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

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Book Reviews / Comptes rendus

Film Review / Revue de film

Couverture / Cover

A black homeless boy sleeps off a night of begging in downtown Cape Town, South Africa. © Clive Shirley/GlobalAware.

Un jeune noir sans abri dort pour se remettre de la nuit qu'il a passé à mendier dans le centre-ville du Cap en Afrique du Sud. © Clive Shirley/GlobalAware.

Address
Weaver-Tremblay Award 2006

Reflections on Becoming an Applied Anthropologist

Richard J. "Dick" Preston *McMaster University*

Abstract: In responding to the honour given me by this 2006 Weaver-Tremblay Award, I will sketch some aspects of my academic and non-academic background, ponder the label "applied," discuss the balance between intellectual inquiry and pragmatic anthropology, and give some examples of my applied work, focusing on the James Bay region.

Keywords: applied anthropology, James Bay Cree, humanism, ethnographicity, long-term research, deep listening

Résumé : L'honneur de recevoir le prix Weaver-Tremblay m'amène à relater quelques éléments de mon parcours universitaire et non-universitaire, à réfléchir sur la nature de l'étiquette « appliquée », à discuter de l'équilibre entre la recherche intellectuelle et l'anthropologie pragmatique, et, enfin, à donner quelques exemples de mes travaux appliqués en focalisant sur la région de la Baie James.

Mots-clés : anthropologie appliquée, Cris de la Baie James, humanisme, ethnographicité, recherche à long terme, écoute profonde

First, my thanks to Harvey Feit for wanting to take the time and effort to assemble the nomination package, and to Chief George Wapache, John Turner, Toby Morantz and Fikret Berkes for writing generous letters of support. It is nice to have friends, and it is nice to be appreciated.

Now for the wordier part:

> His work and mentorship provided a model for contemporary anthropology as it negotiated the relationship between the more purely academic perspective and the emergent applied orientation of anthropology in Canada in the 1970s. [Harvey Feit, Introduction at Weaver-Tremblay Award Ceremony, CASCA 2006]

What was my negotiation? Where to begin? With sage advice to the young? Sure, I can do that in short order, recalling Barbara Myerhoff's (1982) comments that the elderly will present stories of what they would like to believe is true about their lives. My advice to you is to just appraise this old guy's stories with good social-scientific scepticism, for whatever value, pragmatic, abstract, comic or tragic, you may find in them. Be open-minded. As Northrop Frye commented, he was open-minded—but open at both ends. For my part, I believe what follows is true, complete with facets of the pragmatic, abstract, comic and tragic. My stance towards you mimics Rabelais, who suggested to his readers that they appraise, consider, savour and work on getting into his prose, and then go for the marrow. And if you do not like it, well, you can check out Rabelais for that.

A synopsis of my academic history would seem to recommend that everyone should start at the University of Chicago after grade ten, 16 and very immature. Then for three years fail a bunch of courses, go to Korea as a corporal in the U.S. First Marine Division, get shot at, be astonished at the way that a Korean woman in serious straits could laugh good-humouredly at my awkwardness

when I could do little to help her situation, return home to live in my father's house in Raleigh, NC and work as a "grease monkey" (that is a technical term), try engineering at North Carolina State University, fail chemistry, work as a draftsman, labour in the trench on a sewer pipeline, try philosophy and psychology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, get married and have kids, drop out of school, work for four years in a record shop in Chapel Hill, repairing, selling and installing radios, phonographs and hi-fi components, and finally return to school for the last term and graduate with a bachelors degree in philosophy. Take about 12 years for this. Then start grad school (still at UNC-Chapel Hill) with a wife, three children, an advisor (Lewis Levine) who was a linguist and, in my opinion, seriously misanthropic, and have weekly meetings with a psychiatrist-in-training.

On the other hand, after all that flunking, wage work, shifting majors and reflexive therapy, I did not have a big sociological ego to dance with on the heads of some objectified, hapless "study population," and I had a more normal family situation with my wife and children when I went to the community of Waskaganish on the coast of James Bay in 1963. I found a few friends, maintained those relationships and used the morality of friendship to define my professional ethics. And family makes another difference: my late wife Sarah and my daughters Susan and Jennifer have each done M.A. theses on Cree topics.

In the late 1960s I became a Quaker "by convincement," when I found the Society of Friends' morality, social conscience and actions, and their spiritual basis in silent (deep listening) worship very suitable. In 1971, after six years at Franklin & Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, I got a job at McMaster University, at that time the only university in the world with several "northernist" anthropologists, and stayed there until my retirement in 1996.

A half-dozen years ago Regna Darnell and Lisa Valentine invited me to a conference on theorizing the Americanist tradition. I had never thought of myself as being part of an *Americanist* tradition, but I went along and it turned out that many of those invited had the same initial reaction. It seemed reasonable and pleasing to see my work in the context of the work of others at the conference. The late Bea Medicine, Robin Ridington and I had a mini-reunion there after a gap of twenty-some years, and we were joined by some august Americanists—Dell Hymes, the Drs. Tedlock, Ellen Basso and many others. The book that came out of the conference is quite good, and my chapter describes the development, over the years, of my relationship with John Blackned, my principal Cree mentor (Preston 1999). I am now pleased to regard myself as an Americanist—a little like Candide discovering that he spoke prose.

Now I am also pleased to identify myself as part of another tradition, as an Applied Anthropologist. I do not have to choose between these two identities, for I see them as two facets of the same guy. I am convinced that if I had not learned from my long-term fieldwork experience as an Americanist, I would have been very poorly prepared to attempt applied work. And once again, it is reasonable and pleasing to see my work in the context of the work of my predecessors: the late Sally Weaver, Marc-Adelard Tremblay, the late Joan Ryan, the late Michael Ames, Paul Charest, Peter Stephenson, Michael Robinson, Michael Asch, Pierre Beaucage, Donat Savoie, Elvi Whittaker and the late Herman Konrad.[1]

I was good friends with Sal Weaver and her husband Dave, and helped Sal during the early 1970s as she implemented her single-minded initiative to create a new community of scholars, to be called the Canadian Ethnology Society. I will come back to this.

My practice of applied anthropology stems from on-the-job learning, and in perspective follows pretty much what Mike Asch spoke about in his plenary presentation for the Weaver-Tremblay award, now published in *Anthropologica*:

> we provide valuable perspectives on culture, on colonial history and on political relations that are missing from the conversation [of First Nations and Canada]; ones, which I know, can do much to enrich it and propel it forward as well as enrich anthropology in the process. We do not need to keep silent and remain on the sidelines. We can enter the conversation with respect and dignity. We can find a place to stand. [Asch 2001:206]

We anthropologists have the opportunity and the skills to make our voices heard, with full respect for the persons whose efforts towards social justice we choose to support. The prime requisite for trying to make anthropology useful, in my opinion, is to know the people and their history (ethnographic competence).

You may choose from a wide range of applied styles. The most controversial applied stance within anthropology is a confrontational or activist stance, exposing abuses of political power and celebrating tragic heroes like Nelson Small-Legs, as the late Joan Ryan did in the 1970s and documented in her book *Wall of Words* (1978). But Joan also did less controversial work, both before and after that book, as in her 1960s role in the Hawthorn-Tremblay report. Joan could be formidable, and many of us choose to stand somewhat farther back from conflicts

and simply work in support of some socially constructive goals.

Whatever style you may choose, be informed and aware of the power relations that are active or potential in the situation. Prepare for the task that is requested of you, in advance, to the extent that you can. Listen deeply to the guidance that may be available to you. My most satisfying applied (and in this case, unpaid) work was in support of a community planning initiative (Preston 1982, 2004, in press), where confrontation was explicitly not acceptable. The sequence of steps below draws from the guidelines the consultants and the government representatives were given as we began the Community Consult planning of the relocation of the people of Nemaska in northwestern Quebec in 1977. As part of the Baie James hydroelectric project launched by the Province of Quebec, strongly opposed by the Crees, and then negotiated to a settlement in the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement 1975, the level of Lake Nemaska was to be raised over 20 feet in the process of making a reservoir. These guidelines were prepared by some leaders of the Grand Council of the Crees in conversation with two consultants from Peat, Marwick and Associates:

(1) Avoid taking initiatives on behalf of other people, unless you are specifically asked to by a person who has the moral and social authority to do so.
(2) Provide information when it is wanted, but do not sound too much like an expert who should not be doubted.
(3) Where it will not seem to be a challenge, ask for clarification of the concerns, values, hopes and dreams expressed by people to draw out ideas and values more clearly.
(4) Watch for potential problems, obscure details and obstacles with developing plans and bring them to light by asking probing and concerned questions, not by discouraging declarations.
(5) Find innovative, pragmatic and relevant solutions that do not compromise the community's desires.
(6) Build mental checklists of activities and resources that may be needed, based on previous experience or reading, and share them where and how it seems appropriate.

"Applied" implies something more than a pragmatic orientation, and is associated in many people's minds with a variety of praxis theory or some guiding critical theory and political ideology. I cannot over-emphasize the value of theory, in the general sense of an intellectual toolbox of general and abstract systems of ideas that may be brought to a situation to help discern what is going on on the ground, and what it relates to more abstractly. There are two "buts" coming next. But advocating *a* theory in the exclusive singular is an easy route to tunnel vision. We will naturally select the perspective that is most convincing and congenial to our thinking at any given time. After all, we have inherited tendencies to exclusivist thought preferences from millennia of ideologically exclusivist monotheism. But theories are many and have many differing potentials for making sense of experience. Even more, knowing something about many theories provides a relatively full mind with an intellectual ferment that informs each particular theory with its context of abstract forms, perhaps comparable to syntax in language. What we think and say in any given situation draws on a wide range of possibilities, and we select one from this range that seems intuitively appropriate.

I regard it as a frustration of intellectual maturity to advocate a single abstract perspective when it involves either explicitly or tacitly dismissing the potential of others, however urgently post-this or post-that the perspective may appear. And I regard claiming this moral high ground as partly a personal indulgence, imposing an elite intellectualist icon onto human events to make them more easily coherent in your own terms, sometimes before discovering what coherence the events have to the actual participants. Theories, like other human processes, gain meaning in their forms and, no less, in their relationships. If you build eclectically, the coherence will come. Or so I would like to believe. This belief has enabled me to manage considerable breadth in my work, and to have an interesting life.

I would like to illustrate my point about theoretical pluralism with an example from a different genre of symbolic forms. Thanks to my mother's love of music, since infancy I have heard a great number of classical and folk performances, and I have a good memory for the sound phrasings of many works. I think I was weaned onto Brahms' Second Symphony, and in my teens I loved to shadow-conduct. During the 1950s I became immersed in the music of Bela Bartok. His intense and often anxious music was built upon the idioms learned in his years of collecting Magyar folk music, and was composed against the backdrop of the rise of Hitler's fascism. My passion for Bartok's music was built on more than the appeal of Magyar idioms and compassion for the persecution of people excluded from Hitler's vision for Germany in the 20th century. It was built also upon familiarity with the music of many of Bartok's artistic ancestors and some of his contemporaries. I "got" Bartok at a deep intuitive level in substantial part because of the subjective musical universe I could set him within. Although my wife may sometimes have wondered, my passion for his music did not make me an exclusive "Bartokist."

Now I will mimic Pierre Trudeau, who replied to a 1960s challenge as to whether he was a communist with "no, I'm a canoeist." He opined that the various left-wing and right-wing political oppositions—the big "isms"—were obsolete, limiting and immature. I very much admire public intellectuals like Trudeau, the late Edward Said, or the late Paulo Freire, or the still very much alive Michael Ingatieff. Edward Said, you may recall, is best known for having thought and then radically re-thought *Orientalism* (1978), but his strongest influence on me is his little gem *Humanism and Democratic Criticism* (2004). Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1973) was great in some of my Anthropology of Education courses, but his *The Politics of Education* (1985) was a better personal guide. I have read more books by Michael Ignatieff than by any other non-fiction author, not because I always agree with him but rather because, like Freud, he asks difficult and fundamental human questions and constructs his answers with the guidance of rich first-hand experience. And he is big enough to say that he was wrong, as with his retraction of his initial support for the Iraq War. My first choice among his books is *The Needs of Strangers* (1984).

But my orientation—perhaps it is an ideology—took explicit form in my first term of graduate school (1961), when I read Edward Sapir's essay "Culture, Genuine and Spurious" (1958). I felt a deep intuitive surge of recognition, and spent several days re-reading and thinking about that one small essay, phrase by phrase. It is curious to me now that Sapir, in this single essay, used the word "spirit" so many times, without its being noticeable. I will come back to "spirit" in a minute. I read Sapir very intensively, with most attention to the "culture and personality" papers, and my initial surge of recognition expanded as his words and thoughts sank more deeply and intuitively until I "got" it.

My immersion in Sapir went further than intellectual cognizance. I believe that I got to a level of grasping intuitively what he was thinking in the whole domain of personalized ethnography. And like my experience of "getting" the music of Bartok, my experience of Sapir's thoughts and intuitions was (and continues to be) enriched substantially because of the much larger subjective intellectual universe I could set him within.

I wrote a master's thesis (Anthropology, North Carolina) on Sapir's approach to anthropology, and rewrote those 60-odd pages for two years. That is another example of something that graduate students might well regard as academic suicide. On the other hand, it was published, with minor revisions, as lead article in *American Anthropologist* (1966), and the editor complimented me on my "clarity and excellence of exposition." I developed that quality of writing and thinking by concentrating for two years on that article, and it really helped in my getting the McMaster University job. So two years of focused and self-directed learning on a MA thesis was not only a means to "getting" Sapir; it was also an academic success. Go figure. Let me give you a quote from Sapir that we can apply to the hazards of indulging in theoretical fashions:

> Now fantasied universes of self-contained meaning are the very finest and noblest substitutes we can ever devise for that precise and loving insight into the nooks and crannies of the real that must forever elude us. But we must not reverse the arrow of experience and claim for experience's imaginative condensations the primacy in an appeal to our loyalty, which properly belongs to our perceptions of men and women as the ultimate units of value in our day-to-day view of the world. If we do not thus value the nuclei of consciousness from which all science, all art, all history, all culture have flowed as symbolic by-products in the humble but intensely urgent business of establishing meaningful relationships between actual human beings, we commit personal suicide. [1958:581]

Let us follow the arrow of experience, then, from theory all the way down to the ground. Taking theory, held lightly in the hand, down with us.

Perhaps my first applied anthropology role was fixing radios and record players for folks at Waskaganish. Like an attending country doctor I was able to bring life back to a silent record player by dripping a little nearly boiling water onto some dried vomit that had stuck between the speaker magnet and the voice coil—demonstrating to the onlookers a quick and miraculous cure.

I have always liked to busy myself in fixing things, and this has led me into "applied" tasks in anthropology and elsewhere. When I went off to do fieldwork in the 1960s I had just a little of the obviously relevant bush experience, hiking, canoeing, camping, using an axe and shooting. But gradually I became known as a versatile repairman—most conspicuously by climbing a tower to fix the brake on a seriously over-productive Hudson's Bay Company wind charger. My electro-mechanical reputation later led to tough expectations of the grad student who went to Waskaganish after me. He sent me an epic-length letter recounting his responses to a request for repairs to an outboard motor, titled "The Adventures of Ichabod Craik." Brian Craik stayed at Waskaganish for years, became the only anthropologist in the history of the world to become wholly fluent in Cree, and after 30

years is still working for the Grand Council of the Crees. He should be getting this award. But not for his repairs.

My experiential education as an applied anthropologist began at Waskaganish in the mid-1960s. It was fundamentally holistic. I am convinced that qualitative ethnography is necessary to learn, painstakingly, from the ground up, and I am convinced that to understand culture deeply and reflexively, we need a broad grasp of theory. I opened myself to a long process of re-socialization that is not quite done yet. This background also helps to know what is really going on in the quantitative data. In addition to a strong base in qualitative understanding, quantitative analysis generates new hypotheses, has utilitarian value and is politically persuasive. And immediate experience is fundamental to doing a good job of both.

Immediate experience means humility, and no conceptual agendas to intervene between you and the people you wish to understand. Rather than importing the theory of "equivalence of discourse" we can simply try sharing conversations, with deep listening. I thought of my "self" as if in the position of a piece of litmus paper, dipping into Cree culture to see what happened to my perception of the immediate environment. That sounds passive, I know, but I think of it as being open and sensitive to what I may be told or shown, comparable to listening to music or reading Sapir. Put in another way, you may look into the eyes of another person and see through the differences of personality, age, culture, gender and the rest—to a level where you see yourself mirrored in the other person's fundamental human nature. And that is the basic requirement, I believe, of my being able to "get" Cree oral tradition. As with my rapprochement with Bartok, and then with Sapir, I learned about Cree stories by listening deeply, and building up a large context of stories that had a cumulative and emergent affect on me. During the third summer of my listening and recording, I had a rather sudden awareness that I was "getting" an intuitively sound understanding of the idiom of experience that the stories were embedded in. My "getting" has gradually deepened over the years, thanks to more stories and more thinking about them, but also thanks to developing a relatively full subjective intellectual universe as a context that I could set the Cree stories within.

The theme of this CASCA 2006 conference articulates a stance on what we do: Human Nature/Human Identity: Anthropological Revisionings. I believe that it is timely to argue for an anthropological revisioning by putting our various contemporary intellectualist urgencies a bit more at arm's length, and beginning at the human basics of person-to-person friendship. When I hear a satiric tone of voice on the CBC telling me that the previous musical selection has been described as post-post-punk, it seems time to set the various post-Lyotard negative and vague "post" claims on a shelf until we can do a better job of figuring out what it is that we anthropologists are trying to find out, and realizing that what we have to offer the rest of the intellectual enterprise is not a post-fashion (the Cultural Studies folks are adroitly doing that), but rather the unique precision of long-term ethnography. Postmodernity as a critique of a past that is based on a hypothesized master cultural meta-narrative and the correlated silencing of polyvocality, seems opinionated and historically naïve when it is espoused as an appraisal of anthropology. In my opinion, we anthropologists have never had something approximating a Kuhnian paradigm, and even those 19th century guys were looking for other voices to engage. Way back at the turn of the 20th century, A.M. Hocart urged that we listen to what the people say. This humanist theme matured by fits and starts, boosted by Sapir in the 1920s and 30s, until in the 1970s Geertz argued that the basic purpose of interpretive anthropology is to expand the universe of human discourse. Post-structural critiques may, I suppose, challenge the past of that minority of anthropologists who were actually competent in structural analysis. Postcolonialism again critiques our past errors, so that we can re-harrass the reputation of Evans-Pritchard and more recent infelicities of ethnological thought. On the other hand, Evans-Pritchard's *Nuer Religion* (1956) is still one of the best books in anthropology, and his combination of ethnographic depth and intellectual breadth are still exemplary. Over the last 40-odd years there have been many brilliant and short-lived theoretical fashions claiming our loyalties. Some, like hermeneutics (remember hermeneutic circles?), would not now sound too comfortably familiar to the younger generation. On the other hand, at the time of its sweeping popularity we made it too comfortable. I recall Gadamer saying he regretted the reduction, by North Americans, of his theoretical work to a methodology. We do that: methodology madness. Read Bettelheim's *Freud and Man's Soul* (1983) to discover how his theoretical work was similarly reduced by Ernest Jones' translation into English pragmatics. And a few decades ago I had students complaining that they did not know how to do anything other than deconstruction. Remember Derrida and deconstruction? Remember his disavowal of postmodernism? Remember Paul de Man's urging that these ideas want emergence, not methodological orthodoxy? (Godzich 1992:112) My advice to you (does this sound familiar?) is to know and appraise these theories with good social-scientific/humanistic scepticism, for whatever value, pragmatic, abstract, comic or tragic, you may find

in them. But be open-minded. In addition, most of us can simply be more reflexively aware of hubris in ourselves and in others.

We have benefitted a great deal from the interpretive turn, building momentum from Geertz, Schneider and Turner at the University of Chicago and building increasingly sophisticated parallels with literary criticism. But the balance between literate sophistication and ethnographic groundedness has tipped pretty far into abstraction. I believe that it is time to give these contemporary reactive and oppositional critiques a lower priority and return to Sapir's "arrow of experience" and to define more affirmative intellectual goals. Let me be more specific. Humanist scholarship has developed skills to account quite well for the ontology of persons. We anthropologists could develop skills to account for the ontology of communities. What we know from studies of human maturation, from life histories, from biographies both actual and novelistic, and from the other arts, is enough to have a sense of the unity and variety of human processes of growth and maturation. Let us try for similar skills in tracing the processual dynamics of communities, from formation to maturation through internal changes and adaptation to external forces. We will then be obliged to account for the differential ability of communities to serve human ends: some are good places to live and raise children; others are more problematic, and their members are usually less relativistic about their situation than we would like to be. Relativism requires the withholding of our judgment, but not forever; just until the situation is appreciated as if it were understood from an insider's position.

Further to this, let us return to a guarded optimism about discerning kinds of cumulative change, as the ecologists are now doing. And let us do all this without losing sight of the simple truth that cultural changes take place in the lives of actual, specific individuals, including, reflexively, ourselves. After all, where else could cultural change take place? In addition to this fundamental starting point of a shared human nature and identity, we can then add on the ethnographer's skills:

- as much as you can of your personal character,
- a disciplined and humbled intelligence,
- a determination to withhold judgment as long as possible,
- a resilient sense of humour.

This comes to the point of what I consider to be maturing spiritually. What do I mean by "spiritual"? It is not receiving Jesus as part of your fieldwork. It is a more Gnostic view: consciously and deliberately living holistically. I am defining spirituality as a condition of whole-ness or holiness, relating to others as one person to another, at once open to being surprised, open to conditional personal insights or revelation and open to learning and being disciplined by respect for what has been learned by others, encompassing a whole mode of life experience. In a sense, it simply means being an ethnographer as completely as possible while minimizing those urgent intellectual impositions. If this sounds weird to you, do not worry about it.

In 1966 I got a little bit politicized. This was caused by witnessing the blatant ignoring of the Waskaganish Chief and council by three different "southern" educational authorities coming to survey parental opinion about the language of instruction. The Federal team asked in English, using a local interpreter, and heard the preference for English. The Quebec group asked in French, through an interpreter, and heard the preference for French. The local Oblate priest asked and heard a preference for French Catholic instruction. Parents tried to give helpful answers, without knowing what the future language of jobs for their kids might be. I wrote a letter to Federal, Provincial and Oblate officials pointing out that going through the existing community Chief and council might be less divisive. But in a community of 500 people, three schools were provided—Federal, Provincial and Catholic, probably to keep peace between the competing school authorities. Ten years later, there was the James Bay Agreement, including a Cree School Board, and one school system. As part of the new Board, each community had a Community Education Administrator, an occupational position that I am proud to have contributed to the drafting of in the Agreement.

It is not only in Indigenous communities that anthropologists may have a pragmatic role to play. It may even happen in the academic world, and in fact is a part of the history of the organization giving me this award. In the mid-1970s I was one of the founding caucus for this society, and served as its third president, just after Sally Weaver and just before Ade Tremblay. We aspired at that time to get much more participation than we had found within the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, and we planned to do this by creating a distinct, overarching four-square anthropology society. But we soon found that the archaeologists, physical anthropologists, and linguists were not ready to merge with us—they too wanted their own distinct societies. So we reduced our ambitions and were the Canadian Ethnology Society/ Société Canadienne d'Ethnologie (CESCE). Right from the beginning the Society drew a good turnout every year, and for us it was an exhilarating period, guided by Sal's vision of building a community of scholars. We published a thematic proceedings in our third year, a panel on *The*

History of Canadian Anthropology (1976) and, in the fourth year, one on *Applied Anthropology in Canada* (1977). As CESCE president I had the honour of having these proceedings printed and bound at the McMaster print shop, addressed all the envelopes myself, filled them, licked all those yummy flaps and mailed them with Departmental postage. Now this is considered executive entitlement.

Within a few years the CESCE got into politics, and we had, for example, a plenary session on the fate of the Hawthorn-Tremblay report *A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada, Political, Educational Needs and Policies* (1966). I should mention that the late Joan Ryan, who received this award in 1993, contributed the section on indigenous education. I found the plenary pretty lively and sometimes useful, but the opinions lofted from the floor verged on conspiracies of low cunning in high places, and the story was too fragmentary until Sally Weaver wrote her 1981 book, *Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-1970*, on the topic. Later political activism within the Society tended to inspire more judgmental venting, and to my mind, it was not so useful, and after a while I withdrew. As Leonard Cohen remarked, we live in an opinionated and belligerent world. I regard this as a profoundly flawed way to live well together.

Social conscience and a concern for people who suffer injustice requires that we know in some depth what is at stake, both past, present and in the foreseeable future. I have been very selectively enthusiastic about political activism, whether as an anthropologist, as a Quaker or just as a citizen. Without resorting to an analysis of the character flaws that lead me to avoid conflict, let me pose an example of why being cautious and selective may be reasonable, based on the way fashions of irrelevance and relevance have shifted in my career. When collecting Cree stories in the 1960s, I was committing the neo-colonialist sin of "butterfly collecting," that is, going to the natives, collecting specimens of living culture, symbolically asphyxiating them and pinning them to a blotter in a museum case, in this case the printed page. Edmund Leach, once the angry middle-aged man of British Social Anthropology, coined this butterfly collecting analogy in the mid-20th century. That should make him the unacknowledged mythic ancestor of the postcolonialists.

I was never much for literally collecting butterflies, or for tormenting other creatures. Actually, I went off to my first fieldwork with a proposal to study social disorganization that—one would assume—must have resulted from 300 years of contact with mercantile capitalism (The Hudson's Bay Company). But alas, I did not find much social disorganization at Waskaganish. I started collecting stories because I was taken by Willy Weistchee, my friend and interpreter to John Blackned, a gifted storyteller, and because I found that these stories deeply interested me. They still do.

Then, in the mid-1970s I collaborated with John Murdoch, a school teacher in Waskaganish who thought that school should meet the children where they were. That is, school should be taught in Cree, and as much as possible with a Cree teaching style. So, some of these stories came out in locally printed "Cree Way" curriculum materials—they had become relevant "butterflies" because they encouraged children to learn to read in the context of their own past. Their parents also were quite interested in reading these storybooks and more of the old people contributed their story-telling and their stories.

In the 1980s there was another change of ideology, and the old stories and storytellers were withdrawn from the schools on protest from born-again Pentecostal Christian Cree parents, who felt strongly that the stories, since they came from the period before they found Jesus, were the work of the devil.

But in life, sometimes you have just got to be patient. In the 1990s this fundamentalist view was moderated and the stories once more came into use in the schools. When the second edition of my book *Cree Narrative* came out in 2002, the Cree School Board bought 500 paperback and 100 clothbound copies, the stories having become not only relevant, but positively valued. Then I got a contract to supply the School Board with sets of 26 CDs with John Blackned's voice, making the stories audible in Cree. So now Old Dick is a sinner no longer? Well, for the moment.

My biggest intellectual challenge came as director of the multidisciplinary TASO project, 1982-96, in the Mushkegowuk region of northern Ontario. TASO is the acronym for Technology Assessment in Subarctic Ontario, and we focused on the planning being done by Ontario Hydro for rivers in the James Bay drainage region, and learning from shortcomings in the Baie James project in the preceding decade. With the endorsement of the Mushkegowuk Council and active assistance from many Crees, there were many disciplinary boundaries to cross and subdisciplinary specialities to try to merge. Over the 14 years, five anthropologists and four economists covered socio-economic and cultural topics. By arguing the virtue of doing good environmental science before a major project begins, we sustained research by 20 individuals in hydrology, climatology and plant biology. TASO secured grants from the Donner Foundation, SSHRC and NSERC, totalling nearly a million dollars.

It was a far cry from my normal life as an interpretive anthropologist, and drew me into the domain of hard science, quantitative analysis, and apparatuses. We produced some good publications and research reports, and I am especially pleased with our land resources study (Berkes et al. 1994, 1995; George et al. 1995) that showed that "traditional pursuits" animal harvesting for the year 1990 in the Mushkegowuk region as a whole, if divided evenly across the population, provided twice the minimum daily requirements of protein, and figuring moose at the equivalent price of beef and goose at the price of chicken (in the Northern Store at Moose Factory), one third of the dollar income value for the region. Hunting continues to be a very important activity, even when taken in only quantitative terms. We did not try to put a dollar value on the cultural aspects.

We also discovered that the earth under the salt flats at our test sites on the west side and the south end of James Bay contains a an ancient layer of salt that would cause salinity grief for any mega-scheme of water diversion, such as the Grand Canal Plan of the 1970s to build a dike across James Bay and channel the freshwater output of these rivers south to the great lakes, to western Canada and to the southwest U.S.A. Ontario Hydro shelved their plans, so that our results will have to wait until the demand for power makes the hydro initiatives re-surface.

It has been a privileged and remarkably varied career, and I am not quite finished yet. Sapir's broad and optimistic humanism continues to inspire yet another re-reading. One of my reviewers for this publication asked several probing questions that I would like to answer here. The reviewer asked me to explain my current theoretical or methodological approach, but I think that I have done that already. I am interpretive in the broad humanist sense that I want to know what events mean to people. I am disinclined to be labelled. I value a broad familiarity with theory in social science and in the arts, and am leery of specialized applied approaches like many "impact" studies. I do what I do, not objectively, but as accurately as I can. In terms of awareness of the political economy, I go where opportunity opens and where my conscience leads me. I have refused to apply for a contract for a study I found pathological in orientation and content. I have worked for nothing (except for my academic salary) more often than for a salary. I do what I do because I personally want to do it and think that I can do a good job. Am I pro-native? Somewhat, but not ardently. Am I pro-Cree? Yes. I have a lifetime of connections to some Crees, and I will honour them. But not as an advocacy spokesperson. That is a responsibility with potential consequences and is therefore best suited for the Cree leadership. The reviewer said that I "would probably not criticize the government." Wrong, but I prefer to make a case solidly, not to seek catharsis.

In sum, I have done and will continue to do what I want to do and am welcome to do. I have enjoyed my career, sometimes intensely. I still love the stories, and am now embarked on a long-term search for the Trickster. Watch for me!

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Note

1 Sally M. Weaver spent most of her research career with the Department of Anthropology, University of Waterloo. Marc-Adelard "Ade" Tremblay was with the Département d'Anthropologie and was a senior administrator at Université Laval. Joan Ryan was based at the Department of Anthropology at the University of Calgary, and with native organizations after "retiring." Michael Ames was at the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, and curator of the Museum of Anthropology, at the University of British Columbia. Paul Charest was at the Département d'Anthropologie at Université Laval. Peter Stephenson was in Departments of Anthropology at McMaster University and then at the University of Victoria. Michael Robinson was at the Glenbow Museum in Calgary. Michael Asch spent most of his career in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Alberta. Pierre Beaucage was at the Département d'Anthropologie at the Université de Montréal. Donat Savoie was with the Federal Department of Indian Affairs. Elvi Whittaker was in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the University of British Columbia. Herman Konrad was in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Calgary.

Projects and Relevant Publications

(1) Publicizing the school issue at Rupert's House–1967

1968a When Leadership Fails: The Basis of a Community Crisis. The Northland 24:7-9.

1968b Functional Politics in a Northern Canadian Community. Proceedings of the 38th International Congress of Americanists 3:169-178.

(2) Assessing the Ontario MNR importation of Quebec Cree trappers–1967

1967 Going South to Get a Living. Research Report to Ontario Ministry of Lands and Forests.

(3) Amelioration of Stanford-Binet IQ testing at Horden Hall by means of Projective (Rorschach and TAT) testing–1968

1968d Facing New Tasks: Cree and Ojibwa Children's Adaptation to Residential School. Research Report to the National Museum of Man.

(4) Human (specifically Cree) problems inherent in the Baie James project–1971

1971c Problèmes humains reliés au développement de la Baie James. Recherches Amérindiennes au Québec 1: 58-68.

(5) Harvesting survey by five McMaster students for Baie James negotiations

(6) Science and technology about Baie James may be blind to cultural factors

1973a Human Problems in Northern Development. Paper read at the SCITEC Symposium, Montreal.

(7) Atomistic assimilation of Cree residential school students–1974

1974a The Means to Academic Success for Eastern Cree Students. *In* Proceedings of the 1st Congress, Canadian Ethnology Society. J. Barkow, ed. Pp. 87-96. Ottawa. National Museum of Man, Paper in Ethnology No. 17.

(8) Post-residential school careers of Cree high school graduates

1977c Academic Success for Northern Indian Students. Research Report to the Ontario Ministry of Education.

(9) Report to Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec on problems in the Fort George high school–1975

1975f Report to the Grand Council of the Crees, on Problems in the Fort George Schools, with Recommendations.

(10) Regional survey of Cree educational needs–1976

1976c A Comprehensive Survey of the Educational Needs of the Communities Comprising the Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec). R.J. Preston and M. MacKenzie, Report to the Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec and the Quebec Ministry of Education.

(11) Contribution of Community Education Administrator job to the James Bay Agreement–1975

1976d Community Education Administrator, section 16.0.20 in the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, Editor Officiel de Quebec, p 272.

(12) Consultant to CBC-TV for documentary *The Cree of Paint Hills* (advised in filming and editing, provided most of the script material)—1976

1976b The Cree of Paint Hills. Film, 57 minutes, for CBC The Nature of Things series. National Film Board 106C 0176 165.

(13) Expert witness at sentencing hearing–1976

1979c Community Default and Personal Disintegration: An Eastern Cree Example. McMaster University. Restricted document in the author's files.

(14) Cree Way curriculum development project–1974-80

1979b The Cree Way Project: An Experiment in Grass Roots Curriculum Development. *In* Papers of the 10th Algonquian Conference. W. Cowan, ed. Pp. 92-101. Ottawa: Carleton University.

(15) Study and report: Moosonee student residence problem

(16) Nemaska Consult–1977

1982b The Politics of Community Relocation: An Eastern Cree Example. Theme issue. Culture 11(3):37-49.

1991d The Community Consultation Method. IDRC Workshop, Winnipeg.

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In press Twentieth Century Transformations of Native Identity, Citizenship, Power and Authority. *In* Globalization, Autonomy, and Community. D. Brydon and W. Coleman, eds. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

(17) Survey of Saskatchewan Cree residential schools–1979

1979d Training Guide for Cree Student Residence Staff.

1979e Report on Survey of Student Residences in Northern Saskatchewan.

(18) Taught UQAC-Chicoutomi college-preparatory course "The Social System" for Cree School Board staff–1981

(19) Technology Assessment in Subarctic Ontario 1981-96

1984a Algonquian People and Energy Development in the Subarctic. *In* Papers of the 14th Algonquian Conference. W. Cowan, ed. Pp. 169-179. Ottawa: Carleton University.

1985d Forum: The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, Ten Years After. McMaster University, TASO Report No. 22.

1985e Recent Developments in Eastern Cree Leadership. McMaster University, TASO Report No. 20.

1987b "Going in Between": The Impact of European Technology on the Work Patterns of the West Main Cree of Northern Ontario. P. J. George and R.J. Preston. The Journal of Economic History. XLVII:447-460.

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1992a The TASO Research Program–Retrospect and Prospect. P.J. George and R.J. Preston. Anthropologica 34:51-70.

1992b The Cree View of Land and Resources: Indigenous Ecological Knowledge. F. Berkes, P.J. George and R.J. Preston. McMaster University, TASO Report, Second series, No. 8.

1992d Wildlife Harvests in the Mushkegowuk Region, 1990. F. Berkes, P.J. George and R.J. Preston, J. Turner, A. Hughes, B. Cummins and A. Haugh. McMaster University, TASO Report, Second Series, No. 6. (some materials not included in 1994)

1992e Indigenous Land Use and Harvesting among the Cree in Western James Bay. P.J. George, F. Berkes and R.J. Preston. McMaster University, TASO Report, Second series, No. 5.

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1990c Hunting Where We Please: Land, Territories, Ethics and Treaties in the Mushkegowuk Region, Ontario. Paper presented at the Ontario Sociology & Anthropology Association, Brock University.

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(24) Facilitator of Education workshop, Kashachewan

(25) Sanikiluaq and Rawson Institute Hudson's Bay Project

1993b Cumulative Cultural, Social and Economic Impacts. Ottawa, Hudson's Bay Project workshop.

(26) Land Skills Programme curriculum

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Thematic Section
Urban Anthropology / Anthropologie Urbaine

Introduction: Class and State in Urban Settings

Alan Smart *University of Calagary*

According to the United Nation's Population Division, the world's population became more than half urban in 2006 for the first time in history. This proportion will increase to more than 60% by 2030, with 90% of the world's population increase in the next generation being accommodated by urban settlements in less developed regions (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2007).

This thematic section of *Anthropologica* is intended to both commemorate this historic milestone and to challenge anthropology to revitalize its theoretical and substantive engagement with urban realities and prospects. Anthropology, as a discipline that has "traditionally" studied the least urbanized parts of the world, faces distinctive challenges in its efforts to understand the social, political, economic and spatial transformations of an urban world. While anthropologists increasingly work in urban settings, it appears that a decreasing proportion of those who work in cities orient themselves towards interdisciplinary urban studies. Thus, most anthropologists who conduct research in cities do not consider themselves as engaged in "urban anthropology" but rather as specializing in medical anthropology, studies of popular culture or transnationalism, to name just a few popular approaches. This lack of engagement with "the urban" and urban studies does not only miss opportunities for anthropology to challenge its analyses in ways that might better suit it for the emerging urban world, but also deprives urban studies of the distinctive methodological and theoretical approaches that anthropologists can offer. This thematic section presents work that has been done on questions of urbanization by anthropologists who explicitly engage with paradigms of interdisciplinary urban studies. For perspective, I am delighted to have been able to include a commentary by Neil Smith, a major contributor to urban studies from our cognate discipline of geography. He is perhaps ideally suited to provide this commentary, both because of his important contributions and,

since his appointment is now in Anthropology at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His insightful comments both acknowledge the contributions that these articles make and challenge us to apply our ethnographic sensitivities in ways that engage even more effectively with important contemporary and past perspectives on state, class and violence from other disciplines.

A small set of papers cannot hope to encompass the diversity of contemporary work in urban anthropology, much less the full complexity of urban processes and transformations. Our approach here has been to concentrate on a set of issues that were central in earlier efforts in urban anthropology, but have more recently been eclipsed by an efflorescence of work on issues such as urban culture and identity. This will focus on some of the basic processes by which cities and towns are structured and restructured: state interventions and class dynamics, and particularly the interaction between these processes. Neil Smith adds "violence" to the dyad in his commentary, a phenomenon that does link these studies, but perhaps is inevitably tied up with the processes of state and class.

While a lot of work continues to be done in the broad area of urban political economy, anthropologists seem to be less likely to engage in interdisciplinary debates and development of the field. As an example, I could identify only two articles written by anthropologists out of 173 (1.1%) in the 2002 volumes of three main urban studies journals: *Urban Studies*, *Urban Affairs Review* and *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*.

It is not that urban political economy is not addressed by urban anthropologists, but the trend has been to emphasize how political economic processes such as globalization, transnational migration, neo-liberalism and restructuring are experienced by people, and particularly how already marginal groups may be further marginalized or how they resist these tendencies. It is not suggested here that these issues and perspectives are not important, nor that they do not produce often brilliant insights into the urban condition, which they certainly do. Indeed, it is precisely because of the high quality and distinct trajectories of anthropological research in urban settings that I find it to be unfortunate that anthropologists do not engage more regularly or broadly in dialogue with urban scholars in other disciplines. When anthropologists fail to communicate the results of their urban work to other students of cities, and shy away from engaging in the debates that continually invigorate the field of urban political economy, both sides lose. One motivation behind this thematic section has been to encourage greater engagement in the exciting debates in urban studies on the part of anthropologists, and to stress the benefits of seeing the city as more than just an accidental setting in which ethnographers conduct their fieldwork.

Anthropologists were first drawn to urban research by following the cityward movements of people they had worked with in the countryside. The connections forged by migration meant that even if anthropologists wanted to restrict themselves to non-urban sites, a full understanding of a village required consideration of the impact of urban ties. The intensification of these translocal linkages means that distinguishing urban and rural has become increasingly difficult. Satellite television, internet shopping and digitally mediated outwork means that most aspects of the urban lifestyle are available in at least those parts of the countryside with good digital infrastructure. In rural Alberta, for example, the declining numbers (and increasing average age) of farmers has meant that the vast majority of the population is engaged in the energy industry and related service sectors rather than agriculture. In the rural municipality of Bonnyville, for example, the children of a farm family I did research with said that they were usually the only farm kids in their classes every year. Even for the farm families themselves, off-farm employment has become indispensable to the viability of the farm. The largest beef producer in this area had a sideline as a veterinarian and a plaque in his house reading "Behind every successful rancher is a wife who works in town." Many cattle producers are convinced that the domination of their industry by huge transnational corporations means that the only way that they can survive is by bridging the disconnect between themselves and urban residents by farm-gate or direct sales to consumers who are also increasingly distressed by the environmental, health and food quality results of global commodity chains. The challenge is to bring these groups together, and the internet is seen as a key medium for doing so.

The countryside of poorer countries such as China is not, for the most part, so privileged with access to "urban" ways of life and livelihood, but the contribution by Tan and Ding shows in other ways how difficult it can be to make distinctions between urban and rural. They also show that the distinction itself, in the form of the official designation of a place or a person as urban, has consequences. The interaction between industrialization and the administrative labelling of places is a central focus of their analysis. Since China's industrialization and urbanization is having a huge impact outside its borders, in terms of almost every export industry, commodity prices, emissions of greenhouse gases, and even the sustainabil-

ity of America's current account deficit, understanding the kind of cities that are emerging there has considerable significance. Labrecque's discussion of Ciudad Juarez provides a comparable case of urbanization through migrant labour, with differences and similarities being almost equally compelling. She addresses the consequences of export-oriented manufacturing in Ciudad Juarez, one of the most important manufacturing centres in the U.S.–Mexico border zone (and which has been significantly challenged by the competitive pressures resulting from the "rise of China." There has been a great deal of attention paid to the high rate of homicide among women in a city where the manufacturing workforce is predominantly female, and commentators have seen it as an indictment of the global factory and transnational corporations. Labrecque provides a more nuanced account of this "feminicide," showing that the dangerous conditions in the city are a product both of state practices such as the poor provision of street lighting and ineffective policing, and the class dynamics of a deeply divided social structure. The kinds of city that are being constructed to facilitate the offshoring of production are a product of both state and economy, and different states can result in very different platforms for export production in Mexico, China, Indonesia or elsewhere.

The conditions of production of low-wage labour are the main theme of Newberry's article. She concentrates on Indonesian *kampung* (neighbourhoods) as spatial containers for a reserve army of labour, while not neglecting their operation as places of rich lived experience and social solidarity, as well as forms for the state's administration and control of urban space. What Newberry endeavours to do is to avoid a functionalist account of the entanglement of class with non-class social relations while still demonstrating their mutual constitution. The complexity of achieving this, of simultaneously building on the important contributions of Marxian class analysis and considering how new conditions might require new conceptualizations is reflected in the reaction to her article in Neil Smith's commentary. From this we can get a sense of both the challenge and the significance of an anthropological re-engagement with class analysis. For Newberry, spatial considerations need to be worked in with class analysis. She considers in particular how kampung "entrap" labour, but also permit it to be reproduced with home-based forms of employment while producing a way of life worthy of personal commitment and reproduction. Her account of the complex social spaces that result provides an example of one way in which urban anthropologists can move between the terrains of global capital, the state and embedded local life, while providing a strong sense of "being there."

Nonini's contribution also focuses on the nexus between urban space, state practices and class, but complicates things further by concentrating on how these are influenced by the ethno-racial policies of the Malaysian government. Among other things, his rich historical and ethnographic analysis highlights that class is not only about production and consumption, but also about the extraction of rents through the actions of the state. Strategies to counter such predatory extraction by state officials included illegal practices, "taking the dark road," another critical element of urban formations that does not always receive sufficient attention.

Whitehead's essay also explores the complex texture of urban local spaces, but concentrates on the way in which these spaces are threatened by local and global forces that are driving the transformation of Mumbai, a key gateway city in the global circuit of capital. Restructuring and downsizing in the textile industry has contributed to large "rent gaps" between rental values for the mill lands and the workers' slums associated with them. She examines the political economy by which the state and other agents are attempting to capture the vast profits made possible by the gap between rents for current uses, and the glossier uses such as convention centres, malls, offices and expensive apartments, planned for in a rising global city. As Neil Smith points out, the scale of gentrification underway there "dwarfs anything imaginable in North America" and deserves much greater attention from mainstream urban studies which is still too preoccupied with North American and European cities, as a glance at the table of contents of most urban studies readers will quickly demonstrate.

Together, these essays span the scale from shared meals to vast urban redevelopment projects, from careful analysis of ways of speaking (or not speaking) to the projects and policies of the state. They reflect the challenges facing anthropologists who wish to understand the complex human constructions that we call cities, but they also suggest the intellectual rewards that responding to these challenges might offer. They show how the nuanced observation of the routines of people in their local spaces can help inform an examination of the global political economy, but also how a neglect of these broader forces can result in misunderstandings of local "tradition" and "culture."

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Introduction : État et classes sociales en contexte urbain

Alan Smart *Université de Calgary*
Traduction de Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni

Selon la Division de la population des Nations Unies, en 2006, pour la première fois dans l'histoire, plus de la moitié de la population mondiale vivait dans des villes. Cette proportion atteindra plus de 60 % en 2030 et, dans les régions les moins développées du globe, 90 % de la population mondiale appartenant à la prochaine génération sera citadine (Département des Affaires économiques et sociales des Nations Unies 2007).

Cette section thématique de la revue Anthropologica vise à marquer d'une pierre blanche cet événement déterminant et à exiger davantage de l'anthropologie pour qu'elle ravive sa contribution théorique fondamentale aux réalités urbaines et à leurs développements futurs. En tant que discipline qui a, par tradition, étudié les régions du monde peu urbanisées, l'anthropologie doit à présent se dépasser afin de comprendre les transformations sociales, politiques, économiques et spatiales du monde citadin. De plus en plus d'anthropologues travaillent en contexte urbain, mais seul un petit nombre d'entre eux s'inspire des études urbaines multidisciplinaires. Ainsi, la plupart des anthropologues effectuant leurs recherches dans le monde citadin n'estiment pas faire de l' « anthropologie urbaine », mais considèrent plutôt qu'ils se spécialisent en anthropologie médicale, en étude de la culture populaire ou qu'ils s'inscrivent dans le courant du transnationalisme, pour ne mentionner que quelques approches à la mode. Non seulement cette absence de considération pour « l'urbanité » et les études urbaines représente une occasion manquée pour la discipline de remettre en question ses analyses de façon à ce qu'elles rendent mieux compte de ce monde urbain en pleine émergence, mais elle prive de surcroît les études urbaines des approches méthodologiques et théoriques que l'anthropologie est en mesure d'offrir.

Ce dossier thématique regroupe des travaux sur l'urbanisation effectués par des anthropologues qui ont explicitement fait usage des paradigmes interdisciplinaires des études urbaines. Nous sommes ravis d'avoir pu inclure

dans cette section un commentaire de Neil Smith, géographe de formation, qui apporte un éclairage nouveau et qui a grandement contribué à l'essor de la discipline des études urbaines. Il est sans doute la personne la mieux outillée pour fournir cette analyse, non seulement parce qu'il a fait des contributions majeures dans le champ d'études qui nous intéresse, mais aussi parce qu'il enseigne l'anthropologie au département d'Études supérieures de la City University à New York. Ainsi, sa grande capacité d'analyse lui permet de souligner l'apport des articles ici réunis, tout en appelant les anthropologues à l'action. Il nous demande en effet de mettre à profit notre sensibilité ethnographique de façon à aborder encore plus efficacement les points de vue, passés et contemporains, provenant d'autres disciplines, relatifs à l'État, aux classes sociales et à la violence.

L'ensemble restreint d'articles que nous vous présentons dans ce numéro n'a pas la prétention d'illustrer la riche diversité du travail contemporain en anthropologie urbaine, et encore moins de rendre compte de la complexité des transformations et des procédés urbains dans leur intégralité. Nous avons plutôt décidé de nous concentrer sur les enjeux fondamentaux de l'anthropologie urbaine, ces enjeux ayant été éclipsés, au fil de l'évolution de la discipline, par la luxuriance de travaux portant notamment sur les questions de culture urbaine et d'identité. Ainsi, ce dossier met l'accent sur certains des processus prédominants qui structurent et restructurent les villes : les interventions de l'État, les dynamiques entre les classes sociales et, en particulier, l'interaction liant ces deux processus. Dans son commentaire Neil Smith ajoute à cette dyade la violence, phénomène que l'on retrouve effectivement dans les études rassemblées ici, mais qui est peut-être inévitablement lié aux processus étatiques et aux luttes de classes.

Alors qu'il y a de nombreux travaux en cours dans le vaste domaine de l'économie politique urbaine, les anthropologues semblent moins prompts à participer aux débats interdisciplinaires et aux développements de ce champ d'études que leurs collègues issus d'autres disciplines. À titre d'exemple, sur les 173 articles publiés en 2002, je n'ai compté que deux articles signés par des anthropologues dans les trois revues traitant principalement des études urbaines, à savoir *Urban Studies, Urban Affairs Review* et *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. Cela représente un maigre 1,1 % des publications.

N'allons pas croire que les anthropologues des phénomènes urbains font complètement abstraction de l'économie politique dans les villes; ils ont simplement, par le passé, eu tendance à s'intéresser davantage à la façon dont les gens font l'expérience de certains mécanismes économiques et politiques comme la mondialisation, les migrations transnationales, le néolibéralisme ou les restructurations. Ils se sont tout particulièrement intéressés à la façon dont les groupes déjà marginalisés risquent de le devenir encore davantage, et à la façon dont ils résistent à ces phénomènes. Je n'insinue pas que ces questions n'ont pas d'importance. Bien au contraire, elles représentent un apport indéniable à la compréhension des phénomènes urbains. Et c'est précisément parce que ces études anthropologiques sont d'une grande qualité et offrent des trajectoires distinctes que je trouve regrettable que les anthropologues n'échangent pas davantage avec les chercheurs des autres disciplines. En ne communiquant pas les résultats de leurs recherches urbaines en dehors de leur discipline et en ne participant pas aux débats qui contribuent à raviver le champ de l'économie politique urbaine, les anthropologues créent une situation où toutes les parties sont perdantes. Un des objectifs qui sous-tend ce dossier thématique est donc d'encourager la participation des anthropologues aux débats stimulants qui portent sur les études urbaines, et de souligner les avantages à ne plus concevoir les villes comme des cadres anodins au sein desquels les ethnographes font du terrain.

C'est d'abord en suivant les mouvements de ceux qu'ils avaient étudiés dans les campagnes que les anthropologues ont fait de la recherche en ville. Devant l'intensification des mouvements migratoires, même si les anthropologues avaient souhaité ne s'intéresser qu'aux endroits non urbains, une meilleure compréhension des villages rendait nécessaire une prise en compte des liens qui les rattachent au monde urbain. La multiplication de ces liens tissés entre différents endroits rend de plus en plus difficile la distinction entre les mondes urbains et ruraux. De plus, la télévision par satellite, le magasinage par Internet et le travail à domicile par le biais des technologies de l'information rendent accessibles la plupart des aspects d'un mode de vie urbain, du moins dans les zones rurales dotées de bonnes infrastructures numériques. En Alberta par exemple, dans les campagnes, les fermiers sont de moins en moins nombreux et de plus en plus vieux; cela indique que la grande majorité de la population active travaille dans l'industrie de l'énergie et des services qui y sont liés, plutôt qu'en agriculture. Ainsi, dans la municipalité rurale de Bonnyville, les enfants d'une famille de fermiers auprès de laquelle j'ai mené mes enquêtes me disaient que chaque année, ils étaient les seuls de leur classe à être élevés dans une ferme. Et même au sein des familles possédant une ferme, le travail en dehors de l'exploitation agricole demeurait indispensable à la viabilité

de la ferme. Le premier producteur de bœufs dans la région travaillait aussi comme vétérinaire. Sur une plaque affichée dans sa maison, on pouvait lire : « Derrière chaque fermier qui a du succès, il y a une femme qui travaille en ville ». D'ailleurs, de nombreux producteurs de bétail ont la conviction que devant la présence des grandes entreprises transnationales qui dominent le marché, leurs seules chances de survie se résument à resserrer les liens entre leur communauté et les citadins, notamment en vendant au prix coûtant ou directement aux consommateurs. D'autant que les consommateurs se préoccupent de plus en plus des conséquences environnementales, de l'impact sur la santé et de la qualité des aliments produits à la chaîne pour le marché mondial. La difficulté demeure d'établir les liens entre ces groupes, mais l'Internet est perçu comme le médium clé pour y parvenir.

En général, le monde rural dans les pays les plus pauvres n'a pas le luxe d'accéder aussi facilement aux modes de vie et aux moyens de subsistance urbains; c'est aussi le cas en Chine. La contribution de Tan et Ding illustre cependant à quel point il peut être difficile de faire la distinction entre le monde urbain et le monde rural. Ces auteurs démontrent également que le fait de désigner de façon officielle une personne ou une localité comme étant urbaine n'est pas sans conséquence. L'interaction entre l'industrialisation et l'étiquetage administratif des lieux représente un point crucial de leur analyse. L'industrialisation et l'urbanisation de la Chine ont des effets retentissants à l'extérieur de ses frontières nationales, qu'il s'agisse de l'industrie de l'exportation, du prix des matières premières, de l'émission de gaz à effet de serre ou même du déficit budgétaire actuel des États-Unis. La compréhension et la détermination du type de villes qui émergent dans ce pays revêtent donc une importance considérable.

L'article de Labrecque sur la ville de Ciudad Juárez présente un cas semblable d'urbanisation résultant de la migration de la main-d'œuvre et il comporte des dissemblances et des ressemblances tout à fait fascinantes par rapport à l'article de Tan et de Ding. L'auteure traite des conséquences de la production axée sur l'exportation à Ciudad Juárez, l'un des grands centres manufacturiers dans la zone frontalière entre les États-Unis et le Mexique – qui souffre d'ailleurs de la compétition engendrée par le réveil de la Chine. Elle souligne qu'une attention soutenue a été portée au taux élevé de femmes victimes d'homicides dans cette ville où la main-d'œuvre industrielle est principalement féminine; de nombreux commentaires ont d'ailleurs pris la forme de réquisitoires accablants contre les usines à vocation mondiale et les entreprises transnationales. Mais Labrecque propose une analyse plus nuancée de ce « féminicide », en démontrant que les dangereuses conditions de vie dans cette ville sont le produit non seulement de pratiques étatiques telles l'absence d'éclairage routier ou l'inefficacité des services de police, mais aussi des dynamiques des classes sociales dans un contexte où la structure sociale est profondément divisée. Ce type de villes construites afin de favoriser la délocalisation de la production est fonction à la fois de l'État et de l'économie; des États différents – qu'il s'agisse du Mexique, de la Chine, de l'Inde ou d'autres pays – créent des types distincts de production axée sur l'exportation.

L'article de Newberry porte sur les conditions de travail des petits salariés. Elle s'intéresse aux *kampung* (quartiers) indonésiens, qu'elle considère à la fois comme des espaces contenant une réserve de main-d'œuvre, comme des lieux débordant d'expériences vécues, riches en solidarité sociale, et comme des formes d'administration et de contrôle de l'espace urbain par l'État. Newberry s'efforce d'éviter de faire une analyse fonctionnaliste de l'enchevêtrement des relations relatives ou non aux classes, tout en démontrant que ces relations se constituent mutuellement. Dans son commentaire, Neil Smith exprime toute la complexité de l'entreprise de Newberry, c'est-à-dire la difficulté de fonder une analyse sur l'importante contribution de l'analyse marxiste des classes tout en envisageant que de nouvelles conditions de production nécessitent de nouveaux outils conceptuels. Partant, on saisit à la fois l'importance pour la discipline anthropologique de se relancer dans l'analyse des classes et l'exercice délicat que cela représente. Pour Newberry, l'examen des espaces doit aller de pair avec l'analyse des classes sociales. Elle s'intéresse tout particulièrement à la façon dont les kampung « piègent » la main-d'œuvre, mais aussi à la façon dont ils lui permettent de se renouveler par le biais de types d'emplois localisés qui génèrent un mode de vie méritant un engagement personnel et une reproduction sociale. Les espaces sociaux complexes qui en résultent et que Newberry expose offrent un exemple de la façon dont les anthropologues de l'urbanité peuvent naviguer entre les terrains du capital à l'échelle de la planète, de l'État et de la vie locale, tout en générant un profond sentiment de présence.

La contribution de Nonini porte également sur les liens entre l'espace urbain, les pratiques étatiques et les classes sociales, mais elle ajoute une variable de plus à l'analyse, à savoir l'influence qu'ont les politiques ethnoraciales du gouvernement de Malaisie sur ces trois éléments. Sa riche analyse historique et ethnographique démontre, entre autres choses, que la classe sociale n'a pas que des incidences sur la production et la consom-

mation, mais aussi sur le prélèvement des loyers par l'État. Les stratégies pour contrer ces prélèvements étatiques prédateurs comprennent des pratiques illicites. D'ailleurs, l'emprunt des « noirs chemins de l'illégalité » représente un des éléments fondamentaux des formations urbaines qui ne reçoivent pas toujours suffisamment d'attention.

Le texte de Whitehead explore également la nature complexe des espaces urbains. Elle se concentre par contre sur la façon dont ces espaces sont menacés par les pressions locales et mondiales qui transforment Mumbai, ville incontournable du circuit planétaire des capitaux. La restructuration et le redimensionnement de l'industrie du textile ont contribué à créer de grandes disparités dans le prix du logement entre la valeur de location des terres industrielles et celles des bidonvilles où vit la main-d'œuvre qui y travaille. L'auteure examine l'économie politique de l'État et d'autres agents qui tentent de capter la manne créée par cette disparité entre le prix actuel des locations et celui, plus faramineux et prestigieux, dont ils bénéficieraient si ces sites hébergeaient des palais des congrès, des centres commerciaux, des bureaux ou des appartements de luxes comme ceux qui sont prévus pour cette ville mondialisée en plein essor. Neil Smith souligne que l'ampleur de l'embourgeoisement en cours dans ce pays n'a aucun équivalent nord-américain et mérite davantage d'attention de la part des études urbaines traditionnelles qui sont malheureusement encore trop préoccupées par les villes nord-américaines et européennes. Il suffit de parcourir la table des matières de la plupart des recueils de textes portant sur les études urbaines pour prendre la mesure de ce manque d'attention.

Considérés dans leur ensemble, ces textes dépeignent aussi bien le partage des repas que les vastes projets de redéveloppement urbain et l'analyse détaillée de la façon dont on parle – ou non – des projets et des politiques étatiques. Ils reflètent les enjeux auxquels doivent répondre les anthropologues qui souhaitent comprendre les constructions humaines complexes que nous appelons des villes, mais ils laissent également entrevoir les bénéfices intellectuels qui découleront de cet exercice. Finalement, ils démontrent à quel point une observation nuancée de la routine des gens dans leurs localités est en mesure de nourrir la réflexion sur l'économie politique mondiale, mais aussi à quel point faire abstraction de ces courants économiques et politiques plus larges risque d'engendrer une mauvaise compréhension des « traditions » et des « cultures » locales.

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Rural Urbanization and Urban Transformation in Quanzhou, Fujian

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Abstract: This article examines rural urbanization and urban transformation in Quanzhou city in Fujian. The administrative urbanization of villages and the impact on the residents are examined. The article shows that the scale and speed of China's urbanization is due to interaction between industrial development, including rural industrialization, and intervention by the state-socialist government. By comparing two localities, Chendai and Shudou, the article examines two distinct kinds of rural urbanization. The first area industrialized and urbanized without being officially classified as urban; the second area industrialized and only recently became urbanized despite having been previously classified as urban.

Keywords: urbanization, rural urbanization, administrative urbanization, China

Résumé : Cet article examine l'urbanisation rurale et la transformation urbaine dans la ville de Quanzhou dans la province du Fujian. Il examine l'urbanisation administrative des villages et son impact sur les habitants. L'article démontre que l'étendue et la rapidité de l'urbanisation en Chine sont le résultat de l'interaction entre le développement industriel, ce qui comprend l'industrialisation rurale, et l'intervention du gouvernement prônant le socialisme d'État. En comparant deux localités, Chendai et Shudou, l'article examine deux types de processus d'urbanisation rurale. La première localité s'est industrialisée et urbanisée sans pour autant être officiellement entrée dans la catégorie des localités urbaines. Quant à la seconde, elle s'est industrialisée et ne s'est que récemment urbanisée même si elle avait déjà été classifiée comme urbaine.

Mots-clés : urbanisation, urbanisation rurale, urbanisation administrative, Chine

Introduction

China has been undergoing many kinds of rapid transformation since 1978, including the expansion and population growth of towns and cities, and the urbanization of villages. The great contrast between urban and rural ways of life and the marked physical separation of urban centres and villages made it very easy to distinguish towns and villages. The policy of classifying residents according to "urban residence" (*chengshi hukou*) and "agricultural residence" (*nongcun hukou*) adopted in 1957 and subsequent strict restrictions against rural residents moving to cities and conversion from agricultural to urban status further reinforced the urban–rural distinction. However, post-Reform modernization of towns and villages and the improvement of transportation and communication systems have reduced the contrast in rural and urban ways of life. Even more significant have been the industrialization of villages and the transformation of farmers into entrepreneurs and workers. The government policy of reclassifying certain villages into urban areas and residents from "agricultural residence" status to "urban residence" status has also had a major impact, particularly on quantitative measures of the urbanization of the population.

Scholars studying urbanization have generally viewed it as a process rather than as a classification, and contemporary anthropologists pay particular attention to the cultural meaning of the urban environment as well as "the transnational aspects of migration, culture-making, and identity management" (Low 1996:402). Apart from the attention paid to globalization and the preference of some scholars to use postcolonial rhetoric, this kind of study is still recognizable as classical anthropology, except that the context is a city with a focus on ethnic dimensions, stratification and conflict, religious groups and so on. This is not to say that the emphasis needs to be on anthropology of the city rather than anthropology in the city, a topic of debate for urban anthropology in the 1970s (e.g., Fox

1977; Eames and Goode 1977), with some anthropologists emphasizing one over the other. Our position is that both are relevant to the study of towns and cities and cannot be strictly separated. For example, Zhang's study (2001) of a migrant population in Beijing focuses on the production of space and the "politics of migrant community-making," but this also contributes to our understanding of a central facet of urbanization in Beijing today.

Compared to the many anthropological works conducted in rural settings in China, there have not been as many anthropological studies in urban China or on China's urbanization. The volume edited by Elvin and Skinner (1974), which focuses on "the transformation and modernization of traditional urban forms" (Skinner 1974:vi) in China, was a path-breaking work by anthropologists and historians.[1] Prior to this, Skinner's well-known study of the role of markets in China's regional geography (1964, 1985a) should be considered an important and pioneering contribution to the anthropological study of towns and cities in China. However, it is in the post-Mao period that anthropologists began seriously to turn their attention to China's urbanization, and in this Guldin (1992 ed., 1997 ed., 2001) and his Chinese colleagues (notably Daming Zhou of Zhongshan University, cf. Zhou 1997) have contributed significantly to drawing attention to studying urban China. Recent interest in studying urban China by anthropologists can be seen in Chen et al. (2001), Jankowiak (2004) and the survey of research by Smart and Zhang (2006). One should of course note the role of the famous Chinese anthropologist, Xaiotong Fei, in calling for the study and development of small towns. His work (e.g., Fei 1985) on this are influential in China.

What urbanization is remains contested. Perhaps reacting to the official tendency in China to see cities and towns in terms of demographic figures, Guldin (1992:5) suggests that "urbanization "should refer to the process of increasing contact and interconnection between the urban and non-urban areas of society." This is not very helpful as it assumes an earlier period of limited or no contact, and as we shall show, this is not accurate. In our opinion, the common sense notion of associating the urban with residence in cities and towns is useful for understanding the nature of the urban,[2] and in this respect, a town or city has a distinct landscape which comprises at least a central business area, a complex transportation system and specialized facilities not found in rural areas. However, the urban landscape is always under transformation due to economic changes, government interventions, urban planning, the influx of migrants and so on. Outside the downtown area, and especially in the urban fringes, where the urban ends and the rural begins is often not clear. This is especially so in China today where many villages close to cities and towns are being transformed administratively and by rural industrialization to become part of towns and cities. Indeed towns and cities are always "urbanizing," so to speak, and in this sense, it helps to understand urbanization as city building in the broad sense that includes town building. Smart and Smart (2003:264) have appropriately used "urbanization" "to include not only the growth of cities, but the transformation of existing urban places."

We find Friedmann's multidimensional construct of the urban into administrative urbanization, economic urbanization, physical urbanization, sociocultural urbanization and political urbanization convenient for the discussion of Chinese cities (Friedmann 2005:37). Administrative urbanization is very important in China, since the central and local governments play essential roles in classifying and developing cities and towns. Ma demonstrates this and explains the different Chinese terms for cities and towns:

> In official statistical analyses "town" (*zhen*) is a level of government in the administrative system of China that falls between "city"(*shi*) or "county" (*xian*) on the one hand and "village committee" (*cunmin weiyuanhui*) on the other hand. In the Chinese administrative system, a "designated town" (*jianzhi zhen*) is under either a city or a county. A town is placed administratively at the same level as a *xiang* ("a subcounty district," formerly commune), but a town government has more cadres than a xiang and also has special funds for public construction in town. When a xiang reaches a certain point in population size and in the percentage of its non-agricultural population, its government can apply to become a town. If all administrative levels agree, then a record of the change will be made at the Ministry of Civil Administration. A town can apply to become a city by a similar procedure. [1992:119]

The criteria for establishing towns and cities have changed over time. For example, by 1984 an area to be declared a town needed only be one which was the seat of a county government or the site of a xiang government where there was over 2,000 non-agricultural population (Ma 1992:120). Even the classification of cities (in contrast to towns) is defined. Today, "small city" (*xiao chengshi*) is one where the non-agricultural population is not more than 200,000. One where the non-agricultural population is 200,000 to 500,000 is a medium-sized city (*zhongdeng chengshi*). Those with a population of more than 500,000 are large cities (*da chengshi*) and those with a non-agricultural population of 1,000,000 or more are called metropolis (*teda chengshi*) (Ye and Lu 2003:14). Thus in

2000, there were 40 metropolises, 53 large cities, 218 medium-sized cities and 352 small cities (Ye and Lu 2003:48). Since the Reform, many towns and cities have been added or re-classified, such as from a *xian cheng* (county seat) to shi (metropolis). We shall have more to say later about administrative urbanization in China.

As to economic urbanization, we shall see that rural industrialization plays an important part in the urbanization of post-Reform China. Economic development in a town or city brings about further urbanization. For example, an increase in investment or business opportunities results in more businesses and work opportunities, while the increase in income spurs more consumption and promotes new tastes, thus transforming the culture of consumption. Urban economic development means the construction of new infrastructure and more modern buildings. Thus economic urbanization has impacts on physical and sociocultural urbanization.

The importance of physical urbanization is obvious from our discussion on urban landscape, which is constantly transformed by the unending process of urbanization. The landscape is continuously changing as more infrastructure and buildings are constructed or modernized or as they deteriorate. The influx of rural migrants transforms an existing landscape, with the development of migrants' quarters and new restaurants catering to their tastes, as is common throughout China. The migrants not only contribute to physical urbanization but also to sociocultural urbanization as they bring with them cultural influences. The cultural transformation of a city is also brought about by globalization, often symbolized in China by the recent presence of Western food chains such as McDonald's, and modern coffee shops which may be Western or Taiwanese in origin. Business signs which feature local and international firms remind people of the globalizing nature of cities. The urban landscape, which is both physical and cultural, is an important part of people's imaginary of towns and cities.

Sociocultural urbanization refers to the cultural dimension of urbanization and urban life. This has been the strength of anthropologists who have studied different facets of urban life. For example, the articles in Chen et al. (2001) mostly deal with cultural dimensions of China's cities. The topics studied by cultural anthropologists in urban settings are as diverse as the field, and the urban settings allow easy linkage with the more recent anthropological interest in globalization and consumerism.

Political urbanization refers to political changes associated with urbanization such as decentralizing decision making to local authorities. The development of neighbourhood associations as emergent civil society in Shanghai (Zhu 2002) is an interesting example of this. What Lefebvre (1996:173) calls the right to the city, namely "right to freedom, to individualism in socialization, to habitat and to inhabit" are relevant topics for the study of political urbanization. Local elections which have been introduced in different parts of China are new phenomena deserving serious study. Political urbanization is still not very apparent in Quanzhou and we shall not deal with it as more research is needed.

Overall, the emphasis on various aspects of urbanization as multidimensional is important because their effects are distinct but interrelated. For example, physical urbanization is closely linked to economic urbanization and, as we shall see, administrative urbanization and economic urbanization are crucial in urban development in China and they, in turn, influence sociocultural urbanization. But for cities to be livable, they have to be managed with vision to ensure the quality of urbanization. Thus, administrative urbanization in response to not just the needs of entrepreneurs but also to the rights of citizens (political urbanization) and ecological concerns is important. How all these dimensions of urbanization interact accounts for the diversity in the nature and quality of cities. Our article demonstrates a common trend in China of an over-emphasis on administrative urbanization in response to economic development and consequently, on economic urbanization and physical urbanization.

Rural industrialization has transformed many villages into industrial zones and when these are close to an existing town or city, it is only a matter of time before improved transportation systems linking them to urban centres and the spatial expansion of the town or city turns these villages into part of the urban landscape. As Wong and Yao (2000:295) point out, the provision of infrastructure "has important effects on urban development and urban land use." In Fujian, road infrastructure plays a crucial role in urban expansion as is evident in such cities as Xiamen and Quanzhou and the nearby townships, as well as when one travels along the highway from Xiamen to Quanzhou. The factories and related modern buildings, supermarkets and many other facilities that cater to the growing population of workers and management create powerful images of urban expansion. The local government, which is interested in urbanization, may designate such villages as urban. But what do the "villagers" think and feel? Do they feel urban? What is the impact of such imposed urbanization on their lives? We shall use our observations of the situation in Quanzhou to explore these rather neglected questions in the study of urbanization in China. In fact, Chinese urbanization has, in effect, proletarianized many farmers—not just those who have left their farms

but also those whose villages have been designated as urban areas.

While we will discuss some sociocultural aspects of urbanization in Quanzhou, our focus is mainly on the urbanization of nearby villages. The scale and speed of China's urbanization is due to the interactive effect of industrial development and state-socialist government intervention. The power of the government to intervene in its interest and in the interest of the industrial sector accounts for the speed and scale of urbanization that is brought about by industrialization and commercial development; such scale and speed are difficult to attain in a society where there is democratic space for people to protest the kind of development that they do not want. Good urban planning by the local government, of course, helps to create well-organized modern towns as Tan observed in the case of Xiaolan in Guangdong and Yuxi in Yunnan. Xiaolan, for example, is modern, clean and well planned, and it attracts foreign investment in security products, household appliances and others (cf. Chow 2001). Most people in the nearby villages have either become entrepreneurs or business people, or work in the factories, but the most menial and low-paying work is left to migrant workers. There are many examples of such towns and cities expanding and modernizing, especially in the lower Yangzi delta, the Pearl River delta and in coastal Fujian.

Quanzhou: Brief Historical Background

Quanzhou is an ancient city in southern Fujian. It was already established by AD 718, at which time it was only 3 *li* (1 li is a half kilometre) in perimeter (*zhouchang*)[3] (Zhou et al. 1990). Since then, the city has been extending from this urban core, albeit rather slowly. In 1922, the official size of the city was almost equivalent to what was found in the 10th century, with a perimeter of about 20 li (Zhou et al. 1990). Even up to the early 1980s, the size of the city had remained more or less the same (see Table 1).

TABLE 1
Size of Quanzhou City through History

Period	Area
AD 718	3 li in perimeter
AD 943-957	20 li in perimeter
AD 1658	6.8 sq. km.
1983	6.96 sq km.

Sources: Zhou et al. (1990) and Quanzhou Municipality Planning Bureau (2003).

Although Quanzhou grew slowly geographically, the city had experienced prosperity and fame from the 11th to the early 14th centuries (cf. Skinner 1985b:276), when it was the greatest port of China. The many relics, including tomb stones, left behind by traders from as far as India and the Middle East can be seen today at the new Quanzhou Maritime Museum, which is built on village land (see below). Throughout its history the name of Quanzhou city and its jurisdiction changed many times (cf. Wang 1999). Historically the city had close interactions with its hinterland and with villages, serving as their major commercial centre and the port that linked the region to the world. For instance, Quanzhou was a great exporter of ceramics and porcelains (cf. So 2000), which were made in the hinterland in such counties as Dehua, Cizao and Anxi. Silk cloth, another major item of export, was made in many villages in the hinterland. There were also considerable links between the city and the villages. The rural rich would buy houses in the city which were admired by other villagers, while the urban rich would buy land in rural areas. Furthermore, most urban people belonged to their respective lineages in the villages and they participated in major ritual activities to honour their ancestors. Thus lineage organizations linked urban people to villages.

Scholars who emphasize urbanization as increasing links between rural and urban seem to have neglected the historical links between villages and urban centres. In fact, the strict separation of villages and urban centres was not established by the city walls but by the *hukou* system (permanent residence registration). The classification of people according to urban residence and agricultural residence with restriction on rural-urban migration was like an invincible wall that separated the rural from the urban, and this policy was not relaxed until after 1978. During the pre-Reform period, it was almost impossible for rural people to acquire urban residential status and live in urban centres or to acquire properties there. Because of the advantages of having urban residence,[4] urban people naturally wanted to keep their status. Thus the artificial separation between rural and urban is not age-old but the creation of the policy introduced by the communist government, especially during the Great Leap Forward period (1958-65). With economic liberalization in 1978, the introduction of the household responsibility system (*jiating lianchan chengbao ziran zhi*) allowed rural residents to find jobs in urban centres, thus providing much needed cheap labour for factories, most of which are located in or near urban areas. This has given rise to the now familiar influx of rural population to towns and cities. Since 1984, permanent rural-urban migration

has been officially sanctioned by the central government (cf. Lee 1992:111). Of course improvements in transportation and information technology have made the rural and the urban mutually more accessible. People in Quanzhou and towns in the region can attend a rural function and return on the same day, as we have often observed. However, without an official urban resident status, the rural migrants living in cities are administratively and socially discriminated against. For example, in Quanzhou, students are allocated to schools in their particular area of residence. Children of rural migrants in Quanzhou city are not entitled to study in the schools there because of their official rural residence status unless they pay an expensive fee, which is usually around RMB 20,000 or more. This violates the migrants' "right to the city," or more specifically, the "right to urban life," to use Lefebvre's terms (Lefebvre 1996:158).

Contemporary Urbanization of Quanzhou

A notable feature of the urbanization of Quanzhou since 1978 is physical urbanization, especially the expansion of the city's geographical size, as can be seen in Table 2. This is due not just to economic growth but also to political decisions and administrative planning by the municipal government. The geographical area of the city was 6.96 sq. km. in 1983 and by 2005 it had grown to 70 sq. km., expanding by 63 sq. km in 22 years. This speed of growth is unprecedented. Continued growth at this remarkable rate is expected since the municipal government's 15-year plan (2005-20) considers that the city is relatively small compared to the bigger cities in other provinces, and that this may hinder further economic development of the city and its surrounding areas. It is planned that by 2010, the area of the city will be increased to 175 sq. km. with an expected population of 1.75 million. The government plans to make Quanzhou a modern metropolis (teda chengshi), so that by 2020 the whole city will be modernized (*quan shi jiben xiandaihua*). The government aims to make the city a major manufacturing centre and a major port in China, and to be at the economic forefront on the "western side of the [Taiwan] Straits" (Quanzhou Municipal Government 2005). If successful, this will enable Quanzhou to reclaim its historical glory, but at the cost of many farmers losing their land.

Official urbanization still puts emphasis on hukou classification. The Quanzhou municipal government plans to urbanize Quanzhou city by 60% by 2010 (Municipal Government 2005), meaning that 60% of the urban population will hold *chengshi hukou* or urban residential status. Indeed, the rapid administrative urbanization of Quanzhou since the economic Reform has involved acquiring farmland for industrial development and converting the status of farmers who lost their lands to "urban residence." This development has created "villages in the city" (*cheng zhong cun*) in newly developed urban sectors. These are villages that have lost their lands to government requisition and industrial development and are increasingly surrounded by urban development. However, the villages retain rural administrations even though their names have been changed to "neighbourhood committees." Even basic amenities may remain rural, such as depending on drawing water from wells where there is no supply of piped water. This "Chinese" characteristic of urban development is described by one of our informants from Donghu village (Donghu Cun), one of the "urban villages" in Quanzhou:

> In 1982 each household was given land for cultivation. More than ten years later, the government took over our land to build roads, factories and houses. By 1991, all the lands in our village were requisitioned by the government. Then we heard about "*nong zhuan fei*" (changing from agricultural residence to non-agricultural residence), and later all villagers were given urban residence. [Interviewed on May 8, 2005]

The Quanzhou Maritime Museum is one of the new buildings located on the land acquired from the villagers mentioned by the informants. Cleared of rural landscape and occupied by government and business buildings, this area is now part and parcel of Quanzhou city, and is perceived as such by both locals and outsiders.

The city of Quanzhou has been expanding by absorbing rural areas through administrative measures that facilitate subsequent urban development, as well as the industrialization and urbanization of villages. By 2004, the measure to change agricultural residence to urban

TABLE 2
Geographical Size of Quanzhou City since 1983

Period	Area (sq. km.)
1983	6.96
1988	28
2000	40
2002	49
2004	58.2
2005	70
2010	175 (planned)
2020	450 (planned)

Sources: Quanzhou Municipal Development Planning Managemnent Bureau 1983; Quanzhou Municipal Government 2004, 2005.

residence had reached Shudou village, which is nine kilometers from downtown Quanzhou. It is administratively under the jurisdiction of Jiangnan township which in turn is administratively under the Licheng urban district in Quanzhou municipality. The village has an area of 2.5 sq. km. and a population of 2,598 people. In 2003, all the farmland here were requisitioned by the Quanzhou municipal government for the development of "Quanzhou Jiangnan High-Tech Information Technology Industrial Estate" (*Quanzhou jiangnan gao xinjishu dianzi xinxi chanye yuanqu*), and the residential status of the villagers was changed from agricultural to urban. In line with the implementation of this kind of administrative urbanization, since 2002 the Quanzhou municipal government has been making administrative changes in "urbanized" areas by changing the administrative systems of xiang (an administrative unit comprising villages) and zhen (township) to urban district office (*jiedao banshichu*), and village administration village (*xingzhen cun*) to "neighbourhood committee" (*shequ juweihui*). This change in local administrative structure goes hand in hand with the conversion of agricultural residence to urban residence in Quanzhou administrative urbanization. We shall discuss the impact of this policy on affected residents and their perception of it.

The administrative urbanization of Quanzhou can be seen in Table 3. Before 1997, the administrative centre was Licheng which administered five jiedao banshichu, eight xiangzhen (townships, namely Fuqiao, Jiangnan, Donghai, Chengdong, Beifeng, Luoxi, Majia and Heshi), and two *nongchang* (farms, namely Qingyuan and Shuangyang). In 1997 Licheng was divided into three *qu* or districts, namely Licheng, Fengze and Luojiang. Most of the zhen and the two farms are now jiedao banshichu, along with some new ones (Donghu, Fengze, Quanxiu and Wan'an). Of those not yet classified as urban, Hongshan is a new zhen. The conversion of a zhen to jiedao banshichu indicates administrative urbanization, and the residents' status is converted from agricultural residence to urban residence.

The creation or reclassification of qu, jiedao banshichu and zhen are initiated by local governments and requests via various administrative levels have to be finally approved by the State Council of the central government. Much lobbying is usually needed for final approval. In this way the city and townships in Quanzhou municipality have been re-classified and re-ranked. Shishi was originally a township in Jinjiang county but in 1987 it was designated a *shi* or municipality.[5] The townships of Jinjiang and Nan'an became county-level shi in 1992 and 1993 respectively. In 2000 the northeastern part of coastal Hui'an was taken out of Hui'an county to form Quangang qu, to be administered directly under the Quanzhou municipality. Today, Quanzhou as a *shengxia shi* (a municipality directly under the jurisdiction of the provincial government) administers Jinjiang municipality, Shishi municipality, Nan'an municipality and the counties of Dehua, An'xi, Yongchun, Hui'an, and the urban districts of Licheng qu Fengze qu, Luojiang qu, and Quangang qu. The metropolis plan of the Quanzhou government involves incorporating into Quanzhou city Cidian township, Zimao township and part of Chendai township in Jinjiang county, Fengzhou township in Nan'an county, Dongyuan township, Luoyang township and Baiqi xiang in Hui'an county. The Fujian provincial government had approved this ambitious plan in 1996.

The re-classification of towns has the effect of empowering the local authorities of towns thus promoted. They acquire more administrative power including the power to make more decisions about local economic and urban development, as Marton (1998:13) has described in his study of urbanization in lower Yangzi Delta. However, it can be misleading to talk of administrative urbanization without considering the economic dimensions. In fact

TABLE 3
Administrative Urbanization

	Urban areas (jiedao banshichu) before 1985	Classified as urban areas (jiedao banshichu) in 1985-1997	Classified as urban areas (jiedao banshichu) after 1997	Not yet classified as urban areas (zhen)
Licheng qu	Kaiyuan, Haibin, Lizhong, Linjiang		Fuqiao, Jiangnan	
Fengze qu	Huada	Quanxiu	Donghu, Fengze, Donghai, Chengdong, Beifeng, Qingyuan	
Luojiang qu			Wan'an, Shuangyang	Luoxi, Majia, Heshi, Hongshan

Sources: Compiled from the local governments' websites and interviews with Quanzhou government officials.

industrialization and entrepreneurial development play the crucial role in transforming post-Reform villages and urban centres. It is after some economic urbanization and subsequent physical urbanization that the government tends to adopt policies which bring about administrative urbanization. The interaction of these processes speeds up urbanization as well as intensifying its scale. A good illustration of this is the urbanization of Chendai township, which is about 10 km from downtown Quanzhou.

Traditionally the people of Chendai depended on farming and fishing, including breeding young razor clams (*chengmiao*) for their livelihood. The original market town was rather small, comprising only a few rows of shops.[6] After 1979, taking advantage of opportunities brought about by economic liberalization, the people gradually turned to manufacturing and running businesses. In 1979, there were more than 800 firms manufacturing shoes, paper and plastic materials, as well as making cloth and clothes. By early 1990, local entrepreneurs mostly specialized in manufacturing shoes, consequently the farm labour force decreased from 80% of the total farming and industrial labour force to 20% (Ding 1998). By 2000, Chendai had become a *xiecheng* ("shoe town"),[7] where not only all kinds of modern shoes are manufactured, but all the materials related to shoe manufacturing are produced as well. In fact all processes related to shoe-making including packaging, transportation and arranging exports are handled in Chendai. All the factories and shopping centres were built on farmland. Most farmers have become entrepreneurs or work in factories or shops, and those who still have farms rent them out to the few surviving farmers and some migrants. The amount of agricultural land has decreased because of the invasion of factories. Despite the physical urbanization that has taken place, the people in Chendai are not yet re-classified as belonging to urban households. However, the municipal government has already planned to incorporate Chendai into the planned metropolitan Quanzhou by 2020. This is an example of economic transformation bringing about urbanization, including development that spurs administrative urbanization.

In the case of Shudou mentioned earlier, some villagers had already begun to do business in spare parts for cars even before 1978. The village authorities cooperated by not reporting this "capitalist" activity. After the economic Reform began, family enterprises in Shudou took off and developed rapidly, and many villagers gave up farming. In other words, family enterprises had already developed in many villages before 1978. Villages like Shudou show that there existed ripe conditions for economic development in the few years before economic Reform and that the Chinese themselves including enterprising villagers played crucial roles in the miraculous economic achievement of post-Reform China, alongside foreign investment. After economic liberalization, the enterprising families used farmland for their economic enterprises or bought land from others. Only after considerable rural industrialization did the government decided to requisition the remaining farmland. Villagers who need land will have to buy back the requisitioned lands from the government at a much higher price.

The paradox of Chendai and Shudou results from the politics of local governments. As part of the plan to develop Quanzhou into a metropolis, the Quanzhou municipal government had requested that the State Council incorporate it into Licheng district. However, the Jinjiang local government, which administers Chendai directly, opposed this move. As such the Quanzhou government has not been able to make it administratively urban via the Licheng administration. The politics of local governments aside, administrative urbanization has to do with a local government's plan, which is influenced by genuine concern for development and urbanization as well as the interest of entrepreneurs and developers. Once a local government makes its decision, ordinary citizens under the communist system have little room for opposition. One hears of accusations of *guanshang goudang*, dealings between officials and business people, and this is not uncommon. Furthermore the people perceived to benefit most from this kind of administrative urbanization are the entrepreneurs and corrupt officials. Under the communist system, things can be done fast and effectively under able leaders. If they have vision and take into consideration the interest of ordinary people, the people will benefit, too; otherwise there is the frustration of appeals and complaints unheeded by unsympathetic officials.

The above analysis shows that economic transformation is the primary factor in China's urbanization, including administrative urbanization. The urbanization of villages close to existing towns is brought about by rural industrial development since the Reform as well as by urban expansion. Nevertheless, private enterprise had already emerged illegally in some villages before this. Physical urbanization as a result of rural industrialization, which physically links the villages to the larger urban landscape, makes these villages appear "urban." Whether the affected villagers feel urban or not is another matter (see below). Whatever they feel, it is only a matter of time before this imposed urbanity becomes part of a city's increasing urbanization. This brings us back to the question "what is urbanization?" We feel that this concept is more useful if we keep to the common sense understand-

ing of it as town-building or city-building, processes linked to the development of an urban landscape, rather than treating it as a way of life (urbanism) or an increase in connections between rural and urban. In fact, where villages are not linked to an urban centre by an emerging urban landscape, they remain as distinctly rural villages in both physical and sociocultural terms despite rural industrialization and influx of migrant workers. For example, the village of Shizhen 40 km from Quanzhou, which we have included in an earlier project of ours,[8] is one such village. There, many villagers have either given up farm lives and earn their income from rural enterprises making cloth and clothes or from renting rooms to migrant workers. Shizhen remains a distinctly rural village despite the presence of some factories and the fact that most people do not farm anymore. The villages and villagers' ways of life may change, giving up farm life and enjoying similar amenities as urban people do, but the villages remain rural unless they are incorporated into an existing town or city or they themselves have developed an urban landscape to become towns.

Cultural Influences of Urbanization

In contrast to the official approach of urbanizing villages by re-classifying the villagers as urban residents, the inhabitants of the "urbanized" villages actually care more about their livelihood than whether their status is urban or not. This is reflected in the view of a man from Shudou, who is 44 years old:

> Being re-classified as urban residents has not brought any further improvement in our lives, except that farmland was requisitioned by the government, and the people are forced to find other means of livelihood. Actually it is not better as we do not get any social security from the re-classification, unlike before when we could always rely on farming. Now if we do not have a job, we have no money to buy food. Other than the change in our residential status and that we lost our land, there is no positive change [referring to administrative urbanization]; the condition of village roads and hygiene remains the same. If urbanization helps the village to prosper and there are good jobs, it is alright. As to the change from agricultural households to urban households, I have no opinion, even if I have an opinion it is of no use. This is the decision of the government. What is important is that there are opportunities to earn money and that we can live well. It does not matter whether we have agricultural residence or urban residence. [Interviewed on May 10, 2005]

Overall life in Shudou has improved since 1978, but at the individual level, those who have not benefitted as much are of course not happy about losing farmland. Most of the people in Shudou who are 40 years old or older are sentimental about land ownership, since they had experienced farm life and owning land. They are worried about life without land. An 80-year-old man said bluntly, "If you own a piece of land there is always some guarantee in livelihood, as one can always cultivate crops to get food. When the land is sold and if one does not have a job, one will have no means of livelihood."[9] However younger people have different views. In Shudou where the reclassification to urban status was recent, most villagers when asked about their status say, "we do not know whether we are urban people (*chengli ren*) or agricultural villagers" (*noncun ren*), or "now we are half urban people half villagers" (*ban nongcun ren ban chengli ren*). Younger people in their twenties and thirties are more conscious of the lack of entertainment facilities. An informant of 20 years old said,

> Shudou is not part of the city yet (*busuan chengnei*), as it does not have urban prosperity. In the early evening, it is already dark everywhere. It is not like in Quanzhou city where it is bright with many people even late at night. Shudou people go to downtown Quanzhou (*chengli*) to buy clothes and major items; the transportation is so convenient and one can make a few trips a day. This is like in the past when we attended school in the city. Now we are *jumin* [urban residents], but we also go to downtown Quanzhou to buy clothes or to have fun, as before. [Interviewed on May 10, 2005]

In the case of villages that have become "villages in the city," whether recently like Shudou, or those that had been "urbanized" a decade or so earlier (such as Donghu village), the people generally use the tem *cun* or "village" and are not used to the label shequ juweihui (neighbourhood committee). And they still refer to Quanzhou city as *chengnei* (literally inside the city) or *shiqu* (city area). The attitude towards residential status, of course, has very much to do with social change since 1978. In the pre-Reform period, urban residents had some privileges over agricultural residents (see note 3) who aspired to obtain urban residential status. Now *nong zhuan fei* (reclassification as urban residents) does not bring with it special advantages, and so it does not mean much to the villagers who are naturally more concerned about the overall impact of the policy of administrative urbanization on their livelihoods. However as physical and economic urbanization increases, it is only a matter of time before people will see their locality as part of the larger urban complex.

For existing city residents, urbanization, be it further urbanization of the city or expansion of the city through industrial development and administrative urbanization of nearby villages, is generally welcomed for the convenience that it has brought. There are more shopping centres and there are housing estates built on acquired farmland. As an informant said, "the streets are now broader, and there are more supermarkets, and it is convenient for us to buy things. Also the housing conditions have improved. Last time seven or eight people lived in a small house. Now two or three people live in a big house." New residential areas such as Donghu Xiaoqu, Yungu Xiaoqu and Donghai Bincheng, where the houses are modern and spacious, have emerged as prestigious residential areas for the growing middle-class in Quanzhou. Until recently these new suburbs were farmland and they are now administratively urban, that is, administered by jiedao banshichu. Although still not part of the city proper, they are fast becoming part of the urban landscape of Quanzhou.

The changing modernity of the city is another visible aspect of economic development and urbanization since 1978. The modernity dimension of physical urbanization is marked by new highrises (such as Baoxian Dasha, Zhongyin Dasha, etc., in the new quarter of the city), modern shopping centres owned by local and foreign business people including overseas Chinese (e.g., SM Plaza is owned by a Chinese person from the Philippines), Taiwanese food chains (Taiwanese-owned modern coffee shops are very popular among young people who see them as a symbol of urbanization and modernity), American global food chains (e.g., MacDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut), and others. Indeed, Quanzhou is reclaiming its status as a global city. It still has some way to go when compared to Fuzhou and Xiamen and a long way to go when compared to Shanghai and Beijing, where there are many more direct transnational links with other global cities and there are more transnational residents (people who live transnationally in these Chinese cities and in cities in their original countries of residence). Scholars on urbanization now pay much attention to globalization and transnational connections (cf. Robinson 2004, Smart and Smart 2003). The globalization and modernity of Quanzhou, including the roles played by Chinese overseas and Chinese from Taiwan, is a fascinating topic which we hope to explore further. The 15-year plan of Quanzhou municipality may be ambitious but it is attainable. However, there is a need to make sure that the quality of life is improved too, as is indeed planned (*shixian quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui de mubiao*) (Quanzhou Municipal Government 2005).

Another very visible urban transformation is the influx of migrant workers who seem to have become a permanent feature of the city. While the local people despise or ignore them as a marginal group of people needed by the city's development, these migrants and their descendants will no doubt contribute to the ethnic diversity and cosmopolitan development of Quanzhou, as do professionals and business people from outside Quanzhou. The restaurants they run have become part of the changing urban landscape of Quanzhou and are already contributing to the evolving social diversity and vibrancy of the city. Unlike before the Reform, there are now Sichuan and Hunanese restaurants alongside Taiwanese and Western food chains catering not only to the growing migrant population but also to the changing and diversified tastes of the local Minnan (southern Fujian) people. Indeed, other than their much needed labour contribution, the migrants from outside Fujian have two great social impacts: food and language. Sichuan and Hunanese restaurants have popularized non-local foods to the Minnan people, enriching their tastes. Because the migrants do not speak the local Minnan language, Putonghua has become a common medium between the migrants and the local people. Consequently, as most Quanzhou people have realized, local people themselves now speak more Putonghua than before. It is migration rather than any government policy that has successfully popularized the use of Putonghua among the Minnan people who preferred speaking Minnan to Putonghua. In the rural areas there are still people who do not speak Putonghua well.

Conclusion

An important characteristic of China's urbanization is the industrialization of towns and villages, which has global significance because of China's emergence as "the workshop of the world," producing inexpensive Chinese products that are now sold worldwide. China's rural industrialization actually helps to avoid the growth of primate cities as experienced in most Southeast Asian countries (cf. Mcgee 1967), as the influx of migrants is not concentrated in a core city but is distributed in many industrializing towns and villages. Furthermore, historically China has many market towns. The policy of industrializing small towns to develop rural China was strongly promoted by the leading Chinese anthropologist and sociologist Fei, who passed away on April 24, 2005 at the age of 95. He was the first Chinese anthropologist who paid much attention to the roles of small towns in China's modernization (Fei 1985),[10] in particular in the region of Suzhou and Wujiang municipality in Jiangsu province, where Kaixiangong, the village where he did his doctoral research, was located.

"Rural" industrialization is an important factor in fast urbanization all over China, especially in the provinces along the coast, although ironically its success led to the transformation of these rural areas into urban municipalities. The speed and scale of urbanization are the combined result of industrialization and what may be called administrative urbanization socialist-style. While economic transformation is the primary force of urban development, the intervention of the government plays a major part in further encouraging economic development and urban expansion. The requisition of land from farmers may be unfair to farmers and benefits some corrupt cadres, but it facilitates industrial development and urban expansion. The patterning of these connected but distinct dimensions of urbanization helps to explain the distinct local textures of urbanization.

However, both the Chinese government and scholars need to pay attention to the plight of farmers who lose their land to state acquisition in the name of development and urbanization. In the case of Shudou that we have discussed, the conflict between the villagers and the government is not serious since a number of Shudou residents have become entrepreneurs who own factories in the area and many of those who are not so successful have found work in the nearby factories. Still the local residents are not happy that they had to give up their land and are poorly compensated compared to the high price of land sold by the local government to entrepreneurs (including local ones). Where the local residents receive little benefit from state land acquisition and are left unemployed, this becomes a serious problem that leads to bitterness and even open conflict. In an Overseas Chinese Farm (*huaqiao nongchang*, area settled by returned Chinese from Indonesia) in Quanzhou that we are studying, the acquisition of land by the local government and the conversion of local residents from agricultural to urban status are met with scepticism and bitterness. With the area yet to develop into an industrial site and the local people not having any alternate jobs (except young people who have found work as drivers in Quanzhou and other cities), this animosity is to be expected. The village is about 16 km from Quanzhou city and five km from the nearest town (Luojiang). Without any urban landscape, the village remains rural in appearance and in fact, even though it has been reclassified as urban. This is an example of how, in the absence of an urban landscape and the accompanying facilities of urban living, classification as urban does not make a place urban, although the government may be planning for future urban development.

By comparing Chendai and Shudou, we see both similar and diverse aspects of urbanization. Both have developed from rural industrialization. Chendai has developed from a small market town together with its surrounding villages. It has become urbanized both economically and physically, although it has not been administratively made urban and the residents still hold agricultural residence status (except a minority who work in government service). It is administratively under Jinjiang municipality (which in turn is under Quanzhou municipality), unlike Shudou, which is a single village that is administered directly by Quanzhou city's Licheng urban district office. Shudou is still on its way to urbanization, but the municipal government has already classified it as urban and the villagers as urban residents.

Our article thus shows two kinds of rural urbanization in China. The Chendai case shows one of a township becoming industrialized and urbanized but not yet administratively made urban. Such an urbanized township can remain a separate town, although Chendai will be incorporated into the planned mega-urban Quanzhou city. The case of Shudou shows a village becoming industrialized and on its way to being economically and physically urban and is already administratively urbanized. Our brief mention of Shizhen shows a case of a village where the villagers are leaving their farms for rural enterprises, but which remains a rural village. We see these patterns of "rural" industrialization and urbanization all over China. Urbanization is most significant in cities and market towns, but whether a village is urbanized or not depends very much on its proximity and links to a city or an urbanizing market town.

We also tried to show that in the study of urbanization there is a need to pay attention to the effects of imposed urbanization on the people affected. While the reclassification of farmers as urban dwellers together with other measures of administrative urbanization will, in the long-run, incorporate "the villages in the city" into the larger urban landscape, the affected villagers do not necessarily feel urban or see their villages as urban. They are more concerned about improved livelihood than whether they are urban or not. In the study of rural urbanization, there is a need to pay attention to the nature of villages and towns undergoing transformation and the infra-structure development that links villages to an existing town or city, as well as the views of the villagers themselves.

Quanzhou today is not yet a major city. The 15-year plan of the municipal government may succeed in turning it into a mega-urban region. There is of course much that is needed in economic and urban planning. In this push for development and urbanization, it is necessary to pay attention to the quality of life not only of existing urban residents but also of those who have lost their land to urban-

ization and industrialization. There is also a need to pay attention to environmental sustainability. Laquian (1995:238) described these goals very well in his discussion of the governance of mega-urban regions: "(1) efficiency in the delivery of urban services; (2) equity in the inter-relationships of groups and classes in the urban society; (3) economic development in the mega-urban region; and (4) environmental sustainability in the process of development." In the push for economic development and modernization, the issues of social equity and environmental sustainability tend to be neglected by the government and entrepreneurs. In fact, scholars in China have already pointed out the need to pay attention to the sustainability of the urban ecology (cf. Yang 1998; Ye and Lu 2003). This is, of course, a very important issue to which we hope the government will pay special attention. As McGee and Robinson (1995:350) mention, environmental degradation is perhaps the most challenging of the problems posed by mega-urbanization "because it is the most difficult to predict."

The macro-study of urbanization and the comparative survey of towns and cities are important for our understanding of urbanization. But the study of the local is equally important, especially in highlighting the cultural meaning of urbanization and what local people feel about urbanization. Of course, the study of the local involves studying the global in the local. This is obvious when we discuss the global influences on sociocultural aspects of urbanization. The global can be found in the individual voices of the local, as Mintz (2004:1) puts it, "through the individual voices of life history, the human and cultural meanings of globalization in the recent past can be made manifest." Anthropologists can contribute to the study of local urbanization, urban living and the cultural meaning of urbanization.[11]

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Notes

1 For a recent study of China's cities by historians, see Eschenick (2000).

2 Here we are not concerned with urban as virtual or a "mental and social form" as discussed by Lefebvre (1996:131). We are concerned with the sociological aspects of urbanization.

3 *Zhouchang* refers to the length of the outer boundary of an area, in this case the city of Quanzhou. It is like a circumference except that the outer boundary is generally not round, hence we translate *zhouchang* as perimeter.

4 For example, those with urban residence status were eligible to work in government departments or state enterprises. Urban residents could get coupons to buy rice, meat, fish and cloth cheaply. Those with agricultural residence status had no such advantages. The only way they could try to change their residential status was for them to serve in the army and hope that they would be allowed to live in a city after discharge or to get into a university and be given a job in a city after graduation. In actual fact, very few of those with agricultural residence status were successful in changing their residential status.

5 A shi refers to a city and also the areas outside the city proper (*chengli*, *chengqu*) that are under its administration, and so shi is usually translated as municipality.

6 Due to urbanization, most zhen towns are of considerable size and are easily perceived as urban, but in the pre-Reform period many zhen market towns were quite small, more like bazaar towns (called *pekan* in Malay) in Southeast Asia. Smaller ones, made up of one or two rows of simple shops, are actually not perceived by the local people as urban.

7 This kind of economic development whereby a whole town specializes in making one product is common in a number of towns in post-Reform China. Shishan township in Nan'an munipacility, for example, specializes in making umbrellas and it has acquired the name *sancheng* ("umbrella town").

8 Our interest in the urbanization of Quanzhou and villages in the municipality is an offshoot of research we conducted under the research project "Lineage, Migration and Chinese Network: A study of Emmigrant Communities in Quanzhou of Fujian" (2001-04), of which Chee-Beng Tan was the Principal Investigator, and under which Yuling Ding conducted her doctoral field research in Shudou village (see Ding 2004). The other co-researcher in Quanzhou is Mr. Wang Lianmao who focused his research on Shizhen. In 2006 Tan initiated his research on returned overseas Chinese in Nanshan of Shuangyang in Quanzhou. This village is also administratively urban although it is in every respect rural. Our research methodology was participant observation, through which we talked to many people. For the purpose of writing this article, we conducted interviews in 2005 and 2006 with a focus on urbanization, interviewing government officials, local entrepreneurs and revisiting our informants.

9 Interviewed on May 10, 2005.

10 For a description on the development of small towns and China's modernization, see Ma (1992).

11 This article is a revision of the paper presented at the international conference Asian Horizons: Cities, States and Societies, Singapore, August 1-3, 2005. We thank Alan Smart for his comments which were very helpful in making our revisions. The final responsibility rests with the authors.

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Urbanisation, migration et inégalités à Ciudad Juárez, Mexique

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Résumé : La ville de Juárez se situe au confluent de plusieurs phénomènes propres à l'économie globalisée ou à la mondialisation, particulièrement avec la présence des entreprises transnationales, les maquiladoras. Elle se trouve également au confluent d'importants mouvements de migration interne et internationale. Enfin, depuis quelques décennies des meurtres de femmes suivant une logique particulière ont été commis dans cette ville faisant d'elle, selon certains observateurs, la capitale du « féminicide ». On a été bien prompt à attribuer la responsabilité de ces meurtres à la population migrante. Pourtant, lorsqu'on se place sur un plan structurel, et qu'on examine le tout dans une perspective tenant compte du contexte de l'économie globalisée, on se rend compte que la situation est beaucoup plus complexe. En fait, la migration fait partie de dynamiques plus larges qui s'appuient sur des inégalités historiquement constituées tout en les accentuant davantage. Lorsque ces inégalités se combinent avec le désengagement de l'État et l'irresponsabilité sociale des corporations transnationales, comme c'est le cas à Juárez, tous les ingrédients sont réunis pour donner au changement social une allure de cauchemar urbain.

Mots clés : Ciudad Juárez, Mexique, économie globalisée, migration, classe sociale, inégalités

Abstract: Ciudad Juárez is located at the confluence of several phenomena particular to the globalized economy due the presence of transnational corporations in maquiladoras. It is also at the confluence of significant internal and international migration flows. Lastly, for several decades, it has been the site of many patterned murders of women, making it, according to some observers, the capital of "feminicide." Responsibility for these murders was quickly assigned to the migrant population. However, at a structural level and in the context of the globalized economy, it is clear that the situation is much more complex. In fact, migration is part of a broader dynamic which is based on historically constituted inequalities which are in turn, accentuated by migration. When these inequalities combine with the disengagement of the state and the social irresponsibility of transnational corporations, as is the case with Juárez, all the ingredients are in place to make the pace of social change into an urban nightmare.

Keywords: Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, globalized economy, migration, social class, inequality

Depuis des décennies, plus précisément depuis les années 1960, Ciudad Juárez intéresse les chercheurs parce qu'elle a été un des sites principaux de l'installation des *maquiladoras* (usines d'assemblage et de sous-traitance fonctionnant avec des capitaux internationaux ou mixtes) au Mexique. Située à la frontière nord du Mexique, juste en face de la ville de El Paso, au Texas, Juárez fait partie de l'ensemble régional de la frontière qui inclut tout autant les états du nord du Mexique (Baja California Norte, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas) que les états du sud des États-Unis (la Californie, l'Arizona, le Nouveau-Mexique, le Texas). Cette ville constitue le point de convergence de milliers de migrants venus de l'intérieur soit pour travailler dans les maquiladoras soit pour tenter de traverser la frontière.

L'intérêt pour Ciudad Juárez a été en quelque sorte renouvelé, particulièrement depuis le rapport d'Amnistie Internationale paru en août 2003 sur les meurtres de femmes dans cette ville (Amnistie Internationale 2003). Depuis lors, et même auparavant, plusieurs spécialistes du Mexique, de concert avec des militants pour la justice sociale en Amérique du nord et ailleurs, se sont intéressés à ces événements[1]. Il en est résulté une somme impressionnante de publications scientifiques et de rapports, sans compter les milliers de pages parues dans la presse nationale et internationale ainsi que sur Internet. En ce qui concerne les femmes migrantes, le journaliste Sam Quinones écrit[2] :

> les usines ont attiré les jeunes femmes du Mexique rural profond jusqu'à la frontière; [...] l'entrée rapide des femmes rurales dans la vie moderne joue vraisemblablement un rôle dans les meurtres. Rien dans la vie rurale mexicaine ne prépare une jeune femme pour la vie à Juárez. Dans leur village, elles n'ont pas le droit d'aller dehors la nuit tombée; elles marient le premier jeune homme avec qui elles couchent. Mais à Juárez, les chaînes tombent...Elles ne connaissent pas la ville...Elles vont dans ces clubs, qui sont des ter-

> reaux fertiles pour ce genre de crimes [...] Les liens qui habituellement relient les Mexicains les uns aux autres dans leur communauté n'existent pas vraiment à Juárez. [Quinones 2001:141-149]

La migration, et particulièrement les migrants, est donc pointée du doigt lorsque l'on veut expliquer les hauts taux de délinquance et les meurtres de femmes dans cette ville. Si on croit en général que les victimes sont des migrantes, on aime bien croire également que les criminels sont des migrants en quelque sorte dégénérés, se complaisant dans des conditions économiques dégradantes (Domínguez Ruvalcaba et Ravelo Blancas 2003:125).

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'importance de la migration à Ciudad Juárez est telle qu'il peut être intéressant de la prendre comme fil conducteur pour tenter de comprendre les dynamiques propres à cette ville et surtout d'échapper à une trop grande concentration sur la problématique de la frontière même (Heyman et Campbell 2004:209). De nombreux auteurs[3] ont tenté de fournir des explications aux meurtres de femmes dans cette ville ou à tout le moins des interprétations quant aux dynamiques à l'œuvre dans ces meurtres. Tout en évitant la surenchère en ce domaine, je propose d'examiner les relations entre la migration, les inégalités et le féminicide[4]. Il s'agit de situer la question au sein d'une interrogation plus large sur les inégalités qui sont produites dans le contexte de l'économie globalisée, cette dernière se définissant comme suit :

> the increasingly integrated and interdependant system of capital-labor flows across regions, between states, and through transnational corporations and international financial institutions, in the form of capital investments, technology transfer, financial exchanges, and increased trade, as well as the various forms of the deployment of labor, by which global accumulation takes place. [Moghadam 2000:130]

Dans cette économie globalisée, ajoute Bruno Lautier, « des choses qui, auparavant circulaient peu, ou dans une partie seulement du monde, se mettent à circuler désormais dans le monde entier » (Lautier 2006:41). Or, toujours selon cet auteur, la circulation des personnes fait partie des indicateurs qui permettent d'affirmer que la mondialisation actuelle est qualitativement nouvelle. Dans le présent article, je me propose de tenir compte de ce contexte. En me penchant sur la circulation des personnes, autrement dit sur la migration, j'espère dégager certains liens entre la configuration locale de l'économie globalisée à Juárez, les inégalités de classes[5] et de genre[6], et les meurtres de femmes dans cette ville.

