could be shaped into knives and axes, some villagers from Awarosa unknowingly triggered one of the bombs, and it is estimated that more than two dozen people died, most of them from the closer villages of Awarosa, Mobutasa and Ilakiah, but also at least two men from Purosa. Two of the four Japanese crewmen survived the crash and tried to warn people not to get close to the wreck, but they could not make themselves understood. These two Japanese were nursed back to health for a few weeks, and afterwards they hiked out toward the North through the territory of the Awa and Auyana toward the Ramu valley, leaving behind a population that had experienced first-hand the terrible forces these strange beings could unleash.

An even more deadly, if invisible, force soon made itself felt. A dysentery epidemic swept through the area in 1943–44 and a whooping cough epidemic in 1949 (Lindenbaum 1979:84–85). Dysentery killed a large number of people, especially young children, and agricultural activities ceased for a while because too many people were too sick to tend to their gardens (Lindenbaum 1979:31). Bennett (1962:36) realized in his demographic report on the Fore area in the 1960s that there was a clear gap in the age group of 15- to 29-year-olds, caused by the dysentery epidemic. Hayano (1972:93) in his genealogical census of the Awa village of Tauna counted 25 people killed by epidemics, about 20–25 per cent of the village population at the time. Dysentery and whooping cough, however, did not directly lead to warfare since

both diseases were categorized as not inflicted by other humans but "carried by the wind." A different case was Kuru—a deadly spongiform encephalopathy transmitted by the cannibalistic mourning rites of the Fore—which only arrived in the Purosa area within living memory, around 1933 (Lindenbaum 1979:17–22). The Fore attributed the symptoms of this degenerative disease to a type of sorcery called Kuru (from which the disease got its name). Since the first case in 1933, at least three wars in the Purosa area were started because of this previously unknown disorder. Because this disease afflicted more women than men, there already was a significant demographic gender imbalance by the time of the first government patrols through the area, which increased even more in the 1950s and 1960s.

With World War II the influx of goods from the North abruptly stopped. Colonial officers and missionaries were evacuated out of the Kainantu area because of the Japanese threat. According to Berndt (1952–53:56–57), the Fore considered themselves betrayed by the spirits and new rituals were invented to appease the spirits and to re-attract the goods. The Purosa people also participated in such rituals. In one of the first acts, people built special houses for these spirits, collected stones from the river, bundled these up and hung the bundles in the rafters of these new houses. It was believed that if the stones were to break when heated on a fire, they would reveal large kumu-kumu and smaller giri-giri shells (see Berndt 1953–54:214 for a similar ritual).

It was at this time that the word mono'ana reached the Purosa area for the first time. Mono'ana was a term coined to signify all the goods associated with the red-skinned people, from shells to axes and knives to pieces of cloth or even salt (the term might in fact be derived from the English money). Some Purosa men tried, time and again, to find ways to produce this mono'ana for themselves. One of my main informants, Tambendo Te'u, heard a rumour from up North that the dead were able to produce mono'ana, so he went to the burial places of his ancestors, lit a fire there, smoked tobacco the whole night and asked for mono'ana. After this did not work, together with others, he built a house with big wing-like protrusions, to catch the wind that was supposed to blow mono'ana in their direction, and ordered that only women congregate in this house to "catch the wind." After this failed, he carved wooden guns and put them in a house, and he and some followers entered the house, took out these wooden guns and marched around.

All these rituals are variations on a common theme also reported on by Berndt (1952–53, 1953–54) from the North Fore, Usurufa, Kamano and Jate areas. There was

indeed a direct link between Purosa and Kagu in the North Fore. Part of a lineage from Ai clan of the Ai local group had split and fled from the constant fighting in the Purosa area and found a new home in Kagu. Once Kagu was affected by the rumours and the ritual activities, one of these refugees travelled back to Purosa to inform them about what was happening. He brought news of *mono'ana* to the Purosa area. He instigated rituals and told the Purosa people that they would have to stop wars and no longer marry prepubescent girls, so that the red-skinned people would arrive with their *mono'ana*. Some Australian patrol officers were later quite surprised when people enthusiastically welcomed them with gifts of pigs and food, lined up as if they were ready for a head count or saluted them—all behaviours they had either heard about or witnessed firsthand in already-contacted and pacified areas (Lindenbaum 1979:80).

In the Purosa area, such rumours and cargo cults created a climate conducive to rapid pacification. They bred an interest in new and non-traditional activities. Traditional standards of knowledge were weighed up against these novel events. Thus, the collapse of traditional activities was not only accepted but also actively supported. According to Berndt (1952–53:149–150), the decline of cargo cults among the southern Kamano, the Usurufa and northern Fore coincided with the spread of colonial power and the fervent desire shown by the local population to radically alter their life bore certain traits of a cargo cult in itself.

Among the South Fore, cargo cults did not instantly disappear with the advent of the colonial administration, and there were several recurrences in a different form in the 1950s and 1960s. The quest to gain *mono'ana* remained a preoccupation with the Purosa people throughout the colonial period. When the first Australian patrol officers contacted the Purosa villages, their North Fore translators also constantly used this concept of *mono'ana* and connected it with the end of warfare. Several people told me that they were also more than willing to help in the construction of a car road from Okapa to Purosa in the years 1956–58 because they expected *mono'ana* to arrive with the road. They then went on to say that this was in a sense the truth since, soon after the construction of the road, they were shown how to plant coffee and create an income that for the first time allowed them to purchase novel goods, true *mono'ana*, on a large scale.

In front of this history of new ideas spreading throughout the area, it becomes understandable why a lot of Purosa elders see the event of the raising of the red piece of cloth (associated with the red-skinned people) as the decisive end point in their long history of warfare. It was the common desire among all groups to receive *mono'ana* and to partake in this new world, which made it possible for all sides to stop warfare at the same time, once and for all. That such peace movements can have an overwhelming force is also shown by a case among the Kamano in the late 1930s (Radford 1977), where a charismatic movement to give up war and burn weapons spread to encompass large parts of the Kamano, Agarabi and Gadsup.

The Colonial Pacification Project

The Purosa people came into contact with the "pacification project" of the Australian Colonial Administration when the first exploratory patrol reached their hamlets in 1949. This patrol was part of an ambitious project to establish government control over all the remaining uncontacted areas of the Territory of New Guinea after World War II until 1955 (Downs 1980:98). The extension of control was thereby seen as a necessary prerequisite to the social, economic and political development of the Territory of New Guinea that the Australian government was committed to under the trusteeship agreement with the United Nations (Griffin et al. 1979:103–105).

Australian patrol officers, the so-called kiaps, were charged with implementing the extension of control by conducting patrols accompanied by a detachment of the New Guinean constabulary and cargo carriers who went from village to village to establish contact with the people. In subsequent visits, these patrols then explained and later also enforced government rules regarding the ban on warfare and violence. Kiaps on their patrols conducted a yearly census, appointed village officials, settled disputes and complaints and encouraged people to build bridle paths and roads and, later, to plant cash crops (Griffin et al. 1979:118). Communication of these aims during the first one or two patrols was difficult because of lack of translators. Subsequent patrols then used men from the North Fore who had already picked up a bit of the colonial language of communication, Tok Pisin, and could make themselves understood in the South Fore dialects. It was through these interpreters that the connection between the end of warfare (which had already occurred in the North Fore) and the spread of *mono'ana* was insinuated and strengthened.

The first patrol reached the Purosa hamlets in August 1949 and stayed one night before continuing onward to the Lamari River valley. Until 1952, there was about one patrol per year, usually staying only a night in the Purosa area before moving on. All these patrols until

1952 reported continuous fighting in the South Fore area, which usually ceased for the duration of the patrol, only to break out again afterwards, but the kiaps did little to stop it.

A police post staffed by three New Guinean policemen was set up in Moke among the North Fore in 1950. It was about half a day's walk away from Purosa. These policemen were in charge of bringing the situation in the North Fore under control and overseeing the construction of a road connecting the area to Kainantu. They also did some patrolling on their own in the South Fore area and were well received by the Purosa villagers, even though they could hardly communicate and could do nothing to stop the fighting. One of these policemen, Corporal Nalakor, was on a patrol staying in Waisa Village in early May 1951, when the Purosa local group of Ketabe and their allies attacked the village. Cpl. Nalakor gave two warning shots but, since the effect of a gun at that time had not yet been demonstrated, the Ketabe pressed on. Nalakor then shot Umabea of Takai-Purosa through the knee, whereupon the Ketabe promptly retreated, leaving behind Umabea, who was then killed by the advancing Waisa warriors. It was the first and only time that a government agent used its deadly police force and got embroiled in violence in the South Fore area. While it prevented the village of Waisa from being overrun by the Ketabe at that moment, fighting in the area continued unabated.

It was only the patrol of Assistant District Officer West in 1953 that reported fighting had effectively ceased and that stockades were falling into disrepair:

> The people of South Fore live in small scattered hamlets on the forest line or well concealed in bamboo and pit pit thickets astride steep ridges. All are palisaded, but many of the palisades have been allowed to fall into disrepair, indicating that peaceful conditions had prevailed for some time before the patrol's visit. Everywhere there were indications that steady progress towards a settled way of life has been made since the people were initially contacted and that there has been a considerable amount of free and unmolested movement—an essential prerequisite to any development. [West 1953:4]

In the same year, the administration opened a new patrol post staffed by a patrol officer and a detachment of police in Okapa, 24 kilometres (15 miles) or about half a day's walk north of the Purosa villages. From then on, patrols were regularly visiting Purosa villages at least once yearly, and the next patrol in 1954 reported that the situation in the South Fore had changed considerably:

> Although the area has had several patrols, systematic organised patrolling could be said to have commenced only as far back as October, 1953, with the initial census. Much of what the earliest patrols had accomplished would have been annulled by their infrequency and irregularity. As the situation is today, we have gained a lot. There have been no tribal fights for over a year at least. The confidence of many important men has been gained, and, to a lesser extent, the people considered as a mass. [MacArthur 1954:11]

On their patrols, kiaps offered themselves as neutral and impartial mediators and exhorted villagers to bring grievances and conflicts to the government officers for adjudication, rather than resort to violent retaliation. Former kiaps who I interviewed reported that their presence alone was usually sufficient to bring the aggrieved parties together to discuss the issue and, by themselves, decide upon a mutually satisfactory solution, usually involving compensation of one sort or another.

Where mediation was not successful, kiaps were invested by the colonial administration with their own judicial powers. They could establish a "court of native affairs" by proclamation at any time, acting as prosecutor and judge, giving a verdict and meting out the punishment at the same time. Through this union of judicial and executive powers, kiaps could regulate conflicts very efficiently, either on the spot during patrols or at the patrol posts (Downs 1980:148; Gordon 1983:220–221). The kiaps had the duty to enforce the Native Affairs Regulation, which concerned practically every sector of traditional life. The regulation provided sanctions for varying infractions, from theft, assault or "riotous behaviour" (a euphemism for armed warfare) to the lack of maintenance of roads and houses or the burning of grassland without permit—a traditional form of hunting or clearing land for gardens (Sinclair 1981:46–47, 170).

Those arrested because of riotous behaviour were usually sentenced to two or up to six months in prison at the patrol post in Kainantu or Okapa. Those few people actually charged with murder received sentences of several years' duration. The convicts had to perform hard labour while imprisoned and were employed in road construction, logging or general improvement work around the patrol station. Apart from being a disciplinary measure, the prison was also a focal point of pacification. It was in prison that, for the first time, Highlanders came into intense contact with the "civilizing" project (Görlich 1999:158). They got acquainted with the extent and aims of the colonial presence, befriended policemen and learned a smattering of Tok Pisin, which often rendered them valuable contact persons for kiaps upon their return to the village.

Local Leaders and Conflict Settlement

Since the number of colonial officers and native policemen was hardly sufficient to effectively patrol or efficiently control the whole area, indigenous contact persons and representatives of the government were needed. In each village (or more precisely, in what kiaps considered to be each village), a village head (known in Tok Pisin as *luluai*) was appointed, as well as a deputy-cum-interpreter (*tultul*). The luluai, acting as the local representative of the government, was responsible for maintaining law and order and was charged with the duty of reporting promptly to the administration any breach of the peace or other irregularity (Gordon and Meggitt 1985:37). When kiaps first contacted a village, they usually lined up all the inhabitants and tried to identify the most influential man in the village to appoint him as luluai.

The people chosen as luluais in the Purosa villages were all respected leaders of their local groups. Tultuls were younger men who had already made names for themselves as warriors, but who also had already come into contact with the administration. The positions of luluai and tultul were apparently highly coveted because of the prestige afforded these official representatives. Many ambitious men saw in this position an excellent way to strengthen their own standing in society with the assistance of the powerful kiaps. All tultuls and luluais in the Purosa area were keen to support the administration, and thus were quick to stop quarrels and bring troublemakers to Okapa patrol post for sentencing. Most people readily accepted the legitimacy of courts held by police and the kiap at the patrol post, and many voluntarily went to Okapa with their disputes or waited until the kiap came by on his yearly patrol.

The luluai and tultul also held rudimentary courts, whereby minor cases—mainly concerning adultery—were debated in front of an audience and finally settled through the administering of a compensation payment or corporal punishment. The acceptance of such informal courts was widespread, and rested on a scant understanding of the duty of a village official in combination with a consensus among the majority of the population that conflicts needed to be settled. These courts were efficient, not only because they upheld traditional values, looked at root causes of each case and passed more locally acceptable sentences, but also because the luluai and tultul could always send recalcitrant villagers not wanting to obey these sentences to the patrol post for imprisonment (Berndt 1962:314–327). Such unofficial courts are also known from other parts of the Highlands (Gordon 1983:211; Meggitt 1977:150; Pflanz-Cook and Cook 1983; Westermark 1996:307) and seemed to be crucial for the keeping of the peace, since they handled most low-level conflicts in easily understandable and culturally appropriate terms.

The cooperation between the luluai and the tultul on one side and the police and kiaps on the other was apparently functioning very well, and the two former tultuls still alive told me that whatever the dispute or infraction was, they would accompany or send the guilty party on their own to Okapa to serve some time in jail. Most people interviewed thus spent some time in prison, usually for a few weeks at a time. One self-avowed troublemaker achieved a total of 12 different prison sentences within about a dozen years, for infractions such as hitting his wife and not showing up for compulsory roadwork, but also for participating in brawls and stick fights between hamlets or even local groups over disagreements regarding the distribution of mortuary payments or marriage arrangements. At least in this case, the threat of a prison sentence did not seem to have a deterrent effect, even if the person in question stressed that prison labour was hard work, and the sleeping arrangements there were less than satisfactory. But what the institution of the prison achieved was that troublemakers could be taken out of the village for some weeks or months at a time, allowing emotions to cool down and thus effectively preventing the resurgence of serious violence.

Considering that sorcery was indeed the most frequent trigger for warfare, it is worth noting that, with the increased number of kuru cases in the 1950s and 1960s, there was no return to armed conflict. That such a danger was indeed present can be shown by an incident in 1955, when four men from Ketabe and Mugaya-muti ambushed and killed two men from Ainai whom they held responsible for the death of the wife of one of the attackers by kuru sorcery. The Ainai did not retaliate, but instead alerted the tultul of the Ai local group (who was related to them) and informed him about the identity of the four killers. The tultul then went to these four men and instructed them to kill all their pigs and eat them, since they would have to go to prison for a long time. The attackers did not resist and followed the luluai and tultul up to Okapa patrol post, where they were first imprisoned and later charged and sentenced by a Supreme Court judge to six years of hard labour. They were taken to Lae and Port Moresby to serve their jail sentences. As they were absent for such a long time, a lot of people in Purosa actually assumed that they were killed by the administration, and this seemed to have quite a deterring effect.

As these examples show, considerable segments of the South Fore population (especially the luluai and tultul, but also the general population that heeded their

instructions and refrained from instigating violence) were instrumental in ensuring that war would no longer break out. Without the collaboration between village leaders and colonial authorities, pacification would not have taken place so quickly, and wars might have broken out again for quite some time, as can be cogently demonstrated by the example of the nearby Southern Tairora, situated in the Lamari valley 30–40 kilometres to the east, where pacification took much longer, mainly because no such collaboration existed. On several occasions the Tairora leaders, luluai and tultul among them, were behind renewed retaliatory attacks. Although the Southern Tairora area was first contacted in the same year (1949) as the South Fore area, wars ceased only in the mid-1960s.

This raises the question of why village leaders in the Purosa area so willingly cooperated with the colonial government. Rumours about *mono'ana* and a new way of life certainly played their part, combined with the realization that leaders could strengthen their power position with the help of government backing, thus paralleling similar developments in the Western Highlands, where big men quickly realized the value of cooperation with colonial authorities in order to access shell valuables that could be used to increase their political status in feast giving (Strathern 1984:22–23). What seems crucial to me is the fact that leadership among the Fore did not depend on prowess in warfare to the extent shown among the Tairora. Fore leaders were also skilled orchestrators of alliances and exchange relations, sponsors of feasts (although not to the same extent as in the Western Highlands) and makers of peace. Glasse and Lindenbaum (1971:376) called them "Little Big Men," and informants from Purosa mentioned their role in feast giving side by side with their role in warfare. The emphasis of their leadership was thus slightly if perceptibly different from the Tairora "Strong Man," who also arranged alliances (although among the Southern Tairora they never encompassed more than two or three local groups), but whose reputation and fame rested much more on his skill in warfare and aggressive personality (Watson 1971; 1983:234–238). With quite elaborate and costly peace ceremonies (again in contrast to the Tairora), it was the Fore leaders' skill in arranging and also contributing to these ceremonies that guaranteed lasting peace between local groups. It was this legacy as peace brokers that facilitated their transformation into mediators and adjudicators, and they no longer felt the need to underline their leadership with recourse to warfare.

Conclusion

Helbling (2006a:72; 2006b:128–129) has advanced three decisive conditions for pacification based on his theory of warfare in tribal societies: first, a strategy of repression by the state (or any other superordinate authority) that will force local groups, under threat of violence, to no longer wage war and will protect groups who renounce war; second, a strategy of incentives that will reward groups willing to cease war with prestige goods and co-opt their leaders; finally, the establishment of judicial institutions that enable the peaceful settlement of conflicts between the pacified local groups. As has been shown in this article, these conditions cannot solely be construed from the perspective of the state but have to be interpreted and looked at from the point of view of the local population.

When people were asked to account for the end of warfare in the Purosa area, they laid stress on their own agency, mentioning most of all the promise of *mono'ana* and new things to come as a decisive factor in why people no longer took recourse to warfare. There certainly was a threat of force by the state, as the shooting of one Purosa man by a police corporal attests, but this was not seen as a determining event in the ending of warfare. As has been shown in other studies of the process of pacification in Melanesia (Gordon and Meggitt 1985; Rodman and Cooper 1983; Strathern 1984), colonial force was certainly present, at least as a threat, but it acquired social significance only through the cognitive context in which it was set: how it was interpreted and acted upon by the local population. Positive incentives to give up warfare were far more crucial and in the end it was the promise of rewards spread by rumours and North Fore translators in a psychological climate of uncertainty, rapid change and new possibilities that made it possible for all groups to end war at the same time, within a few years after first contact. All groups felt that they could trust each other to no longer escalate conflicts in the knowledge that each one of them desired the goods that were supposed to arrive with the coming of the red-skinned people. This movement of peace thus acquired a dynamic of its own, and the end of war became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Once peace was established, it was the active support from significant parts of the population, especially the role of the luluai and tultul in setting up their own courts and sending troublemakers to jail, that sustained this rapid pacification. Here, too, it is important to realize that judicial institutions to settle conflicts peacefully can

be imposed by a state, but that the success of these institutions hinges on the willingness of a local population and local leaders to use them and make them their own, transforming them in the process. Without this active participation in conflict management, according to Koch (1983:206), peace might be nothing more than "the people's acquiescence to foreign domination and their fear of violent reprisals for which they have no real chance of redress." That South Fore leaders cooperated with the colonial administration to such an extent can be explained by the fact that traditional leadership did not solely rest on prowess in warfare. These leaders were also coordinators and contributors to traditional peace ceremonies, which facilitated their transformation into mediators and adjudicators; thus, they no longer felt the need to underline their leadership with recourse to warfare.

What can the example of this historic end of warfare among the South Fore contribute to the quest to replace armed conflict by non-violent means of conflict settlement? First of all, it shows that the process of ending warfare can develop a positive, self-propelling dynamic. It shows that local leaders can be enabled to keep conflicts under control and settle them peacefully, if given positive incentives and support. And it shows that local cultural understandings and epistemologies have to be taken into account when determining reasons why people give up warfare. After all, the flag of peace among the Fore was red not because of the blood that was shed but for the wealth and prosperity that it promised.

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Merdeka in West Papua: Peace, Justice and Political Independence

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Abstract: The vision for "Papua *merdeka,*" or a "peaceful, just and necessarily politically independent Papua" is perhaps the most powerful force of unity among West Papua's indigenous peoples. This article explores the origins of this supra-uniting vision and provides examples of how merdeka is envisaged by West Papuans as the best outcome of their struggle for peace with justice. It critiques the contested meanings of the term but demonstrates that there is considerable unity among West Papuan leaders regarding its components, and in the belief that merdeka cannot prevail in Papua without political independence from Indonesia.

Keywords: West Papua, peace, justice, independence, *merdeka,* unity

Résumé : La vision de la « merdeka papoue », ou d'une « Papouasie pacifique, juste et nécessairement politiquement indépendante » est peut-être la force unificatrice la plus puissante parmi les peuples indigènes de la Papouasie occidentale. Cet article explore les origines de cette vision super-unificatrice et montre comment la merdeka est envisagée par les Papous occidentaux comme le meilleur résultat de leur lutte pour la paix dans la justice. Il critique les significations contestées du terme mais démontre qu'il existe un sentiment d'unité remarquable parmi les chefs papous à l'égard de ses composantes et de la croyance que la merdeka ne peut s'imposer en Papouasie sans l'indépendance politique de l'Indonésie.

Mots-clés : Papouasie occidentale, paix, justice, indépendance, merdeka, unité

Introduction

"Papua!" calls a man dressed in *koteka* (traditional penis gourd), standing on a misty mountaintop in West Papua's highlands. "*Merdeka!*" is the enthusiastic unison shout of the group of variously aged Papuan freedom fighters standing around him. The repeated call and response of "Papua ... *merdeka*" builds in a rousing rhythmic chant. This powerful scene of West Papuan solidarity and determination of spirit concludes UK filmmaker Dominic Brown's *Forgotten Bird of Paradise*, a documentary on the independence movement in West Papua,[1] filmed undercover in 2009. The Papuan resistance group he had been brought on a dangerous trek to meet, resplendent in outfits of traditional body paint and decoration, army camouflage and accessories such as mirrored sunglasses, had been forced to flee their villages by Indonesian armed forces. In hiding, they worked on strategies for achieving independence, practised combat drills and recited with passion their allegiance to a hoped-for independent West Papuan state (Brown 2009).

Several hundred kilometres from this scene, in June the following year in Jayapura, West Papua's largest city, footage bearing witness to thousands of urban West Papuans taking to the streets was anonymously recorded and later uploaded to YouTube (Westpapuambaham 2011). The leader of the protest continuously booms, "Papua!" through a distorting megaphone; the charging crowds—painted in the red, white and blue of the nationalist West Papuan Morning Star flag, dressed in feathers and traditional jewellery or in West Papuan design-inspired batik—yell back, "Merdeka!" (Westpapuambaham 2011). This demonstration marked the lead-up to the biggest popular protests in West Papua's history, calling for West Papua's provincial governments to "return" to Jakarta its much resented and unsuccessful 2001 Special Autonomy Law and for a referendum on West Papua's political status. Since the 1962–63 Indonesian takeover of their land, West Papuans have been

campaigning for independence through diplomatic, civil resistance and military means. The 2001 Special Autonomy Law was the Indonesian government's post-Suharto attempt to appease the international community and West Papuans by responding to West Papuans' calls for independence with a compromise promising greater autonomy for the province. On paper, it included significant concessions to the Papuans, such as committing more profits to flow back into West Papua from its lucrative U.S.-owned Freeport McMoRan gold and copper mines, permitting freedom of cultural expression, including the right to fly their Morning Star national flag, "straightening" the different Papuan and Indonesian understandings of West Papuan history and promising improvement of education and health facilities (Widjojo et al. 2008). In practice, however, few of these promises came to fruition and, in less than a decade, most Papuans already considered the implementation of the law a failure.

"Papua merdeka"—that is, an independent, peaceful and justly governed Papua—is a vision West Papuans share, whether they live in cities, remote rural locations or the diaspora. It is a vision that unites by way of an "imagined community" (Anderson 2006). "Papua merdeka" is also the catch-cry of the independence movement in West Papua and its diaspora. This article sets out an overview of the various meanings of the term that have been advanced by various scholars as they have attempted to define its significance and application. Some of the critics whose arguments I critique here deny that merdeka must include political independence. However, in so doing, I contend,[2] they also deny the integrity of the movement. In contrast, I use conflict transformation theory to further explore the meanings of merdeka from the perspectives of West Papuan leaders I interviewed in West Papua, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.[3] I demonstrate that, in fact, there is considerable unity among West Papuan leaders about what merdeka entails and in the belief that merdeka cannot be achieved in West Papua until its baseline—political independence—has been attained. To more clearly understand West Papuans' insistence that independence must accompany their ultimate goal of peace with justice (merdeka) in West Papua, a brief overview of the West Papua's colonial history is useful.

The Dutch had proclaimed sovereignty over the western half of the island of New Guinea, from the 141st meridian east of Greenwich, since 1848, having previously asserted control over portions of western New Guinea based on an agreement signed with the Sultan of Tidore in 1660 (Elmslie 2002). When the Dutch were ousted from what was then the Dutch East Indies, in anticipation of Indonesian independence, they determined to prepare West Papuans for self-determination in the form of an independent state. This was negotiated under the 1962 New York Agreement with the United States, and it was decided that a referendum in 1969, supervised by the United Nations, would be held to allow West Papuans to choose whether they wanted their own independent state or to be formally integrated with Indonesia. However, from 1962 until 1969, not only the Indonesian government but also, in the context of Cold War geopolitics, the American, Dutch and Australian governments, which were ultimately concerned with curtailing Indonesia's communist leanings, worked against the actualization of self-determination in West Papua. The result was that, in the 1969 Act of Free Choice referendum in which Papuans were to freely choose their political fate, only 1,025 people—less than 1 per cent of the Papuan population—were handpicked and coerced with threats of violence to vote in favour of integration with Indonesia. The process and outcome of this plebiscite, now widely acknowledged as a sham by U.S., Papuan, Australian, Dutch and United Nations sources (Fernandes 2006; Osborne 1985; Saltford 2003), violated the West Papuan people's right to self-determination enshrined in international treaty and customary law.[4]

The Indonesian state has also deprived Papuans of all manner of civil, political, economic, cultural and social rights in the 50 years of its administration of the West Papuan territory. In short, these include: "the expropriation of land and resources, forced relocation of indigenous communities, racial and ethnic discrimination ... physical assault and torture, sexual violence and extrajudicial killings" (Kirsch 2002:53). This weighty list of abuses has led to calls to end the violence and to sustained concern on the part of many Papuans.[5] Wing and King (2005) and Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (2013) of the University of Sydney and Brundige et al. (2004) of Yale Law School argue that the Indonesian government is responsible for genocide against the Papuan population. This fear is further fuelled by decades of transmigration, both spontaneous and as part of Indonesian state policy, of people from other Indonesian islands to West Papua so that, in 2010, West Papuans ultimately became a minority in their homeland (i.e., numbering just under half of the approximate population of three million) (Elmslie 2010). Thus, many West Papuans believe that despite their repeated attempts at peacemaking over the past 50 years of Indonesian occupation, peace with justice or, merdeka, is unlikely to become a reality without the removal of the Indonesian state and the installation of West Papuan sovereignty within West Papuan territory.

The Malay word *merdeka*, "freedom," comes from a Dutch derivation of the Portuguese version of the Sanskrit word *maharddhika*, meaning "wealth, wisdom or competence" (Junker 1999:126). The Sanskrit term was already being used in Javanese texts from the tenth century (Reid 1998:143). Another derivative term of the Sanskrit word, *mardijker*, had acquired the meaning "freed slave." It referred to former Spanish or Portuguese slaves from India, brought by the Dutch to live in the Malay archipelago (Serving History 2010). It is from *mardijker* that the term *merdeka* acquired its association with freedom. The word *merdeka* has a considerable history of political usage in terms of being a uniting goal of nationalisms within the Malay archipelago, particularly within Singaporean, Malaysian, Indonesian and Acehnese nationalisms (Reid 1998). In pivotal moments in each of these nationalisms, *merdeka* superseded its earlier, broader brushstroke connotations of freedom and assumed the weighted and particular meaning of political independence.

Following the betrayal of the Papuans by the Dutch and the United States during the 1962 New York Agreement that effectively signed West Papua over to Indonesia (West Papuans were completely excluded from the agreement negotiations), the formation of the Free Papua Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*—OPM) in Manokwari in 1965 (Osborne 1985:35) became the first concerted attempt by West Papuan constituents to achieve political freedom from their Indonesian oppressors. Following the failure of the staged and unrepresentative 1969 Act of Free Choice to reflect West Papuans' political aspirations, the OPM grew in strength and numbers, particularly when Seth Rumkorem, formerly an officer in the Indonesian army, defected to join West Papuan law student-turned-guerrilla Jacob Prai's OPM post in the jungle and to train his troops. The highlight of the two men's collaboration was the July 1, 1971, *Proklamasi Kemerdekaan* (Independence Proclamation), issued from their headquarters at Markus Victoria (West Papua), in which they declared the land and people of West Papua "free and independent." Unfortunately for the West Papuan independence movement, the proclamation was not acknowledged by the Indonesians or by the international community at large, and the OPM splintered into factions based on ideological and personal differences between Prai and Rumkorem shortly thereafter.

That the yearning for merdeka with its inherent implications for political independence still lives within the hearts of many West Papuans was made abundantly clear to me during my time in West Papua, during November–December 2008. From the very elderly man who touched my elbow outside of the police station in

Jayapura and whispered, eyes tearing and clouded by cataracts, "Papua merdeka"; to another man, who, stopping for a conversation as he strolled past my accommodation one beautiful evening in Merauke, finished by expressing his desire for "Papua merdeka"; to a woman I worked alongside who, despite her fear, wanted to set up an appointment for her friend to meet and brief me secretly on the West Papuan desire for independence; to a Papuan resistance soldier with an imposing build, long dreadlocks and Rasta colours, who approached me at a pig-killing festival in Wamena and, looking pointedly into my eyes, whispered, "Today it rains but tomorrow the sun will shine"—throughout West Papua, the desire for merdeka was palpable.

Merdeka: Peace, Justice and Contested Meanings

Historian Richard Chauvel writes, "Some have argued that Merdeka, the slogan of the nationalist movement [in West Papua], means not just political independence but freedom, and freedom has been defined variously as freedom from poverty, ignorance, political repression and abuse of human rights" (2005:4). He questions whether "the freedoms to which Papuans aspire could perhaps be achieved within the Indonesian state ... whether these freedoms would be realized even if Papuans succeeded in establishing an independent nation state" (4). Upon reading almost any account of West Papua's treatment under Indonesian occupation, however, it is clear that the "freedom from poverty, ignorance, political repression and abuse of human rights" to which Chauvel refers has not been the common experience of West Papuans, despite attempts to work collaboratively with the Indonesian state—for example, by proposing, albeit a very different version than what it eventually became, the Special Autonomy Law of 2001—or to resist state oppression—for example, by forming the OPM. Chauvel opens up the discussion of compromise as a possible path to effective self-determination; however, in an interview, Oridek Ap, the son of assassinated West Papuan anthropologist and activist Arnold Ap, presented a response to this position when I interviewed him on September 10, 2008, in the Hague, the Netherlands. He contends that the West Papuan desire that independence be the result of an act of self-determination and that West Papuans have the freedom to make mistakes should not be underestimated.

Chauvel poses a second question in regard to merdeka—that is, whether "these freedoms would be realized" even should Papuans attain a sovereign state. I argue that such questions are beside the point in universal human rights discourse. West Papuans have

been denied their right to self-determination, a denial they have been fighting and lobbying to reverse, since 1962 (Drooglever 2009; Ondawame 2010). Hence, the first step to rectifying the abuse of West Papuans' human rights—and such rectification is one of the components of merdeka that Chauvel has outlined earlier—would be, according to the West Papuans whose views I draw on for this article, to grant them this right. Chauvel's question, which is echoed by others, implies that West Papuans may do a *worse* job of pursuing peace, human rights and justice in their homeland than the Indonesians have done over the past five decades. Regardless of the slender possibility of the fulfilment of such paternalistic musings, given the grimness of Indonesia's occupation thus far, the question skirts the issue of the human right at stake—namely, the right of West Papuans to self-determination, regardless of the outcome.

As previously stated, this right is spelled out in the United Nations General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples Resolution 1514; it is also enshrined in treaty law, through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations 1966a) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations 1966b). It seems, however, that in academic arguments, such as the example just cited, realpolitik concerns, such as amicable diplomatic, security or trade relationships with the Indonesian state (rather than with groups that currently make up Indonesia's body politic, such as West Papuans), take precedence over human rights concerns (King 2004:141). Regardless of what arguments against a merdeka inclusive of political independence that analysts of the West Papuan merdeka movement put forward, what is clearly evident from my research in West Papuan communities is that the majority of West Papuans are in favour of independence,[6] to the point that the word *independence* is often used interchangeably with *merdeka*. That political independence cannot be separated from the goal of merdeka is one of the strongest views currently uniting West Papuans.[7]

Using insights from conflict transformation theorists, I offer an alternative interpretation of merdeka (to the realpolitik one addressed earlier) based on concepts of positive peace and peace with justice that resonate with West Papuan ideations of merdeka. Such concepts of peace are similar to that referred to by Kuehling (2014) in her discussion of *siwalowa*—the Dobuan word for peace meaning "deep calm sea." The process of enabling peace with justice, known as conflict transformation, is, according to conflict transformation theorist John Paul

Lederach, committed to facilitating peace through providing advocacy for those harmed or for those with less power, adhering to justice ("making things right") and openly addressing wrongs that have been committed (1995:20), to enable people to live fully and with dignity. The founder of contemporary peace studies, Johan Galtung (1996:26), differentiates between negative peace or the absence of direct violence and positive peace, which refers not only to the absence of direct violence but also to an absence of structural and cultural violence—in other words, "peace with justice." Peace with justice does not mean that conflict does not exist in a peaceful society but, rather, that it is transformed via peaceful, just and creative processes, so that all parties to a conflict benefit from processes and outcomes (Galtung 1996:vii).

If conflict transformation were to be pursued in West Papua, for instance, through dialogue between West Papuans and the Indonesian central government, then it would be important for external observers and analysts to avoid influencing potential dialogue agendas in the direction of realpolitik interpretations of what the Indonesian central government is currently expected to tolerate. This would include, for example, avoiding the dilution of definitions of merdeka so that those deemed palatable for Indonesia have been thinned to the point of excluding national political rights, obfuscating the issues of contention. Instead, observers, scholars and policy-makers could contribute to rectifying the balance of power between the parties to any such dialogue by clarifying through careful consultation with West Papuans, as the less powerful party, the concrete goals they are pursuing. This would contribute to a dialogue agenda that reflected the goals, values and fears of each party, instead of favouring those of the most powerful party, and could create a space for *just* politics, not solely for what some prejudicially assume to be realistic politics.

Various scholars besides Chauvel have reflected on the meanings of merdeka, many drawing on its roots in West Papuan "millenarian" or "utopian" discourses, such as Koreri (a West Papuan spiritual and nationalist movement analyzed at length by Danilyn Rutherford [2003:24–30]). Anthropologist Eben Kirksey and J. A. D. Roemajauw, former member of the West Papuan performance group *Mambesak*, draw on correspondence with the late Viktor Kaisiepo, a West Papuan who lived in the Netherlands, when they define merdeka as "variously a desire for divine salvation, equitable development, environmental sustainability and political independence" (2002:191). Anthropologist Brigham Golden's definition differs slightly but critically from that of Kirksey and

Roemajauw, however, when he contends that merdeka is "supra-political in Papua ... whose meaning fundamentally *transcends* the political concept of 'independence'" and is more closely linked with "a liberation theology, an ideology of moral salvation in which a Christian desire for a world of human dignity and divine justice is finally manifest in Papua" (2000:33, emphasis added).

Anthropologist Jaap Timmer argues that merdeka is located within Papuan "ontological ideas about sovereignty and dignity (*harga diri*)" and is "a response to decades-long denial of the people's competence in learning and performing in modern colonial and postcolonial contexts" (2005:4). Yet he concludes that "the idea of having one's own state, right now and for all times, is seldom on the minds of most Papuans, as it is a construct far from the more intrusive largely individual and communal concern with sovereignty and *harga diri*" (2005:4). Timmer's data supporting this point appear, however, to be drawn largely from his research with one people in West Papua—the Imyan (Timmer 2005:3–4)—although his contention does highlight that the definitional limitations of merdeka are far from clear-cut and that ideas of statehood and its importance may vary according to tribe and location. Nevertheless, political independence is still a widespread, popularly held goal across West Papua and its diaspora, as conceded by the findings of the usually conservative International Crisis Group, which, based on geographically comprehensive research, concludes that there is "widespread, straightforward and uncompromising support for independence at the village and provincial town level of Papuan society" (2001:14). Papuans in both towns and villages have experienced the brutal oppression of Indonesian security forces and policies, including the burning of houses and gardens from which they are forced to flee, and thus are able to yearn for a life not dominated by the security apparatus of the Indonesian state.

Merdeka has also been invoked by Golden as a concept that should be harnessed by the central government in Jakarta to appease Papuans, writing that "both the apparent contradictions of independence without merdeka and merdeka without independence are possible" and that "Jakarta's goal should be the latter," a possibility only if Jakarta addresses the "*moral* concerns of Papua merdeka" (2000:33, emphasis added). However, given that human rights are both acutely moral *and* political and for West Papuans include their moral human right to political self-determination, the contradiction to which Golden refers—that is, merdeka without an act of self-determination with an option of independence—remains unresolvable.

By contrast, merdeka, as alluded to within the narratives I collected through fieldwork, expresses metaphysical qualities that are inseparable from its physical, tangible and political manifestations. In other words, merdeka is a concept evoking unity, referring both to transcendental freedom and to physical and political freedom on earth, without the dualism suggested in Timmer's and Golden's analyses. Anthropologist Stuart Kirsch even argues that "the Christian association of merdeka with independence draws on the prevailing assumption that both self-determination and territorialized nations are manifestations of divine will" (2010:14). However, merdeka is not just a Christian-influenced ideal, as evidenced by the political support lent to it by Muslim Papuan leaders, including the Muslim secretary general of the pro-independence Papuan Presidium Council, Thaha Al Hamid. In a declaration, which he read aloud at the December 1, 2008, independence demonstration in Sentani, West Papua, Al Hamid called upon the international community and their governments to support merdeka in West Papua by recognizing "the existence of the West Papuan state and its sovereignty declared [by a Dutch-coached West New Guinea Council] on December 1, 1961" (Beanal and Yaboisembut 2008).

Merdeka, as the amalgamation of what has been set out here by Kirksey, Roemajauw and Kirsch, as well as Timmer, Golden and Chauvel, in its fullness, is in fact very similar to peace scholars' iterations of peace with justice—the absence of both direct and structural violence; an emphasis on justice; respect for the natural environment; pursuit of inner and spiritual peace; and respect for human rights (Jeong 1990; Nhat Hanh 2000; Reardon 1990). To reiterate, however, a fundamental human right that has not been upheld for Papuans is that of self-determination, with the option of independence. Therefore, until West Papuans' right to self-determination has been fulfilled, peace with justice, or merdeka, is emptied of meaning for West Papuans. This argument will now be explored by drawing on my field interviews and observations to analyze what it is that merdeka means to contemporary West Papuan leaders in West Papua, Papua New Guinea, Australia, Vanuatu, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Merdeka: West Papuan Aspirations

Meanings of merdeka communicated to me by West Papuans resonate with many of the human needs defined in John Burton's "human needs theory" as "obvious biological needs of food and shelter [and] ... basic human needs that relate to growth and development" (1990:36).

Burton writes that "human needs in individuals and identity groups who are engaged in ethnic and identity struggles are of this fundamental character ... and will be pursued by all means available" (1990:36). Further, he argues that

> needs [similar in this case to the components of merdeka] ... are inherent drives for survival and development, including identity and recognition. It is not within the free decision making of the individual to trade them. [Burton 1990:39–40]

Burton defends his theory, writing,

> The issue whether behaviour is determined genetically, environmentally or both, is not a profitable one for us to engage in at this state of knowledge. The fact that there are behaviours that cannot be controlled to fit requirements of particular societies [e.g., West Papuans' relentless struggle for self-determination, despite Indonesia's insistence on its current territorial integrity] is our concern, rather than the evolutionary explanation of this phenomenon. [Burton 1990:37]

In the West Papuan context, these needs range from minimum human needs and basic rights, such as employment, health care, education, equity of access to other such services and peace (security/freedom from violence and fear); to protection and respect of the natural environment and resources and religious and spiritual freedom; to the more abstract yet equally important need of West Papuans to exercise power and control over their lives through political and social planning and to keep their human dignity intact; and finally to justice—an end to impunity for those meting out violence—and a "'straightening' of history" (King 2004:85) to recognize West Papuans' as yet unfulfilled right to self-determination. Brief biographical details of interviewees quoted in the following sections, explaining their importance within the West Papuan independence movement and their political affiliations, are provided in Appendix 1.

Basic Human Needs (Security and Basic Welfare)

At the most basic level, then, merdeka is used by West Papuans, at home and abroad, to refer to negative peace (in terms of security) and to having access to the fundamentals of "the good" society. Ironically, though, Papuans in West Papua feel a lack of security to the extent that, according to a customary leader of the Marind tribe in Merauke who spoke to me in November 2008, people in Merauke are "scared to even talk about *merdeka*" because of the repercussions should the wrong person overhear.

A U.S.-based representative of the self-described West Papuan provisional government (the West Papua National Authority), Herman Wainggai, emphasized to me in an interview on November 4, 2009, in Melbourne, Australia, that West Papuans yearn for merdeka but stressed that it should be obtained peacefully and democratically, to counter the current lack of peace and security in West Papua. The thwarted ability to feel safe—a fundamental aspect of merdeka—has unsurprisingly fuelled the desire for independence. This was expressed to me by priest and West Papuan intellectual Neles Tebay in Jayapura, West Papua, on December 6, 2008. Although not himself an outspoken advocate of political independence, he said,

> I think the human rights violations committed by Indonesian security apparatus against indigenous Papuans have been one of the reasons [Papuans have] ... been strengthening their demand for independence ... Perhaps only one or two people are really committed to separation [through] independence, but when many people are treated badly, we have reason to join them, just to escape from this.

When I interviewed Otto Ondawame in Sydney, Australia, on July 11, 2009, he analyzed Indonesia's version of "peace" in West Papua—that is, the Special Autonomy Law—as a false peace that has further limited indigenous people's welfare. He views merdeka, by contrast, as being the catalyst for change that *will* provide basic welfare for West Papuans. President of the West Papua New Guinea National Congress, Michael Kareth, who lives in self-exile in Boekel, the Netherlands, elaborated on this connection when I interviewed him there on September 24, 2008, arguing,

> The meaning of independence [is to] protect these people, this nation, from the destruction, [and] killing [by] Indonesia ... The main thing is the social welfare [of the] people.

Benny Wenda, a West Papuan refugee and activist currently living in Oxford, England, also spoke of his hopes for merdeka, describing it in terms of West Papuans enjoying the basic freedoms of everyday living, when I interviewed him there on August 27, 2008:

> When [will my people] be free like other people? ... Free to go to hunting or gardening, [to] enjoy these [activities] with their family, and grow their own vegetables? ... I want to see them dancing with no military surrounding them ... One day I want to see my people go free, smiling, dancing.

On a similar note, Rev. Benny Giay of the Kingmi (indigenous) church of West Papua endorsed West Papuans' right to political self-determination in the hope that it will lead to welfare as a part of merdeka, when I spoke with him on December 5, 2008, in Jayapura, West Papua.

> We are strongly support[ing] it in our church ... Freedom is from God and, once you deny one's freedom then you are in trouble. God is not happy ... God is being hurt when Papuans are not being given the right to ... have access to education, to health, nutrition, culture and God is angry at ... [the] church when we sit here silent.

Cultural, Spiritual and Environmental Freedom

Besides the freedoms identified earlier, merdeka also refers to cultural and spiritual freedoms. A significant part of each of these freedoms has to do with West Papuans' connection to their land and the resources it yields, as can be gleaned from many of the explanations of merdeka that follow. When referring to the cultural aspects of merdeka, such as culturally appropriate development, including enjoyment of the West Papuan natural environment, it was evident that visions of merdeka fit definitions of a just peace but were stymied in their realization. Forkorus Yaboisembut, head of the *Dewan Adat Papua* (DAP) or National Customary Council, contended when I spoke to him in Jayapura on December 2, 2008, that

> there is a future for the Papuans if they don't disappear. Their culture, land and resources must be preserved. Government must be maintained and it must issue policies on land that must not be sold. Mining must be controlled and schools established for cultural education and democratic structures. But the Indonesian government regards all these as separatist activities ... My hope is that West Papua must be independent first so we can have a better future. We are not able to do that under the Indonesian system. We have tried but it is impossible.

Many descriptions of merdeka have a spiritual element to them, too, in that the West Papuans pursuing merdeka believe that it is a God-given right and that God will eventually facilitate its arrival. One ordained church leader in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, a West Papuan refugee and former member of the West Papuan guerrilla army, who wished to remain anonymous when he spoke to me there on August 30, 2009, explained his decision to fight for merdeka, saying,

> I thought, well, it's better for me to join my people for the struggle for independence ... freedom to me is [as] important as [it is] to any other West Papuan. Good to be free on your own land. That is the birthright. And we West Papuans feel that it is our right. Like any other nation, we are Melanesians, we have [a] different entity, we have [a] different identity ... West Papua has been given by God and West Papuans have sole right on that soil.

Political Freedom and Justice

The most popular meaning of merdeka, as political freedom, was frequently expressed throughout my field research as political independence or sovereign statehood, and was often linked to the concept of justice—for righting past political wrongs, such as overlooking West Papua's right to self-determination. When the desire for independence was articulated explicitly, as was often the case, it was frequently spoken of as non-negotiable. For example, Jacob Prai, a founding fighter in the OPM, now exiled in Malmö, Sweden, told me when I interviewed him there on September 15, 2008, of the time he was jailed in PNG and was faced with the choice of either amnesty in Sweden or repatriation to West Papua, on the condition that he would give up the struggle for independence. Prai responded to the choice by saying, "It's better for me to die, than go back and ... [not] struggle." Oridek Ap explained *merdeka* when we spoke in the Hague on September 10, 2008:

> When I talk about merdeka, when most Papuans talk about merdeka, they mean independence. Merdeka is a word, an Indonesian word, but what we mean by merdeka is independence ... We want to have the opportunity to solve our own problems ... that is what we want—merdeka.

Benny Wenda likewise denies assertions that the freedom Papuans ask for is primarily metaphysical or spiritual as some have interpreted merdeka (see Golden 2000:33). In so doing, he refers to the Indonesian struggle for merdeka during the Dutch East Indies' decolonization process. When I interviewed him in Oxford on August 27, 2008, he stated, "This is always my question ... if [Indonesians just] wanted freedom spiritually, why [did] they fight against the Dutch?" Zachi Sawor, a West Papuan refugee living in Wageningen, the Netherlands, similarly proclaimed during our interview on September 25, 2008, that "to me ... merdeka is independence ... Independence is to raise everything yourself, like Australia and the Netherlands ... And, until now, Indonesia [is] the boss of the country, so the Papuans do nothing ... there is no independence at all." Hence,

merdeka is envisaged by many West Papuans as a sum of, or even greater than, its parts, rather than as a composite of a random selection of its parts chosen to fulfil a realpolitik agenda.

The right to self-determination is inherently important to West Papuans, not just because it is a first step in enabling the other benefits of merdeka to be implemented, but also because it represents West Papuan dignity and identity. This is echoed in the words of Andy Ayamiseba, former member of the West Papuan rock band the Black Brothers, who is a Papuan refugee living in Port Vila, Vanuatu. Speaking to me on July 20, 2009, in Port Vila, he stressed the importance of independence to Papuan identity and dignity. Regardless of any initial difficulties an independent West Papua might encounter, Ayamiseba explained,

> The issue here is that [of] identification of ourselves, our identity is—we are not Indonesian. Maybe when we become independent, the situation may be [that] our economy is not as good as [it was] under Indonesia, we have to crawl out, but you know we want to be ourselves ... I am a Papuan ... So, in all due respect to the Indonesians ... we are two different people: we are not Indonesians, they are not Papuans.

However, independence is not necessarily envisaged as the end point of merdeka, but rather as an imperative step toward its realization, the fulfilment of holistic emancipation-focused hopes for future peace. In our interview on September 24, 2008, in Boekel, the Netherlands, Michael Kareth contended that the "importance of independence is the first thing—we need to be free from any type of colonialist system." West Papuan student activist Markus Haluk, when I interviewed him in Jayapura on December 1, 2009, identified three fundamental issues. "First, politics. Our independence on first of December 1961 was destroyed by Sukarno. Second, human rights issues. And third, development: delivering services in education, health and infrastructure" to Papuan people. Hence, merdeka includes, rather than solely consists of, political independence. Viktor Kaisiepo reflected critically and at length during our interview on September 11, 2008, in Amersfoort, the Netherlands, on the importance of independence for merdeka, in effect blaming Indonesia for preventing West Papua from reaping the benefits of globalization while it is simultaneously exploited by the same:

> Of course I'm fighting for independence. [However,] when I was younger I believed independence [was] the [only] solution. But in a globalized world I don't think independence is the [whole] solution, because we have entered into a world that we call interdependence. I can't live without them and they can't live

without me. Both of us cannot live without the resources ... I don't believe in West Papuan independence if it's not open to outer influences, because [it has] already been globalized. That's why I'm fighting Indonesia, Indonesia's trying to keep Indonesia together but that's not going to help, it's going to fall apart, it's like I'm raising a family and I say all kids should stay at home until mom and dad die at the age of 90, you should not marry you should not go, get out; no, that's stupid.

While the majority of West Papuans support political independence (this was emphasized by Paul Barber and Liem Soei Liong from TAPOL [a human rights organization that monitors Indonesia], whom I interviewed on September 3, 2008, in Surrey, England), it is the case that not all West Papuans are unified in pursuing independence as a goal of merdeka. Various West Papuan refugees, particularly in Port Moresby, when I spoke to them there on September 2, 2009, told me that the majority of West Papuans desired "full independence" but that "some leaders [are] you know, influenced by [the] Indonesian government." Their reference may have been to West Papuan Franzalbert Joku's Independent Group Supporting the Autonomous Region of Papua within the Republic of Indonesia (IGSSARPRI), which receives funds from the Indonesian government and advocates special autonomy and the repatriation of West Papuan refugees in PNG to West Papua (Vatsikopoulos 2007). At a 2007 conference hosted by advocacy group Indonesian Solidarity and the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney, Franzalbert Joku presented his views concerning West Papua's likely future opportunities:

> Special Autonomy Law and Papua's status as an autonomous region is a *fait accompli* and, having searched the globe in search of answers, the independence campaign has come to a dead end road. Those still searching for it, we have gone to the UN, to the PIF [Pacific Islands Forum], to other countries and each time we plea for help we are told to go back to Jakarta and sort your problems out. That's why I say the international system does not support the struggle for an independent nation state of Papua. [Joku 2007]

Joku's language, however, seems to be that of defeatist pragmatics,[8] an exhaustion of ideas, rather than an embracing of what special autonomy has to offer. While he argues that special autonomy is a "bottom up process ... as opposed to perceptions among Papuans abroad and ... supporters that it is something shoved down the throat of Papuans by politicians in Jakarta," and contends that it is "a golden political opportunity for Papuans to manage their own affairs, while enabling the central government

in Jakarta to preserve their country's sovereignty and national unity"; yet he does not go so far as to claim that special autonomy achieves what West Papuan people want it to—that is, merdeka—or even what the Special Autonomy Law itself purports to do. He goes so far as to mention what the law does not allow—that is, a wide-ranging list of limitations to self-rule that prohibits self-governance in political and security affairs; diplomatic and foreign relations with other countries in the pursuit of trade, investment, cultural and educational objectives; judicial and justice administration; education; and fiscal and monetary policies (Joku 2007). Yet, despite this, he entreats,

> Papuans should have every reason to now, I believe, firmly embrace the Special Autonomy Law, however diluted, imperfect or incomplete and I underline those words, "however diluted," imperfect or incomplete, [it] may be in [its] present form. Politics is the art of compromise and political compromise through regional autonomy is an important cornerstone in conflict management and resolution. I do not see any other option on the table [and] although there are various aspirations expressed ... realistically there is no other option on the table right now that we can legitimately discuss and pursue as an achievable goal. [Joku 2007]

In an appeal for Papuans and the international community to accept special autonomy, rather than pursue an act of self-determination, using a similar discourse of pragmatics, former West Papuan activist Nicholas Messet, now deputy chairperson of IGSSARPRI, provided a testimony in September 2010 to the U.S. Congress:

> After many years of struggle and hardship, I realized that I can only cry for so long. No amount of tears can bring back the past ... The Special Autonomy is the solution that is endorsed by the world community. This is the solution that is the most practical, good for Jakarta, good for the Papuans. [Federal News Service 2010]

Further, Messet calls upon those outside West Papua "not to make tensions worse because when things get worse in West Papua, you stay [home] in your comfort and we suffer" (Federal News Service 2010). This is a valid point that certainly needs to be considered by advocates for West Papuan rights but one that carries with it a veiled threat—that is, standing up for human rights will serve only to entrench abuses against West Papuans by the prevailing power, Indonesia. Perhaps unintentionally, it therefore reinforces the legitimacy of calls for independence and the claims of many other West Papuans and observers that a climate of human rights violations and impunity is ubiquitous in West

Papua.[9] That threats of reprisals against West Papuans for rejecting special autonomy and calling for a referendum, coercion or corruption might be behind Messet's statements is supported by Burton's human needs theory, mentioned earlier, which posits that "it is not within the *free* decision making of the individual to trade [needs]," including the need for self-determination or, in Burton's words, for identity and development (Burton 1990:39–40). Further, that Messet's ideas about what will meet Papuans' needs have been influenced by Indonesian cultural and political hegemonic discourses is evident from his justification of special autonomy's shortcomings: "We are given millions of pounds to establish [special autonomy] ... but we are lazy. We are [too] lazy to do that" (Federal News Service 2010). This is internalized racism exemplified, which, in Camara Jones's terms,

> is defined as acceptance by members of the stigmatized races of negative messages about their own abilities and intrinsic worth. It is characterized by their not believing in others who look like them and not believing in themselves. It involves accepting limitations to one's own full humanity, including one's spectrum of dreams, one's right to self-determination and one's range of allowable self-expression. [2000:1213]

It appears, however, that the views represented by Joku and Messet—that is, special autonomy is perhaps an enabler of merdeka—are those of a minority of West Papuan leaders, particularly when seen in the light of recent events in West Papua, such as the mass rallies for a referendum mentioned at the beginning of this article, organized in June and July 2010 and throughout 2011, 2012 and 2013, by a broad representation of Papuan leaders who reject special autonomy. However, although I have demonstrated that West Papuans are largely united in their vision of what *merdeka* involves, throughout the five decades of their struggle for peace with justice, including independence, Papuans have employed various strategies for achieving their vision, while disagreeing over the efficacy of this or that approach. Nevertheless, this, as I shall argue, has not necessarily been to the detriment of the movement.

Merdeka-Seeking Efforts

"Power relations change ... as a result of the intentional exercise of power by specific, historically-situated individuals and groups ... The ability of individuals to create change—no matter how insignificant—is power" (Heller 1996:83). Counterintuitively, one of the most powerful agents of change in West Papuan politics has been factional and generational conflict. Competing ideas and networks, different resource pools and milieux of educa-

tion have spurred on various generations and factions of West Papuan political groups to more ambitious strategies and tactics in the pursuit of merdeka. Four major strategies for achieving merdeka through independence, each with diverse strengths and spheres of influence, are discernable as having operated, at times simultaneously, throughout West Papua's liberation struggle, building unity when necessary, branching out in different directions when possible, but always heading toward the same goal. These are: guerilla warfare, international diplomacy, acceptance of special autonomy as a stepping stone to building independence and campaigns for an independence referendum. Otto Ondawame reflects that it was the original split in the OPM between Jacob Prai and Seth Rumkorem in 1976 that "had the positive effect of opening up alternatives in approach and increased areas of control and mass participation" (2010:123).

The revolutionary urge instigated by the guerrilla-fighters who were the first generation of independence leaders has come full circle to the current (third) generation, albeit this time with an insistence on peaceful means. Despite the instances of intergenerational differences of opinion, this strengthens Garry Trompf's (1979) theory that important ideas, especially those so intimately linked with liberation, will be revisited repeatedly, even if the particular strategies associated with their epochs have become passé. The four main strategies employed by the three generations of West Papuan freedom fighters since Indonesian occupation are highly contingent upon the political and social milieu of the leaders of each of the strategies. Thus, once they realized that they had been abandoned by the Dutch, leaders of the first generation who remained in West Papua tended to engage in guerrilla warfare as a significant complement to the overseas lobby work that others were undertaking at the time, given its strategic prevalence during the decolonization era as well as its revolutionary philosophical underpinnings. As times changed and the international backing for decolonization fell away, the leaders of the second generation of independence fighters searched for other means to secure international support for West Papuan freedom. Some pragmatists chose to accommodate Jakarta's offer of special autonomy, as has been discussed, believing that an increasingly democratizing Indonesia should be given a chance to display its new colours. Others have decided to pursue peaceful dialogue with the hope that independence might eventually be put on the dialogue agenda. In recent years, however, a revolutionary appeal to the international community to sponsor a fair referendum for West Papua was instigated by third-generation independence leaders, Victor Yeimo

told me in an interview via Skype on June 1, 2010. This has been taken up since 2010 by leaders from the first and second generations too, and appears to be the strategy that currently enjoys the most traction (Webb-Gannon 2011).

