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Joshua Barker, Tania Li and Gavin Smith

Ethnographic Approaches to the Study of Fear / Approches ethnographiques à l'étude de la peur

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CASCA Keynote Address 2008 / Discours inaugural de la CASCA 2008

Articles

Book Reviews / Comptes rendus

Cover / Couverture

© Clive Shirley / GlobalAware. Riot police attack a protestor in Germany.

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Thematic Section
Ethnographic Approaches to the Study of Fear / Approches ethnographiques à l'étude de la peur

Introduction: Ethnographic Approaches to the Study of Fear

Joshua Barker *University of Toronto*

Like all affects, fear is inherently social and relational. It is social in a variety of respects. First, the original stimulus for a feeling of fear may be something that comes from one's involvement in a social field, such as hearing a story about a crime that took place close to one's home or experiencing a physical threat by a fearsome other. But even when the most immediate stimulus of fear is something internal to the psyche, such as a bad memory or an unconscious thought, the expression of fear—whether spoken or not—and the means by which people seek to address it both involve others.

One of the main social means by which people seek to address fear is through discourse. As Teresa Caldeira (2000:19-101) has shown in her analysis of "talk of crime" in São Paulo, Brazil, discourse provides people with a means of ordering a frightening world and making it more intelligible. Through talk of crime, people learn about who and what they ought to fear and why. For middle-class São Pauleños, it might be *norteños*, people from the north who live in the favelas and are often reputed to be involved in violent crime. For Indonesians living under the early years of Suharto's authoritarian regime, it would more likely be "communists," people whom the state classified as threats to the very fabric of the nation. Communists were associated less with any particular place than with particular institutions, such as the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and labour unions. Discourse addresses fear by making it possible to name certain forms of "otherness"—whether they be a category of person, place, time, institution or practice—as the objects of one's fear and to locate these others within a broader system of meaning. However, for those who are categorized as one of the threatening others and for those who question whether or not they might be, this ordering of the world can itself lead to a great deal of fear (Barker 2001:30-43; Rochijat 1985).

The organizing effects of discourse may be working on more than one level at once. In Caldeira's account of the

talk of crime, for example, she emphasizes that the fear of crime is itself symptomatic of other kinds of fears, which people do not always talk about directly. These fears are related to transformations in São Paulo's economy and the undermining effects these transformations have had on entrenched social hierarchies. As the social distance between classes breaks down, the anxiety felt by members of the middle class about their changing status is manifest not in a discourse about class relations but indirectly in a discourse about crime. James Siegel (1998:4-8) has noted a similar pattern in Indonesia where fears about social revolution and a more general menace came to be displaced onto fears of a certain criminal type, known as the *preman*, who came from the street but was upwardly mobile. More generally, Brian Massumi (1993:12) has argued that fear is so integral to consumer capitalism and so much a part of everyday life that it might be considered to be the affect proper to late capitalism. Appadurai (2006:8) has similarly drawn a connection between what he calls a "fear of small numbers" (such as the fear of minorities, elites, terrorist cells) and deeper anxieties of "incompleteness" linked to globalization and liberal democracy.

In trying to understand the deeper sources of fear, it is important to recognize that fear may be sufficiently repressed that it is not displaced onto other subjects but becomes manifest in a discourse of expressive silences, unfinished sentences, and non-verbal cues (for example Smith, this volume). Whether it occurs verbally or non-verbally, however, discourse can serve to organize and make intelligible fears that are latent, masked or unconscious. This is evident even in cases where the form of intelligibility given to fear is that it is inexpressible or incomprehensible.

The organizing effects of discourse often serve as a prelude to other kinds of responses aimed at addressing the problem of fear. In Indonesia during the early 1980s and again during the mid-1990s, the fear of *preman* provided the prelude to a campaign of "mysterious killings" (*pembunuhan misterius*) in which unidentified paramilitary forces hunted down and murdered recidivists and others considered by the police and the Army to be habitual criminals (Barker 2001; Bourchier 1990; van der Kroef 1985). Such use of a supposedly widespread public fear as a pretext for violent state interventions is not uncommon. It is evident in all the innumerable "wars" on drugs, crime, piracy and terror that have been declared and fought around the world, from New York City to Colombia to South Africa to Afghanistan. Each of these wars has its own particular manner of defining threats and its own techniques and strategies for trying to remove these threats. Some of these techniques and strategies are violent and others are not. Wars on crime in Indonesia have often been violent, but the backdrop to these wars has been a steady expansion of bureaucratic means of social control and surveillance. In the bureaucracy, fear does not lose its force but reactions to it become routinized. In the Indonesian police precinct where I conducted ethnographic research in the mid-1990s, this routinization was evident in the ways that statistics were collected, analyzed and used to generate synoptic charts that identified certain parts of the cityscape, such as churches, market places and bus terminals, or certain elements of the population, such as former members of the PKI, as the loci of threats to public order. The social geography of fear represented in these charts was sometimes used merely to demonstrate to higher ups in the bureaucracy that the local precinct had matters in hand, but the status of particular persons and places in these charts could also serve as the basis for decisions about how frequently an area was patrolled or how a suspect was treated. In these examples, discourses that make fears intelligible are closely entwined with state strategies and techniques aimed at eliminating or managing perceived threats. Discourses about fear incite the state to particular kinds of actions.

The character of state responses to fear may be derived from historical experiences in a given locale or they may be the result of globalizing discourses and practices. Peru's recent efforts to target a resurgent Shining Path undoubtedly draw upon methods used during earlier phases of the conflict, when the Maoist rebel movement was more powerful and was based in a different region of the country. But it is also evident that the panoply of practices involved in counterinsurgency operations and "wars" on drugs and on terror are drawn from a fairly standardized tool kit. Government authorities learn from one another, sometimes explicitly through joint-training initiatives like the School of the Americas (Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation) and exchange programs for military personnel, and sometimes indirectly through media coverage and other forms of reporting. Thus, when one traces the history of state responses to a given set of fears one usually comes across both a local genealogy and a global genealogy for a state's particular responses.

Responses to fear come not just from the state but also from a wide range of societal groups and individuals. The former include non-governmental organizations, such as environmental groups mobilizing to try to prevent the worst effects of climate change, human rights groups seeking to protect citizens from state violence, and women's shelters seeking to protect women from the dangers of

domestic abuse. The latter include the wide range of mental health professionals and traditional healers that help people deal with fear-related ailments such as panic attacks, post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. They also include institutions that use magic, science or religion to address routine fears by making them more intelligible and by providing steps one can take eliminate or mitigate risk. Michael Taussig (1980:143-150), for example, described how Bolivian miners used ritual offerings to appease the spirit of the mines and to address their fears of tunnel collapse, dynamite explosions and the like. Clifford Geertz (1960) showed how, in Java, the *slametan* ritual was a crucial means by which many Javanese confronted the risks to health, well-being and security that came with important shifts in life cycle, place of residence and work. Sometimes one can also ask a specialist to recite certain prayers from the Koran or to give one an amulet that will help ward off certain dangers. Many of these techniques make use of a form of divination that uses numerology to reduce the perceived risk of certain actions—like travelling, getting married, et cetera—by finding the most auspicious time to do them. Nowadays in Java, this kind of risk assessment exists alongside a whole array of more "scientific" methods of risk assessment, like the actuarial models used by the insurance and finance industries. The growing pervasiveness of finance and insurance means that the techniques these industries use for assessing and assigning monetary value to risk will concern everyone. Some have even characterized the coming society as a "risk society" (Beck 1992; Giddens 1999; see also Virilio 1993), where more and more of our social institutions and governmental techniques are designed with the aim of reducing risk.

In many countries, the boundaries between state responses to fear and societal responses to fear are blurred. A mundane example of this blurring is the drill, in which people are asked or obliged by government agencies to perform a sequence of actions to prepare to respond to an impending danger. Well-known examples of these drills were those performed by American school children during the Cold War, when they were taught how they ought to respond in the event of a nuclear war: by getting under their desks, going to a fallout shelter and so on. Similar drills are common today in parts of Indonesia as students are taught how to prepare for a tsunami. More broadly, civil defense of various kinds—militias, paramilitaries, neighbourhood watch programs, vigilante groups, gangs—has, in many contexts, become a key means for people to protect themselves against threats (Barker 2006; Buur and Jensen 2004; Feldman 1991:46-84). Such groups are common in parts of the world where violence is endemic or where the state may be seen as ineffective and where communities take the law into their own hands. These groups may sometimes act relatively independently of the state and can even help to mark out spheres of autonomy where the state has little capacity to exert its authority. But more often they enjoy some degree of training, support and oversight by the state or by particular cliques within the state.

State and societal responses to fear are manifested not just in the realms of discourses and institutions but also in security technologies, architecture and the built environment. In his writings on Los Angeles, Mike Davis (1992:223-263; 1998:359-422) described the "ecology of fear" that led Los Angeles to become one of the most fortified cities in the world. He shows how city planning, architecture and surveillance technologies have been used to keep feared groups, such as African Americans and the homeless, out of the financial core and out of certain neighbourhoods. Indeed, it appears that cities around the world are becoming increasingly fortified and their inhabitants increasingly fearful (Balán 2002; Caldeira 2000:256-296). In some cases, fortifications against feared others extend to national boundaries, like the U.S.-Mexican border or the walled boundary between Israel and the Palestinian territories (Weizman 2007). Technologies do not only address fears of certain kinds of people; they also address fears of accidents, disasters and illness (Massumi 1993).

The discourses, institutions and technologies aimed at addressing fears often have the ironic effect of communicating these fears more widely. Discourses focusing on fear and danger help to organize the world and to locate sources of fear but they also serve to remind people that they ought to be afraid. In Indonesia in the late 1990s, I heard stories about a riot in a nearby town, Tasikmalaya, in which several buildings in the town were destroyed and many people feared there would be widespread violence. The stories I heard all involved roles for the police, the army, the local government, a group of Islamic youth and Chinese businesspeople, but they diverged in their account of whom the targets of the violence had been and what the motive for the riots had been. I noticed that everyone told stories that made it seem that people of their ilk were not among those that had been targetted. In this sense, they told stories that they would find overtly reassuring. But all of these people were aware that theirs was only one version of events and doubts thus crept in. The retelling of their story thus had the ironic effect of reproducing fear, since it served as a reminder of all the unknowns about the case. So even as discourse aims to mitigate fear, it also allows fear to travel and to reproduce. The same is true for many institutionalized responses to fear; they

may serve to redirect fear onto particular subjects but they do not necessarily allay people's fears. The War on Terror might make a person more worried about getting on an airplane with someone who looks like they are from the Middle East, but it does not necessarily make them feel safer from terrorism. Furthermore, responses like the War on Terror or a war on crime always incite more discourse as more boots on the ground yield more criminal and terrorist subjects, more rumours and more stories in the media. As fears become routinized, they "undermine one's confidence in interpreting the world" (Green 1999:59).

The assemblage of discourses, institutions and technologies that shape the social dimensions of fear may sometimes achieve a certain degree of stability and coherence over time. In these cases we might talk about a *culture of fear*.[1] Cultures of fear may be restricted to a particular locality, such as a city or nation-state, but they may also be global in scope. An example of a very longstanding global culture of fear is that of the Cold War, in which the fear of nuclear Armageddon radically reconfigured governments, economies and societies around the world (Masco 2006). In more recent years, we have seen the emergence of at least three distinct global cultures of fear. The first of these was that produced by the 9/11 attacks and the War on Terror. This culture has been characterized by airport security checks, threat level warnings, wars in the Middle East and so on. The second of these was the climate crisis brought on by global warming and a whole array of related and unrelated "natural" disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, the Indian Ocean tsunami and flooding in India.[2] Finally, there is the culture of fear taking shape out of the global financial crisis and what some believe will be one of the worst economic depressions of the past hundred years. In Canada, manufacturing, forestry and oil jobs are disappearing; and in the United States, large corporations are failing, homes are being foreclosed and members of the over-leveraged middle class are being pushed into poverty. In just the past seven or eight years, these three recent global cultures of fear, taken together, have taught many people around the world what it means to fear for their lives, their civil liberties, their future and their livelihoods.

Ethnographic studies of cultures of fear can produce powerful insights into subjectivities, epistemologies, social relations and politics (Das 2000; Douglas 1966; Massumi 1993). An analysis of the War on Terror, for example, can reveal a great deal about American anxieties related to race, globalization and the fragility of civil rights. Studies of fears about climate change can provide the grounds for better understanding the terms in which human–nature relations are being construed, the means by which scientific authority is constructed and challenged, and the differences between environmental movements in various parts of the globe. And, analyses of fears about the financial crisis can shed light on problems of social inequality, popular anxieties about the conditions of late-capitalist accumulation and coping strategies under conditions of economic hardship.

One of the most interesting fields of investigation relating to fear is the study of the role played by a given culture of fear in shoring up a particular political regime or a particular mode of production. The connections between fear and political economy are sometimes relatively easy to trace but sometimes the "real that lurks in the background" (Žižek 1999:204; see also Smith 2006:621-622) is not so readily observable and may only become evident after many years. For example, it has taken decades for scholars of Indonesia to establish the complex interconnections between the regimes of fear cultivated by President Suharto of Indonesia during his 32 years of rule and the Indonesian political economy of this period. But many of the connections are now quite clear. For example, we now know that Suharto's government promoted a fear of communism, a fear of Islam and a fear of crime and that these fears had the effect of weakening opposition while strengthening the Indonesian Armed Forces and the ruling party (Bourchier 1990; Roosa 2006; Sidel 2007). The overwhelming strength of these latter blocs yielded an extremely long-lived political regime. Less directly, but also demonstrably, this regime of fear had the effect of promoting the integration of the Indonesian economy into the global economy. Elements of the Indonesian oligarchy and the Army benefitted greatly from foreign investments in resource extraction, agriculture, telecommunications and industry, and it was an alliance between these elements and foreign capital that pushed for a degree of liberalization of the Indonesian economy (Barker 2008). At the same time, the dominant role of the Armed Forces in the economy helped to raise primitive accumulation, or accumulation by dispossession, to a whole new level as large swathes of land and large quantities of natural resources were taken over using violence or the threat of violence. Fear was thus both a cause (among many) and an effect of this broader political economic transformation.

This volume was conceived at a time when the War on Terror was losing its hold on our political culture and other fears began to vie for our attention. Our aim was not to focus on our own current state of affairs but to gain a critical perspective by looking at cultures of fear in other parts of the world and in other eras. The seven essays in

this volume focus on cultures of fear in Spain, Poland, Mexico, Colombia, Guatemala, Argentina and post-Vietnam America. Needless to say, this long list of countries represents only a small sample of places around the world where fear has been an organizing feature of social and cultural life during the past few decades. Nonetheless, it is a sufficiently broad sample to shed light not only on the specific characteristics and consequences of particular cultures of fear, but also to illustrate the value of various kinds of approaches to studying fear. We hope that the lessons these researchers provide will be of help to ethnographers grappling with emergent cultures of fear around the world and in their own lives.

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Notes

1 Taussig (1987) and Bourgois (1996:34) use the term "culture of terror," and Green (1999) uses the term "culture of fear" to describe a cultural formation produced by conditions of endemic violence. Here I am using the term more broadly to include not just violence but threats of all kinds.

2 On the social construction of "natural" disasters and the way such disasters have been interpreted using New Age religion, see Davis (1998:6-9).

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Introduction : approches ethnographiques à l'étude de la peur

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Traduit de l'anglais par Michel Tanguay, Montréal

Comme tous les affects, la peur est intrinsèquement sociale et relationnelle. Elle est sociale à divers égards. D'abord, le stimulus à l'origine d'un sentiment de peur peut provenir de l'engagement d'une personne dans un domaine social, comme ce qui arrive si l'on entend dire qu'un crime a été commis près de chez soi ou si l'on subit une menace physique de la part d'une personne terrifiante. Mais même quand le stimulus de peur le plus immédiat demeure interne à la psyché, comme un mauvais souvenir ou une pensée inconsciente, l'expression de la peur – verbalisée ou non – et les moyens par lesquels nous essayons d'y faire face passent tous par les autres.

Un des principaux truchements sociaux par lesquels les gens essaient de gérer la peur est le discours. Comme l'a montré Teresa Caldeira (2000:19-101) dans son analyse des « récits de crimes » à São Paulo au Brésil, le discours fournit aux gens un moyen de mettre de l'ordre dans un monde effrayant et de le rendre plus intelligible. Par ces récits de crimes, les gens apprennent ce et qui ils doivent craindre, et pourquoi. Pour les São Pauleños de classe moyenne, ce peut être les *norteños*, ces immigrants du nord qui vivent dans les favelas et sont souvent réputés commettre des crimes violents. Pour les Indonésiens qui vivaient pendant les premières années du régime autoritaire de Suharto, la menace provenait plus probablement des « communistes », que l'État qualifiait de menaces contre le tissu même de la nation. On n'associait pas les communistes à des lieux précis, mais plutôt à des institutions spécifiques, comme le PKI (Parti communiste indonésien) et les syndicats. Le discours prend en charge la peur en ouvrant la possibilité de nommer certaines formes « d'altérité » – qu'il s'agisse de catégories de personnes, de lieux, de temps, d'institutions ou de pratiques – en tant qu'objet des peurs d'un sujet, et pour situer ces « autres » dans un système de signification plus large. Par contre, pour ceux qui se trouvent catégorisés comme les « autres » menaçants, ou pour ceux qui se demandent s'il est possible qu'on les catégorise ainsi, cette façon d'ordonner le

monde peut être la source d'une peur importante (Barker 2001:30-43; Rochijat 1985).

Les effets organisateurs du discours peuvent agir à plus d'un niveau à la fois. Quand Caldeira rend compte des récits de crime, par exemple, elle insiste sur le fait que la peur du crime est en soi symptomatique d'autres genres de peurs, dont les gens, souvent, ne parlent pas directement. Ces peurs sont liées à des transformations dans l'économie de São Paulo et à la capacité de ces transformations de miner les hiérarchies sociales bien établies. À mesure que la distance sociale entre les classes s'amenuise, l'angoisse ressentie par les membres de la classe moyenne quant à leur statut en évolution se manifeste non dans un discours sur les rapports entre les classes mais indirectement dans un discours sur la criminalité. James Siegel (1998:4-8) a relevé un modèle semblable en Indonésie où les peurs liées à une révolution sociale et à une menace plus générale furent reportées sur des peurs relatives à un certain genre de criminel, connu comme le *preman*, qui venait de la rue mais avait la capacité de monter dans l'échelle sociale. De manière plus générale, Brian Massumi (1993:12) a suggéré que la peur fait tellement partie intégrante du capitalisme de consommation et de la vie quotidienne qu'on pourrait la considérer comme l'affect caractéristique du capitalisme tardif. Dans le même registre, Appadurai (2006:8) a tracé un lien entre ce qu'il appelle une « peur des petits nombres » (comme la peur des minorités, des élites, des cellules terroristes) et des angoisses plus profondes liées à des sentiments « d'incomplétude » face à la mondialisation et à la démocratie libérale.

En essayant de comprendre les sources profondes de la peur, il est important de reconnaître qu'il est possible que la peur soit tellement réprimée qu'on ne la déplace plus vers d'autres objets mais qu'on la manifeste plutôt dans un discours de silences expressifs, de phrases non complétées et d'indices non verbaux (voir par exemple Smith, dans le présent volume). Que cette manifestation soit verbale ou non verbale, toutefois, le discours peut servir à organiser et à rendre intelligible des peurs qui sont latentes, masquées ou inconscientes. Cela est évident même dans des cas où la forme d'intelligibilité donnée à la peur révèle qu'elle est indicible ou incompréhensible.

Les effets organisateurs du discours servent souvent de prélude à d'autres genres de réponses destinées à faire face au problème de la peur. En Indonésie, au début des années 1980, puis à nouveau au milieu des années 1990, la peur des *preman* fournit le prélude à une campagne de « mystérieux assassinats » (*pembunuhan misterius*) dans laquelle des forces paramilitaires non identifiées donnaient la chasse et exécutaient des récidivistes et d'autres personnes considérées par la police et l'armée comme des criminels d'habitude (Barker 2001; Bourchier 1990; van der Kroef 1985). Cette façon d'utiliser une peur publique supposément répandue comme prétexte pour des interventions étatiques violentes n'est pas inhabituelle. Elle est évidente dans les innombrables « guerres » à la drogue, au crime, à la piraterie et au terrorisme qui ont été déclarées et menées autour du monde, de New York à la Colombie et de l'Afrique du Sud à l'Afghanistan.

Chacune de ces guerres a sa propre manière de définir les menaces et ses propres techniques et stratégies pour essayer de venir à bout de ces menaces. Certaines de ces techniques et stratégies sont violentes et d'autres ne le sont pas. Les guerres contre le crime en Indonésie ont souvent été violentes mais le fond de scène de ces guerres a pris la forme d'une expansion constante des moyens bureaucratiques de contrôle social et de surveillance. Au sein de la bureaucratie, la peur ne perd pas sa force mais les réactions à la peur deviennent banalisées. Au poste de police où je menais des recherches ethnographiques au milieu des années 1990, ce passage au mode routinier devenait évident par la manière dont on recueillait des statistiques puis on les analysait et les utilisait pour générer des tableaux synoptiques qui identifiaient certains éléments du paysage urbain, comme des églises, des marchés et des gares d'autobus, ou certains éléments de la population, comme des anciens membres du PKI, en tant que foyers de menace pour l'ordre public. La géographie sociale de la peur mise en scène dans ces tableaux était parfois tout simplement utilisée pour démontrer à des personnes plus haut placées dans la bureaucratie que le poste de police local avait les choses bien en mains, mais le statut des personnes et des lieux particuliers dans ces tableaux pouvait aussi servir de base à des décisions relatives à la fréquence des patrouilles dans un secteur ou à la manière de traiter des suspects. Dans ces exemples, des discours qui rendent la peur intelligible sont étroitement entremêlés avec des techniques et stratégies étatiques destinées à éliminer ou à gérer des menaces perçues. Des discours relatifs à la peur poussent l'État en direction de certains types d'actions.

Le caractère des réponses étatiques à la peur peut découler d'expériences historiques pour un lieu donné ou être le résultat de pratiques et de discours en voie de mondialisation. Les récents efforts du Pérou pour cibler le Sentier Lumineux en résurgence s'inspirent sans aucun doute des méthodes utilisées lors des phases préalables du conflit, quand le mouvement rebelle maoïste était plus puissant et implanté dans une autre région du pays. Mais il est aussi évident que la panoplie des pratiques déployées dans les manœuvres anti-insurrectionnelles et les

« guerres » aux drogues et au terrorisme provient d'une boîte à outils relativement standardisée. Les autorités gouvernementales apprennent les unes des autres, parfois de manière explicite par des initiatives conjointes de formation comme l'École des Amériques (Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation /Institut de l'hémisphère occidental pour la sécurité et la coopération) et des programmes d'échange de personnel militaire, et parfois indirectement par le biais de la couverture médiatique et d'autres formes de reportage. De telle sorte que lorsqu'on entreprend de retracer l'histoire des réponses étatiques à un ensemble donné de peurs, on trouve généralement une généalogie locale et une généalogie globale pour les réponses particulières d'un État.

Les réponses à la peur ne proviennent pas seulement de l'État, mais aussi d'un large éventail de groupes sociaux et d'individus. Parmi ceux-là, des organisations non gouvernementales comme les groupes écologistes qui se mobilisent pour essayer de prévenir les pires effets des changements climatiques, les associations pour les droits humains qui cherchent à protéger les citoyens de la violence étatique, et les refuges qui cherchent à mettre les femmes à l'abri de la violence familiale. Parmi les individus réagissant à la peur, il faut compter la grande diversité des professionnels en santé mentale et les guérisseurs traditionnels qui aident les gens à supporter les malaises associés à la peur comme des attaques de panique, l'angoisse et les troubles de stress post-traumatique. On y inclut aussi les institutions qui utilisent la magie, la religion ou la science pour faire face aux peurs coutumières en les rendant plus intelligibles et en proposant des étapes qui permettent d'éliminer ou de tempérer le risque. Michael Taussig (1980:143-150) a par exemple décrit comment les mineurs boliviens apportent des offrandes rituelles pour apaiser l'esprit des mines et faire face à leur peur de l'effondrement des tunnels, des explosions de dynamite, etc. Clifford Geertz (1960) a montré comment, à Java, le rituel du *slametan* est un moyen crucial par lequel de nombreux Javanais affrontent les risques à la santé, au bien-être et à la sécurité qui accompagnent d'importants changements dans le cycle de la vie, et dans les lieux de résidence et de travail. Parfois, on peut aussi demander à un spécialiste de réciter certaines prières du Coran ou de fournir une amulette, et cela contribuera à éloigner certains dangers.

Plusieurs de ces techniques recourent à une forme de divination qui utilise la numérologie pour réduire le risque perçu de certaines actions – comme de partir en voyage, se marier, etc. – en trouvant le moment pour les accomplir sous les meilleurs auspices. Aujourd'hui, à Java, ce genre d'évaluation des risques côtoie tout un éventail de méthodes plus « scientifiques » d'évaluation des risques, comme les modèles actuariels utilisés par l'industrie financière et des assurances. L'omniprésence croissante de la finance et des assurances signifie que les techniques utilisées par ces industries pour évaluer le risque et lui attribuer une valeur monétaire toucheront bientôt tout le monde. Certains sont allés jusqu'à qualifier la société à venir comme « une société du risque » (Beck 1992; Giddens 1999; voir aussi Virilio 1993), où une proportion croissante de nos institutions sociales et de nos techniques de gouvernement sont conçues avec l'objectif de diminuer les risques.

Dans plusieurs pays, la limite entre la réponse étatique à la peur et la réponse sociétale est floue. Un exemple banal de cet espace de confusion est l'exercice militaire, où des organismes gouvernementaux demandent ou imposent à des citoyens d'accomplir une séquence de gestes d'entraînement pour répondre à un danger imminent. Des exemples bien connus de cet entraînement étaient les exercices exécutés par les écoliers nord-américains pendant la guerre froide, où on leur enseignait à réagir en cas d'attaque nucléaire, à se cacher sous leur pupitre, à se rendre aux abris, etc. De tels exercices sont aujourd'hui fréquents en Indonésie quand on enseigne aux étùdiants à se préparer à un tsunami. Dans un sens plus large, les mouvements de protection civile de divers types – milices, paramilitaires, surveillance de quartier, groupes d'autodéfense, gangs – sont devenus dans plusieurs cas, un moyen central pour les citoyens de protection contre les menaces (Barker 2006; Buur et Jensen 2004; Feldman 1991:46-84). De tels groupes sont courants dans des parties du monde où la violence est endémique, où l'État peut être perçu comme inefficace et où les communautés prennent en mains la loi. De tels groupes peuvent parfois agir de manière relativement indépendante de l'État et peuvent même contribuer à définir des sphères où l'État a peu de moyens pour exercer son autorité. Mais, le plus souvent, ils jouissent d'une certaine mesure de formation, de soutien et de supervision de la part de l'État ou de certaines cliques au sein de l'État.

Les réponses étatiques et sociétales à la peur ne se manifestent pas seulement dans les domaines des discours et des institutions, mais aussi dans les technologies de sécurité, l'architecture et l'environnement bâti. Dans ses articles sur Los Angeles, Mike Davis (1992:223-263; 1998:359-422) a décrit une « écologie de la peur » qui a transformé la mégalopole en l'une des villes les plus fortifiées du monde. Il démontre comment on a utilisé l'urbanisme, l'architecture et les technologies de surveillance pour maintenir les groupes redoutés, comme les Noirs-Américains et les sans-abri, hors du cœur financier et de

certains quartiers. De fait, il apparaît que de plus en plus de villes dans le monde deviennent fortifiées tandis que leurs habitants sont marqués par la peur (Balán 2002; Caldeira 2000:256-296). Dans certains cas, on érige des fortifications contre l'étranger redouté qui s'étendent jusqu'aux frontières nationales, comme le long de la frontière entre les États-Unis et le Mexique, ou le mur qui encercle les territoires palestiniens en Israël (Weizman 2007). Les technologies ne répondent pas seulement à la peur à l'égard de certains types de personnes; elles ont aussi affaire à la peur des accidents, des désastres et des maladies (Massumi 1993).

Les discours, les institutions et les technologies destinées à répondre à des peurs ont souvent l'effet paradoxal de contribuer à répandre davantage ces peurs. Les discours qui mettent l'accent sur la peur et le danger aident à organiser le monde et à situer les sources de la peur, mais ils servent aussi à rappeler aux gens qu'ils devraient avoir peur. En Indonésie, à la fin des années 1990, j'ai entendu des récits à propos d'émeutes dans une ville voisine, Tasikmalaya, au cours desquelles plusieurs bâtiments avaient été détruits, et où plusieurs craignaient que se produisent des violences à grande échelle. Tous les récits que j'entendais ménageaient des rôles pour la police, l'armée, le gouvernement local, un groupe de jeunes musulmans, et des hommes d'affaires chinois, mais ils divergeaient quant à savoir qui avaient été les cibles de la violence et quelles avaient été les raisons des émeutes. Je remarquai que tous rapportaient des récits selon lesquels ce n'était pas les gens de leur espèce qui avaient été ciblés par la violence. À cet égard, les histoires qu'ils répétaient étaient particulièrement propres à les rassurer. Mais tous étaient conscients que leur version des événements ne présentait qu'un côté des faits, de sorte qu'elle laissait place au doute. Ainsi, en répétant ces histoires, on produisait l'effet paradoxal de reproduire la peur, puisqu'on rappelait tout ce qui restait inconnu dans la question. Même quand le discours a pour objet de tempérer la peur, il lui permet aussi de circuler et de se reproduire.

La même observation est vraie de plusieurs réponses institutionnelles à la peur. Elles peuvent servir à reporter la peur vers des sujets particuliers, mais elles n'allègent pas nécessairement les peurs des gens. Dans la foulée de la guerre au terrorisme, certains peuvent vivre de l'inquiétude du fait de monter dans un avion avec d'autres passagers qui semblent provenir du Moyen-Orient, sans pour autant que ces mécanismes contribuent à améliorer leur sentiment de sécurité. De plus, des réponses comme la guerre au terrorisme ou la guerre au crime constituent une incitation à toujours davantage de discours, puisque la présence de plus de forces armées sur le terrain soulève l'intérêt pour plus d'histoires de crime et de terrorisme, plus de rumeurs et plus de récits dans les médias. Plus les peurs sont banalisées, « plus elles minent la confiance que peut avoir quelqu'un dans ses moyens d'interpréter le monde » (Green 1999:59).

Il arrive que l'assemblage des discours, des institutions et des technologies qui façonnent les dimensions sociales de la peur atteigne un certain degré de stabilité et de cohérence avec le temps. Dans de tels cas, on peut parler d'une *culture de la peur*[1]. Des cultures de la peur peuvent être restreintes à une localité particulière, comme une cité ou un État-nation, mais elles peuvent aussi être de portée globale. Un exemple de culture de la peur globalisée étendue dans le temps nous est fourni par la guerre froide, au cours de laquelle la peur d'un Armagédon nucléaire a reconfiguré de manière radicale des gouvernements, des économies et des sociétés partout dans le monde (Masco 2006). Plus récemment, nous avons assisté à l'émergence d'au moins trois cultures globalisées de la peur distinctes. La première d'entre elles a été provoquée par les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 et la *guerre au terrorisme*. Cette culture s'est caractérisée par les contrôles de sécurité dans les aéroports, la publication d'avertissements sur les niveaux de menace, les guerres au Moyen-Orient, etc. La deuxième de ces cultures de la peur vient de la crise climatique associée au réchauffement global et une série de catastrophes « naturelles » qui y sont liées ou pas, tels que l'ouragan Katrina, le tsunami de l'Océan Indien et les inondations en Inde[2]. Finalement, une culture de la peur est en train de prendre forme autour de la crise financière mondiale et de ce qui, selon certains, sera la pire crise économique des cent dernières années. Au Canada les emplois disparaissent dans les secteurs manufacturier, forestier et pétrolier; aux États-Unis, de grandes sociétés font faillite, des maisons sont saisies et des familles de la classe moyenne surendettées sont poussées vers la pauvreté. Au cours des sept à huit dernières années, ces trois cultures globales de la peur, conjuguées, ont enseigné à beaucoup de gens, partout dans le monde, à craindre pour leur vie, leurs libertés civiques, leur avenir et leur gagne-pain.

Les études ethnographiques des cultures de la peur peuvent produire de puissantes intuitions relatives aux subjectivités, aux épistémologies, aux relations sociales et politiques (Das 2000; Douglas 1966; Massumi 1993). Une analyse de la *guerre au terrorisme*, par exemple, peut nous révéler beaucoup de choses sur les angoisses des Américains relativement aux races, à la mondialisation et à la fragilité des droits de la personne. Des études sur les peurs liées au changement climatique peuvent fournir des assises pour mieux comprendre les termes de l'interpré-

tation des relations homme-nature, les moyens par lesquelles l'autorité scientifique se construit ou est contestée, et les différences entre les mouvements environnementaux dans différentes parties du monde. Enfin, des analyses des peurs liées à la crise financière peuvent nous éclairer sur des problèmes d'inégalité sociale, sur les angoisses populaires relatives aux conditions d'accumulation du capitalisme tardif et sur les stratégies d'adaptation face à des conditions économiques difficiles.

Un des domaines de recherche les plus intéressants relativement à la peur est l'étude du rôle joué par une culture de la peur donnée dans l'appui que celle-ci peut apporter à un régime politique particulier ou à un mode de production. Les rapports entre la peur et l'économie politique sont parfois relativement faciles à établir, mais parfois, « la réalité qui se tapit dans le contexte » (Žižek 1999:204; voir aussi Smith 2006:621-622) n'est pas si directement observable et peut parfois exiger des années avant de devenir évidente. Par exemple, il a fallu des années aux spécialistes de l'Indonésie pour décrypter les interconnexions complexes entre les régimes de peur cultivés par le président indonésien Suharto durant ses 32 ans de pouvoir, et l'économie politique de cette époque. Mais beaucoup de ces liens sont aujourd'hui bien clairs. Par exemple, nous savons que le gouvernement de Suharto propageait la peur du communisme, la peur de l'Islam et la peur du crime, et que ces peurs avaient pour effet d'affaiblir l'opposition tout en renforçant les forces armées indonésiennes et le parti au pouvoir (Bourchier 1990; Roosa 2006; Sidel 2007).

La puissance écrasante de ces blocs s'est traduite dans un régime politique d'une longévité exceptionnelle. De façon moins directe, mais aussi démontrable, ce régime de peur a eu pour effet de promouvoir l'intégration de l'économie indonésienne dans l'économie mondiale. Des éléments de l'oligarchie indonésienne et de l'armée ont tiré d'immenses bénéfices des investissements étrangers dans l'extraction des ressources, l'agriculture, les télécommunications et l'industrie, et c'est une alliance entre ces éléments et le capital étranger qui a créé la pression en faveur d'un certain degré de libéralisation de l'économie indonésienne (Barker 2008). En même temps, le rôle dominant des forces armées dans l'économie a contribué à pousser l'accumulation primitive, ou l'accumulation par dépossession, jusqu'à un niveau encore jamais vu, alors que des associés du régime s'appropriaient de vastes étendues de terrain et de grandes quantités de ressources naturelles en utilisant la violence ou la menace. Ainsi, la peur se trouvait être une cause (chez plusieurs) et un effet de cette transformation économique plus large.

Le présent volume a été conçu à une époque où la *guerre au terrorisme* commençait à perdre de sa prégnance sur notre culture politique et où d'autres peurs commençaient à rivaliser pour notre attention. Notre objectif n'était pas de nous concentrer sur l'état actuel de nos affaires, mais de gagner une perspective critique en nous intéressant à des cultures de la peur dans d'autres régions du monde et à d'autres époques. Les sept articles proposés dans ce volume s'intéressent à des cultures de la peur en Espagne, en Pologne, au Mexique, en Colombie, au Guatemala, en Argentine et aux États-Unis après la guerre du Vietnam. Inutile de dire que cette longue liste de pays représente seulement un petit échantillon des endroits du monde où la peur a joué un rôle organisateur de la vie sociale et culturelle au cours des dernières décennies. L'échantillon est assez large, toutefois, pour jeter un éclairage non seulement sur les caractéristiques et conséquences spécifiques de cultures de la peur particulières, mais aussi pour illustrer la valeur de diverses approches à l'étude de la peur. Nous espérons que les leçons que nous fournissent ces auteurs seront utiles aux ethnographes aux prises avec des cultures de la peur en émergence autour du monde et dans leur propre vie.

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Notes

1 Taussig (1987) et Bourgois (1996:34) utilisent le terme « culture de la terreur » et Green (1999) emploie le terme « culture de la peur » pour décrire une formation culturelle produite par des conditions de violence endémique. Ici j'emploie le terme dans un sens plus large pour inclure non seulement la violence mais des menaces de tous genres.

2 Pour lire sur la construction sociale des désastres « naturels » et sur l'interprétation de ces désastres par la grille des religions du Nouvel Âge, voir Davis (1998:6-9).

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Formal Culture, Practical Sense and the Structures of Fear in Spain

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Abstract: In this article I seek to understand how social memory and fear conjoin at various levels in Spain from the period of the Transition following Franco's death in 1975, to the passing of a Law of Historical Memory in 2007. I argue that the ways in which formal culture in the public sphere interacts with the practical sense of everyday life produces a kind of social regulation appropriate to liberal democracy. I employ two features of Raymond Williams' use of the notion "structure of feeling" to elucidate how this occurs. Formal culture can be understood as the product of a self-conscious program that seeks to produce a coherent "quality of social experience...which gives the sense of a period." By contrast a particular feature of practical sense, that it does "not have to await definition, classification...before [it] exert[s] palpable pressure...on experience and action" provides the possibility to regulate democratic sovereignty by keeping ordinary people's "dangerous" memories fragmented on the threshold of attaining social definition.

Keywords: fear, social memory, Spanish Transition, repression, Raymond Williams, structure of feeling

Résumé : Dans cet article, j'essaie de comprendre comment la mémoire sociale et la peur se conjuguent à divers niveaux en Espagne entre la période de transition suivant la mort de Franco en 1975 et l'adoption d'une Loi sur la Mémoire historique en 2007. Je soutiens que la manière dont la culture formelle dans la sphère publique interagit avec le sens pratique de la vie quotidienne produit une sorte de régulation sociale appropriée à la démocratie libérale. J'emploie deux aspects de l'utilisation que fait Raymond Williams de la notion de « structure des sensibilités » pour élucider comment cela se produit. On peut comprendre la culture formelle comme le produit d'un programme délibéré qui cherche à produire « une qualité [cohérente] de l'expérience sociale [...] qui fournit une prise sur "l'air du temps" ». Par contraste, un caractère particulier du sens pratique, à savoir « qu'il n'a pas besoin d'attendre une définition, une classification [...] avant d'exercer des pressions palpables [...] sur l'expérience et l'action » ouvre la possibilité d'exercer un rôle régulateur de la souveraineté démocratique en maintenant fragmentés les souvenirs « dangereux » des gens ordinaires, sur le point d'atteindre une définition sociale.

Mots-clés : peur, mémoire sociale, transition en Espagne, répression, Raymond Williams, structure des sensibilités

Most of us are quite familiar with liberal discussions of the use of fear and the suppression of social memory in regimes such as Hitler's, Stalin's or Mao's. The implicit contrast is with liberal democratic regimes where fear plays no part in governance and social memory is free to develop in the fertile soil of "democracy." If we reject this Manichaean imagery, however, we are obliged to think more carefully about the role of fears and memories in the regulation of liberal democratic societies as well as their potential for querying such regulation. In this paper I take the period leading up to the passing of Spain's Law of Historical Memory in October 2007 as a filter through which to explore these issues.[1] It may be argued that such a law is a peculiar product of Spain's recent history: the death of a dictator, the Transition that followed and the particular tensions and debates that resulted therefrom. And I would not deny the specificity of the Spanish case. But my argument will be that flows and flexibilities of liberal and social democracies have become so normalized that it is hard to find a lens that would highlight the ways in which fears and memories play their part; the law can serve as a kind of dam, slowing the ebbs and flows for better inspection.

Historical memory and fear conjoin at various levels in modern Spain. There is a dialectic in which public discussions of appropriate *national memory* and *everyday evocations of past fears* shape one another. The character of national memory and its need to be coded in law has a great deal to do with the way in which everyday memories and fears are *named* in public discourse on the one hand—government statements, newspaper editorials, television programs, films et cetera—and *experienced* in specific settings in their infinite variety on the other—as restraint, obtuseness, unvoiced emotion, anxiety, insecurity and so on. And the ways in which these contextualized memories are articulated, or communicated—or not—are, in turn, a function of the broader public discourse. So there is an articulation between what I call *formal culture*

produced by institutions of cultural production and *practical sense* emergent from people's everyday lives (Smith 2004a).

Constrained by length and to a certain extent by the rapid movement of events in Spain, this paper does not purport to be a comprehensive account of this complex political landscape (see Fernández de Mata 2007; Ruiz Torres 2007). Rather my purpose is to explore the extent to which Raymond Williams' notion "structure of feeling" might throw light on the way in which formal culture and practical sense interact to shape fears and memories at different levels of a liberal democratic social formation.

At the risk of simplification we might think of the pursuit of national historical memory as an (albeit perpetually failing) attempt to produce an integral "spirit of the age," a broadly agreed-upon frame within which intercommunicative practices can blossom, thereby producing "democracy."[2] Williams tried to capture something of this kind in his use of the expression *structure of feeling*. In this case, we appear to be speaking of a quite programmatic attempt to produce an integral national sentiment, yet Williams was especially concerned with the way in which the structures of feeling of an epoch were emergent and unnamed. Indeed, along a rather different dimension, he used the term for a much more methodological consideration. He wished to evoke that moment when a pattern of experience has not (yet?) been named. This was not just the problem of how we think of an experience for which we have no name, or for which we feel no existing words apply; for Williams it is also a methodological problem for the student of culture, insofar as they enter experience post hoc through the filter of its name. I wish to use this second dimension of Williams' term then, to throw light on the other end of the articulated process I have referred to above—practical sense. There I have spoken of experience that is problematically given social recognition and, remaining on the edge of being named, is thereby restricted in terms of intercommunicative practice. Placing myself as the student of culture to whom Williams implicitly refers, I will begin by narrating my own perception of these instances, the one at the level of the formal production of culture and the other at the level of everyday practices.

In mid-2006 a journalist, writing a comment column in a national newspaper, *El Pais*, remarked, "the [Civil] War continues and its conclusion is uncertain." From the moment the conservative Partido Popular (PP) fell from power to be replaced by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), following the Madrid bombing of March 2004, disputes in the public arena over Spain's recent past had become increasingly acrimonious. The new government's attempts to open up a dialogue with Basque nationalists were at first so promising that the PP could only respond by accusing the Prime Minister, Zapatero, of cowardice—for withdrawing from Iraq and for talking to terrorists. The PP campaign found little public sympathy until the party turned to an entirely new strategy. They began to mobilize the "victims of terrorism," largely the families of those killed by ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*: Homeland and Freedom). By employing the term "victim" and suggesting that it was the PSOE who were showing no respect for them, the PP was attempting to reverse a public discussion in which, while in power, they had sought to invoke a balance between the victims of Franco's repression and those who had "died for God and country" fighting for the Nationalists in the Civil War—the victors in other words.

So incensed was Jesús de Polanco, the owner of the liberal newspaper *El Pais*, by this conduct that he publicly accused the PP of intentionally using people's sense of victimhood to stir up the divisions and hatred of the Franco era. The PP responded by banning all party members from giving interviews to any parts of de Polanco's media empire. This was no small move, since it essentially divided the media into those to whom the PP would or would not speak. De Polanco, Spain's fifth wealthiest businessman after all, owned as much as 30% of the Spanish media industry, from newspapers, to television stations to publishing houses. It was in reference to these kinds of face-offs that the journalist remarked that the Civil War was not over.

It had not always been thus since Franco's death in 1975, and I want to turn for a moment to the other end of the spectrum I have alluded to, away from what I have called formal culture, to the arena of practical sense in a small town in southern Valencia, Spain. One day a few months after the PP had formed their first government, having defeated the Socialists, the Spanish anthropologist Susana Narotzky and I were talking with three women and a man in a day labourers' neighbourhood. All of them had been secret members of the Socialist Party throughout the Franco period. As we talked, each of us becoming more absorbed, I think, in the emotions stirred up by going back over quite fearful life histories, and all of us too, I would say, sharing a sense that we were doing something slightly illicit, a silence suddenly fell, as though an angel had passed, as my mother would have said. We all looked at each other. Nobody quite knew how to move on. Then one woman laughed a little nervously. "Ah well," she said, "we'll all be back in jail soon anyway," and the others laughed too. The man said, "it's as though we have been out in the school yard. It won't be long now before they ring the bell and call us all back inside again."

For me as I sat in that house with the old people, I think I interpreted their fear more as a sign of how deeply Franco's terror had affected their lives. I'm not sure how much I felt that their fear that they may find themselves back in jail was a realistic assessment. But something else happens when we place it in the context—not of the past—but of the contemporary discourse of formal culture. I have not spoken to those people since 2004, but the journalist's remark that the Civil War continues and its conclusion remains uncertain takes on a much more ominous sense seen from the perspective of that neighbourhood in southeastern Spain. I have no doubt that within the field of journalistic thrust and counter-thrust, the remark may be more rhetorical than anything else. But seen from the perspective of the people who felt a silence pass, it is likely to induce quite different feelings and assessments of the present.

So before returning to southern Valencia, I want to describe this broader setting—the discursive conduct of public politics whose *effect* is the constitution of a kind of formal political culture, almost a kind of emergent, taken for-granted atmosphere within which political possibilities are discussed. This is certainly one sense of the way in which Williams used the notion of a structure of feeling. He was constantly urged to relate what he meant to a more complex heterogeneity arising from different class consciousnesses. But he always resisted this and insisted that, in given eras, there was a set of relevances shared—albeit unevenly and in highly complex ways—across all members of a social formation.

> What we are defining is a particular quality of social experience and relationship, historically distinct from other particular qualities, which gives the sense of a generation or a period. The relationship between this quality and the other specifying historical marks...[such as] the changing social and economic relations between and within classes, are an open question...At the same time [what we are referring to here is] taken as *social* experience, rather than as "personal" experience. [Williams 1997:131]

The events following the 2004 elections can be seen as the final moment of the *pacto de silencio* (pact of silence) produced by the Transition (always referred to with a capital T). The Spanish Civil War ran from 1936-39. It was the result of a failed coup d'état by Franco's Nationalists against the democratic government of the Republic and, after Franco's total victory, there followed 20 years during which it is estimated that as many as 100,000 people were disappeared (Richards 1998) in a crusade [*sic*] that Franco described in terms of a redemptive cleansing of the body of Spain from the Red sickness. Although the last 15 years of the dictator's rule saw a change in policy, the fact remains that the last anarchist was garrotted as late as 1974, a year before the Caudillo's death. It was the period following his death that is referred to as the Transition. During the 12 years of PSOE government that followed and on into the first years of the PP government that replaced it, up to the turn of the century in fact, the pact of silence was maintained at the level of formal culture.

On its return to power with an increased majority in 2000, the PP shifted away from its previous careful obtuseness about its links to the Franco regime and began increasingly to present itself as the party representing the values of integral Spain, a kind of nationalism that configured any variation on what the national (and class) project would be not just as anti-Spanish, but as a threat to the very essence of the body of Spain—a discourse entirely consistent with that of Franco's *Movimiento*.[3] This position in turn gave rise to a heterogeneous series of initiatives by small groups of people connected to those who had been victims of Franco's repression in the Civil War and afterwards to open up the mass graves of those summarily executed by the Movimiento. Starting in the small community of Vilafranca del Bierzo, within a couple of years these initiatives had become something the government could no longer control.[4] These events gave the lie to prevailing expert opinions regarding Spain's peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy. Political elites and scholars in Spain and public figures in the European community had generally agreed that the managed amnesia of the so-called pact of silence engineered by Franco's technocrats after 1975 had been a huge success, insofar as, supposedly, the entire Spanish population had signed on to the pact. Yet now it was evidently falling apart. And newspapers, books, television and films soon took up the hew and cry.

This entry onto the public stage of "historical memory" exemplified by a media frenzy has been periodized by a number of "historians of the present" (Arostegui and Godicheau 2006), and strongly criticized for its sensationalism, inaccuracies and partisanship (Juliá 2006). But both the periodizations and the criticisms tend to discuss social memory since 1975 only at the level of formal culture, implying that grassroots experiences simply shadow those developments.

When I had been working in rural Spain during the first of these periods, described by Juliá (2006:68) in the following terms, "the recent past was absolutely absent from Spanish public life during the Transition and in the eighties," I had been struck not just by this absence, but

by a similar reluctance to engage with the past among the people I was living with. By contrast, one could hardly have said the same thing about the level of formal culture that followed from 2000 to the fall of the government in 2004. Superficially Sunday supplement magazine series, television documentaries and movie features, all appeared to be *debating* Spain's recent history. Yet, like flies buzzing round a cow-pat, every program, photo-series and documentary refused to settle on anything decisive. The effect of the debates at this stage was to produce a quite well packaged account, one which—albeit obscured by the talking heads who appeared to be opening up the closed doors of history—was notable for its continuity with the Franco regime. The Republic and attempts to defend it during the Civil War were uniformly painted as Spain's inevitable and repeated descent into chaos and fratricidal killing, while the role of the army perpetuating the violence of the war years and of the Church in its enthusiastic and vicious destruction of the personas and families of Republican supporters were avoided as though circling dangerous bulls.

The point of relating the details of these events at the national level is to note the particular way in which they play upon and effectively produce a pervasive sense of fear thereby confounding the emergence of a kind of political agency that would lead to even minimal democratic sovereignty. The political issues and personal ideals that might explain why one person was prepared to take a political position that led to the grave, while another was not, and still a third was the one with gun in hand, are reduced to the unexamined notion of fratricidal war. When I asked one informant in Barcelona whose grandparents had been anarcho-syndicalists whether he thought television treatment in this period of the Franco repression really affected people who had their own experiences to draw upon, he said, "two years ago my grandmother was quite clear about the ethical value of her people's action in the Civil War. Now she no longer talks about those people. She focuses instead on the dangers of Spain falling back into a Bosnia-like barbarism bereft of political pattern or direction."

It is important to recognize the effect of this perpetual chorus of threatened internal strife on the grassroots interactions I want to talk about now. At the level of formal culture, during the Transition and in the years following, a strange inversion took place. "Democracy" was not associated with the open and often fraught dialogue on the street and in the café of fundamentally different political ideas, but rather was associated with the necessary discretion of silence and compromise achieved by the Transition. And the alternative to this kind of so-called democracy was fratricidal chaos. In this way, far from Franco's terror being the shadow hanging over Spain, it was the chaos of popular participation represented by the Republic that cast the long shadows. This seems a muddled way of speaking of the way in which failure to form an historic bloc facilitated a coup d'état and the subsequent retention of power by a class bloc that, despite its changing composition, kept one element of continuity: the total absence of a need to consult (and hence any habit of consulting) the populace. It is hardly surprising then that Spanish public figures were never heard to say "Franco's Spain, let us never go there again" while playing again and again the refrain "let us forever be spared the experiment of Republican Spain."

Clearly, by 2004, this configuration of Spain's past and hence its future had reached the limits of its political usefulness but the period that has followed is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather I want to remain within the period I have been discussing but turn now to the realm of cultural production that takes place within the everyday world of practical sense. We are returning then to the kind of setting we have already seen with the two anthropologists talking with the old people. As I have said, a pervasive belief was that the order and amnesia that framed Spain's Transition arose from *a general agreement* among the Spanish as a whole not to re-visit the past nor to encourage a kind of civil society that would run the risk of chaos. This is the position, for example, of two of Spain's major writers on the period, Paloma Aguilar (1996) and Santos Juliá (1999). Yet for me this is not really the issue, rather it is the way in which certain forms of fear can severely delimit the space of the social as an arena of intercommunicative practices.

To address this I need first to turn to a methodological question—how we might seek to understand fear in a deeply fragmented subalternity. To do this I will return for a moment to Williams' notion of structures of feeling. We have already seen that, in one sense, he has used the term to refer to a kind of pervasive social atmosphere, but now I want to point up a quite different element that obliges Williams to resort to this term. To do this we need to accept two assumptions he makes. The first is that all consciousness is social consciousness. Hence, "its processes occur not only *between* but *within* the relationship and the related" (Williams 1977:130, italics added). Second, we need to realize that, as students of social practice we arrive on the scene after the event. We are rather like those who treat the finished product of the commodity as a fetish of the labour process that produced it, but with us, the fetish is the named social practice rather than the experienced moment that we can only very

roughly capture when we give it a name. For Williams, this gap is not merely unfortunate or inconvenient; it misses out an absolutely vital element of the production of culture.

So I have already made a rudimentary distinction between formal culture and practical sense and now we can make a further move. We are not making a distinction between a broad array of cultural forms shared in the public arena on the one hand, and on the other the intimate culture of the personal somehow hidden away from society; rather we are assuming that practice is perforce social and then making distinctions with respect to the forms this takes. What I am calling practical sense is social in two ways which distinguish it from "formal culture" or categorizable social practice or relationship. These two characteristics Williams describes as "changes of presence." The first is that it is while these moments are being lived that they are experienced and "when they have been lived this is still their substantial characteristic" (1977:132). And the second is that "they do not have to await definition, classification...before they exert palpable pressure...on experience and action" (1977:132). So I am concerned with these kinds of moments *and* their relations to formal culture—overt assent, private dissent, and more nuanced interaction with selective elements of formal culture.

Williams is talking in terms of a kind of unfolding through time. He is cautioning us in micro form against a kind of whiggish history of action, in which all gestures move toward a progressive result. We need to sense the initial contingency of a present moment while resisting anticipation of the outcome of a practice by naming it too early, and this is especially so in times of change (hence his expression *changes of presence*). Yet I do not think Williams can release himself entirely from a kind of historical progressivism. Even as he keeps bringing us back to the lived moment, he is almost awaiting that next moment of culture when the lived becomes articulated, or perhaps it is better to say, when it becomes *related.*

> The peculiar location of a structure of feeling is the endless comparison that must occur...between the articulated and the lived. The lived is only another word, if you like, for experience: but we have to find a word for that level. For all that is not articulated, all that comes through as disturbance, tension, blockage, emotional trouble...If one immediately fills the gap with one of these great blockbuster words like experience it can have very unfortunate effects over the rest of the argument. [1979: 168]

What is being described here seems to me to address precisely the issue I am trying to deal with in southern Valencia—an acutely lived practical sense, and certainly one that is lived *socially.* It is not its private or non-social character that is at issue but its hesitance before the moment of being related, or articulated—"tension, blockage, emotional trouble." Williams actually refers here to comparison. He talks of the endless comparison that must occur between something lived acutely and at this moment and whatever vocabulary we have available to hang it on. Of course in a stable society formal culture provides such hooks.[5] As one Spanish historian working at the grassroots puts it, "any reading of an individual past is deeply conditioned by the prevailing framework because every person tries to make his/her memories fit into it" (Cenarro 2002:178). That Spanish formal culture following the Transition failed entirely in this regard is evidenced by the movements to open up the mass graves.

So I think we can find useful Williams' injunction to seek a way of understanding unarticulated changes of presence, while not necessarily thinking of these in terms of a kind of delay in the progress of history—hence eventually "emergent," as he puts it. Rather, it could be heuristically useful to see this gap between presence and articulation as the result of a particular kind of politics of fear.

We need to know something about the peculiar nature of localized terror in Spain to understand this—how it was produced by Franco's Movimiento in the 20 years following the Civil War, and how it then became the foundation on which the Transition was built. Put another way, we are speaking of a succession of regimes: a regime which destroyed the spaces of social interaction for selected enemies of the state thereby curtailing the social articulation of fear, and then a subsequent regime which relied absolutely on this failed articulation as the basis for the establishing of liberal democracy.

As Susana Narotzky and I have written elsewhere (Narotzky and Smith 2002, 2006) for many years it was really not possible to talk to people about the 1940s or 1950s. When one takes into account that I recorded 87 life histories, it makes one realize the oddness of this statement. Of course the point is that lived moments and extended periods of fear do not get articulated much less do they become related stories. Rather they crop up unexpectantly and unexplained like floating deadwood on a lake, ramming into your side, throwing you off the direction of your interview but—oddly I suppose—making both informant and enquirer conspire in heading back to the original direction. "He came back sick." "I wish I could have spoken to her." "Yes, three daughters. Yes all married here. No. I've never seen the inside of the church,

not since I was a girl of fifteen." "Yes Jesús was lucky. He originally had 11 siblings, but after the war there was just him, so he got the plot." And so on.

Nonetheless the persistent return of this flotsam and jetsam as I met people over many years of returning to Spain did eventually produce threads of interlinkage, something resembling a narrated account. And it was not just the longevity of my presence. There were other factors. Political elites' assurances that nobody in Spain wanted to remember notwithstanding, the accumulated evidence following Franco's death that the dominant classes were holding the reins of democracy very tightly indeed did in fact make Socialist, Anarchist and broader Republican families feel an urge to explore what had happened. For those who had identified with the Socialists during the Repression (and this had been the majority party in the town during the Republic), the compromises of the PSOE political leadership however de-legitimated these practices. Then a younger, Spanish anthropologist joined me for a while, a government came into power for whom these people felt no allegiance at all, and finally people began to hear about the graves being opened. Under these conditions narratives began hesitantly to emerge, handicapped by habits of fear in the past and by continual public reminders in the present that such narratives poisoned the present. The effect could be devastating and always these emergent accounts put the lie to the new democracy. As one small group's retained memories and occluded information began to meet with other hitherto hesitant and isolated accounts, they exposed the elite's suggestion that an unwakened memory meant a quiet sleep. To the contrary, the effects first of political repression and then of the personal self-imposed repression that followed could be devastating:

> Elías Górriz's father and uncle were two victims of a vigilante mass execution. Elías's mother, however, never told him how or why his father had died. Elías in fact every Tuesday and Thursday evening went to a bar where he played cards with three other men. His mother was later to say that she said nothing to her son because she wanted him to lead a "normal life." The three other men were Franco supporters; two of them had held minor offices in the municipality.
>
> As newspapers and television began to report sporadic actions around the mass graves and the destruction of memorials to Franco, Elías began to show some interest in a narrated past and indeed provided a rather awkward account of the immediate postwar period. He had a vague idea of the fact that his uncle had at one time been mayor, although he could not say exactly when. When I suggested that his uncle might have been mayor during the Popular Front government, he asked what the Popular Front was... During the interview, he raised objections when I encouraged him to persevere in his efforts to discover information about his relatives' past. Although he expressed the need to know more about them, he explicitly declared his fear of discovering an uncomfortable truth...The inability to create a coherent narrative about his genealogy resulted in a sense of guilt. After projecting [this] guilt onto his father's background... [he had] fantasies about a presumed dishonest past and acceptance of his relatives' guilt.
>
> Over the course of time and partly at the urging of a young local historian, Elías raised the issue with his mother and discovered some of the details of his relatives political past. He is no longer welcome at the biweekly card games. [Cenarro 2002:174-176]

As we began to go over my initial fieldnotes recorded in the early days of the Transition, and then to replay what we found there back to people in the town, it emerged that accounts of this period fell into two broad patterns. Many stories revolved around the order that resulted from membership in the local community and from the narrator's sense of holding a clear position within a social order dominated by the local *patrones.* I would call these *integral* stories.[6] As one woman put it, as she ended her description of the period, "todo en su sitio, todo en su sitio" (everything in its place, everything in its place) with a certain gleam of satisfaction on her face. The year was 1979. She was almost perfectly repeating one of Franco's last speeches to the nation, as he handed the reins to others, assuring the Spanish people, "in what was to become the nautical catch-phrase of his twilight years, that 'all is lashed down and well lashed down'" (*todo ha quedado atado, y bien atado*) (Preston 1993:748).

But another kind of narrative made no reference at all to the social order and concentrated entirely on the hazards of the black market. Here the structure of feeling was almost reproduced by the very haphazardness of the stories, often flying out of the blue, apparently from nowhere. To understand this we have to know that Franco's formal economy was controlled through ration cards and supporters of the Republic were denied them unless they could secure *un aval,* a letter of good character, from a member of the local hierarchy. For those who had supported the Republic these were very scarce indeed. "When I came back," says Celestino, "nobody would speak to me. It wasn't that you had no friends, but friends avoided one another. I got work in the next town." To be deprived of a linkage to the community in terms of hierarchy then, meant to be deprived of un aval and being

deprived of un aval meant being prevented from securing the ration book that gave at least minimal access to the formal economy. So being pushed into the *estraperlo* (the semi-legal market) was not only dictated by economy but by politics; moreover it formed the conditions of social practice and interaction, the essentials of what social membership there was available. It transpired then that the narratives of order did not reflect directly the political sympathies of the narrator's family so much as the social order that defined their means of subsistence after the war.[7]

Fernando Arroyo had a similar background to Celestino. He had a reinforced bicycle on which he carried smuggled wheat. The people in his immediate world were so strapped for cash that no family alone could afford his supplies, so he went round accumulating small orders for each trip, and in this way gradually developed a network of people who shared in common their "exile" from Franco's new society.

"Exile" has a special meaning for people who lived in Franco's Spain. For many years in approved dictionaries there was no ordinary entry for the word *exiliado*. It simply meant to have committed a crime against Spain, to be a traitor. Often I discovered that people who said that they had "gone away" or "had come back" had not in fact moved at all. Indeed that was the case for Celestino, whose experience I just mentioned. He did not "return" as he says; he had never been away. Rather he had been in hiding. Such people had simply been cast out. Carmen Gutierez is the daughter of a man who had been mayor for a short period when the Anarchists controlled the town. After Franco's victory, the Falangists caught him and beat him so badly the doctor could not get the threads of his shirt out of his flesh. He died two days later. Carmen, a primary school teacher, knows I know about her father. We are sitting on her patio trying to talk about the past, while Carmen nervously remarks on the conditions of the roads in those days, and then as we seem to approach somewhere near her father, she says "it wasn't really political here. Things were just in turmoil. There was so much ignorance." Carmen's mother comes out on to the patio. There seems to be a quiet anger in her voice. I am not sure if it is directed at the elisions of her daughter or simply at the facts of her past. "He was a baker," she says. "We had the bakery." Then she shifts the time frame to the years following her husband's death.