La migration et l'urbanisation

Dans le contexte mexicain du XX^{e} siècle, migration et urbanisation sont étroitement reliées. Dans un premier temps, on a observé une importante croissance urbaine comme résultat de la migration des populations rurales vers des villes comme Mexico et Puebla entre 1950 et 1970. C'était l'époque des politiques d'industrialisation par substitution d'importation émises dans un esprit d'indépendance nationale (Leora de la Rosa 2004:243); la population rurale trouvait alors aisément à s'employer dans les secteurs non seulement de l'industrie mais aussi des services (particulièrement en ce qui concerne les femmes). À cette époque, plus précisément entre 1942 et 1964, la migration internationale s'effectuait essentiellement dans le cadre du Programme Bracero. Ce programme reposait sur un accord bilatéral entre le Mexique et les États-Unis et visait à fournir une main d'œuvre saisonnière pouvant travailler sur les fermes des états du Sud.

Entre-temps, on remarque un changement radical d'orientation au Mexique alors que les politiques d'industrialisation par substitution d'importations cèdent le pas à une adhésion aux modèles privilégiant l'exportation. À la même époque aux États-Unis, on assiste au passage d'un modèle fordiste de production à un modèle post-fordiste plus flexible qui repose sur la relocalisation des industries qui ont perdu leur avantage comparatif, ce qui coïncidera avec l'installation de ces industries à la frontière entre le Mexique et les États-Unis et leur restructuration selon le modèle des maquiladoras (Peña 2005:286).

Un mouvement de migration, interne lui aussi, de populations urbaines vers d'autres centres urbains, plus particulièrement à partir de grandes villes vers d'autres grandes villes ou des villes moyennes[7] se produira dans un deuxième temps. Par exemple, entre 1995 et 2000, 48,7 % des flux migratoires au Mexique ont eu les villes à la fois comme point de départ et point d'arrivée. Pour sa part, la migration rurale vers la ville ne représentait alors plus que 18,3 % (CONAPO 2004a:29). La migration interne a contribué à intensifier le processus d'urbanisation au Mexique de même qu'à le diversifier au cours des dernières décennies (CONAPO 2004b). La migration internationale, plus précisément celle de populations rurales appauvries vers les États-Unis, s'est aussi intensifiée à la fin du XX^{e} siècle et au début du XXI^{e} siècle, parallèlement à la migration interne. Selon Fernando Lozano Ascencio, la migration interne et la migration internationale des Mexicains sont en effet liées l'une à l'autre en ce sens que les migrants internationaux auraient, dans une large majorité, une expérience de migration interne antérieure (Lozano Ascencio 2002:98)[8].

Qu'il s'agisse de migration interne ou internationale récente, les causes sont à rechercher dans le creusement des disparités régionales. Plusieurs recherches ont montré que l'Accord de Libre Échange Nord-Américain (ALÉNA), en tant que fer de lance de l'économie globalisée au Mexique, a contribué à accentuer ces disparités, particulièrement celles entre le nord et le sud du pays. Déjà en 1993, Prévôt-Schapira et Revel-Mouroz écrivaient que, dans les années 2000, la région frontalière connaîtrait :

> une pression migratoire accrue du fait des déstructurations-restructurations en milieu rural et du développement de l'informel au Mexique. L'ALÉNA, une fois signé, ne devrait pas modifier, sinon à long terme, l'existence du flux de migrants du travail vers les États-Unis, et les villes de la frontière devraient continuer à connaître de graves problèmes d'équipements urbains et de gestion de la population flottante. [Prévôt-Schapira et Revel-Mouroz 1993:143]

Ces auteurs ne s'imaginaient probablement pas à quel point leurs propos allaient se confirmer. Depuis la signature de l'ALÉNA, le bassin traditionnel d'états « expulseurs » de migrants internationaux, comme Michoacán, Guanajuato, Zacatecas et Jalisco, s'est élargi pour inclure d'autres états comme Veracruz, Puebla ou encore Hidalgo. Mais tous, presque sans exception, sont situés dans le centre et le sud du pays. Cette migration internationale est d'ailleurs devenue un élément fondamental de l'économie mexicaine. Ainsi, en 2005, les remises d'argent reliées à cette migration ont été de plus de 20 milliards de dollars, ce qui représente 2,8 % du produit intérieur brut du Mexique[9]. Il s'agit de la deuxième source de revenu externe de l'économie mexicaine (Arteaga García 2005:755).

L'intérêt de se pencher sur une ville comme Ciudad Juárez lorsque l'on s'intéresse aux processus d'urbanisation et de migration au Mexique est qu'elle se situe au confluent de la migration interne et de la migration internationale. Déjà, à l'époque du programme Bracero, une grande partie de la migration des travailleurs ruraux mexicains vers les fermes du Texas notamment était canalisée à travers la ville de Juárez (Esparza et alli 2004:122). Aujourd'hui, Ciudad Juárez est pour ainsi dire une ville de migrants, plus de 32 % de la population vivant dans cette ville en l'an 2000 étant né à l'extérieur (INEGI 2000); elle est aussi située sur une des trajectoires privilégiées par les migrants. Il n'y a d'ailleurs pas que les migrants en provenance du sud de la République qui s'y retrouvent. Il y a aussi ceux d'Amérique centrale, et depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, le renforcement des mesures de sécurité à la frontière font que beaucoup d'entre eux sont forcés de rester dans les villes frontalières mexicaines dont Ciudad Juárez (CPEVMCJ 2004:22).

La ville de Juárez : généralités

Ciudad Juárez appartient à l'état de Chihuahua, le plus grand du Mexique quant à la superficie. L'état est caractérisé par le fait qu'il soit peu peuplé, qu'il soit éloigné de la capitale nationale sur les plans économique et politique, et qu'il soit davantage tourné vers les autres états frontaliers avec lesquels il partage davantage de caractéristiques économiques et politiques de même qu'un certain modèle de développement. L'état de Chihuahua est également caractérisé par ses grands espaces et son climat extrême. Il s'agit d'une région sur laquelle il a toujours été difficile pour le pouvoir, d'abord colonial, puis républicain, d'établir sa souveraineté, autant en raison de son éloignement, des incursions des Indiens du nord, que de sa faible démographie. La souveraineté a été réalisée à grand peine par la militarisation puis par une forme de colonisation fragmentée.

En 1848, lorsque le Rio Bravo devient la limite méridionale du Texas en vertu du Traité de Guadalupe Hidalgo, la bourgade de El Paso del Norte n'est tout au plus qu'une colonie militaire qui a pour fonction d'empêcher les pirates et les délinquants de s'établir à la frontière. En 1865, El Paso devient zone franche et s'y installent des casinos de même que des bordels. La localité devient ville en 1888 et prend le nom de Ciudad Juárez en l'honneur de Benito Juárez qui s'était réfugié dans le Chihuahua lors de la guerre de réforme. La ville cesse d'être zone franche en 1905 mais les casinos et autres entreprises de même acabit continueront leurs opérations. Ils connaîtront même une résurgence en 1935 alors que règne la loi de tempérance (la *ley seca*) aux États-Unis et que les citoyens de ce pays viennent s'y livrer à la production et à la vente d'alcool (Selene de Dios 2004).

Au milieu du XX^{e} siècle, Ciudad Juárez fut un site important d'immigration européenne dans le contexte de la deuxième guerre mondiale. La ville a également reçu plusieurs Mexicains dans le sillage du programme des Braceros (1942-1964)[10]. En même temps que prenait fin ce programme au milieu des années 1960, une série de programmes axés sur l'industrialisation de la frontière prendront naissance et favoriseront l'installation des premières maquiladoras dans les villes frontalières tout en donnant lieu à un processus accéléré d'urbanisation (Monárrez Fragoso 2006a:122). À Ciudad Juárez, en 1969, on comptait 17 maquiladoras employant 2100 travailleurs. La maquiladora non seulement a déplacé l'industrie locale préexistante à Ciudad Juárez, elle a aussi façonné un mar-

ché particulier du travail tout en se combinant aux tendances de la migration interne. Des 400 000 habitants que comptait la ville à cette époque, pas moins de 225 000, en majorité des migrants, s'étaient installés dans des quartiers précaires, dans des maisons d'une seule pièce et ne disposant d'aucun service public (Flores Simental 2006:18-19).

La population migrante et le travail dans les maquiladoras

La ville de Juárez a attiré les migrants en raison de son taux de croissance économique au-dessus de la moyenne nationale et de fait, cette ville a connu la plus grande concentration d'emplois dans les maquiladoras de tout le pays. Les femmes ont d'abord constitué la composante principale du mouvement migratoire dans le pays, particulièrement entre les années 1950 et 1970 et on estime qu'elles ont joué un rôle de premier ordre dans la création de réseaux reliant les populations du lieu d'origine au lieu d'arrivée. Les femmes immigrantes proviennent surtout de l'état même du Chihuahua ou des états voisins de Coahuila et Durango, ou encore d'états plus lointains comme le Zacatecas. Pour la moitié d'entre elles, elles seraient d'origine rurale. Il y aurait deux formes de migration féminine vers Juárez : l'émigration familiale décidée par le père de famille et l'émigration individuelle qui représenterait 40 % du total d'émigration féminine à Juárez (Covo-Maurice 2001). Apparemment, la population locale n'a jamais considéré ces femmes autrement que comme des *fuereñas* c'est à dire des étrangères. Au début de la vague de migration vers les maquiladoras, plusieurs d'entre elles avaient un faible niveau d'éducation et étaient qualifiées de *maquilocas*, jeu de mot qui pourrait être traduit par les « folles des maquiladoras » (Ravelo Blancas et Sanchez Díaz 2005:99). Il faut dire qu'au Mexique les femmes se sont intégrées au marché du travail dans un contexte de misogynie prononcée et les travailleuses des maquiladoras, dès qu'elles manifestaient leur nouvelle autonomie en dépensant leur salaire à la discothèque ou encore en fréquentant les nombreux bars de la ville, ont souvent été associées à des prostituées dans l'esprit de la population.

À partir des années 1980, de larges contingents d'hommes ont commencé à arriver du centre et du sud du Mexique (Barnett 2000) et à s'intégrer de plus en plus aux maquiladoras. Alors qu'en 1982, on comptait dans les maquiladoras de Juárez 260 travailleurs pour 1000 travailleuses, en 1993 cette proportion était déjà passée à 820 travailleurs pour 1000 travailleuses (Zamorano Villareal 2006:49). On parle alors d'une masculinisation de la force de travail des maquiladoras due, entre autres, à la croissance de l'industrie des pièces automobiles, à l'innovation technologique et à une pénurie de main d'œuvre féminine – liée en très grande partie à leurs obligations familiales (Bayon 2003). La maquiladora ne cessera pas pour autant d'être la principale source d'emplois pour les femmes (Quintero Ramírez 2003:5-7).

La signature de l'ALÉNA a entraîné de meilleures opportunités pour la circulation du capital et pour les entreprises, de même que de nouvelles modalités d'exemption d'impôts, ce qui s'est traduit par un boom des maquiladoras à la frontière et même par leur expansion dans le reste du pays. En même temps qu'il favorisait l'installation encore plus intense des maquiladoras, l'ALÉNA a sans nul doute contribué à ce que la migration vers les états frontaliers continue d'augmenter. Cela se vérifie particulièrement pour l'état de Chihuahua qui, de tous les états frontaliers, a présenté le plus haut taux de croissance dû à la migration (Esparza et alli 2004:126). À Ciudad Juárez, ce taux de croissance entre 1990 et 2000 a été de 4,34 % alors qu'il était de 4,99 % à Tijuana, autre ville frontalière comparable, et de 2,3 % pour l'ensemble du Mexique (Rubio Salas 2005a:46 et CONAPO 2004b). En 2005, la ville de Juárez comptait 1 460 660 personnes, une augmentation de 40 000 personnes par rapport à 2004[11]. C'est la cinquième ville du Mexique sur le plan démographique et première ville de l'état du Chihuahua avec 39,9 % de la population totale de cet état[12].

Le développement des maquiladoras à Ciudad Juárez a atteint un sommet en 2000 alors que le nombre de travailleurs était de 262,805 personnes, ce qui représentait 32 % du nombre total de travailleurs dans ce secteur au pays (Rubio Salas 2006:59). Par contre, la récession de l'an 2000 et les effets des attentats du 11 septembre 2001 se sont fait ressentir fortement, car entre 2001 et 2002, 100 000 emplois ont été perdus à Juárez dont 60 000 dans le secteur des maquiladoras (Rubio Salas 2006:44 et 2005b:192). Cette perte représentait 80 % de tous les emplois perdus dans l'état de Chihuahua (CPEVMCJ 2004:15). Actuellement et ce, depuis 2005, on remarque une certaine récupération alors qu'à la fin de 2006, on comptait 236 293 personnes travaillant dans quelque 279 maquiladoras (PEDJ 2006).

Comme on peut s'y attendre, à Juárez, la proportion de la population économiquement active travaillant dans le secteur secondaire (secteur de la transformation incluant les maquiladoras), qui atteint 47,3 %, est plus élevée que pour l'ensemble du pays où la proportion est de l'ordre de 28,7 %[13]. Chez les hommes de Juárez, il s'agit de 46,3 % et chez les femmes, de 49,3 % (Cruz Piñeiro 2005:127). Dans les maquiladoras proprement dites, les femmes représentent 60 % de la main d'œuvre totale (Gilot

2006). Cette proportion est remarquable car elle est plus élevée que pour l'ensemble du pays où 54 % des ouvriers des maquiladoras sont en fait des ouvrières[14]. Quant à la migration, dans la présente décennie, on estime à 33,9 % la proportion de femmes qui seraient arrivées à Juárez en provenance d'un autre état à la recherche d'un travail[15] alors qu'il s'agirait de 35 % pour les hommes. Les femmes ne forment donc plus la majorité du contingent migratoire. Les immigrants des deux sexes sont jeunes, la moyenne d'âge se situant entre 15 et 39 ans (Rubio Salas 2005a:62; 2005b:196). Les migrants à Ciudad Juárez seraient en fait de trois types. D'abord, on a les résidents de la ville qui sont nés dans un autre état que le Chihuahua; ensuite, les migrants temporaires qui y demeurent tant qu'ils ont du travail et enfin les migrants en transit qui ont comme objectif de traverser aux États-Unis ou encore qui ont tenté de traverser mais qui ont été déportés. En d'autres termes, il y a tout un éventail de formes de mobilité des migrants (Rubio Salas 2006:38, 54) qui font d'ailleurs de Ciudad Juárez une ville multiculturelle (Zamorano Villareal 2006:31). Depuis 2000, la population flottante a vraisemblablement augmenté tant devant la diminution des opportunités d'emploi que la difficulté de passer la frontière.

Une participation au marché du travail, particulièrement dans les maquiladoras, ne signifie nullement que les revenus soient satisfaisants ou encore qu'ils soient suffisants pour « se sortir » de la pauvreté. On estime que 58,1 % de la population active des villes frontalières mexicaines doit se contenter de moins de trois salaires minimum[16] par jour ce qui, au Mexique, est nettement insuffisant pour une vie décente sur le plan économique (Monárrez Fragoso 2006a). Le manque d'opportunités économiques et l'absence de services sont des caractéristiques de la marginalité urbaine. Or, de façon paradoxale dans une ville comme Ciudad Juárez, longtemps synonyme de sécurité d'emploi (Landau 2005:360), les proportions de la population présentant un indice élevé et très élevé de marginalisation sont de 33,3 % et de 11,7 % respectivement[17]. Les populations marginalisées n'ont d'autres options que de vivre dans certains secteurs de la ville, de sorte que l'on peut parler d'une ségrégation spatiale de la pauvreté (Peña 2005:293).

La délinquance

Lorsque l'on observe une carte de Juárez, et encore plus lorsqu'on contemple la ville depuis les collines au-dessus de la ville d'El Paso, on est frappé par son étendue et surtout par la présence de terrains vagues en plein milieu de la zone urbaine. Le centre-ville n'est en fait pas au centre. Il se trouve plutôt près de la frontière. Cette ville a grossi sans contrôle ni planification (Landau 2005:359). La majorité des quartiers populaires sont situés au sud de la ville, d'autres sur les flancs de la Sierra de Juárez à l'ouest. Les quartiers qu'on y retrouve se sont développés à partir de l'invasion illégale des terres. Pour entrer en possession d'un lopin sur lequel ériger leur maison, les nouveaux venus doivent recourir à des associations de *colonos*[18] dirigés par des leaders, eux-mêmes affiliés au régime en place (Flores Simental 2006:18). Les habitants de ces quartiers ne sont pas propriétaires au sens propre du terme : ils paient une sorte de rente au gouvernement, aux leaders des associations de colonos ou encore à des propriétaires absentéistes – bref ce sont des squatters (Zamorano Villareal 2006:42, note 8). Il ne faut donc pas s'étonner si les infrastructures brillent par leur absence dans ces quartiers (Flores Simental 2006:5). Les nouveaux arrivants ont d'ailleurs tendance à s'installer toujours plus en périphérie de la ville précisément dans les zones d'expansion physique de la ville (Esparza et alli 2004:135). Une recherche comparant les conditions de logement des migrants des années 1980 avec celles des migrants plus récents suggère que les conditions économiques se sont détériorées, que leur conditions de vie sont encore plus précaires qu'auparavant et que, contrairement aux migrants plus anciens, ils n'arrivent pas à améliorer leur situation avec le temps (Zamorano Villareal 2006).

Quant à elles, les maquiladoras sont installées dans les quelque 17 parcs industriels qui sont installés sur le pourtour de la ville. Les quartiers populaires (*las colonias*) tendent à se coller à proximité des maquiladoras. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant que les travailleurs et travailleuses trouveront de l'emploi dans les maquiladoras les plus rapprochées de leur lieu de résidence d'où leur étroite dépendance quant au transport public. Or, de l'avis de plusieurs observateurs, ce réseau de transport public mal conçu se combinant avec une multiplicité d'espaces ouverts (ou de terrains vagues) font de cette ville un « énorme piège urbain » (Selene de Dios 2004:s.p.)

Il y aurait en fait deux Ciudad Juárez, celle des migrants, réduits à une économie de subsistance, exclus de la cité, considérés comme responsables de tous les problèmes sociaux de la ville, et l'autre, celle des classes plus aisées qui se considèrent comme les occupants légitimes de la ville (Bernt 2003:278), sans compter cette classe transnationale davantage tournée vers les États-Unis que vers le Mexique. On se retrouve là devant une polarisation sociale bien marquée. C'est ce qui fait d'ailleurs dire à certains chercheurs que la ville est devenue polycentrique (Esparza et al. 2004:129), ou encore qu'elle est comparable à un archipel (Rodríguez Álvarez 2002). Plusieurs attribuent les tensions sociales qui se font sentir dans

cette ville à l'industrialisation rapide, particulièrement aux maquiladoras qui ont favorisé le développement des inégalités non seulement économiques mais aussi de genre dans la mesure où la main d'œuvre féminine a été et continue d'être préférée à celle des hommes (Bernt 2003:277) mais traitée de façon discriminatoire.

Dans cette ville, 50 % des rues ne sont pas pavées et celles-ci se concentrent bien entendu dans les quartiers populaires; il y a un déficit de zones vertes de l'ordre de 80 % et plus de 200 000 familles vivent dans des zones considérées à haut risque (CPEVMCJ 2004:13). Les données disponibles dans le domaine des délits comme celles présentées sur le tableau suivant montrent clairement que Ciudad Juárez est une ville violente.
D'autres études, dont notamment l'Enquête nationale sur

TABLEAU 1
Délits à Ciudad Juárez en 2001
(nombre absolu par 100 000 habitants)

	Ciudad Juárez	Chihuahua	Mexique
Blessures	730	303	113
Homicides	66	25	12
Enlèvements	133	51	18

Source : ICESI 2002

l'insécurité (Encuesta Nacional sobre Inseguridad) de 2005 peuvent ici être citées. Le chercheur Rubio Salas a examiné la partie de cette enquête qui compare les villes frontalières comme Ciudad Juárez, Mexicali et Tijuana et a fait ressortir qu'elles présentent toutes des niveaux d'incidence de la violence sensiblement plus élevés que la moyenne nationale, soit de l'ordre de 30 %. Et, comme le montre clairement le tableau précédent, une ville comme Juárez présente une proportion de délits beaucoup plus élevée que celle de l'état dont elle fait partie.

Parmi les délits rapportés sur le tableau précédent et dans l'enquête nationale sur l'insécurité, de nombreux sont liés au narcotrafic, au crime organisé et aux activités mafieuses. Ces dernières auraient augmenté ces dernières années, particulièrement avec le démantèlement du cartel de Cali en Colombie, ce qui a provoqué un déplacement des activités en lien avec le trafic de drogue à la frontière nord du Mexique où sévit le cartel de Juárez. Le crime organisé donne une allure particulière à la violence urbaine malgré les dénégations des autorités, sans doute parce que la ligne séparant les corps policiers des organisations criminelles est « plus que subtile » (Flores Simental 2006:25) comme l'ont montré de façon éloquente au début de l'année 2004 l'affaire des « narcofosses »[20] de même que les enquêtes de Fernandez et Rampal (2005, 2006a et b) et celles de Washington Valdez (2005).

Tous ces facteurs provoquent une recrudescence de l'utilisation de drogues et d'armes à feu, d'où un sentiment d'insécurité accru. La Commission nationale des droits humains qui, bien entendu, s'est penchée sur le cas de Ciudad Juárez, estime que la lutte menée par les corps policiers contre le narcotrafic a fait de cette ville « non seulement un champ de bataille mais aussi un quartier général où se livrent périodiquement des affrontements en vue du contrôle du commerce illicite de la drogue, ce qui affaiblit l'État de droit, tout en créant un climat d'insécurité et de crainte parmi la population » (CNDH 2003:s.p.) À tout cela s'ajoute le trafic des êtres humains, particulièrement des femmes, le trafic des armes, le vol de voiture, et bien d'autres crimes encore (CPEVMCJ 2004:16).

Les meurtres de femmes

Les données disponibles sur les meurtres dans leur ensemble montrent qu'à Ciudad Juárez, particulièrement dans les années 1990, on a trouvé encore bien davantage de corps mutilés d'hommes que de femmes (Nathan 2002). Entre 1994 et 1997, 143 femmes et 942 hommes ont été assassinés dans cette ville. Les meurtres d'hommes représentent quelque 87 % de tous les meurtres qui y ont été commis. Par contre, alors que les meurtres d'hommes augmentaient de 300 % par rapport à la période 1990-1993, la croissance était de 600 % pour les meurtres de femmes (Jones 2004)[21]. C'est d'ailleurs une donnée qui a attiré l'attention d'Esther Chávez Cano, une militante des droits des femmes, fondatrice et actuellement directrice du Centre de crises *Casa amiga* à Ciudad Juárez. À la simple lecture des faits divers dans les journaux, elle a pressenti qu'un phénomène suivant une logique particulière était en train de se produire[22]. Le registre des meurtres de femmes qu'elle a tenu depuis lors a constitué le point de référence d'un certain nombre de bases de données qui ont été confectionnées par la suite.

La base de données la plus crédible sur le féminicide est, à mon avis, celle du *Colegio de la Frontera Norte*, institution académique d'où provient une grande partie des documents sur lesquels est basé le présent article. Cette base de données, pour la période 1993-2005 rapporte quelque 442 cas de femmes et de fillettes assassinées, dont 58 non identifiées. De ce nombre 60 % étaient nées dans l'état de Chihuahua dont 45 % dans la ville même de Juárez; la moyenne d'âge était de 26,1 ans; enfin, 46 d'entre elles, soit 10,4 %, étaient des travailleuses de maquiladoras. Si on considère que l'occupation ou l'activité à laquelle ces femmes se livraient avant de mourir comme indica-

trice de l'appartenance de classe, on peut dire que la très grande majorité appartenait au prolétariat formel ou informel. En effet, seulement 25 femmes, soit 5,6 %, étaient des propriétaires, commerçantes ou professionnelles, alors que 35 étaient étudiantes et 25 mineures (Monárrez Fragoso 2006b:356-360). En fait, la plupart des victimes ont un point en commun, soit celui d'être pauvres.

Ce point a été mis en lumière par une équipe du Colegio de la Frontera Norte qui a élaboré un Système d'information géographique pour le féminicide (le SIGFEM). Pour ce faire, on a relié les variables à l'étude (soit les féminicides) et les unités spatiales dans lesquelles elles avaient pris place. L'hypothèse centrale pour l'élaboration du SIGFEM est que « la violence de genre et les conditions structurelles socio-économiques sont des facteurs qui conditionnent un contexte d'extrême violence pour les femmes à Ciudad Juárez depuis la décennie 1990 » (Cervera 2006:405). Les deux indicateurs auxquels les chercheurs ont recouru étaient : le niveau socio-économique des habitants de la ville et le déficit d'infrastructure (eau, drainage et énergie électrique). Or la distribution spatiale du féminicide est venue confirmer l'hypothèse en ce sens qu'il y a une correspondance très forte de son occurrence avec les zones caractérisées par des niveaux socioéconomiques bas et avec une carence d'infrastructures. En fait, plus les gens appartiennent à des niveaux socio-économiques bas et plus ils habitent dans des zones caractérisées par un déficit d'infrastructure, plus il y a de probabilité qu'ils soient victimes d'un acte de violence comme le féminicide. Une de ces zones est celle de l'ouest de la ville (Cervera 2006:468).

Les organisations de défense des femmes de Ciudad Juárez signalent pour leur part que les meurtres de femmes continuent[23]. Seulement au cours la première moitié de l'année 2006, quelque 15 femmes auraient été assassinées dans cette ville[24]. Le 23 mai 2006, la ministre de la Justice de l'état de Chihuahua a fait état sur la base de 386 cas d'assassinats de femmes[25] entre 1993 et 2006 que 47 % d'entre eux, soit 185, avaient été résolus; 65 étaient en instance et 124 autres faisaient l'objet d'une enquête, alors que 12 dossiers avaient été acheminés au ministère fédéral de la Justice (Monárrez Fragoso 2006b:357, note 7). Remarquons ici que dans le langage judiciaire, le terme « résolu » ne signifie pas nécessairement que les coupables aient reçu leur sentence et s'ils l'ont reçue, qu'ils aient été condamnés. Il y a de nombreuses indications voulant que la justice se soit traîné les pieds ou encore que des coupables aient été fabriqués de toute pièce par la police qui aurait recouru à la torture (CPEVMCJ 2006). De plus, les 177 fonctionnaires de l'État qui avaient été trouvés coupables d'actes de négligence « criminels » ou administratifs par la Commissaire spéciale nommée en 2004 ont tous été innocentés par des juges locaux de l'état de Chihuahua[26]. Tout cela n'est pas sans alerter les instances internationales. Ainsi, du 7 au 25 août 2006, le Comité pour l'Élimination de la discrimination à l'égard des femmes, un organisme des Nations Unies chargé de faire le suivi de l'application de la Convention du même nom (CEDEF) tenait sa 36e session dans la ville de New York et recevait diverses organisations préoccupées du sort des femmes au Mexique[27]. Le Comité a interpellé l'État et a pointé l'impunité en des termes à peine voilés :

> Alors qu'il apprécie l'engagement et les efforts de l'État pour traiter des cas de violence contre les femmes à Ciudad Juárez, le comité continue d'être préoccupé par le fait que les disparitions de femmes et les crimes contre elles se poursuivent, et que ces efforts soient insuffisants autant pour compléter avec succès les enquêtes sur les cas et pour poursuivre en justice et punir leurs auteurs que pour donner accès à la justice, à la protection et aux compensations pour les victimes et leurs familles. Le comité est particulièrement préoccupé par le fait que ces efforts soient jusqu'ici restés vains en ce qui a trait à la prévention des crimes. (CEDEF 2006)

Conclusion

Depuis maintenant 40 ans, les maquiladoras de la frontière constituent le fer de lance de l'économie globalisée. Elles profitent d'avantages comparatifs non négligeables et ce, non seulement sur le plan du faible coût de la main d'œuvre mais aussi sur celui de l'exemption d'impôts municipaux. Lorsqu'elles en paient, les maquiladoras font tout en leur pouvoir pour cesser de le faire. Ainsi, il semble que Ciudad Juárez va perdre des sommes de l'ordre de 50 millions de dollars en impôt pour l'éclairage public, alors que 10 maquiladoras ont gagné leur cause devant la Cour suprême pour éviter de payer ce service. Il y aurait une centaine d'autres causes en attente de jugement (FIDH 2006:33). Rappelons que l'absence d'éclairage public, combinée à l'existence de rues non pavées qui empêchent le transport public d'atteindre les quartiers populaires, a été identifiée comme un des facteurs de risque pour les femmes.

Une multiplicité d'hypothèses concernant les causes structurelles des meurtres de femmes à Juárez ont été explorées et chose certaine, aucune d'entre elles prise isolément n'est suffisante. Malgré le fait que seulement 46 femmes sur les 442 répertoriées aient été des travailleuses dans les maquiladoras, la culture du travail propre à ce secteur a été à maintes reprises mentionnée comme fac-

teur de risque pour les femmes. Dans les maquiladoras, en effet, on assiste à de nombreuses violations des droits des travailleurs et des travailleuses et de la Loi Fédérale du travail. On remarque notamment une domination du syndicalisme à la solde des entreprises et conséquemment une faible tradition de lutte dans le domaine. La culture du travail est plutôt déterminée par les maquiladoras qui régulent non seulement les conditions de travail mais aussi les conditions de vie dans le quotidien même des travailleurs (Ravelo Blancas et Sanchez Díaz 2005:97). Cette culture du travail se caractérise par l'irresponsabilité sociale, une irresponsabilité vraisemblablement renforcée par l'économie globalisée dans la mesure où son allié principal est le désengagement de l'État pour à peu près tout ce qui touche le bien-être et la sécurité des travailleurs et des travailleuses.

Une autre caractéristique propre à l'économie globalisée dans sa dimension de flexibilisation du travail s'est manifestée récemment par l'apparition d'agences émettant des contrats de travail de 30 jours pour les travailleurs au nom des maquiladoras. Ainsi, ces dernières sont pratiquement déchargées de la responsabilité tant sur le plan du recrutement que sur celui des avantages sociaux, y compris de la sécurité des ouvrières (Ravelo Blancas et Sanchez Díaz 2005:128). C'est d'ailleurs « grâce » aux maquiladoras que la frontière est devenue un « cauchemar environnemental » (Laudau 2005:366) : des égouts à ciel ouvert sans usines de traitement des eaux, du matériel toxique relâché dans le sol, l'air et l'eau. Bref, comme le dit le sociologue Victor Quintana, tel que le rapporte Landau, la maquiladora se moque des valeurs traditionnelles comme la coopération et la solidarité; ses seules valeurs sont l'individualisme et la compétition (Landau 2005:361).

Contrairement à ce qui est occasionnellement véhiculé dans les médias, la relation entre la migration et la résurgence de la violence, et particulièrement les meurtres de femmes à Ciudad Juárez, n'est pas avérée. Par contre, il existe bel et bien une relation entre la configuration locale de l'économie globalisée – qui s'exprime dans une fragmentation spatiale toujours plus profonde de la ville –, et les conditions d'inégalité dans lesquelles les migrants doivent s'installer. Les résultats du Système d'information géographique pour le féminicide et qui ont illustré cette fragmentation spatiale sont particulièrement intéressants car ils permettent de prendre en compte des conditions économiques issues d'un processus plus large et de réfléchir en termes structurels plutôt que de faire une lecture trop ponctuelle des liens entre l'urbanisation, la migration et les meurtres de femmes à Juárez. En d'autres termes, ce que l'on peut observer dans cette ville, c'est une combinaison particulière de désengagement de l'État et d'irresponsabilité sociale des corporations transnationales qui contribuent à creuser les inégalités et à donner au changement social une allure de cauchemar urbain.

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Notes

1 Un certain nombre de documents utilisés pour cet article ont été recueillis lors de trois courts séjours à Ciudad Juárez entre 1999 et 2005. Un de ces séjours a été effectué dans le cadre d'une enquête du Comité québécois de solidarité avec les femmes de Juárez en février 2004 (Acosta et al. 2004) au cours de laquelle, avec les autres membres du Comité, j'ai pu rencontrer différents acteurs significatifs sur les questions relatives aux meurtres de femmes de Juárez dont les autorités administratives et judiciaires de la ville de Juárez et de l'état de Chihuahua, de même que des personnes rattachées à des institutions de défense des droits humains (tant à Juárez qu'à Mexico) et enfin des mères de victimes. Bien que le présent article repose sur des sources secondaires, il n'aurait pas pu être écrit sans ces séjours qui m'ont permis de mieux comprendre la configuration de la ville tant spatialement que socialement. Enfin, bien que je sois toujours membre du Comité québécois de solidarité avec les femmes de Juárez, les propos contenus dans cet article n'engagent pas les autres membres de ce comité. Je remercie mes auxiliaires de recherche, Geneviève Roberge et Sandra Desrochers, qui ont été d'un grand secours dans la lecture et l'annotation des articles scientifiques utilisés ici. Dans un autre ordre d'idées, veuillez noter que toutes les citations traduites soit de l'anglais ou de l'espagnol au français l'ont été par la présente auteure.

2 Quinones s'appuie en partie ici sur les propos de Maria Antonietta Esparza, une avocate directrice d'un bureau qui traite des crimes sexuels et de la violence domestique à Ciudad Juárez.

3 Melissa W. Wright est sans doute la plus connue de ces auteurs parce qu'elle a abondamment publié sur le sujet depuis 1997 et qu'elle fait partie du monde académique nord-américain. Voir notamment Wright 2006. Toutefois, la très grande majorité des auteurs qui se sont intéressés au féminicide à Juarez sont en fait Mexicains et ce sont eux (et elles) qui constituent ma principale source d'inspiration – ils se retrouvent dans la bibliographie de cet article, notamment Domínguez Ruvalcaba et Ravelo Blancas 2003, Esparza et alli 2004, Monárrez Fragoso 2006a et b, Ravelo Blancas et Sánchez Díaz 2005.

4 Selon Radford et Russell (1992), le féminicide est l'assassinat misogyne de femmes par des hommes; c'est cette définition qu'utilise Julia Monárrez Fragoso dans ses nombreux travaux sur le féminicide à Ciudad Juárez. Dans un de ses travaux les plus récents, elle ajoute que le féminicide s'appuie sur une combinaison de facteurs dont on doit tenir compte dans l'analyse, tels les motifs des assassinats, les

auteurs, les changements structurels dans la société et la tolérance de la part des États et des autres institutions (Monárrez Fragoso 2006b:354). Pour qu'un féminicide se produise, ajoute Marcela Lagarde, il faut une convergence criminelle de silence, d'omission, de négligence et de collusion des autorités responsables. Il y a féminicide quand l'État ne donne pas de garanties aux femmes et n'assure pas les conditions de sécurité pour leur vie dans la communauté, la maison, pas plus que dans les espaces de travail, lors de leurs déplacements ou durant leurs loisirs, et encore plus, lorsque les autorités ne remplissent pas leurs fonctions de façon efficace. Pour tout cela, selon Lagarde tel que le rapporte CPEVMCJ, le féminicide doit être considéré comme un crime d'État (CPEVMCJ 2004:11-12).

5 De façon générale, je m'inspire ici de l'apport de Bellone et Hite (2005) pour parler de la structure de classe. Ces auteures s'appuient sur Portes et Hoffmann (2003) qui, sur la base de la possession ou non de cinq atouts, déterminent quelque quatre classes principales, les plus hautes possédant les cinq atouts et les plus basses en possédant moins ou pas du tout. Ces atouts sont : 1) le contrôle sur le capital et les moyens de production; 2) le contrôle sur la force de travail; 3) la possession d'habiletés significatives (valued) rares; 4) la possession d'autres habiletés; 5) les protections légales et la régulation. Les quatre classes principales sont la classe dominante, la petite-bourgeoisie, le prolétariat formel, et le prolétariat informel. Dans le présent article ce sont ces deux dernières classes qui nous intéressent davantage. Le prolétariat formel comprend les travailleurs formels autant dans les institutions publiques que privées; le prolétariat informel comprend les employés dans les microentreprises informelles; les travailleurs non-spécialisés, non professionnels autoemployés, et enfin les travailleurs domestiques (Bellone Viterna et Hite 2005:58-59).

6 J'adhère ici à la définition fournie par Moghadam : le genre est « une relation sociale asymétrique entre les hommes et les femmes basée sur des différences perçues de sexe, et une idéologie concernant leurs rôles, droits, et valeurs en tant que travailleurs, propriétaires, citoyens et parents » (2000:129).

7 Les grandes villes sont celles de plus d'un million d'habitants. Les villes moyennes ont entre 100 000 et 1 million d'habitants. Selon ces caractéristiques, Ciudad Juárez est une "grande" ville.

8 L'auteur soutient également que la migration interne a été plus intense vers la partie nord du pays. Divisant le pays en trois zones pour les fins de son étude, il constate que de 1995 à 2000 notamment, les soldes migratoires des régions sud et centre sont négatifs alors que le solde migratoire de la région nord est positif (Lozano Ascensio 2002:89). Pour sa part, la migration internationale des Mexicains est de plus en plus massive. Face à ce phénomène, les États-Unis hésitent (à peine) entre une répression sans merci et un accommodement plus libéral. Voir Durand (2006).

9 D'après The Migration Policy Institute. Document électronique, www.migrationinformation.org, Immigration Facts, Novembre 2006, no. 14.

10 Dans la seule année 1955, 369 000 braceros seraient allés travailler aux États-Unis (Flores Simental 2006:15).

11 D'après CONAPO, tel que rapporté sur le site de « Ciudad Juárez es mejor ». Document électronique, www.Juárezesmejor.com/notas/nota1143.html, consulté le 16 décembre 2006.

12 La ville de Juárez n'est pourtant pas la capitale administrative de l'état de Chihuahua. La capitale est la ville de Chihuahua.

13 Même si les catégories ne coïncident pas, disons que la proportion de la PEA dans les secteurs primaire, secondaire et tertiaire pour l'ensemble du Mexique était en 2002 de 16,3 %, 28,7 % et 55 % respectivement. Document électronique, http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/sistemas/cgpv2000/100historia/epobla10.asp?c=995, consulté le 30 décembre 2006. On peut voir que le secteur transformation (secteur secondaire) à Juárez se situe au-dessus de la moyenne nationale.

14 D'après l'INEGI, tel que rapporté sur le site de CFO (Comité Fronterizo de Obreras). Document électronique, www.cfomaquiladoras.org/dataprincipaljunio06.htm, consulté le 16 décembre 2006.

15 D'après ICHIMU (Instituto Chihuahuense de la Mujer), tel que rapporté le 1er septembre 2004 sur le site de Mujeres Hoy – el Portal de las Latinoamericanas. Document électronique, http://www.mujereshoy.com/secciones/2342.shtml, consulté le 16 décembre 2006.

16 Au Mexique, le salaire minimum varie en fonction de trois régions géographiques prédéterminées où il est établi selon le coût de la vie. Ainsi dans la zone A à laquelle appartient Ciudad Juárez, le salaire minimum est de 48,67 pesos par jour (environ 5 dollars can.); dans la zone B, il est de 47,16 pesos; dans la zone C, il est de 45,81 pesos. Voir Infodemex. Document électronique, http://www.rel-uita.org/laboral/salario_minimo_mexico.htm, consulté le 9 janvier 2007.

17 D'après CONAPO, tel que le rapporte El Diario Digital : Edición Cd. Juárez, 27 juillet 2006. Document électronique, www.diario.com.mx, consulté le 16 décembre 2006.

18 Le terme « colonos », dans ce contexte, désigne les habitants d'un quartier, en espagnol : « colonia ».

19 Le réseau de transport est conçu de façon telle qu'il faut passer par le centre-ville pour aller d'un site à l'autre, autrement dit pour changer de route.

20 En janvier 2004, on a découvert les cadavres de 12 personnes exécutées par des éléments du crime organisé avec le concours de membres du corps policier de l'état de Chihuahua.

21 Adam Jones a écrit un article sur les hommes assassinés dans le but d'attirer l'attention sur l'impunité qui règne aussi quant aux victimes masculines. Il voudrait que les organisations de défense des droits humains réclament la fin de l'impunité tout autant pour les hommes que pour les femmes. On peut bien évidemment être impressionné par le nombre de meurtres d'hommes mais l'auteur discrédite son argumentation en faveur de la justice sociale en attribuant aux militantes féministes le fait que l'on ait accordé plus d'attention aux meurtres de femmes, sous-entendant que c'est la raison pour laquelle on ait négligé les meurtres d'hommes.

22 Pour en savoir davantage sur le combat d'Esther Chávez Cano, on pourra lire le court chapitre de Fernandez et Rampal (2006a :148-150).

23 Tel que rapporté par BBC Mundo.com. 25 novembre 2006. Document électronique, http://newsnote.bbc.co.uk, consulté le 16 décembre 2006. Le rapport du Comité peut être trouvé sous la référence suivante : CEDAW/C/MEX/CO/6. Les témoignages des groupes ayant participé à la consultation se trouvent sur le site du Centro Prodh, une organisation non gouvernementale de droits humains http://www.centroprodh.org.mx.

24 D'après Marcela Lagarde de la Comisión Especial de Feminicidios et rapporté lors de la 36e session du Comité pour l'élimination de la discrimination à l'égard des femmes. Voir CEDAW 2006.

25 Les chiffres diffèrent d'une base de données à l'autre. Ce chiffre est celui reconnu par le ministère de la Justice de l'état de Chihuahua.

26 Il s'agit de la Commissaire de la Fiscalía Especial para la Atención de Delitos Relacionados con los Homicidios de Mujeres en el Municipio de Ciudad Juárez, créée en 2004 par le ministère fédéral de la Justice, la Procuraduría General de la República. On peut remarquer ici la tension entre les niveaux judiciaires fédéral et locaux en ce que ce sont des juges de l'état de Chihuahua qui renversent une mise en accusation issue d'une instance fédérale.

27 Le Mexique a signé la Convention pour l'Élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination à l'égard des femmes en 1999 et l'a ratifiée en 2002.

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Double Spaced: Abstract Labour in Urban Kampung

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Abstract: Although *kampung* means village in neighbouring Malaysia, in Indonesia, it refers to dense neighbourhoods in cities. These neighbourhoods represent a community form reproduced through governance across various regimes but also through daily exchanges and support between inhabitants. Based on fieldwork in Yogyakarta, central Java, this paper considers the form of labour represented by these spatial enclaves and its connection to the reality of a community form produced both through administration as well as a local structure of feeling. The relationship of these imagined communities to questions of abstract labour is considered along with their relevance for contemporary urban anthropology.

Keywords: community, governance, informal sector, labour, urban anthropology, Indonesia

Résumé : Alors qu'en Malaisie, le mot *kampung* signifie village, dans le pays voisin, l'Indonésie, ce mot désigne de denses quartiers situés en ville. Ces quartiers représentent une forme de communauté qui s'est reproduite non seulement par le biais des modes de gouvernance des différents régimes, mais aussi par le biais d'échanges et de soutien quotidiens entre les habitants. Cet article, qui est fondé sur des enquêtes de terrain à Yogyakarta, au centre de l'île de Java, s'intéresse au type de travail que représentent ces enclaves spatiales et à son lien avec la réalité d'une forme de communauté constituée à la fois par l'administration et par une structure émotive locale. La relation que ces communautés imaginées entretiennent par rapport au travail abstrait est prise en compte tout comme leur pertinence pour l'anthropologie urbaine contemporaine.

Mots-clés : communauté, gouvernance, secteur informel, travail, anthropologie urbaine, Indonésie

> The streets of Solo describe the boundaries of vast residential neighbourhoods. Alleyways that run off the main streets penetrate these neighbourhoods... Javanese neighbourhoods, especially those in the centre of the city, are not homogeneous. They contain the places of the wealthy and the noble as well as the shanties of the poor, and also, often, small factories, repair shops, and other businesses. The walls, then, hide what they protect, and they protect a great variety. To someone who is not familiar with the neighbourhood, what is behind the walls is unknown. They create a pervasive sense of a "somewhere else"...a pleasant mystification. [Siegel 1986:125-126]

Kampung is a word that resonates immediately with most Indonesians, but this resonance varies by class and by history. Whether slum or pleasant mystification, kampung often seem doubled, functioning always in two registers, operating always in two dimensions. It is the doubled sense of kampung as both social and spatial formation that prompts the present inquiry into kampung as an economic modality.

Scholarly attention to the Indonesian kampung is overdue. Although these urban neighbourhoods are found throughout urban areas in the archipelago, they are taken for granted and rarely subjected to consideration beyond attempts to improve them. Yet, they are a pervasive part of urban life in Indonesia, perhaps especially Java, the focus of this inquiry, where urban densities are among the highest in the world. The relevance of these urban enclaves for a 21st-century urban anthropology relates both to the history of the discipline and its possible futures. The interpretation of kampung as closely knit communities in urban settings harkens back to the importance of community studies in early urban anthropology. Histories of Javanese kampung community suggest a hybrid form, at once attendant on the administrative needs of various regimes and on the nostalgia for imagined forms

of rural community co-operation and consensus exploited in the name of governance.

Although the historical unpacking of the kampung community as a social, political and economic form is not the primary subject of this inquiry, elements relate to the central focus of this consideration, namely, the current reality of kampung communities as the spatial organization of specific forms of labour. Given concerns with the consequences of new forms of globalization for the spatial dimensions of capital, the stability of the kampung as the materialization of a particular organization of labour is quite remarkable. Recent scholarly concern with globalization and the rise of the middle class in Southeast Asia and Indonesia has generally overlooked these urban enclaves of small-scale producers, who seemingly run the gamut from lumpenproletariat to petty-commodity producers, the majority existing at the edges of the formal labour market. The abundance of micro-enterprises within kampung is evidence of the importance of house-based economic practices for the great bulk of urban Javanese. While susceptible to analysis as micro-enterprises, as petty-commodity production and as the informal sector, the approach taken here is instead to relate the community form to forms of labour organization to illustrate not only the relevance of labour and production in understanding these urban neighbourhoods but also the significance of urban anthropology for the contemporary scholarly concern with space.

I have previously considered how kampung manifest a particular political rationality of urban governance which amplifies and extends their function as spatial containers for a reserve army of labour, just as the daily experience of kampung social reproduction amplifies and extends the local structure of feeling of home community (Newberry 2006). The question of reserve labour identifies two key components in the following analysis. First, this approach to kampung labour is one informed by a Marxian understanding of the labour process, a position that has fallen out of favour, particularly in an era marked by critiques of such "modernist" theories. Yet, some of the concepts from the Marxist toolkit are being re-engineered to take into consideration changing conditions of production. Here, the concept of abstract labour is engaged to suggest a process of appropriation of surplus value that is general and that generalizes human labour, yet one that simultaneously reserves and entraps specific forms of kampung labour. Making use of one particular reading of abstract labour (Chakrabarty 2000), the spatial consequences of the kampung as the materialization of particular forms of labour is considered. Meshing this reading with contemporary approaches to space and labour explains both the reproduction of kampung in an era of flexible labour and the advantage of placing urban anthropology within urban studies broadly construed.

Kampung as Urban Villages

> The Malay word kampung is generally taken to mean "village" but in Java it is more commonly applied to urban entities, to parts of towns and cities. Initially, it meant "compound," most typically the walled yards, gardens, and residences of well-to-do families (Reid 1979:5) and it was long used thus in Yogyakarta for the residential compounds of princes, nobles, and other dignitaries. In fact, the Sultan's palace itself was once recognized as a complex of kampungs. Yet today the majority of Javanese take kampung to mean primarily something akin to "home community" while a better-off and more genteel minority tend to interpret it more decisively as "slum." [Sullivan 1992:20]

To use the word *kampung* in Indonesia is to say a lot. The etymological association with compound is often noted, as is the history of the development of named kampung as ethnic enclaves in port cities and as guild neighbourhoods in inland kingdoms (for an overview, see Sullivan 1992). The names of many kampung gesture to these pasts even as they represent a history of occupation and growth in colonial cities such as Batavia, coastal cities such as Surabaya, and court towns such as Yogyakarta, where one might just as easily find a kampung named to refer to its original Chinese or Arab inhabitants as one named for court lamplighters. Interpenetrating ethnic and occupational definitions of kampung are those related to administration and governance. Although kampung appear to be informal and unstructured settlements, these neighbourhoods have been and continued to be organized on a number of levels.

Yogyakarta, a court city in central Java where I have conducted ethnographic fieldwork since 1992, is a city of named kampung organized around the main palace compound of Sultan Hamengkubuwana X.[1] Like other sultanates, the Yogya *kraton*, the Sultan's palace compound, displays a logic of orientation and boundaries that mirror heaven and model society. The walls of the kraton mark its north–south orientation, which is extended through the *alun-alun*, or open squares, to point toward the powerful poles of the south sea and Mount Merapi to the north. In some contrast, the development of kampung neighbourhoods appears to represent little in the way of rational design. The boundaries of many are given by major streets, although these may be marked by walls as well. Kampung represent a spatial segregation of the

lower class in contrast to those living in larger, better built houses that line streets and that have been associated in the past with the Dutch and with Chinese Indonesian businesses. Kampung in this context are understood to be the quarters for the *wong cilik* (Jv.), the little people (Guiness 1986, 1991; Sullivan 1980, 1992).[2] This spatial separation is marked as well by differences in housing density and construction and the size of the alleyways that thread through these neighbourhoods.

In Kampung Rumah Putri[3] where I have done most of my fieldwork and where the alleyways are generally wider and the number of better houses proportionately higher than downtown kampung, the tiny residences of some kampung dwellers are often hard to see. These range from single rooms in larger buildings to shacks that appear to the side and behind larger houses, mimicking, in a sense, the pattern of development of kampung themselves behind the larger street-side houses of the wealthy (Guiness 1991). The density of occupation in kampung is noticeable, even for an island that is home to more than 60% of the 250 million people living in Indonesia. Although most kampung have at least one alley that is wide enough to accommodate automobiles, kampung are better understood as traversed through a series of paths that range from shoulder-width allowing for foot traffic up to bicycle and motorcycle width. As Kellett et al. (2001:8) note, "these pedestrian scale alleyways form the key spatial component of the *kampung*," and they are intensively used as extensions of dwellings, but also for productive and collective activities.

Kampung footpaths illustrate the ambiguity of private space and the density of traffic and habitation in these neighbourhoods, as they frequently cross directly in front of thresholds and windows. Beyond the challenge to any easy divide between public and private space in these urban enclaves, the presence of small-scale home industries in houses further muddles any easy division of space even as they reiterate the tightly packed character of these neighbourhoods. Networks of relations, commercial, familial, neighbourly, make use of these paths daily, and their overlaps and absences are telling markers of neighbourhood relationships.

Kampung life is a flow of resources, including money, aid and services, between households related through kinship, proximity, need and networks of exchange—often networks managed by women (Brenner 1995, 1998; Newberry 2006; Sullivan 1994). Many scholars have noted the dense networks of exchange and support evident in these kampung neighbourhoods, including the *arisan* (the rotating credit association or neighbourhood lottery), the ritual, communal meal known as *slametan*, and the social fund for the ill and poor (Brenner 1995, 1998; Guinness 1986, 1991; Sullivan 1980; Sullivan 1983, 1994). Kampung residents make reference to this ethic of helping one another, of co-operation, and an equality of purpose and life style. The boundaries of kampung culture are repeatedly remarked upon by kampung dwellers who describe the kampung as close and neighbourly, based on harmony and mutual support, and frequently compare it to the broken (*dipecah*) social life of new suburban developments.

This kampung ethos is extended through its use as an index of social class and poor neighbourly conduct. To be accused of not being sufficiently kampung suggests an aggressive and middle class individuality out of keeping with local values. This ethos relates as well to a felt sense that kampung members are well known and familiar, and that outsiders are not readily incorporated. *Wong kampung* (Jv.) or kampung person can suggest humbleness and community spirit, while the term *wong kampungan* (Jv.), that is, person with a characteristic kampung mentality, carries pejorative connotations of small-minded localism. Indeed, *kampung* serves as a class referent in common speech that has few class markers other than those associated with royalty and the hereditary occupational categories of Dutch colonialism.

The structure of feeling (Williams 1977) that is central to life in the kampung is tied up with the sense that kampung are the site of traditional forms of cooperation, consensus, and neighbourliness. These values resemble very closely those associated with the ideal peasant village. In fact, in Malaysia, *kampong* refers directly to rural villages, and the resonance with a rural village imaginary is clear (Thompson 2006). In Indonesia, the word *kampung* is more often used to describe urban neighbourhoods. Even so, the ambiguity of the Malay word *kampung* for the Indonesian case is neither coincidental nor trivial. The use of a word associated with rural life to discuss urban neighbourhoods signals the overlapping character of administration in these areas.

The administration of rural areas in Indonesia was built upon the presumptions of a functioning, egalitarian community of producers, and the question of whether an egalitarian, self-governing peasant village was a traditional social form or a Dutch colonial invention is equally longstanding (Antlov 1995; Breman 1980, 1988; Burger 1957; Kano 1979). Scholarly work on class differentiation and critiques of Geertz's (1963) notion of shared poverty and agricultural involution have shown that the search for origins tells us more about those who desire to find the traditional village than it does about the social organization of rural areas (Kahn 1985; Kemp 1988; Goh 1998; Schulte-Nordholt 1987). The search for origins only

repeats the error of the Dutch who were looking to document "traditional" social forms and neglects the reality of this model of community as a form of governmentality and modern statecraft (Kemp 1988; Newberry 2006; Rigg 1994; see also Dumont 1966).

What has received less attention is the evidence that, despite the sense of historicity that clothes much of kampung life for its residents, the development of these urban communities is as much a product of sociological and political imagination and the needs for administration as was the peasant community. Sullivan, for example, concludes that kampung in Yogya have always existed as "elements of a rational administrative plan and de facto units of a state system" (1992:24). He suggests that kampung outside the walls of the Sultan's palace were used for royal tax farming, later to become the homes of the wong cilik (little people). In the late 19th century, Raffles consolidated the village as the basic rural administrative unit, and Dutch reforms in the early 20th century produced administrative structures in both rural and urban areas led by unpaid headmen. Japanese war-time occupation elaborated the urban administrative structure and reinforced the role of the kampung as an administrative rationality, even as it continued its Janus-faced quality. As in Japan, local leaders served two masters: their neighbours who chose them and the higher political authorities who recognized them (Falconeri 1976:35; see Bestor 1989 and Garon 1997 on the neighbourhood section system in Japan). Yet kampung were not always the site of a pacified, administrative functioning. During the nationalist era, residents "developed a sense of community and view of the world which found expression in many of the concepts of the Indonesian awakening of the twentieth century" (Van Niel 1979:118; see also Siegel 1998).

It was under Suharto's New Order regime (1966-98), that the administration of village-like units in rural and urban areas reached its apotheosis. All of urban Indonesia, until the recent era of democratic reform in the late 1990s, was divided into a neighbourhood section system. Groups of 10-20 households were numbered and their populations managed and accounted for through a popularly selected unpaid leader. Six of these small Harmonious Neighbour sections (*Rukun Tetangga*, RT) make up the larger Harmonious Citizen section (*Rukun Warga*, RW), also run by an unpaid, locally chosen head (a man in most cases). These units remain in urban Java, despite the changes in governance due to regional autonomy measures in the era of *Reformasi*, or reform, following the end of Suharto's rule.

The New Order government of Suharto (1968-97) used and reproduced the nostalgia for rural community as a means to administer urban localities through its neighbourhood section system, to deliver social welfare and to organize residents to follow the principles of *gotong royong* or mutual self-help in the running of their own affairs (Bowen 1986). Consequently, urban kampung mimic all the traits of the ideal peasant community, including those traits associated with the so-called closed corporate peasant community of mid-century anthropological analysis (Wolf 1957); that is, these communities exhibit rotation of civil leadership among unpaid, popularly selected leaders, a closed attitude towards outsiders, wealth-levelling mechanisms and communally held property. One might quibble with the degree of importance of these traits in daily kampung life, but there is no arguing with their existence as a part of a particular knowledge practice mobilized especially by the New Order government or their acceptance by kampung residents.

Kampung, then, represent a culture of administration but are just as clearly a structure of feeling (Willams 1977; see also Adorno 1990). The brief sketch of the history of kampung as administrative forms does not contradict this felt sense of community. Rather daily acts of exchange by neighbours and close kin reinforce a local ideology of community. This imagined community has proved to be powerful not only for Java, and for much of Indonesia, but also for urban anthropology as a discipline. Early Chicago studies of the city began from the assumption of a traditional rural village as signifying other, as evident in Redfield's folk-urban continuum (1941), Oscar Lewis's consideration of community in the city (1959; Hannerz 1983), and Herbert Gans 1962 book *Urban Villagers*. Chicago sociology's relationship to Mexican ethnography shows that the Mexican peasant community, an anthropological staple, should be understood in terms of its relationship to emerging theories of urbanization, urbanism and the city (Hannerz 1983). Even more, early theories of cities as interdependent communities following an ecological model (Park and Burgess 1967) find their Javanese doppelganger in Clifford Geertz's (1963) analysis of the ecology of agricultural involution and shared poverty in Javanese peasant villages.

Given the centrality of the ideology of the breakdown of the traditional social order to early theories of the city, from Weber to Durkheim to Tönnies, perhaps it is not surprising that the continuing dissolution of the rural is fundamental to the making of the urban. Yet, in fact, kampung exist on a number of levels: as named neighbourhoods, as social units, as administrative units, as a way of life, and as spaces where all of these combine. Kampung are a palimpsest showing traces of various historical moments, while contemporary popular connotations turn

on the doubled character of kampung: its inward aspect as home community and the outward aspect as slum. Beyond these dimensions of the kampung as urban spatial form, as administrative rationality, and as moral community, its reality as an economic form supports and reproduces this sense of community as well.

Small Industries

The continued reproduction of these imagined communities across colonial, military occupation, authoritarian and newly democratic regimes in Indonesia challenges the standard model of spatial dispersion of labour and production under conditions of late capitalism. The disarticulation of production away from a Fordist model of national concentration in urban centres to international economies of scope organized and co-ordinated virtually between dispersed points of production has been described, famously, by David Harvey (1990). The general spatial dimensions of flexible accumulation indeed do hold true for parts of Indonesia, which has served as a source of low-waged, flexible labour, easily acquired and just as easily shed in export processing zones (EPZ) for various transnational and corporate capitalist concerns. Growth in manufacturing between the late 1960s and the onset of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s was impressive (average growth rate of 12.4% per year), and manufacturing's share of the economy grew from 10.3% to 25% between 1970 and 1996 (Berry et al. 2001:364). Clearly, Indonesia's competitive advantage relies on its labour surplus economy (Hadiz 2002) and Southeast Asia has generally played a role in the provision of cheap, largely female labour on global assembly lines (Wolf 1992; Hill 1991) and the export of female labour as domestics throughout Asia and the Middle East.

Since 1994, when restrictions on foreign ownership were relaxed, this labour force in Indonesia has been enclaved in EPZs that ring the major cities of Medan, Jakarta and Suryabaya. This rural and peri-urban aspect of flexible labour in the periphery under late capitalism finds its opposite in the erasure or expulsion of the working class from cities in the developed core: whether in the information city (Castells 1989), the ex-urban city (Castells 2000), the global city (Sassen 2001) or the militarized carceral complex of de-industrialized city cores (Wacquant 1996, 2001). The role of the kampung as an urban organization of labour and administration flavoured with a strong resonance of the rural village poses an interesting question, then, about the role of cities in an era of new forms of global capital.

The economic world of the kampung is a dense and interconnected one. Residents are involved in innumerable exchanges, many of these taking place within and between households based on kinship and proximity. These exchanges include money, services, gifts, and even children.[4] Beyond these exchange relationships, kampung are also the sites of significant amounts of production through small industries, known as *kerajinan kecil* locally. Kellett et al. (2001:1) use the term micro-scale home-based enterprises (HBE) to describe these industries that blur and reconfigure the "spatial and conceptual boundaries between work and home, between production and reproduction" in order to generate income and sustain themselves. Berry et al. (2001) follow the Indonesian Central Statistics Agency (BPS) which defines micro-enterprises as those with 1-4 workers (although BPS documents use the term cottage industry for these very small enterprises), small enterprises as those with 5-19, medium enterprises as those with 20-99, and large enterprises as those with over 100 workers.

Although kampung are often the sites for the entire range of micro, small and medium enterprises (even some large ones), the focus here is on the cottage industries or the micro-enterprises. Although Berry et al. (2001) document minimal growth in micro-enterprises between 1975 and 1996 (0.2%), these enterprises continue to dominate in number of workers. Micro-enterprises represented 75.4% of workers in manufacturing in 1975 (3,900,000 workers), 49.3% in 1986 (2,714,000 workers), and 39.9% in 1996 (4,076,000; Berry et al. 2001:365). Without disputing their argument that economic dynamism lies with small and medium enterprises, the statistics offered by Berry et al. (2001) also suggest another important trend: the surprising persistence of micro-enterprises as a large percentage of employment in the manufacturing sector. As they note, "in 1996, 40% of all workers were found in units of under 5 workers" (Berry et al. 2001:365).

A complete inventory of the small-scale industries in Kampung Rumah Putri, my old kampung neighbourhood, or any kampung for that matter, is likely impossible, in part because so many of these house-based industries seem to bloom overnight and disappear just as quickly, and in part because of the relative invisibility of these enterprises that are often quite small and sited within kampung houses. In my original census of my near neighbours (plus a smaller sample from a nearby kampung; Newberry 1997), 50% of the households reported some kind of house-based micro-enterprise (30 of 60 households). For those reporting, income from these enterprises ranged from 20 to 120% of other income earned outside the home (N=11) and from 19.3 to 54.5% of total household income. The simple majority in both cases falling between 20 and 50%. These numbers are very small, and

the problem with accurate reporting of wages is obvious in a sample with only 11 of 60 households reporting actual figures. More often the kind of work was described (seamstress, masseuse, food stall operator) with the report that the money earned was enough for daily needs (*untuk kebutuhan sehari-harian*, or *cukupan*, enough). A broader view of the role of small-scale enterprises is provided by government measures of nearly a half million of these enterprises (409,814) employing over 800,000 people in the special district of Yogyakarta in 2004 where the population is a little over three million.[5]

In general, these house-based industries are based on self-exploitation and family labour. Fixed capital is low, if not non-existent. Wages often include in-kind payment and food. These enterprises can include true entrepreneurial concerns, with a family starting a small business out of the home. The fibreglass statue maker in my block was one example of this kind of business. The husband of the family hired two workers to make statues in a small shed next to his house. His wife cooked lunch for the workers, and the children of the family pitched in as needed. This kind of kampung business most closely matches petty commodity production. Other examples included a puppet maker, a bedspread and fabric craft maker, and a drum kit business.

Just as often these enterprises were even smaller, not even meeting the definition of petty-commodity producer offered by Smart and Smart (2005) as employer of the labour of others. Frequently, these activities occupied only a small space within a house and required only part-time labour along with occasional family help, such as the many small dry-goods stalls, often called *warung*, which might be nothing more than a shelf in a front room or on a front porch from which a woman, typically, sells mosquito coils, soap, cigarettes, matches and other small sundries. Another example was a name card business run out of my neighbour's house. Started by an unemployed son, this business occupied less than a meter of space in a small hallway next to the kitchen.

In the small compound around my rental house, there were three kin-related houses including five households. Four men earned the low wages of Indonesian civil servants, and one worked as a store clerk; a fifth received a small army pension. In only one household of five did the formal wages of a father and son provide sufficient income. Even so, this household included a woman engaged in a micro-enterprise cooking peanuts to order. She also helped manage a small dry goods stall in the local market begun with the aid of money and training from the Indonesian government. The other son started the name card business next to his mother's kitchen. In the house next door, the retired army officer cooked peanut candy for sale. His married daughter worked sporadically as subcontracted labour. One son cut hair for neighbours and later became a spiritual healer. Next door, one daughter-in-law worked as a seamstress out of her house sewing clothes on order for the local puppet maker. Another daughter-in-law made and sold *jamu*, traditional health tonics, from her house as well as in the local market. From a total of 15 adults in these five households, six received a formal wage or pension, and seven earned money in micro-enterprises.

Local subcontractors could count on ready labour when projects emerged: finishing work on leather hand bags, the stuffing of kapok, the silky fiber from tropical trees, into pillows, and the bundling and packaging of craft goods. This labour was just as easily dismissed to be re-absorbed by the kampung when the job ended. One of the chief characteristics of the form of labour and work described thus far is the ease with which it is taken up and then abandoned. More precisely, the labourer is taken up and just as easily abandoned without any of the aspects associated with formal employment. Few people within the kampung are working within the formal sector, and many people are underemployed. The level of disguised unemployment, especially male unemployment, appears to be high, while the majority of small, house-based enterprises are begun and managed by women.

Despite a history of active income-generation by Javanese women of the lower classes (Brenner 1995, 1998; Carey and Houben 1987; Papanek and Schwede 1988; Stoler 1977; Wolf 1992), the New Order regime was quite successful in placing women's work within the home and the community in service to a developmentalist ideology that emphasized the two-child family and the stay-at-home mom through PKK (*Pembinaan Kesejahateraan Keluarga*, Support for the Prosperous Family; Newberry 2006). All married women in Indonesia are considered to be members of PKK, a well-known feature of the Suharto era that continues to function in the Reformasi era. This national organization of housewives as unpaid, local social welfare workers mirrors the male administrative hierarchy that reaches from the level of six households up to the national level. In fact, the programs of PKK are assimilated to the village-like structure of administration described above in both rural and urban areas. PKK ideology and the associated programs have achieved no small degree of success, especially in Java where the programs were begun before being extended to all of Indonesia.[6]

What has received much less comment is that PKK's programs also encourage women to work for *tambahan suami*, income to supplement the husband's wages, in a

variety of small-scale, informal sector, house-based enterprises for which the government offers courses and small monies. The programs of PKK deliver no-cost and low-cost social welfare inputs at the most local level, but they also encourage small, house-based industries to support and reproduce the unemployed and underemployed labour within the kampung. In this way, the administration of urban communities in Java institutionalizes women's support and reproduction of surplus labour.

The articulation of communities of reproduction with spatially dispersed centres of production is not a new one. Meillassoux's (1981) analysis of the articulation of African sites of labour's reproduction with France's employment of migrant labour is perhaps the most famous example of the articulation literature of the 1970s. Feminist scholars, including critics of Meillassoux (Harris 1984), have challenged the idea of a division between reproductive and productive labour (see Moore 1988 for an overview). In the case of Indonesia, it is clear that labour in EPZs and in the mega-city of Jakarta is subsidized by rural and urban communities of reproduction. What the current case offers is not simply a return to this issue, but a reconsideration of the constitution of community and its durability under new conditions of global production. The durability of the community form may follow from its ability to both facilitate the flow of capital and to provide the medium in which capital is enacted (Joseph 2002; Creed 2006:3). In a very real way, to understand class in Java, and parts of Indonesia, requires an understanding of kampung community.

Questions about class in Indonesia and Southeast Asia have often centred on EPZs and the nascent industrial working class, enclaved and feminized, that has emerged in tandem with these transnational enterprises (Beeson and Hadiz 1998; Hadiz 1997, 2002; Ong 1987; Wolf 1992). More recent attention to class in Southeast Asia has been concerned with the emergence of a middle class, and much of this attention has been on the consumption practices of a new transnational class (Dick 1985; Kahn 1991; Robison 1996; Shiraishi 2004). There are serious limitations to a strictly consumption-based definition of class, including the fact that a politically significant professional and educated middle class emerged to play a role in Suharto's fall (Heryanto and Mandel 2003). The kampung residents who are sending their children through high school, who have perhaps a motorcycle for transport, and are increasingly able to buy televisions do not match the emerging picture of middle class consumption, but neither are they the suffering poor. The question then becomes what kind of a class analysis is suitable for understanding urban kampung?

In David Harvey's now 15-year-old treatise on flexible accumulation, he describes one of the paradoxical effects of new global forms of capitalism and their spatial effects: the revival of domestic, familial, and paternalistic labour systems. As Harvey notes, although Marx assumed that these forms of labour would be driven out under advanced capitalism, they persist. As he says:

> Re-reading [Marx's] account in *Capital* strikes home with a certain jolt of recognition. We there read of the ways in which the factory system can intersect with domestic, workshop, and artisanal systems of manufacture, of how an industrial reserve army is mobilized as a counter-weight to workers' power with respect to both labour control and wage rates...of how capitalists foster the spirit of competition amongst workers, while all the time demanding flexibility of disposition, of location, of approach to tasks. [Harvey 1990:187]

The patterns of labour in the kampung across economic and political regimes suggest that these urban neighbourhoods are the site of self-exploitation in the production of surplus value. Whether considered as a flexible response to new forms of capital (Rothstein 2005) or a retrenchment of old forms of exploitation (Gates 2005), these forms of production often depend on familial and female labour (Smith and Narotzky 2005). How are we to understand the class dynamics of these tiny, house-based businesses that seem to rely not only on the work of women within the household but also the administration and management of communities?

Abstacting Labour

Perhaps it is not surprising that issues of class and labour have returned in an era framed by questions of whether new global forms of capital represent disjuncture or stability and by the desire to compare labour across space. This return has been marked by the effects of significant theorizing about the nature of modernity, including challenges to Marxist analyses of class as profoundly modernist and essentialist. In response, Gibson and Graham posit class as "the social process of producing and appropriating surplus labour (more commonly known as exploitation) and the associated process of surplus labour distribution" (1992:113; see also Wolff and Resnick 1986). By reconceptualizing class as the social process of surplus value appropriation, the household, as well as locally significant exchange practices and the structures of local governance subsidizing these modes of self-exploitation, can be placed within a complex nexus that includes both capitalist and non-capitalist forms, giving neither logical nor historical priority (Gibson and Graham 1992:121). The

analysis of the feminization of the low-cost Indonesian workforce on the global assembly line can then be considered alongside kampung labour.

The organization of kampung labour suggests this process of appropriation involves reserving surplus labour. Characterizing kampung labour as *reserved* provides a different approach to flexibility in the labour process that moves beyond dichotomies between male and female labour, private and public, or informal and formal labour. Even more, it suggests a process of entrapment (Bauder 2001) of labour that operates by logic different than that of enclaved factory labour in peri-urban areas. Rather than enclaving young female workers in bounded areas around factories in EPZs, kampung are home to labour, young and old, male and female, held in reserve when not actively deployed in Jakarta and other sites. This entrapment does not represent any pre-capitalist versus capitalist divide, but a labour process resistant to such designation and yet ideal for the rapid mobilization and release of low-waged labour. Even more, the reserve function of the kampung cannot be disentangled from its role as a moral community or as a form of governance.

Kampung labour, like kampung community appears double: on the one hand, the result of a general process of labour's cheap and flexible reproduction in a labour surplus economy, and on the other, the specific relations of exchange and support within home community. Recent reconsiderations of abstract labour seem to turn on this doubled aspect of labour in Marx's analysis: its commensurability across domains but also its concrete manifestation as specific social relations, or as Castree describes, "its ontological nature as social and universal" (1999:149-150).

In Chakrabarty's reconsideration of abstract labour (2000; following Postone 1993), the distinction between abstract and concrete labour highlights the contrast between universal human rights and local difference. His conjunctural analysis offers a means to relate the labour of the kampung to local processes of differentiation and simultaneously to a more general logic of accumulation and surplus value production in countries organized through new forms of global capitalism. At the centre of Chakrabarty's analysis is a comparison of two histories of capital. The first, History 1, describes the antecedents to capital "posited by capital itself as its precondition" (2000:668). These antecedents can only be known and identified retrospectively as central to the life processes of capital and its reproduction. Marx argues that free labour is one example—both a precondition of capital's development and its invariable result (Chakrabarty 2000:668). This is a universal and necessary history, according to Chakrabarty, "the backbone for the usual narratives of transition to the capitalist mode of production" (2000:668). Balanced against History 1 and the historical emergence of reserved surplus labour in kampung is the stubborn specificity of kampung social networks and the socially embedded character of its labour forms, amenable to appeals to tradition on the part of both citizen and state alike. To make sense of this, we must turn to Chakrabarty's History 2: the histories of difference and social relations which do not contribute to the logic of capital but "can actively be intertwined with the relations that do" (2000:669).

As suggested earlier, the search for the origins of these forms of community sentiment and practise runs the risk of recreating the search for the primordial village. Yet it is this structure of feeling, felt to be historically given by kampung residents, that is the condition of possibility for self-exploitation in the production of surplus value, particularly on the part of women. It is the local perception of the history of kampung as home to people who support one another and who make do by sharing and supporting one another that sponsors the very acts of exchange that support kampung members as mobile and flexible labour characteristic of the kampung.

So whatever the history of capital in Indonesia and the multiple forms of labour that become part of its reproduction, for kampung dwellers their ways of life are historically specific. Indeed, one could describe kampung as a form of local historical consciousness. Consequently, like Chakrabarty's History 2, kampung labour destroys "the usual topological distinction between outside and inside that marks debates about whether the whole world can be properly said to have fallen under the sway of capital" (2000:671). Forms of kampung labour cannot be simply subsumed into capital. And while their relationship to capital may range from opposition to indifference, kampung social life, rather than merely being a function of capital, may also serve to interrupt the totalizing thrusts of History 1. The habitus of kampung life, Chakrabarty's History 2, is "embodied in the person-cum-labourer's bodily habits, in unself-conscious collective practises, in his or her reflexes about what it means to relate—as a human being and together with other human beings in the given environment" (Chakrabarty 2000:671-672). Even more, the habitus of kampung labour and its character as embodied memory allows for the possibility of dwelling. That is to say, History 2 allows for human belonging or "worlding" despite the global logic of capital.

Attention to dwelling is particularly appropriate here in a consideration of the kampung as residence, as a form of labour organization, as a community, and as a structure

of feeling. Kampung are particular "worlds" whose everyday rhythm seems to have little to do with the pulses and cycles of a global capitalism. Yet, it is clear that the patterns of makeshift work and community support of the unemployed and underemployed produces a particular kind of labour force. These are not docile bodies in the sense of factory discipline, but instead bodies that dwell within the socially enclosed space of a community that both explains and reproduces this particular kind of labour, both recapitulating capital as well as interrupting its dynamic.

The space of kampung community can be understood then as both a relation of production and a force of production, following Syngedouw (1992). The repeated precipitation of structures of exchange and support between neighbours and within families are the use values of kampung labour as a relation of production, while the mobilization and reproduction of surplus labour in the kampung also constitute it as a force of production. The structure of feeling that is the kampung is the precipitate of both aspects (Williams 1977). Bauder usefully applies structure of feeling to a process of labour segmentation that "often coincides with the spatial entrapment of women, minorities and low-income families" (1992:38). Residential inequalities are produced so that workers are segmented, not only by social difference in the form of class, race, and ethnicity, but also spatially, by place of residence (1992:40). This spatial entrapment has symbolic dimensions as well. That is, neighbourhoods like the kampung are also "expressions of culture" that are "negotiated in and through the context of place" (1992:42) that consequently may shape labour market identities (1992:43). In his analysis of place as an important, constitutive factor in the division of labour, Bauder shows that "work and social meaning are mutually dependent and jointly feed cycles of reproduction of labour," providing a "micro-level conceptualization of place on the neighbourhood scale" (1992:46).

Urban kampung are spaces for the reproduction and support of particular forms of labour and labour processes. Historical and history making, these spatial enclaves provide the matrix for meanings that support their reproduction as social forms and as the site of self-exploitation in the production, distribution and consumption of surplus value. The spatial reproduction of this kind of labour depends not on class in traditional Marxist analysis but on forms of difference that are locally meaningful even as they succumb to forms of governmentality that place women in the household, reproducing their families and their community. Kampung are forms of labour entrapment that serve a segmented labour market that includes as well enclaved industrial labour. In part, the product of layers of historical service as a form of labour exploited in rounds of capitalist accumulation, kampung are also the precipitate of structures of feeling that are not capitalist even as they serve as elements of the life process of capital. Entrapment then is not stasis but the process of reserving labour, a process that at once recapitulates capital and interrupts it. And one that allows for kampung to be both the space for dwelling and the space for a structure of feeling that draws on local habitus and historical consciousness.

Double Spaced: Urban Kampung Labour

What can urban anthropology bring to this analysis of kampung as both an organization of labour and a space for dwelling? The doubled character of the kampung moves this analysis beyond any easy divide between anthropology in the city and anthropology of the city, as Fox (1977) conceptualized it. Rather than an undignified scramble to find substitute savages in the city (Fox 1977), a 21st-century urban anthropology must account not just for the movements of cosmopolitans, but also for those who dwell. The resonance of the kampung as rural village in the city provides an ironic twist on Ferguson's (1999) analysis of urban dwellers in Zambia on the African Copperbelt, the other significant site in the development of urban anthropology. Ferguson (1999) documents urban Africans returning to villages for the purposes of reproduction and support in the context of abjection and de-industrialization, bringing Meillassoux full circle. These reversals of fortunes in the rural–urban divide suggest the complexity of contemporary urban anthropology. Former urbanites return to African villages as an imagined and remembered community, often unmoored from actual experience. In the process, the deeply intertwined natures of city and countryside are remade again.

Fox's contrast of anthropology in the city versus anthropology of the city does serve to contrast an urban anthropology that began as method extended to a new space with an urban anthropology that begins with the city and derives its methods accordingly. In recent years, the most muscular studies of the urban seem to derive from outside of anthropology, with geographers, city designers and planners, and cultural studies scholars influenced by the visual and performing arts. Whereas Fox lamented the lack of the city's presence in early urban anthropology focused on urban "folk," recent research is lamentably lacking in people as the city looms as artefact, plaza, boulevard and park. The doubled character of kampung, both History 1 and 2, space and social relation, suggests a third way for urban anthropology "between the

antinomies of modern and after-modern modes of theorizing capitalism and class" (Castree 1999:139). Urban anthropology must account not only for the persistence of community as a political and sociological concern, but also for its reality in the lives of those who dwell and labour within these urban spaces.

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Notes

1 Ethnographic fieldwork in this neighbourhood was conducted in 1992-93, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, foreign words included here are in the national language, Bahasa Indonesia, while Javanese words are noted with Jv.
3 The name of this kampung is a pseudonym.
4 *Anak angkat* (literally lifted child) refers to a pattern of informal fosterage that moves children between households based on differences in relative prosperity and numbers of children in a household. Often such children are shared between kin-related households.
5 The Daerah Istimewah Yogyakarta (DIY) is considered a province, although it is smaller in size than many.
6 The ten important programs of PKK include: (1) comprehension and practical application of *Pancasila* (the national ideology); (2) mutual self help; (3) food; (4) clothing; (5) housing and home economics; (6) education and craft skills; (7) health; (8) development of co-operatives; (9) protection and conservation of the environment; (10) health planning (read as family planning).

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Processes of State, Class and Ethno-racial Formation in Urban Malaysia: Geo-Spatial Transformations and Regime Shifts 1970-2000

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Abstract: This article is a historico-ethnographic reconstruction of the simultaneously interconnected processes of postcolonial state, class and ethno-racial formation in Malaysia, as these were refracted in the daily lives of ethnic Chinese in one Malaysian city over a 30-year period (1970-2000). The projects of the dominant Malay ethno-racial fraction of the ruling elite to deflect class struggles, protect capital and consolidate its class interests through state expansion have become visible as aspects of space (Lebfebvre 1974) in the built environment of the city, as have the dialectical responses of resistance and emigration by the city's Chinese residents to these projects.

Keywords: urban spatial transformations, class formation, state formation, ethno-racial formation, Malaysia, crypto-geographies

Résumé : Cet article présente une reconstruction historico-ethnographique des processus inter-reliés de formation post-coloniale de l'État, des classes sociales et des différences ethno-raciales en Malaisie, tels qu'ils se sont manifestés dans la vie quotidienne des Malais d'origine chinoise dans une ville de la Malaisie pendant une période de 30 ans, soit de 1970 à 2000. Les projets de la fraction dominante ethno-raciale des Malais de la classe dirigeante visant à faire dévier les luttes de classe, à protéger leur capital et à consolider leurs intérêts en soutenant l'expansion de l'État, ont laissé des traces visibles dans l'espace (Lefebvre 1974) au sein de l'environnement construit de la ville. Les réactions dialectiques des résidents chinois de la ville à ces projets, qu'ils aient résisté ou immigré, ont également laissé des traces visibles dans l'espace.

Mots-clés : transformations spatiales urbaines, formation des classes sociales, formation de l'État, formation ethno-raciale, Malaisie, crypto-géographies

Introduction

In this article I argue that the processes of state formation in Malaysia, which over the three decades from the 1970s to the present have increased state enclosure of and control over the living and working spaces of the ethnic Chinese minority, are also processes of class and ethno-racial formation.[1] I attempt to illustrate this claim by a process of analytical abstraction in which I employ an ethnographic study of urban space among Chinese Malaysians in one Malaysian city to index broader national changes in the political-cultural economy of class and ethno-racial relations within the processes of state-making. To do this, I am particularly interested in drawing on Lefebvre's (1974) analytics of space in everyday life in which he analyzes three distinctive aspects or moments whose interplay must be understood—"spatial practices," "representations of space," and "representational space"—in class and state formation.

For Lefebvre, spatial practices are the embodied habitus and routines persons engage in as they move through and appropriate space. Representations of space are conceptions of spaces within systems of verbal and visual signs, such as maps, as for example created by "scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers, and social engineers." Representational space is space as affectively marked in perceptions, memories, and cathexes (Lefebvre 1974:38-42). All three aspects are dimensions of how people talk about and appropriate spaces in their everyday lives as they come into relation with the means of production, form ethno-racial identities and engage as subjects and citizens with the states that rule them. A historical ethnography of urban spaces, of how in the past and present people have talked about and acted toward spaces as they mobilize forms of material power, can provide a particularly insightful understanding of how cities manifest the dialectically connected formations of classes, ethno-racial groups and states over time.

I begin with several related theoretical and epistemological premises relevant to an interpretative political economy of classes, ethno-racial groups and states in postcolonial capitalist societies such as Malaysia. First, I follow E.P. Thompson (1978) in seeking to reconstruct how classes come into existence through class struggle, but never exist as "objective" positions in society outside of the history of struggle. Second, in many postcolonial nation-states, members of dominant classes by virtue of their control of the state seek to define class struggles out of existence by promoting the lived identities of people as members of ethno-racial groups, that is, groups defined with respect to one another (and antagonistically) as in essence different and unequal (Williams 1989; Alonso 1994; Harrison 1995) in ways that cross-cut or neutralize class-based identities, solidarities and alliances.[2] At the same time, the ethno-racial fractions of the dominant class generally display a solid intra-class alliance ruling on behalf of their shared class interest in capital accumulation, which only breaks down in times of generalized social crisis. State elites from the dominant class employ law, state policies, programs, ideologies and projects to create distinctions that divide and rank the working population into mutually antagonistic social groups. As Sider (2003, 2006) points out, governing class elites promote such divisions between different groups in terms of groups' differential rights of citizenship related to livelihood and the labour process as a means of limiting the demands of labour and controlling labour markets. As a consequence, these distinctions functionally disenfranchise certain working populations, even to the point where their social (and cultural) reproduction are jeopardized, while the structurally imposed impetus toward dialectical struggle between classes is deflected into ethnic and national conflicts. This does not mean that class struggles disappear or that classes are not formed from struggle, but that these struggles are misrecognized and limited in their transformative effects.

One major ideological consequence of such a specific configuration is that people tend to articulate their suffering from class-based inequalities and exploitation as grievances and antipathies between ethno-racial groups, since state institutions and practices impose hegemonic "truths" about ethno-racial differences onto the everyday lived experiences of members of these groups, even as such truths are episodically disrupted by misrecognized class struggles. One major social consequence is that in contrast to the general unity found between different ethno-racial fractions of the ruling dominant class, members of subordinate classes tend to form self-conscious solidarities and discourses only when they belong to the same ethno-racial group. Malaysia is certainly one such state manifesting this pattern.

The theoretical and epistemological challenge of my fieldwork among urban Chinese Malaysians has therefore been to begin with the experiences of my informants, most frequently articulated in terms of their disadvantaged ethno-racial status in Malaysian society, but not to end the investigation with a merely superficial interpretation of their experiences. Such premature closure would have prevented an analysis of the processes of class conflict and state formation which broadly encompass these experiences and account for why they were channelled along ethno-racial lines to begin with. Experience never suffices or is exhaustive; analysis and theory are crucial to make sense of it, and in this case an analytics of urban space provides critical entry to these processes.

My aim in the historical ethnography that follows is therefore to situate the uses of urban space in Malaysia within these connected processes of class struggle, ethno-racial division, and state formation—processes rife with ambiguity and conflicts over the meanings of citizenship, the nation, and group and individual rights to the social product. I pose the question: how do changing urban spatial practices, representations of space, and representational spaces index transformations occurring over the last 30 years as elements of these three interconnected processes? To investigate urban space in this way, I seek to frame my ethnographic findings on changes among urban Chinese Malaysians since the 1970s within a historical political-economic analysis of the displacement of class struggle and state formation into the terms of ethno-racial conflict, spatially manifested.[3]

State Ordering of Ethno-racial Spaces

The "Emergency," the counterinsurgency campaign conducted by British colonial rulers from 1948-60 against the insurrection of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), made it increasingly difficult, by the time of Malaysia's independence in 1957, for Malaysians to publicly think and hence act in terms of "class" and "class struggle." Proletarian class ideologies in support of restive postwar labour unions enunciated by Chinese labourers and displaced squatters were put under public proscription, as the MCP came under state repression in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Cross-racial solidarities between workers and farmers were broken when the leftist Malay Nationalist Party and the All-Malayan Council of Joint Action-PUTERA, a pan-ethnic alliance of parties to which it belonged, were banned, and the leaders of both arrested and detained in the early 1950s. British rulers also sought to drive a spatio-social wedge between rural Chinese

squatters (displaced by the Japanese occupation 1941-45) and rural Malay farmers by forcibly urbanizing 500,000 Chinese and resettling them into fortified "New Villages" (Sandhu 1964), identifying them to conservative Malay leaders and poor rural Malays as suspect "subversives" who were enemies of and aliens in Malaya.

By the 1960s, it was no longer safe to speak publicly of class struggle, or even of the working class, as persecution of the Labour Party and the suspension of local council elections in the 1960s show (Tennant 1973). Late colonial administrators had successfully prepared conservative Malays—members of royalty, petty civil servants and large landowners—as their successors after Independence, and these latter, interconnected by marriage and clientage, became the governing elite as leaders of the dominant party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). They formed a coalition, known as "The Alliance," with the anti-Communist Chinese bourgeoisie, represented by the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and together with it formed the postcolonial dominant class (Nonini 1992:103-126). Within the Alliance, the division of labour allotted political leadership to the Malay elite, and economic decision-making to Chinese businessmen. Once talk and political action along the lines of class had been suppressed, a hegemonic discourse of essential difference and social division between Chinese, Malay and Indian "races" emerged and became institutionalized through the powers of the postcolonial state. The state circulated and firmed up claims of naturalized differences and inequalities between Malays (Muslim, poor, rural, honest yeomen, taken advantage of by unscrupulous outsiders) and Chinese (polytheistic, wealthy, urban, crafty merchants, in control of the economy), and these became public truths or myths.[4]

By the late 1960s, as part of state projects of ethno-racial recognition that diverted social tensions from class, government officials had come to identify ethno-racial groups with explicit spatial referents. The distinction between "rural" and "urban" became an official metaphor representing the manifold political, cultural, et cetera, differences between Malays or *Bumiputera* (literally "princes of the soil")—the "rural" populations—and Chinese and Indians—the "urban" populations.[5] Thus, for example, the reports of successive Malaysia Plans in the 1960s and 1970s identified the most serious priorities for "development"—particularly the need for preferential provision of infrastructure such as schools, paved roads, and health clinics—with the "rural population," that is, with Malays (Government of Malaysia 1979). This spatial image pointed to the threatening presence of politically unsympathetic "urban" working-class populations and the spaces they occupied. Their presence became a matter of concern to the ruling Malay elite and its Chinese bourgeois allies.

In this sense, the state of Penang was the most "urban," that is, the most "Chinese" of all states in Peninsular Malaysia—with about 50% of its population being listed in recent censuses as ethnic Chinese, compared to the percentage of Chinese nationally at about 35%. By the early 1970s, the Chinese population of the city of Bukit Mertajam, where I began fieldwork in 1978, made up almost one half of the total population of the district (49%), with the remainder being Malays (39%) and Indians (12%). But there was an even closer association between ethno-racial identity and place, since almost 80% of the population residing within the boundaries of Bukit Mertajam, the district capital and its only large town, were ethnic Chinese (Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 1972).

The New Economic Policy: Ethno-racial Complaints, Class Injuries and New Bases of Accumulation and State Formation

The national elections of 1969 were followed by the 13 May 1969 riots in Kuala Lumpur during which hundreds of Chinese were killed at the hands of petit-bourgeois and poor Malays fearing the new enfranchisement of urban Chinese voters who had successfully elected opposition candidates in several states. A crisis of legitimation faced the Alliance of UMNO and the MCA and challenged the pre-existing balance of power between the ethno-racial elites of the dominant class—with Malay leaders in charge of politics, and Chinese businessmen of the economy. After a year of effective martial law and the suppression of political dissent, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was instituted by the UMNO-dominated parliament in 1970 in response to widespread Malay discontent against the Chinese presence. There were two stated objectives to the NEP—to eradicate poverty and to reduce the identification of each "race" with economic function; that is to move Malays into business and the professions, which had previously been populated mostly by Chinese and expatriates from the colonial period (Government of Malaysia 1979:27-58). While the first objective of the NEP sought to placate impoverished Malay farmers and urban poor, the second provided the rationale for the aggrandizement of the Malay fraction of the ruling coalition—UMNO leaders, Malay royalty, and large landowners—and those who belonged to the growing UMNO patronage networks in each state. This decisive step put politics in command, and while assuring the protection of capital accumulation in general and the class domination it required, dislodged the wealthy Chinese bourgeoisie from its prior position

of economic dominance and imposed a legal and administrative apparatus of control that generated state discrimination against and intensified conditions of exploitation of Chinese workers, family-operated businesses, small capitalists and professionals.

Not long after my arrival in Bukit Mertajam in late 1978, I became accustomed to hearing what I, at first, took to be a standard litany of complaints from Chinese residents about state policies, enumerated to me on repeated occasions. The list of injustices told me was long and came from people diversely situated in the local economy. The Malaysian government discriminated against Chinese because it required their children to pass Bahasa Malaysia (standardized Malay) instead of English or Mandarin examinations in the Form 5 secondary school year that determined whether they would go on to university. It set quotas for the number of Chinese who could enter the universities, while it forbade Chinese from undertaking to fund and establish a private Chinese-language university, Merdeka University. Government officials, all Malays, were "corrupt" and always hungry for bribes. The government took away hard-earned equity from Chinese business owners without compensation. Government employment virtually excluded Chinese from the civil service, police and military (and people stated that the government, after all, was the country's largest employer). The government's Ministry of Public Works discriminated against Chinese businesses in handing out large government contracts. Special Branch police threatened opposition leaders with preventive detention (and detained some) when they spoke out against Malay *tequan* (special rights) and so on. Informants made these complaints to me informally as they expected that I would listen sympathetically, since my ability to speak and read Chinese indicated that I honoured "Chinese culture." They said they dared not utter such words in public for fear they might come to the attention of the Special Branch. What I want to emphasize is that while this catalogue of injustices confirmed to Bukit Mertajam residents that they were being treated "unfairly" as "second-class citizens" by "their [Malays'] government," at the same time, informants emphasized to me that as citizens who belonged to the Chinese "race," they recognized the legitimacy of the independent Malaysian state, saw their home in Malaysia where many had lived for generations, and knew little about China, most having never visited there.

As I began to listen to these complaints—and all informants displayed some animosity toward the government and Malays and a sense of being unjustly treated—it became clear that people's precise complaints were dependant on their class positions. Merchants told me they particularly despised the Industrial Coordination Act (1975) which allowed the equity of medium- and large-sized Chinese-owned firms to be taken over by government-controlled corporations to be held "in trust" for poor Malays. Merchants who were wealthy enough to have visible property but who lacked access to UMNO or MCA patronage networks were those most subject to such takeovers. In contrast, young Chinese adults educated in Mandarin or English and coming from the families of workers, artisans and professionals and from self-employed business families, were most anxious or angry about the new examination in Bahasa Malaysia required for university entry and the new university entry quotas instituted for Chinese. Many I talked to felt that both were deliberate and mean-spirited attempts to provincialize Chinese by preventing them from acquiring linguistic skills needed in commerce or the professions: "One can do business or study in English or Chinese anywhere in the world but one can only use Bahasa in Malaysia and Indonesia, nowhere else." But then, as I discovered, business families owning extensive capital were at that time starting to pay to send their grown children abroad to universities in Australia, Singapore, Canada, the U.S. and Taiwan, and these complaints about discrimination in education were of little direct concern. And different again, working-class Chinese came under intensified harassment by police and military who saw them as anti-social, lawless and subversive; police shakedowns and road blocks for "tea money" targetted this group for rough treatment, as I discovered in my 1985 research on the work of Chinese truck drivers in Malaysia (Nonini 1999). They well knew that they had little chance for government employment or work in government-owned corporations where Malay special rights prevailed. They did not mention worries about government or Malay takeover of Chinese business equity.

From a historical and national perspective, it is possible to tie this array of class injuries to a set of complexly interconnected processes of class, ethno-racial and state formation. What NEP policies that ostensibly aimed to reduce overall ethnic economic disparities actually focused on was the goal of making rich not all Malays but the families of UMNO leaders and those business groups, royalty and rentiers who were their clients, as UMNO maintained its dominance over elections and the government from Independence onward (Gomez and Jomo 1997). This meant massive state interventions not only in what had been the dominant plantation and mining sectors of the colonial period, but also in the most modern corporate sectors in ways that systematically favoured those groups who made up the "new Malays," the *Melayu bharu*—a

state-connected economic upper class-in-becoming. The conceptual link between the Malays forming this class and *all* Malays made in official NEP rhetoric was the notion of "trusteeship." These Malays were to manage public enterprises controlled by UMNO as "trustees" for poor rural Malays, who would eventually come to prosper as soon as (at some indefinite future time) they were able to acquire wealth held for them by the trustees.

The instrument for state intervention was the public enterprise managed by Malays connected to the UMNO elite by family, marriage, and region and, most markedly, political clientage. Under NEP legislation and policies, UMNO leaders serving as government ministers converted government departments into new profit-seeking government-owned public enterprises and directed the managers of these new enterprises to form joint-venture partnerships with foreign industrial investors and to acquire equity from domestic capitalists. Large Chinese-owned banks, factories, real estate firms, plantation and mining companies as well as many smaller businesses were required to turn over up to 40% of their equity as the condition for being allowed to continue operating (Gomez and Jomo 1997).

By the late 1970s, this "statification" of the economy aimed in part at claiming the equity of private Chinese capital for redistribution to public enterprises and the UMNO patronage machine was well underway, as were specific NEP measures that sought to eliminate what UMNO leaders and their followers regarded as advantages Chinese possessed vis-à-vis Malays (e.g., the prevalence of English and Chinese as languages in the workplace, and higher Chinese exam scores ensuring greater access to universities). In support of official NEP policies, UMNO's Malay base of supporters (farmers, small tradespeople, soldiers, police, teachers and petty government functionaries) held shared notions that Chinese were essentially alien, subversive, dishonest, greedy and anti-social and it is undeniable that an ethnic revanchism by those then in power targetted Chinese. My informants saw these policies of "their government" as vindictive, punitive and capricious.

NEP policies by no means harmed the class interests of all Chinese in Bukit Mertajam. The new export-oriented industrialization policies of the NEP, which promoted major foreign investments in nearby Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in Penang state, in fact, provided many opportunities for enhanced capital accumulation among owners of local industrial subcontractors and small factories. These factories produced apparel and small consumer goods assembled by young women (themselves mostly Chinese) working under sweatshop conditions in illicit factories in the city's residential neighbourhoods. Construction contractors, labour recruiters, bus company owners and others providing ancillary services to the large factories in the EPZs also found chances for private enrichment. In contrast, government police and officials continued their violent repression of "subversive" Chinese workers, while quashing the prospects for both upward mobility by workers and for social reproduction by Chinese artisans, professionals and those self-employed in small businesses, by denying these subordinate classes access to university education, capital and government employment.

Everyday State Predation, Class Repression and Encompassing Ethno-racial Spaces

It is no surprise, therefore, in areas where a majority of Chinese resided, as in Bukit Mertajam, that a large majority voted in the 1978 national election for the candidates of opposition political parties and against the ruling coalition of political parties dominated by UMNO. In Bukit Mertajam, this party was the Democratic Action Party (DAP) led by Mandarin-educated Chinese leaders. The "stronghold" of the DAP from the late 1960s through the 1970s were several thousand Chinese living in *kampong* (villages) within the boundaries of the city and others residing in three outlying New Villages still in existence from the Emergency era. These kampongs were several densely populated squatter areas occupied by poorer Chinese. Residents paid the landowners nominal rents, but later—when downtown real estate values surged—resisted forcible removal, and insisted on remaining on as a customary right. Most kampong and New Village residents were workers, artisans and petty traders, although over time a few began to prosper by setting up small-scale manufacturing in their homes (e.g., putting-out work in apparel) or operating small enterprises (e.g., bus owner-drivers) servicing nearby EPZs while remaining in low-rent kampong homes. Many poor residents belonged to "secret societies," and engaged in illegal activities such as selling lottery tickets not sanctioned by the government, running small gambling dens, shaking down local merchants, distilling *samsu* (liquor) and, in a very few cases, smuggling and refining heroin.

At the time I began my fieldwork in 1978, government officials, most of them Malays, viewed Bukit Mertajam kampong dwellers and New Village residents not only as ungratefully voting for the opposition party but also as dangerous, subversive and criminal. Here is how one Road Transport official, described them in 1980:

> Over there in Bukit Mertajam they do a lot of evil things: smuggling goods in from Thailand; opening factories making imitation goods; breaking the traffic laws by having unregistered trailers in their yards or by not having paid road tax. You see, they are all grouped together, concentrated together in a very small area, some 20-25 000 of them. Therefore, they let one another do all sorts of illegal things without reporting them to the government. There are also communists over there. They [Chinese] will do anything to make money...[They are] doing anything they like, with nobody to stop them.

During this period, the postcolonial links between state formation, ethno-racial politics, and class formation were firmly consolidated. From the perspective of Bukit Mertajam's Chinese, state rule and "race" domination were linked in a variety of ways. In everyday life these most commonly made their appearance as predation by state officials, police and military on Chinese residents. Whether it was the "tea money" (bribes) required from Chinese truck drivers to pass through a roadblock or from petty merchants to have electricity installed in their factories, or the monthly collections by police officers visiting each Chinese-owned shophouse downtown, or the giving by wealthy entrepreneurs of large sums of money in "red packets" to friendly District Office officials and police superintendents on Chinese New Year and other holidays, all Chinese paid (Nonini 2005). There is no doubt that in the aggregate, the combined flows of exactions like these from urban Chinese settlements throughout Malaysia represented an enormous flow of capital toward those who worked at various levels for national, state, and district-level government agencies, who largely coincided with UMNO patron-client networks. It is difficult to see this as anything other than the consolidation of the capital accumulation base of members of a state-connected Malay official rentier class.

At the same time, however, these costs were class-based, and thus unevenly shared and suffered. While for a well-to-do businessman giving red packets was merely one of the costs of doing business and might be part of a strategy of currying favour in order to illicitly receive government contracts, for a poor worker or a self-employed petty property owner (e.g., a truck owner-driver) coming into frequent contact with police or petty officials and thus forced to pay them tea money taken out of low wages or petty profits, these impositions were major losses.

Withdrawal of national and state level government services were also employed as a whip to enforce political discipline on a recalcitrant and dissatisfied Chinese population of labourers, the self-employed, artisans and others who did not accumulate capital. This took the form of national and state government officials systematically penalizing the poor residents of the city's kampongs and New Villages who voted for the opposition by denying them post-electoral municipal services. Such services were provided to more politically loyal, wealthier Chinese constituencies residing in outlying areas like the new suburbs where many Chinese owners of capital had moved and to the rural Malay-populated villages of the rest of the district. Here is how an informant who lived in one of the city kampongs described its situation to me in 1978:

> There are shortages in water and electricity that we residents experience there. Many residents, like my family, draw on wells for our water supply. This water and electricity shortage is due to the area I live in–Kampong Tanah Liat, which is like other kampongs in Bukit Mertajam. Unlike areas out of town where the wealthy live, electrical, water and road services are poor in these areas...Officials have never come to visit my neighbourhood to inspect conditions there. This is due to two factors: our State Assemblyman is the DAP's man, and also our area is populated exclusively by Chinese.

Throughout the 1970s, the government extended a reign of police terror throughout these urban kampong settlements, ostensibly against the secret societies whom officials and police saw as the core criminal element there. Here is how the owner of a small restaurant located on the fringes of one of the town's kampongs described the actions of a particular police inspector who made continual incursions into these urban kampongs:

> Inspector Tan has done a lot of good by threatening bad hats [criminals] with arrest and administrative detention on Pulau Jerejak. For instance, one bad hat named Henry is notorious on this street for his threatening behaviour. He carries *parangs* (knives) and things like that. One time, I was disturbed by Henry and his gang who awakened me late at night and threatened me, and had his gang stand on my car. After a while, however, I saw no more of Henry. I found out later that Inspector Tan had sent him to Pulau Jerejak for at least a year. Inspector Tan can do this with the authorization of the magistrate, and no trial is needed.

The class character of state repression directed against the unruly youth of the kampongs associated with the Chinese urban working class was evident, as indeed was the broader intimidation of poorer Chinese, irrespective of their ties to secret societies, living in these areas.

Police raids and harassment, violence and imprisonment of kampong residents were one means of establish-

ing a state presence in and police controls over these spaces of opposition defined by subordinate class and ethno-racial position. By the 1980s, the government deployed an even more effective weapon against these spatially defined enemies of the developmental state: "improvement." This was intimated in a press release of 1979 by the local branch of the Gerakan Party, whose state president was also the Chief Minister of Penang and a strong ally of top UMNO leaders. It appeared in a regional Chinese-language newspaper under the innocuous-sounding title "Bukit Mertajam Gerakan proposes improved traffic measures":

> roads can be broadened, for example, Jalan Aston can be widened and afterward converted into a two-way street; a new road can be opened to connect Tanah Liat intersection with a new Kampong Cross Street. When this road is finished, it will reduce the traffic on Jalan Tanah Liat. Vehicles coming and going between Kedah and Butterworth can use this new road, and at Kampong Wusha, another road should be opened up to connect Berapit and Kulim Road. This proposed road will directly reduce the town's traffic. [Guanghua Ribao 1979]

These proposals for traffic "improvement"—which required extensive removal of hundreds of squatters living in several kampongs who happened to lay in the way of the proposed roads—were put into effect in the late 1980s.

Residents viewed such rhetoric as a prelude to grander measures of state and Malay encompassment of Chinese space. For example, in 1979 after I noticed that an open area of ground abutting the town's *padang* (municipal square) was being used on a daily basis by vegetable dealers as a depot for sorting vegetables brought in from outside, I asked a vegetable wholesaler about it. He replied, "we won't be here much longer, because the Malays are going to move us out in order to construct an Islamic courthouse for themselves." When I returned several years later, the Shariah courthouse—symbol of the nexus between the state, Malays, and Islam—had been constructed in this prominent central space.

The Crypto-Geography of "Travelling the Dark Road": Representational Spaces Which Represent What Cannot Be Spoken Of

Wittgenstein (1961) wrote that "that which we cannot speak of, we must pass over in silence," but in daily life, as distinct from philosophy, silence can be eloquent. Here I want to suggest that even as state encompassment of Chinese spaces in Bukit Mertajam proceeded in the name of the NEP, a new anti-statist sensibility among Chinese emerged to thwart the claims of the state, but without announcing its name. It was radically different from the standard litany of complaints about the Malaysian government's discriminatory policies described above. At the level of discreet speech, the latter was a discourse about "unfairness" in how Chinese citizens were treated by the governing Malay majority, measured by a notion of citizen "rights" which the government ignored. Working within the frame set by the state's recognition of group rights, one might take this discourse to be a very model of discursive encompassment of citizens' subjectivities: Chinese were "second class citizens," but still citizens.

However, if this was encompassment, for many Chinese it was only superficially so. I wish to argue that in strong contrast to it were rumours about residents who "travelled the dark road," (*zoule heian de luxian*). A metaphor of mobility interesting in its own right, *travelling the dark road* referred to persons who sought to gain wealth through illegal and admittedly anti-social means, especially narcotics trafficking and processing. Narcotics trafficking, people told me, shadowed the transnational connections that businessmen in the Bukit Mertajam truck transport and fish wholesaling industries had established with merchants trading out of the fisheries of southern Thailand. Both groups shared China native-place and linguistic affinities as Teochews, and in some cases had actual kinship ties. People thus speculated about the smuggling of narcotics from the Golden Triangle through southern Thailand based on these connections, and the opportunities for trafficking (e.g., by employees) they provided.

Travelling the dark road constituted a circulating message based on improvised signs which set apart specific features of the everyday landscapes of Bukit Mertajam with the stamp of an anti-statist imaginary of capital accumulation. These rumours did not dispute outright so much as displace the moral narrative of the New Economic Policy, which was that Malay economic betterment would develop the whole nation, even if some (i.e., Chinese) had to suffer for the nation's good. At the same time, travelling the dark road, something never declared yet continually alluded to in these rumours, also undermined the conventional trope of Chinese rags-to-riches-and-fame featured in the standard biographies of successful businessmen[6]: "raising up one's family with one's own bare hands" through hard work, thrift and intelligence and, once having made one's fortune "taking from society then to use for society" through philanthropy that benefitted "Chinese society" while it celebrated a man's reputation for generosity.

A range of features of the built environment and more broadly of the humanly-transformed spaces in Bukit Mertajam coded this alternative moral economy of travelling the dark road. This moral economy never announced itself as such in public. Instead, stories and rumours circulated around and invested certain places and spaces—shopfronts, bank offices, plots of land, truck depots, even the mountain behind the town itself—with passing and improvised meanings that pointed to a dangerous path to capital accumulation. Conversely, local spaces and places were mnemonic placeholders for the stories and rumours that carried the marks of this alternative economy.

One such representational space (Lefebvre 1974) that pointed residents to the possibility that someone living or doing business in them was travelling the dark road, were certain two- or three-storey shophouses in the downtown district or in outlying commercial ribbons along the roads leading into Bukit Mertajam, when evaluated in the context of local knowledge and rumours about sudden changes in the financial condition of their owners. Mr. Ng of Heng Ee Agricultural Supply, had this to say:

> People are suspicious of me because I have such a small downtown office on Jalan, yet I am able to do such a large business. When I first met Mr. Ooi See-Huat, the Assistant Manager of the OCBC Bank in town, he was very suspicious of me because he knew that my monthly turnover was very high. How could I do this from such a small office? I said that it was due to the convenience of transport in Bukit Mertajam. I can take orders at my shop, and then have the fertilizers and their components transported to and from my godown elsewhere a few miles outside of downtown, in Alma. Yet some people have been suspicious of me because of the smallness of my office, and have assumed that I am smuggling drugs instead.

As his wife Mrs. Ng put it to me on another occasion, "many Chinese businessmen hang out a sign in front of their shops, but do a different kind of business inside, as in the case of heroin manufacturers—they become rich and no one knows it."

Another representational space associated with travelling the dark road were plots of land that someone acquired when their legitimate source of income to purchase expensive land in and near the town was not in evidence. One evening in late January 1980, as Mr. Chooi was driving me out of town and we passed by a cemetery, I saw that an area near it had been planted in oil palms.

> Author: Who has planted oil palms on such valuable land which is road frontage and immediately adjacent to the cemetery?
>
> Chooi: Eng Huat Company owns this land. The idea is to plant oil palms and hold onto the land until it can be developed into housing estates and sold at a high profit. People expect that eventually Bukit Mertajam's housing development will even extend as far as out here. This company is also involved in drug trafficking. Recently the son of its owner has been seized by police for drug trafficking. He's only been released after paying a very large bribe of several hundred thousand ringgit to certain people. After he was released, he fled to Taiwan and lives there now. Many of Bukit Mertajam's very wealthy people are involved in drug trafficking and in other illegal ways of making money, like smuggling and manufacturing liquor. But some people trafficking in drugs are not yet wealthy, and both workers and bosses are involved.