My research reveals that factional membership loosely follows generational lines and, to a degree, dictates strategy preference (Webb-Gannon 2011:198–254). (A table of the different factions of the West Papuan independence movement and their chronological emergence is included as Appendix 2.) Hence, factions of the OPM and its armed wing are proud of their guerrilla backgrounds, even if various members have renounced guerrilla strategies and have joined new factions. Few have given up OPM allegiance, preferring instead to join other groups as well, including the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation, the umbrella group of West Papuan liberation organizations based in Port Vila, Vanuatu; the West Papua New Guinea National Congress, an interim government based in PNG and the Netherlands; and West Papua National Authority (WPNA) instigated Federal Republic of West Papua (FRWP), a powerful, on-the-ground, parallel government. A prominent member of the Papuan Customary Council (DAP), the late Viktor Kaisiepo, supported special autonomy as the best strategy for West Papuan independence until his death in 2010, believing that, as it had the support of world powers, it probably represented West Papua's best chance of attaining respect for indigenous rights with global backing. He was in the minority within the DAP, however, which has become increasingly referendum-oriented over the past four years (Webb-Gannon 2011:237–239). The WPNCL is primarily made up of second-generation independence activists, with some first-generation supporters as well, and favours strategic, peaceful dialogue with Indonesia. WPNGNC and the WPNA/FRWP are made up mainly of second- and some first-generation leaders. WPNGNC rejects dialogue altogether and seeks international recognition of West Papua's independence, while the WPNA/FRWP does not reject dialogue outright but has little faith in its feasibility. Third-generation youth and student groups, the most prominent of which currently is the West Papua National Committee (KNPB), also reject dialogue and seek an internationally monitored referendum for West Papua. To draw international attention, which is part of their strategy, this generation operates tactically within a similar sort of "subaltern counterpublic" as that referred to by Na'puti (2014), when she writes about the resistance movement among certain Chamoru of Guam, who use blogs, their own press and distinctive rhetorical strategies to build community.

Of course, cultural background and diasporic location play a role in factional and strategic choice as well. My conversations with anonymous West Papuan leaders in Sydney, Australia, on June 1, 2010, showed that conflict between generations exists to a degree, with some resentment among young leaders that various older leaders are outstaying their welcome and among older leaders that the younger ones have too little strategic discretion. However, for the most part, each generation has built and continues to build on the strategic strengths and ideas of the others. This pertains to factions as well. While interpersonal feuds between leaders of different factions are at times destructive and waste energy, they are by no means uncommon in any political conflict situation anywhere in the world. Instead, strategic inter-factional conflict has also been able to play a constructive role in West Papuan politics, an aim of conflict transformation (Galtung 1996:96), with each faction promoting their own strategies and chasing strategic achievements with perhaps more fervor than they would have had there been no competition. A larger-picture unity of spirit and of ambition, as West Papuans build for themselves an enhanced international profile, is thus emerging (see Webb-Gannon 2011 for an in-depth analysis of the various West Papuan independence factions and their strategies).

Conclusion

West Papua's struggle for decolonization, I have argued, understands merdeka as peace with justice, indivisibly practical and spiritual. Moreover, peace with justice, which has so far eluded West Papua during its recent colonial history, includes the political right to exercise self-determination with the option of founding an independent state. Syllogistically speaking then, the opportunity to choose an independent state is a necessary step toward the actualization of merdeka. However, just as "negative peace is a necessary but not sufficient condition for positive peace" (Barash 2000:2), so independence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for merdeka.

Regardless of whether sovereign state status is recognized in West Papua, Papuans still face a maze of challenges to a just peace and to achieving the many other dimensions of merdeka, Andy Ayamiseba told me on July 20, 2009, in Port Vila, Vanuatu. These may include intertribal and ethnic tensions, elite exploitation, endemic violence against women, difficult development and resource management decisions and tensions between diaspora and in-country leaders (see Webb-Gannon 2011:144–195 for further details regarding how West Papuans envisage dealing with these and other issues

they may face if independence is achieved). However, as Oridek Ap pointed out, when I interviewed him in the Hague on September 10, 2008, in the event of attaining independence, these would be West Papuan problems and it would be the right and responsibility of the West Papuan people—united as a polity, with a democratically agreed governance system—to decide how to address these in line with shared West Papuan understandings of merdeka.

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Notes

1 The territory located on the western half of the island of New Guinea has experienced frequent name changes corresponding with its colonial occupiers and their political plans. Given the proliferation of name changes, in this article I use the term *West Papua*, in solidarity with West Papuans who chose this name in 1961, to denote the entire territory of what has now been divided into Papua and · Papua Barat provinces. (For more on the history of the territory's names, including West New Guinea, West Irian and Irian Jaya, see King 2004:19–20.)

2 Western scholars might propose less controversial definitions of *merdeka* (i.e., those that do not include independence) for a number of reasons, including an acceptance of or belief in the Indonesian ideology of NKRI (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* or the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, which includes "Sabang to Merauke"), concerns about retaining research visa access to Indonesia, efforts not to upset Indonesian/Australian academic exchange partnerships and efforts to avoid controversy for scholars' own (especially Australian government-funded) institutions, such as public universities, or a defeatist view of the likelihood of West Papuan aspirations coming to fruition, which might lead to the support of the "second-best" option of special autonomy.

3 The data for this article were collected as part of my Ph.D. research, now written up in my 2011 dissertation *Birds of a Feather: Conflict and Unity within West Papua's Independence Movement*. I used semi-structured interviews and participant observation as methods of data collection in West Papua (Indonesia), Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and the United Kingdom. I interviewed West Papuan political, religious, customary and women leaders, as well as non-Papuan experts on the independence movement. The majority of my fieldwork was carried out between August 2008 and September 2009, although I continued to collect data throughout the course of my candidature, which was finalized in June 2011. Interviews and other data drawn on for the dissertation and for this article were limited to the English and Indonesian languages.

4 See the United Nations General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-

tries and Peoples Resolution 1514, which states, "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the United Nations Charter, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation, and that steps should be taken to transfer, unconditionally, all powers to the trust and non-self-governing territories so that they might enjoy complete freedom and independence" (United Nations 1960). Additionally, the right to self-determination is enshrined in treaty law through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (United Nations 1966a) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (United Nations 1966b), both of which declare in Article 1 that "all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they may freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."

5   This suspicion of genocide was expressed on the banner displayed on the outrigger canoe, taken by the 43 West Papuan refugees who arrived in Australia in January 2006, which read, "Save West Papua people soul from genocide, intimidation and terrorist, from military government of Indonesia. Also we West Papuan need freedom, peace, love and justice in our homeland" [sic] (Australia Council of Trade Unions 2006).

6   International human rights lawyer Jennifer Robinson notes that even at the time of the UN sanctioning of the Act of Free Choice, prior to the concept of West Papuan independence being thoroughly "socialized" by independence advocates in West Papua, "UN officials admitted in private that 95 per cent of Papuans supported independence" and that the "process of consultation did not allow a genuinely free choice to be made" (Robinson 2010:173).

7   Other factors uniting many West Papuans include: a steadfast belief that God will deliver independence to them; an emphasis on a pan–West Papuan, Melanesian identity; ideas about a future democratic "federation of tribes"–type government (which, given the vastly varying sizes of Papuan tribes, and the significant migrant population, would struggle to operate democratically); and a strategic, Christian and Melanesian valuing of unity within the independence movement (see Webb-Gannon 2011 for a more comprehensive exploration of these unifying factors).

8   As mentioned previously, many West Papuan leaders whom I interviewed believe that genocide will be the horrific alternative fate of the West Papuan people if special autonomy, rather than independence, remains the foundation of West Papua's future governance. Most West Papuan leaders whom I have interviewed are convinced, partly because of the horrific nature of what they believe to be the alternative to independence, partly because they believe it is their God-given human right and partly because there is international precedent (e.g., East Timor, Kosovo and South Sudan), that they will achieve independence and, therefore, do not agree with Messet and Joku's realpolitik stance (Webb-Gannon 2011).

9   See, for example, comments by Sophie Richardson from Human Rights Watch and Salamon Yumame from FORDEM (Forem Demokrasi) (Federal News Service 2010).

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Appendix 1 – West Papuans Interviewed

Ayamiseba, Andy: July 20, 2009, Port Vila, Vanuatu. Ajamiseba is a West Papuan refugee based in Port Vila, Vanuatu. He managed the West Papuan band the Black Brothers, and is a spokesperson for the West Papuan National Coalition for Liberation.

Ap, Oridek: Interview with the author, September 10, 2008, the Hague, the Netherlands. Ap is son of assassinated West Papuan musician and anthropologist Arnold Ap. He is an activist for West Papua in the Hague, the Netherlands, with his family.

Giay, Benny: December 5, 2008, Jayapura, West Papua. Giay is the head of the indigenous Kingmi Church of West Papua and a human rights advocate.

Haluk, Markus: Interview translated by Rex Rumakiek, December 1, 2008, Jayapura, West Papua. Haluk is a student leader with pro-independence student organization AMPTPI.

Kareth, Michael: September 24, 2008, Boekel, the Netherlands. Kareth is the president of the West Papua New Guinea National Congress.

Kaisiepo, Viktor: September 11, 2008, Amersfoort, the Netherlands. Kasiepo, now deceased, was the founder of PaVo and an indigenous rights advocate and refugee in the Netherlands.

Ondawame, Otto: July 11, 2009, Sydney, Australia. Ondawame is the vice-chairperson for the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation, based in Port Vila, Vanuatu.

Prai, Jacob: September 15, 2008, Malmö, Sweden. Prai is one of the founders of the OPM. He and his son Joseph operate the OPM office in Malmö, Sweden.

Rumakiek, Rex: January 21, 2010, Sydney, Australia. Rumakiek is the secretary general of the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation.

Sawor, Zachi: September 25, 2008, Ede-Wageningen, the Netherlands. Sawor was one of the first West Papuans under the Dutch New Guinea administration to be educated in the Netherlands, where he still resides.

Tebay, Neles: December 6, 2008, Jayapura, West Papua. Tebay is a Catholic priest and intellectual, preparing West Papuans for (a hoped-for) dialogue with Indonesia.

Wainggai, Herman: November 4, 2009, Melbourne, Australia. Wainggai organized the voyage of the 43 refugees from West Papua to Australia in January 2006. He is a student leader and activist, and a member of the West Papua National Authority,

Wenda, Benny: August 27, 2008, Oxford, UK. Wenda and his family are refugees and musicians living in Oxford. He is a founding member of the International Parliamentarians for West Papua.

Yeimo, Victor: June 1, 2010, via Skype from Sydney, Australia (author) to Jayapura, West Papua (Yeimo). Yeimo is a student leader and former political prisoner. He is a key figure in the KNPB resistance organization.

Yaboisembut, Forkorus: December 2, 2008, Jayapura, West Papua. Yaboisembut is the head of the Dewan Adat Papua (Papuan Customary Council). He lives in Jayapura.

Appendix 2 – Factions within West Papua's Independence Movement

Faction/Affiliation	Strategy	(Main) Generational Membership	Position on Independence	Countries of Operation	Description
OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka)	Dialogue	All generations	Pro-independence	West Papua, PNG, Australia, Vanuatu, the Netherlands, Sweden	Est. 1965, Manokwari, to resist Indonesian occupation
TPN (Tentara Pembebsan Nasional)—armed group of the OPM	Mixed: peaceful dialogue, referendum, armed resistance	Gen 1: 1933–1948	Pro-independence	West Papua, PNG, Sweden	Est. 1970, border region of West Papua, to prepare for "radical action" before the AoFC
WPNGNC (West Papua New Guinea National Congress)	International intervention and recognition of independence	Gen 2: 1950–65 (with some Gen 1 and 3)	Pro-independence	West Papua, PNG, the Netherlands	Est. 1994, PoM, PNG, as "caretaker government" for WP
PDP (Presidium Dewan Papua)	Referendum; dialogue	Gen 2: 1950–65	Pro-independence	West Papua, Vanuatu	Mandated in 2000 to work peacefully for West Papuan independence
DAP (Dewan Adat Papua)	Referendum	Gen 2: 1950–65	Mixed, but increasingly pro-independence	West Papua	Est. 2002 to protect WP indigenous rights
WPNA (West Papua National Authority)	Referendum; dialogue	Gen 2: 1950–65 (and some Gen 3)	Pro-independence	West Papua, Australia, Vanuatu	Est. 2004 in West Papua as a "provisional" or "transitional" govt. for WP
IGSSARPRI (Independent Group Supporting the Special Autonomous Region of Papua within the Republic of Indonesia)	Special autonomy	Gen 2: 1950–65	Pro–special autonomy	West Papua, Indonesia, PNG	Est. 2006 to assist the Indonesian/PNG governments in repatriating West Papuan refugees to WP
WPNCL (West Papua National Coalition for Liberation)	Dialogue	Gen 2: 1950–65	Pro-independence	West Papua, PNG, Australia, Vanuatu	Est. 2008, Port Vila, Vanuatu, as umbrella body for WP independence groups
KNPB (Komite Nasional Papua Barat)	Referendum	Gen 3: 1971–87	Pro-independence	West Papua, Indonesia	Est. 2008 to support the International Parliamentarians for West Papua launch in London, and as a media clearing house for West Papuan resistance news
FORDEM (Forum Demokrasi)	Referendum	Gen 2: 1950–65 and Gen 3: 1971–87	Pro-independence	West Papua	Est. 2009 in Jayapura, West Papua, to protest against special autonomy
FRWP (Federal Republic of West Papua)	Referendum	All generations	Pro-independence	West Papua, USA, Australia	Est. 2011 in Jayapura, West Papua, to govern a newly declared (but not internationally recognized) independent West Papua

Dealing with Difficult Emotions: Anger at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada

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Abstract: This article approaches the Canadian TRC and its aspiration for reconciliation from an emotions perspective, thereby acknowledging the significant role emotions play in constituting identities and political communities, as well as understanding emotions as central to how conflicts are generated, viewed and solved (Hutchison and Bleiker 2008). I explore Michael Ure's claim that TRCs are host to a fundamental tension between the competing imperatives of justice (and its prime emotion of anger) and reconciliation (2008:286). The aim is to understand how survivors deal with this emotionally tense process and make sense of the TRC in this context.

Keywords: Indian Residential Schools, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, emotions, feeling rules, reconciliation, healing

Résumé : Cet article aborde la Commission de vérité et réconciliation (CVR) du Canada et son aspiration à la réconciliation à partir d'une perspective axée sur les émotions, reconnaissant par là le rôle clé que jouent les émotions dans la constitution des identités et des communautés politiques, et considérant ainsi leur position centrale dans le cadre de la création, la perception et la résolution des conflits (Hutchison et Bleiker 2008). J'explore la prémisse de Michael Ure selon laquelle les CVR sont le siège d'une tension fondamentale entre les impératifs concurrentiels de justice (et son expression principale de colère) et de réconciliation (2008:286). Je cherche à comprendre le sens donné à la CVR par les survivants, ainsi que leurs façons de gérer ce processus si tendu émotionnellement.

Mots-clés : pensionnats amérindiens, Commission de vérité et réconciliation, émotions, règles de sentiment, réconciliation, guérison

Introduction[1]

The woman screamed from a place inside herself where there was so much pain that the air froze in the lobby of the Queen Mary Hotel in Montreal. "My daughter hung herself and nobody cares," she yelled over and over again. Quickly, staff from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) tried to catch her as she wildly ran for the doors of the Grand Salon where the welcoming ceremony of the fifth national event had just begun. She flung herself to the ground, still wailing and trying to get away from TRC staff members determined to stop her from entering the room. Inside the Grand Salon, the drums were beating so loud that this wild chase was kept from the media, keen on getting the images of the event opening.

I had just run into Ogi gwan abik,[2] an old friend and a survivor of residential school. We stood there in the lobby, interrupted in our reunion and feeling this woman's pain, while flustered at the insistence from TRC staff that we must at once enter the Grand Salon.

Such raw displays of anger mixed with despair were not commonplace at the Montreal TRC event. And yet, in contrast to retributive justice mechanisms, TRCs are known for encouraging emotional expression. Their victim-centred approaches provide platforms for people who have suffered devastating abuses to share their stories. The Canadian TRC creates both public and private spaces for former students to share their memories of residential schools, where over 150,000 Aboriginal children were sent for most of the 20th century, in over 139 schools spread across the country (Miller 1996; Milloy 1999). As is being uncovered, these schools, which were financed by the federal government and run by the churches, were not only places of sexual, physical, psychological and cultural abuse but also places where more than 4,000 children lost their lives. The survivors, as they call themselves,[3] were often unable to cope as they grew up and frequently reproduced dysfunctional

behaviour patterns in their own families as adults (Dion Stout and Kipling 2003).

The Canadian TRC is part of the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement (IRSSA)[4] that was implemented in 2007, in an attempt to address the intergenerational legacy of residential schools and the increasing numbers of class actions and individual cases that were being filed by survivors. The official spaces[5] created by the commission engage people's emotions through the giving and receiving of difficult stories. The transformative potentials and challenges of these spaces are important to consider in how they relate to historical renderings, healing and reconciliation. This article approaches the Canadian TRC and its aspiration for healing and reconciliation from an emotions perspective, thereby acknowledging the significant role emotions play in constituting identities and political communities, as well as understanding emotions as central to how conflicts are generated, viewed and solved (Hutchison and Bleiker 2008:387).

The opening story in this introduction suggests that TRCs (like workplaces) create emotional norms or feeling rules (Hochschild 1979:557) that specify in which ways emotions are to be felt, by whom and when and how they should be expressed (in their form and intensity). Adopting an approach that considers emotions in their sociocultural contexts,[6] this article explores Michael Ure's claim that TRCs are host to a fundamental tension between two competing imperatives: the imperative of fidelity to legitimate emotions stemming from injustice (such as anger, rage or sorrow) and the countervailing imperative to overcome these emotions for the sake of reconciliation (2008:285–287). According to Ure, victims in TRC settings are therefore actively encouraged, if not compelled, to banish their anger (2008:285).

From this claim emerges this article's main questions: If Ure's claim is applicable in the Canadian TRC context, how do survivors of residential school make sense of the TRC? How do they deal with this emotionally tense process?

Drawing from qualitative fieldwork with 21 members of the Mitchikanibikok Inik community (also known as the Algonquins of Barriere Lake) carried out before, during and after the Montreal TRC event, I analyze the voices of three survivors to try to better understand what prompted their participation in the TRC event, how they experienced it at the time and how they reflected upon it three months later. While this kind of person-centred approach cannot provide the statistics that a survey approach would, it aims for a thick description that embeds survivor emotions and experiences into their everyday life contexts and webs of meaning.

This article first approaches Ure's claim by drawing from the South African TRC experience to look at what shapes these countervailing emotional imperatives in the context of the Canadian TRC. Second, it draws from survivor experiences of the TRC to explore the feeling rules that, while encouraging survivors to express their suffering and emotions by legitimizing their experiences, also reveal the tension created by the aim to repair and renew personal and political relationships that calls for an "overcoming" or "healing" of difficult emotions for the sake of fostering a process of reconciliation. It shows how the way that survivors make sense of the TRC in this double-bind context reflects this tension. And finally, it looks at how some survivors' ways of dealing with "Ure's tension" via emotional transgressions led to productive action outside the TRC spaces.

On a final introductory note, readers should bear in mind that the work of the commission has been extended until June 2015 and that this article does not aim to draw general conclusions on the work of the TRC. Rather it is a personalized exploration of one TRC event as experienced by a handful of survivors in an attempt to try to better understand the emotions at work in such processes.

TRCs and Emotions

Truth and reconciliation commissions have been adopted as a way to deal with victims and perpetrators of collective atrocity in processes of national reconciliation. There have been over 30 commissions around the world since 1974. Most were created by the governments of the countries concerned and some by the United Nations, as well as by non-governmental organizations. Though they often differ from one another in their application, truth commissions share a common aim of moving away from retributive justice (criminal verdicts) toward truth-seeking and reconciliation. This does not prevent them, by definition, from cooperating with judicial processes, and the extent to which commissions are involved in facilitating prosecutions (e.g., by handing over perpetrators' names) or in granting amnesty is entirely dependent on their mandate. For instance, the well-known 1994 post-apartheid South African TRC had the power to grant amnesty from prosecution to perpetrators who testified of their politically motivated crimes. This is, according to Ure, the highly controversial way that the South African TRC tried to balance the antinomy between recognizing and repudiating anger and indignation (2008:286).

For Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a leading figure of the South African TRC, the future of the nation depended on securing social harmony—the greatest good. He

argued, "Anything that subverts or undermines this sought-after good is to be avoided like the plague. Anger, resentment, lust for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, are corrosive of this good" (1999:34). The active encouragement to forgive perpetrators became a key component to deal with anger and other emotions perceived as dangerous and was made possible by the participation of perpetrators. It led to some cathartic moments: "No one could have predicted that day's turn of events at the hearing. It was as if someone had waved a special magic wand which transformed anger and tension into this remarkable display of communal forgiveness and acceptance of erstwhile perpetrators" (Tutu 1999:117).

Tutu's conflation of anger with danger reflects what Paul Muldoon describes as a Christian-inspired morality (also found in certain strands of the Graeco-Roman ethical tradition) that tends to regard anger as one of the biggest threats to the recognition and realization of our common humanity (2008:299). Following this commonly held view, anger can lead to disproportioned revenge and resentment. Thus anger becomes something to be feared and overcome. In the South African TRC's post-apartheid context, one of unstable political transition after mass violence, it is easy to understand how the risks of renewed violence and revenge were legitimate preoccupations and why anger was dealt with through the strongly suggested practice of forgiveness. In this context, Ure's claim points to an obvious emotional tension. But how does this claim extend to a TRC in a non-transitional political context like Canada, where there is no obvious risk of sudden exploding violence or revenge?

While it was made clear that the Canadian TRC was not modelled on the South African one (as stated by National Chief Phil Fontaine 2007) and that it did not consider forgiveness as a requirement (as clarified by Justice Sinclair 2011), the Canadian TRC has been designed with elements from the restorative justice approach that aims—just like the South African TRC did—to facilitate reconciliation. In its mandate and through commissioners' speeches, the Canadian TRC provides a wide (and arguably vague) framework for apprehending reconciliation: it frames reconciliation as part of a healing discourse and situates it as a long-term journey toward the restoration of balance in the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people. In its mandate (Schedule "N", TRC 2013), the TRC extends the work of reconciliation not only to large groups (national reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people) but also to individuals and their families (interpersonal reconciliation), as well as their communities. The primary means it puts forward to achieve national reconciliation is education (as explained in the condensed two-minute film clip entitled "Reconciliation" by commissioner Justice Sinclair on the TRC website). The task of education takes on an extra meaning when the TRC is considered within its non-transitional context. Indeed, the TRC is one of two commissions that have taken place in the absence of political regime change.[7] Its impetus was not war or civil conflict but litigation resulting in a settlement between the Canadian government, the churches involved in running the schools and the Assembly of First Nations and the plaintiffs (former students). This sets the Canadian TRC clearly apart from other TRCs. It means that it has not benefited from the same degree of national or international attention as have commissions in conflict-emerging countries and that it has to work actively to promote itself (Niezen and Gadoua 2014:23). Moreover, the fact that it is dealing with a largely non-recognized part of Canadian history has a major implication: it means it has to convince the general population of the truths it is uncovering (Niezen and Gadoua 2014:23).

This has resulted in what anthropologist Ronald Niezen (2013) describes as an essentialization of narrative emerging from the TRC events. He claims there is a consistent pattern in the statements presented to the commissioners in the public forums (called the Commissioner's Sharing Panel), in which emphasis is overwhelmingly placed on personalized traumas that unfolded in the schools and their continued effect in adulthood, often through addictions and parenting failures (2013:62). In his book, Truth and Indignation (2013), Niezen demonstrates how the commission encourages this master narrative through visual materials (e.g., selections of films in the compilations made available to the public online, or the images and slogans shown directly at TRC events) and cements its incontestability through the creation and repetition of sacred rituals at TRC events. He claims there is an emphasis on "the themes of loss and suffering, both within the schools and in adult lives broken by the experience, the heightened emotion of grief (but within certain bounds of self-control and composure) and, in closing narrative, a positive story of healing and rediscovery of that cultural heritage once slated for destruction through the schools" (2013:68).

Niezen's findings confirm the applicability of Ure's claim in the TRC context: despite its non-transitional feature and the lack of threats of sudden violence or retaliation in Canada, the TRC's effort to create a master narrative that insists on suffering and healing is bound to shape and control the emotional expressions it encourages and discourages. In this way, the Canadian TRC is faced with the very same emotional tension between its

prime goals as other commissions, and its participants—in this instance, the survivors—are urged to remember difficult stories that were the source of great pain, to tell and to heal. As in South Africa, the Canadian TRC intimately links reconciliation to the notion of healing. But if the South-African TRC attempted to erase anger through the promotion of (bilateral) forgiveness, the question can be posed as to whether the Canadian TRC attempts to "treat" anger through its healing discourse and symbolic practices, which implicitly suggest unilateral forgiveness[8] as the way forward. Anger may not pose a threat of violence and revenge, but it tracks feelings of injustice that are incompatible with the idea of working toward a reconciled Canada.

Motivations

When I asked Sheila[9] why she had decided to go to the TRC event in Montreal, she answered,

> I wanted to tell my stories. And I was curious about what the truth and reconciliation was. I had to go and see and hear for myself, that's why I went there. Because I'm not a very educated person so I have to actually see and hear to know what's happening. What it's about. If I just read it on paper I don't understand. I choose not to I guess [laughs]. But I do understand what I see. What I experience.

Ogi gwan abik's motivations were quite different. He wanted to denounce what he articulates as the Vatican's and the Government of Canada's lack of accountability. As for Helen, she was not really able to say why she came, but she wanted to "check it out."

Of the 53 residential school survivors from this small Algonquin community, 40 are still alive. While the regional Val d'Or event was left unattended by community members, about 20 people came for the national TRC event in Montreal in April 2013. They drove down from the Rapid Lake reserve (Kitiganik), one of two Algonquin communities located in the Verendrye Wildlife Reserve, which is on unceded[10] Algonquin territory located about 250 kilometres north of Ottawa. The wildlife reserve spreads over 13,615 km^2 of largely coniferous forest and over 4,000 lakes. While the majority (552 people) of Mitchikanibikok Inik community members live at the Rapid Lake reserve (AANDC 2012), over 160 people live off-reserve, in small settlements in the bush or in nearby towns and cities. It is one of the few Algonquin communities (there are nine in Quebec) where Algonquin is still widely spoken (in its local dialect known as Mitcikanâpikowinîmôwin) and where so-called traditional activities in the bush are commonly practised. This includes hunting, fishing, setting traps, harvesting medicinal plants and picking berries.

Sheila, Ogi gwan abik and Helen are from the same community, but they live in three different places and have different residential school stories. Sheila went to Saint-Mary's in Ontario, with the first generation of children sent off to residential school, while Ogi gwan abik and Helen were sent with the second generation[11] to the Indian Residential School of Amos, closer to home in Quebec. Sheila was schooled in English, Ogi gwan abik and Helen in French. Sheila and Ogi gwan abik went to school for many years; Helen only a few months. Despite these differences, and like many other survivors, their stories share the common leitmotivs of abuse, constant fear, submission and anger. It is for this "common experience" that they received a first IRSSA payment (the Common Experience Payment—CEP) as far back as in 2008. The CEP made survivors eligible for $10,000 (CAD) plus $3,000 (CAD) for every year they attended a residential school. Applications for the CEP closed in September 2011. According to its mandate, the TRC has the duty of providing a context and meaning for the CEP through its national events (TRC Mandate, Events, 10(c)). This constitutes an ambitious mandate to fulfil a posteriori.

Sheila, Ogi gwan abik and Helen also applied for an Independent Assessment Process (IAP) for sexual and physical abuse (this is the other IRSSA financial compensation measure, for which applications closed in September 2012). Though slightly less tedious than an actual trial in court, substantial proof and legal assistance were still required to file such a claim. For all three, it was a harrowing experience of having to recollect and tell their stories to an adjudicator, of expecting an amount of money and being attributed "points" for less (different types of abuse rank according to specific points, which add up to a sum of money). The process and payment did not bring about a sense of validation; rather, all three felt that parts of their stories were not believed by the adjudicating committee and they were angry after their hearing. It was particularly difficult for Sheila, who, after having gone through the whole ordeal, first received a letter confirming the amount she would get and then received a second letter saying she would not get anything. The reason she was given was that she had not reported the abuse to the caretakers at the time (she was sexually abused by another student). "But they knew about it," Sheila told me.

> Actually, to say they knew it, they saw it. And at the time, when I was telling that (in the IAP), I held back with some of my story. Thinking that they wouldn't believe me anyways, so I didn't actually say it. So they took it back. And I had bought some stuff for my daughter because I knew that I was going to receive that. And they turned around and didn't give

it. So I'm in a hole. I have over three thousand dollars debt. And when this truth and reconciliation, when I went to this place, I said today they're still doing the same thing. That's another abuse.

This statement makes clear that Sheila entered the IAP with a sense of distrust, which she carried already at the time of her childhood abuse when the adults failed to protect her (from another student). This distrust in relation to this part of her life story was reinforced with her failed IAP application. So it is with this mind frame that Sheila came to the TRC event, with deep-seated feelings of injustice and a sense of distrust.

The ten survivors from the community who shared their experiences of the IRSSA payments with me, as well as the many interviews (58 recorded) I carried out with family members and people involved in community healthcare support, confirmed a general frustration with the money which was given to individuals and had no lasting constructive impact for the community. The financial compensations had a considerable impact on these survivors' apprehension of the TRC, and they received payments long before finding out about the commission (my data show that in 2011 most community members, including clinic staff, had not heard of the TRC). Scepticism was high after realizing the "killer money" (as it was rapidly called) did not go hand-in-hand with a healing plan for the community and was, instead, often given to fragile individuals. This scepticism following the allocation of financial compensations was reinforced by their legal implications: effectively, it is at that time that most survivors found out about the tripartite nature of the settlement and that "former students—and family members—who stay in the settlement will never again be able to sue the Government of Canada, the Churches who joined in the settlement, or any other defendant in the class actions over residential schools" (IRSSA Official Court Notice). For Mitchikanibikok Inik survivors, this resulted in "feeling tricked" and misrepresented by the Assembly of First Nations and plaintiffs representing former students. Survivors and their families felt the government and the churches subtly imposed the settlement and that, despite wanting to opt out of the financial compensations out of protest of what they deemed a "sell-out deal," they were too economically strangled to do so.

Another non-negligible factor which shaped Mitchikanibikok Inik survivors' disposition toward the TRC was the fact that logging operations had been intensifying on their territory since the previous summer. The logging of specific family territories and the differences in opinion as to how to deal with this—either protest

to fully block the logging operations or try to push for a co-management (and resource revenue sharing) agreement—once again pitted community members against one another despite their common concern for the territory. It resulted in the arrest of two of Ogi gwan abik's siblings for obstructing the logging machinery and in a court case, which involved Ogi gwan abik and his family, as their territory was concerned. A few months after her release from prison, Ogi gwan abik's sister, Diana, suffered a stroke and died, one month before the TRC event in Montreal. For Ogi gwan abik, the struggle and the arrest had put a considerable strain on his sister, and he blamed them as factors contributing to her stroke. April 24, the starting day of the Montreal national TRC event, was the court date Ogi gwan abik's family had obtained for their hearing against Resolute Forest Products, the company clear-cutting on their territory with provincial permits. So as Ogi gwan abik headed to the Queen Elizabeth Hotel for the TRC event, members of his family were heading to court.

The IRSSA payments (their legal implications, as well as the allocation timing) and the logging struggle constitute important elements of the contextual bedrock crucial to understanding these survivors' TRC event experiences. As we will now explore, Sheila, Ogi gwan abik and Helen participated in the fifth national TRC event in three distinct ways, yet came home with the same conclusion.

Feeling Good

Scholars have argued that truth-telling can have a therapeutic effect on victims, thereby framing TRCs as restorative justice events that promote emotional healing by reflecting a practical view about human psychology that seeks to repair and build social connections. "Unlike retributive approaches, which may reinforce anger and a sense of victimhood, reparative approaches instead aim to help victims move beyond anger and a sense of powerlessness" (Minow 1998:92). By bringing emotions into the foreground, Martha Minow's claim makes a causal link between truth-telling and healing; by sharing their stories and breaking the silence around the taboos of multiple forms of abuse, survivors and their families can set off on "healing journeys" that imply emotional labour and are important components of national projects of reconciliation.

While the kind of normative moral imperative to dissolve anger implied by Tutu in his calls for forgiveness is not widespread at Canadian TRC events, the assumption that self-revelation is healing is ubiquitous. That anger is perceived as an impediment to healing and

plays into the residential school "syndrome" trope (James 2012) is mostly implied but is also sometimes made explicit in TRC-selected films (its "highlight reels" as Niezen [2013] calls them) and as, for instance, during one of the two public open-mic discussions on reconciliation at the Montreal TRC (entitled "Ça me tient à coeur"), when a Mohawk elder spoke out in anger, saying, "(Prime Minister) Harper and all government should be hung!" and the moderator answered that violence is not the way for reconciliation, brushing the man and his tears of rage aside. The conversation had, until then, focused on the undesirability of reconciliation in the light of unresolved land and treaty issues, not on residential schools, but it was implied that the attempted identity destruction through schooling was comparable to the destruction of identity via displacement of Aboriginal Peoples off their traditional territories and onto reserves. What the Mohawk elder was expressing and that the moderator failed to hear (and validate) was a deep ontological distress resulting from the impossibility of *being*, due to blockages resulting from government policies controlling the lives of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada.

Aboriginal cultures with oral traditions are known to place emphasis on emotion regulation in ways that make the public expression of emotions rare and embedded in protocol (Brant 1990), which includes, as has been found, for instance, in Cree, Inuit and Algonquin cultures, emphasis on respect and non-contradiction of elders (Bousquet 2008; Briggs 2000; Ferrara 1999). Though cultural codes of emotion and display rules evolve and change (especially when influenced by early childhood education and socialization into other cultural norms[12]), the Mohawk elder's public tears and visible unsettling revealed a sense of having been deeply insulted.

In the public places where survivors were to share their residential school stories, the atmosphere was more permissive, in the sense that speakers were not interrupted and testimonies usually succeeded one another without commentary or response on behalf of the commissioners. Grief and sorrow were the emotions that dominated throughout the testimonies, though what Niezen (2013) identified as indignation was also present.

Ogi gwan abik and Sheila both reported feeling good right after speaking out publicly. Sheila had chosen to do so in a Sharing Circle (consisting of a smaller audience and a survivors' circle with members of the Survivors Committee) and Ogi gwan abik at the Commissioners' Sharing Panel (consisting of a larger audience and a commissioner, in front of which the survivor testifies on stage, while being broadcasted live onto the TRC web-site), as well as in a private statement. Helen had decided to keep quiet.

Yet, though they reported feeling good, this had nothing to do with sharing their stories of abuses and being "freed" from them. Indeed, in contrast to the majority of survivors giving public testimony, neither Sheila nor Ogi gwan abik actually shared their residential school experiences with the public. In this sense, both departed from the conventional narrative template.

Speaking Out: Ogi gwan abik

Ogi gwan abik was the first to give testimony at the Commissioners Sharing Panel on Saturday morning. In front of a half-empty room, Commissioner Mary Wilson opened the session with a reminder of the agreements (*les ententes*): Survivors or intergenerational victims are to speak of their residential school experiences and their impacts, or of reconciliation. They should try to respect the 15-minute time frame. There is available health support for all. The tears witnesses "shed without shame" are healing (*c'est de la guérison*) and not garbage. Therefore, the tissues people use are not to be thrown away but collected and burnt in the sacred fire. She reminded the audience that this room is a witness of sacred sharings (*des partages sacrés*) and that the TRC is independent from the government. It is necessary, she also said, not to name an aggressor if this person has not been to court or if they are not dead.

As the body of testimonies makes clear, survivors usually take this rule as an implicit ban on naming and do not name their abusers. Ogi gwan abik began his testimony by defying this no-naming rule and, though he first made clear that he would not be speaking about his personal experience, he said, "I, and many of my peers, have been raped by Frère Brochu and he will not face justice; on the contrary, he has been praised for the great work he did with the Indians. How can we reconcile with that?"

Ogi gwan abik's tone remained controlled and factual throughout his testimony and his posture and bodily movements composed. He called attention to the collective harm of residential school by providing examples in support of the UN declaration of genocide and reminded the audience that the declaration states that conspiracy, attempt and complicity to genocide are all deemed punishable. "I have made peace with my past," he said. "But church and government leaders must not only recognize the wrongdoings of their agents and admit their crimes, they must also offer reparations for the genocidal actions committed against Aboriginal Peoples of Turtle Island."

Ogi gwan abik then continued with the idea that reconciliation is meaningful only if embedded in action and suggested that church-member abusers be excommunicated, even if dead. He also called on the Vatican to provide all information necessary to bring individuals to justice and asked the government to recognize the traditional territories of the First Nations because "the identity of my people *is* the land; to rid us of our territories is to rid us of our identity and our right to exist as Anishnabek."

Ogi gwan abik's testimony departs from the conventional testimonial template in several ways: first, in content, as I have just described—he moves away from telling a story of personal suffering to addressing issues of collective justice. Second, Ogi gwan abik does not represent himself as a traumatized and emotional victim; instead, he is keen on not showing grief (which—as the multitude of testimonies makes clear—is an acceptable and almost expected TRC feeling rule) or anger in relation to personal trauma. "I have made peace with my past," he reminds his audience and, instead, calls for justice—not healing—in relation to what he identifies as historical and ongoing injustices. Ogi gwan abik's call for justice and action is something that can be found echoed in the voices of victims of the South African apartheid who sought justice in township courts (*lekgotla*) outside the TRC (Wilson 2000) and, among others, in the voices of guerrilla "afectados" (the *affected*, as they call themselves) in Peru, who expressed the need for concrete actions (monetary and non-monetary reparatory measures or reforms, etc.) after their TRC testimonies (Laplante and Theidon 2007).

Ogi gwan abik had invited a Catholic priest who was attending the commission to witness his testimony. Three months after the TRC event, he told me he was still waiting to hear back from this priest, and that if no action was taken "to wake up and do something," this made him an accomplice.

According to Minow, restorative justice emphasizes the humanity of both offenders and victims. "It seeks repair of social connections and peace rather than retribution against the offenders. Building connections and enhancing communication between perpetrators and those they victimized, and forging ties across the community, takes precedence over punishment or law enforcement" (1998:92). Minow's claim, coupled with Ogi gwan abik's wish to have someone standing in for his perpetrator (and, therefore, the Catholic Church), reveals how, at the Canadian TRC, the task of healing and reconciliation rests disproportionately on the shoulders of survivors and their families. They are expected to repair social connections within their families

and communities, but the possibility of doing so with perpetrators, the non-Aboriginal population and the government remains abstract: there are no "perpetrators" at the TRC. As Niezen (2013) shows, the absence of the government is silently accepted and the indignant churches mostly contest taking on the full blame. Hence, unilateral forgiveness through healing of the self is implicitly proposed as "the way forward."

Transporting the feeling rules of tribunal and court settings, which discourage the display of anguish and trauma to favour emotional control and cool rationality (Flam 2013:377)—and which Ogi gwan abik is more than familiar with as he has been in and out of court for the last decade over logging issues—Ogi gwan abik uses the space of the TRC to question and contest this very way of addressing the legacy of residential schools and the system they were a part of.

To be able to do this, therefore revealing the permissiveness of the TRC unfoldings, initially felt good for Ogi gwan abik. He did not censor himself nor follow the TRC narrative template and feeling rules, and this had no consequences.

Speaking Out: Sheila

Unlike Ogi gwan abik, Sheila provided the broad lines of her residential school experience. She did so in a smaller setting, the Sharing Circle, which was less intimidating to her than the Commissioners' Sharing Panel. Yet she also stayed away from her personal story of abuse and from the implicit feeling rule of exposing grief and sorrow. Instead, Sheila reported feeling good at having expressed her anger—in both tone and content:

> I forgave my grandmother (for sending me to school) but I won't forgive the government. There's no way in hell. The TRC is bullshit to me. I'm going to court to protect the land. I can't go back in the bush anymore because they put in an injunction. This is why it's a lot of bullshit with the government and the apology. Where is he? I will never believe that ... I'm still fighting for something that I believe in, the animals, the trees, the water—it comes from my heart. They destroyed my mind but not my heart.

Sheila felt good because she expressed her anger and was not rebuffed in her emotions like the Mohawk elder in the reconciliation discussion panel. The circle context enabled Sheila to express her anger, what she probably would not have dared to do at the Commissioner's Sharing Panel.

Three months later she told me, "Well, it made me angry when I was talking about it, but I felt good. And I wasn't holding back because it's the truth. It's exactly

how I feel. The words that I used, that's exactly ... I choose to use the words that I used. And I was mad. I was mad from the inside. And as of today, too, I still feel the same way."

For Sheila to be able to recognize her anger and express it is something she has recently learned from a trauma workshop organized by the community's wellness counsellor:

> 'Cause for me, I went to a trauma session. So it did help me understand about myself, no matter what I see today. Sure, I'm angry, I'm angry more than I ever was but I let it come out now. I don't hide anything.

For Sheila, who was socialized into Algonquin feeling rules before going to residential school, Algonquin cultural codes of emotions can be seen as an influencing factor in the regulation of an emotion like anger. Traditionally, and to some extent still today, emphasis was put on control of emotions like anger (Bousquet 2009:59). Another emotion-regulating factor can be related to the experience of sexual abuse as a child, which trauma scholars have linked with lasting emotions of shame due, partly, to the child having believed she deserved the abuse. For Sheila to be able to be angry and to allow herself to understand why, is something that the trauma workshop has enabled her to do and that she feels good about; as for many others, speaking out is self-affirming and important. But, as she made clear, Sheila differentiates the anger she holds (or held) in relation to specific individuals like her grandmother, and their actions, from the anger she holds toward systemic institutionalized injustice. She does not want to "treat" this latter anger for the sake of healing and reconciliation.

Keeping Quiet: Helen

Sheila and Ogi gwan abik were therefore atypical participants at the Montreal TRC event; both departed from the expected narrative template and its implied feeling rules. In so doing, they did not enable the subtle slippage between personalized stories of suffering and healing, where healing the self becomes symbolic for healing the nation (see Hamber and Wilson 2002 for a critique of the assumption of a national psyche that can be healed via a TRC). Yet, though their public participation shows how the TRC provides space for contestation, Helen's lack of participation is a reminder that Ogi gwan abik and Sheila were exceptions to the rule. Effectively, and to the other extreme, Helen did not feel she could share her story in public and also did not want to give a private testimony after her unsettling IAP experience, where she afterwards had felt alone in her reawakened

pain. Despite the hefty consequences her short residential school experience had on the rest of her life (including the fact that she was never able to bring herself to study again, despite having a deep desire to obtain formal instruction), Helen did not feel her suffering was as legitimate as the others who had been to residential school for longer periods. So, she went to the TRC event, but stayed on its outskirts, not finding a place for her story within the narrative template. She did not go home with much disappointment she told me, as she had come with low expectations. She had also come wary of emotional exposure, the fear of another post-IAP breakdown being too real. Several months later, her understanding was that the TRC "didn't really do anything."

The Double Bind

Interviews carried out three months after the TRC with Sheila and Ogi gwan abik revealed that the immediate "feeling good" after their public statement did not last. Frustration and anger, which had been there all along (also for Sheila when "feeling good"), were strong, and "bullshit" and "expensive bandaid" were the qualifiers used to retroactively make sense of the TRC. The underlying distrust they came to the TRC with, reinforced by the IRSSA payments and the logging, was still strong. Ogi gwan abik felt angry about the Church's lack of recognition, and Sheila felt angry at the idea that she should not feel anger; in this sense, both rejected "healing and reconciliation" as put forward by the TRC.

Scholars have argued there is little evidence that testifying at TRCs actually helps victims in any way (Flam 2013:378; Mendeloff 2009:615). For instance, empirical research with South African apartheid victims has shown that many found the TRC process painful, disempowering and disappointingly filled with unmet expectations and promises (Byrne 2004). Going even further, Karen Brounéus's 2008 research in post-genocide Rwanda showed how survivors can also be harmed by testifying in public: the women she interviewed who testified in the *gacaca* village tribunals (initiated to enhance reconciliation) not only experienced intense psychological suffering but also were faced with new threats of violence by perpetrators still alive and displeased with the public disclosures.

While recognizing that victims' responses to truth-telling are highly individualized and idiosyncratic, Mendeloff's review of the few existing TRC-related empirical studies concludes that "there is very little definitive evidence that supports the assumption of truth-telling's psychological benefit. What little we do know casts doubt on that claim" (2009:616). Mendeloff further

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mentions the evidence of victims' diverging opinions when it comes to the question of whether justice has been served, and asks, "Is victim dissatisfaction with the truth-telling process the result of faulty truth-telling institutions or is dissatisfaction inherent to the search for justice after mass atrocity?" (2009:622).

Sheila's and Ogi gwan abik's experiences add complexity to "Ure's tension" in several ways that are important to consider in the light of this question. Ogi gwan abik's call for justice reflects the style of upbringing the residential schools endorsed, one that called for punishment as a norm and that was at odds with Algonquin traditional education.[13] In his statement, he said, "These people should be pursued in an international court of law, as groups and as individuals." This directly clashes with the TRC's restorative approach, which is said to resonate with Aboriginal conceptions of justice (Llewellyn 2002, 2008; Ross 1996, 2004). According to this view, retributive justice is based in western principles that are incompatible with Aboriginal ways of thinking and feeling. By constantly reminding the audience that it is a "survivor initiative," the TRC implicitly de-legitimizes emotions related to injustice (like anger) felt by some of its participants, such as Sheila. It throws back the responsibility of "healing and reconciliation" to survivors, by grouping them together as "the survivors" who initiated the process in its restorative format, whereas Mitchikanibikok Inik survivors and their families actually felt excluded from the IRSSA design and implementation process—in their view the legal implications behind the financial compensations, among other factors, discredited the settlement and its (much later) TRC. Sheila's and Ogi gwan abik's TRC-related emotions reveal that survivors are *emotionally bilingual* (in the sense that they are familiar with both Algonquin and settler-Canadian feeling rules) and that they do not exist as a unified group.

Sheila's and Ogi gwan abik's participative contestation also reveals the way the TRC itself tries to negotiate "Ure's tension" by making use of symbolics and ritual. "The mere fact that we're in the Queen Elizabeth Hotel makes me feel like they're laughing at us." Ogi gwan abik continued: "The Church and the Crown are the two major actors to blame for the genocidal actions committed against my people." Although Ogi gwan abik might be the only survivor who brought in the role of the Crown in treaty relationships with Aboriginal people in his TRC testimony at the Montreal event, the number of survivors who came to thank him for what he said points to the possibility that he was not the only one made uncomfortable by the site name and what was interpreted by some as symbolic settler-control at the

TRC. A prime example by Sheila was her interpretation of the Bentwood Box, commissioned by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and carved by Coast Salish artist Luke Marston.


Figure 1: Bentwood Box, by Coast Salish Artist Luke Marston. Photo by Anne-Marie Reynaud.

Brought to all TRC national events, the box is meant to reflect the strength and resilience of residential school survivors and their descendants, honour the survivors who died, and receive offerings that commemorate personal journeys toward healing and reconciliation (TRC 2009). As Niezen shows, the box's repository function (of material testimony, books, documents, DVDs, etc.) has taken on a sacred dimension, and the box acts as a ritual vessel that connects commissioners with participants (2013:66). It is with great reverence that things get put in the box, and its meaning (the story of the carver's grandmother featured on the box, a story of suffering with lasting effects) is retold at each event before the first "offering" is made in what Niezen coins a "ritual of deposition" (2013:67). For Sheila, the box embodied a subtle way of exerting control through ritual. "I don't believe in it," she said. "Everything the

people had to say, they put it in that box. Did you see that box? It had tears coming down on it. And they put everything in that box. And they're going to seal it now."

Niezen argues that, while drawing attention to the box's meaning, the ritual of deposition also "brackets the testimony within a kind of ontological invulnerability. There can be no contestation of opinion, no alternative historical narrative with any broad power of persuasion when it runs up against the perceived infallibility of sacralized truth" (2013:67).

Sheila's tone and words revealed both her anger and her fear; all those emotions that had finally started coming out, after years of being "boxed-in," could very well be sacralized as truth, but Sheila feared they would also be sealed away forever.

Back Home

The TRC characterizes the place of emotional tensions described by Ure (2008): on the one hand, encouraging emotions, such as anger, resulting from suffering and injustice and, on the other hand, expecting people to "move on" or, at least, control themselves. Indeed Ogi gwan abik's, Helen's and Sheila's somewhat unconventional participation revealed that if "the struggle to feel" is viewed as paramount in the regeneration of selves and communities (Million 2009) and TRCs provide a place for that, they also are very controlled, non-lasting places.

Ogi gwan abik and Sheila dealt with "Ure's tension" via emotional transgressions of either not showing expected emotions (Ogi gwan abik) or by showing emotions like anger, which trespassed TRC feeling rules (and, for Helen, with a lack of availability to emotions). Their distinct participation styles at the Montreal TRC remind us that the past is a site of struggle, not condensable into one "essentialized" story that the TRC tries to affirm (Niezen 2013). Ogi gwan abik's wish to have a representative church member present at his public testimony, and his frustration in not knowing whether this had prompted this person to action after, point to the fact that the Canadian TRC partially fails to fully provide the "process of dialogue with one's former enemies" described by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela (former coordinator of the South African TRC public hearings) as an inherent feature of truth commissions (2008:335). To recognize the TRC as a site of narrative and emotional struggle acknowledges that there are a variety of emotions at work. These emotions in turn are the communicating agents of "healing and reconciliation" and remind us that, for some survivors, reconciliation in this way is not desirable and anger is legitimate.

Following Martha Nussbaum's understanding of anger as underscoring as well as manifesting our shared vulnerability to suffering (2001, 2004), Paul Muldoon argues that

> anger should not be regarded as something antithetical to the cultivation of humanity which should be eradicated at any cost.... To become indifferent to the worldly attachments that lead to anger would be to simultaneously take away the basis for compassion and this, perhaps more certainly than any of the excesses of anger, would certainly put an end to the hope of reconciliation. [2008:310]

Not only does Muldoon's argument rehabilitate Sheila's anger, but also it calls for attention to how important it is in the wake of reconciliation projects. While many scholars argue that when fear and anger remain unacknowledged and unaddressed, they can easily re-create a culture of anxiety and resentment (Hutchison and Bleiker 2008:391), Muldoon further cautions against this presumption that anger necessarily descends into resentment and revenge. "It is possible to be angry without succumbing to a violent rage that wreaks havoc in an entirely disproportionate and indiscriminate fashion" (2008:309).

Sheila, Ogi gwan abik and most other survivors I spoke to from the community described being angry, but none voiced a desire of vengeance against their abusers or against the government. They mostly demanded land restitution and control and to "be left in peace." Yet this "being left in peace" was not articulated as a desire to ostracize anyone—which could have made more sense than a desire for revenge, as ostracism was a traditional Algonquin conflict resolution tool (see Bousquet 2009:58)—but more out of a sense of wariness and out of desire to control their own internal community affairs.

For Sheila and Ogi gwan abik, going home angry did not get fuelled into revenge and resentment but into an "Idle No More" initiative prompted by youths, who called upon the "Traditional Council of Grandmothers," which Sheila is a member of, to visit all the Algonquin communities in Quebec and speak to as many grandmothers as possible to work toward unity within and among the various communities (the Algonquins are divided between two tribal councils). "And this is what we were working on with the grandmother talk," Sheila explained. "We have to unite as one to stand and fight as one. Protect the mother-earth there from all this destruction that's going on. And to stand up to the government and say: enough is enough."

These community visits resulted in seven grandmothers (*kokoms*) from various Algonquin communities

coming together to organize the first bush camp specifically for Algonquin youth in July 2013. Children and teenagers camped out together in the bush for several days, and elders (including Ogi gwan abik) shared spiritual teachings and stories, following the seven "grandfathers": courage, wisdom, respect, love, honesty, truth and humility. On the day of the teaching on truth, Sheila brought her carved staff to the sacred fire where the teaching would take place. After we had all purified with smoke, she explained the story behind her staff and what was on it. She showed us a red ribbon tied to the top, which was there to remember residential school and had been given to her at the Montreal TRC event. There was no anger in her voice as she continued, by stressing the importance of unity among Algonquin people and how this was about doing things together in the bush. "Because everything is in the bush and you have to teach the kids. This is why we brought them here. To do that," she later told me.

> They destroyed the people, their self-esteem. So let them [youth] get back their inner spirit and this is where it is. It's in the bush, it's in the territories, where they all have their skill. Everything is in the bush. This is where our language is. This is where our culture is. Everything. It's in the bush. This is why they're doing this. They're cutting up the trees now. They're going to do mining. They put dams up. They're going to destroy everything that mother earth provides. And this is where we do our survival. This is where our teaching are, everything. A lot of things are in the bush to teach the children today. This is why we're doing what we're doing now. Nobody's recognizing that and certainly not the government.

"Kokom's camp" and the new offer of trauma workshops for Mitchikanobikok Inik survivors and their families via the reserve clinic constitute important healing spaces outside the TRC. They are locally understood as *mino mamwi sewin* (gathering with good intent), which is also how Sheila, Ogi gwan abik and Helen translate "reconciliation" into their language.

Conclusion

As this article has shown, Sheila, Ogi gwan abik and Helen provide us with three examples of distinct yet similar (in their non-conventionality) ways of participating at the TRC. By refusing to abide by TRC feeling rules, their participation highlights what Ure described as a fundamental emotional tension inherent to TRC projects. Via emotional transgressions, Sheila and Ogi gwan abik contest, in their own ways, "healing and reconciliation" as proposed by the TRC. Following Mul-

doon, this article has outlined that survivors' anger has legitimacy and points to the need for dialogue when it comes to the scope of justice in dealing with residential schools and the system they were a part of. The way Ogi gwan abik and Sheila dealt with their emotions reflects their desire to move away from a strictly interpersonal approach to reconciliation and points to outstanding structural issues. Yet the frustration and anger they came to the TRC with and took back home did not translate into revenge. Kokom's camp serves as an example of the work being done away from the eyes of the commission in the hope of fostering healing via cultural affirmation and, most importantly, of fostering unity to obtain recognition from the government.

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Notes

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2 This is Algonquin for "face in the rock," a pseudonym chosen by the participant.

3 The term *survivor* should be understood here as an appellation that former students have adopted, for the most part, as reflecting the reality of what they have overcome. Not dissociable from the language of trauma, the term *survivor* serves as a reminder that the psychological syndrome seen in survivors of rape, domestic battery and incest is essentially the same as the syndrome seen in survivors of war (Herman 1992:32). In this context, the term *residential school survivor* offers recognition of the impact of repeated abuse and trauma that children experienced in the schools, which were used as instruments of a larger colonial assimilative apparatus. The term *survivor* sounds more proactive than the term *victim* and, for this reason, former students have more readily adopted it. As this article will put forward, pending processes of national remembering and history-making, such appellations also run the risk of presenting humans in tightly unified groups.

4 In May 2006, the Canadian government, the churches involved in running the schools, the Assembly of First Nations and the plaintiffs (former students of Indian Residential Schools) agreed upon what would soon be known as the largest class action settlement in Canadian history: the IRSSA. The settlement is divided into five measures, two of which offer direct financial compensation to survivors (the *Common Experience Payment* and the *Independent*

Assessment Process) and three in the form of healing and education programs for the communities, including a *Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, a *Commemoration Programme* and additional funding of the *Aboriginal Healing Foundation*. Survivors had until Christmas 2006 to object to the IRSSA proposal. Once it was through, there was an opt-out period until spring 2007, at which point the settlement came into force (with a five-year mandate) and former students were able to start applying for payments. Those who chose to go ahead with the settlement lost their right to ever go back on the issue. That means they lost their right to bring the government or a former abuser to court. According to AANDC (2014), 1,074 former students opted out.

5 The TRC offers three kinds of event spaces: National Events across Canada (seven in total, the last one in 2014), Community Events and Individual Statement-Taking/Truth Sharing.

6 Anthropologists interested in emotions have recently moved away from the polarizing discourse that for so long pitted universalists and cultural constructionists against one another. In the quest for an integrative solution to a long-standing debate, Röttger-Rössler and Markowitsch (2009) came to the following interdisciplinary definition of emotions: emotions are complex bio-cultural interaction systems that develop and change over the course of time. This approach recognizes

> that the emotions felt by an individual in a given situation depend on several factors: the particular social context and the corresponding cultural models of interpretation and behavior, the biography and psychological structures of the single individual, and innate physiological processes anchored in human biology ("bodily reactions") and their subjective perception ("feeling"). The latter, in turn, is partly shaped by culture, just as the expression of emotions is molded by culture specific display rules. [3–4]

While endorsing this definition that acknowledges physiological processes, it is the specific sociocultural shaping this article focuses on.