> The people here would come in and buy bread. Everyday. And they wouldn't say a word. Some wouldn't even look at me. For 25 years it was like that. I had three daughters marry here. They wouldn't let me into the church. I stood in the *plaza* outside.

As this old lady told me this, Carmen was so profoundly shamed she showed every sign of wanting to leave the room. "Yes," she said, "my father was an anarchist. But even so he was a good father."

What is notable about these two kinds of memories of the 20 years after the Civil War is that one incorporates the person in what Williams would call a "knowable community," one which is locally confined, hierarchical and above all *ordered*; while the other is about a kind of social exile and stresses in short sound-bites quite intense "changes of presence" for the person. As these bits and pieces accumulated over the years of my interaction with people, I felt that there was a threshold of articulation that could not be crossed. I think you see it in Elías's mother, in Carmen's problematic account of her father, and in the small moments that Celestino and Fernando are able to throw into their accounts of quite other things.

But putting these two kinds of local accounts alongside the narratives of formal culture reveals something else. As I have said, *during* the Franco regime, Republican democratic voice was configured as a chaotic fratricidal period that tore apart the body of Spain, while under Franco's Movimiento, because nobody speaks out of place, peace and order are brought to the sacred body of Spain. Then, with the Transition, the Republic is portrayed in terms of a certain kind of deficient democracy that could return again to Spain; one which, left to the masses, risks the emergence of partisan hatreds threatening to tear apart the social fabric. By contrast the kind of democracy offered by the elite through the Transition ensures that nobody speaks without first exercising careful constraint—nobody "speaks out of place" in other words. And the result will be peace and order. If we think of this in terms of violence, then an extraordinary inversion has taken place. The terror of Franco's repression is made to stand for order *against* violence, while the agency of the masses represented by Republican democracy is made to stand for the rending apart of the social body. This is asserted with a steel hand under Franco and repeated in a velvet glove through the Transition. And it finds its echo in my fieldsite in southern Valencia where order and hierarchy can be articulated but the political agency of day labourers is replaced by fragmented allusions to picaresque opportunities in the black economy.

It is not then simply that the repression silenced those who had sympathized with the Republic. It was that this repression made possible the dirigisme of the Transition which in turn, then imposed guilt on anybody seeking to make sense—through seeking to bridge the gap Williams talks of between experience and articulation—of their

own or their relatives' political agency as an expression of democracy.

We see this especially clearly in the final case I want to relate here, one where the main protagonist had for years insisted on expressing his socialist principles. For Juan Gil, socialism was not unfortunately about class conflict, it was inherently about an insistent struggle by manual workers against those who exploited them. A struggle which could only succeed through collective solidarity and uncompromised dealings with the class enemy, an enemy characterized in the Spanish case not just by its economic position, but also by its political sympathies. As the possibilities for political organization began to open up with Franco's old age, Juan began gathering day labourers together who insisted on a uniform day's wage and hours of work.[8] And by the time I arrived in the field he was recruiting people to the socialist worker's union, the UGT (*Unión General de Trabajadores*).

Some years later Juan's son, Juan Jr., was urged by his neighbours to run for mayor on the Socialist platform. By now the father was an old man and his son had been urged to run in some respects as the symbolic representative of his father. In the event, he did not get a clear majority and so had to negotiate with others as each issue arose. Yet every time he did this, his father flew into a rage. Here is the younger Juan's description:

> When Franco died, my greatest desire was to install a democracy, but to go from a dictatorship to a democracy without firing guns as we did here is very difficult...not so much for people my age [He was born in 1940] but for older people. On either side they still had open wounds...but we started to work in order to bring the rest of them over to our way...it was difficult but the fight for democracy was my job...We had this fight with older people...I had these terrible discussions with my father and often we didn't speak to each other for several days...I wanted them to see the way of realism...What we could not have is a situation where if twenty years ago you threw a stone at me, now I throw it back at you. I couldn't understand that...We had to think of a way...but it was very hard because [my father] had suffered and endured a lot in those years and he couldn't forget it...But nowadays things have changed a lot and one has to recognize it...one has to be democratic. [Fieldnotes 1995]

For the younger Juan, the compromises he had to make were temporary ones, made necessary by the tensions of the early years of the Transition. But increasingly the party office in Alicante insisted on further compromises, more discussions and less and less on the substance of what Juan Jr. felt had drawn him into politics. So that the last time I saw him he was a broken man who felt that he had sacrificed dignity and responsibility for a politics of convenience and compromise and had lost the respect of his family and neighbours as a result.

If, as one historian of Spain has noted, "for the individual man or woman who does the act of remembering, memory is a kind of social inheritance...in which the individual is placed from birth" (Cenarro 2002:178), then the younger Juan's entry into the political arena has caught him between the inheritance of his father's insistent memories and the demands of a formal culture of amnesia. But in this he was the exception that proves the rule. Unlike his peers, he had not entirely dismissed the path of politics. And his father had not taken the route, for example, of Elías's mother who had sought to ensure her son's social integration through her reticence.

The story of the two Juans, father and son, serves as a means for thinking how entry into the arena of political agency can begin to give fragmented accounts a potential coherence.[9] The character of what I have called *integral* accounts is that they are reinforced by the narratives produced by formal culture; their coherence relies precisely on a kind of settlement, an emersion in residual structures of feeling. What we see, as fragmented accounts begin to emerge, is the hesitance and difficulty that arises from the failure of formal culture to provide links across intense experiences, as though what vocabularies do emerge do so without grammars, or are hung on what grammars seem available, in this case a kind of picaresque agency that arose within the semi-legal *economy*. It is only with understanding of the political arena as one of collective agency and struggle—one explicitly denied by formal culture up to 2004—that a sense of agency can be produced among those people whose sense of social membership and personal responsibility is closely associated with the Republic.

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I have tried here to understand what we might call "structures of fear" by looking at them through the prism of two articulated spheres, drawing on two rather different features of Raymond Williams' attempts to refine his term, *structure of feeling*. At the level of formal culture, I have emphasized his wish to make us think about the pervasive atmosphere of a historical period. At the level of practical sense, I have employed his concern with the gap between the lived presence and the move toward relating that moment in articulatable terms. I think, in the case of Spain, both the various moments of formal culture leading up to the 2004 elections and their precursor in the period of Franco's repression have instrumentally

produced a barrier for many people in Spain at the level of practical sense that made the bridging of this gap an almost insuperable problem.

The spaces this opened up for an especially corporatist kind of democracy reached its limits with the moves toward outright dirigiste government in the last days of the PP. What the Law of Historical Memory represents is an acknowledgement at the level of formal culture that hegemony will have to be secured by more material engagements with the conflicts of the past than the evoking of fears of internal disorder and external threats of terror that had become the strategy of the power bloc up to that point.[10] The law is far from the sign of closure on the issues of democratic sovereignty in Spain (cf. Ranciere 2005); it does however represent an emergent form of the way in which social democracy mediates the relationship between formal culture and people's practical sense.

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Notes

1 Although the law has come to be referred to by this its original name, the proper name is *Ley de reconocimiento y extension de los derechos a las victimas de la Guerra Civil y de la Distadura* (Law of recognition and extension of the rights of victims of the Civil War and of the Dictatorship).

2 See, for example, Fernández de Mata's (2007) use of the expression *espíritu de la Transición*.

3 *El Movimiento* was the name given to the alliance of right wing interests behind Franco.

4 Discomfort and discussion about mass graves and disappearances were increasingly voiced through the 1990s. But among the relatives of those in Vilafranca del Bierzo, was a journalist who brought these initiatives to the level of formal culture, co-authoring a book (Silva and Macías 2003). Meanwhile, at a grassroots level, an umbrella organization to help co-ordinate actions around the *fozas comunes* (common graves) and other sites of memory was set up, *Asociación para la recuperación de la memoria historica, ARMH* (Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory, see http://www.memoriahistorica.org/).

5 If this were so then, where formal culture failed to provide any kind of appropriate vocabulary, two things might happen. One is that a lived experience consistently gets hung on an inappropriate cultural hook—your past heroism in fighting for democracy was a disgrace, and the result of bad psychology and so on . The other is that it simply slips off the hook, finding no articulation at the level of formal culture—a radical dis-articulation between practical sense and formal culture, a failure in other words, of hegemony.

6 For a discussion of integralism, see Holmes 2000.

7 The point to be made here is that in the early days after the war, as landlords and large tenants returned to the town, a certain modus vivendi took shape that resulted in powerful vertical ties between the large farmers and selected labourers. For some, however, this option was either not open to them or unpalatable to them. The result was a different kind of relationship to the rural community. This is taken up at greater length in Narotzky and Smith 2006.

8 Juan's hard line was consistent with that of the PSOE during this period. As antagonistic to the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) as it was to Francoism, the PSOE refused any compromises with Franco sympathizers of whatever stripe and avoided joining the *Junta Democratica*, a loose alliance of left and centrist parties brought together by the Communists. It was only by the mid-1950s that this line was to soften (see Muñoz 2006).

9 I discuss the emergence of organic ideology in the context of hegemonic fields in Smith 1999, 2004b and 2004c.

10 As I have said, this is not the proper name of the law. In fact the new law makes very material modifications in the political landscape of Spain. Images and names of Franco and his Movimiento are to be removed from public spaces such as schools and municipal buildings and the possibility of taking legal action in respect to the illegal actions of the victors in the years that followed the Civil War have now been opened up.

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Headlines of Nationalism, Subtexts of Class: Poland and Popular Paranoia, 1989-2009

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Abstract: Recent and diverse authors in anthropology such as Jonathan Friedman, Andre Gingrich, Marcus Banks and Arjun Appadurai have suggested that current globalization processes are associated with emergent nationalist sensibilities and majority mobilizations. They also imply—but do not yet empirically study—that such ideological effects are profoundly class structured. This paper takes their lead in studying the emergence of working-class nationalism in post-socialist Poland. It studies the critical junctions of Polish transition and its class configurations and power balances, and develops a relational and quintessentially anthropological understanding of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic fields under the path-dependent effects of globalization in Eastern Europe. It shows, in a critical dialogue with the recent work on Poland of political scientist David Ost on the Solidarnosc movement, that such nationalist sensibilities and mobilizations are not simply the creation of right wing political contenders who fill the void of what used to be the liberal left, but reflect the key experiences of skilled industrial workers in Poland.

Keywords: neo-nationalism, populism, post-socialism, class, hegemony, globalization, Europe

Résumé : Récemment, divers auteurs du domaine anthropologique comme Jonathan Friedman, Andre Gingrich, Marcus Banks et Arjun Appadurai ont suggéré que les processus actuels de mondialisation sont associés à l'émergence de sensibilités nationalistes et de mobilisations des majorités. Ils infèrent aussi – sans entreprendre d'en faire une étude empirique – que de tels effets idéologiques sont basés sur de profondes structures de classes. Le présent article poursuit sur leur lancée en étudiant l'émergence d'un nationalisme de classe ouvrière dans le contexte post-socialiste de la Pologne. Je m'y intéresse aux jonctions critiques de la transition polonaise, à ses configurations de classes et à ses équilibres de pouvoirs, et j'y développe une analyse relationnelle et essentiellement anthropologique des champs hégémoniques et contre-hégémoniques sous les effets associés aux cheminements de la mondialisation en Europe de l'Est. L'article montre, dans un dialogue critique avec les travaux récents sur la Pologne et le mouvement Solidarnosc du politologue David Ost, que ces sensibilités et mobilisations nationalistes ne sont pas une simple création des candidats politiques de droite qui remplissent le vide de ce qui était la niche de la gauche libérale, mais le reflet des expériences clés des ouvriers industriels qualifiés de Pologne.

Mots-clés : néo-nationalisme, populisme, post-socialisme, classes, hégémonie, mondialisation, Europe

Introduction

At first glance, it seems pointless to quarrel with Tony Judt's recent revisit of one of those memorable debates in the human sciences: that grumpy, funny, razor-sharp exchange between Edward Thompson and Leszek Kolakowski on the merits of Marxism; happening, as they must have sensed, on the blurred fold-lines—the mid-1970s—of two distinct eras in the European postwar period (Judt 2006). Thompson lost, declared Judt less than dispassionately. And that was, he argued, because of Kolakowski's merciless exposure of Marx's unholy trinity of analysis, politics and moral eschatology, dressed up as scientific certainty, which made its claims and methods so insufferable: both closed to as well as deeply vulnerable to empirical refutation—and not just under the conditions of "really existing socialism" that Kolakowski in the mid-1970s had just left behind. Judt's judgment of the Thompson-Kolakowski contest was surely not surprising. With the collapse of Marxism worldwide he was writing with the full weight of recent history ostensibly on his side, and minimally the full authority of the current pantheon of public intellectuals.

In spite of that, Judt ended his praise for Kolakowski on a surprisingly uneasy note. He observed that the post-Wall combination of accelerating globalized capitalism with deepening inequality, poverty and social uncertainty might now well be occasioning a resurgence of the conditions under which Marxism has historically flourished. If so, this was certainly not because of its academic persuasiveness, he implied: it was precisely because of this characteristic populist collusion of analysis, politics, hope and moral righteousness that Kolakowski had so forcefully rejected. Was Judt close to a disconcerting awareness that Kolakowski's mid-1970s victory might turn out to be phyrric after all? The future subalterns might be totally mistaken from the Kolakowskian viewpoint in analytical philosophy, but Marxism could well be just what they needed.

Three comments help me to further paint the intellectual canvass situating my topic. First, one should not miss the chance to point out to Judt that it was precisely the common man's and woman's needs that figured so prominently in Thompson's defense of, and his own take on, marxism as a life "tradition" rather than a fix and finished body of intellectual and political work (as represented in Kolakowski's three volume History of Marxism). Thompson was always much more interested in the ongoing people's marxisms than in Marxism as a big idea in intellectual history—his inspiration springing more from William Morris than from Capital or even the Manifesto. Judt's final unease, therefore, might well come from his realization that Thompson in the end could still be winning a respectable chunk of the academic debate too; if not the one within analytic philosophy then, in any case, the one on the actual methods of social and historical inquiry, which was what motivated Thompson throughout.

Secondly, Judt seems largely ignorant of the fact that the past 20 years have not only seen the marginalization of Marxism from the world of state and party politics—and from his own discipline of history still rather infatuated with methodological nationalism—but also, and not unlikely in response, a resurgence of various historical materialisms emphatically spatialized beyond the cage of the national state in disciplines such as geography, anthropology, international political economy and historical sociology, excelling in analyses of global conjunctures, and epitomized, among others, in the work of authors such as Arrighi, Brenner, Jessop and Harvey. This work surely takes marxism, like Thompson, more as a life tradition than as a closed body of work, and is very much open to neighbouring visions, from Arendt and Braudel to Polanyi and Zizek. The death of "Marxism-within-one-(state-based)-social-formation" has gone together, then, with the growth of marxist inspired analyses of global capitalism *across* (state-based) social formations, shedding much needed light on the turbulent self-reproduction of contemporary capital and its transformations from national capitalisms and national capitalist states to transnational valorization. While that work is often still painfully stretched to illuminate actual popular political struggles, and in that sense acts at a remove from Thompsonian method, it has demonstrably served to support analysis and bridge-building among the disparate parts of the global justice movement and its academic surroundings since the late 1990s.

These two comments serve—third—to establish a paradox of history and academia; a paradox that is ultimately the topic of this paper. There is the suspicion—shared among the radical left as well as, apparently, among champagne-social democrats such as Tony Judt—that somehow it may well be the logic of capital that is, according to Zizek, "the real that lurks in the background" of current political process (Smith 2006:621). But on the other hand, there is the actual record of popular politics in the 21st century, which appears largely unresponsive to that background lurking. Indeed, outside the celebrated Southern cases of the global Left—Zapatista, Brazilian SMT, urban South African and peasant Indian mobilizations, and recent Bolivarian or Colombian indigenous translations—there is little popular politics, certainly not in the North, that actually breathes the breath of Thompson's Spittalfield weavers. The language of class is not widely and popularly spoken—nor even whispered clearly—that much must be conceded.

On the contrary, both current affairs and recent anthropological studies and fashions suggest that we are still, and perhaps more than ever, stuck in the post-1980s phase of "culture talk," the identity politics of region, place, race, ethnicity, ethnic nation and religion (Stolke 1995). My focus in this paper is on the spasmodic spread of neo-nationalism in Europe (and beyond). But, perhaps counterintuitively, my case will serve an alliance with Thompson rather than with the discourse analysts of identity and difference. Indeed, Thompson had no problem analyzing "class struggle without class." The explicit use of the language of class was never a necessary condition for him to analyze the workings, relationships and mechanisms of class, which for him could be expressed in thoroughly non-class idioms as well. I am driven to explore this because of the simultaneous omnipresence as a subtext, as well as silence in the headlines, of class in recent studies of ethnic and religious nationalism.

Anthropologies of Fear, Crisis and the Nation

In recent anthropology, both Gingrich and Banks (2005) and Appadurai (2006) highlight the importance of social insecurity and fear in generating popular receptiveness for ideologies of ethnic or religious neo-nationalism. Both also invoke the association of such receptiveness with the general conditions generated by neoliberal globalizations. Their work resonates with Friedman's (2003) general notion of double polarizations associated with globalization: polarizations that pair widening social divides to spreading idioms of deep cultural difference in an era in which ruling elites and their allies are structurally invited to transform themselves into cosmopolitan classes and forsake the project of the nation as a community of fate. In the process, the erstwhile "fordist" working classes

are unmade, in representation as well as fact, into a new "ethnic folk," while the lower tiers are turned, in representation and fact, into *classes dangereuses.* The work of these very different authors colludes, then, in suggesting that any explanation of the surge of neo-nationalism (in Europe and beyond) must be placed against the combined background of what I would call the dual crisis of popular sovereignty on the one hand, and of labour on the other; a dual crisis that certainly characterizes the millennium. They also suggest, though do not work out, that spirals of nationalist paranoia, while structurally derived from the dual crisis, receive their precise historical dynamics from demonstrable configurations—confrontations, alliances, divisions—of class.

There seems substantial support outside anthropology proper for this general thesis. Comparativist historical sociologists such as Moore (1978), Mann (1999), Katznelson (1998) and Tilly (2003) have suggested that the class cleavage under democratic capitalism must be faced, articulated and organized rather than repressed if liberalism wants to remain a vital force in the centre of the democratic process. Now, the dual crisis signals, if anything, that over the last three decades it has become ever harder for liberals to do precisely that sort of balancing. On the European scale, this is of course far harder in the post-socialist East, with dependent states, thoroughly comprador capitalisms, and at best some 30% of the wealth of Western Europe, than in the West of the continent. Nor is the story limited to Europe. For the Middle East and West Asia it has been argued that the repression of the nationalist Left has ultimately become the harbinger of religious fundamentalism (Ali 2002). Various studies have made plausible that neoliberal globalization, by fragmenting labour and exerting downward pressure on social wages, by reducing popular sovereignty on behalf of the sovereignty of capital, and by circumscribing what Bourdieu (2000) has called "the left hand of the state" (social inclusion) while strengthening "the right hand" (finance, law and order), might well be systematically associated with producing a climate of deep popular uncertainty. This climate feeds into a politics of fear and results in defensive and more often than not "illiberal" popular responses in areas as diverse as Central and Western Africa, the US, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Kaukasus and East Asia (Frank 2004; Friedman 2003; Gingrich and Banks 2005; Derlugian 2005; Turner 2003; Nonini 2003; Wievorka 2003; Ost 2005; see my overview article Kalb 2005).

These popular politics of fear should not be seen as being immediately oriented on, or caused directly by, global actors or accelerating flows of people, trade and information as such. This is the always slightly opaque level of abstraction moved by what Eric Wolf would have called "strategic power" (Wolf 1990). Rather, actual outcomes on local grounds are intermediated by various path dependent "critical junctions" that link global process via particular national arenas and histories to emergent local outcomes (Kalb 1997, 2000, 2005; Kalb and Tak 2005). Critical junctions link the level of structural power with the institutional fields of "tactical power" (Wolf 1991) and it is there that the politics of fear gets incubated.

While headlines in the Western press tend to paint an orientalizing picture of the post-socialist East as a cauldron of majority ethnic nationalisms, there has, in fact, been little anthropological work on the class driven dynamics of neo-nationalisms in the East.[1] This stands in contrast to political scientists or political sociologists, who have consistently discussed East European neo-nationalisms, often in an alarmist mode, since the early 1990s (for example, Tismaneanu 1998). The newest wave of such work is less alarmist and much more class-analytical and has started to experiment with, and advocate, ethnographic methods (Ost 2005; Derlugian 2005), which does represent a great advance even though their actual ethnographic exercises will not greatly impress anthropologists.

Western media, of course, tend to treat majority nationalisms in the West differently. They see the recent conflicts within which nationalisms in the West are expressed as conflicts about immigration or multiculturalism, spurred on by local far-right movements. In so doing they mystify the sources of nationalism in the West by shifting them onto actors deemed ultimately external to the core of the West itself, that is migrants and the fringe of the extreme right. Such events and movements are figured as an aberration from a supposedly well-established norm of liberalism in the West, which appears to stand in contrast to the East, which *is* nationalist.

Against such popular occidentalizing imagery, it is my contention that recent Western and Eastern European popular nationalisms have broadly similar social roots and not-widely-divergent spreads, and are occasioned by related processes of neoliberal globalization and class restructuring, which indeed separate them from older elite-driven nationalisms. Their actual event-based dynamics, though, derive of course from differently ordered and sequentialized political fields and get their symbolism from significantly different national histories, memories, fears and amnesias.

Recent anthropological work on neo-nationalism in the West (Gingrich and Banks 2005) has somewhat echoed the media emphasis on migrants and far right movements. Thus, it does little to expel orientalizing and occidental-

izing mystifications. Alternatively, it has focused (Holmes 2000) on conservative West European elites and their revived Catholic organicist ideologies. This does help to re-establish cultural essentialism in its rightful place within the Right flank of Western European and continental corporatism (even though liberalism has started to serve as an essentialism too in countries such as Holland and Denmark), but does little to explain its populist dynamics outside elite circles.

Lustration, Purification and Class Anger in Post-socialist Poland

The recent work by political sociologist David Ost, *The Defeat of Solidarity* (2005), is the first long-run study of East European post-socialist political culture that looks systematically and in a grounded way at the politics of skilled industrial workers, arguably the largest population segment in post-socialist societies. His study is based on a firm grasp of the development of the *Solidarnosc* movement in Poland, both before 1989 and after, and combines political history with local as well as national social surveys and ethnographic vignettes of workers in distressed areas and industries. He develops a complex picture of the making of an increasingly "illiberal" working class culture over the period 1980-2005; a culture, he shows, that became ever more indulged in fantasies of mass lustration, national purification, anti-communist witch-hunts and anti-capitalist and anti-liberal fears over corruption and social breakdown. It was also a fertile ground for popular support for the anti-gay, anti-feminist, anti-multicultural and anti-Jewish rhetoric of conservative and clerical organizations such as *Radio Marya* and the League of Polish Families.

He explains the emergence of this illiberal working class culture in post-socialist Poland in three steps, all based in the failure of the liberal intelligentsia to keep up their alliance with industrial workers. First, he shows that from the mid-1980s onward Solidarnosc's political elites—the former dissidents minus the workerist clique around Lech Walesa—increasingly embraced liberal cosmopolitan discourses that expressly sought to disqualify workers' interests as a threat to liberal democracy and the transition to market capitalism. Secondly, he shows that workers, in response, brought the ex-communists back into power immediately after parliamentary democracy was secured, and then started to recapture the Solidarnosc movement for their own ends (1992-93). Thirdly, after the established cohort of liberal dissidents around Adam Michnik and Bronislaw Geremek had left the movement in 1994 and had formed a thoroughly neoliberal political party, the Freedom Union, second rank labour organizers took control of Solidarnosc (unions and affiliated parties) and pushed it decisively into an illiberal and religiously nationalist direction. This allowed them to capture the labour vote while channelling it away from conflict-oriented industrial unionism.

Ost was right to call for more systematic social science attention to the paradoxical outcomes of transition in Poland. Here was a nation that deliberately shook off communism by mass participation in a broad-based social movement. But the vision that was increasingly articulated in Solidarnosc circles and media in the course of the 1990s was one of a comprehensive national and cultural crisis. That vision held that the popular choice for democracy and the market of 1989 might perhaps still turn out to be salutary as long as communists would be kept from power or purged from the bureaucracy (lustration fantasies and organized fights against former communists within enterprises), the influence of liberals in public life would be contained (celebrations of law and order and obsessions with morality), and cosmopolitans would be prevented from selling out the nation to foreign interests (nationalist moral and economic visions, among others, against the EU and against foreign capitalists, although American capital was more trusted). The first nation that proudly and concertedly threw off the stifling yoke of Soviet-led communism found itself ten years later indulging in increasingly self-victimizing and paranoid discourse. Ost's ethnographic vignettes showed that workers participated actively in these discourses.

Ost was "re-confirmed" by history itself through the outcome of the 2005 Polish elections shortly after his book came out: the Kaczsinsky brothers (key informants for Ost over the years) brought a resurgent right to power with precisely these election themes. Their policy visions culminated in 2006-7 in an assertive anti-German stance within the EU, anti-liberal diatribes against gays and the proclaimed multiculturalism of the European Union, a stress on law and order, and finally the creation of a very well endowed anti-corruption watch dog that would, among other things, work on a register of some 700 000 Polish individuals that were suspected of collaboration with the communist secret services.

Ost emphasized that while he analyzed just the Polish path to what we might call popular illiberalism, his argument had a validity for post-socialism in general. Beyond the specifically Polish contingencies, the general rule was, he claimed, correctly to my mind, that if liberal intellectuals turned their backs on workers' interests and did not help to organize the anger that is inevitably produced by capitalism (let alone the deep workers' anger surrounding the transition to capitalism) "in class ways," the anger

would get framed by ethnic nationalists, religious activists or other non-liberal actors, blocking the path to the desired "open society."

Over the last ten years I have followed Polish workers in the southwestern city of Wroclaw in their visions of and responses to the post-socialist transition.[2] My material does, on the whole, seem to support the popular illiberalism thesis, but not without substantial modifications. Skilled or semi-skilled workers throughout the later 1990s did indeed often subscribe to deeply conservative family-oriented attitudes, mixed with nationalist, Catholic and sometimes openly anti-Semitic discourses. While barely saving themselves from the collapse of socialist industry in the wake of privatization, liberalization and economic restructuring, they sought to shield themselves from a public life that was felt to be alienating, un-solidary, non-supportive of their interests and dignity and overly materialist and acquisitive. Many such people also saw the U.S. as a reliable conservative ally (pre 9/11), and Europe as well as Russia as modernist moguls that could not be trusted and would only further corrupt the Polish nation (attitudes to Europe changed substantially after accession to the EU).

At the same time, however, the attitudes of the very same people toward capital and capitalism could be much less favourable and were often much less of one piece than Ost would have us believe. Most significantly, quite a few informants combined discourses of hard work, self-education, social care and family responsibility with hopeful visions of piecemeal societal progress. They expected modest income gains over time as a reward for hard work and schooling, and expressed hope and support for the next generation under a mildly beneficial EU accession. While mostly voting for right wing Catholic nationalists, if they voted at all, there was, thus, also a Polish Catholic nationalism that could hardly be called by definition illiberal and which left lots of openings for alliances with a considerate liberalism. It is a close kin to West European Christian democratic visions, derived from late 19th-century social Catholicism and solidarism. Liberal intellectuals everywhere have found it difficult to discover the difference between that and illiberalism, but the difference is vital (see also Kalb 1997). My material, in short, partly underwrites the evidence for Ost's thesis, but also indicates that popular reality was much more complex, dynamic, diversified and open to alliances than he painted it.

The greatest problem in Ost's work, however, remains his chain of causation. Are these illiberal views largely imposed by willful right wing political elites or have they somehow organically emerged from Polish popular classes? Can we perhaps arrive at a combination of both visions in which we can specify who did what? My material unfortunately does not permit strong conclusions about process in time through the early to mid-1990s. David Ost's elite manipulation thesis is superficially vindicated by the almost universally shared picture among my informants from the late 1990s onwards of the people's arch enemy: former communists now dressed up as capitalists, perverting naturally wholesome capitalism into a self-serving fake capitalism that is actually a masked communism; a notion that I admittedly found far-fetched when I started interviewing. This may ultimately be the strongest part of his account. But let me try to unwrap these surprising viewpoints a bit further.

Is this idea of the enemy of the people an effect of the imposition of a rhetoric by conservative Solidarnosc elites *à la* the Kaczynskis, or should we rather interpret it as an outlook based in a popular history and experience of actually fighting communist control over factories for over a decade (1980-94) as well as of fencing off the consequent shock therapy dispossessions of the 1990s administered by the liberals? Should we not see it as an effort at explaining their own dispossession while symbolically leaving the social goal of a democratic market society—inscribed in the national narrative by the very recent popular victory over the communists and subsequently superimposed by Poland's vital Western alliances—undisputed?

My material suggests that there is much to be said for the latter explanation. Workers in the late 1990s could still vividly narrate the nerve-wracking fight against communist control and dirty tricks in their own factories up to about 1994. The durability of that theme throughout the 1990s and 2000s in public life, politics and the media may well be attributed to willful reproduction in conservative election campaigns, as Ost in fact claimed, but the origins of the vision are much more historical, organic and structural than that. I argue that it must be understood in light of the ferocious but as yet understudied fight over "people's property" between workers and the communist nomenklatura in the 1980s and early 1990s. In this fight the party state lost much of its control over national assets to worker collectivities. The liberal state (run by an alliance of former nomenklatura and ex-dissident liberals), after 1989, sought to wrestle actual control over the shopfloor, the factory budgets, and productive property as a whole, from often well-organized local worker collectivities who exercised strong claims to de-facto control and semi-legal ownership and often pressed for a program of worker co-operatives in national markets rather than full speed global integration and (foreign) capitalist ownership (for a more extensive account see Kalb in press). In this important sense the Polish proletariat of

1990 was a full heir to the great popular rebellions against really existing socialism in Budapest 1956, Prague 1968 and Poland 1980-81; rebellions that understood themselves less in terms of a claim for capitalism and parliamentary democracy than in terms of claims for worker self-management.

In the end, my argument with Ost crystallizes into a different vision of what hegemony is, how it works and what it can do. My take on it relies more on a relational approach to hegemony that stands in contrast to the "ideas based" one employed by Ost, which is directly derived from Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Relational approaches have a strong pedigree in anthropology (Roseberry 1994; Gledhill 2000) and have been excellently spelled out again in Smith (2004). In the case of Polish right wing populism, a relational approach points at a field of shifting class power that generates a history of clashes, victories and defeats, including memories and amnesias, which then form the background for broad-based populist sensibilities to emerge that open the path for right-wing elites to capitalize on them. This is what has happened in Poland (as in many other places).

I would claim that nationalist outlooks among urban workers in the course of the 1990s in Poland were—while of course in all generality suggested by old and recent Polish history itself (independence from the Soviet occupation after the genocidal Nazi occupation)—ever more articulated as an attempt of self-ascribed "deserving," disciplined and efficient skilled workers to morally distinguish themselves from, on the one hand, "undeserving" workers in industry and, on the other, from the ostensible public winners of the transition, the liberal intelligentsia and their clients. It was a banner meant to confront cosmopolitan liberals as well as the undeserved clients of the former communists. I see current workers' nationalism in Poland as a symbolic claim to be rightful members of the restricted circle of beneficiaries of democratic capitalism in the face of lots of evidence to the contrary. Importantly, workers' nationalism gained this particular meaning only after the fight of local worker collectivities for co-operatives and popular control over productive property and associated social programs was lost, somewhere between 1990 and 1995 (see for more extensive evidence and discussion Kalb in press)

The symbol of the market is a good opening for making this case. Ost suggests that the pro-market attitude of rank and file Solidarnosc members was ultimately an indoctrination by their leaders eager to avoid conflict with capital. My material, however, shows that skilled workers around 2000 understood their self-interest in markets much better than that. Workers often eloquently explained that thorough marketization was perfectly good for them because it would finally make an end to the protection that uncompetitive and less disciplined workers—a key symbol of which was the abuse of alcohol—had enjoyed under socialism, a clientelism, many complained, that had been dragging down their whole enterprise as well as the wider society for years. Markets were seen as helping to reward good workers and punish the bad. There is nothing surprising in this: capitalist social differentiation and popular languages of moral elevation and hierarchy have a deep elective affinity. Popular languages of elevation and deservingness have the habit of turning necessity into virtue, as Bourdieu observed, and in this particular case helped to legitimize claims of self-proclaimed deserving workers to continued access to a shrinking pool of resources. Privatization and marketization meant that the city of Wroclaw, for example, would lose almost all its large and nationally reputed firms in electrical engineering—a destruction of tens of thousands of jobs in a few years time. None of my interviewees complained about people hit in the first waves of redundancies. They were often peasant workers with little education or women commuters with perceived loyalties to the farm and the family rather than to the organized worker collectivities that practically controlled some of the bigger firms in Wroclaw around 1990. The core worker groups of these firms, however, were saved or bailed out by severance pay and early retirement schemes. Solidarnosc activism, after the defeat over factory control in the early 1990s, became instrumental in allowing unskilled, older and more peripheral workers to be shed with benefits, while trying to protect the core production processes and their workers.

Polish political elites drew from this popular moral discourse and fed it with new themes. In earlier work (Kalb 2002) I noted how shock therapy advocate and Polish finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz saw his task in thoroughly moralist terms, echoing skilled workers' visions of moral distinction. Under socialism, he observed, "conscience was crowded out"—note the interesting overlap of monetarist and moralist language. Markets, Balcerowicz as well as many workers believed, served to "lock in conscience" by rewarding the conscientious. The "defeat of solidarity," in a sense, was something that skilled workers had been eagerly awaiting, rather than an ideological imposition by right wing political elites.[3]

Several additional relational processes reinforced this turn to languages of self-dignification. The core workers of enterprises had often been risk-taking Solidarnosc activists, and had struggled hard against communist control over their enterprises. They could thus legitimately claim to co-own the transition to democracy. The really

high-risk fights had indisputably been theirs, certainly after the declaration of martial law in December 1981 and continuing into the early 1990s, fights that often led to imprisonment and potentially permanent disruption of the livelihoods of whole families. But their rewards had remained very insignificant compared to those of the (public) intelligentsia. Activist workers in the later 1990s were acutely aware of this discrepancy. Their claim was made urgent by the absence of any rise in real incomes in manufacturing over the 1990s and early 2000s. Average wages at the assembly lines of the Whirlpool factory in Wroclaw (formerly the Polar factory), for example, in 2007 were very much the same as in 1997 (about €300) even though productivity per worker at some of the plants had increased by more than 700% and price levels had steadily risen. This basically meant that economic stagnation (1977-2007) had become a life-long verdict for them. As workers with often enterprise-specific skills, they were locked in their struggling and declining former state enterprises and could rarely benefit from the new public and private economies. These were largely controlled by the "pacting classes" and their clients, represented at the 1988-89 Polish Roundtable—communists and liberal intellectuals—whose cultural capital and political connections reserved for them by far the greatest chunk of the spoils of post-recession economic growth after 1995. The skilled worker families we interviewed, meanwhile, more often than not still inhabited the same 25 or 35m^2 apartments that they had first occupied in the late 1970s or early 1980s, before the terminal crisis of socialism set in. From their insufficient salaries they saved penny by penny for a new secondhand car replacing the one they had owned over the last 20 years or, often, to help out their grown children.

Although it always needed some prompting, workers in each and every interview showed themselves rather keen to help re-live, re-member and re-inscribe the earlier fight against communists in their current post-socialist public life. Communists now masked as capitalists were discovered everywhere and denounced as corrupting the integrity of Polish public life. This typical keenness-after-prompting was a response to the hegemony of what is known in Poland as the "thick line" that Michnik and other dissidents had officially drawn behind recent contentious Polish history as part of the negotiations at the Roundtable. As in Spain and Latin America, the Polish Roundtable Pact had determined that the past would be buried "peacefully" and that with democratization no one would be purged and punished for their actions under the "authoritarian" old regime. This imposed policy of amnesia was deeply unpopular with Polish workers, as were similar policies among Spanish, Chilean and Argentine labour (for Spain see Narotzky and Smith 2006). This nation of Catholic workers felt deeply betrayed by the liberals whose ascendancy in post-socialist Poland seemed based on a "peaceful transition" negotiated by themselves for themselves, while bestowing very little in the way of material benefits, security or honour on the groups that had waged the actual fights *en masse*. On the contrary, they were consistently reminded by the media of their populism, "lack of class" and uncertain democratic credentials. None of the liberals had the guts to actually propose cancelling the state debt as the debt of an illegitimate regime (as Naomi Klein (2007) importantly points out), but while shock therapy was shaking out the nation's economy, intellectuals and media people began to picture themselves desperately as potentially "middle class," while depicting workers and peasants as gross liabilities for a Poland openly exposed to world capitalist competition. Workers and peasants were systematically associated in the media with alcoholism and laziness, and labour unions were openly decried as dysfunctional for the new civil Poland.[4] In fact, the whole concept of "civil society" was regularly turned against them.

Even an honorable person such as Adam Michnik (the ex-dissident writer and publisher) at a commemoration in 1999 of the epoch-making events of 1989 in Vienna,[5] kept openly devaluing Polish industry by talking about "ex-socialist workers who were merely producing busts of Lenin." At the same elite ceremonial event, Leszek Balcerowicz, architect of shock therapy in Poland and finance minister at the time, was still almost religiously proud to have unleashed market-enforced creative destruction on Polish workers in order to punish them for "the crowding out of conscience" that had supposedly happened to them under the state-led economy (Kalb 2002; for further examples see Buchowski 2006). While they celebrated their peaceful victory over communism and the Evil Empire in lusty Vienna, there were no audible dissidents to this orchestrated silencing of the workers' fight—and plight—among the new Polish elite at this particular banquet, as there surely would have been at other banquets.

This was the context that Michal Buchowski recently described with the notion of "internal orientalization" in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe (2006; see also Kideckel 2002, 2007), a public discursive practice which "blames workers and peasants for their own degraded circumstances and for society's difficulties" (Buchowski 2006:467). It refers to a public climate in which "workers have proven to be 'civilizationally incompetent' (Sztompka 1993), show a 'general lack of discipline and diligence' (Sztompka 1996) and obstruct the efforts of those who

are accomplished and the progress of whole societies in the region" (Buchowski 2006:469).[6] By regularly invoking the "*Homo sovieticus* syndrome" liberal intellectuals displaced workers out of the bounds of Europe and into a timeless Asia. At the same moment, they passionately claimed a place for themselves in the new European pantheon, invoking their conscientious and peaceful advocacy for liberal civil society against the communist Goliath and their successful liberalization and privatization of "the economy."

The symbolic politics of the Kaczynski regime were primarily meant to be the end of the "thick line" that liberals like Michnik and Geremek had defended throughout the 1990s. None of my working-class informants in Wroclaw ever said a good word about the policy of the thick line. Without exception they favoured lustration and punishment in the later 1990s possibly even more so than during the later Kaczynski government. The Kaczynski government translated these popular and populist feelings subsequently into the creation of a very well endowed anti-corruption watchdog that would, among other things, work on a register of some 700,000 Polish individuals who were suspected of collaboration with communist secret services. Very tellingly, the most prominent potential traitor in the eyes of the Kaczynski government was Bronislaw Geremek himself, the core dissident–liberal actor at the Roundtable and by now a widely respected former minister of foreign affairs, a professor of history, a member of the European Parliament and an active participant in liberal-conservative European think tanks. Geremek was accompanied by hundreds of thousands of academics, judges, administrators, engineers and business people. All were summoned to submit declarations that they were not guilty, an intentional inversion of the liberal procedures for establishing innocence and guilt. Suspicion was sufficient for an accusation and proof had to be shown to refute a suspicion. The entire Western press joined *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Adam Michnik's liberal daily, in a sustained public outcry against the demeaning picture of Geremek—for some *the* icon of dissident incorruptibility—pushed into submission by a populist government in Warsaw chosen by uneducated workers and peasants and desperately pleading his innocence before a hardly friendly committee of populists who judged him under the gaze of a less than civil public media.

But of course, as Buchowski (2006) would appreciate, it was the material as well as the public symbolic history of working-class dispossession throughout the neoliberal transition that was at work behind Geremek's top position on the corruption list. In fact, the post-1989 Polish elite finally faced the return of the repressed[7]: it would be punished for its own willing and nationally imposed amnesia of the workers' fight as well as the workers' plight, and for that to happen its "pacted" and therefore quasi-constitutionally imposed amnesia had to be inverted by a lustration that was not just about communists but perhaps, even more, about them. This was all posed as the Polish ethnic nation taking revenge on those of its members who were seen to have sold it out. There was an ominous underlying message to the Polish liberal elite in this: it said, not yet fully explicitly but certainly audibly, that it might not be you but we who actually are "the people" of 1989. Few workers we talked to felt any commiseration with Geremek.

The nation is a very complex symbol, open to articulations for every new goal and conjuncture. The nationalism that post-socialist industrial workers articulated was very often a "nationalism of common care," a claim to an inclusive nation that posed the nation as a huge hierarchical family with strong mutual obligations and responsibilities. It was the nationalism that could have been expected in an age of neoliberal post-socialist transition and, indeed, neoliberal globalization. This was a vision that sought explicit antagonism with the individualist rights-based ethos of the liberals. And it sprang above all from the practical and daily dependence of worker families with thoroughly insufficient incomes on mutual reciprocity and support through the generations. While liberal politics and media imageries of consumption paid little homage to these daily efforts and realities, the Solidarnosc leadership articulated them with the old notion of Catholic solidarism. Catholicism as a religious belief, finally, though much less prevalent among industrial workers than the idea of Poland as a Catholic nation suggests, helped to articulate, explain and dignify the self-restraint that members of households on permanently insufficient incomes had to instil in each other in the face of booming consumer fascinations and market fetishisms in the mediatized public sphere. Again, this classic function of religion for working class people seemingly permanently condemned to the "limited good" was eagerly appropriated and ritualized by the radical right.

Consider, in this context, the symbolism of the "Equality Parade," which used to be called "the Gay Parade." This international parade was intentionally scheduled to happen in post-socialist Warsaw in order to challenge Lech Kaczynski's "anti-multiculturalism." Mayor Kaczynski had forbidden the parade in 2004 and 2005, spiced up with some politically incorrect anti-gay rhetoric. A youth organization associated with the League of Polish Families and founded by Jaroslaw Kaczynski's ideologue-cum-education-minister Giertich had beaten up some local

parade participants in prior years. West European political classes from the multiculturalist left had intervened and had officially warned Warsaw about spreading "intolerance." That pressure helped to secure the event for 2006 and 2007, which then included the participation of high-level Western politicians, mostly from the German Greens, under the banner of promoting human rights in Poland. The League of Polish Families, however, was allowed to schedule a counter demonstration at the same time. One of my interviewees participated in it. He was annoyed by the multicultural and human rights imagery sponsored by the EU: "Why is the EU making so much fuss about that parade?," he asked. "Nobody in Brussels says a word if Polish workers starve on low wages, have to work like dogs and get exploited."

For him, the Equality Parade was a travesty, which served, again, another important imposed amnesia. He wished to recall, as the quote shows, that the equality in the title of this parade used to include a concern with social rights, and not just multicultural gay rights. He therefore hinted at Western Europe's forgetfulness about its own history of dealing with issues of social equality. Many of my informants in Wroclaw would have concurred. Of course there is a clash of class going on around multicultural events such as gay parades. From the point of view of post-socialist industrial workers who had first lost control over their factories and communities, had barely saved their skins in the collapse of their industries, and had subsequently been confined to a life of hard work and material stagnation in a wider public environment that openly fetishized consumption, these events appeared to extol the pleasure of licentious free-choice consumerism. It was a feast that symbolized the pleasures of never ending free circulation, as it were, not just a circulation of objects but of objectified intimate relations. Their lives taught other lessons. One of those lessons was the importance of solidarity within intimate relationships of families and among workers, a lesson that was about the strict limits of free circulation.[8] Another was that the liberal promise of mass consumption had simply been false and that the opportunities of a world of endless circulation and unlimited pleasure had been very unfairly distributed. The Equality Parade for them was not just an indecent public act, as it was for the Polish Catholic church, it was, rather, an indecent public myth that served to silence the Polish popular reality of scarcity, toil and confinement for many—a reality that received much less public attention and respect, including by the EU, they felt, than that futile parade. Hence it was again an issue of public amnesia: a festival used as a signifier to hide an uncomfortable reality. And the Polish ethnic nation again got positioned against the promiscuous cosmopolitans who were pictured as literally willing to sell themselves out to everybody.

Conclusion

Against David Ost's idea of a willful hegemony by right wing ideologues cunningly imposed on post-socialist industrial workers I have tried to propose an alternative explanation of their largely "illiberal" outlook. My alternative explanation is less "ideas based" (Ost's own words) and more relational in that it looks at the relational trajectory of skilled workers in post-socialist Poland, characterized by what now emerges as an intricate double bind. This double bind leads skilled workers to confront both unskilled labour and the leading liberal classes. It also leads them to accept the market as the tool to do the first, and to ally with a politics of paranoia, unmasking liberals as communists and communists as liberals, to do the second. This double bind is entirely embedded in the critical junctions that have shaped their biographies. Ost was very right in putting his finger on the politics of the Polish liberal intelligentsia after 1989 as a major factor, but he was largely wrong in suggesting that the upcoming right-wing elite of the Kaczynskis and their circles has manipulated industrial workers into a fearful illiberal politics. Against reductive notions of class and interest, I am making an anthropological case for analyzing the complex critical junctions that describe the global and local historical configurations of structural power and personal becoming "in class ways." I point to the displacement through time of material confrontations onto public symbolic, but not less real, fights after the former have been lost and the resources needed to take them up again in a different liberal and globalized context have dissipated.

The Kaczynski interlude, however, has suggested something else. Post-1989 politics in East Central Europe has always been more a politics of resentment than a politics of endorsement. Electoral participation has consistently been low, hovering mostly around the 50% mark and few governments anywhere in Central and Eastern Europe have won two elections in a row. Post-communist transition under conditions of neoliberal globalization and the dual crisis of labour and sovereignty was never truly popularly approved. The extrication from the Soviet embrace and the farewell to local communist party machines was unanimously celebrated, but not the substance of what came after. The Kaczynskis got into power because their voters, at best some 15% of the electorate, were the only ones motivated to go to the polls at all in 2005, the others stayed home. And even though many of my informants in Wroclaw's electrical industries felt a certain discursive proximity to them, only a minority was

actually willing to give them votes. My informants always whispered and sometimes screamed political cynicism of all sorts, rather than a positive belief in the virtues of any Warsaw government, including that of the Kaczynskis. Only a few really embraced the Kaczynski campaign of virtue, fear and suspicion. In October 2007, the right wing government was voted out again and the remnants of the liberal Freedom Union were voted in. Participation at the polls was the highest since 1989, an enormous 51%. While the Kaczynskis had a bigger following in absolute numbers than in 2005, electoral mobilization among educated youth in the bigger cities had changed the whole fragile equation.

Something else had changed too in the conditions of working-class reproduction in larger Polish cities, including Wroclaw. The accession of Poland to the EU in 2004 had finally delivered two things that Poles since 1989 had been intensely longing for: the possibility of large-scale labour emigration to the West and an accelerating flow of industrial investments by transnational enterprises to the East. Poland was the biggest recipient and originator of these flows. And Central and Eastern Europe as a whole was being turned into the premier mass production base for West European corporations. After 2004, the two processes together began to dent Polish unemployment, the highest in Europe, significantly (official unemployment in 2003 was still close to 20%, in 2007 it was around 13%). But they also seem to have led to increasingly despotic regimes of labour in manufacturing. Because of mass emigration, labour shortages emerged for the first time. And Western capital, now finally pouring in substantial investments in fixed capital, began to demand unprecedented levels of productivity from workers in the face of surging East Asian competition. While my interviewees in the late 1990s would complain about scheming communists and a public life corrupted by liberals, in this new European and global context they began to tell stories of increasing old style exploitation by (Western) capital. Significantly, a wider shift in political identifications seemed underway. "We are workers, after all," said an only slightly embarrassed informant, who had in the late 1990s insisted that he had always been a sort of entrepreneur. It was the first time since I started research in 1997 that this word, with old style socialist connotations, was used as self-ascription in an interview. While uttering this sentence, the man, in his fifties, kept a searching eye on my interviewer, deeply unsure of, but somehow also eager for, his approval.

In this article I have discussed the particular Polish path to popular nationalist paranoia. I have argued that in order to analyze contemporary, often screaming headlines of nation and nationalism we should not just study nationalist parties and elites but rather bring a relational approach to trajectories and configurations of class in order to penetrate the lived subtexts of social and existential insecurity and its attendant fear and anger. Against Tony Judt, I have shown how Edward Thompson's methods of analyzing "class struggle without class," in particular when wedded to Eric Wolf's multi-level strategies of analyzing power, are more than apposite for the current post-socialist conjuncture of a double global crisis of labour and popular sovereignty, a crisis that forms the necessary background for understanding local popular paranoia anywhere. I have argued, too, that David Ost's recent and excellent analysis of "the defeat of Solidarity" in Poland, places undue emphasis on elite discourses and their supposed imposition on misled workers. On the contrary, these right-wing elites capitalized on organic working class sensibilities reflecting an authentic politics of anger, distrust and disenchantment with the liberal state in globalizing mode after de facto workers' control over significant chunks of the national pie had unravelled in the wake of shock therapy and liberal dispossession. Polish workers, in short, did not really need political elites to teach them the populist neo-nationalist narrative. What they would have needed new political elites for was the reappropriation for their own ends of the notion of democracy and liberty from the neoliberal state-class that dispossessed its working classes after 1989 in the name of liberty, democracy and civil society. The dual crisis of labour and popular sovereignty, internalized in the global neoliberal consensus and linked with globalization, made the emergence of precisely such a politics highly unlikely, in Eastern Europe even more so than in many other places. It was a question of structural power, not of ideas. The outcome of that skewed power balance in many places is the discursive antagonism of cosmopolitans versus ethnic nationals, as Jonathan Friedman (2003) has argued. And so it was in Poland.

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Notes

1 As Charles Tilly (2001) has rightly noted there is little anthropological attention in general for issues of categorical inequality such as class. While anthropological research on post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe has flourished over the last decade, I can only think of the work of David Kideckel (2002, 2007) and Jack Friedman (2007), both working in particular on miners in Romania, that systematically addresses questions of class. In sociology, there has been more interest in ethnographies of class in Central and Eastern Europe lately; see the overview article by Stenning (2005), and the ethnography of women and class in the Czech Republic by Weiner (2007).

2 I thank the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (N.W.O.) and the Central European University Research Board for making this research possible in respectively 1997-2000 and 2007. This is the first paper in what is intended to be a series of research articles based on approximately 60 long ethnographic interviews with workers in Wroclaw, in particular in the Polar/Whirlpool factory. For a more elaborate ethnographic and historical analysis of populist narratives and popular experiences of dispossession see Kalb in press.

3 Eastern Europe, enjoying a late, disparate and peripheral industrialization in comparison to most Western and Central parts of the continent had not developed the strong inclusive working-class cultures, uniting workers over the skills divide, that had been the classical harbingers of socialist visions and politics in Western and Central Europe. In her recent dissertation at Central European University, "Alienating Labor: Workers on the Road from Socialism to Capitalism in East Germany and Hungary, 1968-1989," Eszther Bartha (in press) shows that in the late 1960s workers in Gyor, Hungary, in comparison to workers in the GDR, were deeply segmented along lines of education, urbanity and skill and that the more skilled families were keen to let their own self-interests in markets, higher wages, and private consumption prevail over socialist politics of collective consumption and state-led accumulation. The same interests lay behind Gierek's private consumption oriented policies in 1970s Poland. In this sense, skilled workers had abandoned solidarity long before 1989. Thanks to Kacper Poblocki and Istvan Adorjan for reminding me of this crucial divide in the logics of solidarity between skilled-educated and unskilled labour among the more and less developed parts of the European economic landscape.

4 Jerzy Scacki, a respected grandfather of Polish sociology, gave a talk at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna in 1997 which I attended. There, several discussants tried to convince him that labour unions are a crucial part of civil society but he refused to accept that because unions demonstrated "communist style claiming behaviour."

5 I served as program director of the SOCO program at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, and as such was part of the celebration "Ten Years After." SOCO was a support program for social policy research in mainly the Visegrad countries paid for by the Ford Foundation and the Austrian Federal Chancellery. SOCO was one of the Western reponses to the surprise election of the post-communists in 1993 in Poland.

6 These quotations refer to internationally known sociologists.

7 The return of the repressed was in fact anticipated by John Borneman (1997). However, he failed to explicitly include liberals in his vision of the need to name and blame "wrongdoers" in the nation and restricted himself to the communists and their collaborators. He also generalized too much from the experience of the Yugoslav tragedy and expected that in the absence of an institutionalized and public naming and blaming process the powers that be would shift popular aggression to external enemies.

8 Malgorzata Calinska, leader of the Solidarnosc local at Polar-Whirlpool, regularly referred to the factory, the workers and Solidarnośc as "my family."

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Lynching and States of Fear in Urban Mexico

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Abstract: On 23 November 2004 people in San Juan Ixtayopan, an urban community of Mexico City, lynched three agents of the Federal Preventative Police, accused of attempting to kidnap children attending the Popul Vuh elementary school. This article discusses how the state assumed a "law-and-order" approach to the lynching, missing an opportunity to interrogate critically the broader impact of neoliberal policies. While any particular lynching is the partial product of social and historical relationships on local social fields, neoliberal political economy establishes a broad context for grasping the recent spate of lynchings in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America.

Keywords: popular justice, neoliberalism, state and society, urban Mexico

Résumé : Le 23 novembre 2004, la foule de San Juan Ixtayopan, une agglomération urbaine de la cité de Mexico, a lynché trois agents de la Police fédérale préventive, accusés de tentative d'enlèvement d'enfants fréquentant l'école primaire Popul Vuh. Dans cet article, nous discutons de la façon dont l'État a abordé les lynchages selon la grille de « la loi et l'ordre », passant à côté d'une occasion d'interroger de façon critique les impacts élargis des politiques néolibérales. Alors que chaque lynchage particulier est partiellement le produit de relations sociales et historiques sur les terrains sociaux locaux, l'économie politique néolibérale crée un contexte plus large pour appréhender la recrudescence récente de lynchages au Mexique et ailleurs en Amérique latine.

Mots-clés : justice populaire, néolibéralisme, État et société, Mexique urbain

On 23 November 2004 a large crowd in San Juan Ixtayopan in Tláhuac *delegación* (borough) in Mexico City, lynched three agents of the Federal Preventative Police (*Policía Federal Preventiva*, henceforth PFP), presumably for attempting to kidnap children attending the Popul Vuh elementary school. These strangers had appeared in San Juan several weeks earlier, their presence noted by local residents as they carried out surveillance around the school and took photographs of children and nearby buildings. On the day in question, a rumour spread quickly and widely that three men had kidnapped a child (or perhaps two) from the school and were preparing to flee; a crowd numbering 300 or more amassed and converged on the agents' vehicle. Though no kidnapped child was discovered in their possession, subdirector Víctor Mireles Barrera and officer Cristóbal Bonilla were pulled from the car, beaten senseless over the course of two hours and eventually doused with gasoline and burned. Officer Edgar Moreno Nolasco was beaten and dragged a kilometre or more downhill to the town kiosk, where he might have met the same fate as his colleagues had he not been rescued late that night by federal judicial agents and the Federal District's Special Immediate Reaction Group in a hastily organized operation that involved liberal use of tear gas and threats to open fire on the crowd. Despite life-threatening injuries, including severe damage to his kidneys, Moreno survived the ordeal that claimed the lives of his colleagues on the police force.[1]

Lynchings are not new to Mexico, particularly since the advent of neoliberalism. Antonio Fuentes documented 331 lynchings between 1984 and 2003, over 30% of which resulted in the death of one or more persons. Although concentrated in rural areas of south and centre south states such as Puebla, Oaxaca, Guerrero and Chiapas, Fuentes' sources registered at least one lynching in 25 of 32 states (including the Federal District[2]). Indeed, the Federal District led the statistics with 71 lynchings (Fuentes 2007:115, 122). Some of the incidents are striking

in their details. In Veracruz in 1996, an amateur videographer taped the five-minute trial of an accused murderer-rapist and his subsequent immolation. A few years later in Huejutla, Hidalgo, state governor Jesús Murillo made a dangerous, late night, over-the-mountain helicopter trip in a futile effort to halt the lynching of two travelling stamp salesmen erroneously accused of child kidnapping and organ theft. There the mob shouted the governor down before dispatching the captives (Quinones 2001). Albeit spectacular, neither incident exercised the Mexican press for more than a few days, probably because they occurred in communities remote from the capital and were perpetrated by people whom most Mexico City cosmopolites consider only partly civilized.

The lynching in San Juan Ixtayopan differed from many others for at least four reasons: first, it occurred within the boundaries of the capital and the victims were federal policemen; second, television crews called to the scene by the perpetrators broadcast the grisly proceedings live; third, the lynching became another chapter in a long-standing dispute between Mexico City mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and President Vicente Fox Quesada of the ruling National Action Party (PAN), which López Obrador and the PRD hoped to unseat in the July 2006 presidential elections; and fourth, if violence and politics were not enough, the drug trade and even guerrillas found their way into the mix, resulting in a volatile ideological cocktail that gave rise to endless political manoeuvring, public commentary and much uninformed speculation. *La Jornada*, Mexico's principal centre-left daily newspaper, devoted more than 200 articles to the San Juan Ixtayopan case and its aftermath during the two months following the tragedy in Tláhuac.

In this article we examine these particularities in the context of two decades of neoliberal capitalism, which has produced profound changes in the "structure of feeling" (Williams 1977) in Mexican society. Liberally drawing on newspaper accounts of the incident, we discuss the production of information and misinformation about San Juan Ixtayopan, its inhabitants, the men lynched and the response of the state, all within the larger frame of a neoliberal political economy that has contributed to weakened state authority, growing income concentration and the erosion or disappearance of compensatory mechanisms—generating anxieties around control over physical and social bodies. We begin by positioning lynching in Mexico within a broad regional and historical context, in the course of which we offer both a general interpretation of the phenomenon as well as methodological suggestions for comparative analysis. The essay then examines the San Juan Ixtayopan incident through its coverage in the press and the state discourses assembled and disseminated in order to "explain" the actions of both perpetrators and state agents. In a later section we discuss the fear of loss of control of the body—illustrated through concerns over child kidnapping—as a general manifestation of neoliberal capitalism. Finally we mark the limits of this exercise and call for intensive fieldwork as the only means of situating local social fields within broader processes in the service of grasping lynching in contemporary Mexico.

Lynching in Latin America

Godoy limits lynchings to "incidents of physical violence committed by large numbers of private citizens against one or more individuals accused of having committed a 'criminal' offense, whether or not this violence resulted in the death of the victim(s)." She exempts "confrontations between armed groups, military actions, disputes over land which may result in murders, individual settling-of-accounts or vengeance killings, and other types of violence" from her definition (Godoy 2002:640-641, n1). As such, she presumably excludes many of the executions in Northern Ireland and South Africa committed by members of the Irish Republican Army and African National Congress, respectively, in the service of maintaining social order in areas under day-to-day insurgent political control (Munck 1995; Scheper-Hughes 1995).

This definition also has the merit of focusing on the act and the actors without overly restricting the motive, as does Mendoza (2004), or prejudging the result, as in the case of Goldstein (2004), for whom lynching necessarily results in death. In contemporary Latin America local, state or federal police forces, the town priest, mayor or other locally respected persons, or even members of the crowd may intervene to save the victim.[3] Broadening the concept to encompass "incidents of physical violence" short of death seems warranted under these circumstances, which are quite different from those that predominated in the post-Reconstruction U.S. South, where lynching of African Americans—accounting for 85-90% of the more than 3,000 lynchings registered for the 1889-1931 period—were generally supported by local law enforcement officials and politicians (Corzine et al. 1983; Tolnay et al. 1989).

The highly varied circumstances that surround lynchings in contemporary Latin America problematize their analysis, certainly as compared to the post-Reconstruction U.S. South. The predominantly inter-racial character of historic lynching in the United States gave rise to a large sociological literature, much of which has been devoted to

testing hypotheses purporting to explain differences in the rates and timing of lynching in terms of boundary crises, power threats and even cotton prices (Beck and Tolnay 1990; Corzine et al. 1983; Inverarity 1976; Reed 1972; Stovel 2001; Tolnay et al. 1989). While some of this literature may be useful for historic and perhaps contemporary analysis of some lynchings in Latin America—the lynching of Chinese by Mexican nationals during the Mexican Revolution comes to mind (Sato 2006)—much of it will have to be "recoded" in order to inform the analysis of situations in which both perpetrators and victims usually share similar class and ethnic identifications (see for example Castillo Claudett N.d.; Guerrero 2000; Huggins 1991).

One form of recoding attributes lynching to subaltern groups—Mayans in Guatemala, Quechua speakers in Peru and Ecuador, Afro-Brazilians in Brazil, et cetera—incompletely incorporated into modernity, a perspective manifest in early press reports of the San Juan Ixtayopan incident. Speaking of urban Brazil, de Souza Martins states, "I am thinking particularly about those people on the 'razor's edge' of incomplete transition, in the space where property, work and authority relations are disintegrating" (1991:22). But far from being pre-modern holdovers or evidence of an incomplete incorporation to modernity, contemporary lynchings are better viewed as *specific effects of modernity*, which is to say the distinct ways that rural and urban communities *have* been incorporated into capitalist underdevelopment. Godoy notes that in Guatemala and elsewhere, lynchings

> have made painfully present the contradictions of capitalism: while globalization produces polarization, it also pulls the poles together in geographic proximity, making the markers of exclusion sharper as many realize the depth of their own deprivation. It is not only the poverty and disruption of community engendered by globalization, but also the attendant revelation of its deep divides that lays the groundwork for lynchings. [2004:634]

This form of collective violence also comes across as "a perverse form of community empowerment" in which "embattled communities [seek] to reaffirm values they see as threatened," thus representing "a 'dark side' of democracy,...indicators of a struggle between citizens and the state, a struggle in which communities use collective violence to impose their authority and assert their autonomy in affairs about which they are extremely concerned, but on which the state has been utterly unresponsive" (Godoy 2002:623, 636, 640, 641).