Residents of the city might be said to be divided over this alternative moral economy, if it were even possible to assess the presence of diverse opinion on the morality of such activities as heroin manufacture, sales, or smuggling, in a situation when the articulation of opinion itself required the existence of a field of public debate. Such did not exist and one could not do an opinion survey. The state promoted its anti-narcotics propaganda vigorously and unopposed in schools and throughout the electronic and paper media. Government officials spoke of narcotics trafficking as the gravest injury to the Malaysian, and especially Malay, nation in a tone that brooked no discussion of alternative views. Narcotics manufacturing and trafficking were hanging offenses, and local Chinese had been convicted and hung for engaging in them. Still, the Malaysian government showed no racial favouritism, having hung Malays, Chinese and Europeans with an equal rope—although class favouritism existed, as the example of the rich man's son's successful flight to Taiwan shows.

Thus, no one I spoke to in Bukit Mertajam publicly promoted the idea that narcotics manufacture, smuggling and trafficking were acceptable practices. Nonetheless, these stories and rumours attached to places suggested that while some disapproved outright, others were ambivalent. Some people displayed a waggish black humour in mentioning Bukit Mertajam's international notoriety as a centre for heroin smuggling in north Malaysia, transparently extolling the town's reputation as a matter of local pride. Others, if pushed, said they deplored these practices but spoke of those who committed them and got away with doing so in terms of moral neutrality or even of backhanded admiration. When I asked Mr. Chooi what residents thought of persons who travelled the dark road, he replied, "To them, it is just a matter of making money, and if people are able to get

away with drug trafficking and so become rich, it is acceptable to them. But I myself feel this traffic definitely hurts people, and perhaps such men will find out that in the future they have harmed their own children." Rumours circulated that several of the town's wealthiest "celebrities," noted for their philanthropy to local Chinese institutions (e.g., the Independent High School) and for holding high office in community associations, had begun their journey toward successful capital accumulation by travelling precisely along this "road." After all, even if one "took from society" in this way, as long as such a man's money was also "used for society," this was what ultimately mattered.

Far from being discursively encompassed by the rhetoric of citizenship promoted by the Malaysian state, those residents who enunciated the crypto-geography of travelling the dark road cultivated an anti-state imaginary that placed them potentially outside and beyond the moral community of the Malaysian nation. This imaginary challenged the conventional rags-to-riches-and-fame account of Chinese achievement: there were other ways to become rich and well-regarded, as dangerous and anti-social as they were. This new imaginary points not to the dangerous "voice" option some residents took in publicly opposing the state, as in the case of those who participated in opposition party politics of the DAP, even less to the "loyalty" option adopted by some residents who joined and were active in parties allied with UMNO like the Gerakan Party and Malaysian Chinese Association—but to the option of "exit" from the Malaysian nation-state itself (Hirschman 1970). Although some residents were discursively encompassed by the two options of citizens—loyalty and voice—others repudiated this encompassment entirely by the imaginary of exit. What I am suggesting here is that this imaginary preceded and made possible the physical move offshore by many Chinese in the years that followed.

Exiting Malaysian Space or Being Stuck, and What "Chinese Society"?

During 1978-80 and again during my visits in the 1980s and early 1990s, middle-aged businessmen in Bukit Mertajam often approached me asking how to migrate to the U.S., Canada and elsewhere, or sounded me out about assisting their grown children's entry into universities overseas. Many talked longingly of moving their families to countries like Australia, Taiwan or Canada which they had visited as tourists. For instance, in 1990, when I asked a local leader how I might best reciprocate the many Bukit Mertajam residents who had helped me in my previous research, he informed me that the best way of showing thanks would be to talk to local high school students about the process of applying to overseas universities and so I gave a presentation at the local Chinese Independent High School on how to apply to American universities.

As I have described elsewhere (Nonini 1997), relocation overseas by Chinese Malaysians who belonged to small business or professional families took the form of a "middling transnationalism" which most frequently began when an adult son or daughter applied to and successfully entered a university overseas in Australia, the U.S., Canada, New Zealand or, in the case of Chinese-only speakers, Taiwan. Such transnational migration whose objective was over time to permanently relocate family members and their (usually modest) liquid capital overseas, was in stark contrast to the "globalization" of Chinese Malaysian tycoons who sent out capital (and sometimes family members) as part of a capital accumulation strategy of seeking new markets, while putting their wealth beyond the grasp of the Malaysian state. During my fieldwork in 1985 and then again from 1990-93, my attempts to find people whom I had last seen a few years previously in their homes in Bukit Mertajam and hoped to interview again were stymied because I could not locate them. But then I would encounter a mutual acquaintance who told me, "oh, Tan went to Australia to live with his sons who work there," or "the Cheah family moved to New Zealand."

It is a fair generalization from such encounters and other evidence (Munro-Kua 1996:166, Table A.6) that during these years many Chinese families in Malaysia, like these small-scale capitalists and professionals from Bukit Mertajam, sought opportunities to move overseas during the same period that neoliberal Anglophone states throughout the Asia Pacific were liberalizing their immigration programs to seek out "business migrants" and "skill migrants" who could bring scarce "global" capital and high-tech skills into their territories for investment (Nonini 2004). Huge amounts of Chinese capital fled Malaysia to overseas locations; according to a Morgan Guaranty estimate, US$12 billion was sent overseas from Malaysia from 1976-85 (Gomez and Jomo 1997:44). While the families of wealthy tycoons accounted for most of this capital flight, nonetheless in terms of the number of people involved, the offshoring of capital and people by middling transnationalists had a far greater social effect on the Chinese who remained.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that only the owners of capital could consider permanently relocating overseas. It is crucial to mark at this point a new inflection in class formation—with the colonial days of upward mobility for Chinese migrants long since past, with the NEP-

based discriminations in university entry and government and corporate employment against Chinese labourers, self-employed and others—the exit option for Chinese labourers, male and female, was also one that could only be temporary. Within the tiered transnational labour markets that had emerged in the Asia Pacific during the 1980s, working-class Chinese could only find jobs as day labourers in Japan and Taiwan doing "3-D" jobs (dirty, dangerous and difficult) or as domestic workers, where wages were high compared to those in Malaysia but permanent work and residence were unattainable.

Outside of temporary and illegal "overstaying" as overseas labour migrants in these countries, Chinese workers had no exit from Malaysia, unlike better-off Chinese. Even the option of migrant labour in Japan ended when the onset of depression in the Japanese economy in the early 1990s led to crackdowns on Malaysian workers who overstayed their visas. Workers found themselves in the condition of being "stuck" defending their increasingly embattled spaces of work and life within Malaysia (Nonini 1997). In contrast to the late 1940s, they were without labour union representation or political power, and had recourse only to jobs within the Chinese petty capitalist sector and (for women) the booming corporate industrial export sector. Extensive control by public enterprises of major sectors of the economy meant that large corporations effectively enforced NEP policies of employment and language discrimination that most adversely affected Chinese workers, and kept working class Chinese from employment, access to credit, et cetera. Chinese workers, both men and women, were effectively "docilized" as objects of capitalist exploitation from the 1980s onward. Although this process of subjection became increasingly endurable in material terms for working people—due to booming conditions of rapid economic growth associated with Malaysia's export-based industrialization with generally rising wages, high employment and rising living standards—nonetheless, Chinese working women and men were employed on terms firmly set by Chinese petty capital and supported by the state. The sites at which petty capital sought to exploit these workers were those in which class struggle, occluded and denied, took place (Nonini 1999).

1990s-2000s: Elite Withdrawal, State and Ethno-racial Spaces of Enclosure and New Divisions in the Working Class

By the mid-1980s, the government-owned public enterprises that dominated the most dynamic sectors of the economy had suffered major losses not only due to declines in export markets for Malaysian oil and other commodities, but also due to their poor and inefficient management. Approaches to business taken by these public enterprises were driven far more by their managers' interests in cultivating their UMNO patronage ties, and for some managers by their own self-aggrandizement than by careful considerations of profitability (Gomez and Jomo 1997). As a result, by 1987 the debt held by public enterprises (among those whose books could be audited) amounted to more than 30% of all government debt servicing (Gomez and Jomo 1997:78).

As a result of this financial crisis and of pressures toward liberalization coming from the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury, the Mahathir administration embarked on a campaign to privatize public enterprises, first transforming their legal organization into public and private limited companies, and then selling their assets to preselected or favoured bidders. Privatization occurred through sale of assets and equity, leasing out of assets, management contracts, and in the case of new projects, through "build-operate-transfer."[7] Although privatization was a radical measure that reduced the size of the public sector and public enterprises as instruments for the NEP, UMNO leaders chose to sell the newly privatized corporations to their clients—the managers, equity owners, and Malay-equity trustees of public enterprises. The process of managing the economy through political patronage via the state-corporate nexus continued in altered legal form. There is evidence that publicly-owned assets were divested at prices far below their market value to Bumiputera managers with political connections to UMNO (Gomez and Jomo 1997:81-83). Through this process, New Malays condensed into a specific upper-class position—separated by vast differences in wealth, power and social status not only from other Malays, but from Chinese and Indians as well. They, their UMNO patrons and a very few extremely wealthy Chinese tycoons with strong patronage ties to top UMNO leaders formed the ruling class. By the inception of the National Development Policy (NDP 1990-2000), the successor to the NEP, these changes were well underway.

It is also important to consider the changed position of the national Chinese economic elite, given their long-standing prior status as the most influential "leaders" and "celebrities" of local "Chinese society." From the beginning of the NEP, in response to government pressures on Chinese-owned businesses, the wealthiest Chinese business families in Malaysia—bankers, real estate developers, resort owners, manufacturers and monopoly wholesale distributors—not only developed new patronage ties with UMNO leaders, but also moved part of their capital to overseas subsidiaries (Gomez and Jomo 1997:48-49). Over

the same period, the financial influence of the MCA, the political party of large Chinese capital, waned vis-à-vis UMNO leaders, given the greatly increased wealth the latter could draw on from their clients among New Malays (Gomez and Jomo 1997:44). As a result, by the 1990s the MCA had become increasingly ineffectual in representing Chinese economic and cultural interests, even as "the trends toward 'Bumiputerization'...continued unabated, in education, in scholarships, in employment, in privileges for housing, loans, and so on" (Munro-Kua 1996:151).

As a consequence, there was a shift by the wealthiest Chinese fraction of capital away from support of collective Chinese economic and cultural interests identified with "Chinese society." This broader view of the decapitation of the hierarchically organized associations of local "Chinese society"—its abandonment by the national Chinese economic elite—was consistent with what I observed ethnographically in Bukit Mertajam. The wealthiest Chinese in the Penang region made donations to Chinese organizations in the island city of Georgetown but they rarely played leadership roles in these organizations, and this was even more the case in their lack of involvement with the much smaller Chinese population of Bukit Mertajam 15 miles away (as the crow flies) from Georgetown. Instead, these tycoons spent their time cultivating their patronage ties with the Gerakan Party in power in the Penang state government and with national and state UMNO leaders.

The withdrawal of the national Chinese economic elite from financial support of local "Chinese society" was compounded by the exit of middling transnational families noted above. The latter had been "stalwart" members of the associations so their absence resulted in an increasingly formalistic, hollowed-out remnant of what had been a self-conscious diasporic sociocultural formation. By this time, the diasporic imaginary held by an older generation in which the wealthiest merchants sat at the apex of an organizational structure which could be mobilized along segmentary lines of China native-place, clan and commercial associations, to unify Chinese and protect Chinese cultural and commercial interests vis-à-vis state authority, no longer made any sense, if it ever did.[8] Within this imaginary, "Chinese society" was identified with maintaining and protecting the representational spaces most closely associated with the reproduction of a China-based ethnic identity—Chinese-language independent primary and secondary schools, Daoist-Buddhist temples, Chinese cemeteries, native-place association halls and clan halls (Nonini 1998: 447-449)—while wealthy celebrities financed these organizations, and less well-off stalwarts operated them. Although such institutions in Bukit Mertajam represented the economic and cultural interests of petty Chinese capital in the area, they grew increasingly powerless to counter the class and ethno-racial redistribution of wealth, rights and power central to the NEP and NDP. For example, when, in the late 1970s, a faction of Bukit Mertajam association leaders used this imaginary to make calls demanding that community associations come together in a segmentary hierarchy to create "unity" on the grounds that "to unify is to be strong" vis-à-vis the common enemy—the Malaysian state—their calls were ignored or repudiated by other leaders as ineffectual or too dangerous (Nonini 1998:448-451). Instead, by the late 1990s, Chinese residents of Bukit Mertajam were confronted by the massive material presence of Bumiputera-owned and managed privatized national corporations connected to UMNO and the Malaysian government, whose new constructions encompassed the urban landscape. These took the form of massive, state-subsidized built structures (government office buildings and complexes) and huge multi-story "hypermarkets" (supermarkets of mall size). For instance, not only had the Shariah (Islamic) courthouse long since supplanted the Chinese vegetable wholesalers' depot on the edge of the municipal square, but the latter itself—a large sward of grass where Chinese high school students previously played soccer, music bands performed and police marched on public holidays—had completely disappeared. It had been displaced by an eight-storey hypermarket under construction and financed by a Malay-owned corporation connected to the national government. Such massive state-sponsored projects of commercial and residential construction and the new roads built to provide access to them had razed the squatters' kampongs that had been the site of determined political opposition to the governing party, UMNO, two decades previously. "Working-class Chinese removal" had been widely, if not completely, accomplished.

In fact, such visible displacement was part of a much more inclusive state project of encompassment of local, indeed, regional spaces, which previously bore the impress of Chinese presence and economic control. Maps and their readings may *make* states (Thongchai 1994), but, we might add, only through the implementation of state-initiated political and economic projects. Techniques of state cartography were crucial to the projects of erasure that sought to construct novel state appropriations of space as inevitable, enduring and entirely natural: maps projected the will of state agencies and functionaries through the modality of "development." At the same time, however, these maps pointed to broader projects of class struggle undertaken in the form of making ethno-racial divisions.

One favourite activity of Malaysian state officials was to colour represented spaces in terms of their "development potential." Thus for example in 1992, I found myself speaking to the District Officer. On the wall of his "Operation Room" was a full-length map of the eastern region of the state: filled with spaces of various shapes and sizes marked in blue, red, pink, et cetera:

> Pointing now and then to different areas on the map, he gave his exposition: In Seberang Jaya, an entire township [pointing to a coloured area] is being built, with a new hospital and many other facilities. The district capital for Utara District is being moved from Butterworth to Kepala Batas [pointing again], with the relocation of the district office there. The port facility will be moved up the coast north of Butterworth. A new international airport will be constructed in Bertam, far in the northeast of the state. Within this district proper, the offices of the District will be moved to a new administrative complex at the west end of the town, within the next two years. The work on the segment of the East-West Highway linking the west coast to Kelantan passing near here is just getting underway.

The image, like the word, preceded the deed. During my visits in 1997, 2002 and 2004, I observed that the material effects of these huge projects delineated by state maps years earlier had been undertaken by Bumiputera-owned national corporations and were pervasively in evidence. The new District Office and courthouse had been built on the western edges of downtown and a new road opened to them; this project had displaced the homes of scores of Chinese residents of an urban kampong. The mega-projects of national corporations extended far beyond the town itself to include the entire district and more in a continuous strip of industrial parks, government office complexes and housing projects built by Bumiputera corporations, that extended eastward and southward from the port of Butterworth though Bukit Mertajam to the town of Kulim in southern Kedah thirty miles to the east. Local Chinese developers with connections to UMNO, MCA or Gerakan leaders had also prospered by constructing smaller commercial and housing projects. Still, the material transformations of the local landscape made clear who was really in charge: as Bukit Mertajam Chinese put it, it was "their [Malays'] government" and "their corporations" that were initiating these changes.

These projects manifested the process of class and ethno-racial formation in yet another way. While poorer Chinese had been displaced by these state projects, some obtained the new skilled labour jobs in local businesses (transport, logistics, construction, etc.) serving the influx of new residents and nearby flourishing EPZs and factories, and had moved to live in the new housing projects located in the suburbs of the city. While they had lives of hard physical toil in the workplace, still, given the high levels of employment and regional labour scarcity, they were able in the early 2000s to obtain wages compatible with the new low-end consumer-driven leisurely lifestyle they adopted outside work. However, neither Chinese nor, for that matter, Malay and Indian labourers, were the only members of the working class, which had in fact become stratified such that Chinese workers had become a functional "labour aristocracy." By this time, the new proletariat were immigrant labourers from Indonesia, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, who formed the masses of industrial and construction labourers employed in these mega-projects. Other Indonesian immigrants worked as domestic servants of professional or business families living in town, or as workers in the small shops and factories owned by the latter.

By the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, new forms of state-enforced industrial discipline had come into effect, evident when huge numbers of Indonesian labourers were rounded up by police, harassed and many subjected to torture, then deported, leading hundreds of thousands of Indonesians to return in panicked flight from Malaysia to Indonesia (Far Eastern Economic Review 1998). These new oppressions of labour aimed at foreign migrant labourers not only indexed the new division of labour within ASEAN, and more broadly the Asian region, regarding national "comparative advantage" in labour specializations, but also conveyed a new message of intimidation to Chinese and other Malaysian workers. It reminded them of what could happen to them if the militancy of domestic labourers increased or if less flourishing economic conditions dictated a more coercive response by the state to the unruliness of labour.

Conclusion

Gerald Sider (2003, 2006) in his historical research on social reproduction in Newfoundland and North Carolina reminds us of the processes by which states work on behalf of capital to shape new ethno-racial identities of workers tied to differential citizenship, thus providing a political means of regulating labour markets, and allowing capital to subject specific fractions of the working class to hyper-exploitative conditions within contemporary (and historical) labour processes. This historical ethnography of urban Malaysia amply confirms Sider's broader claims.

Moreover, Sider points out that the processes of exporting human beings and their labour power were evident both in Newfoundland and, in the case of North Car-

olina agriculture, in Mexico. These processes threaten the social reproduction of the communities from which labourers come. A similar process clearly exists in the most recent phase of postcolonial Malaysian capitalism from the 1980s onward, when tiered transnational labour markets segmented by ethno-racial groups and nationalities began to emerge throughout the Asia Pacific region in two phases. In the first phase from the mid-1970s through the 1980s, Malaysia became a source for the export of labour, predominantly Chinese, to the "3-D" and domestic labour markets of Japan and Taiwan—regional centres of accumulation at the time. As I have reported in previous work (Nonini 1997), such experiences left migrant labourers from Bukit Mertajam who had worked illicitly in Japan with little to show at the end of two or three years on their necessary return to Malaysia, and for the most part, intensified their desperate sense of being stuck in Malaysia, and being taken advantage of by labour recruiters, Japanese employers, and the Malaysian government. In the second phase (1990s-2000s), Malaysia became an importer of large numbers of labourers from nearby countries (Indonesia, Philippines, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan etc.) to work in the most exploitative sectors of Malaysia's post-Asian crisis economy—construction, labour-intensive industry, and domestic work—where their working conditions were essentially unregulated by the state. As Sider's (2003, 2006) work suggests, the social reproduction of such imported people within their countries of origin has over the longer term become increasingly problematic and insecure.

If Chinese labourers were able to move into the structural position of the "labour aristocracy" under these new conditions, they acquired few privileges in doing so, for they had exhausted the exit option and found themselves still discriminated against by corporations and the state alike. What made their conditions bearable under these repressive conditions was the burgeoning export economy, in which they were able to find work in the Chinese petty capitalist sector due to the scarcity of skilled labour. It was in this sector that I witnessed class struggle between labourers and their employers over the terms of exploitation (Nonini 1999). Yet struggle was to a large extent hidden, as employers misrecognized this as a conflict over worker theft (of "rice-eating money"), and male workers' "crudeness" and "disputatiousness," even as they saw their profits declining and felt under assault by a predatory Malaysian state and the "race" it supported. And, like the rest of this historical ethnography, the struggle was over the spaces that capital, the state, and labour each sought to control, and it extended over long distances of space (Nonini 1999).

Despite the massive displacement of class struggle in the direction of contentions over ethno-racial domination and suffering by the hegemonic projects of the Malaysian state, class has not gone away in Malaysia. It is just that those who have suffered its injuries have not yet looked across ethno-racial divisions to be reminded of what they already know.

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Notes

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2 I employ the concept of "ethno-racial group" rather than either "ethnic group" or "race" in what follows because I accept Alonso's (1994:391) argument that both "ethnic groups" and "races" are deeply implicated in the projects of state formation, but would argue that recent work on the "new racism" (e.g., Gilroy 2000) holds that essential differences defining fundamental inequalities between groups may be defined either by physical or cultural traits attributed to groups. What matters is that these essentialized and unequal differences arise from the dynamics of group recognition by states (Omi and Winant 1994). In this sense, which *kind* of traits are attributed to a group matters less than that these traits index an essential difference between groups and signal a ranking between groups sanctioned by the state.

3 The connection between state formation, ethno-racial identities, and spatiality is one that Alonso (1994) makes in her important *Annual Review* essay.

4 These myths were exemplified in the stereotypes set out for instance in the social Darwinist tract *The Malay Dilemma* (1970), written by Mahathir Mohamad, later to become Prime Minister for more than two decades.

5 Indians, most of whom were poor and lived in large numbers on plantations, nonetheless were, I would argue, classified as "urban" in that the British saw them as having no moral rights to reside in rural areas, despite the manifest dependence of rural plantations on them for labour. In this respect, their absence of a status associated with rights to land situated them, like Chinese, as "urban."

6 For instance, these tropes were present in the written biographies of prominent businessmen and contributors in the community association "memorial books" periodically published on noteworthy anniversaries such as the 10th or 25th anniversary of the founding of the organization.

7 "Build-operate-transfer" is an arrangement by which a contractor builds and then operates an infrastructural project (e.g., a toll road or bridge), in return for which profits are

transferred to the contractor for a set period of time.

8 Even as late as the 1960s anthropologists still proffered this imaginary of *an imperio in imperium* as if it could be taken at face value as a model of social organization for urban "overseas Chinese" (e.g., Crissman 1967).

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Rent Gaps, Revanchism and Regimes of Accumulation in Mumbai

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Abstract: This paper examines the spatial reshaping of Mumbai through the lens of rent gaps, showing how differences between actual and potential rents in central regions of the city influenced the decline of the textile industry and working-class neighbourhoods there. It discusses theories of urban rent, changing class relations in Central Mumbai, and situates recent slum clearances within a framework of the new revanchism in global cities. It concludes with a discussion of Mumbai's projected future as a property and finance-led "island" of accumulation, noting differences between it and Hong Kong and Singapore, cities that are often cited as models of Mumbai's future redevelopment.

Keywords: Mumbai, revanchism, rent gaps, class relations, textile industry, slum clearance

Résumé : Cet article examine la réorganisation spatiale de Mumbai sur la base de la disparité des prix du logement. Il démontre à quel point la différence réelle et potentielle entre les loyers dans les zones centrales de la ville a influencé le déclin de l'industrie du textile et des quartiers ouvriers. L'article traite des théories portant sur les loyers urbains, de la mouvance des relations entre les classes au centre de Mumbai et il resitue les récents aménagements des quartiers insalubres dans le cadre du nouveau revanchisme en cours dans les villes mondialisées. L'article se conclut par une discussion du futur prévisible de Mumbai, « îlot » d'accumulation propulsé par la finance et l'immobilier, en soulignant ce qui la différencie de Hong Kong et de Singapour, deux villes souvent citées comme modèles du futur développement de Mumbai.

Mots-clés : Mumbai, revanchisme, disparité des prix du logement, relations entre les classes, industrie du textile, aménagement des quartiers insalubres

Introduction

As a gateway city to an emerging economy, Mumbai is undergoing dramatic transformations similar to those of other globalizing cities around the world.[1] These include the increasing prominence of financial, producer, managerial and real estate services as compared to industry, enabling Mumbai to function as an important node in global financial networks (Sassen 2001). Mumbai is also undergoing spatial restructuring that reflects its changing economic profile (Bannerjee-Guha 1996, 2002; D'Monte 2001; Grant and Nijman 2006). Areas of Central Mumbai, once sites of an important textile industry, are giving way to office towers, shopping malls and entertainment complexes. The redevelopment and gentrification of Central Mumbai has led to an influx of middle-class professionals and business elites there and the exit of many former working class families to the suburbs.

These spatial transformations are occurring in a context in which the majority of Mumbai's residents cannot afford apartment or house ownership, unless they belong to a co-operative society that caters to caste, religious, or ethnic communities that jointly purchases apartment colonies (Falzon 2004:148). A recent statistic that average residential rent is 140%[2] of per capita income sheds some light on a housing market in which the contradiction between the use-value of housing and the exchange-value of real estate is severe. In the past decade, the percentage of the population living in dwellings officially described as slums has risen from 55% in 1995 to about 70% in 2006.

As the most important commercial city in India, Mumbai's recent spatial restructuring has already been analyzed in terms of its global rescaling into a network of gateway cities occupying significant nodes in the flows of international financial capital (Banerjee-Guha 2002). This has involved changes from a predominantly fordist city dominated by large-scale manufacturing to one that may be moving towards a property-based regime of accumu-

lation (Boyer 2000; Smart and Lee 2003). Manufacturing has been relocated to the hinterlands, based on small-scale units with a flexible and cheaper labour force employed on temporary contracts. Financial and producer services, both high and low-end, real estate, commerce and entertainment have emerged as leading sectors of the economy on Mumbai island itself. Resulting changes in Mumbai's employment patterns were statistically captured in the Metropolitan Mumbai Regional Development Agency's (MMRDA) planning documents as early as 1996:

> The share of employment in manufacturing industries in Greater Mumbai reduced from 42% in 1980 to 23.5% in 1994, whereas trade, finance and service industries have increased their share of employment from 52.1% to 64.3% in the same period. Parallel to this shift in the employment base of the urban economy has been a decline in total employment in the older parts of the Island City, from 71.8% in 1971 to 55.7% in 1990, due to the flight of manufacturing to the hinterlands." [MMRDA 1996:5]

The shift in Mumbai's employment patterns has been accompanied by simultaneous spatial changes that have been quite massive. Yet no one so far has analyzed these in terms of ground rent, which, I would argue, forms the mechanism propelling institutional and policy changes enabling Mumbai's built environment to be re-imagined and reshaped. This paper offers a political economic analysis of housing policies in Mumbai that outlines the recent spatial changes in Central Mumbai and evaluates the extent to which Mumbai is shifting from a fordist regime towards a finance led regime of accumulation, in the context in which real estate is a major investment (Boyer 2000; Smart and Lee 2003).[3] It does so by evaluating the role of ground rent and real estate in Mumbai's changing spatial landscape. Although municipal officials and business organizations see the future of Mumbai in the finance-based Asian centres of Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai, the paper concludes by outlining the roadblocks to a finance-led accumulation regime in Mumbai.

Rent Gaps and Ground Rent

My analysis of Mumbai's changing spatial topography draws on Smith's (1996) notion of rent gaps, which has been used to explain the process of deindustrialization and disinvestment followed by gentrification (redevelopment) in global and gateway cities.

Ground rent is a claim made by landowners on users of the land; it represents a reduction from the surplus value created over and above the cost price by producers on the site. For Smith, actual, capitalized rent is the quantity of ground rent that is appropriated by the landowner, given present land use. In the case of tenancy, the landlord's ground rent returns mainly in the form of rent paid by the tenants. In the case of owner-occupancy, ground rent is capitalized when the building is sold and appears as part of the sale price. Potential rent is the amount that might be capitalized under the land's "highest and best use" or at least a "higher and better use" than the present one (Smith 1996:68). The rent gap is the disparity between actual and potential ground rent.

Smith's theory of rent gaps has been criticized for insufficient rigour and for its terminological departure from Marxist discussions of ground rent. Indeed, a critic has argued that the "the concept of rent that is relevant to changes in land use is land rent as an opportunity cost, which is a function of the potential use of a site rather than its actual or current use" (Bourassa 1993:34). Bourassa interprets rent gaps as a particular type of opportunity cost. However, the concept of opportunity cost does not capture the cyclical character of investment and disinvestment in urban spaces, and therefore seems less appropriate than rent gaps in discussing changes in the built environment over time.

In relation to Marx's terminology, the analysis of urban ground rent is complicated by the fact that Marx concentrated on ground rent in agriculture. Indeed, his discussion of absolute ground rent was based on the existence of a lower organic composition of capital in agriculture than in industry, with landlords capturing a portion of the surplus value created rather than it being redistributed through the equalization of rates of profit between agriculture and industry. It therefore represents a deduction of total surplus value and, like interest bearing capital, it is not created in production but arises through distribution (Harvey 1982:339). While some have interpreted absolute ground rent in terms of different technical compositions of capital, others have viewed class relations—in agriculture or elsewhere—as fundamental in creating sectors with different compositions of capital (Evans 1999:2112). If the latter interpretation is accepted, it is possible to see the amount of rent captured on the worst available land in Mumbai as representing absolute ground rent, with the comparison of agriculture and industry that Marx discusses being a special case of absolute ground rent typical of England in the 19th century.

Marx also discusses differential rent, broken into two subcategories of differential rent 1 and differential rent 2 (Bryan 1990:178). Differential rent 1 is the ground rent that represents the difference between the land of worst quality in production (the source of absolute ground rent) and that of better quality, either in terms of fertility or

location. Differential rent 2 refers to the difference between the lowest level of capital investment on land and that in which greater capitals have been employed (Harvey 1982:340-343). In relation to ground rent in Mumbai, differential rent 1 would refer to the special spatial advantages of location in the central business district in south Mumbai as compared to other areas. Differential rent 2, involving different levels of investment in land, is very similar to the difference between actual and potential rents, understood as a process through time. Indeed, in many cases landowners have observed the effects of rising rents due either to changing spatial advantages or to the investment behaviour of landowners in their neighbourhood and have altered their investment behaviour in response to changing opportunities. Rent gaps can therefore be understood as a type of differential rent 2 in urban areas that have been observed to have changing levels of investment over time.

Another category of ground rent relevant to Mumbai is monopoly rent, which arises where competitive conditions in land markets do not prevail such as for example, where a small group of landowners control land of such special quality or location that they may be able to extract monopoly rents from those desiring to use that land (Harvey 1974; 1982:350). The land market in Mumbai is oligopsolistic, as supply is constricted by geographical and historical factors. First, major public bodies own large tracts of land, including the Bombay Port Trust (2,000 acres), the Airport Authority and the National Textile Corporation (NTC) (400 acres) (Singh 2003:10). Second, privately owned land is highly concentrated, due to land grants originating in the colonial period. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the British leased large tracts of land as a reward for political loyalty to them in their struggles against the Marathas. In this way, Parsi merchants and philanthropists came to control land trusts that were at first leased and then later sold to them. These cover most of Mumbai island (Times of India 2005:4). Over time, some trusts lost land to encroachments or to government acquisitions (for example, the Sanjay Gandhi National Park), while a few trusts sold some of their lands to developers. Today, about nine developers and trusts control all available private land on Mumbai island (Singh 2003:6). Land is only released into the market in small parcels when prices are high.

An oligopsolistic market encourages monopoly rent-seeking, on the one hand, and forceful encroachments on the other. The relative immobility of land has given rise to a fusion of economic and extra-economic elements in underworld involvement in real estate development, transactions and construction. The role of the underworld is crucial in lubricating the transition from manufacturing to a finance-dominated economy dominated by real estate and financial services. This is true both for disciplining worker resistance to moving and in mediating conflicts between real estate developers and tenants:

> Developers need to get 70% of the population of a site to agree to redevelopment in order for it to take place. People in an area who refuse to agree to redevelopment are met with muscle-power and sometimes, bribes. Gangs in the city are regularly used for extortion and for persuading people to move. Also, the builders take money from financiers, with the return being based on "respect"; however, very often gangs must be used to ensure the repayment of loans. [Interview, December 21, 2005]

Hence, public resistance to monopoly rent seeking has tended to be muted, as has the political will to reform the land market.[4] The role of the underworld in Central Mumbai is so pervasive that a major gangster, Arun Gawli, son of a retrenched mill worker, was elected to the state legislature in 2004 and floated his own political party, the Akhil Bharatiya Sena. Voters explained that he was the only person who could ensure efficient delivery of water and electricity to the slums. A police officer reported that he even paid for the repair of police headquarters in his constituency (Bunsha 2004:54).

Accepting that rent gaps represent a type of differential rent observed over time, Smith analyzes the gaps between actual and potential rents in inner city areas in global and gateway cities such as New York, London, Amsterdam and Budapest. He especially focuses on those areas that are located between the Central Business District (CBD) and the outer suburbs.[5] These areas experienced substantial disinvestment between 1950 and 1980 due to a "normal" cycle of depreciation. A long period of disinvestment followed that made gentrification profitable by the late 1980s. Such a cycle of disinvestment followed by reinvestment applied especially to first world cities where cycles of depreciation followed by reinvestment followed a classical fordist pattern. However, rent gaps can also emerge in other ways that are very applicable to countries experiencing economic liberalization. They follow rapid and sustained inflation, or where strict regulation of a housing market keeps potential ground rent low but is then repealed (Smith 1996:76), leading to a sharp rise in rental values.

Since all these conditions—"normal" disinvestment in the central zone, economic liberalization, and inflation—occurred either singly or in combination in Mumbai in the past two decades, it is not surprising that the city's rents

and real estate prices in the southern zone, which contains the CBD, rose to become the highest in the world in the mid-1990s. Today, they are ranked among the top ten global real estate prices in a city in which the average income is US$2,235 (McKinsey 2003:20). Prices in the central zone, between the southern CBD and the northern suburbs, also rose substantially during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is this central zone, comparable in many ways to Smith's central zones of New York, London, Amsterdam, and Budapest, that is the focus of my research.

Spatial and Economic History of Mumbai

Mumbai, known before 1995 as Bombay,[6] emerged as the major commercial centre in western India not only on the basis of its port facilities, but also due to its large-scale industry such as cotton textile mills, which started operation around 1850. Its industrial base was diversified in the post-Independence period, as pharmaceuticals, chemical production, consumer goods and engineering products emerged as important industrial sectors as well. However, the textile industry remained the major industry in terms of both output and labour force, employing about 250,000 workers in the late 1970s and comprising nearly 60 mills. Most of the mills were privately owned, although 13 were run by the National Textile Corporation, due to their declining profitability. The majority of the work force was made up of migrants from outlying districts of Maharashtra, including Satara, Sangli, Kolhapur and the Konkan coast, with a smaller number migrating from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Many of the intra-state migrants retained important ties to their extended families, sending them remittances, visiting for holidays and weddings, and finding jobs and accommodation for relatives who were migrating to Mumbai (Interviews, August 10-12, 2004).

Most of the mills were built in the late 19th or early 20th century in what was then the northern edge of the city. As housing and commercial development expanded rapidly into the northern suburbs after Independence,[7] however, the mill areas, which included workers' *chawls* (one room apartments built in the colonial period) and rental spaces along with factories, came to occupy the central zone between the southern business and financial districts and the northern residential suburbs. These neighbourhoods included Worli, Parel, Dadar, Lalbaug, Prabhadevi, Byculla and Saat Rasta. They were the centres of a distinctive working-class culture that supported the first trade union in India (the Girni Kamgar Union), the first industrial strike in the 1920s, and regional historical dramas called *kamgar rangabhumi* (Chandarvarkar 1994). The Girni Kamgar Union (GKU) was later eclipsed by the Rashtraya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS) after Independence due to the GKU's lack of support for the Quit India Movement of 1942. However, since the RMMS was affiliated with the governing Congress Party, it reputedly became much more pro-management than the GKU throughout the 1950s and 1960s. During the movement to separate Maharashtra from Gujarat along linguistic lines, the Shiv Sena unions also became important in the mill areas due to the fact that they supported the demand that mill jobs be reserved for Maharashtrians alone (Bhowmik 1999:39).

According to housing activists with the Bombay Environmental Action Group, land prices in central and south Mumbai began rising in the early 1980s, which led many owners of textile mills and other industrial units to consider shifting their investments to commercial and residential real estate (P. Deshpandy, Interview, December 16, 2005). Informalization in the textile industry occurred simultaneously with rising real estate values, with owners opting to contract out portions of the production process to small-scale units in the urban hinterlands of Bhiwandi, Malegaon and Ichalkaranji. This was especially true of weaving, which was the easiest to contract out. These small-scale powerloom operations, where wages were less than a quarter of those paid in the mills, quickly overtook the mills in Central Mumbai as major textile producers.

Hence, rent gaps were beginning to grow in the central mill districts at the same time that informalization and decentralization of the textile industry was beginning to occur. The low rent from workers' chawls and non-existent rent from older factories in Central Mumbai contrasted with rising real estate values of both commercial real estate in the southern business districts and the pockets of commercial office space in Central Mumbai. Low rental values of workers' chawls and housing were supported by the Bombay Rent Act of 1948, which froze rents using 1940 as the base-line level, permitting only marginal annual increases per year, as well as ensuring the right to sublease the property to heirs of the original tenants (Mehta 2005:115). Housing activists believe that mill-owners, the Congress state government and the RMMS union planned, in the early 1980s, to begin dismantling the mills and redeveloping mill lands as commercial, residential and recreational real estate, thus linking the central business districts in Fort and Nariman Point with the northern suburbs (Interviews with MGKU [Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union] activists, December 2005). They believe that the spatial reshaping of Mumbai that is now underway was already laid out in plans drawn up by government and industry as early as the 1980s (D'Monte 2001:4-5).

The Textile Strike and the Fate of the Mill Lands

The Bombay mills were already under pressure in the early 1980s as they suffered from a lack of reinvestment and competition from powerlooms and Bangladeshi mills. Although pay and bonuses were an issue, the introduction of *badli* (temporary) work for certain processes inside the mills caused widespread dissatisfaction. In addition, the docility of the RMMS in relation to the badli system provoked the longest strike in world history, the Bombay Textile Strike of 1982-84 (Lahta 1989). The strike was renowned for its militancy, its size—with over 250,000 workers involved—and its ultimate and dramatic collapse. The pressures of informalization inside the mills, the retrenchment of jobs and the emergence of the powerloom sector meant that mill owners were in an advantageous position. The National Textile Corporation, owners of 13 factories in Mumbai and others in Kanpur and Ahmedabad, was also concerned that rising wages in Mumbai would lead to wage demands in other state-owned enterprises. Armed with accumulated stocks, the use of the powerloom sector for weaving, and the support of state and central governments, the mill-owners were able to wear down the striking workers over an 18-month period and conceded, finally, to none of their demands. The end of the strike was marked by widespread retrenchment and the gradual closing of the 47 private and 13 government-owned mills. Within ten years after the strike ended, 42 of the 60 mills had been closed, while the number of workers in the industry had shrunk to one-fifth their number in the early 1980s (Bhowmik and More 2000). Today, the mills are almost completely closed.

The millowners' shift from manufacturing to redevelopment of mill lands began in earnest after the collapse of the strike. They accelerated the process of rendering their mills "sick" by not investing in new technologies and by closing them down piecemeal. However, since the mill lands had been leased to textile owners for industrial purposes only, there were a number of legal obstacles that had to be circumvented. First, the mills were rendered unprofitable by not upgrading or replacing machinery and subcontracting production, so that the mills appeared to be losing money. The management would typically then approach the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) with a proposal to revitalize the industry, with some residential, commercial or leisure functions added to the application. The second phase, however, involved using monies sanctioned by the BIFR to proceed with the sale of some of the land for commercial or residential uses. This process produced even more reasons to lay off remaining workers (N. More, Interview, August 10, 2004).

The Phoenix Mills in Parel, now a posh shopping centre and apartment complex, was the first to follow this strategy (Krishnan 2000:4-5). In 1977-78, a fire, which many workers believe was set by management, allowed for a car dealership to be built where the former mill canteen stood. In 1984, a new proposal to "revive" the mill allotted an additional 23,000 square metres for commercial purposes, in order to provide rent to offset losses and modernize the mill. In 1995, a further submission to BIFR gave Phoenix Mills tax exemption on the basis of further "reviving" the mill. In 1998, in what became an infamous case after it was uncovered, the management applied to BIFR for additions to the mill including recreation facilities, indoor sports facilities (billiards, table tennis and "a number of bowling alleys") as well as a health club, spa and sauna for the staff of the mill (Krishnan 2003:10). The recreation facilities, however, were not meant for Phoenix Mills staff but became the famous Bowling Alley which opened to much fanfare in May 1999. The recreation facilities included a high-end discotheque, and numerous restaurants and shops, including the ubiquitous McDonald's, Marks and Spencer, the Gap, and Rita Kumar, an important Delhi-based fashion designer. The "integrity" of the mill structure was preserved by retaining one of the chimney stacks, painted over to resemble a bowling pin, and by renovating some of the mill sheds into offices. Meanwhile, areas for two major apartment complexes, Phoenix Towers A and B, were sold off and constructed by Mittal Towers and are now selling for approximately Rs14,000 per square foot (P. Deshpandey, Interview, December 18, 2006).[8]

Needless to say, retrenchments at Pheonix Mills occurred simultaneously with the transformation of the mill structure into one of Central Mumbai's poshest residential and entertainment complexes. After the strike, the mill retained only 1,200 of its 7,000 workforce. All were employed on a temporary basis, including those who had earlier been permanent workers. In 1988, the Processing Department was closed and its tasks—winding, framing, blowing, et cetera—were subcontracted to powerlooms in Bhiwandi. The cloth was returned to the mill only to be stamped with the Pheonix Mills logo. This process caused the retrenchment of 500 more of its employees (Krishnan 2000:12). Harrassment combined with Voluntary Retirement Scheme offers continued, so that by 1999, there were only 150 temporary contract workers remaining at Phoenix Mills, at the same time that it was claiming the need for recreational space for 1,000 workers and staff. By 2000, all remaining 150 workers had been let go,

while some are still waiting for their Voluntary Retirement Scheme payments (Interview with MGKU activists, December 18, 2006).

While Pheonix Mills pioneered the way, other mills, including Matulya Mills, the Kalpataru Heights in Mahalaxmi, the Belvedere Court and Reliance Group followed suit. They were encouraged in this transition by the stratospheric real estate market in South and Central Mumbai throughout the early 1990s. A stock market downturn in 1992, fuelled by a financial scam, led to a flood of domestic equity into real estate (Nijman 2000; Tiwari 2000). In addition, financial liberalization after 1991 led to an influx of multinationals interested in real estate speculation and commercial properties (Nijman 2000). These factors converged to push South Mumbai's real estate to the most expensive in the world in 1995-96. Prices in South Mumbai soared 700% between 1991-95. In Central Mumbai, the centre of the former mill areas, prices moved upwards by 450%. Only the northern suburbs did not experience a huge increase during this period (Nijman 2000). The speculative nature of the real estate market led to a collapse of 30% in the late 1990s, but prices subsequently began to climb again at the beginning of 2000.

Rising Rent Gaps in Central Mumbai

Hence the gap between the potential rent to be acquired from "highest and best use" versus actual ground rent from textile production and rent on workers' chawls, widened sharply during the early 1990s. With some fluctuations, this gap has continued to widen. The assessed value of workers' chawls and apartments was also far lower than their market value, because the assessed value was only an upward revision from the 1948 Rent Act (Tiwari 2000:149). In addition, construction costs in Mumbai were quite low: in the 1980s, they were Rs400 per square foot of apartment construction, rising to between Rs900-1200 per square foot today (P. Deshpandey, Interview, December 14, 2005). By contrast, the average rental is Rs8,000-12,000 per square foot in Central Mumbai, with the cost increasing the further south one goes. With low costs of production, high potential ground rents, and extremely low or non-existent actual rents, the incentive to redevelop Central Mumbai was very great. Figure 1 outlines the actual rental rates in South Mumbai (Zone 1), and the potential and actual ground rent in Central Mumbai (Zone 2).

A major source of land for new housing has been the mill lands, which consist of over 500 acres in Central Mumbai. Recently, there has been a great deal of public debate over these lands (D'Monte 2001), as mill-owners wish to receive the ground rent from the "highest and best use,"



Figure 1: Rental Rates in South and Central Mumbai[9]

while housing activists want a substantial portion to be reserved for low-cost housing and public amenities. A major legal hurdle in the transformation to high-end commercial and residential real estate has been the Development Control Regulations, created in 1991 by the state government in negotiation with unions and housing activists. Rule 58 of the Development Control Regulations specified that one-third of mill lands should be reserved for low cost public housing to be administered by the Maharashtra Housing and Development Authority (MHADA), one-third was to be reserved for the Bombay Municipal Council to be used for public purposes, such as parks or other amenities, and only one-third was to be given over for real estate development (commercial, residential or recreational). The rationale of this formula was that most mill lands were not specifically owned by textile firms, but had been leased for extended periods provided they were used for industrial purposes. In addition, Mumbai already had a very high built-up area in relation to green space (.03 acres per 100 inhabitants), so that parks were needed, while retrenched workers should be accommodated in the one third of mill lands reserved for low-cost housing. In the 1990s, builders were encouraged to develop apartments *in situ* through increased allowances in the Floor Space Index (FSI[10]), provided that parts of the residential structures were constructed for slum-dwellers and ex-textile workers. Rising real estate prices throughout the 1990s made redevelopment *in situ* profitable, even with the added cost of 25% of structures devoted to low-cost housing (Mukhija 2003).

Nevertheless, the huge gaps that had emerged between potential and actual ground rent gave developers incentives to forego plans for affordable housing for former textile workers and push for changes in the Development Control Regulations. Table 1 gives an indication of the differential rates of rent to be acquired from redevelopment under Rule 58, and without it.

TABLE 1
An Example of the Rent Gap: India United Mills #6 at Worli (Zone 2)[11]

Under DC Rule #58		
Category	Area in Sq. Metres	Rate: Rs. Per Sq. Metre
Residential/ Commercial	7406	60,000
BMC Land	6110	20,000
MHADA Land: Low Cost Housing	4999	20,000
Total		666,360,000 Rs.
Without DC Rule #58	Area in Sq. Metres	Rate: Rs. Per Sq. Metre
Category	7406	60,000
Hotel	7406	60,000
Convention Centre	6110	60,000
Hospital	4999	
Total		1,109,000,000 Rs.

This example shows how changes in the development control regulations would increase the rental rate by over 66% for a textile mill in a seafront location in Worli. With a change in government to the Congress Party in the state elections of 2000, subtle changes in the wording of the DCR were instituted. Instead of one-third being allocated to low-cost housing, the new wording stated that only one-third of open land had to be so allocated. This was land that lay outside the perimeters of the mill buildings. This amounts to only 10-12% of the total land surface in mill areas, rather than 33.3%. This clarification also held only if the mill owners demolished the buildings. For those mills in which renovation into shopping malls took place, however, no land had to be parted with (for example, Phoenix Towers). This modification led a group of activists, the Bombay Environmental Action Group, to file a public interest lawsuit with the Mumbai High Court, charging that the change in phrasing subverted the purpose of DC Rule #58. While they won their case in the Mumbai High Court in October 2005, the National Textile Corporation (NTC), which owned 13 of the 60 mills, filed a counter petition with the Supreme Court in October 2005, on the basis that some of these lands had already been sold under the condition that only 10% of total area should be donated to the BMC and MHADA. In March 2006, the Supreme Court sided with the NTC and allowed the development of the lands already sold to continue. Most are apparently slated for shopping malls. Indeed, the sale of the 25 NTC mills between March and July 2005 covered an area of 50 acres at prices that surprised even those Mumbaikers already jaded by their stratospheric real estate market.[12] Although protests against this ruling were organized by the MGKU, an offshoot of the original GKU, 17 other organizations also participated, including the Trade Union Congress, the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, Documentation Research and Training Centre, the Communist Party of India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), and others. There has not been massive resistance to this conversion of mill lands into zones of "residential, commercial and recreational excellence." The lack of overt resistance may be due to memories of the failed textile strike combined with pervasive underworld control over the real estate market and major real estate transactions.

Working-Class Politics in Central Mumbai

The massive retrenchments that characterized the decade after the failed textile strike led to increasing impoverishment for ex-textile workers and demoralization for the MGKU, the union that led the strike. This period also witnessed a steep decline of the communist and socialist political parties in Central Mumbai and the rise of a militant Marathi-nationalist party, the Shiv Sena.[13] Founded in 1966 by political cartoonist Bal Thackeray, Shiv Sena gained its first electoral success at the municipal level by promoting Marathi linguistic identity and campaigning for job reservations for Marathi speakers. South Indians were targetted as "outsiders" responsible for Mumbai's job losses and other civic problems. From 1970 to 1980, however, the predominantly working class areas of Central Mumbai remained largely aloof from the Shiv Sena (Bhowmik 1999:40) and the major base of Shiv Sena's support was among white collar workers. The Shiv Sena later broadened its electoral appeal by linking with the Hindu nationalism of the Bhartiya Janata Party, in which Muslims became the feared "other," targetted for their supposedly seditious, anti-national tendencies (Hanson 2001). This period coincided with the collapse of the textile industry and the rise of the informal sector in Mumbai. The Shiv Sena—or Shiv's Army—projected a militantly masculine image, symbolized by the warrior king Shivaji Bhonsale, who successfully fought the Mughals in the late 1600s, and established the Maratha Empire. It created gymnasiums and employment service centres for young men, ran ambulances and informal health centres. The Shiv Sena also created local-level recruiting organizations, known as shakas, of which there were 220 in Mumbai in 1990. One was located in Janata Colony in Worli, the site of my fieldwork (Katzenstein et al. 1997:383).[14] The Shiv Sena militias were also reputedly responsible for the murder of prominent left union activists, such as Krishna Desai (member of the legislative assembly) in 1970 (Bhowmik 1999:41). Its finances are rumoured to

include donations from larger industrial houses, as well as *khandan* (gifts) taken from local shopkeepers and small businesses to "prevent" violence in their neighbourhoods or to protect them in areas in which violence—often instigated by the Shiv Sena itself—might occur (Katzenstein et al. 1997:379).[15] Winning municipal elections in 1985, one year after the failed textile strike, the Shiv Sena increased its financial clout through its administrative control over real estate transactions. Reliable sources, such as the Srikrishna Commission Report, have implicated the leaders and militias of the Shiv Sena in inciting and carrying out massacres of Muslims during the communal riots of 1992-93.

The psychological and discursive appeal of the Shiv Sena for working class youth in Central Mumbai is too complex to be attributed solely to economic factors. However, the fact that the Shiv Sena's appeal became significant in working-class neighbourhoods only after the failed textile strike and during a period of maximum retrenchment cannot be solely coincidence either. The psychological insecurities accompanying massive unemployment and the loss of a source of masculine identity and honour in a secure job,[16] undoubtedly played its part in making the Shiv Sena's totalizing organizational culture and hyper-masculine discourse and tactics appealing for young men.[17] As a number of interviewees explained, "the Communist Parties and Datta Samant blamed capitalism for the loss of jobs. The Shiv Sena promised to save jobs for Maharashtrians and to give us work when we had nothing." Bhowmik reports an example of a not untypical generational difference that emerged in ex-textile workers' families during the 1990s. A middle-aged retrenched worker and former activist in the MKGU, who now works as a street hawker, complained about his sons making fun of his politics, "What have you got from your support of the communists? A useless ideology and unemployment...at least the Shiv Sena gives us a steady income" (Bhowmik 1999:44).[18] Unfortunately, neither the MKGU nor left political parties were able to transcend economism and a "rational" analysis of unemployment to provide the organizational structure and psychological support that could respond to the trauma of massive retrenchments and match the appeal of the Shiv Sena. The collapse of left political forces and the memories of the failed textile strike form the historical backdrop for the relative lack of resistance to gentrification in Central Mumbai today.

Migration of Ex-Textile Workers

The general pattern in the past decade has been a large-scale, but unreported migration of ex-textile workers and slumdwellers from the central areas of Mumbai to north Mumbai and the outlying suburbs (P. Deshpandey, Interview, December 14, 2005). While 17 wards of the northern suburbs witnessed a population growth of 50% between 1981 and 1991, several wards of South Mumbai actually saw a population decline (Falzon 2004:147). South and Central Mumbai are increasingly the preserves of finance, real estate businesses and the residences and recreational spaces of the well-to-do.

With the northern suburbs dominated by the middle-class, the island city is increasingly inhospitable to the former working class and the working poor, employed, for the most part, in the informal sector. This intra-city migration is indicated in Bhowmik and More's study of ex-textile workers, who reported that they had difficulty at first finding ex-textile workers to interview because so many had moved either to Thane and Bhowindi, or returned to their home villages (Bhowmik and More 2000). The more fortunate of the ex-mill workers were offered relatively good prices to vacate their chawls. In combination with their Voluntary Retirement Schemes (VRS), some have managed to purchase apartments in outlying suburbs and towns, where rents and apartment prices are much lower. For example, Sharit Gowte lived in a one-room, 100 square foot chawl that he rented on a *pagdi* system (informal monies that change hands with most real estate transactions) in Worli from 1965 to 2000. He worked at Elphinstone Mills until the textile strike, after which his employment was terminated. His landlord had been pressuring the tenants to leave, but the tenants' chawls committee had resisted this pressure. In 2000, however, he heard about affordable one-bedroom apartments in Mira Road in Thane, and had the future of his two sons to think about. He pooled his VRS of Rs 450 lakh[19] with the price he received for his apartment, a figure of Rs8 lakhs, of which 1 lakh had to be given to the landlord to change the name to the new tenant. With the combined total of Rs1,150,000 he was able to buy two flats, one for himself and his wife and another for his sons to live in. Despite his relative good fortune, he feels he was pushed out of Central Mumbai as the landlord was in negotiations with a builder to develop the site. Even though the mills are a closed chapter, he feels that the mill lands should be used to build housing for workers at an affordable rate—"so that people like me who have given their whole life in the city don't have to move out just because we could not afford to buy a flat in Central Mumbai" (Interview, March 21, 2006).

Janata Colony in Worli

Other ex-textile workers have not been so fortunate, either in their VRS remuneration or in their residential choices.

Janata Colony, an upgraded slum in Worli village near the seashore, is populated by former ex-mill workers, most of whom are now working in construction or machinery repair, or as rickshaw drivers or street hawkers. Most of the women in Worli village also work, mainly as domestic servants in the surrounding high-rises, a pattern that started after the textile strike. Indeed, for a decade, women were often the major breadwinners in their households and Janata Colony experienced the feminization of survival during this period of massive industrial retrenchment (Sasson 2001).

The majority of inhabitants of Janata Colony migrated to Mumbai from rural districts along the Konkan coast and also from some of the more drought-prone districts of southeastern Maharasthra. The caste composition in Janata Colony is mainly *agris, kunbis* and *Marathas,* all agricultural castes found in western India, and *bhandaris,* an ex-untouchable or Dalit caste. They came seeking work in the mills in the 1950s and continued coming until two decades ago. According to a local municipal councillor, prior to 1947, Worli village was solely a fisherman's colony inhabited by Kolis, a scheduled tribe considered indigenous to the region. The migrants (150,000) now far outnumber the original fishing families (25,000). There are also more recent migrants from Uttar Pradesh. Houses are generally two-storey structures that have been added onto and renovated extensively over the past decades. Some people said that they had invested about Rs1 lakh in house construction and renovation in the past thirty years, and would have done more if the BMC allowed higher structures. Most had lived in their homes for 30-40 years.

House construction was still going on in the summer of 2004. Despite the insecurity of legal status, contractors were able to charge Rs 50,000-70,000 for a two-storey "slum" house. Indeed, outright squatting in Janata Colony is impossible today, as smaller-scale contractors, with reputed links to politicians and the underworld, have commodified all available space.

Janata Colony is divided between those who built houses on land owned by the BMC or the Collectorate, and those who built on the land reclaimed by the Bombay Port Trust (BPT). After the BPT started reclaiming land from the sea in the 1970s, some constructed their houses on this land, after which the BPT constructed a huge wall to protect its land from further encroachments. Various enactments regularized the informal housing built on BMC land. According to the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, those structures that were built before 1995 have the right to be regularized. People in regularized slums acquire a photopass that enables them to vote and to avail themselves of some civic amenities such as water taps. They also have rights of compensation if they are displaced and resettled. However, only people on the land belonging to BMC or the Collectorate have been given a photopass. Despite having lived in Janata Colony for 30 to 40 years, those who built their houses on land belonging to the BPT have not received a photopass. Records I obtained from the Collector's office indicate that the status of these houses is, as yet, undecided. These people, constituting 30% of the 150,000 population of Janata Colony, are vulnerable to future demolitions. They are also subjected to rent-seeking by BMC officials, as their undecided status leaves ample room for officials to "negotiate" with them annually.

Janata Colony, whose original houses were built on reclaimed "free" land, is now situated on land that is amongst the most valuable in the world. Prices for the upper-middle class apartment buildings that have mushroomed along the Worli Sea Face were Rs9,000 per square foot in 2004, rising to Rs14,000 per square foot in late 2005, and that does not include the pagdi. Even in the "slum" of Janata Colony, rents are about Rs4,000 per square foot and conflicts between the Koli fisherfolk who rent out rooms and their tenants, many of them ex-textile workers, are not unusual (Interview, August 2004).

Revanchism in Central Mumbai

Fears of demolition and forced removal of slum dwellers were heightened in December-January 2004-05, when the state government, elected on a platform of regularizing and redeveloping slums authorized to 2000, began instead a policy of widespread demolitions of "slums" not authorized after 1995. At least 300,000 people had their houses demolished during this period, including about 40 households in Janata Colony living on land owned by the Bombay Port Trust. In July 2005, there were further demolitions in Worli Naka, and a further 100 people lost their houses with no compensation. Other areas where demolitions occurred included Ganesh Murti Nagar (Colaba), Mahakali Nagar (Worli), slums behind the Sasmira Polytechnical College (Worli), Wadala, Sion, Khar-Danda, Malad, Malwani, Dahisar, Chembur, Mankhurd, Deonar and Govandi. There were also demolitions on lands whose leases to the present "owners" had expired, including land leased by the India Oil Corporation, Shree Shakti Mills, the LIC and Simplex Mills. While most of the demolished slums are in Central Mumbai, there were some demolitions in the northern suburbs of Borivli and Andheri. This appears to contradict rent gap theory since the difference between existing and potential ground rent was not high in the northern suburbs at least until 2000 (Nijman 2000).

Yet these two suburbs are planned as secondary business districts to be linked with the Bandra-Kurla complex in the near future (McKinsey 2003:16). Hence, it appears that the "redevelopment frontier"[20] is being pushed northwards. While there were widespread protests against the demolitions, including one in which protesters dressed up as 19th-century Mahars (ex-untouchables), the state government remained adamant that non-regularized slums would be demolished, especially in Central Mumbai.

The state and municipal governments became more revanchist in their approach to slums and the poor in Mumbai in 2004,[21] a possible indication that Mumbai is moving towards a finance-led regime of accumulation. The slum policies of the state government have come full circle. In the 1950s, slum demolition was common but was criticized on humanitarian grounds. In response, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a policy of in-situ upgrading. The slum policy of the 1990s emphasized the redevelopment of slums through commercial apartment construction in situ, when real estate prices were soaring. This was supplemented by relocation and redevelopment where necessary (Mukhija 2004; Contractor et al. 2003). In situ upgrading was accompanied by policies that encouraged developers to redevelop slum areas, most notably a policy that provided construction companies with free land if 25% of the apartments were built to house former slum-dwellers. The apartments are small (225 square feet) and have been plagued by problems of faulty construction, corruption, and exclusion (Contractor et al. 2003). However, they at least rhetorically recognized the housing rights of long-standing slum dwellers and support the principle that slum dwellers should be compensated in kind for their loss of previous dwellings.

In 2004, however, the state government returned to the policy of forced demolitions and evictions especially in Central Mumbai where rent gaps were highest. The changed policies of the state government, and the policies of both the state and central governments promoting the sale of mill lands, indicate that welfarist rhetoric has now been jettisoned and more coercive aspects of state policy towards the poor are surfacing. The disciplining and controlling of space through "class cleansing" means that Central Mumbai is to become a zone of "recreational, commercial, and residential excellence" through the removal of ex-textile workers from that region. It is a form of spatial governmentality that followed the emergence of rent gaps and did not precede them. State and municipal policies have been reshaped to enable, facilitate and promote international flows of financial and real estate capital.

Conclusion

Analyzing the spatial changes in Mumbai through the lens of rent gaps offers a clear mapping of capital flows; the points of potential resistance or blockage to them; and, the channels that facilitate them. Not surprisingly, government policies have clearly followed the rising curve of rent gaps. This analysis supports what many housing activists in Mumbai have long suspected: that the deindustrialization of Central Mumbai and the removal of the working class from those neighbourhoods were probably being planned as early as the mid-1980s (D'Monte 2001). Both state and central governments have facilitated this flow of financial and real estate investment, transforming themselves into instruments that attract foreign and domestic investment through developing off-shore financial facilities (Banerjee-Guha 2002; Jessop 2000; Smith 2002). Needless to say, the disempowered trade unions (after the failed textile strike) have been able to offer only sporadic and limited resistance to the dismantling of their work and residential spaces.

If both the real estate markets and National Stock Exchange investments continue their stratospheric rise, it is possible that Mumbai's policy makers may increasingly promote a property-based regime of accumulation in which there is a greater emphasis on investment income than on wages for generating demand (Boyer 2000; Smart and Lee 2003). Indeed, following the Hong Kong and Singapore models, the McKinsey Report envisages the relocation of space-extensive, low-wage manufacturing to Mumbai's hinterlands, while concentrating financial and producer services and entertainment and real estate businesses in the island city (McKinsey 2003:9). A finance or property-based regime of accumulation means that investments rather than wages drive consumption so that a downward pressure on wages can be consistent with stable growth since investment returns are the driving force of demand (Boyer 2000:127). A finance regime of accumulation involves great income polarization, since it privileges social groups able to benefit from asset price increases, whereas less privileged groups have access only to unstable jobs and poor wages in the informal sector (Boyer 2000:141). In Boyer's estimation, only the U.S., Britain and Canada qualified as capable of supporting a finance-led regime of accumulation during the 1990s. Smart and Lee (2003), however, have critically amended Boyer's theory to include real estate investments in a theory of financialization. Hong Kong during the 1990s was a prime example of a city-state in which income from real estate investments formed a large proportion of overall investments, while real estate companies were major con-

tributors to Hong Kong's GDP, its taxation base, and major contributors to overall demand (Smart and Lee 2003). Hong Kong's property developers are also the largest and most globalized companies on its stock market. A similar economic portrait is true of Singapore (Haila 2000).

Recurring pronouncements from municipal and state governments in Maharashtra and the Bombay First Foundation indicate that Hong Kong and Singapore's role as financial hubs for manufacturing "hinterlands" are considered ideal models for overall future planning for Mumbai. However, the extent to which Mumbai will emerge as a property-based "island" of accumulation is limited by several factors. The first relates to the nature of monopoly rents and the land market in Mumbai. In both Hong Kong and Singapore, the government owns all or most of the land, with land sales being confined to leaseholds (Haila 2000). This enabled the state to subsidize certain types of land use, to capture increased value from undeveloped land, and to prevent land banks emerging that hoard land and act as monopolies (Haila 2000:2245-2246). Regular auctions have also increased the mobility of land as a factor of production in those two cities. As shown in this paper, however, the colonial state in Mumbai followed a different policy regarding land ownership. It granted most of the island to a small group of prominent loyal supporters that created a historical legacy of oligsopsoly. The historical pattern favouring monopoly rents in Mumbai has made home ownership in the island city impossible for all but a narrow stratum of the population, unless people use co-operative forms of ownership (Falzon 2004). Indeed, it is estimated that only 30% of the population can afford even rental housing at present. A reform of the land grants, with the imposition of overarching state ownership and management of them, would be a priori necessary for real estate to become the basis for a successful property-based regime of accumulation drawing in larger segments of the middle class. It would also be necessary for larger segments of the population to be able to afford home ownership. In addition, due in part to the relative immobility of land as a factor of production, Mumbai has much higher levels of informal housing (slums) than existed in either Singapore of Hong Kong in previous decades. Often referred to in Asia as "Slumbai," current estimates of the numbers of slum-dwellers in Mumbai are close to 70% of its 15 million population. At present, the policy of slum removal and relocation has displaced a small fraction of this population, and at the cost of considerable distress. In the immediate future, heightened conflict over slum removal and relocation is a possible feature of Mumbai's urban policies and politics, and its outcome is still uncertain.

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Notes

1 I would like to thank Alan Smart and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on this paper. The usual disclaimers apply.

2 This statistic comes from the McKinsey Report (2003:9).

3 This paper resulted from fieldwork carried out in Mumbai in partnership with the Sociology Department of the University of Mumbai during the summers of 2004 and 2005, and in December 2005 and was funded by a Shastri-CIDA grant under the SHARP (Shastri Applied Research Partnerhip) program from 2003-05. The research occurred in association with an NGO, LEARN, (Labour Education and Research Network) and focused on the legal, spatial, health and nutritional needs of slum-dwellers. LEARN created an umbrella network of NGOs in Mumbai that petitioned the state for legal changes and access to basic urban infrastructure. Research in the summer of 2005 was cut short by the Mumbai flood of July 26 and its aftermath. Fieldwork involved participant-observation in Worli and Parel, two of the major neighbourhoods in Central Mumbai currently being redeveloped. It also involved formal and informal interviews with selected residents in these neighbourhoods, as well as with housing activists, municipal government employees, members of co-operative housing societies, NGOs working in these neighbourhoods, housing developers, and real estate agents. Focus groups were held with residents in Worli and Parel concerning the legal status of their residences and land use. Quantitative information used in the study was obtained from government reports, real estate bulletins, real estate advertisements in major newspapers and secondary literature.

4 For obvious reasons, more intensive research on this aspect of the land market was impossible. D'Monte discusses the land and development "mafia" at greater length in terms of their affiliations with textile and real estate companies, sometimes different companies with the same backers and personel. He also documents the role of gangs in the murder of trade union leader Datta Samant in January 1997. While three assassins connected with the Chhota Rajan and Guru Satam gangs were convicted of the murder in July 2000, speculation still exists as to the extent of involvement of sections of corporate Mumbai in his killing. After the failed textile strike, Datta Samant, the leader of the MGKU continued to oppose retrenchment and closing of the mills (D'Monte 2001:164-167).

5 The theory of rent gaps leading to exclusion of the urban poor from gentrified and redeveloped areas has been applied to a number of cities. See the special issue of *Antipode* 34(3) for a useful collection.

6 Bombay was changed to Mumbai by the Shiv Sena dominated municipal government in 1995, on the basis that it represented the original Marathi language term for the city. Marathi is the dominant local language of Maharashtra, the state of which Mumbai is the capital.

7 Falzon (2004) notes that 17 wards of the northern suburbs witnessed a population growth of 50% between 1981 and 1991.
8 In 2006, the exchange rate was about Rs33.5 to CAN$1.
9 Prices are in rupees per square foot; in 2006, there were 33.5 Rupees to the Canadian dollar.
10 FSI represents the ratio of built area in relation to the total plot area enclosed by the perimeter of the building. The usual allowed FSI is 1.5, but in some recent constructions, it has gone up to 5 or 6 due to concessions (P. Deshpandey, Interview, December 18, 2005).
11 These numbers are taken from Prabhu quoted in D. D'Monte (2001:192).
12 Apollo Mills covering 8 acres was sold to Lodha Builders for Rs180 crore, Mumbai Textile Mills covering 18 acres to DLF for Rs702 crore, Elphinstone Mills covering eight acres to India Bulls for Rs441 crore, Kohinoor Mills No. 3 spanning five acres to Matoshree Realtors and Kohinoor Group for Rs421 crore and Jupiter Mills covering 11 acres was sold to India Bulls for Rs276 crore. One crore is equal to ten million.
13 Marathi is the major indigenous language of Maharashtra, the state in which Mumbai is located.
14 According to one report, the number of job seekers in Mumbai-Thane increased from 160,000 in 1961 to 3.5 million in 1990. This figure gives some idea of the extent of retrenchment in Mumbai's various industries during this period.
15 Members of the Shiv Sena reject the idea that they are involved in extortion, and that the money they receive from local businesses constitutes a bribe. Rather, they see themselves as following in the tradition of Shivaji, the Maratha king, collecting tithes to promote their social service work and "disciplinary" tactics.
16 A number of older ex-textile workers explained that having a job in the mills, although not highly paid, was a major bonus in marriage negotiations. The stability of the job and its pension benefits were such that many families in surrounding regions would seek to have their daughters marry textile workers.
17 I was only able to conduct 4 interviews relating to masculinity and politics in Worli. Unfortunately, the July 26 flood interrupted this work, which I hope to continue at a later date.
18 The steady income they are referring to is their share of "collections," or khandan.
19 One lakh equals one hundred thousand.
20 Smith refers to the spatial expansion of redevelopment as "the gentrification frontier" (Smith 1996). While this may apply to New York, London and Amsterdam where construction costs are high and renovation of existing structures is the most profitable alternative, Mumbai has been characterized more by redevelopment of inner-city areas, due perhaps to lower construction costs. Therefore, in Mumbai, the "gentrification frontier" is more aptly referred to as the "redevelopment frontier."
21 *Revanchist* in France means revenge, and is a term that derives from fin-de-siècle French politics in which right-wing nationalism sought to rid Paris of the working class after the fall of the Paris Commune (Smith 1996:45).

Glossary

Agri: A farming caste of Maharashtra that formed a large section of the migrant population of Janata Colony.
Badli: Temporary, contract work introduced into the textile mills in the early 1980s. This created the dissatisfaction that produced the Bombay Textile Strike of 1984-86.
Bhandari: An ex-untouchable, or Dalit caste that formed a section of the migrant population in Janata Colony.
BMC: Briha Mumbai Municipal Corporation. The elected governing council of Mumbai.
BPT: Bombay Port Trust. The organization that owns and runs the ports of Mumbai and owns large sections of seafront land, including 1/3 of the land in Janata Colony.
Chawls: One-room apartments, with shared bathrooms, that were built during the early 20th century to house mill workers.
CPI: Communist Party of India. The original Communist Party of India, formed in 1927.
CPI (M): Communist Party of India (Marxist). A break-away party of the CPI that left it in 1964 due to the latter's support of the Congress Party. The CPI (M) is now the largest Communist Party in India.
Crore: 10 million.
FSI: Floor-Space Index.
GKU: Girni Kamgar Union. The original trade union representing mill workers, formed in the early 20th century. It led the Bombay Textile Strike of 1926-28. It was eclipsed by the RMMS in the 1940s. This was primarily due to the popularity of the 1942 Quit India movement, which the GKU and the CPI opposed, due to their support of an anti-fascist front, and hence their tactical support of Great Britain during WWII.
Khandan: Can be literally translated as "gift." It was a tithe established during the reign of Shivaji Bhonsale, a famous warrior-king of Maharashtra. Currently in Mumbai, Shiv Sena members collect khandan from small businesses as protection money.
Koli: The original, or aboriginal fishing caste of the Mumbai islands. They are currently designated a Scheduled Tribe and form a major part of the population of Worli Village.
Lakh: One hundred thousand.
Marathi: The regional language of Maharashtra, the state that contains Mumbai.
Maratha: The dominant, warrior caste of Maharashtra.
MGKU: Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union. An offshoot of the original GKU that formed in the late 1970s under the leadership of Datta Samant, a physician and independent unionist who led the textile workers in the 1984-1986 strike.
MHADA: Maharashtra Housing and Development Authority. The government department that establishes housing policies in Maharashtra and regulates housing development.
MMRDA: Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority. The government department that has overall authority over regional planning for Mumbai. Critics charge that overlapping jurisdictions of the BMC, MMRDA and MHADA have allowed developers to circumvent important environmental and planning regulations.
Pagdi: An informal sum that is often part of real-estate transactions in Mumbai.

RMMS: Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sabha. The mill-workers union that became dominant in the Mumbai mills after Independence. It was affiliated with the then-ruling Congress Party, and was seen by many mill workers to be pro-management by the 1970s.

Shakas: Local-level cells run by the Shiv Sena that provide educational, social service work, and political outreach. There are about 220 currently in Mumbai.

Shiv Sena: A militant Marathi-nationalist political party, formed by the political cartoonist, Bal Thackery, in 1966. It initially championed the Marathi language, but then targeted various outsiders, e.g., Tamil and north Indian migrants, as well as Muslims, as "outsiders" who were stealing jobs from Maharashtrians. It became politically influential among ex-textile workers only after the collapse of the Bombay Textile Strike of 1984-86 and the resulting retrenchment and mill closures.

Shivaji: A famous Maratha warrior king of the late 17th century who successfully fought the Mughal Empire and established a Maratha Empire covering much of western India. He is an important symbol of the Shiv Sena, or Shiv's Army.

SRA: Slum Rehabilitation Authority. The government department that determines policies towards slums, e.g., upgrading, electricity and water supply, and the "regularization" of slums.

VRS: Voluntary Retirement Scheme. This is the monetary settlement paid out to retrenched mill-workers after the closure of the mills.

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Afterword: Class, State, Violence

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In 1909, William Morris Davis, Harvard physical geographer and central figure in the founding of the discipline in the United States, extolled one of his ex-students: "Why don't you take a look at cities. No-one seems to know what they are." In those days geography and anthropology, among other fields, were still in the process of separating into recognizable disciplines, and while geography and especially sociology did begin a cross-disciplinary social scientific focus on cities in subsequent decades, it took till the 1970s for anthropology to get cities in focus, with the important exception of the Copperbelt urban studies in the 1940s and 1950s. This was no simple case of backwardness but rather a question of disciplinary choice and the academic and cross-national divisions of labour being worked out between and within different fields. If geography was the premier discipline of empire in Britain, anthropology took up that role, albeit quite differently, in the U.S. where, with the exception of indigenous populations, it largely ceded the North American and European terrain, where the vast majority of urbanites then lived, to sociology. In North America, the interdisciplinary focus of the so-called Chicago School, spanning sociology, geography and human ecology, was the driving intellectual force after the 1920s. Beginning in the 1960s, that focus broadened significantly as urban issues were placed firmly on the political agenda, and despite a pervasive if highly varied anti-urbanism in many parts of the world, the "right to the city," as Lefebvre provocatively called it in 1968, is a central political and intellectual issue. This collection of essays is testimony not just to how far anthropology has come, nor just to the inextricably interdisciplinary nature of urban research today (clustered in part around ethnography as well as political economy), but also to the changed conditions, processes and forms of urban development.

Four of the five essays in this collection are from Asia and the fifth is from the Mexican border with the U.S. This is significant because it represents less a due obeisance to politically correct geographies of research than

a tacit recognition that the cutting edge of urban social change no longer lies so clearly with the Manchesters and Chicagos, the New Yorks and Parises, Londons and Berlins of the world, but rather with the extraordinary metropolises of Asia, Latin America and Africa. There, in extraordinary variety, we find the new cities of 21st-century capitalism, stretching from Lagos to Dubai, São Paolo to Shanghai, and many points in between. This urban revolution—spanning the physical and social transformation of cities internally, their role in the global political and cultural economy, and their function as crucibles of revolt—has been bound up with the most massive industrial revolution the world has seen, namely the industrialization of East, Southeast and South Asia since the 1960s. It might be tempting to rephrase this argument according to the problematic of neo-liberal urbanism and its discontents, but this nomenclature of neo-liberalism is already so generalized that despite its political utility its analytical value is increasingly blunted. And in practice, desperate calls since 2007, eventually heeded, that various national states intervene in the unfolding global financial crisis amount to a rejection of neo-liberal ideologies *from within*. Rather, it seems to me that three basic themes, all of course interrelated—and not in any way divorced from the contours of neo-liberalism—emerge from these papers. In many ways these themes mark the anthropology of the contemporary urban transition: class (co-constituted with other kinds of oppressed social difference); the state; and violence.

Although its neo-liberalization after 1978 came later than many others', China's industrial revolution has been second to none, and as Tan and Ding suggest, the resulting political, cultural and economic geography of urban expansion has played havoc with any clear distinctions between urban and rural. Previously rural outskirts have become urbanized, as one would expect, but previously marginal villages have also become urbanized in essence if not in official designation ("villages in the city"); other rural areas have become industrialized on the outskirts without being fully integrated into the metropolis while others are functionally rural yet well inside designated urban areas. A number of official land use, residential and work classifications crosscut the socio-economic and socio-geographic processes of urbanization. Working through the contradictions and chaos of such rapid change and capitalization in Quanzhou in Eastern China, this paper emphasizes the power of the state as arbiter of rural versus urban designation and its uniquely aggressive pursuit of capitalist urbanization. If China today represents neo-liberalism with a state face, this gives the lie to ideologies of state-noninterventionism that floated neo-liberalism in the first place. It is presumably only a matter of time before the Chinese state rewrites Lenin to the effect that "capitalism is the highest stage of communism." Meanwhile, violence—the violence of the state against people's daily lives and means of well-being—is also an implicit theme in this piece, and it is worth emphasizing that the rural-urban axis of Chinese industrialization has become potentially the most intense fissure of class struggle in the world today. The Chinese government conceded that in 2004, there were some 74,000 "mass incidents, or demonstrations and riots," and that special anti-terrorist police units were being established in 36 cities to deal with such revolts (French 2005).

Violence does not always come at the end of a barrel or baton, and in the context of Mumbai, Whitehead traces the way in which the capitalist real estate market disguises the violence of mass eviction as rational. But the workings of the market through the formation of a rent gap were not themselves sufficient to secure the "class cleansing" of more than 600 acres of old mill and residential land, and the state by various means, legislative and corrupt, has eagerly stepped in as the catalyst of a whole new "property-based regime of accumulation." There are echoes here of Lefebvre's suggestion that urbanization comes to supplant industrialization. Just as in China, the role of a highly powerful state is absolutely crucial in this process, not just to facilitate the economic transfer of land and property to global developers but to execute the revanchist policies that evict the area's workers and their families, and keep them evicted. The barrel and the baton are ever available. The remake of Mumbai's textile mill lands, together with adjacent and nearby chawls (working-class slums), into condos, parks, restaurants and shopping malls represents a class grab of valuable urban space. It portends a scale of gentrification—a far wider and deeper class grab of urban space than was envisaged under the quaint, early residential definitions of this process—that dwarfs anything imaginable in North America or even in Europe (Smith 2002).

The landscapes of Quanzhou and the Mumbai mill lands are palpably real in these essays, and Nonini addresses this question of space and social power very directly. Some in geography have moved to celebrate culture as the essence of politics just as many anthropologists have distanced themselves from culture as a discipline-defining concept, and have in turn refocused, in part, around questions of space and place. Nonini's revisit to Burkit Mertajam, Central Province of Wellesley, in northwest Malaysia jousts a longstanding and ongoing ethnography with a political economic analysis of the region's historical geography. Here too the story is about capital

accumulation in favour of the elite classes and yet these classes have their own ethnic divisions concerning control over and access to the state. The state and state-supported repression of an ethnic Chinese working class was matched by the reciprocal success of ethnic Chinese capitalists who both moved capital offshore, or emigrated, and weakened their connections to an ethnically defined community in favour of class coalition with the postcolonial Malay ruling class. Many travelled the "dark road" of drug smuggling and purveyance to make money and boost their class positions, etching out an ambivalent attitude toward the state and a transnational "crypto-geography." Despite the social intricacies, overall, class–ethnic violence in one place is matched by a very different if partial, ambivalent and never total class-based acceptance of "ethnic" minorities among the elite classes.

In all of these essays, there is a sense of the progressive encompassment, production and social reproduction of space by the state, and in this respect Newberry's discussion of the kampung of Yogyakarta displays clear resonance with the earlier essays. She also insists on the deeply home-made ingredients of place. The emphasis on the role of kampung as reservoirs of labour and social reproduction for the wider economy as well as a source of petty capitalist production is undoubtedly correct, and recalls sociologist Gans's much earlier analysis of *The Urban Villages* (1965) which offered a community study of the Italian American enclave in Boston's North End. Precisely because any evolutionary stage model of urban change whereby Asia simply follows some pre-established European or North American pattern of urban industrialism is a non-starter, it would have been revealing to compare the Yogjakarta kampung with Gans's community ethnography. The emphasis here on labour and its social reproduction is especially fertile—an advance on Gans—as is the insistence that the kampung enclaves are interwoven with the global economy. The in-between class position of petty commodity producers, often mobilizing family labour, is also crucial.

Yet this makes even more curious Newberry's epithetical dismissal of "standard marxian notions" of class, and the resort to a series of dubious dichotomies. It is not clear, for example, why it makes sense to declare Export Processing Zones non-urban except as a rhetorical device for marginalizing scholarship on labour and economic geography in such places. More pointedly, even though later analyses in this paper assert the intimate connection between "capitalist" and "non-capitalist" work processes and social relations, the narrative, in order to dismiss certain analyses while embracing others, posits just such a spurious diagnostic precision concerning class. Thus in volume 1 of *Capital*, Marx explicitly raises the figure of the "hybrid labourer" who is simultaneously capitalist and worker (see also Smart and Smart 2005). In fact, this paper usefully reconsiders the dilemma raised by McGee (1964, 1976) in the 1960s and 1970s, on the basis of empirical work in the same region, concerning the life, labour and significance of what he called the "proto-proletariat." McGee's language perfectly captures the class interstices of kampung and it would have been useful to match these kampung ethnographies vis-à-vis McGee's findings. In retrospect, was he too optimistic thinking that the in-between status of street hawkers and petty producers, whom he also understood as integrally linked to the global economy, would in time escape into the proletariat proper? Or have generations of migrants to the cities indeed passed into the working class while a constant rural to urban migration continually refuels the enclaves of the urban village? Amidst the stability of the kampung, what are the stories of mobility that render its real and imagined boundaries permeable? This of course connects back directly to the case of Quanzhou and indeed the other papers too.

The class and gender violence done to workers in the global economy, with the complicity of the state, is the explicit focus of Labrecque's account of the femicide recorded in Mexico, since the mid 1990s. For Labrecque, the murder of some 442 women in Ciudad Juárez between 1993 and 2005—most working class, 10% of them maquiladora workers, many abducted from the city's public spaces, their bodies turning up in dumps and wastelands—happens where transnational corporate exploitation and state disengagement intersect with a culture of misogyny and the classed and gendered danger of produced public space. Exploiting cheap labour while paying few if any local taxes, transnational corporations are drawn to the maquiladora zone for its access to workers from throughout Mexico and Central America, yet they refuse to provide even the barest minimum in social services or infrastructure for the burgeoning metropolis and its inhabitants. Both the Mexican and the U.S. state deny any responsibility for the support of largely migrant workers and vital social services, while the former benefits from remittances to the country's south and the latter gains cheap exports to the mammoth economy to the north. The result is an "urban nightmare."

The state, social violence, and class (which is gendered and raced from the start), are the social markers of neoliberal capitalism, from Ciudad Juárez to Quanzhou, Mumbai to Burkit Mertajam and Yogyakarta. If an updated Dickensian indictment of capitalist squalor will be written for the latest convulsion of global industrial urbanism, it

might well be set in one of these places (cf. Mehta 2004). Equally, there are myriad other cities, towns and regions that would yield commensurate stories however different in detail. The major question may well be whether "northern" intellectuals are receptive to the global message these stories have to tell. It is challenging enough to have New York, London and Tokyo displaced as the models of the global city, but a sober recognition of the sources and complicity of state, class and violence in the world's largest (and not so large) cities flies somewhat tangentially to contemporary poststructuralist sensibilities.

The power of discourse analysis is very real, but insofar as it differs from the critique of ideology, it focuses on the mechanisms, strategies and technologies of power more than the rooted social interests that generate both these mechanisms and discourses of power. It is comparatively easy to deconstruct the silences, omissions, and volitions that render maps, for example, such powerful political instruments. It may be quite transparent what is going on when Soviet Cold War maps shuffle towns around while U.S. Geological Survey maps of the same era may simply omit, rename or white-out military facilities. The making of maps involves multiple layers of irreducibly political choices, and so as Nonini suggests here, as regards a transport planning map for Malaysia's Central Province of Wellesley, "the image, like the word, preceded the deed" (the making of the map). To leave the question here, however, suggests the supremacy of "the image" and "the word," which invites a certain idealism insofar as image and word are certainly connected to social practice but are not themselves granted a specific social origin. They might seem to appear de novo. In the making of maps, of course, the power of image and word are not unhinged from social interest, either of the cartographer or of the state or the corporate organization sponsoring the making of the map. The raison d'être of the critique of ideology is not just to point out, as discourse analysis so ably does, the silences and volitions in word and image—the *mechanisms* of power—but to illuminate these discursive productions as emanating, in however complex ways, from explicit social interests.

This is less an academic attenuation than a practical insistence. With the global financial meltdown in 2008, the intensification of class exploitation, race and gender oppression, national protectionism, and outright social, political and economic violence will only increase. Whatever new mechanisms of power are invented along the way, the most pressing question will be to render transparent the connections between these new mechanisms and the specific social interests they variously advance and disguise, and the forms of social struggle and revolt that are also likely to intensify. This is simultaneously a theoretical and ethnographic quest (cf. Narotzky and Smith 2006). With its simultaneous commitment to ethnography and social theoretical analysis, recognizing too the importance of political economy, urban anthropology is propitiously placed to dissect and reconstruct the kinds of urban transformations that will come with a post-neoliberal world. It is impossible to predict what that world will look like but it will certainly involve a sophisticated theoretical trafficking between global and other scales—not just the global urban nexus but the importance too of nation states and neighbourhoods, and indeed households.

To respond to William Morris Davis's 1909 exhortation, therefore, it seems necessary that we always "take a look at cities" afresh because cities are changing in the crucible of global national and local change and because our ideas are always anxiously catching up with "what cities are." These essays are valuable contributions to that task.

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Thematic Section
Citoyenneté / Citizenship

Introduction : Citoyenneté

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Ce dossier thématique trouve son origine dans une session organisée lors de la Conférence de la Casca à London (Ontario) en mai 2004[1]. S'il s'agissait au départ d'interroger les pratiques contemporaines dites de « démocratie locale », les contributions rassemblées, toutes ancrées dans des situations localisées, ont progressivement permis d'élargir le propos et de se situer pleinement dans la problématique de cette conférence « Citoyenneté et espace public ».

Dans un article récent, Ong (1999) souligne les deux contributions principales, selon elle, de la réflexion anthropologique aux débats sur la citoyenneté. Elle évoque d'une part un ensemble de travaux portant sur les droits et les minorités, et l'articulation entre égalité et différences; et d'autre part une problématisation des dimensions spatiales de la citoyenneté, les évolutions politiques et économiques contemporaines étant venues distendre l'isomorphie, par ailleurs largement illusoire, entre État-nation, populations et cultures (Gupta et Ferguson 1999). Comme le souligne de son côté Werbner, si l'anthropologie peut contribuer à l'analyse de la citoyenneté, ce n'est pas seulement « parce (qu'elle) étudie l'impact de l'État sur le local, ou les significations de l'activisme, mais parce que d'un point de vue théorique, le sujet de l'anthropologie a toujours été "la différence" et "l'identité," le particulier et l'universel, les dynamiques d'inclusion et d'exclusion » (Werbner 1998:6). C'est bien autour de ces enjeux que les contributions rassemblées ici proposent une série de réflexions, qu'elles s'interrogent sur la capacité de l'État australien à incorporer les Aborigènes, sur les régimes de citoyenneté à l'œuvre autour du musée du District Six de Cape Town, ou sur les fondements de processus d'ethnicisation dans deux villes européennes.

Approches anthropologiques de la citoyenneté

S'il fallait brièvement comparer les approches anthropologiques de la citoyenneté à celles mises en œuvre par

d'autres disciplines, ce qui les caractériserait le mieux serait sans doute la volonté de s'intéresser à sa « fabrique » sociale et politique[2] et d'en déstabiliser les théories par un regard critique et empiriquement fondé. Du côté de la science politique en effet, la « citoyenneté » a fait l'objet d'une multitude de travaux, qu'il se soit agi d'en retracer les conditions historiques d'émergence dans ses versions antiques ou modernes, d'analyser les modalités concrètes de sa mise en œuvre ou d'en préciser les conditions d'exercice dans différentes périodes, ou encore d'en définir les contours du point de vue de la philosophie politique. Déloye rappelle également que les sciences juridiques, abordant la citoyenneté d'abord et avant tout comme un statut, étudient plutôt les critères d'accès à la citoyenneté et le contenu des droits et obligations ainsi définis (Déloye 1994). Quant à la théorie politique, toujours selon Déloye, elle s'intéresse aux conditions de l'obligation civique et aux liens qu'entretient le concept de citoyenneté avec les concepts voisins de nation et de démocratie, tandis que l'histoire examinerait les événements ayant favorisé l'extension progressive d'un tel rôle social (Déloye 1994). Mais cette diversité des approches laisse tout de même la part belle aux approches théoriques et normatives, les travaux empiriques restant beaucoup plus rares et la citoyenneté y étant assez généralement conçue à la fois comme conformité à un rôle social et statut vis-à-vis de l'État.

Un des premiers apports de l'anthropologie à une compréhension plus fine des processus de citoyenneté réside donc bien dans la capacité de cette discipline à ancrer ses analyses dans leur observation empirique, et de le faire à la fois en élargissant la focale et en variant les lieux de cette observation, notamment par une attention au point de vue « des gouvernés ». Mais par un effet classique, loin de se limiter à doter d'un peu plus de « chair » un objet problématisé (ou non d'ailleurs) et conceptualisé par d'autres, une telle approche permet en retour de porter un regard critique sur les théories de la citoyenneté elles-mêmes, ainsi que sur les modes de délimitation de ses « frontières ».

L'intérêt de l'anthropologie pour les enjeux de citoyenneté est relativement récent, et il faut bien reconnaître que ces travaux ne progressent pas partout au même rythme, ni ne suscitent partout le même type de questionnement. Si la recherche française est ici particulièrement en retard[3], dans la littérature de langue anglaise, on peut distinguer des approches qui la considèrent du point de vue de ses liens avec la culture, soit, de manière assez traditionnelle pour la discipline, pour les estimer indissociables (Nic Craith 2004), soit pour analyser comment la citoyenneté est influencée (*informed*) par la culture (Rosaldo 1999). D'autres réfutent au contraire, sur ce même objet, une approche qui serait inspirée par une grille de lecture « culturaliste », pour s'intéresser aux modèles de citoyenneté mis en œuvre dans les politiques publiques (voir entre autres Bénéï 2005; Shore et Wright 1997), ou plus largement, proposés par les États (Ong 1999). C'est dans une optique qui allie les deux approches que se situe McDonald dans ce dossier, quand elle se demande, à travers l'analyse des pratiques des Wijaduri, jusqu'où l'État (libéral ?), ici australien, peut « accommoder » une diversité des cultures sans contredire son propre éthos.

Que la question des relations complexes entre citoyenneté et culture constitue un sujet de prédilection pour les anthropologues n'a rien de surprenant; tout d'abord parce qu'elle permet de traiter, à partir d'un objet spécifique, d'une des questions qui a longtemps mobilisé cette discipline, celle des dimensions culturelles des phénomènes sociaux. Or comme le souligne Jean Leca (1991), la citoyenneté, comme la nationalité[4], étant des constructions sociales arbitraires, elles sont à ce titre ouvertes à l'enquête empirique, de même que l'est l'ethnicité, un des objets de prédilection de l'anthropologie. Werbner nous invite ainsi à explorer les modes d'articulation entre discours sur la citoyenneté et processus sociaux et politiques. Repérer les multiples tensions et contradictions entre discours (et théories) dominantes de la citoyenneté d'une part, et réalités des représentations et des pratiques, tant sociales qu'institutionnelles d'autre part, constitue dès lors un enjeu important pour saisir les multiples manières par lesquelles telle conception historiquement située de la citoyenneté vient accompagner, soutenir ou à l'inverse, constituer un obstacle dans les mouvements politiques et sociaux traversant une société. Ainsi, mes propres recherches (Neveu 1998, 2003) auprès de mouvements associatifs rassemblant des jeunes Français d'origine postcoloniale ont montré à quel point le recours au vocable de citoyenneté peut constituer pour eux à la fois un obstacle, quand il permet aux autorités étatiques de les maintenir dans les limbes d'une « intégration » toujours à accomplir; et une ressource, quand il leur permet de s'appuyer sur le discours de l'égalité indifférenciée pour revendiquer une égalité et une reconnaissance réelles. Les discours sur la citoyenneté sont alors effectivement « un processus culturel de manière inhérente », comme le soutient Nic Craith (2004), dans la mesure où ils portent un ensemble de représentations quant à l'image du « vrai citoyen », non pas tant ici au regard de « bonnes pratiques » qu'il faudrait mettre en œuvre pour être reconnus comme tels, qu'en terme de visibilité sociale et politique. Cette « citoyenneté culturelle » (*cultural citizenship*) est alors

plus proche de l'analyse qu'en propose Rosaldo (1999), quand il souligne à quel point l'exclusion dont sont victimes les Latinos aux États-Unis découle de la non-reconnaissance de leur appartenance pleine et entière à la collectivité des citoyens étatsuniens[5]. Mais à l'inverse de Nic Craith, qui tend à réduire la question de la culture à celle de l'ethnicité, dans une vision « culturaliste », reconnaître la dimension culturelle de la citoyenneté consiste plutôt à analyser à la fois « comment ces catégories clés—citoyenneté et culture—sont constituées à nouveaux frais (et sont transformées dans ce processus) dans les pratiques quotidiennes de gens ou de peuples particuliers dans des périodes et des espaces particuliers » (Ousourroff et Toren 2005:209); et la nature profondément politique de « la culture » :

> La culture est politique parce que les significations sont constitutives des processus qui, implicitement ou explicitement, cherchent à redéfinir le pouvoir social. C'est à dire que quand des mouvements déploient des conceptions alternatives de la femme, de la nature, de la "race," de l'économie, de la démocratie ou de la citoyenneté, qui déstabilisent les significations culturelles dominantes, ils mettent en œuvre une "cultural politics." [Alvarez et al. 1998]

Ce que nous montrent donc nombre de travaux anthropologiques prenant la citoyenneté comme « porte d'entrée » de leurs analyses, c'est l'extrême versatilité de cette notion, et des usages qui peuvent en être faits. Mais s'agissant des modèles de citoyenneté à l'œuvre, la question est aussi celle de la position (localisation) des chercheur-es; une lecture un peu attentive et comparative des travaux portant sur ce thème laisse apparaître en effet un risque constant dans nos propres analyses : celui de ne parvenir que partiellement à nous défaire de ces fameux « modèles », dont la prégnance peut parfois amener à prendre une version spécifique de la citoyenneté (sa conception, son rôle) pour sa définition générale. Autrement dit, il nous faut être attentif à ne pas construire nos propres analyses critiques à partir d'une conception spécifique, historiquement et socialement située, de la citoyenneté[6]. La réflexion récente de Ong sur le « libéralisme asiatique » en constitue un bon exemple. Dans un article intitulé « Clash of Civilisation or Asian Liberalism ? », elle souhaite battre en brèche le discours sur le « choc des civilisations », opposant un individualisme occidental à un holisme et un éthos collectiviste des sociétés asiatiques; en analysant le modèle de citoyenneté proposé par des États des tigres de l'Asie (la Malaisie et Singapour notamment), cette auteure souligne que, loin de refléter de quelconques « valeurs asiatiques » atemporelles, celui-ci est parfaitement adapté aux conditions contemporaines de la mondialisation économique, et produit des citoyens aux qualités et aux attentes certes différentes de ceux « produits » à l'ouest, mais tout aussi modernes. Si on ne peut que suivre Ong dans sa volonté de dépasser les explications mécaniquement culturalistes au profit d'une prise en compte des projets politiques des États, il n'en reste pas moins qu'elle reproduit d'une certaine manière un clivage par trop binaire opposant à un modèle de citoyenneté dans lequel les politiques publiques (éducation, formation, logement, emploi...) revêtent une dimension pédagogique importante (celle des Tigres de l'Asie), un modèle « occidental » dans lequel ne seraient valorisés que les droits et libertés individuels. D'une part parce que ce dernier modèle, strictement libéral, n'en est qu'un parmi d'autres qui circulent actuellement dans les sociétés occidentales; d'autre part parce la centralité du rôle pédagogique d'un État protecteur a pu être repérée ailleurs dans des termes assez similaires à propos d'autres périodes historiques, en France par exemple. Ainsi, Ong estime que « plus qu'en Occident, l'État libéral asiatique joue un rôle pédagogique en éduquant le public au sens éthico-politique de la citoyenneté. Une expertise en sciences sociales et humaines est déployée afin de fournir "un certain style de raisonnement" » (Ong 1999:58). Comment ne pas rapprocher ce constat de celui établi par Déloye (1994) à partir de l'analyse du conflit déclenché par la « loi des écoles sans Dieu » en France en 1882 ? En s'attachant à produire un individu-citoyen qui accepte d'être gouverné et soit capable de discipliner ses propres actes et passions (« favoriser à la fois le gouvernement de soi et la soumission volontaire à un gouvernement dorénavant élu au suffrage universel »), la politique des moralistes républicains du début du XX^{e} siècle relève clairement pour Déloye d'une stratégie de gouvernementalité telle que définie par Foucault : « Il s'agit pour les pédagogues de la République de faire apparaître un type de rationalité qui serait intrinsèque à l'art du gouvernement démocratique : l'autodiscipline des citoyens » (Déloye 1994:27).

Le « rôle pédagogique » de l'État ne serait donc pas plus important en Asie qu'en Europe, comme le montre la manière dont l'école est devenue, au début du XX^{e} siècle en France, l'arène centrale de formation d'un citoyen conforme aux conceptions politiques de la République d'alors. Il ne s'agit pas d'un « simple » décalage dans le temps, comme pourrait le prétendre une vision évolutionniste ; on a bien là affaire, comme le souligne d'ailleurs Ong, à un effet des enjeux auxquels sont confrontés les États et des objectifs qu'ils se fixent : « L'État-providence s'est développé comme manière de gérer le conflit de classe, la stratégie post-développementaliste des écono-

mies middle-range asiatiques cherche à produire des citoyens techniquement compétents et socialement unifiés, attractifs pour le capital » (Ong 1999:65). De même, les moralistes républicains menaient une « entreprise étatique de promotion d'une identité nationale et civique englobante » (Déloye 1994:28), au service de leur projet politique républicain.

Face à cet objet complexe et souvent fortement normatif qu'est la citoyenneté, il est donc sans doute particulièrement nécessaire de prendre en compte, mais également d'expliciter nos propres « localisations » (Gupta et Ferguson 1999), c'est à dire la position occupée d'un point de vue géographique, social ou culturel, mais aussi celle choisie dans le débat sur notre objet lui-même; comme toute anthropologie du présent, celle des processus de citoyenneté nécessite en effet de « se détacher et de se repositionner suffisamment loin des normes et des catégories de pensée qui donnent sécurité et sens à l'univers moral de sa propre société » (Shore et Wright 1997:17).

Inverser la démarche

Si la prise en compte pleine et entière des dimensions culturelles de la citoyenneté, au sens de Rosaldo (1999), constitue, comme on vient de le voir, une dimension essentielle dans une approche anthropologique de la citoyenneté, cette dernière ne saurait s'y limiter. En effet, les questions ouvertes par la citoyenneté, non seulement comme théorie, mais aussi comme forme sociale et politique imparfaite et paradoxale, sont aussi celles de la subjectivation politique et de l'individualisation. Approcher la citoyenneté d'un point de vue anthropologique permet donc également d'enrichir la réflexion sur une dimension fondamentale des recompositions contemporaines du politique : celle des modalités d'articulations (et de leurs conditions sociales de possibilité) entre individus, groupes et État.

Qu'il s'agisse des processus liés à la mondialisation, comme l'enchevêtrement croissant, à tous les niveaux, entre États, mouvements sociaux, institutions internationales et ONG (ainsi que d'une multitude de fondations philanthropiques et autres; voir Pandolfi et Abélès 2002) ou de l'émergence progressive de nouveaux rapports au politique, parallèlement ou articulés à d'autres, plus « classiques », les catégories qui fondaient jusqu'ici le politique et ses analyses sont largement remises en question. Fréquemment basées sur un registre d'unicité (un État, un territoire, mais aussi un citoyen abstrait de ses conditions sociales, économiques et culturelles; voir Leca 1991), celles-ci sont aujourd'hui soumises à l'irruption de la pluralité, tant des références que des niveaux. Parmi ces bouleversements contemporains, certains concernent plus directement les enjeux de citoyenneté ; tout d'abord la remise en cause de l'unicité du lien citoyen, unicité vis-à-vis de l'État (on ne pourrait être pleinement citoyen que d'un seul État; pour une analyse interrogeant cette dimension, voir Basch et al. 1994), mais également unicité des formes de pratiques citoyennes (trop souvent réduite à la seule sphère électorale). Or c'est notamment dans les modes d'articulation entre individus et collectifs, dans les rapports politiques, que des évolutions marquantes se font jour (voir entre autres Ion et Péroni 1997; Corcuff et al. 2005); et la notion de citoyenneté concentre de manière particulièrement nette la tension entre individualisation et appartenance (Leca 1991; Marie 1997).

L'anthropologie est sans doute particulièrement bien armée, à condition qu'elle ne se limite pas aux seules sociétés non-occidentales, pour saisir et analyser ces transformations contemporaines du politique, et des pratiques et représentations de la citoyenneté; pour la double raison qu'elle porte depuis longtemps un regard critique sur l'universalité et la transférabilité des catégories politiques occidentales (Werbner 1998; Bénéï 2005); et qu'elle a en conséquence multiplié les efforts pour saisir les modalités alternatives de les concevoir, de les débattre et de les organiser. C'est alors en soumettant un certain nombre de catégories dominantes (« espace public », « société civile », « État », « individu » et aussi... « citoyenneté »...) à ce « regard distancié » que les anthropologues peuvent le plus clairement contribuer à une réflexion renouvelée sur les formes contemporaines du politique, telles qu'elles se donnent à voir dans une variété de situations, de contextes et de localisations.

En suivant Werbner quand elle propose de considérer « que les idées des Lumières à propos de la citoyenneté universelle ne sont pas tant fausses que partout insérées dans un champ social de récits et de pratiques hétérogènes, partiellement superposés et conflictuels » (1998:3), les approches anthropologiques de la citoyenneté peuvent permettre de modifier certains termes classiques du débat sur la citoyenneté, et notamment quant à sa neutralité culturelle ou universalité, pour appréhender « les » citoyennetés, et travailler à découvrir, dans la diversité de ses formes d'effectuation, ses « équivalents homéomorphiques » (Etienne Leroy, communication personnelle). Comme le fait remarquer M. Abélès, et c'est sans doute particulièrement vrai pour la citoyenneté,

> la clarté et la distinction apparente des catégories en vigueur dans le champ politique occultent la question de leur adéquation. [...] D'où la nécessité de procéder à l'envers et de construire les concepts à partir d'une démarche analytique, les catégories de base étant con-

sidérées au point de départ comme des données intuitives et par définition insuffisantes et théoriquement insatisfaisantes. [Abélès 1990:132]

La « fabrique » de la citoyenneté

Au-delà de la diversité des approches, et des débats sur la notion même de citoyenneté, ce qui rassemble les contributions de ce dossier thématique est une volonté partagée de saisir empiriquement les processus de « fabrique » de la citoyenneté, que ce soit dans les multiples interactions entre État et mouvements sociaux, ou entre individus et groupes au sein d'une société. Au-delà de la diversité des contextes, une série d'interrogations similaires traversent ces contributions.

Tout d'abord, une question cruciale, mais que le sens commun contemporain tend à éluder : l'échelle locale est-elle une échelle « naturellement » démocratique ? Le développement d'initiatives multiples en faveur de la « démocratie de proximité », en Europe mais aussi plus largement, tend à assimiler sans les soumettre à un regard critique proximité sociale et spatiale (Massey, 2004), proximité et convivialité, et à attribuer aux mobilisations locales des qualités démocratiques quasi-naturelles (pour un regard critique, voir entre autres Gupta et Ferguson 1997; et surtout Ferguson 2004). Est-on cependant encore dans le registre de la « participation » quand le modèle de référence est celui de la communauté de proximité a-politique, affective, extraite des conflits idéologiques ? Que se produit-il quand l'espace laissé vide par les formes précédentes de mobilisations urbaines en vient à être tout entier occupé par des discours populistes et xénophobes, faisant du local le strict espace d'un entre-soi « ethniquement pur » ? Les relations entre démocratie et populisme sont souvent ambiguës, comme le montrent Dematteo et Coman. La première analyse le « détournement » des instruments de la démocratie directe par des élus de la Ligue du Nord en Italie, qui exploitent les peurs et le ressentiment des habitants des quartiers défavorisés pour populariser leurs options partisanes et accréditer l'idée que la représentation fidèle des citoyens par les élites est en fait une escroquerie. Quant à la deuxième, elle montre que loin d'être le énième signe d'une résurgence des ethnicités en Europe de l'Est, l'ethnicisation des places de Cluj-Napoca par les autorités locales roumaines doit être lue comme une stratégie de récupération des patrimoines légitimants. Paradoxalement, cette ethnicisation de l'espace a alors des valences dépolitisantes, dans la mesure où elle a induit une absence presque totale de débat et de controverse sur la vie de la ville.

On peut alors lier ces interrogations à un questionnement plus global sur la capacité des formes contemporaines de « gouvernement des hommes » à intégrer, à incorporer l'altérité. Y a-t-il des limites à la capacité d'incorporation de l'État libéral ? Que se produit-il quand la mise en avant d'une altérité culturelle menace les systèmes de statuts, de places et de forces, comme c'est le cas avec les Wijaduri avec qui MacDonald a travaillé ? Comment réagit cet État quand les stratégies de contention (sociale et/ou spatiale) de l'altérité ne peuvent être mises en œuvre ? Ce sont alors à la fois les dimensions spatiales et les formes de territorialisation des pratiques de citoyenneté, dont Poche (1992) souligne l'importance quand il renvoie au « partage du topos » comme modalité de reconnaissance, qui trouvent toute leur importance. Mais ce dont il s'agit également, c'est du partage, ou plus exactement d'ailleurs de la re-constitution, d'un espace public commun; c'est ce que propose Balibar, quand il estime, à la différence des théoriciens du contrat social, qu'il est :

> impossible d'imaginer que la constitution (de la sphère publique) peut se faire par la « table rase » des « identités collectives » et des appartenances, qu'elle soit forcée, fictive ou historiquement acquise. [...] Tous, y compris les « autochtones », doivent au moins symboliquement remettre en jeu leur identité civique acquise, héritée du passé, et la reconstruire au présent avec les autres. Cela ne veut pas dire que le passé n'existe pas ou qu'il ne sert à rien, mais cela veut dire qu'il n'est pas un héritage, qu'il ne confère aucun droit d'aînesse, qu'il n'y a pas de « premiers occupants » du territoire civique. [2001:211-212]

La mise en lumière de « modèles » concurrents, différents, de citoyenneté permet alors de mesurer la complexité de leurs relations; ainsi, l'importance donnée à la responsabilité individuelle de chacun se retrouve aussi bien dans les visions libérales de la citoyenneté, dans les discours leghistes que chez les Wijaduri : à quelles conditions « être responsables à l'égard des siens » signifie émancipation ou développement de l'égoïsme ? Enfin, dans son analyse des mobilisations menées par le District Six Museum de Cape Town et autour de cette institution, Beyers explore les modalités de construction et d'articulation entre « communauté » comme forme d'identité collective, et agencéité comme forme de lutte citoyenne; il revient alors à son tour sur la question complexe des liens entre « identité(s) » et citoyenneté, pour suggérer, à la suite de Isin et Wood (1999) que la citoyenneté ne s'oppose pas simplement à l'identité, comme l'universalisme s'opposerait au particularisme, mais porte des relations historiquement spécifiques avec les processus d'identification collective; à ce titre, elle manifeste donc une dia-

lectique complexe entre subjectivation et appartenance collective. On retrouve là, sous une forme spécifique, la discussion centrale évoquée plus haut quant aux liens entre identification et subjectivation, entre individualisation et appartenance.

Ce qui distingue donc une approche anthropologique de la citoyenneté des approches plus classiques est alors précisément cet accent mis sur l'imparfait et l'inachevé, la fluidité des frontières, plus que sur la délimitation a priori d'un pré carré achevé dont il s'agirait alors de mesurer les (écarts aux) normes. De même que Werbner définit la citoyenneté comme « une forme politique et juridique instable » (1998:7), Balibar estime que « parler de citoyenneté imparfaite [...] ce n'est pas seulement suggérer que la citoyenneté est une institution défectueuse, rectifiable, améliorable, c'est surtout suggérer que la citoyenneté est plutôt une *pratique* et un *processus* qu'une forme stable. Elle est toujours "en devenir" » (2001:210-211).