7 The other non-transitional commission was the 1979 Greensborough Truth Commission that unfolded in North Carolina and inquired into the deaths of five anti–Ku Klux Klan demonstrators.

8 Unilateral forgiveness has been defined by Trudy Govier as not requiring acknowledgment or repentance on the part of the wrongdoer:

> He or she may be absent or even dead or may be present and unrepentant. When forgiveness is unilateral, the victim forgives not as a response to acknowledgment by the perpetrator but for other reasons of her own. These often include a sense that, for the victim herself, it will be best to overcome feelings of anger and resentment so as to cultivate a more constructive and healthy attitude to the world and move ahead in life. [2006:101]

9 To respect participants' privacy, all names in the article are pseudonyms.

10 This means they have never surrendered their rights and title to this land.

11 According to interviews with survivors, two generations of children from the community went to residential schools: the first was sent to two schools in Ontario in the 1950s and the second to the Indian Residential School of Amos between 1955 and 1973. Located at Saint-Marc-de-Figuery, the Indian Residential School of Amos was one of four schools in Quebec that was run by the Oblates of Mary Immaculate, a Roman Catholic community of missionary priests and brothers.

12 For more on the links between child-rearing cultural norms, practices and the development of socializing emotions (as tools that enable children to adjust their behaviours in culturally appropriate ways) see Quinn (2005) and Röttger-Rössler et al. (2013).

13 Mitchikanibikok Inik children until then had been brought up on the land, following a semi-nomadic hunter-trapper way of life. Traditional education, rooted in the valorization of respect, self-control, patience and endurance, encouraged learning through observation and letting children try things autonomously (Bousquet 2012). As has also been observed in other Aboriginal groups (Anderson 2007; Briggs 1970), correction happened indirectly, usually through humour or mockery.

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Enduring Pasts and Denied Presence: Mi'kmaw[1] Challenges to Continued Marginalization in Western Newfoundland

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Tyranny, stupidity and lack of vision have brought about what is now alluded to as the "Indian Problem."
Luther Standing Bear, Sioux, 1933

Abstract: Prior to the 1970s much of the anthropological research conducted in Newfoundland and Labrador focused on either Inuit, Innu or Beothuk populations, a fact that can be attributed to the failure of provincial and federal governments to formally recognize the Ktqamkukeweq (Newfoundland) Mi'kmaq. This study documents the ways in which the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq challenge the institutions and practices that serve to assimilate and suppress them. As an anthropology of decolonization, this research supports Aboriginal peoples in resisting colonial projects of assimilation and the dispossession of lands and resources by providing a counter-discourse to settler notions of what constitutes Aboriginal rights and claims to Aboriginality.

Keywords: Aboriginal, Mi'kmaq, Qalipu First Nations, Ktaqamkuk, Newfoundland, identity, assimilation, Aboriginal rights, neocolonialism, decolonization

Résumé : Avant les années 1970, la plupart des recherches anthropologiques menées à Terre-Neuve et au Labrador portaient sur les populations Inuits, Innues, ou Beothuks, un fait qu'on peut attribuer à l'incapacité des gouvernements fédéral et provincial de reconnaître les Mi'kmaqs Ktqamkukeweq de Terre-Neuve. Cette étude documente les manières par lesquelles les Mi'kmaqs de Terre-Neuve affrontent les institutions et les pratiques qui visent à les assimiler et les faire disparaître. Dans le cadre d'une anthropologie de la décolonisation, l'article soutient les peuples autochtones qui résistent aux projets coloniaux d'assimilation, de dépossession de leur territoire et de leurs ressources, et ce, en fournissant un contre-discours aux notions coloniales de ce que constituent les droits Autochtones et les revendications du statut d'Autochtone.

Mots-clés : Autochtones, Mi'kmaqs, Première Nation Qalipu, Ktaqamkuk, Terre-Neuve, identité, assimilation, droits autochtones, néocolonialisme, décolonisation

Introduction

In Canada, the forms of domination and preferred interest that marked colonization continue to affect the lifestyles and lifeways of Aboriginal peoples. This article derives from and responds to the need to approach Aboriginal studies in the context of applied anthropology, particularly as a form of social action focusing on the well-being of Canada's Aboriginal peoples. By foregrounding the negative effects of state policy and by critically examining the cumulative effects of colonial and state control, the centrality and persistence of dominant state discourses are called into question. Here, the struggle of the Ktamkukeweq (Newfoundland) Mi'kmaq to extricate themselves from a socio-political milieu, birthed in the colonial past and nurtured by the Canadian state, is examined.

At first glance, the formation of Qalipu Mi'kmaq First Nations Band (hereafter Qalipu Band) in September 2011 can be seen as a positive step forward for the majority of Mi'kmaq in Newfoundland and Labrador. However, as a landless band, its formation can also be viewed as a form of state repression within which Qalipu Band self-determination will be eclipsed by the state: under the Qalipu Band agreement, federal agencies will determine social and political orders and all rights to lands and resources are to be forfeited. In addition, the process through which the Qalipu Band was formed can be viewed as inherently flawed, in that approval for status is based on a set of criteria deemed legitimate by state agencies that is challenged by existing Mi'kmaw political organizations, such as the Grand Council and Mi'kmaw Kwilmu'kw Maw-klusuaqn Negotiation Office (MKMNO). In effect, the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq are to be governed by rules and regulations not of their own making and over which they have limited control.

Arguably, while events of the past reveal the power of the state to define, control and forcefully assimilate the Mi'kmaq of Newfoundland, the formation of the Qalipu Band may be seen as another stage of the same process. Rather than viewing its formation as a point of arrival, it may be seen as a point of departure or as a tentative first step in a protracted struggle. Essentially, the true point of arrival will be marked by the validation of Aboriginal lifeways, rights and freedoms as determined by the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq themselves.

Methodology

The information presented here is based on ethnographic research and data drawn from historical documents, media reports, social media sites, archival data and court documents pertaining to the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq. Ethnographic data were collected between 2006 and 2012, during a series of community consultations, private and public meetings, personal interviews and informal conversations, through participant observation and via print and social media sites. I work and reside in the western region of Newfoundland, and, although non-Aboriginal, I am an active member of the Corner Brook Aboriginal Women's Association (CBAWA) and the Newfoundland Aboriginal Women's Network (NAWN), which has allowed for direct and significant personal experience with those seeking Qalipu Band membership.

The ethnographic data informing this study were collected in the western, southwest and northwest regions of island Newfoundland and include general information on Mi'kmaw populations distributed throughout the province and within Eastern Canada. West Coast Newfoundland populations were selected because the majority of Newfoundlander residents claiming Mi'kmaw descent reside in the region, I live in close proximity to the target population and the Qalipu Mi'kmaq First Nations Band office is located in Corner Brook, the largest West Coast centre in Newfoundland.[2] Of the estimated 103,000-plus applicants for membership in the Qalipu Band, many, possibly the majority, reside outside the province. Non-resident Newfoundland Mi'kmaq, for whom no official figure is available, number in the tens of thousands and, as such, constitute a diverse and widely scattered population not included in this study. In addition, the Mi'kmaq of Miawpukek (Conne River) are not included, as this group obtained status in 1987 under a separate agreement, received self-government in 2013 and negotiated the terms of Miawpukek membership in collaboration with federal agencies and the Mi'kmaw Grand Council.[3] Other regions of the province were excluded principally because social and cultural contexts are considerably different from one region to another and require separate study.

Both the phenomenological method, as used and defined by anthropologist Michael Jackson (1996:1–3), and Gerald Sider's (2014:xv) observational methods were employed in the data collection and participant observation components of this research. My observations and their elaboration and expression are very much the culmination of an extended period of living among and acting as a direct witness to the recent experiences of local Mi'kmaq who reside in the western region of Newfoundland.

Ktamkukeweq (Newfoundland) Mi'kmaq in Context

The Mi'kmaq are an Algonquian group of speakers, residing primarily throughout Canada's Maritime provinces, the Gaspé Peninsula (Que.), the island of Newfoundland and regions within the United States, particularly Massachusetts and Maine. According to archaeologist Charles Martijn (1989), in pre-contact times and historically, the Mi'kmaq of Eastern Canada were competent marine travellers who made use of an archipelago of islands and coastal regions throughout the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Mi'kmaw annual seasonal rounds involved extensive travel throughout Mi'kma'ki (traditional territory).[4] The arrival of Europeans irreversibly changed Mi'kmaw subsistence patterns and created major shifts in their lifeways. For instance, Prince Edward Island and the Magdalen Islands, territories once favoured for hunting and fishing by Mi'kmaq, were claimed by European settlers to exploit the significant resources they offered (Martijn 1989). Written documents, dating from the early 16th and 17th centuries, pertaining to Mi'kmaw presence in Newfoundland attest to Mi'kmaw occupation and use of the region (Marshall 1996:45; Wetzel 1995:132–136; Whitehead 1991:22). The displacement of the Mi'kmaq from their traditional hunting territories is a primary consideration when assessing the impact of European immigration and settlement in Eastern Canada, one that offers a compelling argument for Mi'kmaw claims to Aboriginal rights in Newfoundland. Arguments supporting the rights of Newfoundland Mi'kmaq inform the constitutional claims made by the Federation of Newfoundland Indians (FNI) in 1989 and contribute to the premise of systemic marginalization experienced by the Mi'kmaq imposed by British imperialism and upheld by the Canadian state.

Under both British imperial policy and responsible government, which remained intact in Newfoundland and Labrador until 1949, the presence of the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq was officially ignored (Tanner 1998:238).

However, when the former colony became Canada's tenth province, the denial of a Mi'kmaw presence was taken to an extreme; at that time, the position taken by both federal and provincial representatives presaged the universalism of Trudeau's White Paper (Government of Canada 1969), by claiming all peoples in the province to be one and the same with no substantive provisions being made for its Innu, Inuit, Métis and Mi'kmaw populations (Wetzel 1999). This one-identity-fits-all approach to governance asserted a form of neo-colonialism that ensured continued and, arguably, increased repression of Aboriginal peoples in the province. Quite possibly meant as a political coup, this approach did not work as intended and set in motion a series of events that have yet to be addressed to the satisfaction of the province's Aboriginal populations. The lack of attention to the rights of Aboriginal peoples and the neglect of state institutions to uphold their responsibilities to them are characteristic of countries with racist histories, particularly those where forced assimilation, dispossession and extermination were in evidence and where present-day injustices continue to be tolerated (Keal 2003:165). The Canadian state shares many of these characteristics and continues to hold Indigenous peoples under a form of federal control rendered valid by the application of the Indian Act in 1876, to which all status "Indians" are subject and that may be viewed as a set of terms and conditions upholding the colonial ideologies and practices that reinforce the political, social and economic marginalization of Aboriginal populations. Interestingly, in Canada's Constitution Act (Government of Canada 1982), Part I, Section 25 of the Charter of Rights and Part II, Section 35 of the Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada clearly establish Aboriginal and Treaty rights as the supreme law of Canada. Although provisions within the Constitution Act supersede the Indian Act, the Government of Canada is delinquent in reconciling the provisions that affirm Aboriginal and Treaty rights (Bird 2011).

For the majority of Newfoundland Mi'kmaq, the Canadian government's Agreement in Principle (AIP) with the FNI in 2007 represents long-awaited acknowledgment of their rights as Aboriginal peoples. The intent of the AIP was to formally recognize Mi'kmaw peoples (and their descendants) who were eligible for status under the Indian Act when the Terms of Union between Canada and the Dominion of Newfoundland was signed in 1949. The AIP set in motion a process to recognize a "new regime" with the formation of a landless band, the Qalipu Mi'kmaq First Nation. Emerging from this process were applications in excess of 103,000 people for potential registration as status Indians under the band.

As noted on the Qalipu Band official website, landless band status ensures funding in support of non-insured medical and dental benefits, post-secondary education and training, band administration and programs to promote business and various other community-based initiatives. However, it does not provide exemption from federal, provincial and municipal taxation (including property, gas, sales and income tax). While realization of the landless band is not an ideal solution for Mi'kmaw registrants, it represents an initial step in addressing a series of historical and present-day injustices. The formation of the Qalipu Band in November 2011 spurred increased activity among Newfoundland-based Mi'kmaq, who are now in the process of reclaiming their identities as First Peoples, revitalizing their heritage and culture and asserting a renewed sense of community. However, while progress is being made in these areas, other areas of conflict and adversity have emerged.

Generally, the formation of the Qalipu Band is a historical milestone that marks the end of an era and the beginning of the so-called new regime that, in terms of justice for the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq, promises much but offers little restitution. Ahead, I outline the direct effects of social, economic, political and cultural marginalization that resulted from state oppression of the Mi'kmaq. In the section following, the political foundations of the FNI, the registration process for claims to "Indian" status and the founding of the Qalipu Band are considered. And the final section discusses the ways in which the formal recognition of Newfoundland Mi'kmaq as status Indians has given rise to personal and collective identity and a renewed sense of community. Here, I also consider some of the challenges that accompany such transformations, notably that, with membership in the Qalipu Band and registration under the Indian Act, new sets of problems are emerging.

Colonialism, State Repression and the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq

Jennifer Reid maintains that, in the case of the Mi'kmaq, throughout Mi'kma'ki the Christianity and civility of British colonials ran counter to what they perceived as the "savagery and heathenism" of the Mi'kmaq: "like the uncultivated land that was without meaning, the Mi'kmaq were regarded as lacking human significance and so were ignored altogether or imagined to be material for further acts of transformation" (1995:98).[5] Reid's observations characterize the experience of the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq under British and Canadian rule, whereby the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq were subjected to assimilation policies that privileged Eurocentric ideologies and philosophies that forcefully subverted and

radicalized Mi'kmaw traditions and lifeways—policies that culminated in the outright denial of a Mi'kmaw presence in the province (Hanrahan 2003; Lawrence 2003; Robinson 2012). The domination and suppression of the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq have a complex history, one that is not easily reconstructed owing to the fact that the province's early history almost exclusively focused on immigrant populations on the east coast, with scant attention paid to the western, interior and northern regions. For the purposes at hand, more recent Mi'kmaw history and experiences are foregrounded, beginning with 19th-century British colonial rule (1855 and following), Newfoundland's inclusion within the British Dominion (1907–49) and the impact of confederation on the Mi'kmaq.[6]

From the time the British claimed sovereignty over the region, Aboriginal populations were either completely ignored or subjected to severe and effective government oppression. Throughout Canada Aboriginal peoples were forced to bow to the authority of foreign rule through enforced repressive policies and strategies (including warfare), which pushed them to the margins of society, facts to which the political, social and economic marginalization of Aboriginal peoples in Canada stands as testimony. In Newfoundland, the political strategies employed by controlling authorities follow a similar pattern; warfare was a common tactic of domination which precipitated the demise of the Beothuk and, more generally, throughout Mi'kma'ki, resulted in the drastic reduction of Mi'kmaw populations (V. Miller 1982).

During the early phases of colonial expansion, the rights of Aboriginal peoples to traditional resources, including lands, were upheld through treaty negotiations (Keal 2003; Lawrence 2003; J. Miller 2004; Wicken 2004) but no such rights were extended to the Aboriginal peoples of Newfoundland and Labrador. Anthropologist Adrian Tanner argues that, between the late 18th and early 19th centuries, Aboriginal peoples "soon found themselves transformed from independent peoples ... to refugees in their own land, outnumbered by newcomers and no longer able to support themselves as they had always done" (1998:239). The overarching project to assimilate involved transformative ideas about education, a sedentary agricultural economy and the imposition of beliefs and values that detracted from traditional teachings and socialization processes. David McNab notes that

> British Imperial Policy towards the Mi'kmaq nation in Newfoundland by the mid-nineteenth century was a half-way house from the earlier policy of extermination towards a new policy of indifference, neglect and gradual amalgamation. [1995:2]

The writings of Herman Merivale, a British civil servant responsible for the Mi'kmaw nation, reflect prevailing mid-19th-century attitudes about Aboriginal peoples; "natives" were regarded as a lower class like the Irish or the poor in Britain, and British liberals sought to better the material condition of these people by means of the panaceas of education and religion. Their object was humanitarian and their methods were usually paternalistic (McNab 1995:9). Merivale considered the "native question," or the questions of "civilizing"/assimilating peoples, to be the "greatest moral difficulty of colonization" (McNab 1995:21) and the most significant challenge to European expansion. In effect, the problems raised by the "native question" were intimately connected to other concerns, such as free trade, missionary enterprises, responsible government, commercial enterprise and imperial defence (20). However, Merivale also felt that the difficulties associated with colonization were detrimental to Aboriginal populations and were practically unsolvable.

> The hunting tribes that first became known to Europeans were the mere fragments of a great family of the human species, losing, in every successive generation, something of the qualities which had distinguished their predecessors, diminishing in numbers and resources, and on their way to extinction; and there are some who hold the same opinion respecting all the races commonly called savage. [McNab 1995:7]

Accordingly, for the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq, the imposition of British colonial rule radically altered most aspects of their being. As with many Aboriginal peoples, the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq were considered "savage/uncivilized whereas settler populations, particularly the English and Irish, were viewed as civilized" (Bartels and Bartels 2005:253). Moreover, Mi'kmaw affiliations with the French resulted in added discrimination. British colonials were notorious for their ill treatment of the Mi'kmaq throughout Mi'kma'ki, particularly in Nova Scotia, where local Mi'kmaq were noted allies of the French.[7] For the Mi'kmaq of western Newfoundland, geographic isolation from their mainland counterparts added to a decline in traditional ways. In time, isolation and increased pressure to assimilate resulted in the loss of many aspects of traditional lifeways, including social organization, cultural practices, the use of traditional language and, in many cases, their very identity as Mi'kmaw peoples (Robinson 2012).

Across Canada, colonial and federal policies were guided by the dual fallacies of gradual but progressive assimilation and/or the certain extinction of Aboriginal

populations, neither of which occurred. The short-sightedness of such policies caused and continues to cause extensive and persistent problems for Aboriginal peoples. A rather graphic reminder of the ways in which altering subsistence strategies destabilizes communities can be seen in the instance of present-day Labrador Inuit communities. Recent studies have shown that government policies designed and implemented for relocation have had a detrimental effect on Inuit populations, resulting in lack of meaningful livelihoods, low self-esteem, widespread substance abuse and general social disintegration (Government of Canada 1996; Samson 2003). Although Canadian Aboriginal policies were not imposed on the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq in the 1930s, when success and status became associated with the European class-based system, coercive assimilationist forces resulted in the suppression of personal and social identities, in that ancestral lines, traditions and cultural heritage were publicly and privately subverted. In many cases, they were forgotten or, quite simply, never known. Dorothy Anger notes that Mi'kmaw ancestry was downplayed, "remaining only alive within family circles," principally because it was often accompanied by negative attributes, such as "dirty, thieving or lazy" (Anger 1988:x). One man informed me that his family was locally known as "the savages on the hill" and was targeted as culprits if property was stolen or damaged in the area (personal communication, February 24, 2009).

Local Mi'kmaq were often referred to pejoratively as *jakatars*, a term which has various interpretations (Robinson 2012). Significantly, throughout the Bay St. George, Bay of Islands and Port au Port regions, among non-Aboriginal the term was universally applied to local peoples regardless of their ancestral backgrounds. Historian Gerald Thomas (1977) suggests that, in its original context, "jackotar" was used to refer to French national fisherman who had deserted the fishery to avoid military service and who were attracted to the French Shore because it lacked laws and policing.[8] While the term is ascribed different meanings by different people, over time it was applied generally, and again pejoratively, to those of French/Indian descent. John Mannion maintains that "some [Mi'kmaq] intermarried with the local Acadians and French and were called Jack A' Tars" (1977:237). However, like their counterparts in Nova Scotia, many Mi'kmaq in the region spoke several languages, predominantly French, English, Mi'kmaq and Gaelic. French was commonly spoken along the western region of the province, particularly in Port au Port and Bay St. George's, as these names suggest. Commonly referred to as the French Treaty Shore, from 1783 to 1904 the French were given exclusive fishing rights to the area in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles. However, historical evidence also suggests that several Mi'kmaw families in Bay St. George descended from the earliest settlers to the region, predating mass European immigration.[9] One regional genealogist informed me that distinguishing between the several French populations in the region is a difficult task since "some Mi'kmaq have French ancestry while others do not" (personal communication, July 23, 2009). Hence, many can be more accurately described as French-speaking Mi'kmaq and not French-Mi'kmaq. Tanner and Anger point out that, within local communities, social distinctions between "proper French," the Mi'kmaq and the British were made clear (1995:78). These distinctions were marked by religious backgrounds (Protestant and Catholic) and by community: the communities of Flat Bay, St. Theresa's and Fishells were Catholic and Mi'kmaq, while the neighbouring community of Heatherton was British and Protestant (79).

Tanner and Anger (1995) also maintain that a clear social hierarchy was established between groups in the region, with the British (English speakers) positioned as the local elite, followed by the French, with the Mi'kmaq situated at the bottom of the social scale. This social order was evident in most areas where Mi'kmaq resided, particularly in centres such as Stephenville and Corner Brook, where wage-based jobs were available. For instance, the majority of those interviewed in Stephenville and Stephenville Crossing remarked that during the construction and operation of the Harmond Air Force Base, people of Mi'kmaw descent were discriminated against in the hiring process. I was told by one woman that her father would "never admit to being Indian" because "you would not be hired" (personal communication, July 8, 2008).

One region of Corner Brook, Crow Gulch, was a dilapidated area that housed the city's poorest population. Many Crow Gulch residents were of Mi'kmaw descent, mostly unemployed and, by many accounts, unemployable. Crow Gulch had no electricity, running water, sewage or garbage disposal and consisted of a series of "shacks" built along the sides of an old stone quarry cut through by railway tracks. Crow Gulch overlooked Corner Brook Pulp and Paper Limited, but few of its residents worked there. A resident of nearby Curling told me that "respectable people" never entered Crow Gulch as they did not want to be associated with its residents. Even taxi drivers stayed on the fringes, dropping fares off near the "last street light" at the end of Broadway, a local street bordering Crow Gulch (personal communication, January 18, 2009).[10]

Economic Transitions and Transformed Communities

Eric Wolf (1982) notes that the fundamental contradictions between Aboriginal and Western capitalist modes of production and the tensions precipitated by their intersection have deep roots in the process of colonization. Accordingly, recent studies in development anthropology that identify the subordination of receiving, "developing" populations to the interests of the "developer" reveal strikingly similar characteristics to Newfoundland Mi'kmaq experiences during the transition from a subsistence-based to a wage-based economy. As in other regions, colonial and subsequent state governments conveniently denied or ignored Mi'kmaw concepts, beliefs and values to serve dominant interests (Reid 1995:101–102). Across Newfoundland and Labrador, the onset of WWII brought significant economic changes that transformed relative rural independence and autonomy into "unprecedented dependency" (Kennedy 1997:307). For the Mi'kmaq in western Newfoundland, radical economic changes were instituted in the late 1930s when the rise of commercial industry in the region brought a significant demographic shift marked by a "diversity of cultures" (Mannion 1977:243). At the time, populations throughout the Port au Port peninsula and St. George's Bay were predominantly Catholic, deriving from Acadian, French, Irish, Scottish and Mi'kmaw origins (Mannion 1977:236–243). In a 1995 study, anthropologists Adrian Tanner and Dorothy Anger made the following observations:

> Industrial development, white settlement, ecological deprivation and assimilationist acts of government, church and school have undermined and left it [Mi'kmaw society] on the verge of destruction ... [The Newfoundland] Mi'kmaq went from socio-cultural and economic independence, [and were subject to] externally-imposed social and economic change causing cultural loss and demoralization. [1995:12]

Arguably, introduced settler, market-based systems forcefully subverted and radicalized traditional subsistence strategies and lifeways, while simultaneously privileging Eurocentric ideologies and philosophies.[11] Unfortunately for the Mi'kmaq, an increased European presence and the rise of industry, coupled with their physical isolation from other Mi'kmaw communities, meant that the Mi'kmaq of western Newfoundland[12] were left with few resources with which to combat the destructive forces that accompanied dispossession and marginalization (Robinson 2012).

Although the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq quickly and selectively adapted to the ever-changing economic and social conditions imposed by colonizer/settler society, few employment options were available to them.[13] Key to understanding the situation among the Mi'kmaq of western Newfoundland is the fact that Mi'kmaw forebears and, until recently, their descendants have borne the burden of being labelled Indian without sharing in the rights that accompany status recognition. The effects of outright discrimination, negative labels and stereotyping accompanied systemic social, economic and political marginalization within a class-based system diametrically opposed to accommodating traditional Mi'kmaw lifeways (Reid 1995; Robinson 2005). Along with the rise of industry in the region came the process of dispossession. While displacement typically occurred throughout Mi'kma'ki during the early contact period (McGee 1983; Prins 1996; Reid 1995; Upton 1979), in Newfoundland there was a dispossession by degrees. Notably, the impact of European expansion on Aboriginal populations in Newfoundland involved local and regional Mi'kmaw populations taking on labour-intensive jobs, many of which their non-Aboriginal counterparts rejected. According to the 1921 and 1945 Newfoundland censuses, the Mi'kmaq lived off the land in occupations such as forestry, fishing, coopering, farming, guiding and trapping/"furring."[14] The 1945 census notes that a small number of Mi'kmaw males were employed by the railway; none, however, claimed employment at U.S. Harmon Air Force Base (HAFB)[15] in Stephenville. In western Newfoundland, it is commonly known that racial profiling greatly influenced whether a person gained employment at HAFB or at the Corner Brook Pulp and Paper Limited (Bartels and Bartels 2005). Anger observes that in Corner Brook, ethnic and social boundaries existed between local Mi'kmaq and Mill workers:

> The English and Anglo-Newfoundland executives formed the upper social echelon. Mill workers, office staff and loggers scrambled for their place in the hierarchy ... The "Frenchies," Micmacs from Bay St. George, did not take part in the paper industry and were marginalized by all other sectors of Corner Brook society. They eked out an existence based on subsistence activities, legal and illegal. Their part of town [Crow Gulch] was avoided by "respectable" people. [Anger 1997:n.page]

Similarly, for the Mi'kmaq in Stephenville, the construction of the HAFB had a transformative effect on local populations; it entailed the loss of community and the forfeiture of farmlands and homesteads which were co-opted in the late 1930s.[16] This precipitated radical changes to the way that many people made a living,

transformed social relations and disrupted the pre-existing community structure. Local residents were no longer self-sufficient: prime agricultural land was lost in the construction of HAFB, and there was less access to wildlife resources as the influx of civilian construction and support/maintenance workers placed additional stress on local resources. Family and other social networks were seriously disrupted owing to the fact that many householders were forced to relocate to other areas, becoming dispersed throughout the bays, miles away from family members. The forced relocation of families physically distanced members of family networks and fractured the community. Tanner and Anger note that "increased white settlement and industrial development meant that Micmac communities became isolated from each other ... [and] destroyed much of Micmac hunting lands. Yet there is almost no recognition of these events in the white historical record" (1995:52).

Local residents were faced with a new set of social challenges, since along with the base came a new wave of immigrants in the form of American servicemen, who quickly established a division between themselves and local residents. One respondent told me that she felt intimidated by the Americans, but soon learned that "we could survive where they all would die in a pile ... but I think they enhanced what the British had already done to us" (personal communication, July 8, 2008). Accordingly, people in the region actively promoted an Anglo-European identity. By most accounts, it was felt that by claiming French or, worse, Indian extraction, you were denied assurance of success in the emerging economy. Another respondent commented that "my father couldn't identify that he was Mi'kmaw ... [He] was told straight out, if you identify as a Mi'kmaw, you will not get a job with the Americans. They will not hire Indians ... So, he never admitted he was Mi'kmaq" (personal communication, June 25, 2011).The HAFB, as one person put it, was "the final blow" for the Mi'kmaq. Although the construction and operation of HAFB from 1941 until 1966 provided economic advantages to the area, for Aboriginal peoples its presence proved to be yet another form of dispossession and marginalization.

Blatant as well as more discrete forms of discrimination persist today. Collected qualitative data obtained through interviews, informal conversations and participant observation reveal two very specific forms of systemic discrimination relating to the registration process: among eligible registrants many were either unaware of their ancestry until recently or they were reluctant to publically acknowledge their ancestral connections. In the first instance, many applicants discovered their Mi'kmaw roots when their relatives were accepted into local band organizations. One man told me that he accidentally discovered his ancestral roots in a casual conversation in which it was revealed that his cousins were accepted for membership in the Qalipu Band. Until this discovery, he had "absolutely no idea" that his grandmother was a "full-blooded Mi'kmaq" (personal communication, July 10, 2008). Another respondent told me that although her mother knew she was of Mi'kmaw descent, she vehemently denied it. Out of respect, the family did not pursue their Mi'kmaw roots until after her death. However, it was also suggested to me that there are and were varying degrees of discrimination from region to region. For instance, I was told that in Corner Brook it is "generally understood and accepted that, of those born within 'the bay' [Bay of Islands] two generations or more back, the majority have Aboriginal ancestry" (personal communication, August. 12, 2010). The respondent added that Mi'kmaw ancestry was so common that it was rarely commented upon and that she perceived no negative associations with being Aboriginal. However, for a respondent from Flat Bay, an acknowledged Mi'kmaw community, there was no escaping an Indian identity or the negative slurs and taunts that went along with such recognition (personal communication, May 12, 2008). The Corner Brook perspective noted earlier is, however, at variance with most of the information gathered recently and conflicts with Anger's commentary on the "Frenchies" from Crow Gulch, who were reviled as an unsavory lot and were economically and socially marginalized within greater Corner Brook society (Robinson 2012). One possible reason for discrepancies between these accounts could be, as Anger notes, that the residents of Crow Gulch, like the "Indians" from Flat Bay and Bay St. George, were economically marginalized, were more visibly "Indian" and were among those Mi'kmaq who did not fare well within a largely industrialized economy (Anger 1997).

Confederation, the Terms of Union and the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq

For the Mi'kmaq, the end of British rule in Newfoundland did not mark the end of suppression, but was arguably the beginning of transformed repression. Confederation, according to John Omohundro (1985), brought swift and radical economic change to Newfoundland and Labrador, changes which could not be accommodated readily by receiving populations. As noted, colonial domination proved to be an almost insurmountable obstacle for Mi'kmaq in the province. Thereafter, Newfoundland and Labrador's entry into confederation served to further marginalize the Mi'kmaq through increased political and economic domination by the Canadian state, whereby

they fell victim to almost complete social and cultural assimilation. While small pockets of the Mi'kmaw population managed to retain aspects of their social and cultural integrity, many were compelled to adopt the ways of mainstream settler society. With assimilation and often seamless incorporation into prevailing society and culture, individual and collective identity as Mi'kmaq was radically obscured, becoming discretely hidden or completely eclipsed. State denial of a Mi'kmaw presence in the province, as encoded in the Terms of Union, is indicative of deeper, broader and more systemic forms of marginalization that serve to deny rights to lands, resources and access to many aspects of Aboriginal birthright for Mi'kmaq residing outside Miawpukek.

Maura Hanrahan argues that Mi'kmaq omission from the Terms of Union "has had lasting negative repercussions ... in terms of community health, community infrastructure, and land claims" (2003:n.pag.). Ultimately, what emerged out of this omission were deliberate efforts to reinforce continued political impotency and ethnic discrimination supported by Eurocentric interpretations directly pertaining to land and resource rights in Newfoundland. I have argued elsewhere (Robinson 2012) that the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq are victims of a politicized geography since they are seen predominantly as an immigrant population. With the exception of the Beothuk, the only other group accepted as having any legitimate claim to a land base on the island is the Miawpukek Mi'kmaq. The long-held "Mi'kmaq as immigrant" argument is firmly located within the Eurocentric notion that a rightful claim to land is predicated on a *terra nullis*, or "discovery" argument. However, the official position of the federal and provincial governments to assign ownership based on European settlement patterns is itself rooted in a selective interpretation of historical documentation. For instance, Don Downer notes that the Mi'kmaq were the first settlers to arrive in the western region, followed in the late 18th and early 19th centuries by English, Irish, Jerseymen, French and Acadians (1997:17–20). However, this fact is frequently overlooked within the historical and social scientific literature, which focuses on European immigration. An important and related consideration is the fact that documentation pertaining to the immigration of Nova Scotian Mi'kmaq to Newfoundland during the 18th century is not fully contextualized as resulting from the dispossession of lands and physical dislocation, but is most often used to support the immigration perspective which is based on the notion of permanent settlement. From the immigration perspective, the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq are not recognized as First Peoples in the province. This argument appears to be

the basis for their omission from the Terms of Union[17] and is one that gained increasing credibility thereafter.[18] However, according to Mi'kmaw oral history and as previously noted, the Mi'kmaq carried out traditional, seasonal occupation and use of lands along the Gulf of St. Lawrence including many regions throughout island Newfoundland (Martijn 2005). The argument privileging permanent versus seasonal occupation is soundly entrenched in a colonial/settler frame of reference that rejects Mi'kmaw traditions and lifeways.[19] Accordingly, Eurocentric interpretations of land occupancy, use and "ownership," which form the legal basis for the Mi'kmaw dispossession of land, are central to understanding the negative effects of colonizer/settler frameworks of meaning imposed on Aboriginal populations.

A different form of political marginalization is evident in what Dennis Bartels (1987) refers to as the "Micmac Mercenary Myth" (MMM). Taught in public schools until the late 1960s,[20] this account of Mi'kmaw presence in Newfoundland suggests that they were introduced to the island by the French during the 18th century to wage war against the then "troublesome" Beothuk. However, such claims have been refuted by several scholars (Bartels 1987; Caddigan 2009; Pastore 1978; Upton 1977) and have been replaced (particularly within scholarship) with a more comprehensive version of Beothuk "extermination," involving a combination of factors, not the least of which was the hunting of Beothuk by European settlers, most notably the newcomer residents of central and northeastern Newfoundland.

While political marginalization by federal and provincial governments led to the historical subversion of the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq, it did not suppress their insistence on formal recognition within the province. As mentioned, Flat Bay, a small community in St. George's Bay, is widely acknowledged as a Mi'kmaw community, with the majority of its residents being recognized as "Indian." With the exception of Miawpukek, Flat Bay has emerged as the locus of a legal challenge to the Canadian state. Flat Bay resident Calvin White, elder and former president of the FNI, was one of the first and most vocal promoters for the recognition of Mi'kmaq in the province. Beginning in the early 1970s and coinciding with the American Indian Movement (AIM), White and others consistently lobbied for status under the Indian Act, claiming that the formal recognition of the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq was long overdue.[21]

The main impetus behind the formation of the FNI was to address issues resulting from Newfoundland's entry into confederation. For the next four decades, the FNI sought redress through formal means and from 2004 to 2011 actively engaged in negotiations with Ottawa to

establish First Nations status for its membership.[22] In 1989, the FNI filed court action against the Government of Canada in violation of the Canadian Constitution, claiming that under Section 91(24) the federal government failed to provide the "benefits, entitlements and rights provided to other Indians, and Indian bands" and is, therefore, in violation of its fiduciary obligations under Section 52(4) of the Charter (*ER v. White* [2011]). The resolution of this action resulted in the Agreement in Principle (AIP) signed in November 2007, and in September 2011 the Harper government announced the recognition of the Qalipu Mi'kmaq First Nation as a landless band.

Once set in motion, registration with the Qalipu Band was not to proceed uninterrupted. On February 1, 2010, Calvin White filed a court injunction expressing concerns about the process leading up to the foundation of the band, demanding that all eligible members be registered on the First Founder's List (Government of Canada 2011).[23] The Plaintiff's main concern was that a failure to make the initial list would result in the creation of "two classes" of membership, whereby members on the First Member's List would have rights and privileges denied those added after the formation of the Qalipu Band (Government of Canada 2011).[24] White alleged that non-inclusion on the initial list would impact on "a person's ability to vote or run Band elections, apply for certain jobs offered to Status Indians, partake in benefits and social programs offered by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and access benefits currently offered by the Federation of Newfoundland Indians" (Government of Canada 2011). In sum, there was the overriding concern that of those eligible for membership in the Qalipu Band, members added after its founding would be relegated to lesser positions within the organization and that political, economic and social discrimination would remain a reality for at least half or possibly the majority of potential registrants. The creation of a two-classed membership is reminiscent of the historical separation of the Miawpukek Mi'kmaq and the Federation of Newfoundland Indians in 1983 (Qalipu Mi'kmaq First Nation Band n.d.) and is a situation that White perceived would thrust second-class Indians into a protracted legal struggle that would take years or even decades to settle.

Although the registration process served to address several issues pertaining to Mi'kmaw marginalization in Newfoundland, it also uncovered the continuing negative effects of colonization. While Calvin White's attempt to create an equal opportunity registration process proved successful for some potential registrants, the inequalities

he anticipated are now becoming evident. Since the burden of proof rests firmly on the shoulders of those wishing to claim Indian status, there are few solutions to the many problems encountered in the registration process. First and foremost, there is the issue of documenting a legitimate claim to Mi'kmaw ancestry. Fortunately, many Mi'kmaq have ready access to church and government documents, archival records and historical proof (oral or otherwise); however, many others do not. The fact that the Mi'kmaq are now required to show incontrovertible proof of ancestry is complicated by the fact that oftentimes the assignation of Indian was not registered in legal documents, particularly census, birth, marriage and death records. Various applicants have related to me reasons for these omissions, which include the failure by church and government officials to register ancestry and attempts by those of Aboriginal descent to avoid the types of discrimination discussed earlier. In addition, many potential registrants claim that lost, misplaced or inaccurate documents often frustrate the process: names changed or misspelled by notaries and clergy cause complications; personal and official documents lost in fires and floods or otherwise destroyed often result in a failure to establish proof or add to financial costs associated with securing other forms of documentation; and many of those who knew the oral history and heritage of a region are either at an advanced age or are deceased. Alternatively, several people have subjected themselves to DNA testing, which alleviates some issues, but there are numerous ethical implications to consider and many people remain suspicious of this procedure.

The problem of literacy and access to administrative supports has proven to be an obstacle as well. In many areas of the province, those who worked in land-based occupations, such as the lumber and fishing industries, often have low literacy skills and require assistance to navigate through and properly complete registration forms. Lack of access to administrative supports prevents some eligible registrants from filing applications. An associated problem for those living in remote and distant locations in the province and elsewhere is a general lack of access to the regional processing centres located in Stephenville, Grand Falls and Corner Brook. In areas throughout the Northern Peninsula, such as Hawke's Bay, Bartlett's Harbour and St. Anthony, this particular issue has proven to be a deterrent. In addition, financial costs associated with registration are problematic for some potential registrants. Average costs associated with filing applications range from hundreds to thousands of dollars, depending on the amount

and type of documentation required. Again, in regions where most are pensioners, unemployed or under-employed, out-of-pocket expenses are unaffordable and many people are reluctant to invest funds into a registration process that may prove futile. If travel is required to consult public archives or to retrieve other required documents, either within or outside the province, then additional costs are incurred, which in some cases become formidable obstacles.

Another significant obstacle to full registration is the fact that many of those eligible for membership are/were completely unaware of their ancestry (Robinson 2012). A member of a local Mi'kmaw woman's group informed me that of the "countless people" who had contacted the organization, many had just learned of their ancestry and were seeking a way forward (personal communication, May 15, 2012). She also commented that, in her view, the main factor contributing to this lack of knowledge pertains to the fact that Aboriginal identity and lineages were hidden, owing to fear of discrimination. The degree to which identities were hidden is a common encumbrance met with in the process of reclaiming Mi'kmaw ancestry, heritage and identity. The inherent irony here is that the governments responsible for the suppression of all things Mi'kmaq are now demanding that proof of being Mi'kmaq was miraculously retained over time and can be retrieved upon demand. No doubt many required documents can be provided, but time constraints and missing documentation ensure that injustice and inequality will prevail to some degree.

In addition to the foregoing, the official response of representatives of the broader Mi'kmaw community presents a further complication and a formidable challenge to Qalipu Band formation and the registration process. In more recent years, particularly 2011–2014, the Maritime Mi'kmaw nation at large has become increasingly proactive on the topic of citizenship. In a letter dated October 14, 2013, to United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples James Anaya, the Mi'kmaw Grand Council formally objected to the 2007 AIP (noted earlier) and the formation of the Qalipu Band, stating that the "unilateral federal action" to potentially qualify 100,000-plus members for membership in the Qalipu Band violates "article 33 of the Declaration that affirms the ability of Indigenous people to determine their own identity and membership" (Grand Council of the Micmacs 2013). The letter establishes that the Grand Council reserves

the jurisdiction and rights to create or recognize any individuals as "Mi'kmaq" in accordance with our custom and traditions ... [That] the Grand Council has never been consulted by the federal government or the Qalipu Mi'kmaq, during the creation or negotiation of this band ... [And, although the formation of the band seeks] to remedy historical wrongs of Newfoundland ... their large numbers of new Mi'kmaq is our concern ... These new Qalipu members we simply do not know and do not recognize as Mi'kmaq. [Grand Council of the Micmacs 2013]

Another Nova Scotia–based group, the Mi'kmaw Rights Initiative or Mi'kmaw Kwilmu'kw Maw-klusuaqn Negotiation Office (MKMNO), was established to seek "consensus on the best ways to implement our Aboriginal and treaty rights" (Kwilmu'kw Maw-klusuaqn n.d.). Citizenship is a topic of primary concern for the MKMNO, which focuses on the issue as a "two part question—Who is a Mi'kmaq person and why?" Responses to this inquiry entail the involvement of the Mi'kmaw people in determining the criteria for band inclusion and exclusion. Throughout 2013, MKMNO's Citizenship Officer held meetings in communities throughout Nova Scotia, focusing on the very issue. For both the Grand Council and MKMNO representatives, federal government involvement in matters of citizenship did not go unchallenged. However, such proactive responses do not bode well for potential Qalipu Band registrants, as the criteria for membership were devised by both the FNI and the federal government with no input, either sought or received, from the larger Mi'kmaw community.

The observation that the restoration of Aboriginal cultures and societies is a lengthy and complicated process involving extended periods of resistance and strife is fitting in the Qalipu case (Battiste 2000). However, while often disruptive, such processes and periods are necessary to effect significant change.

Reclaiming Mi'kmaw Ancestry, Heritage and Identity in the 21st Century

Among the positive outcomes emerging from the formation of the Qalipu Band is the renewed pride and interest in all aspects of Mi'kmaw culture and heritage, the rise of various cultural groups throughout Newfoundland and the re-emergence of a strong sense of community. Historically, some Newfoundland Mi'kmaq managed to retain aspects of their culture and heritage; many did not, however. Arguably, at a collective level, the majority of Newfoundland Mi'kmaq residing outside Miawpukek rank among the most westernized/assimilated in Eastern

Canada. Hence, for some, reclaiming, retaining and promoting Mi'kmaw culture and heritage are of primary importance. The reasons behind Mi'kmaw integration into mainstream society, many of which were identified earlier, precipitated the loss of ancestral ties, contributed to the fracturing of community and pre-empted a strong Aboriginal presence in the region (Robinson 2012). However, the registration process and the anticipated formation of the Qalipu Band have helped to promote a sense of community, owing in no small measure to the uncovering of ancestral lines. Rather than limiting the notion of community to fictive kinships (i.e., ethnic concepts of "brothers and sisters"), many Newfoundland Mi'kmaq create community through tracing blood relations and connecting with relatives along one or more ancestral lines. In turn, the formation of a personal and collective sense of Mi'kmaw identity deriving from these connections has given rise to a cultural revival or "awakening," primarily focused on expressions of Aboriginality that uphold strong, personally held beliefs about what it means to be Mi'kmaw and an affirmation of the right of Mi'kmaq peoples to develop and maintain teachings and knowledge pertaining to their Aboriginality (Robinson 2012).

In reference to personal and collective identity among the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq, an interest in many aspects of material and non-material culture is on the rise, including participation in drumming and singing and the production and use of material culture (e.g., drum-making, beading, carving and basket-making workshops), accompanied by heightened interest in teachings on Mi'kmaw spirituality, medicines and culturally specific beliefs and practices (personal observation). For instance, the popularity of the annual Flat Bay powwow, now in its eighth year, indicates a renewed interest in Aboriginal traditions more generally. For many Newfoundland Mi'kmaq powwows are among the most important events in their annual calendar. The communities of Miawpukek and Flat Bay hold powwows on consecutive weekends in early July, strategically organized to encourage participation from outside the province. Ex-patriot Newfoundland Mi'kmaq and representatives from other Canadian and American Aboriginal groups are arriving in increasing numbers to participate in the events.[25] Importantly, the construction and maintenance of public and private identities through ritual processes cannot be overstated. I note elsewhere that powwows operate "as a medium through which cultural identity and a sense of community can be reclaimed, maintained and reinforced. In a more particular sense it is a repository for expressing personal identity and celebrating Aboriginal culture through individual and collective ritual

expression" (Robinson 2012:19). For many Newfoundland Mi'kmaq, powwows have become key occasions for teaching, celebrating and reclaiming Aboriginality.

Notably, community-based organizations, such as the St. George's Cultural Circle, the Corner Brook Aboriginal Women's Association and the province-wide Newfoundland Aboriginal Women's Network, have gained ascendancy and are instrumental in promoting an Aboriginal presence in the province (Robinson 2012). In addition to reviving Aboriginal culture and heritage these organizations have contributed significantly to creating a strong sense of community (Robinson 2012). Instituted programs mainly focus on community-based events that encourage participation in traditional teachings and practices. For instance, in addition to powwows, sweats, fasts, pipe ceremonies and talking/healing circles, the community of Flat Bay has developed strategies to revive and celebrate Mi'kmaw identity in the region. In particular, the local film *L'nug Agnutnaqan* [The native's story] and the "Tajike'k Creating Wellness Program" are designed to reinforce traditional beliefs and practices.

While mostly positive, the rise of traditional ways and the call to community also reveal compound social divisions (personal observation). For those Mi'kmaq who recently learned of their ancestry and among those distanced from their culture and heritage, reclaiming a Mi'kmaw identity and the acquisition of traditional knowledge and skills may hold little or no appeal. However, those who take pride in their ancestry and who seek to establish strong cultural identities are often critical of those who do not. For some cultural observers, non-practitioners are viewed as opportunists who remain in denial of who they are. Several respondents intimated to me that such persons are Aboriginals "in name only," who dishonour the memories of their ancestors and who use their lineage for material gain only, not to promote a strong Aboriginal presence on the island. From an academic standpoint, however, value judgments are to be avoided and personal motivations behind claims to Aboriginality bracketed.

Undoubtedly, there are other issues associated with registration for the Qalipu Band, many of which will unfold as the process continues. However, the most current and compelling issue to emerge is the fact that the number of applicants has far exceeded those anticipated by the FNI and by federal agencies. Recently, the Harper government and the FNI devised a set of new criteria for membership under Bill C-25 (Qalipu Act) that will significantly reduce eligibility (Government of Canada 2014). The new set of criteria promises to raise innumerable questions and will continue to pose significant challenges to those seeking membership in the Qalipu Band.

Conclusions

Although the Newfoundland Mi'kmaq have made significant inroads, several areas of concern arise from the struggle to claim rights as Aboriginal peoples. That the processes of reclaiming and reasserting Mi'kmaw ancestry, identity and rights as First Nations peoples has been marked by struggle speaks to the necessity of furthering decolonization processes, by formally recognizing the rights of all Aboriginal peoples to self-determination and by promoting the means and conditions through which such autonomy can be realized. As it stands, Canada's federal agencies place restrictions on Aboriginal populations through the Indian Act, the terms and conditions of which all status "Indians" must comply with. Indeed, with the formal recognition of the Qalipu Band as a landless band the membership will forfeit all claims to lands and resources. From an advocacy perspective, formation of the Qalipu Band ensures that continued supremacy, territorial integrity and the economic opportunism of the settler state will in no way be affected by the agreement, in that the Indian Act offers fewer freedoms for its membership and increases personal and collective controls by the state. Under the Indian Act the state holds complete control of membership status, political processes, economic supports, education and social programs and, with few exceptions, inserts itself into most aspects of Aboriginal peoples' lives. The question as to whether the founding of the Qalipu Band is a Pyrrhic victory must be posed: Have the Ktqamkukeweq Mi'kmaq sacrificed greatly to obtain far too modest gains?

In addition, the issues of citizenship and political autonomy are further complicated by the interests of Mi'kmaw communities represented by the Grand Council and the MKMNO, who, in the interest of seeking treaty rights and obligations, fundamentally challenge the right of the federal government and the FNI to determine criteria for inclusion/exclusion for registration in the Qalipu Band.

Arguably, there is no "new regime" on the horizon that will address the violation of personal and collective rights and freedoms. Although commonly perceived as a victory, the formation of the Qalipu Band can be viewed as a form of defeat that embraces political domination. Essentially, this "new regime" can be viewed as new attire for an old one, wherein few significant changes occur. Consequently, rather than taking the formation of the Qalipu Band as a political *fait accompli*, it is a call to anthropologists to conduct forms of academic surveillance in support of Aboriginal peoples in their struggles against continued inequality, repression and injustice. A truly "new regime" involves Aboriginal self-determination and autonomy, which, it seems, cannot accommodate the rights of both Qalipu Band members and Mi'kmaw communities more broadly.

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Notes

1 In compliance with the Smith-Francis orthography, the terms *Mi'kmaq* (plu.) and *Mi'kmaw* (sing.) are used throughout this article. The singular form is also used adverbially and adjectively within this orthographic system.

2 For instance, 19 out of the 36 pre-Confederation Mi'kmaw communities listed in the qualifications for membership are/were located in the western region of the province, with Corner Brook, Bay of Islands and Port au Port holding significant populations. For details of the AIP and documents associated with the Qalipu Band, refer to the official website: qalipu.ca/qalipus-story/formationof-qalipu.

3 The Mi'kmaw Grand Council (or Sante Mawio'mi), the traditional governing body of the Mi'kmaq, consists of appointed members, including the grand chief, grand keptin, putus (wampum keeper) and regional representatives, primarily local keptins and prayer leaders who represent local and regional populations throughout Mi'kmaki. The primary role of the Grand Council is to represent Mi'kmaw spiritual, cultural and political interests.

4 The term *Mi'kma'ki* refers to the traditional Mi'kmaw land base—that is, of "usual occupation and use"—throughout New Brunswick, island Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, P.E.I. and a portion of Gaspé, Quebec.

5 Reid provides a thorough treatment of the ways in which Europeans subverted Mi'kmaw beliefs, values and lifeways.

6 The island of Newfoundland was included in the British Dominion from 1907 to 1949, before which time it was a self-governing British colony. It was granted independence in 1931, but responsible government was relinquished on February 16, 1934, when governance reverted to direct control from London. From 1934 to 1949, a Commission of Government administered Newfoundland, reporting to the Dominions Office in London until it became a province of Canada.

7 The majority of Mi'kmaq resided in the western region of the province or the French Shore (1783–1904), a geopolitical area agreed upon in the Treaty of Versailles. However, while most Mi'kmaq were clustered in this region, Mi'kmaw families settled in smaller, more isolated groups throughout the province, particularly the central and eastern regions of Newfoundland.

8 In *Turbulent Tides*, Don Downer suggests that "jackatar" is a derivative of Jacques au terre, a term ascribed to the progeny of Mi'kmaw women and the French sailors who jumped ship; the *Dictionary of Newfoundland English* references it as "a Newfoundlander of mixed French and Micmac Indian descent; the speech of such a person. 1857

Lind MS Diary [I] went to see a poor man who has been very ill for 7 months, he & all his family belong to a much despised & neglected race called 'Jack a Tars,' they speak an impure dialect of French & Indian, R.C.'s and of almost lawless habits" (Story et al. 1982:272); Gerald Thomas considers the term "jackotar" to mean a French national "fisherman who had deserted the fishery in order to avoid military service. The few good French elements were those who wintered in the area to watch over the fishing installations" (1977:7).

9 In 1667, Captain James Cook reported a "tribe of the Micmack Indians" located in Bay St. George, but made no mention of European occupation. The earliest accounts of European settlement in the region refer to the French, who frequented and settled along the French Shore after 1783.

10 Similar to Africville in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Crow Gulch was razed and its residents moved to other areas of the city. Many former residents of Crow Gulch were relocated to social-housing units built in the early 1960s.

11 The immigration of Acadian Mi'kmaq to Newfoundland during the mid-19th century was partly in response to increased social and economic pressures experienced throughout Maritime Mi'kma'ki. Historical documents indicate that land dispossession, disease and European encroachment had significantly reduced the Mi'kmaw population (Whitehead 1991; see also Bartels and Janzen 1991).

12 For a more thorough treatment of the European domination over the Mi'kmaq, refer to Reid (1995).

13 Stephen Marglin suggests that "in the West workers have largely accommodated themselves to the capitalist project of dominating the workplace because Western culture provides neither compelling reasons nor compelling means for workers to resist this project" (McNab 1995).

14 While Mannion notes that furring and gaming declined after 1850 (1977:256), adapted game-based occupations remain an important feature of the 21st-century Mi'kmaw economy. In Newfoundland, "a number of local Mi'kmaq are involved in the tradition of guiding/outfitting, specifically in the pursuit of black bear, caribou and moose which have broad appeal in international markets" (Robinson 2012:6–7).

15 Many of those interviewed reported experiencing difficulty while tracing their Mi'kmaw ancestry, owing to surnames being changed from the French to their English equivalent—for example, Le Jeune to Young, or Benoit to Bennett. Some respondents claimed that English-speaking priests altered spellings when recording births, deaths and marriages, while others reported that their ancestors purposely changed surnames in order to avoid discrimination and secure better futures for their children. The latter claim, however, cannot be substantiated.

16 I collected data on the HAFB for a 2008–09 research project titled "Mi'kmaq Relocation in the Humber River Basin Region of Western Newfoundland at Crow Gulch (Curling) and Stephenville: An Ethnohistorical Perspective."

17 Jerry Wetzel argues that during the 1947 negotiation of the Terms of Union, Canadian officials accepted that "the Aboriginal peoples of Newfoundland would come under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Government and the In-

dian Act. This position was put in writing as an Appendix XI of the Terms of Union and became part of the agreed upon terms for Confederation between Canada and Newfoundland" but that this document was "deliberately hid" by senior Canadian officials, and does not appear in the final document (1999:24).

18 Since 1949, the Inuit, Innu and Métis of Labrador, as well as the Miawpukek (Conne River) Mi'kmaq, have gained some federal support and recognition, albeit with restrictions. For details on post-confederate legal processes undertaken by various Aboriginal groups in NL, see Hanrahan (2003). Hanrahan maintains that Mi'kmaq, Innu and Métis have been "unable to participate equally in programs and services aimed at Aboriginal people ... [In addition] the Conne River Mi'kmaq have not been able to catch up to First Nations elsewhere in Canada in terms of land claims and other processes" (2003:217).

19 For a more comprehensive treatment of Mi'kmaw lifeways and seasonal occupation, see Martijn (2005); Speck (1922); Upton (1979); and Wicken (2004). One of the earliest accounts is offered by Nicholas Denys in *A Description of the Natural History of the Coasts of North America*, 1908 (1672).

20 The MMM appeared in Frances Briffett's *The Story of Newfoundland and Labrador*, published between 1949 and 1964, and was part of the general school curriculum throughout Newfoundland and Labrador.

21 The original FNI membership also included Miawpukek; however, political affiliation with the FNI was severed in 1981 when, out of political necessity, Miawpukek leaders opted to establish a separate political entity. Subsequently, the Miawpukek reserve was founded in 1987, becoming the only Aboriginal community in the province "to enjoy the full range of programs afforded other First Nations in Canada" (Hanrahan 2003:268). Although Miawpukek representatives lobbied heavily to have other Mi'kmaw communities included in negotiations, it appears that pressure from the provincial and federal governments forced Miawpukek leaders to relinquish ties with the FNI in exchange for status recognition. In 1984, Miawpukek became the only Aboriginal group in the province "to enjoy the full range of services afforded other First Nations in Canada" (Hanrahan 2003:268).

22 The seven original members of the FNI were Benoit's Cove First Nations (now Elmastogoeg), Conne River Band, Corner Brook Indian Band, Flat Bay Indian Band, Gander Bay Indian Band, Glenwood Mi'kmaq First Nation and Port au Port Indian Band, followed by the addition of Exploits Indian Band (now Sple'tk First Nation), St. George's Indian Band and Stephenville/Stephenville Crossing Band (now Indian Head First Nations) in the late 1980s (QMFNB official website, qalipu.ca/qalipus-story/formationof-qalipu).

23 Federal Court Document, T-129-89, 2010/09/14, St. John's, NL, 36 pages.

24 The initial date was pushed forward from September 2011 to November 2012 in response to concerns about the registration process.

25 On my first visit to the Flat Bay powwow in July 2006 the number of participants was significantly less than the estimated 5,000–6,000 attending in the years following.

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Contemporary Transformations of Indigenous Medicine and Ethnic Identity

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Abstract: Over the past two decades, many Indigenous leaders in Nicaragua have been promoting the idea that, beyond its vital and obvious medical value, Indigenous medicine represents an important political tool for claiming and signalling cultural boundaries. This article explores the particular conditions under which medical practices and ideas in a Nahua community become both objective and subjective markers of ethnic identity and cultural resistance. Within this context, I introduce the concept *derivative functions of medicine* to describe a role of medicine in non-medical matters, including the creation and maintenance of an ethnically distinct sense of group identity.