Seventy-eight percent of the 331 lynching reports Fuentes (2007) culled from the Mexican press for the years 1984-2003 occurred *after* the 1994 peso devaluation, which was largely a result of the uncontrolled opening of Mexican financial markets to short-term international portfolio investment. Indeed, reports of lynchings throughout Latin America multiplied during the last decade of the 20th century, where deepening contradictions of neoliberalism coincided with a growing exhaustion of pre-existing social and economic defense mechanisms (Castillo Claudett N.d.; Goldstein 2004; Guerrero 2000; Godoy 2004, 2006; Vilas 2001). This is so even where, as in the case of Guatemala (and perhaps Peru), the messy end of a lengthy civil war introduced additional complications (Cifuentes 2004; Fernández 2004; Godoy 2006, 2002).

In Mexico since 1982, and particularly 1985, fiscal austerity, the privatization of state enterprises, tariff reductions, incentives to foreign investment and the elimination of import quotas have reconfigured basic economic and social relationships. In gross statistical terms, neoliberal capitalism has been accompanied by income concentration, declining real incomes, reduced formal sector employment and the concurrent expansion of informal sector work, cuts in government health and education budgets and the replacement of entitlement programs with targetted poverty alleviation programs advocated by the World Bank (see Portes and Hoffman 2003; Portes and Roberts 2005). In the process the "resources of poverty" represented by informal loans, mutual assistance and household economic diversification succumbed to the crisis of a "poverty of resources," resulting in the deterioration of relations of neighbourhood and community solidarity and a "turn inward" that often led to the abandonment of responsibility toward ill, infirm and elderly members of extended families (González de la Rocha 2001, 2004). In Mexico and elsewhere unease and discontent grew as labour unions were disarticulated, weakened and eliminated and citizens' committees and other organs of mediation were repressed, bought off or neutralized by the state (see Zermeño 1996).

Finally, crime, both violent crime and, especially, crime against property—often a form of "forced entrepreneurialism in a context of widespread relative deprivation" (Portes and Roberts 2005:75)—has increased throughout the country.[4] In Mexico City homicides went from 10.2 (26.3 for males) per 100,000 inhabitants in 1990 to 19.5 (34.6 for males) in 1995, and robberies rose from 866 per 100,000 in 1990, to 1,017 in 1994 and 1,831 in 1997. Overall crime grew by 35.4% from 1991-97 following a much slower growth of 2.2% for the decade of the 1980s (Portes and Roberts 2005). Street assaults, home invasions, auto theft, kidnapping for ransom and the *sequestro exprés*—"express kidnappings" in which the victim is

driven around the city and forced to withdraw money from banks or ATM machines before being released—led the U.S. Embassy to alert travellers to the danger in the late 1990s. Crime figures declined after the turn of the millennium but remained above pre-devaluation (pre-1994) levels (Pansters and Castillo 2007). The security forces and judicial system have proven incapable of coping with this situation, being both undermanned and easily corrupted. The generalized belief in the incapacity of the government to deal with crime finds sustenance in the low rates of apprehension, indictment and conviction for crimes reported to the police. Indeed, many crimes are never reported because of a complete lack of confidence in the interest or ability of authorities to take effective action.

It seems likely, though, that lynchings are "not about crime qua crime so much as the social anxiety produced by it" (Godoy 2004:628). Albeit fixated on crime and the fear of victimization, anxiety responds to a broad range of uncertainties about the future of the self, family and society in general: the insecurity of steady employment, income, family and household well-being, and at least in the Mexican case, the withdrawal of an already feeble state from the arena of social welfare. In this sense, lynchings are and should be understood as over-determined events, referencing first, the social relational precipitates of past state and non-state violence in the context of, second, contemporary social crises that, according to Fuentes, "upset people's life plans [and] modify the basis of social reproduction" (2007:11-12).[5] Third, they respond to specific histories as enacted in and through local social fields, which is merely to say that the "disposition to lynch"—if indeed such a disposition exists—need not be spread evenly across all rural communities and urban neighbourhoods (see Castillo Claudett N.d; Fuentes 2007).

Placing lynchings and other forms of vigilante justice at the intersection of micro and macro processes and in the context of historical and contemporary relationships—with the state at the centre—has not been the norm in public discussion, yet this is the grey area that begs historical and ethnographic interrogation in order to account for the tremendous growth of popular (in)justice. Journalists who reported on the event in San Juan Ixtayopan failed to inquire into the roles that broader social conditions or the local social field—everyday life and community relations—might have played in the violence: Who were the men who were murdered? What were they doing in the town? What townspeople were involved? Why some and not others? What power did they exercise to make things happen as they did? And more generally: What was the history of community-state relations? How had different groups of residents negotiated the social, economic and ideological transformations of the last decade or more, and at what costs? Satisfactory responses to these questions cannot be obtained on the basis of short journalistic forays into the community. We can, however, follow the public debate as it unfolded in the press, noting how government officials, politicians and the press combined to generate confusing discourses that clouded as opposed to clarified the causes, enactment and aftermath of the lynching, and that mirror in many ways the very atmosphere of rumour and innuendo that shrouded San Juan on 23 November. We can also point to some local concerns in San Juan Ixtayopan, captured by journalists and official and unofficial testimonies to the events, that suggest links between broad-based social anxieties rooted in neoliberal political economy and this episode of popular (in)justice.

Politicians and the Press on San Juan Ixtayopan

For months after the lynching, the press devoted enormous attention to accusations and counter accusations levied by different groups charged with security in the Federal District, among them the Federal Preventative Police (PFP), the (Mexico City) Federal District Security Secretariat (SSPDF) and the Federal Security Secretariat (SSP). Whose responsibility was it to respond? Who was on the scene first and why did they not prevent the lynching? Why were helicopters not employed? Were police ordered to stand down by their supervisors? And who was at the top of the chain of command that evening? What roles did traffic, distance, the size of the lynch mob, the narrow streets and limited access to the site, and more ominously, politics play in determining the outcome? The discussion was contained within a volatile political space where a PAN-dominated federal government faced off against a PRD-dominated Federal District administration, and President Vicente Fox opposed PRD Federal District mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Both PAN and PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party)—equally fearful of López Obrador's impending presidential run—attempted to use the lynching as evidence that he was soft on crime and tolerant of unrest, for them clear evidence that he was not presidential material. Unwilling to accuse López Obrador directly, President Fox dismissed Marcelo Ebrard, the mayor's Secretary of Public Security. Then, in a kind of trial by proxy of López Obrador, the PAN-dominated Attorney General's office indicted Ebrard for dereliction of duty.

From one side of the political divide and then the other, commissions were organized, officials subpoenaed to tes-

tify and field exercises were carried out to show that this or that rescue force could (or could not) have gotten to San Juan Ixtayopan in time. The Mexico City Attorney General's office even spent a hundred thousand pesos (over nine thousand dollars) financing a mock run from ten different police posts to San Juan Ixtayopan, under traffic and weather conditions similar to those of the night of 23 November in order to "prove" that the trip could not be made in the minimum 40 minutes claimed by the federal Attorney General's office on the basis of *its* trial. At 2,600 pesos per hour (roughly US$230), a notary public accompanied each motorcade in order to certify travel time between the two points (Castillo 2004a; Servín 2004b).

The lynching's containment within party politics impeded a more profound investigation of the relationship between neoliberal-based social and economic crises and citizen (in)justice. A few early news articles discussed weakened institutions and alluded to the role that the perpetrators' "social exclusion" played in their actions. But other journalists, "experts" and public officials (including President Fox) attributed the lynchings to *usos y costumbres* (traditional law), belying the fact that San Juan Ixtayopan is a large, urban mestizo community and not a small, rural indigenous one (Áviles 2004; Saldierna and Herrera 2004). The usos y costumbres argument also demonstrated ignorance that "traditional law," where intact in Latin America, generally emphasizes compensation over retribution (Fernández 2004). Speaking of indigenous Guatemala, Godoy affirms that "lynchings did not occur in any regular fashion until the 1990s." Had they been part of traditional Mayan justice, she says, "they surely would have surfaced earlier" (2004:630).

The hegemony of what Godoy refers to as "a law-centred vision of social and political change" (2002:641) dominated press reports. But within a few days a more ominous figure was pushed onto centre stage in the form of armed rebels seeking to overthrow the state, and what began as a spontaneous act came to be reinterpreted in some quarters as the result of a planned operation. By the time the dust settled on a convoluted and serpentine public discourse that purported to explain the lynchings, the crime scene could no longer be investigated, compromised as it had been by the passage of time, collective community shame and the myriad and roundabout explanations that had been thrown out haphazardly by state officials, as if to see what might stick.

Guerrillas and Narcomenudeo

Early reports had it that the agents lynched in San Juan Ixtayopan had been investigating street-level drug sales, or *narcomenudeo*. But on 4 December, Gabriel Regino García, the undersecretary for Public Security in the Federal District, raised the possibility that they had been pursuing either the Peoples Armed Revolutionary Forces (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo* or FARP) or, alternatively, the Popular Revolutionary Army (*Ejercito Popular Revolucionario* or EPR). The EPR is a small, armed guerrilla organization that made its public debut in Guerrero on 28 June 1997, the first anniversary of the Mexican army's massacre of 17 unarmed peasant protestors at Agua Blanca (Ross 1998:265). Francisco Cerezo Contreras, a suspected EPR leader, fugitive from justice and father of three young men jailed for ERP sympathies, had lived for a time in San Juan in a house near the Popul Vuh elementary school, though according to his brother, he had left the area some 15 to 20 years earlier. That EPR affiliates or sympathizers might have been in San Juan also raised the spectre, bandied about for weeks in the press, that the lynching was not a lynching at all but the culmination of an EPR plan to assassinate members of the state security forces. This scenario displaced initial claims about peasant-Indian brutality inscribed in customary law[6] at the same time that it legitimated the intervention of armed police and military forces.

During 15 years after the winding down of the government's "dirty war" against opposition groups, the state's neoliberal project had progressed without the aggravation of a real armed opposition. The brief Zapatista uprising garnered substantial national and international attention and support, but the Zapatistas were ensconced in remote Chiapas and lost little time in distancing themselves from armed struggle, opting publicly for the nonviolent road to the "nontaking" of state power. The EPR posed no real military threat either, despite the arms and Leninist diatribes, both amply displayed on its web site, but it did index the state's increasingly tenuous hold over Mexican national territory and a pervading concern with the potential impact of domestic insurgencies on foreign investment. Then, in July and August of 1996, the EPR carried out a series of brazen assaults on police posts and other objectives in Guerrero, Oaxaca, Puebla and the Federal District, and conducted armed propaganda actions in Chiapas and Tabasco. A decade later in 2006 the government attempted, unsuccessfully, to tie the EPR to the campaign of the Oaxaca People's Assembly (*Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca*, APPO) to unseat corrupt PRI governor Ulises Ruiz. In July of 2007, the EPR blew up three state-owned gas pipelines in retribution for Governor Ruiz's jailing of two of its members in Oaxaca, a possible harbinger of more attacks on the country's fragile economic infrastructure. Although the most

recent EPR actions transpired several years after the San Juan Ixtayopan lynching, the government has been worried for years about the havoc this small guerrilla group might provoke, and perhaps concerned as well that successful challenges to the state on the part of the EPR might enlarge the ranks of the group's militants and sympathizers. One PAN federal deputy even claimed the discovery of "links between Al Qaeda and the ERP," which provoked a colleague to ask, sarcastically, "and Osama Bin Laden ordered the lynching, right?" (Méndez and Garduño 2004:42).

As of April 2008, the agents' motives for being in San Juan Ixtayopan have not been clarified by any state security organization. In the wake of the tragedy, spokespeople for the federal security forces who ordered the surveillance operation changed their stories several times. At first, the agents were investigating narcomenudeo, then they were seeking out cells of either the FARP or EPR, soon settling on the latter. Later, officials claimed that the investigation embraced *both* drugs *and* guerrillas, because, they said, the EPR finances its organization and purchases arms with profits from narcotics sales. One account had it that the agents' investigation of street level drug sales was a cover for their real mission, which was "to locate and photograph presumed guerrillas who financed their activities by selling drugs" (Castillo 2004b:31). Public confusion heightened when *La Jornada* published a summary of a document—that it later determined to be falsified—that affirmed the presence of guerrillas in San Juan (Urrutia 2004). In a statement noteworthy mainly for its vagueness, Francisco Labastida, 2000 PRI presidential candidate and former Interior Secretary under President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), said that in 1998 the EPR operated in "marginal neighbourhoods, rural zones and those near to Mexico City" and that "quite probably Tláhuac was among them" (Salgado and Méndez 2004:37). The lawyer for the director of the PFP in the Federal District added to the confusion when he explained that his client had not attempted to rescue Mirales, Bonilla and Moreno earlier in the evening of the 23rd because he believed at the time that they had been *delinquando* (engaged in delinquent acts), such as child kidnapping—the same rumour that rippled through the crowded streets of San Juan Ixtayopan (Méndez and Castillo 2005)!

Those who accepted the claims of EPR involvement and manipulation reduced San Juaneros to a mindless mob easily swayed to action by strong, charismatic personalities. Such portrayals are not uncommon. Ethnographic and journalistic reportage of lynchings elsewhere highlight the roles of one or two people who whip a crowd—senses often dulled by alcohol—into "lynch mob" frenzy, with adult women urging on younger males, showering the captive(s) with abuse and calling for the death sentence (see Goldstein 2004; Quinones 2001). The leader is frequently portrayed as an otherwise forgettable figure that seizes, in Warholesque manner, her 15 minutes of fame. The Huejutla, Hidalgo lynching of two stamp salesmen, mentioned above, was ostensibly led by Martín Hernández, characterized by Sam Quinones as "an unlikely figure to lead a movement but an appropriate one for a lynching" given that he was "sixty-five...poor, lumpy, and balding, with a healthy appetite for sugarcane rotgut" (2001:43).

In San Juan, witnesses identified the leaders to be Alicia Zamora, known as *La Gorda* (Chubby) or *La Güera* (Blondie), and her spouse, local policeman Eduardo Torres Montes. In the aftermath of the lynching, both were accused by state security agencies of involvement in drug sales, subversive groups or both (Castillo and Méndez 2004). Several police who arrived early on the scene alleged that Zamora exercised a Svengali-like control over hundreds of (mostly) young men: she was said to have "egged on" the inhabitants to attack the federal officers and set herself against those authorities who attempted to calm the crowd. Officer Gloria Guadalupe Hernández testified that when she arrived at the site where Bonilla and the others were being held captive, La Gorda approached her and said

> "Chief [*Jefa*], I've got three detainees," and in asking who they might be, she replied: "they say that they are from the PFP [Federal Preventative Police]." She [Zamora] took her [Hernández] to them and she was able to speak to them, and when she suggested that they take them to the Police Station [*Ministerio Público*], the response she received was "no, we are going to mess them up [*los vamos a madrear*] because they are kidnappers." She mentioned that at the same time they [the crowd] began to throw various objects at the detainees, and saw that some...brought sticks and pipes with which to beat the agents; she protected one of them, but was herself attacked. La Güera stood out as the one who gave the orders, and it was she who told the crowd when to stand down and when to rush the three detainees. [Llanos and Romero 2005a:41]

The witness portrays Zamora—alternately reported to be a drug trafficker and EPR militant (or both)—as a master of dangerous beasts: it is *she* who moves the masses to action and reins them in. The belief that the agents' deaths resulted from a clever insurgent plot enacted upon an impressionable crowd deprives San Juaneros of independent will, and at the same time,

obscures the tensions that characterize contemporary state-civil society relations. While authorities held individual San Juaneros legally responsible for killing two PFP agents and injuring a third, the belief in an insurgent plot has their actions being driven forward by the lynching's intellectual authors—the *Eperistas* (EPR members) who planned the assault and duped locals into participating. An underlying assumption seems to be that in the absence of EPR instigators, cooler heads would have prevailed and tragedy would have been averted.

But who is La Güera and her policeman husband? How long had they lived in San Juan Ixtayopan? Where were their families? What social group or class do they belong to? What relations did they maintain with their neighbours and with teachers and administrators at the Popol Vuh school? Who else was involved, and how are they socially located within this community? How could one person, this Güera, instigate dozens, if not hundreds, of her neighbours and fellow-townspeople, to behave "out of character," and outside routine and collective norms? Given what we know about the phenomenological status of everyday life, this would seem to be improbable if not impossible, unless some kind of disposition already existed, some set of ideas or relationships that could *not* be integrated with everyday knowledge and practice, and thus constituted the generalized sense of social anxiety that Godoy identifies.

Most poor and working-class Mexicans manifest a combination of loathing, fear and distrust of state (in)security forces, which are viewed as inefficient, incompetent and abusive of their authority. Judicial agents, in particular, use torture and forced confessions to secure convictions against those lacking money and influence, even after numerous reports criticizing them for doing so (see Human Rights Watch 1999; Amnesty International 2007). Confronted with unknown men hanging around the Popul Vuh school, San Juaneros could not be certain that they were PFP as they claimed to be, false identities and documentation being common occurrences. But even if they were, this does not mean that they were not participating in a child kidnapping ring. Mexicans might object to the violent, neocolonial tropes that predominate in *Man on Fire*—the 2005 movie in which an ex-U.S. "black-ops" agent detonates a load of C-4 explosive in the spectacular assassination of "Fuentes," a Federal District Judicial policeman involved with a kidnapping ring—but they have no difficulty accepting the premise of the latter's involvement in crime and corruption. In the state of Morelos in the late 1990s, PRI Governor Jorge Carillo Olea was forced from office by President Zedillo for allowing the state judicial police to protect *Moche Orejas* (literally, Ear Hacker), a notorious kidnapper known for sending an ear—and other body parts if that failed to do the trick—to the victim's family in order to expedite ransom negotiations . In Mexico City and elsewhere, hundreds of members of different agencies (state and federal preventative police, judicial police, the public security secretariat and elite police groups assigned to combat narcotrafficking or protect migrants from criminal bands) have been dismissed, though seldom prosecuted, for corruption, kidnapping, theft, assault, murder and the transport and sale of illegal drugs. During a community meeting in San Juan Ixtayopan three days following the lynching, the press reported that one young man asked: "we know that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and members of the Federal Preventative Police are daily involved in narcotrafficking and kidnapping. How can we be certain that those people [the lynched agents] weren't among them?" (Salgado 2004b). Five hundred Mexicans polled in 1998-99 regarding their opinion (good, bad or indifferent) of 16 different social "positions" rated the judicial police above only drug traffickers, drug addicts and alcoholics, and below prostitutes, politicians and homosexuals (Reguillo 2002).

In San Juan Ixtayopan, state officials aggravated rather than assuaged residents' concerns. Journalists reported that on two and perhaps three occasions between 11 and 17 November, local inhabitants, *including Alicia Zamora*, were rebuffed in their attempts to confirm the identifies and mission of the strangers hanging out around the school. They asked the men to identify themselves, and receiving unsatisfactory responses, spoke with local authorities and even requested in writing a meeting with Fátima Mena, the Tláhuac delegate to the Federal District congress, in which they expressed concern that "presumed members of the PFP had been filming 'children in the streets and schools'" (Llanos and Romero 2005b:40; see Castillo 2004b). None of these efforts bore fruit. The agents' claim to be from the PFP was affirmed by local police, but a phone number provided one resident by the officers was answered by someone who claimed to have no knowledge of them. Fátima Mena's office perceived little urgency in scheduling the requested meeting, postponing it until the 24th, which turned out to be the day *after* the lynching. Some San Juaneros claimed that even as the three agents were being detained and abused by the angry crowd, the lynching could have been prevented, because the captured officers succeeded in communicating with the central PFP office. However, "'someone' [who answered the phone] told them that their commanders were 'in a very important meeting' and could not attend to the call" (Méndez 2004:35).

"State" of Fear

People practise the epistemologies of everyday life at the immediate level of home, street and school. Socialized into this world—albeit a world readymade in and through the social relations of capitalism—most people come to assume a "natural attitude" in interacting with others, one that allows for communication, movement and the satisfaction of daily needs (Schutz 1967; Berger and Luckmann 1966). Changes in this familiar, face-to-face environment guided by repetition, pragmatism and habit in thought and action (Schutz 1967; Heller 1984) are duly noted. Strangers taking photos of school children is not itself a sufficient condition for a lynching, but may become so in the context of shifts in what Raymond Williams calls the "structure of feeling"—manifest in the social anxiety discussed by Godoy.

Although there is much we do not know that would help us understand this lynching, the presence of outsiders near the Popul Vuh school and their photographic surveillance of Education Technology Street surely unsettled local residents. Child theft occurs frequently in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America, and has served as the popular justification of a number of lynchings over the course of the last 20 years (see for example Quinones 2001; Shadow and Rodríguez-Shadow 1991). Scheper-Hughes traces the pervasive belief in child kidnapping (and organ theft) to deaths, disappearances and defilement of bodies on the part of authoritarian states from Brazil to Guatemala and El Salvador. She considers them to reflect the "ontological insecurity of poor people to whom almost anything could be done...reflecting everyday threats to bodily security, urban violence, police terror, social anarchy, theft, loss and fragmentation" (2000:203). By way of illustration, during the above-mentioned lynching of the travelling stamp salesmen in the state of Hidalgo, the rumour circulated that "the men weren't salesmen at all but foot soldiers in a Texas-based ring of child kidnappers who not only trafficked in organs but had a liver or two in the cab of their truck, for which they were said to receive the awesome sum of $1,500 apiece" (Quinones 2001:33).

Eyes, livers and other bodily organs were not mentioned in the stories that circulated among the crowd in San Juan Ixtayopan, but kidnapped children were. *It was said*—note the use of passive voice—that the accused men had kidnapped one young girl (or perhaps two), that they had been taking notes on young people, had photographs of children and "were the ones going around kidnapping in the borough" (Servín 2004a:38, 40). Investigation of this rumour yielded no evidence of anyone "going around kidnapping in the borough." But even if lacking in precision and exaggerating the magnitude of the threat, the fact remains that poor Mexicans encounter a plethora of supporting evidence in their immediate environment in the postings of missing persons in bus stations or the crime sections of tabloids avidly consumed by the urban working classes. Read through the frame of daily life, in which people have a limited behavioural and cognitive repertoire for incorporating the unknown and unexpected into the *doxa*, the taken-for-granted, something as extraordinary as kidnapping a child or stealing and selling an organ would be certain to heighten the general anxiety that people already feel due to employment and income insecurity, poor-to-nonexistent public services, rumours of narcotrafficking and the failure of the combined forces of the police and army to control both drug production and sales as well as daily, drug-related executions; many of these problems can be attributed in part to the bipolar disorder of the state—absent in the daily, basic functions that support civil society, but present in the form of heavily armed, anonymous forces when a "threat" presents itself, as in the alleged appearances of guerrillas. We believe that in these ways a case can be made that child kidnapping rumours materialize in people's minds, even as they also incorporate and refract sometimes inexpressible apprehensions about loss of control over economic, social and even biological affairs (see Scheper-Hughes 1996).

Before this community could begin to cope with what it had done and why, the state invaded in a military-style action involving as many as a thousand agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Attorney General's Office. Without a single arrest warrant, but armed with folders full of grainy images obtained from the previous night's television broadcasts of the lynching, officials conducted a house-to-house search, explaining to those who opened their doors that they "were going to inspect the premises" (*que se realizaría una inspección*).[7] They detained 35 persons whose images supposedly matched those in the archive, shortly thereafter releasing 13 and holding the remaining 22 as "materially responsible" for the murder of officers Mireles and Bonilla and the injuries sustained by officer Moreno (Méndez and Vargas 2004:45; see Salgado 2004a). Later incursions, involving helicopter flyovers, caravans of vehicles and large numbers of police and Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, netted an additional seven suspects, although a number of the key people for whom the judicial apparatus eventually issued warrants—Alicia Zamora among them—evaded the dragnet.

On 3 December, nine days after the arrests, the 29 defendants accused uniformly of "qualified homicide, theft, property damage and crimes against public servants," were convicted and sentenced to prison. President Fox congratulated the judge and declared that "criminals who shame our country will have to confront justice and receive the punishment they deserve...Now they are in jail...the ones who lit the fuse, who sprayed gasoline, who beat and detained those honourable, diligent public servants" (Pérez 2004:37).[8] But in his eagerness to applaud the work of the courts, Fox overlooked cases such as that of Julio César Roa Hernández, an airline employee, sentenced with the others, who, during the lynching, made two telephone calls to Televisa (a national television station), two to the Federal District Human Rights Commission and four to the National Human Rights Commission, all "with the object of requesting assistance so that the PFP agents might be rescued" (Méndez and Salgado 2004).[9]

Conclusions

Neoliberal political economic policies and practices have altered the contours of daily life and intensified myriad fears and apprehensions about the present and future of self, family and society. We believe that the post-1994 increase in lynchings objectifies these fears and apprehensions on the body of the victims, generating a transitory sense of collective relief, a social catharsis as it were. In the process of carrying out citizen (in)justice, the participants critique the state for inaction and pose "popular justice" as a necessary substitute. The young man cited above as questioning the possible activities of the lynched agents, was quoted as stating, during the same community meeting, that "all the authorities of our country are corrupt"; he insisted that "we won't be led by a bunch of politicians who spend their time passing the buck [*no nos dejemos llevar por una bola de políticos que nada más se la pasan echándose la bolita*]. I would ask them: 'What would you do if your daughter was raped? Would you stand around with crossed arms?' I bet not. They would close in, stab him and kill him" (Salgado 2004b:36).

A Mexican state that cannot provide for the basic needs of civil society expects challenges to its legitimacy, and in the last few decades, this has come in many forms, including social mobilization against development projects (state plans to expropriate agricultural land in Atenco for the construction of a new international airport) against government corruption (APPO), and for the provision of public services. There have also been legitimate political challenges from parties outside the two major power holders, as in López Obrador's PRD run for the presidency, and more seriously, armed struggle in the form of the EPR, EZLN and other groups. When we add to this unstable mix the open defiance of the state's pretensions of controlling the violence that has accompanied the spread of narcotrafficking, and then throw in the ever-present rumours of child kidnapping, sex trafficking and organ theft, the structures that support the certainties of everyday life suddenly seem unstable indeed. Far from discouraging lynching, the massive use of force in San Juan Ixtayopan and the arrest and conviction of local residents merely reinforced existing views of the undemocratic, corrupt and repressive nature of the Mexican state in its dealings with the working classes and the poor. Like the brutal torture and quartering of the 18th-century regicide Damian, documented in gruesome detail by Foucault (1977), the contemporary Mexican state sought to use raw power in order to intimidate into silence and inaction those who would challenge its authority by harming its representatives.

Under these conditions, the "stock of knowledge" that guides everyday thought and action is rendered irrelevant (Berger and Luckmann 1966). And if the contours of the close, social world in which people live, raise their children, go to work and do their daily shopping can no longer be counted on, anything can happen. It is for this reason that we insist that investigations of lynchings like that in San Juan Ixtayopan need to begin with a global analysis that can link changes in the contours of everyday life with alterations in the economic structures that govern employment, wages and benefits, state responsibilities for reproduction of the labour force, and institutional rights and obligations from law enforcement and legal systems to health, welfare and education. The press is incapable of carrying out the kind of deep interrogation required to get at these issues, not the least because, in the capitalist market, speed and novelty trump depth and analysis. Influenced by the dominant position of television journalism, "fast thinking" journalists offer up "cultural 'fast food'—predigested and pre-thought culture," precisely the opposite of what one requires in order to actually understand anything (Bourdieu 1998:229). We drew liberally upon press reports in this interpretative essay, linking them with empirical material and theoretically informed analyses of lynching in Latin America (and elsewhere). However, we acknowledge the limitations both of our sources and the lessons that might be extracted from any single case study (such as this one), and urge ethnographic investigation of this phenomenon, as well as the compilation of systematic databases. Both are necessary means for developing a deeper analysis and gaining a comparative perspective on this lamentable phenomenon.

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Notes

1 Earlier versions of this essay benefited from close, critical readings by Gavin Smith, Lesley Gill and two anonymous reviewers, none of whom is responsible for the final content.

2 The Federal District is a political entity with administrative standing as a state. The Mexico City metropolitan zone today, however, extends well beyond the limits of the Federal District, into independent towns in the state of Mexico.

3 Lynching (*linchamiento*) is a vernacular term widely used in Latin America to denote the exercise of unauthorized and generally unorganized collective violence against individuals or small groups with or without the complicity of the authorities, who in some circumstances are themselves lynching victims. In Mexico the term is also used metaphorically to refer to journalistic and political campaigns to discredit public figures.

4 That is to say that property crime in Mexico City and other urban zones of Latin America "frequently involves young men from [poor] areas going to where the wealth is [wealthier urban zones], and where some of it can be appropriated without undue risks of arrest and incarceration" (Portes and Roberts 2005:75).

5 Contemporary social displacements and crises resulting from the implementation of neoliberal policies generate a "hysterisis effect" in Bourdieu's terms (Bourdieu 1990). Hysteresis refers to the situation in which a habitus formed under one set of objective conditions finds itself in radically different circumstances where its socially inscribed strategies do not work. Hysteresis can occur in a variety of circumstances—rapid social change being one of them (disasters, such as Katrina, another)—but the specific responses to hysteresis will depend on the particular habitus, on the one hand, and the new or altered social fields in which it must operate, on the other.

6 That many residents of San Juan were migrants from more densely populated areas closer to the city centre and not part of the growing population of urban indigenous fleeing the ruined countryside meant little. Saner heads pointed out that San Juan housed a stable working class population, that there was no historical precedent for the lynching and that crime rates in San Juan and in the Tláhuac borough of which it formed a part were lower than other areas of Mexico City. Even so, the unconscious association of lynching with Indians and Indians (and lynching) with customary law manifests some of the ways that race and class (or ethnicity and class) meet up in the cerebral cortexes of otherwise progressive Mexican intellectuals.

7 Later the government claimed that four local witnesses volunteered to identify the lynchings' perpetrators and participants (Méndez 2005).

8 Lawyers for the defendants argued that Fox pressured the judge. On 2 December, the day before the judge announced her verdict in the case, Marisa Morales, co-ordinator for the Attorney General's Office, met with the judge for ten minutes. Morales denied that they discussed the Tláhuac case, but the timing of the meeting suggests otherwise (Méndez and Salgado 2004).

9 According to *La Jornada*, which obtained access to the court depositions filed by the defendants, 6 of the 29 defendants admitted having participated; another 8 denied having taken part but, according to the correspondent, could be definitively linked to the lynchings by photos and video recordings; the remaining 15 claimed that they were either not present or were merely onlookers (Méndez and Salgado 2004).

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The Parastate in Colombia: Political Violence and the Restructuring of Barrancabermeja

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Abstract: This article examines how terror and fear hastened the neoliberal restructuring of Barrancabermeja and the creation of a violent surrogate state. It argues that neoliberal reforms arose in the context of a severe social crisis. Massive violence and disorder ruptured social solidarities and facilitated the incorporation of some working people into exploitative forms of labour regulation, rent extraction and political subjugation that deepened neoliberalism and undergirded the creation of a public order in which the private power of paramilitarism merged with the state.

Keywords: Colombia, informal working class, parastate, neoliberalism, crisis, violence

Résumé: Cet article examine la façon dont la terreur et la peur ont accéléré la restructuration néolibérale de Barrancabermeja et la création d'un État de substitution fondé sur la violence. On y présente la façon dont les réformes néolibérales ont vu le jour dans un contexte de crise sociale sévère. Des violences et désordres massifs ont ébranlé les solidarités sociales et ont facilité l'incorporation de certains travailleurs dans des formes de règlementation du travail fondées sur l'exploitation, l'extorsion des loyers, et l'asservissement politique, qui ont renforcé le néolibéralisme et sous-tendu la création d'un ordre public où le pouvoir privé des paramilitaires a fusionné avec l'État.

Mots-clés : Colombie, classe ouvrière informelle, para-État, néolibéralisme, crise, violence

A number of scholars have documented the social decomposition that arose as states in the Andean region and around the world aligned their policies and practices with the rationales of neoliberal economic theory in the late 20th century. The process of neoliberalization entailed the reorganization of states and societies to facilitate the accumulation of wealth by domestic and foreign elites, both new and old. Through the enactment of "flexible" labour laws, cuts in social welfare expenditures, the deregulation of foreign capital, the privatization of state enterprises and the commodification of public assets, state policy makers and corporations dispossessed peasants and working people and they facilitated the dismantling of social relationships through which the poor had taken care of themselves and each other. Many of the institutional forms, such as labour unions and state welfare agencies, that provided some people with cover from the ravages of capitalism were also destroyed or weakened (see for example, Breman 2003; Collins 2003; Davis 2006; Gill 2000; Seabrook 1996;Winn 2004). The dispossession and dislocation of broad sectors of the population has aggravated old inequalities and given rise to new vulnerabilities.

The social disarray generated by neoliberalism is most evident in cities, where downsized workers and ruined peasants struggle with the marginalized urban poor for diminishing returns in the informal economy. Davis calls this growing army of the dispossessed an informal proletariat (Davis 2004, 2006). This working class is dominant demographically in a way that the industrial proletariat never was, but its members are ever more superfluous to capital accumulation under neoliberalism. As the neoliberal state has retreated from the provision of social services, government officials treat this class as a disposable workforce and demonstrate little initiative to provide for the economic security of impoverished peoples. Consequently, marginalized urbanites must rely on their own solutions to the chaos imposed upon them. Unlike the

industrial proletariat, which organized to fight exploitation and the power of capital through trade unions, their efforts to rebuild social solidarities and confront deepening poverty include a variety of solutions, including neoliberal development NGOs (Gill 2000), evangelical churches (Stoll 1990), gangs (Bourgois 1996), social movements (Sawyer 2004), vigilante groups (Goldstein 2004; Godoy 2006) and guerrilla insurgencies (Burt 2007).

These myriad initiatives reflect the enormous heterogeneity of the new informal working class and they raise questions about how this working class, which enjoys few rights and protections, is being incorporated into networks of power that have emerged within, alongside of and against the formally constituted state. They also raise questions of order and control for nominally democratic states, which are increasingly unable to manage the disorder that their policies have always generated. It is therefore not surprising that as states have retreated from the provision of social welfare, Pentagon planners worry about the military challenges posed by so-called "feral cities" (Norton 2003; Graham 2007) and militaries and police forces remain key to upholding the very order that neoliberal policies undermine (see for example, Aiyer 2001; Davis 2006; Gill 2000; NACLA 1998). Yet as states outsource the provision of security to private entities, both legal and illegal, they allow these groups to accumulate wealth and power within the institutional apparatus of the state and this, in turn, threatens states' control over the exercise of violence.[1]

Although all states assert rights over a territory and people in the name of the nation, these claims have grown more untenable as privatization and outsourcing have reconfigured state power under neoliberalism (Hansen and Stepputat 2006). And in Andean societies, the capacity of states to claim effective control over diverse regions, urban neighbourhoods, and political constituencies has always been limited and uneven (see for example, Burt 2007; Ceballos Melguizo 2001; Mauceri 2004; Nugent 1997; Vargas 2004). Perhaps the most extreme example is Colombia, where an enduring civil war and the politics of neoliberalism have become intertwined (Hylton 2007). For 40 years, left-wing guerrillas have used illegal violence to oppose the state and Colombia's largest and oldest guerrilla group—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—has itself taken on many state-like characteristics, such as the control of territory, the extraction of "taxes," the provision of security and the administration of justice. In contrast to the guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries have operated alongside the official state since the 1980s and used terror to combat the insurgencies. The paramilitaries have also taken on state-like characteristics, but unlike the guerrillas, who aspire to create an alternative state, the paramilitaries defend the status quo and in some instances have become a kind of surrogate state in regions where the power of the official state is either absent or ineffective (Bejarano and Pizarro 2004).

Widespread political violence has torn apart social solidarities and exposed peasants and working people to extreme social and economic insecurities. Thousands of trade unionists have died—most at the hands of the paramilitaries—in the last 20 years and Colombia now has the largest internally displaced population in the world after Sudan and Iraq (UNHCR 2009). As people have grown more vulnerable, they are available for incorporation into or exclusion from the social relations of neoliberal capitalism on terms not of their choosing. They must also struggle with each other to overcome the chaos that civil war and economic restructuring have imposed on their lives. As displaced peasants, the urban poor and downsized workers compete for jobs in an expanding urban informal economy, they must simultaneously negotiate their security, social and economic well being, and a variety of norms and practices with armed authoritarian groups under conditions of extreme fear.

This essay examines the violent neoliberal restructuring of Barrancabermeja, an oil refining centre in Colombia's conflicted Middle Magdalena region, which was, for many years, a stronghold of leftist guerrillas and was then taken over by the Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB), a powerful paramilitary bloc of the now defunct Autodefenses Unidas de Colombia (AUC). AUC co-ordinated, for several years, the actions of paramilitary groups operating throughout the country. I argue that the production of terror and fear in Barrancabermeja by paramilitaries allied with the state hastened the neoliberal restructuring of the economy and the erection of a violent surrogate state. The creation and manipulation of crisis was central to this process. Massive violence, terror and repression ruptured social networks and the organizational forms, such as labour unions, that protected people from the full impact of the market. They pushed people to the extremes of vulnerability by threatening their lives, eliminating any feeling of safety and making daily existence completely unpredictable. The social disorganization and crisis then facilitated the incorporation of some working people into new exploitative forms of labour regulation, rent extraction and political subjugation that deepened insecurity, weakened any collective response and facilitated new forms of capital accumulation for regional elites and a new rising class of narco-entrepreneurs.[2] All of this undergirded the creation of a new public order in which the private power of paramilitarism merged with the state itself.

The case of Barancabermeja allows us to grasp how fear and disorder aggravated the marginalization of working people under neoliberalism and facilitated their incorporation into new networks of power. It also enables us to consider how a clandestine, paramilitary army strengthened the repressive power of the central state at precisely the moment when the official state was retreating from its social service responsibilities and free-market policies were eroding social well-being and creating widespread discontentment. Yet as the paramilitaries transformed themselves from auxiliaries of the state's security forces into a partially autonomous, surrogate state, they had to contend with new tensions that emerged in the social "order" over which they presided; tensions that arose from the unregulated "gangster capitalism" that engulfed the city and the brutal violence that sustained it. The official state, for its part, had to confront the Frankensteinian monster it had created but could no longer control.

The paper is organized in the following manner. The first section describes Barrancabermeja and the regional conflicts that lead to the paramilitary takeover in 2000-2. The second section examines how paramilitary terror ruptured social ties, exposed the working class to new insecurities, and accelerated the neoliberal restructuring of the urban economy. The discussion then focuses on how paramilitaries incorporated dispossessed people into clientelist networks that constituted the fabric of a repressive surrogate state whose boundaries are often indistinguishable from the official state, and its considers the instabilities that arose from this process.

Barrancabermeja in the Crosshairs

Barrancabermeja (population 300,000) developed as an enclave economy on the banks of the Magdalena river after the Rockefeller-owned Tropical Oil Company won a government concession in 1918 to extract oil. The initiation of oil production drew migrants from different provinces to jobs in the nascent export industry and the city emerged as a centre of populist and left labour activism (Vega Cantor 2002). The powerful oil workers' union (Unión Sindical Obrera, USO), which formed in 1923, won the nationalization of the Colombia oil industry in 1951 and lead the city's vibrant labour and popular movements throughout the 20th century. By linking the concerns of its members to those of the broader community, the union forged close ties with Barrancabermeja's working class districts. It fought for infrastructure and public services in poor neighbourhoods on the urban periphery, supported an array of civic activities—sometimes with its own funds—and defended the national sovereignty of the oil industry (Delgado 2006).

As Colombia's civil war heated up in the 1980s, Barrancabermeja's working class communities provided fertile ground for expanding guerrilla groups seeking to extend their power in the Middle Magdalena region. Three guerrilla organizations—FARC, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and most prominently, the National Liberation Army (ELN)—established a presence in the city, and from the 1980s to the early 21st century, they played a part in the development of poor neighbourhoods. Their eventual eviction was the climax of a long process of massacres, disappearances and massive civilian displacement that, for two decades, accompanied the expansion of paramilitary power throughout the Middle Magdalena region where the struggle over land had attained crisis proportions.

Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, an emergent agrarian narco-bourgeoisie based in the cities of Medellín and Cali started to launder drug profits through the purchase of some of the best, most fertile properties in the countryside. The massive infusion of drug money ignited a speculative market in land that led to the unprecedented accumulation of rural holdings at the expense of poor peasant cultivators, whose land claims were based less on property titles than settlement and use. This process constituted a veritable "counter agrarian reform" and it provoked tensions between drug-barons-turned-landlords, cattle ranchers and some merchants on the one hand, and peasants on the other hand. The consolidation of land holdings and the conflicts sparked by it aggravated a long-term agrarian crisis and quickened the decline of subsistence agriculture. Not surprisingly, many small cultivators formed alliances with ELN and FARC to protect their interests (Richani 2002).

The worsening agrarian conflict placed the regional bourgeoisie on edge. By the 1980s, the guerrillas—especially FARC—controlled large swaths of the countryside and they extorted, kidnapped and harassed rural power holders to such an extent that many felt unsafe visiting their rural properties. In addition, the emergence of the left-wing Patriotic Union political party, which was tied to FARC, and the unification in 1986 of the national trade union movement under the umbrella of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) symbolized the resurgent power of social movements. Moreover, the decentralization of political power, including the first mayoral elections of 1988, opened new opportunities for previously excluded groups to gain a foothold at the local level, and peace talks with FARC initiated by President Belisario Bentancur (1982-88) raised expectations about the incorporation of the insurgents and their political demands into the political system (Romero 2003). These developments threat-

ened the regional bourgeoisie, who feared that the balance of power would shift to favour the insurgents and their sympathizers. They also worried the armed forces who opposed peace talks with the guerrillas.

All of this prompted closer collaboration between the armed forces and the regional bourgeoisie, who complained that the state was not doing enough to protect it or to eliminate the guerrillas. Rural landlords also claimed a right to "self defense" in a region where property holders had long organized private armies to protect land acquisitions, and where paramilitarism had deep roots.[3] Their claim highlighted the state's continuing inability to monopolize the use of violence. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, the state began to collaborate more closely with regional power holders and to clandestinely expand its power in the Middle Magdalena region. With the technical support of the military and the financial muscle of major drug traffickers, it promoted the growth of covert paramilitary groups to fight an expanding counterinsurgency war.

The Middle Magdalena river town of Puerto Boyacá became the epicentre of paramilitarism in Colombia when, in 1982, the town's mayor, the Texas Petroleum Company, cattle ranchers, drug traffickers, foreign mercenaries and members of the armed forces financed and supported the creation of a paramilitary group to join the military's fight against the guerrillas (Medina Gallegos 1990:173). Puerto Boyacá was, at the time, a stronghold of the Colombian Communist Party (CP) and its military wing, FARC. The newly formed paramilitary group and the army concentrated their efforts on disrupting the political organization of the CP and FARC and disarticulating the ties between the party and the insurgency (Medina Gallegos 1990). Yet the repression did less damage to the guerrillas than to unarmed members of the CP and labour and peasant leaders who were easier targets.

Despite the initial "success" of the Puerto Boyacá paramilitaries, they were little more than hit-and-run death squads that never expanded beyond the Middle Magdalena region. They did, however, serve as a source of experience and training for other paramilitary groups that emerged in northern Colombia and elsewhere (Madariaga 2006). By the 1990s, with the enormous profits from the cocaine traffic, regional-based paramilitary entities morphed from roving death squads into standing armies and their commanders began to dispute territorial control with the guerrillas (Duncan 2006). Regional armies obtained increasing autonomy from the state, and they federated in 1997 under a national umbrella organization called the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) that centralized under its command 18 different groups, or approximately 75% of Colombia's paramilitaries (Bejarano and Pizarro 2004:110).

The AUC then grew more lethal with the passage in 2000 of Plan Colombia, a US$1.3 billion, mostly military, U.S. aid program that strengthened the police and the military, the AUC's closest allies. Plan Colombia targetted the guerrilla-controlled coca fields in southern Colombia for fumigation and put pressure on FARC by displacing peasants who formed the guerrillas' support base in the region. Yet it left paramilitary-dominated areas in the north largely untouched and there was little effort to wrest control of strategic cocaine trafficking corridors, like the Magdalena River, from the paramilitaries. Not surprisingly, the paramilitary blocs consolidated their political power and territorial control in many areas once ruled by the guerrillas (Hylton 2006) and civilian displacement became less a consequence than a strategy of an intensifying dirty war.

For many years, as paramilitary massacres and terror displaced peasants from the Middle Magdalena countryside, refugees flooded into Barrancabermeja and the city swelled with displaced victims of rural violence. Most refugees came from areas once under guerrilla control and, during the 1980s, many benefitted from the support and solidarity of the city's trade unions, neighbourhood committees and social organizations united under the umbrella of the Coordinadora Popular de Barrancabermeja. Refugees from particular rural areas tended to cluster together in emerging neighbourhoods, and it should come as no surprise that the guerrillas followed their support base into the city and established a strong presence among them (Interview, human rights worker, 2007).[4] The city's capacity to receive traumatized immigrants changed when the AUC turned its sights on the city.

By the end of the 20th century, Barrancabermeja was the only regional urban centre not under paramilitary control but it was not immune to the escalating violence as state security forces within the city collaborated with the AUC. A Navy-controlled death squad, for example, helped to pave the way for the AUC takeover by assassinating at least 68 trade unionists, journalists and human rights defenders in the late 1980s and 1990s (CINEP/CREDHOS 2004; Loingsigh 2002). The oil port offered the AUC the possibilities of capturing profits from the illicit sale of gasoline produced by the state-controlled oil company (ECOPETROL), of strengthening its grip on cocaine traffic through control of commerce on the Magdalena River and the coca fields in adjacent Bolívar province, and of limiting the provision of supplies to surviving guerrilla redoubts in the countryside. Moreover, the presence of three guerrilla groups in a city known for

its militant social organizations made capturing Barrancabermeja an important political victory.

The Bloque Central Bolívar (BCB)—one of the most powerful blocs in the AUC—executed the takeover of the city. The late AUC leader, Carlos Castaño, had established the BCB in the northern province of Cordoba and, throughout the 1990s, the BCB extended its operations to some 11 Colombian provinces that spanned the length and breadth of the country, amassing a fighting force of 7,000-8,000 mercenaries. The BCB conquered and held territory by forcing guerrillas and other paramilitary competitors to either join forces with it and abandon areas that they claimed or face destruction, and by expelling or massacring civilians who opposed it. Castaño and his brother, Vicente Castaño, also expanded the BCB's influence by "franchising" its activities to drug traffickers such as Carlos Mario Jiménez, alias "Macaco," who had amassed a fortune and a private army through his affiliation with the North Valle drug cartel (Semana 2007).

In Barrancabermeja, the BCB's first objective was to eliminate the leadership and destroy the support base of any organization that represented an alternative to paramilitarism. This not only included the guerrillas but also trade unions, human rights organizations, student groups and neighbourhood councils, which, it claimed, were guerrilla fronts. To accomplish this objective, the BCB unleashed a wave of terror that killed or forcibly displaced thousands of people from the impoverished northeast and southeast sectors. Eighteen thousand people fled the city between 1998 and 2001. Yet the uncertain life of a refugee was better than the fate of others who remained behind. Between 1998 and 2001, 800 people died in the city, mostly at the hands of the paramilitaries (Romero 2003:107), and Barrancabermeja had a per capita death rate in 2000 that was three times higher than the rest of the country (Madero 2001). Because of the terror and confusion, residents no longer knew whom to trust and merely leaving home for work became an act fraught with fear, as fire fights erupted without warning, dead bodies with signs of gruesome torture littered the streets and uniformed paramilitaries patrolled openly in some neighbourhoods. Guerrillas intensified the disorder, according to some survivors, when they switched sides and exposed their support networks to the paramilitaries (Gill 2008).

The paramilitary takeover of Barrancabermeja had less to do with the absence of the state than with its presence and active collaboration with the BCB. Two military bases, several fortified police stations and the bunker-like headquarters of the Department of Administrative Security (DAS)—Colombia's maximum law enforcement agency—operated in the city. They allowed truckloads of BCB fighters to pass freely through military checkpoints; they refused to respond to civilian pleas for help; and, they looked the other way as the BCB committed gruesome atrocities. The total impunity with which the paramilitaries operated left residents feeling completely unprotected. Many human rights crimes went unreported because residents worried that they too would become targets and this, in turn, empowered the paramilitaries to continue terrorizing local people.

The behaviour of the guerrillas also eroded the legitimacy of the insurgents and created a climate conducive to the entry of the paramilitaries. The paramilitary assault on Barrancabermeja coincided with the initiation of U.S.-backed Plan Colombia. As FARC contended with stepped up assaults on its southern Colombian strongholds and confronted growing repression in Barrancabermeja from the state and the BCB, it showed less interest in the political education of residents than in extracting more onerous "war taxes" from city merchants to finance military operations and in using the city as a source of recruits. The escalating war also gave rise to more severe guerrilla "justice" in which suspected informants were executed without any serious investigation of the allegations against them, and guerrilla attacks on police and military installations in densely populated urban areas demonstrated a disregard for civilian life. This behaviour alienated the insurgents from urban residents, and relations between them and many of their supporters soured (Interview, human rights worker, 2007).

By 2002, the initial wave of paramilitary terror had passed and an uneasy calm hung over the city that continues today. Wholesale massacres of suspected guerrilla sympathizers were no longer necessary as the guerrilla militias had retreated from the city, but the paramilitaries used death threats and the selective assassination of social leaders and their family members as a tactic to keep the opposition frightened and off balance. The death and displacement of so many people had ruptured community networks and severed the ties that bound Barrancabermeja's unions and social organizations to a support base in the city's northeast sector. Widespread impunity precluded any public accounting for the human rights abuses and it left perpetrators free to continue terrorizing urban residents. An imposed silence in working class neighbourhoods spoke of the persistence of fear, feelings of hopelessness and worries about the future. All of this accelerated the neoliberal transformation of the local economy, which had begun in the early 1990s. Weakened unions and social organizations found themselves poorly equipped to challenge new "flexible" work arrangements and the

rising cost of basic services as state utilities passed into private hands.

Terror and Neoliberalism

In working-class Barrancabermeja, where opposition to neoliberalism was intense, the links between paramilitarism and the state's neoliberal project were readily appreciated. Paramilitaries targetted labour leaders with particular ferocity, especially during moments of labour conflict that intensified with the initiation of neoliberal reforms. Even more than the official state, they refused to distinguish legitimate protest and the insurgency, and paramilitaries presumed that residents of the city's poor neighbourhoods were guerrilla supporters, regardless of their actual sympathies and associations. Unlike the guerrillas, who opposed opening Colombia to greater foreign investment, the paramilitaries had no position against multinational involvement in the economy and, according to Richani, "this allows for an affinity between the AUC and the foreign companies, particularly those invested in areas of conflict" (2005:130). More importantly, paramilitaries conceptualized local power holders as "the people" (Romero 2003:113) and supported the far-right, neoliberal candidacy of Álvaro Uribe, who became president in 2002, because, according to AUC head Carlos Castaño, Uribe was "the man closest to our philosophy" (Hylton 2006:104). In contrast to the guerrillas, the AUC was less concerned with overthrowing the state than in shoring up and participating in the status quo, and serving as the violent enforcers of its most reactionary elements. They presented Barrancabermeja's company managers with a violent means of labour discipline that helped to create the political conditions for the advancement of neoliberal policies.

During the early months of the BCB occupation of Barrancabermeja, paramilitary commanders summoned labour leaders to meetings in which they advised people to keep a low profile and laid out the new rules of social engagement: no protests, no strikes and no public statements against employers. One union leader who was an outspoken human rights advocate refused to attend these meetings. He explained that:

> [After the takeover], the paramilitaries began to send emissaries to tell me that I should meet with them. They did this to all the trade union leaders in the city, but we were one of the only unions that always refused to meet with the paras. We have a policy to never talk to any of the armed actors. So they started to squeeze me and to threaten me more. [Interview, trade union leader, 2006]

The pressure culminated with the attempted kidnapping of his four-year-old daughter, when she was with her mother in a public park. When the mother's screams attracted attention, the kidnappers fled. The labour leader explained that two days later "a paramilitary boss reached me on my cell phone and called me a guerrilla son-of-a-bitch. He said that I was very lucky; they had planned to kill my daughter because I refused to meet with them" (Interview, trade union leader, 2006). Those trade unionists who responded to paramilitary pressure for meetings did not always survive these encounters.

Company managers took advantage of weakened unions, the social disarray engendered by widespread terror and the expulsion of the guerrillas, whom Delgado describes as the trade unionists' "uncomfortable allies" (2006:139), to push through reforms. On the eve of the paramilitary takeover, for example, the outsourcing of jobs by the state oil company to non-unionized workers had already weakened the USO and the strike had become an increasingly ineffective weapon of resistance. The paramilitary reign of terror displaced or eliminated some of the most dynamic leaders, and it weakened the USO's ties to community organizations and the broader labour movement. All of this debilitated the union's ability to challenge the loss of jobs and the reconfiguration of the oil industry; a 1999 civic strike, for example, was the last time that the USO lead a major protest that shut down the city. The USO's storied solidarity with the urban working class became limited to the defense of its members rights and benefits that had been won in the past.[5] In addition, the restructuring of the oil industry, which began in 1991 and culminated in 2003 when the government split ECOPETROL into two companies, opened the door for greater multinational involvement in oil production.

A similarly bleak scenario played out in other parts of Barrancabermeja. In the city's Coca-Cola plant, trade unionists observed plant managers talking with known paramilitaries whom, they asserted, extorted protection payments from the company (Interviews, Coca-Cola workers, 2004-7). Although it was well-known among workers that the Company had once paid "war taxes" to the guerrillas, the extortion payments (*vacunas*) made to the paramilitaries guaranteed protection from the demands of labour. Paramilitary threats, harassment and assassination attempts pushed workers to renounce their union membership and accept coercive buy-out deals when the production line closed in 2003. Union membership plummeted and the number of Coca-Cola workers with stable contracts and relatively good wages declined, as the plant was downgraded to a storage and distribution centre. The company increasingly ignored collective bargaining agree-

ments negotiated with the union, and a new generation of non-unionized, subcontracted labourers who earned lower wages entered the workforce. As the ties of familiarity that once bound workers to each other eroded, fears that paramilitaries operated in the plant limited workers ability to make effective demands on the company (Gill 2007).

By weakening or decimating organized opposition to neoliberalism, paramilitaries hastened the elimination of full-time, unionized employment, the rise of subcontracting and the privatization of public entities. This aggravated long-standing problems of un- and under-employment and it limited the access of poor urban residents to basic services and forced them to pay more for them. The downsizing and anticipated closure of the public hospital—the only hospital in Barrancabermeja—aggravated a health care crisis and forced people to travel to the provincial capital for certain treatments that were no longer available in the city. Telephone service and electricity became more expensive in the wake of privatization and water rates followed a similar trajectory when the government prepared the public water utility for sale to a Spanish firm. Yet when several hundred residents protested usurious electricity rates, after newly installed meters malfunctioned in their homes, paramilitaries threatened them and the members of a citizens' group that organized to oversee the cost of public services.

Barrancabermeja became bloated with the victims of neoliberal restructuring and paramilitary violence. Ruined peasants, downsized urban workers and shell-shocked residents of the northeastern neighbourhoods toiled alone as owners of marginal businesses, temporary wage earners and itinerant vendors. They had little choice but to rely on fragile personal networks for their daily survival. Yet, as they fell back onto fragmented or newly reconstructed bonds of personal support, people discovered that friends and relatives were not able to provide them with all that was necessary and the organizational forms that had once channelled their demands to employers and the state were either severely weakened or had ceased to exist. Many people found themselves obliged to turn to the paramilitaries for the support that they had once provided to each other. They did so as the new lords of the city extended their grip over a range of local organizations that became vital to establishing authoritarian clientelist relationships with local people and to embedding paramilitarism in the fabric of society.

The Parastate and the Informal Working Class

Nowadays, the paramilitaries no longer operate as a mercenary army that wages a dirty war under the protective wing of the state. They have in effect become the state itself. The paramilitaries have penetrated the official state apparatus and erected a mafia-like surrogate state in which organized crime fuses with the politics of counterinsurgency. They manipulate elections by openly or tacitly supporting certain candidates, while intimidating others and dictating to people how to vote, and because of their enormous power, aspiring candidates for political office seek out their support, albeit surreptitiously. Through the control of government office, the paramilitaries can thus tap into municipal treasuries, dictate who receives government contracts and demand kickbacks. They also monopolize the illegal cocaine traffic and the theft and sale of gasoline from the state oil company, and they operate a variety of legal businesses, such as the lottery, transportation enterprises, private security firms and subcontracting agencies. In addition, the paramilitaries have divided up the city into zones of control with the state security forces, with whom they cut deals and make compromises as they negotiate the imposition of order with them.[6] And finally, like the guerrillas before them, they operate a protection racket that extorts payments from merchants and demands financial "contributions" from residents to ensure their safety.

In Barrancabermeja, the paramilitaries strengthened their control of the local economy by incorporating dispossessed, working-class Barranqueños into rigid, hierarchical relationships that were undergirded by violence and fear. They seized control of neighbourhood councils that had once advocated for affordable public services and used them to mobilize residents for political meetings (Loinsigh n.d). They wiped out entire trade unions and, after murdering 20 members of the taxi drivers' union (UNIMOTOR) in 2000, they transformed the organization into a source of rewards for supporters who received jobs in exchange for using the taxicabs to carry out intelligence work (Loinsigh n.d.). Paramilitaries also took over subcontracting firms that proliferated with the enactment of neoliberal labour laws designed to give employers greater access to part-time workers. By controlling the subcontracting process, paramilitaries could not only extort money from both workers and employers, they could also dictate who worked and who remained unemployed.

For workers, access to patronage networks was essential for getting a job in a city with a high and constant level of unemployment. Yet, as these networks fell under paramilitary control, applicants with a trade union background or residence in a neighbourhood stigmatized for its left-wing sympathies were either excluded from them or forced to remain silent and risk physical harm if their personal

histories were revealed. Unemployed ECOPETROL workers, for example, organized the Sindicato de Trabajadores Disponibles y Temporales (SINTRADIT) to pressure the oil company to provide temporary jobs to members and to thereby avoid the discounts and commissions charged by subcontractors. SINTRADIT was one of dozens of similar associations of the unemployed that emerged in the late 1990s as unemployment deepened in the region, but like many other worker organizations, it did not survive the paramilitary takeover.

A displaced leader described how paramilitaries demanded a large sum of money from SINTRADIT as a condition for its continued work with the oil company. When he refused to pay, hit men tried to murder him, and they ultimately forced him to leave the city. Yet the intimidation did not end with his departure from Barrancabermeja. According to the individual, a well-known paramilitary commander visited the home of a family member and explained that "he had given the order to capture me alive. He needed me alive so that he could tie me to a post with barbed wire and destroy me piece-by-piece so that the community would understand how guerrilla leaders died" (Interview, trade union leader, 2007). Such vicious repression shattered SINTRADIT, and workers' private experiences of terror were difficult to express publicly. As people were displaced from the city or forced to maintain a low public profile, they grew more divided from each other. Mistrust and uncertainty eroded social solidarity in an ever more fragmented working class, while access to jobs and benefits became gifts or favours from powerful, authoritarian patrons instead of social rights.

The erosion of economic well-being pushed some people into coercive debt relationships with the paramilitaries after a health crisis or a financial emergency overwhelmed their ability to cope. Many residents told how fliers offering generous credit started to appear in their neighbourhoods after the paramilitary takeover. To access this money, one had only to call a cell phone number and a young man would appear on a motorcycle to negotiate the deal and provide the funds, which usually required repayment at 20% interest. The arrangement built on an older form of quasi-legal credit known as *gota a gota* (drip by drip) but it required no guarantors, collateral or signed documents, and it turned on fear.

One woman explained that after surviving a traffic accident with a bus, she faced the task of paying for expensive repairs to the vehicle because the owner—a paramilitary—insisted that she bore responsibility for the accident. Yet neither she nor her husband were in a position to assume the cost of the repairs. The husband had lost his job with the state oil company and the family of five depended on her wages as a nurse for basic necessities. Fearing what might happen if they neglected the damaged bus, husband and wife borrowed money from a local lender whom they suspected of paramilitary ties, and then began to repay the funds immediately. When they fell into arrears, two paramilitaries came to their home and threatened them with harm if the payments did not continue on schedule. As the woman later explained, "I didn't know what to do. I could borrow from another paramilitary to pay off the first one, or I could plead with my relatives to lend me the money, which they don't have" (Interview, Barrancabermeja resident, 2007). The paramilitaries wove exploitative relationships of credit and debt out of the vulnerabilities of local residents—vulnerabilities which, to a considerable degree, they themselves had created—and these relationships in turn allowed them to launder drug profits and siphon additional wealth out of the local economy. Debtors faced the impossible situation of living with the imminent threat of violence or squeezing their social networks to the breaking point and deepening their economic insecurity.

Although many people manage to avoid paramilitary credit, they find it much more difficult to ignore the paramilitaries in their neighbourhoods, where local enforcers extort protection payments from them. A resident of the northeast sector described how a BCB protection racket emerged in her neighbourhood after the paramilitary takeover, when a commander called people to a meeting in a public school. He explained that the paramilitaries had entered the city at the request of local citizens to deal with the "security problem" caused by the guerrillas. He then offered the services of his men to the community. Shortly thereafter, young enforcers began to visit individual households on Saturday afternoons, requesting weekly payments of 2000 pesos for neighbourhood protection.[7] Most residents understood that their "contributions" to these individuals were little more than an exemption—sometimes only temporary—from the violence of the paramilitaries themselves.

The "security" they provided included monitoring the comings and goings of residents and the enforcement of social norms including evening curfews, the repression of prostitution and homosexuality, the prohibition of marijuana, and a ban on the use of earrings and long hair by men. Manuals that appeared in the city around 2003 spelled out the paramilitary moral code for poor urban neighbourhoods—a code that sought to re-establish rigid gender, generational and sexual hierarchies disrupted by years of violence and economic restructuring. A young man from the northeast sector, for example, noted the irony of paramilitaries, who virtually monopolize the ille-

gal drug traffic, enforcing a ban on marijuana consumption and he lamented that some residents did not object to what is widely referred to as "social cleansing," because "seeing young men on the corner makes them uncomfortable" (Interview, Barrancabermeja resident, 2007).[8] Because residents were obliged to turn to the paramilitaries to resolve problems, they inadvertently legitimized the power of the mercenaries and the social order that the latter sought to create.