Ce dont il s'agit en fait est de saisir les enjeux politiques de la citoyenneté. Sont-ils « d'homogénéiser la culture des membres de l'État-nation » (Déloye 2000:209) ou de développer « la capacité à exposer les litiges et à formuler à nouveau la question des droits et de l'exclusion » (Rancière 2000:63) ? La question n'est pas alors de faire une place aux différentes cultures, mais de prendre en charge de telles relations de pouvoir et de domination, tant il est vrai que ce qui nous permet de « faire société » (et de « faire culture ») n'est pas ce sur quoi nous sommes d'accord, mais ce sur quoi nous sommes en désaccord (Eder 2001). Pour reprendre les termes de Jacques Rancière, travailler sur la citoyenneté comme processus induit nécessairement de travailler à ses « marges », comme autant d'espaces où elle se constitue et se fabrique, « en tant qu'un des espaces de confrontation pratique avec les différentes modalités de l'exclusion, confrontation qui constitue toujours le moment fondateur de la citoyenneté » (Rancière 1998:117).

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Notes

1 En dehors des articles rassemblés ici, des communications y furent également présentées par Sylvie Fortin (Université de Montréal), Mary Hancock (University of California), Bernard Kalaora (Laios, Paris), Florence Piron (Université de Laval) et Sophie Wahnich (Laios, Paris). L'article de Beyers a été ajouté par la suite.

2 Dans le double sens de la fabrique (*manufacture*) souligné par Bénéï (2005), qui en fait à la fois une production standardisée et conforme et un espace d'inventivité et d'appropriation.

3 Sans que l'on dispose ici de la place nécessaire pour développer cet argument, on peut cependant attribuer ce retard notamment au poids normatif extrêmement fort de cette notion dans une certaine culture politique française; voir Neveu (2005). Un certain nombre de travaux, menés notamment en Afrique, viennent toutefois compenser partiellement cette faiblesse; voir entre autres Holder (2004). Mais les travaux anthropologiques sur la citoyenneté menés en France restent extrêmement rares.

4 Bien que ces deux notions soient fréquemment confondues, tant dans les débats que dans la pratique, elles doivent néanmoins être clairement distinguées ; voir Neveu 2005.

5 Exclusion ici de citoyens statutaires, dans la mesure où tant les Latinos avec qui il travaille que les « jeunes » rencontrés à Roubaix sont légalement citoyens, voire même nationaux de leurs sociétés respectives. On voit par là que la question de la citoyenneté est loin de se déduire ou de se réduire à sa seule dimension statutaire. La notion de « cultural citizenship » a connu un certain succès aux États-Unis, bien qu'elle ait renvoyé à des significations assez diversifiées et parfois confuses; voir notamment Ong (1996) et surtout Rosaldo (1999).

6 Ou à tout le moins nous faut-il en être conscient et l'expliciter.

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Introduction: Citizenship

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This thematic section originates in a session organized for the May 2004 CASCA (Canadian Anthropology Society/Société Canadienne d'Anthropologie) conference in London (Ontario).[1] While the aim at that time was to question contemporary practices of "local democracy," the articles assembled here, all based on localized research, have expanded the discussion to encompass the full scope of the central topic of the conference, "Citizenship and Public Space."

In a recent article, Ong (1999) underlines what are, according to her, the two main contributions of anthropological reflection to citizenship debates. She notes, on the one hand, research concerning rights and minorities and the link between equality and differences; and on the other, a problematization of the spatial dimensions of citizenship, since contemporary economic and political evolutions have stretched the otherwise largely illusory isomorphism between nation-state, populations and cultures (see Gupta and Ferguson 1999). As rightly noted by Werbner, if anthropology can contribute to an analysis of citizenship, it is not only "because anthropology studies the impact of the state on the local, or the meanings of grassroots activism, but because theoretically, anthropology's subject matter has always been "difference" and "identity," the particular in the universal, the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion" (Werbner 1998:6). It is indeed around such themes that the articles collected here propose a series of reflections: questioning the capacity of the Australian state to incorporate indigenous groups; regimes of citizenship at work around the Cape Town District Six Museum; and the grounds for ethnicization processes in two European cities.

Anthropological Approaches to Citizenship

If one had briefly to compare anthropological and other approaches to citizenship, what would certainly best characterize the first would be a willingness to look carefully at the social and political "manufacture"[2] of citizenship

and to destabilize citizenship theories using a critical and empirically grounded approach. In political science, citizenship has been the topic of a considerable literature: retracing historical conditions of appearance of older or modern versions; analyzing actual modalities of implementation or how it is exercised at different times; and, defining its contours from a political philosophy point of view. Déloye reminds us that legal sciences, since they consider citizenship first and foremost as a status, mainly study the criteria for gaining access to it and the content of the rights and duties attached to this status; that political theory is mainly interested in the conditions of civic obligation and in the links citizenship maintains with "neighbouring" concepts of nation and democracy, while history would examine the events that supported the progressive extension of such a social role (Déloye 1994). But despite this variety, political science and history nevertheless privilege normative and theoretical approaches with little empirical research. Citizenship, in most cases, is considered both as a status vis-à-vis the state and conformity to a given social role.

One of the first anthropological contributions to a more complete understanding of citizenship processes thus relies on the discipline's capacity to root analysis in empirical observation and to do so by both enlarging the focus and relying on a diversity of levels of observation—most notably through attention paid to the point of view of "the governed." But as is often the case, far from being limited to adding some "flesh" to an object problematized (or not) or conceptualized by others, the anthropological approach to citizenship allows for a critical re-evaluation of citizenship theories as well as of the way its "borders" are determined.

Anthropologists' interest in citizenship processes is a relatively recent one, and it has to be acknowledged that research does not develop at the same pace, nor raise the same level of interest everywhere. If research in France on this topic is notably scarce,[3] a variety of approaches are found in the literature in English. Some researchers consider citizenship from the point of view of its relationship to culture, either, in a rather classical manner in the discipline, to assert their indissociable links (Nic Craith 2004), or more dynamically, to analyse the extent to which citizenship is "informed" by culture (Rosaldo 1999). Others deny the relevance of a "culturalist" approach and explore models of citizenship implemented through public policies (see, among others, Bénéï 2005; Shore and Wright 1997), or more generally proposed by states (Ong 1999). It is within a framework linking these two approaches that Macdonald's contribution falls: she inquires, by analyzing Wiradjuri practices, to what extent can the (liberal?) Australian state accommodate a diversity of cultures without contradicting its own ethos.

It should come as no surprise that the question of the complex relationships between citizenship and culture stands as a central topic for many anthropologists. Such an approach does indeed deal with one of the issues that has long mobilized the discipline: the cultural dimensions of social phenomena. Indeed as Leca (1991) has rightly noted, citizenship, like nationality[4] and ethnicity (one of anthropology's favourite topics), is an arbitrary social construct, and as such, can be subjected to empirical enquiry. Werbner (1998) thus invites us to explore how discourses of citizenship and social and political processes are linked. To locate the multiple tensions and contradictions between dominant discourses (and theories) on citizenship on the one hand, and actual, both social and institutional, representations and practices on the other, thus constitutes an important element for grasping the multiple ways through which a given, historically situated conception of citizenship can go along with—support or on the contrary be an obstacle to—political and social movements in any given society. My own research with local associations of French youth of postcolonial backgrounds (Neveu 1998, 2003) has shown the extent to which using and referring themselves to the notion of citizenship can be both an obstacle and a resource. It is an obstacle when referring to citizenship allows state authorities to maintain them in the limbos of an always to be accomplished "integration" and a resource when it allows them to rely on the discourse of undifferentiated equality to claim actual equality and recognition. Discourses on citizenship are thus "inherently cultural process[es]" (Nic Craith 2004) to the extent that they carry sets of representations about the "real citizen," here not so much in terms of "good practices" one should adopt in order to be recognized as such, but in terms of social and political visibility. This type of "cultural citizenship" is then closer to Rosaldo's analysis (1999) when he explores the extent to which the exclusion Latinos are confronted with in the U.S. flows from denying their full and entire belonging to the "community" of U.S. citizens.[5] But contrary to Nic Craith, who tends to reduce the question of culture to that of ethnicity—and a "culturalist" version of it—to recognize the cultural dimensions of citizenship consists in analyzing both "how these key-categories—citizenship and culture—are being constituted anew (and in this process transformed) in the practices of their everyday lives by particular people(s) in particular times and places" (Oussourroff and Toren 2005: 209) and the profoundly political nature of "culture":

> Culture is political because meanings are constitutive of processes that, explicitly or implicitly, aim at redefining social power. This means that when movements deploy alternative conceptions of woman, nature, race, economy, democracy or citizenship, that destabilize dominant cultural representations, they enact a "cultural politics." [Alvarez et al. 1998:7]

Anthropological research, taking citizenship as the "point of entry" for its analysis, thus shows the extreme versatility of the concept and the uses to which it can be put. But considering models of citizenship at work, the issue is also that of the researchers' localization. A closer and comparative reading of research on citizenship underscores a constant risk in our analysis: that of succeeding only partly to get rid of these famous "models," the strength of which can sometimes result in taking a singular version of citizenship (its conception, its role) for its general definition. To put it differently, we have to be wary of building our own critical analysis on a specific, historically and socially situated conception of citizenship.[6]

A recent article by Ong (1999) on "Asian liberalism" is an interesting example of such a confusion. Ong wants to dismantle the "shock of civilisation" discourse that opposes Western individualism to the collective ethos and holism of Asian societies. By analyzing the model of citizenship proposed by Asian Tiger states (notably Malaysia and Singapore), she shows that far from reflecting timeless "Asian values," their model is perfectly adapted to contemporary conditions of economic globalization and produces citizens with qualities and claims different from those produced in the West, but not less modern for that. While Ong's will to go beyond mechanistic culturalist explanations is very relevant, she nevertheless reproduces, to a certain extent, a far too binary cleavage when she contrasts the model of citizenship found among Asian Tiger States in which public policies (education, training, housing, employment) are endowed with an important pedagogical role, with a "Western model" she describes as one in which individual rights and freedoms are totally paramount. This is problematic, on the one hand, because the latter, strictly liberal, model is only one among many circulating nowadays in Western societies and, on the other hand, because the central pedagogic role of the protective state has also been noted in quite similar terms elsewhere concerning other historical periods (in France for instance). Thus Ong argues that "more than in the West, the liberal Asian state plays a pedagogic role in educating the public as to the ethico-political meaning of citizenship. Expertise in social and human sciences is being deployed to provide a 'certain style of reasoning'" (Ong 1999:58). It is difficult not to compare such a conclusion with that made by Déloye (1994) in his analysis of the conflict over the "law on Godless schools" in France in 1882. By trying to produce an individual–citizen who agrees to be governed and who is able to discipline his own acts and passions ("to favour both the government of the self and voluntary submission to a government now elected through universal franchise"), the republican moralists of early 20th century were clearly working toward, according to Déloye, a governmentality strategy as defined by Foucault: "the aim for the Republic's pedagogues was to bring about the type of rationality that is intrinsic to a democratic government: citizens' self-discipline" (Déloye 1994:27, Author's translation).

Thus, it seems that the "pedagogic role" of the state is not more important in Asia than in Europe, as shown by the way schools became, in early 20th-century France, central arenas for training citizens adapted to the political conceptions of the republic of the time. The issue is not just, as a strictly evolutionist view would have it, one of a simple "time shift"; one is confronted here, as Ong rightly underscores, with an effect of the challenges states are confronted with and of the goals they are seeking to achieve. "In other words, while the welfare state developed as a way to deal with class conflict, the post-developmental strategy of middle-range Asian economies seeks to produce technically proficient and socially unified citizens attractive to capital" (Ong 1999:65). Similarly, republican moralists were leading a "state project of promoting an encompassing national and civil identity" serving their political project (Déloye 1994:28).

Confronted with the complex and often strongly normative topic of citizenship, it is especially necessary to take into account, but also to render explicit, our own "localizations" (Gupta and Ferguson 1999): not only the position we occupy in geographical, social or cultural terms, but also the position we choose in the debate on our research topic itself. As with any anthropology of the contemporary, the anthropology of citizenship processes requires that one "detach and relocate oneself far enough from the norms and categories of thought that give security and meaning to one's own society's moral universe" (Shore and Wright 1997:17).

Reversing the Approach

Taking full account of the cultural dimensions of citizenship, in Rosaldo's sense, is, as shown above, an essential dimension of an anthropological approach to citizenship; but this approach should not be limited to such dimensions. Issues raised by citizenship, not only as a theory but also as an imperfect social and political form, are also issues of political subjectivation and individualization. To

study citizenship from an anthropological point of view thus also allows us to further the discussion of a fundamental dimension of contemporary political reconfigurations: how do individuals, groups and states relate to each other and what are the social conditions under which these relations develop?

Whether one considers processes linked to globalization, such as the growing number of cross-cutting links between states, social movements, international institutions and NGOs (as well as a number of philanthropic and other foundations, see Pandolfi and Abélès 2002) or the progressive emergence of new relations to politics, together with or distinct from more "classical" ones, the categories that were used to define politics and its analysis are largely called into question. Frequently based on a reference to unity (one state, one territory, but also a citizen abstracted from his social, economic and cultural conditions, see Leca 1991), these categories face the growing challenge of plurality, both in terms of identifications and of scales (local, regional, national and transnational). Among such contemporary changes, some are of more direct importance for citizenship studies: the questioning of the unity of the "citizen tie" (one could only be a full citizen in a single state; for a critical analysis of this view, see Basch et al. 1994) but also of the unity of citizens' practices (too often reduced to the electoral realm). Indeed modes of articulation between individuals and collectives in political relations are the sites of remarkable contemporary evolutions (see inter alia Ion and Péroni 1997; Corcuff et al. 2005); and the notion of citizenship concentrates, in a particularly clear manner, the tension between individualization and belonging (Leca 1991; Marie 1997).

If it is not limited to non-Western societies, anthropology is no doubt particularly well-equipped to grasp and analyze contemporary transformations of politics and of citizenship practices and representations for the double reason that it has long questioned the universality and transferability of Western political categories (Werbner 1998; Bénéï 2005) and that is has consequently multiplied efforts to grasp alternative modalities to conceive of, debate and organize these categories. Thus, by submitting a number of dominant categories ("public space," "civil society," "state," "individual" and also "citizenship") to such a "distanced gaze," anthropologists can more clearly contribute to a renewed reflection on contemporary forms of politics found in a variety of situations, contexts and localities.

Following Werbner, when she considers "that Enlightenment ideas about universal citizenship are not so much false, but everywhere inserted in a social field of heterogeneous, partly overlapping and conflicting narratives and practices" (1998:3), anthropological approaches to citizenship can modify certain classical terms of the citizenship debate—especially concerning its cultural neutrality or universality—so as to understand citizenships in the plural and uncover, behind the diversity of its implementation processes, its "homeomorphic equivalents" (E. Le Roy, personal communication). As Abélès notes, and this holds particularly true for citizenship,

> the clarity and seeming distinction of categories at work in the political field obscures the question of their adequacy...Thus the need to proceed in the reverse and to build concepts from an analytical approach; basic categories being, right from the beginning, considered intuitive and essentially insufficient and theoretically unsatisfying. [Abélès 1990:132, Author's translation]

The "Manufacture" of Citizenship

Beyond the diversity of approaches and of debates on the very notion of citizenship, what unites contributions to this thematic section is a shared willingness to grasp empirically processes through which citizenship is "manufactured," be it in the multiple interactions between states and social movements or between individuals and groups within a society. Beyond the variety of contexts, a series of similar questions traverses these contributions.

We begin with the crucial question contemporary common sense tends to evade: is the local level a "naturally" democratic level? The development of multiple initiatives in support of "democracy of propinquity" in Europe, but more generally throughout the world, tends to confuse social proximities with spatial ones (Massey 2004), and propinquity with conviviality, without submitting such conflations to a critical gaze; and to grant local mobilizations quasi-natural democratic qualities (for a critical view, see Gupta and Ferguson 1999 or more particularly Ferguson 2004). Meanwhile, is one still within the realm of "participation" when the reference is to an apolitical, affective local community, abstracted from ideological conflicts? What happens when the space left vacant by former types of urban movements ends up being entirely occupied by populist and xenophobic discourses so that the local becomes a strictly "ethnically pure" place? Relations between democracy and populism are often ambiguous as Dematteo and Coman show. Dematteo analyzes the "hijacking" of direct democracy procedures by Northern League elected representatives in northern Italy, who exploit fears and resentments in deprived neighbourhoods to popularize their partisan options and lend weight to the idea that a faithful representation of citizens by the elites is a fraud. As for Coman, she shows that far from

being yet another sign of the revival of ethnicities in Eastern Europe, the ethnicization by Romanian local authorities of public squares in Cluj-Napoca is better analyzed as a strategy for re-conquering legitimizing patrimonies. Paradoxically enough, such an ethnicization of space then has depoliticizing effects, since it induces an almost complete lack of discussion and controversy about the life of the city.

Such questions can then be linked to a more global one concerning the extent to which contemporary forms of government of human beings can integrate and incorporate alterity. Does the liberal state's capacity to incorporate have limits? What happens when promoting cultural alterity threatens systems of statuses, places and strengths, as is the case with the Wiradjuri Macdonald worked with? How does this state react when strategies of (social and spatial) contentions of otherness cannot be used? It is then the importance of both spatial dimensions and forms of territorialization of citizenship practices that is underscored, as Poche (1992) rightfully stresses when he evokes the extent to which recognition can rely on "sharing the topos." But what is also at stake is sharing, or more precisely re-constituting, a common public space. That is what Balibar suggests when he considers, contrary to social contract theorists, that it is

> impossible to imagine that constituting (the public sphere) can be done by making a clean sweep of "collective identities" and belongings, whether it is forced, fictitious or historically acquired...Everybody, including "indigenous," must at least symbolically bring into play their acquired, inherited from the past, civic identity, and rebuild it alongside others. This does not mean the past does not exist or is useless, it means it is not an inheritance, that it confers no birthright, that there are no "first occupiers" of the civic territory. [2001:211-212, Author's translation]

Highlighting different and competing "models" of citizenship then permits one to measure the complexity of their relations. Thus the importance given to individual responsibility can be found in liberal visions of citizenship as well as in Leaguist discourses and among Wiradjuri: under what conditions does "to be responsible towards one's own" (MacDonald this issue) mean emancipation or the development of selfishness? In his analysis of social movements about and around District Six Museum in Cape Town, Beyers explores modes of construction and articulation between "community" as a form of collective identity and agency as a form of citizen struggle. He also questions the complex issue of the links between "identity(ies)" and citizenship, and suggests, following Isin and Wood (1999) that citizenship is not opposed to identity as universalism would oppose particularism, but bears historically specific relations with processes of collective identification. As such, it manifests a complex dialectic between subjectification and collective membership. One is again confronted, in specific form, with the central discussion mentioned above concerning the links between identification and subjectification, between individualization and membership.

What then distinguishes an anthropological approach to citizenship from other more classical approaches is precisely the emphasis on the imperfect and unfinished, on the fluidity of boundaries, more than on the a priori delimitation of an enclosed definition from which (deviations from) the norm could be measured. Like Werbner, when she defines citizenship as "an unstable political and juridical form" (1998:4), Balibar argues that "to speak of imperfect citizenship...is not only to suggest that citizenship is a defective, adjustable, improvable institution, it is rather to suggest that citizenship is more a practice and a process than a stable form. It is always in the making" (2001:210-211, Author's translation).

The aim is thus to try to grasp the political stakes of citizenship. Are these "to homogenize the culture of those who belong to a nation-state" (Déloye 2000:209), or to develop "the capacity to expose disputes and formulate anew the question of rights and exclusion" (Rancière 2000:63)? The question is not about making room for different cultures, but about taking charge of such relations of power and domination, since what allows us to "make society" (and to "make culture") is not what we agree about, but what we disagree about (Eder 2001). In Rancière's terms, to work on citizenship as a process necessarily involves working "in its margins" as spaces where it is constituted and produced; these margins are "the spaces of practical confrontation with the different forms of exclusion, a confrontation that always constitutes the founding moment of citizenship" (Rancière 1998:117).

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Notes

1 Apart from the authors presented here, papers were also given by Sylvie Fortin (University of Montreal), Mary Hancock (University of California), Bernard Kalaora (Laios, Paris), Florence Piron (University of Laval) and Sophie Wahnich (Laios, Paris). C. Beyers' paper was added afterwards.

2 I use "manufacture," following Bénéï (2005), to suggest the double meaning of being both a standardized and con-

formist production process and a space for invention and appropriation.

3 While it would take a longer development to explain this scarcity, one can nevertheless attribute it to the extremely strong normative weight this notion has in a certain French political culture (see Neveu 2005). Research, especially on African societies, nevertheless partly balances this situation (see among others Holder 2004), but anthropological research in France on citizenship is still extremely rare.

4 While these two notions are often confused (both in discussion and practice), they should nevertheless be clearly distinguished (see Neveu 2005).

5 One is talking here of the exclusion of legal citizens, since the Latinos with whom Rosaldo was engaged, as well as the youth with whom I worked in Roubaix, are legally citizens, or even nationals, of their respective societies. One can see here that the question of citizenship is far from being deduced or reduced to its sole statutory dimension. The notion of "cultural citizenship" has met with a certain success in the U.S., although it refers to quite varied and sometimes confused meanings (see especially Ong 1996 and Rosaldo 1999).

6 Or, we should at least know about them and render them explicit.

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La « défense du territoire » en Italie du Nord, ou le détournement des formes de la participation locale

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Résumé : L'autonomisme de la Ligue du Nord prend racines dans les provinces préalpines du Nord de l'Italie marquées par l'intransigeance catholique. Il est le fruit d'un communautarisme prepolitico qui conditionne le rejet de la nation et des allochtones sur la base d'une ethnicisation du territoire. La Ligue du Nord se propose de « préserver » la communauté locale de l'intrusion de l'administration centrale comme de celle des étrangers et relaye les revendications sécuritaires qui émergent dans les quartiers dégradés des périphéries sous les registres de l'ordre et de la propreté en lieu et place de celui du racisme. Cet article examine trois situations qui témoignent, à Bergame, de la réémergence du prepolitico dans ses manifestations locales, et illustrent le détournement populiste de la rhétorique participative. Dans la première, il s'agit de reconquérir les espaces publics investis par les étrangers, dans la seconde, de restaurer un ordre moral menacé de toutes parts, et dans la troisième, de privilégier la résolution des difficultés autochtones, le tout pour restaurer une communauté traditionnelle idéalisée.

Mots clés : Italie, Ligue du Nord, prepolitico, mobilisations locales, revendications sécuritaires, prophylaxie ethnique

Abstract: The separatism of the Northern League is rooted in the Catholic intransigence of the Lower Alpine provinces of northern Italy. It is the fruit of a prepolitical communitarianism which entails the rejection of the nation and foreigners on the basis of ethnicization of territory. The Northern League proposes "to preserve" local communities from the intrusion of the central government and outsiders and assuage the security concerns that emerge in down-at-heel peripheral districts using the vocabulary of order and cleanliness instead of that of racism. This article examines three situations in Bergamo which demonstrate the re-emergence of local manifestations of the prepolitical and illustrate the populist distraction of participatory rhetoric. The first is a case of reconquering public spaces occupied by foreigners; the second concerns restoring a moral order threatened on all sides; and, the third involves privileging the resolution of local difficulties in order to restore an idealized traditional community.

Keywords: Italy, Northern League, prepolitical, local mobilization, security demands, ethnic prophylaxis

En Italie, la défense du territoire propre est à la base de toutes les mobilisations conduites par les habitants des quartiers qui refusent la présence des étrangers, et l'expression xénophobe se traduit dans ce pays par une ethnicisation du territoire, comme Clara Gallini (1989) l'a mis en évidence dès la fin des années 1980. Principal locuteur xénophobe sur la scène politique italienne, la Ligue du Nord se fait le relais de ces revendications qui émergent localement et réclame l'éloignement des « minorités non-assimilables » pour des motifs environnementaux au sens large. Les travaux pionniers du sociologue Ilvo Diamanti sur la politisation de la question territoriale dans une optique protestataire sont incontournables pour comprendre le déplacement des catégories politiques dont la Ligue du Nord fut l'un des principaux acteurs (Diamanti 1993, 1996, 2003). L'atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale, qu'elle soit réelle (vandalisme et petite délinquance) ou symbolique (dégradations de l'image du quartier et de la valeur mobilière des habitations) devient centrale dans les mobilisations contre la présence étrangère. Or, ces actions, qui se réclament de la démocratie directe et entretiennent de nombreuses affinités formelles avec les mouvements citoyens, bousculent le cadre habituel de nos représentations et subvertissent l'ordre démocratique; alors que l'implication directe des habitants dans la gestion administrative de leur quartier est généralement perçue comme un signe de vitalité démocratique, les matériaux ethnographiques recueillis à Bergame entre 1998 et 2000[1], révèlent, après analyse, que des droits politiques difficilement acquis peuvent être détournés à des fins contraires aux principes démocratiques. Je tente ainsi de relever les stratégies perverses que la Ligue du Nord déploie dans l'ordre du symbolique pour mieux diffuser un discours illégitime et bousculer nos catégories morales (Babcock 1979). Les trois exemples examinés dans cet article viennent ainsi rappeler que l'échelle ne détermine en rien le caractère démocratique d'une action collective et que les revendications d'auto-

nomie locale, lorsqu'elles se réduisent à l'expression d'un communautarisme xénophobe, n'ont plus rien de démocratique en dépit des stratégies rhétoriques qu'elles empruntent. Celles-ci ne visent plus alors qu'à nourrir la fausse bonne conscience des participants.

La Ligue du Nord est une fédération de mouvements autonomistes nordistes dont le registre d'argumentation se distingue des autres registres populistes repérables en Europe dans la mesure où ce n'est jamais la communauté nationale qui doit être « préservée » mais la communauté locale, sur la base d'un racisme différencialiste qui passe le plus souvent inaperçu. Suivant la même logique, les revendications *nimbys*[2] « environnementalistes » ont pour effet de rendre le racisme « invisible » aux yeux de ses locuteurs italiens. Pourtant, l'ethnicisation du territoire qu'opèrent les discours de ce mouvement populaire dénote, à travers leurs motifs purificateurs, un racisme particulièrement violent.

La communauté traditionnelle menacée sur son propre territoire

Mon immersion dans la Ligue du Nord à Bergame et Milan constitue la base d'une réflexion sur la sous-culture de ce mouvement populiste, les symboles, les rituels et les comportements partisans (Dematteo 2007). Mon interprétation s'inspire des analyses anthropologiques des rites d'inversion (Turner 1990; Balandier 1992). En articulant longue durée de la tradition carnavalesque et contemporanéité de la scène politique italienne, je fais émerger des éléments de continuité dans la culture politique locale qui révèlent selon moi la particularité de la Padanie et l'indépendantisme nordiste. Les membres de la Ligue ne peuvent s'appuyer sur aucune donnée objective (territoire, histoire commune, langue ou culture) pour fonder leurs revendications nationalistes; ils combinent alors de manière iconoclaste des matériaux de la culture populaire pour développer l'expression d'un anti-nationalisme padan qui renverse les stéréotypes négatifs de la culture italienne, et que j'interprète comme le produit de la dérision des institutions nationales[3].

Ce renversement rencontre dans les provinces du Nord-Est de l'Italie une profonde résonance. Si la Padanie de Bossi fait sourire, l'altérité des deux Italie n'est jamais remise en cause. Le discours anti-méridional de la Ligue du Nord ne fait que porter en politique les stéréotypes culturels de certaines provinces périphériques. J'ai enquêté sur l'élaboration de ces discours en combinant enquête de terrain et dépouillement de la presse locale sur une longue période. La permanence de certains thèmes dans les journaux locaux à plus d'un siècle de distance relativise considérablement l'idée de « révolution *leghist*[4] ». Le leader de la Ligue du Nord mobilise d'anciens mythes nationaux pour problématiser des enjeux contemporains, ce qui lui permet de s'inscrire dans une tradition politique locale et de créer de la syntonie avec des territoires bien précis (Hobsbawm et Ranger 1983). Lorsque les autonomistes nordistes captent certains symboles du Risorgimento, ils s'inscrivent dans une tradition politique locale et témoignent de leur volonté de se réapproprier le territoire (contre l'Italie et les étrangers) pour mieux en préserver l'héritage matériel et spirituel (Dematteo 2001).

Selon moi, il est nécessaire de revenir sur les « ratés » du Risorgimento pour comprendre l'orientation politique de ces provinces de l'Italie du Nord (Herzfeld 1997, 2003). Le comportement politique ne se laisse pas seulement conditionner par les évènements récents, mais se distingue par des caractéristiques plus stables. L'enquête ethnographique révèle ce que Marc Abélès appelle des « renchaînements de temporalités », c'est-à-dire une concaténation de temporalités différentes qui sont mobilisées à des fins de représentation et de légitimation politique. L'anthropologie politique française a montré comment les pratiques politiques contemporaines peuvent s'inscrire dans une historicité qui échappe à leur contrôle. Les travaux de Marc Abélès dans l'Yonne (Abélès 1989) et ceux de Yves Pourcher en Lozère (Pourcher 1987) ont mis en évidence comment la compréhension de la superposition de temporalités différentes dans les discours des acteurs locaux peuvent nous permettre de saisir une culture politique locale entendue comme « un ensemble de manière de faire et de penser la politique partagée par une communauté humaine » (Abélès 1992:21).

Bergame est, avec Côme et Varèse, l'un des trois points d'expansion du *leghismo* (idéologie de la Ligue du Nord). Cette province était depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale la vitrine du catholicisme social et la gauche laïque y a toujours été marginale. La Bergamasca passe pour l'une des provinces les plus réactionnaires d'Italie, où elle est surnommée la « Vendée blanche » en raison des insurrections anti-françaises de 1797 et de l'orientation légitimiste pro-autrichienne des vallées qui surplombent la cité. La République de Venise, afin d'asseoir sa domination sur les territoires de la *Terraferma* et de contenir les ambitions politiques des cités les plus florissantes de la plaine padane, avait consenti de larges pans d'autonomie administrative et d'importants avantages fiscaux aux vallées, qui les perdirent lorsque Bonaparte créa, sur le modèle administratif français, la République Cisalpine. Ce bouleversement institutionnel avantagea la bourgeoisie citadine au détriment des provinciaux et provoqua de nombreuses insurrections popu-

laires. C'est à partir de ces évènements que se noue le conflit entre la ville de Bergame et les vallées, et la mémoire de ces anciennes révoltes paysannes est aujourd'hui réinvestie par la Ligue du Nord, qui perçoit le nationalisme comme un produit d'importation français aux conséquences funestes, et valorise les appartenances locales au nom de l'héritage habsbourgeois du Nord Est italien ; le renforcement des institutions locales préconisé par les cadres de la Ligue doit ainsi concourir à progressivement affaiblir l'État-nation. En singeant l'entreprise de construction nationale au bénéfice d'une nation inventée, la Padanie, la Ligue dénonce l'usage instrumental que les élites piémontaises firent du nationalisme (Anderson 1983). Le nationalisme padan est ainsi essentiellement instrumental et subversif : la menace de la sécession aura surtout permis aux industriels du Nord-Est de faire pression sur le centre pour obtenir des réductions d'impôts, et le simulacre ainsi produit discrédite la nation italienne plus qu'il ne concourt à l'édification d'une nouvelle réalité géopolitique.

Le parti réinvestit ainsi les thématiques de l'intransigeance catholique sans vraiment les expliciter, car ces discours ont mauvaise réputation en Italie : anti-étatiste et anti-unitaire, ils furent l'expression de la réaction et témoignent, à travers la nostalgie d'une Italie guelfe composée de Communes et d'États régionaux garantis par la souveraineté du Pape, d'une très grande inertie des représentations politiques et culturelles. Pour décrire cette conception organique de la collectivité héritée de la réaction, l'anthropologue américain Douglas R. Holmes, sur la base de sa monographie sur Rubignacco dans le Frioul (1989), a forgé le concept d'*integralism* (Holmes 2000:8).

Les discours de la Ligue s'appuient sur ce que les Italiens appellent le *prepolitico* : des conceptions particularistes propres à l'homme *guichardien* (opposé à l'homme *machiavélien*)[5] qui évolue dans le monde a-politique de la communauté affective, étrangère aux conflits idéologiques, et sensible aux seuls intérêts privés. Le prepolitico, c'est l'involution du politique tel qu'il s'ébauche à l'aube de la modernité dans les travaux de Machiavel. Dans cette optique réactionnaire, l'action politique est perçue comme venant jeter le trouble dans la gestion des affaires courantes en créant des divisions fallacieuses au sein de la communauté. De telles conceptions servent les intérêts des affairistes qui ont investi la sphère publique dans le sillage de Silvio Berlusconi et légitiment, si l'on peut dire, le patrimonialisme qu'ils affichent. Cela se traduit concrètement par une contraction de l'espace public.

L'idéologie autonomiste de la Ligue a été élaborée dans des milieux catholiques (Bouillaud 1998); la pensée autonomiste catholique s'est développée à mesure que le processus d'unification prenait corps en Italie, les élites locales des provinces les plus catholiques s'opposant à la centralisation par une valorisation de l'institution communale qui représentait pour elles un organe de pouvoir « naturel » composé par un ensemble de familles. Les autonomistes catholiques créeront des réseaux de pouvoir horizontaux susceptibles de concurrencer l'administration centrale sur des territoires périphériques souvent négligés et exclus des réseaux de financements publics, et la Bergamasca constitue sans doute l'un des modèles les plus aboutis de cette volonté de transférer sur le terrain politique une société chrétienne intégrale. La création à l'intention des petits épargnants du *Credito Bergamasco* et des caisses de secours mutuel catholiques sera à l'origine de tout un micro-système économique vertueux qui, en dépit de son isolement culturel, portera la communauté toute entière au bien-être économique et à la fidélité électorale inconditionnelle, du moins jusqu'à la fin des années 1980. En 1982, lorsqu'il fonda la Ligue Lombarde, Umberto Bossi se contenta de reprendre à son compte la symbolique de l'autonomisme bergamasque qui s'était développée en marge des milieux démocrates-chrétiens, faisant écho à toute une tradition politique locale, délégitimée par le centre, mais toujours évoquée avec respect par les représentants locaux de la Démocratie Chrétienne[6]. Contrairement donc à ce que laisse entendre l'historiographie officielle de la Ligue, ce mouvement n'est pas l'œuvre d'Umberto Bossi, mais le produit d'une idéologie périphérique délégitimée, à l'évolution plus ou moins souterraine, qui remonte au début du XIX^{e} siècle. L'émergence électorale du leghismo ne marque donc pas tant une rupture qu'une phase de recomposition de la culture politique locale : la Ligue du Nord, c'est le retour sous une forme renouvelée des vieux schémas guelfes, ce qui fait dire à certains observateurs bergamasques que le conservatisme modéré des provinces blanches a accouché d'un « monstre » en engendrant le leghismo. Parfaitement consciente de cette dérive, la hiérarchie catholique italienne a dénoncé fermement le mouvement de Bossi, qui en retour s'est acharné contre elle et notamment ses initiatives caritatives à l'intention des immigrés.

La matrice idéologique du leghismo est donc le fruit d'un catholicisme enraciné sur un territoire et vidé de ses présupposés universalistes; elle repose sur une double tradition politique locale qui remonte au Risorgimento : le néo-guelfisme[7] des catholiques intransigeants et le fédéralisme républicain de l'élite intellectuelle de Bergame dont prétend s'inspirer Umberto Bossi, même si le fédéralisme ouvert de Carlo Cattaneo[8] n'a rien à voir avec l'intolérance sur laquelle prospère électoralement les ethno-fédéralistes de la Ligue du Nord. La confluence de ces

deux courants idéologiques, surprenante à première vue, est à l'origine du concept de *bergamaschità*, selon lequel l'identité bergamasque est fondée sur un communautarisme religieux et prepolitico qui conditionne le refus de la conflictualité sociale au nom du motif *municipalista* (c'est-à-dire « Ce qui nous unit est plus important que ce qui nous divise »). Les « bonnes gens » de la Bergamasca (simples, honnêtes et travailleurs) sont la projection sur le territoire d'une confession commune qui fonde l'appartenance civile et politique. L'autochtonie est ainsi définie comme le partage d'un patrimoine éthique et culturel qu'il faudrait absolument préserver des influences « étrangères » et notamment méridionales[9]. Ces conceptions qui, aujourd'hui encore, sont divulguées par *L'Eco di Bergamo*, éclairent la nette prévalence de la droite dans la culture politique locale et le succès électoral de la Ligue du Nord.

Les discours de la Ligue du Nord, composés dans les années 1950, ne seront diffusés qu'à la fin des années 1980 dans un contexte politique très différent de celui qui avait présidé à leur élaboration. La révolution leghista s'apparenterait plutôt à une involution idéologique, le retour du prepolitico sous une forme post-moderne témoignant du dépassement de l'État-nation sous la forme qu'il avait prise depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Depuis 1945, les autonomistes bergamasques avaient cherché à émerger électoralement sans y parvenir, car les élus locaux parvenaient à les contenir. Entre l'autonomisme bergamasque et la Ligue du Nord existe une indéniable continuité humaine et idéologique; ici plus qu'ailleurs, la Ligue s'est enracinée en englobant des réseaux préexistants (Dematteo et Bouillaud 2004). Le discours leghista a été élaboré par des notables catholiques de la province de Bergame qui étaient en relation avec le professeur Gianfranco Miglio qui joua un rôle important bien que discret dans l'histoire de l'autonomisme nordiste[10].

Cette idéologie véhicule une conception ethnique du territoire suivant laquelle la présence continue conditionne l'appartenance. Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas un hasard si la matrice idéologique de la Ligue du Nord a été élaborée par des hommes originaires de la vallée Imagna qui a fourni les plus gros contingents d'émigrés de la province. Les émigrés italiens, parfaitement intégrés dans leurs pays d'adoption, maintiennent un lien identitaire fort avec leur vallée d'origine à travers la propriété familiale[11]. L'expérience de l'émigration qui, en Italie, est généralement communautaire, conditionne le rejet de la nation, et la transculturation, c'est-à-dire la traversée des cultures interconnectées (celles des diasporas et celle du pays d'origine) est essentielle à l'intelligence du leghismo. La direction de la Ligue du Nord nourrit le fantasme de ramener tous les émigrés italiens dans leurs villages d'origine, allant jusqu'à promettre des aides à ceux qui reviendraient sur les terres de leurs ancêtres. Il existe en effet une sorte d'aristocratisme montagnard, renforcé par l'endogamie villageoise qui a prévalu jusque dans les années 1950. Les militants leghisti de Bergame considèrent avec envie les montagnards car « ils ne se mélangent pas avec les autres et supportent difficilement l'intrusion des personnes étrangères à leurs communautés » (Entretien, 7/06/2000). L'isolement géographique, mais aussi l'émigration, ont nourri ce repli et contribuent à expliquer la persistance de telles représentations. L'autonomisme septentrional est, à l'origine, l'expression de ce communautarisme montagnard qui s'enracine dans le temps et dont la nostalgie réactionnaire survivra probablement à la Ligue du Nord.

La mixité culturelle vient rompre ce bel ordonnancement communautaire et introduit, selon la Ligue, la menace d'une *libanizzazione* du pays, l'expulsion des étrangers étant alors conçue comme devant restaurer les liens sociaux traditionnels. Les militants leghisti, qui expriment une profonde nostalgie de la communauté de voisinage qui était jadis le lieu de la solidarité, justifient l'expulsion des immigrés en mettant en avant « l'amour du territoire » : les autochtones seraient les seuls à savoir en prendre soin, tandis que les immigrés ne seraient que des profiteurs. Le territoire pérennise en effet la présence des ancêtres et celles des vivants qui s'en déclarent les descendants. Sa valeur réside très clairement dans le travail accumulé des générations précédentes dont les nouvelles craignent de se voir déposséder par les étrangers. Autour de ces représentations s'organise une hiérarchie relative à l'inscription au sol. Cet attachement jaloux à la terre s'enracine dans la culture paysanne. Depuis le XVII^{e} siècle et jusque dans les années 1970, la pauvreté de ces terres de montagne contraignait les jeunes hommes à quitter leurs villages pour faire vivre leurs communautés. Le souvenir de cette culture de l'émigration est vivace, et l'arrivée des immigrés, à la faveur de l'industrialisation récente, réveille chez les autochtones une mémoire douloureuse qu'ils voudraient refouler avec les immigrés[12]. Contre les étrangers, ils démontrent leur « présence sur le territoire » par différents symboles partisans : des drapeaux de la Padanie s'affichent sur les habitations et les maires de la Ligue font placarder à l'entrée de leur Commune le nom de la localité en dialecte, signifiant ainsi l'autochtonie de leurs administrés. Les villes conquises par la Ligue sont autant de Communes « libérées du joug italien » c'est-à-dire, surtout et avant tout, de la République qui méconnaît leur spécificité communautaire.

L'influence de cette idéologie peut difficilement s'étendre, car elle repose sur la culture politique de certaines zones périphériques. La Ligue du Nord est un mou-

vement populaire qui s'est développé en symbiose avec cet environnement et, comme tous les partis néo-populistes, son discours repose sur le sens commun, car c'est pour le leader une manière de créer une empathie immédiate. Comme le meneur fasciste que décrivait magistralement Philippe De Felice dans les années 1940, Bossi ne fait que

> reprendre sans trêve les assertions initiales dont il s'imagine être l'inventeur et qui ne sont en réalité que l'expression des passions les plus élémentaires de son peuple et de sa classe. De là, lorsqu'on écoute ses discours, l'impression d'extraordinaire pauvreté qu'on en garde. De là également le malaise qu'on éprouve à constater que des auditeurs qu'on voudrait croire sensés, peuvent s'enthousiasmer d'élucubrations aussi vaines, dans lesquelles ne se trouvent que des formules creuses, des accusations sans fondements et d'absurdes violences de langage destinées à étayer quelques affirmations tendancieuses, toujours les mêmes, et qui, à y regarder de près n'ont souvent aucune signification. [1947:355]

Lorsque chacun s'avise de « balayer devant sa porte »

L'afflux de travailleurs immigrés est directement lié à l'expansion économique des provinces du Nord Est de l'Italie. Les petits industriels de cette région, souvent issus de familles émigrées en Suisse ou en Allemagne, font désormais faire aux autres les travaux que faisaient leurs parents ou qu'ils faisaient eux-mêmes lorsqu'ils étaient plus jeunes. Cette expérience, loin de les avoir conscientisés, les porte plutôt à se comporter avec une arrogance de parvenus. Cela se traduit par une forme de dissociation mentale : d'un côté, on profite d'une main d'œuvre bon marché, on confie ses parents âgés à des domestiques ukrainiennes, on négocie les prestations de prostituées guinéennes; de l'autre, on refuse de prendre en considération les problèmes spécifiques que rencontrent ces personnes qui vivent et travaillent en Italie depuis des années. Cette attitude, nourrie par un sentiment de supériorité ethnique, hérité du fascisme et jamais réellement questionné, a fini par créer une sous-catégorie d'individus que l'on s'emploie à rendre « invisibles » dans l'espace public, bien qu'ils contribuent largement au processus d'enrichissement collectif (Dal Lago 1999).

Ainsi, les immigrés, en dépit de leur insertion économique, ne parviennent pas à s'inscrire pleinement sur le territoire italien dans la mesure où des citoyens, la police et les administrations locales s'entendent largement pour entraver leur installation. La violence de ce rejet reflète la brutalité des bouleversements sociaux; le Secrétaire provincial des Démocrates de Gauche de Bergame rappelait à juste titre : « Il y a quinze ans à peine, les Bergamasques n'avaient jamais vu de Noirs » (Entretien, 29/01/1999). Depuis, certains d'entre eux parlent de *milanizzazione* de leur ville à partir de la gare (littéralement *milanisation*, de Milan, substitut euphémique de *marocchinizzazione*). La mixité ethnique est plus importante dans la capitale lombarde et cette nouvelle réalité sociale effraye les provinciaux qui s'y rendent occasionnellement pour leur travail, leurs achats, etc. De fait, la périphérie milanaise s'étend toujours plus et finit par englober les petits centres provinciaux qui se transforment en cités dortoirs. Les habitants des zones périphériques assistent alors à l'arrivée massive des *extracomunitari* qui intègrent les industries de la Brianza, et voient dans le même temps leurs conditions de vie se dégrader (pollution, insécurité, etc.). Le Bergamasque se trouve soudainement dépaysé en sortant de chez lui... Aujourd'hui, on peut voir sur les murs de la province des graffiti tels que « Vive la nuit de cristal », « *White power* », « *Bossi imperatore* »... Et les agressions racistes se sont multipliées ces dix dernières années.

La Ligue du Nord exprime l'inquiétude d'une partie de la population :

> Face aux accusations ridicules de racisme qui sont lancées contre les patriotes qui s'opposent à la destruction de leur propre peuple, il faut réaffirmer avec force le droit sacro-saint des nôtres à maintenir et à défendre leur propre identité ethnico-culturelle et religieuse et à ne pas se voir réduit à n'être qu'une minorité résiduelle sur sa propre terre. Concrètement il faut revendiquer le droit d'être le patron chez soi. [Mussa et al. 1999:4].

Umberto Bossi fait ainsi de la globalisation une entreprise totalitaire visant la destruction des peuples (ce qu'il appelle un « nouveau nazisme ») :

> La société multiethnique et multiraciale est, en fait, une société qui de par sa nature est contre l'homme parce qu'elle mortifie en lui toute velléité de générosité sociale (...) à un certain point la société ne peut plus tolérer la perte d'identité, elle se replie sur elle-même, en développant cette pathologie sociale que constitue la désagrégation dont témoignent la drogue, la délinquance juvénile et l'homosexualité. [Bianchi et Iacopini 1994:40].

L'immigration mettrait en péril la communauté traditionnelle; elle est, selon lui, « destinée à démanteler l'idée même de peuple et d'appartenance » (Bianchi et Iacopini,

1994:40). En faisant ainsi passer l'antiracisme de la gauche à la droite, le leader de la Ligue du Nord a repris à son compte le retournement opéré par la « nouvelle droite » française dans les années 1970. Le racisme avance désormais sous le masque de l'éloge de la différence, et pour caractériser le renversement opéré, Taguieff parle de la stratégie de « rétorsion » qui vise les mots et les valeurs de l'antiracisme (Taguieff 1987). Le politologue établit en effet une distinction entre le racisme impérialiste/colonialiste ou d'assimilation (« anthropophagie ») et le racisme différentialiste/mixophobe ou d'exclusion (« anthropoèmie »), reprenant celle esquissée par Claude Lévi-Strauss dans *Race et histoire* (1952). Les leghisti condamnent le premier lorsqu'ils dénoncent l'impérialisme culturel de Rome à leur encontre, mais nourrissent le second en prétendant que l'identité locale est menacée par des éléments allogènes.

En Italie, les acteurs politiques ne sont pas les seuls acteurs sociaux à prendre en charge la production du discours xénophobe et ils craignent même d'être dépassés par les manifestations d'intolérance des habitants des quartiers multiculturels. Depuis la seconde moitié des années 1980, les mobilisations de quartier (généralement très suivies) assument en effet, au niveau local, l'expression de la xénophobie courante. Les actions des associations de quartier ne se donnent pas de visée générale et entretiennent une certaine proximité avec les formations politiques *one issue* : ne dépassant pas l'échelle d'un quartier ou d'une ville, elles négligent, pour ainsi dire, la dimension nationaliste, et mettent en scène un « nous » étroitement localiste. Mais en même temps, et de manière largement inaperçue, elles expriment le nationalisme en s'insurgeant contre l'étranger (Gallini 1991:117). Ces citoyens se mobilisent pour défendre leur « cadre de vie », selon les registres de l'ordre et de la propreté, et jamais sous celui du racisme : effet nimby et localisme se renforcent ainsi mutuellement.

Rarement exprimé directement dans l'espace public, le rejet de l'autre emprunte le plus souvent divers biais : la dégradation de l'environnement social, le développement de la petite délinquance et le tarissement de la sociabilité de quartier sont généralement mis en avant par les habitants; des revendications positives, rendues anodines, traduisant ainsi une xénophobie bien réelle. Lors du relogement de populations immigrées, la colère explose en de violents accès qui prennent parfois la forme de grandes protestations civiles (contre les Roms à Naples) ou de mobilisations suivies (contre les Chinois à Milan) qui, si elles parviennent à canaliser la violence des habitants, sont néanmoins susceptibles de dégénérer et inquiètent les autorités italiennes.

Ces mobilisations nimbys interviennent dans un contexte où le coût des locations a considérablement augmenté. Le prix du mètre carré est plus élevé à Milan qu'à Paris et il est difficile pour les catégories sociales les plus fragilisées de trouver un logement. L'attribution des logements sociaux fait ainsi l'objet d'une compétition entre étrangers et autochtones, et le clientélisme qui affecte parfois leur distribution contribue à exacerber les tensions[13]. Le droit à la sécurité émerge également dans les revendications des associations de quartier, et le contrôle d'un territoire, souvent étroitement circonscrit, fait ordinairement l'objet des revendications citadines, les habitants associant en effet immigration et petite délinquance.

Les militants de la Ligue du Nord distribuent des dossiers exhibant des graphiques mettant en parallèle l'entrée des migrants et l'expansion de la criminalité, cherchant ainsi à justifier « scientifiquement » l'amalgame migrant/délinquant sur lequel repose l'essentiel de leur argumentation. À la fois cause et effet de cette confusion, l'ethnicisation de la population carcérale s'est en effet accélérée en Italie (Palidda 1999). Le nombre de détenus étrangers a ainsi considérablement augmenté dans la prison de Bergame, de 30 en 1989, ils sont passés à 140 en 1999, soit 30 % du total des prisonniers, dans la plupart des cas des clandestins en infraction avec la nouvelle loi sur l'immigration (*Il nuovo giornale di Bergamo*, 16/01/1999).

La police est le plus souvent absente des conflits qui éclatent ici et là entre les autochtones et les migrants; les premiers s'en plaignent et tentent parfois de faire justice eux-mêmes. Lorsque les Communes ne répondent pas à leurs revendications, les commerçants paient des vigiles pour « nettoyer » les places. Des rituels carnavalesques sont parfois réactivés à cette fin, comme la chasse au *marocchino*[14] lancée par les ultras de Florence en 1995 : le visage peint en blanc comme des clowns, les supporters armés de barres de fer ont traqué dans les rues du centre ville les vendeurs ambulants qui importunent tant les commerçants (Gallini 1989). La Ligue du Nord organise dans les quartiers où se concentrent les immigrés des « marches aux flambeaux », sorte de simulacres de lynchages aux allures de parades (Dematteo 2007). Les incidents qui ne manquent pas de se produire font ensuite l'objet de discours métaracistes préventifs : pour éviter ces malheureux excès, souvent sciemment mis en scène, expulsons les étrangers. Les formations populistes agissent en fait comme des pompiers pyromanes qui s'empressent de crier au feu après avoir allumé l'incendie. Les institutions étatiques relaient leur racisme préventif lorsqu'elles s'efforcent de contenir les tensions intercommunautaires qui émergent ça et là en entretenant l'illusion d'un contrôle frontalier[15].

Affiche 1 : « Si vous nous aviez écouté… [suivent les noms de six Italiens assassinés par des étrangers]… Ceux-ci et beaucoup d'autres seraient encore parmi nous. Soutiens-nous dans notre lutte contre la criminalité et l'immigration sauvage. » Tract et affichette distribués par la Ligue du Nord.

La Ligue fait campagne dans les parcs

Les trois situations examinées plus particulièrement ici témoignent de la réémergence du prepolitico dans ses différentes manifestations et illustrent le détournement populiste de la rhétorique participative. Je me suis tout d'abord penchée sur les discours lors de la campagne municipale de 1999 dans la mesure où, pour les provinciaux de la Ligue, Bergame représente aussi bien l'Italie que son nouveau visage multiculturel, c'est-à-dire un espace à reconquérir. Les « chemises vertes » du parti entretiennent un rapport problématique avec l'espace urbain : leurs bastions se trouvent en province, et ils ne sont jamais parvenus à obtenir plus de 15 % des suffrages dans la ville de Bergame. Roberto Calderoli, l'une des principales figures du parti, a été défait lors des précédentes élections municipales et les élus locaux considèrent que ce sont les méridionaux qui ont « sauvé » la ville du leghismo. Quant aux militants de la Ligue, ils expliquent généralement ce divorce entre Bergame et sa province en estimant qu'« en ville le lien avec le territoire s'est perdu ». Les étrangers, parce qu'ils proviennent tous d'un Sud qui s'étend dans leurs fantasmes racistes à l'ensemble des pays pauvres de la planète, symbolisent cette invasion qu'ils se proposent d'endiguer.

Durant la campagne, les dirigeants locaux de la Ligue vont promouvoir un argumentaire non pas raciste mais « environnementaliste », parce qu'ils savent pertinemment que leurs déclarations à l'emporte-pièce seraient mal reçues en ville. Ils vont alors recourir à un registre « citoyen » pour promouvoir leurs visées politiques xénophobes, en détournant l'initiative originale d'un collectif d'associations proche du centre-gauche et visant la réhabilitation des espaces verts de la ville. En effet, à Bergame comme un peu partout en Italie, les nouveaux migrants ont spontanément investi les parcs citadins, suscitant bien souvent l'exaspération de leurs usagers habituels. Le manque d'espace et la crise du logement conduisent les étrangers à occuper des espaces publics qu'ils détournent ainsi de leurs fonctions premières, dessinant à travers leurs usages de l'espace des paysages culturels diversifiés (Scandurra et al. 2001). Ces espaces, fortement connotés ethniquement, sont souvent associés à des formes de petite délinquance, mais ils peuvent également devenir des lieux d'identification et de sociabilité pour les membres des communautés immigrées. À Bergame par exemple, les employées de maison ukrainiennes se retrouvent en plein centre, dans les jardins de Porta Nuova où elles échappent pour quelques heures à l'espace résidentiel de leurs employeurs. Mais à quelques pas de là, sur la place Cavour et dans le jardin Donizetti, les Bergamasques savent aussi qu'ils croiseront les dealers originaires d'Europe de l'Est.

L'usage quasi-privé que ces immigrés font des espaces publics est à l'origine du malaise que suscite leur présence. Par leur emploi culturellement différencié des parcs, ils remettent en question, aux yeux des Italiens, leur caractère public. Ces réappropriations attirent depuis peu l'attention des anthropologues et des urbanistes italiens, et elles éclairent, par les réactions qu'elles suscitent, le rapport très particulier que les Italiens entretiennent avec le territoire qui entoure leurs habitations. L'appropriation qu'ils réaffirment lorsqu'ils protestent contre la présence étrangère révèle que la définition de l'espace public n'est pas moins problématique chez eux. L'espace de l'urbanité devrait être celui du vivre ensemble, sans sous-estimer les réajustements que cela engendre inévitablement de part et d'autre, mais les dirigeants de



Affiche 2 : Tract annonçant le tour des périphéries à bicyclette (toutes les références partisanes sont gommées).

Photo 1 : Départ de la promenade, juin 1999. Photo de l'auteure.

la Ligue ne sauraient s'encombrer de telles considérations lorsqu'ils se réapproprient symboliquement les parcs.

Le secrétaire provincial de la Ligue sait pertinemment que son parti ne gagnera jamais les municipales à Bergame : il a donc décidé de soutenir la candidature d'une femme pour « briser » l'image guerrière de son parti. Raffaella Bordogna (42 ans) : « *una donna in mezzo alla gente* » (« une femme proche des gens ») est présentée comme la mère de deux enfants, dont le divorce et la profession d'avocate ne sont jamais mentionnés dans les brochures du parti. La fortune de son cabinet repose pourtant sur son compagnonnage avec la Ligue, dont elle a commencé par défendre les militants intempérants avant de les seconder dans leurs fonctions administratives lorsqu'ils entrèrent dans les Conseils municipaux. Elle fait partie de ces personnes qui sans avoir un profil leghista sont entrées dans le mouvement pour se « faire une place » dans un système politique local très fermé, le succès électoral de la Ligue au début des années 1990 ayant attiré une foule d'ambitieux, dont il semble bien que Raffaella Bordogna fasse partie. Secondée par un ancien militant d'extrême gauche italo-argentin qui a rejoint les péronistes avant de venir s'établir à Bergame comme conseiller en communication, elle se présentera comme une Evita Perón bergamasque en articulant sa campagne autour du langage de « l'affectif » pour mieux éluder toute référence idéologique; une promenade à bicyclette de Raffaella Bordogna dans les quartiers périphériques de la ville sera ainsi baptisée : « l'embrassade aux périphéries ».

Les représentants de la Ligue privilégiant toujours les rapports directs avec la population, et insistant sur la proximité et le pragmatisme, la campagne municipale est essentiellement tournée vers les femmes, les enfants et les personnes âgées. La candidate de la Ligue entend améliorer la qualité de l'environnement, la qualité de la vie et développer les lieux de sociabilité à l'attention des personnes âgées[16].

Sa candidature sera essentiellement appuyée par des commerçants et des artisans de la ville. Ces derniers, qui craignent la concurrence des étrangers, soutiennent en effet le mouvement de Bossi[17]. Ils s'inquiètent également de la désaffection dont pâtit le centre-ville au profit des grands centres commerciaux de la périphérie et mettent en cause le sentiment d'insécurité. Le programme de leur candidate a une orientation essentiellement sécuritaire : Raffaella Bordogna prévoit de réformer la police municipale, requiert la présence de vigiles armés dans les quartiers de la ville et demande la création d'un super **mandat d'adjoint** à la sécurité dont elle prendrait la charge. Pour remédier aux deux principales sources de désagrément, elle envisageait même de déplacer la gare et le stade en périphérie !

Affiche 3 : Tract de la campagne de Raffaella Bordogna (le logo de la Ligue du Nord apparaît seulement en bas à gauche)

Photo 2 : Raffaella Bordogna entourée par des enfants et des personnes âgées dans le parc Locatelli, mai 1999. Photo de l'auteure.

Pour mieux mettre en scène ses propositions, la candidate de la Ligue va investir avec son staff les espaces verts de la ville, qui faisaient l'objet d'une polémique depuis plusieurs mois. Selon la presse locale, ils étaient devenus les lieux de rencontre des drogués, des clochards et des marginaux. Les forces de l'ordre, conscientes du phénomène, les surveillaient étroitement, mais ils étaient malgré tout désertés par leurs usagers habituels : les enfants et les personnes âgées, ce qui favorisait en retour l'afflux de personnes suspectes. Raffaella Bordogna se proposa donc de réinvestir les parcs afin de les restituer à leurs usagers légitimes. Elle va planifier différentes initiatives en fonction des problèmes qu'elle entend affronter : ses partisans vont s'enchaîner dans le parc de la Malpensata pour manifester contre la présence de prostituées, distribuer des ballons et des glaces aux enfants dans les différents parcs du centre ville et même offrir aux promeneurs un spectacle de clowns...

À chaque initiative, les références au parti de Bossi sont aussi rares que discrètes, et en investissant les parcs citadins, Raffaella Bordogna s'inspire directement de la démarche d'un collectif d'associations parrainé par la Commune un an auparavant, détournant alors toute une série de propositions formulées par le centre gauche. L'administration sortante (composée d'anciens communistes et d'anciens démocrates-chrétiens) avait en effet soutenu une initiative qui proposait aux habitants d'« adopter les parcs citadins » afin d'éviter d'avoir recours aux vigiles (Ruocco 1998). Les associations (à commencer par les objecteurs de conscience) estimaient en effet que le sentiment de sécurité ne dépendait pas forcément de la présence d'hommes en armes dans les parcs de la ville. Souhaitant limiter l'action des vigiles aux heures nocturnes, les objecteurs de conscience proposèrent de multiplier les initiatives récréatives et culturelles pendant la journée; en faisant en sorte que les habitants réinvestissent les parcs de leurs quartiers, on pouvait selon eux éviter qu'ils ne deviennent le repère des délinquants. Ils espéraient impliquer la communauté locale, vaincre l'incivilité et redonner confiance aux riverains; en amenant ainsi les habitants à débattre de l'usage des parcs, une prise de conscience des problèmes réellement posés devenait possible.

L'administration communale de l'époque, déjà attaquée par la droite pour son laxisme, s'était dans un premier temps montrée hostile au projet, mais les objecteurs de conscience ont conduit une enquête dans les parcs pour mesurer le sentiment de sécurité des promeneurs et contrer les discours sécuritaires de l'opposition[18]. En moyenne, les interviewés dirent fréquenter le parc une fois par semaine, généralement l'après-midi, car la plu-

Affiche 4 : Tract annonçant la manifestation de la Ligue dans le parc Locatelli pour la campagne de Raffaella Bordogna (aucune référence politique n'apparaît).

part des parcs sont fermés le soir. Contrairement aux lieux communs répandus par la presse locale, 83 % d'entre eux estimaient que les parcs étaient sûrs, et dans leur définition de la sécurité, la propreté arrivait avant la petite délinquance. Un tiers des interviewés disaient avoir assisté à des incidents qu'ils considéraient comme « nocifs pour la sécurité » et parmi ceux-ci, le vandalisme arrivait en tête. C'est donc l'entretien des parcs qui était mis en cause, et si la présence d'un gardien était jugée nécessaire pour empêcher les actes d'incivilité, celle d'un vigile était la dernière option choisie. Il existait donc un écart significatif entre le sentiment des usagers et les articles alarmistes paraissant alors dans *Bergamo Sette*.

Lorsque la candidate de la Ligue reprend à son compte cette initiative, elle prend une toute autre signification, faisant des parcs des lieux de « reconquête sociale » à forte connotation ethnique. Le staff de Raffaella Bordogna veut amener les Bergamasques à se réapproprier les parcs contre la *malavita* étrangère – les immigrés qui y stationnent dans la journée, figurant cette « invasion du territoire » que la Ligue veut contenir. Les cadres de la Ligue doivent représenter sans jamais l'énoncer explicitement l'exigence de prophylaxie ethnique de leur électorat. Durant la campagne, le message sera suggéré à travers des images de la dégradation des parcs (détritus sur les aires de jeu, seringues abandonnées dans les allées). En délogeant leurs adversaires de leurs thèmes traditionnels (engagement citoyen, qualité de l'environnement, etc.), les représentants de la Ligue se montrent particulièrement habiles. En détournant la rhétorique de la mobilisation citoyenne et de la démocratie directe, ils brouillent les repères de l'électorat et disqualifient les thèmes de campagne progressistes par les réemplois cyniques qu'ils en font. En agissant de la sorte, ils s'efforcent de mettre en évidence la vacuité des solutions proposées par la gauche, puisque dans leur esprit seule l'expulsion constitue une réponse au phénomène migratoire. Ils la délogent également de ses thèmes habituels, la contraignant à se repositionner. Ce type de stratégie perverse est tout à fait caractéristique des tactiques rhétoriques mises en œuvre par les représentants de la Ligue du Nord qui, par dérision, détournent les symboles partisans et retournent les discours de leurs adversaires politiques (Dematteo 2007).

« Mordre la vie » et ne pas la subir…

La candidature de Raffaella Bordogna était également soutenue par l'association *Mordilavita*, qui regroupe des habitants du quartier de la Malpensata qui jouxte la gare de Bergame. Créée en 1997, cette association se propose de remédier à la dégradation sociale du quartier, et ses promoteurs, tout en rejetant le projet sécessionniste de la Ligue, s'inspirent de ses modes d'action. À l'issue du bras de fer qui l'a opposé à la majorité de centre gauche pour la création d'un corps de vigiles urbains, le président de Mordilavita, Orio Zaffanella, décida de s'engager dans la campagne municipale en créant un nouveau collectif politique : *Bergamo Sicura*. La surdité de la Commune l'y aurait pour ainsi dire contraint :

> Nous avons cherché à dialoguer avec l'administration de centre gauche, sans résultat, nous avons alors mené des actions assez retentissantes en engageant toujours plus de personnes, et comme ils ne nous prenaient toujours pas au sérieux, qu'ils n'apportaient pas de réponses à nos revendications, alors nous avons décidé de franchir le pas. [Entretien, 01/06/1999]

Au départ, Orio Zaffanella a envisagé de faire campagne seul, mais le collectif Bergamo Sicura n'ayant sans

doute pas les moyens financiers suffisants pour ce faire, il s'est résolu à soutenir la candidate de la Ligue du Nord :

> Elle s'intéresse aux besoins des gens, à leurs intérêts, nous n'avons eu aucun problème lorsque nous nous sommes alliés avec elle [...] Nous avons voulu lui donner les voix que nous étions susceptibles de recueillir de façon à obtenir quelque chose de concret, nous l'avons fait dans l'intérêt des citoyens et pas dans le nôtre, car nous ne sommes pas avec la Ligue, nous sommes avec elle, nous avons fait un choix bien précis, nous insistons toujours sur son nom, nous ne reprenons pas le discours de la Ligue même si nous opérons dans la même direction sur les questions d'ordre public. [Entretien, 01/06/1999]

Au cours de la campagne municipale, les membres de Bergamo Sicura se montrèrent d'ailleurs particulièrement soucieux de se distinguer des militants de la Ligue qui faisaient partie du staff de leur candidate, en portant des tee-shirts qui les en distinguent et en ne cessant de réaffirmer leur rejet de l'autonomisme nordiste.

Comme Umberto Bossi, Orio Zaffanella rejette les deux principales forces politiques italiennes sous prétexte qu'elles ont recyclé les représentants de la Première République, se dit eurosceptique (au point d'envisager un nouveau conflit européen), mais produit un discours métaraciste, particulièrement euphémisé, en effectuant une « montée en généralité » pour défendre des intérêts nimbys. De toute évidence, il ne s'adresse pas aux mêmes catégories sociales que la Ligue :

> Les problématiques personnelles, existentielles, les rapports avec les autres sur le territoire doivent susciter, disons, une certaine réaction de la part de l'individu. L'individu ne doit pas tout absorber sans réagir. Il doit en partie assimiler les choses, il doit en partie réagir [...] Lorsque nous avons commencé, nous avons voulu analyser les problèmes des gens sur le territoire, les problèmes qu'ils rencontrent avec les autres personnes, avec les administrateurs, et l'un des problèmes majeurs que nous avons relevé, c'est le besoin de sécurité, le fait de ne plus pouvoir se retrouver, de ne plus pouvoir faire coïncider son identité avec son propre territoire. Concrètement le territoire va dans un sens et les gens dans un autre. Le territoire va vers une européisation et les gens se replient sur eux-mêmes, sur leur maison, les relations avec les autres sont plus réduites, l'égoïsme est plus important et ils refusent l'immigration. [Entretien, 01/06/1999]

Entre les objectifs énumérés dans les statuts de l'association et les actions réellement menées, il y a cependant un écart significatif. Si l'on s'en tient aux premiers, il semble que l'association ait vocation à venir en aide aux personnes en difficulté en les appuyant de différentes manières : « L'association Mordilavita entend être un instrument – réel et concret – au service des gens en recueillant, en analysant, en approfondissant et en interprétant "pour résoudre" les problèmes et les difficultés des personnes. » L'association entend favoriser l'insertion des habitants dans le monde du travail, développer une action qui soit à la fois sociale, culturelle et politique. Elle veut :

> améliorer la réalité sociale et le climat culturel général en aidant l'individu singulier, en intervenant dans les situations de difficultés et de marginalisation, en accompagnant moralement et culturellement les personnes par une présence active de soutien [...] Les besoins des personnes seront au centre de l'action afin d'éviter que ne se concrétisent des gestes, des actes et des situations déviantes et explosives. [Atto costitutivo di associazione, 20/03/1997]

En réalité, les membres de l'association se montrent surtout préoccupés par le développement de la prostitution aux abords de leurs habitations : Mordilavita organise ses propres « marches aux flambeaux » pour sensibiliser les élus et réclame des vigiles de quartiers (« Fiaccolata contro il degrado », *L'Eco di Bergamo*, 24/11/1998).

Ce décalage ne relève pas d'une simple ruse, il est plutôt le produit de la fausse bonne conscience qui entoure l'expression du racisme dans nos sociétés policées. Les militants de Bergamo Sicura sont intiment persuadés qu'ils ne sont pas racistes; dans le quartier de la gare, la petite délinquance prend de l'ampleur et les riverains ne veulent pas rester sans rien faire. Pour le Président de l'association, les citoyens bergamasques seraient « expropriés de leur territoire par les criminels », et il mentionne à ce propos le meurtre en janvier 1999 de deux commerçants par des étrangers dans des quartiers périphériques (*La Padania*, 13/01/1999). Il s'agit là selon lui d'une « criminalité contagieuse » qui recrute sans cesse parmi les immigrés clandestins, les marginaux et les désaxés : une « marée de marchandises humaines prête à tout pour survivre ou vivre aux dépens de la communauté » (cf. tracts). Selon lui, on ne saurait contraindre les citoyens à vivre au contact de cette « diversité » et de ces « déviances ». Comme les représentants de la Ligue, le président de Mordilavita se montre cependant soucieux de distinguer immigrés et clandestins : « Sur l'immigration, nous sommes plutôt tolérants [...] Nous parlons seulement des clandestins. C'est fondamental. L'immigré qui s'est intégré, qui a fait des sacrifices, parce qu'ils ne reçoivent aucune aide, jamais, ils doivent s'arranger tous seuls... » (Entretien, 01/06/1999).

Photo 3 : Les membres de l'association Mordilavita s'enchaînent devant le parc de la Malpensata pour manifester contre la petite délinquance et la dégradation de leurs lieux de vie, juin 1999. Photo de l'auteure.

Les membres du collectif Bergamo Sicura ne sont pas uniquement préoccupés par les problèmes de sécurité liés au développement de la petite délinquance étrangère, ils s'alarment aussi du dépérissement de la morale publique, et l'univers politique semble devenu pour eux la source d'une insécurité plus grande encore. Le président de Mordilavita tient les politiciens pour des délinquants et le besoin de sécurité dont il se veut l'interprète concerne aussi bien la prostitution que la délinquance en col blanc :

> Bergamo Sicura, ce n'est pas uniquement un discours sécuritaire concernant le territoire, c'est une demande de sécurité qui concerne également la fiabilité de ceux qui nous gouvernent, leur sérieux personnel, leur sérieux politique, etc. Je parle d'une fiabilité susceptible de se traduire par des résultats appréciables sur le territoire de la communauté qu'ils administrent. [Entretien, 01/06/1999]

Depuis que la Ligue du Nord est devenue une force de gouvernement, elle a peu à peu abandonné cette thématique qui avait fait son succès au début des années 1990. Le « pacte de fer » conclu au lendemain des élections administratives de 1999 avec Silvio Berlusconi jette une ombre définitive sur la volonté de restauration morale de la Ligue du Nord. Le leader de *Forza Italia* est en effet le parangon de cette « culture de la fourberie » selon laquelle seuls les imbéciles sauraient être honnêtes, l'honnêteté ne menant nulle part, et surtout pas au pouvoir. Comme beaucoup d'Italiens entretiennent, chacun à leur échelle, des rapports avec la sphère de l'illégalité, l'opinion publique se montre plus tolérante à l'égard des criminels autochtones qu'à l'égard des étrangers, qui ne sont souvent que les exécuteurs des basses œuvres des premiers. La Ligue du Nord excuse ainsi plus facilement la corruption que le trafic de stupéfiants, par exemple quand elle dénonce explicitement le fait que les autorités emprisonnent les dirigeants locaux alors que la criminalité étrangère envahit les rues de la ville.

Le Président de Bergamo Sicura se fait ainsi le porte-parole d'une inquiétude plus large, relative à la globalisation de la criminalité sous ses formes mineures, mais également sous ses formes financières, qui rend aujourd'hui instables l'environnement immédiat comme les institutions locales. Il n'hésite pas à se poser comme le repré-

sentant des citoyens contre l'administration : « Le politicien est devenu notre adversaire, le politicien qu'il soit de gauche ou de droite, le politicien qui nous ignore parce que nous lui posons des problèmes ».

Le camp de réfugiés roms de Boccaleone

La mobilisation des habitants de Boccaleone contre les tziganes, relayée par la presse locale et la Ligue du Nord, illustre de quelle manière les instruments de la démocratie directe peuvent être détournés à des fins purement électoralistes. Certains quartiers, déjà dégradés, concentrent de nombreuses difficultés; c'est notamment le cas du quartier Boccaleone de Bergame. La sixième circonscription (Boccaleone et Malpensata) regroupe déjà toutes les structures les plus « indésirables » (friches industrielles, campements de tziganes, prison, Luna Park, cirque, siège des transports collectifs); selon sa présidente, une élue de la Ligue, elle est devenue la « décharge » des situations dérangeantes. La Municipalité de centre gauche prévoyait en 1998 d'y construire un nouveau camp de réfugiés destiné à remplacer l'ancien, une structure provisoire, construite à la hâte cinq ans auparavant pour accueillir les tziganes persécutés. Le camp situé sur la via Rovelli regroupait au moment de l'enquête deux communautés : au 160, dans un ancien abattoir, vivaient à peu près 80 Roms musulmans du Kosovo, pour l'essentiel des hommes; au 99, vivaient des Roms serbes d'origine roumaine, parlant un dialecte roumain et de confession orthodoxe : ils étaient 160 et composaient une vingtaine de familles (parmi eux 80 hommes, 25 femmes et 40 enfants). Les deux communautés ne s'entendaient pas et causaient bien des difficultés aux deux travailleurs sociaux en charge du camp.

Lorsqu'ils eurent connaissance du projet, les habitants du quartier ont protesté en arguant que la structure serait trop proche des habitations. Depuis plus d'un an déjà, la détérioration du camp provisoire attirait des ennuis à la municipalité, et les élus de la droite, relayés par une certaine presse locale, alimentaient la polémique. Les journaux dénonçaient dans de nombreux articles la « dégradation du quartier », se faisant les porte-paroles des riverains manifestement excédés par ce voisinage :

> Les hôtes de la via Rovelli ne travaillent pas, ils ne gagnent pas d'argent, et cependant nous les rencontrons au supermarché, ils font des courses pour des sommes importantes, dans les bars, ils ne lésinent ni sur les cigarettes, ni sur l'apéritif et les petits encas. D'où sortent-ils tout cet argent, dites-moi ? De la mendicité d'une part, mais pour le reste ? Des vols. Et nous, nous sommes leurs distributeurs de billets et personne ne bouge ! [« In balìa degli Albanesi », *BergamoSette*, 13/02/98]

La peur et le ressentiment montent donc chez les habitants de Boccaleone. Ils mettent en cause l'angélisme du centre gauche, qui prendrait en compte les difficultés des Roms et négligerait les leurs, et se sentent abandonnés par la Municipalité.

Si la situation s'est récemment dégradée, Bergame reste l'une des villes les plus riches et les plus tranquilles d'Italie, mais la presse locale n'est pas moins alarmiste et produit des discours d'une rare violence xénophobe. Les habitants affirment être excédés de devoir vivre dans une sorte de « Bronx méditerranéen » contrôlé par les Roms et les Albanais du camp d'accueil de la via Rovelli. Ils sont persuadés que celui-ci est devenu le foyer de la petite délinquance et les travailleurs sociaux sont effectivement embarrassés lorsqu'il s'agit de démentir l'hypothèse (entretien, 16/06/1999), même si cela ne justifie en rien les généralisations de certains journaux. Il semble parfois que seuls les faciès inhabituels suffisent à effrayer les habitants (« Tenera è la notte (se c'è la polizia) », *BergamoSette*, 10/09/1999).

Les habitants les plus radicaux sont bien évidemment ceux de l'immeuble le plus proche : « La logique voudrait que l'on organise un référendum entre les habitants. Ce n'est pas juste que celui qui a fait des sacrifices pour s'acheter un appartement le voit ensuite déprécié à cause du voisinage d'un camp de gens qui ne travaillent pas, n'apportent que des ennuis et des maladies » (« Boccaleone un coro di no : 'vogliamo il referendum' », *Il Nuovo Giornale di Bergamo*, 10/03/1998) ».

À l'entrée de la via Rovelli, se trouvent les containers destinés aux toilettes. Les Bergamasques vivent cette situation comme une offense personnelle; à Bergame comme en Suisse, l'expression de la xénophobie se focalise souvent sur les excrétions de l'autre (les étrangers sont régulièrement accusés d'uriner contre les murs). Dans la presse locale, le camp est présenté comme un « foyer d'infection » :

> Les vagues d'émigration continues et fréquentes, et partant l'installation de centaines de personnes dans des conditions de promiscuité et de difficultés matérielles, ont favorisé la résurgence de pathologies que nous avions depuis longtemps reléguées dans les replis de notre mémoire historique, lorsqu'elles étaient encore le symbole de la faim, de l'arriération et de la pauvreté qui sévissaient dans notre pays [...] Ce n'est pas un hasard si la tuberculose est réapparue en Italie en concomitance avec les flux migratoires les plus consistants, c'est-à-dire entre 1991 et 1994. [BergamoSette, 13/02/1998]

C'est ainsi que les « populations en danger » se transforment en « populations dangereuses » (Chevalier 1978).

« Nous ne sommes pas une poubelle ! » En mars 1998, la Ligue du Nord fait monter la tension en proposant d'organiser un référendum consultatif, dont le résultat ne laisse aucun doute, sur la localisation du nouveau camp tzigane de Bergame[19]. Le 9 mars, la Ligue mobilise les habitants du quartier de Boccaleone qui envahissent la salle du Conseil municipal. La présidente de la sixième circonscription conduit la rébellion des habitants, avec le soutien du Secrétaire provincial de la Ligue : « Nous ne permettrons pas que cette base arrière de voleurs soit réalisée aux frais de la communauté ! C'est pourquoi je soutiendrai le référendum que propose de réaliser la présidente de la sixième circonscription » (« Campo nomadi, presto il referendum », *Il Nuovo Giornale di Bergamo*, 13/03/1998). Ce dernier demandera ensuite dans un style très leghista que le nouveau camp soit entouré de fossés remplis de crocodiles afin d'empêcher les tziganes d'en sortir. La Commune doit faire face à une levée de boucliers : une pétition recueille déjà 1200 signatures, le maire leghista de la commune voisine s'oppose également à la construction de la structure et les ex-démocrates-chrétiens de la circonscription se désolidarisent de la majorité communale...La décision est renvoyée en raison de l'imminence des élections communales.

Les conseillers municipaux de Ligue du Nord requièrent bientôt une session spéciale sur le thème de l'ordre public en présence des autorités policières et appelle à une « mobilisation générale » contre l'administration. La présidente de la sixième circonscription célèbre la participation directe des citoyens et préconise le démantèlement du camp. Le 16 mars 1998, le Conseil communal est le lieu d'un nouveau chahut (Compte rendu de session du 16 mars 1998). Les membres de la Ligue ont de nouveau mobilisé les habitants qui sont venus en nombre assister aux délibérations : une centaine d'entre eux, massés au fond de la salle, restèrent silencieux et obséquieux, jusqu'à ce qu'on aborde la question du règlement interne du camp. Une femme s'écria alors : « Mais quel règlement de règlement ? Moi je m'en vais ! » La présidente de la sixième circonscription reprit : « Oui, allons-nous en ! » Et en se tournant vers l'assistance : « De toute façon, ici, c'est eux qui décident ! » Derrière les têtes, un panneau est apparu : « Moins de Roms. Moins d'impôts ! »; l'assistance se leva alors en masse pour crier aux membres de la majorité : « Bouffons, rentrez chez vous ! » Un esclandre s'ensuivit. D'un côté, les résidents de Boccaleone (et, précisa *L'Eco di Bergamo,* quelques personnes qui n'habitaient pas le quartier) insultaient le maire et ses conseillers. De l'autre, le secrétaire de la Ligue s'en prenait au Secrétaire communal coupable de l'avoir rappelé à l'ordre. On a hurlé de toute part jusqu'à ce que le secrétaire de la Ligue renverse dans un excès de colère la bouteille d'eau qui se trouvait sur son pupitre, et que la session soit suspendue, pour ne reprendre que quinze minutes plus tard.

Les représentants de la Ligue s'appuient ici sur les habitants excédés pour faire valoir leurs options politiques à la veille des élections. Dans toute cette affaire, la gauche est dans une posture assez inconfortable, puisque la Ligue du Nord médiatise une question qu'aucun politicien local ne voudrait voir médiatisée, car d'un point de vue électoral, les tziganes ne sont ni porteurs, ni payants. Les représentants de la Ligue « font les idiots » : ils réclament à haute voix ce que les autres s'arrangent pour faire discrètement, car dans la province, les tziganes font l'unanimité contre eux.

En s'opposant à toute mise de fonds relative à l'entretien du camp, la Ligue contribue un peu plus à sa dégradation et exacerbe les difficultés du quartier; elle a beau jeu de dénoncer ensuite le manque d'intégration des populations en question. La Commune refusera de financer le référendum sur le camp de réfugiés, et les partis de gauche attaqueront l'initiative dans un tract où la Ligue sera accusée « d'envelopper dans un manteau de volonté populaire leur position intolérante ». En mai, la sixième circonscription organisera sur ses propres fonds un référendum et finalement les élus de *Forza Italia* démantèleront le camp au lendemain de leur victoire de juin 1999.

Ces matériaux ethnographiques recueillis en 1999, où les immigrés sont explicitement assimilés à des déchets (« Nous ne sommes pas une poubelle ! »), confortent la thèse radicale que développe actuellement le sociologue anglais Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman 2004, 2007). La construction du « mur de Padoue » marque aujourd'hui l'aboutissement de ce processus d'ethnicisation du territoire qui affecte l'Italie du Nord et plus largement l'Europe occidentale. Ce mur de métal, long de quatre-vingt mètres et haut de trois, enserre depuis le mois d'août 2006 un quartier dégradé du centre de Padoue, afin d'en faciliter le contrôle par les forces de police qui surveillent jour et nuit les allées et venues des habitants (essentiellement des clandestins) depuis des *check points*. Sa construction, lancée par une administration de centre gauche, fut initialement requise par les riverains effrayés par les affrontements récurrents entre les gangs qui se disputent le contrôle du marché de la drogue. Ce mur qui a fait l'objet de débats au Parlement a été comparé dans la presse italienne, tantôt au mur de Berlin, tantôt au mur de Cisjordanie, mais il évoque plutôt les ghettos qui, dans l'histoire européenne, permettaient aux autorités de contrôler la population juive.

Conflits globalisés et paranoïas locales

Ces trois études de cas illustrent selon moi la réémergence du prepolitico dans la gestion des tensions locales relatives au processus de globalisation. Il s'agit, dans le premier cas, de reconquérir les espaces publics investis par des étrangers, dans le second, de restaurer un ordre moral menacé de toutes parts, et dans le troisième, de privilégier la résolution des difficultés autochtones, le tout pour restaurer une communauté traditionnelle largement idéalisée. La Ligue pense la territorialité en termes d'identité : communauté et territoire sont pour elle superposables et la nécessité de cette coïncidence justifie l'expulsion des étrangers. Les discours recueillis s'articulent tous autour des catégories du pur et de l'impur : est pur celui qui est à sa place, est impur celui qui transgresse les frontières définies par la nature. Le déplacement est un désordre. Ces idées relèvent du mythe et mettent en œuvre au sein de la modernité, les catégories de la « pensée sauvage » (Douglas 2001). La mixophobie de la Ligue est exigence de différence et suppose un essentialisme culturel qui nie la perfectibilité humaine. Ses représentations, qui tournent autour de la génération et s'inscrivent dans la temporalité de la reproduction, reposent sur la crainte de se voir supplanter sur « son » territoire par un groupe différent et dénotent une volonté de se retrouver dans ses descendants. En janvier 2003, le parti faisait placarder dans les rues de Bergame des affiches représentant une petite fille blonde avec ce slogan : « Faites des enfants padans ».

La Ligue du Nord offre ainsi un cadre d'expression à l'inquiétude engendrée par les bouleversements sociaux (urbanisation sauvage, disparition des réseaux de solidarité traditionnels, arrivée massive d'immigrants...), et propose des solutions simples et expéditives. Les discours préventifs qu'elle produit ravivent les craintes irrationnelles engendrées par les conflits de l'ex-Yougoslavie; ils évoquent de manière détournée les logiques de la « purification ethnique » qui ont ensanglanté le pays voisin. À la veille des élections locales, la guerre du Kosovo viendra d'ailleurs durcir les tensions. La Ligue du Nord ne manquera pas de jouer sur les imaginaires en agitant le spectre de la « substitution ethnique », et déroutera ses alliés autonomistes du Parlement européen en prenant fait et cause pour les Serbes, dépossédés de leurs territoires ancestraux par les Albanais du Kosovo. Ces derniers (à l'instar des autres autonomistes) avaient manifestement le tort d'être musulmans.

Au moment des bombardements de l'OTAN sur la Serbie et le Kosovo, les élus bergamasques de la Ligue s'enorgueillirent des opérations humanitaires menées sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie (« La solidarietà è tutta orobica », *La Padania*, 30/04/1999). La Province de Bergame et le Cesvi (Coopération et développement) ont réalisé trois camps dans le sud de l'Albanie, et envoient sur place des volontaires, des techniciens et des produits de première nécessité. Le quotidien de la Ligue interroge à ce propos le Président de la Province, un élu de la Ligue qui, par ses propos altère les présupposés de l'action de cet organisme humanitaire laïque et indépendant :

> Avant tout, nous devons mettre en avant l'activité de la Cesvi. C'est un organisme présent partout dans le monde pour venir en aide, offrir sa coopération, mais surtout favoriser le développement des populations en difficulté pour différentes raisons (catastrophes naturelles, guerres ou autres) chez elles [C'est moi qui souligne]. Il s'agit d'un soutien, et j'insiste sur ce point, qui vise à réinsérer dignement les populations dans leur pays d'appartenance et d'origine. Il décourage les grandes migrations qui dénaturent les populations qui se déplacent et celles qui subissent en grande partie ces intrusions... Avec la Cesvi (une ONG membre du *Coordinamento di organizzazione e di cooperazione allo sviluppo*), la Province de Bergame organise depuis deux semaines des opérations dans les Balkans pour aider toutes les populations qui souffrent en cette période de guerre. L'aide que nous apportons est très concrète puisqu'il ne s'agit en rien d'une aide générique (dons alimentaires ou financiers), nous y allons en personne avec des volontaires de la protection civile de la Province de Bergame, le corps de la Police provinciale et des techniciens. [« La solidarietà è tutta orobica », *La Padania*, 30/04/1999]

Les camps *Bergamo-Vrion*, *Serio-Telepene* et le centre d'accueil restructuré de *Brembo-Quafe Kashte*, financés par le programme ECHO de l'Union Européenne, se trouvaient dans la région de Valona en Albanie. Toujours selon le Président de la province, saisi par la mégalomanie humanitaire, ils étaient susceptibles d'accueillir 6000 à 7000 personnes; en attendant, la ville de Bergame est incapable d'assurer des conditions de vie décentes aux quelques réfugiés présents sur son territoire...

Orio Zaffanella et les habitants de la Malpensata se préoccupèrent beaucoup de ce conflit susceptible d'atteindre leurs arrières-cours : les Roms kosovars de la via Rovelli s'efforçaient déjà de faire venir leur famille en Italie. En avril 1999, l'association Mordilavita envisageait ainsi d'envoyer mille personnes à Belgrade pour servir de boucliers humains et tenter d'empêcher la guerre : « Nous voulons identifier le véritable problème qui a engendré cette guerre et vérifier qui sont les vraies vic-

times de ce conflit » (« In mille a Belgrado », *La Padania*, 3/04/1999). L'objectif de ces nouveaux « Mille » était de faire cesser les bombardements de l'OTAN et le nettoyage ethnique, de rouvrir les négociations afin de régler la situation du Kosovo. Les « Mille » de la Malpensata projetaient de manifester à Belgrade et même d'envoyer une délégation auprès du Président Milosevic – comme Bossi au même moment !

Détournements et glissements de sens

Les profonds bouleversements sociaux qui affectent aujourd'hui les sociétés occidentales brouillent les registres d'argumentation de la gauche et de la droite, et nourrissent un repli identitaire sur ce qui semble le plus intangible, le territoire. Le développement des discours sur les bienfaits de la proximité administrative a contribué au succès de la Ligue du Nord, qui a toujours vanté les mérites de la démocratie directe et considéré le fédéralisme comme une panacée. Les élus locaux de la Ligue prétendent que les conflits idéologiques sont désormais dépassés; contre les grands discours, ils prônent une action administrative concrète qui réponde au plus près aux besoins des habitants. Le mouvement a ainsi activement milité pour obtenir l'élection directe du maire, du président de la Province, du conseil communal et du conseil provincial (loi du 25 mars 1993, n. 81 en Suppl. ordinario de la Gazz. Uff. n. 72, du 27 mars 1993), contribuant ainsi au démantèlement de l'héritage administratif fasciste; ce n'est pas le moindre paradoxe de ce parti par ailleurs centraliste et autoritaire, mais la Ligue du Nord est un mouvement hybride, autonomiste et populiste, et les relations qu'elle entretient avec la démocratie sont pour le moins ambiguës. Pour imposer leurs vues, les représentants de la Ligue, qu'ils soient ou non dans l'opposition, invoquent sans cesse la souveraineté populaire contre les institutions. Les mobilisations d'intolérance xénophobe qu'ils orchestrent empruntent toujours des voies d'expression démocratique.

Cette stratégie fait incontestablement la force de ce parti, qui reste foncièrement non violent et relativement respectueux des procédures administratives en dépit des attaques verbales; mais ces mobilisations, bien qu'elles soient présentées comme relevant de la démocratie directe, n'en sont pas moins l'expression de pulsions (égoïsmes locaux, xénophobie, racisme, etc.) qui enfreignent les principes constitutionnels de la République. Les procédures démocratiques sont ainsi détournées afin de remettre en cause les principes qu'elles étayent. Le patriotisme micro-local se présente alors sous sa face la plus dangereuse. Lorsque l'identification territoriale devient problématique, les habitants semblent incapables de répondre positivement aux défis engendrés par les changements sociaux. La dégradation de certains quartiers périphériques engendre la dislocation du tissu social (disparition des relations de voisinage et des réseaux de solidarité) et les habitants ne savent plus lutter en créant des associations susceptibles de prendre en charge leurs revendications en matière de logement, de services publics, etc. Les mobilisations qui émergent dans de tels contextes sont exclusivement défensives et semblent exprimer une orientation politique quand bien même leur organisation est confiée à des groupes indépendants. C'est alors le rejet de l'autre qui permet au quartier de retrouver une certaine unité sociologique largement illusoire. Lorsque l'horizon de la participation locale, c'est l'exclusion, voire le lynchage, il est plus que légitime de se poser des questions sur la santé de la démocratie locale dans les périphéries des grandes agglomérations italiennes.

La stratégie de la « rétorsion » mise en œuvre par la nouvelle droite mine non seulement les discours antiracistes, mais également l'ensemble des manières de dire ou de faire de la gauche. Cette technique de subversion est d'autant plus efficace qu'elle permet aux populistes d'avancer masquées leurs assertions dérangeantes. Les trois cas que nous avons analysés illustrent parfaitement cette stratégie. À l'occasion des municipales, lorsqu'elle détourne le projet des objecteurs de conscience pour mettre en scène ses idées, la Ligue vide le mot « participation » de son sens démocratique : l' « adoption » des parcs se transforme en « réappropriation », voire en « libération » prenant ainsi une coloration raciste. Suivant la même logique, le président de l'association Mordilavita entretient la confusion entre le discours caritatif et le discours xénophobe. Cela lui permet de faire circuler ces revendications illégitimes dans l'espace public. Enfin, lorsqu'elle exploite les peurs et les ressentiments des habitants de la périphérie en recourant au référendum d'initiative populaire, la Ligue fait un usage dévié des instruments de la démocratie directe. Elle y recourt non pas tant pour résoudre des difficultés réelles que pour populariser ses options partisanes et discréditer les droits constitutionnels. Ces stratégies permettent ensuite aux hommes de la Ligue d'opérer une inversion en se présentant comme les « vrais démocrates » contre les hommes de l'*establishment* italien. Le défi que lance aujourd'hui l'extrême droite aux institutions démocratiques occidentales est nouveau dans la mesure où elle ne veut plus les abattre, comme les fascistes dans les années 1920, mais les investir pour mieux les subvertir.

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Notes

1 J'ai réalisé mes recherches ethnographiques en vue de l'obtention du doctorat de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS, Paris) en anthropologie sociale dans la Bergamasca. Située au Nord-Est de la Lombardie, cette province (population résidente de la province : 937 000 hab., chef-lieu : 115 000) est l'une des provinces italiennes les plus riches, c'est aussi le bastion électoral de la Ligue du Nord. La réalité sociale bergamasque est contrastée : cette province hyperactive est aussi l'une de celles qui ont le taux d'illettrisme le plus élevé : elle fait partie de ce « Sud du Nord » que les sociologues italiens évoquent depuis que la Ligue interroge le centre.

2 Acronyme de l'anglais « *Not In My Back Yard* » (*pas dans mon arrière-cour*), ce terme provient des États-Unis et désigne de façon péjorative le combat d'associations de riverains créées pour défendre leur environnement local, sans tenir compte de l'intérêt général.

3 Entre 1982, année de sa fondation, et 2000, quand elle s'allie à nouveau avec Silvio Berlusconi, la Ligue du Nord a beaucoup évolué. Les politologues s'accordent aujourd'hui pour distinguer deux grandes phases dans la chronologie leghista : une première phase fédéraliste de 1982 à 1994, et une seconde phase sécessionniste de 1994 à 2000 (Biorcio 1997). Dans un premier temps, la Ligue Lombarde s'affirme électoralement dans les provinces industrialisées de la périphérie de Milan, pour devenir très rapidement le parti des « classes moyennes productives » apparues dans les années 1980 à la faveur du développement des Petites et Moyennes Industries et Entreprises (PMI-PME). Premier parti du Nord en 1992 lorsque la Démocratie Chrétienne sera laminée par les révélations des magistrats du pool « Mains Propres », la classe dirigeante de la Ligue sera dépassée par son succès et se révèlera incapable de répondre aux attentes des Italiens du Nord. La victoire d'une coalition de gauche en 1996 et l'inclusion (inespérée) du pays dans l'union monétaire européenne conduiront le parti à radicaliser ses positions. Après la déclaration d'indépendance de la Padanie, le leader de la Ligue sera isolé comme un « fou dangereux », et les électeurs de droite reporteront leurs votes sur Silvio Berlusconi. L'entrepreneur milanais, sans être indépendantiste, partage en effet beaucoup des options politiques de la Ligue du Nord, et après sa victoire aux élections en 2001, il nommera ses dirigeants, dont Umberto Bossi, à la tête de trois ministères importants : les Réformes institutionnelles, la Justice et le Travail. En 2003, Umberto Bossi sera victime d'une attaque cérébrale qui l'a très sérieusement diminué : il ne sera plus le tribun qu'il a été, même s'il fait toujours l'objet d'un culte populaire impressionnant. La défaite de la nouvelle droite aux élections politiques d'avril 2006 et le « non » au référendum sur la réforme de la Constitution promue par les leghisti en juin de la même année sanctionne définitivement le déclin politique de la Ligue du Nord.

4 Adjectif italien relatif au nom du parti de la Ligue du Nord.

5 François Guichardin (1482-1540), historien florentin, plus modéré que son contemporain Nicolas Machiavel, était favorable aux oligarchies citadines et au *statu quo* politique. Il est l'auteur d'une critique de la méthode de pensée machiavélienne traduite depuis peu en français.

6 La Démocratie Chrétienne, loin de condamner l'esprit de clocher, l'a savamment cultivé en défendant avec constance le principe de subsidiarité contre la forme administrative centralisatrice prise par la République italienne.

7 Le néo-guelfisme fut théorisé par Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852), ce prêtre patriote était favorable à la création d'un État italien fédéré autour du pape. Ce courant du nationalisme italien faisait référence aux péripéties de la querelle des Investitures (1075-1122). Au Moyen Âge, les guelfes, partisans de l'Empereur Henri IV, se sont affrontés au sujet de la collation des titres ecclésiastiques. Le pape cherchait à affaiblir le pouvoir temporel en s'appuyant sur les marchands qui avaient investi les assemblées communales, tandis que l'empereur s'appuyait sur l'aristocratie afin de rétablir l'ordre sur ses domaines, l'un et l'autre cherchant à établir sa suprématie (Dematteo, 2001).

8 Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869) savant bergamasque, plusieurs fois condamné par la censure autrichienne et menacé de déportation. Il était partisan d'une graduelle autonomie politique dans le cadre de l'Empire austro-hongrois, la Lombardie-Vénétie serait ensuite venue rejoindre une fédération indépendante des peuples italiens qui aurait préfiguré des États Unis d'Europe sur le modèle de la confédération helvétique. Également homme d'action, Cattaneo fut en 1848 le leader des « Cinq Journées » de Milan : il tint tête à Radetzky et fit preuve d'une grande sagacité politique. Conseiller de Garibaldi, il tenta d'imposer en vain le principe fédéraliste contre celui de l'annexion. Républicain, il refusa lorsqu'il fut élu, d'entrer au Parlement pour ne pas avoir à prêter serment au roi. Déçu par les suites de l'unification italienne, il alla finir ses jours en Suisse.

9 Dans les années 1980, la Ligue du Nord se fera connaître en s'élevant contre l'emprisonnement au Nord des chefs de clan sous prétexte de protéger les communautés septentrionales de la « contamination mafieuse ».

10 Gianfranco Miglio (1918-2001) était professeur de science politique à l'Université Catholique du Sacré Cœur de Milan. Figure marginale de la Démocratie Chrétienne, il se fera dès la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le paladin de l'autonomisme nordiste. Durant toutes ces années, il nourrira une réflexion sur le fédéralisme et restera en contact avec les groupuscules autonomistes. Elu sénateur sous l'étiquette leghista en 1992, à l'âge de 74 ans, bientôt surnommé le « *Grande Vecchio* » de la Ligue, ce professeur qui apparaissait déjà comme un « vieil original » jouera les ultra-leghisti sécessionnistes. Ses déclarations provocatrices finiront par impatienter Bossi, et en 1994, il sera définitivement écarté.

11 Aujourd'hui, dans cette vallée, 71 % des maisons sont inhabitées, car elles appartiennent aux émigrés (*L'Eco di Bergamo*, 13/06/1999).

12 Signalons l'ouvrage du célèbre journaliste italien Giorgio Bocca paru en 2002 chez Rizzoli, *L'Orda d'oro. Quando gli Albanesi eravamo noi* [La Ruée vers l'or. Quand les Albanais, c'était nous] qui réactive, photos à l'appui, ce qu'on appelle la « légende noire de l'émigration italienne », c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des représentations faisant de l'expatriation, une chimère, un chemin de souffrance et de perdition, une véritable malédiction.

13 Par souci de transparence, les journaux locaux de Bergame publient la liste des familles retenues par les services publics, tandis que la Ligue du Nord souhaiterait qu'une préférence locale soit juridiquement entérinée.

14 Le terme *marocchino* désigne en italien tous les ressortissants du continent africain.

15 Les camps de rétention dont l'Europe est aujourd'hui parsemée sont, au-delà de leur iniquité, des dispositifs administratifs aussi complexes qu'inutiles dont la fonction principale est de rassurer une opinion publique alertée par des semeurs de haine.

16 Le vieillissement de la population citadine n'est pas étranger à la montée du sentiment d'insécurité. La population de la cité est plus âgée que celle de la province qui est déjà plus âgée que la moyenne de la population nationale (21,5 % de la population bergamasque était âgée de plus de 65 ans au 1er janvier 2000).

17 Le 20 juillet 2000, les commerçants de la ville de Bergame se mobilisèrent afin que des licences commerciales ne puissent être délivrées aux étrangers [*BergamoSette*].

18 85 entretiens directifs ont été réalisés à cet effet.

19 Le référendum consultatif tel qu'il est défini à l'article 6 (alinéa 3) de la loi constitutionnelle 142/90 est une institution typique de la démocratie directe. C'est une forme de participation populaire optionnelle à travers laquelle les citoyens ont la possibilité d'exprimer leurs opinions sur les programmes, les interventions ainsi que le fonctionnement de l'administration locale. C'est le Statut communal qui définit les titulaires du pouvoir d'initiative (loi du 29 mars 1903 n°103). L'objet du référendum relève exclusivement des compétences locales. La loi ne se prononce pas sur les éventuels blocages que génèrent ces initiatives référendaires. C'est une pression de fait sur les organes gouvernementaux des institutions locales.

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Ethnicisation des places publiques en Roumanie. Le cas de la ville de Cluj-Napoca

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Résumé : Après la chute du régime communiste en 1989, les espaces publics de Cluj-Napoca, ville multiethnique et multireligieuse du centre-ouest de la Roumanie, ont subi une série d'interventions de roumanisation. En prenant comme objet d'étude les places publiques centrales de la ville, l'article montre comment la roumanisation de celles-ci relève d'un processus de reformulation de la hiérarchie sociale, d'émergence de nouvelles catégories sociales et d'instances de débat public. Les disputes et les conflits que les places publiques ont provoqués ont mis en évidence de nouveaux enjeux sociaux de même que les groupes, qui en ont fait la promotion, leurs discours et leurs actions.

Mots clés : place publique, post-communisme, Roumanie, ethnicité, nationalisme, classification sociale

Abstract: Since the collapse of the communist regime (1989), the public spaces of Cluj-Napoca, a multiethnic and multireligious city of mid-western Romania, have become the stage of multiple interventions whose purpose was to produce an ethnic transformation with a Romanian character. These public spaces—central squares—represent the object of my research. The intention of the article is to demonstrate how the central squares' Romanianization conceals the reformulation process of a social hierarchy and the emergence of new social categories and different instances of public debate. The disputes and the conflicts determined by the authorities' ethnic interventions revealed the new social stakes and the discourses and actions of different groups.

Keywords: public square, post-communism, Romania, ethnicity, nationalism, social classification

Introduction

Pendant plus de douze ans, Cluj-Napoca, ville du centre-ouest de la Roumanie, a donné l'impression d'être en perpétuelle fête nationale. Dès que l'on entrait dans cette ville, capitale symbolique de la Transylvanie, on remarquait que les principaux boulevards et les places publiques étaient bordés de nombreux drapeaux nationaux et que des plaines de jeux, des grilles et des poubelles arboraient les couleurs du drapeau roumain. L'abondance de ces signes à caractère identitaire roumain s'était en effet imposée depuis 1992 dans l'aménagement de cette ville traditionnellement multiethnique et multireligieuse. Mais comment expliquer leur apparition dans une ville qui, depuis plus de cinq décennies, est habitée par une population roumaine qui domine du point de vue démographique? En effet, presque 80 % de la population de la ville se déclarant roumaine en 2002 lors du recensement (Prefectura Cluj 2004). De plus, pourquoi ces signes se manifestent-t-ils à ce moment?

Selon une vision stéréotypée, la réalité esquissée ici pourrait être l'illustration d'un espace typique de l'Europe de l'Est, c'est-à-dire d'une région où les passions nationalistes d'antan nourrissent facilement des conflits ethniques d'aujourd'hui. Il s'agira dans cet article de porter un regard critique sur ce lieu commun, et de montrer que dans le cas de Cluj-Napoca, l'ethnicisation des places publiques, en l'occurrence, de la Place de l'Union et de la Place Avram Iancu, ne relève pas d'une exacerbation des conflits ethniques, mais d'un processus de reformulation de la hiérarchie sociale, d'émergence de nouvelles catégories sociales et d'instances de débat public. J'entends par « ethnicisation », l'étalage du drapeau roumain, les célébrations publiques des événements importants dans l'histoire des Roumains, l'édification de statues et de monuments dédiés à des personnages historiques roumains. Il s'agit-là de marques ou d'actions qui expriment une volonté de prouver que les Roumains vivent à Cluj-Napoca depuis longtemps et que la ville est aujourd'hui

roumaine. Telle que définie par Barth (1995), l'ethnicité est une forme d'organisation sociale construite à partir d'un processus d'attribution catégoriale dans le cadre duquel on classe les personnes en fonction de leur origine supposée. L'ethnicité est validée et exprimée dans les interactions sociales, toutes les ressources utiles étant mobilisées (Poutignat et Streiff-Fenart 1995). Je vais démontrer qu'à travers ces marques à caractère ethnique (c'est à dire roumain), un processus continu de dichotomisation entre Nous et les Autres, entre les *insiders* et les *outsiders*, est « mis en scène » – processus ayant les valences d'une restructuration sociale qualifiée ici d'«ethnicité».

Après avoir présenté des aspects théoriques de l'étude concernant la place publique comme un lieu privilégié d'observation de l'instauration des nouveaux rapports sociaux, j'exposerai les étapes importantes de l'urbanisation de Cluj-Napoca et de la construction de ses places publiques centrales afin de mieux saisir leur importance actuelle. Sur la base de données recueillies sur le terrain[1], je m'attarderai sur les « inscriptions » ethniques des Places Avram Iancu et de l'Union, en mettant en évidence les interventions urbaines réalisées après 1989, qui ont suscité des contestations, voire même alimenté des conflits publics. Je continuerai en analysant les significations de cette ethnicisation spatiale, en l'occurrence, l'émergence de nouveaux critères de catégorisation sociale. En conclusion, je reviendrai sur la thèse que je propose, à savoir qu'à Cluj-Napoca après 1989 la mise en place de la « roumanité » coïncide avec la restructuration sociale plutôt qu'elle ne résulte de l'exacerbation de conflits ethniques.

La place publique, reflet et médiateur des processus sociaux

Les processus d'aménagement et ré-aménagement, de spatialisation et de dé-spatialisation, articulés aux rapports sociaux, ont contribué, ces dernières années, au renouvellement des problématiques en sciences sociales. La perspective théorique dans laquelle se situe ma démarche participe de ce questionnement. Il s'agit d'analyser les phénomènes socio-spatiaux à partir des constructions discursives élaborées par les différents groupes engagés dans la production de l'espace. Selon Gille et Ó Rian, certains, comme Giddens, considèrent les relations sociales contemporaines comme étant « dés-enchâssées du local », d'autres, tel Albrow, comme étant « dés-enchâssées de l'espace » et d'autres encore, comme Hannerz, les considèrent comme des « réseaux de réseaux » (Gille et Ó Rian 2002). D'autres auteurs (Barthez 2001; Corcoran 2002; Hammouche 2001) mettent en évidence un certain ancrage spatial, sinon un fort attachement matériel de ces relations. À l'instar de Lefebvre (1974), Castels (1983), Gregory et Urry (1985) ainsi que Low (2000), les formes spatiales sont considérées ici comme constituant un reflet des organisations sociales, mais aussi comme un médiateur participant à leur production et reproduction.

L'étude des configurations spatiales et des mécanismes qui les produisent, nous donne donc un accès privilégié à la dynamique sociale, ainsi qu'aux significations qui lui sont attribuées. Dans ce cadre, les places publiques sont des productions qui relèvent à la fois d'un agencement systémique – une configuration sociale, politique et économique spécifique – et d'investissements subjectifs mobilisés soit par des individus, soit par des groupes ou des communautés. Selon Sénécal, Entrekin et Berdoulay définissent la place publique comme un lieu spécifique : « Le sens des places (...) contient à la fois des traces identitaires, culturelles et vécues. La place publique permet au sujet de connaître une expérience collective, si tant est que le concept d'espace public soit porteur d'une approche sociale et de la ville » (Sénécal 2002:53). En tant que lieu spécifique, la place publique n'est pas seulement un espace qui possède une forme physique particulière, elle est aussi l'endroit où se déroulent des processus sociaux par lesquels les formes matérielles sont désignées, construites, utilisées ou discutées par différents groupes (Gieryn 2000). Dès lors, elle apparaît comme le produit des processus de dénomination, d'identification et de représentation qui sont menés par les « gens ordinaires » (Gieryn 2000). En tant qu'espace public, la place urbaine est le produit des acteurs et le résultat de processus sociaux auxquels ils participent. Il s'agit d'individus, de groupes, d'organisations qui, à travers leurs actions, influencent d'une manière ou d'une autre leur milieu de vie. Chez Castells (1983), Mitchell (1995) ou Nieto et Franze (1997), l'espace public – qu'il s'agisse des places publiques ou des parcs – est vu comme le résultat des luttes symboliques ou réelles entre les adeptes d'un espace public idéal – caractérisé par un maximum d'ouverture, physique et sociale – et les adeptes d'un espace public contrôlé qui soit le reflet d'une certaine organisation politique et sociale : « Public space is the product of competing ideas about what constitutes that space-order and control free, and perhaps dangerous, interaction – and who constitutes 'the public' » (Mitchell 1995:115).