Keywords: derivative functions, identity, Indigenous, medicine, Nicaragua, Rivas

Résumé : Au cours des deux dernières décennies, plusieurs chefs indigènes du Nicaragua ont défendu l'idée qu'au-delà de sa valeur vitale et médicale évidente, la médecine indigène représente un outil politique important pour revendiquer et marquer des frontières culturelles. Cet article explore les conditions particulières dans lesquelles les pratiques et idées médicales d'une communauté Nahua deviennent des marqueurs à la fois objectifs et subjectifs de l'identité ethnique et de la résistance culturelle. Dans ce contexte, j'introduis le concept de fonctions dérivatives de la médecine pour décrire un rôle de la médecine dans des domaines non-médicaux, y compris la création et le maintien d'un sens de l'identité de groupe ethniquement distinct.

Mots-clés : fonctions dérivées, identité, indigènes, médecine, Nicaragua, Rivas

Introduction

In the 16th century, Spanish chronicler Fernández de Oviedo y Valedés described how aborigines in Nicaragua used medicinal plants to heal fractured bones. Soaked leaves of *Opuntia ficus-indica* were applied as plaster, forming an adhesive cast. It did not matter how badly broken the bones were; after fifteen days, this medication would leave the bones as good as before (Oviedo y Valdés 1959:8). Currently, for many Indigenous[1] people in Nicaragua, medicinal plants not only heal broken bones but also provide the means for demarcating and maintaining ethnic boundaries.

In this article, I examine the ways in which the Nahua people from Veracruz del Zapotal or the Veracruceños use their construct of "Indigenous medicine" as a strategy to claim and assert their precariously kept Nahua identity. By contextualizing the Veracruceños' struggle to remain culturally distinct in alterity to the predominant mestizo culture, this article also explores the role of medicine in the process of ethnic boundary formation. I examine the circumstances under which seemingly dormant medical symbols acquire revitalized cultural value and political significance as objective markers of ethnic identity. Thus, I later introduce a concept to describe this process. Although in the past, Veracruceños have used notions of genealogy, language,[2] history and territoriality as visible markers of ethnic identity (De Burgos 2006), here I focus on the usage of Indigenous medicine. Pragmatically, many Veracruceños claim that holding a strong Indigenous identity allows them to keep a comfortable level of territorial and cultural autonomy (De Burgos 2006). In this regard, community leaders are aware that having a cohesive ethnic identity proportionally demands maintaining strong ethnic boundaries that include values, beliefs, knowledge and traditions.

Since the arrival of the Spanish in Nicaragua in 1522 and the subsequent invasion and colonization of most of its native populations, Indigenous people in this country have struggled to remain culturally distinct. The story of

their struggles is courageous, long-standing and painful, plagued with disease, war, genocide, torture, slavery, cultural destruction and political and economic marginalization (Crosby 1986; Galeano 1988; Las Casas 1957; Newson 1987; Sherman 1979; Whisnant 1995). Today, in many parts of the world, "Indigenous peoples derive much of their identity from histories of state-sponsored genocide, forced settlement, relocation, political marginalization and various formal attempts at cultural destruction" (Niezen 2003:5). Veracruceños' historical memories of their Indigenous struggles are, beyond its human tragedy, also symbols of their identity, a "historical metaphor" (Sahlins 1995) signalling group continuity. Despite historical and current efforts to assimilate Indigenous people into the mainstream society in Nicaragua, Veracruceños continue to resist those attempts through several means, including the use of their Indigenous medicine, which they see as deriving from an autochthonous ancestral history and culture.

For most people in Veracruz, the term "medicine" designates a very complex category of ideas and practices about health, illness and healing, which overlaps with various aspects of their material, social and ideational life. Here, however, I use the term "medicine" as a discrete category but only inasmuch as it is an analytical tool to describe the cultural activities I examine.

The Veracruceños

The Veracruceños are a Spanish-speaking Nahua community from the department of Rivas, in southwest Nicaragua. They are descendants of the Nicarao people who settled in the Isthmus of Rivas around A.D. 500 (De Burgos 2006, 2010; Fowler 1989).[3] The ancient Nicarao also inhabited the islands of Ometepe and Zapatera (Healy 1980; Urtecho 1960:87), and their capital, Quauhcapolca, the largest city, was situated near the city of Rivas and approximately nine kilometers northwest of Veracruz. A chief ruled in every city or chiefdom, with the advice of the *monéxic*, Nahuat for "council of the wise ones" (De Burgos 2006, 2010; Urtecho 1960:87–89). According to current demographic figures, approximately 3,900 Veracruceños inhabit the Veracruz del Zapotal valley and the mountain region between the rivers Camarón, Guachipilín and Rio Grande in the department of Rivas. Primarily farmers, they supplement their diet by fishing in nearby rivers and off the Pacific coast and by hunting and foraging in their legally owned Indigenous territory (De Burgos 2006). Unlike most Indigenous communities in southwest Nicaragua, Veracruceños hold legal title to their land. In 1847, 26 years after Nicaragua became independent from Spain, the land Veracruceños had traditionally occupied was fraudulently confiscated

by public notary José Ruíz, who took advantage of a legislative land decree of March 5, 1830. Nevertheless, on July 3, 1860, after a long process of struggle and negotiation, Veracruceños legally purchased the land that had been usurped by a mestizo (De Burgos 2010).

A group of approximately 10 women and 20 men form the core of the contemporary monéxico. Due to their overt cultural "militancy" and commitment to preserving their Indigenous identity and culture, I describe monéxico members as "culturally conservative leaders" (henceforth referred to as CCL; see De Burgos 2006). They occupy the most influential positions or roles in the important spheres of local social and political life. The monéxico is a local elite of respected community members. As described by Shore and Nugent (2002:4), elites are, in general, typically incumbents as leaders, rulers and decision makers in any sector of society or are custodians of the machinery of policy-making. In this sense, monéxico members in Veracruz are the "movers and shakers," as their decisions crucially shape what culturally transpires in the community.

Methodology

The primary data for this article was gathered during my 15 months of doctoral fieldwork in Veracruz, between September 2001 and December 2002, including more than 400 unstructured interviews as part of a population survey, as well as 100 semi-structured, 20 open-ended and 15 structured interviews. I produced abundant vital statistics information and several epidemiological charts from these data. Some interviews were video and audio recorded, while others written on paper. The interviews ranged from five minutes to two hours in length and were conducted in Spanish, the native tongue of the Veracruceños. Knowledge of key issues was collected from unstructured interviews and a population survey, for which I used semi-structured interviews. I interviewed ordinary Veracruceños women and men, as well as community healers and leaders. Some interviews were designed to elicit informative narratives regarding community history, issues of identity, Indigenous medical ideas and practices, the threat of the mestizo culture and the impact of globalization. Most of my key cultural consultants were either members of the monéxico or healers, but I also include the testimonies and knowledge of ordinary Veracruceños to corroborate details and address controversies. Information about the Estelí Indigenous Medical Encounter comes from the only Veracruz delegate and a copy of a publication resulting from the event. The names of participants have been only partially disguised here, since, by their own choice, some participants kept their last name. I

indicate the gender and age of cultural consultants by adding (in parenthesis) either an M or an F and number to their name, as well as the initials CCL to designate culturally conservative leaders.

Derivative Functions of Medicine

In principle, medicine's primary function is to procure health, alleviate suffering and heal the body and soul. In practice, however, medicine is not always bound to medical concerns. The ethnographic record shows that neither the pragmatic nor symbolic functions of medicine are restricted to health concerns (Baer et al. 1982; Crandon-Malamud 1991; Grass 1986; Unschuld 1975). In this context, this study demonstrates how Veracruz people also use their medicine for non-medical purposes—that is, to safeguard Indigenous values and to symbolize group identity. The use of medicine for non-medical ends is implicit in much of the medical anthropological literature, but is rarely foregrounded or explicitly discussed as it is here. Thus, I use the term *the derivative functions of medicine* to refer to ways in which medicine's multiple functions pervade other spheres of social life, thus altering its initial medical purpose. For example, "through medicine, physicians acquire economic power and prestige, and insurance and pharmaceutical accompanies accumulate capital" (Crandon-Malamud 1991:ix).[4]

Claiming Indigenous identity through the use of medicine is not unique to Nicaragua. Similar strategies have been used in Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and Venezuela, among other countries (De Burgos 2006; Sotomayor 1992). Comparable examples are also found in Nigeria, where Fela Anikulap-Kuti, struggling against western cultural imperialism, wanted Africans to reclaim traditional methods of healing as a way of asserting ethnic identity (Grass 1986:143). Crandon-Malamud (1991) describes how, among the Aymara from Bolivia, class and ethnic boundaries are redefined and negotiated as people talk about and subscribe to different kinds of medicines, such as Aymara, Methodist[5] and western medicine. Maneesha Lal (1996) describes how two apparently distinct medical idioms, Ayurveda and western medicine, are used to construct strong bodily identities as part of a complex process of identity and nation building in India. James Waldram (1997) describes how, through Aboriginal spiritual healing, cultural heritage and identity are promoted among Indigenous inmates in the United States and Canada. Katz et al. (1997) explore how healing rituals performed by healers counteract the threat of cultural extinction. Andrews and Sutphen (2003) show how medicine can provide new insights into the construct of colonial identi-

ties and how multiple perspectives on identity, including Indigenous ones, can be accommodated within a single medical narrative.

My contribution here, however, is to explore and describe how the Veracruceños use their construct of "Indigenous medicine" as an autochthonous cultural possession to trace, claim and reaffirm their Nahua identity in the face of an overwhelming mestizo society, which they claim erodes and threatens their Indigenous culture.

Ethnic Identities and the "Indian Problem" in Nicaragua

Like all Indigenous people in Nicaraguan, Veracruceños live within the lager Nicaraguan mestizo society; thus they are subject to the same historical and contemporary tensions between the two ethnic groups (De Burgos 2010). The term *mestizo* originally designated the offspring of a Spaniard and Native American. Currently, however, it is generally applied to individuals who speak Spanish and observe cultural norms of Hispanic origin (Esteva-Fabregat 1995).[6] In Nicaragua, as in other parts of Latin America, ethnic identities are not defined solely on the basis of physical characteristics. Field (1998) argues how discursive narratives of *mestizaje* in Nicaragua are

> a process of biological miscegenation, a process of nation building which requires that mestizos, as individuals and as collectivities, undergo "de-indianization" to accommodate national identity in ways that Indians [sic] cannot; and a process that necessarily creates a panoply of divergent identity positions. [435]

The process of mestizaje in Nicaragua is not only a "racial" issue but also a social one. Being a mestizo has become both an ascribed and an achieved status. Knight (1990:73) argues that, by dint of education, migration and occupational shifts and general acculturation, as well as individual agency, people can leave their "Indianness" and claim a mestizo identity. Indigenous and mestizo identities in Nicaragua are fluid and overlap in a manner that shapes the historical emergence of different kinds of mestizos and different kinds of Indigenous people (Field 1998:438). Thus, mestizos can be white and non-white and have multiple ancestries and physical appearances.

For most of Nicaraguan history, Indigenous people have been seen as an "Indian problem." Starting in 1522, with the European invasion, followed by the colonial period and continuing with independence, ruling elites and successive Nicaraguan governments have endeavoured to exterminate Indigenous people or force them to abandon their "Indianness" to occupy their lands

(Field 1998; Newson 1987; Whisnant 1995). The two most significant and contrasting regimes in the 20th century, Somocistas and Sandinistas, both tried to solve the "Indian problem" through assimilation in an attempt to "civilize" them into a perceived Nicaraguan mestizo society (De Burgos 2006; Hoyt 1997; Whisnant 1995). Field (1998) suggests that the mythologized perception of a mestizo Nicaraguan society dangerously denies the existence of the numerous Indigenous people in the country. Membreño (1992) argues that this myth is an ideology constructed on racial criteria and conceptions that do not reflect the fact that some Indigenous people resisted the conquest and subsequent colonization, including Zelaya's liberalism, Somoza's mercantilist capitalism and the Sandinistas' socialist tendencies to absorb them. According to Wheelock (1980) and Gould (1997), the idea of mestizaje is perhaps the founding myth through which all others have been assimilated or, at least, this is how it has been engraved in conservative literature and popular discourse in Nicaragua. Hale (1996) argues that, in a post-Sandinista Nicaragua, discourses of "hybridity" and mestizaje continue to be used by relatively powerful mestizos to advance their own political and economic agendas, while Indigenous activism is delegitimized. Whisnant (1995:13) suggests that the politics of culture in Nicaragua, following independence from Spain, owes some of its most stubborn structural features and its evolving character to certain developments during the colonial period. One of those developments is the concept of mestizaje and the emergence of the idea of "race" that, linked to the class system, has become a self-perpetuating social reality. Thus, in contemporary Nicaragua, mestizo society predominates and has acquired a *de facto* status and not an "imagined" national culture (Anderson 1991). Most mestizos in Nicaragua discriminate against Indigenous peoples and see them as "racially" and culturally inferior (De Burgos 2010). As the most impoverished group in Nicaraguan society, Indigenous people also suffer from class discrimination, which is objectified in their physical appearance, language, clothing, customs and place of residence. To avoid discrimination, some Veracruceños often deny their Indigenous identity when they are outside their community. As Gonzales explains,

> Just to avoid humiliation, some of us simply hide our Indigenous identity. It hasn't been easy to say, "I am an Indigenous person." It is difficult in a society where Indigenous people are looked down upon, isolated and mistrusted. [Gonzáles, CCL, M55]

In September 2002, Arturón (CCL, M54) told me that, in an effort to erode the Indigenous culture in Veracruz government-run school, teachers routinely tell children and their parents that Veracruz and its people are no longer an Indigenous community.

> I remember that, during a public and crowded school assembly in November 2001, the school principal, Mrs. Cébaco, told us that we should stop fooling ourselves pretending to be Indigenous people. "There are no Indigenous people left in the Pacific of Nicaragua. You are all mestizos," she said. After a heated argument and feeling deeply offended, we [Indigenous people] left the meeting.

A long-standing image of Indigenous culture as dead or at least dying is an old discursive notion in Nicaragua, rooted in a double morality complex about "Indian things," which are simultaneously appreciated and disdained by non-Indigenous people (De Burgos 2006; Hoyt 1997; Whisnant 1995). Presently, the historic and systematic reluctance of the successive Nicaraguan governments to fully recognize Indigenous rights abruptly contrasts with a benevolent national discourse about Indigenous people and Indigenous "things." Veracruceños are particularly sensitive to the hypocritical stance taken by both the government and the general mestizo society.

> On the one hand, governments have boastfully promulgated the value of the Nicaraguan Indigenous heritage but, on the other, they have hypocritically ignored us by negating our rights and looking down on us. [Gonzales, CCL, M54]

This ambivalent relationship with Indigenous "things" and people seems to be an inherent problem in societies with Indigenous minorities in Latin America. For instance, Knight (1990:101) notes that "Indigenous people in Mexico are discriminated against for being 'Indians,' but at the same time admired for being the 'real soul' of the country." Veracruceños also live under the same national double morality complex. "As people, we are disdainfully regarded by the state and mestizo culture; but things about us are ambivalently glorified in the national literature, music, dance and art" (López, CCL, M42). Ironically, Nicaraguan remnants of colonial Indigenous culture are romantically showcased as "the best of the Nicaragua culture" [la flor y nata de la cultura Nicaragüense]. This suggests that Indigeneity is valued for its symbolic capital but not for its human reality.

Although Veracruceños were granted legal Indigenous status by the Nicaraguan government in 1915, not all mestizos and government officials regard Veracruceños as "genuine" Indigenous people (De Burgos 2006). According to university-educated monéxico member Esban (M27), this is in part due to the fact that, unlike other

Indigenous societies in Nicaragua, in Veracruz one does not find the stereotypical "Indian" mestizos expect to see in an Indigenous community. In September 2002, Esban told me that many mestizos in Nicaragua still believe that "genuine" Indigenous people wear feathers and other ornaments on their heads, carry a bow and an arrow, walk around nearly naked and speak their own language. In the absence of visible ethnic identity markers, a subjective reference to genealogy as an essential component of group identity is usually evoked.

> We are Indigenous people simply because we were born Indigenous people, in the same way that our parents and grandparents were born Indigenous people, and so were their ancestors. Who we are is inscribed in our blood, in our genealogy and no one can just remove it by decree. [Esban]

A survey I conducted in 2002 with 400 participants revealed that, for most Veracruceños, ethnic identity is a primal condition "into which one is born, a form of essentialism, in the sense that it involves an ongoing, relatively unchanging group identity" (Lewellen 2002:108). Although most Veracruceños typically regard their ethnic identity in essentialist terms, they feel forced to culturally claim and reaffirm that intangible essence by establishing other kinds of objective markers of Indigenous identity. Through the perceived historical continuation of many of their cultural features, Veracruceños thus started to reaffirm their group identity by claiming the ancient legacy of their medical practices.

The Estelí Medical Encounter and Medicine as a Marker of Identity

In 1992, national governments from across the Americas and parts of Europe celebrated the 500th anniversary of the arrival of Christopher Columbus in the "New World." Also in 1992, Indigenous societies from across the Americas commemorated 500 years of resistance against colonial and post-colonial domination. Between October 4 and 6, 1992, around 350 delegates from Nicaragua, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Puerto Rico and Venezuela gathered in the city of Estelí, Nicaragua, to celebrate "The First Continental Encounter of Indigenous, Black, Popular and Traditional Medicine: 500 Years of Indigenous, Black and Popular Resistance." A nominal distinction was made between "Indigenous," "Black," "popular" and "traditional" medicine, but the terms *Indigenous* and *traditional* were used interchangeably as overarching categories encompassing all these medical traditions. Participants were mainly Indigenous leaders, healers, midwives, bonesetters, diviners and shamans. The event

was organized by the Continental Secretariat for the 500 Years of Indigenous Resistance Campaign[7] and came to be known as the First Continental Encounter of Medicine (henceforth, FCEM).

A book authored by Uriel Sotomayor (1992) entitled *Memorias*[8] with keynote speeches, oral testimonies and resolutions from the event was published the same year. According to this text, the FCEM had three explicit objectives—to recover, to safeguard and to promote Indigenous medicine as part of the history and cultural heritage of Indigenous peoples. Politically, the FCEM created an elaborate regional discourse and understanding of how Indigenous medical systems were and continue to be ancestral forms of cultural resistance and group survival. Participants claim that the historical struggle to survive as Indigenous people frames more than 500 years of Indigenous resistance to non-Indigenous hegemony. This notion is pervasively present in both the historical memory and the current orientation of Indigenous struggle in Nicaragua. The following excerpts from *Memorias* summarize the main arguments made at the FCEM.

> After 500 years of ancestral medicine's resistance, we keep on defending our ancestral medicine as part of our culture ... since the Spanish invaders first arrived they have persecuted, repressed and nearly destroyed our autochthonous medical systems. Thousands of shamans, healers and bonesetters were accused of witchcraft and burnt by the invaders. [Sotomayor 1992:12]

During the FCEM, the cultural survival and affirmation of Indigenous medicine were seen as forms of resistance, transformed into new, objective signifiers of ethnic identity. Ideationally, the FCEM provided the means for leaders and healers to elaborate a discourse that would allow them to overtly promote new dispositions toward Indigenous medicine in their respective communities. This discourse transformed Indigenous medicine into a cultural idiom of ethnic identity and a metaphorical reference of social identity and historical belonging. Medicine was no longer seen only as a way of healing and understanding illness but also as a form of cultural inheritance. "Indigenous medicine is a gift given to us by our ancestors. That is why our Indigenous medicine is our identity" (Sotomayor 1992:70).

In this new context, Indigenous medicine was understood simultaneously as a cultural object and a natural possession that had to be reclaimed and preserved for present and future generations. "Our ancestors gave us traditional medicine so that we can live in the present and build our future. We must preserve it because it

was born with us. It belongs to us" (Sotomayor 1992:12). Through new dispositions, Indigenous medicine was simultaneously understood as both an entity deeply rooted in cultural tradition and a precarious possession that needed to be recovered. "As our ancestors' legacy, we must recover it because people without its traditional medicine have no future (Sotomayor 1992:32) ... we must defend our traditional medicine because it represents our roots" (Sotomayor 1992:33). Thus, Indigenous medicine became the ideational plane, whereby notions of wellness, illness and healing are grounded as cultural expressions. "Our Indigenous medicine is grounded in culture-specific ideas about health, illness, nature and the universe, rather than on a set of informal or improvised arguments" (Sotomayor 1992:8).

Historically, Indigenous medicine had been perceived as an autochthonous medical system in Veracruz. This sense of autochthony, however, was emphasized and legitimized at the FCEM. "Our Indigenous medicine has its own means for diagnosing, treating, applying therapeutic methods, and producing our own healers. We are not charlatans as we are deprecatorily referred to by the biomedical system" (Sotomayor 1992:8). The construct of Indigenous medicine also became a conceptual place where ancestral knowledge is kept. Indigenous medicine is seen as embedded in wisdom and tradition resulting from a long, symbiotic relation to the natural world.

> Indigenous medicine is the repository where we as Indigenous people preserve our ancestral knowledge. That knowledge is the ancestral wisdom derived from the ancestral traditions of pre-Hispanic societies. That tradition has allowed us to totally integrate ourselves into our surrounding natural world. That is the deepest root of traditional medicine. [Sotomayor 1992:ii]

Many FCEM delegates claimed Indigenous medicine is an "essence" indelibly written in their biology. Thus, medicine is understood as an embodied entity and as a "living organism" in the form of "cultural heritage" and an "ancestral gift," vital for cultural and objective existence.

> It is only natural that traditional medicine belongs to our people because we carry it in our blood ... It was passed on to us by our ancestors ... Indigenous medicine belongs to us because Indigenous blood runs through our veins, blood from our ancestors who gave us their medicine so that we could survive. [Sotomayor 1992:12, 33]

The FCEM allowed many Indigenous people to see their ethnicity as both inscribed in and expressed by their medical practices. The FCEM was also a public rite of passage through which medical experiences were formally transformed into new ways of understanding and reifying ethnic identity. As a Honduran Indigenous delegate pointed out, Indigenous medicine became both an omnipresent and exclusive possession:

> [Traditional medicine] is found everywhere and even in the most recondite places in our countries where the tentacles of the official medicine have not reached yet ... traditional medicine is always in our home gardens and backyards. [Sotomayor 1992:32]

To become an objective marker of Indigenous identity, medicine was first "culturally objectified" (Handler 1988) and acquired multiple derivative functions and meanings. It became a historical legacy and an object that had been sequestered and therefore needed to be rescued. Indigenous medicine was understood as a necessary condition for ethnic survival and thus became a ubiquitous "thing" that helped Indigenous people resist the domination of non-Indigenous medicine, safeguarding in this way their own medical values and cultural identity. Although several important pragmatic goals, such as territorial autonomy, accompanied this strategy, Indigenous medicine is symbolically constructed as an essential constituent of a shared past, a binding heritage embedded in and motivated by both symbolic and pragmatic value. For example, many Veracruceños today use the metaphor, "Indigenous medicine as resistance," in reaction to a long history of conquest, colonization, land seizure, imposed governance, civil violence, poverty, dispossession, discrimination and mestizaje.[9]

The Impact of the FCEM in Veracruz

Nine years after the FCEM took place in Estelí, I arrived in Veracruz. By then, the notions initially promoted at the FCEM had been well assimilated by many Veracruceños. López (M42) claims to be the only Veracruceño delegate who attended the FCEM. In June 2002, he told me that the FCEM was organized to give Indigenous medicine its rightful place in history as a cultural symbol of Indigenous identity. Like all delegates, López was expected to bring back to his community the idea of using Indigenous medicine as a strategy to revitalize their ethnic identity. Indeed, when López came back from the FCEM, he met with several local healers and members of the monéxico to inform them about it. Soon after that, he explained the FCEM's resolutions to the community during a general assembly. According

to López, local healers, leaders and people in Veracruz generally did not have any trouble understanding the concept of medicine as identity and quickly embraced it. "Somehow we all already knew our Indigenous medicine was an intrinsic part of our culture but never thought about it consciously," Antolin Mendoza said in June 2002. Several members of the monéxico told me in June 2002 that the FCEM both inspired them and reinforced what they already knew and felt was right.

As I conducted my research in Veracruz, it became abundantly clear to me that medical beliefs and practices in this community are also symbols that inform, outline and mediate people's sense of ethnic identity and ancestral history. In December 2001, Pedro Gonzales expressed some of these ideas, which also echoed the FCEM.

> Recovering our Indigenous medicine is to recover our Indigenous identity and culture. Using our traditional medicine is expressing our Indigenous identity. To recover our identity means to recuperate what the mestizo culture had eroded from ours. It means to regain much of the lost political autonomy the Nicaraguan government has gradually taken away from us. It also means to be proud of our Indigenous identity in the face of a dominant mestizo culture.

In this sense, the political impetus of FCEM came to reinforce and expand the cultural valuation of Indigenous healing in Veracruz. Through more assertive idioms, medicine was reaffirmed as an intricate part of the Veracruceño natural world. It was also seen as part of the essence that defines and substantiates them as Indigenous people. The FCEM helped transform old ideas into new social actions in Veracruz. In October 2001, Veracruceño healer Carbonero (F59) shared the following:

> I have been a healer in the community for about forty years ... but the knowledge I have is not something I made up. What I know is ancestral knowledge. We've kept it because that's what we believe. Now we must try hard to keep it. Our medicine is our traditions, our way of doing things and healing our sick.

In May 2002, prominent healer Mateo Mendoza (M55) also told me that their medicine is part of who they are as a people. He explained that to understand their illness categories, people (including anthropologists) needed to first understand their Indigenous culture. Furthermore, Veracruz medical definitions and practices are also shaped by and created in response to present threats and pressures from the mestizo culture and globalization. In October 2002, López stated that

Some physicians and nurses tell us that our medical practices are nonsense and that we should abandon archaic ideas and practices. They say that because they probably want to sell us more of their western medicine. That is why promoting our Indigenous medicine is a way of resisting globalization. Keeping our Indigenous medicine is also keeping our culture.

In the past, people in Veracruz made use of medical knowledge according to their traditions but not in any explicitly political manner. Influenced by the FCEM, however, medical experiences in Veracruz became culturally circumscribed. Medical activities became distinctive cultural behaviours that maintain cultural boundaries through a process of signalling difference (see De Burgos 2010). As Barth suggested, ethnicities "only persist as significant units if they imply differences in behaviour" (1969:15)—that is, as persisting cultural differences. In November 2002, Morales (F50) related that if she told a physician that his son is sick with *mal aire* (evil wind), the physician wouldn't understand. "Physicians don't believe in this kind of illness. Only we understand our own kind of illnesses" (Morales). In May 2002, healer Urrútia (CCL, M60) told me that

> One day a woman came to me saying, "Felipe! I broke my leg." "No, Ma'am," I said, "this isn't a broken bone. This is just an injured tendon." Then, I started to massage her leg and fixed the problem. My grandfather taught me the Indigenous way to treat broken bones and other kinds of complaints. I now teach my children how to heal bones because it's our way of preserving our [cultural] identity.

In Veracruz, illness categories, etiologies, pharmacopoeia and nosology, diagnostic and healing rituals, prophylactic devices, bone setting and divination are seen as constituents of their cultural identity and autonomy. Conchita (F32), a woman leader, explained to me (in 2002) how medicine and culture are intertwined in Veracruz.

> Our medicine is our culture because, when you think of a bonesetter or a healer, you also think of the Indigenous community the healer comes from. You think of traditional knowledge, you realize that behind that culture there is an identity ... an identity that belongs to the bonesetter, to the healer and to the rest of people where that knowledge comes from.

Urrútia (M60) also explained the historical link between the Veracruceño medicine as cultural heritage and their present Indigenous identity.

I'm an Indigenous *sobador* (bonesetter). Thus, I set bones and treat muscular pain and other problems. My father taught me what I know. We heal broken bones by first using special animal fat as a base for the massage. Then, after having boiled *suelda con sualda* leaves and bark (*Anredera vesicaria*), we apply it on plaster and the broken bones gradually heal ... our healing knowledge is our ancestral heritage. It is part of who we are now.

When I told Urrútia (M60) that according to some historical books, the 16th-century Spanish chronicler Oviedo y Valedés had described how Indigenous people in Nicaragua used *suelda con suelda* leaves to successfully treat fractured bones, he was not surprised at all. "You see," he said rather confidently, "books won't let me lie to you."

In May 2002, during an important community festivity, Gonzales (M55) exhorted Veracruceños to protect their Indigenous identity by means of recovering and promoting their Indigenous medicine.

If we want to keep on existing as an Indigenous people, we have to protect our Indigenous identity. The process of mestizo acculturation has caused great damage. It has eroded our identity. We need to build a strong barrier to protect our culture. Let us not abandon that which we do and the way in which we do it. We are our food, our traditional laws, our dances, our festivities, *our medicine* and traditions. [Gonzales, CCL, M55]

A year before the FCEM took place, culturally conservative leaders from Veracruz, headed by Gonzales, had been working on a biannual sociocultural plan. It was part of a permanent strategy culturally conservative leaders had been implementing since the 1980s. Its objective was to formally structure the political struggle for cultural and territorial autonomy in the community (De Burgos 2006). In this plan, they delineated the areas of work considered important and necessary for the invigoration of their Indigenous identity and community life. Indigenous medicine was part of it. However, before the celebration of the FCEM, appreciating the cultural value of Indigenous medicine was not as prominent in Veracruz. Subsequent strong valuation was largely influenced by FCEM, whose impact on the reconfiguration of Indigenous medicine was solid and significant. It provided Veracruceños a new understanding of their healing tradition. It helped leaders, healers and the people at large to have a deeper insight into the historical and present derivative value of their medicine. For many Veracruceños, medical configurations are also ways of expressing key cultural values. In this regard, López stated,

We believe that by keeping our traditional knowledge of medicinal plants and healing, we are also maintaining an important aspect of our culture and Indigenous identity. Traditionally, we have had a special relationship with nature. Nature gives us life, food and medicine. We treat most of our health complaints with herbs and plants before going to the government medical post. Having medicinal plants in our gardens is not only useful and convenient; it's also part of our ancestral identity.

In the past, Veracruceños made use of medical knowledge according to tradition, but not in a political manner. However, the FCEM brought new awareness about the political significance of Indigenous medicine and new dispositions toward Indigenous medicine emerged in Veracruz. The FCEM brought an important historical transformation of Indigenous medicine and ethnic identity to Veracruz, which helped Veracruceños to be more ethnically assertive through a reinvigorating discourse of self-representation.

Individuals and groups define their identities in ways that both express and reinforce ideas about self-representation. People choose from several variables and available cultural traits to reinvigorate their social identity (Barth 1969). Niezen (2003:6) argues that the growth of reinvigorated identity, as a source of group membership and the pursuit of distinct rights to protect ethnic identity boundaries, is a relatively universal trend among Indigenous peoples and has gained momentum in recent years—particularly in the face of globalization (Friedman 1994). Many Veracruceños consciously decided to re-evaluate and invigorate Indigenous medicine because they believe it to be an essential component of who they are presently and have been historically. Mendoza (M48) explained to me how many Veracruceños think their Indigenous medicine is culturally circumscribed around Indigenous identity and history.

Our medicine is part of who we are. Look, for example, there are illnesses here which afflict our people that physicians do not understand because they don't understand our life, our way of viewing life and things. Our medicine is part of our Indigenous past, our history, our present and future.

In Veracruz, the construction of an ethnically meaningful past through Indigenous medicine is a project that "selectively organizes events in a relation of continuity with a contemporary subject, thereby creating an appropriated representation of a life leading up to the present. [It is] a life history fashioned in the act of self-definition" (Friedman 1994:117). The relationship between medicine and ethnic identity in Veracruz is also

a spoken one. Thus, Veracruceños also construct their history by speaking about it: "in speech history is made" Sahlins (1995:5). By promulgating that Indigenous medicine *is* Indigenous identity, Veracruceños seem to be simultaneously claiming and constructing their ethnic identity through a "performative discourse" (Bourdieu 1991)—that is, the utterances that produce, in themselves, the act or the reality they name. The FCEM was precisely about discursively exalting cultural presuppositions. Participants did so by consciously reclaiming and making relevant to the present ancient Indigenous medical categories as part of a historical continuum. For many Veracruceños, the ethnic past is made meaningful in the present through the invocation of their Indigenous medicine, which they see as a timeless cultural heritage. Thus, claiming Nahua identity through the historical reconstruction of an Indigenous medicine is, at the same time, validating the continuity of a perceived ancient medical identity. In this sense, past medical knowledge and practices are also made relevant to the present through social categories of persons and things. As Sahlins (1995:67) claims, "People act upon circumstances according to their own cultural presuppositions, the socially given categories of persons and things." This is especially relevant since Veracruceños relate their Indigenous medicine (as a "thing") to their own sense of themselves (as a people) based on their own modes of interpretation, presuppositions and actions.

During the FCEM, the history of Indigenous medicine was conceived as a significant set of past symbols, which continue to be meaningful in the present. In some respects, through Indigenous medicine, the FCEM helped to reinvent tradition—therefore, altering it—by overtly evoking the past to reconstruct and validate the present. Borofsky (1989) and Firth (1967) have both found instances in which Indigenous traditions in the process of being preserved are also altered. Paradoxically, in being altered, Indigenous medicine is also being preserved because, through it, "the past is being made meaningful to those upholding it in the present" (Borofsky 1989:144).

La Medicína Indígena

In most non-industrialized societies, medicine is not clearly differentiated from other social and cultural institutions (Baer et al. 2003:8). This is the case for Veracruceños, for whom medicine is an important part of a larger cultural context encompassing religious, magical, mythical, political, historical, social and even judicial ideas. For healing purposes, however, most Veracruceños generally depend on their own Indigenous medical system, which they call *medicina Indígena*, Indigenous medi-

cine. They believe in its medical efficacy and value its cultural appropriateness. Only in cases of emergencies or locally untreatable sickness do Veracruceños seek medical help outside their community in government-run clinics.

Healers or curers in Veracruz are called *curanderos*. They are socially recognized, part-time medical specialists who diagnose, treat, alleviate and cure illness and disease. Veracruceños distinguish between four types of local curanderos. These are: *yerberos* (herbalists), *parteras* (midwives), *sobadors* (masseurs/bonesetters) and *brujos* (witches). Although all curanderos have other sources of income, they constitute a local occupational category. During my fieldwork, I identified six people who were socially recognized as formal Indigenous healers in Veracruz. They were perceived as efficacious, not only locally but also outside the community's boundaries by mestizo patients who came from Rivas and nearby towns in Costa Rica. They came to seek health advice and the healing power of Indigenous medicines (De Burgos 2006).

The local pharmacopoeia of Veracruceños combines Indigenous herbal wisdom with other medical traditions, including contemporary biomedical medicaments. Thus, it is common for some healers in Veracruz to give injections of B complex vitamins or penicillin, as well as pills for *los nervios* or "nerves" (see also Scheper-Hughes 1992). However, minerals, animals and plants constitute the primary material basis of the Veracruceños medicinal repertoire. With the reinvigoration of Indigenous healing in Veracruz, community leaders routinely encourage villagers to cultivate medicinal plants as a way of maintaining the Indigenous tradition of herbal medicine. In 2000, community leaders started a local youth program to teach students to cultivate and learn about the medicinal and cultural value of local plants.

We believe that by keeping our traditional knowledge about medicinal plants, we are also maintaining an important aspect of our culture and Indigenous identity. Traditionally, we have had a special relationship with nature. Nature gives us life, food and medicine. Here, we treat most of our illnesses with herbs and plants before going to see a physician. Having medicinal plants in our gardens is not only useful but also an ancestral tradition. [López, CCL, M42]

I learned how to identify plants because my mother used to tell me about each plant and what their healing properties are. But when I don't have a particular plant in my garden for an illness, chances are my neighbors have it. Sometimes, you can find the medicine in the bush. We also keep oils and fat from animals that we use for healing. [Pavón, healer, F90]

Medicinal plants in Veracruz are socially valued for their healing powers and their association with Indigenous material culture. Although very useful and in high demand, medicinal plants have no monetary value for Veracruceños. People collect them from their gardens and the wild, and exchange them free in a system of general reciprocity.

> Whenever we are sick, we find our medicine in nature. That is why you cannot sell nor buy medicine herbs or plants. That is how we learned it from our ancestors. These plants are precious but nature gives them to us free. [Urrútia, healer, M60]

Similar to the FCEM discourse on medicine, Veracruceños also regard their *medicina Indígena* as a biological essence. During my 2002 survey, many people in Veracruz told me that "everything that is Indigenous, including medicine, comes in our blood" [todo lo Indígena, incluyendo la medicine, lo traemos en la sangre].

In a broader historical context, however, their Indigenous medicine is not as autochthonous and cohesive as they may perceive it. At a closer look, it is the synthesized articulation of different medical traditions. Nevertheless, historically, Veracruceños have been able to adhere to their pre-Hispanic herbal wisdom and practices from other medical traditions (see Bolaños 1974). During my research I was able to identify at least eight external sources of other medical traditions, including African healing (including witchcraft); bioenergetics;[10] biomedicine; early Arabic medicine; Greek humoural medicine received from the Spanish Renaissance; Judeo-Christian religious beliefs, symbols and rituals; medieval and later European witchcraft; and contemporary spiritualism and psychic phenomena. With the exception of *bioenergetics*, Trotter and Chavira (1997:25) have delineated the same historical traditions as the major influences shaping *curanderismo*, which he describes as a widespread traditional medical system found among Spanish-speaking people in Latin America and in many parts of the United States (Campos Navarro 1997; Cosminsky 1976; Foster 1972; Rubel et al. 1984; Trotter and Chavira 1997). Many of the medical practices and beliefs in Veracruz are comparable to curanderismo. They share many ideas and practices, particularly in terms of the most basic etiological concepts, pharmacopoeia, healing procedures, diagnostic techniques and sickness categories. One good example is *calor de vista* (literally, heat of gaze or evil eye), a combination of the classic Mediterranean evil eye with an ancient Nahua illness called *iscucuyalis* that is symptomatically and etiologically similar to the evil eye. Friar Bobadilla reported in his chronicle how Indigenous people in Nicaragua believed in a deadly infant illness caused by simply staring at a child (Bolaños 1974:52).

Notwithstanding its eclectic origins, Veracruceños view their medicine as historically authentic because they have been able to *autochthonize* external ideas and practices by incorporating them into their vernacular medical systems. Echoing the FCEM in May 2002, healer Carbonel (M53) told me that their ancestors gave them their traditional medicine so that they can live in the present and survive in the future. For many Veracruceños, the historical authenticity of their Indigenous medicine is self-evident in the existence of individuals who, by "essence," are Indigenous people. "Things belong to people and reflect the autochthonous essence of their originator," explained Carbonel. Of course, autochthonizing ideas and practices from elsewhere is not a process unique to Veracruceños. In a different context, Evans describes how, in Tonga, Indigenous peoples have "the capacity to incorporate and re-create, as autochthonous practices, things from elsewhere" (2007:39). For the last 500 years, many of the Indigenous healing traditions in the Americas have re-created ideas and practices from elsewhere as autochthonous, by modifying them to fit vernacular schemes.[11] This is not to conclude that Indigenous medicine in Veracruz is simply a set of filtered-down medical practices and knowledge; rather, I suggest that contemporary Indigenous medicine in Veracruz is also constituted by a historically tailored medical pluralism. This is an important premise because, as Kleinman argues (1995:23), "there is no essential medicine, no medicine that is independent of historical context." Furthermore, in reference to the *dhâmi-jhânkris* in Nepal (roughly, shamans and other ritual specialist healers), Pigg (1995) argues that it is not possible to recover a pure, authentic Indigenous belief system that is clearly separated from someone else's modern ideas. Authenticity, then, in any form or degree, remains a construct of our cultural imagination. However, such a perception is important for Veracruceños, as authenticity legitimates their long struggle for cultural survival.

Conclusion

In this article I have shown that over the past two decades, Indigenous leaders in Veracruz, influenced by a regional trend and reified by the FCEM, have been promoting the idea that, beyond its immediate medical value, Indigenous medicine represents an important political tool for claiming and signalling cultural boundaries. I have argued that seemingly dormant medical symbols acquired revitalized cultural value and political significance through discursive notions that have been

translated into social actions in Veracruz and examined how Veracruceños see their Indigenous medicine as more than a social scheme for healing. They also see it as the constituent of a cultural configuration that informs, shapes and mediates their human experience in ways that go beyond purely medical functions. In this regard, I introduced the concept of derivative functions of medicine. It describes the ways in which Veracruceños direct their behaviour and use medical belief and practices to craft and claim an Indigenous identity. I have analyzed how the political usage of Indigenous medicine emerged in the context of historical threat posed by the mestizo society. Thus, in their constant search for objective markers of social identity, Indigenous medicine is now regarded by many Veracruceños as part of the knowledge and practices that make them culturally and ethnically distinct. This derivative function of medicine contrasts sharply with the construction of scientific medicine or biomedicine, which is categorically non-specific to any particular people or culture.

In Veracruz, as elsewhere, the matter-of-fact relationships people believe exist between themselves and others [and things], "are not perceived purely as such ... they are grasped only through the agency of cultural formulations of them" (Geertz 1973:367). The idea that "Indigenous medicine" is a signifier of Indigenous identity is, thus, a symbolic representation of one of the several historically perceived cultural boundaries. In their "imagined community" (Anderson 1991), Veracruceños have learned to see their "Indigenous medicine" as both a natural object and a conceptual essence that belongs to and defines their sense of Indigeneity, ancestral history and cultural resistance.

I have elucidated how the FCEM symbolically transformed into social action sentiments that have been harboured for over 500 years of Indigenous resistance in Nicaragua. Through the use of Indigenous medicine as both *materia medica* and a symbolic system that also signals ethnic identity, many Veracruceños promote community practices that enhance an Indigenous world view. Indigenous medicine is for many Veracruceños, as W. H. R. Rivers (2001) noted so long ago, a symbolic system, and all symbolic systems are valuable sites for creating meaning. Medicine in Veracruz is used to revitalize ethnic identity in the same way that language and other objective markers of ethnicity are used in other parts of the world by Indigenous people (De Burgos 2006; Shulist 2013). Barth (1994:17–18) argues that central and culturally valued institutions and activities in an ethnic group may be deeply involved in its boundary maintenance by setting internal processes of convergence

into motion. As a central and culturally valued institution in Veracruz, Indigenous medicine set a process of convergence by bringing and binding together constructs of history, ancestral knowledge, Indigenous struggles, medical heritage and resistance to mestizo and global pressures into a single narrative of distinctiveness.

Despite its pluralistic origins, Veracruceños perceive their Indigenous medicine as an autochthonous and primordial experience, an essential experience based in tradition and the emotions evoked by perceptions of common ancestry and history (see Geertz 1963; Gil-White 1999; Grosby 1994; Isaacs 1975; Shils 1957; Stack 1986). Although 16th-century Spanish chronicler Oviedo y Valedés provides objective evidence of their ancient Indigenous medicine, Veracruceños seem to derive more significance from the subjective attachment to their cultural practices, which they see as a primordial experience. This perceived primordiality allows Veracruceños to effectively build ethnic boundaries through Indigenous medicine and, thus, politically resist mestizo culture and the effects of globalization. Examining the interface between global processes, identity formation and the production of culture, Friedman (1994) suggests that cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenization are equally constitutive trends of global reality. At the same time that many Veracruceños react, adopt and adapt to circumstances imposed from outside, they also struggle to assert their own cultural identity. Therefore, the process of ethnic formation in Veracruz is never completed but always temporarily positioned within multiple contexts. Or, as Hall (1990) and Lewellen (2002) suggest, it is constantly subject to imaginative and adaptive interpretation of the people themselves. Yon (2000) claims that it would be a mistake to imagine that, because globalization has made the boundaries so fluid and identity more open-ended, issues of self-representation no longer matter very much. Instead, he argues that the proliferation of meanings and identities in late modernity makes the question of identity matter more, not less.

Beyond seemingly instrumentalist purposes,[12] Indigenous medicine is for many Veracruceños a symbol of ethnic history and identity, manifested in ideas, actions and social relations predicated on non-utilitarian cultural attachments. Reducing the symbolic principles through which humans orient their lives to a utilitarian explanation drastically misconstrues the nature of the humans we are trying to understand (De Burgos 2013; Keesing 1990). Therefore, as simultaneously both pragmatic and symbolic, Indigenous medicine provides Veracruceños with objective and subjective features of a cultural past

that referentially transforms their present. In this way, their construct of Indigenous medicine becomes an instrument of transformation, not only of their medical practices per se but also of their contemporary sense of an ethnically distinct identity.

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Notes

1 I use the term *Indigenous* with a capital "I" to refer to Veracruceños for the following reasons. First, Veracruceños abhor the term *Indios*, Spanish for "Indian," and call themselves *Indígenas*, Spanish for *Indigenous*. Second, Veracruceños and most Indigenous people in Nicaragua find the term *Indios* pejorative and view it as a sad, anachronistic misnomer. However, instead of using the lower-case "i" for the term *Indigenous*, I use the capital "I" to make a distinction between *indigenous*, meaning "local" or "home-grown," and *Indigenous* peoples in general. Stephen Greymorning (2004) makes a similar argument about the erroneously overused term *Indian* to designate Indigenous or Native people and chooses to capitalize the term *Indigenous* when referring to a particular people.

2 A small number of Nahua words, such as *monéxico* (governing council) and *nacatamal*, among several hundreds of others (including place names), play an important symbolic role in providing a linguistic component to the Veracruceño identity (see Marenco 2002 for a list of words of Nahua origin used in contemporary Nicaragua). A similar case has been documented by Edwards (1991). He demonstrated that despite ineffective efforts to revive the Irish Gaelic language, Irish national identity remains strong and vibrant, since the symbolic role played by the common maintenance of a small number of words appears to be sufficient to satisfy the need for a linguistic component to national identity. Comparable to Veracruz, some of the surviving Irish Gaelic words are the ones used to designate governmental and other national or ethically significant institutions.

3 Migrations of Nahua groups from Mexico to Central America are perhaps some of the best-known examples of large-scale population movements of "New World" cultural history (Fowler 1989).

4 Other important ethnographies addressing this phenomenon include works by Baer et al. (2003), Banerji (1984), Elling (1981), Good (1994), Kleinman (1995), Martin (1987), Romanucci-Ross et al. (1997), Sontag (1978), Taussig (1987), Unschuld (1975), Young (1993) and Whyte et al. (2002).

5 The term *Methodist medicine* refers to the medical practices brought by the U.S.-based Methodist Church to Bolivia in 1891.

6 Nicaragua's national territory encompasses a land area of approximately 120,254 square kilometres and a total population of 5,128,517. Ethnicities are divided more or less into 69 per cent mestizo (mixed Indigenous with white), 17 per cent white, defined as Caucasian physical appearance or Euro-American), 9 per cent black and 5 per cent Indigenous (Estadísticas nicaragüense 2002:3–7).

7 Most of the funding came from several European and Nicaraguan non-governmental organizations. The bigger donors were the German-based *Pan para el Mundo* (Bread for the World) organization, Popular Norwegian Aid and the Managua chapter of the Continental Secretariat for the 500 Years of Indigenous Resistance Campaign.

8 Although the general theme at the FCE was resistance, some healers were advocating for the integration of traditional healing into the national medical system. This strategy was aligned with the goal of thoroughly meeting the medical needs of the Indigenous population. Proponents of this integration argue that "in a clearly multicultural society there cannot be a mono-cultural medical system" (Sotomayor 1992:15). Cultural diversity should also reflect medical diversity.

9 Nevertheless, as suggested by Keesing (1990), dismissing the symbolic motives and values through which humans orient their lives as hiding some covert ecological rationality is to drastically misconstrue the nature of the humans we are trying to understand.

10 Bioenergetics is a diagnostic method developed by a Japanese physician, Yoshiaki Omura, and introduced to Nicaragua in 1978 by the Germans who, in the 1980s, came as internationalists to work with the Sandinistas. The method was initially called "Bi-Digital" or "Ring-Test"

11 For a more in depth discussion see Campos Navarro (1997), Cosminsky (1976), Foster (1972), Rubel et al. (1984), Scheper-Hughes and Stewart (1983), and Trotter and Chavira (1997).

12 Sahlins (1995) aptly suggests that signs are set in various and contingent relationships according to people's instrumental purposes as socially constituted.

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Aging and Narratives of Loss: A History of Social Suffering

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Abstract: The notion of "loss" often appears as a common theme in both popular and academic discussions of aging. This focus on loss, however, tends to simplify or ignore important aspects of the phenomenon, including how people view themselves and their life experiences. In this article, we address how an individual life narrative can serve as: (1) a counter-narrative to this notion of loss; and (2) a way of drawing attention to a variety of personal and structural factors that may complicate the experience of aging itself.

Keywords: aging, "loss," narrative, counter-narrative, social suffering

Résumé : La notion de « perte » est un thème récurrent dans les discussions aussi bien populaires qu'académiques sur le vieillissement. Cette insistance sur la perte, toutefois, tend à simplifier ou ignorer des aspects importants du phénomène, y compris comment les gens se perçoivent et perçoivent leurs expériences de vie. Dans cet article, nous nous penchons sur les façons dont le récit de vie peut être utilise : (1) comme contre-récit à cette notion de perte, et (2) comme une façon d'attirer l'attention sur une variété de facteurs personnels et structurels qui peuvent compliquer l'expérience même du vieillissement.

Mots-clés : vieillissement, « perte », récit, contre-récit,

Introduction

The gerontological literature tends to focus on two interrelated phenomena. The first is the notion that aging is intimately linked to a process of "loss" (e.g., Garatachea and Lucia 2013; Inouye et al. 2007; Schrack et al. 2010; Wright and Perricelli 2008)—loss in the sense of increasing difficulties with physical mobility, failures in memory and mental acumen, loss of social relationships (often due to the death of loved ones or one's inability to take part in various activities) and decline in mental and physical health, with death as the eventual and inevitable outcome. Second, the gerontological literature also focuses on the ways individuals can be assisted, directly or indirectly, to meet the challenges of these losses as they age (e.g., Chu 2011; Morris et al. 2010). Although laudable and potentially helpful to those in need, the focus on "loss" and its management tends to ignore or minimize key aspects of the experience of aging (Graham and Stephenson 2010; Migliore and Dorazio-Migliore 2010; Randall 2013).

Today, a growing number of scholars acknowledge that loss may occur as people age but stress that the process of aging is much more complex than the attention to loss would indicate. Life experience consists of various ups and downs throughout a person's life and may vary considerably from person to person (Capps 2012; Leon 2012; Migliore and Dorazio-Migliore 2010; Pruyser 1975). A focus on loss tends to draw attention away from the significant political, economic and social factors that have affected and in some cases continue to affect the lives of specific individuals, as well as the experiences and interpretations that give meaning to how people see themselves and their situation(s) in later life (see Russell 2010; Wentzell 2013). A focus on physical and mental decline also facilitates the ever-expanding medicalization of aging (see Conrad 2007; Hadler 2011). What is often missing in the gerontological literature, then, is attention to the various *contexts*—personal, social, cultural and historical—that influence and affect

individuals throughout their lives and thereby impact the experience of aging, including any decline in health (see Fuller-Iglesias et al. 2009; Martin-Matthews 2011; Mayer 2009).

In this article, we build on ideas from critical and interpretive medical anthropology, life course theory and other sources to examine issues of complexity in aging. More specifically, we address these issues of complexity by focusing on the life experiences of one elderly Sicilian Canadian woman in her mid-80s. Our aim is to make use of life history and illness narratives to illustrate how this individual contextualizes her current experiences of "aging and loss" in terms of the cumulative distress she has endured as a result of her social situation in Sicily, emigration/immigration to Canada, work in the garment industry, financial problems and discrimination. Loss, as interpreted by this individual, is not associated with aging per se, but rather is a consequence of a lifetime of what we would call *social suffering*—"human problems that have their origins and consequences in the devastating injuries that social force inflicts on human experience" (Kleinman et al. 1996:xi).

Distress, Illness Narratives and Social Suffering

Everyone experiences pain and suffering at certain points in life. This experience is subjective and idiosyncratic. To communicate one's pain to others, however, this subjective experience must be transformed into a social and cultural language that others can understand (Nichter 1981; Parsons 1984).

> This language consists of: (1) a number of verbal and nonverbal cues people can use to express their suffering; (2) various cultural concepts that provide individuals with a basis for interpreting and explaining their experiences or the experiences of others; and, (3) various preventive and therapeutic rationales people can employ to guide them in their attempts to deal with illness and misfortune. [Migliore 2001:103]

The study of illness narratives serves as a vehicle for examining this language of suffering. More specifically, illness narratives provide insight into people's subjective feelings and how they attempt both to convey their experiences of distress and to seek the assistance of others.

In some cases, however, these narratives may also reveal how individuals, often through metaphor, make use of the idiom of distress to generate additional or alternative messages (Migliore 1997, 2001). These additional messages are significant because they address the broader context within which the experience of

suffering occurs (see Kleinman et al. 1996). Illness narratives provide people with the opportunity to present a social commentary on their suffering and some of the historical, social, economic and political factors they recognize as intimately linked to, if not directly responsible for, this suffering. A focus on illness narratives, then, provides a basis for examining social suffering by revealing aspects of the interplay between micro and macro phenomena—the personal and subjective experiences of individuals, and the various structural factors that affect their lives (Singer 2006). In addition, as Merrill Singer (2006) clearly illustrates, the focus on individual experience has the potential of providing a "face" for the type of social suffering that may affect, in modified form, a larger number of people within a society.

Finally, the study of illness and life narratives can serve as a challenge to and critique of discussions of "aging and loss." The rising field of *narrative gerontology*, for example, recognizes that

> human beings are, fundamentally, hermeneutical beings. Rather than bodies in various stages of decrepitude, we are unique individuals, immersed in making meaning of our experience right to the end, even amid dementia ... We make meaning through the continual imagining, interpreting, and telling of *stories*, including "the story of my life" as a whole ... The key is: living a life is not just a biological process but a biographical one. [Randall 2009:322; see also Miller 2011]

People make sense of their current situations, including health problems, by focusing on past experiences (Becker 1997). By presenting one's biography in terms of social suffering, an individual can generate a counter-narrative, a narrative that resists discussions that tend to downplay or ignore the impact of social forces on personal and community health (see Phoenix and Smith 2011). The growing literature that links suffering to poverty, discrimination and inequalities of various kinds (e.g., Dressler 2010; Nguyen and Peschard 2003) lends support to the need to take these narratives seriously.

Zia Sofia: *Nierbi* and a Life of Suffering[1]

Zia Sofia is an 85-year-old woman born in south central Sicily, Italy. Although she has fond memories of her early years, growing up in a family with seven siblings, she also acknowledges several family difficulties and tragedies. For example: two of her siblings passed away at an early age, she suffered from malaria and other health problems and the family experienced the type of economic circumstances and constraints that plagued

rural Sicily in the 1920s and 1930s (Schneider and Schneider 1976). Her father was often away for work in distant places, sometimes out of the country. To help her family financially, Zia Sofia left school at a young age to begin work as a seamstress. She also learned how to produce various items for sale to women for their trousseaus. Zia Sofia married while in her mid-20s and moved to her husband's hometown some 75 kilometres away. Although the two communities are not very far from one another given today's modes of transportation, at the time, it was as if her family lived in a distant country. She faced loneliness, even though she lived with her husband, his parents and his two unmarried sisters. Her new family placed restrictions on her movements in town and controlled various aspects of her life. Zia Sofia's in-laws adhered to an exaggerated cultural ideal linked to notions of family honour and respectability, through the seclusion of young and newly married women. They attempted to present a positive image of themselves within the community by demonstrating their commitment to protect and financially support female members of the family. As someone who had been working for years and had business dealings with several families in her own hometown, Zia Sofia found these restrictions oppressive and a serious source of distress.

After many long discussions, Zia Sofia succeeded in convincing her husband to leave Sicily to join family members living in southern Ontario, Canada. They immigrated to Canada, with two young children, in the late 1950s. They were part of the large wave of Italian immigrants who travelled to Canada in the hundreds of thousands after World War II (Iacovetta 1993; Migliore 1997; Troper 1993). Their aim, as in the case of many others, was to escape the harsh realities of life in post-war Italy. They wanted to improve their socio-economic standing and thereby provide a better future for their children. At the same time, Zia Sofia hoped to free herself from some of the social and cultural restraints she faced in Sicily. Life in Canada, however, came with its own complications and problems. This was particularly true in the workplace.

It was difficult to find a well-paying job when one did not speak the language of the new place of residence. Zia Sofia and her husband, however, sought and found work almost immediately with the help of other Italian immigrants. Her husband found a job in construction, while she accepted work at a local garment factory where many Italian women, as well as other immigrants, were employed.

They put me to work making men's pants. They called what we did "top stitch". At first, I worked at a daily rate of 49 cents an hour. Then, in time, they put me on "piecework"; what I earned depended on how many pants I made. The most I made in a week was 14 dollars. After, say, a year, I began to earn a little more; but, in those times, with this money we could pay for the rent and food by economizing. [Zia Sofia]

Zia Sofia and her husband, however, did not want to just get by. They wanted their own home.

Well ... things were not going very well. We had all arrived recently from Italy and we all hoped that, in a day, everything would be fixed. No one wanted to stay *a suggietu* [to feel subjected or subordinate] in someone else's house, even if they were relatives. Everyone wanted their own nest. So, we all sought to see who could do a little more, to work very hard, to earn even an extra dollar more each week. [Zia Sofia]

To help achieve her family goals, Zia Sofia was prepared to embrace the hard work and sacrifice necessary for success at the garment factory.

Zia Sofia now attributes some of her current health problems to specific events and circumstances she experienced while employed at the garment factory. The "piecework" itself was strenuous and stressful. She felt sore and drained of energy by the end of each work day. This type of work also raised problems by placing her in competition with co-workers.