Vigilante justice, the manipulation of fear, extortion and control undergird the surrogate parastate in Barrancabermeja, and the government's Justice and Peace Law has threatened to virtually "legalize" paramilitary power and to completely blur the distinctions between the official state and the parastate. The 2005 law, which emerged from talks between the government and paramilitary commanders, has had less to do with justice and peace than with regulating the incorporation of the paramilitaries into the state and the political process. It offers paramilitary commanders who have committed crimes against humanity reduced prison sentences (five to eight years) in exchange for demobilizing their troops, confessing their crimes and dismantling their criminal operations. BCB fighters, like those in other paramilitary blocs, have participated in public ceremonies that marked their official demobilization. Yet the Justice and Peace law makes no effort to expose the state's responsibility for creating, consolidating and expanding paramilitary entities, and it completely ignores the most fundamental problem of dismantling the organizational and financial structures of the BCB and other former affiliates of the AUC. Even though it requires paramilitaries to hand over arms and wealth acquired illegally, there is no mechanism to force them to do so and paramilitary commanders, who have testified under the terms of the Justice and Peace law, have revealed very little. The law essentially excuses the state and its accomplices for participating in mass murder and dispossessing thousands of Colombians of their jobs, lands and social security.

With their wealth and organizational structure basically in tact, the paramilitaries have had little difficulty enlisting new recruits. As the demobilization process came to a close in 2006, with over 30,000 fighters allegedly reintegrated into civilian life, the government declared that paramilitarism no longer existed in Colombia.[9] Yet at least 70 "new" groups had emerged in the national territory. They counted within their ranks re-armed mercenaries, who had participated in the demobilization process, and former mid-level AUC commanders, who took advantage of a power vacuum created by the demobilizations to rise to the head of reconfigured paramilitary entities. All of this made clear the connections between the "old" and the "new" generations of paramilitaries.[10]

Powerful paramilitaries have also sought ways to legitimate their power and consolidate their control through the creation of foundations and non-governmental organizations. For example, Semillas de Paz is an NGO that illustrates the depths of impunity in Barrancabermeja. Tied to the paramilitaries and comprised of demobilized members of the BCB, Semillas de Paz maintains an office in Barrancabermeja and presumes to counsel victims of political violence and document cases of abuse. In March 2007, it convened a meeting for the family members of victims of the armed conflict to promote its activities and gather documentation about the dead and disappeared. Meeting participants, however, realized only afterwards that Semillas de Paz represented the victimizers of their loved ones and not fellow victims. The widow of a man murdered in a BCB massacre also recalled how members of Semillas de Paz visited her home and expressed a desire to "reconcile." She found their unannounced arrival extremely intimidating, and when they were unwilling to give information about the fate of her husband, she told them not to return (Interview, massacre survivor, 2007).

Instability, Opposition and Cracks in the Facade

From their beginnings as adjuncts to the state security forces charged with stopping the insurgency, the paramilitaries have obtained relative autonomy from the state and have consolidated a surrogate state in which the boundaries between the legal, official state and the illegal, paramilitary state are difficult to distinguish. They now subcontract labour to the state oil company, multinational corporations and other businesses in Barrancabermeja. They have also secured the rights of private property for a new agrarian, narco-bourgeoisie in the countryside and control municipal governments in Barrancabermeja and other regional urban centres. And today, more people secure their livelihood through highly dependent and insecure relationships with the new lords of the city. The targetted and strategic use of terror remains crucial to this project. It has ripped apart social relationships and accentuated the privatization of the economy and social life.

In working-class neighbourhoods, "security," too, is under paramilitary control and is increasingly incorporated into the apparatus of the state. Demobilized BCB fighters now constitute legal "private security cooperatives" in some neighbourhoods, while vigilantes dressed in civilian clothing and regulated by the enduring structures of the BCB continue to police other poor neighbourhoods. Residents of the northeast sector complain

about demobilized paramilitaries who continue to threaten and harass them, while collecting government benefits through the justice and peace process. Politically motivated assassinations and disappearances take place with disturbing regularity and the murder of gays, prostitutes and other so-called "undesirables" proceeds with impunity.

Yet even as the Colombian parastate has created the conditions for what *Business Week* describes as an "investment miracle" where "the stats all scream: 'Go, Go, Go'" (Farzad 2007). it has simultaneously become a threat to the domestic and international legitimacy of the official state. While the paramilitaries and their allies in the security forces were clearing the Middle Magdalena region of guerrillas and destroying reformist political alternatives, government officials willfully ignored the paramilitary pursuit of private accumulation through the cocaine traffic and the dispossession of small rural landholders. They did so even as they backed a U.S.-financed campaign to wipe out coca leaf cultivation and extradite major traffickers. Paramilitary commanders accumulated an astonishing level of political and economic power that surpassed the capacity of the official state to control. As the paramilitaries outgrew their role as the state's clandestine enforcers and claimed power for themselves, the presence of mercenary armies that massacred civilians and accumulated wealth illegally became untenable for the state.[11] Mounting evidence of the links between paramilitary commanders and leading members of President Álvaro Uríbe's ruling coalition and Uríbe himself undermined the President's efforts to negotiate a free-trade agreement with the United States during the Bush administration. Moreover, the eruption of the parapolitica scandal led to the encarceration or investigation of over 60 members of congress.

The parastate in Barrancabermeja is also itself highly unstable. Brutal violence has sustained the five-year paramilitary rule, but this violence has done less to create a legitimate social order than to establish the conditions for the additional accrual of power and resources.[12] Paramilitaries have always represented less a single actor than a marriage of convenience among drug lords, sectors of the state and regional elites, and with the demise of the AUC, which fell victim to its own internal disputes during the demobilization process, there is no overarching entity to regulate the competing claims of reconfigured paramilitary groups and criminal entities in the wake of the demobilization process. Leadership quarrels, conflicts with competitors over territory and tensions between mobilized and demobilized mercenaries are typically resolved through violence, which threatens fragile alliances between powerful bosses prone to betrayal and which makes the present moment highly unstable.

The Colombian state must now confront the task of harnessing the violence that it unleashed to defeat an insurgency and to create a propitious environment for neoliberal capitalism to flourish. It shares this task with other states that have pursued aggressive neoliberal policies. Although market-based economies can operate with vibrant trade unions, affordable public services and state control of strategic resources, neoliberal regimes have, to varying degrees, intensified processes of commodification and privatization, as well as the destruction, weakening, or co-optation of social solidarities that stand in the way of the redistribution of wealth to elites and global corporations. Colombia is an extreme example: the private power of a mafia-like parastate has usurped many functions of the official state and massive terror has severed social relationships and made working people available for incorporation into new relationships of inequality. New forms of rent extraction and "flexible" labour relationships now form part of illegal networks and organizations that are beyond the reach of the official state and they are maintained by fierce coercion.

Yet to the extent that neoliberal states rely on security forces, both legal and illegal, to contain the social disarray produced to a considerable degree by their own policies, the result is not stability but a durable disorder[13] that has constrained the idea and the practice of democracy. In Barrancabermeja, where radical political ideas were the coin of the realm, the parastate now strives to stabilize a war-torn city and re-moralize society through the reconstruction of social hierarchies that have long characterized Colombian society. "Security" masquerades as peace, as threatened labour leaders and human rights defenders carve out protected spaces with bodyguards, fortified residences and armoured cars amid continuing threats and uncertainty. As ordinary Barranqueños become dependent on authoritarian, hierarchical relationships with the paramilitaries in an ever more fractured informal economy, the extent to which they can create—and even imagine—relationships that offer them an alternative remains an open question.

Yet Barrancabermeja differs from other regional urban centres and working class communities elsewhere because of the continued vitality of some of its unions and human rights organizations (cf. Lopez 2005). A small group of trade unionists cling to direct labour contracts that continue to provide them with a decent wage and benefits and they do not have to turn to the paramilitaries for economic support. In addition, labour leaders and human rights defenders have built national and international alliances that circumvent the official state and the parastate to support their struggles, provide them with

physical accompaniment and fight impunity. Many ordinary Barranqueños also quietly refuse to give in to paramilitary extortion demands and keep trade unionists and human rights defenders apprised of paramilitary activities (Gill 2007a, 2007b). In these and other ways, people constantly push against the status quo, evaluate its strengths and take advantage of its weaknesses. In so doing, they take stock of what they can do by themselves and with each other. This, in turn, is the first step towards refashioning a broad-based solidarity that can form the basis of a renewed challenge to impunity and capitalist privilege.

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Notes

1 Skahill suggests, for example, that the mercenary firm Blackwater USA is no longer willing to remain subordinate to the United States. Its executives envision the company becoming an independent army, akin to a United Nations force, that is unaccountable to any nation (Skahill 2007:343). See also Singer (2003) for more on the privatization of state security forces.

2 My argument builds of the work of Naomi Klein and David Harvey. Klein (2007) suggests that neoliberal policy makers exploited moments of crisis, such as natural disasters, indebtedness and war, to enact free-market policies, while Harvey argues that the creation and manipulation of crisis has been a key feature of the liberalization of markets (Harvey 2005:162-165) . The strategic use of crisis is part of a broader process that Harvey calls "accumulation by dispossession," which, he claims, has intensified under neoliberalism (Harvey 2003:137-182).

3 See Roldán 2002.

4 For obvious reasons, I cannot use the names of informants here. I have cited fieldwork material as interviews and provided the date and a brief description of the interviewee in the text.

5 See Delgado 2006 for more discussion of the labour movement in the Middle Magdalena region and the role of the USO.

6 The respected Colombian news weekly, Semana, has done some of the best reporting on the embedding of paramilitarism in various regions of Colombia (Semana 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). See also Isacson 2005. For a description of paramilitary control of Medellin, see Hylton 2007. For specific reference to Barrancabermeja, see the comments of former AUC leader Carlos Castaño in Serrano Zabala 2007 and in Aranguen Molina 2001 (Pp. 255-257).

7 This amount is slightly less than one U.S. dollar.

8 See also Taussig 2003 for more on paramilitaries and the "social cleansing" of so-called undesirables.

9 For more on the weaknesses of the Justice and Peace Law and the problems with the demobilization process, see Human Rights Watch 2005, Isacson 2005, and Colectvio de Abogados Jose Alvear Restrepo 2006.

10 Indepaz, a Colombian NGO, calculated the number of new groups based on information from the Organization of American States and the Colombian military and police. See www.indepaz.org, accessed 2 June 2007.

11 The rise of the paramilitaries under the protective wing of the Colombian state shares many similarities with the emergence of the Italian mafia, which the Italian state encouraged as a bulwark against the Communist party in the 1950s (Schneider and Schneider 2003), and the creation of al-Qaeda, which the United States promoted to fight the Soviet Union in 1980s Afghanistan (Schneider and Schneider 2002). In both cases, these entities outgrew the ability of their patrons to control them and posed a threat to the very states that had facilitated their rise to power.

12 See Sider and Smith (1997) for more discussion of this point.

13 I borrow the term "durable disorder" from Romero (2007).

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The Fear of No Future: Guatemalan Migrants, Dispossession and Dislocation

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Abstract: This article examines the relationship between neoliberal economic policies and practices, state-sponsored violence and international migration through the lived experiences of a Mayan Indian from Guatemala. The Arizona-Mexico border has become "ground-zero" on the war on migrants as tens of thousands cross monthly without legal documents in the hope of creating a future for themselves and their families in the United States. Migration to the U.S. has become one of their last, best options, albeit a dangerous and violent one. This essay explores both the causes and consequences of international migration in the Guatemalan case through the lens of historical political economy to trace how national and international economic policies and practices associated with free trade agreements and peace accords have displaced and dispossessed Guatemala's indigenous people, and coupled with militarized immigration practices, are in reality an extension of war by other means.

Keywords: migration, Guatemala, United States, Mayan Indians, neoliberalism, violence

Résumé : Cet essai examine les relations entre les politiques et les pratiques économiques néolibérales, la violence d'État et les migrations internationales à partir des expériences vécues d'un Indien maya du Guatemala. La frontière entre le Mexique et l'Arizona est devenue un « point zéro » dans la guerre contre les immigrants, alors que des dizaines de milliers d'entre eux la traversent chaque mois sans papiers dans l'espoir de se créer un avenir, pour eux et leur famille, aux États-Unis. La émigration vers les États-Unis est devenue une de leurs dernières et meilleures possibilités, pour violente et dangereuse qu'elle soit. Le présent article explore les causes et les conséquences des migrations internationales dans le cas du Guatemala, par la lorgnette de l'histoire de l'économie politique, pour établir comment les politiques et les pratiques économiques nationales et internationales associées aux accords de libre-échange et aux accords de paix ont déplacé et dépossédé les peuples indigènes du Guatemala, tandis que, couplés avec des pratiques d'immigration militarisées, ces accords sont en fait une extension de la guerre par d'autres moyens.

Mots-clés : émigration, Guatemala, États-Unis, Indiens maya, néolibéralisme, violence

> Foreign direct investment in particular is associated with an increase in inequality. The available evidence does suggest that income inequality has risen across most countries and regions over the past few decades.
>
> —IMF 2007

> How can this inequality be maintained if not through jolts of electric shock?
>
> —Eduardo Galeano 1983

Introduction

This essay, at heart, is the story of Antonio, a middle-aged Mayan Indian from Guatemala whom I met several days after he was rescued by a humanitarian group from the Sonoran desert along the Arizona Borderlands. While Antonio's narrative is a disturbing one, it is not simply a singular tale of woe. Rather Antonio embodies through his lived experiences an articulation of Guatemalan and American political economy and history.

The central conceptual preoccupation that motivates this essay is the intricate relationship between neoliberal economic polices and practices, state-sponsored violence and international migration. While the processes and forces that have produced each of these phenomena have been extensively explored in the social science literature, the dialectics of the three taken together have largely gone unexamined. David Harvey, for example, has brilliantly documented the rise of neoliberal theory as a hegemonic economic practice with its attendant discourse of the "free market," that, contrary to popular understanding, depends extensively on state involvement for its advancement. He does so, however, without exploring the experiential fallout on the lives of ordinary people (Harvey 1989, 2005). Numerous anthropological works have illuminated the causes and consequences of state-sponsored violence across the globe, bringing to light not only how domination and resistance operate but the vital role of local actors in processes of accommodation and complicity, as well as the numerous ways in which structural violence has

remained hidden all the while undermining the livelihood and lives of the world's poor (Farmer 2003; Green 1999, 2002; Nordstrom 2004). Yet the dispossession and dislocation of large swaths of people across the globe—fueling contemporary labour migrations—have not been fully examined through the conceptual lens of state-sponsored or structural violence.

Importantly, migration studies (Kearney 1986) have examined the push and pull factors over the past half century that have contributed to an exponential rise in the number of people crossing borders worldwide. Some 200 million people, over 3% of the world's population, lived outside their country of birth in 2006 (International Monetary Fund 2007). Scholars in the 1980s recognized that many of the migrants from Mexico in particular were not temporary but were increasingly settling in the U.S. even while they maintained "circuits" between their home communities in Mexico and their locales in the U.S. (Chavez 1992; Fink 2003; Rouse 1991). Heyman (1991) has been particularly insightful in understanding the historical dynamics of the U.S.-Mexico boundary where processes of identity, illegality and militarization have been crucial in the formation and maintenance of locality. Yet, here too, the historical and political-economic linkages between large-scale labour migrations and human rights violations have not been fully articulated.

When taken together these phenomena importantly point us toward an understanding of the historical dimensions and power dynamics of "profiteering off the poor" through the production and reproduction of inequalities and vulnerabilities[1] (Chacon and Davis 2006). An examination of migration across the Americas and its relationship to neoliberalism as both an economic model and a mode of domination (Gilly 2005), reveals the multiple and often brutal ways "disposable people" fit into a system in which violence, fear and impunity are crucial components. Immigration can be thought of as (1) a consequence of a complex set of global economic doctrines and geopolitical practices that produces both desperate workers—in the context of this essay, from Guatemala—*and* low wage jobs in the U.S.; (2) a strategy of survival for millions of Guatemalans who have no viable means of a livelihood—that is no future—in their own country; and (3) a set of punitive laws and practices that have reconfigured the U.S.-Mexico border and beyond into a militarized zone, a space of death, that punishes—with utter disregard and unbeknownst to most U.S. citizens—the very people who are dispossessed and dislocated by these policies.

This triple lens illuminates more clearly how free trade agreements—in this case, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)—have created the conditions for the U.S. to become a magnet for cheap, exploitable and "illegal" migrant labour. State-sponsored violence becomes integral, not incidental, to both dislocation and dispossession of millions of working people *and* militarization at the U.S.-Mexico border and, beyond that, is a necessary component to disciplining the working class on both sides of the border.

In this essay I explore how these processes have given shape to the lived experiences of Antonio and the millions of migrants who have crossed the U.S.-Mexico border over the course of the past decade. Insofar as the majority of the people crossing the Arizona-Mexico border are indigenous, as anecdotal evidence suggests, then these processes can also be thought of, in part, as an ethnocide in which people are torn from their history, their kin, their sense of place and space, and their work and livelihood are decimated.

The men and women who migrate from Guatemala to the U.S.—the subjects of this article—are part of a worldwide phenomenon of "surplus" people produced through neoliberalism and its attendant structural adjustment. These are not the reserve army of the poor in Marx's terms, but disposable people who are no longer necessary or needed in their home countries (see Robinson 2003). The fear of no future and the hope of creating a viable life for themselves and their kin propel migrants to "voluntarily" take on unimaginable debt and expose themselves to both known and unexpected levels of violence, exploitation, virulent racism and, increasingly, incarceration. The rub, of course, is that they are simultaneously vital—as migrants—in propping up the failed economy of Guatemala through their remittances and in the U.S. where they are the highly exploitable, expendable workforce without any protection as workers or, increasingly, as human beings.

Migrants are not taking jobs away from U.S. citizens in the way the far right would have us believe. Rather they are a disempowered workforce who are continually foiled in their attempts to organize, unionize or make demands for health and safety in the workplace—which, not surprisingly, is a boon to capitalist profits. Current violent and vicious border policies and practices are, in part, necessary accompaniments to Guatemalan-style structural adjustment with its attendant repressive apparatus, as well as to U.S. American style neoliberalism—orchestrated in part through deindustrialization and deunionization—that has led to a massive decline in jobs and wages, as "mass termination [of employees has become] a reasonable profit-maximizing strategy" (Wypijewski 2006:141).[2] Together, these processes—U.S. Amer-

ican and Guatemalan—work synergistically to produce a surplus of "disposable people" in Guatemala and a plethora of low wage jobs in the U.S., all the while throwing millions of U.S. workers out of their jobs. This reworked economy has also made in Marable's words, "the historical demand for black labour superfluous" (Marable 2000; see Sider 2003), while simultaneously creating the conditions for the largest prison system in the world (Chomsky 2003; Pager 2007)—what Parenti referred to as "Lockdown America" (1999).

Before turning to Antonio's story, I highlight some key facets of Guatemalan history. The current desperate situation in which Mayan people find themselves is at once singular and part of a larger set of processes of dispossession, violence and its attendant impunity that arguably have their origins in the 16th century. This current iteration may be the final phase in this 500-year history of dispossession and dislocation for Guatemala's indigenous peoples as their social relations are reworked from a sense of social solidarity to modern individualism, what Anderson (1992) refers to as the commodification of social relations. Of necessity, Antonio's story must be placed within that context as it allows us to understand the shape of a Mayan history beset by patterns of exploitation and brutality, yet that is also one of continued, albeit reworked, survival and dignity.

Dispossession, Dislocation, Repression in Indigenous Guatemala

Primitive accumulation cuts through traditional lifeways like scissors. The first blade serves to undermine the ability of people to provide for themselves. The second is a system of stern measures required to keep people from finding alternative strategies outside the system of labour (Perelman 2000).

Primitive accumulation, according to Marx, is a process where people are dispossessed often violently of their land and resources, the locus of their survival, and then subsequently fully integrated into a wage economy (Perelman 2000). Rather than a one time occurrence, dispossession in Guatemala has been a long, slow and uneven process, taking well over 500 years. In part, this is due to the ways in which dispossession took place. Involuntary labour practices were the mechanisms—utilizing violence and repression when necessary—through which Mayan land and the social relations attached to that land were extracted.[3] Ever since the Spanish Invasion in the 16th century and up to the present, the Mayas of Guatemala have been the major source—often through violent means—of non-Indian wealth and privilege as a cheap, exploitable labour force. Because of the peculiarities of colonization in Guatemala and continuing over the ensuing centuries, labour not land was crucial to the enrichment of the dominant classes. Each epoch further diminished the bases from which the Mayas were able to pursue a "collective enterprise of survival" (Farriss 1984). Land was not expropriated per se in the highlands; a more subtle chipping away at land holdings took place through labour extraction often in conjunction with coercion, militarization and, when necessary, outright repression.

By the end of the 19th century, Mayan labour had become crucial to the Guatemalan state for the creation of coffee plantations for large-scale export production. The demands of plantation work led to increasing impoverishment among highland Mayas. Because of the long absences required by cyclical migration to cultivate coffee on the piedmont, Mayas were unable to attend adequately to the diverse economic activities necessary for survival. Increasingly drawn into debt, a vicious cycle was created whereby their absences led to further neglect of their subsistence agriculture in the highlands. As early as the 1920s, many Mayan families could no longer survive on subsistence agriculture alone—having lost much of their land base—and the annual migratory trek to the coastal plantations to earn cash, however minimal, had become a necessary way of life. The changes produced increased stratification among Mayas themselves: between those who did have sufficient land resources to meet the minimum requirement for exemption from state-mandated obligatory work and those who did not (Britnall 1979; McCreery 1994). A repressive state apparatus was expanded to include an increasingly militarized presence in the *altiplano* (high plains) to quell resistance to the expropriation or privatization of community-held lands and increased labour demands (Cambranes 1985; Handy 1994; McCreery 1994). Moreover, land, particularly for the production of corn and beans, had been crucial to maintaining a nexus of social relations that formed the fabric of kin-based and community social organization. The subordination of subsistence production to the market had a devastating impact on these relations.

The only serious interruption in this historic dynamic was during the 1944-54 period known as the "ten years of spring," when two successive, democratically elected presidents attempted to redress the plight of the majority indigenous population through significant land reform and political enfranchisement (Gleijese 1991; Handy 1994). These processes were rolled back violently with the 1954 CIA-sponsored coup d'état which unleashed a reign of terror against the Mayan population that has not abated despite the signing of Peace Accords in 1996. The repression reached its pinnacle during the late 1970s and 1980s

in Guatemalan military counterinsurgency, particularly pronounced in the countryside, that resulted in what the UN-sponsored Truth Commission called "a genocide against the Mayan people." Moreover there are two oft unacknowledged partners in the crimes waged against the Mayan people—crimes of both wartime and peacetime—international development agencies, notably the World Bank and USAID, and the U.S. military (Green 2006a).[4]

Robinson (2003) has argued that the end stage of dispossession of indigenous lands was only fully accomplished in the 1980s through counterinsurgency which delivered what economic measures alone had failed to do—the full capitalization of indigenous lands and social relations. In conflict areas, small scattered peasant communities were forcibly relocated by the military into nucleated settlements reminiscent of the colonial era, leaving them without sufficient land to farm and forcing many to seek wage work in order to survive.

The signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996 ended a 36-year internal war, where, in addition to over a quarter million people killed or disappeared, over one million people were internally displaced for some period during the 1980s and another one million sought refugee status outside Guatemala's borders. Yet, by design, the Accords did little to redress marked inequalities and racism directed against the Mayan majority. The Peace Accords were, in fact, an arrangement between the business elites, the military and the leaders of the guerrilla group, known by their Spanish acronym as the URNG. Ordinary people were mostly excluded from the benefits. The negotiated settlement put into effect two conditions favourable to the continuation of war against the poor, mostly Mayan, population: (1) impunity for those responsible for the orchestration of a brutal counterinsurgency war, which even ten years later, facilitated an ongoing militarized state structure in civilian guise (as the 2007 the candidacy of retired General Otto Perez Molina for president illustrates)[5]; (2) a neoliberal economic model that created conditions most favourable for transnational elites while economically strangulating the poor. Thus, the Accords have become the newest iteration in the ongoing production of inequality and vulnerability for the majority of Guatemalans. With impunity intact, the Guatemalan military retains de facto power and remains intent on quelling the first sign of social protest (Schirmer 1998).[6] Thus, the Peace Accords facilitated the successful rhetorical de-linking of these two instruments of violence, impunity and international development, utilized against the poor.

Today, in the neoliberal global economy, large numbers of people need wages to survive but have no visible means to secure that cash and thus, they have increasingly no "value" as workers or as human beings. Bereft of land and livelihood in their homeland, migration is one of the last options for procuring a future, what Chacon and Davis poignantly describe as "informal survival" (2006). Migration implies a seemingly voluntary, individual decision and to a certain extent it is: where to go, when to go, how to go, if one is able to go, or even if one should go. But beyond that, a migrant's freedom, as Berger (1975) suggested, is that of really only being free to sell their labour power. Although Guatemala generates 35% of all the wealth in Central America, a staggering 75% of the labour force works in the informal sector. For the Maya, who make up the majority of the population in Guatemala—a status they have never relinquished since conquest—80% live in poverty, 50% are illiterate and 70% suffer from chronic malnutrition. Thus, if these surplus people—people without any value in Guatemala—stay in place, they have no future. Migration for many is undoubtedly a journey circumscribed by apprehension and fear, but is also one of hope: the hope of creating a future for themselves and their families. Moreover, by the very act of migrating these disposable people refuse the fate assigned to them in a neo-Social Darwinist world of "survival of the fittest." Yet, by the mere act of crossing borders, they are transformed into "illegal aliens" who accrue significant value for both the U.S. and Guatemalan economies, a point I elaborate below.

Antonio's Story: The Border and Beyond

Here I draw on the story of an indigenous Guatemalan migrant, whom I have come to know over the past two years, to underscore the lived realities of migration and the processes and forces that have produced the circumstances in which over 4,000 people have died trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border over the past decade.[7]

Antonio is a 43-year-old Mayan Indian whom I met in early July 2005 some days after he had been rescued from the punishing 115°F degree heat of the Sonora Desert in southern Arizona. Exhausted and confused, Antonio had been walking almost two days without food or water, having been abandoned by his *coyote* (coyote, a term used to refer to those who transport migrants across the U.S.-Mexico border) whom he and 20 other migrants had hired to guide them across the Mexico-Arizona border.

In 1970, a then five-year-old Antonio, his mother, stepfather and four brothers and sisters moved from the highlands where they had no land to the Ixcan jungle where they joined other mostly indigenous "pioneers" in a colonization project under the auspices of U.S. Maryknoll priests with the support of the provincial diocese of the

Catholic Church. This was to be an alternative economic response to the Guatemalan state's refusal to enact a land reform—where even today 2% of the population own of 80% of the arable land (the most unequal distribution of land in all of Latin America). The project began in the late 1960s and by the mid-1970s over 30,000 mostly Mayan Indians had migrated internally to develop the land. Each family was given a parcel of land and each was a member of a co-operative that sold their coffee and cardamom. Within a few years, the co-operatives were showing signs of fiscal success as the international market prices for these products climbed (Falla 1994).

Soon after the land was cleared, oil was discovered in an area that included the Ixcan. Multinational oil corporations began exploration in the region. By the mid-1970s these companies were drilling for oil on colonized land and procuring land titles granted by the Guatemalan Institute of Agrarian Transformation that the co-operatives had applied for but had never received. Soon thereafter, the Guatemalan military and paramilitary death squads arrived to enforce oil company claims. During a three-month period in 1975, 28 men from the Ixcan co-operatives were "disappeared" (Anonymous 1993).

In 1981-82, the Guatemalan military carried out 15 massacres of unarmed civilians. Antonio, along with other members of the Communities in Resistance (CPR of the Ixcan), fled to the mountains but refused to leave the country. The people of the CPR refused to be resettled into model villages after their own communities were razed, nor were they willing to participate in local civil militias under the auspices of the military, or collaborate in any way with the military's counterinsurgency. As a result, they were ruthlessly persecuted as military targets, even though their resistance was unarmed. For over a decade tens of thousands of internally displaced peoples in Guatemala hid in the jungles of the Ixcan and the Peten and in the mountains of the Ixil Triangle where they were bombed by army helicopters. After the CPR publicly broke the silence about their existence in 1993, they continued to be pursued by the military in direct violation of international human rights law that protects civilian, internal refugees (Anonymous 1993; see Falla 1994).

Ricardo Falla, a Guatemalan Jesuit priest and American-trained anthropologist lived among them for over five years and it was during this time, according to both Falla and Antonio, that a sense of collectivity and political consciousness emerged (Falla 1994). Survival in the CPR meant creating new forms of social organization to withstand relentless army persecution. The equitable redistribution of food, for example, generated new forms of social consciousness as people shifted their social relations based on cooperation to relations based on collectivity[8] (see Manz 1988, 2004).

In the late 1990s, the people of the CPR were resettled onto new lands as part of an agreement reached through the Peace Accords. Their lands in the Ixcan, which they abandoned to save their lives, have been usurped by the military and by private businessmen who were often one and the same. Antonio and 30 other families in his subgroup were thus resettled onto land purchased by the Belgian government and each family was given a two-room concrete block house, a solar panel with batteries for electricity and a plot of land. Although the group returned to growing cardamom, this time collectively, it was no longer a viable project and nor was coffee production because of they ways in which agricultural production has been remapped on a global scale. Peasant agricultural production in rural Guatemala is thus moribund.[9]

For the past five years, over 10% of families in Antonio's co-operative settlement have someone working in the U.S. because they are increasingly unable to pursue a collective, or even individual, enterprise of survival. This is true for most all communities of the CPR and other returned refugees. The exceptions are the poorest, most especially widows, who do not even have the resources to secure a loan to migrate or send a family member.

Since 2004, this section of the U.S.-Mexico border, 60 miles south of Tucson, Arizona, has the distinction of being the site of the highest number of border crossings and deaths annually.[10] This has not happened accidentally. Since the passage of the Immigration and Reform Control Act (IRC) of 1996, coming two years after the passage of the free trade agreement known as NAFTA, there has been a significant rise in the number of migrants without legal documents crossing and dying along the U.S.-Mexico border. Simultaneous to the IRC, the Department of Defense Center for Low Intensity Conflict produced a policy of "prevention through deterrence"—known as the Border Strategic Plan—that advocated pushing immigrants away from the "traditional" urban crossing points of San Diego, El Paso and Nogales into the remote, dangerous areas of the high mountains of California, the Sonora Desert of Arizona and the more difficult sections of the Rio Grande (Massey et al. 2003; Nevins 2002). What these policies and practices have done is to create a death zone on a border that has, over the past decade, been thoroughly militarized and is host to human rights violations so extensive that they have been characterized as "preemptive counterinsurgency" (Parenti 1999). Although these policies have done nothing to deter the number of migrants crossing—in fact the numbers have risen exponentially—they have had two disturbing effects: first, they

have removed migrant detentions from public scrutiny; and second, they have made these same detentions more difficult because of the harsh terrain thus justifying more extensive militarization.[11]

At noon, on the second day of Antonio's border crossing trek with the coyote, the group stopped to rest under the shade of a mesquite tree. Antonio fell asleep and when he awoke the group was gone. By his own account Antonio had been lagging behind the group, finding it more and more difficult to keep pace.[12] Two days later, weakened, sick and seemingly defeated by the heat, Antonio made his way to State Highway 286 to wait for U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) to pick him up. Hundreds of Border Patrol (BP) agents patrol the vast open spaces of the Altar valley each day in search of migrants. This area of the Sonora Desert—the Buenos Aires National Monument—is delineated by paved roads and desert footpaths well-worn by human and animal traffic, and more recently by tens of miles of border fencing.[13]

Antonio sat on the side of the road, making numerous attempts to flag down BP vehicles as they raced past him, all to no avail. Several BP agents I have spoken with admit to only stopping for ten or more migrants, otherwise as one noted sardonically, "it's not worth the paper work." However, when BP agents do apprehend migrants some agents reportedly commit unnecessary, seemingly petty, acts of violence against them. For example, almost all migrants I have talked with, after being detained by BP agents, were denied water, were pushed into cactus, desert brush or rocks, or were made to roll in sand filled with biting ants. I have witnessed BP apprehensions in which the migrants were forced to kneel with their hands crossed behind their heads in the hot sun, while the agents awaited a bus to transport them for processing and eventual return to the border.[14] On several occasions BP agents, standing idly by, have refused to allow humanitarian groups to give the migrants food, water and first aid.[15] After some hours of waiting by the side of the road Antonio was "rescued" by one such humanitarian group from Tucson, a group that regularly searches migrant routes and roads for people in need, offering food, water and medical aid.

Antonio's journey began in his mountain village in western Guatemala. For 30 days he travelled by foot, truck and bus, wading across the Suchiate River that divides Guatemala from Mexico. This border has become a hotbed of organized crime and corruption, where trafficking in drugs and people is the modus operandi. This is a corridor of death where gangs and Mexican law enforcement officials co-mingle and crimes of the most egregious nature are committed; where almost everyone who passes through becomes a victim of robbery, rape, assault, kidnapping or violent "accidents." The 1500-mile route from the Guatemala-Mexico border to the Mexico-U.S. border is a particularly perilous one and an extremely dangerous and violent passage for women—some of whom reportedly begin taking birth control pills before starting out. Without exception, all of the 15 women I have interviewed over the last few years, have told me of their experiences of being raped at least once during the journey. According to reports by a respected human rights group in Mexico, somewhat fewer than 90% of Central American women who migrate through Mexico are raped, many at the hands of security forces (Vasquez and Garcia 2006). As increasing numbers of women from Central America and Mexico migrate alone to find work to survive economically, they embody a process that has been called the "feminization of migration."[16] According to a recent study, the majority of these women are between 18 and 29 years old, head their households and have left children under 12 behind with family members (Diaz and Kuhner 2007). Additionally, the rise in numbers of unaccompanied children who cross the border each year has been dramatic. Reportedly, many of them come in search of mothers they have not seen in years. They were left as young children when their mothers migrated with the hopes of providing them with a future. The children come to find the women they feel inexplicably abandoned them (Nazario 2007). The BP estimates that 30-40,000 unaccompanied minors attempt to cross the border each year.

Having left his wife and seven children with a six-month supply of wood and corn and bean plots planted, Antonio sold off anything he could and borrowed the rest to pay the coyote the US$5,000 he needed to reach the small dusty town of Altar, Mexico, 60 miles south of the Arizona border. As it has become more dangerous both to traverse Mexico and to cross the border into the U.S., the necessity and the price of securing a coyote has risen exponentially. Thus, U.S. border policies and practices have had the consequence of creating multi-billion dollar mafia-like enterprises for human smuggling that hardly existed 15 years ago. Although the actual coyotes who arrange for and lead the migrants on the routes through Mexico and across the border are often poor local men with little power or influence, the larger structures of human smuggling are increasingly tied to mafia and drug running cartels.[17]

Altar itself is emblematic of the kinds of forces that are produced by the free market economy, violence and migration. A former cattle ranching town of some 10,000 people, moribund in the wake of NAFTA, Altar is now booming again as it has transformed into a service economy for human and drug smuggling for the 1,500-2,000

people who pass through daily. Altar is a dry dusty town with only a few blocks on either side of the highway where buses from all across Mexico pull up every half hour to the central plaza in the shadow of the Spanish colonial church to offload dozens of mostly young men, although there are increasingly more women, some with babies or young children in tow. Townspeople have become merchants along this migrant route, with booths catering to migrant needs: gloves, hats, backpacks, water bottles and numerous bunkhouses scattered all over town where migrants rest, waiting aimlessly for their coyote to signal the time to move up to the border town of Sassabe, a staging area for crossing into the U.S. Many local people are quite sympathetic to the plight of the migrants, noting that they have been a boon to their own flagging economy. Yet, others I spoke with, particularly mothers, were distressed that the large influx of drugs and smuggling was having a negative impact on the town's youth, luring them with fast, easily made money.

Antonio, without money to afford the luxury of a night's rest (about US$1) hastily bought two gallons of water, tortillas and beans and a backpack and set off the same day to cross into southern Arizona. Packed into a van with 30 other migrants who each pay US$10 for the 60-mile ride to the U.S.-Mexico border, Antonio met up with the hired coyote who would lead him and his group across the border. The cost was to be US$1,500 for what was billed as a one- to two-day walk in the desert to meet up with another van for a ride to Phoenix. The price continues to rise as increased militarization of the border has forced migrants to cross in ever more desolate areas of the desert. These include the Tohono O'dahm Reservation, a sovereign nation itself now militarized by U.S. BP and the U.S. military, the even more remote Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument further west and the Barry Goldwater Firing Range where there is no chance of being found or rescued (Annenno 1999; Urrea 2004). If Antonio had made it to Phoenix, he would have called his family contact in the U.S. to wire the contract money and he would have been free to leave. While waiting for the money to arrive, migrants are kept in "safe houses" with armed guards. Those who are unable to pay off their debt, work it off or are sold off at the discretion of the smugglers.

Antonio told me that he survived his two-day ordeal in the desert because of the survival skills he had learned while evading the Guatemalan military during the scorched earth counterinsurgency. He spoke of the helicopters flying overhead scouring the desert for migrants, recalling how it reminded him of the Guatemalan army helicopters that searched for internally displaced people during the counterinsurgency war.

Today the Arizona desert, too, looks like a war zone, a space where Blackhawk helicopters, unmanned spy drones, ground-based sensors, real and virtual fences and armed BP agents, military personnel, National Guardsmen, and armed civilian militias—the American Border Patrol, Border Guardians and the now infamous Minutemen, sometimes accompanied by local folks "sport hunting for illegals" at night—scour the desert in search of so-called "aliens." The newest iteration of this violence on the U.S. side of the border is the active presence of the Mexican drug mafia from the in the State of Sonora, as they battle their rivals from the Juarez cartel across the terrain of migrant bodies.[18]

What is important to note is that this recent construction of a materially and ideologically violent boundary between the U.S. and Mexico is not unique. In fact this border has a long sordid history of violent dispossession and dislocation that began soon after the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in the 1840s. Indigenous peoples of the southwest were dispossessed of their land and their labour forcibly appropriated by armed militias. The BP was created by the Immigration Act of 1924 with the mandate to catch tequila smugglers and later to regulate the numbers of undocumented immigrants entering the country, in reality acting as a gatekeeper controlling the flow of a cheap, exploitable labour force from Mexico (Behdad 1998; Ngai 2004). For much of the next 60 years the BP languished as a backwater agency until, in the early 1980s, then president Ronald Reagan declared that "this country has lost control of its borders. And no country can sustain that kind of position." National security in the fight against communism became the new rhetorical mission of the BP, while in practical terms the southern border became increasingly militarized. The Reagan administration introduced a number of punitive policies designed to "regain control of borders" and a discourse that demonized undocumented migrants as the primary threat to that security. Ironically, perhaps, the majority of those crossing the borders in the early 1980s were in fact refugees fleeing state-sponsored counterinsurgency wars in Guatemala and El Salvador as well as the violence perpetrated by U.S.-backed Contras in Nicaragua and Honduras all of whom were receiving—in some cases illegal—funds and training by the U.S. military.[19]

Illegality has been a crucial mechanism for instituting a series of immigration policies and laws that provide loopholes of impunity to employers who hire people without valid immigration documents, while increasingly criminalizing and punishing the migrants' transgressions of rather inconsequential immigration rules that transform

them into "illegal" human beings.[20] This "illegality" has had a number of far-reaching effects. The militarization of the borderlands has been profound over the past decade. In southern Arizona, desert and border communities are now surrounded with high-tech equipment: motion-detection sensors, high-intensity cameras, high-intensity stadium lighting, new roads and miles of steel fencing. This technology is of military origin and the military continue to be involved in construction, maintenance and operation of the equipment (Meyers 2006). Illegality has not only produced a docile workforce increasingly under surveillance and driven further underground into "shadowed lives," which is a necessary component in disciplining it (Behdad 1998), but has created a fertile terrain for human and civil rights abuses to flourish. As a result, "illegality" has encouraged racial profiling along the border, such that Hispanics whatever their documentation status are increasingly harassed by CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE, the interior enforcement arm of CBP). Illegality, moreover, fosters a climate where hate crimes can flourish. The rise in armed civilian militias like the infamous Minuteman Project in southern Arizona is a case in point.[21] In its most recent iteration, migrant "illegality" is creating a growth industry in immigration detention centres, as CBP policies are detaining rather than immediately releasing many more of the migrants who are apprehended both along the border and in the interior of the country.

Antonio left Tucson at the end of July after having fully recovered from his ordeal. He was enroute to join his brother-in-law in the agricultural fields of Maryland, when he was apprehended by ICE at a Greyhound bus station. Greyhound allows ICE agents to regularly board its buses and ask for documentation from "suspicious looking" people. Antonio was "voluntarily" repatriated to Mexico as he claimed he was from Chiapas. Antonio spent the next four months, working and travelling back and forth along the Mexico side of the border, from Tijuana to El Paso, looking for a way to cross. Finally, Antonio re-crossed successfully in Texas in November 2005. Afraid to travel very far for fear of being detained, Antonio found work picking tobacco in Kentucky. He remains in Kentucky now working in a factory, earning US$40 per day for ten-hour shifts.

In 2006, during one of our phone conversations, he told me that more than one year into his migrant life, he had paid off US$400 of his remaining US$3500 debt and sent US$100 per month to his family. Initially, he desperately wanted to return to Tucson—where he stayed for three weeks and became particularly attached to my husband who is also indigenous from Guatemala—but it was too dangerous. Antonio, like so many other migrants, is dispossessed of his family and community, of his collective attachments to place and to his kin and extended network. This is a profoundly individual dispossession without accumulation, yet with major social ramifications for indigenous peoples and their communities. As another Guatemalan migrant told me recently, "I left Guatemala five years ago and the loneliness is killing me. I still have a wife and children in Guatemala, but I am no longer a part of that family, I only send back the money." As the border becomes more militarized, making it both more dangerous and more expensive to cross, migrants stay longer in the U.S. and do not return at all to Guatemala, not even for visits or for the death of family members which leaves them ever more distant from their kin ties. Even as some migrants are able to bring their immediate families to the U.S., at great risk and cost, at the same time they are involuntarily losing their kin and community based social networks at home. While new communication technologies such as cell phones and computers, much heralded in the anthropological literature, make distant contact possible, the integrity of face-to-face relations—the crucial basis of organized collective struggles—is weakened. This isolation and fracturing of social relations continues a process which began in Guatemala during the counterinsurgency war.

One of the profound consequences of counterinsurgency war and displacement was how violence and its attendant impunity further divided Mayan people from one another in rural Guatemala in new and brutal ways, as some local people were complicit in human rights violations against their neighbours and kin. Fear became an effective mechanism of social control by the state as it destabilized social relations, driving a wedge of distrust between family, neighbours and friends. Fear divided communities by creating suspicion and apprehension not only of strangers but of each other. These processes continue today. Impunity, in new guises, has permeated the social fabric, even in the rural countryside, as gangs, drugs and guns have become a way of life—circumstances that were unimaginable even 20 years ago (Green 1999, 2002). The fear of no future has made migration one of the few remaining survival strategies. At the same time, migration has exacerbated the economic and social divisions as the built landscape in migrant sending communities attests, further eroding any sense of collective solidarity or possibility of struggle.

Sunday, Not Monday

Deportation raids by ICE, known as Operation Return to Sender, began in earnest in May 2006 shortly after a spring in which millions of migrant workers and supporters took to the streets in major cities and small towns in what were some of the largest public demonstrations in U.S. history. ICE has captured, detained and deported over 50,000 people since then. Formally, CBP policy had been to "catch and release," detaining migrants in the U.S. and dropping them off in Mexico. Now, increasingly, the policy is to "catch and detain," and the construction of private detention centres along the border in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona has become a new growth industry.[22] Haliburton Inc., for example, was awarded a no-bid contract of US$350 million to take part in these construction efforts. These policies have had a significant and chilling effect on local organizing efforts among undocumented migrants for their rights as workers and as human beings.

People stopped on routine traffic checks in Arizona are asked for immigration documents—if they are Hispanic looking—by local police. For example, a Guatemalan woman was involved in a fender-bender at an intersection in Tucson. The man who hit her car called the police. When she could not produce her documents—although she did have a driver's licence—the police officer called the ICE. The woman had her two small children in the car with her, both U.S. citizens. She called family members to come get the kids because the border patrol was about to detain her. Her family members, all undocumented, were too afraid to come. So this woman and her two children were deported to Mexico, and now wait on the other side of the line, trying to figure out how to get back. More recently, a high school student in Tucson was caught in school with a small amount of marijuana in his backpack. The school authorities called the Tucson police. When the boy's father came to the school the police asked for his driver's licence. Frightened, the father admitted he did not have legal documents. The Tucson police called ICE and the entire family was deported to Mexico that day. Initially, the Tucson Unified School District stood by its actions, which allowed the Tucson Police Department and BP agents onto the school campus. A week later, when 100 students marched from their school to police headquarters in protest, the school district quickly rescinded its policy.

Fear engendered by ICE raids at the workplace and at home has driven migrants further into the shadows. They are being hunted down, furthering what Chacon and Davis (2006) have called "neoliberal immigration" policies in which state-sponsored violence, virulent racism and segregation of the migrant population in the U.S. act in tandem to create a de facto apartheid.[23]

I have gotten to know a small cadre of Zapatistas from the Lacandon area who live in Tucson. They work as day labourers and wait most days on street corners looking for work. On Sundays, they are increasingly afraid to leave their apartment. Sunday is the day that there is an especially heavy presence of ICE patrols in their neighbourhood. They live in South Tucson where the majority of the residents are Hispanic. So, on the one day a week that these men, well versed in collective struggle like Antonio, would have the opportunity to meet up with other migrants or sympathizers, they remain hidden. They are afraid, afraid they may lose their opportunity to create their future. This surveillance of migrants on Sunday however, has no effect on their work schedule on Monday nor on the undocumented labour supply, as thousands of migrants cross the Arizona border daily. Thus, the choices migrants must make to meet their family obligations force them into seclusion and inscribe individualism (see Mahler 1995). They live mostly hidden away but under surveillance. Moreover, this inscribed individualism places migrants in the untenable position of acting against other impoverished workers, thus, mitigating their desire and ability to struggle collectively for dignity and justice.

Perhaps it is ironic that Antonio laboured in the tobacco fields of Kentucky earning less than minimum wage under deplorable conditions reminiscent of the black sharecroppers whose descendants now live in urban ghettos and the increasingly forgotten rural south, themselves displaced and dispossessed. Antonio must now struggle on his own as he is pitted against his own people and other disenfranchised people if he and his family are to have a future.

When I spoke with Antonio in March 2008, he had just been diagnosed with a rare blood disorder. A priest has befriended him and is helping him receive necessary medical treatments. Antonio is still working, sending home as much money as he can; his future and that of his family is now more precarious than ever. We spoke again in August and Antonio's health has been improving. His debt for his medical care is US$3,000, which he is slowly paying off with the help of the priest and some parishioners. The priest told me that Antonio lives on next to nothing, as he is committed to paying his debt to the hospital that helped him. He is anxious to return home to his wife who is sick. "Perhaps next summer," he says over and over to me, in a voice mixed with hope and sadness.

Remittances

Guatemalan Indians as migrants do have value in Guatemala but only as long as they shore up the Guatemalan

economy. They send home remittances worth over US$3 billion annually, second only to export agriculture and tourism in foreign export earnings. Before the 1980s, Guatemala received most of its foreign exchange from commodity exports (coffee, cotton, sugar), but now one of its major export commodities is its own "disposable workers," who only gain in "value" when they are transformed into "illegal aliens" as they cross the border into the U.S.

According to a study by the World Bank, remittances are sent home in installments of US$200. While the World Bank and the Guatemalan government celebrate remittances as a new development strategy because it substantially dwarfs the amount of money invested by G7 countries in development aid to Latin America, migrants are now encouraged to reinvest their savings in their own communities. Of course, for many, this is their only source of hope, the basis of their social organization and a key matrix of their indigenous identity, no matter how partial and flawed. How cynical it is that the very people who have been condemned by policies of dispossession that produce "planned misery," first by violence and repression and now by migration, are being heralded as the new entrepreneurs by the very institutions that ravage them.[24]

Moreover, migrants act as a release valve for social disruption, as many are men and women who might have followed in their parents' footsteps—parents who organized and struggled in the 1970s and 1980s for a more equitable way of life. Although there continue to be social protests in Guatemala by indigenous people, those who do speak out are often murdered.

Many migrants are successful in their efforts to improve the possibilities for those family members left behind. The physical landscape—in particular, the often partially built two-story block houses in many rural communities—is testimony to their labour. Behind their successes, however, are often bitter tales of individual and collective violence both imposed upon them and, at times, directed against one another.

These Mayan migrants also have value in the U.S. not only as a cheap exploitable workforce, but also because they conveniently provide a scapegoat for a virulent nativism that deflects attention away from the increasingly ruthless and brutal social and economic policies directed against U.S. citizens. Migrant communities and families in Guatemala also bear the brunt of the social costs of their reproduction, a boon to U.S. capital. Moreover, if injured or sick, most migrants return to Guatemala, which relieves the U.S. social and health care system of any costs. One consistent provision of all the proposed immigration reform bills considered in the U.S. Congress over the past few years, including guest worker programs, allows for no social or health care services and mandates immediate return of sick or injured migrant workers to their country of origin.

Conclusion

Historically, the U.S.-Mexico border, since its creation in the early 20th century, has been a key locus of labour control for mostly Mexican migrants and increasingly, over the past two decades, for Central Americans. Border repression continues to be a useful mechanism for the reproduction of social inequalities for all working class people in the U.S., whatever their documentation status. Moreover, the border continues to be the material and symbolic site for the enactment of state policies and practices that continually rework the parameters of impunity and of solidarity

There are thousands of migrants who have died trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border over the past decade; 4,000 bodies have been found while another 25,000 Central Americans are unaccounted for over a five-year period (Navarro 2004), and still others including children are disappeared, abused, raped, murdered and mutilated. All of this remains unknown to the U.S. public. Instead they are fed a steady diet of virulent and vitriolic rhetoric that passes for news; Lou Dobbs' "Broken Borders" on CNN regularly features "immigration experts" who spout white nationalist verbiage without properly identifying themselves or their views as part of white supremacist organizations.

These reports vilify migrants as "illegal aliens" and accuse them of carrying out an invasion with the intent of a *reconquista* (reconquest), of taking jobs away from U.S. citizens, and of criminal activity (see Chavez 2001)—accusations that have been repeatedly disproved by respected academic research. The de-linking of immigration policies and practices from economics and geopolitics is accomplished through "illegality" and impunity. What is produced is fear of the other with little or no empathy for the suffering of the migrant population. Moreover, these vicious media attacks disguised as news give the ordinary U.S. citizen no sense of a shared responsibility for that suffering. Our own geopolitics have gone a long way in producing the economic and political upheavals that make life in Central American and Mexico increasingly untenable. These are crimes of far-reaching human rights magnitude, as we increasingly deny a segment of our population, as well as people in Central America and Mexico, the right to life (as defined by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as a "dignified existence") through policies that are backed by a state repressive apparatus.

Fear and hatred are stirred up to further divide us from each other. All the while, the real attack on workers, on whatever side of the border and regardless of their documentation status, goes on unabated.

Postscript

By the mid-17th century, England had established what Foucault referred to as the "great confinement," workhouses for the sick, the insane and the destitute, not with the intent of improving their fate, but as a mechanism to extract a profit from their "free" labour (Foucault 1965). Later, prison labour was captured in the form of chain gangs, a practice that has waxed and waned over the centuries as a popular mode of production and of discipline and punishment (Foucault 1977). A recent iteration of these processes is now notable in the agricultural fields of Arizona. As migrants flee ICE raids at the workplace, leaving farmers with a shortage of employees at harvest time, prison populations are the "new" workers filling that gap. They work for a pittance of what it costs for undocumented migrants. In Arizona, for instance, migrants are paid about US$40 per day for a 10- to 12-hour shift picking chilies, while prisoners are paid only US$20 per day. As migrants are increasingly being locked up not only in the ICE detention centres—with a substantial number confined in state and local prisons—one can only imagine that some of those prisoners working on the chain gangs are migrants, who, in a perverse Orwellian twist, have replaced themselves at a much lower wage, even as they await deportation for their "crime": their refusal to be disposed of.

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Notes

1 I borrow Gerald Sider's (2006) definition of vulnerability to mean the inability of people to completely secure their collective social reproduction with their own social, cultural and material resources.

2 According to Louis Uchitelle (2006), more people were laid-off from their jobs during the "economic expansion" of the Clinton years than during the 1980s, with no efforts made at job creation, labour law reform or investment in employment-led growth.

3 Since Independence, strategies such as forced labour drafts, debt peonage and vagrancy laws have been used by the state to appropriate Mayan labour for capital.

4 The World Bank's involvement in funding the construction of the Chixoy hydroelectric project—taking place during two of the most brutal regimes in Guatemalan history—is instructive. Initial funding was approved in 1975 without conducting a comprehensive census of the affected people, well over 40,000 Mayans. A number of communities refused to move. The army declared the communities subversive and a number of people were disappeared. When the dam was finished in 1983, the army again forced removal of the population. In one village alone, 444 of the 791 residents were killed. Ten communities were destroyed by massacres. In 1984, the Bank funded a second loan. In 1996, a World Bank staff-conducted evaluation concluded that their obligation to the resettled population had been met. Notably, the World Bank also made a profit: it invested US$72 million in loans including US$11 million in interest and other charges. Interest income from the Chixoy loans were revalued by the International Development Bank in 1994 at US$140 million (see Johnston 2005). Moreover, the World Bank has recently been involved in making loans to private gold mining companies based in Canada. One community in the province of San Marcos held a community referendum against exploration and development on their lands. Both the World Bank, through its continuing support, and the Guatemalan state continued to back the rights of the mining company over those of indigenous citizens in direct violation of ILO Convention 169.

5 General Otto Perez Molina, 2007 presidential candidate who narrowly lost the elections in the second round in November 2007, was a key player in the counterinsurgency war and a graduate of the School of the Americas. Recently, evidence has emerged that he was directly involved in the murder of Bishop Juan Geraldi. Bishop Geraldi was bludgeoned to death 1998 two days after the Office of Human Rights of the Catholic Church, which he headed, released an exhaustive report, *Guatemala: Nunca Mas*, accusing the military of over 90% of the human rights violations committed during the counterinsurgency campaign (see Goldman 2007). Moreover, weeks before the run-off elections, two Guatemalan investigative journalists for *El Periodico* revealed the intimate connections between Molina and drug trafficking. Seventy percent of all cocaine from South America enroute to the U.S. goes through Guatemala. Amnesty International (2002) characterized Guatemala as a "human rights meltdown" presided over by a corporate mafia-state in which the military had shifted from being funded by the CIA to benefitting from the largesse of drug traffickers.

6 Emblematic of this have been military incursions into returned refugee communities and communities where genocide-case witnesses live. There is a pending genocide case against General Efrain Rios Montt in the Spanish courts while the same case languishes in the Guatemalan court system for most of a decade. These eye-witnesses to genocide are crucial to the cases. In October 2007, the Guatemala military entered a community in Chajul Quiche allegedly to recruit youth into its "volunteer" army. Illom is a community of people who survived the massacres of the 1980s.The army stayed in the community for over seven hours, going door-to-door and in some cases, entering houses. They returned for three consecutive days. In a similar incident in July 2006, Guatemalan soldiers with blackened faces dropped out of helicopters into several refugee communities in the Ixcan under the pretext of searching for terrorists, weapons and guns. They used similar tactics of intimidation and terror as had been used against the

same people 20 years earlier. Unsurprisingly, nothing was found.

7 These are recorded deaths. No one knows for sure how many people have actually died, nor the numbers of people who have died enroute across Mexico for which there are no statistics.

8 When referring to co-operative work relations I mean that people worked their plots of land, for instance, individually or with kin, sold the harvest together as a co-operative, yet the profits accured to individuals. In constrast, the CPRs laboured collectively and shared equitably all the resources that accrued.

9 The importation of cheap corn and beans from the U.S. has had a devastating effect on local economies as prices undercut the domestic market and local food security. Moreover, by the mid-1990s a crisis of overproduction and speculation on the world coffee market, alongside ecological catastrophes had occurred in Central America, hitherto one of the leading coffee production regions of the world. For the first time in over a decade, coffee prices fell below $50/100 pounds. In a sign of the deregulation times, in 1989 the International Coffee Organization lifted strict price controls and the world market began to fluctuate culminating in overproduction, which in Central America and Mexico left millions of small producers as well as landless labourers on large coffee plantations in dire economic straits.

10 Deaths by calendar year recorded by Pima County Medical Examiner's Office, where 90% of the bodies found in the Tucson sector are processed, are as follows: 75 in 2001, 147 in 2002, 156 in 2003, 170 in 2004, 196 in 2005, 175 in 2006, and 201 in 2007 (to 1 November) (Personal communication, Dr. Bruce Anderson).

11 Through June 2007, there were 13,000 Custom and Border Protection (CBP) agents nationwide (under the auspices of Department of Homeland Security) with over 12,000 stationed along the Southwest border and 3,000 in the Tucson sector. The CPB budget has grown from US$6.7 billion in 2006 to over US$10 billion in the 2008 fiscal year. In contrast, in 1994 there were only 300 agents in the Tucson sector.

12 Coyotes often tell migrants that the trek across the Mexican border to their pick up along one of the state highways in Arizona will take only a day or two. In reality the shortest trek is three to four days without incident. To walk in the desert in the summer where temperatures often exceed 110°F, a migrant would need to carry two gallons of water per day, which is, of course, impossible. The most common cause of migrant death in the Arizona desert is dehydration.

13 Border Patrol agents include the more militarized BORTAC (Border Patrol Tactical Unit), a specially trained tactical unit as well as BORSTAR (Border Patrol Search, Trauma and Rescue), the "humanitarian response team." BORTAC's website is illustrative with regard to the delusional quality of their self-described mission to halt terrorism at the border: "But it's in the desert where BORTAC teams are really in their element. Agents hide in the desert brush and wait for illegal immigrants or drug smugglers to sneak down centuries [*sic*] old secret trails used by Spanish gold prospectors and Indian raiding parties" (www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/border/border_patrol/bortac.ctt/bortac.pdf).

14 There have been several incidents in the past five years in which BP agents have been indicted on murder charges stemming from killings while apprehending migrants. None have resulted in convictions. The most recent in southern Arizona was in January 2007 when a BP agent shot a 22-year-old man from Puebla, Mexico at point blank range while he was kneeling on the ground (Green 2008). After two hung jury trials, the prosecution dropped the case and the BP agent has resumed his position.

15 In 2005, 23-year-old Daniel Stauss and Shanti Sellz, two volunteers for the humanitarian group based in Tucson, No More Deaths, were apprehended by BP agents as they were transporting three migrants in critical condition from the 105°F heat of the Arizona desert to a hospital in Tucson for emergency care. They had received clearance from a medical doctor and a lawyer via satellite phone, following protocols that had been agreed upon between No More Deaths and the BP. Notwithstanding, Straus and Sellz were arrested and prosecuted for a felony crime of transporting "illegal aliens" with intent, which could have resulted in a 15-year prison sentence. The charges were dismissed in September 2006. However, the arrest and prosecution initially had a, perhaps intentional, chilling effect on organizations that provide humanitarian assistance to migrants. No More Deaths has historical ties to the Sanctuary Movement that began in Tucson in the 1980s to offer legal and humanitarian assistance to Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. In 1984, the Department of Justice initiated criminal prosecutions against two activists of the Sanctuary Movement in Texas and 16 activists in Tucson.

16 Some women take their children with them. Two devastating stories, both witnessed by my husband, are illustrative of the tragedies occurring repeatedly in the Tucson sector. A woman from Guatemala was found dead, propped up on a rock on the Tohono O'dham reservation in July 2007 with her ten-year-old son sitting by her side waiting for someone to find them. The boy had refused to leave his mother who died of dehydration. In 2006, the BP had just apprehended a large group of migrants, approximately 20 people, when my husband arrived as part of a humanitarian group. A woman was sobbing uncontrollably. While the helicopter had circled overhead, the coyote had grabbed her four-year-old out of her arms and ran. The coyote and child were not caught in the sweep.

17 The *Arizona Daily Star* reported that Mexican drug cartels are increasingly using human decoys to facilitate cocaine shipments in the Arizona desert. According to the *Star*, drug lords are increasingly taking over the business of smuggling migrants as more of the drugs are being transported on foot as the BP has increasingly sealed off the usual drug routes and erected vehicle barriers. (Arizona Daily Star 2007b). However, large quantities of drugs enter the U.S. through ports of entry. An FBI sting in Tucson in 2005 entrapped over 40 law enforcement officials including BP agents and active duty military personnel transporting drugs from the border to Phoenix. In several instances, U.S. military vehicles were used in the operation.(Arizona Daily Star 2007a). There have been several convictions, but no one implicated higher up the chain of command.

18 In a rather strange co-mingling of drugs, violence and impunity, a news article (Smyth 2005) reported that a Department of Homeland Security warning was issued to south Texas law enforcement, including CBP, that some former members of the Guatemalan special forces, the "Kaibiles"—self-described "messengers of death" during the counterinsurgency war in Guatemala—had resurfaced in Mexico and were training members of the Zetas, the paramilitary force of the Mexican Gulf drug cartel.

19 Reagan claimed they were "economic" migrants and the then Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) routinely denied asylum to refugees from Guatemala and El Salvador. Less than 3% of Guatemalans and Salvadorans seeking refugee status in the U.S. were granted in 1984. Given the widely reported human rights violations taking place in both countries, these policies were a violation of U.S. obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention (Gzesh 2006). See Scott and Marshall (1991) for an examination of the complicity of the CIA with cocaine smuggling during the Central American wars.

20 Over 40% of people in the U.S. without documents first entered the country through U.S. ports of entry and then overstayed their visas.

21 There is widespread documentation of militia abuses against both undocumented and documented people, including U.S. citizens of Amerindian and Hispanic origin in southern Arizona (see Border Action Network 2002). In 2003, an undocumented migrant escaped from a mobile home in Three Points, Arizona, a town 25 miles from the border, where he and two others had been held and tortured by several local men. According to Pima County Sheriff's violent crime unit, the migrant who escaped had "torture wounds of a screwdriver and pliers under his toes" and "his front teeth were beaten out of his head with some implement." The fate of the other two men, at the time of the report, was unknown (Arizona Daily Star 2003:1).