Augustin (2000) définit l'espace public comme le lieu privilégié d'interactions sociales, qui favorise un vécu commun et une mémoire collective, comme l'espace de la rencontre, de la coprésence, des différences visibles, de la citoyenneté (Augustin 2000). Pour Germain (2002) et Sénécal (2002), les places publiques sont des lieux où se jouent les questions sociales importantes, où sont révélées les

tensions (in)visibles qui marquent les micro-territoires de la ville. Enfin, les études sur la matérialité de l'espace public permettent d'explorer les voies multiples irriguant le langage en filigrane, comme le souligne Hodder (2000).

Symboles de la vie politique démocratique, lieux d'expression du (des) pouvoir(s) politiques, économiques, religieux ou encore, éléments centraux de l'aménagement urbain, les places publiques sont des portes d'entrée privilégiées de l'étude des sociétés post-communistes. Les changements politiques, économiques et sociaux survenus ont engendré des transformations des rapports sociaux à l'espace public, y compris la place publique. On peut parler de tentatives de ré-aménagement allant de pair avec des significations inédites attribuées aux espaces publics, qui accompagnent les changements politiques en cours.

En Europe de l'Est après 1989, la ville s'est bâtie à l'image des processus sociaux et politiques qui ont suivi l'effondrement des régimes communistes. Les nouvelles conceptions du pouvoir ont trouvé à se légitimer dans une dynamique sociale que certains ont associé à la re-territorialisation ou à la création des nouvelles représentations du lieu (Young et Lights 2001). Les grands projets d'urbanisation ont été abandonnés, et la ville a été transformée par une requalification de l'espace urbain, grâce au renforcement des symboles nationalistes (Andrusz 1996) ou à l'apparition de nouveaux signes, en particulier marchands (Bodnar 2001). La chute des régimes communistes a permis l'ouverture de la place publique, de sorte qu'on assiste depuis à des « prises de possession » de celle-ci plus ou moins chaotiques, individualisées ou collectives, consensuelles ou conflictuelles.

Cluj-Napoca et ses places publiques centrales : Esquisse historique

Une courte esquisse historique mettra en lumière les enjeux politiques et sociaux de l'aménagement de la ville de Cluj-Napoca. Le premier noyau de la ville a été fondé sur les ruines du castrum romain *Napocense*[2] (Niedermaier 1979; Gutkind 1972), par les colons saxons de Rhin et Moselle, amenés en Transylvanie autour du XI^e^ siècle par le roi de Hongrie Géza II, afin de défendre les nouvelles frontières de l'empire. La cité construite, *Klausenburg*[3], gardera pendant quelques siècles les caractéristiques de l'organisation territoriale saxonne : de grands lotissements systématiques et une place devenue centrale, non par un projet urbanistique, mais grâce aux activités qui s'y déroulaient – religieuses au début, économiques, politiques, juridiques et sociales plus tard (Niedermaier 1979). Au fur et à mesure que la ville devenait un important centre économique, politique et religieux pour la région, les Hongrois ont été acceptés en tant que citoyens et, au milieu du XVI^e^ siècle, ils accèdent aux postes décisionnels de la ville aux côtés des Saxons. Comme toute la Transylvanie, la ville sera marquée par les vagues d'immigration et les luttes religieuses européennes (le catholicisme, la Réforme, la Contre-réforme) qui divisent principalement les Saxons, de moins en moins nombreux, et les Hongrois, dont la puissance numérique, mais aussi politique et économique, va croissant. Orthodoxes, les Roumains ne seront pas au centre de ces guerres religieuses et politiques. La ville sera assiégée plusieurs fois par les paysans et la noblesse des villages voisins, surtout des Roumains, mais aussi des Hongrois, qui demandent l'égalité sur le plan des droits économiques et politiques. En 1700, avec le soutien des Autrichiens catholiques qui essayaient de consolider leurs positions en Transylvanie contre les Hongrois – la plupart d'entre eux étant des uniates ou des réformés –, une partie des Roumains transylvains deviennent gréco-catholiques[4]. La création du gréco-catholicisme (qui permet le rituel orthodoxe, mais exige un rapprochement institutionnel du Vatican), avait permis aux « peuples minoritaires » de l'empire austro-hongrois, tels que les Roumains, d'acquérir plus de droits civiques, l'égalité avec les Hongrois et les Saxons, et de progresser dans la hiérarchie sociale de l'Empire austro-hongrois[5]. Ce sont les Roumains gréco-catholiques qui entreront parmi les premiers dans la ville. Grâce à Joseph II, l'accès à la ville deviendra libre pour tous, Roumains ou non – notamment les Juifs – vers la fin du XVIII^e^ siècle.

En 1910, la population de la ville était composée de 83,38 % de Hongrois, 2,75 % de Saxons et 12,44 % de Roumains (Rotariu 1999). La ville aura une administration principalement hongroise jusqu'en 1918, moment où l'Empire austro-hongrois est démantelé et où la Transylvanie est réintégrée à la Roumanie par plébiscite populaire. De 1918 à 1940, quand le nord de la Transylvanie est cédé à la Hongrie par le traité Ribbentrop-Molotov (connu également sous le nom de Diktat de Vienne), la ville a une administration roumaine, avant que le régime fasciste de l'amiral Horthy ne s'installe à Cluj-Napoca de 1940 à 1944. En 1944, la Roumanie reprend une partie des territoires qu'elle a perdus durant la guerre. Malgré la politique explicite de roumanisation menée par l'État roumain entre 1918-1940 et la magyarisation menée par les autorités horthystes entre 1940 et 1944[6], Cluj-Napoca reste, à la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, une mosaïque ethnique et religieuse, formée par une majorité hongroise catholique, évangéliste et uniate, une importante minorité roumaine principalement gréco-catholique, mais aussi orthodoxe, des minorités saxonne et juive dont les effectifs allaient en diminuant. Ainsi, en 1930, la population de

la ville était composée de 47,3 % de Hongrois, 34,6 % de Roumains, 13,0 % de Juifs, 2,5 % de Saxons et 1 % de Tsiganes (Comisia națională pentru statistică 1994).

Le centre actuel de la ville a été aménagé principalement au XIX[e] siècle. Les anciennes murailles de défense furent démolies et la place centrale, l'actuelle place de l'Union, centre religieux, économique, politique et social de la grande cité médiévale, subit la plus importante reconfiguration urbanistique de son histoire, avec le déplacement vers les rues latérales des boutiques et des ateliers entourant l'église Saint-Michel[7] et le pavement de la place. Ses alentours furent également réhabilités, et de nouveaux édifices, tant publics que privés, apparurent. En 1902, le paysage de la place est transformé de manière significative par l'érection d'un monument dédié à Mathyas de Corvin, roi de Hongrie (1458-1490); celui-ci est devenu l'un des plus importants symboles de la nation hongroise et il ne sera jamais plus modifié par la suite. Au même moment, le plan d'urbanisme propose de réaménager l'ancienne Foire au bois de la ville, aujourd'hui Place Avram Iancu, située à quelques centaines de mètres, et on y construit le théâtre (où on jouait en hongrois) et le palais EMKE (qui sera vendu à la société hongroise de chemins de fer). Après 1918, cette place est transformée pour devenir le « pendant roumain » de la Place centrale : une cathédrale orthodoxe[8] est construite en son centre, des bâtiments abritant les nouvelles institutions étatiques de la Transylvanie sont érigés sur ses marges (la direction des Postes, le Palais de justice et le Cercle militaire), le Théâtre devient le Théâtre National (en langue roumaine) et le siège de la société hongroise de chemins de fer devient le siège de la société roumaine de chemins de fer[9].

Mais la ville va profondément changer à partir des années 1970. C'est en effet à cette époque que les autorités décident de s'engager dans la construction d'un combinat d'outillage lourd, une grosse unité industrielle employant des dizaines de milliers de personnes, dont l'installation aura des effets à long terme sur les plans démographique, urbanistique, économique et politique. Avec cette arrivée massive de main-d'œuvre, la ville connaît une explosion démographique[10] sans précédent, et de nouveaux quartiers sont construits, provoquant au cours des années 1980 un phénomène spécifique, appelé depuis d'« entassement », à la suite de la construction d'immeubles d'habitation sur les espaces restés vacants au cœur même de quartiers déjà aménagés. S'il s'agissait certes d'accueillir et de loger une population nombreuse, les ambitions personnelles de responsables locaux doivent également être prises en considération; ceux-ci sont en effet engagés dans les compétitions nationales annuelles de construction d'appartements.

Le centre-ville et ses places publiques seront plus ou moins abandonnés, malgré le fait qu'ils demeuraient le lieu où étaient concentrées les institutions politiques et administratives importantes. La migration interne, de même que l'émigration des Juifs en Israël et celle des Saxons en Allemagne (et ce à partir des années 1970), ont transformé les rapports démographiques et ethniques de la ville. Ainsi, au moment du recensement de 2002, sur une population de 317 953 habitants, 79,3 % se définissaient comme roumains, 18,95 % comme hongrois et 1,75 % comme appartenant aux autres minorités nationales (juive, saxonne, rom (tsigane), etc.).

À Cluj-Napoca, en dépit de l'industrialisation et de l'urbanisation intenses, l'ancienne place centrale, actuelle place de l'Union (et place de la Liberté avant 1989), est demeurée le lieu central de la ville. C'est ici qu'en décembre 1989 se sont affrontés les opposants au régime communiste et les forces de l'armée. En outre, entre 1990 et 1998, l'Église gréco-catholique[11] a organisé des messes les dimanches et les jours de fête devant le monument de Mathyas de Corvin. Après avoir vu leur Église interdite pendant plus de quarante ans, les gréco-catholiques, toujours en conflit avec l'Église orthodoxe qui refusait toute concession sur le plan du patrimoine, avaient trouvé là le seul endroit pour leurs manifestations religieuses. Pendant les années 1990, la place de l'Union est demeurée un endroit de rendez-vous, de repos et de passage, ainsi qu'un lieu incontournable pour les touristes, notamment hongrois, et pour les jeunes mariés qui s'y font photographier. C'est enfin un « endroit d'occupation illégale à titre de lieu de résidence » pour les quelques enfants qui font la manche et pour les sans-abri. Les bars et les terrasses y abondent, tout comme les kiosques à journaux, les places de stationnement et les stations de taxi et de bus pour la Hongrie. Mais on y voit aussi une publicité souvent agressive et occupant de plus en plus d'espace.

La place Avram Iancu[12], baptisée ainsi en 1993, (place de la Victoire avant cette date), est devenue un lieu de grandes rencontres. C'est ici que sont organisés les rassemblements populaires du 1[er] décembre, jour de la fête nationale roumaine, du Jour de l'An, et que sont fêtés de façon informelle les succès de l'équipe nationale de football et les victoires électorales. C'est également un lieu propice à la pratique du roller et à la tenue d'événements promotionnels comme des concerts. Enfin, le dimanche, les messes qui se déroulent dans la cathédrale orthodoxe sont retransmises à l'extérieur à l'aide de haut-parleurs.

Ethnicisation et imposition de la définition nationaliste des places publiques centrales

Interventions urbaines à caractère ethnique

Pendant douze ans, plusieurs signes identitaires ont été disséminés sur les places publiques de Cluj-Napoca afin de souligner certains aspects de l'histoire nationale roumaine et d'affirmer ainsi la présence majoritaire des Roumains. Les interventions des autorités ont été dirigées en priorité vers des espaces déjà aménagés. La période à laquelle je m'intéresse ici (février 1992 et juillet 2004) est celle pendant laquelle Gheorghe Funar[13] fut maire. Les interventions autorisées à l'époque par G. Funar ont plutôt été d'ordre symbolique, car d'une part, le maire n'a eu qu'un soutien tacite de la part des autorités centrales[14] et d'autre part, le nouveau plan général d'urbanisme de la ville n'a été finalisé qu'au début des années 2000. Si les marques de « roumanisation » étaient présentes dans tous les espaces publics de la ville, les deux places centrales illustrent le mieux ce phénomène : la place Avram Iancu est devenue de plus en plus roumaine, tandis que la place de l'Union a fait l'objet d'un « effacement symbolique » destiné à minimiser, voire à faire disparaître les signes non-roumains. Chacune d'elles représente une facette du même tableau de l'ethnicisation : la première, à travers une forte affirmation de la roumanité, la deuxième, par une forte négation de la magyarité. Je vais présenter d'une manière succincte la situation issue des initiatives qui ont concerné la Place Avram Iancu et la Place de l'Union. Je vais développer par la suite un événement, – il s'agit de l'ouverture du chantier archéologique – qui « synthétise » d'une manière éloquente les conflits autours de l'aménagement de l'espace public central et les arguments qui ont prévalu.

Au début des années 1990, la place Avram Iancu faisait étrange figure : en son milieu, entourés des bâtiments du XIX^{e} siècle, devant et derrière la grande cathédrale orthodoxe, on trouvait deux monuments soviétiques : l'obélisque « Étoile rouge » et le « Char d'assaut ». Après le renversement du régime communiste en 1989, la destruction ou du moins le remplacement de ces monuments par d'autres, plus adéquats, allait de soi. C'est ainsi que furent construites les statues d'Avram Iancu (1993) et « Gloire au soldat roumain » (1996). L'érection de cette dernière doit être vue comme l'expression, jugée absolument nécessaire, de la reconnaissance à l'égard de l'armée roumaine, tandis que celle de la statue d'Avram Iancu relève davantage d'une obligation, dans la mesure où elle aurait dû avoir lieu avant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, si les événements historiques l'avaient permis. Les membres du Parti de l'Union Nationale de Roumanie (PUNR) ont dominé les débats au sein du jury responsable de la sélection du projet pour la statue d'Avram Iancu, à tel point que les spécialistes d'art et d'architecture se sont sentis manipulés par les autorités, puisque par leur présence, ils ne faisaient que légitimer une décision prise à l'avance. L'importance politique de l'érection de cette statue a relégué au second plan les préoccupations esthétiques; comme le dit un habitant de Cluj-Napoca : « On avait besoin d'une statue dédiée à Avram Iancu à Cluj; si on avait attendu un beau projet, on aurait risqué de ne jamais le faire » (P.R.)[15]. D'un point de vue esthétique, la plupart des habitants n'apprécient d'ailleurs pas ces monuments, respectivement surnommés « Blanche-Neige et les sept nains » et « le Nain ». Certains sont ironiques en déclarant que si l'on a construit un piédestal aussi grand et disproportionné, c'est afin qu'Avram Iancu puisse voir ce que fait Mathyas de Corvin sur la place de l'Union (Mitrea 1994). Un étudiant me disait que « si la base du monument avait été plus grande, plus accessible et si l'on avait pu y grimper comme c'est le cas avec celle de Mathyas de Corvin, alors la place serait devenue le centre de la ville » (C.S.). La surcharge symbolique du personnage historique d'Avram Iancu a contribué à l'époque, et encore aujourd'hui, à rendre illégitime toute contestation publique, y compris de la statue elle-même; comme me le relatait un retraité « il est très difficile de la remplacer ou de la modifier, parce qu'on risque d'être accusés de ne pas être de bons Roumains » (P.R). En ce qui concerne la place en tant que telle, les habitants estimaient, quand je les ai interrogés à ce sujet, que la place Avram Iancu « est mieux aménagée que la place Mathyas de Corvin[16], elle est plus propre. Il y a du béton et des espaces verts où on n'a pas le droit d'aller, bien que ce lieu soit laid » (M.S.). Tous les événements, cérémonies militaires et commémorations, organisés à l'époque par la mairie s'y déroulent, et la plupart des gens qui s'y rendent sont « les siens », c'est-à-dire des nouveaux venus dans la ville et des retraités.

D'ailleurs, ces derniers sont enthousiasmés par l'aménagement de la place : « Ah que c'est beau ! J'avais entendu que c'était beau, mais je n'imaginais pas que cela l'était à ce point. » (K.M.). Pour eux, comme pour tous les autres, il va de soi que c'est la « place de Funar », l'« apanage de Funar » (L.P.). Admiratifs ou dépréciatifs, les commentaires des habitants exprimaient leur conviction que la place appartenait au maire, au sens où elle reflétait tout ce qu'il signifiait : la roumanité, l'esprit national, l'histoire sociale des Roumains transylvains, etc. Qu'on aime ou qu'on n'aime pas les interventions effectuées dans/sur la place, on était d'accord pour dire que les autorités faisaient des efforts considérables pour la transformer en

l'image de la ville : propre, régularisée, destinée aux activités représentatives organisées par la mairie et les associations agréées par celle-ci.

Si le réaménagement de la place Avram Iancu symbolisait le remboursement d'une « dette historique », dans le cas de la place de l'Union, les interventions ont davantage été de l'ordre de l'« ajustement historique », qui visait à minimiser l'importance visuelle et donc le rôle historique des Hongrois. Plusieurs décisions municipales ont donné lieu à une série de controverses. Ainsi, la mairie a fait rajouter sur le monument de Mathyas de Corvin une plaque avec une citation de Nicolae Iorga[17] rappelant l'origine roumaine du plus important héros des Hongrois, que seuls les Roumains ont réussi à vaincre. D'ailleurs cette inscription avait été ajoutée une première fois sur le monument dans les années 1920 à l'initiative de Nicolae Iorga lui-même, qui voulait ainsi redresser une erreur historique incarnée par le monument : le capitaine moldave qu'on y voit ne pouvait pas soumettre son drapeau au roi Mathyas de Corvin, puisqu'il avait gagné la bataille. La phrase correctrice est restée jusqu'à l'arrivée du régime de l'amiral Horthy. L'initiative du maire Funar et de ses partisans dans les années 1990 visait donc à renouer avec un passé considéré comme remarquable. Il s'agissait en même temps de rappeler les significations du contexte original de son emplacement : l'union de la Transylvanie avec la Roumanie et, indirectement, la re-consécration des Roumains en tant que maîtres de la ville. Cette initiative a suscité de nombreuses protestations de la part de l'Union Démocratique des Hongrois de Roumanie (UDMR), des associations hongroises et de simples habitants, mais l'inscription n'a pas été supprimée.

D'autres interventions ont eu lieu, qui n'ont toutefois pas autant alimenté les passions civiques (ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'il n'y a pas eu de protestations de la part de partis d'opposition ou de spécialistes) comme par exemple, le fait d'avoir peint en rouge, jaune et bleu les bancs de la place. De même, une dizaine de drapeaux nationaux et de l'Union européenne furent installés derrière le monument de Mathyas de Corvin et devant le square de la place Avram Iancu vers la fin de 1993 et le début de 1994. Quelques années plus tard, en 2000, des toilettes écologiques, qui n'ont pas fonctionné très longtemps, étaient placées devant le monument. Une des dernières actions importantes a été l'installation d'un bloc en pierre annonçant la construction du symbole le plus représentatif des origines du peuple roumain, une copie grandeur nature de la colonne de Trajan[18] à Rome. Pour marquer l'importance de l'événement, le maire, des politiciens issus des partis qui le soutiennent et des prêtres participèrent à la cérémonie. Les efforts de roumanisation de la Place Avram Iancu à travers des marques matérielles ont cessé avec l'installation en 1994 des drapeaux roumains devant le monument.

À la découverte incessante du passé

Toutefois, c'est l'ouverture du chantier archéologique dans le square situé devant le monument de Mathyas de Corvin qui a été un des plus forts gestes politiques visant à marquer ethniquement la ville; celui-ci a mobilisé pendant plusieurs semaines, à l'été 1994, les politiciens, tant roumains que hongrois, tant sur le plan local que national, qu'ils aient été au pouvoir ou dans l'opposition. Il est important ici de prendre en compte non seulement l'intervention sur/dans l'espace, mais également les décisions prises, les arguments qui les ont soutenues, et les institutions en cause. Ce qui au début semblait être une activité de routine menée par le Musée national d'histoire de la Transylvanie[19] est devenu un conflit impliquant les autorités locales, régionales et nationales ainsi que les politiciens et les habitants de la ville. Selon le directeur de l'époque du Musée, fortement soutenu par le maire et les conseillers municipaux, l'objectif officiel était la recherche archéologique, notamment des vestiges du Forum du municipe roman de *Napoca*, sous l'actuelle place de l'Union. Les arguments présentés par ceux qui soutenaient l'intervention mettaient en avant la légitimité de la recherche historique et archéologique, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le « passé historique millénaire » évoqué par les responsables du Parti Démocrate (PD) (Adevărul de Cluj 1994c). Ils défendaient aussi l'idée selon laquelle « le centre de la ville n'est pas seulement constitué de la statue de Mathyas de Corvin et de l'église Saint-Michel, mais le sera aussi par les éventuelles découvertes de sites daces ou romains » (Chioreanu 1994 : 5). On pensait alors transformer la place de l'Union en y aménageant un parc archéologique en plein air – qui serait un cadre historique imprégné de preuves matérielles de la civilisation roumaine – où pourrait être installée la statue de Lupa Capitolina, symbole de la latinité du peuple roumain, offert en 1921 par la mairie de Rome. Ainsi, la place de l'Union ne deviendrait pas simplement un espace exposant des vestiges romains ou symbolisant la cohabitation des Hongrois et des Roumains, mais la preuve que cette société s'était constituée du temps des Daces et des Romains, c'est-à-dire avant la venue des Hongrois.

Il s'agissait donc de repérer des preuves matérielles pouvant illustrer d'une manière irrévocable la continuité de la population daco-romaine sur ce territoire, après le départ des Romains. Partout en Europe de l'Est, les origines, la primauté de l'occupation d'un espace, et l'habitation sur une longue période d'un espace ont été des stra-

tégies d'affirmation ethnique en vue de construire la nation. Les Hongrois tout comme les Roumains ne font pas exception. Sur l'« après retraite romaine » de la Dacie, l'insuffisance de preuves archéologiques a favorisé un débat à portée identitaire sur la « continuité de la vie » sur ces territoires. Depuis presque deux cents ans, le retrait des Romains n'aurait pas signifié le départ de tous les habitants. C'est du moins le point de vue de la plupart des historiens roumains, pour qui les Daco-Romains seraient demeurés sur place. Au contraire, du point de vue de la plupart des historiens hongrois, personne n'est resté et les premiers habitants à s'installer à nouveau sur ces territoires, vers le X^e siècle, auraient été les Hongrois. Pour les Hongrois, qui ont gouverné la Transylvanie jusqu'en 1918 et le nord de la province entre 1940 et 1944, être les premiers venus leur donnait le droit de refuser aux Roumains l'égalité du point de vue ethnique et linguistique (Schöpflin 1998/1999). Pour les Roumains, qui ont gouverné entre les deux guerres mondiales et après la deuxième, c'était l'arrivée tardive des Hongrois, après l'installation des Daces et Romains, qui justifiait le refus de leurs droits (Schöpflin 1998/1999). Aucune de ces positions ne peut pas être contestée, car les deux sont élaborées à partir du « mythe de l'intégration et du sacre qui lie un groupe à son territoire » (Schöpflin 1998/1999:76). Ces enjeux apparaissent essentiels pour tous; comme le dit Boia, toujours recourir au passé est révélateur d'un présent problématique (2002). Le débat n'est pas clos et ne le sera pas tant que les enjeux identitaires nationaux seront d'actualité.

Dans ce contexte, on comprend bien la force des réactions des représentants de l'Union Démocratique des Hongrois de Roumanie (UDMR). Pour eux, ces fouilles archéologiques étaient un prétexte utilisé par l'administration locale, dominée par les nationalistes roumains, pour déplacer le monument de Mathyas de Corvin à un endroit où il perdrait sa portée identitaire[20]. Cette menace représentait une possible perte symbolique de la magyarité, une « profanation [des] trésors culturels placés dans cet espace qui appartient spirituellement à tous les habitants de la ville, indifféremment de leur nationalité » (Adevărul de Cluj 1994a :1) et provoquait des craintes quant à une future transformation urbanistique de la place de l'Union. Selon le président de l'époque de l'UDMR « s'ils ne trouvent pas des vestiges romains, ils trouveront des prétextes édilitaires pour transformer l'espace architectural de la place de l'Union » (Adevărul de Cluj 1994f).

Le troisième groupe d'acteurs dans cette controverse était constitué par la Convention Démocratique de Roumanie (CDR), l'Alliance Civique (AC), le Parti de l'Alliance civique (PAC), le Groupe pour le dialogue interculturel, certaines organisations civiques et quelques partis politiques non hongrois, une série d'acteurs qui, à l'époque, constituaient l'opposition politique (tant sur le plan national que local). Pour eux, les fouilles archéologiques étaient une provocation du maire Gheorghe Funar (Adevărul de Cluj 1994b), une tentative de « yougoslavisation de la Roumanie » comme le dit Doina Cornea, l'un des dissidents anti-communistes les plus connus de Roumanie (Adevărul de Cluj 1994b). Cette décision montrait également que la ville était mal gérée et que les véritables besoins des habitants de Cluj-Napoca n'étaient pas pris en compte (Adevărul de Cluj 1994d). L'indifférence des autorités locales face à ces désaccords, et notamment face à la position de l'UDMR, a conduit cette dernière à protester violemment pour empêcher les travaux archéologiques. Grâce à son appel « [à créer] une chaîne humaine autour du square » et à celui de la CDR pour s'opposer à l'« intention d'agresser la place » (Chiorean 1994), des dizaines de personnes ont occupé l'endroit le jour du lancement officiel du chantier (le 22 juin 1994), obligeant les responsables à en annuler l'ouverture.

Ce moment marque aussi l'intervention d'un quatrième groupe d'acteurs. Plus diffus, il est constitué d'institutions de l'État, centrales et locales : la préfecture, la police, le ministère de la Culture. Leurs représentants ont organisé des discussions et ont essayé de modérer le conflit, voire de le résoudre. Finalement, ils interviendront d'une manière décisive en mobilisant les valeurs et les principes nationaux qui leur sont constitutifs.

Malgré l'assurance que les travaux n'allaient pas affecter l'église ou le monument de Mathyas de Corvin, l'UDMR décida de poursuivre ses manifestations, en appelant à la « désobéissance civile » (Adevărul de Cluj 1994a), appel qui fut suivi par d'autres actions au caractère d'ultimatum : la déclaration du maire Gheorghe Funar annonçant qu'il n'y avait plus d'obstacles aux fouilles archéologiques, le refus de l'UDMR de finaliser un protocole concernant la localisation des vestiges archéologiques, l'appel du maire s'adressant aux citoyens pour que ceux-ci ne se laissent pas entraîner par les provocations de l'UDMR et la promesse de restaurer l'ordre et la loi en faisant appel au commandant de la police. La situation explose le 7 juillet 1994, lorsque les fouilles commencent sous bonne garde policière. Les cloches de toutes les églises hongroises de la ville se mettent alors à sonner et de nombreuses personnes envahissent la place, qui est entourée par des policiers et des membres des forces spéciales de l'armée. Les représentants de l'UDMR demandent la suspension du maire; ils l'accusent d'avoir agi de manière illégale dans la mesure où l'autorisation de fouilles obtenue par le musée ne portait que sur la localisation de

vestiges archéologiques, et non sur l'ouverture d'un chantier susceptible de durer plusieurs années. Malgré une tension extrême, certains habitants sont demeurés toute la journée sur la place, mais aucune violence physique grave n'a été enregistrée. À la dernière minute, les forces armées ont reçu l'ordre d'évacuation. Le lendemain, le ministre de la Culture intervenait en suspendant les travaux et en constituant une commission de spécialistes chargée d'étudier l'opportunité et l'importance scientifique des recherches à effectuer. Dans ses conclusions, la commission considère « légitime et absolument obligatoire » la recherche historique et rappelle le point de vue du directeur du musée, selon lequel les investigations menées place de l'Union font partie d'un programme de recherche établi depuis longtemps. La commission assure par ailleurs que le Ministère de la Culture et le gouvernement garantissent la protection du patrimoine historique et artistique de Cluj et estime que ces questions historiques et archéologiques ont été incorrectement médiatisés (Adevărul de Cluj 1994e). Le parti principal de l'alliance d'opposition, le Parti national paysan chrétien et démocrate (PNTCD) accepte les conclusions, tandis que l'UDMR nuance sa position : comme le préfet et la commission déléguée par le ministère de la culture garantissent officiellement la préservation de la place avec son monument, ils ne continueront pas les protestations de rue. Pourtant, ils considèrent toujours comme illégal le sondage archéologique (car il n'a toujours pas été approuvé par le Conseil local) et vont continuer la bataille judiciaire contre le Musée d'histoire de la Transylvanie, le Conseil local, le maire et la Mairie de Cluj-Napoca, en demandant l'annulation de l'autorisation d'exécution de travaux d'archéologie dans la place de l'Union[21]. Quelques jours plus tard, le chantier est ouvert dans des conditions de sécurité exceptionnelles, sous la stricte supervision de la police.

Les fouilles archéologiques vont continuer sporadiquement, quelques mois par année, le plus souvent avant les campagnes électorales ou après des déclarations concernant l'intention de fermer le chantier. Le chantier est resté ouvert, visible pour tous, objectif touristique inévitable, non pas tant pour les vestiges que pour le conflit qu'il remettait en mémoire. En mai 1995, après la reprise des recherches archéologiques, l'UDMR menaça de «désobéissance civile» en accusant l'absence de l'autorisation du Conseil local. Après les assurances que le monument de Mathyas de Corvin resterait à sa place, l'échange d'accusations réciproques d'illégalité entre le maire et la direction de l'UDMR cessa (Tripon 2005). Une deuxième mobilisation eut lieu en septembre 2000, quand on voulut fermer le chantier en le couvrant avec de la terre. Elle mit cependant plus en évidence des conflits politico-personnels opposant le maire et le préfet, ou encore le maire et le directeur d'un service de la mairie, que des conflits entre Roumains et Hongrois (Szabadság 2000; Kiss 2000a). Le jour fixé pour l'action, les employés de deux départements de la mairie se retrouvèrent face à face sur la place : les uns, dirigés par le directeur en conflit avec le maire, venus appliquer l'ordre du préfet; les autres, soutenus par les conseillers municipaux du Parti «Grande Roumanie», venus faire une « chaîne humaine » de défense à la demande d'une directrice proche du maire (Kiss 2000b). Le départ sans violence du premier groupe à la fin de la journée de travail mettra fin aux tensions et le préfet justifiera l'évacuation de la place en invoquant l'atmosphère calme devant régner dans la ville lors des exercices de l'OTAN à Cluj, dont le déroulement était prévu quelques jours plus tard (argument repris ultérieurement également par le maire) (Salamon 2000).

Rétrospectivement, pour certains habitants, tant hongrois que roumains, le conflit a été provoqué par le maire, Gheorghe Funar, qui a interpellé l'UDMR : « Si l'UDMR n'avait pas réagi, Funar n'aurait pas continué les démarches et les fouilles archéologiques n'auraient pas pris cette ampleur politique » (T.G.). Neuf ans après, le chantier de la place de l'Union est devenu, dans le vocabulaire des habitants, les « fosses » ou les « fouilles ». Certains considèrent qu'il était nécessaire de montrer qu'avant d'être une ville hongroise[22], Cluj-Napoca fut un castrum romain et donc, par filiation historique, roumain. D'autres habitants adoptent un discours esthétisant aux accents pragmatiques : la place est enlaidie, les monuments érigés sont très laids, il n'y a pas d'espace pour s'asseoir, on a diminué l'espace où on aurait pu mener d'autres activités : « Un périmètre immense où on pouvait organiser toutes sortes de choses a été confisqué à la place » (C.S.). Malgré toutes ces critiques, pour les habitants de la ville, la place de l'Union demeure la « plus belle », « humaine parce qu'on peut s'asseoir, notamment au printemps » et « très lumineuse », « l'endroit où j'adore me reposer, regarder la foule qui passe ».

Nouveaux critères sociaux, nouvelles catégories sociales, ancien-nouveau monde

À cette étape, il est légitime de continuer à s'interroger sur les significations de ces interventions urbanistiques et politiques à caractère roumain. Questions d'autant plus pertinentes que les Roumains dominent d'un point de vue démographique. Pourquoi dès lors tiennent-ils à affirmer leur présence avec une telle force ? Plus que les signes « roumanisants » en tant que tels, c'est la signification de la démarche qui les accompagne et les groupes porteurs de cette signification qui sont ici intéressants.

En 1993, à Cluj-Napoca, les disputes liées aux fouilles archéologiques se sont produites à une période durant laquelle les marques ethniques parsemées dans la ville étaient de plus en plus visibles, multiples et répétitives, contribuant à créer un climat de méfiance. Tant qu'il s'agissait d'une action de renforcement de la « roumanité » de la Place Avram Iancu, les polémiques portaient sur les aspects esthétiques, et impliquaient tant les spécialistes que les non-spécialistes, dans le cadre des commissions, comités et jurys constitués par la mairie. Quand les interventions ont visé les symboles de la « magyarité », on a eu principalement à faire avec les protestations publiques de l'UDMR, qui allèrent de la prise de position des leaders aux marches et manifestations de rue. Les controverses déclenchées par la décision d'entreprendre des recherches archéologiques dans la place de l'Union ont mobilisé, du côté de l'UDMR, l'opposition politique et civique de l'époque, et, du côté du PUNR, les spécialistes-archéologues et les institutions centrales de l'État (le président, des ministères, la police, etc.). Bien qu'il y ait eu deux camps, trois types de discours argumentatifs ont circulé. Promu par le groupe constitué autour de PUNR, le premier de ces discours soutenait l'obligation de mener des recherches archéologiques afin de mieux mettre en lumière le passé historique et d'exposer sur la place même les vestiges romains. Le deuxième discours, formulé par l'UDMR, soulignait les dangers de perdre, voire de faire disparaître, l'identité hongroise et d'endommager, voire détruire le patrimoine universel que constituait la Place de l'Union. Bien que soutenant, d'un point de vue politique, les protestations de l'UDMR, la CDR et les autres associations civiques non-hongroises s'intéressaient davantage au gaspillage potentiel de ressources financières de la ville et à l'importance réduite de ces enjeux pour la vie quotidienne des citadins de Cluj-Napoca. Malgré cette justification « excentrique », c'est bien le « passé » qui a irrigué les disputes. Mais il ne faudrait pas cependant exagérer son importance au niveau des discours, car finalement ce n'était pas le but qui comptait (le « passé » ou la gestion de la ville), mais la stratégie de présentation sur la scène publique politique et de distinction par rapport aux autres groupes. Dans d'autres cas, tels que ceux présentés par Mitchell (1995) ou Nieto et Franze (1997), la lutte est menée pour l'accès effectif et quotidien des Autres – en général, des marginaux, qu'il s'agisse de sans-abri ou d'immigrés – à l'espace public. A Cluj-Napoca, l'accès à la place est très ouvert; les confrontations liées aux fouilles archéologiques ont visé la présence historique de l'Autre (Roumain ou Hongrois), les traces que chacun des groupes intéressés avait pu laisser dans l'espace physique de la place centrale. Les disputes à propos des recherches archéologiques sur la place centrale équivalent à une lutte pour préserver, voire défendre, des traces (pour les Hongrois) et pour conquérir des nouveaux espaces qui deviennent les leurs (pour les Roumains). Le recours au « passé » n'était pas surprenant car la chute du régime communiste a favorisé la consolidation du principe national-ethnique dans la vie politique.

Comme l'ont noté plusieurs chercheurs travaillant sur les transformations survenues en Europe de l'Est (Paqueteau 1995; Todorova 1995; Verdery 2003, 1996; Freeman 1997; Schöpflin 1998/1999), les manifestations nationalistes d'après 1989 n'ont rien à voir avec les nationalismes de l'entre-deux-guerres qui furent étouffés par les régimes communistes, ni avec les « nouveaux nationalismes ». Déjà lors de la déstalinisation (à la fin des années 1950 et pendant les années 1960), les idéologies nationalistes avaient ressurgi sous une forme idéologique hybride, celle du communisme-nationalisme. Le discours particulariste national avait été facilement plaqué sur le squelette des thèses universalistes marxistes-léninistes. En instrumentalisant les signes, les thèmes et les discours nationaux, les régimes communistes se sont donné une légitimité qu'ils auraient difficilement pu obtenir autrement, notamment dans les pays où ils étaient très faiblement soutenus[23]. Comme l'a démontré Verdery (1991, 1996) à partir de l'exemple de la Roumanie, surtout après 1970, le Parti communiste a réifié et institutionnalisé le principe ethnonational en tant que nouvelle base d'organisation sociale. La « nation socialiste », plus que la classe ouvrière, était destinée à jouer un rôle central tant pour la construction du socialisme que pour le progrès, alors que le Parti communiste était identifié à la nation tout entière (Verdery 2003). Le marxisme-léninisme a été traduit dans un « langage national », substituant la nation au prolétariat, et sans que cela ne soit dit explicitement, l'homogénéisation sociale est devenue homogénéisation ethnique. De même que les nationalistes prétendent représenter la nation comme un tout, le parti unique parlait au nom de toute la société, sans tenir compte des différences ethniques ou religieuses, et occupait toute la scène publique (Verdery 2003; Todorova 1995; Pacqueteau 1995). Après 1989, l'échec de l'idéologie marxiste-léniniste a favorisé la consolidation du « principe national » en tant que seul élément pouvant donner une direction valable à la vie politique. On était alors davantage préoccupé par la reconnaissance et le maintien de la nation que par la redéfinition de principes sociétaux, et on s'intéressait plus à récupérer le passé qu'à construire l'avenir.

Plus que les autres sociétés de l'Europe de l'Est, la société roumaine a été prise au dépourvu par les effets de la chute du régime communiste : la délégitimation du

système politique, la désintégration du système économique, le bouleversement de la hiérarchie des valeurs. Le chômage en hausse, la dissolution progressive de l'identité ouvrière à la suite des processus de privatisation et de restructuration économique et la désaffiliation politique par la disparition du Parti Communiste et des syndicats (auxquels les individus actifs étaient intégrés, bien que beaucoup d'entre eux les contestaient) ont contribué à l'effritement des solidarités construites avant 1989 et par conséquent, les relations entre les groupes sociaux se sont dépréciées (Verdery 2003). Mais encore une fois, le « passé » faisait la distinction. De nouveaux critères de classification sociale ont alors émergé qui, en fonction de leur référent, s'articulent à des périodes historiques différentes : avoir été ou non gréco-catholique avant le communisme; avoir été des citadins de « souche » ou des nouveaux venus de l'industrialisation, *veneticii,* pour la période communiste; avoir été des sympathisants du pouvoir ou de l'opposition politique, pour la période plus récente. Recourir au passé ou glisser les significations de l'ethnique au social est fortement lié à la problématique de l'ethnicité. « Forme d'organisation sociale ou principe de division du monde social, elle n'est pas une qualité, ni une propriété attachée à un certain type d'individus ou de groupes » (Poutignat et Streiff-Fenart 1995:29). Pour Barth (1995), l'attribution catégorielle devient ethnique quand une personne est définie selon son identité fondamentale déterminée tant par son origine que par son milieu. Autrement dit, une catégorie ethnique définit un agrégat d'individus qui se trouvent dans des conditions communes ou qui sont perçus comme étant similaires par les Autres (Poutignat et Streiff-Fenart 1995).

La catégorie sociale la plus importante est composée en majorité des « nouveaux venus », les *veneticii,* qui sont pour la plupart des Roumains ayant quitté les villages et les régions pauvres du pays pour venir travailler dans les nouvelles usines de Cluj-Napoca à partir des années 1970. En s'y installant définitivement, ils ont pu obtenir un travail, mais aussi de quoi se loger dans les quartiers nouvellement construits pour eux. Après les restructurations des années 1990 dans les grandes entreprises, ils sont tiraillés entre un avenir incertain dans une ville où beaucoup d'entre eux vivent grâce à l'assurance-chômage, et un impossible retour dans leur village natal. Là-bas, les rétrocessions des terres ont en effet bouleversé les relations familiales. Souvent, ceux qui sont partis travailler ailleurs n'ont plus d'héritage foncier, et s'ils parviennent quand même à récupérer un terrain, ils ne disposent pas des ressources financières suffisantes pour l'exploiter.

Les anciens citadins de la ville (ceux de la deuxième génération et des suivantes) considèrent de leur côté que la décision de l'ancien régime d'industrialiser et d'urbaniser massivement Cluj-Napoca a été prise pour la punir d'être trop universitaire, intellectuelle et cosmopolite. Pour eux, les nouveaux venus sont donc symboliquement les porteurs d'une nouvelle ville qui a englouti l'ancienne. Pour ces anciens citadins, les *veneticii* sont des « barbares » qui, par leur domination démographique, ont bouleversé les normes de civilité usuelle de la ville au profit de leurs propres valeurs. Il s'agit bien là d'un processus de rejet catégoriel, dans la mesure où il ne s'accompagne pas d'attitudes de refus et de marginalisation individuelles de ces « nouveaux venus » qui rendent compte d'un processus d'instabilité sociale inconnu jusqu'alors.

Quant aux anciens ouvriers, et ceux, plus âgés, qui ont grandi dans l'esprit de la construction nationale, ou qui ont vécu des situations de violence ethnique, comme par exemple pendant l'occupation de la Transylvanie entre 1940 et 1944, ils avaient tous peur d'être expulsés de la ville par « les Hongrois ». Cette crainte, ils la partagent avec les électeurs plus jeunes à la recherche de leur premier emploi, pour qui « les Hongrois » sont responsables de tous les malheurs survenus après 1989. Dès lors, il n'est pas surprenant qu'ils aient constitué la base électorale la plus loyale du maire Funar. Interrogé sur les raisons qui l'ont poussé à voter pour Funar, un de mes interlocuteurs répond comme suit : « Si les autres gagnent, les Hongrois nous mettront à la porte » (G.V.). Dans un tel contexte, la figure paternaliste, justicière et d'homme d'action du maire Funar pouvait catalyser tous les espoirs, car il symbolisait à la fois ce qu'on est et ce qu'on valorise. Ainsi, selon un sondage d'opinion réalisé à Cluj-Napoca en 2000, année du début de son troisième mandat, les gens appréciaient le maire non seulement parce qu'il avait imposé l'ordre et le respect de la loi, mais aussi parce qu'il avait fait de Cluj-Napoca une ville propre, qu'il était un bon administrateur, qu'en plus d'être un bon citoyen roumain (64 %), il était combatif (IMAS 2000). Que Gheorghe Funar ait continué d'habiter le même appartement après son élection, à Mănăştur, quartier le plus populaire de Cluj-Napoca, a contribué à créer son image de politicien capable de lutter contre la corruption et pour la légalité et l'ordre. Toutes les annonces qu'il a signées et qu'il a diffusées dans les média locaux à son nom ou au nom de la mairie, pendant les conflits liés à l'inscription correctrice sur le monument de Mathyas de Corvin ou aux fouilles archéologiques de 1993, mentionnaient la nécessité de respecter la loi et l'ordre et sa détermination à lutter en ce sens. D'ailleurs, l'accusation principale portée contre les membres de l'UMDR a été celle d'illégalité.

En Roumanie, l'histoire des relations roumano-hongroises a contribué à constituer les Hongrois en tant

qu'« ennemi par excellence» (Mihăilescu 1991). Cela remonte au XIX[e] siècle, quand la « roumanité » a été construite comme corollaire des deux traits considérés comme essentiels du peuple roumain : la « ruralité » et la « latinité ». « Cette double équation "roumanité = paysannerie" et "étranger = exploiteur" explique pourquoi toute prise de position contre les injustices, dont les paysans – donc le "peuple" – étaient l'objet, prenait la forme d'un discours nationaliste et xénophobe. (...) [une forme discursive] plutôt catégorielle qu'individuelle, sociale plutôt qu'ethnique » (Mihăilescu 1991:9-10). Certaines controverses sont menées dans les termes rhétoriques de l'ethnicité (Calhoun 1993) :

> As Leach (1954) and Barth (1969) and his colleagues have argued, ethnic identity is constituted, maintained, and invoked in social process that involve diverse intentions, constructions, and meaning, and conflicts. Not only are there claims from competing possible collective allegiances, there are competing claims as to just what any particular ethnic or other identity means. Dispute by no means always undermines traditional identities. Ethnicity is a rhetorical frame within which certain disputes are conducted (...). [Calhoun 1993:223]

Dans la Roumanie post-communiste, elle l'est toujours : après 1989, la Hongrie et les Hongrois ont « [symbolisé] la fragmentation, le sentiment du démembrement, du chaos et de la perte du contrôle (...) » (Verdery 2003:182). Il n'en demeure pas moins important que des situations d'antan ou contemporaines aient été utilisées pour nourrir continuellement cette image : des luttes du XVIII[e] et du XIX[e] siècles pour l'égalité de droits à la perte du Nord de la Transylvanie en 1940 (« une humiliation profonde et dévastatrice » selon Schöpflin (1998/1999)), mais aussi à ce que Verdery (2003) appelle les « confrontations post-1989 », par exemple la demande d'autonomie de groupe formulée par l'UDMR, l'auto-nomination du premier ministre Antall de Hongrie en tant que leader des Hongrois du monde entier ou la proposition d'envahir la Roumanie pour reprendre le nord de la Transylvanie (en 1992, à Budapest, dans le cadre du Congrès des émigrés politiques hongrois et de la Conférence mondiale sur la Transylvanie). Mais, tout comme les Roumains, les Hongrois ont aussi leurs peurs (Schöpflin 1998/1999) qui prennent leurs sources dans le fait que les Roumains refusent d'admettre que la Transylvanie représente pour la nation hongroise la « source la plus authentique de la culture nationale » qui a garanti la continuité de l'État hongrois entre le XVI[e] et le XVII[e] siècles, d'autant plus que deux millions de Hongrois y habitent (Schöpflin 1998/1999).

A Cluj-Napoca, après 1989, la catégorie « Hongrois » ne renvoie pas nécessairement au groupe ethnique des Hongrois, elle inclut les gréco-catholiques ainsi que les sympathisants de l'opposition politique, ceux qui représentent la « différence », l'Autre. Plus précisément, la réapparition du gréco-catholicisme dans la vie publique en 1990 a directement remis en cause la définition exclusive qui avait été établie par les nationalistes roumains, la « roumanité » en tant que corrélative de l'orthodoxie, définition qui « ignorait » les apports significatifs que l'Église gréco-catholique a pu avoir en Transylvanie[24]. Même si d'un point de vue numérique, les gréco-catholiques sont moins nombreux qu'avant, l'Église orthodoxe s'est sentie menacée et a refusé pendant plusieurs années de rétrocéder le patrimoine acquis 45 ans auparavant[25]. L'insistance dont ont témoigné les fidèles et les prélats gréco-catholiques pour récupérer ce patrimoine leur a donné une image négative, celle de « causeurs de désordre social ». En outre, en apparentant cette Église au romano-catholicisme, qui est à Cluj-Napoca la religion des Hongrois, on a transformé les gréco-catholiques en « Hongrois », donc en « non-Roumains ».

Une logique similaire a fonctionné dans le champ politique. En critiquant les positions prises par le Parti de l'Union Nationale Roumaine (PUNR) et en soutenant les différentes actions contestataires de l'UDMR, des partis politiques – le PAC, la CDR – et des organisations civiques – l'Alliance Civique ou le Groupe pour le Dialogue interculturel – ont été accusés d'être les ennemis de la nation roumaine, des traîtres, parfois des inconscients, des gens ayant perdu la raison.

À Cluj-Napoca après 1989, l'Autre prend alors la figure du citadin, un Hongrois romano-catholique ou un Roumain gréco-catholique, votant pour l'UDMR et l'opposition politique. Le discours ethnicisant n'a fait qu'exprimer une disparition, celle du monde de l'industrie communiste et de ses repères connus. Il a aussi révélé l'apparition d'un monde nouveau, par le biais d'anciens thèmes qui sont recyclés et promus par « d'anciens-nouveaux » acteurs qui se rattachent à d'autres rôles et à d'autres systèmes de valeurs.

En guise de conclusion

Paradoxalement, l'ethnicisation de l'espace à Cluj-Napoca a engendré des effets « dépolitisants », en l'occurrence la disparition presque totale des controverses et des débats concernant la vie urbaine. Bien que depuis l'effondrement du régime communiste en 1989, différents acteurs politiques, religieux, économiques aient tenté de s'exprimer publiquement et de participer à l'aménagement de la ville, le maire et les conseillers nationalistes roumains, soute-

nus implicitement par les représentants des institutions nationales (préfet, ministre, etc.), ont toujours eu le dernier mot en imposant le cadre du débat public. À cette situation ont contribué d'une part, les nouveaux arrangements politiques à l'échelle du pays et d'autre part, le recul et l'abandon des protestations publiques.

Ainsi, les déclarations de portée nationale et internationale de Gheorge Funar, président du PUNR, représenté au Parlement roumain et au gouvernement entre 1992 et 1996, ont convergé avec des décisions d'ordre local, ce qui a entraîné une déformation dans les perceptions politiques, le local était alors lu en priorité au prisme du national. Il en a résulté un déséquilibre dans la perception de l'enjeu nationaliste à Cluj-Napoca, devenue une ville à portée nationale sans pour autant disposer des ressources nécessaires à de telles prétentions. En 1996, l'opposition politique a remporté les élections nationales et présidentielles, ce qui a contribué à faire reculer les contestations à Cluj-Napoca, dans la mesure où la plupart d'entre elles avaient été initiées et organisées par l'UDMR et la CDR. Les tensions liées aux marques urbaines ethnicisantes montrent que jusqu'en 1996, l'opposition et, particulièrement, l'UDMR, ont eu une politique revendicative menée directement sur/dans la place publique. Après 1996, arrivant au pouvoir et disposant des scènes politiques institutionnalisées (ministères et autres instances de l'État), beaucoup plus puissantes et efficaces pour leurs actions, ces partis ont renoncé aux mobilisations de rue et comme le montre Radu (2003) dans le cas de l'UDMR, leur démarche est devenue «légaliste». Après 1996, le rouge, le jaune et le bleu peints sur des piliers dans les rues, et les autres marquages ethniques, ne suscitent plus de manifestation. En 2000, Gheorghe Funar et son parti gagnent les élections locales, la CDR perd les élections parlementaires, mais l'UDMR fait toujours partie du nouveau gouvernement.

Alors que les premières tentatives d'ethnicisation des places publiques centrales promues par les autorités locales provoquent, dans un premier temps, la mobilisation des associations politiques de la minorité hongroise et de différentes organisations civiques, les opposants disparaissent progressivement de la scène urbaine. En 2003, plus personne ne sortait dans la rue pour protester et l'apathie politique régnait, car l'échec répété des mobilisations sociales avait découragé les militants la poursuite de l'action. Comme le disait une Hongroise, « le symbolisme national roumain devient partie intégrante de la vie quotidienne et on développe des stratégies pour vivre avec lui » (E.M.). Les mécontentements de ceux qui sont opposés à la politique de Funar, qu'ils soient Hongrois ou Roumains, s'expriment désormais à l'intérieur d'autres espaces publics, des espaces publics alternatifs, comme celui que l'association Casa Transit essaie de créer dans une ancienne synagogue de la ville. Il s'agit de susciter des débats portant sur des problèmes sociaux, politiques et civiques, à partir d'expositions d'art et de spectacles de théâtre, ou de recourir aux médias locaux lors de discussions touchant les activités du conseil municipal. Mais il est de plus en plus difficile de rassembler des gens qui ne sont plus prêts à s'engager à long terme. Tous ces mécontentements sont des réactions plutôt individuelles, qui n'ont pas de grande portée sociale, et qui ont progressivement remplacé les contestations ayant eu cours sur la place publique. Lassés du nationalisme du maire et sans espoir de changement, la plupart des opposants considèrent ce dernier comme un clown, un fou, auquel ils n'accordent plus beaucoup d'attention et dont les actions sont à classer dans la rubrique des faits divers : « A quoi ça sert de dire quelque chose quand de toute façon on ne peut rien changer ? Les *mănăşţureni* [les habitants du quartier Mănăştur] vont toujours voter Funar, non ? » (L.P.). Ils ont renoncé à pratiquer le « civisme collectif » et se sont tournés vers leur carrière, leur famille et leurs amis. Certains continuent, grâce à leur position sociale actuelle (universitaires, journalistes, politiciens par exemple) à être des citoyens engagés, mais ils ne manifestent presque jamais dans la rue. En prenant leur distance face à l'espace public, ces acteurs sociaux participent indirectement à la dynamique politique que reflète l'ethnicisation des places publiques, dans la mesure où ils semblent en accepter les définitions imposées. Si les médias et les politiciens sont aujourd'hui plus nuancés, les références nationales n'étant pas les seules à définir la société, il n'en reste pas moins que la violence symbolique des discours du maire Funar et de ses conseillers est parvenue à écraser toute opposition civique et de ce fait empêche toute résurgence de la différence dans l'espace public à Cluj-Napoca.

Dans les compétitions déclenchées par le changement de régime de 1989, toutes les ressources utiles ont été mobilisées, à commencer par les ressources nationales et ethniques qui ont joué un rôle important. Dans les villes multiethniques, les tensions ethniques relevaient désormais des enjeux locaux de récupérations de(s) patrimoine(s) légitimant(s) et de l'ethnicisation des lieux. Les interventions qui ont eu lieu à Cluj-Napoca pour « ethniciser » les places publiques de la ville, les disputes et les conflits qu'elles ont provoqués, ont mis en évidence de nouveaux enjeux sociaux en même temps qu'elles ont mis en lumière les groupes qui en ont fait la promotion ainsi que leurs discours et leurs actions. Éphémères ou permanents, les nouveaux critères de distinction sociale per-

mettent de rendre compte de la dynamique sociale qui se dessine à Cluj-Napoca, après 1989. Si, avant cette date, les thèmes ethniques et nationaux servaient à légitimer les actions du Parti Communiste, après la disparition de ce dernier, ils ont exprimé une nouvelle configuration sociale et politique. Comme je l'ai précisé, après la chute du régime communiste, le discours nationaliste a été le seul capable de mobiliser une grande partie de la société. La résurgence des peurs historiques au début des années 1990, notamment en Transylvanie, renvoie à une controverse roumaine-hongroise qui remonte au XIX[e] siècle. La rareté des débats publics, surtout multiethniques et multireligieux, a été un deuxième facteur qui a favorisé l'apparition d'une avalanche de signes et de symboles à caractère ethnique à Cluj-Napoca. Recourir à des thèmes ethniques pour aménager la ville a mis en évidence l'existence d'autres clivages sociaux. Imaginées par les autorités locales roumaines comme des espaces d'imposition-inscription de la domination des Roumains (au moins par leur nombre), les places publiques centrales de Cluj-Napoca sont devenues grâce aux contestations civiques et politiques des lieux où s'affirment les différences – ethnique, religieuse et politique. L'arrivée au pouvoir (au niveau national) de ceux qui se trouvaient dans l'opposition a fait disparaître le conflit à caractère ethnique de la place publique. Désormais, les conflits seront déplacés sur le plan politico-juridique. Et les places centrales seront transformées en décors passifs, simples lieux de passage et de cérémonies officielles jusqu'en 2005.

Post-scriptum

En 2004, Emil Boc et son parti, le Parti démocrate[26] (PD), gagnent les élections locales à Cluj-Napoca. Quelques mois plus tard, après les élections parlementaires, le gouvernement est formé par des anciens partis de l'opposition, y compris, l'UDMR. Après 2004, le nouveau maire prend des décisions destinées à annuler les interventions ethnicisantes mais l'imprégnation symbolique de la place a continué sous la forme ritualisée des événements périodiques nationaux (le jour national) ou non (le Réveillon) organisés par la mairie. La position d'Emil Boc sur ces questions a été (et est encore) assez ambivalente : déclarations critiques envers le Parti «Grande Roumanie» (PRM) et son leader local, Gheorghe Funar, mais aussi envers l'UDMR; interventions « des-ethnicisantes » – la peinture en rouge des bancs et des poubelles tricolores ou la démolition du bloc annonçant la construction de la colonne de Trajan – mais aussi, des actions qui pourraient être interprétées comme ayant au moins un caractère national-roumain – le renouvellement des drapeaux roumains dégradés en décembre 2004 ou le grand spectacle de musique folklorique roumaine organisé place Avram Iancu autour du sapin installé en ville. Après quelques années d'accalmie, et pour la première fois depuis 1994, la mairie organisa en février 2005 un débat public concernant l'avenir du site archéologique de la Place de l'Union. C'était aussi la première fois que la société civile prenait publiquement une position critique par l'intermédiaire du groupe MindBomb[27]. Après ce débat, une fosse fut couverte en mai 2005, tandis que des experts et le Conseil local étaient consultés au sujet de l'autre (Kiss 2005). Le Ministère de la culture et le Conseil local approuvèrent des recherches en vue de « décharger historiquement » le site jusqu'à la fin de septembre, date d'expiration de l'autorisation. En l'absence du maire et du maire adjoint (Roumains tous les deux), le deuxième maire adjoint (Hongrois) déclencha la procédure pour la couverture du site. Si pour la population, l'action n'a rien eu de provocateur (à l'heure prévue pour cette action, sur la place il y avait des gens qui traînaient, au soleil, se bronzaient, mangeaient des sandwichs, prenaient des photos, indifférents à l'agitation des journalistes autour des fosses), pour les médias locaux, avant même qu'il ne devienne effectif, le geste a eu les significations d'un « conflit ethnique latent » (Éditorial 2005). L'action a été suspendue suite à l'intervention téléphonique du maire, qui a décidé à son retour que les spécialistes devaient avoir le dernier mot sur l'avenir. Pour les gens ordinaires, l'événement n'a même pas existé. L'intégration de la Roumanie à l'Union Européenne, ses avantages et ses inconvénients, sont des sujets qui les passionnent beaucoup plus que des histoires du passé.

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Notes

1 Dans le cadre de cette recherche de terrain, j'ai réalisé environ 40 entretiens auprès des professionnels, des urbanistes, des archéologues, des habitants de la ville, Roumains et Hongrois. J'ai également consulté le quotidien de langue roumaine le plus lu à Cluj-Napoca, publié sans interruption depuis 1989, *Adevărul de Cluj* (numéros parus entre 1989 et 2003) et, (avec l'aide de Kozak Gyula), les numéros du quotidien de langue hongroise *Szabadság* dans lesquels ont été publiés des articles concernant les deux places publiques étudiées. Il faut noter qu'au début des années 1990, les journaux ont joué un rôle extrêmement important dans la communication politique, particulièrement locale. C'était là qu'on apprenait les décisions du maire ou du Conseil local, les événements publics, les positions des acteurs politiques. Ce rôle s'explique d'une part par la confiance très élevée dont ont bénéficié les médias après la chute du régime communiste et, d'autre part, par les dysfonctionnements des institutions politiques ou tout simplement leur absence.

2 Selon Daicoviciu, pour Vasile Pârvan (1882–1927), un historien roumain de renom, le nom romain *Napocense* reprend le nom autochtone dacique *Napoca/Napuncese* (Daicoviciu 1974). L'extension *Napoca* du nom actuel de la ville, ajouté en 1980, a été un des événements importants organisés par le régime communiste, au début de sa phase nationaliste, pour célébrer « 2050 ans de la construction de l'état dace "unitaire et centralisé" de Burebista » (Boia, 1997 : 76). La signification de ces gestes était extrêmement importante, car on montrait de cette manière qu'avant l'arrivée des Romains, et notamment après leur retraite, ces territoires avaient été habités par les Daces. C'était une décision plutôt symbolique car tous les archéologues et historiens étaient alors d'accord (ils le sont d'ailleurs encore) pour estimer qu'il n'y a pas eu de localité dace sur le territoire de l'actuelle ville Cluj-Napoca. Les Daces, population indo-européenne que les Roumains considèrent comme leurs premiers ancêtres, se sont installés dans le Nord des Balkans au VIII^{e} siècle avant J.-C. Après les guerres de 101-102 et 105-106, l'empereur romain Trajan conquit la région du Sud de la Dacie et le roi des Daces, Décébale, se suicida. Dans la recherche identitaire qui accompagna la période de construction nationale du XIX^{e} siècle, Trajan et Décébale ont joué, séparément ou ensemble, le rôle fondateur de « père(s) du peuple roumain ».

3 Les Saxons n'ont pas repris le nom de *Napoca/Napocense*. *Klausenburg* est le nom en allemand, *Kolozsvar* celui en hongrois et *Cluj* en roumain (Pascu 1974; Goldenberg 1958).

4 Il n'y a pas eu un mouvement systématique et les facteurs qui l'ont influencé ont été très liés aux personnalités intellectuelles locales et à la présence des catholiques dans les villages.

5 En 1687, l'empire autrichien et l'empire hongrois se sont réunis, formant l'empire austro-hongrois (le dualisme austro-hongrois).

6 Pendant cette période, des mesures politiques visant à rétablir les avantages que les Hongrois détenaient avant 1918 seront adoptées : les écoles en roumain seront fermées et l'usage du roumain interdit dans l'administration (Pascu 1974). Quant à l'université, elle sera délocalisée. Comme partout en Europe, les partis politiques seront interdits et, au printemps 1944, les Juifs de la ville seront déportés dans les camps d'extermination nazis.

7 Les travaux de construction débutent en 1350. La dernière intervention au niveau architectural est la tour néogothique qui date de 1848.

8 La construction d'une Cathédrale orthodoxe dans une ville où les orthodoxes ne représentaient qu'une minorité a été un des plus importants gestes de « roumanisation » de la ville posés par l'État roumain.

9 Malgré la « roumanisation » de cette place et la construction d'autres espaces qui l'expriment (comme par exemple, le quartier *Andrei Muresanu*, construit dans un style dit roumain), il restait encore à Cluj-Napoca des espaces centraux et des quartiers à caractère hongrois ou autrichien.

10 Si en 1966, la population stable de Cluj-Napoca était de 185 663 habitants, elle atteignait, en 1977, 268 858 habitants (Comisia națională pentru statistică 1994).

11 En 1948, le régime politique de Roumanie prosoviétique interdit le gréco-catholicisme auquel appartenait une partie importante des roumains transylvains; le clergé est emprisonné et le patrimoine revient à l'Église orthodoxe. Une partie des croyants rejoignent alors les orthodoxes, une autre les catholiques. La mesure a profondément secoué les communautés de Roumains, car depuis le début du XVIII^{e} siècle, l'Église gréco-catholique avait mené la lutte nationale pour les droits des Roumains, mais aussi pour la construction d'une conscience et d'une identité nationales. En 1990, l'Église gréco-catholique rentre dans la légalité et récupère une partie de son patrimoine, y compris des églises, après 1997.

12 Avram Iancu (1824-1872), le plus important héros transylvain, a dirigé la lutte des Roumains pour leurs droits civiques et politique dans l'empire austro-hongrois.

13 Gheorghe Funar fut le maire de la ville de Cluj entre 1992 et 2002, durant trois mandats. Depuis novembre 2004, il est sénateur de Cluj au Parlement Roumain sous l'étiquette du Parti « Grande Roumanie » (PRM). À l'époque, Gheorghe Funar était aussi le président du Parti de l'Unité Nationale de Roumanie (PUNR), un des partis nationalistes roumains, apparu presque en même temps que l'Union Démocratique des Hongrois de Roumanie (UDMR), une fédération d'associations culturelles, civiques et politiques représentant les Hongrois de Roumanie au Parlement. La création de ces deux partis au début des années 1990 s'est produite dans un contexte d'instabilité politique nationale et régionale, abondamment entretenu par les médias, qui ne cessaient d'annoncer les dangers d'une invasion hongroise en Transylvanie ou d'une guerre civile comme en ex-Yougoslavie. Disposant d'une base électorale provenant principalement de Transylvanie, le PUNR et l'UDMR faisaient la promotion des discours ressuscitant d'anciens thèmes conflictuels entre Roumains et Hongrois, tel que le droit à l'autonomie territoriale et politique ou l'usage de la langue hongroise dans l'administration. L'un et l'autre entretenaient une relation dialectique-dialogique au niveau discursif politique, mais aussi au niveau électoral : chaque prise de position ou

action promue par l'un des partis suscitait la réplique de l'autre et jusqu'en 1998, les deux partis obtenaient chacun aux élections générales environ 7 % du vote exprimé. En 1998, le PUNR se scinde et la faction qui soutient Gheorghe Funar adhère à un autre parti considéré comme extrémiste, le Parti «Grande Roumanie» dont Funar devient vice-président. Il est important de préciser ici que selon le principe de la représentativité proportionnelle, la minorité hongroise a des représentants dans le Conseil local. Les résultats obtenus par l'UDMR aux élections locales lui ont toujours permis d'avoir des conseillers municipaux, de même qu'un maire adjoint. Cependant, étant donné leur nombre réduit, les représentants de l'UDMR ou des partis composant la Convention Démocrate Roumaine (CDR) (quand celle-ci existait) ont rarement réussi à imposer leur position au sein du Conseil local.

14 Considérés d'extrême droite par les politiciens d'opposition ou les analystes politiques, le maire et son parti, le PUNR, ont joué les «moutons noirs» de la politique post-1989. Mais les relations du parti au pouvoir jusqu'en 1996, le Parti Social Démocrate de Roumanie (PSDR) ancien Front du salut national (FSN), considéré l'héritier du Parti Communiste Roumain) avec eux ont toujours été ambiguës : malgré une position officielle de prise de distance, le pouvoir a formé avec eux le gouvernement en 1993.

15 Ces propos, de même que ceux qui suivront, sont extraits d'entretiens réalisés à Cluj-Napoca en 2003 (de juillet à octobre) et septembre 2004. Les thèmes de discussions ont porté principalement sur les espaces publics centraux, les événements qui les ont marqués, leurs positions, attitudes, etc.

16 De nombreux habitants nomment la place de l'Union « place de Mathyas de Corvin ».

17 Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940), l'historien le plus apprécié des Roumains.

18 Pour commémorer les victoires de Trajan sur les Daces, en 113 après J.-C., a été érigée au centre de Rome la « Colonne Trajane » illustrant les luttes entre les Romains et les Daces et la conquête de la Dacie. Pour certains historiens roumains, la colonne illustre l'ethnogenèse du peuple roumain, la synthèse entre les Romains et les Daces ainsi que le caractère latin du peuple roumain (Boia 2002).

19 A l'époque, le Musée avait déjà deux chantiers archéologiques à Cluj-Napoca, pas très loin de la Place de l'Union, où on avait trouvé des vestiges romains.

20 De nombreux journalistes et politiciens de l'opposition font référence à des propos du maire au sujet du déplacement de la statue – « nous allons emballer la statue de Mathyas de Corvin et l'envoyer à Budapest » – ou du directeur du musée – « s'il le faut, je vais faire des recherches sous la statue de Mathyas de Corvin ». Étant donné qu'ils n'ont pas été consignés, ces propos ne peuvent être vérifiés et restent de l'ordre de la rumeur.

21 Le tribunal a rejeté en février 1995 l'action de la Paroisse romano-catholique Saint Michel de Cluj-Napoca et des conseillers municipaux de l'UDMR (Tripon 2005:235-243).

22 En dépit du fait que les cartes de la ville font référence d'une manière explicite à ses racines saxonnes, la majorité des habitants ne les connaissent pas et ceux qui les connaissent les éludent dans leurs discours.

23 En 1945, les partis communistes des pays est-européens étaient soutenus par la population en proportions différentes. En Tchécoslovaquie, pays le plus industrialisé et urbanisé de la région, le Parti communiste comptait 80 000 membres, tandis qu'en Roumanie, pays agraire, très peu urbanisé et industrialisé, sans antécédents de gauche, il comptait environ 1 000 membres, dont la plupart appartenaient aux minorités nationales. Le Parti communiste comptait 30 000 membres en Hongrie, 20 000 en Pologne, 15 000 en Yougoslavie, 8 000 en Bulgarie (Boia 2002). Pour plus de détails voir Paqueteau 1995 et Verdery 1991.

24 Il faut spécifier ici, que cette définition de la « nation roumaine et orthodoxe » n'est pas nouvelle; elle remonte à la période qui a précédé la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, et a été reprise en partie y compris par le régime communiste (pour plus de détails, voir Gillet 1997).

25 Il n'est pas sans importance qu'en 1995, l'Église orthodoxe ait proposé au Conseil local le projet de construire une église orthodoxe dans le square situé devant le monument de Mathyas de Corvin (Tripon 2005). Cette proposition venait après des années d'appropriation de cet espace par l'Église gréco-catholique et après les événements liés aux fouilles archéologiques. Le Conseil local n'a pas approuvé ce projet.

26 Le Parti démocrate (PD) provient en partie de l'ancien Front du salut national (FSN) (le parti qui a repris la structure et l'image de la formation politique-civique FSN créée en décembre 1989, après la fuite de l'ancien président Nicolae Ceauşescu).

27 MindBomb est un groupe de jeunes artistes de Cluj-Napoca qui a comme but la sensibilisation de l'opinion publique, par l'intermédiaire de l'art (militant), au sujet de certains problèmes sociaux et politiques de la société roumaine. Ils ont réalisé trois interventions liées aux fouilles archéologiques – des grands panneaux installés à côté des excavations : en février 2005, « Des travaux – Place de l'Union », en mars 2005, « Enterre la fosse », en juin 2005, « Problème d'école primaire » (http://www.alternativ.ro/mindbomb.htm, consulté le 15 novembre 2005).

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Difference or Disappearance: The Politics of Indigenous Inclusion in the Liberal State

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Abstract: The effects of neo-liberal economies have meant that effective social inclusion of marginalized groups is of increasing concern, yet it is arguable that economic marginalization as well as the marginalizing of difference are increasing. This paper questions the taken-for-granted view that liberal democratic states want and are able to include. It draws on recent experiences of an Aboriginal network in Australia to argue that liberal democracies are resistant to inclusion of certain kinds and that this is most evident in circumstances where Aboriginal people appear to be making successful headway in state-initiated entrepreneurship.

Keywords: Indigenous Australians, Wiradjuri people, social inclusion, liberal democracy, colonial subjectivity

Résumé : Les conséquences de l'économie libérale ont fait de l'inclusion sociale des groupes marginalisés une préoccupation de plus en plus pressante. Pourtant, on peut soutenir que la marginalisation économique ainsi que la marginalisation des différences augmentent elles aussi. Cet article remet en question l'idée, considérée comme allant de soi, selon laquelle les États prônant la démocratie libérale souhaitent l'inclusion et sont en mesure de l'atteindre. En se basant sur l'expérience récente d'un réseau d'Aborigènes d'Australie, l'article soutient que les démocraties libérales résistent à certains types d'inclusion et que cela est tangible notamment dans les cas où les aborigènes semblent faire des progrès significatifs dans le cadre de programmes mis sur pied par l'État et visant à encourager l'esprit d'entreprise.

Mots-clés : Aborigènes d'Australie, peuple Wiradjuri, inclusion sociale, démocratie libérale, subjectivité coloniale

There is a common assumption made in relation to liberal democracies such as Australia, Canada or New Zealand, that they are and should be incorporative. Access to social citizenship is the right of all; the state has a capacity to include even if it does not always have a willingness to do so. Inclusion implies the state will tackle and resolve problems of, for instance, inequality and access, particularly those impeded by the state's own structures and policies, but also those produced in public sentiment. Such views of the incorporative capacity of the state have sustained progressive social policy for decades. It could even be argued that the variety of forms the liberal state has taken in different parts of the world serve to bolster the popularity of the idea that incorporation is always possible, even the incorporation of radical alterities. Yet contradictions are also familiar: it might be common to hear condemnation of "racism" but it is not difficult to identify its pervasiveness or its mobilization when legitimating exclusion of certain categories of persons from full social and economic participation. When Povinelli (2002:11) notes that one "the great persuasions of liberalism [is] its seeming openness, its voracious encompassment," she cautions this is not true without reserve. She examines what it is about Aboriginality in Australia that produces a refusal on the part of the state to encompass that which is abhorrent to it. This paper takes a rather different approach to a similar question. While it is clear there are exclusions by the state that are a matter of political choice or expediency, I am interested in identifying characteristics of liberalism, its values and practices, which make acknowledgment or accommodation of difference difficult in that they seem to deny those of liberalism itself. In the indigenous context, this has implications for the inclusion of "differences" which challenge liberalism's apparent openness. This is particularly the case for indigenous peoples, whose very definition as "indigenous" challenges the legitimacy of the state. What, then, are the implications for the incorporation of indigenous difference?

Silverstein's (2002:147) contention that "continued ambivalence over the espousal and denial of cultural difference within the postcolonial period point[s] to the perduring character of coloniality within postcoloniality" is apt here: that difference is "avowed and disavowed, produced and erased" at different times is particularly evident in settler nations in relation to indigenous peoples. English-speaking settler nations have variously adopted policies of segregation, assimilation, integration and self-management, most of which are eventually deemed unsuccessful or inadequate. At the present time, the ambivalence of which Silverstein speaks is intensifying. The English-speaking settler nations have refused to support the International Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and neo-liberalism, by putting an end to the welfare state in favour of the "user pays" philosophy, is increasingly marginalizing those already defined as peripheral, even antithetical, to the interests of the nation and its economy. In response, concerns about social inclusion have become central in contemporary social policy debate. In this paper I take one example of an Australian Aboriginal society's failed attempt to incorporate (itself one of many such attempts) to ask what it means to incorporate *indigenous* peoples within the nation-state? I do so to examine the question as to whether a liberal democratic state is able to include and respect indigenous *difference*. While my case study is Australian, I anticipate it will resonate within other settler nations. It begs the question as to what incorporation means.

Anthropologists have developed various approaches to explain Aboriginal exclusion in Australia, including an Aboriginal cultural incapacity to change (Berndt 1977; Stanner 1979), a self-conscious Aboriginal resistance to change (Morris 1989); racism on the part of non-Aboriginal Australians (Cowlishaw 2004); culturally inappropriate policy development (Martin 2001; Rowse 2002); and Povinelli's (2002) work on the limits of recognition of what the state defines as "culturally repugnant" practice. It has been only since the late 1990s that anthropologists, Povinelli (1998, 1999) in particular, began to take the state more seriously in analyses of Aboriginal experiences of exclusion (but see Beckett 1988). An emphasis on a valorized Aboriginal *resistance* to incorporation is giving way to a greater appreciation of long efforts to incorporate more meaningfully, albeit often with mixed success. Povinelli shows there are resistances embodied within the state itself. I explore this from the perspective of liberalism's *capacity* to include, rather than from the notion that there are *particular* practices or persons whom the state "chooses" to reject. I argue there are ideological limits to liberalism's incorporation of difference and that these stem not from inadequate or reactionary public policy, nor from incompetent, backward or corrupt indigenous peoples, but from the underlying cultural values of liberal democracy which set constraints on the possibilities of inclusion. These then support the variety of social and economic arguments relied on from time to time to justify state practices.

I develop my argument through an ethnographic lens, based on my observations of Wiradjuri Aboriginal people of New South Wales, among whom I have worked for over two decades. Over this time, and certainly predating it by a century, Wiradjuri people have sought—explicitly—to activate their desire for more meaningful incorporation in the rural economies of pastoralism and agriculture that transformed their hunter-gatherer economy, landscape and social world. There are different ways in which indigenous struggles over time might be understood. Groups may struggle *against* models of incorporation proposed by the state in an oppositional sense and, in other times or places, struggle to be *included* within the state. Aboriginality as resistance is often interpreted as a strategy of *dis*engagement. Yet what Wiradjuri people have been attempting to do throughout their two centuries of colonization is *engage*, albeit on their own terms. In fact, it is often the struggle to be better incorporated within Australian social and economic life, but on terms which make sense to them, which becomes represented as their "failure" or as "resistance." The fact that incorporation is desired (and thought feasible and attainable) may be shared by Aborigines and policy makers alike, but this does not imply that the terms upon which it might be achieved, nor the desired outcomes, are shared. A lack of appreciation of the ways in which understandings and expectations differ—or indeed a deliberate mismatch of meanings at times—produces many difficulties and lays open a minority group to derision and condemnation. What they "fail" to do, in wanting to be who they are, is to transform themselves, ontologically, into the "persons" required of liberalism in pursuing its economic agendas.

Colonial Inclusions and Exclusions

The Wiradjuri region, over 50,000 square miles, encompasses the central west of New South Wales, the most developed State[1] in Australia. It is separated from the capital, Sydney, by the Blue Mountains and starts only 200 miles from the city. Its wide river plains and innumerable creeks make it one of the best watered areas on the continent. Once a path over the rugged Blue Mountains was eventually found, Australian historian, Blainey (1975:81) described the haste to establish sheep runs in the 1820s and 1830s as akin to a gold rush. This is the coun-

try within which the colony's wealth in wool was made: Australia was the nation "born on the sheep's back." Wiradjuri land was redefined as pastoral property and, after the waves of disease and frontier violence calmed, Wiradjuri people became pastoral workers. By the end of the 19th century, most were engaged as permanent or casual wage labourers on pastoral stations carved out of their own country, and on which they had formed semi-sedentary camps. Some operated kin-based contracting teams and a few ran their own farms. Federation in 1901 (from whose benefits Aboriginal people were explicitly excluded) and an increasing non-Aboriginal population competing for land and work put an end to these efforts towards a new economic and spatial autonomy. State-based legislation enacted in 1909 restricted Wiradjuri spatial and social opportunities, and segregated them on government-supervised residential reserves.

Wiradjuri people, in other words, are a people significantly transformed by their harsh colonial experiences. They are speakers of English, educated to varying degrees, of mixed ancestry, now living in rural towns or still in the small reserves on the edges of those towns. Their population, by my informal estimate, is about 12,000, some of whom live outside the region in the metropolitan cities of Sydney and Canberra. There is now a significant non-Wiradjuri population living within Wiradjuri country as a result of government-initiated resettlement programs in the 1970s (from far western New South Wales). Wiradjuri and their neighbours are Aboriginal people who were long termed "part-Aborigines." The degrees of radical difference were dissipating and assimilation (understood as loss of Aboriginality) was inevitable on their inexorable path to modernity In the mid-20th century they were considered by anthropologists to be "cultureless," in a "cultureless vacuum," unable to cope with modernity except in its pathological expressions (see Cowlishaw 1987; Macdonald 2001; Gray 2002): they were products of colonialism and racism, not actors within local political and cultural histories. Wiradjuri creolized cultural histories are more complex than such representations suggest (Macdonald 2001; see also Morris 1989; Keen 1994). In part, through policies of enforced separation, they have maintained an awareness of their cultural distinctiveness. Throughout this history they have sought civil rights, access to lands of their own to provide both security and opportunity, the right to work and protection of areas of importance to them.

Wiradjuri people have been and remain as concerned with their access to the resources of the colonizing and capitalizing new nation as they have been with maintaining the integrity of their own values and socialities, albeit in situations which have constantly required processes of transformation. When we adequately historicize the Wiradjuri, they do not emerge in any simple way as either passive victims or resisting agents. It is clear that, as individuals and collectivities, they have wanted to engage with the state in various ways at various times, especially through work and on the basis of the value they place on persons, which respects each person regardless of distinctions in lifestyle or status. When they have engaged, it has been their own understandings and values they brought to the meanings they made of their practice. It cannot be assumed that "working for the whitefella" is a move towards the disappearance assumed of the notion of assimilation. But it is their desire to be who they are that appears to be both the condition of and the impediment to their incorporation. In this they do not differ from the more valorized Aboriginal peoples of "remote" Australia. However, unlike them, Wiradjuri people are confronted with wanting to re-make their cultural presences in an environment in which they have long been defined as having no cultural distinctiveness at all.

After a decade of continent-wide demands for "land rights," legislation was passed in New South Wales in 1983 which seemed to offer a new form of incorporation that many Wiradjuri people enthusiastically embraced. Wiradjuri efforts over the following decade ended dismally but through events not of their own making. This Wiradjuri story is representative of a significant number of Aboriginal initiatives nation-wide. It shows many efforts to become better incorporated within Australian social and economic life, on terms which make sense to them but which, because they are dependent on government funding, are vulnerable to political change. The difficulty Aboriginal people are having finding meaningful modes of inclusion is partly but not solely explained in terms of the intersection of class and race in Australia. Watching their efforts and setbacks, I have found myself asking, what does "successful" incorporation even look like? What does it mean for Wiradjuri people to become incorporated *as Wiradjuri*? Is there room in this nation-state for *Wiradjuri* difference, except when it has been reduced to a set of objectified cultural symbols (flags, costumes, dancing, music, exotic foods) to be celebrated on National Aborigines Day or during international festivals? Wiradjuri difference is no longer radical, and is all the more complex for being only a few degrees of difference. Nevertheless, as their story demonstrates, there are discordant features of Wiradjuri lifestyles and values, including their demand to be treated as indigenous, which make the incorporation of even their difference unpalatable.

Since Australian federation in 1901, Aboriginal people have been categorized as *apart from* all other Australians, with their rights as citizens significantly curtailed by state legislation, including where they lived, who they married, what they ate and how much soap they needed. When they did not "die out" as anticipated, assimilation became the policy priority from the 1940s on, administered in practice by segregation and control. Civil rights activism eventually led to the end of this regime through the 1960s, and a change in the Australian Constitution in 1967 enabled, for the first time, the federal government to legislate on behalf of Aboriginal peoples. However, structural separateness was reinforced through a new need to identify a "community" through which federal funding initiatives could be channelled. "Community" became synonymous with a plethora of Aboriginal organizations that were established along bureaucratic lines to administer housing programs, health services, legal aid and so on. Aboriginal people may have been better serviced but they were not better included through these "progressive" moves. They were being better funded to remain apart. They could be "a part" only by leaving this world of difference and assimilating; by becoming part of an emerging national elite whose role it was to confer with government; or by commodifying and commercializing their cultural practices of design, music and dance (an option not available to many creolized peoples). These politics have, if anything, seemed to further exclude Wiradjuri people. Not different enough, not same enough, they have struggled to understand who they are in this changing scene—and, of course, approximately 12,000 people living across a vast region, and networked well beyond it, have a range of ways in which they can and do position themselves to make the most of their own opportunities. Many fault lines have emerged in the competition for much needed but inadequate resources.

Material conditions for Aboriginal people throughout Australia in recent years have improved, with federal funding enabling better housing in particular. Grants for artistic enterprise and tourist ventures have seemed, at least on the surface, to have brought a new social value to "being Aboriginal." But government largesse has not been able to stem increasing unemployment (up to 90% in some areas), falling literacy rates, and significant increases in substance abuse and domestic violence (including child abuse). Increases in "life-style diseases" such as Type 2 diabetes continue to defy health practitioners. These pressures have been building up over the past two to three decades and few Aboriginal people are immune to them. To avoid the downward spiral in rural communities suffering from long-term economic recession, some Wiradjuri people move to the cities—Sydney and Canberra are close and there are small rural cities within the Wiradjuri region that attract them. But even in the cities they do not necessarily fare much better, although they do have access to better resources. Rural economic pressures have certainly played a large part in an economy which is in the midst of significant change under neo-liberal policy. But Wiradjuri people might have been better able to withstand these pressures and take advantage of certain new opportunities the economy opens up had they been able to attain the greater economic and administrative autonomy they sought in the 1980s. How they tried, and why their efforts failed, is the story that follows.

A Case Study: The Wiradjuri Regional Aboriginal Land Council

My fieldwork since 1981 has focused on particular communities within the Wiradjuri region. This involved me in the events leading to the establishment of the Wiradjuri Regional Aboriginal Land Council (Wiradjuri RALC) in 1982 in anticipation of the *Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NSW)* passed in 1983. The Act, passed under the Wran Labor Government, provided funding over 15 years to develop enterprises on a land base to be acquired by grant (if unalienated Crown land) or purchased on the open market. Fifty percent of funding received each year was to be invested to provide an ongoing fund after the 15 years. The legislation initially set up a three-tiered structure of land councils: approximately 115 Local Aboriginal Land Councils (LALCs), comprised of all Aboriginal local residents, elected two members to 13 regions (RALCs), who in turn elected a 13-member State council (NSWALC). With 17 LALCs, the Wiradjuri RALC was large by choice: they did not want Wiradjuri communities split between regions (although two did opt to join other regions because of historical connections). The Wiradjuri RALC was a creation of legislation but it was also a grassroots movement of Wiradjuri people who were responding to land rights and civil rights movements in which they had long been involved. The 1980s represents "an episode" in their colonial history, in their story of cultural processes unfolding in specific time and place, as a vast network of close and distant kin took on this new organizational task.

The Wiradjuri RALC was widely recognized as successful in terms of the aims of the legislation, which were to enable local and regional councils to acquire land through grant and purchase, and develop businesses. They were proud of their successes, and explicitly concerned to use these to strengthen and reproduce *Aboriginal* social values and cultural knowledge. In its short but successful history as an Aboriginal organization, Wiradjuri RALC

gave tangible substance to the idea of "Wiradjuri" as a social and geographic region which had endured through time. As a regional organization, and within Wiradjuri LALCs, much activity saw office and commercial buildings purchased for city/town-based enterprises such as a motel, a bullbar, engineering business, craft centres, community halls and tourist enterprises. Rural properties acquired included pastoral properties, market gardens, and a drug and alcohol rehabilitation centre. Much needed Aboriginal housing was also a priority. This Regional Land Council was making the Land Rights Act work for them. It consistently produced clear audits and developed a team of staff who provided tangible research, administrative and financial support to its LALCs (see Macdonald 2004).

The relative success of the Wiradjuri Regional Aboriginal Land Council was due primarily to its founding by people who had always had regional networks (through regional ritual cults and later through the regional round of pastoral work). They had known each other throughout their lives and most members could trace some form of kinship or had worked alongside each other. This knowledge extended beyond the individual delegates from LALCs who sat around the Wiradjuri RALC meeting table. The positioning of these people in their various networks was known: their parents' positioning, their histories, and their local and regional politics. When one local member started "standing over" people in a Local Land Council, people knew it was her usual style but they knew how to deal with her and asked senior kin to pull her into line. The reputation of the RALC depended on its success in reigning in the excesses of its Local Aboriginal Land Councils as much as in its own performance. The RALC became a body that could demand accountability, could withhold funds, but could also "look after," along well-established cultural lines, and whose members individually or collectively could deal with people in culturally-familiar terms, knowing when to be tough, when to nurture, and when to despair—and when to call in the police.

Other RALCs had also been successful, notably the Western Region and the Far North Coast, but a number were not and, like many LALCs, were subject to accusations of mismanagement and misappropriation as people struggled to work with a very different set of social and legal demands. Problems were rife in the early years. At the local level there was little experience of business or organizational management. This was the first money Aboriginal people had ever had the opportunity to manage collectively. Even though it was a small sum (the first allocation was less than the annual average wage, and subsequent ones were about twice that wage), it looked huge. This prompted competition and conflict over its use. Inexperience left people open, both to unscrupulous white business people and to misappropriation (sometimes inadvertent, sometimes blatantly corrupt) on the part of Aboriginal people themselves. Amendments to the legislation in 1986 helped sort out most of the financial problems but the damage was done. Negative media coverage had played into the hands of the conservative Liberal-National Opposition, who vehemently opposed land rights. When the Greiner Liberal-National Coalition Government came to power in 1988, it did so with an explicit mandate to rescind the Act. Significant lobbying by RALCs such as Wiradjuri, by NGOs and churches helped to prevent this as the Government did not control the Legislative Council (the upper house). It took Nick Greiner three years but he eventually managed to pass amendments in 1990. These were radical but designed to appear as if they were only efficient and cosmetic. Public pressure would still not support the dismantling of the Land Council system, so the RALCs were kept within the structure—but stripped of their roles and functions. All property and money held by RALCs was transferred to the State body (LALCs were able to keep their property). The members of NSWALC, once accountable directly to the RALCs who in turn were accountable to the LALCs, were now elected on a region-wide franchise and were no longer answerable "down the system." The Land Council system had become the centralized, conventionally bureaucratized—and government-controlled body—the original design was meant to avoid. RALCs, including Wiradjuri, continued to exist only in symbolic form.

After the energetic years of lobbying to avert this axing of their accomplishments, the mood among Wiradjuri people through the 1990s was angry and defiant. They could access money only for meetings and for ten years this anger kept them lobbying for changes to the Act to reinstate their functions and have Wiradjuri properties transferred back to them. By the end of the 1990s they were resigned to their losses but not forgiving. But the energy had almost dissipated, New members of the token organization, elected at the local level to do they know not what, do not know this history or what the RALC has lost in economic, political and social terms. The transformation to a new era is almost complete and it is not toward the greater self-determination they were promised. People involved in the Wiradjuri RALC express this more eloquently than myself:

> Well, the whole thing's changed a lot now—for the worse. Terrible. Ah, well! We've lost a lot. We lost the Locals making decisions, that's what we've lost—and

the Region, taking the Region away. We used to make some ripper decisions! And the "get togethers," like at Dallows [restaurant and dance hall]! It's all gone, all that? All we've got is just these meetings and they're not the same.

How would I change it? You'd have to sit down and think, think back to what happened then—right back. Work it all out again. Try and do it again? But you can't! Can't go back. There's no substitute, see. You can't take it back because, well, you've got no freedom at all, like we had before. The government won't let the Region come back and have a say with the Locals again. Kooris'll never be able to run their own affairs with the State [NSWALC] having a different autonomy to the Locals, and the Locals? and this here Region? "statutory bodies"! If you want anything now, you got to ask the State—it's just like any Government thing, just like it. It could even be getting worse. Maybe DAA (Department of Aboriginal Affairs) will come in and take over the lot. [Noel Stanley, foundation member and office bearer in Wiradjuri RALC, talking to the author in 1995, Macdonald 2004:119]

In April 2004, nine years after Stanley's comments, the NSW State government sacked the NSW State Land Council and appointed an administrator. Early in 2006, the Government announced it would not be reconstituted until 2007 "at the earliest." This equated "to taking the lot" as Stanley predicted a decade earlier. When it was reformed in late 2007, it was with an amended Act which dissolved all pre-existing Regions, Wiradjuri included, in favour of four large zones, strengthening the top-down structure the original legislation had worked to avoid.

The following comments of Agnes Coe, a highly respected Wiradjuri woman who was elected annually as Chair of the Wiradjuri RALC for twenty years, convey some of what the Wiradjuri RALC and the return of property it enabled meant to Wiradjuri people. It was more than an organizational success. It was a recognition of their distinctive history, and a step towards justice.

Back in the 80s, and even after the amendments, I thought it was worth it because it created such unity amongst the Aboriginal people of NSW, and particularly among the people of the Wiradjuri country...Even with all the trouble with the Local Land Councils... That's where I think a lot of people went wrong. They thought it was like a welfare thing. One women said to me, "I don't care about Land Rights, all I want is a house." And of course the government—and a lot of Kooris—it suited them for things to go that way...

I used to honestly think, "Land Rights—what does it mean to Aboriginal people"? That we get all our land back? Is that ever going to happen? And then I would think to myself that, when the people came out here, the squatters and the powers that be, if Aboriginal people had been treated fairly then and they were given their share of the land to hunt and gather and live off the land and do what they wanted to do, and just let them adapt to white man's way whenever they wanted, not having it forced on them, I don't think we would have had near the problems, social problems that we've got today.

We were never given the opportunity to do things the way we wanted. If they'd left our forefathers with our land or given them their fair share of our land, I don't think they would have sold it because they would have handed it down to their children, and their children would have been taught to live off the land and to have an association with the land. But when they took all that away and just locked them away on missions, they were more or less just like prisoners...

For a long time they wouldn't allow Aboriginal people to get a decent education. I used to think to myself then, now why wouldn't they let us? And then when they did get an education and they started to learn what their rights were and that, then they were classified as black radicals! So I started thinking to myself, what the hell do these white politicians and white society want from us as Aborigines? Do they really want us to fit in? Do they want us to be a part of things, or do they just want us to be depending on them all the time?...

But I do think the region was worth while. We achieved so much... One thing that I was very moved by—in fact, I just went away on my own and cried tears of joy—was when we were able to purchase Ingleburn [a river frontage property of 35 hectares]. All my men, my family, like Leslie's father, they all worked down there. I got away on my own and I thought to myself, I wonder if they know that we finally own a bit of this dirt that they worked on all those years for white men. [Agnes Coe, Chair of Wiradjuri RALC for two decades, talking to the author in February 2003, Macdonald 2004:132-137]

Coe's questions strike at the core of the issues raised in this paper: "What the hell do these white politicians and white society want from us as Aborigines? Do they really want us to fit in? Do they want us to be a part of things, or do they just want us to be depending on them all the time?" In RALC meetings, people who were involved in the achievements of the 1980s, and the subsequent struggles through the 1990s to have their assets and their voice returned, would comment that "as soon as we get the ball, they change the goalposts." Another frequent comment, "it's always two steps forward, three steps back," became

the title for my ethnography of the Land Council (Macdonald 2004) which Wiradjuri people involved found particularly apt.

Wiradjuri RALC was one response in a history of responses to the constraints and opportunities presented by the larger social worlds of which Aboriginal people in this area have been a part. Its success was possible because it drew on and transformed former regionalized patterns of Aboriginal sociality, organizing them according to new agendas. It was one response in a history of responses to the constraints and opportunities presented by the larger social worlds of which Aboriginal people in rural NSW have been a part. But in that its activities were also short-lived, it was another reminder that their colonial—postcolonial if you will—worlds are not under their own control. Aboriginal people in this region are well aware that the spaces they continually try and carve out for themselves may open up only transitory experiences of self-positioning. The operations of Wiradjuri RALC played themselves out in a political environment in which there was much opposition to introducing land rights in NSW. But once introduced, how should we understand the dismantling of successful regional programs which seemed to be achieving all that was expected of them? Why was the lowest common denominator—LALCs and RALCs in trouble—the only criterion for evaluation? Why was the Wiradjuri region, commended by the State's Auditor-General, not used as a model to get others on track? Without wanting to deny the force of a history of racism, I argue that this is an inadequate explanatory paradigm. We need to go further to understand the structures of constraint of which racism is an expression.

The Australian state has incorporated many "others," from every continent and of every colour and creed. But it remains resistant to the incorporation of the "indigenous other" as a part of its "self"—it is not alone in this, Giroux's (2004) analysis of Canada being but one other example. Indigenous difference produces a resistance to inclusion on the part of the state which is distinctive and cannot be reduced to racism (although it clearly includes it). It is more akin to the fear of "reds under the beds" in the years of McCarthyism, or the contemporary fear of Islamic fundamentalism, both of which directly challenge the state. By state here I refer to both governments, national, State and local, as well as the more slippery notion of a hegemonic ideology of "being Australian" within which such governments govern. It is hard to justify placing the experience of the Wiradjuri RALC in such a category but what I do want to explore below is why this Wiradjuri appropriation of a new identity and positioning—which from their perspective promised but did not deliver a space for Wiradjuri autonomy but within an effective form of incorporation—was opposed. The Land Council system, glossed as a step towards "self-determination" (it was, rather, merely a form of self-management in line with neo-liberal efficiencies), sought not separatism but engagement. The development of economic enterprise would free them from the accountability which was the condition of their receipt of government-funded services. Such attempts to incorporate which "fail" are most often laid at the doorstep of indigenous peoples themselves: LALCs and RALCs did get themselves into trouble in the early years. While even the government acknowledged this was attributable to poorly designed legislation and lack of training, the media focus, promoted by the Opposition party was that they could not "manage their own affairs" and were "wasting tax-payers' money." Blaming the victim (the one who is "different") also subtly dehistoricizes, the inference being that incompetence or inability is due to "backwardness." The refusal is, rather, as Gledhill (2000:190) has put it, a refusal to recognize "that flesh and blood actors have to cope with structures of inequality, impoverishment and repression and make complicated choices."

The processes I describe for Wiradjuri RALC are being repeated in various parts of Australia, including in federal organizations. The peak indigenously-elected body, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), was disbanded by the federal government in 2004 on the grounds that it was "a failure of self-management." The ostensibly progressive *Native Title Act* of 1994, recognizing indigenous rights to land for the first time in Australia, has been progressively undermined by both amendments and political rhetoric. In this wider context, we begin to see the demise of the Land Council structure in NSW as inevitable, regardless of its successes. One federal structure after another has gone the same way. Within a settler nation-state, to understand these contradictions is to understand the limits of incorporation, and also the politics of producing and managing difference at one remove, as in separatist policies (such as the former reserves, or what is now called the "indigenous sector" (see Rowse 2002)). Even as indigenous difference appears to gain legitimacy in the everyday identity discourses of Australian society, the limits subtly, almost imperceptibly emerge to render indigenous people failures once again.

The nation-state as a political model has proved itself capable of withstanding the emergence of contested domains within it. The problems seem to arise when domains are set up which demand, or are seen to demand alternative forms of allegiance. The limits of incorporation

can be discerned in the state's rejection of ideologies and practices which deny its own legitimacy or challenge its right to the primary allegiance of its citizens. These limits need to be much better understood in the politics of producing and containing what Rowse (2002) calls, but problematically I believe, the "indigenous sector." Then I believe we can begin to understand why the Land Council structure in NSW had to be amended, regardless of its success, why ATSIC is now undergoing a similar process, following on from the deconstitution of two other national Aboriginal bodies before it, and why the *Native Title Act* has also been progressively dismantled and undermined.

The Limits of Incorporation in the Liberal Democratic State

Let me step back from the Wiradjuri RALC story and the contexts in which it played out to examine characteristics of the Australian liberal democratic state which make incorporation less desirable than is so commonly assumed. The nation-state as a political model has clearly proved itself capable of withstanding the emergence of contested domains, and some indigenous initiatives do not pose a threat while others do. Disjunctures arise in those spaces indigenous people seek to carve out for themselves which, implicitly or explicitly, seem to demand oppositional forms of *allegiance*. The limits of inclusion lie in the state's rejection of ideologies and practices which deny its own legitimacy, challenge its right to the primary allegiance of its citizens, and which impact on its control of resources: in other words, in *particular* practices or claims of "difference." Liberalism is realized through the shaping of a particular kind of citizen. It demands a form of "personhood" which requires that Aboriginal people relinquish their own. This is a far greater demand than is normally recognized in the exasperated responses to Aboriginal people who simply seem unwilling to "do the right thing." To do so may mean ceasing to be who they are and have been. Perhaps, in the long term, this change is as inevitable as it was in Europe centuries ago, but capitalism and liberalism's battle to colonize the hearts and minds of Aboriginal people is far from over and it will continue to be wrenching in its effects.

Formal Equality

The notion of democracy is enshrined in Australia in the notion of formal equality: one person, one vote. A political leader—Prime Minister or State Premier—is a first among equals, elected by a majority of those equals. Aboriginal authority systems, however, are more akin to the hierarchy of the judicial system, in which Supreme and High Court judges gain their positions from training, long experience and, significantly, from the fact that they are held in high regard. The respect that is attained by Aboriginal leaders, male and female, is specific to context and does not transfer to other contexts. It is hard won and easily lost, and is based on a lifetime during which one has "done the right thing" by one's own kin and one's people more generally. It requires that someone have access to resources—economic, political, sacred knowledge, health knowledge—which they distribute in culturally acceptable ways so as to "look after" their own. This is their "allocative power" (Macdonald 2000; cf. Austin-Broos 2003). Status in the white world does not count towards such respect—it can even work against one if a person tries to use it to claim authority locally. The social imperative binding people comes from the attractiveness, indeed necessity, of sharing economic and social resources, which mitigates against "independence" but encourages personal autonomy as the taking of responsibility for oneself and one's own. This balancing of autonomy and relatedness is well-known as a pivotal dynamic of Aboriginal personhood and sociality (Myers 1986; Martin 1995). This is not just a value or social difference, it is an ontological difference. Everyday life is and was organized along principles very different and at times in opposition to those associated with both liberal individualism and popular sovereignty.

The vast majority of Aboriginal organizations, including local and regional land councils, have been legislatively constituted on democratic lines, acknowledging no hierarchical system of authority other than that constituted by the legislation governing such organizations. One Wiradjuri woman reflecting on the land council system explained to me, "it's just a numbers game now." It does not follow that, because people have to vote for office bearers of a land council, that they respect this as a system of authority over them personally. It is a procedural necessity, often keenly fought over when perceived to have some "clout" or money attached to it, but it does not confer respect or deference on people who attain roles as a result unless that person was previously highly regarded (as in the case of Agnes Coe, cited above). When government agents negotiate with the Chair of a Land Council on the assumption that they "represent" the community in a democratic fashion, the agents may simply be compounding the contradictions (and often the internal conflicts) rather than, as they assume, deferring to people of influence. Many decisions go nowhere. Within the community, people know why. Beyond it, there is a perception of incompetence or of a lack of responsibility.

The notion of popular sovereignty does not admit of inherited or acquired elitism. Aboriginal hierarchies do not see all people equally nor accord them all equal rights when it comes to decision making (any more than liberal ones do in practice). Kin and country, seniority and sometimes gender all play a part in deciding who can speak for what and when. The historical realities of colonization have left some people removed from what would once have been their country, others have migrated in search of advantages. Not to be in one's own country is to implicitly be rendered a kind of second-class person vis-à-vis traditional owners. Migrants appeal to democratic values, pitching them against systems of authority, when it suits them. The hierarchical nature of Aboriginal authority systems are accorded some recognition by agents of the state in the "remote" ("traditional") areas of Australia but rarely in central New South Wales, where both "Aboriginality" and the continuing existence of "Aboriginal traditions" are contested by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike and where recognition of elders is non-democratic. This is compounded by recent popularizing of the notion of "elders" such that any one over 50 can call themselves an elder and attain a status among non-Aboriginal people which is not recognized by Aboriginal people. Colonial relations are complex.

Privileging "traditional owners" of country is also elitist. Kin and land are modes of value distribution not under state control and are inappropriate to the reproduction of responsible citizens. They can only be countenanced if they can be spatially and socially contained, for instance, in remote Australia. And even there they pose difficult "problems of articulation" (Austin-Broos 2003)—how much more so in central NSW, the premier agricultural heartland of Australia. People with authority based on country distinguish themselves from long-term residents or "blow-ins" and have traditionally been understood in a host to guest relationship. This does not mean that long-term residents cannot exercise authority or acquire respect: they often do. But it does mean that, when occasion demands, they are expected to defer to those whose country they are in. One would not expect them, for instance, to plan a trip to see local rock art sites, or to be making decisions about land use at the level of local government planning. Until recently a clear pecking order has been informally recognized and, in general, rigorously respected. It was such "grassroots people," or "wayback people" who got the Wiradjuri local land councils going. But in time, non-local people were elected, cutting across these cultural distinctions. New waves of conflict, disdain and disillusionment saw the burden of colonial subjectivity grow ever heavier.

"A fair go for all" is an Australian colloquialism designed to capture the notion of formal equality. When the current Liberal Prime Minister, John Howard, came into office in 1996 promising "to govern for all Australians," this was implicitly a *rejection* of difference in favour of the Liberal Party's more individualistic and conservative form of liberalism. As noted above, his government "mainstreamed" various Aboriginal-specific services, disbanded ATSIC, watered down rights under "native title," attempted to enforce the evacuation of Aboriginal communities suffering high degrees of violence on the grounds that it is the reproduction of "their culture" which is creating these problems and, in 2007, suspended the *Racial Discrimination Act* in order to exercise controls over land and incomes in the Northern Territory. Most of this is being done in the name of formal equality, a powerful argument, difficult for indigenous peoples to challenge, especially when waves of resentment against their "special treatment" come from poorer whites. Assimilation (by various names) is based on a requirement to formal equality which, as Neizen (2003:18) has pointed out for indigenous peoples more widely, contravenes their principal goal which "is rather the recognition of distinct collective rights...the ability to exercise self-determination, to develop culturally distinct forms of education, spirituality, economic development, justice and governance." Wiradjuri people have often demanded "justice and recognition" but, as Neizen's comments suggest, they want opportunities to share in the wealth of Australia on their own terms rather than those imposed by a conventional and homogenizing notion of citizenship. This is a desire for incorporation but not assimilation. Wiradjuri people are aware that "success" seems elusive because it also breeds resentment. Wiradjuri RALC fieldworker and later coordinator, Roley Williams, believes that Aborigines as "forces to be reckoned with" are not what governments desire:

> The Region really did bring people together before... They were all good meetings! You didn't mind the travelling to go to them, 'cos everyone was really friends in those days! After the fiery meetings, people got together and had a drink and a talk and that, they didn't carry it on after the meetings. They might all go in fightin' but then they'd go and have a beer after! People were really strong then. I think that's why the government put those amendments in, because they realized the Regions were getting strong and they were a voice for the local people out there.
>
> Well, I think they reckoned Wiradjuri was getting too big—too powerful! I think that's one of the reasons why those amendments, those changes to the Act were

made—to stop Regional Land Councils like the Wiradjuri. Even a lot of the other Regional Land Councils were jealous of Wiradjuri...because of all the things that Wiradjuri were doing—more positive things than any of them.

Wiradjuri really stuck together. They had a lot of really smart people on the Council itself. They were so strong—one people, really committed. All traditional Wiradjuri people they were...the "Old Guard" as I call them...the mob that was in there in the first two or three years, the ones that really set the foundations. They were there from the start, from Day One, and they're still there...The 1990 amendments have really turned the Act around. Whereas the local people did make up the Region and told the State [NSWALC] what to do, now it's the reverse. The State are telling the Locals what to do. And the Region's really there to...well, just tokenism again! They can't make any decisions. All they can do is meet and find out what's been happening. They've really got no authority to authorize people to do anything. It's just for people to see one another every now and then, to find out what's happening around the place. [Roley Williams, Wiradjuri RALC staff member, talking to the author in 1995, Macdonald 2004:121]

Significant in Williams' comments is his observation that governments do not want strong indigenous organizations which, even if only symbolically, might threaten government control, and also, as I discuss below, the cultural hegemony that is rural white Australia.

Representation

Formal equality is practiced as representative democracy, the basis of government in Australia. This is the usual structure imposed on Aboriginal organizations and to which they are required to adhere in order to receive funding. Annually elected officials and members of boards run these organizations but if the value of representation is not recognized, the decisions of such a body may not carry weight within a community regardless of its weight in the wider society and even when respected people lead it. Aboriginal people value their personal autonomy highly but asserting the right not to be "stood over" in their own cultural terms often leads to them being defined by government officials as "difficult" or "obstructive."

The contradictions of a colonial history do provide new scope for political manoeuvring. It might be expected that people without the kudos that country brings would draw on alternative means of acquiring power, such as activating "whitefella" law or procedure in their own interests. Using majority rule, without the prior community consultation which might make it justifiable, and claiming this as democratic, or calling the police when things are not going one's own way, are common strategies to both maintain and acquire power. These were common ways that conflict arose within LALCs, which Wiradjuri RALC members, at one remove, were better positioned to help deal with (although they are no longer able to). Ultimately, however, people know that any form of Aboriginal authority is accountable to a white system which does not legitimize Aboriginal cultural understandings. Even in the most cohesive of communities, authority based on respect has been worn down to the extent that it is now almost non-existent. This then plays into the hands of politicians who say Aboriginal people cannot manage their own affairs. The federal government has attributed the difficulties of self-management and escalation of violence in recent years within Aboriginal communities to the persistence of "culture" and has proposed that this be systematically discarded in favour of "Australian values." There is little mention of the high unemployment and lack of economic opportunity confronting a majority of Aboriginal communities experiencing the violence of "social sickness."

Individuals or Autonomous Persons

Linked to the idea of liberal democracy and exacerbating the tensions already mentioned is the notion of the individual. One might expect that the notion of equal value placed on individuals would mesh better with the value Aboriginal people place on each person as being of equal worth. But here, too, is a slippage—and perhaps a paradox. The significant contrast is not between individual and communal rights, as is often assumed in policy making (as in community-owned land under land rights legislation), but between the cultural notion of the individual which must be distinguished from the high value placed by Aboriginal people on personal autonomy. The intrinsic worth of an Aboriginal person is embedded in the notion of autonomy, and a person's right to be themselves, to take responsibility for themselves, not to have to conform to others' expectations, and to speak for themselves. It does not allow others to "stand over," or to represent them without that person's express consent or direction. Autonomy is defined in relation to the social (a specific kin-defined not generalized social) not in contrast to it. Someone who cannot take responsibility for themselves is *narrabung*, the former meaning of which was an infant's carrying basket. It refers to the state of being dependent, as with the very old or very young. Even very young children can seem to have a remarkable degree of autonomy (see, for example, Bell 1983). No one has a right to tell others what to do or to make decisions of their behalf without their express consent.