Well, I had a lot of trouble, because I didn't have an education in English.[2] [One woman and I] did the same job; but, she came here [from Italy] as a young girl and had an education. She understood something. So, depending on how the job was done, they would send back some pairs of pants [to be redone]. She would say that it wasn't her work and give me *dispia-cieri* [cause me sorrow, pain]. I would have to do 10 to 20 pairs of pants free. I would be killing myself to be able to get a pair of pants with a ticket so I would be paid. She would take the tickets first and laugh in front of the others because I didn't understand. I ended up doing her work.

Something had to be done. The situation had become serious. Zia Sofia developed an ingenious way of distinguishing her work from the work of the co-worker. She created a secret stitch pattern, moving back and forth to create three lines at the top of each label of the garments.

So, one time, around 40 pairs of pants were returned and allowed to accumulate on the machine. Neither she nor I wanted to do them. I was sure that they were not mine. The boss came and said, "You have to finish these 40 pairs of pants before you go home, even if you have to do an extra hour after everyone else has left, or you will lose the money ... You don't understand [how things work here]." [Zia Sofia]

Zia Sofia found herself in a difficult situation. She knew that the garments were not the ones she had worked on, but the foreman insisted that she make the alterations that same day. There was discrimination against people who were not proficient in English and who were considered to be "just off the boat." Even members of one's own ethnic group discriminated against each other, depending on whether they had been born in Canada or when they had arrived in the country. Zia Sofia was upset but also conflicted for other reasons. If she remained late to complete someone else's work, there would be no one at home when her sons arrived from school. At the same time, she was afraid of being fired. The money she brought in each month made a major contribution to the family finances.

> I went to see the union ... I wanted to quit, because every week [the foreman] would say, "Either you redo these pants or Friday you have to quit." He pushed me too much ... The union representative told me I didn't have to quit. He took the pants back to the office. [After a while, the union representative and the foreman came back together.] They divided the pants, 20 pairs each, for us to finish or we would both be let go.

Zia Sofia did not expect this solution to solve the problems between her and the co-worker, but she did think that things might settle down a little. She did not expect the situation to deteriorate further. The co-worker, however, was enraged by the new developments. In this highly competitive environment, the tensions simply continued to escalate.

> [My co-worker] got angry ... The next day, she sent her husband to see me. He worked for the company, too. He said, "Stupid, because you don't understand [you make work for my wife]. Someday I am going to cut your head off with this knife [showing the knife in his hand]." I started to yell; I was afraid. The other workers all came running, especially the Italians.

The other workers came to Zia Sofia's aid, but they were afraid of getting mixed up in a serious dispute that was likely to escalate beyond the foreman and the union. They did not want to get embroiled in a police investigation.

But I didn't *denunsiari* [to denounce or inform on] anyone. They all understood. I didn't *denunsiari* the man, because I knew that he was a father of a family. He was a desperate man who came from Italy too and he didn't know what he was doing. *Lo compatito* [I sympathized with him, and displayed tolerance]. I stopped the machines for two hours ... but, after that, I started working again. I remained silent about things. In that way, I worked for over 10 years with *nierbi* [nerves]. I didn't want to have to look for another job; it was difficult because of the *lingua* [my language skills]. So, I worked 10 years, 10 years, very, very hard, and very *nirbusa* [nervous]. I worked like that to earn something; we had bought a house, had a mortgage, we had a great need. Then I had a baby, so I quit. [Zia Sofia]

Among Sicilian Canadians, *nierbi* (nerves) constitutes an ambiguous concept that can be used in a variety of ways. The term itself, for example, can refer to anatomic features, such as muscles and tendons, an emotional state or the cause of various physical and psychological symptoms (see Migliore 1994:274). In this case, however, Zia Sofia appears to use the concept as a culturally appropriate idiom of distress. She uses the "nerves" idiom to acknowledge and communicate her experience of suffering, to seek empathy (and possibly assistance) from others and to explain her suffering within the context of escalating tensions at an already stressful work environment. The concept of *nirbusu* places the discussion firmly within the context of emotional and psychological distress. Stressful situations have caused Zia Sofia's physical "nerves" (muscles and tendons) to tighten and disrupt her natural equilibrium. As a result, she begins to experience various physical, emotional and psychological symptoms. *Nirbusu* serves as a gloss for this set of symptoms.

> [My co-worker's husband] had *nierbi* that *scattavanu* [that were bursting out]. He couldn't see what he was doing. Because I couldn't say anything, not even tell my husband, the *nierbi* affected my stomach. I felt sick to my stomach.... While working at the factory, after having all these *dispiaciri* [sorrow, pain], I would feel like either crying or leaving. I don't know how many thoughts went through my head. I didn't know what to do, but I was *costretta* [compelled, constrained] to stay on. There was no work; to earn this job I had made such a *fatica* [enormous effort]. But on more than one day, I had to stay home; I just couldn't manage to go to work. I didn't have the strength and the *corragio* [courage] to go. This passed. But I also worried about my boys. They would go to school by themselves. I would go back and forth from work at noon so I could make them lunch. I found myself too *battuta* [extremely tired].

Sometimes I managed and, at times, because of the *nierbi*, I would feel like leaving everything and going home. But if I did it one day, I could not do it the next day. The need was great. Not just for me; for all of us who came from Italy. There was such a great need to work. It was difficult.

Zia Sofia links her distress directly to strained social relations between co-workers, but this distress was exacerbated further by the fact that she could not discuss what transpired with her husband, family members and friends. From a Sicilian point of view, the best way to deal with cases of *nirbusu* is to *spuvari*—to release emotional tension by talking about one's problems with significant others (see Migliore 1994). Zia Sofia was afraid that any discussion of the "knife incident" would create new problems for her. More specifically, she was afraid that her husband might take direct action against the other man. Zia Sofia wanted to avoid the possibility of drawing her husband into any violent conflict that would lead to serious consequences and problems with the police. Under these circumstances, she decided that it was better to suffer quietly than to risk damage to her family.

At the same time, however, Zia Sofia places the discussion of these personal and social tensions within the broader social and economic contexts of (1) the emigration/immigration process; (2) the lack of education and English language skills; and (3) the work environment she found in Canada—an environment that placed Italian immigrants in a position where they had to take piecework jobs that forced them to struggle to survive in Canada and to compete with one another to make a living. Although the co-worker's husband caused her a great deal of suffering, he too was a victim of these same social and economic conditions. He too suffered from *nierbi*. Zia Sofia also hints at other complicating factors, such as difficulties with childcare. Both she and her husband had to work, but they could not afford to pay for someone to help take care of their boys. They could not count on the type of family support that would have been possible in Sicily. Although they had family members in Canada, they too were struggling to work and save money to improve their socio-economic standing.

According to Zia Sofia, these life circumstances and experiences combined to generate negative health consequences for her.

> The *nierbi* caused me a major sickness. The initial stomach problems led to a *castrita*, a small wound in my stomach. I didn't understand what was happening; *nun mi curava tantu* [I wasn't treating myself

very carefully]. I didn't even have time to go to see the doctor ... When I finally did see the doctor, he put me on *pinuli di nierbi* [pills for my nerves] to keep me calm. But nothing could help. Two years later ... I experienced a sudden '*morregia* [hemorrhage]. I passed blood from my mouth and from down below. [The doctors] diagnosed it as an *ulcera* [ulcer]. They didn't operate on me but they treated me at the hospital. I believe all this came about because of all those years I worked with *nierbi* and forcing myself to work hard.

The initial medical treatment, the "nerve pills," helped relieve some of Zia Sofia's symptoms. The medication helped her feel calmer and facilitated her ability to continue to work under stressful conditions at the garment factory. Although, at the time, from Zia Sofia's point of view, this was beneficial and desirable given her economic situation, the prescription of tranquilizers can be interpreted as a form of *medicalization*. According to Peter Conrad (2007: 3), medicalization occurs when life problems are defined as medical problems and then treated from this point of view (see also Davis 1997; Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1986). The situation in Zia Sofia's case is complex. The physician, for example, was attempting to address Zia Sofia's presenting complaint. He or she likely did not know about Zia Sofia's work-related stresses, and Zia Sofia herself was reluctant to discuss these stresses with anyone. In addition, Zia Sofia was certainly willing to take the "nerve pills" so she could continue with her work. At the same time, however, the prescription of tranquilizers served as a form of medicalization by focusing solely on the immediate symptoms of her distress. The treatment failed to address the social origins of these symptoms; it did not address or acknowledge the social and economic stresses Zia Sofia faced at her workplace. In fact, the treatment helped deflect attention "away from the social arrangements and political forces that contribute to the incidence of distress and disease" (Lock 2001:481). In the long run, the treatment strategy failed to solve her work and health problems.

Ten years later Zia Sofia experienced new problems. "I recovered a little, I could eat, but I always suffered from *nierbi*. Then the '*morregia* [hemorrhaging] came back even worse. For 15 days I was in intensive care. They kept giving me blood but the bleeding would not stop. They had to operate." Zia Sofia lost more than half of her stomach and part of her duodenal tube. Some 40 years later, she still talks about problems digesting food and getting the nutrients she needs from the food she eats. She now suffers from osteoporosis. On

occasion, she also experiences "tightness in my chest, pain through my abdominal area and my legs *m'ammollanu* [weaken and give way] ... I don't know if it comes from *nierbi* or some other sickness but I suffer." With age, Zia Sofia has experienced several health problems that continue to plague her as chronic ailments. She attributes these ailments, directly or indirectly, to her long-standing experiences with *nierbi* and *nirbusu*. She, in turn, attributes the origins of these experiences to the tense work environment at the garment factory, being silenced for all those years, as well as the various forms of distress and suffering she endured at other points in her life.

Conclusion

Today, Zia Sofia is a widow living alone in a house that her children argue is too big for her. She sees her children and their children on most weekends, but with the osteoporosis it is difficult to get out for visits with other family and friends. Many of her good friends have passed away or live under similar circumstances. She needs assistance with the purchase of groceries and the maintenance of her home. Her life seems to fit neatly into a stereotypical narrative of an elderly Sicilian Canadian woman who suffers from both acute and chronic ailments and experiences various forms of significant "loss" with age. This line of thinking, however, is called into question when we pay close attention to the detail and intricacies of her illness and life narratives.

Although Italians chose to immigrate to Canada as a means of improving their situation and providing better opportunities for their children, the emigration/immigration process, including the adaptations people made in their new social and cultural environment, often continues to loom large in their individual and collective memories. People, in fact, sometimes link their current health problems to the dislocations and disruptions they experienced many years earlier (Migliore 2001; see also Dossa 2004). This is consistent with Finkler's (2000:437) notion of *life's lesions*—the idea that health problems must be understood within "the context of a person's life, especially inimical social interactions, moral dilemmas and unresolved contradictions that must be confronted in daily life." This is precisely what Zia Sofia suggests in her narrative. Her experiences at various points in life have affected her health negatively in later life.

Zia Sofia, however, not only addresses her current pain and suffering in terms of past experiences but also firmly presents this discussion within the broader context of various social, cultural and economic factors she has struggled with over the years. More specifically: (1)

the social and economic problems in Sicily that influenced her decision to enter the workforce at a young age, rather than pursue an education; (2) the marked gender-based constraints she faced in her husband's hometown; (3) the difficulties of making ends meet in Canada, combined with a work environment that promoted tense social relations between co-workers and discrimination toward new immigrants (particularly immigrant women); and (4) the medicalization of social problems to be able to continue to work under adverse conditions.

In other words, Zia Sofia's narrative draws attention to the various phenomena that help explain and contextualize her experiences of pain and suffering, and thereby serves as a counter-narrative to the notion that "loss" simply comes with age. Zia Sofia has led a life of what social scientists might call *social suffering*—not the type of suffering that occurs as a consequence of overtly political acts, but rather the less visible suffering engendered by a lack of institutional accommodation, discrimination and exclusion based on gender, class, ethnicity and their intersections. This, however, does not make Zia Sofia a victim of life circumstances. She made her own choices, but these choices were sometimes made in difficult situations and within the constraints of the social, cultural and economic circumstances she encountered.

Sicilian Canadians sometimes refer to *old age* (la vecchiaia) disparagingly as a *carogna* (swine or slut). On several occasions we have heard Zia Sofia react to this type of statement with this refrain: "*la vecchiaia* may be a *carogna*, but it is a *vergogna* [shame] to not reach it" (see also Migliore and Dorazio-Migliore 2010:67–68). Zia Sofia is a survivor—a survivor who owns and resides in her own home and has successful children and grandchildren. Their success in Canada is also her success. From Zia Sofia's point of view, her hard work and sacrifice has helped her family achieve some of the goals she and her husband set out to achieve by immigrating to Canada.

Failure to recognize the importance of these types of counter-narratives is to simplify and ignore the complexities surrounding people's later life experiences and the meanings they attach to these experiences. Zia Sofia's narrative is not just a personal story; it is part of the collective Sicilian and Italian Canadian immigrant experience, an experience that has many analogies to circumstances that other immigrants have encountered. We argue that any attempt to conflate the effects of these and many other social and cultural phenomena under the umbrella of "loss" has the potential of serving

as a form of *symbolic violence*—a means of imposing a particular way "of comprehending and adapting to the social world by representing economic and political power in disguised, taken-for-granted forms" that are not consistent with people's conceptions and experiences of everyday life (Swartz 1997:89; see also Bourdieu 1991). From our point of view, Zia Sofia's story is a counter-narrative that attempts to resist taken-for-granted assumptions surrounding notions of "aging" and "loss," as well as any negative implications these assumptions may have for one's life.

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Notes

1 The term *Zia* literally translates as "Aunt." Among Sicilians, it is common practice to refer to one's seniors as aunt or uncle as a sign of respect. *Sofia* is a pseudonym.

2 Zia Sofia lived in a Sicilian Canadian neighborhood near a convent where the sisters provided free English language education for immigrants. Although some people took advantage of this service, she and many other immigrant women did not because they felt simply too busy with work and taking care of their families.

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Next Stop, Cold Lake: Patterns of Mobility, Military Brats and Oil-Patch Kids

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Abstract: The French-speaking population of Cold Lake, Alberta, is mainly constituted by mobile individuals coming from two sectors: the oil industry and the Canadian military. Based on fieldwork in and around a French-only school in Cold Lake, this article explores the community impact of having such a mobile resident make-up. From the parents', educators' and most importantly from the children's perspective, I ask how these mobile families relate to the many communities to which they belong, how they see themselves and how they articulate their sense of belonging.

Keywords: mobility, school, military, oil industry, family, identity

Résumé : La population francophone de Cold Lake, en Alberta, est principalement constituée de personnes mobiles rattachées à deux secteurs: l'industrie pétrolière et les Forces militaires canadiennes. À partir d'une recherche de terrain effectuée dans et autour d'une école exclusivement francophone de Cold Lake, cet article étudie l'impact sur la communauté d'avoir une population caractérisée par une telle mobilité. Avec la perspective des parents, des enseignants mais surtout des enfants, je cherche à savoir comment ces familles nomades entrent en relation avec les nombreuses communautés auxquelles elles appartiennent, comment elles se perçoivent et comment elles articulent leur sentiment d'appartenance.

Mots-clés : mobilité, école, forces armées, industrie pétrolière, famille, identité

Introduction

For the first time, Canadian western provinces hold a larger part of the Canadian population than the Atlantic provinces and Quebec together (Statistics Canada 2012). One reason for this is the cross-Canada migrations that bring individuals to Alberta to benefit from work provided by the oil industry. Between 2006 and 2011, Alberta had the fastest population growth rate among provinces (10.8 per cent), almost 5 per cent above the national average (Statistics Canada 2012). Between 2008 and 20011, the Mobility, Identity and New Political Economy (MINE) research project looked into the mobility of francophone individuals moving about the country for work reasons, many of whom came from Quebec or Atlantic provinces to find employment in Western Canada. As part of this research project, I conducted fieldwork in Cold Lake, Alberta, where the oil industry is an important employer. Cold Lake offered additional incentives for mobility research, as it is home to a Canadian Air Force base.

The objective of this project was to document how children of French-speaking military families living in an English-speaking part of Canada experienced their community, with a focus on the impact of their mobile lifestyle on the children's conception of identity and belonging. In this article, I discuss the consequences of high mobility for a linguistic minority community, through research with the French-only school serving local francophones. I argue that mobility is a major factor in identity and community building within the school clientele, most of whom are from either military or oil-industry families. Referring to fieldwork completed in Cold Lake in 2009–2010, I draw a portrait of the school as perceived by students, teachers and community members and pull from these descriptions to explain how mobile lifestyles can influence notions of community and belonging. After introducing the project, I propose patterns of mobility and semiotic registers as relevant theoretical approaches for work with mobile families. I then provide

a description of the social and historical setting in which this research takes place. This provides the necessary background for a description of the patterns of mobility experienced by the two main clienteles of the school, military brats and oil-patch kids.

Project Overview

In previous research on military families in the Canadian Navy (Asselin 2007), I became aware of the connection between patterns of mobility and community. Among the families of CFB Esquimalt, two main factors had significant influence on levels of mobility: the service of the military member and, second, whether the individual is an officer or enlisted member. Officers generally have a higher level of mobility than enlisted members, and air force and naval military personnel are more likely to be re-posted in the same base, as there are only two operational bases in the Navy.

These patterns of mobility influence how they related to their community as a whole and, for francophones, to local, non-military French networks. This previous research focused on the military family unit as point of reference. In this context, the children's experiences were part of the families' network of interaction.

However, family mobility has different repercussions for parents than for their children. Laura Hammond (2003) explored these divergences in experience between parent and child in families of refugees travelling back to their country of origin. She looked at how children of refugee families go through the process of emplacement through different practices than their parents, while being themselves part of their parents' emplacement experience. In the context of this project, it is similarly important to document how children of mobile families experience their relocation, as well as the processes through which they imbue their communities with meaning.

An ethnographic approach to the community experience of children of military families is relevant as it can counter the often ill-informed mainstream perceptions that civilians have of the military lifestyle (Ender 2005). Providing original data on an often hidden group can contribute to bridging the civil-military gap. Some research has been done on the impact of the military lifestyle on spouses (Burrell et al. 2006), but their children have been less likely to come under scrutiny (Ender 2005).

Anthropology is well suited to the study of military communities, who abound with elements of interest to its practitioners, such as jargon, traditions, rituals and distinct world views. They can therefore be studied with the same approach taken to studying any cultural group. Indeed, military culture has been referenced to help

understand military and civil-military relations in particular (Académie Canadienne de la Défense 2003; English 2004; Winslow 1997). In their own publications (Académie Canadienne de la Défense 2003), the Canadian Forces talk about military ethos—represented values and world views—which can be equated with elements of an institutional culture. Others, such as Harrison and Laliberté (1994, 1997) and Winslow (1997), focus on elements of military culture that diverge from civilians' values. For example, Cockerham and Cohen (1980) express the level at which civilians and military are divided by a redefinition of what are acceptably social acts, whereby "what most distinguishes the military is that it must train and socialize its membership to norms that are non-normative in civilian society, such as kill people and obey orders implicitly" Winslow (1997:15)

The common point is an agreement that military members are subjected to a military culture which is distinct from civilian culture. However, while military organizations across national borders may share elements of this organizational culture, it remains important to consider national and local re-articulations of these characteristics in context. While what is considered Canadian military culture contains elements that are typical of military organizations, it is redefined and actualized in relation to a Canadian national reality, which allows the legitimization of the Canadian Forces. Thus, in Cold Lake the reality of military life and the influence of the military institution on the family are played out in locally unique ways.

To widen my understanding of the military community, I began work with École Voyageur, in Cold Lake, Alberta, a school providing services to the Cold Lake Air Force base. Cold Lake is located in northeastern Alberta near the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) base of CFB Cold Lake (known as 4 Wing). As many communities in the region have a French-Canadian heritage, Cold Lake provided a relevant context in which to observe the interactions between the mobile francophones of the Canadian Forces and the local, historical francophone community.

Theoretical Approach

Mobility, particularly with regard to voluntary moves across borders, is seldom experienced collectively. Among my research population, each family has its own history of relocations, making it difficult to generalize. This is reflected in numerous works on human mobility (e.g., Ender 2002; Goebel 2010; Westwood and Phizacklea 2000), often in a transnational perspective, works that prefer to consider sense-making as an emergent phenomenon that evolves from interpretations and percep-

tions based on frames of expectations resulting from a continuous chain of interactions. This approach to identity is relevant in this case, where individuals are exposed to a multitude of socialization contexts and where their continuous participation across geographical, linguistic, social and institutional borders challenges the possibility of associating with a single, all-encompassing, cultural identity.

Yet, despite this uniqueness, many experiences can be framed by similar influencing factors that lead to general tendencies within a group. Families who move around Canada as part of careers in the Canadian Forces share some similarities in their experience of mobility. Their moves are motivated by similar needs and expectations and supported by the same institution, and they are subjected to networks of similar nature. It is in this light that I speak of military families sharing a *pattern of mobility*. This pattern is an important element of each individual's trajectory of socialization, establishing reference points to evaluate the experience they have of Cold Lake.

Patterns of mobility are not the same as trajectories or relocation histories. Trajectories, which are often personal in nature, are a specific lived experience of mobility across various localities. Each trajectory is unique and is an account of relocations by an individual, even though he or she may share many or even all parts of it with other individuals, such as family members. The trajectory can often be related through a narrative accounting for the various locations an individual has lived in over the course of his or her life. Kevin, a sixth-grader whose father is in the Air Force, summarizes his own personal trajectory:

KEVIN: Je suis né à Moose Jaw, puis après on a déménagé à Cold Lake. On a vécu ici pour cinq ans.

ASSELIN: Okay

K: Puis après on a re-déménagé à Moose Jaw pour environ 5 ans, parce que mon père était pilote là-bas. Et puis maintenant on est ici à Cold Lake encore.

A: Ça fait combien de temps que vous êtes revenue à Cold Lake?

K: Juste depuis le mois de juin.

This trajectory, though shared with family members, would likely not be expressed the same way by his parents, who were not born in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, and whose relocation history started before he was born. The trajectory of each military brat can vary greatly. The child of another RCAF military member may never have lived in different towns or regions. However, while their trajectories may differ, their relocations are nevertheless framed by similar characteristics, which may provide orientation to how they are interpreted. It is not suggested that two such individuals share similar experiences but, rather, that their interpretive framework of mobility is influenced by certain shared characteristics. In the following sections, I provide examples of elements that constitute patterns of mobility for these families, such as the motivations for moving, the institutional support and the public opinions surrounding professional occupations. Because patterns of mobility are tied to framing characteristics, they can be shared by groups who participate within the same framework and are not uniquely personal, as are individual trajectories. A pattern of mobility also differs from a trajectory in that while the latter can be summarized as a described list of moves, the former is seldom articulated so concisely.

The same observations can be made in relation to other patterns of mobility, such as transnational families (Le Gall 2005; Tsang et al. 2003; Tsong and Liu 2009) and Third-Culture Kids (Ender 2002; Pollock and Van Reken 2001). The characteristics shared within these groups are because of similar elements in how the relocations and connections between different parts of the world are experienced and understood.

Oil-industry families also have a distinct trajectory of socialization. Some of them come from the same region of origin and share the same environment today; but the motivations, social networks and institutions framing their mobility vary to such a degree that they provide different points of reference toward their experience of northern Alberta. These same motivations, social networks and backgrounds are something that they share, making their own experience representative of another pattern of mobility.

To understand how mobility can be a factor in the building of identities and sense of belonging, I focused on how individuals in Cold Lake talked about and represented this part of their life. Goebel looks at identity as "fluid and something that constantly emerges within a chain of communicative events involving discourse on sameness and difference" (2010:2). He uses the concept of semiotic register, borrowed from Agha (2007), to explore identity. Semiotic registers represent a cultural model for action constituted of a "repertoire of performable signs linked to stereotypic pragmatic effects by a sociohistorical process of enregisterment" (Agha 2007:80). Goebel shows how multiple semiotic registers can coexist within a given group, allowing individuals to make sense of complex situations. This approach proved useful in understanding the mixed feelings revolving around the issues of mobility and about École Voyageur in general.

Cold Lake

Northern Alberta is home to a community of francophones who have achieved ethno-linguistic maintenance (Asselin and Daveluy 2011). Cold Lake is a relatively

young town, settled by Euro-Canadians in 1905. The local economy, based around agriculture and logging, was profoundly changed by the discovery of oil deposits at Leduc in 1946–47, which kick-started a wave of oil and gas exploration in Alberta (Kerr 1991). French-speakers have been part of the regional make-up for over a hundred years, settling nearby villages, such as Bonnyville, Saint-Paul, Plamondon and Lac La Biche. Another wave of oil industry expansion was spurred when technological advances and rising oil prices made the exploitation of the Fort McMurray[1] tar sands, one of the largest oil deposits in the world, profitable. The Cold Lake region proved to be a productive source of gas and oil and started attracting new workers. During the 1990s and 2000s, the oil industry boom changed the local economy and demography as workers coming from other parts of Canada moved to the region to benefit from the Alberta Advantage.[2]

A second event that shaped Cold Lake was the establishment of a nearby Air Force base in 1954. This started a continuous flow of military members coming from all parts of Canada into the Cold Lake area. Along with military members came their families, who were mostly housed in permanent married quarters (PMQs) around the base. This added francophones in the region, as a proportion of military members were French-speaking. The proportion of French-speakers in the Canadian Forces progressively increased to be representative of Canadian demographics after the adoption of the Official Languages Act in 1969. While other towns in the region do have a heritage of French-Canadian pioneers, historically Cold Lake itself was not a French-speaking community before military presence.

Today, a considerable part of Cold Lake's economy and identity is related to these two industries. Accordingly, Cold Lake's francophone community is mostly constituted of military members, oil workers and their respective families. For these families, the main nexus of interaction is the local French public school, l'École Voyageur, whose origin is tied to Canadian Forces' history.

The main component of fieldwork for this research focused on École Voyageur (K–12 French school). While École Voyageur provides services to military families, it is no longer a military school and is open to all children having a right of access to French education, referred to as ayant-droits, and is not in direct relation with the Canadian Forces. Cold Lake's population is 13,924 people, with 41 per cent of the population between 18 and 40 years old. Twenty-two per cent of the population work for the federal government (mostly through the military base) and 17 per cent work for the oil and gas industry (City of Cold Lake 2010).

Schools and the Canadian Forces

There are very few recorded concerns for the families of military members before World War I (Morin 1986). While the families of officers played an important role in the community, the families of enlisted members were generally not recognized. Furthermore, between the two World Wars, the minister of defence recognized no obligation toward their children's education. Families of military members were often caught in a difficult situation as the municipal school boards would require them to pay non-resident tuition fees because they lived on crown land and therefore did not pay school taxes. However, starting from the end of the 1940s, the Canadian Forces progressively began recognizing its responsibilities toward the families of enlisted members. After the creation of the Official Languages Act in 1969, the issue was complicated by a necessity to provide education in both of Canada's official languages. The bilingualism programs of the Canadian Forces brought French-speakers to regions where French-speaking services were not necessarily available (Bernier and Pariseau 1991). This influx of francophone families created or reinforced local French-speaking communities, which then warranted the provision of schools in that language. On many bases, as education was provided by the Department of National Defence (DND), providing space to establish French programs became one of DND's responsibilities.

In CFB Cold Lake (4 Wing Cold Lake), the first French program was created in 1974 and began complete operation at the beginning of the 1980s (Morin 1986). Because French services were provided where demand warranted, the initiation of the process fell to members of the community. At 4 Wing Cold Lake, dedicated individuals started to adapt and develop programs in a trailer behind another school for children of military families and civilian employees on the base. These programs were not thought to be well adapted to local realities; subsequently, Cold Lake teachers worked toward local adaptation. To reduce expenses, in the early 1990s, the DND decided to pass responsibilities for the schools to local school boards. For the French school, this meant joining the emerging regional school board and offering the provincial curriculum. The schools were now open to the general public but still located on the base, with some children coming from as far as 40–50 kilometres away.

Indeed, by the time the French school was created at 4 Wing, linguistic composition in the surrounding

communities had changed to the point where there was no longer an official French school in many surrounding communities. This is how, when the 4 Wing French school became public, many parents came to send their kids to Cold Lake for their elementary education. Since then, new French schools have been created in Bonnyville, Saint-Paul and Plamondon, as part of a French school board. Nowadays, the children attending École Voyageur all reside in the Cold Lake area. Finally, in 2004, the school relocated off-base. This move was motivated by a need for new infrastructure and also to move closer to the civilian communities, in the hope of attracting more local, non-military, French-speaking families.

Patterns of Mobility

Military Brats

In considering trajectories within the military community, it is important to distinguish between officers and enlisted members. While an officer's career generally requires some level of post-secondary education, this is not the reality for enlisted members, who can join the military as unskilled labourers. This means that officers, enlisted members and their respective families often come from and belong to different socio-economic groups and may have different perspectives on the value of education and mobility. Furthermore, while all military members have to change posting every 3–5 years, not all postings are accompanied by relocation. To decrease cost, the current trend is to minimize the number of long-distance moves, at least for enlisted members. Avoiding moves is more difficult for officers, whose careers rely on showing adaptability and command capacity in various environments. Within the military institution, it is deemed preferable that an individual does not become too comfortable in a certain commanding position, and leaders are therefore moved. Second, the trade of an enlisted member also impacts trajectories. For example, some of the military members I met were Air Force technicians who specialize in the CF-18 and could be posted only where those planes are based or wherever the aircraft were currently deployed.[3] Furthermore, not all military members posted at 4 Wing Cold Lake belong to the Royal Canadian Air Force. Some of them belong to the Army and even the Navy, and were posted in Cold Lake for several reasons. It was explained to me by a military member that some types of occupations, such as medical support, are transferable from one service to the next and are only nominally associated with a specific one. Among the military families at École Voyageur, the level of mobility and specific trajectories therefore varied according to occupation.

These individuals' patterns of mobility influence how they relate to their community as a whole and, for francophones, to the local, non-military, French-speaking networks. For instance, in Esquimalt, BC, some military families who had experienced living as a linguistic minority did not have the same type of integration as those coming directly from Quebec, where they had always lived as part of the linguistic minority. In Cold Lake, I was told by school staff that some parents coming from Quebec, who expected to return to Quebec after their stay in Cold Lake, were more likely to enrol their children in the English schools than other francophones, because they were not as concerned about language maintenance.

The Canadian Forces assigns a linguistic designation to each unit or base, and units can therefore be labelled as French Language Units (FLU), English Language Units (ELU) or Bilingual Units (BU)[4] (Asselin 2006, 2007; Commissariat aux langues officielles 2004:23). Bagotteville, a French language Air Force base located in Quebec, is often avoided by unilingual English speakers, if they can help it, often for the sake of their spouse. While military members do not have the final say in their postings, they still express preferences that can be taken into account. Spouses of military members often mentioned to me having put pressure on their husbands to try to influence the process.

Age can also influence the likeliness to move. Members with young families, who are at the beginning of their career, are likely to accept being moved to aid in their advancement. However, those with older children, in particular those nearing the end of high school, are more likely to seek ways to stay in one location until their children have graduated.

A distinctive aspect of military family mobility is that their relocation, indeed, their entire lives, is framed by their relationship with the Canadian Forces. In a way, their moves are not voluntary. While the military members enlisted of their own free will, once they are part of the Canadian Forces, they are not in control over where they will be posted. There are provisions for special circumstances and ways to influence the posting process. Having children, in particular high school children, can be taken into consideration when postings are assigned. In this light, children can be anchors for military members, providing them with reasons to reduce their movements and grow roots in a given community.

However, children have very different perspectives on their family's mobility than their parents. Unless they themselves are from military families, mobility is a recent life choice for the parents, while for many children it is the only lifestyle they have ever experienced.

A child could have been born in Trenton, Ontario, moved to Goose Bay, Labrador, when he was two, then back to Bagotteville, Quebec, at six and end up in Cold Lake, Alberta, at age ten. When the time comes for the next posting, the family might decide to try to stay in Cold Lake to allow their 14-year-old the opportunity to stay in the same high school until graduation.

Oil-Patch Kids

For oil-industry families, mobility is primarily motivated by economic opportunity. While individual families have different trajectories, the typical scenario is one where workers sought relocation in Alberta to benefit from better employment opportunities. As such, a sizeable proportion of this group comes from regions of Canada suffering from ongoing economic difficulties, such as New Brunswick (as far as French-speakers go), or from other parts of Canada where industry has been struggling. This characteristic further differentiates military and oil-industry families. Within the population I studied, French-speaking military families are more predominantly from Quebec, as Quebecers have a larger demographic weight compared to other French-Canadians, while French-speaking oil-industry families in Cold Lake are often from New Brunswick or Ontario.

Oil-patch kids usually have a more linear relocation history. Even if coming to Cold Lake was not their first move, they can easily trace their own origin and identity back to their parent's province of origin. The path that led them to Cold Lake clearly came from there, and they often see that that is where it will lead them again.

Many oil-patch kids were born in New Brunswick or were born in Cold Lake but have parents who recently migrated from the east. While their stay in Cold Lake might be temporary, as their parents are often planning to eventually move back east, their living situation is more stable than that of military brats. As for the move to Cold Lake, the family's decision for returning to their region of origin or moving to a new location is left to individual families. This is in contrast with military families, whose movements can be dictated by an outside institution. In interviewing parents of oil-industry families, there is a sense that the move to Cold Lake was always accompanied with a willingness to make a home there. Thus, there is a sense of stability and permanency, even if living in Cold Lake is seen as temporary.

In comparison with military families, oil-industry families, as civilians, tend to fit in better with the wider community. This is largely because their occupation does not add an additional barrier to social integration. They also take part in the local economy, and their prosperity is more closely related to local reality. Further-more, they are also "not quebecois," and often have an easier time adapting to the local francophone community, already being accustomed to being a minority in their home towns and often having a better grasp of the English language.

The Students of École Voyageur

From the outside, École Voyageur looks like any other school. Upon approach, its identity as French-speaking school quickly becomes apparent: the billboard near the parking lot relates news in French and there is a Franco-Albertan flag on a pole beside the Albertan and Canadian ones. Inside the school, the French language dominates, even with a few bilingual or English-only notices, mostly relating to local events. Like any other school, students go to their classes, talk in the hallways or other common areas and play in the schoolyard. One giveaway that the school is a little different can be seen in the number of men and women wearing military uniforms dropping off and picking up their children. When asking community members if École Voyageur is unique, two main discourses seem to emerge. One is of normality. In this discourse, according to participants, École Voyageur is a regular school, where the students are first and foremost children with children's concerns. They want to have fun, they wish they could skip some classes, they have fights, they fall in love, they goof around, they hang out.

However, this discourse is mixed within another semiotic register, seemingly without contradiction, which claims that École Voyageur is a very unique school. At the forefront of this portrayal of the school is that the people of École Voyageur are mobile. What makes Voyageur particular in this regard is the extent of this characteristic within its population. Around school, in any given class, when asking students with military parents to raise their hands, the majority of them will do so. The main clientele of the school are clearly military families. However, what completes the mobile characteristic is that a large majority of the non-military families have also come from other parts of Canada, mostly to work in oil and gas extraction and related industries. Although there are some locals in the school, they remain a very small minority, even including those coming from other parts of Alberta. École Voyageur is a very apt name for the school, even if it officially refers to the original pioneers who explored Western Canada's waterways.

Among the school staff, the semiotic register surrounding mobility often frames it as an obstacle; the mobility that is omnipresent at École Voyageur presents challenges. One of the simplest is technical: when new

students arrive at École Voyageur, teachers need to assess their level in comparison with the Albertan school program, so they rely on forwarded academic files. However, delays or oversights are frequent. Teachers spoke of frustrations when lacking important information regarding students to provide them with the appropriate level of instruction. One teacher told me it had taken her many months to assess where a new student was in relation to the Alberta science curriculum, having recently moved from Quebec. Her opinion was that a better communication between the schools who dealt with mobile families could help the situation.

Furthermore, some teachers felt that many students had self-esteem issues as a result of a difficult adaptation to the Alberta school curriculum, partly due to the fact that students coming from other provinces were often stronger in some disciplines and weaker in others. While being ahead of their classmates may provide a boost in self-confidence, it rarely makes up for the feeling of inadequacy resulting from having to struggle to keep up in another subject, particularly if students' performances were considered good in their previous school. This is accentuated by the fact that the readjustment to the curriculum occurs at the same time that the student is learning the norms of the new environment. This is exacerbated when students struggle to communicate in the wider community, such as when they do not yet speak English with confidence. For example, one difficulty for older students who were not very comfortable with their English skills was in finding part-time jobs.

A less tangible but nevertheless profound impact of mobility on the students of École Voyageur is in their attachment to localities. Observation and interviews lead me to think that the patterns of mobility of military brats and oil patch kids also have an impact on their concepts of identity and belonging. For instance, asking where they are from elicits different answers. The question is often harder to answer for military brats.

A good proportion of them struggle to answer this question, feeling it does not reflect their own conception of belonging. Although they can name where they were born, their answer generally comes as a list of the various locations where they lived, without classifying one as more important than the others. For them, the journey that their life has been is more relevant than any single location to which they may have an attachment. This does not mean that they lack any symbolical attachment to place. The specifics of various trajectories create situations where some children claim a specific regional identity. Many children of Quebec families, for example, still claimed a Quebecois identity, even though they had no recollection of living there. It is just not "where they

are from." This can at least, in part, be attributed to their socialization within a discourse, from their parents but possibly also from other mobile individuals, in which their Quebecois heritage is promoted. Julie, a high school student who had no recollection of living in Quebec, still considered herself Quebecoise.

ASSELIN: Quand on te demande tu viens d'où, qu'est-ce que tu dis?

JULIE: Québec ... Bien je suis née là, puis, je suis québécoise, donc je dis Québec.

Furthermore, while a lack of attachment to place is seen in how they look at their past trajectory as well as their relationship with Cold Lake, it is also reflected in how they see themselves in the future. Unless they have lived in Cold Lake for most of their lives and have established deep networks or roots within the community, most students expect to leave Cold Lake one day, and do so without regret. They plan to go where life takes them, often with an eye for employment opportunities.

Even though adapting to a new social environment is often brought up as one of the main difficulties for students changing schools, École Voyageur is particular because it is almost entirely made up of relocated individuals. Almost everyone has known what it is like to be the new kid or is used to welcoming new classmates, so there is no stigma surrounding new arrivals. And because the school is small, it lacks the complex social stratification which can make school life, maybe particularly high school life, so difficult for outsiders. The experiences of École Voyageur's students clearly reflect this.

In fact, as far as putting stress on social life, what is difficult is not being the new student at the school and making new friends, but rather having to leave friends, either in the previous school or in Cold Lake, when someone moves away. Jean, a military member, and Lucy had two boys at École Voyageur and explained some of the challenges for their children in making friends.

JEAN: Tu vas remarquer que la plupart des enfants ne se font pas des bons amis. Ils vont être chums, mais de là à devenir meilleurs chums... La plupart le savent pas mal d'avance, habituellement les parents vont le savoir au mois de novembre, qu'ils sont transférés l'été. Ils savent peut-être pas où, mais ils savent qu'ils sont [transférés]. Fait que déjà là, les enfants vont le savoir. Fait que tu sais, ils savent que lui, il part, fait que ça sert à rien de se mettre bien chum avec lui. Il va partir dans, dans 3 ou 4 mois, fait que tu sais...

LUCY: Mais en même temps il vient un âge où ça vient difficile de partir parce qu'ils se sont fait des amis. Puis, nous autres aussi.

J: Mais c'est plus les blondes puis les chums.[5]

In this regard, while this research did not produce conclusive evidence, it is possible that mobility may have a different impact according to the gender of children. Many boys who were interviewed belonged to secondary groups, which facilitated their involvement in the local social network, primarily by being members of sports team. Indeed, some children and parents told me that organized sports had contributed to establishing ties after their relocation. However, among my sample, the children involved in such sports, usually hockey, were mostly from oil-industry families, who relocate less often than the military families.

Another secondary group which is likely to be available to military children are the various cadet groups which are often found in communities where there are military bases. Indeed, these can and do offer some amount of continuity to children of military families who are involved in such groups, as these units are structured similarly across Canada. While it can be expected that the cadet organization, like the military institution upon which it is structured, is gendered in ideology and practice, among the children I interviewed during my stay in Cold Lake, members of the local cadet group were equally male and female.

Finally, once again within the group I studied in Cold Lake, a similar proportion of male and female children expressed distress in severing important primary friendships. Similarly, the parents of both boys and girls expressed concern or related difficulties for their children when they lost close friends because of relocations. Therefore, it is not possible to establish a strong gendered perspective on mobility of children based on this research.

As a result of the mobility of its clientele, École Voyageur is also quite different from other schools of the regional French school district. The *Conseil scolaire Centre-Est* (Centre-East School Board) is composed of four schools: École Beauséjour in Saint-Paul, École des Beaux-Lacs in Bonnyville, École du Sommet in Plamondon and École Voyageur in Cold Lake. While each school and community has their specificities, there seems to be an agreement that École Voyageur is distinct from the other three. All three other schools are in communities sporting local, historically grounded, French-speaking populations. While the regional expansion of the oil and gas industry has also brought some outside workers to these towns, perhaps most importantly in Bonnyville, it remains that the students attending these schools are mostly coming from a local Franco-Albertan community. In relation to the other three schools, École Voyageur has often been labelled the Quebecer school, because of the large proportion of students having come from that province because of their parent's military career. The difference between Voyageur and the three other schools becomes apparent during the regular activities that they jointly hold, called the BBSV (Beauséjour, Beaux-Lacs, Sommet and Voyageur). One thing that clearly differentiates the students of École Voyageur is the quality and extent of their use of French. According to many accounts, students of other schools have a lower level of French fluency and are more likely to use English in social encounters than those students from École Voyageur. Robert, a teacher at École Voyageur, describing differences between École Voyageur and the Bonnyville French school, noted the following:

ROBERT: Ah oui, à Bonnyville, les élèves parlent plus anglais.

ASSELIN: Dans l'école?

R: Dans l'école, à la maison, même pour les familles francophones. Ici [École Voyageur] il y a beaucoup de français, ici tu marches dans les corridors puis si ça parle anglais, c'est étrange. À Bonnyville, si tu entends du français c'est étrange!

A: Ah c'est quelque chose à quoi j'avais pas pensé ça. Comme avec les enfants de familles militaires, puis les enfants de familles pas militaires: est-ce que les enfants de familles pas militaires parlent plus en anglais?

R: Oui, ceux qui sont de racines albertaines. Ça c'est une autre grosse différence que j'ai remarqué. Ça c'est, je pense, parce qu'il y a beaucoup de jeunes qui viennent du Québec. Et c'est bon pour une école, parce que là (au Québec), c'est francophone, évidement. Mais un autre problème c'est qu'on a besoin d'enseigner l'anglais, pour graduer dans la province.

Beyond a difference in linguistic use patterns, there are claims that École Voyageur students differ in character from those of the other schools. They have different tastes, might dress differently and may have a different sense of humour. The exact nature of this difference is unclear, but the suggestion is that École Voyageur is home to individuals of different backgrounds and cultural influences. Among other things, perhaps more at the parent committee level, is that although École Voyageur is a Catholic school like the other three, religious elements are much less present in the Cold Lake school. According to the school administration, this is once again attributed to the predominance of families from Quebec in the community, who are much less likely to be practising Catholics compared with local Franco-Albertan families.

Some teachers have expressed the opinion that as a result of their mobility, students of École Voyageur seem worldlier than those of other surrounding schools. In particular, children from military families who have

lived in multiple towns and provinces show a greater awareness of Canadian and even global diversity. Another teacher explained having been impressed by her students' breadth of experience:

> Puis souvent ils nous parlent. Tu sais, ils sont au courant des provinces, puis quand j'avais les 4ièmes je le voyais encore plus: "Ah oui moi je suis née ici, ou en nouvelle écosse, puis je suis allé au Québec, puis je suis allé en Ontario, puis je suis allé ici, puis je suis déjà allé là puis là ..." Ils ont voyagé, puis ils [les familles militaires] prennent le temps de voyager ... Ils voyagent beaucoup ces enfants-là. Ils en connaissent des gens, puis ils sont au courant.

They have experienced multiple environments and seem open to a wide range of options and realities. As a whole, the student body of École Voyageur has extensive connections throughout Canada. In today's age of electronic communications and digital social networking, keeping in contact with individuals over long distances is easier than ever, and the students of École Voyageur do so. The constant coming and going of students at the school creates a wide-ranging network of connections between individuals who, at some point, shared a school environment but were separated because of their families' relocation. High school students in particular maintain connections with friends across Canada and sometimes overseas. Furthermore, because they have personal connections with the military, they are more likely to be aware of and seek out information regarding international affairs, especially if they are relevant to national defence or the Canadian Forces' operations abroad.

It could be expected to find some variations in regard to worldliness and to propensities for higher education among children of military families, in particular because of the variations in regard to different socio-economic levels between officers and enlisted members mentioned earlier. However, the sample that was under scrutiny in Cold Lake did not display a meaningful variation in this regard. It could be that the studied sample was not representatively distributed between families of officers and enlisted members, but it could also be attributed to the general economic context of northern Alberta. The economic boom, which was ongoing in the area, provided individuals with many opportunities to bring in large salaries without having to become professionals through post-secondary education, and unemployment did not seem a concern within the population. Some of the children interviewed aspired to pursuing their education in universities after high school, but several them thought they might complete training in various trades, without obvious distinctions between those from families of officers or enlisted members.

Discussion

An institution catering to a mobile population can find itself at the middle of ideological conflicts. In the collection edited by Olwig and Gullov (2003) entitled *Children's Places*, many of the authors share the idea that the choices that parents make in relation to how and where to raise their children are highly ideological and reflect a stance toward concepts of identity and belonging. However, after observing how children create and maintain ties to communities, a common realization is that children develop their own sense of place locally, through experience, perhaps more than through ideological ties. To a certain extent, this situation is reflected in Cold Lake. For French-speaking parents living in linguistic minority settings, the choice to send their children to École Voyageur is most often ideological. Parents prioritize their children learning and maintaining their use of French language, and providing an environment outside the home where French is the exclusive legitimate language of expression is an important tool to this effect. Given the correlation of language and culture, in the Canadian context the transmission of French is also a means for parents to transmit their own sense of cultural belonging to their children. Research such as that presented in Dalley and Roy (2008) has shown the complexity of issues surrounding language use in the context of education in francophone minorities. The discourse on francophone identity can be understood as constitutive of semiotic registers in the same way that the discourse on mobility can be seen as a contributing factor to the experience of community.

In this regard, École Voyageur finds itself in the middle of a conflict among multiple French-Canadian identities. On one hand, the school belongs to an Albertan school district, promoting a Franco-Albertan identity and offering locally and provincially developed programs and services. Many teachers are themselves from Alberta, and the school is involved in regional and provincial activities strengthening ties within the Franco-Albertan community. However, school administrators and teachers often find that their attempts at fostering a sense of community in Cold Lake are undermined by the parents' lack of involvement because of their mobile lifestyle. Parents who came to Cold Lake for work reasons are less likely to put efforts into community life than locals. This is particularly the case with military families, whose pattern of mobility is one of a sequence of moves in which Cold Lake is likely not the final destination. Fieldwork suggests that oil-patch families, who are likely to be established in the region for a longer time frame, if not permanently, express more frequently an interest in community involvement. However, for many oil-patch

families, the northern Alberta adventure is primarily an economic endeavour and they still have limited interest in adopting a Franco-Albertan identity. There are some exceptions, and individuals who invested themselves in the community are remembered; but these contributions are usually temporary, and the constant turnover of those who volunteer is a challenge to any attempts at continuity.

While École Voyageur is officially part of the Franco-Albertan network, the predominance of Quebecois military families within its population causes a shift in organizational identity. From the perspective of the French-military family, École Voyageur is more of an essential service provided on the periphery of the base than it is a connection with the Franco-Albertan community. As they move from posting to posting, French schools are part of the way they seek to maintain their own language and identity and not necessarily to participate in locally defined ones. Many school staff members are spouses of military members, and while they may not be promoting Quebecois political or cultural references in their classrooms, they are likely less equipped to be fostering Franco-Albertan identity. One more palpable contentious issue has recently been about religious activities at the school. École Voyageur is officially a Catholic school, a choice that had been debated when the school was created. In Alberta, the French-speaking minority was, in great part, able to develop its school system by relying on constitutional rights based on religion, rather than language. This resulted in a network where the Catholic identity of the schools was usually accepted as a default status. This strategy was different than that of some communities in other provinces, such as in Ontario, where language was the determining factor (Couture 2005).

In Cold Lake, the creation of the school went through a slightly different process as many of the individuals involved were not Franco-Albertans but Quebecois and Franco-Ontarians. While some individuals, presumably some from Quebec military families, would have preferred a laic designation, the decision was eventually made based on an assumption that recognizing ties with Catholic heritage would make it easier to strengthen bonds with traditional French-Canadian representations. That being said, at the time of my fieldwork, I was being told that Catholic practices were less prominent at École Voyageur than in the other schools of the district. This was cause for some tensions as during the second year of my fieldwork, the school district decided to re-establish the Catholic nature of the school.

What is suggested in *Children's Places* (Olwig and Gullov 2003) is that while parents make ideological choices in regard to their children's education, the children's own sense of identity and belonging is more often based on their own experiences. Therefore, while mobile parents may not have much investment in local identities, children of such families do not seem to suffer from such limitation. Even while aware of being temporary residents and of not being native to a locality, children do seem to moderate the extent to which they participate in local life the same way their parents sometimes do.

As many teachers mentioned during fieldwork, children are children, and the activities that are important to them are not greatly influenced by the time frame they have available. It is through this engagement with their social world that they become enculturated and build their sense of self. In doing so, they internalize several semiotic registers which form the basis of how they understand their lives. While their parent's ideology may be consistent across the various moves that make up their pattern of mobility, their experience of socialization occurs locally at every point of this trajectory. At each location, while still being subjected to their parent's discourse, they become acquainted with new semiotic registers regarding identity, community and belonging.

Among the children of mobile families who contributed to this project, there is a tendency toward broad perspectives insofar as where they intend to live and work as adults. I believe this to be a product of their patterns of mobility that subjected them to a variety of cultural environments. Theorists such as James, Jenks and Prout (1998) have suggested that growing up can be understood as an increased access to space and that childhood must therefore be understood in light of children's relationship with social and physical environments. In other words, as children age, they gain access to new spaces and the potentiality of their environments increases. If this is the case, patterns of mobility are of great consequence in childhood, as they shape the possible experience of localities and the localities themselves. For instance, teachers in Cold Lake talk about the worldliness of their student population, which they attribute to their high level of mobility.

Children with high mobility, such as those of military families, have had exposure to a variety of social and physical environments over the course of their trajectory. If their process of growing up is to be understood in relation to an increase in legitimate access to space, their own socialization is particular in that this increase occurs in a sequence of localities instead of in one context. The high school they will get access to is often not the same one that was barred from them when they

were elementary school children. The mall that they will eventually get the right to go to on their own may not be the one they know today or even the one they will get to know in a future posting. However, wherever they go, one of the constants is that these spaces do exist, and that their relation to these spaces is evaluated according to the same criteria. Their experiences in different localities help them build prototypical understandings of these spaces, which further facilitate mobility. Wherever they will go, they expect similar places will be there. This transposition of relation to place can also occur with individuals and institutions. Experience teaches children of mobile families that wherever they go, they will re-create similar social relations with new individuals, whether they be other children, adults, such as teachers, or institutions, such as their new school. These characteristics are similar to those found on another scale, in the children of foreign diplomats, missionaries or corporate workers, who are raised outside of their parent's country of origin, sometimes labelled Third Culture Kids (TCKs), a term coined by Ruth Hill Useem in her work with Americans working in India (Pollock and Van Reken 2001). In fact, a 2002 collection edited by Morton Ender (2002) explicitly portrays military brats as a typical form of TCKs.

Therefore, many of the children of highly mobile families with whom I spoke did not express much distress about the prospect of moving to a new town. In general, the difficulties around moving were generally tied more to leaving good friends behind than to a worry about the new environment. A result of this is that as they near graduation, most children of mobile families in my project do not hesitate to consider leaving their current social network behind to seek further education or work. They see themselves going "where the work is," and do not limit their career choices to those sustainable in the Cold Lake area. In fact, the few exceptions I encountered are quite telling in this matter. The individuals who were planning to stay in the area after graduation either were from families working in the oil industry who intended to follow their parents' steps or had been living in the area for a long time after their parents had decided to refuse further posting to allow their children some stability.

Theorists (e.g., Appadurai 1996) have identified the family as a unit of interest to see how small groups deal with changing realities to fulfil their functions of reproducing themselves and cultural forms along the way. In a context of heightened interconnectedness and mobility, it is easily possible to focus on a study of flows and ideologies, but it is important to remember that movements, even those that are part of a larger social phenomenon, are always experienced at the level of the individual. Mobility is an activity that can involve the solitary worker but also families who come to experience new and old environments both simultaneously and from different perspectives.

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Notes

1 Following a municipal restructuring in 1995, the City of Fort McMurray was merged with the neighbouring district to create the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo. However, it is still most commonly referred to as Fort McMurray.

2 The Alberta Advantage was an official slogan used by the province of Alberta from 1994 to 2009. Used to attract workers and investors, the slogan focused on the low taxation rates, the debt-free status of the province and other fiscal advantages of the province, going through an economic boom because of the expansion of the oil industry (*Edmonton Journal* 2009).

3 During my 2009 fieldwork, a number of pilots and technicians were waiting to be temporarily posted near Vancouver for a period of time surrounding the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics.

4 Some units, such as some overseas bases, lack an official designation.

5 *Blonde* and *chum* are Quebec French colloquialisms meaning respectively girlfriend and boyfriend.

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Toward an Ethnography of Mobile Tourism Industry Workers in Banff National Park

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Abstract: While there is much anthropological literature concerning transnational mobility and identity of migrants and refugees, tourists and even entrepreneurs, less explored is the great complexity of the many different factions within mobile worker communities of resort destinations. If it is unexpected that these tourism workers are understudied, it is even more surprising given that they are key agents in (re)producing the identity and character of the place, which they then "sell" to tourists. At the same time, the identity of tourism workers is profoundly shaped by their experiences. This article examines approaches for studying the experiences of travel, work and life in Banff National Park.

Keywords: mobile tourism workers, travel/work experience, young adult, Banff

Résumé : Les questions de la mobilité internationale et de l'identité des migrants, des réfugiés, des touristes et même des entrepreneurs, sont abondamment couvertes dans la littérature anthropologique. Par contre, celle de la complexité des différents groupes composant les communautés de travailleurs nomades dans les destinations touristiques est peu étudiée. Il peut sembler inattendu que ces travailleurs du tourisme soient peu étudiés, mais cela l'est d'autant plus du fait que ceux-ci sont des agents-clés dans la (re)production de l'identité et du caractère d'un lieu, qu'ils ont pour mandat de « vendre » aux touristes. Par ailleurs, l'identité des travailleurs du tourisme est profondément façonnée par leurs expériences. Cet article recense diverses approches pour étudier les expériences de voyage, de travail, et de vie dans le parc national de Banff.

Mots-clés : travailleurs mobiles du tourisme, expériences de voyage/travail, jeunes adultes, Banff

Introduction

There was a general buzz of chatter in the room as some 70 young adults quickly found chairs. This was the Banff Ambassador Information presentation offered by Banff Heritage Tourism (a unit of Banff Lake Louise Tourism) in conjunction with Banff Parks Canada and the Town of Banff. The presentation specifically targets new staff working in the Banff tourism industry. The presenter raised her arms and welcomed all: "Everyone in this room is now a local!!" Indeed, the program's stated goals are to help "new residents to Banff discover how they can become knowledgeable 'locals' and share the uniqueness of this place with visitors" (Banff and Lake Louise Tourism 2012). This very notion of how youth workers in the tourism industry, as non-local "outsiders," help to shape and represent the identity of the place of Banff was to be the focus of our research concerned with heritage and mobility.

While a fascinating topic in itself, during the course of our first stage of study, we quickly became aware of significant assumptions and misconceptions about the identities and experiences of these young, mobile tourism workers in Banff who are the backbone of the tourist industry, and thus the livelihood of the Banff community. They are vital to the maintenance and perpetuation of Banff as an iconic Canadian destination place. Yet the lives of mobile workers are overlooked and subject to assumptions in the tourism industry and mainstream public. Furthermore, mobile tourism workers are academically understudied. While the theme of mobility, as linked to issues of place and identity, has received significant attention in anthropological literature, mobile tourism workers have largely gone unnoticed in these studies. In this research, we examine the dynamic nature of what it means to be a tourism worker in the town of Banff. Although they may be welcomed in the information session as "locals," their experiences and role within the town and the tourism industry suggest a much more complex, problematic relationship and situation. What

we have found is that, despite economic prosperity built, in large part, from a successful tourism industry that caters to the privileged, for these mobile tourism workers, Banff is also home to many underlying social problems and issues.

Funded by a small research "SEED" grant from the University of Northern British Columbia, we undertook initial research concerning mobile tourism workers in Banff. This prepared us for beginning a multiple-year research project that focuses on the experiences of travel, work and transient living of mobile tourism workers in the destination resorts of the Rocky Mountains in Western Canada and is part of a larger national research study on mobility and employment across Canada funded by a partnership grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).

In this article, we focus on those mobile tourism workers who seek to travel to and experience work in the town of Banff. First, we set the study within the context of mobility studies, particularly within the studies of tourism and tourism labour, and offer suggestions to explain why mobile tourism workers have often gone understudied within the framework of mobility research. Next, we describe the context of the Banff case study, briefly giving the historical background of the park and outlining the unique demographics of life in the town. Following this, we define the methods and objectives of our study and work in the tourism industry and end by highlighting some significant aspects of our findings, including some of the key issues and problems facing mobile tourism workers in Banff.