22 With the introduction of the Secure Borders Initiative in 2005, the Department of Homeland Security has been a boon to U.S.-based defense industries such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman and Boeing as they compete for multi-billion dollar contracts to install a sophisticated array of high-tech surveillance technologies, including a "virtual fence," along the southern border.

23 ICE raids in three factories during 2006 in Colorado, Nebraska and Massachusetts resulted in over 900 migrants being arrested at work, leaving behind children and infants without a mother or father. A recent report by the National Council of La Raza and the Urban Institute noted that 500 children were directly affected in these raids, the majority of whom are U.S. citizens, and that many are suffering from trauma-related illnesses.

24 Perhaps this is only matched by the fact that private construction firms holding government contracts with the Department of Homeland Security have hired "illegal immigrants" to build the fences along the U.S.-Mexico border designed to keep them out (Desert Sun 2007).

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Places That Frighten: Residues of Wealth and Violence on the Argentine Chaco Frontier

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Abstract: On the old frontiers of the Gran Chaco plains in northwest Argentina, people in rural areas argue that some of the overgrown ruins that dot the regional landscape have the power to "frighten" *(asustar)*, usually through the presence of ghosts, apparitions, or unusual sounds and lights. In this article, I aim to show that these experiences of fear contain important clues to the way local *criollos* (non-indigenous settlers of racially mixed background) spatialize their social memory. I analyze how the spatiality of these frightening presences is grounded on the vestiges of Jesuit missions, Spanish forts and colonial settlements that evoke the history of conquest that constituted the regional geography. In particular, I examine how criollo perceptions of these sites revolve around imaginaries of the wealth that allegedly characterized the region in the past and the violence once unleashed on "the Indians" who used to live there.

Keywords: fear, space, ruins, social memory, Gran Chaco, Argentina

Résumé : Dans les anciennes régions pionnières des plaines du Gran Chaco du Nord-Ouest de l'Argentine, certains ruraux prétendent que les ruines envahies par la végétation qui parsèment les paysages de la région ont le pouvoir de « terroriser » (*asustar*), généralement par le biais de la présence de fantômes, d'apparitions, de phénomènes sonores ou lumineux inhabituels. Dans cet article, je cherche à montrer que ces expériences de peur comportent d'importants indices relatifs à la manière dont les *criollos* locaux (colons non-indigènes d'origines raciales mélangées) donnent une dimension spatiale à leur mémoire sociale. J'analyse comment la distribution spatiale de ces présences effrayantes est ancrée sur les vestiges des missions jésuites, des forts espagnols et des implantations coloniales qui évoquent l'histoire de la conquête qui a structuré la géographie régionale. En particulier, j'examine comment les perceptions des criollos de ces sites tournent autour des imaginaires des richesses qui caractérisaient supposément la région dans le passé, et de la violence autrefois déployée contre « les Indiens » qui y vivaient.

Mots-clés : peur, espace, ruines, mémoire sociale, Gran Chaco, Argentine

During my fieldwork on the old western frontier of the Gran Chaco plains in northwest Argentina, there was an expression that local people used repeatedly when referring to the overgrown ruins of forts, Jesuit missions, or abandoned towns that dot the landscape and are associated with the conquest of the region. They would say in Spanish: "*ese lugar asusta,*" literally "that place frightens." By that, people meant that those who ventured there could be subject to an intense experience of fear, usually caused by the presence of a ghost or a strange sound. Fear is not the only feature they attach to those ruins, and not all ruins in the region are equally associated with this type of experience. Yet when people agree that a particular place "frightens," apprehension is part of a practice that evokes the history that constituted the regional geography. In this article, I aim to show that these experiences of fear contain important clues to the way local people spatialize their social memory. In particular, I analyze how the spatiality of these frightening presences evokes the history of colonial conquest against the "wild Indians" who once roamed the region. Further, I am interested in the cultural sensibilities associated with this perception, which see certain places not simply as frightening but as imbued with the capacity to *generate* fear: that is, "to frighten."

This bodily disposition can be analyzed in terms of what Raymond Williams (1961, 1973, 1977) called "structures of feeling." Much of the force of this concept comes from Williams' attempt to play with the tension between its two components, "structures" and "feeling," which at the time he began using this term (the 1960s) were often seen as excluding one another. With the concept of "structures of feeling," Williams was trying to account for the patterns that organize social subjectivity but also for the daily intimacies that make those "structures" fluid cultural fields, operating "in the most delicate and least tangible parts of our activity" (Williams 1961:48). As he put it, "structures of feeling can be defined as social experiences in solution" (1977:133).

In this article, I analyze how these "social experiences in solution" are shaped by a social memory tangled with material vestiges from the past. In particular, I aim to show how local structures of feeling are configured by the spatiality of ruins in a process in which the latter become spatial-cultural sedimentations that people reconstitute, reinterpret and manipulate in terms of shifting collective experiences. In this region of Argentina, the southeast of the province of Salta, the way people construct this spatiality of fear involving local ruins draws on a relatively distant history of which they had no direct experience, for most of these sites were abandoned over two centuries ago. Therefore, the memories that these places evoke are based not on personal recollections but on a bodily disposition, a habitus in Pierre Bourdieu's (1977) terms, that draws on local narratives and images to read ruins on the landscape in a particular way.

The embodiment and remembrance of collective experiences of fear, suffering and terror have been the subject of numerous anthropological analyses (Das 2000; Feldman 1991; Gordillo 2004; Green 1999; Kleinman et al. 1997; Taussig 1987). But for the most part, these studies have focused on the memory of events directly experienced by the people under examination. In this article, I am interested in a type of fear that, even though equally grounded in people's lived experience, is reminiscent of events and conflicts that have long since come to an end. The spatiality of fear in this region, in this regard, is not necessarily linked to ongoing or recent conflicts but to a historically constituted structure of feeling that sees certain traces on the landscape as landmarks that precipitate the evocation of prior epochs. And the perception that those places "frighten" allows people to navigate and make sense of a geography seen as drenched in tension-ridden histories.

The analysis of this culturally mediated fear is important to account for the shifting social fractures that make up places in this region. A growing number of geographers and anthropologists have moved away from earlier conceptions of space as a fixed, rigid matrix and have examined space as a dynamic social and historical process that is permanently made and remade through practice, social relations, and political forms of contestation (Gordillo 2004; Harvey 1996; Massey 2005; Mitchell 2003; Moore 2005; Raffles 2002). In particular, several authors have explored the ways in which memory is a spatial practice that shapes people's perceptions of the geography and is, in turn, constituted by spatially grounded experiences (Basso 1996; Casey 1987; Gordillo 2004). I draw on this body of work to look at how fear becomes a cultural force that is important in analyzing both the spatiality of memory and the configuration of places as unstable, dynamic social formations. Ruins and other spatial traces, I argue, are particularly charged places in this regard, for they bring to light the historical nature of space and the tensions and ruptures that have constituted it.

Criollo Geographies and the Memory of "Indians"

Located at the eastern foot of the Andes, in the area where the Juramento River—called "Salado" downstream—flows down the mountains toward the Gran Chaco plains, this region was for several centuries a frontier separating the Spanish territories in the highlands from the lowlands under the control of *indios infieles* (infidel Indians).[1] Beginning in the late 16th century, the Spanish gradually built a number of forts, mission stations and towns on the frontier, both to protect it from attacks by indigenous groups and to launch military expeditions in the Chaco. After a long process of violence, confrontation, and accommodation, the local Lule and Vilela-speaking groups were either exterminated, pushed into the interior of the Chaco, or they intermingled with non-indigenous settlers. By the time the Argentine military finalized the conquest of the Chaco at the turn of the 20th century, the region of the Juramento-Salado River had become a geography without a noticeable indigenous population, dominated by cattle ranches and inhabited mostly by *criollos*, as non-indigenous rural dwellers of *mestizo* (racially mixed) background are called in northern Argentina.[2] This region, in fact, came to epitomize the home of the *gauchos salteños*—the cowboys that best represented in official narratives the cattle-raising livelihood of much of the province of Salta.

Most criollos I interacted with in the field are rural labourers who live in poverty, work on cattle ranches or agricultural farms, and own a few head of cattle. Others pay rent to landowners to graze their cattle on their lands. A few others own small and mid-size *fincas* (farms) and rely entirely on the labour of their own families. Beyond these differences, most local people see southeast Salta as an eminently "criollo" and "gaucho" region. Yet when they remember the past, they also highlight that "Indians" lived there and point out the different ways in which Christian missionization and violence gradually made them disappear as social actors. Influenced by state and Church-sponsored narratives and rituals that commemorate the regional history as an epic struggle between civilization and barbarism, most criollos remember those Indians as the epitome of savagery. Many emphasize that the latter were *malos* (mean) and *ariscos* (unfriendly or distrustful) who, in their hostility to civilization, were akin to wild animals. Yet together with this distancing from indige-

nous people and in tension with it, many criollos are open to acknowledging that they are in fact "mestizos" with "indigenous blood" who, therefore, partially descend from Indians. In other words, criollos are aware that the disappearance of indigenous people from southeast Salta was also the product of cultural and racial mixture and of the emergence of the criollos as a mestizo social subject. This mestizo identity in fact often makes many criollos create more ambivalent memories of those Indians and the civilizing violence once unleashed upon them, as we shall see.

The criollos' social memory is closely tied to the overgrown ruins that dot the forested hills and open fields that mark the landscape around the Juramento-Salado River. Most of these historical vestiges are on private lands, are not easily accessible, and have not been incorporated within state-sponsored practices of preservation. Yet local criollos, even those who do not live in the vicinity of these ruins, are sensitive to these sites' presence and see them as landmarks charged with the capacity to generate fear. This perception does not necessarily mean that people do not venture into these places. Some people do avoid them, as we shall see, but many have no problem going there for short periods of time during the day. Local criollos, in fact, guided me on most of my visits to these ruins. In this regard, most people see these sites as imbued with a sense of apprehension that does not automatically translate into outright fear. The transformation of these ruins into "places that frighten" is produced by contingent, often unpredictable events. But this usually involves the evocation of clusters of collective memories of events and actors associated with those sites. In what follows, I examine two of these clusters: the wealth that allegedly characterized the region in the past and the violence once unleashed on the indigenous people who used to live there.

Traces and Memories of Wealth

Beginning in the late 1500s, and for at least two centuries, the so-called *camino real* (royal road) passed along the Salado River connecting Buenos Aires to the mining centres in Alto Peru (today Bolivia). Currently, criollos living in this region invoke the memory of this road on a recurrent basis. On countless occasions during my fieldwork, I was told that "at the time of the Spanish" caravans of wagons full of gold and silver passed through the region. In people's collective memory, the actors who best embodied that wealth were *los Jesuitas* (the Jesuits). Jesuit missionaries were indeed active in this region in the 18th century, when they ran five stations among Lule and Vilela groups until the Spanish crown expelled the order from its territories in 1767. Today, people argue that the Jesuits were able to amass large fortunes due to the royal road and the labour of the Indians missionized by them. And the Jesuits, people agree, buried those riches underneath what are today those missions' remains.

The view that these ruins contain hidden treasures coalesced in a story I heard numerous times about the so-called "seven gold wagons of the Jesuits," which they allegedly buried before their departure with the hope that they would get them back on their return. Yet the Jesuits never came back and the seven gold wagons, so the story goes, are still there, below those remains. Currently, the overgrown ruins of two of those mission stations, San Esteban de Miraflores and San Juan Bautista de Balbuena, are relatively well preserved. Local criollos know these sites, respectively, as "the tower" (after the 15 metre high remains of the church) and "the church of La Manga" (named after the ranch on which the old mission chapel is located). People tell numerous stories about the riches that allegedly exist in or near these ruins and of the many treasure hunters who have tried to find them.

Criollos refer to these buried treasures as *tapados*, a term that can be roughly translated as "that which is covered" (*tapar* meaning *to cover*). Even though originally buried by social actors linked to the regional history, people tend to see tapados as sites jealously guarded by potentially frightening presences such as a *diablo* (devil) or an *alma* (soul)—figures that many criollos evoke to refer to the non-human, potentially dangerous beings roaming forested areas. One is able to find these riches only if these "devils" or "souls" mark their exact location through an unusual apparition embodied, for instance, in a rooster, a large snake or a light. The possibility of a person finding a tapado, in other words, ultimately depends on the willingness of those non-human beings to give it away. This is why many criollos agree that it is fruitless to try to search for tapados by using metal detectors or digging with shovels, for one can only find them if the latter are "granted" (*entregados*) as a gift. Further, many criollos also argue that those who do find tapados through encounters with "apparitions" nonetheless receive a cursed wealth, which either "doesn't last long" or later on causes the recipient's death—a view about wealth associated with diabolical entities that is common elsewhere in Latin America (Crain 1991; Taussig 1980). These perceptions have not stopped countless treasure hunters from combing the regional geography in search of tapados but locals tend to depict those searches as unsuccessful affairs conducted by people alien to the area. And the apprehension that many criollos associate with tapados brings to light the unresolved tension configuring this wealth:

that it is spatially proximate yet invisible, often unreachable, and ultimately cursed.

The view that a more prosperous, distant past has left a detritus of elusive yet potentially frightening riches is not restricted to the ruins of Jesuit stations. In May 2003, near the hamlet of El Vencido, not far from the limit between Salta and Santiago del Estero, a young man named Mariano took me to visit the mounds marking the remains of one of the first Spanish settlements in the Chaco: Nuestra Señora de la Talavera or Esteco (founded in 1565 and moved in 1609 to a new location farther west). We spent over an hour exploring the site, and on our return he took me to see a small pond of still greenish waters near the edge of the town's vestiges. Decades earlier and on that same spot, he told me, his great-grandfather saw a bright light that seemed to mark the presence of a tapado. That light, he thought, was probably caused by "the vapours" emanating from gold coins. His great-grandfather then grabbed a shovel and began to dig, thinking he had found one of "the gold wagons of the Jesuits." Yet after making significant progress he began hearing strange noises, made by "ghosts" or "spirits." He got scared and ran away. Rainwater subsequently filled up the hole he had dug and formed the pond we were observing. What seemed like a natural expression of the landscape was in fact the product of social practices informed and haunted by the memories of past riches. Ever since then, people in the area argue that the pond "frightens."

This apprehension is part of the dominant local sensibility toward the mounds of Esteco. Most inhabitants of El Vencido, located three kilometres west of the ruins, avoid entering the place close to sunset. People agree that "when the weather is about to change" or at dusk, it is possible to hear reverberations of the town's past life. Those sounds seem to have been even more apparent in the past. In October 2006, on a new visit to El Vencido, I talked extensively with Mariano's father, a man in his late 60s named Pablo. He told me that in his youth he could sometimes hear from his home a distant but clear murmur. He said,

> In the past, that place frightened a lot, especially at the time of prayer [at dusk]. It was really bad...When it was getting dark it was the time they made a ruckus [*la hora del bochinche de ellos*] in Esteco. You heard they were talking, you heard dogs, everything. It was a town.

It is primarily through the sounds of past mundane activities that Esteco lingers as an active presence on its own ruins, as if those sounds were the resonance of an epoch that resisted being erased from the landscape. And this is a presence that "frightens" and is closely associated with the remnants of past riches.

In this region, the Spanish ruins most famously associated with imaginaries of wealth are those of the second city of Esteco, the result of the first Esteco being moved in 1609 a hundred kilometres to the west, closer to the most important trade routes to Alto Peru. In this new location at the foot of densely forested hills, Esteco became the most important town of the Chaco frontier and concentrated the labour of thousands of indigenous men and women. In 1692, however, a powerful earthquake destroyed much of the town. Esteco, which had already entered a period of decline, was abandoned. According to a legend that is currently well-known in northwest Argentina, the inhabitants of Esteco were extremely rich, arrogant, and faithless, to the point that they used gold horseshoes and on rainy days put bread on the street to walk on. This is why, so the story goes, God himself decided to punish Esteco by causing the earthquake that destroyed it. Currently, criollos throughout this region agree that Esteco's fabulous riches still lie underneath the many mounds that mark the remains of this city, located a few kilometres east of Río Piedras, a small town of about 2,000 people. Generations of treasure hunters have searched for tapados there, leaving behind a landscape dotted with holes of different sizes.

Like the tapados left by the Jesuits, locals agree, the riches of Esteco are also looked after by potentially frightening presences. But the view that "God" sent the earthquake that obliterated Esteco is a further component of this apprehension and many criollos see the place as "cursed" (*maldecido*). The overgrown ruins of *la ciudad perdida* (the lost city) have for a long time been in a 50 hectare patch of forest located on a cattle ranch recently turned into a citrus farm.[3] Drawing on "the legend of Esteco," most locals see this forest as "damned" and many of the men who work on the farm have avoided entering it. This apprehension seems to be old. In 1906, an explorer from Buenos Aires conducted excavations in Esteco and complained that the local criollos feared the site and ended up refusing to work for him "because they heard the singing of a rooster or because they saw a ghost that lurked in the recently opened holes" (Payró 1960:198). As with the site of the first Esteco farther east, during my fieldwork in Río Piedras, people told me that strange roosters as well as dogs could be heard near the mounds, confirming that the ruins of "the lost city" are still haunted by forces and sounds reverberating from another era.

These frightening presences have curtailed many attempts to uncover the tapados lying below Esteco. Roberto is a former rural worker from Río Piedras now

in his late 60s. In September 2006, I visited him in his home and he told me how, when he was only 12, he "got scared" while searching for a tapado on the then cattle farm in Esteco. He was digging near a large mound when all of a sudden he felt "a cold thing" in his back, as if someone had stuck a cold dagger in his body. He ran away but was so terrified that he was unable to speak for four days. He got what criollos in the region call *susto*, a so-called folk-disease that is in fact known in many parts of rural Latin America. This is an often temporary state of bodily semi-paralysis in which a person loses his or her consciousness or ability to speak as a result of an intense experience of fear (see Green 1999). Roberto's grandmother eventually cured him and he recovered. But even though he continued working on the farm for several decades, he never entered Esteco again. The susto that temporarily took over his body is the most apparent product of the fear that can be triggered by these places. Therefore, when criollos argue that some places *asustan* (frighten) they mean not simply that people can be temporarily afraid; they also imply that this fear can be so intense that it can dislocate one's sense of self and make one lose control of one's consciousness.

The view that places such as Esteco "frighten" and the bodily disposition this view entails are not restricted to rural workers. In 2006 in Río Piedras, I met the grandson of the previous owner of the farm, an 18-year-old named Marcos who goes to college and works in the city of Salta but drives back to his hometown on weekends. Despite being part of the small local elite, he shared with local working-class criollos the view that the ruins of "the city of Esteco" are damned. Marcos told me that the previous year he had gone to Esteco on his bicycle and decided to take away with him a few pieces of the countless broken tiles that dot the site. On returning home, his bike felt heavier and slower than usual. From then on, he said, "many bad things" began happening to him: his mother got very ill and almost died; he had problems at school and work; and he began losing money. In Salta, he consulted "an astrologer" who told him that those objects had "bad energy" and that he should take them back to Esteco immediately. He did. On arriving in the ruins of Esteco to return the pieces of tile, he made the sign of the cross to deflect the place's bad energy. Since he knew I had been at the site several times, he told me, looking at me with a serious gaze, "I recommend that you do the same when you go to that place."

The view that the negative influences emanating from places such as this can be countered by symbols of Christianity is an important component of the structure of feeling shaping the spatiality of fear throughout the region. And the invocation of these symbols has been especially prominent in Esteco, given the particularly charged imaginaries that this place evokes. In 2000, a businessman bought the farm on which Esteco is located. He subsequently cleared and levelled a patch of forest on the eastern edge of the ruins and planted it with avocado trees. Shortly afterwards a frost, highly unusual for this area, killed all the plants. The owner feared that "the curse," stirred up by the levelling of some of the mounds, was behind the frost and contacted the priest from a nearby town to organize a religious ceremony in Esteco. In July 2004, a crowd of several hundred people arrived at the farm on several buses and trucks and gathered at the edge of the forest that hid the mounds of Esteco from view. The farm owner was present as was a member of the provincial legislature. The priest presided over the ceremony, and said, with his back turned toward the ruins of "the lost city":

> We want to ask God to put this sign of the cross in this place that's so historic...For the first time, and I know I'm not wrong, someone puts the cross in this place of Esteco so that Our Lord Jesus Christ...reigns over the life of this Church of Salta...With this blessing, we want to take any curse on this place away from it, take away all the curses and the fantastic stories that have been created about Esteco; ask for the souls of those who died in that event; free this place from any negative action, from any diabolical action...We want to free Esteco from any connotation of fear that we sometimes have in remembering...Free this place from this sad and difficult story, from everything that has been transmitted from generation to generation.

At the end of the ceremony, the priest and several men planted a one-metre wooden cross at the edge of the forest. This ceremony and the planting of the cross were remarkable attempts to invoke the power of the Church and Christianity to appease and control the negative, uncontrollable forces emanating from the remains of Esteco. It is worth noting that the priest was also trying to counter the structure of feeling that has long dominated collective perceptions of Esteco in the region, coalescing in "fantastic stories" passed "from generation to generation." This is a structure of feeling that he explicitly associated with the memory of Esteco and with the fear this place evokes. For Raymond Williams (1977:134), structures of feeling mobilize regularities in the lived experience of social actors sharing the same historical epoch, often cutting across class differences. As the ceremony at Esteco illustrates, this is the case in this region, where people of diverse class and social backgrounds share the view that certain places have the power to

"frighten." But what is distinctive about this particular ritual involving Esteco, in contrast to the accounts by working-class criollos examined earlier, is that the farm owner mobilized the power of the Church to try to counter this apprehension. The priest made another significant point: he was certain ("I know I'm not wrong") that no cross had been planted on that soil for over three centuries. This assumption further configures Esteco as an untamed place located beyond the reach of Christianity, and for that reason, requiring an affirmation of spatial and moral authority such as the planting of a cross.

Local perceptions of the ruins of Esteco and the Jesuit missions reveal that most people see the cursed riches hidden below them as the product of particular histories, ultimately tied to the process of conquest that configured the region. And some criollos are explicit in pointing out that this elusive wealth was produced by the past exploitation of indigenous labour. Some of these places, in this regard, "frighten" because they stir up memories of domination and violence.

Ruins of Forts and Bones of Indians

In this region of Salta, some of the clearest spatial reminders of colonial violence are the vestiges of the Spanish forts once built to guard the Chaco frontier. About 50 kilometres east of the second Esteco, near the hamlet of Balbuena, four relatively high mounds (five to six metres) mark the corners of what in the 18th century was Fort Balbuena. The well-preserved ruins of the Jesuit mission the fort was set to protect, San Juan Bautista de Balbuena, are a few kilometres away. Criollos living in the area argue that "the royal road" to Peru, and hence caravans of wagons carrying gold and silver, once passed only a few hundred metres away from "the fort."

The owner of the mid-sized farm that currently encompasses the four mounds is a tall, bright, energetic man in his 70s named Carlos. In July 2005, after I talked to him in his house in Balbuena for a couple hours, he took me to see the site of the fort, which forms an overgrown quadrangle of about one hectare fully surrounded by cornfields. While we were exploring the place, he told me that "40 years" earlier a group of men came to his house and asked him for permission to dig up the mounds. They thought that the place might contain tapados. He agreed, and they all began digging. Yet instead of a treasure they found human bones, and plenty of them, "all piled up." "It was a mass grave," Carlos told me:

> I think that when they killed large numbers of Indians, the Indians rebelled. And with the army that the Spaniards had, they liquidated them and buried them there. There are four mounds and we only opened up one of them. But I think that all the four mounds are the same and have bones.

I asked him who could have killed those people. "In those days, I think it was the Jesuits. Because those Indians who weren't tamed, they got them killed. They tamed many people, but others rebelled...The Jesuits made the Indians work for them." After discovering those bones, he continued, they simply buried them again. I asked him whether the place with the four mounds "frightens." He nodded:

> Yes, there are stories of apparitions. My dad was a person who didn't believe in those things. In 1961 or 1962, I was plowing that field...It was all cleared. There were no bushes, no weeds, nothing. Then, my dad came at night and told me: "I'm gonna relieve you for a while. Go get something to eat." "All right," I said. And I was away for about an hour. When I came back, my dad said to me: "You're going to frighten me." I asked him why, and he said I had been standing on one of those mounds, thinking I was going to frighten him...I told him it wasn't me. "Come on. Don't be silly," he kept telling me. But it wasn't me. He said there was a guy standing up there. I never saw anything, but my dad assured me it was true.

In a few strokes, Carlos wove through the local traces of death, violence and wealth to highlight some of the elements that characterize local views of the spatiality and historicity of fear. And the discovery of a mass grave at a site that embodies the past violence of the frontier brought to light the forms of oppression and disciplining that contributed to creating the riches that many people see as an elusive yet potent component of the local geography. Further, for Carlos, the mounds constituting the fort's remains were actually four mass graves; hence, they were nothing but piles of bones covered with dirt. The very materiality of the site, in other words, consisted of human remains. That the treasure hunters found traces of death rather than of wealth reveal that behind the surface appearance of riches existed a hard reminder of colonial violence. This is also a perception in which the actors most closely associated with the wealth of the tapados, the Jesuit missionaries, are remembered as agents of violence (rather than as "the protectors of Indians," as official narratives currently portray them). The mysterious apparition on the mound emerges here as a sign of disquiet, as a reminder that something disturbing happened there. This is also a sign that the remains of Fort Balbuena do not form an enclosed, restful place but an unstable, tense configuration haunted, in this case, by memories of death. And this is, unambiguously, the death of Indians.

About a hundred kilometres to the north, on a cattle farm covered with thick forests near the town of Las Lajitas, lie the ruins of another fort, which was in fact the most important Spanish fortification on the whole Chaco frontier: San Fernando del Río del Valle (founded in 1750 and abandoned in the 1810s). More so than in the case of Balbuena, criollos living in the area tell many stories of how the soldiers manning the fort fought the Indians who raided the frontier. The owner of the cattle farm where the fort's vestiges are located is a man in his late 50s named Armando, who lives humbly in a small house in Las Lajitas. I met him in July 2003, after several people in town told me he knew the location of the fort. When I visited him in his home, he immediately agreed to take me to see the ruins in his decrepit pick-up truck. A local acquaintance of mine, a man in his 30s named Víctor, joined us. Armando drove us to his farm, parked the truck at the end of a narrow dirt road, and we walked for about 40 minutes through the dense forest that covers much of the farm, with Armando leading the way, slashing his machete back and forth. We finally reached the site. Two-metre high mounds marked the perimeter of the fort and overgrown piles of large bricks signalled the layout of internal buildings. Víctor had never been there and was clearly impressed by the site. As we were exploring it, he kept repeating: "there has to be something here; there has to be something here." He was convinced, he said, that there were tapados below. Armando did not pay much attention to these remarks; rather, he commented that, decades earlier, a long, thick pole with steps carved on it could be seen lying on the ground (at that moment, it was nowhere to be seen). It was the lookout from where a sentinel saw "whether the Indians were coming." He added that captured "indios" were hanged from that same pole. I asked Armando whether the place "frightens." He shrugged; he said that some people argue that it does but that since he had never been there at night he had not seen or heard anything strange. Yet he then told me an intriguing story: a man named Gregorio claimed that decades earlier, while walking near the fort, he was "whipped" by "the soul of a Mataco," the standard derogatory term used in the region to refer to the Wichí people that used to inhabit the area around Las Lajitas.

Intrigued by the story, the following day I visited Gregorio at his home in Las Lajitas. A man in his 60s, he looked like the archetypical gaucho of the region: he was wearing a leather hat and baggy pants (*bombachas*, the typical gaucho pants) and his horse was standing outside his house. After chatting for a few minutes, I asked Gregorio about the story of "the ghost of the Mataco." He nodded casually. That happened, he said, because he found human bones carved out of the earth by flooding on the banks of the Del Valle River, near the ruins of "Fort San Fernando." On seeing the bones, he decided to rebury them inland. Suspecting that a soul was probably haunting those remains, he told me that he said to the bones: "Now I'm burying you again. Don't screw with me." Despite that, Gregorio said, "that bastard punished me." Shortly thereafter, he was riding his horse sharing the saddle with his two children near the fort's ruins. "And all of a sudden," he said, "I feel several whippings. They hit me with three strong whippings. Then my kids said: 'Dad, what's that?' 'Nothing, kids,' I told them. 'It's nothing.' But I was beaten with three big whippings, strong ones. ... I said to myself that maybe it was that Mataco shithead. That Mataco must have been big!" I asked him how he knew it was a Mataco. "They say they buried them over there."

As these stories illustrate, some of the ghostly presences that criollos associate with local ruins embody the actors who once constituted the social landscape of the frontier. And the apprehension grounded in the vestiges of these two Spanish forts is closely connected to human remains that, almost by default, are assumed to be those of Indians. This assumption draws on the memory of the violence that once engulfed this region and the fact that the current relative absence of indigenous people in southeast Salta can be traced back to that violence. The detritus of human bones that is part of these ruins' spatiality, therefore, creates an apprehension that often resurrects those long-vanished social actors not as passive objects of remembrance but as forces imbued with agency: as ghosts. And this is a presence that, in the eyes of Gregorio at Fort San Fernando, "punished" those who disrupted the sedimentation of those remains in space.

It is also worth noting that, for people like Víctor and for the men who asked Carlos to dig up the mounds near Balbuena, the ruins of these forts cannot but hold treasures. Imaginaries of wealth and of violence, in this regard, are entangled within the same social field shaping both their collective memory and the physicality of the regional landscape.

The memory of the killing of Indians attached to these sites is far from implying a celebration of indigeneity or a broader political critique of the violence unleashed against indigenous people. As noted, most criollos tend to participate in the hegemonic narratives that celebrate the triumph of Christianity and civilization over the savagery that once haunted the frontier. Yet by attributing potency to those remains, many criollos evoke the power contained in the memory of savagery and acknowledge the agency that those Indians once had in shaping those

some geographies. In so doing, they partially counter state-sponsored attempts to erase that agency from the regional collective memory and to project Indians into a remote past with no bearing on the present or on current landscapes.

Conclusions

Criollo structures of feeling about the forms of fear awakened by local ruins cannot be separated from their social memory of the conquest that turned the region into a "gaucho" geography without indigenous people. Wealth and violence are, as we have seen, closely intertwined sets of imaginaries within the tension-ridden sensibilities through which rural people in southeast Salta imagine their history. The stories of buried riches, and the fact that the sites allegedly containing them "frighten," point to the dialectic of proximity and distancing that marks criollo social memory. The wealth attributed to the Jesuit missions and to Esteco highlights the view that in the past that same geography was very different from the one that people currently know—one that is characterized by high levels of poverty. Yet this distancing is part of a tense movement that simultaneously turns those traces of wealth into spatially proximate presences, located almost within hands' reach. The widespread view that myriad tapados exist in the region makes it clear that those riches are still *there*, as indissoluble components of the landscape. Yet this is an invisible, largely unreachable and ultimately dangerous wealth. Criollo views of tapados, in this regard, are characterized by a profound sense of estrangement from them. And this estrangement, in turn, is embodied in perceptions of fear and apprehension.

As we have seen, the social sensibilities organizing the spatiality of fear among criollos are also connected to memories and physical traces of past experiences of violence, in a process in which wealth and violence are seen as part of a single thread. This is clear in the view that the Jesuits' wealth was not only brought on wagons from elsewhere but also produced locally through the exploitation and ultimate extermination of indigenous people. Thus, in the case of the mass graves of Indians in Fort Balbuena, the current absence of indigenous people and their presence as piles of bones evokes a suffering that is ultimately the expression of a collective death. That in Las Lajitas Gregorio claimed he was "whipped" by "the ghost of a Mataco" buried near the ruins of a fort, is also a notable inversion of the labour hierarchies and forms of violence that constituted the frontier. Indians armed with whips are still fighting back, even if only occasionally and even if they do so as ghosts.

As these different accounts show, the anchoring of apprehension in particular places, and especially in ruins, indicates that for local people something meaningful happened there. Most criollos, in this regard, read and navigate the regional landscape through a cartography of potentially frightening places that is as cultural as it is historical. This is a sensibility that treats the landscape not as an inert, arrested object but as a fraught, potent configuration that, as Raymond Williams would put it, is "in solution."

The nature of this fear is relevant for examining these sites' spatiality. In this region, people do not say, as most people would in other parts of Argentina, that certain places "are frightening" (i.e., that they "*dan miedo*"). Neither do they say that it is "the ghosts" or "the bones" located in particular sites that create apprehension and eventually "susto." People unambiguously say that it is the place itself that "frightens." In saying that, they anchor the production of fear and susto and, in fact, the very agency that causes fear *in space*. In other words, it is the place itself that produces fear, as if fear was intrinsically tied to the spatiality of that site. Fear is an embodied articulation of the memories that turn those places in ruins into unstable, discomforting configurations; it is also an expression that history is not simply the past but, rather, a spatially grounded, forceful presence that still haunts the living.

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Notes

1 In the 19th century, in the province of Salta, the Salado River was renamed Juramento (Oath) to commemorate that in 1813, during the wars for national independence, General Belgrano made his troops swear loyalty to the Argen-

tine flag on this river. Once the river enters the province of Santiago del Estero it is called Salado again.

2 In the Juramento-Salado region in southeast Salta, there are only three small urban settlements (with a total population of 600) in which people identify as *aborígenes* (indigenous). These people, however, do not descend from the original inhabitants of the region but from Wichí who migrated to the area in the early 20th century from the province of Chaco and, to a lesser degree, the Bermejo and Pilcomayo Rivers.

3 Early in 2005, the farm owner bulldozed this forest with the aim of building a fruit-packaging plant, an event that created intense public controversy about the preservation of the remains of Esteco. The bulldozing received considerable media attention in Salta and a local judge ordered any further alteration of the site to stop, but the future status of the ruins of Esteco remains to this day unclear. I have analyzed this incident and the local responses to it elsewhere (Gordillo 2009).

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Structures of Fear, Spaces of Hope

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Abstract: Fear, as Mary Douglas long ago observed, is centrally a concern with boundaries and their transgression. In this article, I explore the politics of boundary maintenance and transgression in the cauldron of the American War in Vietnam. Drawing primarily upon the war crimes testimony, memoirs and oral histories of U.S. soldiers and veterans of the Vietnam era detailing their dissent and shifting loyalties, I argue that boundary transgression, contrary to Douglas' influential deep structural analysis, is an important means of establishing countervailing forms of power. Further, the multiple challenges that these soldiers and veterans posed to the expansion of the American empire allow us to view boundaries and transgression not as opposite poles to be contemplated but rudiments of a ferocious encounter between fear and hope.

Keywords: fear, hope, Vietnam War, race, class, internal colonialism, American empire

Résumé : La peur, comme Mary Douglas l'a observé il y a longtemps, a parmi ses enjeux principaux les frontières et leur transgression. Dans le présent article, j'explore les politiques relatives au maintien des frontières et à leur transgression dans le brasier de la guerre américaine au Vietnam. En puisant avant tout dans un un corpus de témoignages, de souvenirs, de récits oraux de soldats et d'anciens combattants américains relatifs à des crimes de guerre commis lors de la guerre du Vietnam, et où ceux-ci révèlent leur dissidence et l'inconstance de leur loyauté, je soutiens que la transgression des frontières, contrairement à l'analyse structurale en profondeur qu'en fait Douglas, si marquante, est un moyen important pour établir des formes de pouvoir en opposition aux pouvoirs prépondérants. Qui plus est, les multiples défis que ces soldats et anciens combattants ont posés à l'expansion de l'empire américain nous permettent de voir les frontières non comme des pôles à mettre en opposition mais comme les rudiments d'une rencontre féroce entre la peur et l'espoir.

Mots-clés : peur, espoir, guerre du Vietnam, races, classes, colonialisme interne, empire américain

Introduction

Perhaps the best way to understand a structure of fear is to situate it in relationship to its dialectic opposite: an emergent structure of feeling, which at least in Raymond Williams' (1977) formulation is associated with a sense of renewal and, yes, hope. Toward that end, as well as to highlight the tension between practical consciousness (what is actually being lived and experienced) and official consciousness (the already articulate and defined) that Williams identified with the emergence of a new structure of feeling, I will begin with a personal vignette. In the latter part of the American War in Vietnam, African American soldiers regularly greeted one another with the black power handshake, which always unfolded in a relatively lengthy and precise choreography of hands and fists. More than a show of solidarity, it simultaneously symbolized a resistance to military authority. One would always engage in this ritualized encounter even before saluting an officer, if a salute was even offered that is. Not everyone engaging in this ritual was an African American, however. Many Chicanos, American Indians, Asian Americans and even white ethnics could be seen among the participants. This polycultural approach to race grew out of sustained conversations about race, class, American society and imperialism among like-minded ground troops, conversations in which, not surprisingly, black soldiers always had the most developed and articulate positions (see Westheider 2006).[1] In my own case, I began to take part in this ritualized greeting as a show of solidarity with the various struggles for liberation that it came to symbolize after engaging in multiple conversations in which the relative and very recent whiteness of Italian-Americans was explained to me in rather elaborate historical detail. As one of my friends said pointedly: "Italians simply are not white. Never really have been. Never really will be." We will leave aside here the ways in which these conversations emphasized the social construction of whiteness decades before academics began to focus on this

issue. I use this anecdote instead to highlight the sheer terror that this crossing of racial boundaries instilled in the military brass and career soldiers, or lifers, who seemed completely unsure about how to—and were at times simply unable to—maintain military discipline when confronted with these transgressions.

The broader implications of these transgressions will, I hope, become clear shortly. For now, this anecdote suggests a starting question: why did the soldiers' crossing of racial boundaries cause such fear among their military superiors? I suggest that the beginning of an answer has to do with the ways in which this transgression upended the structures of fear on which military discipline and, more importantly, military strategy depends. Fear, as Mary Douglas long ago observed, is centrally a concern with boundaries and their transgression. But Douglas took the boundaries separating insiders and outsiders, kin and strangers, allies and enemies to be essentially deep structures, facilitating meditation on the great religious and philosophical mysteries of the ages: "the relationship of order to disorder, being to non-being,...life to death" (1966:5). Yet, as we all know, far too many people are confronted daily with these "mysteries" not in the form of a philosophical riddle, but as a material consequence of dispossession, war and political violence, as well as unequal human and citizenship rights and restricted access to forms of redress and justice. In this paper, then, I begin from what I take to be the dialectical implications of Frederic Jameson's striking insistence that "the underside of culture is blood, torture, death, and horror" (1984:57), at once evoking the crushing realities of political repression and terror as well as the possibilities of new social visions and affiliations emerging from and in opposition to these realities. What I want to draw out here especially is the emphasis on boundary transgression as a means of establishing countervailing forms of power and resistance. In this reading, boundaries and transgression are no longer opposite poles to be contemplated but rudiments of a ferocious encounter between fear and hope.

In what follows, I explore the politics of boundary maintenance and transgression in the cauldron of the American War in Vietnam. An adequate understanding of this issue, I suggest, requires both a remapping of the war itself and the U.S. Empire. Towards this end, I will draw primarily upon the war crimes testimony and memoirs of U.S. soldiers and veterans. Although I pursue this topic largely from the vantage point of U.S. soldiers, I hope that the broader implications of my research for expanding our historical understanding of the tensions of American empire building will become evident.

Counterinsurgency in Vietnam

It is well known that the U.S. military's deployment of counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam was executed through an assortment of atrocities (free-fire zones, search and destroy missions, napalming of villages, air-attacks), displacements (forced urbanization and relocation into strategic hamlets) and ecocide (massive defoliation and crop destruction). This systematic counterinsurgency campaign was intended to produce a generalized sense of fear among the rural villagers and, ultimately, to diminish their support for the revolution.

It is less well known that this relentless deployment of overwhelming military force simultaneously relied heavily on the instillation of fear among U.S. ground troops. For this, rumour, gossip and racialized narratives were centrally important. We all know that dehumanization of the enemy is central to war preparation and execution. But military strategists and trainers know very well that the specifics of dehumanization are critical to its success. Hence it should come as no surprise that from the first days of training, U.S. troops were inundated with rumours of Vietnamese women placing hand-grenades in baby blankets or razor blades in their vaginas, and the oft-repeated story that the Vietnamese, young and old, did not value life—and hence were unafraid to kill or be killed. In case novice soldiers missed the intended "moral" of the story, it was often stated starkly: "the only good 'gook' is a dead 'gook.'" For a generation that had been raised on Hollywood westerns, there was no mistaking the reference. The Vietnamese were the new American Indians. The U.S. military's emphasis on body counts—the obsessive daily tallying and broadcasting of the number of "enemy" killed by U.S. forces—served as grotesque reinforcement of this distorted morality. The rumours and stories with which new soldiers were inculcated thus infused the prevailing orientalist narratives and Old West imagery of the "savage Indian Wars" with their emotional power, encouraging soldiers to fight savagery with savagery.[2]

Circulating these kinds of rumours, gossip and stories was part of the military's attempt to create a climate of fear that could serve as a bulwark for maintaining the cultural and political boundaries between peasants and guerrillas, soldiers and civilians, and friends and enemies. The emphasis of counterinsurgency warfare on displacement, containment, and "pacification" of civilian populations depends critically upon the creation of a sense of fear and hatred among soldiers charged with these tasks (Ahmad 2006). For American war architects, military planners and officers, the erection of these separations and

boundaries was strategic. Truth did not enter into the equation.

Yet in the conventional historiography of the war, the strategy has become the truth and the boundaries have become reified, albeit without all the implications of savagery. For example, there is frequently an assumption in much of the literature on the war that Vietnamese peasant culture was based on an extreme localism. Few peasants, it seems, had the slightest interest in what happened on the other side of the village fence, nor the ability to interpret terms like "democracy, communism, [or] imperialism" (Hunt 2006:79). American soldiers, on the other hand, are attributed with a different form of provincialism, as Marilyn Young (1991:175) suggests in her otherwise nuanced history of the Vietnam War. Thus:

> A Japanese reporter, Katsuichi Honda, understood the distance between American soldiers and the ordinary scenes of Vietnamese rural life they witnessed daily without ever comprehending. It was hard to see a house of mud and thatch as more than a temporary dwelling; hardly a home in the American sense. Rice cultivation—labour intensive, back-breaking, closer to gardening than any farming even soldiers from farm country had ever seen—simply did not register with the troops, for whom neither the labour, nor the crop, nor the people who planted and depended on it were real.

These depictions of the incommensurable differences of "pre-modern" Vietnamese peasants and "modern" American soldiers simply recreate an imperial cartography and genealogy. As such, they work to erase the historical consciousness and agency of both Vietnamese revolutionaries and American soldiers.[3] Given what we know of the vital role of peasants and peasant culture in the Vietnam War, on the one side, and the GI revolt on the other, a healthy dose of scepticism seems appropriate (see Cortright 2005; Hunt 2006; Moser 1996; Wolf 1999). How, one may wonder, were such localist, inward-looking peasants able to actually defeat the world's most powerful military? Or, for present purposes, how were significant numbers of supposedly provincial U.S. soldiers able to identify with the Vietnamese struggle for liberation, and even find ways to work across the lines that divided them? Put differently, how were they able to see beyond the culture of fear created by the military and enter into hopeful dialogue, even if tentatively and discontinuously, with their supposed enemy? The answer to the latter question, I think, can be found in the following outline of the demographics of the conscripted troops and the changing nature of their relationship to the U.S. state. The conclusions I reach, though, are foreshadowed in the opening vignette of the black power handshake. In my understanding, it represented a rejection of the racialized hierarchies of the nation-state, on the one hand, and a respect for *difference*—with the accompanying demand for equality in difference—on the other (see Lefebvre 2005). It was this conception of difference, as it emerged from the struggles and social movements of the 1960s, that allowed a significant number of U.S. soldiers to appreciate and in some instances even identify with the Vietnamese struggle for self-determination.

The Rebel Army of the Poor

It is well known that the obligation to serve in the military during the Vietnam War fell overwhelmingly to the sons of the poor and the working class. It is also well established that a disproportionate number of low-level combat and support troops serving in Vietnam were people of colour (Appy 1993; Cortright 2005; Mariscal 1999; Westheider 1997). It is less well known, however, that this class and racial imbalance resulted from a 1965 Selective Service Agency policy designed to "channel" the working classes into the military and the middle and upper classes into crucial "civilian support occupations"—i.e., professional careers (Tax 1968). Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then assistant Secretary of Labour for policy planning, was the original architect of this program; his proposed solution for what he called the "culture of poverty"—borrowed, of course, from Oscar Lewis–centred on sending the poor, especially young men of colour, off to fight the war. Although we cannot be sure of Moynihan's intentions in drafting these proposals, it is safe to say that their institutionalization by Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara into a program called Project 100,000 (designed to admit 100,000 formerly unqualified men into the armed forces every year) at the apex of the civil rights movement signalled a real distancing of the Johnson administration from the improvements promised by the voting rights and civil rights acts of the mid-1960s (Hsiao 1989; President's Taskforce 1964). Indeed, young civil rights activists and black power militants were often the favourite targets of local draft boards (Westheider 1997). At the same time, this selective service policy also signalled the administration's distancing from the Fordist capital-labour compact, and the imminent end to the limited, but very real privileges enjoyed by the core U.S. working class relative to labourers in other parts of the world economy. In effect, it also ended the promise of future prosperity to other sectors of the U.S. working class that had not yet benefitted from the post-war economy. Young workers coming of age in the 1960s—the very people who were being conscripted into military service—

experienced this displacement and dispossession most sharply, doubly so as stable manufacturing jobs and manual labour jobs began to evaporate at around the same time.

If U.S. counterinsurgency in Vietnam represented the revival of the genocidal methods of colonial warfare, with the brutal pacification of American Indians and the Philippines as its main sources of inspiration, the new selective service policy represented the assertion of colonial rule within the U.S. itself, at least for populations that increasingly bore the status of subjects. The divisiveness of this form of governance both foreshadowed the neoliberal state and reinvented the colonial ethnographic state apparatus, in which select populations were objects of specific government policies, not rights-bearing citizens (see Chatterjee 2004).

As Henri Lefebvre (1969) noted in the immediate aftermath of the events of May 1968 in Paris, this changing relationship between state and subjects represented a more global transformation as capitalism and states readjusted to decolonization in the South by creating internal colonies in the North. Internal colonization was most evident, he argues, in the metropolitan centres of the North, as segments of the population became increasingly separated into ghettos reminiscent of colonial cities. In the U.S. these conditions had longed prevailed. American cities' history of segregation and ghettoization is such that the spatial relations of race and class already looked like internal colonization. Nonetheless, the political implications of the transformation that Lefebvre identified were immediately evident in the U.S., as the state's internal and external enemies became virtually indistinguishable, and the line separating police and military activity in effect disappeared (Parenti 2000). By the mid-1960s, both internal police forces and external military forces were actively collaborating in applying the theories of pacification and counterinsurgency to domestic political problems, such as urban riots and political demonstrations (Ahmad 2006). And ironically, perhaps, these policies were also being applied to rebellious soldiers within the military. Mass incarceration of black soldiers in Vietnam, for example, was a common occurrence, as were stockade riots. The 13-week rebellion and occupation of Long Binh stockade beginning in August 1968, in which over 70 incarcerated black soldiers were wounded by military police, is only the most well-known example (Westheider 1997). The urban riots that rocked U.S. cities in the aftermath of Martin Luther King's assassination thus had their counterparts in Vietnam, as the struggle for civil rights and self-determination among Blacks, Latinos and Native Americans exploded in the middle of the war zone. As dramatically, the infamous Phoenix Program, purportedly charged with assassinating Vietnamese guerrillas, initially targetted U.S. military deserters known to be living among the Vietnamese (Trujillo 1990).

Soldiers in Vietnam often referred to this systematic repression as the "war within the war." It was also obvious that the military brass also considered it a war. For one, the number of rebellious soldiers was staggering. By 1970, much of the Army in Vietnam refused to fight and staged a quasi-mutiny. Two sociological studies conducted for the Army in 1970 and 1971 (Cortright 2005:270) reported that roughly half of the low-ranking Army soldiers were engaged in some form of active resistance. Further, the activists articulated the sentiments of a significant number of soldiers who did not necessarily engage in outright resistance (Moser 1996). If we consider that by 1968 there were 500,000 U.S. troops stationed each year in Vietnam alone, the GI revolt constituted one of the most significant social movements of the 1960s, with roots in and inspiration from a variety of political streams, such as the black power, peace, labour and national liberation movements.

We can begin to see here the many points in which a sense of common struggle and humanity could have developed between dissident GIs and Vietnamese insurgents. This recognition was registered in GI folklore and rumours of U.S. soldiers *crossing over* to fight with the National Liberation Front (Mariscal 1999; Rees 1979). A common rumour featured "Salt and Pepper," two marines who, according to soldier lore, *crossed over* and continuously evaded capture (Holguin 1990). It is also registered figuratively by many veteran-writers of the Vietnam War as a process of either crossing over "enemy" lines or by imaginatively becoming the enemy or the *Other* (Cano 1995; Durden 1976; Franklin 1997; Lee 1977; O'Brien 1977; Roth 1973; Rottman 1997).

Here we see that military strategists and officers did not have a monopoly on the circulation of gossip, rumour and stories. But in the soldiers' stories, the shared history of exploitation and oppression underlining these narratives of recognition is always evident. As one stockade prisoner replied when asked by a journalist about the attitude of black soldiers toward the war:

> I feel that the black man's attitude is that the war in general is one of genocide toward the coloured people of the earth in general, in that the military can kill two birds with one stone. There is a little bit of fear...inside the black serviceman's makeup but it is slowly and surely disappearing. [Harvey 1969:9]

In Daniel Cano's (1995) *Shifting Loyalties,* a multiple-protagonist work of Chicano social fiction, the desertion of Jesse Pena and his crossing over to fight with the National Liberation Front (NLF) becomes an occasion for his friends to consider his actions through the prism of their own history of oppression. After discussing the impoverished conditions of Pena's childhood in the Southwest, conditions that in many ways resembled those of the Vietnamese peasants, one of the friends articulates the group's sentiments: "so now they send him here to fight for his country, for his land! Wow, what a joke man." In both cases, we see the growing identification of some U.S. soldiers, especially soldiers of colour, with the Vietnamese and their anti-colonial struggle.

In the latter part of the war, this recognition of a common struggle and humanity was expressed in informal truces between U.S. soldiers and Vietnamese guerrillas. NLF and North Vietnamese soldiers were known to refrain from firing upon U.S. troops displaying red bandannas, black power armbands, peace signs, or wearing a Vietnam Veterans against the War button, unless the Americans opened fire first. The sense of mutual recognition evident here is vividly illustrated in the recollection of Greg Payton, an African American soldier:

> We were walking in this high grass and we saw the grass moving so you knew somebody else was in the grass. We got to a clearing; it was the Vietcong, they had weapons...They looked at us. We looked at them. They went that way. We went this way. That was the end of that. There was identification, man. Oppression is a universal kind of thing. [Moser 1996:54]

As may be expected, this "structure of recognition" (Mariscal 2006) was also expressed in a range of class-based, anti-imperialist and self-determination struggles by Vietnam-era military veterans (Helmer 1974; Johnson 1996; Lembcke 1998; Stacewicz 1997; Strayer and Ellenhorn 1975). Many Native American, African American and Latino veterans, among others, self-identified as members of a colonized people, and figured prominently in a host of liberation and self-determination movements within U.S. borders: the 1969-71 *Indians of All Tribes* invasion of Alcatraz Island, the Black Panther Party (BPP), American Indian Movement (AIM), and El Comite, among others. And a number of veterans—such as John Trudell (Alcatraz, AIM), Geronimo Pratt (BPP), Bill Means (AIM) and Federico Lora (El Comite)—became public figures through their participation and leadership in these movements.[4]

For some movement activists, the connection between the struggles on different sides of the world was especially heightened during moments of fear and danger. Witness the reflection of a Vietnam veteran activist who participated in the AIM occupation of Wounded Knee. While hiding in a ravine to avoid being caught in the bright spotlight of a U.S. military armoured personnel carrier, he has an epiphany:

> Suddenly a popping sound punctuated the night. I was shocked–I knew that sound. I had heard it every night for twenty months in Vietnam as the security forces defended the air base at Da Nang, unleashing flares to light up the Vietnamese night to see if Victor Charlie (code for Viet Cong) was coming through the concertina wire. In that moment in the ravine, I realized the United States military was looking for me with those flares. I was the gook now. No wonder the Vietnamese, looking at the Indian tattoo on my arm, had presciently told me, You same same Viet Cong. I damn sure was. [Kipp 2004:126]

Alfredo Vea, the author of the magical realist novel *Gods Go Begging* (1999), similarly draws upon his military experience to situate devastated U.S. inner cities and destroyed Vietnamese villages within a common history and geography. In a crucial scene, he recounts a comparable moment of recognition between a Chicano soldier and a North Vietnamese Army prisoner:

> After a long moment of immobile silence on both sides of the wire, the NVA soldier smiled broadly... then reached up to grab a shock of his own hair. With his other hand, he pointed to the American sergeant. "You same-same me," he said in pidgin. His voice was high pitched and musical. War had not altered his civilian timbre. He released his hair, then ran his fingers over the brown skin of his cheek, then over his brown, sunburned forearm. "You same-same me," he repeated. [Vea 1999:79]

The pidgin English was quickly dropped as they both realized they both spoke French. Immediately the conversation became more personal, with each understanding that they shared the wish to find a cosmopolitan place to live, a place where the boundaries of culture and difference are truly permeable. The NVA prisoner addresses the American soldier again:

> You must go to Marseille someday. The port is magnificent. From the hills above the sea it is easy to imagine the Crusaders leaving in their wooden boats for the Holy Land. Sit in the coffee shops or on one of those green benches...and just listen, just listen. Marseille is great simply because of all the people like you and I who must go there. It is beautiful because emissaries

> of separate countries have conferences at every café. There are cultural exchanges in every doorway. Besides...Paris is too cold for dark people like you and me. [Vea 1999:82]

So much for Vietnamese localism!

It is important to emphasize here that this structure of recognition was not in any way limited to dissident soldiers. It is clearly evident in the best known and widely read memoir of the Vietnam War, Tim O'Brien's (1990) *The Things They Carried.* O'Brien's meditation on the war and his involvement in it touches a chord with a wide range of readers. And, if my children, nieces and nephews are any indication, it is the one book about the Vietnam War that is regularly assigned to every succeeding cohort of U.S. high school students. The key passage for present purposes occurs in the chapter, "The Man I Killed," as O'Brien imagines the common feelings and hesitations he shared with the man he killed many years earlier. Earlier in the memoir O'Brien recounts how it was fear of being thought a coward and the dread of being ostracized from his community, not bravery nor a belief in the mission, that influenced his decision to enter the military, and not to evade the draft and escape to Canada as he secretly wished to do. "I was a coward," he writes, "I went to war" (1990:61). In a later chapter, these same sentiments are ascribed to the Vietnamese man he fatally confronted in battle: "Beyond anything else, he was afraid of disgracing himself, and therefore his family and village. But all he could do, he thought, was wait and pray and try not to grow up too fast" (1990:127).

Remapping the World

In the varied movements, mutinies, testimonies and imaginative writings of U.S. soldiers and veterans that I have presented here, the experience of black prisoners, Vietnamese peasants, Chicano farm workers and dispossessed urban dwellers are linked as different local instances in a struggle against U.S. imperial power. A highly explicit articulation of this revised conception of the world was presented during the 1971 Winter Soldier Investigations in Detroit, an unofficial war crimes tribunal organized by Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). During the "Third World Panel," to give just one example, discussions of the rampant police violence and economic dispossession then shattering communities of colour within the U.S. were linked directly to the devastation of Vietnamese communities as the overlapping effects of U.S. imperial rule (VVAW 1971). Much like W.E.B. Du Bois' (1999) concept of the world colour line, the juxtaposition of these dispersed instances of oppression, exploitation and terror created a counter-geography of belonging and connection in the world among a multiplicity of subject positions always already constituted as different within and between reigning structures of power. It was this transgression of racial, ethnic and national boundaries that so effectively upended the military structures of fear during the Vietnam War.

These transgressions, in effect, were arguments-in-action against state power, new imperialisms and internal colonialism. They were not arguments for homogeneity. As mentioned earlier, the right to difference was a central political demand of the 1960s and 1970s. Yet the difference evoked here is not the radical alterity of post-colonial scholarship. The instances of "crossing-over" and "becoming the other" described above identified commonalities within difference. In identifying the commonalities of political aspirations across a range of struggles and socio-economic conditions, it may be said that dissident soldiers and veterans were involved in mapping what David Harvey (2000) recently called "spaces of hope" in the global struggle for expanded human rights and liberation.

The cartography of these "spaces of hope" emerged, I suggest, from the dissident soldiers' ongoing refusal of imperial and state classifications. For one, it was a refusal to name the Other as barbarian, a rejection both of national allegiances and of global racial and cultural hierarchies. It was a refusal also to name themselves as Other, a redefinition of the racial oppositions and class fragmentations inhering in the nation. Raymond Williams' idea of a structure of feeling provides a useful framework for understanding the dissident soldiers' embrace of a provisional namelessness. As I mentioned in the introduction, Williams' distinction between practical consciousness (what is actually being lived and experienced) and official consciousness (the already articulate and defined) helps us see the emergent possibilities of this refusal of classifications. There is frequent tension, Williams argues, between received interpretation and practical experience. "There are experiences to which the fixed forms do not speak at all, which indeed they do not recognize. There are important mixed experiences, where the available meaning would convert part to all, or all to part" (1977:130). In the absence of adequate frames for understanding experience, the tension between meanings and values as they are actually being lived and the already articulate and defined is especially pronounced, provoking on occasion new modes of thinking and feeling (Williams 1977:131).

The previous examples of mutual recognition—"crossing over," becoming the "Other," refusing "names"—thus,

from my perspective, represent telling moments in the emergence of a new structure of feeling. At the same time they infuse Williams' concept with greater spatial breadth and historical depth than it is usually afforded. Williams' analysis seems tacitly set within the nation, and focused primarily on changing relationships between and within national classes. Still, the highly fraught encounter between lived experience and established meaning that Williams attributes to the emergence of a new structure of feeling makes it, I think, a profoundly useful tool for understanding the "cosmopolitan culture mixing" that emerged in the cauldron of the Vietnam War.[5] According to Tarak Barkawi (2006:78), soldiers' creative encounters with difference during wartime frequently lead to "reassessments of home." I would add here that these reassessments are often not just of "home," but of the seemingly static distinctions of "self" and "other" used to justify combat in the first place, thus fostering a greater appreciation of what Edward Said (1994) calls the intertwined histories and overlapping geographies of subalterns in the North and South.

In refusing imperial and state genealogies, the dissident soldiers and veterans were seemingly articulating a provisional internationalism, in Timothy Brennan's (2003) sense of issuing a proposal for international solidarity in advance of securing the necessary political, cultural, or organizational forms for its realization. Premature though it may have been, this proposal did highlight the need for creating links between a range of struggles both within and across national borders to counter the expanding and genocidal reach of the U.S. empire. In their disavowal and transgression of both colonial and national boundaries and classifications, then, these dissident soldiers and veterans presciently offered us a glimpse of how a map of the world may be redrawn, one that traces the connections of disparate people subjected to the globalized American model of governance, or what we now once again call imperialism. Such a map of the relations of connection and affinities of the dispossessed, insecure and terrorized would be an important and urgently needed step in the creation of a countervailing culture of creativity and possibility to the structure of fear and chaos erected by U.S. military imperialism. Although long suppressed, the enduring legacy of the GI resistance to the American War in Vietnam rests in it being an important example of how spaces of hope can emerge from within imperial structures of fear and occasionally even transcend them.

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Notes

1 I borrow the idea of polyculturalism from Vijay Prashad (2001:xii), who insists that people's cultural identities are drawn from a host of lineages. "The task of the historian," he writes, "is not to carve out the lineages but to make sense of how people live culturally dynamic lives."

2 Michael Taussig (1984) developed a useful framework for thinking about the relationship between violence and rumour in an early and influential article, but tended to analyze only the discourse of the colonializers, not the colonized. But David Hunt (2006) showed how the informal "grapevine" among villagers, market vendors and revolutionary cadres in the Vietnamese province of My Tho fostered a political cosmopolitanism among local people, who clearly understood the universal significance of their anticolonial struggle.

3 As a counter to these localist assumptions, I will point to the wide-spread cosmopolitanism of peasant insurgents that David Hunt (2006) has documented in his study of village study sessions and neighbourhood meetings; and to the U.S. Vietnam-era veterans who travelled to North Vietnam during the last years of the war to establish an international "peoples diplomacy" (Singh 1998; Stacewicz 1997).

4 See, among others, Churchill and Vander Wall 1990; DeMeyer 1998; Johnson 1996; Singh 1998; Torres and Velazquez 1998.

5 The idea of "cosmopolitan culture mixing" was developed by Tarak Barkawi (2006:77) in his primer on *Globalization and War.*

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Reflections on the Ethnography of Fear

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Taken together, the seven essays in this collection offer a striking spectrum of approaches to ethnographic writing about fear. It is a difficult topic. The difficulty, if I can frame it boldly, is this: how do we link the *contours* of fear, that is, the political economic conditions that produce and shape it, to the *experience* of fear? And how can we begin to grasp that experience, when our usual tools—narrative, observation, discussion, inquiry—yield only fragments, silences, vague associations, evasions, banalities or bizarre events?

One approach to fear, proposed by Gavin Smith in his abstract for the colloquium, is to work with Raymond Williams' notion "structures of feeling." As Smith pointed out, Williams used this term "to refer to the shared 'sense' prevailing in a social formation at a certain historical period." Williams selected these words—structure, feeling—and juxtaposed them, in order to challenge orthodox Marxism's distinction between base and superstructure, and offer in its place a "cultural materialism" in which culture would be understood as something that "saturates all social activity, including productive activity." Smith also highlighted the methodological puzzle that engaged Williams, one centred on the "distinction between direct experiences and our subsequent study of them," since the "un-named moment of experience...cannot be captured at that moment, or in that un-named form." Experience, and the structures of feeling from which it is generated and to which it responds, can only be captured retrospectively and inadequately through a repertoire of terms that are always more fixed, and more solid, than the original.