While there is no pressure to conform, in real terms one does or one cannot remain a part of the social, which is where the responsibility for oneself as part of that social comes in. No one should expect others to take care of them unless in infancy. Even the aged may find themselves neglected if they can no longer command respect or allocate valued resources. This is simultaneously a close and caring world and an apparently ruthless one. For countless centuries, the autonomy–relatedness tension has worked well. It is now seriously out of kilter (Macdonald 2000; Sutton 2001; Austin-Broos 2003). This value placed on each person's right to be different (even if this choice means "messing up" their lives) is undermined by the requirement in a representative democracy that one respect the majority, and accept the notion of representation, even being represented by people who are completely unknown. The majority vote is supposed to carry with it a mandate by which a representative may act or speak on behalf of others. While Aboriginal people participate in this system, sometimes it looks more like a game, going through the motions, because the values under-girding the system are not respected. The resultant conflicts tell us that Aboriginal values are alive and well—and that they do not necessarily translate "democratically."

The Wiradjuri RALC worked more effectively than many of the local land councils within the region. Conflicts emerging at a local level were often mediated by the region. Why the difference? First, the region was a step removed from the intimacy of kin relatedness and accountability but, in addition, others around the regional table did not and could not contest the right of delegates around the table to speak for their local communities. It could be assumed they had been accorded this right. However, at the local level this was harder to manage, except in those communities where people of long-standing local authority were elected to LALC positions. In the early years, this was often the case, as it was "grassroots" people who had got the system off the ground. But, as Valerie Simpson, a Wiradjuri woman from Cowra remarked to me, once the money started flowing "blacks started coming out of the woodwork." It was an apt description. Not only were those who had previously chosen not to involve themselves coming to the fore in the hopes of largesse, but so too were people who, for many years, had not identified themselves as being of Aboriginal descent. They were people who could and had attributed their somewhat different appearance to being of, for instance, Indian, Melanesian or Polynesian ancestry. This enhanced their status in the context of Australian racism. But these "born again" people, as they were called, had removed themselves from the cut and thrust of daily life, the demands of kinship and demand sharing, and the ever-present tension between autonomy and relatedness. They were more often attuned to the "whitefella way." Ambivalence and often bitterness emerged as the grassroots people saw the opportunities they had worked for being taken over by "other mobs" who had not wanted to be around "when it might have meant being kicked in the guts" in land rights marches and scuffles with police.

The current Liberal federal government, and the Liberal parties at federal and State levels, have consistently opposed "special rights" or collectively-oriented programs for Aboriginal people. Inclusion means self-reliant *individuals* (see examples in Watson 2004:577). "One Australia," "one nation," "governing for all Australians" are statements countering claims to both indigenous rights and special needs. The pressure is assimilationist, the methods are increasingly authoritarian. The Labor–Liberal political divide in Australia is better understood as one between socially-oriented liberalism and individually-oriented and more conservative liberalism. A State Labor government introduced the New South Wales land rights legislation, a Liberal government emptied it of content. But while the Labor Party has been more prepared to acknowledge indigenous rights and needs, it does so cautiously. It has not found a rationale for indigenous rights which the populace has been prepared to support (except, perhaps, for a short period in the late 1990s). Indigenous affairs is governed with a heavy hand because it requires a commitment to the maintenance of a set of contradictions ("difference") within the state. Both major parties shy away from its demands when they can.

Citizen or Kin

The notion of the individual as citizen raises the issue of kin-based socialities. For Wiradjuri people, doing things "our way" often means using accustomed pathways of kinship in accessing and distributing resources and opportunities. In a kin-based world, every autonomous person is also a social self, inseparable from rights, responsibilities and obligations to particular others. It is to be expected that a market society would have difficulty with a kin-oriented world. Austin-Broos (1996) has written of the disjunctures of morality which stem from the incompatibility of these very different social worlds as they interact and why it would take any fewer generations to change indigenous ontology and social values than it did in the tumultuous centuries it took Europe to become liberal and democratic. Aboriginal kin-oriented worlds have proven resilient to state-modification, in part because they were shielded by their spatial segregation, but also

because Aboriginal people often do not find the individualizing socialities of modernity attractive. While in parts of Australia which are more intensely occupied, like Wiradjuri country, Aboriginal people have been subjected to enforced change, most, in some way or another, still straddle different worlds as their daily experience. Negotiating such conflicting demands can be extremely stressful (see, for instance, Austin-Broos 2003).

Stanley Diamond's (1974) model of the state as concerned to impose its modalities of being on resistant kin-based communities is applicable here (cf. Gledhill 2000: 23ff.). Even kinship, reduced to its simplest form as nuclear family, potentially remains a contested domain because of its power to reproduce persons and identities irrespective of the state, and Diamond pointed out the state's attempts, through civil structures such as education, to control the possible resistance which might emerge from this private domain. In the case of whole kin-communities, this problem is writ large. In the highly individualized forms of liberalism evident in Australia, the Anglo-Australian kin-community has effectively been reduced to a nuclear family, a small unit which does not pose a challenge like that of whole communities organized on the basis of kinship. As Gledhill (2000) reminds us, kin-communities are based on consensual authority embodied in custom rather than power relations embodied in law. This is not to argue that Aboriginal kin-communities had more humane or egalitarian forms of social control. Rather, it is a recognition that their continued existence, and the apparent value placed on the maintenance of "Aboriginal culture," challenges the power of the state to intervene in people's lives, to transform moral orders and to command primary allegiance. As Austin-Broos (2005) has argued, difference is transformed into moral deficit.

Wiradjuri kin-networks are not equivalent to "extended families" or "local communities." They incorporate hundreds of people across regions that are spatially and socially extensive. This is in large part what contributed to the relative success of the Wiradjuri RALC, but it contravenes the roles and relationships defined by legislative requirements, by the notion of representative government, and by the formal equality of all. State resistance to the moral order established within a kin-based society is to be expected: the imperatives to look after kin become nepotism and to distribute one's earnings with kin who do not work is irresponsible. Aboriginal modes of kin-based "demand sharing" (Peterson 1993; Macdonald 2000) are modes of distribution not under state control and inappropriate to the reproduction of responsible, independent and individualized citizens and wage earners.

The Aboriginal domestic economy is rapidly changing so that interdependence does not have the pull it once had. Individualized social benefit payments, the notion of a role that can be acquired (by democratic election) rather than achieved (through a lifetime of effort), and the ability to move to cities and absolve oneself of kin demands—all such practices erode the former imperatives of sociality and can result in autonomy "run riot," each person for themselves. Often referred to by Wiradjuri people as an increasing "greed," this unhappy convergence of the liberal ideal of individual rights with the value placed on personal autonomy and distinctiveness within the social tears apart the capacity of Aboriginal persons and socialities to reproduce themselves in coherent ways—with few people sensing why relationships are becoming exploitative, uncaring, as well as psychically and physically abusive.

Equality as Sameness

This discussion brings me back to the issue of difference and specifically the relationship between the worth of any person and his or her right to be different. Liberalism does not cope well with difference. In defining people as individuals, there is nevertheless a sameness about these individuals, and a common social standard by which their worth will be gauged, summed up in such notions as "civilized" or "the good citizen." Occupation, intelligence, education, appearance, ability, all these and more create their own hierarchy of distinctions (Bourdieu 1998). One's worth in a secular society is more problematic to negotiate than in a spiritually-defined world, in which it is pre-ordained by the fact that any person is already, from their conception, an expression of a creative ancestral life force (one's Dreaming). Wiradjuri people have not been able to reproduce their spiritual understandings through the 20th century. Nevertheless, two essential components of their transformed world remain constant: kin and country. People are constituted as persons within specific places and among a network of kin which will constitute their meaningful—for many their only—social relations throughout their lives. They do not have to achieve personal worth, they are born with it. They do have to achieve their full complement of rights, including the respect that will see them acknowledged as leaders, who are accorded a right to speak for specific significant others by those others. A Wiradjuri person is not going to be cast out because she is "on the grog" or a "no hoper" either. One's worth is intrinsic to "being kin," within intersecting communities of kin, within all of which one becomes a unique person.

Liberalism has an ambivalent approach to difference and conformity: it requires conformity at the same time that it extols tolerance and diversity, but the diversity it

espouses is more symbolic than actual. Australia has been generous in its migration policy in recent decades (with the exception of those arriving by boat) but the often heard refrain, that people are welcome "as long as they become like us" and "fit in with us," reflects an intolerance of different ways of life when these might seem to intrude or demand changes on the part of the "true blue" Australian, who is still of Anglo origin. Various social pressures are laid at the foot of newcomers including reasons for why people cannot get jobs, for why prices are rising or for why there is more crime. It is not difficult for politicians to use fear tactics to delegitimize the notion of "special treatment."

The Place of Property

While individual rights in property (of all kinds) is the cornerstone of the Australian legal system, and thus its socio-economic system, the state asserts a valid jurisdiction over all its territory, including that owned by individuals (single or corporate). It has the right, if not always the temerity, to override individual rights. It is to be expected in a settler state, in particular one with no history of treaties, whether honoured or not, that indigenous claims to prior possession, calls for land rights, and the recognition of native title would call forth political and economic concern. The Australian High Court's determination of 1993, which became known as the "Mabo decision" after its instigator, Eddie Mabo, was the first legal recognition that indigenous rights pre-existed British sovereignty. As such, it clearly threatened the notion of "property" and thus the entire national legal and political edifice. The hastily enacted *Native Title Act* (Cwth) 1994 responded to what became known as "Mabo madness": near hysteria from Australians talking about losing their "backyards" to Aborigines. This Act protected non-indigenous interests in land, leaving a restricted allowance for indigenous claims. Aboriginal political activity, aimed at self-determination, land rights or native title, political or economic autonomy, or the creation of a treaty (a current demand of many indigenous Australians to better guarantee their rights), is often represented as "against the national interest," resulting in a "loss of land to Australia," or as not in the "interests of all Australians." *Indigenous* interests are not equated with *Australian* interests and are implicitly or explicitly cast as oppositional or antagonistic. Whether or not the threats are real, voicing them publicly is enough to create an impression of illegitimate "special treatment" or a pending economic collapse, both of which contravene Australian democracy's "fair go." Although Wiradjuri people worked in the 19th century as members of an emerging working class, it was never intended that they become new landholders or part of a landed social elite.

Since the early 1980s, Aboriginal calls for recognition of their sovereignty through the enactment of a treaty or, at least, constitutional change, challenge the legal legitimacy of the state, as illustrated in two court cases (*Coe vs Commonwealth* 1976, 1994, both brought by Wiradjuri people). Such demands need to be domesticated and rendered ineffectual by the state—as indeed they have been. Demonizing, sacking or sidelining radical or critical national Aboriginal leaders is a common strategy: they are represented as divisive of Aboriginal people. When the federal and State governments are the major employer of all Aboriginal people through an elaborate system of welfare-oriented "self-management" (what Rowse 2002 calls the "indigenous sector"), it should be of no surprise that governments have spent more money opposing Aboriginal demands for recognition of rights to land than it has spent allocating land, alleviating poverty or educational inequality, or developing sustainable economic opportunities. One has to conclude that what is defined as Aboriginal "oppositional" movements are, on the one hand, attempts to incorporate in distinctive ways, or, on the other, frustration at the lack of recognition that persists. In a nation-state with a strong historical commitment to a homogenized national identity—with the exception of two decades celebrating "multiculturalism" in the late 20th century—the recognition of legitimate difference in Australia remains elusive. Medal-winning Aboriginal athlete, Cathy Freeman, running a victory lap with an Aboriginal as well as a national flag at the Commonwealth Games was accused of denying her Australianness. On the other hand, this is the nation which refused to recognize Aboriginal service in both World Wars or admit Aboriginal service personnel into the Returned Services League (RSL) until the mid-1980s. Some might think there was no finer demonstration of the desire to incorporate than to volunteer (there has been no conscription for Aboriginal people but many have volunteered from the 1914-18 war on). Can this be attributed to "racism" when Australians of many non-indigenous colours and creeds were recognized?

Strategies of Denial

There is a slippage between "peoples and their rights" and "states and their advantages" (Maybury-Lewis 1997:136) which allows for indigenous Australians to be represented as working "against the national interest" even when this is irrelevant or untrue. So, is it the case that indigenous people, by definition, can be assumed to differ from other citizens in that their primary loyalty is

not to the state? Are indigenous peoples a "threat" to the modern settler nation? There is no doubt that they are at least a festering sore for various reasons, not the least of which is the increasing marginalization that is now following decades of ambivalence about their inclusion (and there are ample signs that neo-liberalism is exacerbating this to an extreme extent). It is made more difficult by the common assumption in Australia that nation-building and a strong state are one and the same. The presence of the indigenous colonial subject poses a particular problem for the homogenizing project of nation-building.

Two different strategies are evident in the history of dealing with colonial subjects in English-speaking settler states. The first involves a denial of difference through its erasure—accomplished quite literally through extinction or programs of eugenics, or socially through either spatial segregation or assimilation. All have been tried in Australia. The civil and indigenous rights movements have put an end to legislated exclusions but the indigenous subject is now othered in a different way, called upon to "perform an authentic difference in exchange for the good feelings of the nation and the reparative legislation of the state" (Povinelli 2002:6). An oppositional identity is legitimized but extended only to a symbolic other, rendering it external to the operations of the state. It is in this context that we can understood the contradictory government focus on, on the one hand, the Aboriginal person's "failure" to attain modernity epitomized in welfare-dependence, sickness and criminality, and, on the other hand, the celebration of Aboriginal arts and tourism, and the discourse of cultural authenticity. In either case, Aboriginal people are positioned outside the state. Given that an enduring theme of Australian mono-nationalism is the depiction of Aboriginal peoples as lacking the civilization or cultural characteristics taken to be those definitional of the hegemonic nation (cf. Handler and Segal 1993:5, who note that the hegemonic majority is dependent for its assessment of itself on the minority it denigrates), this lends weight to Povinelli's (1998, 1999) argument that this understanding of the Australian national self requires that Aborigines continue to fail, except as tourist draw-cards or, notably, in sport which can, in any case, be understood in terms of racialized characteristics.

The politics of indignity in the nation-state are struggles between the right of soil (based on a liberal universalism in which primordial individuals are united into an enlightened society based on rights and duties), and the right of blood (which divides the world into particularistic "ethnic" groups). It is here that we can begin to locate the limits of the liberal democratic state to deal with difference. Aboriginal movements of any kind have as their goal a political community alternate to that offered to them by the state at the time (cf. Breuilly 1994 on colonial nationalism). Local or uncoordinated movements pose little threat but regional movements have the capacity to turn into effective instruments of power which, in their agenda of difference and desire for at least less accountability to the liberal state, cannot be legitimized within it. The objectification and institutional containment of Aboriginal difference is a necessary exercise of power by a state that needs to enframe and secularize Aboriginality—indeed, as with other forms of difference which emerge, for instance, in migrant groups.

In the homogenizing project of the nation, people who "do not fit" are displaced and marginalized. This may take place on the basis of, for instance, ethnicity, gender, class and sexuality. In ethnic terms, "blacks" are easier to marginalize, the people referred to in Australia as "real Aborigines." As Mary Douglas (1984:67) said, "holiness requires that different classes of thing shall not be confused." But if blood provides the fiction of "race" and race, based on blood, binds the nation, settler nations have a dilemma. Whose blood, black or white, defines the nation? Thanksgiving Day in the United States of America is a remarkable coming together of indigenous and colonizer in a powerful nation myth, but there is no similar example in other settler nations. In Australia it has clearly been white blood that has been important and that is celebrated on Australia Day commemorating white settlement. Black blood was not only located on the periphery but its presence was seldom in the historical record at all until relatively recently. And how much more problematic has been mixed blood: the creole, the métis, the part-aborigine? In Australia, as elsewhere, there has been a history of attempts to limit coitus between racially defined categories of citizens, illustrating the conjuncture between race, nation and sexuality (Carnegie 1996:497). A threat is posed by those, such as Wiradjuri people, who jeopardize the continuity of nation as "race" because they are evidence of an inappropriate placement of procreative substances (the offspring of both consensual and enforced sex destabilize theories of race). Wiradjuri people are rarely dark-skinned, not fully of Aboriginal descent, and have lived with Anglo-Australians over a long period of time. They are no longer radically different and they cannot perform authentic difference even though many make efforts to respond to this agenda. Rather, their efforts are made in terms of their understanding of themselves as colonial subjects which challenges not only "race" but also the ways in which Australia has told its national history. The challenge to the state posed by them beginning to amass political strength

and economic power is not the kind of Aboriginal success story the state wants to celebrate.

Because Anglo-Australian whiteness is still the standard by which achievements and civilization are measured, Wiradjuri people find it harder to achieve—they are put on the defensive if they want to achieve in Aboriginal terms. The kind of disparaging comments the Wiradjuri RALC and other land councils experienced through the 1980s stem from the common set of fictions within the state's cultural conceptual system in which "pure essences" are affirmed and assigned a hierarchical order. This threatens the boundaries of whiteness. The difference constructed by the colonizer between "black other" and "white us" is uncomfortably unsettled by their presence. The white Aborigine is uncontainable, even more so now there are waves of people re-identifying and newly identifying as Aboriginal, people who previously defined themselves or were defined as white.

Status and the Proper Person

Indigenous incorporation also challenges entrenched systems of statuses and civility. Wiradjuri people, historically and now, have not just been engaged in shaping their identities. They were, from their perspective, engaged in shaping their status vis-à-vis other Australians, challenging and changing notions of privilege, ranking and prestige (cf. Handler and Segal 1993:6). They wanted what Ann Weldon, Wiradjuri leader, referred to in 1985 as "justice and recognition" (personal communication). The recognition was not to come that easily. In 1986 the *Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NSW)* was amended to, among other things, restrict claims to residential property. White land owners had complained that the value of their houses would decline with Aboriginal neighbours. Wiradjuri people often encountered negative, even aggressive, reactions to their "successful" purchases of land and property. Challenging a system of status is far more destabilizing than bland assertions of Aboriginal identity or cultural resurgence. In translating a government concept into practice, the Wiradjuri RALC was engaged in producing a new set of relations of power. They were not recreating either dependence or a new form of rural labourer. Rather, they saw themselves as emergent land owners and entrepreneurs. They managed this only in a small way—but the message was clear enough. They wanted the tables turned.

Returning to the Wiradjuri RALC

Wiradjuri people have not simply been reproducing themselves as persons throughout their colonial history. They have also been being produced according to other, and shifting, categories—as labourers, sexual objects, racialized others, an expense on the state, as inconsequential, cultureless, a nuisance or a threat. Even as "part-Aborigines" (never part-white), they were able to be excluded as a lesser other, but not being "real Aborigines" were not even worthy of the essentialized and primitivized identity that "real" Aborigines could claim as *legitimately* other. Axel (2002) is right when he maintains the state does not perceive the threat of the indigenous presence as being in terms of an enemy or even a different culture but as continually making visible "the tenuousness of the colonial state and its futures." The containment of Wiradjuri people illustrates what Axel refers to as "one of the basic ironies of colonial rule: that it produced the possibility of its own demise while setting the ground for the emergence of national and ethnic identities, those seemingly contagious hallmarks of modernity" (2002:18). The objectification and institutional containment of Aboriginal difference, even difference of a few degrees as in the Wiradjuri case, is a necessary exercise of power by a state needing to enframe, secularize and, hopefully, to commodify Aboriginality so as to ensure its own continuity. The state must measure its success by its ability to either fix difference outside itself or assimilate it into itself: there is little room to be "successful" as *Wiradjuri* people.

The "Aboriginal problem" which the state in Australia has deliberated over for more than a century is that they continue to exist. That brings me back to Agnes Coe's question, "what the hell do these white politicians and white society want from us as Aborigines? Do they really want us to fit in? Do they want us to be a part of things, or do they just want us to be depending on them all the time?" The answer is that they want you "as Aborigines" to disappear, to become like any other citizen of the nation-state, to eliminate the threat of a tenuous legitimation. There are always "others" on the margins of any socio-cultural–political world and imperialism and the reach of global capital have ensured that all states have "others" within as well as beyond. However, liberal-democracies espouse humanism, and there is the rub. Colonialism awkwardly required that the colonized other be made part of the political self. A new "scientific" theory of humanness developed to meet the need for a principle of exclusion: evolution, quickly followed by "race." Racializing theories allowed for exploitation, inequality and exclusion *within* a state, allowing liberal democracies to camouflage the contradictions on which they were based. Race theories sustained systems of power and reinforced class relations. In the 20th century, as these scientific theories were debunked, Aboriginality became defined in temporal terms, as the "traditional" and allochronistic (Fabian 1983)

other, but still in "the savage slot" (Trouillot 1991; Austin-Broos 1998): a kind of difference that could be contained.

Yet I am implying that racism, pervasive as it is and inextricably part of the liberal state's construction of itself, is an insufficient explanation of why and what liberalism excludes. That it does so, and uses "race" and "traditionality" as key strategies, does not explain *why* it excludes, and this can only bring us back to the hegemonic system of capitalist power that liberal democracy has so skillfully continued to disguise—which is the perduring character of capitalism which will always be "colonial" in its effects. Liberalism, as capitalism's moral order, needs moral legitimacy for its exclusions. This not only explains the continued efficacy and persistence of racializing models but also the ongoing discomfort of the settler nation. As Stanner (1979) once pointed out, the destruction of Aboriginal society was not the consequence of the development of the Australian nation but its price.

Liberalism maintains its currently extraordinary, even attractive force in world politics through institutions which recognize—but in such a way as to exclude—the process Povinelli (2002) calls "the cunning of recognition" (cf. Litzinger 2003). What she calls the "celebratory rhetoric of liberal multiculturalism" is undoubtedly unique and desirable, giving democracy, as Povinelli puts it, "its unique social vitality." But she also recognized that "that liberalism is harmful not only when it fails to live up to its ideals, but when it approaches them" (2002:11). Liberalism has its limits. There are intractable incommensurabilities which, when encountered, mark the boundary of possibility for inclusion. They are not based on culture or race but on hegemonic economic power. Where movements arise which might challenge this hegemony, even if only in symbolic ways, they must be suppressed. Cultural difference or waves of unpleasant racism are manageable, even desirable ways of explaining and dealing with unrest because they, by default as it were, legitimize the status quo of who can represent themselves as genuinely concerned for the other experiencing cultural violence.

For Wiradjuri people to claim Aboriginality is to be rendered a double failure: they are neither what the state legitimizes as "real Aboriginal" nor are they the "good citizen." If distinctive Aboriginal ways of being in the world are incompatible with the state, then indigenous social policy can do no more than alleviate the distress caused by the destruction of one by the other. The price is still being paid. Thus the "ambivalence" of Silverstein's (2002) "enduring colonialism" lies in the refusal of the adherents of liberalism to acknowledge the limits of liberal democracy's incorporative willingness, because, in doing so, they would have to acknowledge its ongoing history of destruction and suppression. This leads Povinelli to speak of the state's issue with "repugnance" (2002:6ff) but it is more a matter of the state being unable to incorporate that which challenges its very self.

The conceptual unity of the nation is based on its imagined sharing of history, language and culture. The homogenizing this involves supports pressures for conformity at the same time that it encourages oppositional movements (Gledhill 2000:17-18). The almost complete lack of any economic autonomy on the part of indigenous Australians gives governments an extraordinary degree of control because all programs to benefit indigenous individuals or communities are channelled through state bureaucracies. The state even pays for indigenous legal challenges against itself, for instance, contested land claims and native title cases, and compensation for child removal. When an Aboriginal organization gets too political or outspoken, it is simply defunded or restructured, as in the case of the Aboriginal Legal Service in Sydney—commenced by Wiradjuri people in 1972 and the first indigenous organization in Australian to gain NGO status at the United Nations. Indigenous rights and sovereignty were central to its platform alongside its concern about a racist legal system and the over-representation of Aboriginal people in jails.

Maybury-Lewis (1997:136), reviewing the French tradition of liberalism within which, as a state develops, its citizens are expected to be "more reasonable and rational" and to "abandon their traditional ethnic attachments," points out that ethnicity was expected to vanish (1997:132). This is the path to the destruction of cultural difference: liberalism has always had its "despotic" side (Valverde 1996) evidenced in policies of enforced assimilation. Nevertheless, Maybury-Lewis seems optimistic when he says "the world has woken up to the fact that ignoring or denying ethnicity will not work." However, he underestimates the move to neo-liberalism and its redefinition of the citizen, a move that sidelines cultural and social difference and diminishes democracy. Neo-liberalism redefines the citizen as client or consumer, moving from a social–political definition to an economic one. It supports an economic policy which is socially exclusionary. While it is already provoking resistance in some parts of the world, its destabilizing of industrial relations enforces conformity because people worry about their economic futures (see Bourdieu 1998). At present, Australia's welfare system is still sufficiently robust to camouflage the extent of increasing Aboriginal economic marginalization, and the recent tolerance of racism (in the name of keeping out refugees who are described as "illegals") makes it politically palatable to blame Aboriginal

ghettoization on Aboriginal people themselves. However, it is evident that this is the tip of a much bigger iceberg: hegemonic categories of race, class and gender are re-emerging and will make more visible the structures of (colonial) power which persist within liberal democracies. The evidence to date is that neo-liberalism will more conspicuously use its power to contain ethnic difference, demands or dissent, as the treatment of refugees and Aboriginal political movements indicates. In fact, it is liberalism's history of using coercive means of controlling certain populations that highlights both the limits of inclusion but also the success of its rhetoric over time. It is not difficult for liberalism to create a fearful or lesser "other" when occasion demands, which is precisely why racism is so integral to it.

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Note

1 Australia is a federated system of States and where this level of government is referred to, State is capitalized. When state is used in its wider reference to governance it is not capitalized.

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The Cultural Politics of "Community" and Citizenship in the District Six Museum, Cape Town

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Abstract: This paper examines the representation of "community" in the District Six Museum, and its deployment in citizenship struggles in District Six and Cape Town. It discusses the connection between the Museum's participatory project of memorialization, and its positioning in relation to the land restitution and redevelopment process in District Six, as well as in urban reconstruction in Cape Town more broadly.

Keywords: District Six, community, citizenship, land restitution

Résumé : Cet article examine les représentations de l'idée de "communauté" dans le musée de District Six et le déploiement des luttes relatives à la citoyenneté à District Six et à Cape Town. L'article traite aussi des liens entre le projet participatif de commémoration du musée et la prise de position de ce musée sur les questions relatives à la restitution des terres et aux processus de redéveloppement à District Six, ainsi que sur la reconstruction urbaine à Cape Town de façon générale.

Mots-clés : District Six, communauté, citoyenneté, restitution des terres

> What had to be collected was, in fact, this intangible spirit of community. The Museum is attracting people who care and want to understand what was destroyed in the name of "community development" and what needs to be done in terms of community redevelopment. [Prosalendis et al. 2001:77]

The District Six Museum (D6M) has achieved considerable international repute for its work with memory in the context of displacement. It prides itself on being a "community-museum," first and foremost dedicated to those who suffered the trauma of being forcibly removed from District Six as a result of past laws and practices of racial discrimination. It was founded by a highly committed group of activists and intellectuals on the eve of apartheid's collapse, and in the dawn of a new era opened its first exhibition in one of the lone, standing churches spared from the bulldozers. Some of the key elements of this exhibition were a large floor map of District Six onto which former residents were invited to write, as well as the original street signs—remarkably acquired from one of the men who bulldozed the area. These elements continue to occupy centre stage in the Museum in its new location on the boundary of the district, and—along with a range of other elements largely consisting of artifacts contributed by ex-residents and sympathizers as well as media that capture "the voices of the people"—provide "a focus for the recovery and reconstruction of the social and historical existence of District Six" (Delport 2001:11). While the D6M is often admired for its innovative ways of obtaining the participation of District Sixers in its project of memorialization, there has been less attention to and study of its broader position in processes of land restitution and urban reconstruction—the focus of the present paper.

District Six was a high-density neighbourhood adjacent to the Central Business District of Cape Town that consisted of a largely low-income population. It was

racially diverse, but the majority of its residents were classified "coloureds"—a residual racial category designating a very diverse group of people who were not considered "white" or "African" or "Indian" but somewhere in between.[1] District Six was proclaimed a "whites-only" area in 1966, after which the majority of its 60,000 odd residents were forcibly removed progressively until 1982 to the barren and windswept Cape Flats, although many African District Sixers had been removed dating back to the turn of the 20th century. Removals were carried out by the cynically titled Department of Community Development, which rationalized that District Six was a dilapidated slum, and that moving people to state housing projects on the Cape Flats contributed to their "social upliftment." In fact the overarching rationale for the removals was not just to expel blacks from the city centre, but to excise the fact of heterogeneity and hybridity of which District Six was emblematic. Today a large portion of District Six remains undeveloped, lying empty as what is often referred to as a scar in the centre of the city. The apartheid government was largely unsuccessful in its bid to turn District Six into a white residential neighbourhood due to concerted opposition first from the popular sectors—who made the case known internationally—but also from developers and corporations—who did not want the mark of District Six on their name (see Soudien 1990). However, due to the construction of the Cape Technikon (a post-secondary college), some wide boulevards, and a few other smaller developments, only about 40 hectares (le Grange 2003:6) of the original 90 hectares is left for urban reconstruction.

With the possibility of moving a large population of low-income people who formerly were racially excluded back into the *centre* of the city on prime real-estate, District Six represents a prize-case for the ongoing land restitution program. However, the majority of restitution claimants have thus far opted for monetary compensation instead of eventual resettlement in District Six. Nevertheless, the District Six Beneficiary and Redevelopment Trust (D6BRT)—which formally represents claimants—and the D6M are actively campaigning to increase the numbers who will resettle, and it is hoped that some 4,000 homes will be built on the remaining vacant land in District Six, mainly for settlement by ex-residents. This entails a huge development effort—a *re-development*, since its ultimate aim is ostensibly to rebuild "community."[2] Consonantly, the fundamental signifier of the work and identity of the D6M is the community, consisting of ex-residents of District Six.

As Coombes notes, promoting community is the predominant way in which government expenditures are rationalized in the South African public heritage sector. She argues that this can be seen as "a genuine attempt to incorporate a more representative multicultural diversity in many aspects of public life but can also be a slipshod way of 'managing' the more contradictory and potentially troublesome aspects of cultural and political diversity" (Coombes 2003:4). In the District Six case, an older idea of a diverse—"multiracial" and "multicultural"—community is seen as offering normative guidance for a new South Africa dealing with the deep-seated wounds of segregationism, and as a potential impetus for transcending hardened group identities. Such an idea of community can also in part be seen as animating a political project spearheaded and led by a certain minority. Since the formation of the Museum, and the advent of the land restitution process, community in District Six has been an instrument of political mobilization, and the context for citizenship struggle.

It is important that the conception of community in the Museum is anything but uniform and stable over time. This paper begins by examining the history of the politics of community in the D6M. How has community been conceived and manifested at different times of its life span, and what were the factors producing such outcomes? In keeping with the central concern of the analysis of community in anthropology (Amit 2002:42), these questions are in the first instance about *incorporation*—about the symbolic construction of community (Cohen 1985) as a vehicle for complex forms of social inclusion and exclusion. The analysis of community leads, in turn, to a broader line of analysis framed in terms of citizenship: in its political engagement with those it designates as part of the community, as well as other actors, how does the Museum influence emerging patterns of urban citizenship? To address this question, it is necessary to analyze how, as a structured "participatory" space of memorialization, the Museum has positioned itself vis-à-vis the land restitution process, as well as within a broader arena of citizenship struggle.

I shall demonstrate that the D6M—along with the D6BRT—has increasingly come to symbolically position itself as the social and cultural epicentre of the community of District Sixers at large, and indeed as the very place of community in the absence of the real thing. This centralism is reflected by what I take to be the most pivotal component of its interior material culture—a large street map of the former District Six on the museum floor—which supplements the remains of the destroyed neighbourhood adjacent to the museum building. However, I shall contend that the community which the Museum most clearly serves to anchor consists of a relatively small core group

of District Sixers and activists and intellectuals—some of whom are ex-residents—among whom a more or less cohesive ideological framework informs a relatively well defined political project. Following Handler and Gable's lead, I see this hegemonic project of the museum not so much the product of ruling "interests" as of a set of "assumptions and entrenched cultural patterns" (2000:221) born of the history of political activism of this core founding group. The centralist orientation of the Museum has much to do with its historical and ongoing positioning as a cultural and political vanguard for the transformation of the apartheid city. In working to assimilate District Sixers at large to this project in the particular terms of a small group of activists and intellectuals, and thus to a particular conception of community, I suggest that the Museum risks effecting a new kind of social exclusion. This is because the reality and ideological dispositions of the majority of District Sixers stand to be misrepresented—as proxy representations of community are wont to do (Bourdieu 1991, 1997).

Community and Citizenship

The relationship between community and locality has become increasingly complex as efforts at "place-making" have intensified in the context of increasing displacement and deterritorialization in late modern society (Gupta and Ferguson 1997:41). While primordialist or essentialist approaches have now widely been discredited in the social sciences, the alternatives continue to be problematic. Barth's treatment of community as a situationally based form of identification whereby putative cultural differences are organized according to social boundaries that are established between "us" and "them" (Barth 1970; Verdery 1994:34-35), tends to take community identifications as merely arbitrary constructions occurring in a vacuum. A related alternative is Anderson's famous study of nationalism (1991) as a kind of "imagined community"—a community imagined as historically continuous and as consisting of a profound horizontal solidarity between nationals, despite most of them being unknown to one another. However, Amit cogently argues that in the concept's increasingly widespread usage to represent deterritorialized social relations (e.g., Appadurai 1996), it "has been stripped of much of its social and interactive content so that it looks increasingly like little more than a categorical referent, the possibility of attributing social connection without the complications of place, commonality or even regular interaction" (2002:36).

Amit also argues that both the Barthian and Andersonian focus on boundaries and exclusion distort what those who identify as community in most cases take as most essential: what "we" share, namely, a set of substantive social relations. Even in cases where the exclusionary dimension of community seems to be primary—where those deemed insiders would seem to have little else in common—the foremost problem for leadership is still the internal one of how to override division and dissent within in order to generate a sense of unity (2002: 60-61). Amit criticizes Anderson and Appadurai for assuming

> that if people imagine themselves, even when they do not know each other, to share a distinctive collective identity, then they can mobilize themselves as a community, and to move on from there to presume that to imagine community is already to constitute a community.
>
> To indulge, however, in this kind of slippage between personal network and social group, between category and collectivity, is to minimize the considerable difficulties of structure, logistics, persuasion, ideology and opportunity involved in constructing actual as opposed to imagined communities. [Amit 2002:24]

I would like to extend this critique to develop a more ethnographically situated critique of the way in which the construct of community is deployed towards political ends.

The concept of community can be seen as symbolically anchoring a sense of collective identity (Fardon 1987; Wilson 1993), thus concentrating and intensifying meaning in such a way as to stabilize the field of signification in a more or less durable way. However, to merely speak of community as a symbolic ground is to risk analytically abstracting what is most essential to community (a durable "structure") from social process, as in Smith's (1986) approach to *ethnie*. As Cohen argued (1985:12), the meaning of the term *community* is not merely lexical; *community* is meaningful in a more consequential way than is implicit in its *use* in social conflict. Attention thus needs to be paid both to the ways in which collective identity is symbolically *anchored* in community, and the social and political processes in which collective identities are practically manifested. I shall argue that despite claims to the contrary, the version of community imagined in the D6M does not line up with the substantive social relations amongst District Sixers at large, nor with the way in which they tend to "imagine community." The particular ways in which these levels relate at different times is important to understanding the changing nature of the Museum's political positionality.

How is community related to citizenship? In recent classically-inspired approaches, citizenship is defined as contiguous with the nation-state. Somers (1993) proposes

an understanding of the relationship between community and citizenship that is much more amenable to the present case. She challenges the idea that citizenship is "a status or attribute of a category of persons" that, in Marshall's influential formulation (1992), connects state and capitalism in a progressive expansion of rights. Citizenship for Somers is rather "a set of institutionally embedded social practices" which "are contingent upon and constituted by networks of relationships and political idioms that stress membership and universal rights and duties in a national community" (1993:589). She argues that "citizenship practices emerge from the *articulation* of national organizations and universal rules with the particularisms and varying political cultures of local environments (types of civil society)" (1993:589). The extent to which rules of national membership are turned into practicable universal rights depends upon the ability of civil society to democratically appropriate public spheres through a set of participatory activities.[3] In a similar vein, Isin and Wood move beyond the classical Marshallian approach to citizenship, as mediating the contradiction between formal political equality and social and economic inequality, to take citizenship as a *relationship* between legal status and social practice, such that it consists of "*both* a set of practices ... and a bundle of rights and duties ... that define an individual's membership in a polity" (1999:4). Citizenship is not simply opposed to identity, as universalism is to particularism, but rather bears historically specific relationships with processes of group *identification* (Isin 2002).

These overlapping ideas allow us to move beyond the fallacy of presuming that the problems of defining citizenship can be resolved theoretically or normatively, whether under the guise of communitarianism or liberalism (see Cowan et al. 2001; Cowan 2006; Young 1990). As a phenomenon that exists vis-à-vis dynamic social relations and political struggle, citizenship can only be adequately understood through a context specific analysis of processes of group formation and the articulation of rights claims by group representatives in the wider political sphere.

In the struggle for restitution in District Six in particular, community appears to stand in an intimate relationship to *local urban* citizenship: it is not just about a sense of belonging and identity, rooted in a common past; it is also about the expression of that sense of belonging and identity as a form of entitlement—namely, the right to symbolic as well as physical "return." At the same time, as a form of identification, this sense of belonging to a community is no doubt more primary than citizenship, and thus more deeply felt as the ground of commonality. The D6M and D6BRT tap this well of affective ties in consolidating and mobilizing community as the primary agent of citizenship struggle in the city. And yet community can not be discussed in isolation of public institutions and the state. In its particular form, the present understanding of community as a form of collective identity and agency arises in response to the possibilities generated by the process of land restitution as well as by the political struggle leading up to it. Community is the mediating construct linking the individual experience of relocation and oppression under apartheid with human rights-based nation-building in the "new" South Africa.

Towards the project of post-apartheid nation-building, the ANC (African National Congress) government set up two parallel processes to deal with injustices of the past: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission for the Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR), both of which are important for District Six. Both Commissions had, as their broad objective, bringing about justice, reconciliation and healing, although with different emphases and in different ways. The TRC's business was to establish "truth" by revealing past human rights abuses to an incumbent nation, while the CRLR's aim was to begin undoing the structural effects of the injustice of land dispossession under racial laws—at least in those cases involving development.[4] With the TRC now officially completed, it is debatable whether it succeeded in its goal of promoting "reconciliation" among the broader public and thus paving the way for a new nationhood (Wilson 2000). However, its privileging of individual oral testimony and witnessing as the building blocks of a new post-apartheid national history had significant consequences for how history was perceived in certain public domains, such as in museum practice and debate (Coombes 2003:10). With regards to the CRLR, on the other hand, the process of land restitution is still far from complete. The much slower rate of delivery is due in large part to the tremendous complexity of bringing about effective restitution, particularly when this involves negotiating and planning a large scale development effort, such as in the case of District Six (see Beyers 2007a). From the vantage point of the national discourse on reconciliation and development, District Six is to be a model for rainbow nation-building and to contribute significantly to the goal of transforming and reintegrating Cape Town, one of the cities where the legacy of apartheid continues to be most clearly in evidence.

The Museum's vision is broadly consonant with this discourse, with some important qualifications. The political persuasion of the majority of Museum-associated intellectuals is ideologically rooted in the non-racialism move-

ment in the Western Cape, and the Non-European Unity Movement in particular.[5] Due to this background, their orientation is to be distinguished from the dominant perspective of multiracialism that characterizes the official rhetoric of nation-building. While Museum-connected academics also promote a "human rights culture" in the context of nation-building, they insist that the experiences of different racial groupings can not be addressed separately, since their very social and politico-legal definitions emerged as part of the same history of social construction.

The District Six Museum as "Centre"

The Museum was the product of a relatively cohesive group of highly politicized activists and intellectuals, which were born of the struggles of civic associations in the 1980s, as well as of the direct opposition to redeveloping District Six in the "Hands Off District Six" (HODS) Campaign. Activists and intellectuals associated with the HODS alliance—consisting of 21 organizations—rallied together in 1988 against the proposed redevelopment of an "open residential area" by the multinational company BP (South Africa), objecting that any such initiative would be palliative while certain basic demands such as lifting the State of Emergency and releasing detainees failed to be met (Soudien 1990:172). Among the many determinations of this meeting, two key ones were to establish a museum in honour of District Six, and to publish a book on the history of District Six. The book, *The Struggle for District Six: Past and Present*, proclaims "the demand that the people of District Six, having once before been the victims of callous bureaucratic and politically-inspired diktats, make their own decisions about the fate of the area" (Jeppie and Soudien 1990:12). The book's authors saw District Six as a symbolically contested space that could not be reduced to single or essential truths—an approach which continues to characterize the dominant intellectual vein of Museum-associated thinking to the present.

The District Six Museum Foundation was established within a year of the HODS-organized meeting, and included trustees from HODS, the Ratepayers and Residents' Association, the Roman Catholic Church and the Methodist Church. The Museum's Board of Trustees continues to act on behalf of the Foundation to ensure that the Museum abides by its democratic and participatory founding principles (Terrence Fredericks, personal communication, June 28, 2005).

A banner that has been hanging from the balcony of the church building in which the Museum is housed reads: "In this exhibition (museum), we do not wish to recreate District Six as much as repossess the history of the area as a place where people lived, loved, and struggled." The "repossession" is framed as a participatory and interactive process—as a process of active *incorporation*—in which "community members" are relied upon to reveal the past. A democratic vision lies at the heart of the Museum's exhibition policy, which is

> fundamentally about finding ways of incorporating the subjects of the stories of District Six—the people themselves—into the exhibition process. In the process, attempts are made to have people participate in the decisions about how they are to be represented. The past is not so much an archive awaiting unveiling, but a tapestry on which individuals and groups are able to inscribe themselves. They announce their positions and interests and take responsibility for their self-portrayal. [Prosalendis et al. 2001:85]

The Museum has sought to promote popular participation as a source of renewal and innovation, to guard against the iconization of its exhibits. Indeed, it relies on former residents of the area to reveal the past, and thus in a sense to co-author a composite sense of the past as a work that is continually "in progress." The intention is that aesthetic forms will be generated, or at any rate influenced, by popular expressions of the experience of removal, and that these will continually inform and subvert the interpretive frameworks of academics, curators and artists (see Delport 2001). At the same time, the frameworks of the latter are taken to contribute a "self-critical and reflexive pedagogy," where the concern is "to examine the different modalities, methods and discursive strategies employed by different knowledge genres" (Mpumlwana et al. 2002:256).

There is, then, an implicit tension between the intellectual and the popular. While academics, curators and artists have been concerned to emphasize "a society of 'many cultures' and a history of 'great lives of resistance and reconciliation'" (Rassool 2001b), popular understandings tend to be more apolitical, and to read cultural diversity in more static and unproblematized ways. While there is general agreement about the District's ethos of mutual support and generosity and its lively informal street culture, there is much less agreement about whether it was truly as "harmonious" as many popular narratives have it, or whether it was rather a place where identities were negotiated in complex and shifting ways, sometimes with attendant forms of social and racial exclusion. Now, the kind of detailed ethnographic study by Handler and Gable (2000) of how different "theories of history" are manifested at and translated through various institutional levels in various ways is beyond the scope of

this paper. However, it can minimally be asserted that there are significant differences of interpretation of the role of the museum in relation to community within the Museum itself, among, for example, "front-line" workers on the floor, artists, and academics. Nevertheless, a sense of common purpose and unity is maintained by the common foe: the brutality and inhumanity of those who destroyed District Six. Against the apartheid state's rationalization that District Six was a dilapidated "slum," there is general agreement that instead the District was rich in "community spirit," a spirit which continues to live, against all odds—although there is little agreement about what this means for the future.

The Museum achieves internal coherence by promoting itself as a centre for and of community, as well as the leading edge of a common cause. According to the D6M's guiding policies, it is a "heritage project" that "offers itself as a centre for former residents of District Six and others to recover, explore and critically engage with the memories and understandings of their District Six and apartheid pasts, for the purpose of remaking the city of Cape Town" (D6M n.d.).

One might interpret *centre* in several ways. The more obviously intended meaning is a space of convergence for the purpose of memorialization. In this respect, it is not only—or even primarily—a meeting space for former residents. As a primary contact zone (Clifford 1997) in the city, the Museum acts as a space of convergence for the production of knowledge about the past in the service of a postcolonial and democratic future, but also as a space of tourist consumption.

A second meaning of *centre*, which shall be elaborated in the next section, is as an anchor for community: the Museum has positioned itself not only as the prime agent for reconstructing a social history of District Six (de Kok 1998:63), but as the central place for community, a place where community happens. Indeed, in the absence of the "real" District Six, it posits itself as *the* locality *of* community—where it is housed in the interim. As some of the leading figures in the Museum put it:

> What had to be collected was, in fact, this intangible spirit of community. The Museum is attracting people who care and want to understand what was destroyed in the name of "community development" and what needs to be done in terms of community redevelopment. [Prosalendis et al. 2001:77]

A third meaning of *centre*, implied in the above quote, is political vanguard—in the struggle for restitution, but also in a broader struggle for urban citizenship. According to Terrence Fredericks, a prominent figure in the leadership of both the D6M and the D6BRT, the Museum's involvement in the land restitution process was initially incidental and loose, but it soon intensified and took on a central role in the negotiations about how to redevelop the District's vacant land (Fredericks, personal communication, April 12, 2001). Indeed, like Fredericks, a number of trustees of the D6BRT are trustees of the D6M. It was decided in the early years of the Museum that its primary political goal would be "to mobilize the masses of ex-residents and their descendants into a movement of land restitution, community development and political consciousness" (Rassool 2001a:viii). The Museum also provides infrastructure, resources and space for meetings by community organizations, and for official meetings relating to restitution. It was chosen as the site for the Land Claims Court's session to ratify the decision against the Section 34 Application under the Restitution of Land Rights Act (see below), as well as for the signing by key stakeholders of the Record of Understanding.[6] Moreover, by recording the history of District Six and promoting community, it acts as a platform for securing funding from national and international funding agencies. In 2003, the bottom floor of the newly acquired Sacks Futeran complex was established as a Homecoming Centre, a meeting place for ex-residents and other victims of forced removals, where assistance is provided regarding the settlement of claims and resettlement, and where functions related to redevelopment are conducted (*Voice of the Cape*, May 5, 2003).

Following on its active role in community-building and politicization, the Museum has served to lead and facilitate the D6BRT's push for concientization and building a culture of rights. Like the D6BRT, the Museum actively encourages claimants to opt for resettlement over monetary compensation and promotes the idea of non-racialism. According to Anwah Nagia, Chair-person of the D6BRT and the principal leader and inspirational figure in the struggle for restitution in District Six, the Museum acts as a cathartic space to unpack feelings of pain and loss, thus encouraging victims of removals to direct their trauma in ways that will be conducive to both healing and a politically constructive pursuit of redress. In his view, the Museum leads and facilitates the debate about the reconstruction of District Six, and acts as a sounding board for people's ideas about the future (Nagia, personal communication, June 14, 2002).

In more general terms, the Museum takes on a pedagogical role in seeking to promote a certain (broadly defined) vision of the city, which shall be elaborated shortly. The Museum has run a number of public educational projects and programs, and is a popular destina-

tion for school field trips, which are often framed in relation to Richard Rive's novel, *Buckingham Palace* (1986)—now a regular component of the English curriculum of many schools. At the broadest level, the Museum's public education programs are about transforming the nature of urban citizenship: "How does one develop creative, reflective, critical and resourceful citizens who value and respect humanity, culture and nature?" (September 2001:24). According to Crain Soudien, former member of HODS and one of the founders of the Museum, many elements of civility have been lost during the thirty odd years since the removals, and the role of the Museum is thus to resuscitate civility using civic resources from the past (Personal communication, August 22, 2002).

In the community-building practice of the Museum, the ideal is that three meanings of "centre"—meeting place, anchor for community and political vanguard—converge, and during large and symbolic restitution meetings with a critical mass of people and activity, this would seem to occur. These few cathartic and euphoric occasions are designed to generate the sense of a unitary community.[7] However, this is of course a partial take on the reality of the community. While the Museum was often a place of encounters between people who had not seen one another since their removal from District Six during the earlier years of its existence, such encounters have become much rarer (Personal communication, Noor Ebrahim, June 8, 2005 and Joe Schaffer, June 6, 2005). Moreover, in an extensive set of interviews that I conducted with former residents between 2001 and 2005, I found that while it was not uncommon to hear pride expressed at the existence of such a museum, the large majority of interviewees had spent little time there, and looked at it as a source of momentary nostalgic commemoration, a place of "old pictures and things" which "brings back memories." Their construction of community refers itself to a much broader ambit of social relations and symbolic referents than those actualized at the site of the Museum. Many had not visited the Museum at all. Indeed, tourists of various kinds comprise the majority of visitors to the Museum, with school children on field trips making up a significant minority (Personal communication, Joe Shaffer, June 8, 2005), and while some intellectual activists are understandably highly ambivalent about the effect of tourism on the Museum, most ex-residents saw the extensive tourist interest as a mark of pride and as something to be promoted further.

It is much more accurate to see the three meanings of *centre* as lining up for a particular small group: "community-connected academics—some of whom see themselves as 'activist intellectuals'" (Rassool 2001a:xi). To be sure, others have progressively been brought into the fold, but they continue to cohere around this core group with varying degrees of involvement. But this is not to say that the museum is driven by the "interests" of a set of rulers (Handler and Gable 2000). To be sure, there exists a hegemonic project, but I shall argue that it is animated by a set of more or less implicit understandings which link an emancipatory political vision born of a particular history of activism to a sense of belonging and community. Lucien le Grange, architect and technical advisor to the D6BRT, thus remembers the capacity of the Museum "to engineer a collective spirit and camaraderie amongst all who were involved with it," "to inspire a shared purpose," which "had as much to do with the prevailing political situation we found ourselves in, during the late 1980s and early 1990s as it had to do with the memory of District Six itself" (le Grange 2001:7). The stakes are defined in terms of citizenship: this sense of solidarity owes itself most practically to the project of restitution as a vehicle for claiming "rights in and to the city" (see Isin 2000; Holston 1999). And this, in turn, links up to a deep sense of collective identity, as le Grange claims: "in a strange way the Museum at that time gave some of us a sense of belonging—belonging not only to a memory and a history but to this city of ours" (2001:7).

A Place of Community

If, as I have been suggesting, the D6M anchors a particular community, it needs to be demonstrated how it is able to do so in symbolic terms through its material culture. Situated on the boundary of the ravaged District Six, the Museum acts to punctuate its landscape of absence and invasion. By trying to unearth and record memories of life in District Six, the Museum is working within a space of erasure: the ruins of District Six were, after all, tipped into the ocean. The Museum thereby stands in for District Six in its absence; better, the reality of the Museum *supplements* the real District Six.

In 1992 the Museum found a permanent home in the Buitenkant Methodist Church, and in December of 1993 it opened its *Streets: Retracing District Six* exhibition, which sought to provide an interactive space for ex-residents to reconstruct their neighbourhoods by focusing on the streets that made up the district. The most notable feature of this exhibition was a large plastic covered street map, onto which ex-residents were invited to inscribe their identity and the location of their former homes. This map, along with the recovered original street signs of District Six, a name-cloth, and a series of portraits of life in District Six, were the principal elements of the Museum's first exhibition. Space limitations preclude any compre-

hensive description of the material culture of the Museum,[8] but I shall focus on the map, which I see as most clearly demonstrating how the Museum works to "anchor" a sense of collective identity. The map has proved to be a tremendously successful medium for directly involving ex-residents who have etched the names and addresses of families and other places of significance on the cloth, but also have registered their sense of loss and suffering through written messages and poems around the outside.

Originally intended as a short-term exhibition, *Streets* became the core permanent exhibition due to its tremendous success, and it continues to cover the floor in the centre of the Museum. I would suggest that this is not just because it offers a highly innovative and participatory medium, but because it is such a potent way of "imagining community" in the context of dislocation and estrangement. Representation on the map has been a matter of contestation (Soudien 2001; McEachern 2001). Some Museum trustees have criticized the map for reifying the district as a bounded and self-contained space, and have attempted to encourage a self-critical form of engagement. Thus Vincent Kolbe, librarian and pre-eminent connoisseur of the district, emphatically avers that "District Six didn't have walls around it; we were Capetonians!" (Personal communication, August 7, 2001). Most former residents visiting the Museum, however, are content with a more reified interpretation, as it reinforces the idea of the special character of the District and community. The disagreement is never critical though, because even if intellectual activists construe community as a plural and multifaceted entity characterized by difference and contestation and porous borders, they implicitly posit its centrality. As Soudien puts it, "it is not a place apart. In some senses it is *the* place" (2001:125).

Streets has since been followed by the *Digging Deeper* exhibition, in which the Museum was concerned to "deepen our knowledge of District Six, to ask deeper questions, and to begin to look beyond the geographic space of the District" (D6M n.d.). Subsequently, a series of exhibitions, displays and initiatives that fall under a broad rubric of *Beyond District Six* have been and are still being undertaken. These have aimed to address other areas that were subject to forced removals, as well as areas to which people were relocated. Finally, a recent exhibition that focuses on Horstley Street is the basis for going both "deeper" and "beyond" (Personal communication, Donald Paranzee, July 14, 2005), since it deals with its history as the area in District Six from which the first removals of African people to Ndabeni occurred in 1901, as well as the last removals in 1982. This exhibition is linked to the intended formation of a "Cultural Heritage Precinct [which] will provide opportunities for communities to reclaim the city while also engaging with the legacy of apartheid on the Cape Flats" (Museum inscription 2005).

In spite of these developments, and the expansion of the Museum, the floor map—it seems to me—has been the pivotal element of the material culture of the Museum through most of its existence. The privileged vantage point in the Museum is the map at the centre from which one can see most of the other components. Even the "memory rooms" off the main hall and the exhibitions staged in the back room of the Museum have to be entered by first encountering the map. Moreover, the map most clearly embodies the supplementary logic of the Museum vis-à-vis the destroyed landscape that was District Six—where "supplementation" means both the addition of something to make up for a deficiency, and a "process of new knowledge acting upon prior (never total or sufficient) knowledge, and in consequence destabilizing it" (Battaglia 1999:120). Through its supplementary logic, the street map implies both a loyalty to the original and a certain inevitable rupture from it. Moreover, it bears an inherently frought and difficult relation to the future, as it implies a potentially powerful standard against which to hold the redevelopment of the area (or lack thereof).

District Six as Vanguard

I have suggested that the Museum's "centralism" ought to be understood as the outcome of a series of value orientations and ideological presuppositions carried by activists and intellectuals, and born of their involvement in a history of political activism. I now want to elaborate this with respect to two dimensions: its historical positioning as a political vanguard for broader causes, and its ongoing ambivalent relationship with the City Council.

The Museum came out of a broader anti-apartheid politics in Cape Town during the state clampdown in the 1980s, where, given that revolutionary movements were forced underground, legal civic associations that tackled local level grievances from inadequate housing to the segregation of sports clubs were used as fronts to criticize and undermine government processes, the local city council, and the local-level tricameral parliament. As Nagia put it, "District Six was one of the areas that we used as an agent of change and used as a shield to expose the apartheid government, and the local city council" (Personal communication, June 14, 2002). The Museum continues to self-consciously take a strategic and principled political stance. There is a central core of academics and activists committed to the "possibility of a non-racial community, as it emerges out of and is reflected in the history of District Six" (Rassool 2001b).

Perhaps the most eloquent expression of the general framework informing Museum practice is found in its Memorial Text:

REMEMBER DIMBAZA.
REMEMBER BOTSHABELO/ONVERWACHT,
SOUTH END, EAST BANK,
SOPHIATOWN, MAKULEKE, CATO MANOR.
REMEMBER DISTRICT SIX.
REMEMBER THE RACISM
WHICH TOOK AWAY OUR HOMES
AND OUR LIVELIHOOD
AND WHICH SOUGHT
TO STEAL AWAY OUR HUMANITY.
REMEMBER ALSO OUR WILL TO LIVE,
TO HOLD FAST TO THAT
WHICH MARKS US AS HUMAN BEINGS:
OUR GENEROSITY, OUR LOVE OF JUSTICE
AND OUR CARE FOR EACH OTHER.
REMEMBER TRAMWAY ROAD,
MODDERDAM, SIMONSTOWN.

IN REMEMBERING WE DO NOT WANT
TO RECREATE DISTRICT SIX
BUT TO WORK WITH ITS MEMORY:
OF HURTS INFLICTED AND RECEIVED
OF LOSS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND OF SHAMES.
WE WISH TO REMEMBER
SO THAT WE CAN ALL,
TOGETHER AND BY OURSELVES,
REBUILD A CITY
WHICH BELONGS TO ALL OF US
IN WHICH ALL OF US CAN LIVE,
NOT AS RACES BUT AS PEOPLE.

This inscription indicates very clearly how District Six was seen by early activists in the Museum as a kind of vanguard. While it expresses the expansive vision of Museum activists in wanting to transcend the idea of District Six as a sacred cow, it also paradoxically has a centripetal effect whereby District Six is taken as the centre. The text begins by setting out the relevant frame of reference for representation—the areas of forced removals in South Africa—and situates District Six within this context (lines 1-5). It then identifies racism as the cause of injustice (lines 6-10), and takes the will to survive as a testament to the humanity of victims of removal (lines 10-15). This humanity is in turn identified with the virtues of generosity, justice and mutual care (lines 14-15), which are taken as constitutive features of community, as the historical counterpoint to this injustice (lines 11-15). Notably what follows is to extend the experience of District Six to other areas in Cape Town, thus rendering its problematic coextensive with the city, and implicitly identifying it with the city (lines 16-17). What is interesting here is a movement by which the history of apartheid, and specifically of forced removals all over South Africa, is *brought to bear* upon District Six, which is then in turn taken as the centre from which the city will be rebuilt. The second stanza brings us into the current phase, and projects the *work* of memory, a memory of harms (lines 18-20). With non-racialism as its rubric, the ultimate aim of this work is to transform the city (lines 24-29).

The D6M and the D6BRT have continued to take a wide-angled approach to restitution, but the primary antagonist is now seen to be the local state. Although it is beyond the scope of the paper to address the complicated politics of negotiation between the D6BRT, the Land Commission, and the local state, it should be noted that the D6BRT came into being in a struggle over an application made in mid-1996 by the City Council and the Provincial Government in terms of Section 34 of the Act, which sought to preclude an individual claims process in favour of a state-controlled development project (see Beyers 2007b). The Application was defeated in August 1997, and opposition to the Application had the effect of consolidating "the community" as a political entity, thus setting the stage for the current politics of rights-based claims. In order to defeat the Application, District Sixers had to be seen to act with one voice since the Applicants claimed to be representing the community and the public at large. Various disparate ex-resident organizations and sectors were thus brought together under what was known as the District Six Land Restitution Front, led by Anwah Nagia (*Argus* June 12, 1996). After several months of consultation with and mobilization of potential claimants, a large meeting was held in the Museum in 1998 at which a Constitution for the D6BRT was democratically adopted (Nagia, personal communication, June 14, 2002). The D6BRT had to be seen to be fully representative in order to become the vehicle which would ultimately have control over the redevelopment process. If the D6BRT was to advance a political-legal struggle for restitution rights in the name of community, the Museum was seen as the cultural space par excellence of community, where representational struggles over the nature of the community could occur.

In order to demonstrate how, in spite of losing the Section 34 battle, the City has continued to weigh in on the process, it is useful to discuss a recent controversy over heritage, which directly implicated the Museum. According to Peter de Tolly—City Council Director of Special Projects and the head urban planner working on District Six in the early 2000s—while the Restitution Act contains clauses that preclude the local authority from denying

people the right to settle and develop the land for residential uses, it does not take into account legislation such as the Environmental Management Act and the Natural Heritage Resources Act, legislation that was passed after the Restitution Act had been promulgated (Personal communication, June 11, 2002). The City thus refused to move ahead with the redevelopment process (in particular, in terms of committing to putting bulk services in place) until a Heritage Impact Assessment (HIA) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) were carried out. The HIA, for example, is designed to ensure that heritage resources—i.e., any place or object of cultural significance, including aesthetic, architectural, archeological, historical, social and spiritual significance—are managed and integrated into the planning process from the outset.[9] The national body responsible for the management of heritage resources and ultimately for the approval of the HIA is the South African Heritage Resource Agency (SAHRA).

Members of the D6BRT were understandably annoyed at the prospect of potentially sidelining the urgent need for social redress in favour of accommodating District Six as an archeological site, especially as its history could be considered to be rather recent in the archeological record. From a heritage perspective, their objection reflected the Museum's emphasis on the primacy of "intangible heritage," consisting mainly of narratives of dispossession. In broader terms, members of the D6BRT complained that the most high-profile urban development project in Cape Town since 1994, the Waterfront, was built without any consideration of such things because it occurred before such legislation was put into place. They also expressed suspicion of SAHRA because "it is an inherited structure" from the apartheid era.[10] However, after the D6BRT exerted considerable pressure upon both SAHRA and the City, at the same time as asserting that it was not in principle against the assessment as long as it was not used as a stalling tactic, relations with SAHRA improved considerably (Personal communication, Terence Fredericks, June 28, 2005) and the HIA was completed in May of 2003.

As in the case of the Section 34 Application, the City had all along claimed to be acting in the interest of the broader public. It was therefore also an essential political matter for the D6BRT and Museum to assert themselves as fully representative of—and even inseparable from—the broader District Six community. This tendency carries into the present, and is manifesting itself in a new way as the D6BRT and Museum turn their attention fully to the redevelopment phase. The ongoing and intensifying centralism of the Museum is the result of a combination of an anti-apartheid tradition of activism of which the Museum was born, which took District Six as a vanguard, and a response to the political imperatives of representing a large and fragmented group in antagonistic political engagements with the local state.

Recent Shifts

An international conference in May 2005 put on by the Museum called *Hands on District Six: Landscapes of Postcolonial Memorialization* (henceforth "Conference") marked a highly critical juncture in the history of the Museum. As the processing of restitution claims was drawing to a close, and the objective of engaging the community and mobilizing it towards restitution had effectively been achieved, the future of the Museum was seen to be in question. It was no longer a "project" seeking to establish and consolidate itself. Having secured a stable base of international funding, it has grown considerably (Personal communication, Terence Fredericks, June 28, 2005). The Conference also marked the completion of a pilot phase consisting of the construction and occupation of twenty four new homes. This conference was thus intended "to reflect on ten years of [the Museum's] growth as an institution, and to prepare to play a role in the return of the community to the barren landscape of District Six" (D6M n.d.).

A strong underlying tendency in the Conference, reiterated by a number of speakers, was towards defining the Museum less as a "site museum" and as a space for memorializing loss—which it was felt had become somewhat ossified—and more as an organization or "social movement" actively asserting itself in urban reconstruction. The Conference thus appears to have intensified a shift on the part of the Museum towards a vision of itself that was first announced at the August 2003 "Hands On District Six" media and donor function held at the recently refurbished Sacks Futeran Complex, where the new Director of the Museum, Valmont Layne, and a five-year plan for the Museum were publicly presented. Layne articulated this vision as follows in his introductory address at the Conference:

> What does it mean to rebuild District Six, in order to be *true to the spirit of District Six*, to the intentions of the people who founded this place, and the many thousands that look to us? It means that we've got to be sure that as we engage with that land, that that land becomes in a sense...from a memory point of view, an extension of what happens here [i.e., in the District Six Museum]. When you walk into District Six say in twenty years time, in ten years time, you need to be able to engage with what happened here, what is happening here at the moment, and how that reflects upon

> the desires of the citizens of Cape Town to change the way their city functions for them, and hopefully also reflect the way we think about being citizens of South Africa. [Emphasis added]

More than ever, the Museum is seen as the vanguard for advancing a broader vision of urban reconstruction, a claim that rests not only upon the prominence of the legacy of forced removals in the moral conscience of Cape Town, but also upon the central and strategic location of the land in District Six that is to be redeveloped with regards to broader urban development. According to Fredericks at the "Return of the Elders" official ceremony to open the latest fifteen homes built (June 4, 2005), the Museum sees itself playing a "very very important role" in promoting urban community-building.

Broader designs include the nomination of District Six as a National Heritage Site, and the subsequent creation of a Cultural Heritage Precinct consisting of the Museum, the Sacks Futeran Complex, the District Six Memorial Park at Horstley Street, and about eighty other memorial sites. The recently acquired Sacks Futeran Complex, a block away from the main premises of the Museum, is intended to

> become the key ENGINE ROOM of the District Six Museum, serving as a base for support to a range of heritage sites and developing community museums in the broader Cape Town area.
>
> The Complex will serve as a centre for the reclamation of community life in the District, where a culture of activism and engagement is cultivated whilst drawing on the rich cultural heritage around which the museum's educational, exhibitionary, performative and research activities are centred. [Museum inscription 2005]

This new centre notably implies a significant addition to the main part of the Museum, with the street map at the centre, and, it would seem, something of a shift from the latter's supplementary relation to the district. Aside from serving as a meeting space and housing the D6BRT, plans for the complex include "a theatre project, arts programmes and new exhibition spaces, as well as commercial shopfront dedicated to creation of crafts and products indigenous to the Cape" (Museum inscription 2005). The idea is that people resettling in District Six will come "down" to the Homecoming Centre in groups, and then socialize and form clubs, depending on the particular area within the district that they are living in. It is hoped they will then take ideas to which they are exposed to in the Centre back into their regular lives in District Six (Terrence Fredericks, personal communication, June 28, 2005).[11]

This more proactive involvement in community-building is in keeping with the shift for the D6BRT from being a forum designed to mobilize claimants, and facilitate the processing of claims, to becoming a partner in the planning and rebuilding of District Six, and most of all, in the active promotion of a particular social and moral version of substantive social relations. The D6BRT requires all claimants moving into their new homes in District Six to sign a "social compact." The compact stipulates that property sold within the first five years of occupancy will revert to the D6BRT and pledges that the home to be occupied will not be used for shebeens (unlicensed private bars), prostitution, rent exploitation or gambling, and that the occupants will be tolerant towards all religions (Cape Times, June 13, 2004)—a move that has raised questions about continuities with practices of "social engineering" during the apartheid era. It seems as if the role envisioned for new Sachs Futeran Complex is as a place where these norms can be socialized. Indeed, given that the D6M has been much more successful in obtaining funding than the D6BRT (Personal communication, Crain Soudien, July 25, 2004), it makes sense to have it more closely share some of the functions that might otherwise be the domain of the D6BRT if it were better resourced.

All of this signals a move towards a more assertive politics of intervention in broader processes of community-building, urban reconstruction, and indeed, social control, and away from an understanding of the Museum as a space of contemplation, reflection, and listening. Such a shift towards a politics of presence potentially carries with it the danger of supplanting the all important space of erasure, thus eliding the constitutive relationship of community to loss, and perhaps to a certain extent foreclosing the imaginary possibilities that the latter entails. Note, for instance, the slippages in meaning in Layne's quote above in terms of the successive usages of the word *here*, whereby the Museum is effectively equated with District Six itself. The very figure of "District Six" has come to emphasize the active future-oriented community-building project, more so than a community of those engaged with memory. It is as if the space which the D6M had supplemented is increasingly perceived as an extension of the Museum and its activities.

As the diverse conceptions of community among claimants and Museum-associated intellectuals and activists gradually come up against the realities of a post-claims settlement phase, especially in the case of redevelopment, the disparities between them become more evident and consequential. As the Museum works to

expand its influence amongst District Sixers, particularly those who will resettle, the question will be who will be most competent and predisposed to participate in its culture of intellectual self-reflection and critical community-building. (Indeed, this begs the question of who will be able to resettle—and thus be able to access and be involved in the Museum.) Can the poor majority of District Sixers living in peripheral urban townships and suburbs like Guguletu, Lentegeur (Mitchell's Plain) or Manenburg really participate, and if so, in what capacity? A certain impatience among many in these sectors with intellectual antics is perhaps understandable, especially given their historical exclusion from the benefits of higher education. It is not surprising that museum-associated intellectuals would weigh in most strongly on "the culture of the Museum" during significant transitional moments in the history of the Museum as an institution—such as at present. But there are concerns that intellectual practice has come to be fetishized and dissociated from the criteria of relevance central to the Museum's putative historical constituency. As one worker from the Museum emphatically put it to me at the *Hands on District Six* Conference, "they can't think because they are too clever!" The ongoing challenge for the Museum would seem to be to bring the realm of the popular and that of the academic, curator and artist into relation in a strongly substantive, politically progressive and democratic sense.

Conclusion

For institutions like museums that are actively engaged in community-building, the figure of community can help to generate a sense of unity among otherwise disparate actors, and can do much to mobilize the efforts of various stakeholders towards a common "project." While Barthian and Andersonian understandings of community currently prevalent in anthropology would appear to allow the conceptual flexibility to deal with the increasingly complex relation between community and locality, their limitations become evident in examining how community figures in processes of social citizenship struggle in cases such as District Six, where non-coterminous "boundaries" and diverse "imaginings" between different social actors—all of which claim an allegiance to overlapping but not identical constructions of community—come into play, and where, moreover, a range of evolving concrete social relationships dynamically frame processes of symbolic identification. Indeed, those who identify with community tend to be concerned in the first instance with constituting an authoritative sense of interiority, and critically reflexive community-based projects such as the D6M are concerned primarily with *incorporation* through community-building. In this light, the analytical question is how collective identity is symbolically anchored in community at different times and by different actors—particularly those who most authoritatively speak for others—so as to manifest dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, to be sure, but ones that are grounded in substantive social and political processes. It is thus necessary to frame contestations over community within a context-specific discussion of the politics of group-formation in relation to the broader social and political ambit within which they are situated, and in particular, to examine the ways in which collective identities are more or less effectively mobilized by proxy representatives in rights-struggles.

The formation of the Museum was occasioned by a symbolically rich "imagined community," primarily engendered by a relatively cohesive group of intellectuals and activists connected to the historical struggle for District Six. By offering a space in supplementary relation with the "empty space" of District Six, and through devices such as the floor map, the Museum anchored a sense of collective identity for this group as well as, to a certain extent, for a broader group progressively incorporated into its fold. The explicit mission of the Museum was and continues to be to further the cause of community in District Six, where community-building consists of an often highly sophisticated form of critical memory work towards the ends of a conscious political intervention in a broader project of urban reconstruction and citizenship struggle. Until recently, the work of memorialization was to an extent an end in itself for the Museum; the politics of restitution was largely left to the D6BRT. The Museum's work complemented that of the D6BRT by helping to consolidate a symbolic sense of community and thus contributing a cultural dimension to the broader process of mobilizing District Sixers. It thus buttressed the D6BRT's struggle for control over the direction of the restitution process. Although the resulting Museum construction of community was in a sense somewhat disembedded from the rather tenuous and fragmentary social relations among District Sixers that spanned a diverse set of localities of displacement, it was broadly consonant with their imagination of community through nostalgic commemoration. For these distinct groupings, the Museum thus served the general aims of healing and mobilization.

With the beginning of housing construction in District Six, and the resettlement of the first claimants, the Museum is trying to respond to an increasing need to cultivate a more future-oriented idea of community better adapted to present-day practical circumstances and constraints, and consisting of thicker social relations and networks. In this respect, the Museum is being repositioned

in a more interventionist role, acting in concert with the D6BRT in its community-building initiatives—as is perhaps epitomized by the "social compact" and future plans for the Homecoming Centre. The resulting idea of community would appear to be less open-ended, and to carry greater risks of social exclusion. While community-building has always been seen by the Museum as a means for advancing a broader program of social citizenship, the context appears to be shifting: having achieved a prominent symbolic and cultural position in the city, it has set for itself the ambitious future challenge of establishing its relevance for the redevelopment and renewal of an active neighbourhood by acting as a vital link to its past, and at the same time effecting a certain broader transformative agenda for the city. The degree to which it will succeed in this agenda will surely depend significantly on its ability to maintain and indeed expand its relationship with the broader popular constituency of District Sixers.

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Notes

1 Race is a social fiction, but a very powerful one that shapes social reality and subjectivity. This paper makes analytical use of racial categories wherever they are significantly consequential in such a socially-determined way. With regards to the especially contentious classification of "coloured," this paper follows the frequent popular usage of the term in District Six in its all-encompassing sense, as including Muslims classified as "Cape Malays."

2 While a central concern of the paper is to problematize various usages of the term "community," quotations are dropped after this point in the interest of readability.

3 Public sphere is defined as "a contested participatory site in which actors with overlapping identities as legal subjects, citizens, economic actors, and family and community members, form a public body and engage in negotiations and contestations over political and social life" (Somers 1993:589). I do not wish to try to rigorously adapt her usages of the terms of "civil society" and "public sphere" towards my own ethnographic purposes, but I find Somers' approach useful for moving beyond other practice-oriented theories of social citizenship that continue to privilege the nation-state, and for emphasizing the place-making activities of would-be members of community in local public domains and arenas instead.

4 See Mesthrie 1999.

5 See Kies 1953, 1959; Soudien 2001.

6 The Record of Understanding document outlined the form of the development vehicle that would drive the redevelopment process in District Six, including the roles of key stakeholders and the principles defining its operation.

7 Even on such occasions, there are individuals and subgroups who actively contest and undermine the sense of unity: groups of ex-residents who did not submit their claims on time and thus are not party to the process; individuals who question the motives and integrity of leaders; claimants who openly express fear and prejudice at their potential co-beneficiaries; and so on.

8 See Rassool and Prosalendis 2001; D6M n.d.; McEachern 2001; Soudien et al. 1995; de Kok 1998; Bohlin 1998.

9 *District Six Steering Committee Meeting: Proposed Items for Inclusion on the Agenda.* April 25, 2002.

10 Steering Committee Meeting, April 25, 2002 (attended in person).

11 Other initiatives linked to this more proactive, outward-oriented strategy are the Museum's assistance in the formation of "community museums" in other areas of forced removals in Cape Town such as Simon's Town and Protea Village. Recently the Museum has also begun to engage with interested parties in the Cape Flats areas of Manenburg and Langa in order to assist with memorial projects there. In addition to the in-house exhibitions of other areas of forced removals such as Tramway Road (1997) and Protea Village (2002), and ongoing displays of removals in Claremont and Constantia—areas which were subsequently developed as exclusive wealthy white neighbourhoods—another important but thus far limited initiative has been to take the Museum to the places to which people have been forcibly removed on the Cape Flats. For instance, a travelling exhibition was set up in a school in the low-income area of Lavender Hill in 2003, which "made explicit the link between District Six and Lavender Hill" (Museum inscription 2005).

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Articles

Saints et rois : la genèse du politique au Maroc

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Résumé : Ce texte se propose d'étudier la question politique au Maroc et d'interpréter les différents symboles qui la représentent. À partir de l'examen d'un mythe que j'ai recueilli pendant mon séjour ethnographique au centre-ouest du Maroc, je poserai quelques hypothèses fondamentales pour comprendre la genèse du politique dans ce pays. Je montrerai, entre autres, comment les symboles religieux et politiques sont indissociables. Le roi, figure souveraine du politique, se présente aussi comme un saint; le saint, symbole suprême du religieux, s'impose également comme un potentiel roi. Saints et rois sont les deux figures extrêmes de cette histoire politique du Maroc. Le récit mythique se présente, en fin d'analyse, comme un commentaire ad hoc sur les fondements mêmes de l'identité marocaine.

Mots clés : mythe, politique, Ben Yeffou, saint, roi, Maroc

Abstract: In this paper, I consider the question of politics and political symbolism in Morocco. Starting from an analysis of a myth I collected during my ethnographic research in mid-west Morocco, I will propose some basic hypotheses for understanding the genesis of Moroccan politics. I will show, inter alia, how religious and political symbols are indissociable. The king as political sovereign is also presented as a saint; the saint, supreme religious symbol, also asserts himself as a potential king. Saints and kings are the two extreme figures of Moroccan political history. The myth appears, in the end, to be an ad hoc commentary on the fundamental bases of Moroccan identity.

Keywords: myth, politics, Ben Yeffou, saint, king, Morocco

Introduction

Autour du sanctuaire Ben Yeffou, qui abrite la tombe du saint du même nom, s'est développé tout un culte de possession[1]. Il s'agit principalement d'un rituel thérapeutique pour la guérison des maladies causées par les djinns[2]. Le culte mobilise une mythologie riche autour du saint Ben Yeffou, depuis sa sortie initiatique du désert marocain jusqu'à la fondation de sa propre zaouïa dans la tribu des Doukkala au centre-ouest du Maroc[3]. Ben Yeffou est l'un de nombreux saints légendaires et historiques autour desquels se sont développés différents cultes et religiosités populaires. Les tombes de ces saints sont devenues de véritables lieux de pèlerinage qui attirent des populations pour des raisons sociales, thérapeutiques ou religieuses.

Le présent travail propose une étude interprétative de la question politique au Maroc. Il s'agit essentiellement de comprendre l'interprétation que donnent les acteurs à leur propre monde social (Geertz 1973; Rabinow 1975). Cette méthode implique l'analyse des symboles culturels ainsi que les conditions sociales et politiques dans lesquels ils prennent sens (Rabinow 1975). En m'inspirant du mythe de Ben Yeffou, j'essaierai d'élucider les différents symboles socioculturels constitutifs de la politique dans ce pays du monde arabo-musulman. Le mythe en question m'a été raconté par les descendants du saint Sidi Abdel Aziz Ben Yeffou, mettant en scène le pouvoir aussi bien spirituel que politique de leur illustre ancêtre. Ce récit mythique est un véritable commentaire sur le religieux, le politique, l'économique, l'écologique, le territorial et le thérapeutique. Vu donc sa complexité et sa richesse, je ne pourrai traiter, dans le cadre limité d'un article, du rituel thérapeutique comme tel, ni élaborer les autres aspects qui se rapportent au territorial et à l'écologique ; je me limiterai à examiner les dimensions politiques et religieuses nécessaires à l'analyse. Le texte s'étendra davantage sur la rencontre du saint Ben Yeffou avec le Sultan Noir.

Devant l'absence d'une biographie ou d'un document historique écrit[4] qui traite de la vie du saint Ben Yeffou et de son enseignement spirituel, il est, toutefois, difficile de savoir si cette rencontre entre le roi et le saint a réellement eu lieu. Ceci dit, cette absence de documents écrits n'empêche en rien une analyse pertinente de la genèse du politique au Maroc, car il s'agit avant tout d'explorer le mythe et le monde de significations qu'il engendre et auxquels il renvoie. Ce qui importe ici c'est le discours de l'acteur et l'interprétation qu'il donne aux différents symboles culturels, politiques et religieux. Comme l'écrit Drouin (1996), à propos d'une fondation maraboutique au Moyen Atlas, la tradition orale constitue une littérature hagiographique dont la partialité n'est pas en cause puisqu'elle renvoie non pas à une réalité au sens historique, mais à la vision que le groupe a de cette réalité transmise comme constitutive de son histoire réelle. Pris dans ce sens, le mythe me semble être un lieu privilégié pour comprendre non pas comment les choses se sont passées réellement, mais plutôt comment les choses sont arrivées à ce qu'elles sont actuellement. En d'autres termes, il s'agit d'examiner comment les gens font leur propre histoire politique.

Cette histoire réécrite, sous forme de mythes et de légendes, permet, sans doute, de mieux comprendre la conception du pouvoir dans l'imaginaire marocain et les attitudes des gens devant le changement politique. Ceci dit, cette analyse symbolique ne négligera pas le côté historique. Au contraire, elle prendra en considération le contexte socio-historique général dans lequel les symboles ont pris sens et se sont développés. Aussi, la légende de Ben Yeffou sera-t-elle discutée en référence à certains développements historiques et politiques du Maroc.

La geste de Ben Yeffou

Sidi Abdelaziz Ben Yeffou est originaire du Sahara[5]. Comme l'exige la tradition mystique musulmane, le saint, afin d'accomplir son cheminement spirituel, décide de quitter son Sahara natal et d'errer. Il se dirige vers le Nord. Arrivé à Marrakech, il s'aperçoit que la population est terrorisée par un djinn redoutable; celui-ci salit ses mosquées en y urinant avant chaque prière et interdit aux habitants l'accès à la seule source d'eau qui alimente toute la ville. Pour les laisser puiser l'eau de la source, le djinn exige en échange, chaque mois, une belle vierge en mariage.

Notre saint demande à rencontrer les sept[6] saints de Marrakech pour négocier avec eux un marché. C'est ainsi qu'il leur propose de débarrasser la ville définitivement du démon, mais à condition qu'ils lui signent un décret reconnaissant sa sainteté et sa grandeur spirituelle. Voyant son accoutrement négligé et rapiécé, comme un *bûhali* et un *majdûb*[7], les saints ne donnent pas suite à sa demande. Mais Sidi Abdelaziz insiste et fait montre de patience et de courage; c'est alors que les sept saints de Marrakech décident de le tester pour savoir s'il est un véritable saint, capable d'affronter le démon, ou seulement un sorcier et un charlatan. Ils lui présentent deux plats de couscous : un dont la semoule est *halâl* (licite) mais la viande est *harâm* (illicite), l'autre dont la semoule est *harâm* mais sa viande est halâl[8]. Le saint Ben Yeffou prend la viande halâl et la met sur la semoule halâl et en mange. Après s'être convaincus de la force de son caractère et sa baraka, ils l'autorisent à affronter le djinn malfaiteur. Il prépare alors un stratagème : il ordonne à la population de préparer, comme à son habitude, une belle adolescente bien habillée et ornée pour le rite mensuel. À la fin du mois, la jeune mariée est attachée tout près de la source; le saint écrit sur un bout de papier des mots magiques et attend la sortie du djinn. Quand celui-ci apparaît, le saint déchire le morceau de papier en deux et souffle de toutes ses forces « ffou »; aussitôt, l'esprit malveillant est complètement brûlé, il devient cendre. « Ffou », c'est de là que vient le nom du saint : « Ben Yeffou ». Reconnaissant sa force et son don divin, les sept saints lui signent le décret de sainteté. Il reste parmi eux quelque temps; mais craignant sa force de caractère et ses dons charismatiques, les saints de Marrakech le supplient de partir. Celui-ci ne résiste pas trop à cette demande et quitte la ville. Il arrive dans la région de la grande tribu de Doukkala. Il y trouve les Semlala[9] en train de diviser la viande d'une vache qu'ils viennent de sacrifier. Ben Yeffou envoie son muletier pour leur demander une part du sacrifice. Les Semlala refusent. Contrarié, le saint donne son bâton (utilisé en guise de canne) à son serviteur et lui ordonne d'aller toucher la peau de la génisse immolée. Et, miracle : dès que le muletier l'a touchée, tous les morceaux de la viande déjà distribués ont été attirés et captés par la carcasse de la vache. Celle-ci ressuscite. Le saint prit son couteau et la sacrifia à nouveau et en répartit la viande équitablement. Sceptiques, les Semlala décident de tester Ben Yeffou pour s'assurer de sa sainteté; c'est ainsi qu'ils lui présentent un paralytique lui demandant de le guérir et proposent, en cas de réussite, de lui laisser leur territoire[10]. Ben Yeffou s'approche de l'homme invalide, souffle « ffou », « ffou », et lui ordonne de se mettre debout; d'un coup, le paralytique se met à marcher normalement. Le soir même les Semlala quittent leur village, sauf un qui a demandé de rester avec le saint pour le servir[11]. C'est ainsi qu'a été fondée la zaouïa de Ben Yeffou.

Non loin de celle-ci, dans la ville antique d'Al-Gharbia, régnait un grand roi, *Sultân lekhel*, le Sultan Noir[12]. Informé de l'arrivée du saint dans la région et de ses

exploits charismatiques et craignant pour son royaume la concurrence de celui-ci, le Sultan Noir vient le chercher avec toute une armée. Arrivé à la zaouïa, le monarque exige sans appel le départ du saint loin de son royaume; mais celui-ci, conforté par la présence d'une armée de djinns et de démons que lui seul peut remarquer, refuse et affronte le sultan et ses soldats. Contrarié et enragé par l'entêtement de Ben Yeffou, le roi et ses forces armées attaquent le saint. Celui-ci pour sa part, et d'un seul geste de la main, ordonne à ses alliés démoniaques de contrattaquer. Soudainement et miraculeusement, les soldats du monarque s'envolent avec leurs montures dans le ciel.

Battu et humilié, le roi supplie le saint de l'épargner, mais ce dernier exige en contrepartie la signature d'un décret attestant clairement qu'il est chérif, un véritable descendant du Prophète Mohammed. Le roi accepte de signer et Ben Yeffou ordonne à ses djinns de faire redescendre le souverain et son armée. Le Sultan Noir signe le décret et, avant de rebrousser chemin, dit à Ben Yeffou : « Je suis Sultan et tu es Sultan ».

Sainteté et baraka

Avant d'aborder proprement l'interprétation de la Geste de Ben Yeffou, il est primordial, pour la clarté de l'exposé, de définir d'emblée deux concepts fondamentaux : sainteté et baraka. Bien que les termes de saint et de sainteté soient des notions qui appartiennent plutôt à la tradition chrétienne, ils ont été étendues à d'autres religions, notamment l'islam, et sont devenus des outils d'analyse (Jamous 1994). Les véritables équivalents arabes des termes français « saint » ou « sainteté » sont dérivés de la racine verbale *wâla* (Chodkiewicz 1986; Jamous 1994). Le sens premier de cette notion renvoie aussi bien à l'idée de proximité, parenté, alliance, qu'à celles de protection et de commandement (Chodkiewicz 1986; Kerrou 1998). La notion de sainteté est traduite par *walâya* ou *wilâya*. Le saint est dit *walî*, *awliyâ* au pluriel.

Dans l'islam maghrébin, le sens le plus accepté de walî le désigne comme ami de Dieu, près de lui, puisque celui-ci l'a choisi pour lui accorder ses grâces, des pouvoirs particuliers, la baraka (Jamous 1994). Le walî est donc une personne possédant cette force divine qu'il est capable de mobiliser en faveur de ses descendants, ses adeptes, ses fidèles ou tout simplement des pèlerins qui visitent sa tombe[13]. Grâce à cette « force miraculeuse », le walî est capable d'intercéder pour ses implorateurs dans ce monde et dans l'au-delà, de soulager leurs détresses et afflictions et de guérir leurs maladies mentales ou physiques. Le culte des saints maghrébins trouve son fondement même dans la mobilisation de la baraka (Dermenghem 1954; Kerrou 1998).

En plus du mot walî, d'autres termes désignent le saint maghrébin : *sayyed* (maître), *saleh* (vertueux et pieux) et *mrabit*, ou marabout, (celui qui est lié à Dieu)[14] (Westermarck 1926; Jamous 1994; Chlyeh 1998). Ces différents termes sont employés partout au Maroc avec des variantes d'une région à une autre. Ben Yeffou est désigné par les mots sayyed[15] et walî et parfois par une formulation composée, le *walî saleh*. Ces termes, tous ensemble, désignent aussi bien le saint que le mausolée qui abrite sa tombe. Le walî Sidi Abdelaziz Ben Yeffou est l'un des saints « populaires »[16] détenteurs et dispensateurs de baraka. Il est un saint légendaire dans le sens où aucun document écrit ne mentionne ni sa vie ni son enseignement. Tout son cheminement initiatique et ses exploits miraculeux sont relatés dans une légende très riche, racontée et perpétuée par ses descendants. À l'instar de tous les saints « populaires », Ben Yeffou est un patron local qui exerce une influence sur un territoire délimité. Ce rôle de patronage donne une grande importance à son mausolée qui est devenu un centre de pèlerinage. Le walî est visité essentiellement pour sa baraka contre les maladies « *djinnopathiques* »[17].

Les notions de sainteté et de baraka sont donc étroitement liées. Certains anthropologues définissent même celle-ci par celle-là (Westermarck 1935). Littéralement, le terme baraka signifie bénédiction, au sens de faveur divine; mais il s'applique à toute une série de notions associées, telles la prospérité, la santé, la plénitude, la chance, le pouvoir magique (Geertz 1992).

Dans la légende de Ben Yeffou, la baraka symbolise non seulement le signe incontesté (*al-borhân*) de la sainteté du walî, mais aussi le fruit de son action. Elle prend le sens et la forme de qualités individuelles extraordinaires. La supériorité sur les saints de Marrakech, la neutralisation du démon qui terrorisait la cité, la distinction entre le halâl et le harâm, la résurrection de la génisse immolée, la guérison du paralytique et la domination du Roi Noir sont toutes des preuves tangibles de la baraka du saint.

Selon les *chorfa* de Ben Yeffou, la baraka de leur ancêtre représente le pouvoir surnaturel qui est une forme de manifestation de la grâce divine. Elle est systématiquement identifiée avec ses signes extérieurs : les miracles et les prodiges.

La baraka, écrit Rabinow, « [is] the symbol which formulates and expresses the Moroccan conception of divine grace and supernatural power. Defined in the most abstract terms we could say something like "the manifestation of God's grace on earth" » (1975:25).

L'idée de la baraka est donc une manière d'appréhender comment le divin s'insinue dans le monde. « Plus

exactement, c'est une certaine manière de construire l'expérience humaine (affective, morale, intellectuelle), une interprétation culturelle de l'existence » (Geertz 1992:58-59). Cette interprétation revient, selon Geertz, à admettre que le sacré se manifeste directement dans le monde sous la forme de dons accordés à certains individus déterminés. Seuls les saints, cependant, possèdent ce don charismatique d'une façon superlative. Cette possession de la baraka, qui définit l'état du walî, renvoie non seulement à la réalisation de prodiges et de miracles, mais aussi à une « supposée » ascendance prophétique, ou aux deux à la fois (Geertz 1992).

Si la source originelle de la baraka est charismatique, miraculeuse et individuelle, sa manifestation actuelle, et ce depuis le XVII^{e} siècle, est surtout généalogique et héréditaire. Plus loin, nous verrons que ce sont précisément les tensions qui existent entre l'une et l'autre forme de la baraka qui caractérisent la dynamique de l'histoire socioculturelle et politique du Maroc.

Comment devient-on saint ?

Dermenghem (1954) distingue trois voies de sainteté dans l'islam maghrébin. Premièrement, la voie initiatique qui donne lieu, dans le cadre d'un ordre confrérique, à toute une systématisation de l'effort personnel. Deuxièmement, la voie de l'effort personnel, faite de renoncement au monde profane et d'anéantissement de l'ego. Finalement, la transmission héréditaire de la sainteté qui se fait par un transfert biologique de la baraka : le *charaf* ou chérifat.

Selon la tradition orale, Ben Yeffou a acquis la *wilâya* par l'intermédiaire des deuxième et troisième voies : l'ascèse et le charaf. Rien n'indique, par contre, qu'il était rattaché, de près ou de loin, à une confrérie mystique. C'est par le seul effort personnel que Sidi Abdelaziz atteint les hauts rangs de la sainteté en surpassant des awliyâ confirmés. Plus tard, il sera reconnu par le souverain (le Sultan Noir) en tant que saint par voie héréditaire également. Cette section sera consacrée à la discussion de la voie ascétique de la sainteté. La voie héréditaire sera discutée ultérieurement.

Dans les voies de l'initiation ascétique, le saint prend un accoutrement rapiécé, coupe ses attaches sociales, quitte son Sahara natal et erre en se dirigeant vers le nord. La *siyâha*, la vie errante de l'ascète, constitue une phase importante de l'apprentissage initiatique (Chodkiewicz 1996)[18]. Elle représente le premier instant décisif de ce temps maraboutique qui conditionne la sainteté populaire ; elle en est même le moteur (Kerrou 1991).

Le gyrovagisme mène aussi sûrement à la sainteté que la vie contemplative des ermites; d'innombrables saints, de l'Orient ou de la Saguia al-Hamra (dans le Sahara de l'ouest marocain), ont arpenté le Maghreb priant Dieu et sermonnant les hommes. Leur siyâha, affirme Brunel (2001), est le propre des âmes fortes, des âmes élues de Dieu.

Selon la légende, Ben Yeffou est lui-aussi originaire de la fameuse Saguia al-Hamra. Cette région déserte et presque vide s'est imposée comme le berceau de la sainteté; comme une « pépinière » féconde de maraboutisme (Montet 1909; Brunel 1926; Dermenghem 1954). Au Maroc, comme dans tout le Maghreb, les ancêtres-fondateurs du culte des saints prétendent souvent venir de cette région. Saguia al-Hamra, selon Dakhlia, relève à la limite d'une géographie céleste, elle est perçue comme un pôle de la sainteté maghrébine. Elle écrit :

> On y voit en effet une sorte de miroir de l'Arabie originelle, un pôle réfléchi de l'Orient. Les traditions orales instaurent la Saguia al-Hamra comme le lieu d'une véritable refondation de l'islam puisqu'elles en font le lieu de la migration des Idrissides, et des Shorfa de manière générale [...], et surtout le point de départ de tous les grands saints missionnaires. [1993:183]

Le voyage spirituel de Ben Yeffou le mène à Marrakech, une ville très réputée pour ses saints. Mais sa rencontre avec ces derniers était faite de méfiance et de mépris. Ayant demandé d'affronter le démon, les saints déclinent sa demande, le prenant pour un simple majdûb, incapable d'affronter un djinn qu'eux-mêmes n'étaient pas aptes à neutraliser.

Le majdûb[19], dans la conception mystique musulmane, est celui que Dieu a attiré à Lui, qu'Il a choisi pour compagnon et qui, de ce fait, reçoit toutes sortes de bienfaits et de grâces, et cela, sans aucun effort ni fatigue de sa part. Il représente ainsi l'aspect passif de la vie mystique, la primauté de la grâce et de l'extase (Dermenghem 1981; Jamous 1994; Rachik 1998). Jamous fait une distinction entre le walî parfait et le majdûb. Si celui-là est présent à Dieu et au monde, celui-ci, quant à lui, est présent à Dieu mais absent au monde; il ajoute : « on comprend alors que la perfection du premier lui donne une supériorité et même une autorité sur "l'hébétude" du second » (1994:53). Contrairement au walî « établi » qui non seulement respecte l'ordre social mais participe à son maintien, le majdûb est un saint libre qui échappe à toute autorité et ignore toute barrière humaine ou institutionnelle, transgressant ainsi les règles religieuses et sociales. Il incarne de ce fait la figure de la sainteté « anti-exemplaire » (Rachik 1998).

Dans la tradition populaire marocaine, comme celle de wlad Ben Yeffou, le terme majdûb est souvent employé pour nommer les saints errants (Claisse 2003); il désigne

tout aussi bien un possédé par les génies (Premare 1985; El Bachari 1997).

Tant dans son sens mystique que populaire, le majdûb est un saint marginal. Il est quelqu'un qui n'appartient plus à ce monde, qui est sorti partiellement ou complètement de la réalité humaine et sociale pour s'intégrer dans le monde des esprits. Il vit dans la marge. Et c'est probablement en tant qu'être marginal que les saints de Marrakech, représentant le centre (le monde social et l'autorité religieuse), l'ont sous-estimé et ignoré. Traiter Ben Yeffou de majdûb, c'est le rabaisser à un niveau inférieur de la sainteté.

Sidi Abdelaziz Ben Yeffou fait montre de beaucoup de charisme et domine le démon redoutable qui martyrisait toute la ville de Marrakech avec ses illustres saints. En dominant le monde des djinns, il domine celui des humains et achève sa quête de sainteté. « Le fait de dominer les forces "daïmoniques" peut être considéré comme une caractéristique générale de la sainteté, elle est particulièrement évidente chez certains » (Dermenghem 1954:102). Sans doute Ben Yeffou est-il de ceux-là. En dominant le démon de Marrakech, il obtient une reconnaissance, par décret, de sa sainteté par tous les saints patrons de la ville. De saint marginal, il passe au centre, il devient le saint des saints. Depuis le jour où Sidi Abdelaziz a neutralisé le djinn malfaiteur et l'a transformé en cendre par le soufflement « ffou », les gens l'ont nommé Ben Yeffou, le sultan[20].

Ce passage au centre est bien confirmé par la deuxième séquence de l'histoire qui raconte comment le saint Ben Yeffou a fondé sa propre zaouïa. Car, prise dans son acceptation la plus générale, la zaouïa apparaît essentiellement comme une forme de sociabilité. De plus, en tant que telle, elle préfigure d'autres formes de socialisation : la corporation, le clan, la tribu, la famille (Laroui 1977)[21]. Dans le cas qui nous concerne, la zaouïa mère a donné naissance à tout un village et à un clan ; le terme Ben Yeffou désigne le saint, sa zaouïa et le village qui en est l'extension. Wlad Ben Yeffou sont les habitants de ce village. La zaouïa est principalement un centre de guérison pour les maladies causées par les djinns. Déjà du vivant du saint, si l'on croit al-Kanûni (1937 (II)), la zaouïa de Ben Yeffou attirait beaucoup de pèlerins[22]. Toutefois, la fonction de celle-ci ne se réduit pas à une visée thérapeutique, elle a sans doute joué un rôle d'enseignement dans le passé. Dans *al-I'lâm* d'Assamlali (1983 (X)), Ben Yeffou est décrit comme un excellent prédicateur ayant une belle voix et une très bonne morale. Il est fort possible que les visiteurs fréquentaient la zaouïa pour écouter les prêches du saint. En plus de ces fonctions thérapeutiques et éducatives, la zaouïa joue (et a probablement joué) un rôle socio-économique non négligeable[23].

Le saint étranger : une altérité identificatrice

Ce deuxième épisode de la légende de Ben Yeffou qui relate la fondation de la zaouïa, insiste également et avec force sur l'inversion des rôles sociaux. Les Semlala, maîtres du terroir, sont devenus les *khuddâm*, serviteurs, de ce saint étranger. Celui-ci, par contre, devient *mûl l-blâd* (le maître des lieux), le saint-patron auquel s'identifient les habitants de la région. Il est pertinent de remarquer, à cet égard, que les saints au Maroc (et dans tout le Maghreb) sont souvent des étrangers, venant essentiellement, comme on l'a susmentionné, de la Saguia al-Hamra ou de l'Orient. Les tribus et les villages dans lesquels ils se sont installés ont fini par les adopter en tant que maîtres vertueux, pacificateurs, protecteurs et même sauveurs des désastres humains ou naturels (Dermenghem 1954; Kerrou 1991).

Le saint est l'Autre qui permet à la tribu de s'identifier et de s'exprimer. Cette idée rejoint l'expression de sainteté artificielle d'Ernest Gellner (2003) selon laquelle des tribus berbères du Haut-Atlas, faute de trouver des saints arabes étrangers, désignent parmi eux des *igurramen* (sg. *agurram*), saints locaux, pour contenir la violence intertribale et permettre à des tribus en conflit de communiquer. C'est en offrant des services de médiation sociale et d'arbitrage politique que l'agurram consolide sa position de saint et après s'être imposé comme tel, il permet également une identification, une appartenance historique et territoriale. La sainteté dans ce cas devient une nécessité socio-politique, d'une part, et historico-écologique, de l'autre. Cette double fonction vitale a même poussé certaines tribus berbères à inventer, par des distorsions généalogiques authentifiées par une légende, leurs propres saints. Car, suivant le raisonnement de Gellner, l'isolement, la pauvreté, la dureté géographique et humaine du pays n'a pas dû faciliter l'implantation de véritables étrangers arabes des plaines. Selon Gellner :

> On peut considérer les saints comme de nécessaires « étrangers artificiels » : un grand nombre de sociétés, composées de parties s'équilibrant et mutuellement jalouses, ont besoin d'étrangers comme chefs ou comme arbitres (après tout, la plupart des dynasties sont d'origine étrangère). Mais si les étrangers font défaut, il faut les inventer. [2003:286]

C'est comme si l'altérité était une condition nécessaire pour l'accomplissement de la sainteté et la pratique de la politique; l'agurram est un faux saint, un saint artificiel, car il n'a pas fait l'expérience de cette altérité. Mais les rôles s'inversent : d'une part, l'étranger, l'autre, devient

l'autochtone, le même et l'identifiant; d'autre part, l'autochtone, le même, devient l'étranger, l'autre et l'identifié. Le saint qui est un véritable étranger devient le patron de la ville ou du village auquel s'identifient les habitants et vrais propriétaires du territoire qui, eux, deviennent des serviteurs du saint et de sa lignée.

Non loin de la zaouïa de Ben Yeffou, à une vingtaine de kilomètres vers l'ouest, Moulay Abdessalam, le saint-patron de la ville d'Oualidia est un étranger, plus étranger que Ben Yeffou lui-même, car il est originaire de l'Orient. Il quitte son Yémen natal, fuyant son roi cruel, passe par Safi où il maudit sa population pour son immoralisme et s'installe dans l'Oualidia actuel. Moulay Abdesslam est un lointain étranger, un étranger qui a été, de surcroît, sauvé in extremis par la volonté divine d'un roi sanguinaire[24].

De ce rapport à l'étranger, peut-on sans doute déjà avancer une hypothèse générale sur les expressions identitaires et politiques au Maroc. Rois et saints sont les deux figures extrêmes de cette altérité constitutive de l'identité et de l'histoire politique marocaines.

Historiquement, le Maroc a été gouverné par des rois-saints – les Almoravides (al- Mûrabitîn, les marabouts) – et des rois-chérifs – les Idrissides, les Saadiens et les Alaouites – étrangers qui ont contribué progressivement à la construction d'un royaume uni et consolidé et ont participé à l'élaboration d'une identité marocaine distincte.

Le Roi Noir, à qui Ben Yeffou est confronté, est lui aussi symbole de cette altérité radicale. Il est noir, d'origine africaine. Mais en même temps, ce roi-autre et étrange est signe de pouvoir et de puissance, il est symbole d'identification. C'est lui-même qui authentifie la sainteté biologique de Ben Yeffou par un décret royal.

Le Sultan Noir : entre histoire et légendes

L'historien marocain Ennassiri identifie le Sultan Noir au roi Mérinide Abou al-Hassan Ali qui régna entre 1331 et 1348. On l'appelait ainsi, dit-il, parce que sa mère était éthiopienne (Doutté 1905). Doutté admet une autre identification; selon lui, le Sultan Noir est le célèbre souverain Almohade Ya'qûb El Mansûr qui régna entre 1184 et 1199. Il faut noter, nonobstant ces précisions historiques, que le Sultan Noir est principalement un personnage légendaire[25]. C'est d'ailleurs à cette figure mythique que sont attribuées dans la tradition marocaine presque toutes les ruines d'anciens édifices (Doutté 1905). Il est pertinent de souligner, à ce propos, que le Sultan Noir auquel font référence wlad Ben Yeffou régnait sur la ville antique d'al-Gharbiya qui est aujourd'hui en ruines. Une autre légende qui m'a été relatée par les chorfa de Sidi Mas'ûd Ben Hssein attribue les vestiges de la casbah de Boula'wân, dans la région de Doukkala, au sultân lekhel.

Notons aussi que dans ces récits légendaires, le Sultan Noir apparaît souvent comme un ennemi du walî[26]. Les informateurs insistent sur la force, l'injustice et la brutalité de ce souverain. Sur ce point, les récits que rapportent Eickelman et Draioui (1973) et Jamous (1981) sont assez instructifs. Le premier dépeint le Sultan Noir comme un souverain injuste et cruel ; sans l'intervention du grand walî Sidi Mhammed Charqi et son fils Sid l-Ghazwani, il aurait brûlé vifs tous les Bni 'Mir. Le deuxième relate le massacre de toute la population masculine des iqar'yin par le Sultan Noir; seul un garçon déguisé en fille échappe à ce carnage.

En revanche, si la légende dépeint le Sultan Noir comme un roi fort, brutal et injuste, elle le présente aussi comme inférieur à son alter ego, le walî. Dans la geste de Ben Yeffou, le saint domine le souverain grâce à la supériorité de sa baraka. Puis, après l'avoir puissamment convaincu de ses facultés miraculeuses, il lui demande de le déclarer authentique chérif. Tout se passe comme si cette rencontre avec le monarque intervient pour mettre en évidence cette tension qui existe au Maroc entre sainteté, généalogie et pouvoir. Ce récit mythique peut être lu comme un commentaire ad hoc sur l'histoire politique du Maroc. Pour comprendre la dynamique qui anime cette relation triadique, il est primordial, à ce niveau de l'analyse, de définir la notion du *charaf* (chérifat) ainsi que ses dimensions historiques et sociopolitiques.

Le *charaf* ou la sainteté héréditaire

Le terme « charaf », duquel dérivent les mots chérif et son pluriel chorfa, signifie littéralement l'honneur et la noblesse. Il désigne, dans le contexte maghrébin, l'appartenance biologique à un walî qui lui-même descend du Prophète Mohammed par l'intermédiaire de sa fille Fatima. Les chorfa de Ben Yeffou sont donc des descendants du Prophète de l'islam par l'intermédiaire du saint Sidi Abdelaziz Ben Yeffou. J'ai pu trouver en possession d'un chérif une chajara, arbre généalogique, manuscrite attestant de cette appartenance. Selon ce document, wlad Ben Yeffou seraient des chorfa idrissides par l'intermédiaire de Sidi Abdessalam Ben Mchîch, le pôle du mysticisme marocain.

Les Idrissides représentent la plus vieille famille de chorfa marocains. Ils sont les descendants directs de Moulay Idriss, le premier monarque du pays. Fuyant le régime abbasside de Bagdad, il s'installa au Maroc au VIII[e] siècle et fonda la ville de Fès. Aujourd'hui, un grand nombre de chorfa marocains appartiennent à cette branche des descendants du Prophète et se distinguent de celle des

Alaouites. Ces derniers sont originaires de Yambo' au Yémen ; leur ancêtre arriva au Maroc (Tafilelt) vers le XIII^e siècle. Les Alaouites règnent sur le pays depuis le XVII^e siècle.

Faut-il souligner, par ailleurs, la confusion historique du récit de *wlad* Ben Yeffou ? Almohade ou Mérinide, le Sultan Noir ne peut pas être un chérif; il ne peut, de ce fait, certifier le charaf du saint. Les chorfa de Ben Yeffou s'excusent de ne pas être en possession de ce décret original signé par le Sultan Noir. Toutefois, comme j'ai pu le remarquer, ils détiennent cinq dahirs chérifiens alaouites. Le plus ancien, signé par le Sultan Moulay Mohamed Ben Abd Arrahman, date de 1875 (1292H) et le plus récent est signé en 1947 (1366H) par le roi Mohamed V, le grand père du souverain actuel.

On pourrait situer historiquement les débuts de cette nouvelle voie de la sainteté, le charaf, aux alentours du XV^e siècle. À cette époque, tout le Maghreb connut une crise « maraboutique » marquante. Profitant d'une grande dislocation socio-politique, des saints ont surgi partout dans le pays pour gagner le pouvoir. Mais devant les pressions colonialistes ibériques et les rivalités entre les chefs religieux, les espoirs se sont portés sur les chorfa saadiens. L'engouement pour les descendants du Prophète, remarque Drague, se développe avec une rapidité foudroyante. Il écrit :

> À vrai dire, seul le chérifisme semble susceptible de sauver le Maroc. Les Arabes comme les Berbères, désormais profondément islamisés, ne peuvent que reconnaître l'autorité d'un chef issu d'une telle lignée. Le chérif apparaît donc comme l'arbitre incontesté, désigné par la volonté divine pour réunir sous son sceptre des tribus d'origines diverses et de mœurs variées. [1951:51]

À partir de cette époque, le chérifisme est devenu un élément déterminant dans le jeu politique, ce qui constitue une réelle mutation dans le mode de légitimation du pouvoir central. Toutefois, la dynastie saadienne n'a constitué qu'un bref passage au sein de ce mouvement religieux très important, et l'effervescence « spirituelle » ne se calme qu'avec l'ascension au pouvoir des autres chorfa du Tafilelt, les Alaouites. Rabinow écrit à ce propos :

> The Maraboutic Crisis and its resolution through the triumph of the Alawites also wrought a basic new form for the religious order in Morocco. The religious crisis turned on a conflict between two sources of religious power and authority: the hereditary or genealogical, and the charismatic or miraculous. [1975:7]

C'est pendant le règne du fameux Moulay Ismail (1672-1727) que l'idéologie chérifienne a atteint une centralité qu'elle n'a jamais connue auparavant. La consolidation de l'autorité politique par ce monarque signifiait l'échec de la tentative des marabouts de s'accaparer du pouvoir. Le fondement du politique se dérobe donc du miraculeux et s'ancre dans l'héréditaire.