Mobility: Incorporating Tourism Workers

The theme of mobility, as linked to issues of place and identity, has received significant attention in anthropological literature. Sheller and Urry (2006:207) write that

> all the world seems to be on the move. Asylum seekers, international students, terrorists, members of diasporas, holidaymakers, business people, sports stars, refugees, backpackers, commuters, the early retired, young mobile professionals, prostitutes, armed forces— these and many others fill the world's airports, buses, ships and trains. The scale of this travelling is immense.

In an ever-increasingly globalized world, where the flow of goods, services and people moving across permeable social, political and economic borders is the pattern of everyday life, it is not surprising that theories of mobility have become more and more prevalent in the anthropological discourse (Burns and Novelli 2008; Cresswell 2002; Duncan et al. 2009; Hall 2005; Uriely and Reichel 2000; Urry 2007). These discussions are fundamentally linked to exploring and understanding identity and place: the shifting and transforming identities of people moving between places and the impact that such uprootedness has on the shape and character of places. Much of the anthropological literature concerns transnational mobility and identity of migrants and refugees, tourists and even entrepreneurs (Burns and Novelli 2008; Castles and Davidson 2000; Castles and Miller 2009; Clifford 1994; Lindquist 2009; Nordstrom 2007; Sassen 1988, 2000). These mobility studies often focus on cultural contact and hybridity as actors and agents from multiple societies bring together networks, activities and patterns of life of both their home and host societies (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992). While this literature is rich, surprisingly, there has been much less focus on mobile tourism workers and even less from an anthropological perspective.

There is interdisciplinary work in sociology, geography and tourism studies that articulates various theories of tourism labour. Early on, Britton's seminal work (1991) argued for understanding tourism as a capitalist enterprise that works to create social meaning in place. Britton's focus on the political economy of tourism saw tourism labour as part of the production of the system of tourism, stating that "the position of labour in the supply of many final demand tourism products is unusual in that workers are simultaneously providers of labour services and [in terms of the "quality of service"] part of the consumed product" (1991:458). However, by fixing on labour markets in their place of residence, what Britton misses is the inherent flexibility and mobility of tourism workers. This is better addressed by Urry (2002:70–73) and Shaw and Williams (2002:171–187), making use of the model of four forms of labour flexibility (Atkinson et al. 1984), and by Williams and Hall (2002) in their discussion of "tourism, migration, circulation and mobility." In their ethnographic research, "Paradise Laborers: Hotel Work in the Global Economy," Adler and Adler (2004) examine the range and diversity of immigrant, transient and local tourism workers.

The category of tourism workers that has had the least academic attention is the more mobile seasonal and transient workers. This is especially the case for those working in Canada. Mobile tourism workers are an essential key to the success of the tourism industry in Canada and, yet, are largely invisible in current anthropological discussions. This is particularly surprising, considering the tourism industry in Canada accounted for 1.6 million jobs (9.2 per cent of all jobs in Canada), where non-Canadian-born workers carry out approximately 50 per cent of those jobs (Canadian Tourism Human Resource Council 2008).

That mobile tourism workers are so understudied can be explained by a variety of reasons. One possibility is that youth culture, in general, is largely understudied in anthropology. It is not new that youth and young adults have been chronically under-represented in anthropological research; they have been perceived as merely passing through this stage of life and so are "unfinished adults," not fully cultural agents in their own right. While that perception is changing in some spheres, young adults as transient workers in the tourism industry are still under-explored (Amit-Talai 2001; Amit-Talai and Wulff 1995). The majority of tourism workers in Banff are between the ages of 16 and 35,[1] with younger workers (between the ages of 15 and 24) accounting for one-third of the tourism labour force in Alberta (Government of Canada Sector Council Program 2006). They are considered to be transient and temporary—perhaps all the more transient because of their youthfulness. However, focusing on these young adults allows for a better understanding of the experiences embedded in transformative identity building.

Second, the fact that these young adults are "transient" may be another reason why they have been understudied as a group in anthropological literature. Ethnography traditionally has been defined by location and by a clearly distinguishable group. And while there are examples of ethnographies of more mobile and "un-territorialized" communities, they are not the norm. Perhaps the closest analogy to the study of mobile tourism workers is the research of backpacker tourists, with whom there are some useful comparisons—their transiency and impermanence, as well as the great heterogeneity of the category—and some key differences, including length of stay and the number of destinations (Sørensen 2003:849; Wilson and Richards 2004). A further significant difference is that mobile tourism workers are fundamentally defined by the interconnection between their travel and work experience (Riley 1988; Uriely and Reichel 2000). Nonetheless, focusing on transient and temporary groups is unusual in anthropology and their mobility makes for a challenging ethnographic task. Despite this or, perhaps, because of this, mobile tourism workers ought to be the focus of ethnographic research, especially for those interested in human mobility.

A third possible explanation for being understudied is that they are part of a presumed privileged group (because of their age and social class) and that these young workers are "transient by choice." Such a choice may be considered a "privilege" of their age but also of their social class. Anthropological research tends to under-represent what some may deem as privileged social groups. Experience and observation within the tourism worker community provide a contrary perspective to what is often classified as "privileged youth, just having a good time." Upon closer investigation, tourism workers are from a variety of social classes and communities, including many middle-lower income-earning families and temporary foreign workers from a range of economic backgrounds. Studies such as George Gmelch's *Behind the Smile: the Working Lives of Caribbean Tourism* (2003) suggest that these stereotypes mask the dynamic and complex experiences of tourism workers and, therefore, top-down studies become blind to potential underlying social issues and community problems.

Finally, the location of these workers in an idealized and seemingly utopic site is equally under-represented. Workers and tourists alike are attracted to the pervasive narratives that encompass Canadian natural heritage. A popular online brochure states,

> Whenever Canada is mentioned, one of the first places that springs to mind is Banff. The soaring peaks, dense coniferous forests and abundant wildlife in one stunning region make it a Canadian institution. [YahooTravel.com 2012]

Research commonly overlooks places and experiences that are usually represented by idealized and romantic language. There has been a tendency in anthropology to focus on places on the margins rather than places perceived as idyllic and privileged. Yet there are critical social issues associated even with holiday destination sites. Tourism workers are well examined in global tourism studies, such as Darcie Vandegrift's "This Isn't Paradise—I Work Here" (2008), and given their essential role in the tourism industry in Canada, there is a real need to examine the context, work and lives of tourism workers in Canada.

It is this intersection of youthfulness, transience, privilege and place that makes Banff, Alberta, an excellent case study for understanding the lives of mobile tourism workers. In the next section, we outline the historic, geographic, political and demographic context of Banff to provide the background to our case study.

Background to Banff Case Study

Following a model already firmly established in American parks, such as Yosemite and Yellowstone, Banff is Canada's first national park, created in 1885 by an Order in Council (Armstrong et al. 2009; Campbell 2011a; Marsh 1983). At the encouragement of the vice-president of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), federal land agent William Pearce set aside a section of the Bow Valley from private ownership (Campbell 2011b). Pearce designated several small sections of land that contained

"several hot mineral springs which promise[d] to be of great sanitary advantage to the public" (Armstrong et al. 2009:274). Centred on these natural hot springs, Pearce felt, with some infrastructure, that Banff could "be one of the finest parks in the world" (Armstrong et al. 2009:274). In 1887, by an act of parliament, the Rocky Mountain National Park reserved a 674-km^2 rectangle around what shortly after became a spa. The CPR commissioned a New York architect to design a luxury hotel, and the park's fame spread shortly thereafter. By the early 20th century, the CPR brought in Swiss guides to climb and name the many mountain peaks. Viewing platforms, interpretive centres and outdoor tours were subsequently established in the park. While "wilderness" is Banff's iconic tourist attraction, Banff undoubtedly represents a manufactured wilderness destination.[2]

The initial establishment of Banff National Park was motivated by economic development values—to be the "greatest and most successful health resort on the continent"—rather than by ecological/wilderness conservation principles (McNamee 2002). Initially, parks could not prevent natural resource exploitation (Bella 1987) and timber cutting and mineral development were facilitated through the early parks. There were early concerns over the preservation of the park's ecosystems, but the dominant ideology driving the establishment of the park was primarily its monetary value through tourism (McNamee 2002). In the late 19th century, the railroad companies encouraged the creation of national parks to protect their monopolies in tourism accommodation and transport. While the town and park were established as a tourism destination for economic purposes, there was a strong political subtext coming from Prime Minister John A. MacDonald. Taken from the idea for national parks in the United States, Canada saw parks as symbols of a national heritage that made up for the perceived lack of cultural heritage in comparison to Europe (Kopas 2007; McNamee 2002). This was framed within the government's "responsibility" to make the land "useful" to develop a national economy. Kopas (2007) writes that parks were initially designed for their economic development function, beginning with the government's appropriation of the hot springs in Banff. The government then gave monopolistic commercial opportunities to the CPR, to serve greater expansionist goals of the government.

Today, Banff National Park has expanded to encompass 6,641 km^2 of Alberta's Rocky Mountains. Framed by the towering peaks of the Rocky Mountains and shaped by the waters of the Bow River tumbling over falls and meandering through lush forests, the town


Figure 1: Banff Population[4] (Government of Canada, Community Information Database 2011)

of Banff is the heart of Banff National Park. The park attracts over 4 million visitors each year not only to experience the natural aesthetics of its environment but also to enjoy its ski hills, golf courses, outdoor activities, shopping malls and variety of restaurants and coffee shops in town (Town of Banff 2011).

The town of Banff's resident population is low, regulated by a "need to reside" policy.[3] In other words, one must be employed in Banff to be allowed to reside in the town. The 2011 Banff municipal census counted a town population of just over 8,000, 1,000 of whom (or 12.5 per cent) are considered "temporary" or employed a minimum of 30 days. Many of these are mobile tourism workers (Town of Banff 2011). Forty-four per cent of the population is between the ages of 15 and 34, a trend echoed in Canadian resort communities, such as Whistler, British Columbia. The 2011 Banff age demographic data emphasize the "youthfulness" of Banff (Figure 1).

More than 60 per cent of Banff residents have lived there for less than ten years. Of those residents who have lived in Banff for less than five years, 26.5 per cent came from outside of Canada and 22.4 per cent came from out of province (Town of Banff 2011). In the past 15 years, Banff has had in-migration of 40 per cent to 50 per cent, more than twice the provincial average (Industry Canada 2012). These town demographics suggest the very real presence of young adult mobile tourism workers and thus set the stage for our research to explore this understudied group.

Banff Case Study: Methods and Objectives

For the purpose of our initial research study, our methods involved reviewing primary literature of differing levels of government (government policy and reports), as well as more local-level accounts from business

Map 1: Location of Banff National Park and Banff Town Site

operators in Banff; examining social networking Internet sites; conducting participant observation in the town of Banff on various fieldwork trips; and conducting one-on-one interviews with tourism company operators and mobile tourism workers. We will outline these methods and indicate the intended objectives sought for each.

Primary Literature: Government Policy and Reports

We examined a range of the available primary literature, mostly web-based and grey literature reports. This included examining policy and practice from the federal, provincial and local town–level governing bodies: the Canadian Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for their programs of "travel and work in Canada from abroad"; Industry Canada's "Building a National Tourism Strategy" report; provincial-level programs and resources for foreign workers as tourism and hospitality workers; and, from local governments, Banff's "Community Plan" and the "Business and Community Plan" for the neighbouring town of Canmore. From these primary sources, we sought to map out the relevant top-down decision makers and programs that set the guidelines for and thus shaped and regulated mobility, work, residency and heritage representation in the area.

Primary Literature: Local-Level Accounts

We also examined reports by local business operators, including Fairmont Hotels and the large and dominant Brewster Travel Canada, as well as smaller tourist operators, such as Discover Banff Tours and Ecojourney Adventure Company. The objective was to gain a sense of what kinds of work/jobs were offered and who were the mobile tourism workers filling these positions. In addition, we wanted to explore how and if these businesses made use of any of the government programs for recruiting workers, either from abroad or from across Canada.

Primary Literature: Social Networking Internet Sites

Additional information was collected using social networking Internet sites that provided information about integrating into employment and life in Banff. It was immediately clear from our examination that this type of online communication is significant in shaping the motivations and experiences of mobile tourism workers. These Internet-based resources provided us with current and dynamic information that proved to be highly useful in obtaining contacts and understanding community-level

initiatives, as well as considering forums that discuss the positive and negative aspects of the tourism industry (e.g., blogs that rant about housing issues in Banff). Equally, this form of communication is also used as a means for tourism employers to access their labour pool.

Fieldwork: Participant Observation in the Town of Banff

In addition to the primary literature review, we also undertook the field methods of participant observation and interviews. We first carried out an initial "surveillance" study, to get a first-hand sense of the lived experience of mobile tourism workers, along with some of the issues they face as they work and live in Banff town. We sought to "get a sense" of what inter-provincial and international tourism workers arriving in Banff would experience as they looked for work and accommodation. Thus, we had our undergraduate and graduate research participants (similar in age to would-be mobile tourism workers, based on our age demographic research) visit information centres and job boards, collect newspapers for the employment sections and go to the Job Resource Centre. They also searched housing boards and visited the hostels in town.

This active participant observation yielded an interesting response, as it was immediately assumed that these researchers were themselves seeking work and accommodation by those whom they encountered. They were instantly perceived not as the researchers they were nor as tourists but as tourism workers. With little prompting, these student researchers were given information and advice as to how best to proceed in finding work and accommodation; there was a clear and specific sequence in the process of looking for a job, beginning work and then searching for accommodation. This is the same process that most young adult mobile workers would experience in their attempt to work and live in the community. Unlike for vacationing tourists, places such as free Internet access sites, the employment resource centre and affordable accommodation are the prioritized destinations for newly arriving tourism workers. Provisional accommodation (i.e., short-term accommodation while searching for a more permanent arrangement) is limited to hostels, as no inexpensive motels/ hotels exist in the town. The student researchers found that the employment resource centre and worker integration programs were readily available and easily accessible. Thus, this direct experience method allowed the student research participants to get an initial perspective about what it would be like to be a newly arrived tourism worker in Banff. It also provided us with in-

sight into the community dynamics for mobile tourism workers, as well as resources and programs created through community initiatives. The information from this participant observation "surveillance" supported our decision (established first through our primary literature review) to engage with key organizations and community programs.

Fieldwork: One-on-One Interviews

As a product of the participant observation fieldwork, we contacted and interviewed three different groups: town community workers (five interviews), small tourism company operators (three interviews), and mobile tourism workers (ten interviews). The town community workers we spoke with included the coordinator of BanffLIFE (a non-profit organization aimed at "easing newcomers into the community" and specifically targeted at young adults aged 18–30); the director of YWCA Banff, regarding housing and support of entry-level workers; the coordinator of the Job Resource Centre, concerning the process that entry-level tourism workers must go through to find employment; the Town of Banff's officer dealing with temporary foreign workers and their working and living conditions in Banff; and the coordinator of Banff Heritage Tourism, who established the Banff Ambassador program mentioned at the beginning of this article. Both these interviews and our participant observation highlighted how essential these community programs are to the integration of mobile tourism workers. The small tourism company operators we interviewed (Ecojourney, Discover Banff Tours) had often themselves been mobile tourism workers, who had come to Banff seeking work in the tourism industry before establishing their business. Through our participant observation and, in part, as a result of word of mouth, we were able to contact and conduct initial interviews with ten mobile tourism workers. These interviews aimed to illuminate the on-the-ground lives and issues facing mobile tourism workers in Banff, as we asked questions about their travel, work and living experiences.

Banff Case Study: Findings

In examining primary governmental documents and literature, we found there was concern about declining tourism numbers, generally across Canada and, more locally, within Banff specifically.[5] Governments at all levels are now closely examining their strategies toward tourism and identifying specific areas for improvement in an attempt to mitigate this problem. One area targeted for improvement at the national level concerns mobile tourist workers and aims at improving "human resource

strategies to attract and retain employees in the [tourism] industry" (Industry Canada 2012). This strategy recognizes that retaining employees increases productivity and efficiencies in Canada's tourism industry. The Canadian federal government has identified that it should "foster an adequate supply of skills and labour to enhance visitor experience through quality service and hospitality" (Government of Canada 2011:53). In order do to this, tourism jobs are being promoted as an attractive career choice:

> Although the tourism industry offers the first work experience for many people, the sector is sometimes ill-perceived as a career choice. At the same time, the ability to attract skilled employees is critical to the industry's growth. There is a need to promote the wide range of long-term career opportunities and prospects that tourism offers, particularly in the operation and management ranks, as well as general hospitality. Attractions, hotels, airlines, auto rentals and entertainment are but a few of the areas that offer rewarding, long-term careers. [Industry Canada 2012]

At a more local level, the municipal government of Canmore (a neighbouring town and bedroom community of Banff) has also recognized the need to support its tourism industry by focusing on tourism workers, addressing the importance of the "social fabric" of the community and ways to "attract, include, keep and celebrate a wide range of people" (Town of Canmore 2011). Yet municipal governments tend not to have the purview to be able to attract tourism workers and, thus, are at the mercy of and are directed by the private sector tourism industry or federal-level international agreements for recruiting tourism workers locally. Once arrived, however, there is a disjuncture between the recognized necessity of tourism workers and inadequate approaches to and funding of local-level initiatives for retaining and supporting these vital workers. While municipal governments may want to find innovative solutions to sustain and secure mobile tourism workers, they do not necessarily have the personnel or the financial capacity to do so.

These policies impact on the operation of the tourism industry and on the mobile tourism workers themselves, although this is overlooked in much of the very strategies meant to improve their conditions. Many of the government "top-down" initiatives ignore the experiences, realities and life situations of a vital component of the tourism industry: the workers.

While the tourism industry contributes approximately $61.4 billion (2005) to the Canadian economy, the lives

Banff Employment in Tourism Sector

Figure 2: Banff Employment in Tourism Sector[6] (Adapted from Town of Banff Statistics)

of the many tourism workers who are integral to this industry are little understood (Industry Canada 2012). An ethnographic approach to understanding the lived experiences of tourism workers is invaluable to understanding the Canadian context of mobile work in the world's largest industry and can provide insight into the effectiveness of government strategies that affect mobile tourism workers. That is why, as will be shown in the findings from our participant observation and interviews later in this article, our research aims to implement a "bottom-up" approach that places the mobile tourism worker at the centre of inquiry and is, thereby, better able to reveal the issues, challenges and opportunities they face as they travel to and work and reside in Banff.

In Alberta, tourism employs 168,100 people (Canadian Tourism Human Resource Council 2008). This accounts for 10 per cent of all employment in the province. More specific to Banff, tourism directly employs 70 per cent of the population. For tourism workers, jobs are entry-level seasonal positions—for example, hotel workers, cooks, restaurant servers, baristas, customer service staff at various local stores, tourist guides, ski instructors, ski hill lift and customer service staff, river guides, etc. In Banff, employment in the tourism sector within broad service-related employment is as shown in Figure 2.

Mobile tourism workers in Banff form many different demographic sub-communities based on a range of variables. The international Banff residents/tourism workers come from several different countries, including: the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Germany, Japan, Korea and the Czech Republic. There

are also many mobile workers from Canada who have travelled inter-provincially to work in Banff. While the motivation for travel is varied and beyond the scope of this article, it is noteworthy that there is at least a local perception that both the Japanese and the Quebecois come to Banff in large part to learn English.

Where the workers come from also distinguishes their membership in a specific sub-community, dependent on what kind of visa status they hold and whether it can be extended. Tourism employers must hire international workers who possess one of five types of foreign working visas: a work visa, a working holiday visa, a student visa, a foreign temporary worker visa or the provincial nominee program visa. Within Banff, most of the tourism workers are part of the Canadian bilateral agreement with various countries and therefore fall under the working holiday visa program. The advantages of the working holiday visa program for tourism businesses are also well recognized by the provincial government. The working holiday visa program is one of the easiest and quickest ways to hire international workers ready and eager to work in the national parks of British Columbia and Alberta (Government of Canada, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, 2014). To qualify for this program and thus work in Canada under the bilateral working holiday visa program, the individual must be from one of the 29 countries specified and under the age of 35 (unless from a country with younger age restrictions). While the working holiday visa program is not gender-specific, in Alberta, individuals who work in the tourism industry are 54.7 per cent female and 45.3 per cent male (Government of Canada Sector Council Program 2006).

As we learned in discussions with tourism industry managers, mobile tourism workers are further distinguished into sub-communities based on what work season they arrive in: the winter (ski instructors) or the summer season (white water rafting guides). Further, we were told by community residents there is a general sense that the winter tourism workers tend to stay longer and are more interested in integrating into the community life of the town, whereas the summer tourism workers tend to stay for shorter times, are less interested in integrating into the community and are regarded by "townies" as the party group: loud, noisy and disruptive, especially at the height of the season in July and August. The shoulder seasons are quieter and the number of mobile tourism workers drops significantly. Of course, the seasonality of the work also distinguishes what kinds of jobs are available (further characterizing the sub-communities of tourism workers). Therefore, rather than being one homogenous identity group, these mobile tourism workers are made up of many different complex

and varied categories of workers differentiated by age, gender, nationality, first language, type of work and motivation for travelling to and seeking employment in Banff. The complexity of these different subgroups is yet another reason why this research is essential to support policy-making decisions and to advance the understanding of human mobility.

Our fieldwork interviews with town community workers, small tourism company operators and especially the mobile tourism workers themselves further reinforced the degree of marginality that the tourism workers experience, whether due to the seasonality of employment, the types of available jobs or the residency policy in Banff town. While nominally there may be more security in hotel, food services and retail jobs as opposed to the season-specific jobs in the ski resorts or river guiding, the tourism industry is notoriously unpredictable and changeable and job security is always under threat for transient workers. Notwithstanding some exceptions, most jobs are low-paying, lack benefits or are dependent on gratuities. As a result of an ample supply of available tourism workers willing to accept minimum wages for the perceived fun, the environment or a free ski pass for the season, the job market is more challenging for permanent tourism workers, who struggle to make a living on lower wages. One mobile tourism worker explained, "I was offered a job working in a day-care but I'm not going to compete with someone willing to do that job for only $8.00 an hour and a ski pass" (Mobile Tourism Worker Interview B, February 17, 2012).

In addition to such challenging permanent employment conditions, Banff is an especially expensive place to live. Another worker, who had worked at five different companies over the past ten years, stated that "People are working full-time in gift shops but don't have enough money to put food on the table—they are having to get food baskets to just eat in Banff" (Mobile Tourism Worker Interview A, February 17, 2012). One of the small tourism operators explained that

> You might be sold on the idea that you can come to Banff to work in a coffee shop and go hiking every weekend but then, by the time you have paid for your accommodation and the food on your table, you realize that you are working 60 hours a week just to do that and you have no time to go hiking or skiing; a lot of people come here planning to work one job but end up with two just to make ends meet. [Small Tourism Operator Interview C, February 17, 2012]

The first interviewee said, "I work 55 hours a week but am considered 'part-time'; I have no contract and am paid by the hour—I spend my days either working or sleeping" (Mobile Tourism Worker Interview A, February 17, 2012).

Accommodation is also a critical issue for mobile tourism workers in Banff. It is tremendously expensive to reside in Banff. The town of Canmore, just 25 kilometres away, has become somewhat of a bedroom community for Banff, but it is still relatively expensive and for those workers without a vehicle it is not an option, since there is no public transportation between the two towns. One tour operator explained that he had been living in Calgary (130 kilometres from Banff) because the housing was cheaper, but "after working a nine-hour day white water rafting and then having a three-hour commute on top of that to and from Calgary every day—it really wears on you—and I moved to Canmore" (Small Tourism Operator Interview C, February 17, 2012).

In addition, as mentioned previously, one must be employed in Banff to be legally allowed to live in the town. The result is that many who are looking for work or are between jobs end up living illegally, squatting or couch-surfing with friends (i.e., moving frequently from house to house and sleeping in whatever space is available). Rental accommodations are often overcrowded (illegally so)—it is not unusual to have six or more living in one apartment. One official told us it is a landlords' market and that many take advantage of the situation (Town Community Worker Interview D, February 16, 2012). Town officials are aware of such cramped conditions but opt to turn a blind eye, knowing that, if they did not, many mobile tourism workers would be without any accommodation at all.

There is a different accommodation situation for those working in hotels. Often those who obtain employment in hotels are provided with accommodation on the hotel grounds. However, this situation has its own issues and some hotel service workers are effectively indentured to work a certain period for particularly long hours and low pay, while a significant portion of their pay cheque is allocated back to the hotel as rent for the accommodation they provide. The director of the YWCA (Town Community Worker Interview E, February 16, 2012) explained that these mobile tourism workers are often trapped in this situation since, if they leave, they have no job and no housing and little money to tide them over until they find new work. In other situations, hotel workers obtained their employment as a sponsored employee through a federal government and tourism business agreement (Town Community Worker Interview D, February 16, 2012). In these cases, the company essentially controls hotel workers and their agency can be expressed only within the most rudimentary labour

laws (Town Community Worker Interview E, February 16, 2012). Under this arrangement, the workers can legally work only for the company that sponsored them. If the sponsor terminates the contract, deportation is an option but is at the expense of the company. Many of these hotel workers are young women, and many do not speak much English, thus making them further isolated (Town Community Worker Interview E, February 16, 2012). The variations and the dynamic experiences produced by housing experiences in Banff are one area that certainly requires further focused attention and research.

Conclusions: Toward an Ethnography of Mobile Tourism Workers

These precarious working and housing conditions mean that mobile tourism workers are often living marginal lives. And their marginality is exacerbated by their often-times peripheral social status in town since mobile tourism workers are often regarded as a necessary evil and not really part of the town community, even though they are essential for its livelihood. Despite their indispensability as a labour class, individually they have little economic or political agency. Indeed, their situation is well worth investigation to make visible the complexities of their mobile work experiences and, through partnering with workers and community members, to foster more integrative programs and practices.

Many of these tourism workers are young adults and their narratives are "coming of age" stories. On many occasions, we were told that this experience of living and working in the tourism industry was a "rite of passage" that adolescents and young adults had to undergo before becoming fully mature adults. Whether on a gap year, before or during post-secondary education, getting overseas experience or participating in a working holiday program, for many this is a transitional time in their lives. In fact, there is often a biased perception among the general population that all of these workers are "here for a good time, not a long time," that they are irresponsible and "just want to party." While of course this may very well be the case for some mobile tourism workers, it is not the case for all. Indeed, it is even assumed that, as part of the "coming of age experience," every 20-something-year-old *ought* to experience these conditions of marginality in employment and housing, as that is merely part of the experience.

However, this kind of stereotyping diminishes the attention to the very real social issues mobile workers face in terms of marginal employment, marginal housing and little agency or political power to change the system themselves. In many cases, young transient tourism workers experience real struggles working and living in Banff. Not only must they cope with marginal, low-paying, non-benefited, insecure employment, but also they must endure marginal, overcrowded housing conditions while often suffering from social stereotyping and discrimination.

From these initial findings, we learned of the vital role that the mobile tourism worker plays in the tourism industry and especially so in the tourism destination place of Banff. But we also uncovered the fact that because these tourism workers are young, transient, stereotyped and assumed to be "privileged" and to have "chosen" their lifestyle, they are *not* considered to be "locals" as was the claim in the Banff Ambassador Information presentation that introduced this article. Rather, they are viewed as dispensable labour, such that the issues of their marginal work and housing conditions have largely gone ignored.

Our study, though in its early stages, has already begun to lay bare these issues. We wanted to reveal some of the context for these mobile tourism workers in Banff, to expose some of the misconceptions and/or lack of attention paid to this marginal, understudied type of tourism worker. It is clear that anthropological inquiry can have a role to play in enabling a move away from oversimplified explanations of the lived experiences of mobile tourism workers and toward understanding their true demographics, issues and dynamics as they travel to, work and live in Banff.

In the research initiative we have started to conduct in Banff, we have realized that there are pressing reasons to engage in an ethnographic study of mobile tourism workers. As we prepare to further explore the issues of travel/work experience, mobility, identity and place toward a full ethnography of mobile tourism workers in the Banff area, we hope to be able to provide further insight to benefit local community and government organizations as they seek to resolve some of the problems faced by these workers. In addition, it will be intriguing to examine how these transformative experiences of travel and work help to shape the identities of the workers, as much as the workers help to shape the character of a quintessentially Canadian, iconic place. There is no better opportunity to understand experiences of transformative identity-building, as these young adult tourism workers face specific challenges and lay the foundation of who they will be in the future.

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Notes

1 The term *youth* is often used to define this demographic. The term varies considerably in its usage. *Youth* is commonly used to refer to people less than 18 years of age. Or *youth* is used in conjunction with *young adult* to indicate individuals between the ages of 18 and 25. However, the working holiday visa program under the youth mobility agreement requires that individuals be between the ages of 18 and 35.

2 To read further about the concept of "manufacturing wilderness" and the impact the establishment of the park had on the Nakoda First Nations communities whose traditional territory was incorporated into the park lands, see Armstrong et al. (2009), Binnema and Niemi (2006) and Taylor (2011).

3 Banff is not the only national park in the country that has a resident community, but it does have specific issues of social and urban planning that go hand-in-hand with the dual mandate of the national parks system that must balance ecological integrity with recreational opportunity. While not part of this discussion, for further reading on this issue see Nelson (1994), Nelson et al. (1999) and Scace (1993).

4 From a survey population of 6,500.

5 In the last eight years, the Canadian tourism industry has seen a decline in visitation numbers and is no longer among the top ten global destinations (Industry Canada 2012).

6 The "tourism sector" includes only types of employment that are directly involved in "primary tourism employment." Therefore, employment in government, education and health, albeit related to the tourism industry, is considered secondary tourism employment (since they are necessary for providing essential municipal services for the tourism industry). These types of municipal service employment were not included in Figure 2.

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From French Polynesia to France: The Legacy of *fa'a'amu* Traditional Adoption in "International" Adoption[1]

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Abstract: In French Polynesia, as in New Caledonia, circulation of children is frequent and just as accepted as the movement of women inside kinship systems. *Fa'a'amu* adoption involves open, direct adoption arrangements between extended family members, and this has gradually included international ones. Since 1970, many fa'a'amu babies have also been given to French childless couples. The adaptation of the fa'a'amu institution allows us to trace the legacies of this practice in a globalized world. The Kanak adoption tradition provides comparative material that illuminates the new relationships and parenthood(s) found in the "West," thereby contributing to current debates in kinship.

Keywords: fa'a'amu and Kanak adoption, International Adoption, French colonization, custom, law, unequal exchange

Résumé : En Polynésie française, comme en Nouvelle-Calédonie, la circulation des enfants est fréquente et aussi bien acceptée que les déplacements des femmes au sein des systèmes de parenté. L'adoption *fa'a'amu* passe par des arrangements d'adoption directe entre les membres d'une famille élargie, et cela s'est étendu graduellement jusqu'à inclure des arrangements internationaux. Depuis 1970, plusieurs bébés fa'a'amu ont aussi été donnés à des couples français sans enfants. L'adaptation de l'institution fa'a'amu nous permet de retracer l'héritage de cette pratique dans le contexte de la mondialisation. La tradition d'adoption kanak offre un matériel comparatif qui éclaire les nouvelles relations et les nouvelles parentalités rencontrées dans « l'Ouest », contribuant par là aux débats actuels sur la parenté.

Mots-clés : adoption kanak et *fa'a'amu*, adoption internationale, colonisation française, coutumes, loi, échanges inégaux

I have been studying Kanak adoption and kinship for some 20 years now (Leblic 2000a, 2000b, 2004a, 2004c). Recently, in Rio de Janeiro, I undertook to compare traditional Kanak and Mā'ohi adoption practices with international adoption (Leblic 2012) as an extension of my reflection on this topic, which I began to develop in an earlier book published in 2004b. In the present article, I would like to pursue the question of the connections between traditional *fa'a'amu*[2] adoption and international adoption.[3] As Judith Schachter said at the 2011 AAA session, adoption [has] floated from one domain to the other: a mode of kinship, a version of exchange, an example of custom *versus* law and a thread in colonialism/post-colonialism studies.

In the first section, I will rapidly compare Mā'ohi, Kanak[4] and Oceanic forms of adoption.[5] The Kanak and the Mā'ohi are the two autochthonous peoples of New Caledonia and French Polynesia, respectively, two French Overseas Territories where traditional adoption is frequent. In both cases, as in many traditional societies, circulation of children between families, or "child exchange"[6] (Carroll 1970 and Brady 1976; see also Modell 1995), is as frequent as movement of women inside kinship systems. A parallel can even be drawn between traditions of adoption and marriage, and one can speak of the birth parents as "givers" and the adoptive parents as "takers" (see also Collard 2004) in that for traditional societies, exchanges of children are part of and similar to exchanges of women through marriage (see also Lallemand 1993). I have written elsewhere that the Paicî Kanak use the same terms for the customs and gifts that make an adoption or a marriage official (Leblic 2012): the customary action, *u pa âboro (èpo, ilëri)*, "to take a human being—a child or woman," done by the takers of the child or the woman, mirrors that of the givers of the child or the woman, *u töpwö âboro (èpo, ilëri)*, "to install a human being—a child or woman." This custom gives the newcomer access to the lands on which they are installed, like any other member of the lineage they

join, without risk of incurring the wrath of the local ancestors (for more on the vocabulary of Paicî adoption, see Leblic 2000a, 2000b, 2004a, 2004c, 2004d). One of the most important features of traditional adoption in Polynesia, as more generally in Oceania, is that birth parents and adoptive parents choose each other and, in the majority of cases, stay in touch (there is no secret about adoption). As a consequence, the children add together the rights and obligations of their two kin groups (birth and adoption).

In most cases in Oceania, as in many traditional societies, adoption and fosterage are not necessarily linked to the abandonment of children, which reminds us that, unlike in western societies, parents do not have exclusive rights and functions (Leblic 2004d). For instance, Mā'ohi (and Kanak) may give some of their children to other members of the family—not always childless person—and such gifts may be prompted for several reasons, as we will see ahead. This feature puts us in a specific framework of adoption under French law that is the result of colonial history. Until 1946, French Polynesia was governed by "customary"[7] law, which still applies to the exchange of children in New Caledonia (Kanak exchanges not being necessarily a matter of official record). This is why we need to glance back over the history of this particular legal framework.

In the last few years, with the growth of international adoption and the lack of available children in western countries, parents wanting to adopt a child look farther and farther afield. Furthermore, we know that the children who enter the international adoption circuit are "not always"—I could say, "rarely,"—orphans. These two French Overseas Territories can therefore be of particular importance for French childless couples, since Kanak and Mā'ohi adoption may be seen as a "source of babies" and a means of circumventing certain difficulties inherent in international adoption. We can mention here an important difference between Kanak and Mā'ohi adoption, as far as their integration in the international adoption circuit goes. If the Mā'ohi may give their children to non-Polynesian couples living outside the territory, the same is not true in New Caledonia; although I know of three recent cases of Kanak children being adopted by Caldoches (Europeans who have settled in New Caledonia) or metropolitan Europeans living in New Caledonia. There may be more ... but I will come back to this later.

Since the 1970s, many French childless couples have begun looking for children in French Polynesia, where it is customary to give children within the fa'a'amu adoption circuit. This form of adoption is supposed to maintain ties between the Polynesian birth family that gives the baby and the French adoptive family that takes it.

In most cases, the families themselves look for a pregnant woman willing to take part in this system of adoption (see Laîné 2005). Alternatively, in New Caledonia, the Kanak, among whom the circulation of children is widely practised, rarely give their children to outsiders.[8] I attempt to respond to the question of why the Mā'ohi do and not the Kanak, whereas their traditional systems of adoption are very similar. I also show that, for us, the fa'a'amu transfer of children to these *Popa'ā Farāni* couples ("whites from France") corresponds to international adoption, whatever one says, and will try to answer the question of why Popa'ā Farāni couples choose children from French Polynesia.

What Does "Adoption" Mean in Oceania?

I agree with Carroll that the essential question is "What does 'adoption' mean"? Is adoption "any customary and optional procedure for taking as one's own a child of other parents"? (1970:3). Carroll answers the question, "by noting that answers to questions about adoption are answers to questions about the nature of kinship itself" (Brady 1973:437). Goodenough concludes the same volume by insisting on the fact that

> because adoption and fosterage involve transactions in which rights and duties are transferred or delegated from one party to another as parents, the study of these practices can help to clarify how parenthood is culturally structured in a particular society and thereby, lead to clarification of the phenomenon of parenthood in a general, cross-societal and hence, anthropological sense. [1970:391–392]

All these works bring Brady to formulate a new definition of adoption:

> Emphasizing the importance of adoption as a socio-cultural process of recruitment to kinship identities, a new definition may be formulated as follows: *Adoption is any positive and formal transaction in kinship, other than birth or marriage, that creates new or revises existing kinship bonds to bring them into accordance with any other kinship identity set customarily occupied by two or more persons in that society* ... It is precisely this culturally specific capability to manipulate and change kinship identities that makes adoption possible. [1976:10–12]

To conclude, we will see what kinship and adoption in traditional societies can provide in the way of paths for reflection about kinship in western societies and what lessons our view of traditional adoption can teach us in the current debate on new forms of kinship and parenthood. It should not be forgotten that both adoption and

marriage transform alliance into descent (Shore 1976:196). Because a number of the questions raised in the present debate on these questions in western societies are often familiar to anthropologists working on kinship in traditional societies, we will start our own reflection with these two examples of child circulation. Indeed, today's sociology of the family no longer deals with this but with what are considered, from a certain point of view, as accepted standards (ARTs, gay couple adoptions, etc.), so that one sometimes has the impression of reinventing here what the anthropology of kinship has dealt with from time immemorial.

> From the early years of the discipline, researchers in anthropology discussed practices of child exchanges. From the traditional approach which, in England, lays stress on rights and obligations (Goody 1982), in the USA, on culture et personality (Carroll 1970) and, in France, on the gift (Lallemand 1993), to the more contemporary current of the deconstructionist analysis (Schneider 1984), the study of the relationship between certain children and theirs parents of substitution helped these researchers to reconsider the naturalized categories of the marital family. [Fonseca 2004:209; my translation][39]

Traditional Adoption, French Law and Individual Law: Overseas French Specificities

Like French Polynesia, New Caledonia is still a French colony. There is, therefore, a certain number of local particularities that have been taken into account in their history by the French legislation applied to the native peoples of the two Overseas French Territories, the Kanak and the Mā'ohi. We will quickly see that if Kanak and Mā'ohi child exchanges are quite similar, we need to take note of their principal differences, which are connected with their different inscription in French law. Since the colonial history of these two territories has left its mark on the present legal framework of personal status, we will set out a few elements that will enable a better understanding of what is at stake in adoption.

Until 1946, Kanak and Mā'ohi were not French citizens, which implies, among other things, that they did not enjoy the full rights entailed in citizenship and, in particular, the right to vote. Since the 1946 Constitution, which allowed all autochthonous inhabitants of the French Union to acquire French citizenship, the law has provided for some exceptions to the legal code governing French citizens, to respect certain fundamental customs in the organization of the autochthonous societies. This was the object of Article 82 of the 1946 Constitution, which provided that those persons concerned could keep their personal status, providing they had not expressly requested to come under French law. These dispositions were reiterated in Article 75 of the 1958 Constitution, which stipulates that

> Citizens of the Republic who do not have ordinary civil status, the sole status referred to in Article 34, shall retain their personal status until such time as they have renounced the same. [Assemblée nationale 1958]

The customary status of the native inhabitants of French Overseas Territories thus included certain specificities, which continue to apply today, in the case of the Kanak people of New Caledonia.

> The regime of personal status is that in which the law applicable to persons depends not on the country of which they are citizens but to the ethnic, religious or other group to which they belong; the domain legally governed by this criterion is limited to questions not concerning the country in general but to those more or less internal to the "community" of belonging, essentially family law. [Cercle d'étude de Réformes féministes n.d.; my translation]

In the lawmakers' thinking, this was supposed to allow a gradual transition from customary law to common law.[9] But that did not happen in New Caledonia, and customary rules still govern the civil status of the Kanak people.

The effective application of personal civil status takes several forms. In New Caledonia, the existence of two civil statuses (common law and personal status), the form of the marriage, birth, adoption and death certificates and the procedure followed for their establishment differ in each case. In Wallis-and-Futuna as in New Caledonia, unwritten customs that vary from one region to the next govern the personal civil status of those persons who have not renounced them. In its positive law, the Republic recognizes private property governed by Islamic law on Mayotte, by customary ownership on Wallis and Futuna, and in New Caledonia, groups governed by particular local law, the system of joint clan ownership on Grande Terre and communities of inhabitants in the forest of Guiana. Here the constitution provides for juridical pluralism, a space where questions of power and authority can be debated and resolved according to a system of standing agreements (see Canton-Fourrat 2006).

Today, as the twenty-first century gets underway, Kanak adoption thus comes under customary law, as does everything having to do with the family relations

of persons enjoying a particular legal status. The Kanak, in their great majority, are still governed by the particular civil status, which stipulates in Article 37 of the Territorial Assembly deliberation of April 3, 1967, that what matters is the application of the customary rule after consent by the families concerned. Since the Noumea Accord (May 5, 1998), the term used in the Kanak case is "customary status." For example, in 2005, of 4,106 births, 1,660 (40.4 per cent) were registered under customary status (ISEE 2006:46), which should correspond to the majority of Kanak births[11] (the Kanak population accounts for approximately 40 per cent of the total population of New Caledonia). One of the characteristics of these customary rules is that they are unwritten and can vary from one customary[12] area to another. That is why the Customary Assembly is presently considering standardization of these rules to clarify and adapt them to life as it is today.

When it comes to circulation of children, this customary status has several consequences: all customary adoptions are carried out by agreement between giving and taking families (lineages, clans). Transfers of children, as with customary marriage transfers,[13] are not necessarily registered with the French administration, unless there is some advantage to this (welfare benefits in particular), which means that families adopting in this framework do not need to be approved by the social services, etc., much to the displeasure of many employees of these services, who would like more control over customary adoptions, which they often see in a very negative light (for some pejorative views on Kanak adoption, see also Salomon and Hamelin 2008). All of this is, of course, done for the "child's best interests," a very western notion (Collard and Leblic 2009b; Leblic 2004d; Schachter 2011).

The situation is very different in French Polynesia, where the Mā'ohi do not have a particular civil status. Nevertheless, so-called fa'a'amu adoption entails certain specificities.[14] In effect, the texts dealing with adoption, particularly Law 66–500 of July 11, 1966 (bearing on adoption reform), do not apply in this territory.[15] Therefore, since 1970, in French Polynesia the principle of delegation of parental authority (established by Law 70–589 of July 9, 1970) provides a framework for the circulation of fa'a'amu children. By law, for the first two years of the fa'a'amu child's life, this is not an adoption per se but a delegation of parental authority drawn up with social services and the family court of the Court of First Instance in Papeete and signed and filed by both the birth mother and the future parents. The judge orders an investigation into the social circumstances of the child's parents to ensure that the gift is being made

freely and not under any constraint, so that the judgment of delegation of parental authority can be delivered, which is the only way the adoptive parents can return to France with the baby, a few weeks after its birth. It is also the only legal way of controlling this form of traditional adoption.

Even if this child retains the civil status it had at birth, its status as a child entrusted to a guardian by court decision gives these parents all social rights. At the end of the two-year waiting period (duration of the delegation of parental authority), the parents can obtain from the court located in the child's place of residence the adoption order, which can be for simple or full adoption,[16] depending on the case. This can be done no earlier than two months[17] after the signature of the consent to adoption before the registrar of the Tribunal de Paix in Papeete or before a notary, by the biological parents, with whom the adoptive parents have made a moral contract to maintain ties with the family.

Since 1993, fa'a'amu adoption, like all other forms, is governed by Law 93–22 of January 8, 1993, which modifies the text of the Civil Code relative to civil status, the family and the rights of the child by creating a family court (published in the *Journal Officiel* of January 9, 1993, entering into application from February 1, 1994). The delegation of parental authority is still in effect for all fa'a'amu procedures.

Circulation of Children, Child Exchanges and Functions of Traditional Adoption

To begin with, we can say that adoption is one of the means used by human societies to produce kinship.[18] In Western Europe, adoption fulfils three principal but non-exclusive functions: provide orphans and abandoned children with a family (since World War I in France); provide childless couples with a social progeny; and provide a couple or an individual with an heir in the context of transmission of goods and statuses. Today, as a result of globalization, traditional forms of child exchange often face the importance of international regulations. For instance, since the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was adopted in 1989, it is customary to evoke the interests of the child in all types of transfer. Chantal Collard and I[19] have shown (2009b) that there was no common standard of well-being of the child among cultures throughout the world, despite the fact that the CRC guarantees a well-being of the child that one hoped would be universal but, ultimately, is all too often only found in the West[20] (see also Sheriff 2000). The western vision of the child's welfare may well not suit the ethos of many cultures; yet it implies the right to intervene when it is threatened (Collard and Leblic

2009b:8).[21] In the same volume of *Anthropologie et societies*, devoted to childhood in danger (Collard and Leblic 2009a), I noted the unintended consequences that could result from imposing this well-being as a universal with respect to the affair of the Arche de Zoé (Leblic 2009:83–99).That having been said, let us return to so-called traditional adoption and its main functions.

There is a great diversity of adoption situations in the world, and we can say without much risk that the circulation of children is an almost universal phenomenon. In traditional societies, adoption fulfils several functions; here, I recapitulate the main ones, with no implied hierarchy. One of these functions is, without doubt, to give parents to children who don't have any and vice versa (to ensure the survival and reproduction of the group). But adoption can also respond to the desire to help individuals attain better positions. Adoption also helps balance the sex ratio and compensate a deficit of girls or boys in a sibling group, in particular in response to the needs of alliance, which often demand that to get a wife for my son, I must give a daughter for the son of someone else. This transfer can also "pull" (*tirer*) the child—that is to say, remove it from a bad influence, often having to do with sorcery, to protect it; this is not always unconnected with traditional practices of infanticide, which are avoided by transferring the child. Sometimes it is economic interest that dictates these transfers, the children being given as surety, placed in apprenticeship in domestic work but also entrusted to persons more well-off who can ensure the child a better education. And then there is the child as "old-age insurance," given to support elderly and/or isolated relatives. Lastly and, no doubt, one of the most widespread causes of adoption in traditional societies is the gift of the child that seals new relations between groups or maintains old relations (in parallel to alliance), etc.

In traditional forms of circulation, children (but sometimes adults as well) are moved in the roles of sons/daughters but also as son-/daughter-in-law or another kin relation, in particular grandson/granddaughter. In sum, the causes of child transfers come down to four (Lallemand 1993):

- survival, reproduction, to resolve the case of orphans or barren parents;
- necessity, in response to excess progeny or a divorce;
- social reasons: to balance the sex ratio;
- welfare: to remove the child from harm's way.

Recall that adoptions are quite often repeated between two (or more) groups in cycles that can be seen in the genealogies. These transfers are carried out by:

- direct exchange (a child for a child);
- differed exchange (a child given in turn but later);
- asymmetric exchange (A gives a child to B who gives to C).

After these few reminders about adoption in traditional societies, I look at the case of the Kanak of New Caledonia[22] and the Mā'ohi of French Polynesia.[23]

Mā'ohi Adoption, the Notion of fa'a'amu

Traditional fa'a'amu adoption can be defined as an open form of adoption entailing a direct arrangement between more or less closely related members of the same family. A few words about Mā'ohi vocabulary are in order here. In the Mā'ohi language, the fa'a'amu child is "the child one feeds/nourishes," while the term fa'a'amu designates the adoptive parents as well. *Fānau*, meaning "to give birth," is used for the parents who give their child (from *fānau* (v.), to be born, to give birth, and *fanau'a*, (n.): 1. child (Académie tahitienne 1999:142; my translation).

The reasons for adoption are to render or reciprocate a service, to honour relatives or friends, to strengthen alliance ties, to respond to economic hardship, desire for a child or "old-age insurance," etc. Along with Jeanette Dickerson-Putnam (2008:891), I can say that "children, like other family resources, are communally 'owned' by extended family members" (see also Billard et al. 1994; Hooper 1970). But that cannot be considered a restrictive view of fa'a'amu adoption, since fa'a'amu exchange not only occurs between members of the same family but also is connected with the alliance system.

Teuira Henry speaks of child exchanges as occurring frequently in Tahitian society, in connection with ritual infanticide reserved for the 'Arioi' [24] society (Serra-Mallol, personal communication).

> Tahitians have always adored children. Those who had none adopted and those who had many exchanged them with other families. Adoption was a common gesture of friendship between relatives and friends. These children happily divided their time between their real and their adoptive family. Despite this affection for children, infanticide was so frequent that, Captain Cook having noticed this, tried, in vain, to lecture King Pomare about it. When the first missionaries landed, they found that at least two thirds of all children were killed at birth. [Henry 1962:282–283; my translation]

In addition, naming is an important part of the adoption process[25]:

A family's adopted children were made legitimate by giving them a name from the marae,[26] called *vauvau i'oa* (receiver of the name) and it was considered an injustice not to admit them into the family. [Henry 1962:149; my translation]

Jean-Vital de Monléon, who made a particular study of fa'a'amu adoption, underscored the parallel between adoption and alliance, as we saw in the case of New Caledonia, noting that "at all levels of society, adoption is a form of alliance that allows ties forbidden by consanguinity (Billard et al. 1994)" (Monléon 2004:61; my translation).

If French Polynesia does not manage traditional adoption within a legal framework in the same way as New Caledonia, it is nevertheless a long-standing institution in Mā'ohi social organization that is driven by various motives (Monléon 2004)—to fulfil an obligation (in response to a service rendered), to honour relatives or friends by giving or accepting a child, to reply to the desire to establish or strengthen an alliance, to have children in the house (a sort of "old-age insurance") and to cope with economic difficulties. All of these reasons for the circulation of children among the Mā'ohi are very similar to those found for traditional Kanak adoption and to those found throughout Oceania (Brady 1976; Carroll 1970).

The fundamental difference we find in today's form of fa'a'amu adoption is its inclusion in overseas adoption in the context of international adoption, the reasons for which, according to the study of fa'a'amu adoption presented by Nadaud (1993) and summed up by Jean-Vital Monléon, are

lack of interest in the child (a mother who is too young, too many siblings), rejection of a child (undesired sex, child of a former marriage), kidnapping (usually by ascendants), forced fa'a'amu (neglected children, accepted out of pity) and fa'a'amu for reasons of conflict between the parents (in the case of separation or crisis in the couple). [2004:61; my translation]

I consider that there are four ways of carrying out fa'a'amu transfers today at the beginning of the twenty-first century: cooperation within the family; marital reasons extending to separation of the parents; professional reasons, giving rise to numerous cases of fosterage or temporary adoption; finally, as an alternative to family planning, where adoption is a means of birth control. Monléon also points out the increasing negative influence of globalization in this type of adoption.

Despite the often exemplary and premonitory side of adoption in Polynesia, where the social often prevails over the biological for the good of the child, my conclusion will nevertheless be pessimistic. I have noted over six years an unfavorable evolution of the phenomenon and its pollution by an insidious globalization. In a time where adoption the world over is governed by a Western standard, The Hague Convention, will traditional adoption still have a place? Furthermore, owing to the same convention, adoption has become increasingly difficult world wide, which means that more and more candidates are looking to Polynesia and perverting the system there, going as far as to pay for children. [2004:75–76; my translation]

Child Transfer: Contrasting the Kanak System and the Mā'ohi System

The traditional Kanak system has little place for adoption outside the community or the country; one does not give one's child outside the kinship or alliance network, as reference to Kanak social organization takes precedence. Nevertheless, in the past few years, there have been several cases of adoption of Kanak children by non-Kanak residents of New Caledonia. As I am acquainted with only a very few of these (perhaps due to the fact that one often hears of them by chance), it is hard to have an exhaustive view of this new practice. But one wonders if these out-of-context Kanak adoptions might not be expedient for taker families seeking to adopt abroad.

The first case I heard of[27] was the adoption of a two-and-half-year-old girl instigated by the child's grandmother and her single mother from a very poor family with numerous children (many of whom were born to single mothers) and unable to satisfy even their most elementary daily needs. The child's parents, who lived in the bush, therefore asked a woman from Noumea with whom they were in regular contact because of her professional activity and who often brought them basic foodstuffs. The adoptive family already had three children (two boys and a girl) and had never thought of adopting before being asked. It was the occasion that prompted them, together with the catastrophic situation of the birth family, since the grandmother no longer wanted to take care of her fatherless grandchildren born after alcohol-fueled parties.

They thus asked me several times to take the little girl with me. I asked them if they wanted me to adopt her. Which they confirmed. I told them I had to talk to my husband and my children. Then three months later, we took in the little girl, who was two and a half at the time. [Personal communication, May 11, 2009]

As in the case of traditional adoptions, the adopted child visits her family regularly; the adoptive family also regularly receives other daughters of the family for schooling in Noumea. This adoption is thus typical of a gift for economic reasons based on relations of trust with the future adoptive mother.

One of the main differences between these two forms lies in the fact that, to fully adopt this little Kanak girl, the adoptive family had to go through the necessary court procedures, although without having been approved by the territorial family services, since they had a letter from the biological mother saying she had entrusted the child to their care.

> It had been explained to me that full adoption gives the child the right to the same share in the inheritance as a biological child and that this was not the case in simple adoption [in the end, this information proved false]. In any event, I wanted all of my children to carry the same family name, on the one hand and, on the other hand, the fact that my daughter changed names does not mean that ties with her family are broken. That's what I also tried to explain to my daughter. And she sees her family two or three times a year. [Personal communication, May 25, 2009]

Full adoption was granted at the end of a fairly long procedure (six years), following agreement by the biological mother (in writing and directly before the court) and by the child's maternal grandfather, who normally has authority over the family.

> It seems to me that the child's grandfather is a *petit chef*, they were all in agreement. At one point, after some six years of adoption procedures, the mother had finally written to the court that she no longer wanted a full adoption and that she would like the child to keep her family name. I was very surprised and asked her "why" and, if she wanted her child back, there was still time … She just answered "no, especially not that," then she wrote again to give her agreement for full adoption. [Personal communication, May 25, 2009]

The two other cases I heard about concerned childless couples, one of whom had tried for an international adoption. After having attempted to adopt in the national and international circuits, the first couple took in a little Kanak girl living in their neighbourhood. After having managed to adopt a child within the international framework, they nevertheless continued to take care of the little Kanak girl, in a sort of fosterage arrangement. The second couple I know was unable to have children and adopted two Kanak babies.[28]

It emerges from these three examples that all of these adoptions are based on relations of proximity between giver and taker families, in what is, to be sure, an unequal exchange—the first being destitute, the second much better off—as an aid to needy families, to give the transferred child a chance of a better education, etc. It should also be noted that taking a disadvantaged Kanak child, often a girl, into a well-off Noumean family to give her or him a "good education" was formerly practised in Noumean colonial high society. But it did not necessarily end in adoption, either simple or full.

In February 2013, I heard of another case of a Kanak baby being adopted by a French couple in France. This is a special case because it is based on pre-existing ties between the givers and the takers. The French couple already had a 12-year-old child. The father, whom I will call X, had spent many years in New Caledonia and was very close to a few Kanak families. In fact, the godfather of one of his sons was a Kanak friend who has since died; but the metropolitan family still has close ties with the whole family. X received one of the daughters of his son's godfather in France some time ago. She had had a baby in a relationship that did not last and did not want to raise the child. Therefore, she first entrusted it to her mother, the widow of X's child's godfather. But the grandmother had too much work with her other children and asked X and his family if they would take the baby in France, if the mother did not change her mind and persisted in abandoning her child. So the family of X took advantage of their vacation to go to New Caledonia for the baby and bring it back to France with them. But they wanted the child to keep the birth family's name, even if they adopted it. And to keep up ties with the birth family, they made a photo album that everyone shares.

We thus have two types of transfer. The first aims to take the Kanak child out of its environment and give it "a better life" (at the instigation of the biological parents). The second consists in remedying a couple's lack of descendants (at the couple's request), as a way of getting around the difficulty of international adoption, with its long and complicated procedures.

I turn now to the concrete details of fa'a'amu adoption to metropolitan France. Between 1977 and 1993, a minimum of 60 and a maximum of 199 Mā'ohi children each year entered the fa'a'amu adoption circuit, whether between Polynesian families or with a metropolitan family doing the adopting. For over 20 years, between 21 per cent and 30 per cent of delegations of parental authority have concerned non-Mā'ohi families from metropolitan France. Just what is delegation of parental authority? The originality of international fa'a'amu adoption resides

in the fact that the givers and the takers of children choose each other. In this context, since 1970, numerous Polynesians have entered the international adoption circuit by extending the gift of their fa'a'amu babies to (often childless) French couples, more and more of whom come looking for a baby but always in the context of direct arrangements between givers and takers. If it is important for the birth mother to know where the child she wants to give will go, the parents to whom it will be given often want to meet the pregnant woman who is relinquishing her child for fa'a'amu adoption. It is only once the contact has been established and they feel they have a good rapport that the transfer can be made. This is based on establishment of a relation of trust between biological and adoptive parents (the adoptive parents thus make a moral pact with the birth mother and with the mother's family to keep them posted, as we will see in what we call "international" fa'a'amu adoption). It is, therefore, necessary to the adoption that the adoptive mother at least attends the birth of the child and that she helps and supports the birth mother in the days following the birth until the gift is completed. For, as both sides say, this is indeed a gift. And it is in this way that the tradition of fa'a'amu adoption has come gradually to include international adoption but within the same traditional framework: givers and takers of the child choose each other, which constitutes the originality of this type of adoption within the French system. And, as we saw earlier, French Polynesian customary law was adapted to the French Civil Code via the delegation of parental authority. Therein resides another originality of this type of international adoption via the fa'a'amu system.