Gavin Smith's essay explores the work of fear as a mode of social regulation in post-Franco Spain. During Franco's dictatorship, fear worked directly upon surviving supporters of the Republic, the losing side in the civil war, to silence them, divide them and force them into hiding. Post-Franco politicians subscribed to what Smith calls a "pact of silence," a version of democracy-as-neutrality

held together by imposing tight constraints on legitimate debate. The effect was to sustain the inverted, Franco-era narrative in which Republicans were held responsible for the murder and mayhem of which they were the principal victims. What interests Smith is the way the silence, shame, guilt, anxiety and acute social fragmentation generated by Franco's public narratives (together with his brutal and repressive actions) were sustained among the victims decades into the "democratic" era in which different narratives might have been expected to emerge, if not in public, then at least in the intimate sphere of family life. To catch a glimpse of how deeply "Franco's terror" had affected peoples' lives, he had to rely on the minute observation of fragments—fleeting encounters, glances, tensions—and stray sentences in discussions on unrelated topics. Most of all, he had to recognize absence as presence: the fact that 87 people who recounted their life histories said very little about the 1940s and 1950s, and certainly had no narrative about fear, neatly packaged for the listener to absorb. To understand fear as an absent presence takes a very patient ethnographer, patient not only in the fieldwork setting, but patient across decades of research as the utterly unspeakable of one epoch is tentatively voiced in another, and might still emerge forcefully in yet a third as the social forces realign.

Don Kalb's analysis calls for a different kind of patience as he sets out to disrupt readings that map globalization onto the (re)emergence of nationalist sensibilities in Europe in a hasty fashion, without a sufficiently grounded analysis. He disputes the claim that popular mobilization of an illiberal kind is the outcome of manipulation by illiberal politicians who know how to play on popular fears and insecurities. He is doubly skeptical when the subject is post-socialist Eastern Europe, where orientalist tropes and enduring nationalist tendencies are too often, and too quickly, invoked. Kalb's analysis proceeds much more carefully. His "quintessentially anthropological" task, as he sees it, is to explore the "various path dependent 'critical junctions' that link global processes via particular national arenas and histories to emergent local outcomes," since these are the loci where "the politics of fear get incubated." His exposition of these dynamics tracks Poland's Solidarity movement through several iterations, more and less liberal, more and less nationalist, more and less religious and socially conservative. He grounds his analysis in what he calls a "relational approach to hegemony," one that displaces a focus on ideas with a careful study of shifting class alliances in a complex field of force. Thus, Polish skilled workers welcomed the neoliberal emphasis on markets as a way to discipline their lazy co-workers, while rejecting the liberal promotion of gay rights as incompatible with "the self-restraint that members of households on permanently insufficient incomes had to instil in each other in the face of booming consumer fascinations and market fetishisms in the mediatized public sphere." Their anger and fear were not conjured by politician's rhetoric—they were grounded in lessons learned through quite specific histories of struggle, triumph and defeat.

In a vastly different context, Leigh Binford and Nancy Churchill also make an argument against the culturalization of fear and violence. Examining lynching in Mexico, they note that the number of lynchings has risen sharply in the period of neoliberal ascendance suggesting, at the very least, a correlation worth investigating further. Yet media coverage of lynching fails to situate it in epochal terms. Nor does media coverage situate lynching socially by exploring the personal and collective histories and relations of the protagonists. Instead, the media focus on the gruesome details of the events, on the one hand, and the presumed cultural deficiencies of the crowd, driven by unfounded fears and primitive passions, on the other. As in the case Kalb discusses, the media ascribe leadership to demagogues who direct ignorant masses incapable of knowing or acting upon their own interest. The media recognize that the crowd may act out of fear but name their fears as irrational. Binford and Churchill offer the beginnings of an explanation of these fears, situating them in the fall-out from neoliberal restructuring: the insecurity of informal sector jobs, loss of union and community structures as organizing pivots of collective life, fragmentation of families, decline in state welfare provisions, an increase in crime, and a pervasive sense that "the government" cannot be trusted to protect "the people." As Binford and Churchill acknowledge, there is a gap in their analysis, since they cannot trace causal links between the condition of generalized, epochal anxiety and the specific, situated events they want to explain. Yet I suspect that uncovering these links—even from the base of a deep ethnographic engagement—would be a difficult task. The fears generated by losing control over one's life are inexpressible in the vocabularies available to our informants, and our social-scientific namings inadequate to the task—precisely the problem Raymond Williams pointed out.

It was in Lesley Gill's precise and relentless exposition of the social forces producing the extreme violence of Colombia's oil belt that I felt my flesh crawl with a visceral sense—however far removed—of how terrifying it would be to live in such a place. Her narrative does not dwell on individuals and their stories, nor does it discuss narratives about fear, or fear as such. Her scale of analy-

sis stretches beyond knowable communities. Yet I would still describe her writing as ethnographic, in the sense that it conveys, in a densely situated manner, the sets of social relations that produce this way of living in this time and place. As in the case of Mexico, the social forces at work in her account include neoliberal attacks on trade unions, self-organizing communities and the hard-won social protections of state welfare. To these are added narco-capitalists seeking to grab rural land as a means to launder drug money and sundry para-military organizations tasked by authoritarian forces inside and outside the state with conducting massacres, executions, extortion, intimidation and mass displacement. Gill's description extends—like Smith's—to the "uneasy calm" and "imposed silence" that continues after most of the overt violence has stopped, barring "selective assassinations" designed to "keep the opposition frightened and off balance." The social dislocation she records runs very deep: people toil alone as non-unionized casual workers or itinerant traders and turn in desperation to their para-military oppressors as patrons, money-lenders and suppliers of "security." If boundary crossing is a source of fear, as Mary Douglas proposes, then this one truly gave me the creeps: an NGO tied to the paramilitaries that goes under the name "Seeds of Peace" and offers counsel to the victims of the political violence in which it was—and still is—implicated. Gill enables the reader to sense both the extreme social isolation that results from these inversions, and the ways they could shape a popular desire for order: if not for an order based in the old solidarities, which are difficult to recover, then an order based in stable, if compromised, hierarchies and old-fashioned moralities rather like those in Franco's Spain.

Linda Green explores two kinds of terror among Guatemala's indigenous people. The first and more obvious source of terror is one that her informants can readily express: the fear of being murdered in Mexico or left to die in the desert in a failed attempt to cross the border into the U.S., and the certainty of being raped, robbed and attacked along the way. The more complex fear, and the one Green renders in her title, is the "fear of no future" among Guatemalans who fail in the crossing or do not attempt it, and suffer the slow death of a "surplus" population that no one—not American capitalists, not the Guatemalan state, not even neighbours and kin—have an interest in keeping alive. The link between these two fears is a thoroughly perverse one, as Green explains. To shift from being "surplus," and hence disposable, "at home" in Guatemala, a person must travel to the U.S. where labour is in demand. But that demand hinges on being cheap—supercheap—a feat accomplished by the regime of illegality and intimidation wrought by the bizarre mechanisms set up to guard the border, while rendering it porous. If they want us as workers, why kill us, why let us die, why send us back? This is a question Guatemalan migrants might well pose to themselves, but their attention is more often focused on immediate survival and another kind of death, more serious for them than administrative and political invisibility: the death of the dream of accomplished social personhood—respect within their own families, for the future they built through their sacrifice. As one migrant put it, "the loneliness is killing me. I still have a wife and children in Guatemala but I am no longer a part of that family, I only send back the money."

Gaston Gordillo's essay revolves around a similar, somewhat overlapping conundrum. If the labour of the Indians of Argentina's Chaco was the source of Spanish colonial wealth, why did the Spaniards massacre them? This is not a question Gordillo ever heard expressed in such stark, analytical terms. What he encountered, instead, was a landscape littered with haunted ruins that hide treasure or the skeletons of dead Indians. The people living near these sites attributed their power to terrorize to the sites themselves—not to the questions they raised, or the histories they embodied. More troubling still, and equally inarticulate, was the question of identification. The criollo population of the contemporary Chaco descends from both sides—the Indians and the Spaniards. Where should they, or could they, stand in relation to this violent past? Were their ancestors its perpetrators or its victims? Or were they confused and reluctant witnesses, still traumatized, as were their descendents, two centuries after the fact? This is the immediate ethnographic puzzle that confronts Gordillo, as he tries to work out how ruins could terrify people who have no direct experience of these violent events; how places could embody memories for which people have no explicit narrative. The only public narrative of the past available to these criollos, as Gordillo points out, is the official, public one, that commemorates "the regional history as an epic struggle between civilization and barbarism," leading them to "remember those 'Indians' as the epitome of savagery." Here Gordillo returns us to the terrain laid out by Smith's essay, in which perpetrators of violence switch place with the victims, leaving behind an inexpressible doubt and anxiety about which side was right or, indeed, what the sides were and where one stood in relation to them.

August Carbonella's essay evinces a social terrain in which social boundaries are crossed but the outcome seems to be the overcoming of fear and triumph of hope—at least for some people. Carbonella figures as a participant in the scenario he describes, as a soldier in Vietnam

who learned two things: first, to give a black power salute, in defiance of military authority and in solidarity with his non-white comrades; and second, that the racial boundary he thought he had crossed was far from solid to begin with, as a friend pointed out: "Italians simply are not white. Never really have been. Never really will be." In the war years, defiance of all kinds was risky, and crossing over to fight or fraternize with the Viet Cong was treason. The narrative of hope Carbonella describes emerged later, as the public narrative about the necessity and virtue of the war was challenged on many fronts. But part of that public narrative, Carbonella argues, had been fragile from the start: the part that sought to instil fear of communist "gooks" among soldiers whose own experiences of racialized oppression suggested a different rendering of where lines were drawn and who they should fear. By 1971, these counter-narratives were both public and articulate—constituting "spaces of hope" with which many could identify. This observation, I would like to suggest, marks a crucial difference between the conjuncture Carbonella describes and the other essays in the collection: fears overcome, injustices named and refusals rendered visible constitute a space of hope one can applaud and support; solidarities fractured, betrayals hidden and the wrenching but unspoken shame of surviving, compromising and living a lie sustain the eerie presence of fears untold.

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CASCA Keynote Address 2008 / Discours inaugural de la CASCA 2008

Anthropology in an Era of Permanent War

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Abstract: Anthropologists are increasingly called on to work within and for military institutions in the United States. The entanglement of anthropological knowledge and military power should be set in context of the monumental growth and size and the imperial deployment of the U.S. military. There has been a striking absence of work in anthropology around the question of U.S. military power during the six decades of its permanent mobilization. This paper distinguishes between an anthropology of and an anthropology for the military, and proposes research foci that might help our discipline understand militarization, its effects and the routes to its reversal.

Keywords: militarization, U.S. military, anthropological knowledge, Permanent War, U.S. university research funding

Résumé : De plus en plus, on fait appel aux anthropologues pour travailler avec et au sein des institutions militaires aux États-Unis. On devrait considérer l'interpénétration du savoir anthropologique et de la puissance militaire dans le contexte de la croissance et de la dimension monumentale du déploiement impérial des forces américaines. L'absence de recherche en anthopologie autour de la question de la puissance militaire américaine au cours de six décennies de mobilisatrion permanente est frappante. Cette communication établit la distinction entre l'anthropologie du phénomène militaire et l'anthropologie pour les militaires, et propose des domaines de recherche susceptibles d'aider notre discipline à comprendre la militarisation, ses effets et les moyens de la contrer.

Mots-clés : militarisation, puissance militaire américaine, savoir anthropologique, guerre permanente, financement de la recherche universitaire aux États-Unis

Introduction

Anthropologists today have fanned out from the university to ply their craft in locations as diverse as hospitals, human rights organizations, corporate offices and forensic police labs. In increasing numbers, they also work within military institutions. In broadest location, however, the discipline operates inside national and political environments that shape the ideas in which they traffic. The theme for this CASCA conference encourages us to try and make sense of what difference these contexts of work and politics make to our field.[1] I will do so by asking particularly about the giant state just to the south of here, and the more or less visible effects of its quite staggeringly large military on our field and on the universities. I end with some thoughts on what kind of research might help our discipline understand militarization, its effects and the routes to its reversal.

I want to ask about the entanglement of anthropological knowledge and military power during the long Permanent War that began, by some reckonings, in 1947 (Lens 1987; Sherry 1997). I want to point to both the continuities and the ruptures from that year to the present era of the Global War on Terror. With the notable exception of the Vietnam War years, there has been an eerie silence in our field around the question of U.S. military power through most of this 60 year period. But this issue has come under renewed examination today as the U.S. military turns once more to recruit the discipline and its members to its work. This is evident in both the turn to "cultural awareness" as a concept and set of educational and training practices in the military (Brown 2008; Gregory 2008) and its combat deployment in the Human Terrain System (Gonzalez 2009), as well as the Minerva initiative, announced in April 2008, which has focused Department of Defense (DoD) funds on university social sciences, including and especially anthropology.

The Era of Permanent War

In 1987, Sidney Lens (1987) gave the name Permanent War to the era in which peacetime military spending and a permanent war footing were normalized in the U.S. He argues Permanent War began in 1947 with passage of the National Security Act and a variety of executive orders. They produced a *revolutionary* rupture in U.S. state organization, instituting what Lens argued was a second, secret government that was housed in a set of new organizations, including the National Security Agency (NSA), National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). At the head of this second state was a new, more imperial President permitted, or better created by, the National Security Act. From the Act's passage on, military activities fell under heavy mask from public oversight. The U.S. became a "national security state."

Military activities and funding mushroomed. A multimillion person standing army was established (rather than the previous small force to which troops were added on a temporary basis for individual, declared wars). Massive investments in science produced weapons which would be without competitors in lethality, stealth and sophistication. The U.S. military already had the most deadly military by the Second World War, when the "kill ratio" in the case of some planes was 11 Japanese shot down for every American (Donald 1995). During the invasion of Iraq, U.S. and British forces killed 60 Iraqis for every one of their soldiers killed by Iraqis (Conetta 2004).

The scale of the U.S. military begins with its funding: the United States currently has the largest military budget of any contemporary or historical state. A small downturn at the end of the Cold War notwithstanding, that spending continued apace until it grew with abandon after 9/11. A good portion of it is the so-called "black budget," whose funds are kept secret even from Congress. While this invisible accounting practice began as part of the Manhattan Project, under Ronald Reagan, it came to be relied on for an ever larger number of military projects; the DoD portion doubled during the Bush years, reaching US$32 billion a year by the end. Billions more in black funds go to the CIA and NSA, whose budgets are completely classified, disguised as seemingly unrelated line items in the budgets of other government departments, which sometimes even Congress does not realize (Broad 2008; Weiner 1990).

The money involved overall is astounding, with approximately US$1.2 trillion slated to be spent on military matters in 2009. This includes the formal DoD budget, separate "off-budget" costs for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, military spending buried and often not counted as such in other areas of the budget such as the Department of Energy, NASA and the State Department, debt payments for past and current wars, and Department of Veterans Affairs allocations.But this huge number represents only a fraction of the actual cost of the military, as Bilmes and Stiglitz (2008) show in their study of past and future costs of the Iraq war. They put the price tag very conservatively at US$3 trillion, a total that so far exceeds official budget figures because it includes the macroeconomic effects that follow from both insecurity and higher oil prices, as well as such things as wounded veterans' lifetime disability payments, the opportunity costs of using the civilian labour of the National Guard and Reserve, lost economic productivity of dead troops and health care costs for those with traumatic brain injury, burns, facial destruction and mental illness. The Cold War stage of the Permanent War had similar costs: by one estimate, the U.S. nuclear arsenal cost US$5.5 trillion to create and maintain during those 45 years. The probable cost of cleaning up U.S. nuclear weapons facilities will likely approach the costs of making those weapons in the first place (Schwartz 1998).

What makes the U.S. military stand out in world historical context as well is its imperial structuring and reach is that it is the world's first and only truly global empire (while the British, in the first half of the 20th century, had a financial supremacy unrivalled before and since [Kelly 2006], they did not have military presence in and surveillance of nearly as many places). Officially, there are currently over 190,000 troops and 115,000 civilian employees sited at 909 military facilities in 46 countries and territories (Department of Defense 2007). Those bases are located on 795,000 acres of land that the U.S. military owns or rents, and contain 26,000 buildings and structures valued at US$146 billion. These DoD numbers, however, are quite misleading as to the scale of U.S. overseas military basing: they exclude the massive amount of building and troop movement into Iraq and Afghanistan over the last several years, as well as secret or unacknowledged facilities in such places as Israel, Kuwait and the Philippines (Lutz 2009).

The U.S. military patrols and surveys the globe with fleets of planes, ships and satellites 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The U.S. military rents or owns over 28 million acres of land, and stores extensive amounts of weaponry there, including nuclear bombs and missiles whose presence in any particular country it refuses to acknowledge. This global power projection, as they call it, is legitimated by bilateral and multilateral security agreements, many of which were signed between the U.S.

and its vanquished enemies or with war-battered allies. These unequal relationships of the post-Second World War and now post-Cold War environments became permanently inscribed in international treaty law, something the U.S. has attempted to accomplish in Iraq as well.

The U.S. military spends some of its billions on personnel, with the result that it has become the largest employer in the U.S., with even the largest corporations mere pikers in comparison. The Pentagon pays the wages of 2.3 million soldiers and 700,000 civilians. Having modelled itself after the neoliberal business restructuring of the last several decades, the military now has almost as many temporary employees as permanent: 1.4 million soldiers are permanent employees in the regular branches of the military and 0.9 million in the Reserves and National Guard are called up and fully paid only when they are needed. The Pentagon directly or indirectly writes the paycheque of millions more Americans through weapons and other contracts. When these workers are added to the above, military labour constitutes approximately 5% of the total U.S. workforce. That percentage would be much larger (as it has been for some other highly militarized societies of the past) were it not for the fact that the U.S. mode of warfare displays a preference for more capital-intensive advanced weapons rather than more soldiers.

Most military contracting has provided jobs to industrial, scientific and technical workers designing and producing weapons. In that capacity, one quarter of the scientists and technicians in the U.S. work on military contracts (Korb 1986). Increasingly, work once done only by those in uniform is now subcontracted out to civilian organizations by the DoD.[2] The ballooning of the number of companies selling "private warriors" to the Pentagon occurred alongside the neoliberal restructuring just mentioned. The phenomenon is also the result of successful lobbying by military corporations for budgetary consideration. Companies such as KBR (Kellogg, Brown & Root), Vinnel and Blackwater (now Xe Services), have been doing extensive base construction, providing logistics, training the soldiers of other militaries and providing protection services for military bases and domestic and foreign officials. They have been doing this with many low-level employees from the global south as one route to windfall profits. They have been making such money for years, but many have recently become infamous for their financial and physical abuses in Iraq. By 2007, there were 180,000 civilians on U.S. military contracts in Iraq (21,000 of them Americans, 118,000 Iraqis, and the remaining 43,000 from other countries). In addition, estimates of the number of private armed security guards working for government agencies, nonprofits, and businesses range from 6,000 to 30,000 (Miller 2007).

The U.S. warehouse of weaponry has been called a "Baroque Arsenal" by one analyst (Kaldor 1981). The process by which those weapons have been constructed is a lesson in the relationship between science, technology and profit. It has produced, at the peak of lethality, the still immense number of 6,000 actively deployed nuclear warheads.[3] Many types of missiles, each of great complexity and expense, have been produced. Just one example is the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile, which the Raytheon Systems Company sold to the U.S. government for US$386,000 each. The platforms for launch of such weapons are much more expensive. The Air Force recently bought 91 fighter aircraft (F-22A Raptors) from the Lockheed Martin and Boeing corporations. A total of 183 of the jets will be purchased with the Government Accounting Office estimating that the cost will total US$361 million per individual aircraft. The profits from such military sales go to these and other major contractors whose return on equity is twice that of other manufacturing companies on average—the result of government subsidizing of their research and development costs and infrastructure expenses, and the government's absorption of business risk.

Arms sales and grants to other countries provide a large additional portion of profit to such military corporations. The U.S. is the largest arms dealer in the world, with exports totaling US$124 billion in the years 1999-2006. Many of those sales have the effect of provoking local arms races and are deeply destabilizing. Raytheon's AMRAAM missile, for example, is now in operation in dozens of countries allied to the U.S., including Taiwan which was sold 218 missiles in a large package of weaponry valued at approximately US$421 million in 2007 alone.

Some U.S. weapons are relatively normalized in the context of global militarization. Others have been controversial, including weapons considered to fall under the category of banned use, such as white phosphorus bombs, which the U.S. has used in Iraq.[4] Also highly problematized have been U.S. cluster bombs which explode and spill out hundreds of "bomblets" across large expanses of territory. They have a high "dud" rate which means thousands of unexploded submunitions can be scattered for civilians to accidently come across. The Dublin Convention on Cluster Munitions was endorsed in 2008 and is the beginning of a ban on their use; the U.S. is not expected to sign.The U.S. is among the minority of countries which have yet to ratify the Ottawa Treaty, the international treaty banning landmines, which have killed or maimed

millions (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2008).

Anthropology in the Era of Permanent War

It is widely acknowledged that anthropological work took place in a colonial context. Less often recognized is the fact that it has taken place in the context of war and militarization. This has shaped where anthropologists have gone, what they have said and who has been allowed to say it (Lutz 1999). Examples extend from the work of American anthropologists on the essentially war refugee populations of Native America to Malinowski's First World War sojourn in the Trobriands—lengthened by his status as an enemy alien in Britain to which he could then not return. It includes the battalions of anthropologists working for the War Department in the Second World War, estimated by Ross to be near 95% of all U.S. anthropologists working in the early 1940s (Wax 2008:89-90). They produced the ethnographies-at-a-distance of the Japanese and later the Soviets meant for use in besting U.S. enemies and they put together cultural compendia of areas targetted for influence or acquisition. There later followed the backlash and new interest in power and knowledge that emerged in anthropology in the context of the Vietnam War. And we now find ourselves awash in the effects of the War on Terror and its new crop of anthropologist employees of the Pentagon.

During this whole era of Permanent War since 1947, anthropologists have quite sensibly avoided field sites where they might be shot, and they have avoided sites which might lead to questions about their national loyalty. These included areas of heavy U.S. military and military proxy violence, as well as "enemy territory" (i.e., the Soviet Union and its bloc and China during the Cold War). War and war preparation, on the other hand, sometimes made field sites a kind of war booty, as for English anthropologists in Africa and Japanese and then U.S. anthropologists in Micronesia.

The growth of U.S. universities, and with them teachers and students of anthropology, was, in important measure, the result of the bargain the U.S. state struck with its Second World War veterans in the form of the GI Bill. The affluence that put a generation of men in college with the privilege of learning of the world and all that is in it emerged from having escaped war at home. It was also the result of the trade advantages of that postwar world, and the network of military bases and power that helped ensure market access and cheap oil.

David Price (2008) has written comprehensive histories of the relationship between anthropology and the security apparatus in the U.S. through the Second World War and the Cold War. In them, he details both this kind of anthropological assistance in identifying and figuring out how to respond to and best represent "the enemy," as well as the red-baiting and repression that resulted in firings of leftists and pushed the field away from the hot topics of militarization and from studying up. As Wax sums it up, the militarized climate of that era "snuffed out all meaningful opposition to the official version of the Cold War" (2008:32).

Structural functionalism, moreover, treated modern war as an *event* around which anthropologists had to peer in order to see the stable *patterns* that were considered to be the real sociocultural thing. In the early years of Permanent War, anthropologists' ownership of the Savage Slot helped produce the discipline's focus on "primitive war." These wars were decidedly *not* events; they were the patterns of the people without history. The proliferation of this work is evident in Ferguson and Farragher's bibliography (1988) which identifies hundreds of articles on the subject through the 1950s and 1960s. These studies tended to be ahistoric and depoliticized, a safer analytic strategy in the McCarthy era, to be sure. This all left civilized war as the unmarked category. Modern wars, like those the U.S. participated in and prepared for, were seen as the very engine of history, a result of the strategic rather than cultural reasoning of states or of political economic imperatives. So they remained invisible to anthropology.

In the 1980s, however, the field began to investigate the victims of modern war in Central America and elsewhere (Green 1994; Nordstrom 1997; Tambiah 1986). But the armies that were studied or referenced were rarely those of the U.S. or Europe or other democratic states, but instead were those of repressive governments such as Guatemala or were paramilitaries (Feldman 1991; Schirmer 1998; Sluka 1989, 2000).

The end of the Cold War ushered in an era in which a few anthropologists began to work on the U.S. military. This was primarily an anthropology *of* rather than *for* the military. It includes work by Lesley Gill on the School of the Americas (2004), Hugh Gusterson on nuclear weapons designers (1998, 2004), Joseph Masco on U.S. national security culture (1999) and post-Cold War nuclear communities (2006), and my own work on U.S. military bases' impact on surrounding communities (2001, 2009). Anthropologists looked at resistance to U.S. military bombardment of Vieques, Puerto Rico (McCaffrey 2002) and antinuclear protests in upstate New York (Krasniewicz 1992). They have examined the military practices at issue in Abu-Ghraib (Bennett et al. 2006), U.S. soldier memoirs of Iraq and Afghanistan (Brown and Lutz 2007), and U.S.

dissident veterans (Gutmann and Lutz in press). An emerging cohort of scholars are examining cultural knowledge production in the military (Brown 2008), the military industry in southern California (Pandya 2008), and multiple sites of the war on terror including military hospitals (Wool 2007). David Vine has researched the social movements that emerged among the people evicted from their homes on Diego Garcia for a U.S. base as well as the history of U.S. and British strategic moves made to acquire the island in the 1960s (Vine 2009). Studies have also been conducted on allied democratic militaries including those of Israel (Ben-Ari 1998), Germany (Bickford 2003), Japan (Fruhstuck 2007), Turkey (Altinay 2004) and Canada (Irwin 2008; Winslow 1997).[5]

The post-9/11 period ushered in an era in which asking what anthropology could do for the state and the military had renewed legitimacy. This legitimacy has been developed over the years in the culture at large, whose respect for the military surpassed that of virtually all other institutions in the U.S. including Congress and religious institutions. This was perhaps also true in the discipline itself, increasingly distanced from Vietnam era discussions of the dangers of this work.

There are today numbers of anthropologists (uniformed and civilian) with military paycheques, and they are all, by definition, doing an anthropology for the institution and swimming in the same cultural seas. Anthropologists are now regular teaching faculty at the service academies, and they work in national weapons labs or with the DoD itself. They have studied Homeland Security (Fosher 2005), organizational culture in the CIA (Johnston 2005), Special Forces units (Simons 1997) and problems of job dissatisfaction among officers posted in Germany (Hawkins 2001).[6]

Montgomery McFate is the most well known among them, even perhaps the most famous anthropologist in the U.S. today. She regularly appears on TV, radio and newspapers, and was featured in the April 2008 issue of *Elle* magazine. She has been the chief promoter of anthropology for the military (McFate 2005), and argues its value, as in one recent article, this way: "If you understand how to frustrate or satisfy the population's interests to get them to support your side in a counterinsurgency, you don't need to kill as many of them," "And you certainly will create fewer enemies" (Stannard 2007). She and other military anthropologists see themselves as critical of some aspects of military operations. Some will say they opposed the invasion of Iraq. Many even see themselves as members of an "insurgency" within the military (Brown 2008). They generally would acknowledge, however, that the mission they operate within is given by the Commander in Chief, and that their work is to effect *how* that mission is accomplished.

Anthropologists (as well as regional and language experts) are now being recruited for the Human Terrain System (HTS), to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. There they are uniformed and sometimes armed and advise brigade commanders on the "cultural terrain" with attention both to enemy culture and that of the populace more generally. The HTS's US$60 million allocation makes it a budgetary sneeze in the context of the military's annual trillion dollars, but it is nonetheless one of the largest social science projects ever mounted (Gonzalez 2009). Numerous news stories which began appearing in 2007 in the mainstream U.S. press—many initiated or massaged with the help of a Pentagon public relations campaign—quote officers giving high praise to the anthropologists and the teams for raising cultural awareness and helping reconstruction. These officers, providing no evidence, also claim that the teams have reduced kinetic operations by 60%.

But while the PR campaign relentlessly focuses on the much more seductive idea of HTS as a peacemaking campaign, its own proponents note that such cultural information already has, as one Lieutenant Colonel noted, "help[ed] me sort through who was the enemy and who was not and from that understanding [that his HTS advisor contributed to] I was able to target and sometimes kill the enemy" (Gonzalez 2008a). The ethnographic information they provide is specifically meant to be integrated with regular military intelligence gathering. Moreover, as Gonzalez notes, the five private companies contracted to hire anthropologists (with salaries which can be as high as US$300,000 a year with entrance into the civil service ranks at the equivalent of a full Colonel), "hired unqualified instructors, didn't discuss ethics, and recruited social scientists ignorant of Middle East languages and societies...[in] a pattern of waste and war profiteering characteristic of a privatized Pentagon" (2008b:8). Three HTS members have already been killed on duty.

Those who recruit for and support the program maintain that the question of the legitimacy of the U.S. project in Iraq and Afghanistan is an irrelevance given the principle of civilian control of the military. They argue that it is ultimately we, as civilians, who sent the troops to their war zones through our elected representatives, and therefore it is our responsibility to help those troops complete their mission successfully, or at least safely. Setting aside the historical inaccuracy of that rendition of how the U.S. had the Commander in Chief it had from 2001 to 2008, their argument mirrors the militarization of cultural discourses in the U.S. In this argument, civilians are modelled as aides

to the state, rather than its sources of revenue, ideological targets of opportunity or critics. The civilian advisors on HTS teams are in fact put in uniform despite their civilian status. The shift in conceptions of citizenship could not be more fundamental and is ultimately deeply connected to decades of Permanent War.

Anthropologists working for the military take a variety of stances on their assistance, some seeing themselves as helping the government become more competent, others seeing themselves as assisting the troops themselves rather than the elites who sent them there (their work primarily with officers and the power of the Pentagon leadership to shape U.S. military choices, however, might throw that into question). Yet others take the view that they are engaged in humanitarian work directed at the people in those war zones or potential war zones: their work, they hope, will protect the civilians there from the culturally ignorant blundering or habitual turn to violence of the U.S. military.

It remains, unfortunately, a powerful argument for a U.S. audience to claim that we abandon troops with cultural ignorance if we do not join the war effort. The level of incompetence of the cultural training some soldiers receive cannot be overstated, but the ultimate question is what the overall military project and intentions are. The fact is that this interest in the details of adversary or local populations' cultures is malleable: McFate's letter to the editor of a critical *Newsweek* article in 2008 stated that it does not matter if HTS personnel are not area experts since their major contribution is to bring methodological skills to the work, although cultural specificities were precisely what she initially sold the program as providing.[7]

In any case, the long history of other disciplines working with the military shows that the intention to reform or help a military seen as benighted have often run horribly aground. The most notorious example is that of the physicists who worked on the atom bomb project during the Second World War, beginning with the prompt of countering what was thought to be a German A-bomb project. Not only was their research not ended when it became clear that the Germans could not develop a nuclear weapon, but their bombs were used to kill several hundred thousand people from another country which was on the verge of collapse (Gusterson 2009; see also Finkbeiner 2006 and Price 2008).

But for all the horror of putting anthropology in uniform—expressed in the AAA condemnation of participation in HTS—this program can be seen as sideshow to the larger problem of the militarization of the university and of departments of anthropology, to which I now turn.

Hearts and Minds and Money: Anthropology and Military Funding at the University

Scholars have looked at the many ways knowledge produced in the U.S. across a range of disciplines has been shaped by military funding, a militarized ethos and imperial patterns of thought that militarism has helped create. U.S. universities are often portrayed as hotbeds of anti-military and anti-nationalist sentiment, but in fact the majority of what goes on day-to-day runs orthogonal to or in concert with at least liberal nationalist projects. The university accommodates and more generally supports or rewards research in service to the national security state (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; Giroux 2007; Lutz 1997; Nader 1997; Price 2004; Simpson 1998).

The Pentagon relationship with U.S. universities, and especially the sciences, has been intensive since the Second World War and deeply structuring of those disciplines in which it has taken an interest. The military currently provides 41% of all federal engineering research dollars in the universities and 45% of all federally funded support to computer science graduate students. While this research is often termed "basic," with the notion that it will contribute to the larger public good, that same public good would have been more efficiently and quickly produced through direct civilian agency funding. Moreover, the point of military funding is sometimes simply to keep individual researchers and universities on retainer as much as it is to produce immediately useable knowledge. Given the tremendous size of the Pentagon research and development budget—US$85 billion in 2009—it represents an industrial, educational and science policy in disguise, shaping scholarly (and corporate) research directions and directing students who work on professors' military contracts into career war work.

This is especially true in the hard sciences, which receive the overwhelming bulk of military funding. Historians of science have shown how physics, engineering and applied math, among others, were remade to focus on issues of utility to warmaking through decades of funding. Whole fields of study hypertrophied and others shrank or are never developed as researchers were drawn from one field into other, Pentagon-funded ones. To take just one example: many physics departments were reshaped in order to provide Ph.D.s to the weapons labs, while urban transit disappeared altogether from engineering. Professors today who would like to train students for work on rail transportation would have to translate suitable textbooks from French, German or Japanese: "In the United States, the traditional depositories of

knowledge for these subjects have been wiped out" (Melman 2003; see also Giroux 2007).

This is true in the social sciences as well, even with relatively slim Pentagon funding. In the securitized environment of the Cold War and post-Cold War university, much political science has come to offer "little more than weakly theorized, putatively scientific, repetitive rationalizations for U.S. military policies" (Gusterson 2007). While anthropologists have tended to see themselves as the antidote to this discipline in particular, the nationalism that guides the attention processes of U.S. anthropology has lately come under scrutiny. There are emerging attempts to develop a less imperial U.S. and European anthropology via South–South linkages and pluralizing efforts in the World Anthropologies Network (Restrepo and Escobar 2005; Ribeiro 2005). It is this U.S.-centrism or Eurocentrism that provides some explanation for why a critical anthropology of the military has been so long in coming.

Let me give the example of my own university, Brown. With Mary Wallace, I have been looking at its military funding which has varied from 13-20% of all external research funding over recent years. The figure that the university gets from this in overhead has hovered around US$20 million a year. Brown is a small university. Others, like MIT, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and several of the California schools are even more dependent. In 2000, the University of California system received over US$147 million in DoD research contracts. Like most other U.S. universities, the California universities are now so dependent on Pentagon grant overhead charges for a part of their operating budget that they have begun to lobby Congress in favour of more military spending for research. While some of that research sounds innocuous to the untrained ear, representing "retainer research" or work that is exploratory of basic processes the Pentagon would like to understand, other work is more explicitly in service to destruction. Fifteen universities, for example, have received funds since 1993 from the Air Force and Navy to investigate how to be able to affect atmospheric processes in ways that will allow knowledge or destruction of the communications of those who become enemies.

And now we have the Minerva Project, the Defense Department's 2008 initiative to fund research in the social sciences. Christening the project as a "classic" (i.e., timeless, noble) one, Secretary of Defense Gates noted that the nation is "facing challenges from multiple sources: a new, more malignant form of terrorism inspired by jihadist extremism, ethnic strife, disease, poverty, climate change, failed and failing states, resurgent powers, and so on." But of these challenges, he specifically gave four examples of the kinds of research the Pentagon feels is needed from the social sciences. They include: (1) studies of "Chinese military and technology"; (2) mining documents the U.S. military has captured in Iraq for "The Iraqi and Terrorist Perspectives Projects"; and (3) research on the relationship between terrorism and religion, especially Islam. And Gates specifically called out anthropology, along with history and evolutionary psychology, as disciplines which could be as important to them as game theory and Kremlinology were during the Cold War.

How should we begin to understand the problems with this initiative? Historians, sociologists and anthropologists of science have demonstrated how the funders of research affect not only the topics of interest but the findings themselves. University research funded by Big Pharma has more often found drugs safe than research funded by the National Institutes of Health; academic research in chemistry departments funded by the chemical industry tends to see safety where National Science Foundation research does not (Krimsky 2003). Research funded by the Pentagon will be no different, intensely framed as it is by a set of institutional imperatives that include profit for contractors and ideological commitments to the use or threat of force as the first need of the state. As Big Pharma research generally helps create the commodities it needs, so military research will create what *that* institution needs—marketable threats, recruitable youth and hygienic self-images of itself as an institution of the best and brightest.

University Presidents will not object, however. In a free market model of knowledge production, they will mostly call for their faculty to be allowed to "make their own choices" about what to research and happily rake the grant overhead into their coffers. We should use the anthropological work that has been done on market ideologies, not just to deconstruct this way of thinking but to reconstruct a better one. Without it, the University becomes an instrument rather than a critic of war-making, and spaces for critical discussion of militarism within the university shrink.

Secretary Gates told the university presidents "too many mistakes have been made over the years because our government and military did not understand—or even seek to understand—the countries or cultures we were dealing with." As several scholars (Brown 2008; Gonzalez 2008a; Price 2008) have pointed out, this is a fundamental misrepresentation of what has gone wrong in Iraq (the insurgency is the result of occupation, not of failure to treat Iraqi women with cultural correctness or understand the meanings locally read in hand signals or the soles of feet, or even the distinction between Sunni and

Shia). It is also a misrepresentation of what the leadership of the U.S. military in fact sees itself as doing, which is using cultural knowledge as a tool or weapon whose use is focused on the mission. In any case, many within the military would see the image of a soldier hugging a local on the HTS website as an embarrassing and at best necessary gloss on the larger, more masculine and warrior-like project.

An anthropology of the military must simultaneously question not just a militarized common sense in the consumers of our research, but question and agitate around the conditions of knowledge production at our university homes. Understanding the university's current institutional imperatives is an important research task if we are to be able to successfully develop research programs that question militarization more generally. The seductions of the military for anthropology and social science more generally will need to be understood, for example, in that context where National Research Council rankings hold such sway, rankings which prominently include grant dollars received, and where internal university competition for power can make DoD funding—particularly when other funding is difficult to come by—so attractive.

An Anthropology for and an Anthropology of the Military

There is an important distinction to be made between an anthropology for the military and an anthropology of the military. A story from the island of Guam in the western Pacific can illustrate the difference it makes when anthropology is on a military mission, and when it is on another one. I have been to Guam a number of times in the last few years in connection with research on U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific region and the social movements that have risen in protest to them. There I met Felix Mansapit, an indigenous Chamorro veteran of the Vietnam War in his 50s who continues to suffer from and receive treatment for a variety of mental and social effects of his years in the military.

The story of how he ended up in a war zone in Vietnam in a U.S. military uniform begins in 1598, when Guam's violent colonization by the Spanish got underway. It became more likely in 1898, when the U.S., intent on becoming an imperial power, received the island along with several other Crown territories as loot from the Spanish American War. It became yet more probable in 1941 when the Japanese captured Guam and began an abusive occupation which the U.S. interrupted with reconquest in 1944. The Navy proceeded to fence off a large proportion of the island for military purposes, including its main water supplies. These land takings were given a fig leaf of legitimation by declaring Guam's residents U.S. citizens.

This citizenship is partial (they cannot vote for the President) and sits alongside the fact that Guam has been a colony in the true sense of the word. Local workers have received lower wage rates than U.S. mainlanders, had their harbours irradiated by the washdown of U.S. warships freshly back from standing watch over above-ground nuclear weapons tests in the nearby Marshall Islands, and lived alongside other military toxins and trash bulldozed off cliffs near the shoreline, buried throughout the island or burned in open fires. Nonetheless, gratitude was the normative political affect of the decades that followed (Liberation Day is celebrated with large parades and speeches every July 21). Despite this, the patriotism of the Chamorro people remained suspect and Felix was one of thousands of young men of the island who joined the military to demonstrate their loyalty.

Felix was initially posted as a guard at the U.S. Navy weapons depot on the island where bombs destined for Vietnam were stored. Falsely accused of theft by a white officer, he remains stung by the humiliation today, protesting that he nonetheless continued, as he said, to "serve my country." He was sent to Vietnam and returned after his tour, when many others did not—the Chamorro had the highest combat death rate of any ethnic group in the U.S. military.

He did not come back the same man, however. As he tells it, he drank himself stupid, slept with guns under his pillow, shot them off randomly among his terrified and disgusted neighbours, and became a regular burden to the local police. Thirty-five years later, and with shame-stinging tears, this story of return was punchlined and punctured by the words of his mother who finally said to him, "the army took my son and sent me back a monster."

This man might be the subject of an anthropology for or an anthropology of the military. How do these two approaches differ?

An anthropology *for* the military would find Felix's psychological problems of relatively minor interest compared with other issues of more pressing concern for its mission. Among personnel issues, the military is concerned with recruitment, retention and unit cohesion. Operationally, it foregrounds enemy culture. An anthropology for the military trying to understand people like Felix will operate in an institutional context in which 3,750 soldiers a year have been discharged from the military with pre-existing mental health conditions since 2002. This compares with just 67 soldiers a year in the late 1990s, a rate 55 times lower than today's. An anthropology for the military would be deeply dissuaded or prevented from studying why those rates are so different and from taking on the discharged soldiers no longer eligible for veterans bene-

fits and no longer counted as cases. An anthropology for the military will be asked to examine Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a psychological state set in a social context rather than a sociomoral discourse set in a frail body and mind and an institution motivated to exclude the politics of the war from the diagnosis. An anthropology for the military might try to understand what mental health screening the U.S. Army can provide to war zone-exiting veterans to prevent damage to family, community and Army on return. In a context of intense media and civilian pressure on the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and military facilities for failures to properly care for injured veterans, understanding how the VA might do better would become a higher priority, particularly as it is relevant to morale and future recruitment.

In an anthropology *of* the military, on the other hand, we might ask about how his illness emerged from the mission he was given, and particularly the contradiction between what he was taught about the laws of warfare or about the social or Biblical injunction not to kill and what he was told or encouraged to do in the war. An anthropology of the military would focus on the complex mix of desire, politics, friendship, money, career advancement and idealisms that makes up the motivational context of military action. It would ask how Felix's life chances after he separated from the service are structured by Guam's military-dependent economic life, and ask how his identity as a man and as a Chamorro might be different were he never to have enlisted or gone to war. It might ask how a whole society, in a sense, might have the disease of militarism that Felix is asked to carry as a psychological diagnosis of PTSD (Gutmann and Lutz 2009). It would explore how the creation of PTSD as a diagnosis tells us as much about the institutions that treat it as about the people who putatively have it (Young 1995). It would ask how the social order might be cured of the disease that was slowly killing Felix as an individual. Anthropology *of* the military would decentre battle and foreground homefront militarization and recruitment, and contextualize it in the historical experience of Guam's colonization and the political economy of semi-citizenship and peacetime military spending and the retail wages it produces. To focus just on this soldier and his war in Vietnam's jungle (and his sons' wars in the Middle East desert) is a bit like focusing only on Hiroshima and not on the emerging nuclear weapons system that produced it and shaped post-war consciousness and economies. To examine only the use of this weapon of mass destruction—the U.S. military—without looking at the much larger and more complex facts of its existence and day-to-day re-creation lulls us into a false strategy for ending this war and preventing the next.

An anthropology of the military would also focus on the recent U.S. Navy and Air Force build-up on Guam, which the Pentagon calls "the tip of America's spear" and its "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for its valuable existing facilities. It would analyze the impact of the Marines being moved there after massive decades long protests at their original location on Okinawa. Together with dependents and contractors, 40,000 people will be added to Guam's current population of 170,000. How the U.S. is able politically to invade Guam in this way and the exact nature of the social dislocations to come and the profits and where they flow would be eminently anthropological projects. Right now, the military has contracted out a social impact assessment whose superficial methodology focuses on elite interviews and is structured to allow Pentagon planners to do what they originally intended.

Finally, a reflexive anthropology of the military would ask why Guam has received so little disciplinary attention over the decades of U.S. colonization in comparison with the islands elsewhere in Micronesia. Two answers initially suggest themselves, including more intense DoD interest in the islands newly acquired from Japan through the government funded Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology and the notion, raised in the 1980s disciplinary critiques, that anthropology had been avoiding places like Guam which appeared *too* embedded in the flow of violent colonial histories.

As we all know, there are problems with any dualism such as this one between the *of* and the *for*. Anthropologists' published work, for example, can be used for the military no matter the writers' intention. Moreover, this dualism is challenged by militarization itself which has eroded the distinction between civilian and soldier so significantly that one can argue that no corner of our anthropological practice or cultural context, in the U.S. at least, is not in some way implicated in the prosecution of war and preparation for war. Certainly I remain a paymaster of the U.S. military, for example, through the withholding tax paid out of each of my monthly paycheques.

What Kind of Research Is Needed?

Over the last several years, I have argued that anthropologists should be paying much more research attention—direct rather than indirect—to "the topography of U.S. power—its exercise, effects, negotiation, protest, and limits" (Lutz 2006:593). Central to this task is understanding U.S. military power and its effects at home and abroad. Ethnographies of the institutions and effects of permanent war would look overseas at U.S. military bases, soldiers in joint exercises with and training other militaries, and the sex-industry and other sites those soldiers

visit. They would examine relations between USAID and military operations in places like Mindanao (Docena 2007), and study the U.S. role in international peacekeeping and how U.S. personnel negotiate policy and roles within it (Rubinstein 2008). Ethnography could look at weapons manufacturing (Pandya 2008) and the performances and wealth flows involved in homeland security (Fosher 2005). We can negotiate access to military sites including bases, armouries, recruitment storefronts and military family housing offices. We can examine domestic violence programs in communities around military bases (Chivens and Lutz 2000) and other aspects of the shaping of masculinity by militarization (Enloe 2000, 2007). We can also examine the military funding and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs on some of our own campuses. We can look at basic training in more complex ways than has been done heretofore, and at the veterans groups whose diverse experiences, politics, and memberships have signal importance for U.S. national politics and community life in many places. We can examine the public debates about soldiers, the war, women in combat, the military contractors whose work and workers set the tone and political economy for many communities, and the weapons commodity chains that begin there.

We can examine children's emerging understandings of war and soldiering, and we can research how anti-war or weapons abolitionist movements have had their effects. We need to know how Americans view the military and its power, how they imagine what combat is like and the economic effects of military spending, and how racism and gender play into views of particular wars. We have relatively little empirical notion of how people across a range of positions in the U.S. see their nation's military and understand its functioning, power and activities in the world. How do they imagine the tax system and where funds for the military come from and where they go? How do they select and filter and talk back to media who report particular versions of the Permanent War?[8]

This research is crucial for an anthropology that will speak with any kind of efficacy in the public sphere. It is necessary to speak to a U.S. public that knows little of what the purposes, effects and vulnerabilities of its military are. It will hopefully be of use for social movements trying to accomplish almost any kind of progressive social change in the U.S.: it is obviously of use to the counter-recruitment movement and the antiwar and anti-imperial movements, but it is also of use to the movement for public transit or universal health care, movements whose budgetary requests are crowded out by the Pentagon and the claims for national security motives and outcomes to such spending.

We need to do an anthropology of the cultural supports for militarization if we are going to be able to understand the cultural assumptions that prevent us from asking the right questions or being heard when we do. Those include the idea that war is the health of the nation and that more bombs equal more security.

Anthropologists were crucial organizers in the early anti-Vietnam war teach-ins at U.S. universities. As Marshall Sahlins (Network of Concerned Anthropologists 2007) has reminded us, these efforts were based on the assumption that our job is not to try to influence policymakers from the inside because our knowledge is not what will sway those who choose the missions. Instead, it is by holding civilian and military leadership accountable through educating the public—not advising policy makers—that anthropology will have whatever effect we individually and together want it to have.

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Notes

1 This paper was originally given as the keynote address for the CASCA conference on 9 May 2008. I would like to thank the members of that audience for their challenging and helpful questions and discussion of its themes.

2 Between 1994 and 2002, the Pentagon entered into contracts worth over US$300 billion with dozens of private military companies (Singer 2003).

3 Along with these 6,000 ready to launch weapons, the U.S. had another 4,000 readily deployable warheads in 2008 (see http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction=325&projectId=7).

4 The U.S. used white phosphorus in Fallujah in 2004, at first denying and then admitting it. A military spokesperson claimed its use was not illegal, maintaining that "white phosphorus is an incendiary weapon, not a chemical weapon." The U.S. signed a treaty banning chemical weapons use, but not an international agreement restricting the use of white phosphorus against civilians (BBC 2005).

5 More culturally oriented political scientists like Carol Cohn and Katherine Ferguson are writing in what can be easy dialogue with anthropologists.

6 Some of this work was Ph.D. dissertation work rather than work done as a government employee.

7 She was roundly critiqued for the bait and switch by Derek Gregory: "What McFate resurrects is a shop-worn distinction between understanding the particular and analyzing the universal: she once insisted on social science supplying the former (knowledge of 'adversary cultures') and now, obliged to concede that most of the social scientists recruited by the Pentagon understand neither the area in which they are deployed nor the language in which they are immersed, claims that it supplies the latter" (posted to Weinberger 2008).

8 These media show war hygienically, U.S. soldiers heroically—often as victims—and portray U.S. military activity as exporting democracy, transferring U.S. wealth outward, promoting economic development and liberating women.

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Articles

"We Wanted Change Yesterday!" The Promise and Perils of *Poritikisi*: Zimbabwean Farm Workers, Party Politics and Critical Social Science

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Abstract: In this article, I examine the entanglement of an emergent political imagination of "democracy" with the forms and meanings of *poritikisi*, party politics, for a group of farm workers involved in labour and land struggles in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2003. In so doing, I seek to provide more insight into the on-going political and economic crises in this southern African country, while putting forth an analytic to ethnographically examine the effects of party politics. I also raise questions about the use of politics in critical social science.

Keywords: Zimbabwe, politics, critique, farm workers, land struggles, political anthropology

Résumé : Dans cet article, j'analyse l'enchevêtrement d'une imagination politique émergente de la « démocratie » avec les formes et les sens de *poritikisi*, la politique de parti, pour des ouvriers agricoles impliqué dans une lutte des classes et une lutte foncière au Zimbabwe de 1999 à 2003. Ce faisant, je souhaite apporter un éclairage aux crises politiques et economiques incessantes de ce pays d'Afrique Austral et offrir une profundeur pour analyzer se façon ethnographique les effets de la politique de parti. Aussi, je pose des questions sur l'utilisation de politiques en sciences sociales critiques.

Mots-clés : Zimbabwe, politique, critique, ouvriers agricoles, lutte foncière, anthropologie politique

Introduction

> Maybe none of this is about control. Maybe it isn't really about who can own whom, who can do what to whom and get away with it, even as far as death. Maybe it isn't about who can sit and who has to kneel or stand or lie down, legs spread open. Maybe it's about who can do what to whom and be forgiven for it. Never tell me it amounts to the same thing.
>
> —Margaret Atwood 1985

"We wanted change yesterday! The government is no help to us in our struggle. They promised us milk and honey and we still live in squalor. For workers to get rights we need to struggle together to get what we wanted yesterday."[1] So expressed Tapedza[2] to me and a handful of other men and women farm workers in September 1999, as we sat on the swept ground in front of a temporary shelter made of poles, grass and plastic bags set up near a gravel road leading into a farm. Tapedza, a man in his late 20s, was the chairman of the workers' committee on a farm I call Upfumi in Mashonaland East province, Zimbabwe. He and about 30 other dismissed farm workers were living off and on in this *musososo* (temporary camp) as they were involved in a protracted dispute with Upfumi's owners who had fired over 800 workers in October 1998. He was using a common phrasing I was hearing among workers involved in what was then nearly a year-long labour dispute with one of the largest Zimbabwean horticultural multinationals: "our demands today express what we wanted yesterday." By 1999, such demands almost inevitably were aimed towards the ZANU (PF) (Zimbabwe African National Union [Patriotic Front]) government whose incessant electoral promises of bringing "milk and honey" to the country over the previous 19 years rang hollow to the majority of Zimbabweans. I also had heard other Zimbabweans deploy this expression of impatience, the need to fulfill what was

already needed for some time—as of "yesterday"—during the last half of 1999 as they were engaging in an exciting and tumultuous debate, mobilization and discussion of constitutional and political change. By then, I too was getting caught up in the excitement of a political imagination being promoted by those who were calling themselves and being identified by others as champions of "democracy."

In this article, I examine how *poritikisi* (party politics in the ChiShona language) inflected the political imagination of democracy for these farm workers between 1999 and 2003. I make what may be a blindingly obvious[3] point that the meanings and practices involved in poritikisi entailed particular promises as well as dangers and fears for farm workers that were generally downplayed by many who had been celebrating only the democratic possibilities of party politics and the "opening up" in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s. In so doing, I draw attention to possible differences between analytical uses of politics by academics and those of their interlocutors during research. I contend that those of us who view their anthropological practice as critically engaged with social justice causes and addressing social inequalities (class, gender, indigenous peoples, etc.), those who may deem ourselves "progressive," may elide these differences. Politically aligning one's anthropological practice with a group of people as, for example, Charles Hale (2006) demands may miss out other connotations and effects of party politics for these very people. In some cases—Zimbabwe being one—party politics involves both the potential for dominating violence and, as Margaret Atwood puts it above, the potential "to be forgiven for it."

Like many other Zimbabweans and observers of this southern African country, by the late 1990s, I saw spaces appearing for broadening civic debates and challenging entrenched truths, class relations and institutional arrangements in the country, including ZANU (PF) itself. ZANU (PF) has been the ruling party of Zimbabwe since it emerged as a postcolonial nation in 1980 out of a 1970s armed struggle pitting guerrilla groups against the white minority Rhodesian regime. By the late 1990s, ZANU (PF) increasingly appeared to be a ruling regime that enabled and profited from national and regional configurations of social and economic inequalities. A growing number of Zimbabweans strongly articulated this viewpoint through country-wide protests, strikes, a growing private press and emergent civic movements that had been mobilizing increasingly around labour, constitutional and livelihood issues in the 1990s (Bond and Manyanya 2002; Raftopoulos and Sachikonye 2001). From gay, lesbian and transgendered social activists confronting homophobia (Epprecht 1999) to the labour movement confronting growing social exclusion thanks to the government's structural adjustment policies (Saunders 2001; Sachikonye 2001), many activists sensed that the conditions of possibility for progressive changes in Zimbabwe appeared to be present.

For example, observing in late 1998 that Zimbabwe was not a totalitarian state though its leaders had an "authoritarian streak," Epprecht (1999) enthusiastically saw great possibilities for historians to work for black empowerment and expanding human rights in Zimbabwe as exemplified by his participatory life history project with gays and lesbians of Zimbabwe. Research by historians (and other academics), he proclaimed, could productively contribute to human rights struggles in Zimbabwe: "Public debates in a context where demagoguery is rife will obviously benefit from disciplined historical argument" (Epprecht 1999:40). With such spaces for public confrontations and debates opening up, many Zimbabweans and observers (e.g., P. Alexander 2000), began putting their faith in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the political party that directly emerged from this tumult and was launched in September 1999 as the main champion of this political imagination of democratization.

This nation-wide ferment of demands for better livelihoods and democracy intersected with the unfolding labour struggle at Upfumi in 1999 as many farm workers saw its leaders as connected to the mobilization of the MDC, while the company owning Upfumi appeared to be getting support of some of the key ZANU (PF) leaders in the district, including the then Member of Parliament. Poritikisi in the form of the MDC seemed poised to assist this farm worker struggle and Zimbabweans more broadly. I definitely saw this as a possibility.

Yet, I also noticed that Tapedza was very cautious when discussing these proposed changes and politics with me. His hesitancy and, at times, nervousness were in stark contrast to Chenjerai, the vice-chairman of the workers' committee, who the workers, including Tapedza, identified as the main mobilizer of the Upfumi farm workers in their labour dispute. Chenjerai, a man in his late 30s, clearly drew on ties to political parties in his mobilizing efforts during this dispute: from ZANU (PF) to ISO, the national branch of the International Socialists, and through them, to the MDC. While Chenjerai was very comfortable in talking and mobilizing for party politics, Tapedza was visibly nervous when poritikisi was discussed by anyone, including when I posed questions to him on the topic.

I recognized such trepidation and fear from my research on farm workers in the early 1990s when many

were very cautious about discussing politics in case they were accused by management of "bringing politics into the farm" or by ZANU (PF) leaders of going against the ruling party (Rutherford 2001c). Yet, I found 1999 to be quite different since more and more Zimbabweans, including farm workers, challenged such prohibitions on talking politics, and were expressing what they said were demands they always had but never voiced publicly, demands they wanted met "yesterday." I took Tapedza's reticence to be a remnant of the earlier caution, while his participation as chairman of the workers' committee engaged in a labour dispute with increasing political overtones showed that his actions were definitely a sign of the times as he was pushing for "change"—the latter being the slogan of the MDC, *chinja maitiro!* (change your ways!).

Within a year, Tapedza's nervousness was shown to be prescient. Violence erupted in the Upfumi area and throughout Zimbabwe as the growing popularity of the MDC led the ZANU (PF) government to condone and abet widespread attacks on Zimbabweans deemed to be opposition supporters or resisters of what became a widespread and chaotic land redistribution exercise. For the latter, the government took farms from white Zimbabwean commercial farmers, who had controlled most of the best agricultural land due to unequal, racialized land distribution and economic opportunities inherited from the colonial period, to distribute to black Zimbabwean settlers. But after the transfer, there have also been evictions of many of these initial black settlers by ZANU (PF) leaders and power-brokers (Rutherford 2008).

In this article I explore that which Tapedza feared and Chenjerai revelled in—party politics. The farm workers who led, supported, benefitted from or were harmed by these struggles all identified, some with great nervousness and trepidation and others with excited expectation, the unfolding events to be part of poritikisi. Both in articulating pent-up demands and in exercising terror, poritikisi has been a key vehicle for action in the Upfumi area and elsewhere in Zimbabwe. Whereas in 1999, I had some hope that my on-going research on trade unions and non-governmental organizations and farm workers would contribute in some modest way to the promise party politics seemed to hold for these Zimbabweans, if not on a wider scale, I soon recognized that I too was seduced by the political imagination of "democracy" and its presumed public sphere where "disciplined" arguments can hold sway, neglecting, unlike both Tapedza and Chenjerai, the particular thrust and meanings of poritikisi.

By employing "political imagination" to examine the allure and perils of "democracy" for these farm workers in 1999 and the resulting violence associated with it, I suggest that one is able to get a better grasp of how poritikisi operated for them as a vehicle of meaning that enabled and constrained action in particular ways. Although analyzing politics as a particular imagination may enable one to better grasp the contingencies of mobilizations for change than, say, the more structural or programmatic heuristic of politics allows, it does not mean that all is contingent or that identifying the particular tropes, memories and sentiments informing public actions means the politically possible can be identified and promoted. At times, critical social scientists take such a stance, deploying "politics" as an analytic and ethical form for arriving at progressive change, however so defined. Yet, it is also important to recognize how such alignments and imaginations, including those of social scientists, are situated through "friction" (Tsing 2005) and "entanglements" (Moore 2005) in particular locations. These locations have inherited changing institutionalized forms of representation, interpellation and intersecting social projects, that do not necessarily mesh easily with the analysts' terms or desires about their "disciplined" arguments. This is especially the case when one is talking about party politics, at least in Zimbabwe. To start, I briefly explore some of the theoretical discussions concerning political imagination to show why it is a heuristic analytic to understand poritikisi before turning to understanding the politics of place and the place of party politics for farm workers resident in and around Upfumi from 1999-2003.

Politics and Ethnography

> I am told that whether you are called an expatriate or a missionary depends on how and by whom you were recruited. Although the distinction was told to me by a reliable source, it does not stick in my mind since I have not observed it myself in my dealings with these people. I often ask myself why they come, giving up the comforts and security of their more advanced homes. Which brings us back to matters of brotherly love, contribution and lightening of diverse darknesses.
>
> —Tsitsi Dangarembga 1988

Politics is everywhere in critical social sciences these days, including ethnographic variants such as: "the state" as politics and politics of the "state effect" (e.g., Das and Poole 2004; Donham 1999; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 2005; Li 2005); cultural politics and the politics of culture (e.g., Apter 2005; Briggs 1996; Handler 1988; Roseberry 1991); and the politics of land and landscape politics (e.g., Fairhead and Leach 1996; Fontein 2006; Hughes 2006; McGregor 2005; Moore 2005). Such works are all fruitfully pushing analytical bound-

aries, denaturalizing everyday categories, practices and certitudes, while showing power as productive, coercive and mutable in its intertwining with institutions, forms of sociality and cultural logics at intersecting scales of action. Although many of these works are criticizing dominant analytical approaches for uncritically supporting particular arrangements of power through their conceptual apparatuses,[4] these critical analyses also tend to be predicated on an ethic of contingency and a hope of alterability. By indicating the ultimately political nature of reigning social hierarchies, they assume that change, political change, can critically amend these now denaturalized hierarchies, if not, for the more ambitious, transform them. Gibson-Graham (2006:xxxiii) capture this syllogism and sentiment when they advocate a "politics of possibility" by seeking "to question the claims of truth and universality that accompany any ontological rigidity and to render these claims projects for empirical investigation and theoretical re-visioning. Our practices of thinking widen the scope of possibility by opening up each observed relationship to examination for its contingencies and each theoretical analysis for its inherent vulnerability and act of commitment." Charles Hale (2006) takes this one step further in calling for a politics of ethnographic practice rather than the more conventional call for the politics of representation.

Hale recently differentiated two forms of political practice within critical anthropology, whereby anthropologists affirm "political alignment with an organized group of people" either through participating in their "struggle and allow[ing] dialogue with them to shape each phase of the process" or "through the content of the knowledge produced" (2006:97,98). In so doing, he raises what he calls a methodological question in anthropological "politics" through the distinction between what he calls "activist research" and "cultural critique," arguing persuasively that the latter is hegemonic within cultural anthropology today. While noting the influence of the cultural critique approach on his own analytical strategy, Hale strongly calls for going beyond it when organized groups in struggles for social justice also require analytical assistance. In such cases, Hale argues, anthropologists need to be fully committed to working with those in progressive struggles and prepared to subsume their theoretical and epistemological imperatives to the particular political tasks at hand. Accordingly, the requirements for anthropological knowledge will be shaped, in part, by these pragmatic and strategic contingencies and not simply the demands of reigning theory and academic conventions. Thus, he contrasts a different methodological and political focus: "Cultural critique strives for intellectual production uncompromised by the inevitable negotiations and contradictions that these broader political struggles entail. Activist research is compromised—but also enriched—by opting to position itself squarely amid the tension between utopian ideals and practical politics" (2006:100).