Le saint et le roi : le jeu de la généalogie

L'appartenance généalogique au Prophète met ainsi les chorfa dans une position de pouvoir et de sacralité, et le chérifisme, qui définit une réalité « spirituelle », est devenu dès lors le mobile social par excellence. Mais puisque tout walî n'est pas un chérif, des saints et leurs descendances ont tenté par tous les moyens de s'insérer dans la lignée prophétique, soit en obtenant un décret sultanien légitimant cette appartenance (Rabinow 1975), soit par un témoignage du Prophète lui-même qui apparaît en songe et certifie la réalité de la filiation (Laroui 1977). Les historiographes sont unanimes sur le fait que le nombre de chorfa a augmenté à partir du moment où Moulay Ismail a institué une politique de concorde chérifienne qui s'exprime essentiellement par des privilèges socio-économiques dont des dons sultaniens et des exemptions fiscales (Laroui 1977).

La légende de Sidi Abdslam Ben Saleh, l'ancêtre fondateur du patrilignage chorfa des iqar'iyen (Jamous 1981), permet de bien illustrer cette réalité sociohistorique. Le récit met en scène justement Moulay Ismail. Le saint arrive d'Algérie dans le pays des iqar'iyen au moment où le souverain fait la guerre aux Espagnols pour leur reprendre l'enclave de Melilla. Sidi Abdeslam Ben Saleh se présente à Moulay Ismail et lui demande l'acquisition d'une plaine qui était à cette époque recouverte d'une épaisse forêt et peuplée d'animaux sauvages. Le sultan rejette violemment la demande du walî car, dit-on, il se méfie de lui. Il l'interroge sur sa volonté d'acquérir cette forêt incultivable; mais le saint ne répond pas. Il porte la main sur sa bouche et son front et aussitôt la forêt brûle, découvrant ainsi une plaine riche et fertile. Pris de peur devant ce miracle, le monarque a un mouvement de recul. Mais il finit par accorder la plaine à Sidi Abdslam en l'exemptant, lui et ses descendants, d'impôts sur cette vaste terre. De plus, il lui donne le droit de porter le titre de chérif.

Le saint, grâce à son don miraculeux et la supériorité de sa baraka acquiert le titre du chérif ainsi que de tous les privilèges socioéconomiques qui en découlent. Selon les informateurs de Raymond Jamous, il est évident que le sultan alaouite se méfie d'un chérif idrisside qui peut contester la légitimité de son pouvoir[27].

Une scène très similaire à celle qui oppose Ben Yeffou au Sultan Noir a également été rapportée par Geertz

(1992). Elle illustre bien cette confrontation entre ces deux fondements du pouvoir : le charismatique et le généalogique. Elle met en scène encore une fois le roi Moulay Ismail et le saint Sidi Lahcen al-Yousi. C'est dans le bouillonnement spirituel au tournant du XVII[e] siècle que ce dernier, selon la légende racontée par sa descendance, descend de ses montagnes natales pour devenir un pèlerin, puis un rebelle, et enfin un saint. Il rencontre, par la suite, le souverain Moulay Ismail. Après l'avoir vaincu, dans une scène très similaire à celle de Ben Yeffou, par ses pouvoirs magiques et spirituels, lui dit: « Je ne demande aucun bien, aucun honneur, seulement que tu reconnaisses par décret royal le fait que je suis un chérif et un descendant du Prophète, digne des honneurs, des privilèges et du respect correspondants » (Geertz 1992:49).

Paul Rabinow (1975) rapporte d'autres détails importants de ce mythe. Une fois qu'al-Yousi a reçu le certificat du chérifat, il quitte Meknès, la capitale de l'époque, cherchant un endroit au Moyen Atlas où il pourrait vivre. Il s'arrête tout d'abord au village de Senhaja, mais les habitants refusent de l'accueillir parmi eux. Il les maudit et continue son chemin jusqu'au village de wlad 'Abad. Dès que Sidi Lahcen atteint la colline qui délimite le territoire du village, son cheval s'arrête et s'agenouille. Les wlad 'Abad étaient enchantés de l'avoir parmi eux. Ils lui offrent une terre à cultiver et une femme à épouser. Quelques années plus tard, une dispute se déclenche entre un enfant des wlad 'Abad et un fils de Sidi Lahcen. Ce dernier est devenu tellement enragé qu'il les a tous tués, sauf un. Ce rescapé est l'ancêtre des wlad 'Abad d'aujourd'hui avec qui les propres fils du saint ont fait un « contrat » stipulant que ses descendants seraient égaux aux fils du saint, mais que ceux-ci auraient le droit de les discipliner, les éduquer et les punir.

Il est à remarquer ici les similitudes frappantes entre les itinéraires des deux saints, Ben Yeffou et al-Yousi. Ceci confirme les hypothèses susmentionnées concernant le rapport identitaire à l'altérité. Les deux s'installent dans un territoire étranger où ils deviennent les véritables maîtres, soit après avoir maudit et chassé sa population autochtone, soit après l'avoir massacrée. Dans les deux cas, une seule personne a été épargnée pour devenir l'ancêtre des serviteurs des fils des saints.

Selon Geertz (1992), al-Yousi est l'un de ces « hommes fétiches » qui ont forgé la conscience marocaine originale et le Maroc lui-même. Deux moments importants dans sa vie symbolisent cette empreinte identitaire. Le premier est le fait d'avoir surpassé son maître, le célèbre Cheik soufi du pré-Sahara Ahmed Ben Nasser al-Dar'î, fondateur de l'ordre Nassiri à Tamgrût. Le second est d'avoir surpassé, cette fois-ci, le pouvoir temporel du grand sultan Moulay Ismail. À l'instar d'al-Yousi, le mythe de Ben Yeffou relate lui aussi ces deux moments importants dans l'histoire politique du Maroc : il surpasse le pouvoir spirituel des saints de Marrakech et le pouvoir temporel du roi emblématique, le Sultan Noir.

Le mythe comme un récit contre-narratif

Dans cette opposition entre l'homme charismatique et l'homme du pouvoir et de la force, l'hagiographie populaire érige toujours le premier au dessus du second. Le mythe (de Ben Yeffou, d'al-Yousi ou de Sidi Abdslam Ben Saleh) est en quelque sorte un discours contre-narratif; il inverse la situation historique. Ce n'est plus le roi qui domine le saint par la force des armes et ajoute à son pouvoir politique un pouvoir religieux, mais c'est le saint qui domine le roi par la force des esprits et ajoute à son pouvoir spirituel un autre politique. Car la légalité se donne au vainqueur; la victoire, par force ou dissuasion, est un signe de l'élection divine, un indice de la supériorité de la baraka (Jamous 1981; Hammoudi 2001). Tout se passe comme si le récit mythique, en révélant l'échec du marabout et sa défaite devant le souverain temporel, le priverait de cette force (la baraka) qui est sa raison d'être même.

L'histoire[28] des rapports d'al-Yousi avec le pouvoir alaouite permet, sans doute, d'illustrer la portée contre-narrative de ces récits mythiques. Contrairement à Ben Yeffou qui est principalement un saint populaire et légendaire, al-Yousi est, en plus, une figure historique. En sa personne convergeaient les deux courants principaux de l'islam maghrébin : celui de l'hagiologie populaire et celui de la spéculation savante (Andezian 1996).

Le nom complet de sidi Lahcen est Abû 'Ali al-Hassan Ben Mas'ûd. Il est né en 1631 dans une tribu berbère de la Haute Moulouya. Sidi Lahcen a vécu pendant une période tumultueuse et agitée. Durant sa vie de soixante ans, il a connu quatre dynasties différentes : les Saadiens, les deux principautés maraboutiques d'al-Dîla et de Tâzerwâlt et la dynastie montante des Alaouites.

Vers le milieu du XVII[e] siècle, la zaouïa d'al-Dîla, avec laquelle al-Yousi entretient des relations très étroites, prend les allures d'une monarchie dont le pouvoir va s'étendre sur presque tout le Maroc. C'est le chérif de Tafilalet Moulay r-Rachid, prédécesseur d'Ismail, qui met fin à cette aventure dilâ'ite. Al-Yousi assiste au pillage de la zaouïa. Il échappe à la défaveur qui emporte ses maîtres et ses collègues. La raison de cette grâce n'est pas claire, mais il est possible, comme le suggère Berque (1958), qu'il ait noué des liens forts avec la famille montante. Sidi Lahcen suit le conquérant alaouite à Fès et demeure bien en cour jusqu'à la mort du Sultan. Dans le désordre qui suit

la disparition de celui-ci, la population de Fès se soulève (1672). La ville est encerclée par le grand Ismail. Pendant que dure le siège de la cité, al-Yousi s'en va visiter les sanctuaires du Nord. Plus tard, il retourne à Fès et la trouve encore dans un grand désordre. Il envoie ainsi une épître à Moulay Ismail le mettant en garde contre tout abus d'autorité. L'audace et la lucidité de la lettre impressionnent tellement le souverain qu'il l'invite à Mekhnès (Rabinow 1975). Mais al-Yousi, craignant probablement la vengeance du monarque, décline l'offre.

À la fin de sa vie, Sidi Lahcen écrit deux autres épîtres au Souverain dont le ton vacille entre soumission et défi. Tandis que le préambule fait étalage d'une docilité solennelle, la péroraison porte sur les notions de l'abus et de la tyrannie qui soustraient le sujet au devoir de l'obéissance (Berque 1958). L'une de ces deux missives a été adressée au souverain alaouite après l'une de ses campagnes victorieuses dans le Moyen-Atlas[29]. Le walî exhorte le roi à conserver au peuple sa force défensive et offensive contre les envahisseurs chrétiens. Selon Berque : « La "pacification" que vient d'obtenir le Sultan et qu'il sanctionne par le désarmement des tribus, est donc ressentie par le docteur comme un détournement de pouvoir, une outrance impie et funeste » (1958:92). Pour l'islamologue français, ce reproche à Moulay Ismail – quelqu'un qui n'a pas fait « chômer » la guerre sainte et qui, de surcroît, a récupéré plusieurs villes côtières aux Européens – pourrait être expliqué par une réaction « d'autonomisme montagnard ».

Selon Berque, l'épître d'al-Yousi est plus qu'une homélie, c'est un pamphlet dont l'accent est parfois très virulent. « J'écris cette épître. C'est pour le moment, tout ce que je puis ». Berque (1958:91) ne manque pas de préciser le ton menaçant de cette dernière expression : « À qui connaît les malices du style professoral, ce "pour le moment" fait l'effet d'une menace. C'en est une effectivement ».

Ce « pour le moment » est, sans doute, très chargé politiquement. Exprime-t-il l'impuissance du walî à affronter le sultan au-delà de la remontrance épistolaire ? Malgré l'accent parfois menaçant et violent de la missive, Sidi Lahcen admet servir « en apparence » le souverain; il le considère comme « un accident auquel le sage doit s'adapter au milieu des intérêts supérieurs » (Berque 1958:90).

Al-Yousi va jusqu'à demander à Moulay Ismail un *dahir* qui lui donne le droit de porter le titre de chérif. Rabinow écrit à ce propos : « The Berber savant made his bow to the authority of the Alawite shurfa. Despite his wit, erudition, eloquence, and bravado, he acknowledged, by his act, the supremacy of the authority of the Alawite shurfa » (1975:16). Après avoir obtenu le décret royal, al-Yousi se réfugie dans les montagnes du Moyen Atlas pour y passer le restant de sa vie.

Pour bien illustrer la dimension contre-narrative du mythe d'al-Yousi, il est pertinent d'en rappeler quelques épisodes importants. Contrairement au fait historique, la tradition orale fait de Sidi Lahcen un hôte d'honneur dans les palais de Moulay Ismail. Celui-ci l'introduit même dans sa cour en tant que conseiller spirituel jusqu'au moment où il a commencé à critiquer les traitements cruels réservés aux ouvriers. Le souverain ordonne au saint de quitter sa ville.

> Al-Yousi sortit du palais et alla planter sa tente dans le cimetière en lisière de la ville [...]. Quand le sultan apprit cela, il envoya un émissaire demander au saint pourquoi il n'avait pas quitté la ville alors que le sultan le lui avait demandé. « Dis-lui, répondit al-Yousi, que j'ai quitté sa ville et suis entré dans la cité de Dieu ». Entendant cela, le sultan entra en rage et, enfourchant son cheval, se rendit en personne au cimetière, où il trouva le saint en prière. L'interrompant, ce qui en soi était un sacrilège, il l'interpella : « pourquoi n'as-tu pas quitté ma ville comme je te l'ai ordonné ? » Et al-Yousi de répondre : « J'ai quitté ta ville, je me trouve dans la cité de Dieu, le Puissant, le Saint. » Fou de colère, le sultan s'avança pour attaquer le saint et le tuer. Mais celui-ci, prenant sa propre lance, traça une ligne sur le sol et, quand le sultan voulut la franchir, il sentit que les jambes de son cheval s'enfonçaient peu à peu dans la terre. Pris d'effroi, Moulay Ismail se mit à invoquer Dieu, criant à al-Yousi : « Dieu m'a transformé ! Excuse-moi, accorde-moi ton pardon ! » [Geertz 1992:49]

C'est alors qu'al-Yousi demande à un Moulay Ismail battu et humilié un décret royal le reconnaissant en tant que chérif digne de tous les honneurs et les privilèges correspondants. Faut-il, encore une fois, souligner les similitudes remarquables entre la rencontre d'al-Yousi avec Moulay Ismail et celle de Ben Yeffou avec le Sultan Noir ? Les deux monarques voulant chasser les deux saints de leurs royaumes respectifs se voient miraculeusement défaits, le cheval de l'un s'enfonce dans la terre, celui de l'autre s'envole dans le ciel. Et après une victoire spectaculaire, les saints vainqueurs demandent une reconnaissance royale attestant de leur appartenance à la famille du Prophète.

On sait qu'historiquement les Alaouites, contrairement aux Saadiens, ont pris le pouvoir par la seule force des armes (Drague 1951). Et sous le règne de Moulay Ismail, l'élément maraboutique a été largement domestiqué, usant de force à outrance et de grandes faveurs. Ce qui pourrait probablement expliquer pourquoi ce souverain, de tous les rois du Maroc, est le plus fréquent dans les récits mythiques[30]. Sur cette omniprésence, Crapanzano écrit :

> Il faut noter que Moulay Ismail est un personnage qui apparaît fréquemment dans les légendes hagiographiques. Il est célèbre par sa cruauté aussi extrême qu'arbitraire, qui s'exprime en général par des décapitations à tout va. Il est souvent considéré comme adversaire du saint. [2000:75]

Si Moulay Ismail s'est imposé comme figure légendaire opposée au saint à cause de sa cruauté, le Sultan Noir l'est probablement par son étrangeté, car il est noir. En plus, selon les légendes qui le mettent en scène, celui-ci est toujours représenté comme un roi fort, cruel, et impulsif. Il n'est pas invraisemblable, d'ailleurs, de croire que ces deux figures mythiques de la royauté marocaine sont superposables. Surtout que nombre de mes interlocuteurs marocains, dont des universitaires, identifient le Sultan Noir à Moulay Ismail. Doutté (1905), pour sa part, n'exclut pas cette hypothèse puisque, selon lui, le souverain alaouite avait le teint « presque noir »[31] et était lui aussi un grand bâtisseur[32].

Sur l'omniprésence de ces figures royales dans les hagiologies populaires, on pourrait déjà avancer l'hypothèse suivante. Si le mythe doit opposer un saint à un monarque, celui-ci doit être le plus redoutable et le plus puissant possible pour que celui-là puisse prouver sa supériorité charismatique et la force de ses pouvoirs spirituels. Cela témoignerait du grand pouvoir du saint sur une figure virile, le sultan sans pitié qui décapite ses adversaires (Crapanzano 2000). En revanche, dans cette dialectique de la force et du charisme, le récit de Ben Yeffou, celui d'al-Yousi ou de sidi Abdslam Bensaleh, n'énoncent pas seulement la supériorité de celui-ci sur celle-là, mais révèle aussi une réciprocité de légitimation entre ces deux sources de pouvoir. Tout se passe comme si le saint et le roi ont besoin l'un de l'autre pour exister et asseoir leurs pouvoirs respectifs. Si le saint est légitimé dans son statut de chérif par le souverain, celui-ci se voit reconnaître son autorité de roi-chérif par celui-là même qui pourrait idéalement la lui contester (Jamous 1981).

L'issue de ce conflit est assez révélatrice de ce changement politique et religieux qui a marqué l'histoire du Maroc. Au terme d'une opposition morale, le saint qui en était le représentant par excellence, légitime le principe généalogique de la sainteté. Il reconnaît ainsi, en même temps, l'incomplétude de sa sainteté et son illégitimité au pouvoir temporel. Le sultan, en signant le décret du chérifat, reconnaît implicitement le saint comme un véritable prétendant au sultanat.

Les deux faces du pouvoir

Comme je l'ai susmentionné, le saint Ben Yeffou est désigné par le nom de « sultan ». Quand on interroge les chorfa sur le sens qu'ils donnent à ce terme, ils n'évoquent pas seulement le pouvoir spirituel et charismatique de leur ancêtre, mais sa souveraineté temporelle également. Ben Yeffou était, m'affirment ses descendants, un monarque à part entière, exactement comme l'est Mohammed VI, le roi actuel du Maroc. Selon eux, le walî était un véritable sultan qui régnait sur une partie du Maroc grâce à une armée humaine et démoniaque. Et c'est idéalement lui, plus que le roi, qui mérite le titre de monarque, puisqu'il associe les deux formes de la baraka : la charismatique et l'héréditaire. Dans son interprétation de la tradition orale des *chorfa* imhiwach, des Idrissides également, Drouin (1996) souligne que ceux-ci, par l'affirmation de leur double baraka, chérifienne et mystique, justifient leurs revendications et leur supériorité vis-à-vis du pouvoir central de la dynastie alaouite.

Mais même associant cette double légitimité, le saint-chérif idrisside ne dispose pas de la même force que le roi-chérif alaouite. Confronté à un adversaire plus fort, celui-là se soumet à celui-ci en renonçant à son droit à la royauté. La relation entre Moulay Ismail et Moulay al-Tihâmî, le chérif idrisside de Wâzzân, est assez révélatrice de ce rapport de force. Disposant de la même légitimité religieuse que le souverain, mais pas encore de la même force, le chérif réalise qu'il vaut « mieux plier qu'être écrasé » (Beck 1989:161).

« Je suis Sultan et tu es Sultan », c'est la dernière phrase, rappelons-le, que dit le souverain noir à Ben Yeffou avant de le quitter. On pourrait voir dans cette déclaration une forme de partage des pouvoirs entre le saint et le roi. Le premier gouverne le monde des humains, le second celui des esprits. Pour m'expliquer la différence qui existe entre l'autorité du walî et celle du roi, un des wlad Ben Yeffou me confie que la souveraineté (*mûlk*) au Maroc a deux faces : l'une manifeste, visible (*dhâhir*), que représentent Mohammed VI et sa famille alaouite, et l'autre cachée, invisible (*bâtin*), que représentent Ben Yeffou et les Idrissides en général. Ce dernier pouvoir s'étend jusqu'au Soudan, me dit-il[33]. On pourrait facilement lire dans cette opposition entre le dhâhir et le bâtin une forme de partage entre le pouvoir temporel et le pouvoir spirituel. Ce partage est vraisemblablement la conséquence de la prise du pouvoir et sa consolidation combative et répressive par les Alaouites. Ne pouvant plus manifestement réclamer l'autorité politique, les chorfa idrissides sont devenus, en quelque sorte, des spécialistes de la surnature, de l'invisible. L'écrasante majorité des mausolées de saints que j'ai visités, aussi bien dans la région de Doukkala-'Abda qu'ailleurs au Maroc, sont dirigés par des chorfa qui se définissent comme Idrissides et qui sont généralement des thérapeutes qui guérissent les maux et

les maladies liés aux esprits. Ben Yeffou, me limitant à celui-ci, est qualifié, par sa descendance, de sultan des djinns. Plusieurs chansons que j'ai recueillies dans le sanctuaire le qualifient comme tel. Une de ces chansons dit clairement : « Mon père [Ben Yeffou] est sultan, il guérit le paralytique et le possédé, nourrit l'affamé et abreuve l'assoiffé. Les gens de tout le Maroc, de Meknès, de Fès et de Marrakech, viennent le visiter ».

Lors du rituel thérapeutique également, les chorfa guérisseurs invoquent et implorent le sultan Sidi Abdel Aziz Ben Yeffou. Il est sultan car il exerce un pouvoir sur les djinns et c'est ce même pouvoir qui confère à sa descendance le don thérapeutique d'exorciser les esprits possesseurs. Tout se passe comme si le roi, grâce à son ascendance prophétique et sa force armée, s'était imposé comme un pôle du pouvoir politique, tandis que le saint, grâce à ses origines chérifiennes et sa force charismatique, s'était confirmé comme un spécialiste du pouvoir surnaturel. À travers l'étude des légendes des Aïssawa rapportées par Brunel (1926), Jamous (1994, 1995) distingue, à juste titre, cette séparation qui existe entre l'autorité cosmique et invisible du saint et l'autorité temporelle et visible du souverain. Tandis que la première concerne l'univers supra-humain et infra-humain, le monde de la marge, la deuxième s'applique à l'ordre social. Le souverain est le chef temporel d'une communauté particulière, celle du Maroc. Il est le centre de cet ordre social car il unit en lui le pouvoir temporel et le pouvoir divin.

Et encore aujourd'hui, le Maroc, comme l'a récemment noté Geertz (2005), se définit surtout par la présence en son centre et à son sommet de la monarchie alaouite. Et c'est le roi, en tant que chef de gouvernement et Commandant des croyants, qui définit la « marocanité » même du pays et sa population. Prise dans ce sens, la légende de Ben Yeffou pourrait être lue, non seulement comme un commentaire ad hoc sur l'histoire politique du Maroc, mais aussi comme un mythe fondateur de l'identité marocaine et du Maroc lui-même.

Le mythe révèle avec force les moments clés de cette empreinte identitaire. Il montre, premièrement, comment l'étrangèreté et l'altérité du saint et du roi sont sources d'identification. Il note également, et surtout, ce tournant décisif dans l'histoire du Maroc, quand le chérifat, dans sa forme alaouite, s'est imposé comme un fondement de la royauté et de la sainteté. Le troisième moment fort de cette empreinte identitaire est subséquent au deuxième; il concerne cette césure qui s'est progressivement établie entre l'autorité surnaturelle et invisible du chérif-saint et l'autorité temporelle et visible du chérif-roi.

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Notes

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2 Les djinns ou les *jnouns* (sing. *jenn*) sont des esprits ambivalents qui peuvent être bienfaisants comme malfaisants. Dans ce dernier cas, ils causent différentes maladies mentales et physiques. Pour une synthèse sur l'action de ces esprits et des maladies qu'ils causent voir par exemple Aouattah (1993).

3 Doukkala est une tribu arabe des plaines du centre-ouest marocain, délimitée par deux autres tribus arabes, 'Abda vers le sud et Chawia vers le nord. La présente ethnographie a été effectuée en langue locale, l'arabe, et le dialecte marocain qui en est une variante.

4 Les seuls documents qui évoquent brièvement le saint sont *al-I'lam biman halla bimourrakocha wa aghmata mina al-a'lam* [Faire connaître les éminents hommes qui ont vécu à Marrakech et à Aghmat] de son auteur Assamlali, et *Jawahir al-kamal fi tarajim arrijal* [Les perles de la perfection dans les biographies des saints hommes] d'al-Kanûni al-Abdi. Le premier document ne mentionne le saint qu'indirectement, commentant un petit poème du Sultan Moulay Soulaiman qui évoque Ben Yeffou. Le saint est décrit par Assamlali comme un homme pieux et bon prédicateur. Al-Kanûni Al-Abdi, quant à lui, rapporte une très brève biographie du saint ; il le nomme le père des chevaliers Sidi Abdel Aziz Ben Yeffou : « C'est le fameux et célèbre saint auquel voyagent des femmes et hommes pour se soigner des maladies des djinns et des possessions. Il a vécu au début du XI^{e} siècle [de l'hégire (H), XVII^{e} en calendrier chrétien] » (1937 (II):26). Le saint lui-même n'a laissé aucune œuvre écrite; le seul poème qui lui est attribué, le *Sabre*, ne fait aucune mention ni de sa vie ni de son enseignement.

5 Cette version du mythe est la synthèse de plusieurs variantes que j'ai recueillies dans la région. Ces versions se ressemblent beaucoup avec quelques variations minimales qui n'affectent aucunement le sens global de l'histoire.

6 Dans une autre version, il s'agit de 40 saints. Notons qu'aussi bien le chiffre 7 que 40 sont des nombres magiques dans la culture populaire marocaine (Westermarck 1926, 1935; Dermenghem 1954).

7 *Bûhali* est un idiot, un simple d'esprit. Dans l'hagiographie marocaine, un *majdûb* est souvent assimilé à un bûhali (Rachik 1998). Pour la définition du majdûb, voir plus loin.

8 Si le mot halâl est assez clair et désigne une nourriture licite (non prohibée par la charia), le terme harâm, par contre, pourrait porter à confusion, car on ne voit pas comment une semoule de blé pourrait être harâm. Quant j'ai posé la question à mes interlocuteurs sur le sens qu'ils donnent à ce terme, ils m'ont informé que la semoule pourrait être d'une origine douteuse, volée par exemple; la viande harâm pour-

rait être *jîfa* (celle d'un animal non immolé). Parfois, cet épisode de l'histoire est relaté ultérieurement, quand le saint quitte Marrakech et rencontre les Semlala dans la région des Doukkala.

9 Il est curieux de voir que la légende situe les Semlala dans cette région atlantique des Doukkala. Cette tribu est réputée appartenir au versant sud de l'Atlas. Il est fort possible qu'il s'agisse là d'une confusion. Mais vu la grande mobilité des tribus marocaines, il n'est pas impossible que les Semlala se soient installés, à un moment de l'histoire, dans la région de Ben Yeffou actuelle.

10 Dans une autre version, les Semlala ne quittent pas le village de leur gré, c'est le saint même qui les en chasse. Quand ils refusent de lui donner une part de la vache sacrifiée, il les maudit : « Qu'Allah vous fasse disperser de ces terres ! ».

11 De ces anciens Semlala, il ne subsiste aujourd'hui dans le village de Ben Yeffou que deux foyers (*kanûns*) qu'on nomme les *Ftaytats* ou *Ibn Ftaytou*.

12 Sur le Sultan Noir, voir ci-dessous.

13 La baraka ne diminue pas après la disparition du walî, elle en est plutôt renforcée, voir par exemple (Westermarck 1926(I):159).

14 Le terme mrabit désignait, au début de l'ère musulmane, l'ascète qui habite le *ribât* (couvent fortifié) (Kerrou 1998).

15 Les descendants du saint sont dits *wlad sayyed* ou tout simplement *wlad* Ben Yeffou.

16 Selon Dermenghem (1954), il existe deux sortes d'*awliyâ* maghrébins : les saints « populaires » et les saints « sérieux ». Si ces derniers sont des awliyâ hagiographiques, « savants » et « studieux », les premiers sont plutôt des saints légendaires dont la réalité historique est assez difficilement saisissable. Toutefois il n'y a pas toujours une nette distinction entre ces deux catégories de saints ; quelques uns des awliyâ « sérieux » et savants sont aussi des saints légendaires et « folkloriques ». Al-Yousi, dont nous parlerons plus loin, est de ceux-là.

17 L'expression est de Naamouni (1993). Elle désigne toutes les maladies causées par les esprits djinns.

18 La pérambulation peut éventuellement représenter une forme permanente de sainteté pour certains individus ou certains ordres religieux, comme les Heddawa marocains (Brunel 2001).

19 Étymologiquement, le terme majdûb est un dérivé de la racine verbale *jadaba*, qui veut dire « tirer à soi », « attirer »; il désigne toute personne attirée, séduite par quelqu'un ou quelque chose (Blachère et al. 1970:1379-1382).

20 Le nom arabe que donnent les acteurs au Sultan est *Sultân*. Littéralement ce terme veut dire « celui qui a le pouvoir », il désigne un roi, un monarque.

21 L'auteur énumère les différentes fonctions de la zaouïa qui sont toutes des fonctions à visée socioculturelle ou sociopolitique : enseignement, réunion, arbitrage de conflits, protection contre l'autorité centrale et médiation politique (Laroui 1977).

22 Au début du siècle passé, Westermarck (1926) cite Sidi Abdelaziz Ben Yeffou parmi les saints de Doukkala qui commandent aux djinns et qui sont par conséquent sollicités par les personnes possédées.

23 En plus des visites quotidiennes où l'on assiste à une activité sociale (de nouvelles connaissances et des amitiés qui se forment) et économique (sous formes de dons et contre dons), cet aspect socioéconomique est plus prégnant lors de la foire annuelle (*moussem*) où tout le village se transforme en un grand souk. Fait important, les souks hebdomadaires de la région (Oualidia et Gharbia) se déplacent à Ben Yeffou. Les visiteurs viennent par dizaines de milliers. Lors du moussem de 2006 (entre le 13 et le 20 août) auquel j'ai assisté, le nombre de visites était estimé à 30 000 pèlerins.

24 La légende de Moulay Abdeslam m'a été rapportée par un enseignant d'histoire au collège d'Oualidia.

25 Selon certains récits recueillis par Westermarck (1926), le sultân lekhel perd complètement son caractère humain; il serait le fils du roi des djinns, Sidi Chamharûch.

26 À l'instar de Ben Yeffou et de Sidi Mas'ûd Ben Hssein, la légende de Moul l-Bargui que j'ai recueillie dans la région de 'Abda relate aussi une rencontre entre le saint et le *sultân lekhel*. Pour d'autres confrontations avec le Sultan Noir, voir Doutté (1905); Eickelman et Draioui (1973); Jamous (1981); Naamouni (1993).

27 Notons que le récit désigne Sidi Abdeslam Ben Saleh comme chérif avant même sa rencontre avec Moulay Ismail et l'acquisition subséquente du droit de porter ce titre.

28 Pour une histoire complète d'al-Yousi, voir Berque (1958).

29 Parmi les tribus berbères qui ont été désarmées et domptées par Moulay Ismail figure celle d'al-Yousi (Houdas 1969; Berque 1958).

30 Pour les confrontations avec le sultan Moulay Ismail voir par exemple Brunel (1926); Geertz (1992); Gellner (2003); Morsy (1972); Crapanzano (2000); Rabinow (1975); Jamous (1981); Beck (1989).

31 Si l'on croit Defontin-Maxange (1929), Moulay Ismail serait l'enfant même d'une esclave noire qui servit son père Moulay Ali Shrif pendant sa captivité par le roi de Sous.

32 La casbah de Boula'wân que mes informateurs, et ceux de Doutté, attribuent au Sultan Noir a été reconstruite par Moulay Ismail (Doutté 1905).

33 Le Soudan représente, dans l'imaginaire populaire marocain, le berceau des génies possesseurs (Claisse 2003)

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Still Feeding the World? The Political Ecology of Canadian Prairie Farmers

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Abstract: This article examines how many Saskatchewan farmers came to think of themselves as independent farmer-entrepreneurs who had to control nature and the market by using the latest agricultural technology and by becoming astute players on the world market. The article draws on Innis's staple theory to understand how large-scale export agriculture structures farmers' "fields of possible action" in a thoroughly intervened and produced nature and on Foucault's writings on neoliberal governance to comprehend their subjective responses. Beyond the classical enquiry of anthropological political economy, this article focuses on the relationship of farmers to nature as an intensely political one.

Keywords: agriculture, Saskatchewan, neo-liberalism, political ecology

Résumé : Cet présent article examine la façon dont les agriculteurs de la Saskatchewan se sont identifiés au modèle de l'agriculteur entrepreneur qui contrôle la nature et le marché en utilisant une technologie de pointe et en devenant un joueur astucieux sur le marché mondial. L'article se réfère à la théorie des produits de première nécessité (staples) de Innis pour comprendre la façon dont l'agriculture d'exportation à grande échelle a structuré le champ des possibles des agriculteurs des prairies dans un environnement naturel profondément transformé. Il s'inspire aussi des écrits de Foucault sur la gouvernance néolibérale pour analyser leurs réactions subjectives. Cet article va au-delà de la démarche classique de l'anthropologie politique et économique en envisageant les relations des agriculteurs à la nature comme des relations éminemment politiques.

Mots-clés : Agriculture, Saskatchewan, néolibéralisme, écologie politique

According to a recent FAO study sketching out the challenges and priorities of global farming systems, the evolution of farming systems often follows a recognizable path: specialization, greater use of external inputs, mechanization, intensification of production, export orientation and land aggregation appear as the future for the development of agricultural systems worldwide (Dixon et al. 2001:8). In this article, I will look at farmers who followed that path and who have adopted all of these practices. Their example illustrates both the seduction and the destructiveness of this model.

For most farmers in the world, farmers on the cereal plains of Saskatchewan present an image of prosperity and success. Their farms of an average of 500 hectares (1,300 acres) seem unimaginably big. Saskatchewan government publications advertise the province as the centre for biotechnology and high-tech agriculture. Saskatchewan farmers intensified production per acre by introducing zero till techniques. They grow speciality crops on a contract basis for agricultural corporations and most farmers growing canola now cultivate herbicide-tolerant varieties. All of these innovations led to a considerable increase in production per farm. However for a long time this did not translate into a simultaneous increase in farmers' incomes as large agro-food corporations skimmed off most of the profits. In fact, over the last 20 years their incomes had gone down steadily until the sudden rise in prices in 2007 and the equally sudden drop in October 2008.

On the basis of my fieldwork in the apex of the dry Palliser Triangle, about 50 km southeast of Saskatoon, I will examine how many Saskatchewan farmers came to think of themselves as farmer-entrepreneurs who had to control nature by using the latest agricultural technology and learning to "play the world-market." At the same time, they allowed the dismantling of collective structures of market protection. Why did prairie farmers respond this way since it made their livelihoods ever more

tenuous? I will try to answer this question in a number of ways. I will refer to Innis's staples theory (Innis 1956, 1950) for understanding the impact of large scale export agriculture on the social and economic structures of the prairies and how it "structures the fields of possible action" (Wolf 1990:587; Foucault 1982:224) of prairie farmers. I will also turn to Foucault's recently published writings on neo-liberal governance (Foucault 2004) to comprehend the more subjective responses farmers have to these conditions of possibility. This will lead us to assess both the material conditions driving the ongoing crisis in prairie farming and the particular form response or resistance has taken.

We are posing a classical problem of anthropological political economy, as William Roseberry (2002:61) defined it,[1] when we enquire into how prairie farmers came to constitute themselves as competitive and competing individuals who subject themselves to what they consider to be the law of the market. In this paper, however, I want to show that this analysis is incomplete if it does not take into account the relationship of farmers to nature as intensely political. After an introductory section that sets the argument in the theoretical frame of political ecology, I turn to the remembered history of the prairies. I show how current neo-liberal governmentality was preceded by an earlier kind of settler subjectivity emphasizing collective action and claiming state intervention that is quite different from the images contemporary informants hold of their past. I then present material from informants and suggest that it is precisely the marrying of reinterpretations of the past as an individual struggle to current neo-liberal ideologies of the person that effectively shapes their form of agency when faced with current conditions. I also show that agro-business has reinforced the equation of Innis's staples theory, creating forms of dependency and precariousness that now rely on the intermediary of a thoroughly intervened and produced nature while retaining the image of a war on nature. I want to show not only how Canadian prairie farmers mould their natural environment according to the requirements of productivism, but also how they are, as a consequence, subjected to the social and natural environment that they have themselves transformed. In the last part of this article, I want to follow up one of the surprises of my fieldwork and try to explain why conventional farmers who gave up chemical use because they could no longer pay the bills and who as a consequence became organic producers, developed different relations to nature and a new critical view of the political and economic system. Why is it that farmers who had to withdraw from high-tech farming and who chose, mostly out of necessity, to cultivate in an organic way developed radically different worldviews and social and political priorities? To what extent is it the agricultural practice that shapes political worldviews and attitudes to nature or conversely how do dominant ideological discourses about competition, innovation and risk motivate farmers in the choices they make and the risks they take?

Fieldwork for this study has been carried out since 2002 among friends, relatives and neighbours of our family farm of 2600 acres near Colonsay, Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan study is part of a larger multi-sited fieldwork on "Food, Property and Power: Technology and the Policy of Food Production in the International Arena and in the Everyday of Food Producers" that I am currently undertaking in my research laboratory in Paris, France.

The material used in this study is based on direct observations of farming practices, lengthy informal discussions with farmers, farmers' union leaders, Wheat Board representatives, crop insurance representatives, grain handlers and lawyers, and on taped interviews with 30 grain farming families, mostly husbands and wives together.[2] In addition to oral material, I analyzed government publications, flyers from chemical companies, trade union publications and newspapers. I took part in the crop production week, went to trade union conventions and followed a Saskatchewan farmer to the Supreme Court of Canada (Müller 2006). On all the grain farms I visited, there was a clear gendered division of labour. Men seeded the crop and did all other tasks related to growing and harvesting and they maintained the farm machinery. Women were responsible for preparing food for the family and farm helpers. They also cultivated garden vegetables for subsistence consumption. They often kept the farm accounts and were consulted by their husbands on marketing decisions. It was, in most cases, their income from off-farm work that provided for the needs of family consumption, recreation and education of the children. If their off-farm work permitted, they helped out on the fields harrowing and packing after seeding, and, especially at harvest time, they drove the grain truck and sometimes the combine.

The Political Ecology of Canadian Prairie Farmers

Now I possess and am possessed of the land where I would be,
And the curve of half earth's generous breast shall soothe and ravish me.

—Rudyard Kipling 1924

Political ecology in the French tradition brings the profoundly political nature of the natural order to the forefront (Latour 1999:45). French political ecologists confront the significance of conceptions of nature and humanity for the distribution of power in a community. Every conception of nature has implications for how control is exercised over nonhumans and humans alike (Whiteside 2002:11). Inherent in this thinking is a critique of productivism in capitalist and socialist systems. Productivism describes the orientation of a society against nature: one that tries, by always increasing production and consumption, to negate its links to nature, to free itself from fears of scarcity and from destructive elements (Moscovici 1972:369). In society's quest for higher levels of material satisfaction, individuals are moulded as productivity requires (Moscovici 1976:102). I want to show here not only how Canadian prairie farmers mould their natural environment according to the requirements of productivism, but also how they are, as a consequence, subjected to the social and natural environment that they have transformed.

I am drawing here on Ingold's concept of dwelling that expresses how humans' perception of the environment is shaped by how they live in it and interact with it on an everyday basis. Ingold argues that destructive human behaviour has its source in the very alienation of humanity from the world. The very notions of construction and control[3] are grounded in the discourse of intervention. They presume a world already constituted, through the action of natural forces, which then becomes the object of human interest and concern (Ingold 2000:215). It is not a world of which humans themselves are conceived to be a part. He assumes that, currently, a global ontology of detachment dominates the local ontology of engagement (Ingold 2000:216). He expresses this opposition in the two concepts of land and landscape: land as quantitative and homogeneous and landscape as qualitative and heterogeneous. Ingold moves beyond the opposition between the naturalistic point of view of the landscape as a neutral external backdrop of human activity and the culturalistic view that the landscape is a particular cognitive or symbolic ordering of space. Instead, in the dwelling perspective, the landscape is the enduring record of the lives and works of past generations who engage perpetually with the environment that is itself fundamentally historical and in process (Ingold 2000:189). Assuming the dwelling perspective, it becomes possible to show how an organic farming practice for instance, produces not only a different perception of nature but also a changed political awareness, and why the farmers, once they acquire a new modesty and sensitivity towards the natural environment they work with, seem to acquire a temporary respite from the logic of capitalist production that allows them also to think in a different way.

In the reverse, the landscape that the farmer-entrepreneur contributed to creating by practicing monoculture, by using sophisticated weed control with chemicals and by enlarging the areas cultivated, seems to compel him to use more and more sophisticated means of control like global positioning systems (GPS) for efficient chemical application and biotechnology for becoming more independent of seasonal constraints. The heterogeneity of the *landscape* becomes abstracted to the quantitative category of the *land*, an asset that has to be increased to allow for "economies of scale." The figure of the farmer-entrepreneur dominates in Canadian government publications. For example, the consultation for the Agricultural Policy Framework suggests that farmers need "strategic management skills" to run their farms as "businesses" that require constant renewal (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2002). Permanent growth and ever-tighter organization of farms emulate a U.S.-American model: "the people who have transformed American agriculture have been entrepreneurs. They have believed in themselves, and they have been willing to take great risks, albeit risks they have calculated with great precision" (Hart 2005:20). Hart contends that modern family farms need to become integrated into tightly orchestrated food-supply chains in order to thrive and these complex new organizations of large-scale production require managerial skills of the highest order. According to Hart, this trend is not only inevitable, it is beneficial because it produces the food American consumers want to buy at prices they can afford (Hart 2005:17). The farmer-entrepreneur is a rational individualist willing to take risks and able to control them. The spirit of enterprise, however, also has a moral dimension, supposedly animating everything that is "unique and honourable" about being a farmer (Dudley 1994:148). "Learning to farm is a lesson in the basic principles of a capitalist society. Not only is the market figured as inherently just—'if you work, you get reward'—individual moral character is built by internalizing this logic...it is this inner directed drive that makes being a farmer a

rewarding occupation, although by no means an easy one" (Dudley 1994:147).

I want to show to what extent the effort of prairie farmers to comply with this ideal of rationality and control has in itself strongly irrational traits. The objective of perfect control over farming activities, which depends on the weather and numerous other natural conditions, and over the opacities of an increasingly open global market, is impossible to achieve. I want to show that the apparent rationalization of the life-world of prairie farmers following the model of the farmer-entrepreneur has in fact led to the emergence of new beliefs and prophecies that are inherent in the rationale of market economics. Long ago, Weber apprehended that the rational way of life that built this "powerful cosmos of the modern economic order" which now determines the way of life of each person that gets into its ambit would end in the emergence of new prophecies or a kind of compulsive self-centredness (Weber 1973:187-188). I want to demonstrate to what extent Weber's apprehensions have been realized on the prairies.

Two of the key economic concepts that haunt prairie farmers and cement their feelings of guilt and inadequacy are "comparative advantage" and "flexibility." The theory of comparative advantage, developed in the beginning of the 19th century by David Ricardo and others, stipulated that because Canada could produce resources like fur, fish, wheat and forests comparatively more cheaply than manufactured goods, while in Britain the comparative cost ratios were reversed, the greatest gains to trade would derive from Canada specializing in staples and Britain in industrial goods (Barnes 2005). This viewpoint resulted in the Canadian specialization in the production of staples for export to the metropolis and still dominates actual Canadian government publications. It implies that it is the responsibility of individual farmer-entrepreneurs to grasp the opportunity to produce certain products that they can produce more cheaply than others and to respond flexibly to changing patterns of demand, creatively exploiting niche markets and embracing new technologies.

This theory was criticized by Innis in the 1930s. Innis thought Ricardo's theory not only represented the imposition of a colonial self-justificatory intellectual scheme on the ex-colony but the particular international division of labour it prescribed, first with Europe and then with the U.S., maintained exactly the old asymmetric colonial trade relations (Innis 1956:3). In contrast to orthodox trade theory, Innis argued that there were no advantages, comparative or otherwise, to specializing in staples. Staples production resulted in only halting and incomplete development, enmeshing regions and nations in a "staples trap" (Innis 1950:5-6). In the prairies, the huge private and public investments in infrastructure, railways, grain-elevators and grid roads shaped the landscape permanently but left little room for alternative developments. The result, Barnes pointed out, using Innis's terminology, is that staples-producing regions and nations became dependent on more powerful foreign metropolitan centres and consequently remained on the global economic margin (Barnes 2005).

At the basis of Innis's alternative staples model is a cyclonic metaphor. Staples producing areas are "storm centres to the modern international economy" (Barnes 2005). Innis uses the meteorological metaphor to represent both the whirlwind ferocity of capitalist accumulation at resource sites and the equally ferocious decline and destruction that follows:

> Because the metropolises of capitalism require a continual source of raw materials, there is an incessant search for new and profitable sources of raw materials. Blowing across the economic landscape, global-cyclonic winds touch down at a few sites—single industry towns—to create in a burst of frenetic energy the infrastructure and wherewithal of resource production. But as implied by the central metaphor, stability is always precarious and temporary, and sooner rather than later, "all that is solid melts into air"...Concomitantly there is massive disruption of peoples' lives and livelihoods. [Barnes 2005:3]

Innis assumes that each staple embodies a set of spatial and temporal imperatives ("space-time biases") that are manifest once staples extraction and trade begin. Just as Marx pulls away the veil of the commodity to expose its social constituents, Innis carries out the same manoeuvre to uncover the multifarious and twisted threads of far-reaching geography and history linked to staples extraction and trade (Barnes 2005). For Saskatchewan farmers, these threads are obscured while they attempt to react to falling world grain prices and sudden spikes in prices—Saskatchewan is exporting at least 70% of its agriculture production (in value terms)—by enlarging the area cultivated and by investing into ever-larger machinery. They observe the grain harvest in Argentina, the weather patterns in China and the outcome of trade talks in Hong Kong with the obscure premonition that all these events are linked to the success or failure of their farming operations. They wonder whether the sudden rise in prices on the Winnipeg grain exchange are a function of increased demand for their products or the result of investment funds transferring their assets from shares to agricultural commodities.

Because they have internalized the identity of the farmer-entrepreneur they are set to confront these obscure forces of the market alone. From being inseparably interwoven with the traditional conditions of life, family and neighbourhood, craftsmanship and religion, village and church, the farmers and their land become inseparably connected to market and capital, technology and innovation, corporations and banks. Polanyi once called the marketization of land and labour the most absurd undertaking because it submits social institutions to the requirements of the market mechanism (Polanyi 1990:243-244).

Michel Foucault, analyzing Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism, goes further showing that liberalism is in fact a way of being and of thinking and the source of a new utopian thinking about society (Foucault 2004:224). The central figure in neo-liberal thinking is *Homo oeconomicus*, though not *Homo oeconomicus* as partners in exchange, but as entrepreneurs, as entrepreneurs of themselves (Foucault 2004:232). Their work competence is the human capital they invest in and dispose of to obtain revenue (Foucault 2004:230). The entrepreneurs are thus responsible for themselves, for their education and potential for innovation, and they are in competition with all other entrepreneurs and thus with all the other individuals in society. As a consequence, the economic form of the market is generalized even beyond forms of monetary exchange. The market form, in terms of offer and demand, functions like a principle of intelligibility that spells out the social relations and the behaviour of individuals (Foucault 2004:249). The generalization of the figure of the farmer-entrepreneur also generalizes the principle of competition among prairie farmers and their isolation when confronted with the mechanisms of the market. As we will see below, it throws individuals back on to their own resources, encourages a feeling of guilt and inadequacy and makes farmers take investment risks largely beyond their financial means.

The Myth of the Self-sustaining Pioneer

The prairie is broad, unmolested,
It points to the high and sublime;
Where only the sky is above you,
And only the distance in view,
With no one to jostle or shove you—
It's there a man learns to be true!

—Robert Stead 1910

To have arrived empty-handed in an empty land, to have populated it, to have made it fertile and to have civilized it is the basis for the Saskatchewan founding myth. The settlers saw the prairies as unfinished—as God's raw material (Boyens 2001:23)—that they were called on to give shape and meaning to. For a white Saskatchewan farmer, history starts at the end of the 19th century with the arrival of the first settlers. It was part of the self-perception of many farmers I spoke to that their parents or grandparents had homesteaded in the area and had thus been the first people there. They marked the land with their presence, broke the prairie soil and sometimes even gave their name to the place. In that way, Bill Ritter, a farmer in Colonsay, could take pride that he lived in the house his grandfather built on the road that bears his name. The heritage museums in Saskatoon and Moose Jaw are full of objects from settlement times; they celebrate the schools settlers built, the railway stations and post offices. What a European would consider a modern house from the beginning of the 20th century is considered here a building of a truly venerable age. The myth of the self-sustaining pioneer emphasizes the effort of the individual and silences the fact that the settlements were masterminded and planned by the Canadian Dominion Government eager to populate the prairies and to remove them from U.S.-American territorial ambitions.

I do not intend to give a full account of the historical development of the Canadian West here. This has been done extensively in other places (Adams 1989; Conway 1994; Fowke 1957; Gray 1978; Potyondi 1995). What I want to focus on here is the representation of the figure of the pioneer in the contemporary thinking of prairie farmers and the extent to which it differs from historical accounts. I will critically examine three elements of the myth of the self-sustaining pioneer: the arrival in an empty land; the lonely fight with nature; and, the need to create home, clothing and food from nothing.

Historical and ecological developments before the settlers arrived are mostly disregarded in popular accounts of settlement times. This imagined historical void applies in two ways to the history of the prairies and its inhabitants: it erases the history of First Nations Peoples and it also erases the family histories of the settlers before their arrival in Canada. Settlers were not officially encouraged to hold on to their European past but to merge with the new Canadian society, forgetting their languages and traditions. Many farmers I spoke to have an extremely vague memory of where their ancestors actually came from and why they came to Saskatchewan only two or three generations ago.

The last 100 years that white farmers of Saskatchewan experience as "history" inscribe themselves onto a much longer presence of humans on the prairies that shaped not only prairie ecology but also the form that economic exploitation took. First Nations Peoples on the

prairies had actively intervened in prairie ecology by lighting fires that moved large buffalo herds off their course and attracted them to the fresh soft prairie grass that grows after a fire. Buffalo thrived in such a regime to the point of largely outnumbering deer and other animals and of feeding a large population of predators. This equilibrium changed when buffalo hides became a sought-after commodity, a staple in Innis' sense, first on the U.S.-American market and later for the Hudson Bay Company that had the monopoly on the trade in hides. First Nations Peoples started to hunt more buffalo than they needed for their own consumption and Métis groups, uninhibited by tribal territorial boundaries and organized in paramilitary fashion, started to systematically kill thousands of buffalo (Potyondi 1995). Once buffalo herds were virtually gone by 1879-80, a new boom trade in buffalo bones began that was soon to be replaced by a cattle ranching boom mostly carried out by ranchers from the north of the U.S. who had overgrazed their own lands. First Nations Peoples and Métis lost their basis for subsistence, and the First Nations Peoples were relegated into the misery of reserves. The 19th century had thus been characterized by economic cycles of boom and bust that set the stage for the arrival of the settlers. The prairies were indeed emptied of their original human and animal populations—with the exception of a few cattle ranchers with big free roaming herds—when the Canadian Dominion Government finally managed to attract the first settlers to the area east of Saskatoon at the turn of the century.

The prairies were emptied but they were not disorganized. Before the first settlers arrived, the land had been measured and divided into neat square sections with an identification rod buried in the corner of each quarter section. Railways were built and townships and railway stations planned at a distance of every 15 miles. The railways gave them names in alphabetical order: Allan was preceded by Watrous, Xena, Young and Zelma, and followed by Bradwell and Clavet. Settlers had to choose their land on a map at the land registry and could then set out to claim it. For just $10, everyone 21 years old or older could lay claim to a quarter section, or 160 acres (Boyens 2001:26). The settlers could only guess from hearsay what the land they were going to claim would look like. Disappointments were frequent and land was given back to the authorities if it was no good for settlement. Settlement was thus not spontaneous at all. Conditions were planned and controlled by the Canadian Dominion government that was seeking to attract English-speaking settlers from Britain or the U.S. Settlers who were assisted by government authorities received a determinate number of nails, seeds of plants deemed fit for cultivation in the area and agricultural equipment. The settler was under obligation to break a certain portion of his land in the first season upon arrival and more in the next two years and to hold out on his land for at least three seasons if he wanted to keep the claim. In Saskatchewan, in the period from 1911 to 1931, approximately 57%—nearly six of ten—homesteaders abandoned their claims before securing title (Fowke 1957:285).

The first settlers were idealized by later generations as self-reliant, capable of huge amounts of work in order to fight adversity and capable of making wealth grow out of nothing. The most striking monument to labour as a solitary fight that I came across in Saskatchewan, is the rump of the ship *Dontianen* that a prairie farmer and Scandinavian immigrant built in the middle of the prairies during the depression years. It has become the pride of the open-air pioneer museum in Moose Jaw, where it is exhibited. The farmer made every single nail himself, spent endless hours carving the wood and forging the boiler. The man, who had been declared a lunatic by his contemporaries, became a hero of work for later generations; a symbol of the human capacity to overcome any adversity with a strong will.[4] The memorial plaque reads: "Monument of labour. To all early pioneers to whom we owe so much." The work he accomplished was admired as a purpose in itself, while the ludicrousness of the aim of building a ship capable of crossing the ocean in the middle of the prairies was forgotten.

What was also quickly forgotten by later generations was that their forefathers had come to Saskatchewan, for the most part, not with empty hands but carrying with them all their belongings and savings. Not even when they settled on their land were the early settlers autonomous or self-sustaining. What they built was on the basis and according to the model of what they had been accustomed to in Europe. Fowke, writing ironically about the image of the "self-sustaining settler," writes: "the pioneer settler is ordinarily verbally pictured as living with his numerous sturdy progeny in a rough-hewn log-cabin, with rude, home-made furniture, tilling his 'home-made' clearings with crude, home-made implements, and eating the rough but wholesome fare extracted from the land" (Fowke 1957:14). In reality though, "settlers took with them to the frontier the capital-goods, products of the world's most advanced arts of the day...The frontier settler did not attain self-sufficiency upon arrival at his farm, nor, indeed, at any time thereafter" (Fowke 1957:14, 17).

Settlers who came without sufficient capital relied heavily on others for help and support. The town chronicles of Allan (Allan District History Book Committee 1981), Colonsay and Meacham (Celebrate Saskatchewan

Committee 1980) abound with histories of mutual help and support including the creation of associations and religious societies as soon as the first settlers arrived. These creations were not entirely spontaneous either but followed an established pattern. Settlers re-established associations on the basis of their religious beliefs and schools were founded following regulations laid out by the state for the local school board. In most settlements, shops sprung up almost immediately where settlers could buy the goods they were used to back in Europe. The settler was, right from the start, enmeshed in the commercial system of his time, facing, at the turn of the 20th century, powerful railroads and grain companies that had near monopolies and dictated prices, dockage and grades while asking for exorbitant prices for their inputs.

The first farmers not only broke the prairies but they also took on the monopoly granted to the Canadian Pacific Railway by the federal government and founded cooperatives to counter the marketing power of the private grain companies. As wheat exports were seen to be one of the motors of growth of the Canadian economy they were able to convince the government to protect their interests. There used to be a strong socialist tradition among farmers on the prairies who challenged the liberal economic philosophy of the turn of the century to obtain from the state the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement in 1897. This established the principle of statutory regulation of freight rates on the movement of grains and significantly reduced transportation costs for farmers (Conway 1994:47). During the First World War, prairie farmers envisaged the Canadian plains as the breadbasket of the world and they thrived thanks to high wheat prices obtained through state marketing mechanisms and wartime shortages from 1916 to 1920. The wheat boom continued sporadically throughout the 1920s and led to the mechanization of prairie agriculture (Conway 1994:65). The relative prosperity, however, collapsed like a house of cards at the end of the 1920s when the Great Depression set in. The cyclone of the staples economy hit the prairies hard. Export prices for farm products fell by a full 70%. Prairie farmers, often heavily indebted because of their accelerated mechanization, suffered a 94% decline in net money income from 1929 to 1933 (Conway 1994:99). Thousands went bankrupt and left their farms. The debt problem was compounded by drought and heavy winds in the 1930s, which made the topsoil of whole crop districts blow away. It became obvious that, on the dry plains of Saskatchewan, the farming methods of deep ploughing imported from humid agricultural regions in Europe and the adoption of the practice of summer fallowing to save moisture were, in fact, disastrous.

The federal government felt compelled in 1935 to enact the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act which included a program to teach hundreds of thousand prairie farmers the right way to farm (Gray 1978:xi). The intense cooperation at that time between public plant breeders, agricultural technicians, researchers and farmers to stop erosion of the land has inscribed, in the collective memory, a view of public agricultural research as largely beneficial if not indispensable for the success of the farming operation. It also fostered the conviction that the most difficult economic or ecological problems can be overcome through scientific progress. Western farmers also finally obtained from the government the reinstatement of the single desk marketing mechanism of the Canadian Wheat Board, which was given the monopoly in the commercialization of western Canadian wheat and barley, and for a time oats, inside and outside Canada from 1943 onwards.

The cycle of boom and bust continued at a somewhat slower pace into the 1970s, which resulted in farms growing progressively bigger and more and more mechanized. In the 1980s the disengagement of the state from agriculture accelerated and in 1988 the signing of CUSTA (Canada–U.S. Trade Agreement) made the Canadian agricultural sector more attractive to U.S. corporations. The 1990s have seen a concentration of market power in the hands of few agro-food corporations which were able, thanks to their near monopolies, to cream off potential profits from farmers' incomes by raising their input prices[5] when the market looked favourable for the farmer. In the 1990s, market prices for grain seemed to have been decoupled from actual demand. Grain prices declined worldwide while world grain stocks hit an unprecedented low. Prices that farmers received for their products declined between 1996 and 2000 by 4.6%, while prices they paid for expenses such as fertilizer and fuel increased between 1996 and 2000 by 10%.[6]

At the same time, state regulations for grain transport, the so-called Crow Rate, disappeared in 1995 resulting in drastically increased transport prices and leaving the structure of the system to be determined by the railways. Public sector seed development collapsed: the personnel of state-owned experimental farms were laid off while enormous amounts of subsidies were given to the private sector for the development of new genetically modified (GM) varieties. A socialist worldview ceased to be appealing to the farmers in the 1990s. Members lost interest in and then control of the old cooperatives that followed the "iron law of transformation" (Oppenheimer 1896) by transforming into shareholding companies destined to make a profit, a development which corresponded to the interests of the majority of the aging membership.

In the second half of the 1990s, farmer members allowed the marketing cooperatives, like the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and the United Grain Growers, to go private and to form alliances with multinational grain companies such as Archer Daniel Midlands and Cargill. By 1995 when the big cooperative Saskatchewan Wheat Pool entered the stock market, its cooperative structures had long ceased to be regarded by the farmer members as something they had control over. The board of directors had become detached from the membership, pursuing an aggressive strategy of expansion and arguing that it would increase competitiveness and efficiency. As a consequence, hundreds of grain elevators and the railway branch-lines that connected to them were shut down. The colourful wooden elevators that used to mark the landscape of Saskatchewan were destroyed immediately to prevent groups of farmers or the municipalities from changing their minds, taking them over and running them themselves. Big concrete terminals were built in spots that suited the companies and the railways. The farmers are now obliged to ship their grain by truck over long distances (sometimes over 50 miles) to the next terminal. Transportation fees have thus soared in farmers' budgets. The only collective institution that remains is the Canadian Wheat Board, which is commercializing western Canadian wheat and barley all over the world and is now under constant attack from the U.S. which files lawsuit after lawsuit against it in the arbitration committee of the WTO. The current Conservative government of Canada declared that abolishing the single-desk marketing of grain through the Wheat Board was one of its priorities.

The politics that the pioneers managed to impose on the government and corporations were, in later years and especially in the 1990s, branded by the Ministry of Agriculture as obstacles to the freedom of enterprise for which the farmers had at last become ready. In official government publications, the farmer was often described as an entrepreneur who managed his business successfully using all the tools available on the open market including trade in future funds. Competition and the free market were presented as the very basis of personal freedom and wealth creation.

What personal strategies did farmers in Saskatchewan develop to react to market deregulation and also, to what extent were they active players in bringing about this evolution? Why did they give up the cooperative structures they had fought for? I will focus here on three attitudes prevalent among many farmers I talked to: their particular appreciation of freedom, their belief in progress and their mechanistic attitude to nature.

Freedom, Progress and the Engineering of Nature

> *I load a 1000 tons and what do I get? Another year older and deeper in debt. Cargill don't you call me, because I can't go! I owe my soul to the Agricore!*
>
> *—Ken Eshpeter 2006*[7]

Farming the prairies means being confronted with the extremes of nature: blizzards, tornados, hail storms and drought. The weather can change suddenly passing from soaring heat to severe frost in August. In spring, heavy winds can carry away the bare topsoil while sudden rainshowers fill the ditches with silt. Saskatchewan farmers have thus generally regarded their work as a fight against nature for which all the achievements of human inventiveness and science should be mobilized. No wild species or land varieties of the main cash crops exist in the prairies and as a consequence, agricultural biodiversity is extremely low. The main cash crops were imported from other parts of the world and adapted by government-funded agricultural research stations and the farmers themselves to the climatic conditions of the prairies. The introduction of agricultural chemicals for weed and pest control has revolutionized prairie agriculture and facilitated the work of the farmer. High yielding varieties that respond to the input of fertilizers and are resistant to herbicides and pesticides are commercialized by the main agro-chemical companies (Monsanto, Syngenta, Dow Crop Sciences and Bayer) that also sell the chemicals. In their advertisements, they praise the ease with which their products allow the farmer to achieve, thanks to the highest level of technology, a clean homogeneous field in a safe, green fertile landscape. A neat and tidy field and an immaculate lawn around the farmhouse are the status symbols of a successful farmer as they convey the impression of control over invasive weeds and menacing insects.

Most farmers I spoke to valued their professional freedom and their sense that "nobody can tell you what to do." Their grandparents and great grandparents, so they had been told, moved out to the prairies to escape oppression and to build better lives. As Bill Siegler, a young farmer, phrased it, "when I am driving down the roads around here I have the feeling that they are mine...I like being my own boss even if that means I earn less money. I prefer not to take orders from people. Watch the clock and count the time makes no sense to me." The expression "my own boss" is highly symbolic not only of the values of the farmers but of the contradictory tensions inherent in their position in the social structure. As Mooney argued, even when the farmers are free of the

constraints imposed by wage labour, the presumed independence wrought by the unity of labour, management and capital in one person (or more precisely in one household) is constrained by the ideological hegemony of the larger capitalist social and economic system. The meaning of the expression derives from the farmers' importation of definitions of work from a society in which most production takes place under the close scrutiny and the physical proximity of bosses (Mooney 1988:2). As a result, the farmers feel "free" and compelled at the same time to follow a tougher work discipline than what an external boss would be able to impose.

The range of meanings of what freedom actually signified for the farmers I spoke to was large. In the discourses of some of them, it corresponded to the ideology of market liberalism advanced in government publications and included ideas of self-employment, absence of state regulation and free marketing of goods. Other farmers saw control of corporate power, orderly marketing of grain through the Canadian Wheat Board and secure profit margins for their products as indispensable for maintaining what they called individual freedom or independence. The conception most of them shared, however, was that the amount of freedom they experienced was ultimately a question of money and the result of their individual choices: way of life; production methods; investments in farming technology; how and when to sell their produce; and, the choices they made on election day. The liberal agricultural agenda based its legitimacy on the farmers' conviction that the success or failure of their farming operation was a matter of the right choices, of their willingness to work hard and to embrace wholeheartedly the achievements of technological progress. I will show, in what follows, the strategies Saskatchewan farmers pursued to fulfill the dominant paradigm of individual freedom and wealth creation.

Bill Siegler farmed 13 quarters (2,080 acres) of land, seven of them rented, growing canola, flax, mustard, wheat, barley, peas and lentils with continuous cropping and zero tillage techniques. After years of travelling and jobs on construction sites, he returned to Saskatchewan with his Australian wife because life was cheaper there and offered him more comfort and opportunities. He was one of the few farmers I spoke to who was actually optimistic about his economic situation. To pay for the land he bought, he put in an impressive number of working hours, starting work at 4 o'clock in the morning custom spraying for other farmers and working on his own fields until late at night. His wife also worked full-time as a cancer researcher. They hired childcare help in the summer and hardly managed to see one another except in the winter months.

Siegler was convinced that farming techniques had been greatly improved in the previous ten years with the introduction of GM herbicide-resistant crops and the use of glyphosate herbicides to dry out the crops before harvest and to "clean" the fields of weeds before seeding. He was unconcerned about the fact that the chemicals were not washed off the kernels before being harvested and entering the food chain. Siegler told me proudly that his father learned from him the new farming techniques that do not disturb the soil mechanically but use chemicals instead. He bought a high-clearance sprayer, together with his father, and new seeding equipment—investments that increased the heavy debt load he contracted to buy the land. When I interviewed him in 2003, Siegler had just signed a technology use agreement with the agrochemical company Monsanto to be allowed to seed their GM canola that is resistant to their powerful herbicide Roundup. According to the contract he was not allowed to reseed his GM canola harvest without paying a Technology Use Agreement (TUA) fee. He was persuaded, however, that Monsanto would not be able to police or even know about the cases in which the farmers reseed the canola without paying a fee:

> There are lots and lots of people out there that have grown Roundup-Ready [RR] canola and not paid TUAs. I just know it. The more farmers are unhappy with Monsanto and the TUA program the less they are likely to report their neighbour. There comes a point in time when it goes out of control. I don't think that Monsanto can get away with controlling the market and jacking up the price. Things have a way of looking after themselves. If you look in history there is always a competitor or some rule that has intervened. I don't have that fear. [Bill Siegler, farmer in Allan, July 1, 2003]

He trusted that the market would act as a regulatory principle and "take care" of distortions, excessive exploitation and crops that damage the environment. He was skeptical of all government interventions. He thought that subsidies were useless and was strongly opposed to any legislation labelling food containing GM ingredients. His trust in the market went together with the optimistic expectation that his "extremely poor farming situation," characterized in 2003 by drought and low prices, too much work and too little time for the family, would get better because otherwise he had "nothing to look forward to."

Growing a crop became, for Siegler, a matter of the optimal investment in and timing of "weed control," "nutrient programmes" and moisture. While he felt that he was perfectly able to control the first two elements, the third element continued to escape him in the dry plains

of Saskatchewan where a farmer has to grow a crop often with no more than 90 mm of rain. The mechanistic way of approaching agriculture in terms of input and output was thus constantly offset by the uncontrollable "natural element." Technological progress could not make up for this unpredictability.

When speaking about their investments, farmers constantly used the terms "hope" and "belief" that the coming year was bringing them "the bumper crop," the crop that would suddenly fill their money chests and allow them to pay off accumulated debts. Siegler actually achieved this feat in 2007. He brought in a bumper crop of mustard, sold it together with the mustard that he had accumulated over several years for the best price in years and paid back his loans.

Most farmers in Saskatchewan have enthusiastically adopted herbicide-tolerant canola that was resistant to either Roundup or Libertylink herbicides. It allowed them to have a more flexible cycle of crop production as they could spray herbicides whenever they wanted in the agricultural cycle. Magnan (2004) and Lewontin (2001) attribute the success of herbicide resistant crops to the increased incidence of off-farm work. "To the extent that RR [Roundup Ready] crops help to free farmers' time, they reinforce the exploitative structure of agriculture in which farmers—just to be able to put a crop into the ground—subsidize the cost of food production by working off-farm" (Magnan 2004:307).

The chemical glyphosate, the basic ingredient of Roundup, was relatively cheap because Monsanto no longer had a patent on it. Now canola plants with multiple resistances are emerging and threaten to become a weed difficult to control. Other weeds are becoming resistant to glyphosate too and there might be a link between the poisonous fungal disease *fusarium* and the overuse of glyphosate. Only ten years after the introduction of RR technology on the market, new problems are arising for farmers, especially since the Canadian Ministry of Agriculture in cooperation with Monsanto invested millions of dollars in the introduction of RR-wheat and authorized the cultivation of herbicide-tolerant alfalfa. Almost all farmers I spoke to opposed glyphosate-tolerant wheat as they had no cheap chemical available that would be able to contain RR-wheat volunteers (plants that sow themselves). However, Siegler was convinced that the market would also "look after GM wheat."

Nevertheless, among all the conventional farmers I talked to, the idea of progress was prevalent. It was part of their self-image that they had to outdo themselves every year, embrace new technologies and experiment with new crops that their neighbours did not have. They accepted large loans to buy bigger machinery and cultivate more and more acres that they rented or bought. Diaz and Stirling (2003) argued that the process of incorporation of modern technology into farm production had the purpose of increasing the profits and market share of corporations and allowing them to have control over decision-making processes. "By designing and commercializing complex agricultural inputs they take away from the people their capacity to know and control those inputs. The expected result is a farm family who will be eager to follow all the indications of the corporations to use, maintain and replace those inputs, in other words, passive producers eager to spend their money on products suggested by agribusiness" (Diaz and Stirling 2003:40).

Gary Silver, another farmer I talked to, allowed a fertility consultant to do experiments on his land testing GPS systems that would make a more focused application of chemicals possible. Silver grew up working the family farm of 800 acres together with his father and indebted himself heavily when he bought it in 1992 while also renting an additional 800 acres. His wife works off-farm as a music teacher. To pay back his debt, pay the rent and live cultivating only 1,600 acres—a rather small farm by Saskatchewan standards—Silver felt compelled to farm his land continuously every year without leaving it fallow between crop cycles. This farming method required new equipment as the soil had to be moved as little as possible to conserve moisture, and needed a heavy input of fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides. He invested heavily in new machinery and contracted new debt. To outdo himself every year, he tried new varieties of crops and fertilizers with different blends of nutrients. He is proud of having "tried everything" including the most recent agricultural technology. He explained his efforts to improve productivity as a desperate attempt to stay in control:

> You have to stay updated—you got to stay sharp. You either play the game seriously, or you get out. I love the job, but the politics stink, and the politics changes hourly, like which price you get at the farm gate, you know. It's not just the difference in the dollar, it's the policy in the U.S., the policy in Europe...Everything and anything really affects...It's all out of my control. I can't control it at all, so I guess I'm focusing on what I can control, and that is production. If I've got something to sell, then I am going to have an income. If I don't have something to sell, well, I guess I should do something else, you know. [Gary Silver, farmer in Colonsay, July 11, 2003]

Silver felt that Canada, and especially Saskatchewan, was a mere raw material producer, "an open pit mine" as

he phrased it, selling its production cheaply and buying expensive manufactured inputs mostly from abroad. He also felt at a disadvantage in comparison to U.S.-American and European farmers who received subsidies from their governments. He explained that this constellation forced him to try continually to make better deals and increase production, which ultimately leads to oversupply and depressed prices. In spite of all his efforts, he could hardly survive on his farm and was well aware that his family income was below the Canadian poverty line of CAN$30,000 for a family of four people. While he established a link between political decisions out of his control on the national and international level and his disheartening economic situation, he nevertheless concluded that the success or failure of his farming operation was ultimately of his own making and resulted from his own choices:

> It's weird math, because you start looking at how the accountants write things off and this is not that. We're below, we're below the poverty line I know that. The Canadian poverty line is about $30,000 for a family of four, and we basically have less than that to try and live on. But again, a lot of the reasons are from my own choice. We've decided to buy different equipment, you know, which makes you pay. We could farm with 30-year-old machinery and not have the payments and probably grow a similar crop but with a heavier workload and possibly a higher repair bill, so the costs change to different areas. [Gary Silver, July 11, 2003]

Silver tried to follow the advice of agricultural consultants and tax advisors to invest in new machinery, which would allow him to make certain deductions from his taxes. The financial result was, however, not as positive as he expected, even as he attempted to count the time saved by using new machinery against the financial burden of paying instalments and interest for it. The reality of what farmers entered into by abandoning all structures of regulation and the cooperative defence of their interests was dawning on Silver who then entered into contract farming for multinational corporations and subscribed to TUAs for being allowed to seed Monsanto's herbicide tolerant canola. His margin of choice about what input to use in his farming operation diminished and he was not allowed to keep the grain he harvested as seed. As he became more and more dependent on chemicals, the prices of these inputs went up squeezing his profit margin even further. As Silver put it, "they are following us down the chute."

Silver seemed surprised by his own conclusion as it patently contradicted his self-image of "being fairly on top of things." The certainty that he was at the forefront of technological progress was impossible to reconcile with the awareness that his farm was on the brink of bankruptcy. The feeling that big agro-chemical corporations led him like cattle down the chute was in fundamental contradiction with the theoretical freedom of enterprise for farmers he believed in:

> This is really odd, but you know what? You can still use your own seed and grow it on your own farm. And you're welcome to go market it yourself. You know you could process it out in your shop. You could sell it around the world. And there's not a lot of restrictions on it. There's not really a whole lot on the family farm where we couldn't just process it, make it into bread. Sell the bread. So you have options if you want to. But it becomes a lack of capital. [Gary Silver, July 11, 2003]

As if to remind himself of the entrepreneurial possibilities open to him, Silver constructed the improbable hypothesis that he could decide to process his own grain, make it into bread and sell it around the world. The impediment to this plan, he concluded, was a lack of capital. To get out of his poor economic situation, he dreamt of finding a niche, a clever idea that no one had before him, to get rich quickly and almost miraculously. He mentioned Heinzman's Farms in the U.S. that made a fortune by selling their conventional flax as special health food to hospitals. He was aware, however, that as an individual farmer, he was at the mercy of the large grain companies. For most crops he grows, he saw himself in competition with all the other farmers as a price taker not a price setter. In contrast to the current politics of the Federal government, he would like to see the competence of the western Canadian Wheat Board enlarged and extended to all the crops he cultivates:

> I'm in favour of the Wheat Board. There are times I wish more grain were under the Wheat Board. If I could trust them as my marketer, that's an excellent way to market grain, from my eyes. Like I said, I wish I were the guy in control of all the grain in Canada. All of it. If you call the Wheat Board one guy. Cause that one guy would have the control of it—market control. And what it does is you go into the markets and you get the best price for everybody. You know, I could focus on doing a whole lot of other things to grow my crops and they just do the marketing. And if I can trust them to get my best price, great!
>
> When you go to the open system and you got me bidding with my neighbour to a buyer, and we're just bidding down the low price, you know, and that's how it works. And we're a price-taker not a price setter. So the price is out there, and if the buyer doesn't want to

> take my grain at 10 bucks, well, my neighbour might say, I'll give you it at 8, and I'll say, well, I got to pay some bills, I'll sell it for 7. So it keeps driving the price down and the buyer sits there and laughs at us. So that's what I mean, we're all crazy for doing this, but I like my job. [Gary Silver, July 11, 2003]

The economic situation of most farmers I spoke to was and is extremely precarious in spite of and probably also because of the impressive array of agricultural equipment they call their own. Many middle-aged farmers, who had taken up farming in the 1970s when agricultural prices were good and the weather favourable, experienced a continuous collapse in grain prices since the end of the 1970s and are still struggling to pay back loans they took out to pay for the land, to allow their parents to retire, to increase the surface cultivated and to buy bigger machinery. When they took over the farm they often invested all they had saved in previous jobs over sometimes 10 to 15 years. The farm then became their retirement scheme. They often had second jobs in the winter that supplemented their income and basically subsidized their farms. Their wives had to work to make ends meet. Gary Silver was unable to profit from the high prices in 2007 because he had contracted part of his canola harvest to Cargill for a low price and lost large parts of his flax harvest to hail. He was desperately waiting for rain in the extremely dry spring of 2008.

Lyle Jefferson, a farmer close to retirement age, told me that the mental stress these debts provoked made him sick and that he was no longer able to enjoy the positive aspects of his job. Jefferson had started farming in 1974, one of the best grain-farming years in Canadian history. Lyle and his wife Nancy bought 830 acres from his family and slowly increased their land base to 1,360 acres of owned and 1,120 acres of rented land. They had to mortgage some of the land to pay for more. They bought bigger equipment on a credit basis to be able to farm the extended area and had to put up the equipment as collateral for the loan. They felt that they were in an economic situation where they could not make any mistakes without fearing the loss of their farm:

> In the past people have always talked about the farm as a way of life. The lifestyle is great compared to some others but not as great as it once was. It is more and more a stressful business now. The time and management requirement has become very great. You cannot afford to make mistakes. It is not the same lifestyle as twenty years ago. The machine is more comfortable and the physical labour is nothing like it was but the mental stress is much greater. It is the mental stress, because of the debts, that we had because of the purchase of the combines and the land.
>
> The economics is not there any more. Land has come up for sale, at a reasonable price right next to your land. If you want to set up a block of land for the next generation you have to jump on that opportunity. That is what is happening here. Financial institutions offered the money so we bought. But of course this meant more debt. [Lyle Jefferson, farmer in Zelma, July 4, 2003]

The Jeffersons regretted the race that Saskatchewan farmers like themselves engaged in to become bigger and bigger. Many farmers lost out in that race, got into debt and went bankrupt. The population in Zelma, their rural community, was dwindling and the infrastructure that was set up for the population base of ten years ago, with a skating rink, a swimming pool and a curling rink, cannot be supported anymore. They thought that communities would be healthier and everybody would be happier with more people on smaller farms.

The reason for this decay, so Lyle Jefferson thought, is partially due to the erosion of cooperative structures that farmers built up in the beginning of the 20th century to defend themselves against the power of corporations. By the end of the 20th century, a third generation of farmers had lost control over the structures that their grandfathers built. As Jefferson put it, the free enterprise attitude that prevailed among farmers in the 1990s did not lend itself anymore to cooperative endeavours. The membership gave up control to a management that was uncommitted to cooperative thinking:

> Most of these things have been eroded, have been falling apart and maybe the problem is that people finally just give up. Maybe they think that nothing they do can stop this so-called progress. That's always what we have had thrown at us. That's progress. It is kind of the American way, it must be right. It's progress. [Lyle Jefferson, July 4, 2003]

Lyle Jefferson called the increasing economic liberalization "the American way" to which he wanted to oppose a Canadian way of a regulated "orderly marketing." However, as Nancy Jefferson pointed out, "we have a Federal government that does not stand up for its primary producers at all. We have been giving in to the railroads, we have given in to the Americans, and we have to be worried that they give in to the Monsantos of the world." Analyzing the current attempt of the Canadian government to abolish the single desk marketing of wheat and barley through the Wheat Board, she concluded that losing the Wheat Board would exacerbate competition among individual farmers:

> If they would get rid of the Wheat Board they would just be throwing low quality wheat on the market. The Wheat Board guarantees the quality and the quantity. Through the Wheat Board we will get the same high quality wheat for our bread next year. Prices would go down and people would be fighting, underbidding each other to sell their grain. You might as well have one marketer who has strong ties and a good reputation. [Nancy Jefferson, farmer in Zelma, July 4, 2003]

Also, Lyle Jefferson favoured a much stronger Wheat Board to take over the marketing of all grains, as he had neither the time nor the experience to do a good job at marketing his own grain. At the last short-lived rise in canola prices, he had waited to see the market price go up and go down again without selling. He argued that the theory of healthy competition between farmers that the agricultural ministry advanced was manipulation because "the more a farmer competes against his neighbour farmers, the better it is for others in the industry." When thousands of farmers compete among themselves, the grain industry, comprised of large conglomerates, can dictate prices to them.

Lyle Jefferson felt that he lost some of his independence to grain companies and chemical companies, and that he became a slave to his own business: "I am farming basically because I don't see myself as having lots of alternatives. I am definitely not doing it for the enjoyment of it and obviously not doing it for profit motives. I am thinking how nice it would be to retire."

Visions for an Uncertain Future

The strategies that Saskatchewan farmers followed to react to the increasing deregulation of agriculture were mostly individual in nature. Neo-liberal arguments appealed to the work ethic and the sense of justice that was presented as an inheritance from the times of their grandfathers, the pioneers of the prairies. Those who worked the hardest should be rewarded with success. To the reduction of their profit margin, farmers reacted by extending the surface cultivated, by buying new, more powerful machinery and by adopting less time-consuming production methods. They were hunting for astute ideas to find a niche market that they could exploit as long as their neighbours and competitors did not have the same idea. The farmers accepted the idea that the law of the market opposed them to one another as competitors although they regretted, at the same time, the disappearance of cooperative structures and rural communities. Community became, in fact, a contradiction (Jaffe 2003:143) as farmers competed with their neighbours—particularly via land markets. It came as a surprise to them that they were unable to make it in spite of following the advice of fertility advisors, bank managers and administrators of futures funds. Moreover, high prices for agricultural commodities did not attenuate the competition. As Jaffe (2003:143) pointed out, the steepest rates of decline of farm populations tend to be in booms rather than in busts. Concentration of land in the hands of few farmers actually accelerates in times of high prices as land prices tend to increase and old farmers sell out to insure their retirement.

Most farmers I talked to seemed to be caught in the traps of market ideology and family tradition. The myths they created around their self-sustaining autonomous ancestors who seemed able to withstand alone all the hardships of settling the prairies, put a tremendous pressure on them to prove themselves successful in an environment that appears much more civilized and benign than the one their forefathers had to face. As the dominant worldview of the prairies is so firmly committed to the value of hard work and the belief in progress, it became almost impossible for them to rethink their situation and envisage alternatives. The struggles they waged against natural elements—draught, frost, hailstorms and grasshoppers—are seen in a continuum as is their effort to achieve a decent price for their products. There is the strong belief that the market behaves according to natural laws like the weather that are sometimes favourable and sometimes ruinous to the farmer. The conviction that makes many farmers hold on to their farms and incites them to continue to indebt themselves and to buy more modern machinery is that the market goes in cycles. "The market is naturalized while nature is denaturalized" (Gertler 2003:56). One has to survive difficult times to become able to profit from the good times that are inevitably going to come. As Siegler put it, "things have a way of looking after themselves." The conviction is that the overwhelming power of large corporations and huge farms will be broken one day by the law of the market. As view also shared by Siegler's colleague, Paul Newman:

> I disagree with regulation. Everything goes in a cycle. If we go back fifty years ago there were farmers with horses that farmed huge stretches of land. [They] employed a whole pile of people and a few bad harvests and everything went broke and broke up into small farms. The cycle will come and the big companies will have to chop down. [Paul Newman, farmer in Govan August 16, 2003]

On the other hand, however, the farmers experience the disappearance of their neighbours and the gradual emptying of the countryside every day. This was most grip-

pingly described by an old farming couple that had experienced the days when the local train stopped at their doorstep every day to collect the cream cans and carry them to the local processor.[8] In their lifetime, the branch lines were closed down, the milk processing plant was transferred from Colonsay (10 km away) first to Saskatoon (60 km away) and then to Calgary (600 km away). They saw their mode of life disappear and be replaced by big farm operations, even bigger than the farm of 2000 acres that one of their sons is struggling to run with the most modern equipment.

The self-image that was so strong in the 1920s, that the Canadian prairies were feeding the world, is not relevant for today's farmers. They saw themselves first and foremost in a struggle for survival. As farmer Nancy Jefferson phrased it, "it would be great if this is what we are doing but in fact we are feeding in essence a lot of big corporations." In a curious reversal of causalities, they assumed that their products are too expensive for the poor people in the world and not that small farmers working their fields with a hoe cannot compete with their highly mechanized agricultural production and are thus producing less and less food.

Producing conventional cereal or pulse crops is less and less a priority for the provincial and federal government. Its publications advocate that Saskatchewan should move into intensive hog production, grow GM crops that could be used by industry for the production of new wrapping materials, or produce nutraceuticals.

The vision that competes with the one of the law of the market cycles is that of "Farmaggedon" (Kneen 1999); the apocalypses of farming when the farmer becomes useless and is replaced by huge farming machinery that makes his personal knowledge of the place and land useless and dispensable:

> Your whole social structure of the country disappears. You could have people living everywhere else in the world, fly in on the runways, get into the tractor, seed this place and leave. I'm getting twisted here, but it's very possible. You have custom combining crews in the states. They could come up finish here, go back to Texas for the winter, and you wouldn't have to have anybody up here. [Gary Silver, July 11, 2003]

Many inhabitants of the prairies seem to be haunted by the idea that the towns and infrastructure that have been built in the last hundred years and that have so thoroughly transformed the landscape of the prairies might disappear as quickly as they came. Thousands of abandoned farmsteads made of wood have already disappeared without a trace; entire villages were wiped off the map of Saskatchewan, leaving nothing but their name on abandoned railway stations. Although all inhabitants of the prairies I spoke to declared that they were very attached to the place where they grew up, they posed virtually no resistance to the destruction of the grain elevators that were the landmarks of their communities and found it quite normal that big wooden houses and public buildings were put on wheels and moved hundreds of kilometres to more auspicious locations. Were Saskatchewan farmers thus not really dwelling (Ingold 2000) in the landscape they have conquered and transformed; were they feeling like visitors in a violent natural environment they are ultimately unable to control?

This is the view that some of the organic farmers in Saskatchewan held, criticizing their conventional counterparts for working against and not with nature. Comparing themselves to conventional farmers they accused them of having "a chemical addiction," an almost compulsive need to spray pesticide, herbicides and growth regulators to obtain a clean homogeneous field even if a lower yield (due to more weeds but less expense for chemicals) would be, in the end, more economical for them. They argued that conventional farmers certainly produced much more than they do but that the money they received goes to pay the chemical companies and the interest on the loans they took out. As Paul Newman, who used to custom spray for other farmers and recently converted to organic seed growing, put it:

> For the zero till farmer the most important piece of equipment these days is the sprayer. They use their combines 120 hours per year, the tractor 100 hours and the sprayer 4 to 500 hours per year. Five to 6 to 10 applications per year, with high speed and with spray airplanes. A sprayer, 120 and 130 ft large, can cost $300 000 dollars. So they produce a whole bunch more in less time. They've got to produce a whole bunch more just to survive. [Paul Newman, August 16, 2003]

Like most other organic farmers, Newman took the decision to farm organically and to abandon chemicals altogether after he went bankrupt and became allergic to the chemicals he was spraying. Organic farming in the prairies seems to involve not so much a choice of a way of life, as is generally the case in Europe, as a response to necessity that has as a consequence a change of style of life and work and a radically different attitude to nature. It was one of the surprises of my fieldwork that the practice of organic farming by conventional farmers, who had previously worked as custom sprayers and sales representatives for chemical companies in their second job, brought about a profound change in their worldview and a capac-

ity for resistance that many conventional farmers had lost. Although they had not taken up organic farming by conviction, they started to speak about growing crops in an entirely different way than their colleagues.

Farming organically without applying herbicides, pesticides or chemical fertilizers instantly eliminates the dependency on chemical companies. Organic farmers tend to pay attention to the soil as a living organism; they start to experiment with putting complementary crops in the same field. They have to revivify traditional farming skills, time farm work more precisely and carefully observe soil composition, weeds and organic matter. Farming organically is more time-consuming and as the time slots for different agricultural tasks are narrower, a single organic farmer cannot farm the same number of acres that a conventional farmer can. As they were inexperienced in growing organic crops and also had to resist criticism from their neighbours about the weeds in their fields, they grouped together in associations of organic farmers where they exchanged experiences. Also, the harvest is commercialized through their associations or smaller trading companies that ship the crop in bags or separate containers to customers worldwide. As the demand for organic produce is growing and the market is stable, organic farmers feel secure and comfortable in their market niche, however temporary this may be. A large proportion of organic producers and consumers also see organic agriculture as a vehicle for changing the food distribution system. Many producers are striving to redefine their relationship to distribution and processing and to consumers, in an attempt to diminish corporate domination of the input, processing and distribution sectors (Cushon 2003:227). It seems obvious, however, that organic farming is protecting farmers only for a while from the control of large agro-food corporations. Some organic distribution networks in Canada have already proved unable to resist big money and have sold out to multinational corporations.

Nevertheless, by practicing this type of agriculture, the truths of the established system crumble. To the extent that farmers insulate themselves from market dependency on the input side, they also free themselves from the external pressures that push them towards economic calculation at the cost of those alternative goals of production (Mooney 1988:65). Newman told me how he developed a totally different attitude to the weeds that he used to combat as a custom sprayer just a few years ago:

> The farmer prides himself on a clean crop, as a state of accomplishment. Like a good-looking woman. If you have the cleanest crop in the country, you have nice machinery, you are a respected member of the community. If you have weeds you are nobody. And I am trying. Maybe I am not the best, I have lots of weeds out there. They will tell me a story, they are telling me some. Because I get inspected from the Federal government, my weeds are listed from year to year. Over the next five years I build up a whole trend of weeds and then I can try to go back to all these people who have the degrees and they can tell me what is missing in the soil. What is happening and why. Even though we went into organic seed production as a way to make money I think we are also developing education. As you have wild oats you must have too much nitrogen in the soil. I don't understand her [the agronomist's] theory but she has done that for years. [Paul Newman, August 16, 2003]

Newman cooperates with the few agronomists in government research stations working on organic agriculture and he started to regard the soil, crops and weeds as an interrelated organic system. One of the pioneers of organic farming in Saskatchewan, Edwin Lord, started to experiment in companion cropping on small plots that he set up behind his house. For him, organic agriculture is like the pioneer experience that his parents had when settling the prairies. He says that organic farmers have to cooperate more closely than their conventional counterparts; they need to exchange new experiences with companion crops, find ways to limit the weeds in their fields and try out mechanical inventions like the "broom chaser," a cutting instrument that cuts thistles out of the crop. Melvin Kaiser, another organic farmer, dreams of reconstituting a farming eco-system that resembles the cohabitation of different grass varieties on the prairies. When he heard a plant geneticist from the Land Institute in Kansas talk on the radio about his research into the development of perennial wheat, he contacted him and invited him to use part of his farm as an extension of his experimental fields. As the director of the Saskatchewan Organic Directorate, Arnold Taylor pointed out that conventional plant breeding using herbicides, pesticides and fertilizers is ill-adapted to the requirements of organic farming. The crop thus selected is not resistant to pests, is dependant on chemical fertilization and is prone to diseases.

The common enemy of these organic farmers, who have otherwise very different political outlooks and convictions, has become the agrochemical companies, Monsanto and Aventis (now bought by Bayer Crop Science), that introduced GM crops, in particular herbicide resistant canola, into Saskatchewan. GM crops are a menace

to organic cultures as the market for organic crops in Europe and Japan tolerates no trace of them. As there is no longer any canola seed available in Canada that is not contaminated with GM canola, organic farmers had to abandon that crop and attempted to sue Monsanto and Bayer in a class action lawsuit. The Saskatchewan Organic Directorate, an umbrella organization that represents organic producers, processors, buyers, traders, certifiers and consumers of certified organic food and fibre, filed a class-action lawsuit against the agrochemical companies Monsanto and Bayer Crop Science for having destroyed their market for organic canola and in order to obtain an injunction against the introduction of GM wheat. The claim states that when Monsanto and Aventis introduced their GM canola varieties, they knew, or ought to have known, that the genetically engineered canola would spread and contaminate the environment. The companies had no regard for the damage these crops would cause to organic agriculture. The claim alleged that loss of canola as an organic crop has robbed organic farmers of a high paying and growing market. The lawsuit was ultimately dropped when the courts refused to recognize organic farmers as a class and the Supreme Court of Canada declined, in 2007, to hear their case.

The anger of the farmers, however, is not only directed against agro-chemical companies that they accuse of polluting their crops, but also against a government guilty of complicity with the corporations for having financed part of their research and failed in its duty to protect the interests of producers, consumers and the environment. The old farmer, Edwin Lord, phrased his disgust with what he regards as the duplicity of government in terms of a denial of democracy:

> Monsanto wants global control. We live in an age of globalization and the corporation wants to control everything and wants the government to be secondary to them and they have our government in a secondary position to them. The Prime Minister has pledged to create a democratic government in the interest of the people and this is a denial of democracy. This is fascism. Hitler was not much different from this. I put a uniform on for three years to do something about that and now my own Prime Minister is doing that to me. [Edwin Lord, farmer in Davidson, August 14, 2003]

For Lord, market liberalism became the opposite of freedom, a form of dictatorship in which the government does not reign in, and even encourages, the agro-chemical corporations to flood Canadian agriculture with their patented GM seeds without giving the farmers and consumers the option to choose. Most organic farmers would certainly not share that extreme a view on Canadian politics and may be, like Newman, fervent defenders of market liberalism and radically opposed to market regulations. However, Newman has also become weary of the introduction of further GM crops since GM canola blew in from a neighbour's field and polluted his seed plots of flax and oats endangering his organic certification. He agreed to add an affidavit to the class action lawsuit arguing that "there is no science on the consequences of GMOs and it is affecting our future income. What is the real purpose in doing all this? Show me what the advantage of GM wheat is!"

Conclusion

Farmers in Saskatchewan did not harmonize with a historically fashioned landscape; they conquered one. This conquest was not an individual achievement but a concerted, centrally-planned one. As Innis showed, it was the consequence of the Canadian Dominion Government's plan for producing wheat for export (Barnes 2005). Farming has thus always been closely linked to politics. The current relationship of Saskatchewan farmers to the neoliberal state that withdrew support from agriculture and regulated in the interest of large agro-chemical corporations is characterized by acquiescence as the farmers made neo-liberal values of freedom and progress their own. They agreed to become what Foucault called "entrepreneurs of themselves" (Foucault 2004:232). However, to endure the unpredictability of the weather and the opacities of the market that escape rational planning and control, they resorted to the wishful thinking that the hard-working farmer would be rewarded and to the belief that the market followed a natural cycle where bad days would be followed by good. They seemed to have resorted to the extreme self-centredness that Weber (1973:187-188) dreaded, appropriating the simple evolutionary theory of the survival of the fittest. At the same time, they feared that they could lose that struggle and that the prairie environment and market forces could prove stronger than they and claim back what they had conquered. They already suffered from the gradual disappearance of their local communities.

The neo-liberal worldview of individual achievement and competition and the privatization of state services that the FAO study (Dixon et al. 2001) outlined has been absorbed and put into practice in Saskatchewan, thereby isolating the farmers economically and socially and making them incapable of confronting agro-chemical conglomerates collectively. Many Saskatchewan farmers have regarded global free trade in agricultural products that

the WTO negotiations try to institutionalize as the solution to their problems, as the worldwide establishment of a fair "level playing field." Innis showed convincingly that such a "level playing field" cannot exist between staple producing regions and the metropolis. Farmers believed, on the one hand, that the market should not be regulated by politics, and on the other, that they are solely responsible for the success or failure of their "farming businesses." They have thereby become incapable of defending their interests collectively and politically. According to their neo-liberal worldview, government cannot and should not protect them against the overwhelming market power of agro-chemical corporations. The only thing that remains to them to do is to produce more, more cheaply and on a larger scale.

Organic farmers seem to have achieved a different outlook on the workings of nature and the market, as they made the choice to renounce chemicals thereby escaping the economic control of agro-chemical corporations. This allowed them to achieve a deeper understanding of working with natural systems on the one hand, and on the other, gave them a detached view of the relationships of power and control that dominate agriculture and food production in general. Out of a different practice and skilling (Ingold 2000) in daily life, arose a worldview that made them capable of action, of filing lawsuits against multinational corporations and of dreaming of utopias of a radically different agriculture that corresponds to the ecology of the prairies.

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Notes

1 Roseberry defined anthropological political economy as the study of the formation of anthropological subjects within complex fields of social, economic and cultural power.

2 I have changed all the names of the people I interviewed.

3 They are in this way comparable to notions of destruction and damage limitation.

4 Hard physical work was certainly a requirement for survival in the early days but it has later become a value in itself, the measure by which to judge neighbours and fellow farmers. Farmer friends of mine admitted that if they found themselves sleeping at 7 o'clock in the morning and the telephone rang they would jump up and answer the phone on a dynamic note as if they had been awake for hours.

5 "During the first half of the 1990s, wheat prices rose and fertilizer prices tracked those increases. In the second half of the 1990s, wheat prices fell and, with a lag, fertilizer prices tracked wheat prices downward. In 2001, wheat prices again began an ascent, as did fertilizer prices. When grain prices rise, fertilizer companies raise their prices to snatch any additional revenue right out of farmers' pockets. Such pricing tactics are impossible in markets with real competition." (National Farmers' Union 2003)

6 Statistics Canada, Census of Agriculture 2001

7 This is part of a song sung by Ken Eshpeter, farmer at Battleriver, at the National Farmers Union meeting in defence of the Wheat Board, July 27, 2006.

8 Harold Smith, (Colonsay July 4, 2003):

> When we got married we got quite a lot of cows too. We had as many as 12 milk cows. It is interesting to know what happened to the cream. In the early days a truck would come round once a week and pick up the cream. We used to have a small ice well outside under some straw where we would keep the cream can cool. The can would be five gallons. Then that changed: the truck would not come any more but as we were just a mile and a half from the railway track, the train would come in every day at noon and switch at Colonsay. So we would go along to the track and put a flag on the platform of the station house and the train would see the flag and slow down and pick up your cream.

Edna Smith (Colonsay, July 4, 2003):

> After we were married we would not do that any more. We would deliver the cream to Colonsay and the big train would take it into Saskatoon and it went into the processor in Saskatoon. It would not be too long and the trains would not pick it up any more. When we would go into the city of Saskatoon we would take our can of cream ourselves. This would have been in the 1980s and then finally they got very strict and if your cream can had a little rust on it, it was condemned. You had to buy a new plastic one. So eventually they would not unload the cream in Saskatoon. We brought it to the city and they would haul it all the way to Calgary, 500 miles away. We never did understand that. It was a dairy pool. It was a farmers' organization... You had to wait for a week for your empty can to come back. We quit the thing then, it became too ridiculous.

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Ideas / Idées

Social Capital

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Social capital has been credited with the ability to cure most social ills in the contemporary world. According to many analysts, such as Portes (1998) and Putnam (2000), it helps people resolve collective problems more easily, facilitates development, heightens awareness of our globally connected fates, fosters the flow of useful information and helps people cope with trauma and improve their health, find jobs and maintain businesses. Public health, crime, alienation, vandalism, poverty, civic irresponsibility, underdevelopment: all can allegedly be resolved or alleviated through the appropriate mobilization or inculcation of social capital. As a consequence, the idea of "social capital" has been very successful in attracting the attention of researchers and policy makers alike. In anthropology, social capital has important roots in anthropological research on social networks and reciprocity (Hannerz 1980; Harriss 2001:3-5). But now research in and public attention paid to this area is largely dominated by other social scientists, particularly political scientists and sociologists. So for example, of the 2,277 articles on social capital in the Social Sciences Citation Index, 414 were in sociology, 235 in public, occupational and environmental health, 226 in economics, 199 in planning and development, 166 in political science, 72 in geography, 106 in urban studies and only 30 in anthropology. Anthropologists are barely visible in the literature beyond the provision of useful examples, and where they have been engaged, it has generally involved the application of the ideas of Putnam, Coleman or Bourdieu rather than through having a significant impact on interdisciplinary or policy discussions.[1]

The question I would like explore here is why the concept is so widely used and applied in the social sciences and also beyond them? Is it a powerful solution to a diverse set of practical and theoretical problems or for the social sciences or rather a chaotic concept that has been successful precisely because of its ambiguities and malleability? Does this indeterminacy make it applicable to analyses

and policy recommendations on almost anything but without providing solid practical and theoretical purchase?

The vast, and accelerating, quantity of publications utilizing social capital ideas in recent years makes it impossible to provide an adequate review in the short space of this essay to thoroughly address these questions (see Figure 1). Instead, I offer comments on three issues which may shed some light on certain aspects of these questions. First, I will comment on the nature of social capital, particularly the confusions created by its treatment as both an individual-level and community-level concept. The distinction between positive and negative social capital will also be addressed here. Second, I will briefly discuss the causes and consequences of its increasing popularity as a source for policy and intervention strategies by powerful agents such as the World Bank and national governments. At the same time that social capital is widely seen as a solution for myriad social and developmental problems, corruption has received similar attention as the source of developmental failures, yet the two phenomenon overlap in important ways. How can one be unequivocally good while the other is unremittingly bad? Finally, I consider the tendency to exclude the state from analyses of social capital. The extent of social networks in a community is frequently measured to see if it accounts for epidemiological or criminological differences, but interactions and ties between members of the public and government officials are generally neglected. To illustrate how bringing the state back in (again!) can offer different insights into the dynamics of social capital, I provide an example from my current research on risk communication about bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease).

The Nature of Social Capital

Although the term was first used in 1916 by Lyda Hanifan, to mean loosely the positive attributes of social interaction, contemporary social capital theory generally traces its origins to Coleman, Bourdieu and Putnam.[2] Since each emphasizes a different level of analysis, conceptual confusion would seem to be inherent in the social capital perspective. Coleman, a sociologist, applied his analysis at the level of the individual and presumed the methodological individualism of rational choice theory. The level at which Bourdieu applied social capital analysis was less clear, oscillating between seeing the forms of capital as resources utilized by individually situated and strategic agents and as the properties and product of the field (*champs*) in which practices are deployed (Bourdieu 1986; Smart 1993). It was Putnam, however, who won "masses of converts, convincing them that in social capital they have a concept that will help them to solve many problems and change the world" (Harriss 2001:5).



Figure 1: Number of Articles on Social Capital in Social Sciences Citation Index

For Putnam, social capital is predominantly a characteristic of "societies" or "communities." This approach makes social capital theory of particular interest to policy makers, since it is in the subdivided spaces of authority that policy is concretely implemented. The complexity of Bourdieu's theory of practice is only with difficulty translated into policy recommendations. Bourdieu's approach was "excessively" concerned with both content and context, inconveniently so for a policy idea intended to be generally applicable. Ben Fine has suggested that "social capital can only reign supreme by excising the cultural, the symbolic—and Bourdieu" (Harriss 2006:193).

Putnam encourages conceptual confusion when he also emphasizes the ways in which individuals mobilize social capital (e.g., Putnam 2000:289-290). Even if we adopt the idea that social capital is primarily a collective phenomenon, there is ambiguity between seeing it entailed in characteristics that can only be measured at the community level, such as effectiveness of government or level of crime, versus those that are aggregates of individual data, such as the percentage of population trusting their government or their neighbours or participating in voluntary associations (Pearce and Smith 2003:125). These confusions around the ontological status of social capital make it a "chaotic concept" (Fine 1999:8; Sayer 1992), but they also help to make it popular.

There is nothing inherently wrong with concepts that bridge different levels of analysis, as long as this extension is recognized and evidence that applies at one level is not taken to confirm ideas at another level. Unfortunately, this seems to occur frequently in the social capital literature, resulting in circular arguments so that high levels of social capital in a community (such as localities in northern Italy) encourage civic engagement among individuals, which produces high levels of social capital in the community (with the reverse occurring in communities that "fail to develop" such as southern Italy). As Harriss (2001:8) points out, this risks confusing symptom with cause. The other main difficulty with social capital as a collective attribute is the classic problem of defining the "community." Is it a nation? A state or province? A locality? Are all those residing (or otherwise present) in the selected entity "members" of that collectivity? What about guest workers or others denied the rights of full citizenship and participation? Should their participation in their home places be counted as part of involvement in voluntary associations for the place in which they are residing? The processes of transnationalism or translocality are important challenges to any collective-level definition of social capital (Smart and Smart 1998).

Even Putnam (2000) recognizes that high levels of trust and solidarity can produce problems when they are not optimally located, as among mafia members. This awkwardness encourages elaborations on the basic concept of social capital. One is the distinction between bonding capital (ties between members of a group), bridging capital (links between different groups), and linking capital (ties between society and governmental actors and institutions). Good outcomes require an appropriate balance between the three types of ties, since excessive bonding capital can inhibit development by encouraging parochialism and social exclusion, while insufficient bonding capital can result in opportunistic individualism with negative effects for the community cooperation that social capital is thought to facilitate. As an illustration, anthropology's lack of apparent impact on social capital theory may be because of an excess of bonding capital, represented by how we publish, and insufficient bridging capital to the other social sciences, or linking capital to those who formulate policy.

Another typological elaboration that helps maintain the assumption of the positive nature of social capital is the distinction between positive and negative social capital. The term "negative social capital" is usually attributed to Alejandro Portes, but was used by him as shorthand to demonstrate that social capital can have negative social effects. Scholars who have subsequently used the idea of negative social capital have less justifiably discussed it as a distinct type of social capital. For example, in a discussion of addiction treatment, Cheung and Cheung (2003: 148) distinguish between negative social capital that "facilitates the person's engagement in deviant behaviour" and positive social capital that is "generated by the embeddedness in conventional pro-social networks." This approach is both dubious, since the labels depend on what the analyst (or legal system) considers good behaviour, and lacking in parsimony. We are better off recognizing that social capital is a resource that can be put to unlimited kinds of uses, only some of which we will approve of. Rather than being either good or bad by its own nature, the effects of social capital, like economic capital, depend on what it is used for and this is influenced by the broader social and cultural context. This question will be addressed further in comparing social capital and corruption in the next section.

Where there is a need for subdividing "social capital" is in breaking down the diverse kinds of entities collapsed into the category. Bourdieu's approach has the advantage of distinguishing between obligations between individuals (social capital), broader civic obligations or one's reputation for trustworthiness (symbolic capital),

and knowledge of how networks can be used (cultural capital). A more differentiated approach to non-economic capital is less prone to confusions and questionable causal inferences.

Social Capital and Corruption

There is a kind of schizophrenia current in public policy studies, where considerable attention is being paid to both social capital and corruption, with the former hailed as the solution to myriad developmental problems and the latter the cause of just as many developmental dysfunctions (Bukovansky 2006). The overlap between the two concepts, one seen as an almost unmitigated public good and the other a completely unmitigated public "bad," is, for the most part, conveniently neglected.

The conflict is often managed by designation. Just as economists can predetermine the outcomes of rent-seeking and lobbying as wasteful and inefficient by defining it as "directly unproductive activity" and thereby avoid the work of examining the concrete empirical outcomes, the positive effects of social capital are often worked into its very definition. Combining this with a normative definition of corruption, assuming its negative impacts then effectively diverts our attention from the inevitable overlap between any two concepts that centre on informality, connections and insider status. Corruption becomes even more excluded from conventional notions of social capital than is "negative social capital," and social capital is often seen as being the solution for the problems of corruption. Understanding the results of this use of conceptual blinkers requires a brief excursion through ideas on the use of social capital in the promotion of development.

Woolcock (1998) argues that the possibility of having too much of particular kinds of social capital produces developmental dilemmas. When there is too much social capital invested in integrated communities, which limits linkages outside the community, this may produce the equivalent of "amoral familism." Integration between state and society without bureaucratic integrity can result in corruption and predatory states, while coherent state organizations that lack linkages with society may produce inefficient and ineffective programs (Evans 1995). What provides the best developmental contexts, Evans suggests, are community level forms of integration that encourage and foster extra-community linkages, and state processes that generate accountable and flexible bureaucratic organizations that have non-corrupt linkages with society for the transmission of information and influence.

The crucial question, of course, is how these combinations can be accomplished. Woolcock (1998) identifies seven conditions that reduce a community's prospects for achieving sustainable and equitable economic development. At least three of these apply strongly to the People's Republic of China, which, since 1979, achieved economic growth rates among the highest ever recorded, while several other conditions apply to a certain degree. The three that most clearly fit China are: "poverty is endemic, unchecked by social safety nets, and difficult to escape through stable employment"; "uniform laws are weak, unjust, flaunted, or indiscriminately enforced"; and "polities are not freely and fairly elected or voters have few serious electoral choices" (Woolcock 1998:182). Corruption by itself does not seem to necessarily prevent rapid growth, at least when conditions serve to promote "embedded" forms of corruption based on the emic category of *guanxi*, which like social capital is best glossed as "connections" (Yan 1996; Yang 1994). The traditions of guanxi emphasize the building of relationships over short-term instrumental gain, but can easily be transformed into a poorly disguised extortion of bribes (Smart 1993, 1999).