With this framing of the Ma'ohi traditional code in the French Civil Code, the adaptation of the fa'a'amu institution to the demands of childless French couples allows us to trace the tidemarks and legacies of this adoption practice in a globalized world.

It is likely that this all seeks to serve the best interests of the fa'a'amu child, many of whom are born to very young and/or single women. Many others have numerous siblings. In all events, we are dealing with giver families faced with economic and social hardship and who want to give their future child a better life. Something else to take into account here in trying to understand the transition from traditional to international adoption is the fact that in French Polynesia, unlike metropolitan France, abortion was illegal until 2002. These transfers of children can therefore be seen as an attempt to answer the question about what is the best future for a fa'a'amu child. With the advent of legalized abortion, there are an estimated 1,500 or more abortions a year for 4,500 births, which shows that the demand was pressing. Since then, the number of delegations of parental authority to metropolitan couples has dropped sharply, proof if need be of the impact of one phenomenon on the other.

Let us now come back to the national or international character of fa'a'amu adoptions outside Polynesia. Normally, what we call international adoption implies that there is no contact between birth parents and future adoptive parents, as stipulated in Article 29 of the Hague Convention (Hague 1993)[29]:

> There shall be no contact between the prospective adoptive parents and the child's parents or any other person who has care of the child until the requirements of Article 4,[30] sub-paragraphs a) to c), and Article 5,[31] sub-paragraph a), have been met, unless the adoption takes place within a family or unless the contact is in compliance with the conditions established by the competent authority of the State of origin. [Art. 29, Text 33]

Even if Article 29 does not apply here, it does not prevent considering fa'a'amu adoption of children by metropolitan couples living in France as an international adoption. There are several reasons for this. The first is that French Polynesia (like New Caledonia) was historically a French colony. And, to my mind, it is in no way possible to compare intra-national adoption as it occurs in metropolitan France with fa'a'amu adoption, even within French Polynesia, where, unlike in France, social services play no part. Second, Popa'ā Farāni couples who come to Polynesia for babies are looking for a child in the framework of an international adoption and take advantage of the fact that this territory is still French to circumvent several difficulties encountered in the framework of international adoption (complexity and length of the procedure, in particular). It is even possible that knowing exactly where the future adopted child comes from is also something certain couples may be looking for. Lastly, we are still in an unequal exchange between North and South. If "legally" we are dealing with what jurists call a "national adoption," the global movement of children is similar to that of international adoption. Owing to the colonial context, it is not the legal aspect, "an adoption within national borders," that matters to us here but the local practices and their "exploitation" by French couples in an exchange which, in spite of the fact that certain contacts continue, remains unequal.

Kanak and fa'a'amu Adoptions versus International Adoption

While Kanak[32] and Mā'ohi child exchanges are very similar, I would like to recall the main differences between them. Inclusion of the fa'a'amu practice in the context

Table 1: Comparison between international adoption and Kanak and Mā'ohi adoption

International adoption and Mā'ohi adoption fa'a'amu	Kanak adoption
Occurs outside French Polynesia as well.	Only in territorial New Caledonia.
Adoptive parents deliberately set out to "find a baby."	Personal relations between the families exist before the transfer (on the same model as traditional adoption).
More structured social organization?	Social organization counts on the importance of ties and the relationship.

of national adoption—even if this flows essentially in the direction of metropolitan France—with importance given to personal relations between givers and takers and, therefore, absence of anonymity is important and relatively old. This type of international adoption, modelled on traditional adoption and thought, in terms of adding together both sets of ties and filiations (even if it is a full adoption in France), is a well-known and reputedly easy path for metropolitan couples looking for a child.[33]

Alternatively, because Kanak customary status is still recognized by the French administration, there is no need to register Kanak adoptions with vital statistics. The few recent and still very personal cases involving givers of children attempting to cope with family, economic or educational difficulties and/or takers attempting to solve the problem of childless friends living in New Caledonia remain the exception. And today, when it comes to traditional exchanges in New Caledonia, circulation of Kanak children is still not under the control of the social services (who would like to take charge "in the best interests of the child"). Therein lies one of the biggest differences between the two systems, since fa'a'amu circulation of children between Polynesian families must obtain a delegation of parental authority. Table 1 sums up the elements of this comparison.

In both cases we see the importance of often young, single[34] mothers as providers of adoptable children, whether through the traditional circuit, in the Kanak case, or in the international setting, in the case of Polynesia. In this context, we should remember the correlation between the drop in the number of fa'a'amu children and delegation of parental authority to couples from metropolitan France, since the legalization of abortion in Polynesia in 2002. Thus, everything seems to suggest that women not wanting another child took advantage of the fa'a'amu system to give away supernumerary or undesired children. And in this context, people say it is better to give to Popā'a than to Mā'ohi because the former are motivated by the desire for a child while the latter are moved only by charity.

In conclusion, I would like to try to answer the question posed at the outset: why do Mā'ohi give their children in the international adoption circuit and the Kanak do not?[35] At the present stage of my research, several paths have opened to explain these different ways of dealing with traditional practices in a globalized world.

The first explanation may lie in the social organization of the two groups. I cannot go into detail here, but it is certain that the Kanak social system has remained much more close-knit than that of the Mā'ohi and no doubt less destructured by colonization. The seclusion of the Kanak on reservations for the better part of the colonial period played a part. Their exclusion from the white world and the ban on circulation and, particularly, on going to Noumea all made it easier for the Kanak to maintain a viable "traditional"[36] social organization for a longer time. For the Kanak, the relationship between the individual and the group remains a fundamental definition of their person, in conjunction with the ancestors and the ritual practices devoted to them. This social cohesiveness has also been maintained in part by the customary status, which is still in force today and which can even be said to have been strengthened by the Noumea Accord in 1998, since some individual Kanak, who had lost their particular status through divorce or having been born of a mixed marriage, could ask to be reinstated.[37] It is hard to imagine how a child could be extracted from this system. But the example discussed above, of a child given in adoption to a European family in Noumea, shows that one can sometimes be faced with specific situations of advanced social disintegration (the importance of alcoholism in families, girls conceiving undesired children at drunken parties and an overall increase in the number of families living in extreme poverty).

One reason for this difference has to do with the variable experience of French colonization, which had different effects in the two South Pacific archipelagos. Because of the Kanak's customary status, their social organization was better protected than that of the

Mā'ohi, which largely explains, to my mind, the difference in their insertion in the international adoption circuit. It may be that the Polynesian practice of adoption prefigures a future relationship in other peripheral societies with their colonial powers. Here, if I dare say, Polynesia may be "more advanced" than New Guinea. And that is the second explanation that may be offered—a different evolution in the two social systems and their late inclusion in the process of globalization, with all of the de-structuring effects that often implies. It is perhaps also a way of responding to important social and economic crises affecting these colonial societies.

Lastly, the circulation of children in any so-called traditional society reminds us that the family and more generally kinship are social constructions and that blood or biology is not enough to create kin ties (Gailey 1999,[38] 2010; Collard 2000; Leblic 2004d; McKinnon 2008). Studying child exchanges in Oceania can therefore teach us much and influence our reflections on kinship and parenthood in today's western societies.

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Acknowledgments

Notes

1 This article stems from a presentation I made to the AAA in 2011, "Tracing Pathways of Kinship in Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Arts)," and in the adoption session organized by Chantal Collard and Françoise-Romaine Ouellette in Montreal on November 18. Particular thanks to Chantal Collard for discussions about my presentation.

2 *Fa'a'amu child* means the child one nourishes/nurtures.

3 This work is thus an extension of previous work on kinship and adoption (Leblic 2004b), first within the former research group Anthropology of Childhood, headed by Suzanne Lallemand, and then with other colleagues (in particular Chantal Collard; see the workshop "Adoption et nouvelles parentés-parentalités," which I organized at the lacito (Languages, Civilisation and Oral Traditions) cnrs, December 10, 2010 (http://lacito.vjf.cnrs.fr/colloque/parente/index.htm) and within the kinship research unit of the Laboratoire d'anthropologie sociale (las). I have not yet been able to do fieldwork either in French Polynesia or

on the metropolitan families having adopted there. This last part of my study is in its initial phase, e-mail contact having already been made with some families, whom I am to meet soon.

4 For lack of space, I will focus primarily on adoption in French Polynesia. For Kanak adoption, see Leblic (2000a, 2004a, 2012) and for another point of view, see Salomon and Hamelin (2008).

5 Much has been published on adoption in Oceania. I will refer the reader here to the two principal collective volumes, which propose a broad overview of the question (Brady 1976; Carroll 1970), and to a more recent volume, *Changing Interpretation on Fosterage and Adoption* (Dickerson-Putman and Schachter 2008).

6 Since Carroll (1970) and Brady (1976), we have become accustomed to speaking of adoption and fosterage of children in Oceania in terms of child exchanges (see also Modell 1995).

7 What I call custom or *kastom* is not something static and frozen in time (see Leblic 1993); it is always evolving, changing, more in a dialectical process between Kanak and non-Kanak practices, representations and values (for Hawai'i see also Modell 1995:202; Schachter 2008).

8 In February 2013, I heard of the case of a Kanak child adopted in France (by a couple having lived for a long time in New Caledonia) as a service to a member of the adoptive father's extended family. It is often the case that metropolitans, having worked for a long time among the Kanak (which is also the case of the anthropologist), find themselves included as though by "adoption" in a Kanak family network.

9 On the adaptation of Kanak customary law, see in particular Agniel (1993).

11 Even if we must take into consideration the fact that the Kanak have on average more children than Europeans in New Caledonia, they have fewer than some other ethnic groups.

12 The Kanak of New Caledonia are divided into eight linguistic and customary areas. The Customary Assembly "is the assembly of the different customary councils in the Kanak territory. It reviews the bills and propositions from the territory or deliberations concerning Kanak identity ... it is composed of sixteen members designated by each customary council according to customary practices, two representatives for each customary area." http://www.gouv.nc/portal/page/portal/gouv/institutions/senat_coutumier, accessed December 2, 2009 (my translation).

13 In 2005, only 29.3 per cent of unions were customary marriages, which may mean that many of them were not counted.

14 For an overview of the specific characteristics of *fa'a'amu* adoption, see Anonymous (2008), Billard et al. (1994), Brillaux (2007), Brooks (1976), Charles (1995), Charles-Capogna (2006), Gourdon (2004), Levy (1970), Marshall (2008), Monléon (2000, 2001, 2004), Nadaud (1994), Ottino (1970), Prel (1996), Saura (1998) and Scotti (2008), Viallis (2002, 2009a, 2009b), Wiki de l'adoption (2008). In addition, a memorandum from Service des Affaires sociales, dated November 28, 2003, recapitulates the history of this kind of adoption. Several useful texts can be found on the Wiki adoption site.

15 If the lawmaker has not expressly stipulated it, laws passed in France are not automatically applicable in the overseas territories. They must first be validated by the local assemblies, which then decide whether they are to be applied in their territory.

16 It must be remembered that, in full adoption, the child's first birth certificate is annulled and a new certificate is drawn up, which carries no mention of the birth parents and, therefore, of the child's biological filiation. At the same time, all references to the child's family name and, if the parents so wish, its first names also disappear. This is the principle of replacing one filiation by another. In the case of simple adoption, the birth certificate retains a record of the adopted child's original filiation. Here we have the principle of double filiation, which adds on rather than substituting; nevertheless, only the adoptive parents have parental authority.

17 A waiting period, during which the birth parents can change their mind.

18 Note that historians of medieval Europe see adoption as a way of both manipulating and manufacturing kinship (Corbier 1999:32).

19 See also Leblic (2004d).

20 But it must also be said that the emphasis in the international conventions on children's rights is sparking new interest in childhood studies, for which we can only be glad.

21 "It is not a matter of doing a remake of the Arche de Zoé trial, but of showing how this affair is the best illustration of the excesses that can be engendered by the so-called universal nature of the child's welfare, among other things" (Leblic 2009:84).

22 My fieldwork on kinship and adoption was carried out for the most part in Ponerihouen, on the west coast of Grand Terre, in the Paicî area. I recently began work in a new area, in Ouvea (the Loyalty Islands) for purposes of comparison.

23 The Mā'ohi data comes essentially from bibliographical sources and from a few telephone or e-mail conversations.

24 "Arioi, n. Brotherhood of wandering artists composed of eight classes into which the candidate was admitted out of a novitiate" (Académie tahitienne, 1999:64–65; my translation).

25 This is also the case in New Caledonia.

26 The marae is a sacred place made up of a stone platform where worship was formerly held, often in association with ceremonies of a social or political nature (Académie tahitienne 1999:251).

27 I have not done any fieldwork per se on Kanak adoption out of context. I have had some information through e-mail and telephone conversations with persons concerned by this question in an attempt to understand the difference between the Kanak and the Mā'ohi systems.

28 But for the moment, I have been unable to reach them for more information.

29 See the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption concluded May 29, 1993 (Text 33).

30 "An adoption within the scope of the Convention shall take place only if the competent authorities of the State of origin: a) have established that the child is adoptable; b) have determined, after possibilities for placement of the child within the State of origin have been given due consideration, that an intercountry adoption is in the child's best interests; c) have ensured that: (1) the persons, institutions and authorities whose consent is necessary for adoption have been counseled as may be necessary and duly informed of the effects of their consent, in particular whether or not an adoption will result in the termination of the legal relationship between the child and his or her family of origin, (2) such persons, institutions and authorities have given their consent freely, in the required legal form, and expressed or evidenced in writing, (3) the consents have not been induced by payment or compensation of any kind and have not been withdrawn, and (4) the consent of the mother, where required, has been given only after the birth of the child; and d) have ensured, having regard to the age and degree of maturity of the child, that (1) he or she has been counseled and duly informed of the effects of the adoption and of his or her consent to the adoption, where such consent is required, (2) consideration has been given to the child's wishes and opinions, (3) the child's consent to the adoption, where such consent is required, has been given freely, in the required legal form, and expressed or evidenced in writing, and (4) such consent has not been induced by payment or compensation of any kind" [Art. 4].

31 "An adoption within the scope of the Convention shall take place only if the competent authorities of the receiving State: a) have determined that the prospective adoptive parents are eligible and suited to adopt; b) have ensured that the prospective adoptive parents have been counseled as may be necessary; and c) have determined that the child is or will be authorized to enter and reside permanently in that State" [Art. 5].

32 For more details on Kanak adoption not covered here, see Leblic (2000a, 2004a, 2012).

33 For a metropolitan couple's account of a fa'a'amu adoption, see Sabine Laîné's excellent book (2005).

34 Although I do not have any precise statistics for French Polynesia, it seems that most authors are agreed on their importance.

35 We should not overlook the fact that metropolitan parents may also have chosen Mā'ohi rather than Kanak parents because of the different way Mā'ohi may have been represented in metropolitan France, the first always having been regarded as less "savage" than the second (see on this subject Boulay 2000).

36 For a critique of the notion of tradition, see, among others, Leblic (1993, 2007).

37 Formerly, common law status prevailed over particular law and, if it was possible to switch from the latter to common law status, the reverse was not possible.

38 "In summary, this book addresses central issues in U.S. adoption practice and provides convincing counterarguments to the assumption that families in the United States today are defined by biological relationships" (Gibbons, 2010).

39 Apparently, the same article was published at the same time (January 2004) in two books whose goals are very similar, one in French (Leblic 2004b) and the other in English (Bowie 2004), without the two editors being aware of each other's project.

40 The Arche de Zoé is an association that exfiltrated 103 children in from Darfur. They presented them as orphaned refugees and provided them with bandages for the purpose of smuggling them into France and giving them to French families. This was thus a case of trafficking Chadian children for adoption, for which the leaders were convicted first by the Chadian justice system and then by the French.

41 "It is not a matter of doing a remake of the Arche de Zoé trial, but of showing how this affair is the best illustration of the excesses that can be engendered by the so-called universal nature of the child's welfare, among other things" (Leblic 2009:84).

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Infertility, Adoption and Metaphorical Pregnancies

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Abstract: In this article, I explore the grief some women experience as a result of their inability to have children or, what Linda Layne (1996:132) has called, "a loss of innocence," the loss of the taken-for-granted assumption that being a woman means that you can bear children. This innocence lost is connected to their shattered faith in medical progress, and the disruption of profoundly held beliefs about the nature of womanhood. Here, I elucidate how these women anchor the adoption experience in pregnancy by using pregnancy metaphors to describe the adoption process whereby adopted children are said to grow in a woman's heart instead of her womb.

Keywords: infertility, transnational adoption, kinship

Résumé : Dans cet article, j'interroge le chagrin ressenti par certaines femmes du à leur incapacité à porter des enfants, à l'instar de ce que Linda Layne (1996:132) a nommé « une perte d'innocence », soit la perte de la conviction qu'être femme signifie porter des enfants. Cette perte d'innocence est liée à l'effondrement de leur foi dans les progrès de la médecine et à la rupture de croyances profondément ancrées quant à la nature de la féminité. J'explique comment ces femmes articulent leur expérience d'adoption à la grossesse en usant de métaphores sur la grossesse pour décrire le processus d'adoption. Ainsi, les enfants adoptés grandissent dans le cœur d'une femme plutôt que dans son utérus.

Mots-clés : infertilité, adoption internationale, parenté

I wanted, all my life, to have children and I discovered in my 30s that I couldn't. I had a surgery [to increase my chances of] getting pregnant. After that I decided I couldn't spend my life without children. It was too cruel to be a teacher with a lot of children around and not having my own. [Violet, August 2, 2009]

A trend toward postponing parenthood is increasing in North America, especially among families with professional women (Schmidt et al. 2012). A clinical research study conducted in Western Canada found that women "normalized childbearing among women over 35 years and did not perceive the phenomenon as out of sync for their generation" (Benzies et al. 2006:631). As a result of this trend toward postponing motherhood, some women experience infertility and turn to adoption, surrogacy, donor eggs or IVF to create a family. Despite the increasing presence and acceptance of non-traditional and non-biological families in Canada, biological connections remain important to Canadian couples. This article explores adoptive mothers and the biological metaphors they use to describe their adoption experiences. What these metaphors highlight is that biology is still an important and preferred way of understanding kinship in North America. This article also underlines how, despite the plethora of non-biological ways to build a family, pregnancy is a very important rite of passage for some women. Many women who are unable to conceive grieve this loss and find that it disrupts their ideas about womanhood and femininity.

It is worth noting that not all women who adopt children are infertile, since there is a broad range of reasons and experiences leading women to adopt children, including religious values, a desire to engage in philanthropy and a family history of adoption. This article focuses on a particular demographic—that is, Canadian women who pursued adoption from China after struggling with infertility and, in most cases, infertility treatments. There is some diversity within my research sample concerning the way in which these women experienced

infertility. Some of the women were not able to get pregnant, while others had no trouble conceiving but were unable to carry a pregnancy to term. I am using the broadest definition of infertility to include all conditions leading these couples to abandon the quest for a biological child, including but not limited to endometriosis, pelvic inflammatory disease, chlamydia, hormonal disorders, genetic anomalies, ovulation problems, pregnancy loss, advanced maternal age and the infertility of male partners (Vissing 2002). Pregnancy loss in the first trimester of a pregnancy is much different than a late-term miscarriage because it does not involve giving birth. While there is a plethora of literature treating infertility and pregnancy loss separately and distinctly (Deluca and Leslie 1996; Layne 1996, 2004), my participants conflate the two conditions because the subjective experience of loss is similar.

This article is based on my doctoral dissertation, which more broadly examines adoption from China, looking at Canadian women's subjective experiences, desires and motivations for adopting children from China. I interviewed 30 Canadian women who adopted one or more children from China. Since infertility emerged as a dominant theme in their adoption narratives, this article examines the metaphors that infertile women use to explain their adoption experiences, in terms that symbolically equate adoption to undergoing a pregnancy. In my research on transnational adoption, women used pregnancy metaphors to anchor their adoption experiences in biological processes. In describing the adoption process using biological metaphors, people believe the relationship will be more legitimate and enduring (Howell 2009; Modell 2002). Pregnancy is a very well understood experience for Canadian women, and biological metaphors attempt to describe the adoption process in a way that is culturally meaningful. What these metaphors highlight, however, is the cultural preference for biologically related kin, leaving adoption as a backup plan when all options for creating biologically related kinship have been exhausted. The use of pregnancy metaphors serves to map adoption onto biological processes, thus highlighting the importance of biology in Canadian ideas about kinship and relatedness.

Pregnancy is a significant life event for many women, and those who cannot carry a pregnancy to term may feel they have missed out on that experience. In her research with infertility patients in IVF clinics, Becker found that "stopping the effort to conceive forces women to scrutinize their gender identity with respect to womanhood, motherhood, family and a range of related issues" (2000:2). In her work on adoption and kinship in Norway, Signe Howell writes that the Euro-American understanding of kinship is predicated on biological connections and that such biocentrism means that "fictive kinship" is always based on a biological model. As such, genetic kinship serves as a model for understanding other non-biological kinship relations. Howell explains that transnational adoption is often characterized as analogous to pregnancy and childbirth in order for the kinship relationships between mother and adoptive child to be culturally understood and legitimized (Howell 2009).

In my interviews with Canadian women who adopted from China, infertility and pregnancy loss emerged as dominant themes. I began each interview by asking the women to tell me about their adoption experiences. Most women began their narratives "from the beginning" and related their experiences about trying to get pregnant or having problematic pregnancies that led to miscarriage or ectopic pregnancies. It is well documented that those struggling to conceive experience hardship and may suffer from depression (Becker 2000; Benzies et al. 2006; Franklin 1997; Layne 1996; Mills et al. 2011; Petropanagos 2010; Schmidt et al. 2012). Sociologist Heather Jacobson suggests that "grief over infertility is seen as a necessary part of forming a non-biological family" (Jacobson 2008:27). Similarly, Gay Becker's research in IVF clinics found that "the majority of women were unable to seriously consider nonmedical options, such as adoption or childless living until they had exhausted the medical possibilities" (Becker 2000:120). She also describes IVF as "a last ditch effort to conceive into which couples invest great emotional energy [because] IVF offered their last hope for a biological child" (Becker 2000:120). Likewise, anthropologist Sarah Franklin (1997) carried out research with IVF clients in England with similar findings. The women in Franklin's research felt that fertility and procreation were natural parts of a woman's life-course. IVF is a risky medical procedure with a plethora of unpleasant side effects and a very small chance of success. Yet the women were willing to go forward with IVF and endure the potential risks and failures for the chance to have biological children (Franklin 1997). The research of Becker (2000) and Franklin (1997) deals with a specific demographic of infertile women that differs slightly from my own since not all of my research participants pursued IVF treatments. Nonetheless, it astutely highlights both the pain associated with infertility and the strong cultural preference for biological children. Becker points to the cultural attachments in replicating one's genetic make-up and the ideology of the continuity of lineage (Becker 2000). Likewise, Franklin argues that for many there is a powerful urge to perpetuate their genes through a new generation (Franklin 1997).

The grief experience, however, is not universal. My research participants experienced this pain in many different ways. Barbara, for example, lost her child from the risks associated with prenatal testing, recommended for all women over the age of 35. She had chorionic villus sampling (CVS) to test for genetic abnormalities, and the procedure led to an accidental termination of that pregnancy. Barbara was unable to conceive again and was left with feelings of guilt and anger over a test that was not absolutely necessary (Barbara, April 14, 2010). Anne had experienced three miscarriages (Anne, May 20, 2009). Rachel, who underwent treatment for infertility, had nightmares induced by the fertility drugs about killing her husband and felt that these fertility treatments put a great deal of strain on her marriage (Rachel, April 3, 2011).

During the course of my research in Ontario, Quebec, and Beijing, China, I interviewed 30 women, spanning the ages of 30 to 48 years, who adopted their child/ren from China between 1999 and 2010. The China adoption program has very specific criteria for adopting children in terms of the prospective parents' age, education, income and marital status. As a result, the China program selects for a very specific demographic, represented in my research sample, which includes mostly white, middle-class, educated professionals. Adoption literature is dominated by those inside the adoption triad of birth parent, adoptive parent and adopted child (Balcom 2011). Unlike many scholars who study adoption, I am not an adoptive mother or an adoptee; however, I am invested in this topic on a personal level given that, like most of my peers, I struggle to decide how to balance having children with the pursuit of higher education and a demanding career. Women who cannot carry a pregnancy to term and lose a child during pregnancy are often construed as "failed achievers" especially in the field of reproductive science. This characterization is surprising since they are often such high achievers in other facets of their lives (Layne 2003:150).

Most of the women I interviewed were older parents. The reason these women were older when they were ready to become mothers was often because they had achieved great success in their professional lives. They have lived up to the ideals of their generation that a woman can and should achieve success in her professional life. Nonetheless, my respondents believed that being a mother is an important part of their identity as a successful, fulfilled woman. In turn, these women experienced grief about losing their reproductive capacities in a society that makes it difficult for women to pursue their careers while having young children. Those who do become mothers while pursuing their career

goals find that the workplace does not accommodate new mothers and that opportunities for advancement are limited because they have small children (Evans and Grant 2008). These anxieties about pursuing career and family simultaneously have emerged as themes in popular media, thus highlighting how serious and widespread this concern and tension is among middle-aged, high-achieving Canadian women today. Two edited volumes—*Mama PhD: Women Write about Motherhood and Academic Life* (Evans and Grant 2008) and *Between Interruptions: 30[Canadian] Women Tell the Truth about Motherhood* (Howard 2007)—compile stories of successful career women who struggle with the tension of balancing career with family. The two roles are not always compatible because some careers do not afford the flexibility in the workplace that is needed for mothers. Women in dual-income families usually carry a heavier burden of housework and childcare responsibilities than their partners (Crittenden 2001).

Illness narratives are a common trope explored by medical anthropologists (Eisenberg 1977; Garro 2000; Kleinman 1988; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Martin 1994). Physician and anthropologist Arthur Kleinman (1988) used his experiences in clinical practice to write about the process of creating meaning in periods of illness. According to Kleinman, illness narratives are always culturally shaped, and thus they

> edify us about how life problems are created, controlled, made meaningful. They also tell us about the way cultural values and social relations shape how we perceive and monitor our bodies, label and categorize bodily symptoms, interpret complaints in the particular context of our life situation; we express our distress through bodily idioms that are both peculiar to distinctive cultural worlds and constrained by our shared human condition. [Kleinman 1988:xiii]

Infertility fits into discussions about illness because it is a disruptive life event and it is framed within a specific cultural setting through culturally meaningful metaphors (Garro 2000). Rapp and Ginsburg (2012:247) point out that

> recent research in infertility ... stresses how socially disabling involuntary childlessness and reproductive loss may be, especially although not exclusively, for women. Pregnancy, although not an illness, has been medicalized to the point that it is treated as an illness or disruption of life in cultures dominated by biomedicine. [Davis-Floyd 2003; see also MacDonald 2013]

For example, in her research on midwifery in Canada, anthropologist Margaret MacDonald writes that many

women seek a critical alternative to biomedical or "technocratic" models of pregnancy and childbirth. In contrast, natural birth is understood to "promote women as knowing, capable and strong, their bodies perfectly designed to carry a fetus to give birth successfully without the high-tech surveillance and interventions of physicians in a hospital setting" (MacDonald 2013:367).

Motherhood is a performance of normative gender roles since the family is an expression of social stability and good citizenship (Allison 2011; Berlant 1997; May 1995). Cultural metaphors are used by infertile mothers of adopted children to make infertility seem less pathological. Metaphors that compare adoption to pregnancy also enable these mothers to connect to conventional gender roles. Pregnancy metaphors are used by my research participants to explain the experience of infertility and to anchor their experience of motherhood in biological processes.

This method of anchoring the adoption experience in pregnancy accomplished several important things for my research participants, such as building kinship ties, naturalizing the adoption process as an option for building a family, and explaining grief in terms of socially accepted and understood experiences. Many of the women in my research who adopted children used the quintessential experiences of pregnancy to describe their adoption process in metaphorical terms. These pregnancy metaphors make the adoption process as close as possible to a biological process and signify a deeply rooted preference for biological kin.

This argument closely connects to the work of anthropologist Judith Modell, who focuses on domestic adoption in the United States (2002). She writes that adoption procedures were established with particular efforts to model biological kinship as much as possible. U.S. legal proceedings made no distinction between biological and adoptive children, and adoption was constructed to resemble genealogical relationships. This goal was achieved through matching children and parents by "intimate traits," such as appearance, intelligence and temperament, in order to replicate signs of biological kinship (Modell 2002:7). Modell writes that it was widely believed in adoption circles that resemblances between the child and adoptive parents would legitimize the ties of kinship, give the impression of an "absolute bond" and ensure that the relationship would be more enduring (2002:6).

In my research on transnational adoption, women used pregnancy metaphors to create fictive kinship ties between themselves and their adopted children. In most instances, it is more difficult when adopting children from overseas than in domestic adoptions to match children and parents by appearance. Therefore, the adoptive mothers I encountered emphasize a spiritual connection rather than a genetic one. Chinese adoption stories are often explained through a narrative describing a red thread pulling from the adoptive mother's heart and connecting to her child in a faraway land. A popular adoption fairy tale published in English, *The Red Thread*, is based on "an ancient Chinese belief that an invisible, unbreakable red thread connects all those who are destined to be together" (Lin 2007:1). Although this red thread is invisible, it is nonetheless depicted in the narrative as "real." Significantly, red, the colour of the thread, is also the colour of blood, so the story symbolically constructs the connection between adoptive mother and child as one of "blood relationship." I maintain that by describing the adoption process in terms of biological links, people believe the relationship will prove to be more legitimate and enduring.

Metaphors of pregnancy were continually used by my participants, so much so that they seemed like scripts. References to pregnancy were so common that I could almost anticipate them in the interviews. Kate stated the pregnancy metaphor very succinctly when relating her adoption story to me. "It's as big and as exciting as if you've got a big belly and in a couple of days you will have a baby. It's the same thing really, just that you got on a plane and travelled for 20 hours instead of 20 hours of labour, you know?" (Kate, May 19, 2009). Examples of pregnancy metaphors in my research include references to the ultrasound photo, metaphorical pregnancy photographs and analogies to a child growing in the heart rather than in the uterus.

Each potential adoptive family, once successfully matched with their child, receives a photo of that child, which is known as the referral photo. The referral photo in the adoption experience is likened to an ultrasound photo and becomes a particularly powerful metaphor for these adoptive parents. Like the ultrasound, the referral photo is carried around in the soon-to-be parents' wallets or taped to the refrigerator. It is the first evidence of the child, and for many women it carries the same significance as an ultrasound photo. My research participant Heather said, "We fell in love right at that moment and I carried her picture with me everywhere" (Heather, August 24, 2009). Barbara echoed Heather's sentiments: "Once you get the pictures it's like, God, you know, you just want it to be that day already" (Barbara, April 14, 2010).

The social and cultural significance of the ultrasound photo, known more colloquially as "baby's first photo,"

has been thoroughly examined in anthropological literature (Adams 1994; Mitchell and Georges 1998). Mitchell and Georges (1998) describe the process of quickening in pregnant women as the moment when a woman first experiences the movement of the fetus and begins to conceptualize the fetus as her child. With the introduction of routine ultrasounds this experience has been transformed into a technological fact. Fetal images display these movements on the screen, and women are now expected to bond with their children at much earlier stages of the pregnancy, long before they actually feel any fetal movement (Mitchell and Georges 1998). Analogously, referral photos sent to adoptive parents when they are matched to their child take on much the same social role as the ultrasound photo. The women with whom I spoke describe these photos as an important benchmark in their adoption experiences, marking the moment when they could see the child's face and imagine this little person in their lives. Many of my participants described receiving the referral photo as the moment when they started to bond with their child: "I guess you sort of attach to a particular child through the photos that they send you" (Cynthia, July 21, 2009).

Metaphorical adoption pregnancy or maternity photographs have become a kind of popular standard in the adoption process. Photos of couples with a beach ball or globe to symbolize their expectant adopted child are used by some couples in place of pregnancy photos.[1] Pregnancy metaphors were also used by my research participants to describe other experiences in their paths to motherhood. For Jane, who had a "failed adoption," receiving the referral photo of a boy she would never bring home was highly detrimental to her well-being. After being matched with her child, she took his documents and medical documentation to her pediatrician. It turned out that this child was "too sick to be adopted." She likened the experience to a late-term miscarriage: "I had no other link to make to lose a child that I never held, was never in my hands but was in our lives in such a significant way, you know?" (Jane, May 5, 2009). Jane emphasized the role of the referral photo in creating a situation in which she felt she had "conceived" and lost a child: "Here we had this picture, this *photo*, then we had a massive shower and we named him" (Jane, May 5, 2009).

The ultrasound metaphor has added significance for those of my participants who had experienced miscarriages in their quest to become mothers and eventually chose to adopt. According to Layne (2003), the role of fetal ultrasounds in creating closer connections between a mother and her child deeply affects mothers who then lose the child, who has already been constructed as "real." She identifies the use of the technology so early in pregnancy as problematic because mothers become emotionally invested in their child. Perhaps, Layne writes, "it would be better psychologically not to determine their pregnancies so early, not to start the construction of fetal personhood until a later date, when the chances of ending up with a take-home baby are significantly greater" (2003:101). For Jane, it seems the metaphor of the ultrasound photo was a way of legitimizing her grief over losing a child, by enabling her to use the language of miscarriage to describe the experience of deciding to abandon the adoption.

For others, constructing their adoption experiences as a metaphorical pregnancy resonates in different ways. A number of my research participants have experienced multiple miscarriages. Liz (2009) was pregnant four times and had lost all four children. Anne (2009) told me she had miscarried three times before coming to the decision to adopt. For these women who had lost several babies, it is easy to imagine how the referral photo was equated to the ultrasound photos they had received several times in pregnancies that had been interrupted. The referral photo allowed these women, in a sense, to pick up where they had left off in their pregnancies, but with the guarantee of actually receiving a child in the end.

Some adoptive mothers tailor their adoption experience to mimic pregnancy as closely as possible. For example, when given the option to choose the sex of the child they plan to adopt, they must choose between three options: 1) boy, 2) girl or 3) boy or girl. Several women selected the third option, stating that "Mother Nature does not dictate whether you get a boy or a girl, so we won't dictate either. So we chose boy *or* girl" (Liz, February 8, 2009). Similarly, Pamela said, "It's almost like giving birth, you can't choose" (Pamela, June 14, 2010).

Another prevalent pregnancy metaphor used widely in the adoption community is the idea of growing a child in one's heart rather than in one's uterus. The notion of "conception in the heart" is also employed by mothers who have children through surrogacy (Ragone 1994). According to this metaphor, a child is still conceived and grown within a woman's body, thus validating her as a mother just like any other. The metaphor of "growing in the heart" was ubiquitous among adoptive mothers in interviews and at adoption events and also appears frequently in adoption memoirs (Canfield et al. 2008; Kitze 2003; Lewis 2000, 2007).

These metaphors of maternity used by my respondents were also used at adoption events and seminars by speakers, organizers and parents alike. Metaphors comparing adoption to pregnancy also make numerous

appearances in North American culture and not only by adoptive mothers. These pregnancy adoption narratives are reinforced in the popular literature on adoption. For example, in children's literature, Carrie Kitze's (2003) book, *I Don't Have Your Eyes*, describes a child who looks different from her mother. Her eyes look different, her skin tone is different and yet they share the same heart. Adoption memoirs are also littered with maternal metaphors. *Chicken Soup for the Adopted Soul* (Canfield et al. 2008) is a collection of heart-felt stories from adoptive parents, which express sentiments such as, "though never connected by an umbilical cord, in the space of a heartbeat, mutual cords of love joined this child and me" (Williams 2008:22). "The love we felt for her was instantaneous, just like parents seeing their newborn baby. The difference was our baby weighed twenty-five pounds and could walk" (23).

Pregnancy metaphors are so prevalent in making sense of the adoption experience that they come up in the everyday language of Canadians who observe adoption in their community but have no personal connection to it. For example, a respondent described a scene at the Toronto International Airport, where she witnessed a group arriving from China with their newly adopted children. She compared the airport full of family members waiting in anticipation for their new niece/nephew/grandchild/cousin to arrive from China and the excitement that ensued around "a bunch of women giving birth at the same time and showing off their new baby for the first time to family members in the waiting room" (Janet, July 5, 2010).

Finally, the concept of adoption as a metaphorical pregnancy is used in the adoption industry to normalize the practice of adoption into mainstream culture. Anchoring adoption in the familiar biological process of pregnancy makes sense as a means to draw more couples to explore adoption as a reproductive option. For example, in *The Complete Book of International Adoption*, a step-by-step guide to international adoption, the author and adoption professional Dawn Davenport (2006) uses pregnancy imagery throughout. In the chapter "Our Version of Labour," written to guide prospective adopters through the paperwork, Davenport compares the difficult process of preparing the appropriate documents needed to adopt a child to "labour." She cautions that the bureaucratic adoption paperwork is arduous and, like labour, "is not for the faint hearted" and "requires a strong constitution" (2006:131). Since adoption referrals can be slow even once all the paperwork is submitted, this book also devotes a chapter to suggesting ways for prospective parents to survive "the wait," which Davenport calls the "pregnancy without the stretch marks" (2006:155).

Transnational adoption has been heavily critiqued in the literature as a practice that both emerges from and reinforces the social and political inequities between the Global North and South.[2] In my research on transnational adoption from China, the metaphorical pregnancy constructed by western adoptive mothers serves to legitimize their status as mothers, but what these pregnancy narratives obscure is just as important as what they highlight. When adoptive mothers metaphorically embody the birth of their adoptive children, this process erases the actual pregnancy experience of a woman in China who carried and gave birth to that child.

In spite of all the ways to build kinship in contemporary society, through remarriage and stepfamilies, surrogacy, fertility treatments, gay and lesbian parenthood and adoption, it seems that biology still remains a privileged way of understanding the family. This finding is consistent with other research on new reproductive technologies and other non-traditional kinship practices. In her research on surrogacy, Helena Ragone (1994) found that women use the embodied metaphor of conceiving a child in one's heart. Another example is Charis Thompson's (2001) ethnography of infertility clinics. She found that there is some flexibility in terms of biological relationships in that specific forms of biology are strategically emphasized, while others are downplayed to solidify the tenuous or strained relationships created in laboratory settings. In these clinics, biological connections are broken down into two parts, the sharing of genes and the sharing of bodily substances, which are selectively accentuated based on "procreative intent" (2001:178). Thompson explains how kinship, in this context, becomes an achieved status. Instead of "being a particular and fixed kind of kin," we must instead "do kinship" and carefully choreograph a set of relations in particular ways (2001:176). These conclusions closely align with the work of Marilyn Strathern (1992) and Judith Modell (2002), who both argue that there is still a strong cultural preference for biologically related kinship. This preference explains why the adoptive mothers I encountered relate their experiences as closely as possible to the biological process of pregnancy in their attempts to create meaningful kinship ties.

My research also highlights how motherhood retains a continued significance in women's identity in contemporary Canada. While many women actively decide not to have children, for those who struggle with infertility, becoming a mother is central to feelings about being a woman. The inability to conceive or give birth to biological children results in a perceived loss of femininity by these women. Therefore, they seek to model

other modes of creating a family, such as adoption, as closely as possible to biological kinship.

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Notes

1 See JeJune 2010.
2 See Anagnost (2000, 2004), Briggs (2003, 2012), Brookfield (2012), Cartwright (2002), Dorow (2002, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2010), Dubinsky (2008, 2010), Eng (2003), Fonseca et al. (2003), Howell (2006, 2009), Hubinette (2006), Johnson (2002, 2004, 2005), Kim (2003), Klein (2000), Leinaweaver (2007), Modell (1999, 2002), Solinger (2001), Strong-Boag (2006) and Volkman et al. (2003a, 2003b).

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Performance Review

Reviewer Brian Batchelor
York University

At the beginning of the solo performance piece, *Hear Me Looking at You*, writer and performer Dara Culhane recounts for the audience the experience of visiting her father, for the last time, in a nursing home for Alzheimer's patients in Dublin, Ireland, in 1992. During a rare moment of lucidity, her father caught her attention while she stood at his bedside and cautioned her: "Don't forgive me." These words, Dara tells us, have haunted her long after he passed away. In *Hear Me Looking at You*, Culhane sets out to deal with and unravel the effects of her father's words by re-examining her memories of her past, her parents' tumultuous marriage and her relationship with her father. This performance might sound at first like a personal indulgence, but it is both broader and subtler than that. By sifting through these memories, Culhane covers a great deal of personal and political territory, all the while painting a portrait of a deeply complex man, questioning an ultimately unknowable past and ruminating on the possibilities and limitations of forgiveness.

Importantly, *Hear Me Looking at You* was devised precisely to facilitate and encourage the author's re-sifting and reconstituting of memories; this performance is a form of imaginative ethnography. Culhane's piece follows the tenets of ethnographic praxis articulated by the Centre for Imaginative Ethnography (CIE), of which Culhane is a founding member, an online gathering space for emergent ethnographic practices, experimental research methodologies and creative and artistic works of expression. The CIE was formed as an answer to Maple Razsa's call for an affirmative anthropology in the face of neoliberal expansion: "an ethnographic contribution to the reimaging of politics, the affirmation of other social and political arrangements, even the affirmation of the *possibility* of alternative arrangements" (2012:35). Its founders are a network of pan-Canadian researchers with shared interests and with a connection to the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Simon Fraser University: Culhane, Denielle Elliott, Magdalena Kazubowski-Houston and Cristina Moretti. In the

CIE, these researchers have formed an online space that celebrates imagination and creativity as key factors in both research and practice, which moves toward an affirmative anthropology by following a "commitment to open-ended inquiry that can embrace risks, challenges to orthodoxy, and unintended outcomes" (Centre 2014). By focusing on the processes, machinations and mediations involved in knowledge production, rather than research results, the CIE works toward the project of what Rasza calls "anthropology at its best: the exploration of ways of being human that are at odds with what appears natural and inevitable from the vantage point of the present" (2012:35). Importantly, performance becomes a frame for thinking about, studying and manifesting an imaginative ethnography. According to the CIE, a performance's focus on "storytelling and the social and political lives of stories, as central communicative action engaged in by embodied and sentient beings," renders it an appropriate tool to build connections between arts and ethnography (Centre 2014). Its website and online digital space, at time of writing, remain (perhaps appropriately) a work in progress.

Examining this performance as a piece of imaginative ethnography, I view *Hear Me Looking at You* as an exemplar of performance as a critically reflexive process of memory-work and storytelling. In an artist talkback, Culhane noted that this performance came about while she was doing archival work on a different subject—her grandmother—while in Ireland. During the course of her research, her father's words, history and letters kept nagging at her. *Hear Me Looking at You* became an unexpected detour from her primary research but also a way to come to terms with events that had a profound effect on the course of her life. In this way, this project operates as a form of what Michael Taussig calls back-looping—the casting of "a backwards glance"—a means of negotiating through representation those moments that "beg for commentary if not judgment" (Taussig 2011:51). Culhane's work here is akin to that of the late solo-performer Spalding Gray, whose own autobiographical monologues aimed to find meaning in life experiences through the performance of expressing them as stories (Schechner 2002). Other scholars have also noted that the autobiographical performances vis-à-vis storytelling can lead to critical self-reflexivity as they allow for reflexive thought about those memories, making connections and bridging gaps between separate stories, representations, performers and audiences (Denzin 2003; Gallagher 2011). For Gray, the act of storytelling surrounding memory is a form of re-membering, of making present that past event. "All memory is a creative

act ... If you have a memory, you're re-creating the original event" (Schechner 2002:165). The past—memory—is (re)activated and (re)performed through the interpretations, recollections and remembering involved in storytelling. *Hear Me Looking at You* is a testament to taking that detour, of casting the backwards glance and of celebrating the imaginative and open-ended nature of research through storytelling, memory-work and alternative imaginings.

Culhane's *Hear Me Looking at You* emerges from this focus on performance, research and storytelling. The performance's first act allows Culhane to recount stories of her unconventional childhood as the product of a tumultuous marriage between her Jewish, activist mother and her Irish father, Gerry, a card-carrying member of the Communist Party. It follows the Culhane family as they move from Canada to California, but spends most of the time dealing with the aftermath and conflicts involved when Gerry drags his family to Ireland. Gerry, Culhane makes clear, has a deep and problematic connection to Ireland. Her grandmother, Gerry's mother, was a Catholic, Irish nationalist belonging to a family fiercely devoted to the creation of an independent Irish republic. Their house was a hub for like-minded citizens before the Easter Rising of 1916 put an end to such a political possibility. At some point, Culhane's grandmother became the subject of a public scandal (she had a relationship with a Protestant) that resulted in her leaving Ireland and living "in exile" in Montreal. Into this environment, Gerry is born and he inherits his mother's Irish republican zeal. It is his dream to return, with family—Culhane, her mother and her sister—in tow to his motherland, and he moves them there in the early 1950s.

The problem, however, is that Gerry's idea of Ireland and its social realities do not match. Culhane adeptly demonstrates this contradiction: she adopts her father's voice and relates the stories and notions Gerry had told her family about the Emerald Isle; she juxtaposes this with her own memories of her family's struggles to settle and to make ends meet once there. Her mother has to return to Canada for lengthy periods to make enough money for the family to survive. With no set place to live, Dara and her sister are sent to boarding schools. Gerry's sense of an Irish *home* remains but an imaginary figuration. As time goes by, the differences between the Ireland experienced and felt by Culhane's increasingly dispersed family and the Ireland conjured up in the dreams and stories of her father become irreconcilable. With the burden of income increasingly falling on Culhane's mother, her parents' marriage comes to seem like a troubling mismatch between drastically different personalities and ideals. Culhane's parents divorce in 1960, and Culhane, at age ten, returns to Montreal with her mother, leaving her father behind in Ireland.

However, the narrative of *Hear Me Looking at You* is less about the mother-father relationship than it is about a father-daughter dynamic, a point that is clarified in the second act. Culhane depicts Gerry at the end of the first act as too proud to give up on his Irish dream, to the detriment of his family; it is because of this stubbornness that he remains largely absent from Culhane's childhood. The second act then deals with the questions posed by the first: how does one forgive someone who places his own ideals and dreams above what is best for his family? How do you reconcile the fact that your own father has chosen to be absent from your life but wishes to remain present? How do you come to terms with your father's

dream—one that has never changed? What did his words, "Don't forgive me," mean? The second act takes place in 2010, when Culhane rereads a trove of letters her father had sent to her between 1960 and 1990, as a tactic to deal with and answer these questions. Indeed, we learn that although he was physically absent while she was growing up, Culhane's father nevertheless remained present in her life through the letters he sent her. This absent presence is made manifest and felt in the performance as Culhane reads from the letters themselves and then scatters them across the stage floor so that Gerry Culhane's words haunt the stage as well. This is an effective tactic, because the material form of the letters, which she kept, makes visible her father's continued need for a relationship and offers a testament to the connection between father and daughter. In fact, Gerry's letters amend and augment our ideas and perceptions of her father, while also reinforcing his stubborn, proud character. It is clear that a deep love for Dara and the need for a father-daughter relationship undergird the intention of these letters. However, we are also unsure, as I imagine Dara remains, of how much of his descriptions of life back in Ireland are truthful or are continued imaginings.

The second act culminates in Culhane recounting the time that she brought her own family to Ireland to visit her father. During this trip, her father proposes to her that she move her family back to his property, that she return to her Irish *home*. During this scene, Dara seemed emotionally affected discussing her realization that her father's dream was both impossible and incompatible with her own social circumstances. It is important to note here that Culhane is not a professional performer; she is not taking on the role of aggrieved daughter and *performing for* us. Instead she is *sharing with* us deeply personal revelations, a fact that makes this autobiographical performance all the more intimate in nature. Indeed, the staging, despite the theatre's black-box architecture, reinforced this performance's intimate atmosphere. The modest set indicates a living room. Two tables with chairs are placed parallel to each other stage left and stage right; on one desk sits a file holder and on the other sits a couple of glasses and a bottle of alcohol. Centre stage lies a rug and behind that a third chair. Rather than mimetically standing in for locations mentioned in the performance, the set instead demarcates the living room as a private space in which familial stories are told and where family politics are enacted. A large screen overhead operates as a scrapbook of sorts, showing Culhane family photos as well as scanned copies of Gerry's letters to his daughter. This admixture—the screen and the set's other elements—compliments the performance's mixing of memories, stories and letters. This is perhaps best illustrated through the aforementioned letters themselves, which began the performance in a box but by the end lay scattered across the stage floor, a messy staging that recalls the complexity of Gerry's nature but also points to the unravelling of memory that this performance both reflects on and enacts.

Culhane's father is perhaps as much a paradox to her, albeit a more familiar one, as he is to the audience. Toward the end of the show, Culhane talks to the audience about the Irish Gaelic word *Uabhar*, used in one of her father's letters to her. *Uabhar*, she tells us, has some 25 different meanings, including pride, arrogance, vainglorious pride, wounded pride, spiritedness ... not to mention loneliness. The letters from Gerry Culhane communicate the multiple meanings of *Uabhar* and,

in this word, we see a connection between Culhane and her father. What emerges from this performance is a recognition, on both our part and on Dara's, that Gerry Culhane is a complex and complicated man, himself haunted by an idea of Ireland instilled in him at an early age, while he lived "in exile." Like *Uabhar*'s many meanings, this performance closes perhaps not with forgiveness or complete understanding but with an unfinished reconciliation. *Hear Me Looking at You* is both the process and the product of how Culhane explores her past, through stories and letters, to work toward not forgiveness but perhaps to an indeterminate understanding of her father.

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Film Review

El Sito del Plomo (The Site of Lead): Social Poisoning
in El Salvador

Film by: Hugo De Burgos
Reviewer: Sam Migliore
Kwantlen Polytechnic University

El Sito del Plomo is an interesting and timely film. Hugo De
Burgos brings together, in a sensitive and thoughtful way, a
variety of ethnographic, scientific and historical data to ad-
dress the tragic circumstances surrounding lead poisoning in
a small community in El Salvador. The community, Sitio del
Niño, was exposed for years to lead contamination from a
nearby car battery recycling plant (La Record). The film docu-
ments the efforts, often unsuccessful, of community members
to have both the contamination and its health effects recog-
nized by the company, local medical professionals and political
leaders. We see and hear individuals affected by lead poisoning
tell their stories, describe the effects of lead poisoning on the
community and struggle with fears about their future well-be-
ing, as well as that of their children. One woman, for example,
discusses her daughter's condition in this way:

> She has problems walking because her bones hurt ...
> she falls down. She has also been afflicted with fa-
> tigue, vomiting, dizziness, headaches ... She had a
> blood test and it showed 33.08 micrograms of lead in
> her blood.

By contrasting these powerful personal statements (and those
of community leaders and activists) with those of company rep-
resentatives, De Burgos provides the viewer with a better un-
derstanding of the serious and complex nature of the situation.

Although the film allows people to speak for themselves,
the sickness narratives and other statements are presented in
such a way that De Burgos is able to subtly address complex
issues of social inequality, social suffering and the biological
and social poisoning of a community—a poisoning that appears
to involve the direct or indirect collusion of industry, health
professionals and the political system. One of the more power-
ful statements linking social suffering and social poisoning ex-
plicitly comes from Dagoberto Gutiérrez, vice-president of Lu-
theran University of El Salvador:

> The poisoning clearly refers to lead. However, there
> is another kind of poisoning, which is the relationship
> between the corporation and the government or the
> relationship between the market and the state. La
> Record's contaminating activities were possible be-
> cause the state was very permissive. This permissive-
> ness coincides with neoliberal philosophy, which es-
> tablishes that the market is the king and the state is
> the subject.

For years, the government favoured economic gain over envi-
ronmental and health concerns. This insight will touch a chord
with people in various parts of the world as they struggle with
similar issues.

The film has the potential of making an excellent contribu-
tion to a variety of anthropology courses (as well as courses in
other disciplines). The film can be used to address issues and
theories concerned with social inequality, political economy
and sickness. It is likely to be of particular interest for medical
anthropology and sociology courses. The film can also be used
to address important issues about the place or position of the
anthropologist in the research process. Near the end of the
film, for example, one woman indicates clearly that she has
high hopes that the film will be effective in letting people
know about their predicament and that those in positions of
power will help the community. The film should provide an ex-
cellent opportunity for classroom discussion of the anthropolo-
gist's responsibilities to the community she or he works with,
what is or is not possible in certain circumstances and how
one might proceed with advocacy. By placing the film on You-
Tube, De Burgos has taken the first step in helping to dissem-
inate information about biological and social poisoning in Sitio
del Niño. I look forward to reading some of his work to get a
better sense of how he is attempting to serve the community.

Review Essay

Commissions as Narratives: A Review Essay

Hedican, Edward J. *Ipperwash: The Tragic Failure of Canada's Aboriginal Policy.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013, 304 pages.

Niezen, Ronald. *Truth and Indignation: Canada's Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Indian Residential Schools.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013, 173 pages.

Reviewer: Gerald P. McKinley
Western University

It goes without saying that as anthropologists we are interested in the study of human subjects and their interactions with each other. We are concerned with the mechanisms through which culture becomes a means of interpreting events for individuals and for communities; how local narratives compete with metanarratives; and how the narrative form can be used to create barriers or expand relationship. Narrative is an obvious focal point for our work because it acts as a gateway for individuals and communities to explain how they experience events, often without us having to experience the event ourselves. Two works that exemplify the use of narrative as a tool within anthropology are Edward J. Hedican's *Ipperwash: The Tragic Failure of Canada's Aboriginal Policy* and Ronal Niezen's *Truth and Indignation: Canada's Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Indian Residential Schools.*

Hedican and Niezen have written about two different inquiries into the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and two different levels of government, the Ipperwash Inquiry and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Hedican has focused on a single event in which Dudley George was killed. Niezen's focus was, at the time of his writing, the ongoing TRC. Hedican's work does not shy away from dealing with the role of racism in the Province of Ontario and its institutions. He allows us to consider how the fiduciary responsibility of the Crown can be problematically unfulfilled because of racism. Hedican spends the first third of the book discussing Aboriginal policy and rights in Canada, focusing on historical and legal developments before exploring the Ipperwash Inquiry and the failure of Canada's Aboriginal policy.

Niezen's work is a reflection on the relationship between Aboriginal people, the Crown, the churches that ran the schools and the symbolic construction of a particular version of that relationship. Niezen's analysis of how public performance of trauma can act to transfer blame from one actor (the Crown) to another (the Church) is interesting and important. He does this by his focus on the role of indignation as a response to the abuse of children at the hands of those whose care they were in (Niezen 2013:16–17). In this way, actors narrate the events they experienced and the audience converts the narrating actor into archetype characters within the structure imposed by the scope of the inquiry. The end result is a powerful force that the Crown uses to shape the direction of the inquiry's narrative.

Common ground can be found in these two books not by considering the inquiry as a hearing, which ends a series of events, but by focusing on the potential effects of the inquiry on ongoing relationships. Hedican reminds his readers that these inquiries are expensive and, taking a "cynical view," do nothing but buy a government more time and perhaps deflect attention away from real problems (Hedican 2013:203). His point is important. Certainly the Ipperwash Inquiry did not make the land claims process more efficient. The Provincial Crown has little authority to make such changes. In addition, as is evident by a lack of real changes, racism continues to be a problem in Canada. The TRC serves the role of collecting important personal narratives, but the focus on trauma circumscribes the finished product. In addition, the narrowed scope of the inquiry limits the legitimacy of anyone coming forward with a claim who did not attend a residential school as defined by the commission.

However, I wish to focus on the construction of narratives, including Hedican's and Niezen's, as it relates to how metanarratives continue to be created about Aboriginal peoples. Two elements of narrative worth considering here are the roles of actors and how actors become characters. The concept of an actor is definable as an agent who acts (Bal 1997:5). That is to say, an actor is any person or thing that causes a change in events within the narrative by his or her actions. Within the study of the two inquiries in question, actors take on several similar and expected forms along with several unexpected forms. Hedican's work not only introduces the actors present on the night that Dudley George was killed by the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) but also establishes the effect that actors in historical and other Aboriginal protests had on the events that occurred in Ipperwash. Where his work is strong is

in showing how the overall program of Aboriginal policy in Canada is built and maintained by the interconnection of events and actors across time and space. Using the Ipperwash Inquiry as a case study, Hedican is working to access how Aboriginal policy became flawed in Canada and considering what, if anything, can be done about it (Hedican 2013:3). He effectively demonstrates that events are not isolated but are part of a larger, ongoing, repeated series of events and policies that are present in the daily lives of Aboriginal people.

Narrative plays a central role in Niezen's work. Broadly speaking, he concerns himself with the processes of identity formation, how we come to understand our concepts of self and other and how we develop our sense of belonging and being (Niezen 2013:20). More specifically, Niezen explores the TRC as a program in narrative construction. "Indignation" forms a persuasive element in the narrative, driven by a variety of actors from across the country linked by the bonds of residential schools. In his work, actors are used to build a sense of indignation and anger; often school survivors are narrating themselves as victimized children or the actor/perpetrator of the offence is claiming it did not happen. Niezen does an excellent job in establishing how the TRC acts as a circumscribing narrative, reifying actors into character roles and building barriers against those who are considered other to the experience of residential schools.