Although I agree that "critical politics" does not necessarily emerge from cultural critique, I do not think this is simply due to the method, or one could read politics from the methodology deployed. What Hale downplays is the issue of audience and the particular interpellation of subjects through, in this case, social science research. He notes this by saying, for example, that a critique of hegemony may be intellectually justifiable but it "may also be utterly irrelevant (or even counterproductive) to the immediate struggle at hand" (2006:113). Nonetheless, he presumes a particular audience in his celebration of method and, to go back to Zimbabwe, of politics itself. It is important to recognize how particular struggles and politics configure audiences and public responses in particular and potentially limiting ways. For the mobilizing and immobilizing effects of politics and "activist research" depend on how particular publics and dispositions are hailed by these activities; forms of interpellation that need to be analytically understood, not assumed, for audiences only become so "through the circulation of discourse as people hear, see, or read it and then engage it in some sort of way" (Briggs 2004:177).

Yet, despite this "politics of" spreading throughout social science analytics of the everyday, I find little similar critical engagement with the effects of politics qua party politics. In Paley's (2002) insightful overview of the anthropology of democracy, for instance, there are only a few passing references to the study of political parties. Nor is there a chapter on this in the excellent collection on the anthropology of politics (Nugent and Vincent 2004). There has been insightful attention to localized idioms shaping struggles grounded in particular places (e.g., Moore 2005) and on localized uses of party politics to meet varied agendas at different historical conjunctures (e.g., Gupta 1998; Nugent 1994). Yet, there seems to be little sustained ethnographic focus on Africa, at least at the power-laced receptions of politics *qua* party politics in particular places and for particular represented communities such as farm workers. Such ethnographic engagement could examine the assumptions politics invokes, the ways in which it situates audiences in particular ways, the power dynamics involved, and their intersection with other social practices and agendas through struggles and forms of contestations, inclusions and exclusions. When particular political imaginations involve party politics, how do

the cultural forms and differentiated memories associated with the latter influence responses to the former? How does politics involve national institutions and considerations in varied locales, constituting or unsettling spatial boundaries and differentiated senses of belonging and routes of social agency? In other words, what are the cultural politics of politics?

I suggest here that an ethnographic examination of party politics could view it as a scale-making project that traffics in signs of routinized and novel represented communities intersecting with the political economy of place and the social and cultural dynamics of those implicated as its bearers or its targets at particular historical conjunctures. As in all political imaginations, party politics is engaged with constituting scales, of locating the boundaries of actions and issues, be they, for example, local, national or global (Tsing 2005:58-60). Party politics is also a vehicle of "represented communities"—"'communities' renewed in their existence not only by representations in the semiotic sense, but also by representations in the political, institutional sense" (Kelly and Kaplan 2001:22). Party politics can deploy pre-existing represented communities, groups whose semantic entailments are already resonant through institutional arrangements in a location and thereby reinforce their meaning in people's lives and understandings. Or, party politics can seek to forge new meanings for represented communities, or help new ones gain support in a locality. Such actions take traction and are entangled differently in particular places, depending on political economy, particular social projects and forms of mobilization and immobilization operating in such locations (Li 2002; Moore 2005). In short, party politics is part of the social landscape of the state and its constituted subjects. Its resonance depends on the particular receptivity of the discursively constituted semantic domain of politics with its possible visceral social memories and their articulations with localized social projects, meaningful practices and struggles at that historical moment.

My ethnographic examination of party politics does not focus on how they are vehicles for particular interests or political functions, though such analyses in Zimbabwe have provided great insight into national-scale economic conditions and political stakes leading to militarized responses by the ZANU (PF) regime and the expanding economic and political crisis in the country (e.g., Bond and Manyanya 2002; Dorman 2003; Moore 2004; Raftopoulos 2001, 2003, 2006). Rather, the focus here is on how poritikisi informs a particular political imagination that motivated struggles and mobilization as well as forms of immobilization on commercial farms around Upfumi. This does not necessarily ascribe my particular political alignment with any group or agenda through my actions, including my research methods, or through the content of my writings. Instead, I examine what it meant to align politically on the farms[5]; what actions, in other words, did poritikisi enable and disable for different Upfumi farm workers from 1999 to 2003? How did poritikisi make the different responses of Tapedza and Chenjerai make sense to many of their interlocutors, even when, as I will note below, political party affiliations could change? We critical social scientists and historians may see politics everywhere in the constitution of social life, but others can reserve the term for very particular sets of actions, with very different expectations and responses to it.

Politics and Farm Workers in Zimbabwe

> Relations are a bit better since independence, though they're not all that good. Nowadays there are fewer white farmers beating [farm workers] than before.... That's the only difference. But workers don't have a better working relationship with the employer. He can just say what he wants: "You're goats," or he swears at you. You're forced to work with a little bit of scaring, so you don't have your security there. Only the farm owner has security. Workers don't have anything that can say this is their's, or this is their security.
>
> —Farm worker quoted in Dede Amanor-Wilks 1995

I seek to make two points in my discussions of poritikisi and farm workers in Zimbabwe. My general point concerns how scale-making projects of party politics have intertwined with the positioning of farm workers within dominant forms of governmentality of development and citizenship, giving poritikisi an ambivalence connected to the hopes of social justice and the danger of uncontrollable violence. The second is the more specific point of how poritikisi conjoined with the social dynamics of labour strife and subsequent territorializing practices in Upfumi in view of national events reverberating through the body politic.

Racialized categories deeply etched colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia. Colonial discourses generally classified "natives" as lacking the prerequisite attributes that would make them inherently productive citizens. Accordingly, a whole range of laws, government policies, political possibilities, living arrangements and spatial practices actively discriminated against Africans (Worby 2000). At the same time, colonial officials and others largely assumed that "civilized" behaviour and "modern" values could be taught to Africans, particularly by the 1930s through development, the main mechanism of colonial trusteeship in the 20th century (Cowen and Shenton 1996).

This dovetailed with projects of cosmopolitan nationalism intertwined with respectability that inflamed African political movements from the 1950s to the 1960s.[6]

But the interventions of planned change and advocacy that animated colonial officials, missionaries and African organizations, differentiated their audiences, identifying particular "communities" as more appropriate agents and targets than others. Colonial administrative interventions excluded farm workers from laid-out pathways for transformation of their conduct for a variety of reasons. Since many farm workers came through recruitment agencies or on their own from neighbouring colonies in the 1940s to 1960s, they were foreigners. Moreover, their presence on European farms made their agency subordinate to that of European "masters" who were not only legally given the best agricultural land (while those classified as "native Africans" were placed on native reserves) but also given great administrative, if not moral, duties over "their" farm workers under the administration of the Masters and Servants Act (that governed farm workers until 1979). I use the term "domestic government" to describe this territorialized mode of governance through which farmers sought to control farm workers' labour and lives through their control over landed property (Rutherford 2001a, 2008). Legislation, policies, administrative arrangements and routinized practices helped to inculcate the assumption that as foreigners, as subordinate to white farmers, and as engaged in a low status form of labour, farm workers' capacity to become virtuous citizens of the colony—productive "natives" contributing to the national economy—was not considered. Instead, they belonged to white farmers and their domestic government (Rutherford 2007).

African politics in colonial Zimbabwe was a largely middle-class reformist movement predicated on combinations of gendered and racialized notions of democracy, Afrocentricism, and socialist ideals operating at the scales of Western civilization, the colony, the nation and the globe. The emergent African nationalist leaders of the 1950s and early 1960s subscribed to what Thomas Turino (2000:16) called "modernist reformism," or "projects based on the idea that 'a new culture,' or new genres, styles, and practices, should be forged as a synthesis of the 'best' or 'most valuable' aspects of local 'traditional' culture and 'the best' of foreign 'modern' lifeways and technologies." Their politics, in part, was a vehicle of respectable cosmopolitanism, laced with the potential for masculinist youth violence initially against rival African groups starting in the 1950s. African nationalists increasingly viewed party politics as a vehicle for social justice. As the white regimes increasingly used colonial state forces to try to control and corral African politics in this period, African politics increasingly mingled with guerrilla operations starting in the mid-1960s and breaking out in widespread war in the 1970s (see for example, Alexander et al. 2000; Barnes 1999; Kriger 1992; Scarnecchia 2008; Turino 2000; West 2002).

During the colonial and UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1965-79) periods, party politicians less frequently engaged with farm workers on the European farms compared to those living on native reserves, African purchase areas or urban townships (Rutherford 2001b). Since 1980, legislation, media, government and non-governmental policies and practices continued to publicly characterize farm workers as less virtuous citizens, as foreigners[7] and as uneducated, lazy people engaged in irresponsible labour on the landscape of the nation. The latter comes from the assumption that working on a farm indicates a lack of moral predisposition towards working for oneself as a peasant farmer or in a more remunerative job. I met many Zimbabweans holding such a perspective, arguing that farm workers are lazy, accustomed to working only for harsh white bosses (Rutherford 2001b, 2007). These depictions continued to inform policies, practices and institutional arrangements concerning farm workers. They justified minimal state resources directed towards farm workers and their marginalization in development programs such as land resettlement. At other times, farm workers come across as the super-exploited at the hands of whites who need to be liberated in one way or another. Such a representation was the promise which poritikisi held out for many farm workers I knew. It was a way to tap into national-scale power to challenge the state-sanctioned sovereignty of farmers who, until 2000, were still predominantly of European descent.

Older workers often characterized the years shortly after Independence in 1980 as a source of poritikisi on many farms in which political activists and party cadres worked to try to exert control over or influence on white farmers in terms of labour relations and the living conditions of the workers who lived on the farms. For them, poritikisi had *simba* (strength) as they were connected to the new ruling party with its history of guerrilla warfare and Marxist-Leninist claims. Threats of and actual violence were often the means of transacting poritikisi by its promoters. This was recounted to me by farm workers with some ambivalence. Given the recent guerrilla war of the 1970s, with the white farms being on the front line in many parts of the country and the use of terror by all sides, it is not a surprise that violence was intertwined with politics on the farms. Indeed, the metaphor farm workers have used to explain party politics to me has been

poritikisi ihondo, "politics is war." ZANU (PF) cadres commonly told farm workers that since they won power through the "barrel of the gun" they would be willing to return to that route if need be. Many took this threat seriously not only because of their guerrilla past but also because of the *gukurahundi*: the name given to the terror unleashed in southern and western Zimbabwe as the ZANU (PF) government sent soldiers, police and secret police to arrest, terrorize and kill the population of predominantly minority Sindebele speakers starting in 1982, on the grounds that they were supporting apartheid-backed "dissidents," who were disaffected former guerrilla soldiers of the rival ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) political party (which also had guerrillas fighting the Rhodesian regime). The ZANU (PF) government killed an estimated 20,000 people (CCJPZ and LRF 1997; Werbner 1991). This ended when ZAPU was absorbed into ZANU (PF) after the "Unity agreement" in 1987 (Alexander et al. 2000:229-230).

By the mid-1980s, more bureaucratic labour relations emerged on paper and ZANU (PF) seemed more interested in leaving most white commercial farmers on the land as long as some Africans were put on resettlement farms made out of former white-owned farms bought by the government and some Africans became commercial farmers themselves. Poritikisi on farms of the early 1980s subsided, save during national elections. Many commercial farmers also began to recognize at this time that ZANU (PF) seemed to be no longer interested in making drastic interventions to improve the situation of farm workers (Mtisi 2003; Rutherford 2001c). Meanwhile commercial agriculture became a very profitable sector as the government, national and international financial institutions and marketing networks established by farmers' groups, made export agriculture, particularly flue-cured tobacco and horticulture, the dominant foreign exchange earner in the national economy in the 1990s when the government adopted a structural adjustment policies (Moyo 2000).

On the farms where I did my original research in 1992-93, not many farm workers talked about poritikisi, out of nervousness and fear—poritikisi ihondo—and out of the general neglect of farm worker issues by politicians and ruling party cadres at that time. I was thus very surprised to discover how pervasive the talk of poritikisi on Upfumi and surrounding farms was in 1999. This was a direct result of gains made by what analysts call "civic forces" in the 1990s that "introduced a more expansive and inclusive language of human and civic rights into the national political discourse—a language that had been marginalized in the dominant discursive practices of nationalist politics...[and which] ha[d] been critical to the process of expanding the political imaginaries of Zimbabwean politics" (Raftopoulos and Alexander 2006:4). These civic forces included trade unions, war veterans, students and those advocating constitutional change mobilized and agitated against varied government policies through strikes, stay-aways and marches, many ending in confrontation with the police or army (Raftopolous and Sachikonye 2001). In 1999, the ZANU (PF) government tried a non-violent tactic, seeking to co-opt the movement for a new constitution by creating its own Constitutional Commission to seek out opinions of Zimbabweans across the country to draft a new constitution. Although many civic groups criticized what they saw as a flawed process, the Constitutional Commission contributed to the growing demand for "democracy" and seemed to reduce the violent responses of the government that year. And, in September of 1999 the MDC was launched.

There were two significant events in helping to make this political imagination of democracy become a potential structure of feeling for many farm workers, though specific circumstances of individual farms and social projects by different individuals and groups played a role in determining where it actually emerged. In 1996, farm workers finally received the franchise for local government elections, enabling them to cast votes in the Rural-District Council elections that had previously been reserved only for property owners and lessees in the commercial farming wards. Up to this point, white farmers typically represented commercial farming wards in the Rural District Councils. After the 1998 local government elections, most Councillors for these wards were black Zimbabweans who commonly had ties to ZANU (PF). Farm workers thus became a significant voting constituency in these wards, particularly given the generally low voter turnout in local government elections.

Moreover, the protests and strikes that were key vehicles for the emergence of this movement for democracy in the urban areas also erupted on many commercial farms. Starting in September 1997, there was a massive farm worker protest that lasted several weeks in a number of commercial farming areas across Zimbabwe, starting in Mashonaland East province. The impetus was the deadlock in national level collective bargaining negotiations between the main farm worker union, GAPWUZ (General Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union of Zimbabwe) and the employers' representative in the agricultural sector. Thousands of farm workers downed their tools, with some barricading stretches of highways and a few destroying farm property and looting farmers' homes. As a farm worker told me in 1998, "we showed that farm

workers also can act on the national stage like the war vets and the city people" (see also Mtisi 2003:145-146; Rutherford 2001c). The nervous excitement associated with the apparent gains made by those advocating "democracy" was palpable throughout Zimbabwe in 1999, including on Upfumi.

The Promises and Dangers of Poritikisi on Upfumi

> If I were to see the president, I would ask him a simple question: Does he still like the ex-farm workers? Because it seems the government doesn't want the farm workers any more.
>
> —Displaced farm worker quoted in Irene Staunton (N.d.)

In 1999, Chenjerai and Tapedza were leading a somewhat successful struggle against the mass dismissal of nearly 800 field and pack-house workers in October 1998 on Upfumi. The longevity of this protest signalled the involvement of poritikisi as a means of outside support to help sustain the farm workers. In early 1999, Chenjerai's politics was identified with ZANU (PF) as he held a position in their local structure and had greatly helped the ZANU (PF) Councillor, Banda, win the seat in Rural-District Council elections of 1998 by mobilizing farm workers on Upfumi and surrounding farms. However, there was ambiguity about Chenjerai's political loyalties even then. Banda defeated a candidate formally selected by the district ZANU (PF) structures—Banda at the time called himself an "independent ZANU (PF)" candidate. Chenjerai's loyalties to the ruling party were made even more ambivalent by the time I first met him in July 1999, as he was becoming more involved with the activities of ISO as GAPWUZ arranged for one of their key members to provide legal advice for the fired Upfumi workers. By then, both GAPWUZ and ISO were becoming active in mobilizing for the upcoming September launch of the MDC. Many Zimbabweans initially characterized the MDC as the "workers's party" since it emerged in large part from the trade union movement and its leader was the former general-secretary of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (P. Alexander 2000).

Chenjerai mobilized the fired workers and acquired outside supporters in part through the rallying cry *Shinga Vashandi Shinga* (Be Brave, Workers, Be Brave) evoking the workerist discourse associated with ISO and the MDC at that time. As ISO became clearly identified with the MDC in 1999 as it mobilized workers for the 2000 parliamentary elections held in June, farm workers and others within the local ZANU (PF) structures viewed Chenjerai as a MDC mobilizer. Many Upfumi workers were receptive to this new party in part because many of the leading local ZANU (PF) leaders, particularly those who were rivals of Councillor Banda, had visibly sided with the Upfumi management in the labour dispute, as Chenjerai constantly reminded everyone.

After the defeat of the ZANU (PF) government in a national referendum on its draft constitution in February 2000, a series of land occupations occurred on many commercial farms, particularly those owned and operated by white Zimbabweans who, at that time, formed the majority of the 4,500 or so commercial farmers. Veterans of the guerrilla forces of the 1970s war frequently led these occupations, while various branches of the Zimbabwean state, particularly the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), the Zimbabwe National Army and ZANU (PF) structures, actively aided the land occupations. Commercial farms became a key site of this violence not only because of the demand for land redistribution but also, and more importantly during this time, because many in ZANU (PF) viewed both white farmers and farm workers as pro-MDC. In the lexicon of ruling party leaders and cadres, white farmers and farm workers were *vatengesi* (sell-outs) to the nation: the former because they were closely associated with the colonial order, the latter because they were closely associated with the former. Both groups were also viewed as "foreigners"—respectively MaBhunu (Boers, a derogatory name for white Zimbabweans) or MaBhurandaya (people from Blantyre, the city in Malawi were migrant labourers were recruited during the colonial period, and a derogatory name for farm workers whose ancestors were foreign-born) (see Rutherford 2001b, 2004, 2007). By April 2000, many of the ex-combatants, youth and others stationed on what they called "base camps" on occupied farms started to "re-educate" farm workers and their families (and, on occasion, white farmers and anyone else they found living in the area) to turn against the MDC and support ZANU (PF). Their means included intimidation, beatings and other forms of violence, burning MDC paraphernalia, and forced all-night singing and dancing events called *pungwe*, a performative mobilizing genre used by guerrillas in the 1970s and by Zimbabwean forces during the gukurahundi (Werbner 1991:169-170). ZANU (PF) activists and leaders told people in rural areas that they could identify who voted for whom during the parliamentary elections through "secret ink," hidden cameras and other putative technological devices, threatening to terrorize anyone who had the audacity to vote for the MDC.

By June 2000, Tapedza became even more cautious and followed strategies of dissembling in regards to any

public inquiry on his thoughts about the political activities going on and their role in terms of the final settlement between farm workers and the company. This settlement led to a pay-out of wages owed to the dismissed workers a few days before the parliamentary election in late June 2000.

When I saw Tapedza during the first pay-out that occurred at the musososo (temporary camp) on 20 June, he told me that he had seen me talk to some of the workers in the dispute near Upfumi a few days earlier while he was in a car waiting for a ride to Harare. A fellow passenger saw me and said to Tapedza "look at the *murungu* [white person] sitting amongst the poor black people; he must be the one who is writing all those lies to the BBC!" Tapedza confided to me that he remained quiet in the face of this statement as it echoed a common, publicized ZANU (PF) claim that Western condemnation of government violence was due to racist and malicious rumour-mongering (Willems 2005). Tapedza was worried about possible violence befalling him if he said he actually knew me.

On voting day on 22 June, when a group of men asked Tapedza if he had voted he replied that his name was not on the voters' list and thus, he could not vote; a claim he later told me was a "dodge," as he did not want Councillor Banda to find out that he had actually cast his ballot in case he demanded to know for what party he voted. In contrast, Chenjerai had a very different attitude, even though ZANU (PF) cadres had threatened him due to his support of ISO and his presumed support of the MDC. When I walked with Chenjerai outside the nearby polling station, he gleefully pointed out the half-concealed open-palms of many of the voters, another symbol of the MDC; albeit he did so somewhat surreptitiously given the presence of ZANU (PF) Youth lurking nearby, a group readily used by ruling party officials to intimidate and to hurt (Scarnecchia 2006:224-226). Later, among friends, Chenjerai flashed me a "red card" he had in his pocket—another symbol of the MDC whose supporters often gave the ZANU (PF) government a "red card" during rallies and other public events to signify that the government needed to be evicted, as when a referee shows such a card to a player who commits an egregious foul in soccer matches.

Despite the danger and hostility towards anything associated with the MDC in many farming areas like those around Upfumi, the farm workers I knew were largely positive about their achievements in 2000. Many of the fired workers saw their receipt of compensation from Upfumi in June as a victory since they endured for 20 months of a labour struggle. The MDC won its only seat in Mashonaland East province in the riding where Upfumi is located, even though ZANU (PF) ended up with most seats in an electoral process most observers condemned it for fraudulent activities and ruling party intimidation and violence (e.g., Amnesty International 2002; Kriger 2005). In July 2000, many of the workers near Upfumi and many Zimbabweans I knew seemed confident that change "for the better" would be coming soon.

Yet this *jambanja*—violence associated with the politicized post-2000 land occupations, typically coming from ZANU (PF) supporters against perceived MDC supporters—continued after the June 2000 parliamentary election as ZANU (PF) prepared for the 2002 presidential and Rural-District Council elections. Jambanja also occurred as part of on-going struggles over the control of land and people during what the government called the fast track land resettlement exercise carried out by various businessmen, politicians, war veterans and others, often within various hierarchies of the ruling party. By 2002, jambanja was part of the expansive yet chaotic land redistribution nominally sponsored by the state, which saw the vast majority of commercial farms taken from their previous owners. By then, there was great uncertainty over who had the right and ability to actually use the land, as further evictions and negotiations between claimants became the norm in many of these farming areas (Fontein 2006; Sachikonye 2003a; Scoones et al. 2003).

Violence was also widely linked with party politics more broadly. As with the gukurahundi and violence around previous elections, President Mugabe pardoned any perpetrators of political violence between January and July 2000 with the Clemency Order of 2000. Police officers explicitly excused themselves from becoming involved in situations when ruling party cadres carried out violence, let alone arresting anyone, on the grounds that this was a matter of party politics and not law enforcement.

Such actions helped to ensure that ZANU (PF) was the only party being promoted in the Upfumi area as the vehicle for social justice in 2002. Social justice no longer meant workers' rights but was narrowly conceived as "returning land to indigenous peoples." The latter category increasingly began to define citizenship for ZANU (PF) leaders in legislation and enunciations by its leaders and supporters (Muzondidya 2007; Ranger 2004; White 2003:103ff.). It commonly excluded farm workers. As they have been represented in the nation as a community not really belonging to Zimbabwe given their putative foreign origins, questionable moral attributes[8] and uncertain loyalty to ZANU (PF), farm workers have been actively discriminated against in terms of receiving land (Sachikonye 2003b; Rutherford 2001b, 2004).

By 2002 when I returned to Upfumi, politicized violence was continuing and economic activities became even more fragile and un-remunerative. The last time I saw Tapedza was in July 2002. He was back in the Upfumi area briefly, visiting his wife and daughter living there while he did timber contracts on a farm over 100 kilometres away. We talked about a range of topics, but he explicitly stayed clear of talking about politics, even in the privacy of his room. In contrast, Chenjerai was still very comfortable talking about politics, though by this time, he was now strongly supporting ZANU (PF) and not MDC.

By then, Chenjerai was leading ZANU (PF) youth in a variety of activities which farm workers associated with poritikisi: beating up workers who were said to be "MDC" or those who were said to be part of another ZANU (PF) faction from that of Councillor Banda with whom he was explicitly aligned; invading farms for potential land redistribution; and collecting protection money from a few remaining white farmers in the Upfumi area in payment for trying to stop their farms from being occupied by other leaders or businessmen associated with rival factions of the ruling party. By 2003, it was very difficult to find anyone publicly or privately declaring themselves to be an MDC supporter in and around Upfumi, though "outing" others as "MDC" and thus *vatengesi* ("sell-outs"), including those within ZANU (PF) political structures, was quite common. As during the *hondo* (war) of the 1970s, loyalties to a political movement had been collapsed into testimonials over loyalties to the nation. Being labelled as "MDC" could lead to violence directed towards the person, eviction from their dwelling, loss of whatever type of remunerative activity they engaged in, and prevention from receiving government subsidized maize meal that was being distributed by Councillor Banda.[9] For Chenjerai, Banda, Tapedza and the other farm workers at Upfumi I knew, the metaphor portikisi ihondo, politics is war, had become actualized.

In postcolonial Zimbabwe, poritikisi has been a key pathway used by people seeking to stand up for social justice against entrenched forces, as it can provide simba (strength) through the invocation of the state and its associated violence. The ability of Chenjerai to continue the labour struggle against the owners of Upfumi for a year and a half rested largely on his ties to political parties, initially ZANU (PF) and then ISO and through them the MDC. Ties to these national organizations provided needed leverage to stand against the agrobusiness company. They also enabled sympathetic national media coverage and helped to forge a sensibility of wider connections that buoyed some of the farm workers who were enduring the loss of regular income, small as it was, during their long labour struggle. It also meant Chenjerai, like Councillor Banda, was willing to use violence. Regardless of the disavowal of violence and the promotion of "democratic values" and debate by MDC leaders at that time,[10] Chenjerai threatened and occasionally carried out violence against his own supporters in the name of the politicized labour struggle in 1999 and 2000. Social memories of poritikisi as violence—the 1970s war, the gukurahundi, and the constant violence surrounding all postcolonial elections (Kriger 2005)—both mobilized and immobilized Upfumi farm workers.

Despite it helping them challenge their mass dismissal by the Upfumi management, many farm workers there viewed poritikisi as potentially oppressive, as a force that compelled them to obey its wielder. It entailed a logic of trying to force demonstrative signs of fealty while simultaneously inculcating a doubt about people's "true" party sympathies, especially during the ZANU (PF) mobilizations and jambanja: how could one trust the loyalties of those who had to be compelled to demonstrate their allegiance to ZANU (PF)? Many ZANU (PF) activists with whom I talked saw farm workers as masters of dissimulation since they had to operate through the hierarchical and, in some cases, violent rule of white farmers to acquire farm resources. Those who trafficked in poritikisi, thus, were very suspicious about the political loyalties of farm workers, as illustrated by the widely documented violence directed against farm workers during the jambanja (e.g., Sachikonye 2003b; Rutherford 2007, 2008). Whereas Chenjerai initially drew on a dominant public representation of farm workers as super-exploited by white farmers through his poritikisi mobilization in the struggle against the Upfumi management, during the later jambanja poritikisi in 2002 and 2003, he represented them as people who could not be trusted, whose political loyalties could be connected to their (previous) white bosses and therefore against ZANU (PF). In terms of the changing loyalties of Chenjerai himself, going from ZANU (PF) to ISO and MDC and back to ZANU (PF), Chenjerai reasoned to me in 2003 that the MDC became "sell-outs" against the workers and land distribution and the Zimbabwe *povo* ("masses") needed a strong leader like President Mugabe to improve their lives. When I asked other workers about Chenjerai's change of political parties, after furtively glancing around to make sure no one was around listening to us, they sighed, saying "this is poritikisi."

Conclusion

> "What is one plus one?" Youth groups affiliated with ZANU (PF) posed this question to people they met in and beyond the Upfumi area in late 2001 and early 2002, before the presidential election in March 2002. If the respondent did not answer "one," their interlocutors could beat them for giving the "wrong" (read politically suspect) answer for there is only "one president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe," not "two."

To conclude, I have aimed to show how party politics has interpellated farm workers in general and on Upfumi in particular by showing how poritikisi has forged certain pathways for particular forms of social agency while entailing certain dangers and ambiguities concerning bodily security, the Zimbabwean state and social justice. This was especially so in the era of jambanja, an era that undermined the territorialized practices of white farmers and ushered in competing territorializing projects and practices. I have been less interested here in issues of how party politics played out in terms of, say, legitimation, elite formation, democracy, regime composition, social justice and so forth. Rather I have aimed to give a sense of how party politics played out in this location with regard to labour and land struggles, through reliance on different metaphorical entailments of "farm workers" as a represented community on the scale of the Zimbabwean nation and the social memories and channels of poritikisi.

But what has been the role, the political impact, of critical social scientists in this struggle, as someone like Hale would demand? One could deploy his dichotomy and find evidence of excellent examples of "cultural critique" in Zimbabwe (e.g., Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003; Moore 2005; Ranger 2004; Worby 2001) and could examine "activist researchers" who worked on either side of the polarized divide between ZANU (PF) and the MDC.[11] Although this contrast between what Hale identifies as "activist research" and "cultural critique" may speak to particular audiences in Latin America with which he is engaging,[12] it is less helpful for critically engaging with the struggles of Zimbabwean farm workers, including the ones pursued by those who had been working and living in the Upfumi area. Invoking "politics" in academic writings can provide analytic insight and speak to particular debates and positioning, but it is helpful to remember the very different locations of most academic research from those one is researching—and pinning one's hope of alterability onto a push for political change can run aground on very different localized semantics and practices of party politics. As I have argued, politics as poritikisi has a much more specific set of meanings, traction and very different sets of stakes and dangers for the Zimbabwean farm workers like those who were nervously excited about its promises and perils on Upfumi in 1999 and who were forced to live through its consequences from 2000 on. The demands for improved lives they wanted met "yesterday," are still there for many, but it is extremely unclear when—or whether—they will mobilize again through poritikisi to try to achieve them.

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Notes

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2 All names of people and farms are pseudonyms.

3 This phrase comes from one of the *Anthropologica* reviewers.

4 See for example, Kelly and Kaplan (2001) for anthropology and the state.

5 This is in contrast to my earlier invocation of politics as a form of critical inquiry and engagement with the people I was studying (see Rutherford 2001a:12-13).

6 Turino (2000:161ff.) nicely outlines how class-based notions of respectability intersected with the idea of nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the mobilization of African political organizations in the 1950s and 1960s.

7 There were questions concerning whether people born in Zimbabwe of non-Zimbabwean parents were Zimbabwean or not (see Cheater 1998) until recent amendments to the Citizenship Act before the 2002 presidential elections intentionally sought to disenfranchise many farm workers, and others, who are descended from non-Zimbabweans (Rutherford 2007).

8 This refers not only to the assumptions that they are lazy, as discussed above, but can also include concerns that as uneducated "foreigners," farm workers are likely to engage in witchcraft (e.g., Marimira and Odero 2003:316-317).

9 This food distribution was an important source of nutrition given the evaporation of most formal sector jobs by that time and a resulting decline in food production, made worse by drought conditions in certain parts of the country. As critics of the ZANU (PF) regime like to point out, since 2000 Zimbabwe has had the fastest shrinking economy of any country that was not at war and the highest inflation in the world (official inflation figures were over 66,000 per cent in January 2008). See for example, ICG 2006.

10 The issue of intra-party violence emerged as an issue that caused the party to split in late 2005 (see Raftopoulos 2006).

11 Two well-known Zimbabwean intellectuals, Sam Moyo and Jonathan Moyo (who are unrelated), are good examples of academics who have had alignments with ZANU (PF). The former has been an advisor to the government on land reform since the late 1990s while carrying out academic research on land politics (e.g., Moyo 2001; Moyo and Yeros 2005). But he has had his work critically challenged by other critical social social scientists (e.g., Alexander 2004; Cousins 2006; Moore 2004; Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004). The latter went from being a key critic of ZANU (PF) in the early 1990s (e.g., Moyo 1992) to being their chief propagandist when he became the information minister in 2000 until he was forced out of government due to intra-ZANU (PF) leadership succession conflicts in early 2005. He was elected as an independent MP in the March 2005 parliamentary elections and has once again become a vocal critic of ZANU (PF). See Moore (2007) for more details. Those who have been assisting the MDC have not always found their work welcomed as they got caught up in the conflicts and suspicions of the political party (see Raftopoulos 2006): The MDC is an organization, it is important to note, that has been under constant attack by a range of state agencies, laws and paramilitary groups since 2000 (Raftopoulos and Alexander 2006).

12 I thank Donald Moore for this observation.

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Myth and the Monster Cinema

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Abstract: The project of critical anthropology may be furthered by the incorporation of the popular film into the anthropological study of myth. A structuralist analysis of *King Kong* (1933) reveals it to be exemplary of a body of contemporary myth. Made and explicitly set during the Depression, the Depression itself in the form of the monster is ultimately slain by the organized forces of industrial technology. Monster movies collectively represent various threats to the survival of industrial civilization, and in the vanquishing of the monster, the supremacy of the technological and ideological infrastructure of modern of life is reaffirmed and valorized.

Keywords: critical anthropology, myth, monsters, popular cinema, King Kong, monster films

Résumé : Il est possible de faire progresser le projet de l'anthropologie critique en incorporant les films populaires dans l'étude anthropologique du mythe. Une étude structuraliste de *King Kong* (1933) révèle que le film est exemplaire d'un corps contemporain de mythes. Réalisé et délibérément situé pendant la grande crise économique, c'est la crise elle-même qui s'incarne sous la forme d'un monstre qui est finalement terrassé par les forces organisées de la technologie industrielle. Les films de monstre représentent collectivement des menaces diverses pesant sur la survie de la civilisation industrielle, et dans la victoire contre ces monstres, la suprémacie de l'infrastructure technologique et idéologique de la vie moderne se trouvent réaffirmée et valorisée.

Mots-clés : anthropologie critique, mythe, monstres, cinéma populaire, King Kong, films de monstres

The anthropological study of myth might be properly opened up to include for serious consideration as true myth certain of the more prominent and influential narratives of the mass cinema. The diverse forms and enthusiasms of the commercial cinema constitute branches of an active, ever-proliferating and ramifying mythic realm of the present day. Like more traditional myth, the stories of the mass cinema are shared public discourses having the power to live all at once, but separately, in the minds of the members of a social collectivity. The genre film inscribes multitudinously key representations of an "envisioned cosmic order," generating models of and models for reality (Geertz 1973:4). Entailing important disciplinary and ideological dimensions and active in the construction of social consensus, cinematic works also oversee and proclaim cultural change, encoding revised charters of the self and new ideal standards of thought and action.[1] Not merely an "idle rhapsody," the popular film is, as Malinowski has declared of myth, a "hard working, extremely important cultural force" (1926:13). At first national and now suddenly global in scope, the commercial cinema constitutes a cultural practice far exceeding in its significance the attention anthropologists have seen fit to bestow. This is unfortunate because anthropological perspectives on myth can illuminate the genre cinema, and by that illumination contribute substantially to an anthropological critique of contemporary society and its cultural practices (see Lem and Leach 2002; MacClancy 2002; Marcus 1999; Marcus and Fisher 1986). Critical anthropology seeks to interrogate social reality from an anthropological perspective and, in this, the contextualization of the genre cinema as generative of a body of contemporary myth allows a more profound appreciation of the popular film as a significant ideological force in today's world.

The production of commercial films is costly and almost always undertaken in a business climate rewarding profit. Accordingly, a successful film will usually be

followed by a sequel or sequels and by any number of imitative versions. A remarkably few cinematic works thereby become the kernel narratives for an entire cycle of films, a film genre. As Schatz puts it, "movies are made by filmmakers, whereas genres are "made" by the collective response of the mass audience" (1981:264). As with the myths traditionally studied by anthropologists, a narrative's survival, in whole or in part, depends on its incorporation into the public sphere of enacted culture. An emergent image of this process is not unlike one that might be formed of evolution by natural selection. Studios and independent filmmakers produce a great number of different kinds of movies (variants). Of these, a few are selected by audience response for repetition. With each repetition the public's familiarity with the original work or with its stock features deepens (reproductive success), and at some point a cinematic genre emerges as a "species" in the unfolding taxonomy of a living, contemporary mythology. Most commercial films do not realize even a measure of this acceptance and are destined to the relative oblivion of cinephile interest. Nevertheless, a very few popular films do seem to be genuinely mythic in their proportions, having achieved a recognition and cultural prominence comparable to that garnered by those shared public narratives anthropologists have long termed *myth*.

Whatever else they may be, myths are first and foremost "just stories." Like other stories they display a cast of characters: beings, forces, sentient things. Given multitudinous attributes, these characters together participate in fashioned circumstances and events. Character and event reach, in time, a meaningful point of conclusion. From Malinowski (1926) we learn of these narratives that they can serve as a charter for an institution or social group. With Leach (1954) we realize that they may also act as charter(s) with the emphasis on the plural, each version targetted for a particular faction or social unit and differing appropriately from the next. Along with Kluckhohn (1942), we come to appreciate that myths are entertaining as well. Characteristically told in group gatherings at times of comparatively little activity, these stories are enjoyed and valued in themselves. The application of methods and perspectives of structural linguistics to myth has engendered, along with much metaphysical murkiness, a general feeling that like other cultural practices (food, body decoration) myth may contain a deep structure, an internal code. The decoding of myth involves, according to some, the unpacking of its narrative structure to reveal a skeleton of circumstance and event: inversions, repetitions, homologies, transformations, central binary oppositions. Progressively, it has come to be understood that structural analyses are in themselves insufficient and that a contextualization of myth is necessary to appreciate its hold on people's imaginations. With Willis, many anthropologists have come to see in myth, as with the Fipa central myth, "a sociological charter of a depth and comprehensiveness which might well have surprised Malinowski, and that the language of that charter is a sort of ultra-Levi-Straussian one" (1967:532). Myth, like culture itself, is something that is generated, revised, and regenerated in response to economic and political forces. Thus, as Aucoin (2000) has illustrated in her discussion of women's myths in Fiji as insubordinate discourses, myths can be active in contradicting and subverting dominant meanings as well as in upholding and reinforcing them.

It has been suggested by Willis (1967:532) that we reserve the name of myth for those narratives that exhibit the proper structural form. I do not necessarily agree with this point of view, but in a somewhat ludic mood I felt it might be interesting to regard the eminently popular and influential 1933 film, *King Kong*, as if it were a myth collected in the field and submit it to a kind of anthropological analysis. Does the film have the requisite structural form? With due irony and deliberate naiveté I turned back to Levi-Strauss' original article on myth in the *Journal of American Folklore* (1955) and set out to apply the methodological procedure therein described to *King Kong*. The results were illuminating and provocative. The structure of the film is strikingly reminiscent of the kinds of internal deep structures one characteristically finds in more traditional myths. Clear-cut binary oppositions are presented and juxtaposed; there is a playing with repetition, inversion, homology, mediation; and the narrative has something important to say to an audience situated in a historically particular set of circumstances. A broadly structuralist analysis of the film, a consideration of its socio-economic context, a recognition of the work's popularity and enduring place in the consciousness of our time, along with a survey of similar successive films (monster movies), reveals *King Kong* to be exemplary of modern myth. The film, its central character and the image of that character's action have endured and have together engendered a spiral of like cinematic works, popular films responsive to the changing vicissitudes and complexities of life in the contemporary world.

Released in 1933 and immediately and phenomenally successful, *King Kong* was explicitly set in then-contemporary times. A small group of modern Americans sails to a mysterious South Pacific island to shoot a commercial film but returns instead with a living monster who ravages the city until slain by military aircraft on top of the Empire State Building. A long offshore establishing shot of New York City opens the work and the camera takes us dock-

side to the ship, *Venture*. In a complex mix of action and dialogue, the audience is introduced to Carl Denham, producer of "outdoor pictures"; the ship's captain, Englehorn; first mate, Jack Driscoll; and Weston, a theatrical agent. The *Venture* has three times the crew needed and Denham has a crate of gas bombs, "each one strong enough to knock out a herd of elephants." Weston has been summoned by Denham to provide an actress for his film, but he refuses citing the mystery and danger. In the following sequence, unmistakable images of the Depression are presented in documentary-style footage of a line-up outside the Woman's Home Mission as Denham prowls the city streets seeking to recruit a female lead for his film. He eventually encounters a destitute Ann Darrow being apprehended for theft by a heavily accented and obviously foreign-born sidewalk vendor. Darrow had reached out and almost, but not quite, touched one apple of a display. Denham intervenes and after feeding the starving, unemployed actress, promptly persuades her to join the expedition. During the voyage out from New York, Darrow and Driscoll become romantically involved and Darrow undergoes a screen test prefiguring what is to come. Denham also reveals their destination, Skull Island, a place where the descendants of a formerly more complex civilization have "slipped back" and are now confined to a long peninsula separated from the mainland by an enormous wall.

Arriving at the island, the sound of drums is heard and a shore party including Denham, Darrow and Driscoll interrupt a native ritual as Denham attempts to film the event. The chief offers to trade six local women for the blonde Ann Darrow, "the woman of gold," but his offer is refused. That night, however, Darrow is kidnapped by the islanders. Led outside the village, she is tied to a stone altar. To the sound of drums and chants the villagers line the top of the wall as King Kong, an enormous, sentient gorilla, arrives. He picks up a screaming Ann Darrow and walks off with her into the surrounding jungle. Darrow's absence is soon noticed aboard the *Venture*, and Denham, Driscoll and a group of armed sailors go ashore. They pass through the village and proceed to follow Kong and his human prize. At first light, the men from the *Venture* encounter a stegosaurus. Stunned by one of Denham's gas bombs, the dinosaur is brutally shot to death. Proceeding along, they come upon a lake and after building a raft, attempt to cross it. The raft is overturned by a brontosaurus and guns and gas bombs are lost. Some sailors drown and others are chased and bitten to death by the (actually vegetarian) brontosaurus. With the exception of Denham, who has tripped and is left behind to later return to the village and discuss the day's events with Captain Englehorn, the survivors flee across a log bridge spanning a deep ravine. Having placed Darrow high in a tree in a clearing, Kong returns to the log bridge and shakes off all the sailors except for Driscoll who has jumped into a small cave just beneath the lip of the ravine. Kong repeatedly attempts to pluck him out of his place of refuge but is warded off again and again as Driscoll stabs at the monster's fingers with a long, steel knife. The blade of the knife glints in the sun as it is also used to sever a vine up which a large, predatory lizard crawls. Diverted by Ann Darrow's screams when a *Tyrannosaurus rex* enters the clearing, Kong returns and wrestles with the dinosaur, eventually killing it by unhinging its jaw. He beats his chest and roars in triumph and, picking up Darrow, walks on. Driscoll, who has emerged from hiding, observes all of this and follows along.

Proceeding to a cave in his mountain top lair, Kong places Ann Darrow in a niche on the cave's wall where she is immediately threatened by a serpentine, plesiosaurus-like dinosaur. Kong attacks the creature which wraps itself around his throat, choking the monster ape, until it too is vanquished and killed. Victorious, Kong beats his chest and roars once again. He takes Darrow out onto an open ledge and begins peeling off her clothing, but diverted by Driscoll's dislodging of a boulder in the back of the cave, he leaves her and goes to investigate. Ann Darrow attempts to crawl away but is soon picked up by a giant pterodactyl. Alerted by her screams, Kong hurries back and reaches up to grasp the flying dinosaur which has taken Darrow and is flying off with her in his claws. Breaking and crushing the pterodactyl, Kong throws it down off the mountainside and triumphantly beats his chest and roars.

While Kong is engaged in battling the pterosaur, Darrow and Driscoll escape by descending a large vine. Kong returns and reels them in until both lose their grip and fall into a pool below. Unharmed, they emerge and begin running back to the village. Their imminent arrival is noticed, but soon Kong appears as well. Sailors and Skull Island natives press together against the gate of the wall as Kong beats his fists against it and attempts to push his way in. The heavy wooden bolt of the gate eventually cracks and an enraged King Kong stands before the settlement. The monster ape proceeds to riot through human society. Throwing the roof of a hut on a group of fleeing villagers, plucking people from their homes and flinging them down, he bites and tramples the islanders to death. A group of warriors hurl spears at Kong to no avail as he proceeds through the village to the beach. There, he is met by Carl Denham who throws one of his gas bombs; it explodes in a flash, and Kong slowly falls unconscious to the sand. A

jubilant Denham orders ropes and anchor chains from the ship. "We're millionaires, boys," he proclaims, "I'll share it with all of you. Why, in a few months it'll be up in lights: Kong, The Eighth Wonder of the World!"

Instantaneously transported back to New York City, we join a Broadway theatre crowd. After some backstage conversation with the press, Denham introduces a chained and manacled King Kong to the assembled audience. Kong roars with increasing agitation when newspaper photographers ignite their flash bulbs. "He thinks they are harming the girl," exclaims Denham as the monster finally breaks free. Crashing through a wall, Kong proceeds to riot through New York City. Many of his actions are identical to his trampling of the Skull Islander's village. He throws a hotel canopy on a group of fleeing citizens; he picks up and bites a man to death; he snatches a sleeping woman out of her hotel room and drops her to the street below. Eventually locating Ann Darrow, Kong reaches into her room and abducts her once more. At large in the city, Darrow in hand, Kong derails and smashes an elevated train, repeatedly hammering it with his fists. The first light of dawn finds him climbing the Empire State Building. At the instigation of Denham and Driscoll, the forces of the United States military are mobilized, and in the work's final sequence, a squadron of fighter aircraft challenges the monster. Kong stands momentarily triumphant at the very top of the Empire State Building. Having placed Ann Darrow in place of safety, he once again beats his chest and roars. However, in pass after pass the airplanes relentlessly machine-gun the giant ape. Kong catches one airplane and sends it spinning down, but the others persevere. Clutching his throat and mortally wounded, Kong falls to his death below. A police captain remarks to Carl Denham that the airplanes got him. To this Denham replies, "Oh no, it wasn't the airplanes, it was beauty that killed the beast." But as Matthews (1979:78) has remarked, we all know that this is not so. It was the airplanes after all, and in the obvious truth of this final event there is to be found both a meaningful conclusion to the film's action and a glimpse of its deliberate but subtly encoded intimation.

King Kong establishes a fundamental dichotomy between two islands, one situated in the north (New York City) and the other in the south (Skull Island). The opening and closing sequences take place in the north, in Manhattan, and the film's movement in space is from north to south and back again to the north. Brought to the industrial north from the primitive south is the monster, King Kong, who will devastate the metropolis until slain by the organized forces of the American nation-state at the very pinnacle of a key symbol of its modernity and progress. The actual elapse of time in this journeying is telescoped, and this is especially so in the gap between Kong's defeat on Skull Island and his Broadway debut. A single, brief shot of the *Venture* at sea is metonymic of the entire return voyage. This compression of time serves to delineate a sharp contrast between the two islands, setting them off as separate, parallel worlds. There are no intervening places or peoples.

New York City, the North, is home to the film's leading characters, persons selected for audience identification. Denham, the hard-boiled entrepreneur; Driscoll and Darrow, respectively the male and female leads, are contemporary American urbanites. Their city and its region belong to civilization and the advanced technology of industrial capitalism. Tall steel and glass buildings, automobiles, and elevated, high speed trains serve as visible signs of progress and modernity. The north is a realm of *culture*. It is a prime site of the technologically sophisticated modern world as epitomized by the United States of America. Ruled by the sentient monster, King Kong, the South is, in contrast, exquisitely and archetypally natural. A mist-shrouded land of antediluvian jungle and sheer precipice, Skull Island remains a place of *nature*. Uncharted and unknown to the outside world, the island is inhabited by a swarm of combative prehistoric beasts and a gigantic, intelligent gorilla, nature's highest representative. A retrograde human population barely survives behind an enormous protective wall. Periodically they must appease the monster by offering up human sacrifices (women) to that non-human other. A people in decline, they hang on in a state of servitude and cultural devolution. Descendants of a higher civilization that built the wall, the islanders have "slipped back." Their primitive technology and weapons contrast markedly with the modern tools and weapons of the industrial world. South is opposed to North. Stone Age technology is set off against industrial technology, nature to culture, the size and brute force of dinosaurs paralleled by the machines and modern industrial weapons of war. Images of technological stagnation and decline are projected against those of progress and cultural evolution. To this land of dark-skinned nature come a group of white Americans. Ann Darrow's unique value to the native chief as "a gift for Kong" lies in her being "the woman of gold." Fay Wray, the actress who played Darrow, had naturally dark hair but was explicitly directed to wear a blond wig for *King Kong*. The multiracial nature of the American state is not depicted in this film, and the contrast between north and south is also one of race. Citizens of the north appear fully clothed (richly or poorly) in all circumstances. The people of the south go about partly clothed or "half-naked."

It is not surprising thus that when Kong has Darrow firmly in hand he strips off part of her clothing making her, now his possession, as "half-naked" as any native islander.

As noted by various film studies scholars (see particularly Carroll 1984), there are a great many parallel images and twinned relationships to be seen in *King Kong*. Denham and Englehorn are mirrored by the native chief and his "witchdoctor," the sailors of the *Venture* by the native warriors, and the Skull Island populace by the ordinary citizens of New York. Jack Driscoll and Kong are rivals for Darrow's person and are accordingly set off against each other. Kong and Denham are diametrically opposed in their purposes and are natural enemies. A number of central binary oppositions clearly emerge as the film unfolds:

North	*is opposed to*	South
Culture		Nature
New York City		Skull Island
White		Black
Denham/ Driscoll		Kong
Sailors		Native Warriors
Citizens of New York		Village Populace
Industrial Technology		Stone Age Technology
Modern Machines and Weapons		Dinosaurs
Elevated Train		Plesiosaur
Fighter Aircraft		Pterodactyl
Modernity/Progress		Primitive Life/Cultural Devolution

Essentially passive, Ann Darrow is passed from side to side, a mediator between north and south, culture and nature. The dramatic structure of King Kong involves one episode after another in which her possession is contested. She is taken against her will, rescued and taken yet again until the film reaches its point of resolution. A victim of the Depression, Ann Darrow is seized first by the sidewalk merchant in New York City (a thickly-accented, immigrant "other") but saved by Denham. She is then kidnapped by Skull Island natives and offered to Kong, who takes her away as well. Thereafter, she is threatened by the *Tyrannosaurus rex*, the plesiosaur and the pterodactyl, but Kong saves her in each instance. Driscoll and Denham help Darrow escape Kong in the south, but the monster ape has her again in the north. In the film's concluding sequence Ann Darrow is decisively liberated by the armed forces of the American state and Kong is killed. Darrow is pulled back from otherness and restored to her rightful place in the modern world. A remarkable symmetry is displayed in the course of all of this. Darrow is abducted and exhibited in the south. On Skull Island, her outstretched arms are tied to two ancient pillars. Kong is abducted in the south by Denham and exhibited in the north. On a Broadway theatre stage his outstretched arms are manacled to a heavy steel frame. Parallel themes of abduction, exhibition and escape play themselves out as the narrative unfolds, and these serve to propel Ann Darrow back and forth across the divide separating the film's two dichotomous worlds. As the action of being seized is initiated, Darrow screams and faints, marking the transition.

As is common in mythic discourse, there is a good deal of repetition in *King Kong*. The giant ape's battles with his fellow prehistoric monsters are lengthy and brutal. In succession, many blows, bites and kicks are given and received. These encounters are in themselves repetitious: first, the tyrannosaurus, and then the plesiosaur, and finally the pterodactyl challenge Kong for possession of Ann Darrow. One after the other, the monster ape shakes the sailors off the log bridge and their screams are heard in sequence as they fall. Kong repeatedly attempts to dig Jack Driscoll out of his hole and is repeatedly pricked on the fingers by his knife. Kong hammers the plesiosaur to death with his fists and likewise pounds and smashes the elongated and serpentine elevated train in New York. The monster ape's rampage through the modern industrial city is obviously and deliberately much the same in action as the carnage he inflicts on Skull Island. Kong riots through human society in both south and north. His destructive behaviour in each locale is virtually identical, although sometimes inverted. Thus Kong breaks into the Skull Island village and out of the Broadway theatre. On Skull Island, he bites a man to death, the screaming native facing to the right of the screen; in New York he similarly chews up an American citizen, the tuxedo-clad American facing the screen's left. Kong's rampage in New York is a mirror image of his trampling of the South Seas village and one that repeats itself in detail. He does to the citizens of the north more or less exactly what he had previously done to the primitive villagers of the south.

An interconnected series of agonistic encounters acts as the mainspring of the film's narrative. Violent struggle is central to the work and a calculation of relative superiority and inferiority is established in fury and mortal combat. It is in an assessment of these structures of victory and defeat that the film's ideological intent may be understood. Not shown but described after the fact, Captain Englehorn and the crew of the *Venture* use the weapons of a modern industrial society to frighten off and subdue the native Skull Islanders: the colonial encounter writ small. Led by Denham and heavily armed with rifles and gas grenades, the modern Americans of the north likewise stun and slay the charging stegosaurus. Neverthe-

less, disarmed and disorganized, the sailors are themselves destroyed by the brontosaurus and then by King Kong at the log bridge. Confronted in turn by the *Tyrannosaurus rex*, the plesiosaur and the pterodactyl, Kong destroys them all after fierce and brutal combat. Establishing himself supreme, it is shown, not stated, that Kong is king of all he surveys.

Kong is superior to all except the key representatives of the modern world (Denham, Driscoll) and their weapons of industrial civilization. Kong attempts to kill Jack Driscoll but is successfully warded off by Driscoll's steel knife. Sailors and Skull Island villagers alike are unable to stop the enraged beast at the village's gate and they flee as Kong riots through human society. The native warriors resist as best they can but are defeated and slaughtered. Only Denham stands firm and is able to subdue the monster and render it unconscious with one of his gas bombs. In New York City, Kong likewise destroys many ordinary American citizens. The unarmed and unprepared residents of the metropolis are as helpless as the technologically unsophisticated islanders against the monster's wrath as the giant ape crashes through the urban landscape. However the organized and technologically advanced military forces of the American nation-state prove effective in the end, and King Kong is finally defeated and destroyed.

Kong climbs high to face an aerial threat twice in the film. In the south he struggles with the pterodactyl and is victorious; the flying dinosaur is broken and thrown down. In the north he scales the Empire State Building to do battle with the military aircraft of the U.S. government, but this time Kong is defeated, and it is he who tumbles to the street below. Although both fly, the pterodactyl is a natural, living thing while the aircraft are intricate, lethal weapons of a modern industrial state. In the south Kong struggles with the plesiosaur who wraps itself around his throat almost choking the great ape to death, but Kong prevails. In the north the monster grasps his throat once again as he is there repeatedly and fatally shot. In this, as throughout, the armed and organized forces of modernity and industrial civilization show themselves superior to all else. *King Kong* establishes numerous contrasting relationships between north and south, culture and nature, advanced industrial and Stone Age technology and then illustrates, through incidents of violent conflict, the ultimate ascendancy of the modern American way of life.

The Depression begins the film; its images are initial and inescapable and the viewer is immediately immersed in a particular, then-current set of socio-economic circumstances. Like many monster films that were to follow, *King Kong* touches on an aspect of reality only to immediately careen off into fantasy so as to ultimately present a fantastic resolution to a very real state of affairs. By means of the established propositions and events of the film's narrative and through its visual imagery, Depression and Progress are ultimately presented as opposing polarities of human existence. The former is associated with the south, nature, "primitive" (retrograde), dark-skinned peoples and King Kong. Progress and prosperity are classed with the north and its Caucasian populace, Carl Denham (the very model of the American entrepreneur), culture, modernity and industrial and military technology. Ann Darrow passes from being held against her will in New York by the sidewalk vendor for a contemplated but unrealized theft occasioned by her desperate financial need, to being held by the Skull Island natives as a sacrifice to the gorilla god of the omnipresent and permanent underdevelopment of a degenerate people, a people who have "slipped back" from a former state of cultural and economic development. The monster, King Kong, rules these people and is presumably the cause of their decline. Metaphorically held in the grip of the Depression, the film's heroine is actually, we are shown, gripped by the monster's people and then by the monster himself. That selfsame monster eventually breaks out into the modern city and, as Kennedy notes, "smashes the very Third Avenue landscape in which Fay Wray (Ann Darrow) had wandered hungry" (1960:214).

In his rampage through New York, Kong seems to deliberately go after icons of modernity. He derails and then thoroughly smashes the elevated train, a widely publicized exemplar of industrial progress. Shortly thereafter, he climbs the Empire State Building, recently completed and a major icon of the modern American nation-state. In one of the most memorable and often repeated images of the film, metonymic of the movie itself, Kong stands momentarily triumphant at the very top of this ideologically potent building. He beats his chest and roars in victory as he had previously done after vanquishing each of his flesh-and-blood foes on Skull Island. The monster, King Kong, is then and there the Depression itself, ascendant over the metropolis below.

It is never directly stated that Kong is, or becomes in New York, the Depression incarnate, but this inference is subtly and repeatedly communicated in text, sound and image; in multiple references to money, the lack of money and the making of money; in contrasts between Darrow's circumstances before, during and after her acquaintance with Kong (see Mayne 1976); in the existential situation of the Skull Islanders as a people who have "slipped back" and their subservient relationship with the giant ape; and

in the destructive practice of the monster, its parallel behaviour in south and north, and how these actions are spatially and symbolically situated to generate meaningful statements. Myths (and films like *King Kong*) are perhaps the very antithesis of crude political propaganda. Rather than being directly and forcefully shouted out, messages are embedded in a narrative structure. Once witnessed, the narrative percolates through the consciousness of audience members who individually achieve recognition of a set of meaningful propositions that have been cleverly scattered and hidden in the dynamic interplay of character, event and time. This gives myth its unique power to persuade and, as well, its remarkable verisimilitude.

Myths are certainly among those discourses that might be termed hegemonic and films like *King Kong* might also properly be considered sites where hegemony is won. The dynamics of this process are bound up with the deep structuring of the narrative and the nature of its established oppositions. *King Kong* tells its audience that while we may suffer temporary setbacks, our system will triumph in the end. The industrial technology and military might of the modern nation-state will ultimately prevail. Monster gorillas (and states of affairs like Depressions) will yield in time to the technological sophistication of a determined and organized industrial society. The film presents in dramatic form the ascendancy of the modern American way of life. Personified and identified as a huge, sentient beast, the Depression itself is symbolically slain in the fiction that is *King Kong*.

Released during the worst year of the Depression, in 1933 when President Roosevelt declared a moratorium and closed the banks, *King Kong* was immediately and profoundly successful. Opening simultaneously in two major New York theatres, enormous crowds stood in line to see it. The work's strong positive reaction was no doubt occasioned in good measure by its sensationalism, and by the special effects that give to it a sense of awe if one is suitably willing to suspend disbelief. It is not without significance, however, in considering the phenomenal success of the film to note that *King Kong*, deeply structured, also provided a mythic response to the painful socio-economic circumstances of its time. The Depression challenged many of the central assumptions upon which the collective mazeway of the American public was built. The ideological underpinnings of industrial capitalism were shaken, along with the economic system itself, by the inarticulate and shapeless forces of collapse and disintegration. In *King Kong*, a fantastic resolution to an unwelcome contradiction between expectation and experience is worked out in a surreal narrative that takes as a point of departure the world of its present day. From what is *explicit* in the discourse of *King Kong*, there resounds a broad cultural affirmation, which could only have helped drive on the film's popularity and remarkable presence.

Meriam C. Cooper set out to make in *King Kong*, "the ultimate in adventure." The exceptionally enthusiastic audience response to the film and its enduring popularity are indications of his success in that regard, but it would be misleading and far too simplistic to equate the work with its entertainment value. Following the broad outlines of critical theory as first formulated by the Frankfurt School (see Bailey 1994), an anthropological critique situates films like *King Kong* as cultural productions intimately related to their social, economic and political contexts. They both reflect and are generative of understandings about the world, society and culture, and the "proper" dimensions that inform thought, belief, and action. In *King Kong*, culture and nature are presented as discrete, totalizing antimonies, and the realm of culture, although threatened by nature (Kong), is priorized and given the final victory. The separation and opposition of nature to culture is surely deeply rooted in Western thought, going all the way back to Genesis, but there is nothing necessary or universal about this distinction, contra Levi-Strauss, as Descola (1994), Sahlins (1976) and many others have taught us. In *King Kong*, nature is something to be controlled and used, or else destroyed and this is a particularly insidious commonplace of the Western cultural tradition. Denham, the aggressive capitalist entrepreneur, is valorized and his exploitative and often ruthless attitudes and actions are presented as being not only perfectly reasonable, but laudable. Driscoll, the first mate, is Labour, an exemplar of the loyal proletariat in capitalist society. Competent and hard working, he is unquestionably obedient and respectful of Denham, perfectly malleable and responsive to Denham's direction and control. Darrow exemplifies Woman in patriarchy. Beautiful but passive and highly emotional, she screams and faints when in distress, a valuable object to be possessed but not an active subject capable of independent thought and action. The Skull islanders are the "natives" of the non-Western world. Savage and technologically inferior, they are easily conquered and become thereafter properly submissive and supportive of the colonial regime. Modern technology in the employ of industrial capitalism is ultimately victorious.

All of these understandings and perspectives are inextricably interwoven in the narrative discourse of *King Kong* and they emerge subtly but imperatively as ideological axioms as one watches the film. A critical reading of the work frames it as a discourse of power, active in the construction of a normalized reality. The "truths" of its

portrayals of gender, class, nation and race are unquestioned and uncontested, and in accepting the flow of the film's narrative and in a sense getting lost in it, one comes under the domination of its representations. "Every established order," Bourdieu writes, "tends to produce the naturalization of its own arbitrariness" (1977:164). The fictions of popular films like *King Kong* and of myths in general are especially adept at doing this. In film, as in myth, a story's characters and events can be constructed so as to be exemplary. All of that which is culturally posited to be "the way things really are" can be easily made to be exactly that way on the screen. *King Kong* not only tells us that industrial technology will vanquish serious threats to the infrastructure of modernity, but also that its depictions of race, gender, class, and national and cultural identity are vertiginous. Bound up in the mainspring of its central narrative are both overt and subtle proclamations of multiple, valorized hierarchies of identity, power and "otherness."

Extraordinarily successful, and carrying with it all of its explicit and implicit ideological weight, *King Kong* came to be firmly planted in the collective imagination of our time. Kluckhohn's (1942) thesis that an individual dream can become a shared, public myth if the dreamer's fantasy strikes a sufficiently responsive chord is a close approximation of how Merian C. Cooper's fantastic story became a new American myth. Demand for the work has been sustained. Re-released in 1938, 1942 and 1946, the remarkable 1952 revival of *King Kong* proved pivotal. Earning two-and-one-half times the expected gross of a major new Hollywood film, the work was named Time magazine's Movie of the Year in a cover story (July 14, 1952). The following year saw the release of *The Beast from 20,000 Fathoms*. Deliberately intended to be an imitation of *King Kong*, this work propelled the monster film into the atomic age. A nuclear test explosion in the Artic awakens a long-dormant marine dinosaur, a "rheasaurus." The monster sinks a ship and proceeds to trample Wall Street in New York until slain by an isotope-tipped missile. The message is clear and ideologically powerful: nuclear weapons can awaken a monster, but only nuclear weapons can save us from it.