Characters in this context are "anthropomorphic figures" created in a narrative when the actor is described as engaging in action (Bal 1997:114). The dominance of metanarratives, as detailed in these two books, demonstrates why it is important to consider the role of how actors are turned into characters. Indeed, it is necessary to consider the characters as antecedents of the events leading up to the inquiries. Without the creation of the character of "savage" or "Indian," there is arguably no need for a narrative that seeks to "kill the Indian, save the child." Certainly this does not make colonization historically unimportant; instead, it focuses on one of the colonizer's most powerful tools. Similarly, the OPP and Harris government in Ontario are shown by Hedican to have depended upon the characters of "drunken Indian" and "trouble making Indian" to solidify the narrative in support of their actions at Ipperwash. Narratives about Aboriginal peoples in Canada have depended upon a certain amount of recycling of character and narrative archetypes, largely with the purpose of the reification of the colonial control of their lives. This plays a significant role in the scoping and effectiveness of inquiries for correcting wrongs done to Aboriginal communities.

Although Hedican does not focus on narrative, the role of characters in his book is still worth noting. Hedican spends a significant portion of his book focusing on the role of systemic racism in the development and maintenance of the policies and social conditions that contribute to the negative social, economic, political and health outcomes facing Aboriginal people in Canada. He also details how this normalized racism can integrate itself into the policies and practices of police, news media and politicians. Arguably this system is maintained by its dependence on archetypal characters. Premier Mike Harris's reported derogatory comments about the "fucking Indians" depended on a long narrative history where individual Aboriginal people are replaced by portrayals of negative characters (Hedican 2013:162). Similarly, Hedican, using recorded OPP conversations and testimony, provides insight into how racism

is maintained by the dehumanization of Aboriginal people into characters who are narrated as tax-free living, alcoholic "wagon burners" or "wahoos" (Hedican 2013:165–168). The argument Hedican puts forward depends on government policies that cannot exist without racism being maintained using narratives containing these negative character types.

Two uses of characters that are worth considering in Niezen's work are the "survivor" and the "perpetrator," both of which are woven into his book with great skill. Based on the individual work of psychiatrists Henry Krystal and Bruno Bettelheim on the Holocaust, the "survivor" has developed into an important character in multiple metanarratives, including residential school survivors. Niezen does an excellent job in discussing the role of the TRC in circumscribing this character within its mandate, while also detailing the complex internal variability within the role. It is a stark reminder that the Government of Canada still has the ability and desire to control all aspects of Aboriginal people's lives. The second interesting character demonstrates how narrative can be used to transfer blame away from the government and onto others. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of Niezen's work is how the TRC is able to manipulate the historical narrative into one where priests, nuns and teachers are the perpetrators of crimes seemingly unbeknownst to the government. Sadly, we know from government documents that the Crown was well aware of the elevated rates of death and abuse at least as early as the first and second decade of the 20th century.

So why does this matter? Perhaps it is worth considering that this historical record of the TRC will be with Canadians much longer than the financial payout from the settlements. There are benefits to the government in being able to shape the historical narrative. Niezen was faced with the challenge of writing about events that were still taking place. His ability to shape his narrative as something that is flowing and changing works. He has taken an important critical perspective on the TRC rather than simply reporting events. He, like Hedican, uses the inquiry as a means of viewing the actors involved in terms of the interaction between human subjects. His work deals effectively with why the shaping of that interaction matters. It is in the shape of the developing metanarrative that future generations will come to know the official history of residential schools in Canada: who was involved; what they experienced; and what the outcome was.

Hedican's work deals with the important topic of racism and the failure of Canada's Aboriginal policy. His use of the Ipperwash case could have been more effective if he had integrated it earlier into his work. That being said, his work clearly demonstrates how racism, by depending on archetype characters, contributed to the actions of the OPP and Provincial Government in the events that led up to and followed the shooting of Dudley George. In addition, he contributes to the conversation on why Aboriginal policy in Canada is not changing. Together, these two books are examples of how different forms of inquiry will continue to shape Aboriginal policy and our collective memories about events.

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Book Reviews / Comptes rendus

Sophie-Hélène Trigeaud, *Devenir mormon. La fabrication communautaire de l'individu,* Rennes : Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013, 365 pages.

Recenseur : Guillaume Boucher
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Depuis l'ouvrage pionnier d'Hervieu-Léger (1999), le phénomène de l'individualisation du religieux semble avoir marqué au fer rouge les études de la religion et ce, que ce soit en anthropologie ou en sociologie. Nous semblons vivre l'apogée de l'ère du pèlerin, la quête de sens individuelle apparaissant comme le paradigme majeur de la population croyante. Dans un tel contexte, la survivance, voire la croissance de groupes religieux marqués par une forte cohésion dogmatique et collective interpelle l'étudiant du religieux contemporain et l'oblige à se poser des questions de fond. Selon les propres mots de Sophie-Hélène Trigeaud, « le paysage religieux a changé, les modes d'adhésion et de transmission du croire se sont transformés » (27). À travers l'étude de la production de l'individu mormon par sa communauté, la sociologue se propose d'analyser ces transformations.

Constatant que la croissance du mormonisme passe davantage par le recrutement de nouveaux convertis que par la transmission intergénérationnelle, l'auteur étudie les mormons à travers le prisme de la figure pendante à celle du pèlerin : le converti (Hervieu-Léger 1999). À travers cet ouvrage issu de sa thèse de doctorat en sociologie, Trigeaud fait apparaître la conversion comme le mode premier de socialisation des mormons. Le procédé opère tant au niveau du « né-mormon » que chez le membre provenant de l'extérieur, chaque typologie conservant par ailleurs sa part de nuances. Le prosélytisme précédant la conversion est alors mobilisé au profit de la construction de l'identité mormone, qui se révèle à travers les différents rituels auxquels le groupe a recours pour former ses membres.

Pour éclairer la socialisation mormone, Trigeaud recours à deux disciplines, soit la sociologie et l'anthropologie. De la première, l'auteure retient le modèle de transmission tripartite développé par Hervieu-Léger où le prosélytisme fait figure de transmission en extension, où l'éducation est une transmission en intensité et la communauté sert de « structure imaginaire de la continuité » (27). À cette approche de la transmission, l'auteure superpose la théorie des rites de passage de Van Gennep (1960). La naissance ou la conversion font alors office

de séparation, tandis que l'éducation opère comme une marge – ou phase liminaire – menant l'individu vers une aggrégation qui ne sera atteinte qu'une fois celui-ci pleinement reconnu comme membre de la communauté mormone.

Cette même division structure le livre, qui s'articule autour de trois sections, à savoir la conversion, l'éducation et la communauté. La reprise de la double tripartition dans l'écriture produit chez le lecteur l'impression d'emprunter le même chemin que tout sujet mormon en devenir. La religion mormone se dévoile ainsi progressivement, ses codes, croyances, mesures de socialisation et histoire se dévoilant au fil de la lecture, au fur et à mesure que le lecteur progresse dans sa propre intégration à la communauté.

Si la conversion et l'éducation sont présentées comme deux champs distincts de la production de l'individu par la communauté, l'insistance sur le processus de socialisation continue de la vie mormone laisse difficilement entrevoir la spécificité de l'éducation vis-à-vis la conversion. Bien que l'activité prosélyte soit présentée comme la tâche principale des missionnaires, Trigeaud démontre clairement comment la cohérence de la communauté repose sur l'exercice continu du prosélytisme et que cette activité opère à plusieurs niveaux de la vie quotidienne des mormons. Si les missionnaires sont mobilisés pour convertir les gens de l'extérieur, les gens de l'intérieur sont eux constamment mis en contact avec des activités missionnaires de plus faible intensité de la part de membres plus engagés dans la communauté. Différents types de prosélytes s'adressent à différentes cibles – celles-ci couvrant un spectre allant de l'extérieur vers l'intérieur du groupe – créant de la sorte une véritable panoplie d'activités missionnaires dont les objectifs vont de la promotion à la conversion en passant par la ré-affiliation, la conservation et la coordination des membres.

La socialisation religieuse mormone se présente donc comme un effort constant de la part de la communauté envers les individus qui la composent. Le témoignage, principal outil de prosélytisme, est d'ailleurs fortement encadré par le groupe. La mission – celle destinée aux non-membres – est également analysée en tant que jeu élaboré entre la conversion de nouveaux membres et la socialisation des prosélytes eux-mêmes. Période liminaire où les jeunes mormons sont séparés de leur famille et envoyés de par le monde dans des communautés mormones à différents stades de croissance, la mission propose « un certain mode de rapport au monde » (77) et constitue un passage à l'âge adulte reconnu et valorisé comme tel par les mormons.

Bien qu'il souligne également l'encadrement constant des individus par la communauté, le chapitre sur l'éducation a le mérite d'adresser la socialité mormone, particulièrement en ce qui a trait à la jeunesse mormone, la petite enfance des « nés-mormons », la vie estudiantine de la communauté et la production des genres. Cette section démontre comment la vie en milieu mormon – et ce même en contexte états-uniens – est marquée par une religiosité plus forte et prégnante que celle de la société environnante. Il est également démontré que le rôle des femmes, bien que distinct de celui des hommes – tout affecté à la prêtrise – n'est pas perçu comme le produit d'une domination ou d'une violence symbolique, mais bien comme « un élargissement de la sphère féminine » (234) leur offrant la possibilité d'investir des champs de production relevant des possibilités économiques et de la reconnaissance culturelle.

La production de l'individu religieux n'est pas étrangère à l'étude de la religion en modernité avancée. L'idée est également présente dans les études des églises pentecôtistes (Fer 2007) et chez les catholiques charismatiques (Boucher 2013). Bien que Trigeaud insiste sur le particularisme mormon voulant que leur socialisation mène vers une déification de l'individu, son analyse de la négociation entre religion et modernité respecte les schèmes mis de l'avant par les auteurs cités précédemment: si l'individu se voit sommé de s'approprier le religieux, cette appropriation passe d'abord et avant tout par les cadres imposés par le groupe.

Les analyses sociologiques de Trigeaud permettent de relever des informations très pertinentes à la compréhension de la vie religieuse des mormons. Son recours au questionnaire en milieu universitaire mormon permet non seulement d'identifier quels livres religieux ont la préférence de ces étudiants (le Livre de Mormon prime sur l'un ou l'autre des Testaments), mais également leurs projets de vie dans l'Église. Sachant que l'auteure s'est aussi astreinte à l'approche ethnographique – plus particulièrement l'observation directe – nous aurions aimé sentir davantage « les épreuves de l'intensité et de la durée » (29) auxquelles elle s'est soumise. Si la démonstration de l'individualisation du sujet mormon est impeccable, la subjectivation de celui-ci est quelque peu négligée. Il est possible de sentir tout au long de la lecture une tension entre l'envie de mettre à profit l'expérience de la proximité du chercheur et le souci du maintien d'une certaine distance. Malheureusement, cette dernière préoccupation prend le dessus du pavé, nous privant au passage d'un regard plus pénétrant sur l'expérience de terrain de l'auteure. De façon corollaire, l'*expérience* de la vie mormone se fait discrète – ou plutôt uniforme. Peut-être faudrait-il s'attarder ici aux limites posées par le recours au questionnaire. Compte tenu de la rigidité du cadre normatif dépeint par l'auteure, il est possible de s'interroger sur les capacités de l'outil à dépasser la surface du discours institutionnel. Le choix de l'échantillonnage et des foyers d'accueil de l'auteure, « des familles modèles aux yeux de la communauté » (161) pourrait aussi être interrogé. Une attention plus soutenue aux autres catégories de l'univers mormon – les non-membres, les amis, les désaffiliés et les membres moins engagés – aurait peut-être fourni un portrait plus nuancé.

Malgré ces réserves, *Devenir mormon* demeure une étude fouillée et fascinante. Au final, ce livre éclaire un phénomène religieux trop rapidement mis de côté par l'avènement de la modernité avancée, à savoir l'adhésion au groupe par les individus et son importance continue dans la vie religieuse de nos contemporains.

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Gabriel Lefèvre, *Médecine traditionnelle à Madagascar : Les mots-plantes*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2013, 297 pages.

Recenseures : Mylène Mongeon et Julie Laplante
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Dans son livre, Gabriel Lefèvre nous fait part des résultats de son étude sur la médecine traditionnelle à Madagascar, plus particulièrement à Toliara, qui est la ville principale de la région du sud et sud-ouest du pays. Contrairement à ce que le titre de son ouvrage laisse entendre, le concept de « mots-plantes » – bien que présent dans son ouvrage – ne constitue pas l'élément central de son analyse. En fait, Lefèvre s'intéresse plutôt à la médecine traditionnelle à Madagascar, tout en portant une attention particulière à sa dimension linguistique. Plus précisément, l'auteur soutient que les manipulations linguistiques jouent un rôle déterminant dans l'efficacité des pratiques et des remèdes. Son ouvrage est divisé en deux parties principales; soit une partie « statique », dans laquelle il fait une ethnographie des remèdes et des guérisseurs et une partie « dynamique », où il analyse et interprète les transformations des pratiques de soins. Dès les premières pages de son ouvrage, l'auteur explique clairement son positionnement théorique face à la médecine traditionnelle et la biomédecine. D'après lui, il serait inapproprié d'analyser celles-ci en parallèle, ou encore en opposition puisque certains concepts sous-jacents à la médecine traditionnelle ne peuvent être transposés à la biomédecine et vice versa.

Le choix d'utiliser une approche « statique » dans la première partie de l'ouvrage est expliqué par l'auteur par l'assertion qu'elle « répond [...] plus profondément à la conception des acteurs, qui pensent et affirment souvent de manière véhémente qu'ils ont reçu une tradition remontant à la nuit des temps, stable, permanente, et qu'il est de leur devoir de descendants de conserver ce legs des ancêtres. » (31) Il affirme également que son approche correspond à une méthodologie courante en ethnographie, alors qu'il se réfère quasi exclusivement à des ethnographies classiques dont il fait état. Ainsi, dans cette partie, Lefèvre nous propose en premier lieu d'explorer la pharmacopée de Toliara, qu'il entend comme « liste des remèdes » et qui inclut non seulement des végétaux comme

des plantes, des fruits et des bois, mais également certains produits animaliers et objets divers.

La seconde section est annoncée comme situant la médecine traditionnelle entre système et «non-système» mais il ne faut pas s'attendre à ce que l'auteur se situe dans ce débat pourtant central en anthropologie de la santé alors qu'il entame plutôt une discussion entourant les notions de nature et de surnature en anthropologie. On apprend entre autres que selon les Malgaches, la dichotomie entre nature et surnature est inappropriée, puisqu'existent des esprits « physiques » avec lesquels il est tout à fait « naturel » d'interagir. Ensuite, l'auteur examine la notion de maladie telle que conceptualisée dans la médecine traditionnelle à Madagascar et nous présente les différentes classes de thérapeutes traditionnels. Celles-ci incluent les devins-guérisseurs, qui occupent la figure principale dans son ouvrage, les possédés, les femmes accoucheuses et les rebouteux.

En troisième lieu, Lefèvre s'attarde à la logique thérapeutique des pratiques médicales traditionnelles. L'auteur nous parle de la notion malgache *hasy*, qui correspond à la vertu efficace des remèdes, mais qui peut également être utilisée pour qualifier un guérisseur, un destin, etc. Plusieurs éléments, comme l'éloignement géographique, la fraîcheur, et les jeux de mots sont déterminants dans la vertu *hasy* d'un remède. Les jeux de mots, qui fonctionnent ici par analogie, semblent être particulièrement révélateurs puisqu'ils sont présents dans presque tous les aspects de la médecine et des pratiques des thérapeutes. Par rapport aux plantes plus particulièrement, Lefèvre affirme que « c'est le jeu sur les noms des plantes qui assoit la force sacrée du remède » (82) ; d'où le concept de « mots-plantes ». Or, l'utilisation des jeux de mots n'est pas spécifique à la médecine, mais « traverse le "dit" malgache » (92). On les retrouve dans les contes, dans les énigmes, les devinettes, les poèmes, les proverbes, les histoires de vie, les récits d'origine, etc. Les jeux de mots agissent comme des arguments, qui donnent de la force aux récits. Il est clair, d'après les analyses de l'auteur, que les manipulations linguistiques jouent un rôle important dans la société malgache et dans la médecine traditionnelle. Il est aussi clair que l'auteur n'ira pas beaucoup plus loin dans son analyse alors qu'il clôt ce chapitre par une explication des charmes comme actions véritablement symboliques qui plongent le participant dans un bain de "sens" qu'il réduit malheureusement aux cinq organes – et ce sans se préoccuper de toute une littérature récente qui montre leurs rôles beaucoup plus subtils de manière générale (Le Breton 2007), et en particulier dans les pratiques de guérisseurs (Stroeken 2008). Les promesses d'une approche « dynamique » pour interpréter les « transformations des pratiques de soins » (133) nous laisseront aussi sur notre appétit.

Pour étayer son analyse dans la deuxième partie de son ouvrage, l'auteur opte pour la définition de l'évolution culturelle proposée par Malinowski. Il identifie deux types de facteurs : internes et externes. Les facteurs internes de transformations peuvent être liés aux manipulations linguistiques tel que discuté plus tôt. Lefèvre utilise la notion de *poiesis*, qu'il définit comme étant la liberté d'action des devins-guérisseurs, qui leur donne un certain pouvoir créateur. Ensuite, l'auteur s'attarde aux facteurs externes qui influencent les pratiques de soins. Parmi ces derniers, l'on retrouve, d'une part, la biomédecine et d'autre part, les religions. Bien que dans la représentation courante, le monde *gasy* (malgache) semble être complètement autonome, voire opposé au monde *vazaha* (étranger), la réalité du terrain suggère que la médecine traditionnelle (*gasy*) et la biomédecine (*vazaha*) s'influencent mutuellement. D'une part, le gouvernement malgache a, par exemple, incorporé certains éléments de la pharmacopée traditionnelle dans les pratiques biomédicales officielles. D'autre part, Lefèvre note que l'on retrouve certains emprunts à la biomédecine dans la médecine traditionnelle à Madagascar. Par exemple, certains noms de maladie, comme *kansera*, proviennent vraisemblablement de termes biomédicaux, ici le « cancer » (164-165). Ceci démontre également une capacité d'innovation de la médecine traditionnelle puisqu'elle s'adapte à l'apparition de nouvelles maladies et crée de nouveaux remèdes constamment.

Ensuite, l'auteur s'attarde à analyser les influences du christianisme et de l'Islam sur les pratiques médicales traditionnelles, pour s'intéresser ensuite à la « place des guérisseurs dans la société malgache » (187), qui est de plus en plus ambiguë. Cette ambiguïté serait entre autres due aux autorités malgaches qui mettent en valeur la pharmacopée traditionnelle, mais rejettent l'aspect « magique » de la médecine traditionnelle et du même coup, mettent de côté les devins-guérisseurs. Ces derniers étaient autrefois des acteurs politiques importants, mais aujourd'hui, « quand des devins continuent à jouer un rôle auprès de leaders politiques, leur intervention est masquée » (198). Les autorités déploient également des efforts considérables pour démasquer et arrêter les devins-guérisseurs, qu'ils qualifient de « charlatans ». Or, comme le note Lefèvre, le terme français charlatan « désigne ceux qui pratiquent une médecine qui n'est pas reconnue par le pouvoir » (187), ce qui dans le cas de Madagascar semble englober l'ensemble des devins-guérisseurs. La ligne entre les « bons » et les « mauvais » devins-guérisseurs est ainsi très floue. De plus, il est intéressant de constater que la position morale des devins-guérisseurs peut dans certains cas sembler conflictuelle, puisque certains se considèrent à la fois chrétiens et gardiens de la tradition malgache en tant que devins-guérisseurs, tout en reconnaissant que leurs activités sont parfois diaboliques.

La conclusion de l'ouvrage, extrêmement courte (2 pages et demi), nous rappelle les points importants des différents chapitres, mais ne permet pas aux lecteurs d'en saisir le propos dans son ensemble. La conclusion est suivie d'un « corpus » d'une cinquantaine de pages, constitué de textes écrits en malgache accompagnés de leur traduction française, qui, bien que mentionnés brièvement à quelques reprises au cours de l'ouvrage, auraient dû être mieux incorporés dans le corps principal du texte. La méthodologie de l'auteur reste d'ailleurs nébuleuse. Il reprend par exemple, à plusieurs reprises, des passages d'entrevues réalisées par Félix pour étayer son analyse, sans toutefois nous expliquer dans quel contexte ces entrevues ont été conduites, ni spécifier clairement qui est Félix. Lefèvre fait également un usage extensif de la littérature au cours de son ouvrage, mais la grande majorité de ses sources datent des années 1950 à 1990, ne se situant que très superficiellement au cœur des écrits contemporains portant sur des thèmes très connexes (dont Pourchez, 2011, en société malgache). L'apport le plus précieux de ce livre demeure de signaler que les appellations multiples des plantes ne posent non seulement pas forcément problème, mais que le devin-guérisseur en fait un usage efficace dans la guérison en société malgache.

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Recenseuse : Joannie Jean
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Aux prises, à divers degrés, avec la violence d'État, les pays de l'Amérique latine ont connu, depuis les années soixante, de constantes luttes mémorielles, poussant à la fois les habitants de la région et les universitaires à s'interroger sur le sens à donner aux passés dictatoriaux en période de sortie de régimes autoritaires. L'ouvrage d'Alice Verstraeten sort toutefois de cette question mémorielle alors qu'elle appréhende de manière originale le cas particulier des mères de « disparus » en Argentine. En effet, dans *Disparition et témoignage. Réinventer la résistance dans l'Argentine des Mères de la Place de Mai*, l'auteure se concentre sur la résistance des actrices qu'elle étudie aux politiques mémorielles officielles. En soulignant le caractère particulier du travail de revendication effectué par ce regroupement de femmes, Verstraeten met en lumière l'alternative adoptée par ces dernières faces aux inatteignables buts que sont la « vérité complète », la « mémoire intégrale » et la « justice totale ». Dans le cadre de cette recension, nous aborderons l'ouvrage de Verstraeten à partir de trois thématiques qui sont traitées transversalement dans celui-ci : la résistance au silence et à la disparition, la résistance au pardon et à la réconciliation, et finalement la dénonciation théâtralisée de l'impunité dans l'espace public.

La problématique de la « disparition forcée » a été traitée par plusieurs auteurs. Tous s'entendent pour dire que celle-ci doit être comprise comme une expérience limite où le disparu est à la fois présent et absent, vivant et mort[1]. Alors que les corps de proches sont retirés de la société civile, leurs familles leur attribuent une nouvelle identité : celle de « disparus ». En effet, tel que le souligne Verstraeten à la suite d'Agosín (1993), en étant confrontés au phénomène de la disparition forcée, les proches de disparus mettent de l'avant une nouvelle forme de subjectivité politique afin de non seulement expliquer l'absence soudaine d'individus, mais également de dénoncer le silence et le déni maintenu par les administrations à leur sujet. Le témoignage devient donc une forme de résistance, une rupture avec le silence imposé par les militaires pendant la dictature. Le fait de parler devient ici une stratégie de dénonciation,

tout en rendant visible la disparition dans l'espace public. Le témoin apparaît ainsi être selon Verstraeten à la croisée de deux chemins. Effectivement, ce dernier doit choisir entre deux types de violence : soit celle du silence, qui perpétue la violence des bourreaux, ou celle de la dénonciation, qui évoque par le fait même la violence perpétrée par ces derniers. Pour les participants de la recherche de l'auteure, « dire » équivaut à résister à la disparition en redonnant une existence aux « disparus ». De plus, plusieurs décennies après les évènements, « dire » c'est aussi transmettre la lutte contre l'impunité et au même moment lutter pour la vérité et contre l'oubli.

En sortie de régime, les formes de résistance ont évolué afin de s'adapter à la transition vers la démocratie. Or si cette transition s'est opérée, elle n'est pas synonyme de la réapparition « en vie » des « disparus ». À la suite de l'annulation des lois d'amnistie en 1983 de même que la traduction en justice de grandes figures de la dictature, le gouvernement argentin a adopté diverses mesures pour pardonner les bourreaux. Ces mesures, soutient Verstraeten, traduiraient une volonté d'évitement des conflits afin de préserver entre autres l'unité nationale. Cette politique du pardon, qu'elle qualifie de « volontariste », est accompagnée de la définition d'une « vérité historique », d'une « histoire officielle », soit une version du passé où il n'y a pas de place pour la dissension. La résistance des familles de « disparus » viendrait alors de leur capacité à « rester debout » et « entiers » dans leur lutte contre l'impunité en s'organisant collectivement afin de s'opposer aux lois d'amnistie et aux peines « ridicules » données à des criminels. En résistant activement à la politique gouvernementale du pardon dans l'espace public, ces groupes créent une « forme de désordre conscient du social » (113) en faisant réapparaître leur vérité et les conflits qui la sous-tendent.

Pour les « Mères de la Place de Mai », il apparaît rapidement dans l'analyse de Verstraeten qu'il leur fallait trouver un moyen de dénoncer la pratique des disparitions forcées. Elles commencèrent tout d'abord par se réunir deux par deux pour marcher ensemble autour de la Place de Mai. Hautement ritualisée, cette marche, avec la photo de leur « disparu » épinglée sur elles-mêmes et un foulard blanc sur leur tête représentant l'enfantement, leur permet de revendiquer les noms et l'identité de leurs « disparus », les rendant de la sorte présents dans l'espace. Cette présence est alors synonyme de vie pour les acteurs interrogés par Verstraeten. De plus, le fait qu'elles marchent sans cesse de façon circulaire démontre bien métaphoriquement comment leur travail de recherche est sans fin, comment l'impunité est perpétuée dans la société argentine, et ce tout en faisant écho à la non-finitude de leur résistance.

Pour terminer, le livre d'Alice Verstraeten offre une perspective intéressante sur la façon dont les proches de « disparus » ont résisté et résistent encore aujourd'hui aux politiques mémorielles officielles. Si nous pouvons parfois avoir l'impression que les sujets abordés par l'auteure débordent son cadre d'analyse, par exemple lorsqu'elle discute du cas des survivants et les implications psychologiques de leur survie, cet ouvrage constitue un examen pertinent des « Mères de la Place de Mai ». Il montre bien l'évolution de leur résistance, de la dictature à la période post-transitionnelle, et ce bien que le cadre temporel du cas étudié ne soit pas toujours explicite tout au long du livre.

Note

1 Par exemple Agosín (1993), Ballesteros (2007), Taylor (1997) et Jean (2013) pour ne nommer que ces derniers.

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Recenseuse : Marie-Michèle Sauvageau
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Les éditrices de l'ouvrage *Les collectivités locales au cœur de l'intégration des immigrants*, Michèle Vatz Laaroussi, Estelle Bernier et Lucille Guilbert, tentent de déconstruire le mythe de la « tour d'ivoire » universitaire en proposant un ouvrage collectif dont l'un des objectifs principaux est justement d'ouvrir le dialogue entre les chercheurs et les acteurs politiques et communautaires autour d'un sujet qui sied bien à ce genre de démarche : la question de la régionalisation de l'immigration dans le Québec contemporain.

L'ouvrage, divisé en deux parties, aborde d'abord la question des processus mis en jeu par les acteurs immigrants qui s'installent ou vivent dans ce qu'on appelle au Québec « la région ». Ainsi, dans le premier chapitre, on se préoccupe des rapports entre les familles immigrantes et les écoles de la société d'accueil, en se penchant notamment sur les trajectoires des jeunes immigrants. Le deuxième chapitre traite de la question des transitions de vie. On s'intéresse ici plus particulièrement à l'étude du croisement entre trois types de parcours, soit le parcours de formation et d'emploi ; le parcours de mobilité et le parcours de maternité.

La deuxième partie s'intéresse quant à elle aux collectivités locales et aux processus qu'elles mettent en œuvre pour développer leur « capital d'attraction et de rétention des immigrants » (p. 5). Ce capital dynamique et en continuel développement se décline en trois grandes dimensions, soit le capital d'employa-

bilité, les structures de gouvernance et l'ouverture de la collectivité à l'immigration et la diversité. Quatre chapitres viennent ici aborder ces thématiques, soit un chapitre sur le capital socio-économique et d'employabilité de certaines régions ; un chapitre sur le capital sociopolitique à travers l'étude de la gouvernance et des réseaux d'acteurs ; un chapitre sur le capital culturel et linguistique à travers l'étude du rôle des communautés anglophones des régions dans l'intégration des immigrants ; et un chapitre sur le capital d'ouverture des régions à la diversité et à l'immigration. Le chapitre final, plus théorique, tente d'arrimer ces différents types de capital des communautés régionales aux trajectoires des immigrants.

L'originalité de ce travail collectif réside en outre dans la présentation générale des textes. Ainsi, on trouve dans chaque chapitre un ou deux textes d'analyse scientifique autour de l'un des grands thèmes traités dans l'ouvrage, suivi d'un commentaire rédigé par un intervenant « du milieu » qui complète, discute ou prolonge (et malheureusement, critique très peu) les propos et l'analyse à la lumière de sa connaissance du terrain.

Une telle démarche donne ainsi l'occasion d'aborder ou de préciser des éléments de l'analyse qui peuvent parfois sembler incomplets. Ainsi, dans le premier chapitre de l'ouvrage portant sur les trajectoires de jeunes immigrants dans les écoles en région, le texte de Sylvie Guyon, de la Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes immigrantes et réfugiées, nuance de façon tout à fait juste et lucide l'analyse déjà fine de Marilyn Steinback et Sylvain Lussier. Après avoir effectué une étude longitudinale de deux ans avec des adolescents allophones de la région de Sherbrooke, Steinback et Lussier concluent que si la majorité des répondants ont exprimé un désir de se faire des amis québécois, plusieurs ont fait part de difficultés personnelles (la timidité), mais aussi de barrières institutionnelles (les classes d'accueil fermées par exemple) et de situations vécues de discrimination qui les empêcheraient de véritablement établir des interactions sociales avec des jeunes membres de la société d'accueil.

Les constats un peu pessimistes de Steinback et Lussier doivent toutefois être analysés à l'aune de la période de vie qu'ils ont choisi d'analyser en s'intéressant aux jeunes immigrants : l'adolescence. C'est ici que la perspective de Guyon s'avère tout particulièrement utile, alors qu'elle rappelle que les adolescents, de toutes origines et vivant dans toutes les régions, sont généralement plus touchés par le choc culturel et éprouvent souvent plus de difficultés que leurs aînés à nouer des relations amicales avec des pairs, qui sont déjà insérés dans des réseaux établis. Guyon mentionne aussi les difficultés associées à la construction identitaire typique de cette période de la vie.

En fait, à la lecture du texte de Guyon, on se rend compte de l'importance de lier la trajectoire migratoire (ou le parcours de mobilité) non seulement à l'espace, c'est-à-dire au type de milieu (urbain, régional, rural) dans lequel celle-ci se déroule, mais aussi au temps, c'est-à-dire en fonction des différentes périodes de la vie où le parcours de mobilité se déploie. Ainsi, la migration ne sera pas vécue de la même manière à des âges différents ou à des périodes différentes de la vie. C'est à cette dernière question que le texte de Guilbert *et al.* tente tout particulièrement de nous faire réfléchir, en replaçant la migration au cœur des transitions qui surviennent dans les différentes trajectoires de la vie (familiale et professionnelle essentiellement).

Le texte de Guilbert et ses collaboratrices constitue par ailleurs l'un des apports les plus intéressants de ce collectif. On y présente en effet une méthodologie originale, centrée sur le partage de savoirs et d'expériences et basée sur la méthode des récits de vie, dans laquelle les participantes sont aussi co-chercheuses et où, à travers diverses activités, elles sont amenées à développer un regard nouveau sur leurs parcours. Cette méthodologie permet de souligner ce qui rapproche les participantes nées au Québec de celles d'origine immigrante. Par exemple, en réfléchissant aux recoupements entre les parcours de formation et d'emploi et les parcours de mobilité et de maternité, les auteures en viennent à la conclusion que la maternité est vécue par toutes comme un choc, souvent plus grand que celui de la migration. « Un choc qui transforme le rapport au monde : le rapport au corps, au temps, à l'espace, aux réseaux interpersonnels et sociaux, de toute femme, immigrante ou native » (68). L'utilisation de cette méthode en contexte régional permet en outre de comprendre de quelles manières les ressources locales sont utilisées et mobilisées par les participants, à travers leurs différentes sphères de vie et en fonction de leurs besoins.

La deuxième partie, qui porte sur les communautés régionales, fait quant à elle ressortir une conclusion qui semble de plus en plus partagée par les chercheurs qui se sont intéressés à la question de l'influence des structures dans la société d'accueil sur l'intégration des immigrants. Dans un livre primé, Romain Garbaye (2005) souligne l'importance du cadre local d'opportunités politiques, souvent plus influent que le cadre national, dans l'implication politique des citoyens d'origine immigrante dans deux municipalités de la France et une en Grande-Bretagne. Jouant sur des thèmes à portée encore plus large, les auteurs de cette deuxième partie en viennent à une conclusion similaire, à savoir qu'il importe de s'intéresser aux rapports entre acteurs et structures de l'espace local, en tant que « territoire tissé de rapports sociaux et habité d'histoire » (222), pour mieux comprendre les facteurs de succès de l'insertion et de l'intégration des immigrants dans des communautés situées en-dehors des grands centres urbains.

Dans cette partie, nous retiendrons peut-être plus particulièrement les conclusions novatrices et nuancées de Nicole Gallant, Annie Bilodeau et Aline Lechaume, qui comparent les attitudes envers l'immigration et la diversité en région et à Montréal. À la lumière de leurs résultats, les auteurs s'attaquent à l'idée selon laquelle il y aurait corrélation entre le fait de vivre en région et la méfiance à l'égard de l'immigration. Elles démontrent plutôt que c'est l'absence d'exposition à la diversité culturelle (qu'elles définissent comme l'amitié avec des personnes d'origines diverses et les voyages à l'étranger) qui explique ce type d'attitude négative.

Malgré l'intérêt de ses différents chapitres, le principal problème de cet ouvrage réside probablement dans le fait que sa lecture laisse perplexe quant à l'arrimage entre les deux grandes parties. Le chapitre qui clôt l'ouvrage tente de faire des recoupements de nature théorique entre les deux sections, mais on a un peu l'impression que les auteures se sont surtout intéressées à la question des communautés régionales, et on comprend alors difficilement l'apport des textes de la première partie à cet essai théorique.

Alors, qui trop embrasse, mal étreint? Peut-être un peu, mais une telle affirmation ne rendrait sans doute pas justice aux contributions particulièrement intéressantes et stimulantes de cet ouvrage. En effet, même si on aurait aimé voir des liens plus étroits entre les différents propos de ce livre, cela ne gâche en rien les trouvailles méthodologiques de même que les contributions à l'état des connaissances qu'il apporte. Mentionnons simplement qu'une lecture ciblée de certains passages de l'ouvrage sera peut-être plus utile qu'une lecture détaillée et intégrée de chaque partie.

Référence

Garbaye, Romain
    2005   Getting into Local Power. The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and French Cities. Oxford: Blackwell.

Otis Ghislain, dir., *L'adoption coutumière autochtone et les défis du pluralisme juridique*, Québec, Presses de l'Université Laval, 2013, 230 pages.

Recenseur : Florence Dupré
Université Laval

L'adoption coutumière autochtone pose de nombreux défis aux gouvernements nationaux en termes de connaissance et de reconnaissance juridique. Dans le contexte de la remise, en avril 2012, du rapport du Groupe de travail sur l'adoption coutumière en milieu autochtone, puis du dépôt, par le ministre de la Justice du Québec en juin 2012, du *projet de loi 81* proposant de modifier les dispositions du *Code civil* sur l'autorité parentale et l'adoption, la question de l'altérité et du pluralisme juridique caractérisant le territoire du Québec se charge d'une actualité toute particulière. Les demandes de reconnaissance de l'adoption coutumière au Québec et dans d'autres sociétés font l'objet du collectif *L'adoption coutumière autochtone et les défis du pluralisme juridique* dirigé par le professeur Ghislain Otis, titulaire de la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur la diversité juridique et les peuples autochtones à l'Université d'Ottawa.

À la suite des réflexions tenues dans le cadre d'un atelier scientifique organisé en février 2011 à cette université, l'ouvrage rassemble dix textes de chercheurs et d'experts universitaires, juristes et anthropologues, œuvrant avec les communautés autochtones ou pour la protection des droits et libertés de la personne. Il s'articule autour de trois axes principaux : les bases de la définition de l'adoption en droit coutumier autochtone relativement à son acception en droit civil québécois, les fondements et les obstacles juridiques de la demande de reconnaissance de l'adoption coutumière, et les modèles, procédés et modalités de reconnaissance de l'adoption coutumière hors du Québec. Les principaux objectifs de l'ouvrage, que nous verrons pour l'essentiel parfaitement atteints, consistent à identifier les problèmes liés à la méconnaissance des cultures juridiques autochtones parmi les acteurs politiques et juridiques québécois, à contribuer à leur résolution et à favoriser ainsi l'émergence d'un « champ d'étude comparative des droits autochtones et du droit civil au Québec » (Otis, p. 4).

Les bases de la définition de l'adoption coutumière sont traitées sous leurs angles historiques, culturels et sociaux par deux juristes au Nunavik (Mylène Larivière) et parmi les Pre-

mières Nations du Québec (Martine Côté). Carmen Lavallée questionne ensuite la possible émergence d'une interface entre les définitions coutumières et légales de l'adoption. Si l'on aurait parfois souhaité lire des récits d'expérience coutumière plus diversifiés dans leur contenu, associés à une trame historique plus dense permettant de saisir la portée des différentes appropriations coutumières et légales dans les pratiques contemporaines, cette première partie met à la fois en lumière les interactions possibles entre le domaine coutumier et le domaine légal, et la centralité identitaire et culturelle des traditions juridiques. Au terme d'une présentation des traditions juridiques autochtones du Québec qui souligne les difficultés posées par la non-reconnaissance de l'adoption coutumière (Larivière et Côté), le texte de Lavallée milite en faveur d'une plus grande convergence des cultures juridiques dans la perspective de la reconnaissance de l'adoption coutumière, d'une meilleure écoute de la parole des enfants concernés par cette reconnaissance, mais également, et l'idée est centrale, d'une pensée de cette reconnaissance comme pièce d'un mécanisme bien plus vaste déterminant les conditions de vie des enfants autochtones.

La demande de reconnaissance de l'adoption coutumière est abordée relativement à ses fondements, mais également à ses principales limites au regard des normes internationales (Mona Paré), de la *Chartre des droits et libertés de la personne* (Karina Montminy) et du droit constitutionnel canadien (Ghislain Otis). Ces différentes approches font ressortir avec force les tensions qui existent entre les normes juridiques internationales relatives aux droits individuels de l'enfant et les normes relatives aux droits collectifs des peuples autochtones. Elles démontrent dans cette perspective la nécessaire implication des instances autochtones internationales dans le débat sur l'adoption coutumière encore largement dominé par les perspectives du droit de l'enfant (Paré, p. 109), ainsi que les apports – que Karina Montminy montre parfois insoupçonnés – du droit à l'égalité (Paré, p. 118-121) consacré par la *Chartre des droits et libertés...* québécoise dans la reconnaissance légale de l'adoption coutumière au Québec. Cette deuxième partie met également en lumière l'impossibilité et l'illégitimité, pour le Québec comme pour le Canada, de « nier la juridicité de l'adoption coutumière » (Otis, p. 156), et la nécessité consécutive d'engager des négociations d'accords statuant sur la compétence autochtone en matière d'adoption – vecteur le plus légitime, selon le directeur de l'ouvrage, d'un droit protégeant à la fois « l'intérêt de l'enfant, les droits fondamentaux et le particularisme juridique autochtone » (Otis, p. 157).

L'ouvrage aborde en dernière instance un certain nombre d'expériences de reconnaissance de l'adoption coutumière par les autorités fédérales (en vertu de la *Loi sur les Indiens*, Martin Reiher), provinciales (Anne Fournier) et dans les territoires et départements d'outre-mer français où sont mis en place différents types de reconnaissance – de la reconnaissance formelle en Nouvelle-Calédonie à la « tolérance comme fait culturel » (p. 204) et arrangements juridiques à Tahiti et à Mayotte (Gilda Nicolau) – susceptibles de nourrir la réflexion québécoise. L'addenda propose une perspective intéressante du dépôt du rapport du Groupe de travail sur l'adoption coutumière en milieu autochtone puis du *projet de loi 81* en 2012 ; il conclut à une ouverture québécoise au pluralisme limitée, le législateur ne reconnaissant toujours pas, à leur suite, la garde

coutumière, et imposant « certaines contraintes au libre jeu de la coutume autochtone » (Fournier, Otis et Lavallée, p. 230).

Cet ouvrage collectif est de qualité, tant par la pertinence des axes de réflexion complémentaires dégagés pour aborder les questions posées par le pluralisme juridique, que par les avenues diversifiées empruntées pour y répondre. Les textes et les réflexions rassemblés apportent un éclairage à la fois argumenté et accessible aux fondements et aux obstacles de la revendication de reconnaissance de l'adoption coutumière autochtone au Québec. Relativement à la pluridisciplinarité des approches, l'ouvrage s'adresse tout autant à des chercheurs et à des étudiants universitaires en droit et en sciences sociales, qu'à des acteurs gouvernementaux autochtones et non-autochtones. Il démontre avec finesse la nécessité de poursuivre et de développer l'étude des systèmes juridiques autochtones au Québec pour formuler une proposition tierce reconnaissant tout à la fois le droit civil du Québec et du Canada, et les droits autochtones coutumiers.

Alain Beaulieu, Stéphan Gervais et Martin Papillon, dirs., *Les Autochtones et le Québec. Des premiers contacts au Plan Nord*, Montréal : Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 2013, 407 p.

Recenseur : Brieg Capitaine
Université McGill/CADIS-EHESS

Alors même que des programmes et des cours consacrés aux études autochtones se créent dans les différentes institutions québécoises, l'on ne disposait d'aucun manuel. Car, la première impression en feuilletant cet ouvrage cohérent et écrit dans un langage clair, avec un souci pédagogique manifeste, est qu'il constitue un excellent manuel d'introduction aux études autochtones au Québec. Il faut donc d'emblée saluer la parution de cet ouvrage collectif généraliste, exhaustif et d'une grande qualité. Mais celui-ci ne constitue pas seulement une excellente synthèse des différents aspects de la vie sociale des Autochtones au Québec. Il possède une véritable unité d'ensemble, fait rare pour un ouvrage collectif qui rassemble pas moins de dix-huit contributions.

L'unité du livre se situe dans le regard complexe et nuancé que les contributeurs portent sur la relation sociale, politique, juridique, culturelle et historique entre le Québec et les peuples autochtones. Chaque contribution, à des degrés variés, livre ainsi un constat nuancé à mi-chemin entre la critique postcoloniale et la théorie sociale de l'action. Le thème de la « rencontre » historique (section I), culturelle, sociale, économique (section II) et politique et juridique (section III) constitue le fil rouge des contributions et rend bien compte des dynamiques relationnelles à la fois riches et ambivalentes entre le Québec et les Autochtones. S'il ne s'agit pas de mettre en opposition Autochtones et Québécois, comme cela est souvent le cas, mais de faire voir ce qu'il y a de commun (au sens universel) et, si l'on veut, de déconstruire cette opposition. Les contributeurs ne tombent pas pour autant dans l'angélisme en dépouillant ces « rencontres » de tout rapport de domination coloniale. Les auteurs se montrent bien souvent critiques à

l'égard des gouvernements fédéral et québécois, voire pessimistes sur l'avenir de leurs relations et de la capacité de ces nations à vivre ensemble.

La première section rassemble sept contributions. À partir de données archéologiques, Roland Tremblay rend compte de l'épaisseur historique du Québec et montre, contre les préjugés actuels, la complexité et la dynamique socioculturelles des peuples autochtones. Ces préjugés se retrouvent dans les sources documentaires européennes qui constituent le principal matériau pour rendre compte des premiers contacts. Or, comme Peter Cook le note avec justesse, ces sources sont non seulement partiales, mais partielles. La tradition orale comme le propose Sylvie Vincent constitue une autre voie pour appréhender le passé. L'auteur rappelle pourtant la faible légitimité d'une telle source comparativement aux traces écrites dans nos sociétés occidentales. Cette tradition orale cependant se matérialise à travers des techniques, dans des objets qui rappellent les discours, le contexte ou les acteurs comme les colliers de wampum. Jonathan Lainey montre ainsi que si les perles sont au départ des objets de commerce et d'échanges, les Européens ont fabriqué et échangé des colliers pour sceller des accords commerciaux ou politiques. Pourtant, là encore leur valeur est souvent niée. Les premières rencontres sont certes marquées par des alliances politiques et commerciales, toutefois, comme le note Maxime Gohier, ces politiques de médiation et de pacification constituaient pour les Européens un moyen d'asseoir leur domination en démontrant par là leur supériorité et leur capacité à gouverner. Le Canada poussera cette logique de mise sous tutelle à l'extrême avec la création des réserves, analysée par l'historien Alain Beaulieu. L'originalité de sa contribution réside dans la mise en évidence des résistances des communautés du Sud à l'instauration de ce système, figure exemplaire du « régime de réduction » (Simard 2003) bien souvent décrite du point de vue des autorités coloniales et des missionnaires. Enfin, Toby Morantz analyse les conséquences, sur les politiques colonialistes fédérales, de la montée d'une éthique humanitaire après la seconde guerre mondiale à partir des contextes cris et inuits.

Dans la seconde section de l'ouvrage, Claude Gélinas étudie les structures binaires opposant la culture autochtone à la culture dominante. Son texte montre bien comment ces représentations collectives façonnent les rapports sociaux, la dynamique des mouvements politiques et inversement. La linguiste Lynn Drapeau dresse ensuite un état des lieux plutôt pessimiste des langues autochtones au Québec tout en prenant soin de l'insérer dans les dynamiques globales d'effondrement et de préservation des langues minoritaires. Frédéric Laugrand, critique vis-à-vis du terme de spiritualité, propose d'employer le terme de « corporalité » qui semble, selon lui, plus adéquat pour rendre compte du travail incessant de transformation, de redéfinition et d'emprunts opérés par les Autochtones au gré des contacts. En matière de justice, la criminologue Mylène Jaccoud présente les évolutions du champ pénal. Malgré le mouvement de décolonisation à l'oeuvre, le système de justice ne peut, à lui seul, résoudre les problèmes sociaux. Cela reposerait, selon l'auteure, sur une profonde transformation du système d'intervention sociale en transférant le pouvoir et la gestion de ce secteur directement aux communautés. Roderick A. Macdonald s'intéresse au problème de l'autonomie économique des communautés sous l'angle du droit privé et montre comment favoriser l'autonomie et le développement économi-

que à partir d'une refonte du système juridique des réserves. Le phénomène de migration dans les centres urbains constitue également un enjeu contemporain. Carole Lévesque et Édith Cloutier rappellent ainsi à juste titre que si l'intérêt des chercheurs et de l'opinion publique pour ce phénomène social est récent, celui-ci ne l'est pas. Les motivations personnelles de migrations sont multiples et la ville devient le symbole des mobilisations, des rencontres et de la créativité. Le mouvement des centres d'amitiés autochtone et leur dynamisme comme le rappelle les deux auteures y est d'ailleurs pour beaucoup dans la création d'espaces de solidarité hors des réserves.

La troisième partie est consacrée aux rencontres juridiques et politiques. Jean Leclair s'intéresse ainsi aux implications juridiques et politiques de la constitutionnalisation des droits ancestraux. Il révèle notamment à partir d'une analyse du Plan Nord que le Québec continue de nier la portée des droits ancestraux ce qui rend difficile et complexe les relations avec les Autochtones. Daniel Salée pose quant à lui un regard critique sur l'évolution des rapports politiques entre les Autochtones et le Québec depuis la crise politique d'Oka. Le maintien de l'indivisibilité du Québec, le déni de l'existence des Autochtones et la conciliation constituent selon l'auteur les traits principaux qui caractérisent ces rapports politiques. Si le Canada et le gouvernement fédéral portent un lourd fardeau colonial, le Québec rompt-il avec l'héritage colonial? Les récentes ententes participent-elles à redéfinir les rapports coloniaux? Martin Papillon et Audrey Lord, à travers leur analyse de ce qu'il est de bon ton de nommer les « traités modernes », montrent que les objectifs et les attentes des peuples autochtones et du Québec demeurent forts éloignés même si aujourd'hui la norme n'est plus à l'extinction, mais à la suspension. Il reste que ces traités modernes recherchent la certitude, ce qui entretient une certaine méfiance dans les communautés. Pour comprendre ces ententes concernant le partage des ressources, il faut comprendre l'univers de sens qui entoure le territoire, rappelle Colin Scott. L'auteur voit notamment dans l'émergence de la thématique de l'environnement (moins politique que le concept de territoire) comme enjeu des luttes juridiques l'expression de cette nécessité de mettre au centre du partage des ressources les rapports au monde et à la terre spécifiques aux Autochtones. Enfin, à travers son examen de trois projets de gouvernements, Thierry Rodon présente la diversité des projets politiques émanant des négociations tout en notant que celle-ci est moins le produit des structures traditionnelles du pouvoir que le fruit des relations que les peuples autochtones entretiennent avec les gouvernements centraux.

La plupart des contributions s'achèvent par trois mots-clefs qui permettent aux lecteurs peu spécialistes de se familiariser avec le monde des études autochtones et ses expressions vernaculaires. Il est toutefois dommageable pour un ouvrage d'une si grande qualité et d'une pédagogie rare (qui plus est avec une telle visée sociétale) qu'il soit vendu plus de 40 dollars. On regrettera aussi l'absence d'index pour un ouvrage de plus de 400 pages. La volonté affichée de faire de cet ouvrage une synthèse a toutefois pour principal effet de donner au lecteur la sensation d'une distance froide et analytique entre le chercheur et le sujet alors que la plupart des contributeurs, sans explicitement le mentionner, mènent des recherches de terrain avec les communautés. Cette impression d'extériorité aurait pu être comblée en intégrant notamment le discours des acteurs sur eux-mêmes et en montrant comment ceux-ci

composent concrètement avec les rapports sociaux de domination. On notera également l'absence de contribution sur l'art, la littérature ou la poésie qui constituent pourtant depuis plusieurs décennies un espace de rencontre dynamique entre les Autochtones et le Québec. Espérons que cet ouvrage destiné à un public élargi et donnant une vue large, complexe et nuancée des enjeux entourant les relations entre le Québec et les Autochtones sera l'occasion de nouvelles rencontres.

Simon, Scott. 2012. *Sadyaq Balae ! L'autochtonie formosane dans tous ses états.* Collection: Mondes autochtones, Québec : Presses de l'Université Laval. 252p.

Recenseur : Jean Michaud
Université Laval

La situation est familière en Asie : une population aborigène s'est enracinée sur une île, établissant ainsi une unité de lieu favorisant une définition primordialiste de son identité. Cette population s'est laissée du même coup peu d'options pour chercher asile ailleurs (nonobstant le fait singulier que c'est précisément via Taïwan que le peuplement de l'Asie du Sud-Est maritime puis de tout le Pacifique s'est amorcé il y a près de 6000 ans). Ainsi, dans la situation des autochtones taïwanais comme dans plusieurs cas semblables de la région, les questions du pouvoir, de la minorisation, et de la domination se retrouvent intimement liées à la question territoriale. Qu'on songe par exemple aux Aïnu du Japon, aux Punan de Bornéo, aux Cinghalais du Sri Lanka, aux Maori de Nouvelle Zélande, ou aux Javanais. Là bien sûr où la distinction vitale s'est construite, sur les plans politique et économique, entre Javanais et Cinghalais d'une part, et Maori, Punan, Aïnu et autochtones taïwanais d'autre part, fut lorsque les arrivants postérieurs bouleversèrent l'équilibre démographique insulaire au point de reléguer les premiers habitants à la portion congrue.

À Taïwan, au fil des débarquements, les premiers habitants se retrouvèrent ainsi progressivement réduits à un mince 2% de la population nationale (500,000 individus contre 23 millions en 2010), voyant s'étioler d'autant leur influence. S'ensuivit une histoire trop bien connue dont Taïwan n'a pas l'apanage, celle d'aborigènes minorisés et affligés de taux supérieurs de chômage et de maladie, se situant sous la moyenne nationale concernant le niveau d'éducation et l'enrichissement. Sous cet angle, Scott Simon a parfaitement raison de formuler son analyse dans les termes de l'autochtonie telle que comprise dans les grandes instances supranationales.

L'agriculture aurait fait son apparition sur Taïwan il y a 6000 ans concurremment à la présence de groupes austronésiens. L'île connut une longue période d'isolement relatif rythmée par les compétitions intertribales pour le contrôle des ressources. Suivit à partir du 17e siècle une histoire d'occupation progressive (par des colons chinois), d'arraisonnement économique (comptoirs hollandais et espagnols durant les années 1600), de déplacements et de guérilla de résistance face aux Qing chinois (1683 à 1895), et d'occupation musclée (le Japon de 1895 à 1945 puis le Guomindang après 1949). Cette longue séquence mit à mal les populations premières, sans état, dont l'organisation militaire rudimentaire n'a jamais

réussi à préserver les droits ancestraux face à l'occupant. C'est cette histoire de dépossession et, surtout, ses conséquences contemporaines que nous présente Scott Simon, qui fréquente Taïwan depuis longtemps et fonde plus particulièrement son propos sur une recherche conduite entre 2004 et 2008 dans trois villages Sadyaq, un sous-groupe Atayal.

Après avoir campé son projet dans le champ de l'anthropologie politique de l'autochtonie, Simon l'enracine dans le monde océanien, ce qui se défend du point de vue biologique et linguistique mais moins sur le plan historique, pour enchaîner avec une narration de la période contemporaine et ses enjeux identitaires. Il explique la perte de la souveraineté et les difficultés liées à la propriété du sol, montre que le pouvoir autochtone coutumier se conjugue malaisément avec l'administration nationale, expose les questions de développement et de naissance de mouvements sociaux de revendication, détaille un renouveau local amarré à une forme d'ethnogenèse, et clôt son propos sur les expériences actuelles d'arrimage avec des mouvements autochtones internationaux. Aujourd'hui, une revitalisation culturelle est en cours, issue d'une conscientisation endogène soutenue par de nouvelles avenues économiques – notamment le tourisme 'ethnique' – et par la construction de liens opérants avec des communautés d'ailleurs en butte à des défis comparables.

Scott Simon relève efficacement et avec passion le défi de présenter la situation des aborigènes formosans dans ce qui la distingue, mais aussi en soulignant les liens possibles avec la question autochtone à l'échelle planétaire. Il divise explicitement sa conclusion, et cela intrigue, entre une partie scientifique et une partie morale, suggérant ainsi qu'il voit une séparation à laquelle d'autres – on pense à Scheper-Hughes (1995) ou Low et Merry (2010) – n'adhèreraient pas spontanément.

En comparaison avec la situation relativement nette de l'autochtonie formosane, les questions similaires chez les sociétés minorisées situées sur le continent asiatique, ont donné lieu à des chambardements historiques notablement plus touffus et à des itinéraires migratoires d'une complexité qu'historiens et archéologues peinent à décoder. Le foisonnement de la littérature anthropologique sur de telles populations fait foi de cette effervescence. Simon a choisi d'y faire peu référence, préférant utiliser quelques exemples issus du Canada – vraisemblablement en raison du fait que c'est à ce contexte national que la collection 'Mondes autochtones' se consacre en priorité. Pourtant, sur la luxuriante scène régionale, les points de comparaison féconds seraient abondants. Par exemple, dans le nord-est de l'Inde, les *'Seven Sister States'* contiennent de nombreuses populations (au Nagaland, au Mizoram et en Arunachal Pradesh notamment) aux prises avec des enjeux foncièrement analogues à la situation des autochtones de Taïwan. Un travail de même nature serait possible en s'intéressant aux populations Dayak de Bornéo, tant du côté malaisien qu'indonésien. L'étude de la situation des Ifugao, sur les hauteurs de Luzon, pourrait aussi enrichir l'analyse, tout comme celle des soi-disant *Chao Khao* de Thaïlande, sans parler de tous les reliquats *Orang Asli* des hauteurs de Malaisie continentale. En Chine (et par extension au Vietnam et au Laos) la comparaison serait tout aussi fertile mais devrait prendre en compte la singularité des régimes communistes ayant causé, sur les derniers 70 ans, la mise en action d'une conception totalement différente de la notion même d'autochtonie dont, depuis, les politiques des 'nationalités minoritaires' (*shaoshu*

minzu, 少数民族) portent la marque. Haïnan, île voisine de Taïwan et province chinoise, offrirait ainsi un beau terroir comparatif.

Non pas que l'analyse de Scott Simon soit fautive. Mais il me semble qu'elle aurait gagné en richesse avec un effort comparatif sortant du cadre restreint de la seule Taïwan. En guise de liant théorique entre ces situations asiatiques, les thèses polémiques mais stimulantes de Pierre Clastres revisitées par James C. Scott (2009) sur la fuite de l'état, qu'a bien repérées Simon, auraient certainement pu être exploitées davantage. L'intérêt, entre autres, d'une mise en rapport de ce type serait de contribuer à démontrer que la question de l'autochtonie telle que comprise et promue par les instances de type onusien, ne s'enracine pas aussi aisément dans ces situations asiatiques qu'on aime à le croire. Des situations où l'antériorité dans l'appropriation du sol est presque impossible à déterminer, et où les occupations successives et multiples se sont déployées sur la longue durée sans même que, très souvent, l'impact du colonialisme européen n'y ait joué un rôle marquant. Ce qui, au final, suggère qu'une lecture critique de l'acception dominante de la notion d'autochtonie aurait été ici féconde, notamment au profit d'une réflexion plus poussée sur les processus de minorisation.

On regrette l'absence d'index pour une presse universitaire.

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