One of the most profitable films of 1953, the success of *The Beast from 20,000 Fathoms* was to spark the proliferation and adaptive radiation of monster films. Noting the strong public response to *The Beast from 20,000 Fathoms*, Warner Brothers released *Them!* in 1954. Atomic weapons tests in the desert result in huge mutant ants that invade the sewers of Los Angeles and threaten the survival of the human species. Other giant insect films (Tarantula 1955; The Deadly Mantis 1957) followed, and the genre expanded to feature a diverse lot of life forms. *It Came from Beneath the Sea* (1955) has a radioactive octopus attack San Francisco. An earthquake releases giant, radioactive, prehistoric snails in *The Monster that Challenged the World* (1957). A strong fear of nuclear contamination and anxieties about the unforeseen consequences of nuclear fission animate many of these early American monster films.

An American monster movie tradition was paralleled by the advent of the Japanese monster cinema. The first of this legendary body of films, *Godzilla* (1954), took direct inspiration from *The Beast from 20,000 Fathoms* (1953) and is thematically similar to that work. Nuclear test explosions awaken a marine dinosaur that proceeds to ravage human society. Actual footage of Hiroshima appears in *Godzilla* (1954). As in many descendant Japanese monster epics, the film presents in clear and unmistakable terms the dangers nuclear weapons pose to industrial civilization. A sequel, *Rodan* (1957), opens with shots of two nuclear test explosions—emphasis is placed on the blast's shock waves—and then introduces the two Rodans, giant pterodactyls, who destroy two Japanese cities (as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki) in much the same way, by creating blast-force winds with their wings. The monster is here, as elsewhere in the Japanese monster cinema, the once-realized and ever potential threat of nuclear holocaust (see Noriega 1987). Similar themes animated the monster films of other national cinemas during the 1950s and 1960s, and various other monstrous incarnations of our suppressed but not inconsiderable fears lived out their destructive lives in fantastic renditions of a real but far more intractable predicament.

New myths of the industrial age, monster films present a threat to the material infrastructure of modern urban life in the form of the monster. The monster's anger is directed toward civilization itself and not against the many anonymous persons destroyed in its passage. Larger than life, the monster is on the same scale as the city and it is the modern industrial city itself that is imperilled by the monster's existence. Monsters crash through oil refineries, electrical installations, docks, factories and office towers. In a primordial rage, they smash the buildings, wires, pipes and machines of the modern industrial world. The monster's eyes glint with malice and mass destruction is a certain consequence of its acquaintance. Discovered, created, awakened, arriving from outer space, the monster also takes keen delight in threatening, occupying or destroying the key symbols of the nation-states it visits. Radioactive, the Giant Behemoth (a brontosaurus) crushes Britain's Houses of Parliament (The Giant Behemoth 1957); Gorgo tears down and tramples London

Bridge, the Tower of Big Ben and Piccadilly Circus (Gorgo 1961). Yongary, an indigenous Korean monster from the north, threatens the Temple of the Moon (Yongary 1967); a drugged-out King Kong sits atop Japan's Diet building in *King Kong vs. Godzilla* (1963), and Godzilla himself wrecks many Manhattan landmarks, including the Brooklyn Bridge, in *Godzilla* (1998). In 2004, Godzilla and a host of angry, destructive monsters completely destroy New York, Shanghai, Tokyo, Sydney, and Paris, smashing in the process the iconic structures of these cities (Godzilla: Final Wars 2004). A distinct and well-delineated cinematic genre, the monster film is balanced on a central opposition between civilization and the monster. The monster is a challenge to industrial civilization writ large, embodied and personified. After chaos, ruin and difficulty the vanquishing of the monster is at hand, and the world, the human species, and the modern city is temporarily spared.

Various actual and potential threats to industrial civilization and the modern metropolis have found expression in monster films. Hedora, the smog monster, is pollution itself, animate and tenaciously combative in *Godzilla vs. The Smog Monster* (1971). A botched experiment with disastrous consequences, the Blob is inadvertently created by biological weapons research in outer space (The Blob 1988). In Dino Di Laurentis' 1976 remake of *King Kong*, it is not economic depression but the then-current oil crisis that finds shape in the person of the monster. Virtually identical to the 1933 classic, *King Kong* (1976) contains numerous, multivocal references to oil. The *Venture* becomes an oil supertanker and Denham is Wilson, an oil executive in search of new reserves. Transported to New York in the belly of the ship, Kong appears at his New York debut secreted behind a large curtain representing a gasoline pump advertising Petrolux, the conglomerate petroleum company that sponsored Wilson's expedition. Bursting forth literally from within the pump as the oil embargo and the oil crisis personified, King Kong again crashes through urban society until slain on top of the World Trade Center to the cheers of a jubilant crowd below. Godzilla returns in 2000 to attack a nuclear power station until challenged by a computer-hacking alien monster whose activities likewise threaten the survival of civilization (Godzilla 2000), and Kong is resurrected only to be killed again in Peter Jackson's 2005 remake of the 1933 original.

An international film genre, the monster film is of unquestioned mythic authenticity. The cinematic monster is a mythic being of modernity, but these giant monsters have colleagues in other places and times. The monsters of today's films are but the latest incarnations of the monster, a frequently recurring creature of the human imagination. Monsters are so exceeding common in cultural history that one might almost say that they are necessary so as to highlight, by means of their inversions, hybridizations and transgressions, all that is good, right, necessary and proper. Monsters give weight to the "normal" in contrast to the "abnormality" of their existence and behaviour. Brightman (1993) has thus detailed the inversions of the Witiko (Windigo) cannibal monster of the Rock Cree. With a heart of ice, the Witiko prefers the cold and survives the winter without fire or shelter; the Witiko eats raw meat (human flesh) and not boiled animal meat, the common food of socialized humans; it lives and travels alone and is mute or aphasic and has no concern about its appearance. The Witiko's behaviour is the, "obscene and antisocial extreme of reciprocity: instead of giving food, it steals life, murdering and converting its victims into food" (Brightman 1993:158). Like many other monsters, the Witiko exhibits the inverse of all that is regarded as culturally proper.

Monsters also blur established categories of existence or break through boundaries to impose themselves in inappropriate times and contexts. Hybridization and transgression as well as inversion are key characteristics of monsters. Many of the monsters of the ancient world and of the Middle Ages thus combined heterogeneous elements of different species, mixing and mingling these with the human form. Drawing on the theoretical work of Mary Douglas, Carroll (1990) considers the monsters of the horror film to be hybrid, anomalous creatures that are both polluting and dangerous: their existence violates and threatens the integrity of established cultural categories. The very being of a monster can constitute a contravention of the conceptual order, but monsters transgress boundaries in other ways. Creed writes that, "the concept of a border is central to the construction of the monstrous; that which crosses or threatens to cross the border is abject" (1993:10-11). Spatial marginality tends to be associated with monsters and, as in contemporary Greece (Stewart 1991), monsters are often said to exist on the margins of the physical or social world. Characteristically, they are somehow brought into the centre of human society and come thereby to be beings out of place. Monsters have power, extraordinary power, but their power is anti-social and destructive. The monster's violation of culturally cherished boundaries and categories is an important part of what gives them that power and is, perhaps, the reason for it. They are human, but not human, alive but not alive, intelligent but of animal form, and eventually, in places and times where they do not belong. In *King Kong*, the unfettered presence in New York of a hybrid being, a giant ape with human-like intel-

ligence and emotion, is a transgression that also constitutes an inversion of quotidian ideas about the proper relationship between nature and culture and the inevitability of progress.

King Kong is a complex, deeply layered film that has, as Rony has pointed out, a "highly polysemous quality" (1996:158). Various sectors of its audience are drawn to particular aspects of the work and accordingly, many different approaches to the film have been made. Quite a few commentators have explored the film's misogyny and overt sexism (Mathews 1979; Mayne 1976), the portrayal of woman as victim (Lenne 1979), and the blaming of woman for Kong's undoing and demise (Warner 1994). Others have interpreted *King Kong* as a discourse about race, seeing in it racist ideologies and fears of miscegenation (Rosen 1975), or fears of "Black predators" as a justification for lynching (Bellin 2005), and as a fantastic recapitulation of the trans-Atlantic slave trade (Snead (1991). To Berenstein (1996), Kong's monstrosity is a result of his transgression of boundaries of race as well as of species in his pursuit of a white woman. The work is understood by Carroll as a capitalist fable, "a popular illustration of social Darwinist metaphors...of the American Weltanschauung" (1984:216). Rony finds in it multiple Eurocentric discourses of class, race and gender, and a profound parallel between the film and ethnographic spectacle: "the exploitation of native peoples as freakish 'ethnographic' specimens"(1996:159). Erb's detailed reception study of the work argues that non-mainstream spectators have historically identified with Kong's position as a "tormented outsider" (1998:14).

These perspectives are all cogent and valuable, but even when a précis of the film is provided, which is usually not the case, they are taken without a detailed consideration of the entire narrative and an analysis of its internal structure. Themes of race and gender, class and nation, are frequently discussed but the pivotal significance of the film's historical context and its engagement with the Depression has not been fully realized. I believe that the analysis presented here complements existing readings and extends them. A structural approach can help us get at the mainspring of a narrative, the central parameters of its discourse. Structural analysis is still useful if, in following poststructuralist reservations about metanarratives (for example, Lyotard 1984), one does not take structuralism too seriously and especially if one does not accept everything Levi-Straus has said about myth (see Sperber 1985), particularly his ludicrous assertion that myth no longer exists, having been replaced by music (1978:46). Although structuralist approaches to the popular film have been undertaken by a few film studies scholars, mainly on the Western (Kitses 1970; Wright 1976) during the heyday of structuralism, these proved to be limited in influence (Grant 2007:32) and have been generally abandoned today.[2] What anthropology can do, I believe, is to integrate structuralist work with other anthropological perspectives on myth into a revitalized critical reading of the popular cinema.

Just as monsters were active in the construction of modernity in Japan and long used there in political discourse (see Figal 1999), so, too, is the monster film an ideological force today. A structural analysis of *King Kong* reveals in it a central opposition between industrial civilization and the monster, and this dichotomy informs virtually all monster epics, the monster representing various threats to the integrity of modern life. The emotion generated by a monster film is awe, not fear, for in the monster's destructive action we glimpse the fragility of industrial civilization as its infrastructure is rendered asunder. One crucial and very important message the monster cinema communicates over and over again is that the monster will succumb in time to a clever application of science and advanced technology. Godzilla (1954) was defeated and killed at the bottom of the ocean by Dr. Serizawa's newly invented oxygen destroyer; Yongary, the North Korean monster, succumbs to a helicopter-inflicted chemical weapons attack (Yongary 1967). These films may seem trivial and childish, but they provide a template for the expectation of a technological solution to all of our problems that has very real consequences for how we think and behave toward the challenges we now face. The very widespread belief current today, that technology will always find a way to solve world problems, may actually have been engendered, in part at least, in the narratives of the monster cinema. If "they," the scientists and engineers, will always find a way out, "we" need to do nothing. It is in this way that the monster film is perhaps as pernicious and sinister as the monster itself.

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Notes

1 A good example of this is how Ann Darrow has gone from being a virtual nonentity in a patriarchial fantasy to becoming, increasingly, an active, self-realized subject, her transformation paralleling the rise of feminism in society. In the 2005 remake of *King Kong*, Darrow impresses the giant ape not by being "the woman of gold" but with her juggling, somersaults and dancing performance. They develop a close bond and a number of new scenes have been added to illustrate this: instead of being abducted by Kong in New York,

she runs across town to be with him, they slide together on a frozen pond in Central Park, and she climbs up to the very top of the Empire State Building to be by his side in his final moments where she attempts to protect him.

2 Arguing that the Western displays a central binary opposition between civilization and the wilderness, Jim Kitses' *Horizons West* (1970) was probably the most successful of these structural approaches, influencing, as Grant notes, almost all subsequent analyses of the genre (2007:32). Will Wright's structuralism in *Sixguns and Society* (1976) followed the thematic approach of Vladimir Propp, identifying four basic plot types in the Western (the classical, the vengeance plot, the transitional and the professional plot), but this approach proved to be less influential and has been abandoned in his latest work on the genre (Wright 2001).

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Book Reviews / Comptes rendus

Laurent Carroué, *Géographie de la mondialisation.* Paris : Armand Colin, 2007, 295 pages.

Recenseur : *Vincent Mirza*
McGill University

C'est à partir d'une volonté de clarification que l'auteur entreprend de nous proposer, pour la troisième édition de cet ouvrage, une réflexion sur les différents phénomènes désignés par le terme de *mondialisation*. En effet, sans écarter les apports d'une approche pluridisciplinaire, cet ouvrage se définit autour d'un resserrement conceptuel de la notion de mondialisation en montrant comment l'analyse des dynamiques locales et territoriales s'articule avec des mouvements plus larges pour dessiner une globalisation qui génère à la fois des tendances totalisantes et des inégalités, des asymétries et des résistances.

Ce que cela veut dire, c'est qu'il est nécessaire de relier dans l'analyse les dimensions territoriales à l'histoire, à l'économique, au politique et au social. C'est à partir de cette insistance territoriale que l'on pourra, selon l'auteur, mieux déterminer la façon dont les processus de la mondialisation agissent sur différents groupes en relation aux lieux, sans forcément suivre un processus d'uniformisation, mais bien en tenant compte des spécificités locales.

Pour analyser les ruptures et les continuités des processus de la mondialisation, l'auteur a divisé l'ouvrage en six chapitres. Le premier nous rappelle que la mondialisation est un processus qui s'amorce avec le capitalisme marchand au XV^e^ siècle et qui s'inscrit dans une perspective diachronique. Il identifie alors plusieurs éléments qui nous permettent de donner une profondeur historique indispensable à la compréhension des processus de la mondialisation. Ici l'auteur insiste sur le rôle de l'État, de l'expansionnisme colonial et sur des caractéristiques plus récentes de la mondialisation telles que la finance et la politique internationale. Autrement dit, Carroué avance les bases d'une mondialisation qui n'est pas univoque et qui se fonde sur une organisation financière et territoriale inégale dans une division nord-sud.

Les trois chapitres suivants sont consacrés aux principaux acteurs de ces nouvelles dynamiques. L'examen porte sur la manière dont les entreprises se structurent et organisent la production à l'échelle planétaire. En plaçant les firmes transnationales au centre des processus de la mondialisation, on peut voir que les modes de production et la gestion ne donnent pas des résultats uniformes et uniformisants, mais varient toujours en fonction du territoire, des politiques et des organisations sociales locales. Notamment, l'auteur insiste sur l'importance de prendre en compte, dans l'analyse, le territoire national vis-à-vis des stratégies des grandes firmes internationales. En effet, on oublie trop rapidement l'importance des contraintes et des contextes nationaux qui demeurent essentiels pour saisir les effets différentiels des mouvements de la mondialisation.

Par ailleurs, c'est aussi la capacité organisationnelle de ces firmes qui leur donnent une capacité mondiale. Ce que l'auteur nous montre, c'est la façon dont les transnationales s'organisent autour de la constitution d'un ensemble de règles économiques, politiques et juridiques qui favorisent le consensus autour de politiques d'implantation des entreprises dans différents pays. De plus, c'est surtout dans la gestion de réseaux locaux des grandes métropoles que les multinationales trouvent leurs forces. C'est aussi cette approche, par l'auteur, des compagnies transnationales qui nous permet de prendre de la distance par rapport au mythe de « la world company ».

En discutant de la question des échanges et de la logistique, Carroué insiste également sur une caractéristique importante de la mondialisation contemporaine. Autrement dit, ce qui caractérise cette dernière c'est, outre les flux financiers, l'augmentation significative de la maîtrise du rapport espace-temps qui est une des caractéristiques les plus importantes de la mondialisation (comme nous l'a si bien montré Harvey 1989[1]) notamment à l'aide des nouvelles technologies. Là encore, tout l'intérêt des propos de Carroué réside dans les nuances qu'ils apportent à la question de l'espace-temps en montrant que cette nouvelle dynamique reste fragile et qu'elle renforce les inégalités. Ainsi, lorsqu'on met l'accent sur les effets polarisants des innovations technologiques en soulignant l'avantage marqué des économies avancées, on remarque que la réduction de l'espace-temps s'accompagne aussi d'une politique particulière dans l'organisation de la production et dans la mondialisation des marchés.

Cette politique mène à l'intégration de systèmes économiques et techniques hiérarchisés de plus en plus forts. C'est ce que l'auteur élabore à travers différents exemples comme les relations entre la pêche et l'agriculture intensives, le marché mondial et le développement durable, ou encore les mutations de l'industrie manufacturière. Encore une fois, c'est l'aspect territorialisé de la production et l'importance des contextes nationaux sur la variation des différents systèmes productifs dépendants des facteurs socio-économiques et des politiques locales qui permettent de moduler l'analyse des processus de la mondialisation. Cette thèse, qui sert de fil rouge à l'ouvrage, est plus approfondie dans les deux derniers chapitres où la discussion se concentre sur les relations entre la mondialisation et la notion de territoire. L'auteur nous montre comment les processus de la mondialisation articulent la relation entre les territoires en distinguant des *espaces branchés* et des *espaces évités,* mais aussi des nouvelles dynamiques géopolitiques et économiques.

Finalement, il faut remarquer plusieurs qualités à cet ouvrage. Il est bien organisé, ce qui lui confère des qualités didactiques indéniables, et il est facile à intégrer dans le cadre d'un cours universitaire. Il faut remarquer que l'essentiel de la bibliographie thématique qui accompagne ce livre ne contient que des sources en français (ou presque). Toutefois, la qualité principale de ce livre réside dans la volonté constante de l'auteur d'amener une vision de la mondialisation qui s'appuie sur des localités qui la différencient et qui la réarticulent. Les arguments sont toujours illustrés de plusieurs exemples avec cartes et chiffres à l'appui. Ce livre est une très bonne introduction critique aux questions de la mondialisation.

Note

1 Par exemple, Harvey montre que les transformations du rapport espace-temps dans les systèmes de production, en passant du fordisme à un régime de production basé sur l'accumulation flexible, transforme l'expérience humaine. Cette nouvelle expérience de l'espace-temps est aussi vécue grâce à l'amélioration des moyens de transport.

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Recenseure : *Catherine Bernier*
Université de Montréal

L'auteur nous transporte dans les univers féminins de trois entreprises de restauration collective de Mumbai où elle questionne les différentes transformations dans le domaine de l'alimentation tout en étudiant l'apprentissage progressif des femmes de la sphère professionnelle. En Inde, les pratiques alimentaires sont en grande partie structurées à partir de systèmes classificatoires et normatifs traditionnels qui, en principe, laissent peu de place à l'idée même de se nourrir à l'extérieur de la maison. Or, le contexte urbain impose une cadence de travail et des contraintes spatiales nécessitant un tout autre dispositif. Quelles sont alors les stratégies alimentaires déployées pour concilier les réalités urbaines et les rapports à l'alimentation dits traditionnels? Ces négociations constituent la principale matrice des nouvelles sociabilités à l'étude dans cette ethnographie. Les rapports à l'alimentation se trouvant intimement liés aux rapports sociaux en Inde, le pari de l'auteur est ainsi d'étudier les mutations des conduites alimentaires et leur imbrication à travers les rapports sociaux dont le cadre général est le petit entreprenariat.

Au cœur de ces négociations se trouvent les cuisinières et les organisations au sein desquelles elles travaillent. Afin de mener à bien son étude, le choix de l'ethnologue s'est arrêté sur trois entreprises de restauration collective préparant essentiellement des *dabba*—littéralement « gamelle »—et pour deux d'entre elles, de la nourriture au comptoir. Comment se caractérisent ces entreprises par rapport à d'autres services? Comme nous en informe l'auteur, le restaurant a fait son apparition en Inde au même moment que l'essor industriel et se serait développé au même rythme que l'urbanisation (p. 39). Les besoins reliés à l'apparition de ces institutions étaient rattachés, d'une part, à des travailleurs migrants à faibles revenus et, d'autre part, à des colons européens s'adonnant aux plaisirs de la gastronomie, conception de la nourriture hors foyer qui semblerait désormais liée aux pratiques des individus d'une classe moyenne au pouvoir d'achat élevé. Entre le restaurant et la nourriture à la maison, se trouve des réseaux de *dabbawala* qui distribuent la nourriture de la maison sur les lieux de travail des personnes s'étant inscrites à ce service. Les entreprises à l'étude offrent donc une combinaison variable de dabba confectionnés par l'entreprise, de la nourriture au comptoir et un service de traiteur.

L'auteur s'engage dans l'étude exhaustive de milieux aux visées caritatives, à la clientèle et aux cuisines bien distinctes, soit : Griha Maitri, une coopérative hindoue préparant des spécialités végétariennes maharashtriennes ; l'Institut Pestonji Framji, se spécialisant dans une nourriture cosmopolite et la préparation de plats parsis ; et le Centre Kamala Krishnan, prônant la philosophie de l'alimentation axée sur la santé et inspirée de *Fit for life*, proposant une nourriture végétalienne et des cours sur la santé et l'environnement à ses clients généralement bien nantis.

Cet ouvrage trouve son intérêt dans la richesse de ses données, la particularité de ses choix pratiques et la priorité à l'ethnographie donnant plein feu à son sujet et se tenant à l'écart des débats théoriques. Cette ethnographie a tout à voir avec le changement social sans que cet intérêt n'oriente les données vers une analyse rectiligne et singulière. Au contraire, nous avons accès à des entreprises aux orientations, employées et clientèles contrastées qui offrent à voir une gamme variée

de rapports à l'alimentation. L'argumentaire se développe ainsi de façon discrète en privilégiant l'analyse des transformations, observées et discutées à partir de données organisées autour de thèmes choisis, plus souvent qu'autrement, en fonction des référents traditionnels. Des qualités de la nourriture aux principes de commensalité à l'organisation hiérarchique, différents aspects des rapports à l'alimentation sont étudiés dans chacune des entreprises afin de mettre en lumière les différentes mutations qu'ils connaissent.

Les mutations en question se trouvent être les moments forts de l'ouvrage, c'est-à-dire les épisodes où l'auteur prend de front les confrontations entre l'orthopraxie hindoue et les exigences professionnelles des milieux. Par exemple, la question des menstruations traitée à partir des discussions et observations à ce sujet permet une compréhension des plus saillantes de la séparation des sphères professionnelle et domestique. Si les menstruations sont considérées comme étant impures et que cuisiner durant cette période risque de polluer la nourriture, comment cette situation est-elle gérée dans le milieu de travail? La réponse à cette question donne lieu à une élaboration de distinctions toutes nouvelles que je laisse le soin au lecteur de découvrir.

Bien que les pratiques et conceptions traditionnelles soient au cœur de l'ouvrage, le choix des entreprises reflète davantage un intérêt pour la diversité, ce qui ne manque pas d'alimenter l'intérêt ethnographique mais atténue quelque peu la force des conclusions. Par exemple, une entreprise aux orientations aussi particulières que le Centre Kamala Krishnan fournit notamment un regard unique sur le végétarisme occidental en concurrence avec le végétarisme attaché à l'idéal brahmanique. Son projet éducatif, visant la propagation de ses conceptions de la personne saine et de l'alimentation, trace de nouveaux contours au champ des prescriptions alimentaires. Par contre, et comme l'auteur le souligne, cette organisation constitue un phénomène isolé dans le domaine de l'alimentation en Inde. De plus, au sein même de l'entreprise, une seule personne, soit la secrétaire et comptable, suit à la lettre le régime en question. Les autres employées, les dirigeantes et les clients sont dits être en processus de transition. Ce phénomène illustre bien la singularité du milieu et son aspect inusité, rendant le lecteur attentif aux limites et possibles que son étude soulève.

À cheval entre les sphères domestique et professionnelle, ces entreprises de restauration collective donnent un accès privilégié à l'intimité des rapports à l'alimentation en contexte public et organisé que forme l'entreprise. Cet ouvrage détient tous les avantages d'une étude micro-qualitative, soit le traitement des rapports sociaux dans la totalité de ses dimensions données par un contexte, une compréhension du sujet par la complétude de ses données et une approche du particulier qui rend les milieux vivants et ses informateurs—et dans ce cas, les informatrices—familiers. Le revers d'une telle approche pourrait bien être la difficulté à saisir l'ampleur des phénomènes étudiés au sortir de leur contexte. Somme toute, une problématique passionnante, un contexte éclairant et une étude avertie et bien menée qui ne manquera pas de plaire à tout lecteur gourmand et intéressé à l'Inde contemporaine et aux rebondissements qu'elle connaît.

Arnd Schneider, *Appropriation as Practice: Art and Identity in Argentina*, New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2006, 256 pages.

Reviewer: *Lindsay DuBois*
Dalhousie University

What does it mean when Argentines of European descent take pottery classes in which they aim to reproduce pre-Columbian artefacts? Does fashion photography employing white Argentine models dressed as indigenous people help create a space for indigenous Argentines in the national imagined community? What about fine art incorporating elements of indigenous cultures? In *Appropriation as Practice,* Arnd Schneider considers these and similar questions about how Argentine artists of European descent appropriate indigenousness, arguing that artists are at the forefront of "a process of cultural conversion and identity construction" (p. 5). To make these arguments, the book gathers together case studies drawn from a variety of commercial and fine arts, located mostly in Buenos Aires. Three introductory chapters, about Argentine identity, appropriation, and the Argentine art world respectively, are followed by four chapters addressing a variety of types of artistic appropriation and engagement with the indigenous in several media: pottery, graphic and textile design (ch. 4), photography (ch. 5), commercial film (ch. 6) and multimedia fine art (chs. 7 and 8).

Coming to this topic from previous work on immigrant and national identities in urban Argentina, Schneider considers the impact of the appropriation of the indigenous within this larger context. Argentina is a country in which the indigenous has been almost invisible to those at its administrative, economic and symbolic centre in Buenos Aires. (If readers doubt such claims, I can attest from personal experience that some *porteños* assert that Argentina "has no Indians.") In this sense, Argentina provides an interesting comparative case both for those working in other settler societies—like Canada, Australia and New Zealand—and for Latin Americanists more familiar with national contexts where the indigenous figures more prominently, albeit from a position of marginalization. In this respect, Schneider's discussion of the different significances of *criollo* (ch. 1) is helpful and informative. One of the most striking aspects of the Argentine version of *mestizaje*, is that is not predicated on notions of biological or genetic relatedness; it is about cultural inheritance. Argentines have often seen themselves, and been seen, as the most European of Latin Americans. However, in the context of the steady growth of poverty in Argentina, taking up indigenous themes, symbols, images, or inspiration is understood as part of a process of latinamericanization. When artists reimagine their identities

as tied to aboriginal peoples, they are turning away from the European towards something which they characterize as autochthonous (*"lo nuestro"*), a process Schneider interestingly refers to as "rooting."

While the book's subtitle, "Art and Identity in Argentina," signals Schneider's interest in how art is involved in producing certain ideas of the nation, the book also addresses the ethnography of art more broadly. He contends that anthropologist have, with some notable exceptions, paid too little attention to the creative processes and practices in which artists engage. Ethnographers, he asserts, have tended more to the observation side of the participant-observation pair. Consequently, they have not concerned themselves with artistic practice and process as fully as they might. The varied case studies he describes demonstrate differing degrees and types of possible participation: from actually making objects, to helping cast indigenous extras for a film or accompanying artists on their exploratory field trips. (There is an appendix on methodology with respect to artistic practices.) As a reader who knows more about Argentina than the anthropology of art, I find this argument convincing. It seems to extend a critique anthropologists often level at cultural studies: that too many authors examine cultural products as if we can read from our own experience what others will make of them. Here Schneider suggests that it is not enough to broaden our consideration of cultural products to a careful study of their reception. We need to also ethnographically examine the creative process, which is, one might note, not just an intellectual process, but also an embodied and a social one.

A third theme Schneider pursues is the analogy between ethnography and art-making on indigenous topics. He notes that both share the problem of communicating about the other. As anthropologists well understand, this is a project which is fraught. He asks where artists get their understandings of the indigenous, examining their research processes. The varied case studies reveal a range of research strategies on the part of the commercial and fine artists he follows: from copying designs from photographs of indigenous pottery, to consultation with indigenous artists and craftspeople, collaborations with anthropologists and field trips quite anthropological in nature.

As for the book's shortcomings, they are few and minor. Although the book is readable, it would have been nice if the press had engaged a copy editor. Some chapters appear to be adapted from articles originally published in other languages with translations varying in degree of elegance. I was also put off by the treatment of excerpts of fieldnotes (which were formatted like direct quotations) as if they had the status of direct evidence. Schneider's analysis of appropriation as one of the ways in which cultures connect is suggestive, but I am not entirely convinced by his attempt to link his work to the current (excessive?) academic interest in globalization. Despite a discussion of the relationship of the Argentine art market to international art markets, the study pays too little attention to the political and economic aspects of globalization to be convincing here. On the other hand, I rather like the way Schneider discusses appropriation as a rethinking of the older and outmoded notion of culture contact.

In sum, and as the foregoing suggests, Schneider gives us a lot to think about. I expect the book will be particularly interesting to scholars of appropriation on one hand, and to those engaged in the anthropology of art on the other. As Schneider ably demonstrates, Argentina provides a rich comparative case which scholars better acquainted with other contexts will no doubt find good to think with and against.

Yannick Fer, *Pentecôtisme en Polynésie française: L'Évangile relationnel,* Geneva : Labor et Fides, 2005, 498 pages.

Reviewer: *Deirdre Meintel*
Université de Montréal

The length of Yannick Fer's study of Pentecostalism in French Polynesia may put off readers whose mother tongue is not French. However, that would be unfortunate, because the book holds much that will interest not only specialists of Polynesia but also students of contemporary religious movements. Fer's study offers an unusually nuanced understanding of charismatic Protestantism in this part of the world. As the author explains, day-to-day proximity with his research subjects over two years of field work allowed him to get beyond the conventions of research on this type of religion, notably the conversion narrative, whose contours are (from the researcher's point of view) all-too-familiar, given that they are an essential part of religious rhetoric in Pentecostal congregations. The three sections of the book can be read almost independently from each other, such that different readerships may focus on one or another section of the book.

In the first section, Fer traces the development of Pentecostalism from the charismatic Protestantism introduced by Hakka Chinese immigrants (many of them former Buddhists) in the 1960s. Here he shows the interesting dynamic between ethnic identity and religious identity as Hakka Protestantism saw the emergence of ruptures, divisions and eventually, the rise of the ethnically plural Assemblies of God of French Polynesia, to which many Hakka and their descendants now belong. This part of the book is probably of greatest interest to specialists of Pentecostalism.

Sociologists and anthropologists of religion will find the second section of the book interesting insofar as it details the institutional aspects of the Assemblies of God of French Polynesia, showing an interesting division of religious labour between different spiritual functions (prophecy, healing, teaching etc.), the most fundamental distinction being that between "pastors" and "evangelists" (who may, in fact, be one and the same person at different points in time or in different contexts) (pp. 202-203). Here the classical issues of charisma versus institutionalization and religious communalization are

explored. This reader found the discussion of religious transmission and adolescence particularly interesting, given that Pentecostalism emphasizes the importance of individual choice for religious belonging even for those whose parents are baptized. At this juncture, the group activities offered by the Assemblies of God to adolescents (pp. 275-295) are crucial to forming a new generation of members by providing occasions for them to experience religion in ways that allow them to experience the beginning of a "personal relationship with God" (p. 287), one that they have chosen independently of their parents.

The third section of the book, entitled "Mobilis in Mobile," will appeal to a wide range of scholars interested in contemporary religious experience, including non-specialists of Polynesia or Pentecostalism. Fer's long fieldwork among Pentecostals allows him to explore variability within religious groups, families, and especially in individual religious trajectories over time. We see religious ruptures, falls from grace, and returns to the fold, as well as less dramatic "cooling down" periods and gradual disaffiliation. We also see cases of multiple belongings.

The book presents a style of explanation whereby the author manages to bring together an understanding of religious institutional dynamics together with religious faith as lived by individuals. *Pentecôtisme en Polynesie Française* offers extensive material for reflection on perennial issues in the study of religion, some of which (for example, the role of emotion in religion, see also Fer 2005) are discussed in the book's perhaps too-succinct conclusion. Fer's study merits a wide readership among anthropologists and others who are interested in contemporary religious movements.

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Johanne Collin, Marcelo Otero et Florence Monnais, dirs., *Le médicament au cœur de la socialité contemporaine. Regards croisés sur un objet complexe*, Sainte-Foy : Presses de l'Université du Québec, 2006, 284 pages.

Recenseure : *Anne-Marie Dion*
Université de Montréal

Le médicament au cœur de la socialité contemporaine est un collectif d'auteurs dirigé par l'historienne et sociologue Johanne Collin, le sociologue Marcelo Otero et l'historienne Laurence Monnais. Parmi les dix-neuf auteurs ayant collaboré à l'ouvrage, on trouve des chercheurs dans les domaines de l'anthropologie de la santé, de l'ethnologie et de la santé publique, des médecins généralistes et des psychiatres de même qu'un professeur en criminologie. Plusieurs sont membres de l'équipe de recherche sur le médicament comme objet social (MÉOS) de l'Université de Montréal au Québec, alors que d'autres sont rattachés à des centres de recherche en France et au Brésil. Tous s'interrogent sur l'origine d'un phénomène, celui de l'augmentation du recours au médicament dans les sociétés occidentales depuis les trois dernières décennies.

Le phénomène de l'augmentation de la consommation de médicaments a déjà fait l'objet de plusieurs travaux, notamment dans le champ de l'épidémiologie. Les efforts de recherche se sont principalement orientés vers l'identification des causes à l'origine du mésusage et de l'abus de médicaments. *Le médicament au cœur de la socialité contemporaine* se distingue des travaux précédents par l'angle inusité par lequel il aborde le phénomène. L'ouvrage nous propose d'explorer les transformations sociales ayant favorisé, voire peut-être rendu nécessaire, le recours aux médicaments dans les sociétés occidentales, en particulier les psychotropes. La combinaison des approches anthropologique, sociologique et historique permet d'aborder les logiques de l'utilisation des médicaments et, du coup, d'explorer les origines du phénomène de l'augmentation de leur consommation, dans une perspective plus large.

Intitulée « Les médicaments de l'esprit : entre le « soi et les autres », la première partie du livre explore la relation entre l'individu, la société et les médicaments psychotropes. Elle s'amorce avec le texte d'une présentation donnée par le sociologue français Alain Ehrenberg dans le cadre du 72ème congrès de l'ACFAS en 2004, lui-même une version modifiée d'un article du même auteur publié dans la revue *Esprit*. L'auteur y effectue une analyse critique des prémisses et fondements théoriques des neurosciences expérimentales en mettant en lumière les limites de l'assimilation de l'être biologique à l'être pris dans sa totalité.

Une idée centrale qui émane du texte de Ehrenberg et qui sert en quelque sorte de toile de fond à la première partie de l'ouvrage est que l'importance accordée au cerveau dans l'étiologie des troubles mentaux crée un climat qui favorise l'intervention pharmacologique. Par exemple, et poursuivant dans la même lancée, Marcelo Otero (ch. 3) se demande si, en définissant l'origine des troubles mentaux dans le cerveau, on n'assiste pas à la médicalisation de conditions dont l'origine est sociale. L'auteur explore le recours aux psychotropes dans le contrôle de la nervosité d'adaptation, un état qui se développe en réponse aux changements rapides qui caractérisent les sociétés occidentales. Le recours aux médicaments dans le but de l'amélioration de l'individu, l'usage « plastique » des anti-dépresseurs, la dépendance et l'usage chronique font également partie des causes d'accroissement de l'utilisation de psychotropes explorées dans la première partie.

La deuxième partie intitulée « Le médicament entre raisonnement thérapeutique et objet culturel » se concentre plus spécifiquement sur le raisonnement thérapeutique. L'approche qualitative, sur le terrain, permet de décrire en profondeur les logiques de prescription et de consommation du médica-

ment. Par exemple, Brigitte Chamak (ch. 7) décrit l'interaction entre l'expérience clinique et les savoirs relatifs à la pharmacologie dans l'élaboration d'un plan de traitement à partir de l'analyse des logiques de prescription d'un pédopsychiatre spécialisé dans le traitement de l'autisme. Le réseau de transmission des savoirs est exploré au-delà de la relation patient-médecin pour inclure les relations avec l'ensemble des acteurs présents dans l'environnement clinique. Par exemple, Denis Lafortune (ch. 10) analyse les interactions, tensions et controverses en lien avec le recours au médicament psychotrope dans les échanges entre les différents intervenants dans les centres jeunesse.

Le médicament au cœur de la socialité contemporaine s'apparente davantage à un recueil de textes qu'à une collaboration entre les différents auteurs. Tout d'abord, le fait que les chapitres se suivent sans s'arrimer explicitement les uns avec les autres donne l'impression que les différentes sections ont été produites indépendamment et que le projet de les regrouper pour les publier n'est venu qu'après coup. En outre, l'ouvrage, dans son entier, ne permet pas d'accéder à un niveau d'explication plus profond sur l'origine du phénomène de l'accroissement de la consommation de médicaments que chacun des différents chapitres considérés individuellement. Par exemple, il n'y a pas de conclusion au livre et, du coup, l'ouvrage se termine sans que les contributions des différents auteurs ne soient examinées à la lumière des questionnements soulevés dans l'introduction.

Ceci étant dit, *Le médicament au cœur de la socialité contemporaine* apporte une contribution originale et importante à la réflexion sur l'augmentation de la prescription et la consommation du médicament. Les questionnements sur le phénomène de l'accroissement de l'utilisation des médicaments dans les sociétés occidentales ne sont pas confinés au milieu académique. En effet, l'utilisation du médicament représente des coûts économiques et sociaux importants et la mise sur pied de mesures dans l'espoir de contrôler l'accroissement des dépenses engendrées par leur utilisation est une préoccupation dans plusieurs pays industrialisés. La recherche tant qualitative que quantitative sur les causes à l'origine du phénomène peut éclairer le choix des mesures à mettre en place pour contrôler les coûts.

À l'heure actuelle, les mesures proposées reflètent, et sont en quelque sorte limitées par, les concepts initialement utilisés pour décrire les différentes dimensions du phénomène à l'étude. Par exemple, les descriptions du comportement de prescription développées par l'analyse quantitative décrivent les variations observées en fonction du standard de *l'evidence-based medicine*. Ce cadre d'analyse a favorisé la formulation d'hypothèses dans lesquelles l'écart par rapport à une utilisation basée sur des données probantes s'explique par le peu de poids accordé aux évidences scientifiques dans le choix de prescription. Dans la même suite logique, les mesures inspirées de ce cadre d'analyse sont orientées sur l'information et « l'éducation » des prescripteurs. Bien qu'elles soient cohérentes par rapport au modèle dans lequel elles ont été développées, ces mesures ne prennent pas en considération la complexité des raisonnements thérapeutiques et des logiques de prescription. Du coup, non seulement elles soulèvent des réticences de la part des professionnels de la santé mais de plus, en bout de ligne, l'efficacité des méthodes développées à partir de ce cadre d'analyse est, somme toute, très limitée. En ce sens, *Le médicament au cœur de la socialité contemporaine* est une contribution importante en ce qu'il permet à la fois d'enrichir et de poser un regard critique sur les catégories d'analyse développées dans l'analyse quantitative des comportements de prescription.

En conclusion, *Le médicament au cœur de la socialité contemporaine* permet de faire un tour d'horizon d'un phénomène social complexe au cœur des préoccupations politiques actuelles.

Joëlle Gardette, *Les Innus et les Euro-Canadiens : dialogue des cultures et rapport à l'Autre à travers le temps (XVII^e-XX^e siècles)*, Québec : Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2008, 354 pages.

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Joëlle Gardette a fait des études en philosophie à la Sorbonne et a obtenu un doctorat en sociologie à l'Université Laval. L'ouvrage qu'elle vient de publier représente l'aboutissement de son travail de thèse qui traite principalement de la rencontre entre ce que l'auteure a appelé « l'Ancien et le Nouveau Monde », soit plus particulièrement de celle des Euro-canadiens et des Innus, depuis l'arrivée des Européens dans les Amériques jusqu'à nos jours. La rencontre entre des gens aux réalités culturelles souvent antithétiques, en particulier dans leur rapport à la Terre et à l'histoire, est ici observée. Elle l'est en fonction des diverses représentations, images et stéréotypes de l'Amérindien construits à partir du regard européen principalement. L'auteure s'efforce également d'inverser ce monologue culturel et d'écouter la voix des Innus. Joëlle Gardette a su recueillir un important corpus de données à partir desquelles elle brosse un portrait sensiblement monochrome, celui de la représentation qu'ont les Euro-Canadiens de la culture innue, et esquisse ainsi une identité qui fut biaisée, imprégnée de préjugés excessifs et contraires, allant de la dénégation à l'illusion sur autrui.

L'étude comporte trois chapitres dans lesquels foisonnent les sources écrites, ethnographiques, littéraires, documentaires et autres, et agrémentent bien le propos de l'auteure. La démarche et le style sont impeccablement concis, et répon-

dent aux critères académiques de la dissertation classique. Le premier chapitre débute avec l'image récurrente au cours des siècles du « maudit sauvage ». Gardette énumère ici les négations à l'origine de la rencontre des deux mondes où les Innus sont tout ce que ne sont pas les Européens, soit des êtres inférieurs aux antipodes de leur civilisation. L'auteure soutient que les préjugés énoncés sont encore en vigueur dans le discours contemporain des Euro-Canadiens et renforce, dès lors, l'idée d'une rencontre qui n'a jamais vraiment eu lieu.

La même analyse de cette rencontre manquée est explorée dans le deuxième chapitre où le discours religieux et le mythe du « Bon Sauvage » sont un autre pendant à l'élaboration des fausses représentations de l'identité des Innus. Gardette y note l'ambivalence de cette représentation idéalisée dans le contexte évolutionniste de l'époque où l'Amérindien doit être sauvé de sa condition primitive pour accéder aux bienfaits de leur civilisation.

Le troisième chapitre se veut plus nuancé et remet en question le manichéisme dans lequel l'auteure semblait s'être engagée au cours des deux chapitres précédents. Gardette insiste cependant dans une première partie sur les facteurs de transformations et de dépossessions des Innus, depuis la traite des fourrures jusqu'à la création du système des « réserves ». Consciente de son « parti pris amérindien » (p. 249) qui a orienté l'étude, le reste de l'ouvrage tente de se départir de cette vision simpliste où l'Innu est perçu comme une victime, un martyr aux maux de la civilisation, bref un être idéalisé et objectivé dont l'identité n'est plus. L'auteure relativise ici les défauts et les qualités des Innus sous le couvert d'un ethnocentrisme autochtone propre à la nature humaine; la présentation des Innus se poursuit ensuite brièvement dans le cadre actuel des revendications territoriales, tout en spécifiant qu'identité et culture amérindienne sont encore bien vivantes. Gardette énonce en dernier lieu la nécessité de modifier cette vision commune de l'image des Innus, issue de l'altérité, pour celle de la différence qui place autrui sur un même pied d'égalité que toute autre culture. Pour ce faire, elle propose d'effectuer un « véritable dialogue des cultures ». Ce dialogue consiste à maintenir un juste équilibre entre familiarité et hétérogénéité en vue de favoriser l'émergence d'un rapport à l'Autre fondé sur un processus de reconnaissance mutuelle.

Le regard ethnocentrique des « Blancs » ou Euro-Canadiens sur les Amérindiens est un sujet déjà largement traité dans la littérature depuis de nombreuses années. L'ouvrage de Gardette donne à prime abord une impression de déjà vu d'où se profile, malgré les nuances du dernier chapitre, une prise de position renforçant ce concept de victimisation des Innus dont l'auteure tente de se dégager à la toute fin de son ouvrage. On aurait aimé, par exemple dans le dernier chapitre, entendre davantage la voix des Innus sur leur propre conception de leur identité ou des effets de l'intériorisation des stéréotypes dans leur vie. De plus, si le discours des Innus contemporains sur leur réalité est un manque dans l'analyse de ces représentations culturelles, le choix de certaines sources orales nous semble peu approprié et contribue dans les deux premiers chapitres à accentuer le *leitmotiv* de la dénonciation et de la victimisation ; on pense ici aux références aux « témoignages innus » extraits de l'ouvrage *Innu*, de Jil Silberstein, dont la scientificité est questionnable. D'autre part, Gardette a choisi de ne pas tenir compte dans son analyse de l'unité temporelle sur les représentations des Innus à travers le temps ; elle souligne en effet que « c'est parce qu'à l'inverse des événements, les idées et les attitudes s'intègrent difficilement à un calendrier » (p. 5). Or, il aurait été bon d'avoir quelques repères historiques pour situer le lecteur puisque toutes images et stéréotypes renvoient nécessairement à un contexte historique et relationnel plus précis dans lequel ces représentations culturelles sont engendrées et nourries.

Enfin, la notion de dialogue proposée par l'auteure ne nous permet pas de supposer définitivement une amélioration des relations entre les Euro-Canadiens et Amérindiens. Il aurait été bénéfique d'explorer une approche dialogique davantage orientée vers une transformation de Soi et une redéfinition de la conception épistémologique euro-canadienne. Or, l'approche privilégiée par Gardette nous semble renforcer et entériner, par l'entremise du concept de la « reconnaissance mutuelle », les fondements culturels et historiques européens à la base même de l'ethnocentrisme qui caractérisa les rapports avec les Amérindiens.

Dans le cas qui nous occupe, le défi d'un dialogue authentique pose non seulement l'exigence de nouvelles assises qui permettraient une remise en question radicale des relations entre les acteurs mais la re-conceptualisation de leurs fondements mêmes. Il serait ainsi permis d'espérer voir naître, outre un dialogue authentique, des espaces fertiles en réflexions et en créations communes.

L'ouvrage de Gardette demeure néanmoins intéressant du point de vue de la recherche académique et témoigne d'une connaissance poussée de la littérature sur les Innus. En ce sens, il représente une lecture digne d'intérêt et ouvre la voie vers d'autres études sur les conceptions identitaires, celles enfin, du discours que les Innus tiennent sur eux-mêmes.

Claude Gélinas, *Les Autochtones dans le Québec post-confédéral 1867-1960*, Sillery : Septentrion, 2007, 255 pages.

Recenseur : *Fabien Tremblay*
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Dans cet ouvrage, Claude Gélinas nous invite à une relecture du discours ambiant et de l'idéologie populaire relative aux Autochtones du Québec pour la période post-confédérale (1867-1960). La révision critique qu'il nous présente nous pousse à repenser la cohabitation entre Canadiens français et Autochtones, ainsi que la participation de ces derniers à la société nationale québécoise pendant la période à l'étude. Ainsi, l'analyse de Gélinas remet en question le discours dépeignant les Autochtones du Québec de l'époque comme étant confinés dans

leur réserve et dépendants du gouvernement fédéral. Cette étude démontre que la distanciation qui s'est opérée au fil des décennies entre Canadiens français, Amérindiens et Inuit est plus le produit de l'idéologie dominante que de la réalité. Au contraire, les nombreux contextes de cohabitation au courant du XIX^{e} et du XX^{e} siècle ont eu tendance à rapprocher socialement et culturellement les individus des trois groupes.

Les Autochtones dans le Québec post-confédéral ouvre la voie à de futurs travaux qui pourraient combler un manque important dans la littérature concernant les Autochtones du Québec. En effet, depuis la Confédération, les Autochtones ont été négligés, quand ils n'ont pas été totalement oubliés, par l'historiographie nationale et nationaliste canadienne-française et l'imaginaire populaire. En outre, depuis les années 1960-1970, époque à laquelle les études autochtones sont devenues plus populaires au Québec, les travaux des historiens et des anthropologues se sont surtout intéressés à la période des premiers contacts (époque missionnaire et régime français) ou à l'histoire immédiate et à la réalité contemporaine des Première nations (celle de la montée des nationalismes autochtones et des revendications dans les années 1960-1970 à aujourd'hui). Conséquemment, nous sommes face à une absence de synthèse historique approfondie de l'histoire récente des populations autochtones du Québec, ce qui fait que nous ne connaissons presque rien de leurs conditions sociales et économiques pour la période post-confédérale.

Afin de remédier en partie à ce manque, Gélinas propose de confronter le discours dominant à la réalité à l'aide de nombreuses sources d'information. Pour ce faire, il parcourt à la fois les archives des Affaires indiennes et des missionnaires, les écrits d'intellectuels canadiens français et ceux d'Autochtones, les articles de journaux de l'époque et les notes de terrain des ethnologues. Bien que fragmentaire, l'utilisation de ce vaste corpus permet de souligner le potentiel de ces multiples sources, dressant ainsi la table pour des recherches plus approfondies. Certaines de ces références, dont les écrits autochtones et les rapports des Affaires indiennes sont des exemples, mériteraient davantage l'attention des chercheurs. L'initiative de Gélinas est en ce sens très intéressante.

L'ouvrage est divisé en cinq chapitres. Dans le premier chapitre, Gélinas dresse un profil sommaire de la situation juridique et politique des Autochtones du Québec durant la période à l'étude. Le deuxième chapitre porte sur la place qu'occupent les Premières nations dans la trajectoire historique et dans l'historiographie québécoise. Dans le troisième chapitre, c'est le parcours du discours dominant à leur égard qui est examiné. Dans ces deux chapitres, Gélinas trace les contours de l'idéologie qui régnait alors. Le quatrième chapitre s'intéresse à « la perspective autochtone ». À partir de nombreux rapports, de descriptions ethnographiques, de récits historiques et de témoignages autochtones, on y présente les défis auxquels sont confrontés les Amérindiens du Québec de l'époque. L'utilisation de ces sources permet d'observer la réalité des Premières nations de l'intérieur, apportant ainsi un tout autre point de vue pouvant être confronté au discours dominant. Dans le cinquième et dernier chapitre, Gélinas présente différents exemples qui démontrent que les Autochtones, contrairement à ce que véhiculait l'idéologie populaire, étaient relativement bien adaptés à la société nationale. Somme toute, l'anthropologue démontre que leur absence de l'histoire nationale récente, la tendance répandue à les décrire à la fois comme de bons et de mauvais sauvages, les efforts de ces derniers pour conserver leur identité et leurs cultures sont autant de facteurs ayant contribué à renforcer l'idée qu'ils vivaient en marge de la société québécoise au lendemain de la confédération.

En ce sens, le livre de Gélinas se démarque des études historiques conventionnelles qui ont tendance à donner trop d'importance aux thèmes de l'exclusion, de la marginalisation, de la pauvreté et de l'isolement des Autochtones. Il expose clairement les fondements de l'idéologie dominante participant à la construction de l'archétype de l'Indien, à partir d'une volonté de justifier le colonialisme et de se démarquer d'une altérité souvent jugée menaçante. Une altérité dont on se sert également pour marquer la différence qui oppose Canadiens français et Anglais. À cet égard, le point de vue de Gélinas est inspirant. Il révèle les dynamiques identitaires plaçant, en fonction des contextes, Canadiens français et Autochtones en opposition ou, bien au contraire, les rapprochant à un point tel qu'ils se fondent l'un dans l'autre. L'originalité de l'analyse réside surtout dans la présentation de données dressant le portrait d'une coexistence plus harmonieuse que conflictuelle entre Québécois et Autochtones. En effet, Gélinas adopte une perspective qui replace l'Amérindien dans un contexte de cohabitation dans lequel, plutôt que de s'acculturer, il s'adapte, tout comme le Québécois, aux transformations économiques, politiques et sociales.

Néanmoins, la démonstration demeure orientée sur la construction de l'idéologie dominante. D'ailleurs, la consultation des rapports des commissions d'enquête du gouvernement fédéral pour la période concernée aurait permis d'affiner considérablement l'analyse à ce sujet (consulter Lavoie 2007). Ces rapports exposent avec clarté l'idéologie et les motifs qui sous-tendent les politiques et les législations du gouvernement fédéral à l'égard des Autochtones. L'auteur souligne bien l'importance de ce facteur dans la vie des Premières nations dans le premier chapitre, mais n'en reparle presque pas dans le reste de l'ouvrage. Une exploration plus en profondeur de la question juridique et politique aurait permis d'apporter une meilleure compréhension des causes de la détérioration de leurs conditions de vie dans la deuxième moitié du XX^{e} siècle. Les bouleversements socioéconomiques et culturels que vivent les Amérindiens du Québec à cette époque sont sans conteste une conséquence directe des politiques du gouvernement fédéral.

Dans l'ensemble, l'ouvrage ne permet pas de tirer de grandes conclusions. À quelques reprises, l'auteur met d'ailleurs en garde le lecteur qui serait tenté trop hâtivement de le faire. Il s'agit d'un exercice exploratoire : « la présente étude et ses principales conclusions se veulent à bien des

égards prématurées » (p. 13). En effet, les exemples sur lesquels s'appuie l'ouvrage ne représentent que partiellement la diversité autochtone de l'ensemble du Québec. La particularité de la situation socioéconomique des communautés amérindiennes de la vallée du Saint-Laurent, souvent évoquée dans l'ouvrage, est difficilement généralisable à l'ensemble des Amérindiens de la province. Bien que l'on fasse référence à quelques moments aux Algonquins de l'Outaouais et de l'Abitibi-Témiscamingue, aux Micmacs de la Gaspésie et aux Innus de la Côte Nord, davantage d'exemples de communautés des régions éloignées apporteraient profondeur et nuances à l'analyse. Ces exemples permettraient, d'autre part, de témoigner plus efficacement de la diversité des adaptations autochtones qui est soulignée en conclusion.

Plus particulièrement dans le cinquième chapitre, Gélinas esquisse plusieurs pistes de réflexion pertinentes pour les études autochtones qui, aujourd'hui plus que jamais, ne peuvent faire abstraction des problématiques relatives à la cohabitation, au métissage et aux transformations des relations entre Canadiens français et Autochtones. Dans une section qui s'intéresse aux contextes de proximité, Gélinas évoque l'importance des métissages entre ces deux groupes. La mouvance des frontières identitaires qui s'opèrent au sein des communautés autochtones est d'ailleurs clairement mise en perspective. Les questions alors soulevées sont d'une importance capitale. Malheureusement, encore une fois, le lecteur reste sur son appétit. À titre d'exemple, Gélinas souligne le fait que les unions mixtes témoignent de rapprochements entre individus appartenant aux deux groupes. Or, dans quelle mesure ces métissages sont-ils révélateurs d'une réelle cohabitation entre Blancs et Autochtones au Québec? Comment sont-ils perçus par les Autochtones des différentes communautés? Le fait qu'il y ait un certain nombre de mariages mixtes sans qu'il y ait affirmation de Métis au Québec n'est-il pas révélateur de l'importance des tensions et de la polarisation qui existent entre Autochtones et Canadiens français?

D'une actualité brûlante au Québec, ces thèmes et questions de recherche génèrent tensions et débats. Leur évocation dérange parce qu'elle remet en question les catégories en place relevant de l'idéologie dominante véhiculée, encore aujourd'hui, par l'imaginaire populaire, les politiques et les lois du gouvernement fédéral, et par certains intellectuels canadiens français. Dans ces conditions, on peut supposer que le livre de Gélinas ne passera pas inaperçu.

Quelle que soit l'issue des débats autour de la question de la cohabitation, de la proximité et du métissage entre Canadiens français et Amérindiens dans le Québec d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, *Les Autochtones dans le Québec post-confédéral* est une source d'inspiration pour quiconque s'intéresse sérieusement aux dynamiques régissant les relations trop souvent conflictuelles entre les deux groupes. Il opère un défrichage de sources historiques utiles à l'exploration d'une période peu étudiée et pourtant si cruciale pour notre compréhension de la situation actuelle. Il ouvre indéniablement le chemin à une nouvelle lecture de l'historiographie nationale québécoise, nous pousse à réfléchir sur la conception de l'autochtonie et impose un regard nouveau sur la nature des rapports qu'entretiennent les Canadiens français avec l'altérité autochtone.

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Anne Innis Dagg, *Social Behavior of Older Animals*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009, 225 pages.

Reviewer: *Anne Zeller*
University of Waterloo

Anne Dagg, who has conducted field research on African ungulates, has laboriously gathered information on older social animals from a huge range of sources. Since this is not a well-researched topic, she combed through monographs, journals, newspapers and personal accounts to assemble this record based on a wide range of social animals. The approach is much like Elizabeth Thomas' (1993) work on dogs because the animals are named and referred to from the perspective of their value to the social unit, although all the material is meticulously referenced. Birds and humans are also included among the examples of social species, with the result that this book provides a valuable cross-taxonomic evaluation of the importance of older animals in the social sphere, as well as some comparisons of social functions useful when studying humans.

Most theoretical approaches to animal behaviour focus on the adaptive success of the reproductive strategies of males and females. According to Darwin, the differentially successful production of offspring is the most important contribution an animal can make, while sterile or post-reproductive individuals are adaptively useless. However, more modern theories assess the contributions of these individuals to the success of their relatives' offspring and they have thus become the focus of recent work. This book does consider the reproductive contribution of such individuals but mainly focuses on the behavioural and social transition from prime adult to old adult.

Some older animals continue to reproduce, although at a slower rate, and this may be individually adaptive in terms of having the resources and energy to successfully rear these late stage offspring. Older animals also contribute to their groups as repositories of knowledge about the location of resources when conditions become difficult. They can be excellent leaders as is demonstrated by elephant matriarchs who guide their families over hundreds of miles to find water and food. The herds led by the oldest matriarchs seem to be the most successful. The old females seem to know the individual calls of many others sent from long distances and respond with appropriate action, including caution and defensive postures

to defend calves when unknown elephants are approaching. Post-mature individuals provide a resource that the young can learn from and have been observed trying to teach youngsters how to cope with environmental problems and difficult dietary items. They encourage the young to eat unfamiliar foods when dietary resources are strained. Post-reproductive female orca whales pass on hunting strategies, echolocation skills, and guide the young through hundreds of miles of passages between the islands on the west coast of Canada. Therefore, culling elephant herds and whale pods by killing the older individuals can have devastating impacts on group cohesion and eventual group survival.

Older humans in non-industrialized societies are an extremely valuable source of cultural knowledge, concerning survival strategies and as stewards of the rights to water and resources. As groups become Westernized, this respect for elders can decline as younger individuals become the interface with the dominating society, but in many cases elders are regaining respect as repositories of language and cultural values. This parallelism in the social value of older group members should not be lost on us.

Human primates are a little different from monkeys and apes because they can and do actively teach their young. Older non-human primates must be well respected by the group if non-familial youngsters are going to pay attention well enough to learn from them. Aging adult male and female primates usually have different ends to their life stories. Most older females remain with their groups and help support their daughters and care for their grandchildren. Most aging males either drop in rank—no matter how dominant they were in their prime—and are frequently peripheralized by more active troop members or they leave their troop and try to join another. Sapolosky (1996) argues that the older males leave home because they have no history in their new group and therefore are not hounded by the now high ranking younger males who they had harassed when in their prime. Primates accept their decline in influence as they age in a variety of ways which range from decreasing levels of aggression to strategic alliances to maintain as much influence as possible. High ranked matriarch baboons may retain their influence until they are extremely decrepit, supported by a large network of family. In fact, it may be one of the matriarch's daughters who finally takes over the ranking position because the whole matriline would support her against any other female who might attack.

Dagg summarizes each of her chapters on motherhood, rank, reproduction, family life and captive animals by attempting to pull together material from various species—wolves, lions, whales, primates, birds and ungulates—that she discusses. These brief summaries provide an overview of the pattern of activities and how they contribute to the success of the species. Success in her terms ranges from being as ephemeral as more relaxed families, more paternal care and playful interaction, to the pronounced value to some groups of older females who help care for young and lead their groups. Some older females also fight for their groups once the danger of impact on their reproductive success is reduced.

Dagg's final conclusions are that most wild animals who reach an advanced age are no longer interested in leadership, reproduction, fighting or making strenuous efforts at socializing. Many become loners if they can no longer keep up with their group, living in small areas with sufficient food, water and shelter to sustain them. Those who can (keep up) continue to be social although usually mainly with their family members. Older animals do not necessarily lose their spark and can exert themselves if necessary, as revealed by older pets who have rescued owners from fires or gone for help when needed. Some older animals defend their group or their grandchildren if attacked and may perish in doing so. One of the most revealing anecdotes about the desire for social contact came from Lyall Watson (2002) who reported seeing an old African elephant matriarch whose whole herd had been hunted to extermination. She came down to the seashore where Watson, who was studying her, found her staring out to sea and he felt the low rumble of infra sound that elephants use for long distance communication. About 100 meters offshore was a blue whale, also a species which uses low-pitched sounds for long distance undersea communication. It was lying on the surface of the water, facing the elephant, with its blowhole exposed. Watson felt that these two large, lone animals were communicating.

The importance of the social bond is also revealed by the behaviour of some animals when their long-term associate dies. This is particularly true in paired animals, but has also been seen in primate groups in the wild where bereaved mothers may grieve for lost offspring. This is confirmed by the increased level of glutocorticoids found in the bereaved animal's blood—hormones which are also found in stressed humans. Profound, even mortal, depths of grief have also been observed in chimpanzees and gorillas, as well as many other animals. Some zoos are now taking animals' emotional responses into account and are allowing cagemates to spend some time with the bodies of their mates or associates. One gorilla even tried to rouse his dead mate by putting her favourite food into her hand. Apes, elephants and other long lived, highly social animals seem to respond hormonally and behaviourally in ways very similar to human grief.

The overall effect of this book is to introduce a very humanistic approach to the investigation of this understudied stage of life among a variety of animals. It reveals extensive parallelisms with human behaviour as well as a wide range of responses to the challenges of increasing age. She also discusses learning, teaching, and friendly social relations in enough detail that a student looking for the extent of such activities, long studied among humans, across a range of species, will find the book useful. The material is thoroughly referenced and thoughtfully presented in a form that is accessible to a wide range of readers.

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

Words of the Huron

John L. Steckley

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Words of the Huron is an investigation into seventeenth-century Huron culture through a kind of linguistic archaeology of a language that died midway through the twentieth century.

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Steckley's source material includes the first dictionary of any Aboriginal language, Recollect Brother Gabriel Sagard's Huron phrasebook, published in 1632, and the sophisticated Jesuit missionary study of the language from the 1620s to the 1740s, beginning with the work of Father Jean de Brébeuf. The only book of its kind, *Words of the Huron* will spark discussion among scholars, students, and anyone interested in North American archaeology, Native studies, cultural anthropology, and seventeenth-century North American history.

John L. Steckley has taught at Humber College since 1983 in the areas of Aboriginal languages, culture, and history. His books include *Beyond Their Years: Five Native Women's Stories; Full Circle: Canada's First Nations; Aboriginal Voices and the Politics of Representation in Canadian Introductory Sociology Textbooks;* and *De Religione: Telling the 17th-Century Jesuit Story in Huron to the Iroquois*. In 1999, he was adopted into the Wyandot tribe of Kansas.

Table of Contents

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

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