The World Bank has wholeheartedly embraced social capital as it has attempted to move beyond the so-called "Washington Consensus" of global deregulation and market promotion (Fine 1999; Harriss 2001). Social capital was seen as a way in which market failures could be addressed without returning to a reliance on states as promoters of development (Harriss 2006). Li (2006) provides a useful analysis of the extremely ambitious social capital-based development strategy of the World Bank in Indonesia, which, between 1998 and 2003, was implemented in tens of thousands of villages, costing a billion dollars. Early difficulties did not undermine faith in the effort to promote development by mobilizing and further developing community-level social capital. Instead, recognition that "social capital, in the wrong quantities and combinations, had 'downsides' opened the terrain of social relations to ever-more refined analysis and intervention" (Li 2006:17). While corruption was seen as an ever-present problem, it was seen as distinct from community-level social capital, even if the two were in practice inevitably entangled. Rather than seeing this as a weakness of the social capital approach, it became a technical challenge that could be dealt with through sophisticated management techniques, such as local community tendering for project money. As Li (2006:9) observed, "to govern through community requires that community be rendered technical." These kind of techniques are assumed to be capable of separating out the good social capital that is intended to be promoted from the dangerous corruption that must be ended if development efforts are to succeed.

Here, at least, we move beyond the distinction by definitional fiat between social capital and corruption, but success on the ground has been limited.

My work on contested boundaries between legitimate social transactions and illegitimate bribery suggests that it is only by understanding both the content and the context of the exchanges that they can adequately be distinguished (Smart 1993, 1999). As Harriss (2001:10) points out, "linking capital" is a poor substitute for nuanced accounts of the context of power and class relations that structure the outcome of particular interventions. Generic analyses of social capital may be useful as sensitizing devices, to remind policymakers and economists of what anthropologists, historians and other social scientists have always known (although they may not have known so well how to promote), that resources inherent in social relationships may help people to achieve their goals. The question, however, is how we should bring the state back in to the discourses around social capital. Linking the community with state agents is hardly a solution in itself: that is what corruption is all about after all. It is the nature and the context of linkages that become crucial (Schneider 2006). In the next section, I will consider the process of risk communication between governments and their populations to consider the effects of trust and its loss.

Social Capital and the Politics of Mistrust

The effectiveness of communication about risks to populations by responsible authorities has been repeatedly shown to be closely related to the extent of trust that members of the population have in the government in general or the agency in particular. When communication is seen to involve "cover-up" statements about the safety of products, processes or institutions are more likely to be mistrusted. This can be seen as an erosion of social capital. Effective risk communication, on the other hand, can build trust among the citizenry, and thus social capital for the policy makers. A deficit of social capital in public health risk communication makes it very difficult to implement policies that might be of benefit for almost everyone, thus many crucial opportunities can be lost. If the credibility of "public health information, or worse, the motives behinds its use, are placed in question, this could have long ranging and deeply troubling implications for the profession of public health and all it aims to achieve" (Wynia 2006:3). Trust and credibility are hard to achieve, easy to lose, and once lost "almost impossible to regain completely" (Covello 1989:14). Identifying the conditions under which social capital between government and citizens can be most effectively fostered and those under which it can most easily be lost is an important question.

Wynia (2006) provides a recent example of compromised credibility. The U.S. Center for Disease Control seems to have gone against its own vaccination policies in instituting the post 9/11 smallpox immunization program. The decision to vaccinate half a million health professionals ran counter to advice from its own expert panel and appears to have been influenced by the Bush administration's efforts to build a case for war against Iraq. A 2003 survey of public health agencies found that 79% reported that the vaccination program had adversely affected their other bioterrorism preparedness efforts.

One of the problems raised by the breadth of Putnam's approach to social capital is that it crams too much into a single category (which of course also accounts for its generic utility). A case in point is the treatment of trust. Just as the thesis assumes that reciprocity within voluntary associations creates a norm of generalized reciprocity that encourages civic engagement, the crucial distinction between trust in specific persons and trust in institutions or the system in general is neglected (Giddens 1991; Schneider 2006). Guanxi becomes central to people's coping strategies precisely when they feel that they can trust known individuals more than they can the system and the application of the rules.

Communication about BSE in the U.K. has become a classic case of what not to do in response to a crisis (Powell and Leiss 1997). Official denials about the risk to humans, well past the point at which scientific uncertainty could reasonably justify the attitude, generated a huge increase in public skepticism, not only about government but also about scientific experts (Washer 2006). Delays in removing cattle parts from cattle feed greatly expanded the number of cases of BSE and vCJD in humans, and ultimately necessitated a massive cull of the U.K. cattle population. Both in the U.K. and elsewhere in Europe rates of beef consumption dropped significantly—almost 40% in France and 22% in Belgium (Raude et al. 2004; Verbeke et al. 1999).

By contrast, the discovery of BSE in a Canadian cow in May 2002 did not result in any significant drop in domestic consumption, although the closing of export markets devastated the export-dependent industry since there was insufficient domestic slaughter capacity. In part, this was because the Canadian government had learned from Britain's mistakes and adopted a risk communication strategy with full and frequent disclosure of information as it became available. According to a consultant who worked with Alberta Beef Producers on their communication strategies and media training, however, an additional important factor was that there were widely held public beliefs that the beef industry was made up of small,

independent producers who were working hard to provide the public with a safe, high-quality product. This previously developed reputation helped protect the industry both from loss of confidence by consumers, and conditioned the media to present supportive coverage emphasizing the suffering of the producers and minimizing fears of risk to human health (Larry Clausen, Communication Inc., personal communication, August 15, 2006).

The government was less successful in protecting its social and symbolic capital in relation to Albertan beef producers. While some producers I interviewed conceded that the government did have good intentions, more commonly, politicians were criticized for playing political games around anti-Americanism while people were suffering and the substantial money spent on recovery programs was seen as poorly designed and benefitting almost exclusively the large feedlot operators and packing plants. One producer who believed this cited a recovery program that attempted to stabilize calf prices at 90 cents per pound, which at the time it was announced, was a 20 cent boost from current market prices. The next day the packers dropped their price from 68 cents to 48 cents a pound and basically soaked up all the subsidy money. The price for calves was still 90 cents, but the program was limited to $1 billion, so this stratagem meant that the program ended faster and more of it went to the packers. Normally packers only made $20-50 an animal, according to this producer, while after BSE it went up to $300. The fact that most beef producers were having to repay all of the BSE emergency payments that they received through the Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization Program contributed to an erosion of any social capital that had been gained through the initial payments. This situation is an example of what Flyvberg et al. (2003) describe as the "politics of mistrust." The erosion of trust had reached the point where a substantial number of farmers seemed to doubt the scientific explanations of BSE based on the prion hypothesis and were attracted to the alternative ideas put forward by Mark Purdey (2002) which were given little credence in mainstream scientific circles.

Rothstein et al. (2006) have recently identified a dynamic of upwardly spiraling "risk colonization" where regulatory efforts to manage societal risk may increase institutional risk by taking on unpredictable costs, hazards to legitimacy, and so on. Institutional risk may prompt greater regulation of societal risk factors, again expanding institutional risk, resulting in an increasing colonization of governance by risk-based logic. In the case of BSE in Alberta, governmental risk communication was quite successful in relation to consumers, due largely to pre-existing symbolic capital attached to ranchers, and helped to stabilize domestic demand, even if that did not prevent a major crisis due to the export-dependence of the industry. However, risk management through recovery programs has been much less successful. These regulatory failures have at least temporarily eroded the government's social and symbolic capital among beef producers and trust in future programs will be much harder to achieve.[3] Given the soaking up of most of the support funds by large firms, mostly American controlled, the decline of small, independent producers seems to have been exacerbated, which ultimately may erode the imagery and reputation of the industry that propped up consumer confidence.

Concluding Comments

The Policy Research Initiative (attached to the Privy Council Office) conducted a major research program between 2003 and 2005 on social capital and how public policy might appropriately address it. One of the five key insights that they identified provides a good reason for addressing the topic—which readers might be searching for after the critical treatment provided above. They noted that "governments inevitably affect patterns of social capital development. Taking into consideration the role of social capital (and the interactions between social relationships and policies) in a more systematic way...can potentially make a significant difference in the achievement of policy objectives" (Policy Research Initiative 2005:2). In other words, government action has an impact on people's social resources and it should be useful to take that into consideration before adopting and implementing policies. But there is a limit to the degree of reflexivity in this process. Their next conclusion is that "we need more concrete and context-specific empirical evidence for the best practices for integrating social capital into government policies and programs" (2005:2). Nowhere in the document is there any discussion of the ways in which social capital is already integrated into policy formation through the influence, for example, that industry groups and lobbyists have on decisions through shared social networks and backgrounds, campaign finance and the routine processes of regulatory capture. Once again, social capital becomes something within the population that governments can act on from above to guide the population without recognizing the great importance of social capital that already penetrates government agencies from outside, channelling and constraining the kinds of policies that are likely to be adopted. If social scientists neglect the "economy of practices" within which members of the elite convert social, cultural and symbolic capital into

political influence and economic capital, and concentrate on adopting the current hot theme in order to attempt our own conversion strategies, our ability to understand the operation of the concrete political economy will be unfortunately limited.

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Notes

1 This, I will hazard, is a common pattern for anthropology: insights derived from ethnography frequently develop powerful new analytical frames, but those insights eventually become adopted by other social sciences, while anthropologists gradually vacate the scene and look for new niches to explore. Professionally, we are like grasses that first colonize bare sand dunes, but are soon out-competed by bushes or trees that take advantage of terrain improved by the grass's roots. This has happened repeatedly, most relevantly here with social network analysis, and more recently with transnationalism (see Smart and Smart 1998). Usually, the loss of our first mover advantage has been because technical standards or theoretical sophistication increased to a degree where most anthropologists felt uncomfortable. In the case of social capital, however, this seems to have occurred because it became a "big idea" in policy circles, and having an anthropological origin is not an advantage in such circumstances.

2 For Lyda Hanifan, social capital referred not "to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of people, namely goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse" (Rae 2003:141). Portes (1998) also points out that the concept draws on ideas about the positive consequences of participation in groups that can be traced back at least to Durkheim. Definitions cover a great deal of conceptual ground, but a reasonable working definition is "the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one's social networks," without which "seemingly obvious opportunities for mutually beneficial collective action are squandered" (Woolcock 1998:153).

3 In the interests of space, I have restricted my discussion primarily to risk communication, omitting the much broader issues of risk management and risk society (Beck 2006).

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La dépolitisation de la notion de « capital social » : pourquoi pas un retour à Karl Polanyi ?

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La notion de « capital social » est à la mode. Cette notion nous entraîne, Alan Smart l'a noté avec finesse, sous l'apparence d'un vocabulaire progressiste, dans une sorte de jeu conceptuel flou et chaotique qui « désociologise » les rapports sociaux en les rabattant sur le registre de l'individuel, gomme la hiérarchisation des groupes sociaux au sein des sociétés et obscurcit les conflits entre les intérêts des différents groupes. Chaque individu est présenté détenant un « capital social » dont il est le responsable et qu'il peut faire croître et prospérer ; l'inégalité n'est plus qu'une question de degré entre des individus qui semblent avoir la liberté de se déplacer, à volonté, le long de l'échelle sociale. La vision optimiste de la société charriée par ce concept s'interdit de voir que l'espace social est un espace structuré à l'avance par les positions relativement stables que les personnes occupent et que ces positions sont elles-mêmes, dans la plupart des cas, héritées des histoires familiales.

Alan Smart a raison de souligner que ce concept « dépolitise » l'espace public en transformant les gouvernements en des instances qui s'appuient sur l'action communautaire et les réseaux de solidarité pour solutionner toutes sortes de problèmes, de la criminalité aux grossesses d'adolescentes en passant par la pauvreté. La notion de « capital social » compte, me semble-t-il, parmi les concepts les plus dangereux dont a accouché, ces dernières années, la sociologie néo-conservatrice américaine. Outre le fait qu'il exclut l'État des analyses comme le signale Smart, ce concept encourage l'illusion d'un social réduit à l'addition de la seule coopération entre les sujets sociaux : il n'est pas surprenant que Putnam (2000) aboutisse à une véritable dé-sociologisation de la société américaine dans son *Bowling Alone*. En reliant le capital social à d'autres formes de capital (économique, politique, culturel, symbolique), Bourdieu (1986) réouvre le concept en direction du politique et de l'économique. Hélas, ce n'est pas à la version bourdieusienne de la notion de capital social que les spécialistes de la santé publique, les politologues et les sociologues souscrivent dans leurs travaux.

J'adhère parfaitement à l'ensemble de la perspective critique, détaillée et nuancée, mise de l'avant par Alan

Smart dans son court essai. Je me limite ici à discuter des implications de la sémantique économique inscrite dans la métaphore du capital social; je le fais à partir de la place qu'occupe le concept de capital social en santé publique. D'emblée, je dois dire que je n'ai aucun problème avec l'affirmation selon laquelle nos liens sociaux puissent avoir une valeur économique ni avec la tendance, de plus en plus forte en santé publique, à penser les relations sociales à partir d'une métaphore économique. Je crois même que le terme de « capital social » peut enrichir notre réflexion sur les déterminants sociaux de la santé des populations, à deux conditions cependant : d'une part, le « capital social » doit être mis en relation avec les autres formes de capital, économique, culturel, scolaire, social, etc; d'autre part, le « capital social » gagne à être mesuré, en santé publique, en référence aux individus ET aux groupes.

La notion de « capital social » gagnerait à être envisagée en santé publique, comme une réalité absolument indissociable du capital économique et du capital culturel dont disposent les individus et les groupes. La santé publique aurait avantage, me semble-t-il, à intégrer deux des aspects centraux de la sociologie de Bourdieu, à savoir que : (i) les personnes individuelles occupent des positions généralement assez stables dans l'espace social, positions auxquelles sont associés des volumes différenciés de capital économique, culturel et social, et que (ii) ces positions sociales sont généralement transmises d'une génération à la suivante sous la forme d'un ensemble de statuts, de manières d'être et d'habitus que les personnes arrivent difficilement à changer même dans les sociétés où il existe une forte mobilité sociale.

Les promoteurs de la notion de « capital social » font de la mauvaise science sociale; leur influence est, de plus, néfaste parce qu'ils mettent un dangereux outil d'analyse politique entre les mains des spécialistes de la santé publique. Reprenant à leur compte la vieille idéologie bourgeoise, les défenseurs du concept de « capital social » mythifient, en quelque sorte, les pouvoirs transformateurs des communautés de base et mettent de l'avant, dans un excès d'optimisme typiquement américain, une philosophie politique libérale qui tend à s'attaquer à toutes les interventions social-démocrates des gouvernements. En dernière instance, le concept soutient le discours affirmant qu'il faut moins d'État. Il est surprenant que les promoteurs du « capital social » aient pu accoucher d'une description aussi maigre de la vie sociale et politique et qu'ils aient cru que les vertus de la solidarité pouvaient accomplir, à la manière d'un *deus ex machina*, les réformes que les pouvoirs politiques n'ont pas réussi à faire ou n'ont pas voulu faire.

Le concept de « capital social » a fait entrer le moralisme et le conservatisme à pleine porte, d'abord en sociologie et en science politique, ensuite dans la santé publique américaine qui a canonisé ce concept et l'a diffusé à travers le monde, par le biais notamment de la revue : *Social Science and Medicine*, qui a servi d'importante courroie de transmission dans ce transfert. À trop s'enthousiasmer devant les essais simplificateurs, voire simplistes, d'auteurs comme Francis Fukuyama et à trop intégrer le credo *communautarian* de Putnam (2000), la santé publique court le risque d'en venir à croire que toute réforme sociale et politique de la santé peut se faire à partir d'un agenda moralisateur (la pratique des vertus civiques), de prescriptions éthiques (la solidarité et l'entraide dans les communautés de base), de discours optimistes (le mythe de l'égalité de tous), d'appels néo-conservateurs au désengagement de l'État, dans l'ignorance des inégalités structurelles et dans une véritable dépolitisation des enjeux sociaux et économiques qui sont impliqués dans les questions de santé. Alan Smart a dénoncé dans des termes clairs toutes ces dérives potentielles.

Le concept de « capital social » se présente comme l'idée centrale d'un méta-récit dans lequel triomphe une pensée sociologique conservatrice qui raconte l'histoire fictive de sociétés sans conflit, qui annonce la remise à zéro de tous les compteurs chez chaque enfant qui naît et qui redit le mythe de l'égalité des chances pour tous et pour toutes. Je souhaite que les sciences sociales se libèrent, au plus vite, de cette vision idéalisée du social que charrie la métaphore de « capital social »; il est devenu urgent de retourner aux vieilles notions, plus saines selon moi, de réseau social, de cohésion sociale, de stratification sociale et de classe sociale. C'est ici que l'anthropologie peut contribuer à enrichir les débats. L'essai de Alan Smart est une pierre posée au bon endroit.

Aux sociologues, aux politologues et aux philosophes qui ont fait la promotion de la métaphore de « capital social », on peut opposer une réflexion, basée sur les travaux de Karl Polanyi, qui replace la notion de capital dans un contexte économique plus large qui inclut les notions de marché, de profit, d'intérêt et de rapports de classes sociales. Le mot « capital » est employé, en économie classique, pour désigner une somme d'argent, autrefois appelée le principal, qui rapporte un intérêt s'ajoutant à la somme primitive. Le capital est cette richesse qui est utilisée pour créer plus de richesse et forme la partie centrale d'un système de production dans lequel toutes les composantes sont considérées comme des commodités de marché (*marketables*). Une de celles-ci est le travail qui crée plus que la valeur de son coût parce que le système augmente continuellement la productivité grâce aux innova-

tions technologiques. Dans *Europe and the People Without History*, l'anthropologue Eric Wolf écrit :

> Wealth... is not capital until it controls means of production, buys labor power, and puts it to work, continuously expanding surpluses by intensifying productivity through an ever-rising curve of technological inputs. Merchants may profit by selling the things people make, but unless their wealth organizes the process of production in this way, it is not capital. [1997:79]

Eric Wolf conclut : « There is no such thing as mercantile or merchant capitalism » (1997:79).

Il peut exister, selon Wolf, une richesse (*wealth*) mercantile, mais on ne peut pas se référer à celle-ci sous le nom de capital. Le capital est une composante centrale d'une sorte particulière de système politico-économique dans lequel il fonctionne pour définir les droits des propriétaires sur la valeur que le travail crée. Le capital n'existe pas indépendamment du système social et politique qui le définit et le met en force. C'est la richesse qui a une fonction spécifique dans un système économique : quelques personnes la possèdent et d'autres ne la possèdent pas. C'est pourquoi il existe des classes dans la société : quelques personnes utilisent leur richesse pour organiser la production et le reste d'entre elles travaille pour les détenteurs des capitaux.

C'est là une évidence pour les anthropologues qui sont habitués à travailler dans des sociétés dans lesquelles les manières de vivre et les économies sont organisées autrement que dans les sociétés capitalistes occidentales. Sans cette comparaison avec d'autres systèmes sociaux et économiques, le capital semble être une chose aussi naturelle et aussi inévitable pour les gens vivant au sein d'un système capitaliste que le sont les esprits de la forêt ou l'usufruit des terres communales dans d'autres sociétés. La phrase souvent citée de Karl Polanyi (1886-1964) : « The economy is embedded in social relations » semble, à première vue, laisser entendre que l'économie est essentiellement une affaire de relations sociales. Je dis bien à première vue, car jamais Polanyi n'a vraiment laissé entendre, écrit ou dit, que « l'*embeddedness* » de l'économie dans les relations sociales pouvait justifier de traduire les relations sociales par la notion de « capital ». Pour être correctement interprétée, la phrase de Polanyi doit être replacée dans le contexte général de la théorie sociale et économique qu'il a développée. En fait, dans *The Grand Transformation*, il a fait ces remarques spécifiques au sujet de l'économie de marché: «Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system » (Polanyi 1957:57). Sa thèse peut être résumée en quelques mots : les théories libérales formalistes qui rendent compte des économies de marché généralisé ne sont pas applicables en dehors du contexte historique des sociétés capitalistes. Polanyi a ainsi remis en question le postulat formaliste qui définit l'économie comme l'ensemble des règles déterminant le choix des moyens à travers la logique de l'action rationnelle ; il a aussi rejeté le déterminisme économique en tant que principe universel ; enfin, il s'est démarqué du marxisme qu'il considère être trop centré sur la théorie de la valeur et sur les modes de production, au détriment de la circulation et de la distribution des biens produits.

Les études comparatives réalisées par Polanyi et al. (1957) sur de nombreux systèmes économiques, anciens et contemporains (le capitalisme industriel), à la fois occidentaux, africains et asiatiques, entre autres, l'ont conduit à reposer autrement la question de la place de l'économie dans l'histoire de l'humanité. Polanyi a comparé les différents systèmes économiques en reliant les modèles économiques d'une part aux procès institutionnalisés d'interactions entre l'homme et l'environnement (satisfaction de ses besoins) et d'autre part à l'organisation sociale et aux valeurs. Il a pu ainsi établir une typologie des systèmes économiques sur la base des liens entre la forme du procès économique et son institutionnalisation dans la société, en référence à ce qu'il appelle les « formes d'intégration » : à chacun des systèmes économiques correspond une forme particulière d'intégration qui organise de manière originale l'accès au capital, à la terre, à la main-d'œuvre. Polanyi a distingué trois types de société : a) les sociétés où domine la parenté avec des groupes symétriquement ordonnés dans lesquelles la réciprocité constitue le médium de l'intégration économique; b) les sociétés où domine une organisation politique forte (chefferie, royauté) dans lesquelles la redistribution agit comme forme principale d'intégration; c) les sociétés où domine les classes sociales et les sujets individuels dans lesquelles l'échange marchand constitue la forme dominante de l'intégration.

Dans ces trois cas de figures, l'économie n'est pas un domaine autonome mais elle est plutôt encastrée dans des institutions sociales qui ne sont pas directement économiques; chacun des systèmes possède son support institutionnel propre : en a), la réciprocité prend place dans les rapports entre des groupes sociaux symétriques; en b), la redistribution vers l'extérieur survient après une appropriation par le centre; et en c), l'échange implique un mouvement de va-et-vient au sein d'un marché auto-régulé.

La métaphore de « capital » n'est qu'une parmi de nombreuses autres métaphores à ancrage économique qui ont pénétré, d'une manière de plus en plus envahissante, les sciences sociales, la philosophie politique et la santé

publique au cours des quinze dernières années. Cette métaphore du « capital social » s'est imposée à la réflexion des sociologues, des politologues, des philosophes, des éthiciens et des épidémiologistes, sans être toujours accompagnée d'un questionnement critique à l'égard des aspects proprement économiques qui sous-tendent cette métaphore. La notion de « capital social » risque d'occulter les différences entre les classes sociales dont les frontières deviennent invisibles, disparaissant dans un nuage de pensée métaphorique. Les utilisateurs de cette notion reconnaissent, il est vrai, qu'il existe des variations, entre les individus et les groupes, en matière de revenu, de prestige, d'éducation et de travail, tout en laissant cependant entendre que tout le monde peut, librement, aspirer à toutes ces choses qui sont présentées comme étant également accessibles à l'ensemble des membres d'une société. L'accès à plus de revenu, à plus de prestige et à plus d'éducation relèverait, en quelque sorte, de la liberté des individus sans que les contraintes les empêchant d'y accéder ne soient mises en évidence. Le mythe typiquement américain de l'égalité est toujours à l'horizon.

Les promoteurs américains de la notion de « capital social » font de la mauvaise science sociale; ils font aussi de la très mauvaise économie. De plus, leur influence est néfaste, parce qu'ils mettent un dangereux outil d'analyse politique entre les mains des planificateurs des services publics, notamment dans le domaine de la santé, dans les politiques de protection du revenu, du contrôle de la criminalité, et ainsi de suite. Je souhaite que les sciences sociales se libèrent, au plus vite, de cette vision idéalisée du social que charrie la métaphore de « capital social ». Je termine en reprenant une phrase que l'écrivain russe Vladimir Volkoff fait dire à un des personnages de son roman *Le Montage* :

> On m'a enseigné que pour attenter à la liberté, il faut attenter à la pensée, mais j'irai plus loin : pour attaquer la pensée, il est bon d'attaquer la langue. [1982:82]

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Pourquoi le concept de capital est-il à la mode ?

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Le texte de Alan Smart pose une question importante : Pourquoi le concept de capital social est-il d'un usage si répandu, non seulement dans les sciences sociales, mais également dans d'autres domaines qui se nourrissent amplement à ces dernières comme celui du développement des politiques notamment ? Toutefois, l'auteur s'attarde moins à analyser les processus d'appropriation du concept de capital social par les différentes sciences sociales, ou par différentes activités sociales qui s'en inspirent, qu'à tenter une analyse de la nature du concept d'une part et, d'autre part, de son usage politique. D'autres chercheurs ont abordé des questions similaires.

Par exemple Fassin (2003) en utilisant une démarche similaire tente de rendre compte du passage du concept de capital social issu pour une large part de la sociologie dans l'épidémiologie sociale. Comme Smart, son analyse met l'accent sur le fait que le concept a émergé à l'intérieur de trois traditions sociologiques différentes, représentées par les travaux de Coleman (1990), Putnam (2000) et Bourdieu (1986), alors que l'épidémiologie sociale, qui en est pourtant la principale utilisatrice (Ponthieux 2006), n'a retenu que la tradition putnamienne. Bien que l'analyse détaillée de cette sélectivité dans le champ de l'épidémiologie sociale reste à faire, nous avons soutenu ailleurs (Lévesque 2005) que deux principes semblent la structurer. D'une part, une tendance très forte de l'épidémiologie sociale à emprunter les concepts des autres disciplines en les isolants du contexte théorique de leur production. Cette approche, utile sur le plan empirique car elle fournit des « outils » immédiatement utilisables, conduit trop souvent à une forme de réductionnisme et, plus grave encore du point de vue de notre propos, éloigne

des indispensables débats et réflexions sur le sens, la nature et la portée des concepts empruntés. L'autre principe mobilisé dans cette analyse de la sélection de la tradition putnamienne dans le champ de l'épidémiologie sociale est la place centrale accordée à l'idée de « collectif » dans cette conception du capital social. Pour des raisons dont l'explication détaillée dépasserait largement le cadre restreint de ce texte, l'épidémiologie sociale et son pendant professionnel, la santé publique, ont placé au cœur de leurs démarches tant intellectuelle que pratique l'idée de « collectif » comme cible obligée des interventions et de la compréhension des phénomènes d'inégalités sociales de santé (Fassin 2005). Cette importance préexistante de la notion de « collectif » ouvre grande la porte à tout concept y faisant appel et ce souvent sans grandes précautions.

Bibeau (2005) poursuit également un objectif similaire à celui de Smart. Toutefois, il cherche moins à faire une analyse du contenu du concept de capital social qu'à en retracer les « racines » politiques dans les débats opposant aux États-Unis les courants « communautarians » et « libertarians » aux réformistes progressistes. De ce point du vue qui relève davantage de l'analyse politique que du travail épistémologique (Lévesque 2005), ce sont les conséquences politiques de l'usage du concept de capital social qui sont mises en exergue, notamment ses aspects moralisateurs, la dépolitisation des enjeux collectifs qu'on lui attribue, la caution pour le désengagement de l'État qu'il représenterait, etc. Cette critique politique du concept de capital social, reprise par un certain nombre de chercheurs à l'intérieur même du champ de l'épidémiologie sociale (p. ex. Muntaner et al. 2001) met davantage en évidence les usages politiques, réels ou supputés, du concept que sa nature intrinsèque ou encore son utilité scientifique à savoir sa capacité à permettre la compréhension des phénomènes sociaux. Toutefois elle a le mérite d'attirer l'attention sur les limites, les biais ou les présupposés inhérents à l'usage politique du concept de capital social.

Ce détour par les travaux d'autres chercheurs poursuivant des objectifs similaires à ceux de l'article de Smart permet de mettre en évidence un procédé commun. L'analyse porte sur la nature du capital social, retrace ses origines à l'intérieur de trois traditions et tente d'en montrer les limites et les distinctions. C'est cette démarche classique que nous avons également utilisé dans nos premiers travaux sur le concept de capital social (Lévesque et White 1999) en suivant, dans une certaine mesure, la démarche adoptée par Portes (1998). Toutefois cette façon d'analyser l'émergence et l'évolution du concept de capital social comporte quelques limites.

La première est de passer sous silence une quatrième tradition sociologique qui a traité abondamment du capital social et qui est représentée notamment par les travaux de Lin (2001) et de Flap et Völker (2004). Cette tradition, issue du courant de l'analyse structurale, conceptualise le capital social comme forme de ressource sociale disponible et mobilisable par des acteurs sociaux ce qui s'apparente à la conception bourdieusienne du capital social comme forme de capital. Compte tenu de la grande quantité de travaux produits dans le cadre de cette approche réticulaire du capital social et de son apport essentiel sur les plans théorique et méthodologique l'analyse de la nature du concept de capital social ne saurait faire l'économie d'un travail incorporant cette tradition.

La seconde limite tient au fait que les analyses de la nature du capital social ont souvent porté moins sur cette nature que sur les débats les plus actifs dans le champ. Ainsi, dans son analyse de la nature du capital social, Smart met l'accent sur l'enjeu soulevé dans un de ces débats à savoir le niveau d'analyse auquel il peut être appréhendé. Classiquement ce débat vise à établir la position des trois fondateurs quant à ces niveaux. Smart suggère ainsi que pour Coleman le capital social est de niveau individuel alors qu'il serait de niveau collectif pour Putnam et plus ou moins indéterminé pour Bourdieu avec une dominante individuelle. Les interprétations à ce sujet foisonnent dans les textes portant sur le capital social avec de grandes et souvent d'étonnantes variations. Si ces interprétations convergent en ce qui a trait aux travaux de Putnam, elles divergent souvent pour les deux autres. Ces variations semblent résulter du choix des analystes quant aux aspects qu'ils mettent en évidence (par exemple la définition du capital social proposée par Coleman, ou les exemples qu'ils utilisent dans ses analyses empiriques); elles semblent également être influencées par l'origine linguistique des auteurs dans le cas de Bourdieu, l'interprétation anglophone concluant souvent à un capital social de niveau « individuel », alors que l'interprétation francophone accorde généralement peu d'importance à cet aspect.

La question qui se pose est de savoir si cette analyse des « niveaux » permet de bien comprendre la distinction entre les travaux de ces différents chercheurs. Une démarche peut-être plus féconde pour traiter de la nature du capital social est de se rapprocher davantage de sa réalité intrinsèque et de poser la question de la part de la réalité sociale que le concept, en tant que construction abstraite devant « approximer » une réalité sociale empirique, est censé représenter. Cette démarche conduit à un raisonnement très différent des débats concernant les niveaux en mettant l'accent sur le type de ressources que

représente le concept de capital social. En utilisant un raisonnement de ce genre, on peut aboutir à une modalité d'intégration des travaux utilisant la notion de capital social plutôt qu'à une opposition entre les niveaux d'analyse. Ponthieux (2006), par exemple, identifie deux familles conceptuelles utilisant la notion de capital social à partir, non pas d'une exégèse des travaux fondateurs, mais plutôt d'une analyse du contenu même du concept. Son critère analytique s'appuie sur le statut octroyé à la notion de capital dans l'expression capital social. De cette logique, elle regroupe d'un côté les travaux qui utilisent le concept de capital social en mettant l'accent sur l'idée de capital dans un sens proche du capital économique, ce qui correspond aux travaux de Bourdieu et de la plupart de recherches qui émergent de l'analyse structurale. À l'opposé, les travaux découlant de Coleman et Putnam utilisent le concept de capital social, moins comme une forme de capital que dans un sens très général de ressource. Selon son analyse, dans la première famille (Bourdieu et analyse structurale), le capital social est endogène, c'est-à-dire qu'il est le résultat d'une action entreprise par des acteurs sociaux avec des objectifs de « profit ». Le capital social comme forme générale de ressource (Coleman, Putnam) serait plutôt exogène dans ce sens qu'il est inscrit dans une structure sociale donnée et à disponibilité pour les acteurs.

Il s'agit ici en fait de prendre au sérieux ou non l'idée de capital dans l'expression capital social, ou de chercher à identifier une forme sociale de capital (Lévesque 2000), à la fois distincte des autres formes de capital mais fonctionnant selon une logique de capital telle que le propose par exemple Bourdieu (1986) dans son article *Forms of Capital*. À l'opposé, le capital social comme ressource implique des dynamiques tout à fait différentes étant ancré moins dans l'action ou l'investissement des acteurs que dans certaines caractéristiques des sociétés, communautés, ou collectivités dont les frontières sont souvent difficiles à déterminer comme le souligne Smart à juste titre.

Placer l'accent sur la nature fondamentale du capital social tel que le proposent différents chercheurs (Ponthieux, 2006; Lin, 2001; Flap et Völker, 2004; Lévesque, 2000, etc.) transforme la nature du débat. Si la question du niveau d'analyse demeure significative dans la famille *capital social comme ressource*, elle n'est pas particulièrement pertinente dans le cadre des travaux dans la tradition *capital social comme capital*, dans lesquels l'interrogation porte davantage sur des questions relatives aux modalités d'investissement propres à produire du capital social, aux stratégies d'usage, et ainsi de suite, que ce soit par des acteurs individuels ou collectifs.

Cette façon d'aborder l'analyse de la nature du capital social, tracée à grands traits ici, renvoie de fait à considérer non pas différentes traditions du capital social qui en feraient une lecture dissemblable, mais à une conclusion plus radicale à savoir que ces traditions utilisent un même concept (ou une même expression) pour représenter conceptuellement deux réalités empiriques distinctes (Ponthieux 2006; Lévesque 2005).

Le texte de Smart sur cette question de la nature du capital social adopte une position qui se situe à l'intérieur des cadres habituels de ces débats qui conçoivent le capital social comme un concept unifié avec des variantes sur le plan de l'interprétation et en cela il conduit à des analyses et à des conclusions différentes d'une analyse de la signification intrinsèque du concept. Toutefois, il fait ressortir des lacunes et des contradictions importantes et significatives dans la conceptualisation dominante du capital, dont le caractère relatif, voire moralisateur des attributs positif ou négatif parfois associés au concept, les problèmes méthodologiques associés à la transposition des analyses de niveau « collectif » à un niveau « individuel ».

Pour revenir à la question centrale posée par Smart, c'est-à-dire de chercher à comprendre pourquoi le concept de capital social a eu une telle influence dans le champ des sciences sociales, cette réinterprétation de la nature du capital social n'apporte pas de réponse en elle-même. Si l'analyse a déjà été faite et des pistes d'explication bien identifiées en ce qui a trait au domaine de l'épidémiologie sociale, à notre connaissance une telle analyse reste à faire concernant les autres disciplines plus centrales aux sciences sociales.

Toutefois, cette relecture de la nature du capital social permet d'ajouter à l'analyse présentée par Smart quant au retrait de Bourdieu du champ du développement des politiques qui utilise le concept de capital social. En développant le concept comme une forme particulière de capital soumise aux mêmes mécanismes que les autres formes de capital, Bourdieu met l'accent sur l'inégale distribution du capital (quelle qu'en soit la forme), sur les rapports de domination qui, selon sa lecture, produisent cette inégale distribution et sur le « contrôle » ou la possession du capital social comme outil de domination. On est ici à l'antipode du capital social comme « remède miracle » (Portes 1998) tel qu'on peut le dégager des travaux de Putnam. On est également dans une position difficile, voire impossible, à adopter de la part des producteurs de politiques publiques qui peuvent difficilement concevoir les « problèmes sociaux » dans des cadres d'exploitation et de domination.

Cela dit, la conception *capital* du capital social n'est pas complètement exclue du domaine des politiques. Les

travaux du Policy Research Initiative (PRI) auxquels l'auteur fait référence et qui constituent probablement la plus importante initiative en la matière à l'échelle canadienne ont fortement été influencés à leur début par la tradition « ressource » du capital social dans la foulée des travaux, et de la popularité, de Putnam et ont évolué progressivement vers une conception « capital » du capital social[1]. Toutefois, sans expulser entièrement Bourdieu de ses travaux, le PRI a davantage mis l'accent sur les recherches issues de la tradition de l'analyse structurale et ce particulièrement en ce qui a trait à la question de la mesure du concept de capital social. Cet exemple illustre la plasticité du domaine des politiques. Si la notoriété des travaux de Putnam a fortement contribué à ce qu'ils soient repris comme premier cadre de référence utilisé par le PRI, d'autres influences à la fois externes (de nombreux chercheurs ont participé à de multiples consultations) et internes (différents personnes affectées à ce projet) ont contribué à une réorientation majeure.

Toutefois cette réorientation est demeurée à l'intérieur des pratiques propres au domaine du développement des politiques. Les développeurs de politiques ont tendance, et ont pour mandat, de définir des cibles d'interventions (des problèmes sociaux) et de tenter d'identifier des solutions dans le cadre de certains paramètres. De ce point de vue, l'analyse de Smart du caractère étroit de la problématique du capital social telle qu'elle a été reprise par le PRI en centrant l'attention uniquement sur les actions gouvernementales visant à l'incorporer à ses politiques est fort utile. Une intégration plus complète aurait pu en effet incorporer l'ensemble de la dynamique sociale, et des acteurs sociaux impliqués, dans le recours au capital social comme ressource pouvant être utile dans l'intervention relative aux problèmes sociaux.

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Note

1 La consultation des différents documents produits par ce projet qui s'étend sur plusieurs années est éloquente à ce propos. Les premiers documents illustrent nettement une prédominance de l'approche putnamienne qui est progressivement supplantée par une approche centrée sur les réseaux sociaux, qui devient dominante dans les deux textes qui terminent le projet. On peut consulter tous les documents à : http://policyresearch.gc.ca/page.asp?pagenm=rp_sc_final2

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Why "Social Capital" (Like "Disparities") Is Fashionable

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Alan Smart's stated objective in his article on social capital is to answer the question, why is social capital, the concept and the term, so widely used today in the social science literature? While he points toward an answer, I do not believe he actually provides it—the one he seems to provide is not convincing, at least to me, because he does not consider the political context in which *social capital* appears in the social sciences.

First, let me note that while the term *social capital* is relatively new, the concept is rather old. I believe the first author to use the term was my own professor, James Coleman, when he taught at Johns Hopkins University in the 1960s and I was one of his graduate students. But the concept of social capital is much older. In fact, it goes back to the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, especially in his *Democracy in America* (2000) in which he speaks at length of the sense of communitarianism in the U.S. that he saw as characteristic of American democracy. Communitarianism, and the sense of belonging and togetherness that went with it, was critical to his understanding of the U.S. He thought communitarianism defined the political and social lives of the communities he had visited in New England. The richness of what would later be called "civil society" in local communities impressed him profoundly. He contrasted this communitarianism and local social cohesion with the hierarchy, social tensions and indeed, class struggle in Europe at that time. He saw the U.S. as the way of the future, and Europe, with its class struggles, as beyond redemption.

I believe that de Tocqueville's idealized vision of American society is the reason the U.S. establishment has always loved him. He is the most cited European thinker of that time. In his version of the U.S., the country was an oasis of calm, in contrast to the agitated and tumultuous European political scene, where intense struggles were taking place around control of the state. In the U.S., in de Tocqueville's view, all was placid and cohesive. The central state—the federal government—barely features in his writings; it is something far away, in the background. I have published elsewhere a more extensive review of de Tocqueville's vision (Navarro 2002). But I believe I have summarized his position accurately here.

Social cohesion and communitarianism have long been major elements in the imagery of the U.S., based on the New England town-hall type of participatory democracy as portrayed in Norman Rockwell paintings. Actually, in my almost 40 years of U.S. academic life, I cannot recall any U.S. president who has not called for a revival of communitarianism. Republican presidents tend to do it with stronger conviction than Democratic presidents, but the call was expressed in strong tones under President Clinton's Democratic administration. Even in the U.K., Prime Minister Blair has spoken forcefully about communitarianism. He even replaced the famous Clause 4 of the Labour Party Constitution, which called for state direction in all areas of productive life, with a new Clause 4 that called for "the development of a community...where we live together freely in the spirit of solidarity, tolerance and respect." In this narrative, communitarianism is an alternative to state and public intervention. It is no coincidence that the Democratic president who most often spoke of communitarianism (and social cohesion) was Bill Clinton; he was also the Democratic president who relied least on federal public interventions to resolve the country's enormous social problems. He continued the policies first developed by President Reagan and the first President Bush, and these same policies have been continued by the second President Bush. All of them emphasized communitarianism as an alternative to federalism and state intervention.

Social capital is the individualized version of communitarianism. An individual holds capital derived from his or her membership in networks established in the community. In a major study directed by Professor Robert Putnam of Harvard University (who, with James Coleman, has done more than anyone else to popularize social capital), the states and regions of the U.S. were categorized by their level of social capital. As reported approvingly by the *New York Times* (August 26, 2001, A-1, A-14), New Hampshire was the state in the Union with the highest social capital. The *Times* failed to report, however, that New Hampshire was also the state with the weakest state government, the lowest state income and sales taxes, the smallest percentage of civil servants per 10,000 inhabitants, and the smallest Medicaid program, the state-run program for those referred to in the U.S. as the "medically indigent," which actually covers only 18% of those who need financial assistance to get health care.

Based on these facts, we can begin to understand why the idea of social capital has been so widely used in the social sciences in the past 25 years, and why it is promoted by national and international associations that play a central role in promoting the conservative and liberal conventional wisdom of political, financial and indeed, academic establishments. In the past quarter-century, we

have witnessed an expansion of national and international policies aimed at reducing the role of the public sector in people's lives, with the active privatization of public services and an aggressive deregulation of labour, financial, and commercial markets. These policies are primarily class policies, benefitting some classes at the expense of the interests of others—most particularly, the working classes. In the great majority of developed capitalist countries, capital's benefits have reached unprecedented levels, while wages and social benefits have stagnated or declined (see Navarro 2007). These types of policies are known outside the U.S. as "neo-liberal" policies, and their effects have stimulated a surge in popular resistance everywhere.

The promotion of social capital is part of the promotion of neo-liberalism. Indeed, the term *capital* tells us what social capital is. One indicator of the enormous conservatism in the social sciences has been the takeover of the narrative and conceptualization of these sciences by the language of neo-classical economics. The value of individuals is defined by their resources, the capital that allows them to compete. Thus, "knowledge" becomes "human capital," and "social networks" become "social capital," both types of capital being useful to the individual for increasing his or her competitiveness. Actually, Putnam recognizes this understanding quite openly: in his 2000 book *Bowling Alone*, he titles one chapter "Toward an Agenda for Social Capitalists." He seems to be unaware that this title is in itself a consequence of the triumph of the dominant ideology—the triumph of capitalism; this closes all debate about possible alternatives. The only meaningful debate now seems to be on how best to manage the capitalist system and what type of resources (human capital, social capital) an individual needs in order to compete, survive or succeed. Alan Smart notices, correctly, that analyses of social capital exclude the state but he does not explain why. A better understanding of the political context in which the concept is embedded would reveal that social capital is a political-intellectual-academic project offered as an alternative to state intervention. As in de Tocqueville's writings, communitarianism is favoured as an alternative to state action. We need to keep in mind that during the long period of neo-liberal dominion over the public sphere, government has been perceived as part of the problem, not part of the solution. As a consequence, public social expenditures as a percentage of gross national product have been stagnant or have even declined in many OECD countries.

Completely absent from the notion of social capital is any collective, rather than individual, objective: besides improving people's ability to compete, what else is there? Togetherness, after all, empowers the Mafia as well as the labour movement. To try to solve this problem, Alejandro Portes and others have come up with a distinction between "good" and "bad" social capital. But, as Alan Smart indicates, this simply shifts the problem to another level: what is *good* and what is *bad* and for whom? Moreover, togetherness can be either a tactical or a strategic collective objective. For example, developing a socialist society based on solidarity, justice, and authentically democratic institutions requires a different understanding from that provided by social capital. And, of course, for this objective, the key element is control over the state. Which brings us back to de Tocqueville and the European reality he was trying to get away from: class agitation in struggles to break with the false social cohesion of an order based on exploitation. In the idealized U.S., where de Tocqueville saw social cohesion, federalists saw exploitation (including class, race, and gender exploitation). For the federalists, federal government (which, as I've noted, is very much in the background in de Tocqueville's observations) was a key element of transformation of the social order. The federalists were the main force behind the progressive era in the U.S., responding to a widespread resistance to the exploitation existing in the country at that time. A similar situation is evident now as the huge human and social costs of neo-liberal policies being carried out on both sides of the North Atlantic are arousing considerable resistance and calls for broader public interventions.

Neo-liberal policies are the primary cause of huge and growing inequalities, including health inequalities (see Navarro ed. 2007). A great deal of resistance and struggle has taken place in response to the offense against people's interests. But, again, in the U.S. we can detect touches of de Tocqueville in the redefinition of inequalities as "disparities," transforming a social phenomenon into a biological one. In this new narrative, people are not unequal but just different, with these differences being part of the diversity that enriches human communities. Language is indeed political, and the terms used in the academic narrative are heavily value-laden. The fact that "disparities" seem less threatening to the U.S. establishment than inequalities is, in itself, a profoundly political phenomenon, even though disparities seem less political than inequalities. The term *inequalities* defines differences that are considered unjust. Inequality is the negative of equality: it carries the connotation of injustice. This is why the splendid sentence in the U.S. Constitution, "all men are created equal," is so threatening to those who consider an unequal order to be the natural order. The equality advocated in the Constitution should, of course, include women as well as men, and should not have

excluded a large sector of the U.S. population: African Americans. But my point here is that the concept of equality establishes the need to correct violations of justice. The new term "health disparities" is intended to hide and deny any need for correction. Like *social capital*, the term *health disparities* has become very fashionable. And, in both cases, the explanation is the same: the terms serve the social order that feeds them.

I should note that some fans of social capital refer to the French author Bourdieu, a progressive author who used the concept of social capital. They say to me: "listen, Navarro, you are simplifying. Bourdieu is a progressive author, and he uses the term social capital as well." I have great respect for Bourdieu's work, although I do not agree with much of his narrative. Bourdieu is internationally known but, in his lifetime, he was ostracized by the French establishment. I knew Bourdieu, and I am aware that in his ideological struggle, in order to make his case, he had to use the terminology of the intellectual terrain of his adversaries (the sociological establishment is profoundly conservative in France). Most of his work dealt with culture and how culture empowers people. When he spoke of social capital, he meant something very different from the social capital of the U.S. liberal and conservative establishment. In the U.S., social capital is promoted to encourage the integration of people into the capitalist system. In France, Bourdieu saw social capital as a way of developing an alternative to capitalism. He did not want to make social capitalists. Precisely the opposite: he wanted to help people resist capitalism.

The enormous dominance of the U.S. in the social sciences explains why social capital is now being promoted everywhere, not only by the U.S. State Department (Putnam has been speaking at conferences worldwide under its auspices) but also by the World Bank—a major transmission belt of neo-liberalism—and many other agencies. These organizations promote social capital as a solution to poverty, holding up Indonesia as an example, while ignoring countries such as Venezuela that are successfully reducing poverty through a combination of state interventions and popular mobilization. In the developed world, there have been strong attacks on the welfare state, which was an outcome of labour agitation and action over the state, an agency that is itself subject to class, gender and race forces. It would be useful if social scientists could recover their research focus on these points. Smart's article offers an invitation to do so. It should not be ignored.

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Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Trust

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Smart's essay on social capital in this issue rightly points out the confusion caused by multiple uses of the concept. His discussion of the relationship between corruption and social capital is long overdue. He also raises important points regarding the need for anthropologists to pay more attention to social capital within the state. My goals in this commentary involve amplifying and clarifying several issues he raises in his essay, specifically confusing social capital with civic engagement, trust and linking social capital. I also discuss the ways that the Canadian government and World Bank use these concepts.

Before focusing on these issues, the role of anthropology in understanding social capital deserves attention. While I agree with Smart that academic anthropology has largely ignored the concept, applied anthropologists have played a role in its development. Much of this work focuses on the poor and marginalized, as in Stack's (Lopez and Stack 2001) observations of the importance of power for social capital in poor communities and Newman's (1999) discussion of connections between cultural and social capital for inner city teens. Anthropology's traditional role as providing voice to those often ignored by policy continues to fuel works like these.

However, recent anthropological work on the state tends to focus on symbolic and textual issues, like the ubiquitous references to "neo-liberalism." A few anthropologists like Smart who study actual relationships and state activities note the importance of social capital connections. Stack's (1996) study of African Americans using

social capital developed through government employment in the North to thwart racism and bonding social capital in the rural South, and my observations that most government contracts were awarded based on previous positive relationships (Schneider 2006b), are two examples. Furthermore, applied anthropologists have played a role at the World Bank, in government, and in other institutions. While often overlooked in academic circles, anthropological attention to culture, power and context continues to have a quiet influence in this way. Smart's encouragement for anthropologists to study up is perhaps best seen as a call for the core discipline to address these issues.

Social Capital and Civic Engagement

As Smart notes, social capital scholarship has actually diverged onto two paths: (1) those focused on the importance of networks to facilitate access to resources for individuals following Coleman and Portes, with some reference to Bourdieu, and (2) social capital as a surrogate for civic indicators following Putnam. While the first definition continues to influence program design particularly for marginalized populations, Putnam's definition has gained currency in policy circles. I focus primarily on Putnamesque usage here.

While Putnam clearly understands that networks of social capital are not the same as civic engagement, his raison d'etre for exploring social capital focuses exclusively on its role in fostering civic engagement and functioning communities (personal communication). This stems from a de Toquevillian vision of people developing relationships through civic institutions that lead to collective action. These relationships of social capital spur people to working together for the common good or civic engagement. Putnam's understanding of social capital as a community level good and his use of questions regarding generalized trust to measure social capital arise from this assumption.[1] He notes that diverse communities less often develop these common efforts and his recent work focuses on factors that inhibit community-wide trust and positive efforts to build social capital across communities (Putnam and Feldstein 2003).

As I have discussed elsewhere (Schneider 2006a, 2007), social capital sometimes leads to civic engagement, but not always. Social capital also has many roles independent of civic engagement. However, many of Putnam's followers fail to see the distinction between the two terms, glossing social capital as civic engagement. It is a short step from there to using social capital as a generalized term for community health, as indicated in crime statistics or similar indicators. Like "community" before it, social capital comes to mean everything and nothing. Smart's discussion of health research amply illustrates confusion evident in much of the policy literature. The limited usefulness of social capital in policy largely stems from this conceptual confusion.

Returning to understanding social capital as dependent on specific, reciprocal, enforceable trust rather than generalized weak ties would clear up much of this confusion. As Smart points out, personal connections are so important in China precisely because of generalized mistrust. Likewise, agencies with a proven track record get government contracts because government and non-profit organizations have developed these long term relationships (Schneider 2006b). Specific trust also influences citizens' relationships with government. If people experience government regularly collecting trash, providing services, or protecting public health, they are likely to forgive negative incidents in the expectation that they will be corrected. However, if the police regularly arrest neighbours without cause or corruption abounds, as in many impoverished communities, reciprocal mistrust develops between government and community. Civic engagement does not occur due to this mistrust. Instead, as with the U.S. African American community for much of its history and immigrant communities today, energy goes into individual networks and organizations that benefit the marginalized group. Bonding social capital, always an important base, becomes the only trusted source when others, particularly government, can not be trusted.

Linking Social Capital

World Bank scholars developed the concept of linking social capital, emphasizing it in their work, precisely to address this long established mistrust. Szreter and Woolcock define linking social capital as "norms of respect and trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society" (2004:655). While ties to government would necessarily involve linking relationships, the term also includes relationships with private funders, employers, social workers, school staff or any other unequal power relationship. They go on to note that lack of these relationships powerfully influences community quality of life. As with Smart, they observe that linking social capital can lead equally to nepotism and corruption or to more positive community development.

Linking social capital evolved as a working policy tool rather than a theoretical concept, however. Unlike the sloppy scholarship critiqued by Smart and others, the World Bank's social capital initiative involves a melding of Bourdieu's with Putnam's objectives, as well as some inno-

vative scholarship. Internally, the bank reports uneven application of these various concepts but the idea of helping marginalized communities develop these trusting ties underlies many recent efforts. This is evident in the Indonesian case Smart outlines in his piece. Calls for specific inclusion of women and other marginalized groups in community planning in several World Bank initiatives are meant to develop linking relationships in communities in need. This attention to developing linking relationships becomes an avenue for community empowerment and engagement in the development process. While community involvement in funding development efforts may be a "technical" approach, the design of these techniques includes these social concepts.

Implementation on the ground often lost these distinctions but these attempts were used in further refinement. It is this kind of discursive theory to practice and back again that has served as the hallmark of anthropology's theoretical developments as well as creating the potential for truly context driven policy. But reaching that potential would involve long, hard work in various communities. External critiques are a necessary part of this work but without the bridging and linking ties between those providing outside observations and program administrators, their utility is minimal at best.

The social capital Policy Research Initiative (PRI) Smart discusses in his essay provides another example of efforts to use social capital in policy. In 2003, I was one of several social scientists presenting an overview of social capital to government officials from a wide range of Canadian government departments at a PRI-sponsored interdepartmental workshop on social capital at Meech Lake. Most of us did not use Putnam's definition in explaining the concept and its utility to these government workers.

We were privileged to watch as the various government participants discussed ways to operationalize the concept. Their efforts reflected two predictable themes. On the one hand, enhancing social ties was seen as an important part of improving the lives of the elderly, expanding opportunities for the poor and integrating immigrants into Canadian society. This involved such problems as connecting the marginalized to others in the community as well as better outreach from government.

The second issue discussed both here and at later PRI conferences involved ways that government could ensure inclusion for these marginalized populations. The logic behind this concern was similar to World Bank's linking social capital: how can government develop trusting ties with those most in need of its services? As such, it represents a positive attempt to expand social equity. In this discussion, social capital became a vehicle to create links to communities and, in some cases, involve them more fully in civic life. It was sometimes coupled with references to other civil rights and equity strategies like hiring from targetted communities and community involvement in planning.

As with many policy initiatives, the PRI efforts also drew from several theoretical traditions. For example, a later conference on social capital and immigration featured Putnam and Woolcock as keynote speakers. The presenters included several sociologists as well practitioners talking about their programs. The audience included a combination of academics, policy makers and local agencies that offered programs. I do not recall any anthropologists presenting at this conference. The range of uses for social capital varied greatly, raising concerns regarding theoretical confusion.

I do not know if and how the concept was actually implemented in Canadian government initiatives, but the fact that a central government think tank would look carefully at this concept shows a stronger relationship between academic theory and government practice than is evident in the United States. While these initiatives may ignore the existing social capital that influences policy, initiatives that understand that government needs to pay attention to relationships as part of policy development suggest an effort to use social capital theory to improve social life. The various small initiatives government agencies presented aimed at reaching out to various disenfranchised populations suggest that social capital is indeed considered a tool to increase social equity.

Conclusion

How then, could anthropology play a greater role in analyzing the "economy of practices" Smart rightly outlines where the elite use social capital to their own ends or participate in efforts to create context specific, power conscious relationships between the populations we traditionally study and government? While I cannot speak for the Canadian discipline, U.S. academic anthropologists tend to shun interdisciplinary work and are most comfortable critiquing the status quo from the outside. Playing a greater role would involve both analyzing the current array of relationships as Smart suggests, and discovering ways to more productively develop bridging and linking ties with other scholars and government in order to change them.

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Note

1 Standard questions include "Do you trust your neighbours" or "the police." These questions measure generalized trust and are used in Putnam's Saguaro seminar questionnaire, the U.K.'s social capital study and the World Bank's social capital instrument (Gootaert and van Bastelaer 2002).

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Book Reviews / Comptes rendus

Sarah Buckler, *Fire in the Dark: Telling Gypsiness in North East England*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2007, 234 pages.

Reviewer: *Jane Helleiner*
Brock University

Part of the series *Studies in Applied Anthropology*, this book stems from research conducted by the author while she was a development officer for Gypsies and Travellers in the region of Teesside, North East England. The book opens with the (non-Gypsy) author's account of a February 2002 meeting (attended by non-Gypsy council workers and service providers as well as two Gypsy representatives) the aim of which was "to decide on a course of action for the council regarding the presence of an unauthorised camp of Gypsies in the area" (p. ix). The author states that her goal is to try and "untangle exactly what was going on at the meeting, why no resolution could be reached—and why we were all left with a dull sense of frustration" (p. x).

The book is divided into three parts. In the first part, titled "The Wasteland" (in reference to the divide between Gypsy–non-Gypsy cultural worlds), the author discusses her theoretical approach which begins with Barth and Cohen's work on boundaries but moves on to Bourdieu and Vygotsky's production of culture and identity through processes of intersubjective socialization (later she draws on Foucault's technologies of the self). She addresses some methodological issues and begins to outline the political economy of Teesside. She locates Gypsies within the industrialization and de-industrialization of the Tees Valley and notes that while casual agricultural work has long been part of Gypsy livelihoods in the area, they have also been deeply involved in an urban economy "recycling scrap, working on the growing road and rail network, [and] selling household items to the residents of the rapidly growing townships" (p. 41).

In the second part of the book, "The Fire" (referring to the "face-to-face" world of Gypsies), Buckler describes how children are socialized into Gypsyness through their participation in a community of speakers that in turn produces a shared cultural landscape. She suggests that difficulties between non-Gypsy teachers and Gypsy students derive from the ways in which the two parties have been socialized into different social worlds, with different stories and "patterns of expectation and understanding" (p. 79). She extends this theoretical approach to a discussion of how family relations are constructed through direct and mutual relationships based on an "ethic of care." She suggests further that we–they boundaries are not based on a Gypsy–non-Gypsy divide as much as a distinction between people who are part of one's social network and those who remain unknown others. Gypsy notions of "home" are therefore primarily about to "the ability to maintain and reproduce relationships" in land, space and place (p. 116).

In the final section of the book, titled "The Dark" (in reference to the "unaccountable" non-Gypsy world as seen by Gypsies), Buckler examines how non-Gypsies construct Gypsyness and returns to the concrete question of how non-Gypsy council officials spoke about Gypsies in the context of struggles over unauthorized camping. Buckler offers an analysis of two meetings held to address the issue. Buckler's microanalysis of both meetings reveals the complexity of the players in terms of their divergent constituencies, degree of relationship with and knowledge of Gypsies, their political orientation and their interpersonal positionings. Buckler's attention to the microdynamics of local level Gypsy-related policy making and implementation in the area of urban land use is innovative and should inspire more analysis of this nature. The account could be strengthened, however, by situating the localized struggles over camping in Teesside within a deeper historical and wider national context. Buckler's commitment to searching for mutuality across difference also appears to impede more critical exploration of her material (for example, the possibility of opposing interests between camping Gypsies and various arms of the council).

While there is a lot of tantalizing material and analysis, the study may be less than accessible for a reader not already familiar with the particular setting of Teesside and the theoretical and substantive literature being addressed. For a specialist in Gypsy/Traveller studies, there may also be some disappointment at the many intriguing insights that remain undeveloped. In terms of the latter, Buckler makes it clear that she is interested in challenging what she considers overly structuralist and perhaps essentialist interpretations of Gyp-

sies defined in terms of non-Gypsy–Gypsy binaries or cultural content. While she appears to have the ethnographic material to do this, it is not used to full advantage. For example, while she comments on how official preoccupation with the "problem" of camping Gypsies limits the scope of legislation, policy, service and funding (including her own paid position), and documents a history of Gypsies in houses (often not identified as "Gypsies" by non-Gypsy neighbours or service providers), she ultimately offers little new insight into the housed Gypsy experience. Related to this, her discussion points to how accommodation, locality–mobility, identity and political mobilization–representation played out in Teesside, but she does not explicitly address these issues. Likewise, she does not take the opportunity (also hinted at in some of her discussions), to address how Gypsyness–non-Gypsyness may have intersected with such variables as class, gender, generation or locality and region.

Because this title is part of the *Studies in Applied Anthropology* series, the reader might expect more explicit discussion of methodology, ethics and politics. Buckler does make reference to some of the conflicting identities that she assumed vis-à-vis Gypsies, council officials, academia and family in the context of doing fieldwork "at home," but there could have been more reflection on the significance of these for the research process and product. Buckler's description of leaving her development officer job due to the challenges of combining this kind of employment with academic writing, teaching and mothering may make the study more of a cautionary, than an encouraging tale for those aspiring to applied anthropology.

Sandra Bamford, *Biology Unmoored: Melanesian Reflections on Life and Biotechnology*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006, 230 pages.

Reviewer: *Karen Sykes*
University of Manchester

Sandra Bamford has written an unusual book based on 31 months of research into the livelihoods of the people who call themselves the Kamea. *Kamea* refers to a group of 14,000 Kapua speakers, who reside in the Gulf Region of Papua New Guinea. It is a locale that is markedly the antipode to Bamford's geographical and conceptual world. In that time, she learned how to live in a world that did not privilege biology as a determinative feature of what it means to be human. The Kamea taught Bamford a number of things about how they think differently about "human nature" as it was understood by evolutionary biologists of the last two centuries, and by contrast how they understood the make-up of each person. She summarizes what she has learned about the several assumptions that the Kamea hold in the first chapter of her book. These assumptions define non-biological thinking, which she sees as the mirror of biological thinking. That mirror is then used throughout the rest of the book to reflect upon a number of contemporary debates about biotechnology in Western locales. The result is a fascinating book, aptly titled *Biology Unmoored.*

Biology Unmoored is written to make a point. That point is that some people live quite well with alternative versions of kinship as human nature; ones that are untrammelled by popular Western understandings built of concepts from medical and especially biological science. What these forms of daily existence look like, conceptually, ritually and mundanely, challenges Bamford to name them, which she does in her introduction to the text:

> 1, the capacity to mother or father a child is not given in the nature of things, but depends, instead, on the relationships that one forms with non-human species. 2, in constrast to the guiding precept of evolutionary biology, there is no embodied link that connects the generations; the organic world is understood in nongenealogical terms. 3, males and females, mothers and fathers, create markedly different kinds of social relations. Unlike Euro-American logic, there is no essential equivalence with respect to the kinds of relationships that men and women are seen to engender. 4, bodies do not exist as autonomous entities, but have the capacity to act directly upon one another. Therefore, it is entirely possible for one person to eat for another. [p. 6]

Bamford calls these examples of non-biological thinking by contrast to biological thinking, which is a form of Western academic reasoning that privileges human nature and concomitantly, the argument that human nature should not be violated on moral grounds because it is determinative in the general make-up of each person. This latter concern I will return to below.

I wish to first discuss the structure of Bamford's own argument. *Biology Unmoored* uses a complex three-way comparative method to expose non-biological thinking and biological thinking as they work in popular disputes over the ethics of biotechnology in Euro-American contexts. A couple of misconceptions about what Bamford is up to with such a comparison should be dispelled immediately. Firstly, the reader should not assume that the Kamea live in a world afloat where the flow of life and their movement in its waters is best described as "unmoored." That is not so and it is not Bamford's claim. The Kamea are very clear to anchor their knowledge of who is kin in a series of decisions about how they are related to each other. Bamford does not present the Kamea as ignorant of biology or of paternity or sibling relationships. She shows that Kamea think that human make-up is an effect of social relationships. The relationships between parents create a relationship to the child: they care for the child because they care for each other. The transmission of genetic substances is simply not a focus of their attention and does not matter in how they tether children to parents and parents to each other. Secondly, the reader should not assume that this is an account of Kamea society in the round. While some readers might want

this, I think that this is not an omission but a result of the artfulness of Bamford's highly responsible ethnographic assessments. She can relinquish responsibility for the total story for a more conscientious claim: that deep understanding is built though exposing her ignorance and misunderstandings. Her experience with the Kamea exposed quite a bit about what she had learned honestly, or put differently, what she had never before understood about human relations. She required a specific kind of comparative anthropological craft to communicate what she learned from fieldwork to a reader who had not the privilege to visit the Kamea.

Bamford has her own anthropological craft under tight control. Her presentation of Kamea views of humanity produces an exciting three way comparative framework. In each chapter her research into Kamea understandings of how they are related to each other as kin is contrasted with the assumptions of evolutionary biology by reference to a vignette about a debate in biotechnology. She introduces each chapter with a notable moral dilemma: sometimes a matter of who is related to whom, and how that is so; in other cases a concern about what makes a good parent and how one can know what is good. In so doing, she shows the pervasiveness of biological thinking in European and North American experience and provides readers, lecturers or students, plenty of material to think with as they prepare their own answers to these questions. She then provocatively contrasts that logic to its radical opposite: non-biological thinking among the Kamea.

Bamford practices ethnographic comparison as a kind of polemic; she destabilizes the assumptions of received wisdom creating doubts in her reader about their own assumptions about what is right and wrong about how humans claim to be each others' relatives. In the process Bamford makes readers wonder if Westerners have wrongly enshrined or sacralized many of the assumptions of biotechnology. With deft tacking between Kamea and Western assumptions about how we are kin, Bamford uses the craft of anthropology to travel in more uncertain waters. The distant shore is a space for anthropologists to invigorate their discipline by asking what it means to be human and thereby take responsibility for what they do not understand.

Todd Sanders, *Beyond Bodies: Rainmaking and Sense Making in Tanzania*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008, 261 pages.

Reviewer: *Andrew Walsh*
University of Western Ontario

It is hard not to compile a running mental list of actions, objects and qualities that the Ihanzu people of Tanzania consider to be gendered in one way or another while reading *Beyond Bodies: Rainmaking and Sense Making in Tanzania.* Caring for livestock is the domain of men, beer production that of women; bows, arrows and firesticks are considered male, grindstones and hearths female; heat and dryness are masculine qualities, coolness and wet feminine, et cetera. What a shame, however, to read this book for nothing but the details. What makes *Beyond Bodies* so commendable is what Sanders does with the rich accounts of daily, seasonal and ritual life from which this list might be compiled. He takes us beyond, as the book's title suggests, the familiar, attractive and ultimately misguided assumption that people like the Ihanzu, who understand themselves as living in a "thoroughly gendered world" (p. 200), must associate everything they deem masculine and feminine with sexed bodies. Sanders "seeks to develop...an alternative set of conceptual tools that will allow us analytically to extricate the body from gender—or rather, gender from the body—while simultaneously maintaining gender's manifest materiality" (p. 27) in the contexts such as the ones he describes.

Key to Sanders argument is the notion of "gender complementarity" (p. 104), a way of thinking about maleness and femaleness that is central to how Ihanzu make sense of the world. For Ihanzu, Sanders writes, "one gender evokes and demands its opposite; one without the other is neither meaningful nor potent" (p. 104). Just as men and women must work and live harmoniously if communities are to thrive, so must male and female forces come together in any number of other contexts to effect the transformations necessary for productivity and prosperity. Not that Ihanzu see all male–female combinations and the transformations they effect as reminiscent of or analogous to the processes of human sexuality and reproduction. Nor, Sanders argues, should analysts do so. "For the Ihanzu, male and female forces, while always relational, can operate within and without human forms...to assume a priori that gender must somehow be about men and women and/or the relationships between them is to disallow such understandings" (pp. 16-17). For Ihanzu, objects, action and qualities associated with male forces are as ineffective without their female complements as a firestick is without a hearth (and vice-versa), a fact that is nowhere more evident than in rainmaking.

Although I highly recommend Sanders' previous work which addresses some of anthropology's latest preoccupations—on the fate of African witchcraft in postcolonial, neo-liberal times (2001), for example, and on the parallel rise of discourses of "transparency" and "conspiracy" in the new world order (2003)—I was very happy to read in this book an unapologetic and exhaustive account of topics that are so obviously more important to Ihanzu than to anthropologists these days. Ethnographically, *Beyond Bodies* is primarily an account of Ihanzu rainmaking—and for good reason. For Ihanzu, as for so many others in the world, rain is a necessary obsession. "Without rain nothing grows. And without growth, people and animals wither and die" (p. 3). No wonder, then, that Ihanzu invest the time, resources and energy they do in thinking about, deliberating over and seeking to direct the seasonal rains that make or break them. In offering such a comprehensive and readable account of these investments, Sanders reminds us of

how insightful and effective ethnography can be when it takes direction primarily from the people on which it focuses.

Given what I have presented thus far, some might well wonder what this book is about exactly. Is it a study of Ihanzu conceptions of gender or a book about Ihanzu rainmaking? It is both. Sanders greatest accomplishment here may well be that he never allows the reader to lose sight of the impossibility of disentangling one matter from the other. By the end, it is just as clear that an account of Ihanzu understandings of gender complementarity would be incomplete without reference to its manifestation in rainmaking, as it is that an account of rainmaking without a full reckoning of Ihanzu understandings of gender would be unnecessarily superficial. In this, Sanders' book fits well within a long tradition of holistic ethnography—work that stresses the connectedness of seemingly disconnected aspects of people's lives, and, as such, work that is particularly effective at demonstrating the value of anthropological research to newcomers. Written with an undergraduate audience in mind, *Beyond Bodies* will make an excellent addition to the reading lists of any number of courses.

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Nathalie Lachance, *Territoire, transmission et culture sourde. Perspectives historiques et réalités contemporaines*, Québec : Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2007, 292 pages.

Recenseure : *Anne-Marie Dion*
Université de Montréal

Dans *Territoire, transmission et culture sourde*, Nathalie Lachance explore les conditions dans lesquelles apparaît une frontière qui marque la séparation entre deux identités, l'une sourde, l'autre entendante. Les analyses présentées dans cet ouvrage sont tirées des travaux de recherche effectués par l'auteure dans le cadre de l'obtention de son doctorat en anthropologie (voir Lachance 2002).

Territoire, transmission et culture sourde est divisé en deux parties. Dans la première partie, intitulée *Construction des espaces sourds*, l'auteure présente le processus de développement identitaire à travers une description du contexte social et des débats idéologiques qui ont marqué les modes d'organisations et le choix des méthodes pédagogiques à l'intérieur des écoles spécialisées. Bien que la recherche se limite à la zone géographique du Québec, le thème de la construction identitaire est également exploré à travers des documents d'archives témoignant de l'histoire des personnes sourdes en France et aux États-Unis. Ce choix méthodologique permet à la fois d'enrichir le corpus de données disponibles et de situer l'histoire des personnes sourdes québécoises dans un contexte socio-historique plus large.

Dans la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage, intitulée *Production et diffusion du concept de culture sourde*, l'auteure analyse la manière dont les acteurs sociaux définissent et utilisent le concept de culture sourde. Afin de mieux comprendre la construction et l'utilisation contemporaine du concept de culture sourde, des entretiens de type qualitatif ont été effectués auprès de trente intervenants en lien avec le milieu de la surdité sur le thème de l'éducation bilingue et biculturelle. Ce thème a été retenu parce qu'il permet d'explorer la construction et l'utilisation du concept de culture sourde sans l'aborder directement.

Les conclusions que l'auteure a tirées de ses travaux sont de différents niveaux. Tout d'abord, l'analyse du discours émanant des documents d'archives met en évidence le fait que la création de frontières entre deux identités, l'une sourde, l'autre entendante, prend forme à partir de l'exclusion sociale dont les personnes sourdes font l'objet. En réponse à l'image de personnes dépendantes et inférieures que leur attribue la collectivité entendante, les personnes sourdes ont créé, entre elles, une image plus positive de la surdité. L'apparition du concept de culture sourde dans le discours pour dénommer les manières de faire, de penser et d'agir est importante parce qu'elle permet de transformer le regard que la collectivité entendante porte sur la surdité et, du coup, les rapports entre les deux groupes.

Ensuite, l'analyse du discours qui émane des entretiens semi-dirigés sur le thème de l'éducation bilingue et biculturelle permet de faire ressortir que la reconnaissance ou la négation de la culture sourde a un impact sur l'application de cette approche pédagogique. Par exemple, lorsque les manières de faire, de penser et d'être des personnes sourdes sont réduites à des comportements déviants par rapport à la norme définie par la collectivité entendante, l'éducation devient synonyme de normalisation. Cette vision, qui correspond à une négation de la culture sourde, s'accorde mal avec la création d'un environnement scolaire fondé sur le respect de la différence et avec une valorisation des manières de penser, d'être et d'agir sourde, qui sont pourtant les principes à la base de l'éducation bilingue et biculturelle.

Les analyses que Nathalie Lachance a tirées de ses travaux de recherche soulèvent des questionnements de nature éthique et politique susceptibles d'interpeller les chercheurs, les éducateurs, les décideurs politiques et la collectivité sourde en général. Malheureusement, cet ouvrage ne s'adresse à aucun de ses groupes. En effet *Territoire, transmission et culture sourde*, dans son style et dans sa structure, est un ouvrage qui est difficilement accessible.

Au cours du processus d'édition, les sections de la thèse originale correspondant au contexte méthodologique, de même que certains passages décrivant les courants théoriques dans lesquels se situe l'ouvrage, ont été éliminés. Ces modifications ont pour effet de séparer les résultats de la recherche du processus par lequel ils ont été obtenus. Elles font en sorte qu'il n'est plus possible d'analyser les conclusions en fonction des catégories d'analyse dans lesquelles elles ont été produites, ce qui compromet leur évaluation critique par le lecteur. Toutefois, dans le cas présent, les modifications introduites ont un impact au-delà d'une perte de transparence et affectent la clarté et l'accessibilité de l'œuvre et ce, sur deux plans :

Tout d'abord, à la lecture de *Territoire, transmission et culture sourde*, les lecteurs qui ne sont pas familiers avec les courants postmoderniste et constructiviste auxquels appartiennent les questionnements de l'auteure risquent d'être déstabilisés par la manière dont est abordé l'objet de recherche. En effet, en n'introduisant pas les thèmes explorés dans le cadre théorique dans lequel ils s'inscrivent, ceux-ci ont perdu tout leur sens. La notion de frontière identitaire, de même que les thèmes de construction, production et diffusion, auraient mérité d'être définis dans le chapitre d'introduction.

Le deuxième plan concerne la structure générale de l'ouvrage. Le fait d'éliminer les références au processus itératif caractéristique de l'approche qualitative dans laquelle cette recherche a été effectuée a pour effet de rendre invisible les liens logiques qui relient les différentes sections de l'ouvrage. Cette situation n'a pas été corrigée par l'ajout de matériel permettant au lecteur de comprendre l'organisation des différentes sections et de les situer par rapport aux questionnements qui ont guidé l'auteure.

En conclusion, les choix effectués au cours du processus d'édition font en sorte que *Territoire, transmission et culture sourde* est, somme toute, une œuvre largement moins accessible que la thèse originale. Ainsi, considérant que l'ouvrage ne contient pas de matériel nouveau, à l'exception de photos d'archives et d'un index biographique, les chercheurs en sciences sociales, de même que le public en général, auront avantage à se référer à la thèse originale. *Territoire, transmission et culture sourde*, loin de rendre justice au travail de recherche dont il est tiré, ne présente pas de valeur ajoutée par rapport à la thèse dont il est extrait, peu importe la perspective dans laquelle on l'évalue.

Référence

Lachance, Nathalie
2002 Analyse du discours sur la culture sourde au Québec. Fondements historiques et réalité contemporaine. Thèse présentée en vue de l'obtention du grade de Ph.D., Département d'anthropologie, Université de Montréal.

João Biehl (photographs by Torben Eskerod), *Will to Live: AIDS Therapies and the Politics of Survival*, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2007, 466 pages.

Reviewer: *Margaret MacDonald*
York University

Will to Live is the work of João Beihl, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Princeton University. In a sea of recent scholarly work on HIV/AIDS this book is a unique and significant contribution to critical medical anthropology and interdisciplinary studies of the topic. Brazil's marginalized underclass—who suffer disproportionately from HIV/AIDS—is the main focus of the book, and it is they especially to which the tension of the title refers.

This book is worthy of praise for the depth and breadth of the author's ethnographic method. Although focusing on the poorest of the poor in northeastern Brazil, Biehl traces the work and life trajectories of influential AIDS activists and organizations, and Brazilian politicians and international health policy makers. He documents the means and ways of the massive ARV rollout across the country and wades through the complexities of epidemiological data collection and representation. Finally, he mines the press for portrayals of Brazil's radical AIDS policy on the global stage. Although Beihl describes AIDS policy and practice in Brazil as more imaginative than most, his work complicates this apparent success story by illuminating the gaps *within* and *between* these sites: the hospital without enough beds and the clinic without enough drugs; the impoverished patients who never return for their HIV test results or never present themselves at all; the health care resources spent on middle class patients who return again and again to be tested, suffering from "AIDS anxiety" at greater rates than the infection itself; and the persistence of major donor policies of prevention rather than treatment. In a country lauded for its defiant stand against the limitations of international health policy and global market forces to curb infection rates and treat those suffering from HIV/AIDS, *Will to Live* describes a more complex reality.

Beihl is an elegant writer and thinker. This book, however, has the potential to wear the reader out, perhaps just as the author intended. Stories of individual and collective suffering are recounted relentlessly. "Welcome to the end of the world" Rose says to welcome the anthropologist and photographer to her shack where she recounts her story of abandonment, prostitution and drug addiction. She weeps again over the death of her teenage son the previous year and prays everyday for her infant daughter's sero-positive status to reverse. She is thankful for the antiretroviral treatment she receives and relieved to no longer to be out among "the people [who] are still dying of AIDS in the streets" (p. 28). A group of poor and homeless AIDS sufferers are harassed by police as they search for a quiet place to sit and eat the lunch prepared for them every Wednesday by nurse Dona Conceicao. She says, "many die, many new ones ask for help. Everyday

I get to know three or four more poor people with AIDS and I am only one" (p. 146). On a return visit to an AIDS home—Caasah—the anthropologist and photographer ask after several residents and are told, "Nerivaldo went back to the street and died soon after you left. He and Maria Madalena were last seen at Mae Preta's shelter [for the homeless]. Jorge Leal died in the old Caasah, all of a sudden. Lazaro and Marilda too. Medication did no good for them. Nobody from their families showed up to their funerals, that's the reality" (p. 340).

One is riveted by these stories of suffering, but not in a "nameless masses" sort of way. Nor are the individuals cast in the light of heroism. Rather, one is riveted, just as Beihl was, by the stories of individuals "who, like everyone, have a will to live." His work gives the reader the opportunity to understand the subtleties of such will in the most brutal of circumstances. The effect is not just emotional, but intellectual because of the author's rich engagement of this Brazilian data with the "global assemblages" of power. Beihl shows the convergence of state policy-making, international funding, NGO activism, multinational pharmaceutical companies, and international trade treaties in the story of bringing treatment to the front lines of the AIDS crisis in Brazil. But there are no easy answers, and the paradoxes abound. For example, even as Beihl observes and critically analyses the "pharmaceuticalization of public health" in Brazil, he concludes that it is not just a necessary evil, but a human right.

An important feature of this book is the series of evocative black and white portraits of many of the people Biehl got to know, over the course of his multiple fieldwork trips to Brazil taken by Danish photographer Torben Eskerod. Sontag wrote that "to photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed. It means putting oneself into a certain relation to the world that feels like knowledge—and, therefore, like power." Eskerod's portrait work here is not an appropriation and packaging of "the pain of others" in an uncritical way for the Western viewer, in part because of the rich ethnographic and analytical context that Beihl provides (cf. Sontag 1977 and 2003). The visual and textual in combination work to "unpack" the idea of HIV/AIDS and poverty in Brazil as a place of pure suffering and violence. At the same time they unpack the simple "success" story of Brazil's AIDS policy.

The absence of portraits in some sections of the book, however, leaves a few lingering questions. There are no photographs of the middle class AIDS sufferers, or AIDS anxiety sufferers or their health care providers—not to mention the politicians, policy makers, and NGO executives Beihl also writes about. The names of high level politicians and activists are used, but the pseudonyms (like "Eyeglasses" and "Dog") employed for middle class individuals intensify the uneasy contrast with the first names and faces of the poor and the full names and titles of the elites. These aspects of his study are not footnotes; Biehl spends entire chapters on them. I cannot imagine the author was unaware of the effect. Towards the end of the book the author writes, "the ethnographer upholds the rights of micro-analysis and thus brings into view the immanent fields people invent to live in and by" (p. 378). *Will to Live* does this beautifully and profoundly well. The unevenness of Beihl's representational strategy—intentional or not—and the uneasy feeling it inspires is nevertheless important to mention because it is part and parcel of the anthropologist's (and his reader's) lot. We grapple with the persistent paradox of the anthropologist's disproportionate access to the private lives (and images) of the poor, which sits uneasily with the tension between the power of knowledge and the potential for vulnerability in telling and showing the stories of others.

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Mark Padilla, *Caribbean Pleasure Industry: Tourism, Sexuality and AIDS in the Dominican Republic*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, 294 pages.

Reviewer: *David A.B. Murray*
York University

In their introduction to the ground-breaking volume *The Gender/Sexuality Reader* (1997), editors Roger Lancaster and Micaela di Leonardo argued for the importance of the "political economy of sexuality," an approach which, simply put, examines how sexual desires, practices, and identities are shaped by political and economic processes. Ten years later, Mark Padilla has produced one of the best examples of this approach in his research on male sex workers who have sex with foreign gay tourists in the Dominican Republic. Padilla's examination of a group of men who work in what he calls "the pleasure industry" (the diverse informal sector of the Dominican economy devoted to providing myriad pleasure-related services to more than two million foreign guests who visit annually) succeeds where many other political economy analyses fail: whereas I often find that the complexity and richness of individual lives are lost in lengthy descriptions of macro-structural trends and transformations that work to privilege a few and marginalize many, Padilla works very hard to illustrate the linkages between global processes and local cultural contexts and how a particular group of marginalized men negotiate the pressures and opportunities created through these multi-scalar processes. The goal of foregrounding these linkages requires a constant shifting of analytical lenses from individual narratives to economic and political transformations at local, national and global levels, and there are times in this ethnography when this continuous movement runs the risk of repeating certain themes or curtailing in-depth analysis or thick description in order to foreground connectivity. Nevertheless, *Caribbean Pleasure Industry* makes significant

advances in the areas of gender, sexuality, tourism and HIV/AIDS research.

After briefly introducing us to some of the strengths and weaknesses of previous research on sex tourism in the Caribbean (most notably the absence of research on male sex workers who have sex with men) and methods used to gather data, Padilla describes the two primary groups he worked with, "sanky pankies" and "bugarrones." While there are important distinctions between these two groups, they are similar in that they are both highly masculine in their gendered performances; they exchange sex for something of material or symbolic value with foreign male tourists; and they emphatically do not identify as "gay" (most continue to have relationships with wives or girlfriends) (pp. 14-20).

Chapter 1 outlines the basic contours of gay social and sexual spaces in the two primary research sites, the capital city of Santo Domingo, and the nearby beach resort of Boca Chica. Through the illustration of an incident in which a local gay tourist bar unsuccessfully attempted to ban bugarrones, Padilla shows how Dominican sexual spaces and identities are embedded in multiple social hierarchies (at both local and global levels) which do not always share the same values and interests. Chapter 2 reviews the Dominican Republic's political regimes and the economic policies that have created a service economy and forced millions to move from rural to urban areas in search of work in the informal sectors of the pleasure industry. Chapter 3 elaborates on how local "gay" identity and activism in the Dominican Republic is impacted by the growth of the pleasure industry through the fascinating story of the first Dominican "gay pride" march in 1999, which arose out of the gay community's frustration with increasing police harassment in an area with a number of gay bars that was being transformed into a historic touristic zone by the government. Interestingly, we learn that the police were also harassing groups of young men dressing up in "b-boy" (rap music) styles and groups of "metal-heads" who dressed in heavy metal garb, indicating that the problem was more with non-normative gender roles than with sexuality. Padilla's analysis of how a gay pride parade formed and left out other groups who were experiencing similar forms of discrimination is a superb illustration of the complex effects of internationally circulating gay symbols and discourses of political activism which may work to foreground the interests and rights of some while marginalizing others in local contexts.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide insight into the personal lives of sanky-pankies and bugarrones, discussing how these men come to be sex workers, how many of them maintain close contact with their families and how they often continue to live in family households which requires them to become experts in "stigma management"—trying to keep their sex worker status a secret—through the strategy of "sexual silence" in relation to their engagements with other men. Padilla also shows some of the emotional and psycho-social nuances of these men through his analysis of their relationships with foreign gay tourists—particularly interesting here is the discussion of "performing love" for what Padilla calls the "Western Union Daddies"—the foreign gay tourists who maintain long-term relationships with these men and send them regular remittances.

Chapter 6 is an attempt to combine the political economy of sexuality presented throughout the rest of the book with Critical Medical Anthropology (CMA), a perspective which sees health and disease as embedded within local and global structures of power and inequality. In the Caribbean, where the rate of HIV/AIDS infection is second only to Africa, there is an urgent need to better understand the linkages between local health issues and other political and economic structures which render certain groups more vulnerable to infection. Padilla pays particular attention to the problematic HIV epidemiological model of the "bisexual bridge," in which a small "bisexual" male population is assumed to be the "bridge" that moves HIV from homosexual to heterosexual communities. Padilla notes numerous problems with this model in relation to his research findings, notably how this model falsely essentializes groups through its assumption that the virus is predominantly located within a distinct "homosexual/gay" community, and its stigmatization of bisexuals as "dangerous carriers" of the virus to the heterosexual community. While the shift to the CMA perspective in the final ethnographic chapter begins to integrate the arguments and observations from previous chapters in order to provide a better understanding of risk-related behaviours (i.e. condom use), we get only a cursory analysis of how these men's understandings of health, well-being, bodies and risk are organized. For example, I would have liked to see how (or if) religion operates as a moral and political force in these men's perceptions of mental and physical health, not to mention masculinity and femininity. Apart from this relatively minor quibble, I thoroughly recommend *Caribbean Pleasure Industry*: it is a well written and important addition to the growing literature on sex tourism, the globalization of queer identity, and research on HIV, gender and sexuality in the Caribbean.

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Unni Wikan, Trans., Anna Paterson, *In Honor of Fadime: Shame and Murder*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008, 305 pages.

Reviewer: *Antonio Sorge*
University of Prince Edward Island

Public discourse in the West on honour killing—specifically, the murder of a daughter by a male member of her immediate family in response to behaviour which results in collective

dishonour—is characterized by a lack of comprehension of the norms and standards of the communities in which it occurs. The demonization of perpetrators and their culturally driven motives, often said to be conditioned by Islamic doctrine, seems almost inevitable. Seldom is any attempt made to analyze and understand the realities of life in the communities concerned. Unni Wikan provides a much-needed antidote.

Originally published in Norwegian in 2003 and translated into English in 2008, this volume gives a comparative view on the subject of honour killing within a Scandinavian context. More than this, it details the story of the woman to whom it is dedicated, Fadime Sahindal (1976-2002). At first sight, Fadime's sin appeared to have been that of choosing for herself the man in her life, but we learn quickly that this was just the beginning of her problems. Her family, Kurdish immigrants from rural southeastern Turkey, had already selected a man for her to marry. Fadime's insistence on exercising her free will led to the passing of a final ultimatum: exile from the city of Uppsala or death. But she would not go quietly. Following death threats from her father and younger brother, she publicized her ordeals to bring the problem of honour-related crimes to public consciousness. Various engagements, ranging from television interviews to an unprecedented address to the Swedish Parliament (the full text of which is incorporated in chapter 18), catapulted Fadime to celebrity status, but at the same time, exposed the internal counsels of her family to outside scrutiny. The publicity she sought, which she thought would save her life, served, as far as members of her family were concerned, to broadcast the shame of the Sahindal clan far and wide. Her family was pilloried by the media, her father spat upon in the streets. Her unmarried sisters became unmarriageable, at least within the Kurdish community. The strategy employed by Fadime backfired and, coupled with her secret return trips to Uppsala to visit her two sisters and mother, evidenced a total disregard of all rules pertaining to the rectification of dishonourable action, leading ultimately to murder by her father's hand in 2002. The story is deceptively straightforward, but Wikan's telling of it complicates the issues involved and presents the reader with a tour de force that is both moving and enlightening.

Wikan does not want to exculpate Rahmi Sahindal, Fadime's father, from his crime but rather detail for the reader the forces that compelled him to act in order that further tragedies of this kind might be averted. To do this, she charts the history of honour killing in Scandinavia by introducing, in part 1 of the book, the murders of Maisam "Sara" Abed Ali and Pela Atroshi in 1996 and 1999 respectively. Like Fadime, they were killed because they became "too Swedish." These cases receive full treatment in chapters of their own, and provide the necessary background to a particularly detailed exploration, in part 2, of the meanings of honour. The remainder of the book considers the life and death of Fadime Sahindal. This is the most intensely and carefully researched part of the book. It is based on interviews with those close to Fadime, a careful perusal of police interview transcripts and observation of Rahmi Sahindal's trial in Uppsala District Court and the Swedish High Court which led to a life sentence.

But what exactly is honour? Wikan provides a minimalist definition as "a right to respect" (p. 60). The rules of codes of honour demand fulfillment and as long as individuals conform to these in their actions, they are due respect from society. Failure to adhere to normative standards leads to dishonour, both for the individual as well as for the collective to which they belong. Thus, honour values, where they are found and proliferate, are primarily a characteristic of corporate groups—nuclear families, lineages, clans et cetera—that must possess them in order to survive within contexts of material scarcity and political instability, and, indeed, where the state is widely regarded as a hostile entity. More than this, honour secures the well being of the individual in those societies in which group membership subsumes personal identity and where status is ascribed. Such a system is both sociocentric and patriarchal with women the repositories of collective honour and men their guardians. Female sexuality possesses a kind of exchange value, being a thing that can be controlled, manipulated or bartered. For example, rape might serve as a political tactic that undermines a competitor who suffers ignominy for his inability to protect what is his, whereas a "pure" daughter given in marriage serves as a testament to familial prepotency and alliance-worthiness. Thus, honour rests on "world opinion": reputation and appearances are central. Conversely, gossip and the threat of scandal ensure good behaviour but the slightest inattentiveness to how one's actions may be perceived can lead to rumours that destroy reputations and lives, yet dishonourable acts only become so when they are widely revealed. "Reputation matters more than the truth," Wikan (p. 17) writes. Honour is obviously a very public matter, and a question of group survival.

This definition of honour might seem anachronistic to a citizen of a modern welfare state, who is more likely to think of honour as a quaint notion, something to do with chivalry or ethical goodness. But Wikan's definition of the term, which borrows considerably from Frank Henderson Stewart (1994), clearly distinguishes an older from a newer conception of honour. The latter is essentially internal, pertaining to the sentiments and not subject to public assessment. World opinion is not as evidently a determinant of social esteem in modern industrial society as it is in face-to-face peasant societies where inflexible codes of honour are found.

Wikan does not address questions of how and why such norms and values come into being or persist through time, an issue comprehensively addressed long ago by Jane Schneider (1971) and Sherry Ortner (1978). We are left instead with an atemporal impression of communities that stifle the individual and where rigid expectations have a force of their own. However, religion is thankfully not given pride of place in the analysis. Wikan usefully argues that honour killings, where they occur, have little or nothing to do with religion. They have been recorded in Sikh, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Jewish communities throughout the Middle East, Central, South, and

East Asia and beyond. Also, honour killings are not a manifestation of the universal oppression of women but rather a form of violence which appears in specific contexts, particularly in situations "defined by a patriarchal social system and a tribal structure in which women are seen as the property of men" (p. 100).

The book concludes with a thought-provoking excursus on the issue of cultural accommodation and the integration of minorities in Western society. We learn that it is possible for collectivities to perpetuate structures that stifle individual rights, and that this is an unfortunate thing. Therefore, change is needed, and immigrant organizations must "enter into dialogues with men" who wield the power to which women must submit (p. 242). Far from dispassionate, the author steadfastly champions the values of individual freedom. Her views are situated and her claims normative. She states "there is no view from nowhere" (p. 183). Thus, we learn that people are "sacrificed on the altar of the collective" (p. 17), that killers and killed are both "victims of inhuman traditions" (p. 275), and that Fadime's murder followed a "perverted and terrible" rationality (p. 159). Oblique statements aside, the argument is also full of "oughts." For instance, a higher value ought to be placed on individual happiness and fulfillment than loyalty to one's family, lineage, or clan and the values of immigrant communities in the West ought to more closely coincide with liberal values. Perhaps most disconcertingly, we are told that "respect for a culture must always be secondary to respect for every human being's integrity and welfare" (p. 249), and that "culture per se cannot claim respect" (p. 250).

Readers who are broadly in agreement with the main thrust of Wikan's arguments might nonetheless feel uncomfortable with such pronouncements. There are two sides to every story, this one included. Many members of Fadime's immediate and extended family, men as well as women, saw Fadime as a conniving and manipulative tormentor who subjected them to severe hardship. They are consequently given a less than fair hearing, being regarded instead as prisoners of dominant honour discourses.

These objections may not be germane; *In Honor of Fadime* is not a standard scholarly monograph, but an example of an engaged anthropology driven by humanitarian concerns. As such, this work should be of interest to the specialist as well as engaged lay readers everywhere and would also serve as an indispensable teaching resource within upper division anthropology and women's studies courses. In sum, this work is eye-opening for its careful examination of the struggles of Fadime Sahindal and as a commemoration of a courageous woman who stood for inclusive values and a universal view of individual freedom and sexual equality. In this, it succeeds splendidly.

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Benoît Gaumer, *L'Organisation sanitaire en Tunisie sous le Protectorat français (1881-1956). Un bilan ambigu et contrasté*, Sainte-Foy : Presses de l'Université Laval, 2006, 276 pages.

Recenseur : *Martin Latreille*
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Benoît Gaumer est professeur associé au Département d'administration de la santé de la Faculté de médecine de l'Université de Montréal, où il a obtenu un doctorat en sciences humaines appliquées (histoire). Il a travaillé en Tunisie à titre de coopérant français comme médecin hygiéniste épidémiologiste (1970-1972) et comme enseignant (1978-1984). Si l'idée lui vint lors de son premier séjour, c'est pendant le second qu'il entreprend de faire l'histoire de l'organisation sanitaire en Tunisie sous le Protectorat français.

L'ouvrage se veut un bilan des politiques et institutions d'assistance et de santé publiques mises en place lors de cette période, en même temps qu'un bilan « sans complaisance, mais aussi réaliste de [la colonisation] dans le domaine socio-sanitaire » (p. 6).

L'ouvrage est divisé en trois parties. La première, *Populations et états de santé*, dresse un portrait de la situation démographique et sanitaire du pays sous le régime français, notant les lacunes des méthodes d'enquête et le peu de fiabilité des chiffres obtenus lors des recensements. Il ressort de ce chapitre que si la croissance démographique peut être versée au bilan positif du Protectorat, la persistance des inégalités quant à l'état de santé des diverses communautés qui formaient la société tunisienne d'alors (Tunisiens musulmans et juifs, Français, Italiens, Anglo-Maltais et autres) en est un aspect négatif.

La deuxième partie, *Épidémies et endémies*, traite des principaux fléaux qui affligèrent le pays à cette époque (peste, choléra, variole, typhus, tuberculose, trachome, paludisme) et des mesures mises en place afin de les enrayer. L'auteur dresse également un portrait des figures qui ont marqué la lutte à ces maladies, parmi lesquelles le Dr Charles Nicolle (Nobel de médecine, 1928). Une place spéciale est réservée à l'institut Pasteur et, dans une moindre mesure, à l'Office d'hygiène sociale et de médecine préventive. Un chapitre est consacré à la consommation alimentaire et au rôle joué par les D^{rs} Étienne Burnet et Ernest Gobert dans l'étude des habitudes alimentaires des populations tunisiennes.

Dans cette deuxième partie de l'ouvrage, Gaumer rapporte que l'état sanitaire du pays, au moment de l'instaura-

tion du Protectorat, n'est pas aussi catastrophique que certains le laissent croire. Malgré le triomphalisme des autorités lors du cinquantenaire du Protectorat, épidémies et endémies demeurent néanmoins présentes. Les autorités ne s'attaqueront aux problèmes que progressivement et tardivement.

La troisième partie, *Institutions et professions de santé*, traite de l'organisation hospitalière et des services d'assistance publique, de même que de la constitution et de l'organisation des corps professionnels (médecins, infirmiers, sages-femmes et assistantes sociales). Un dernier chapitre présente les orientations et les mesures mises en place en matière d'assistance et de santé publiques dans la période qui s'étend de l'Indépendance nationale (1956) à l'adoption du sixième plan quinquennal (1982-1986).

Gaumer souligne dans cette troisième partie le maintien des structures qui existaient au moment de l'instauration du Protectorat et rapporte les témoignages dénonçant l'inertie et les carences de l'action médico-sociale au cours de cette période. Le manque d'autonomie du secteur de l'assistance et de la santé publiques vis-à-vis des autorités politiques est aussi souligné. L'auteur montre également comment l'organisation hospitalière se caractérisait par le fractionnement communautaire, notamment à Tunis. L'auteur relève également le rôle joué par les hôpitaux militaires et l'extension tardive de l'infrastructure hospitalière en régions. Il souligne la longue cohabitation, sous le Protectorat, des médecines « moderne » et « traditionnelle », la composition majoritairement européenne de l'élite médicale, le cantonnement des Tunisiens musulmans aux professions auxiliaires et la relégation des femmes au métier de sage-femme ou de matrone. L'Indépendance du pays entraînera l'exode des professionnels français et italiens et, en réponse au manque de main-d'œuvre ainsi occasionné, l'arrivée de médecins originaires d'Europe de l'Est. Aussi le corps médical, hétérogène et formé autour de diverses associations professionnelles, connaîtra-t-il quelques crises.

L'auteur rapporte comment furent mis sur pied les premiers programmes d'assistance sociale, problème qui s'est posé avec l'arrivée des premiers colons, les communautés tunisiennes musulmanes et juives prenant déjà en charge les indigents de leur communauté par le biais de diverses institutions. Le reste du chapitre montre comment l'implantation de mesures d'assistance sociale se fit non sans difficultés et ne concerna pas l'ensemble de la population.

Au terme de son analyse, Gaumer dresse un bilan ambigu et contrasté de l'organisation sanitaire et de l'action médico-sociale en Tunisie sous le Protectorat. D'abord, non sans surprise, les efforts consentis par la Régence en matière de santé et d'assistance publiques furent concentrés dans les villes où vivait une forte population européenne ou contribuèrent à l'extension de la colonisation. Ces efforts permirent néanmoins d'endiguer les endémies qui sévissaient à l'époque.

L'incertitude quant au statut politique de la Tunisie dans les premières années de la colonisation, les luttes larvées entre administrations civile et militaire, et les préoccupations avant tout économiques et politiques des autorités françaises contrarièrent toute tentative de réforme de l'organisation sanitaire. De fait, l'action française se situait dans le prolongement de ce qui se faisait avant l'instauration du Protectorat, les changements survenus ne s'avérant que superficiels. Les initiatives, échouant trop souvent, émanaient principalement des médecins et chercheurs installés en Tunisie. Aussi les infrastructures hospitalières demeurèrent-elles rudimentaires. Au total, la colonie accusa un retard par rapport à la métropole.

Au tournant de la Première Guerre mondiale, les autorités adoptèrent un nouveau paradigme selon lequel l'hygiène et l'assistance publiques sont un investissement et un devoir de solidarité. Mais, en réalité, ce n'est qu'avec la Deuxième Guerre mondiale que les choses se mirent à changer, avec, notamment, la création du ministère des Affaires sociales (bien que contrôlé en dernière instance par la Résidence générale). La table était mise pour qu'on adopte un nouveau paradigme articulé autour la notion de sécurité sociale, mais les forces politiques demeurant divisées et les inégalités sociales persistantes, la situation perdura jusqu'à l'accession de la Tunisie à l'Indépendance.

Cet ouvrage, qui est le fruit d'un dépouillement minutieux des diverses sources documentaires et bibliographiques disponibles, est une très bonne synthèse des travaux effectués à ce jour sur le sujet. Les principaux personnages, institutions et enjeux sont clairement identifiés. L'objectif de départ—dresser un bilan panoramique de la question sanitaire—est en ce sens atteint.

Le livre a cependant les défauts de ses qualités, en ce qu'il ne va pas au fond des choses et laisse quelques questions en suspens. Gaumer conclut parfois sans présenter les faits ou n'élabore pas sur des aspects qu'il dit importants, à commencer par l'articulation de la question sanitaire au politique, pourtant centrale selon l'auteur. En avant-propos, Gaumer nous avise que : « Le tableau que nous dressons de l'organisation sanitaire de la régence de Tunis sous le Protectorat français ne peut-être isolé de son contexte politique, même si nous n'y faisons pas toujours explicitement référence » (p. 1). Or, à part affirmer que la stagnation de l'action médico-sociale en Tunisie est attribuable à des causes politiques, l'auteur n'élabore pas sur les motivations profondes des acteurs politiques de l'époque. Une des principales conclusions de l'ouvrage indique qu'il y a une prise en charge tardive et progressive des problèmes sanitaires, notamment à cause d'un manque de volonté politique. Pourquoi? On ne le sait trop. Il est par ailleurs écrit que les taux de mortalité par tuberculose variaient d'une communauté à l'autre et que ces inégalités étaient « tolérées » sinon « entretenues »—grave accusation—par le régime colonial. Fort probable, mais aucun argument ne vient soutenir cette affirmation. On dit aussi qu'une « certaine presse » s'oppose aux campagnes de vaccination. De qui s'agit-il et qu'est-ce qui motivait ces campagnes ? L'auteur n'élabore pas non plus sur les tensions politiques entre communautés ou entre les autorités françaises et le ministère tunisien des Affaires sociales. Bref, bien que la situation et l'organisation sanitaire de la Tunisie de l'époque soient inextricablement liées au contexte politique, celui-ci n'est qu'effleuré ou implicite. Un

examen plus approfondi de cette dimension aurait donné plus d'ampleur au propos de l'auteur.

Il en va de même pour la dimension socio-anthropologique, dimension qui intéresse plus particulièrement les lecteurs d'*Anthropologica*. L'auteur mentionne bien qu'il existait entre les communautés des inégalités devant la maladie. Mais, à part évoquer un lien entre la pauvreté et la santé, Gaumer n'en dit guère plus sur les causes de ces inégalités. On aurait aussi aimé en savoir davantage sur les raisons pour lesquelles certaines maladies frappaient davantage une communauté qu'une autre, sur l'attitude des gens face à la vaccination, laquelle variait d'une communauté à l'autre, sur l'amélioration de la situation socio-économique du pays, censée avoir fait reculer la tuberculose, sur les rivalités intercommunautaires, ainsi que sur les usages alimentaires des populations et leurs particularités eu égard à la santé publique.

En conclusion de l'ouvrage, Gaumer écrit que

> Les solutions proposées, pour surmonter les nombreuses crises sanitaires qui se succèdent, apparaissent comme issues d'une connaissance approfondie de la société tunisienne et prenant en considération sa grande spécificité par rapport à la métropole mais aussi par rapport à l'Algérie, toute proche, ou même au Maroc, bénéficiant d'un régime de Protectorat. Est-ce le contrecoup de ce régime politique, plus respectueux de la personnalité tunisienne ? [p. 257]

Or, la « spécificité » ou la « personnalité tunisienne », et la façon dont le régime politique fut plus « respectueux » de cette dernière ou en eut une « connaissance approfondie » sont des thèmes qui, quoique susceptibles d'intéresser l'anthropologue, ne sont pas abordés dans les chapitres précédents—autre exemple d'affirmation non appuyée par un argumentaire.

À la décharge de l'auteur, il n'était pas dans son projet d'écrire un livre d'anthropologie. Il s'agit avant tout d'un livre d'histoire, lequel, malgré ses lacunes, offre de nombreuses informations et pistes de recherche pour qui s'intéresse à l'histoire de la Tunisie en général, et à son organisation sanitaire en particulier.

Notons enfin—et la faute incombe davantage à l'éditeur qu'à l'auteur—que l'ouvrage comporte plusieurs erreurs typographiques et fautes d'orthographe.

Thierry Pillon et François Vatin, *Traité de sociologie du travail*, Toulouse : OCTARES Éditions, Seconde Édition actualisée, 2007, 496 pages.

Recenseur : *Vincent Mirza*
McGill University

Thierry Pillon et François Vatin s'interrogent, dans la deuxième édition de ce livre, sur ce que la sociologie peut dire du travail aujourd'hui[1]. Afin de répondre à cette question, les auteurs ont choisi d'adopter une double posture. D'abord, ils se sont fixé pour objectif de faire une synthèse sur la question du travail qui se démarque de la simple revue de littérature en incorporant plusieurs éléments critiques. Autrement dit, les deux auteurs ont choisi d'approcher la notion de travail à partir de leur champ, la sociologie, mais en construisant un dialogue avec d'autres disciplines. Ensuite, ils inscrivent de façon explicite leurs travaux dans la tradition française de la sociologie du travail. Cette position est non seulement intéressante, mais elle est aussi utile puisqu'elle a l'avantage de représenter une sociologie du travail influencée par un cadre national de production, tout en insistant sur l'importance de la mise en relation avec d'autres « traditions » disciplinaires afin de cerner un objet global. Ainsi, même si ils parlent d'un point de vue hexagonal en assumant un cadre de référence français, les auteurs soulignent l'importance d'une approche qui met en relation la sociologie, le travail et la mondialisation. Précisons aussi que ce livre a été conçu pour offrir plusieurs niveaux de lecture. Ainsi, il est possible d'employer cet ouvrage pour consulter des références sur un thème, ou bien on peut approfondir un sujet à partir des différentes options proposées. En effet, l'ouvrage est divisé en trois grandes sections : le travail et les sciences, le travail et la technique, le travail et la socialisation. Ces sections sont elles-mêmes subdivisées en 12 chapitres et 36 sous-chapitres. Ces derniers peuvent être lus comme des articles. Cette division est bien pensée et l'on peut facilement consulter l'ouvrage. Néanmoins, ce sont aussi les qualités didactiques de ce livre qui rendent la tâche d'en faire un compte rendu un peu difficile. Je me concentrerai donc sur quelques dimensions de l'ouvrage et moins sur les particularités du contenu.

À cet effet, on peut distinguer plusieurs éléments dans l'orientation qui a été donnée à ce livre. En fait, pour les auteurs, « la sociologie doit rendre compte des différentes constructions comme expressions intellectualisées de l'idée ordinaire de travail ». C'est donc à partir de ce postulat que les auteurs ont orienté leurs travaux, en mettant d'abord l'accent sur une approche historique des différentes problématiques reliées au travail. Si l'histoire, en particulier à partir du XIX^{e} siècle, tient une place importante dans ce livre, il faut aussi ajouter à cette approche une conception dynamique et synchronique de la définition du travail. En effet, les auteurs présentent la notion de travail comme étant au « cœur de la dynamique sociale », en insistant sur deux dimensions clés : premièrement, le travail est un « acte technique », deuxièmement c'est un « acte social ». À ce titre, les auteurs soulignent qu'il est important de réintroduire dans l'analyse la *technè* qui a souvent été écartée au profit de la dimension sociale du travail.

Dans une première partie, à travers leur analyse des différentes dimensions du travail et des façons de le conceptualiser, les auteurs insistent sur le rapport entre les sciences et le travail. Après avoir consacré une section à la genèse de la notion de travail, ils problématisent les relations du travail et des sciences à travers trois prismes : le travail et les sciences

de la nature, le travail et l'économie politique et, enfin, le travail et les sciences humaines. Ici, il s'agit de rendre compte de la production des différentes représentations de la notion de travail et du développement de la sociologie du travail. La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage est consacrée au rapport entre le travail et la technique. Là encore, les auteurs n'ont pas fait l'économie d'une approche en profondeur et ils débutent leur synthèse avec l'hominisation et la technique pour finir avec l'automatisation et la dématérialisation du travail. On y retrouve tous les thèmes clés qui entourent les débats sur la technique et le travail. Par exemple, les auteurs proposent une vision très intéressante de la révolution industrielle en refaisant l'historique de l'expression même de « révolution industrielle ». C'est d'ailleurs ce souci de définition qui est une des qualités de l'ouvrage. Enfin, dans la troisième section, l'accent est mis sur le travail comme un acte social. Ici, les auteurs nous présentent l'évolution des débats qui se sont construits autour de la division du travail, des métiers et professions, des mouvements sociaux et de l'emploi et du chômage. Encore une fois, plusieurs sujets sont abordés (par exemple un très bon historique de la classe ouvrière ou encore une belle critique de la « flexibilisation » du travail) et on retrouve des thèmes chers à la sociologie du travail : le métier, la professionnalisation, les qualifications, etc.

Pour terminer, on peut dire que l'ouvrage est à la fois une revue de la littérature et une revue critique des questions entourant le travail. En effet, les auteurs présentent un tableau très complet de la sociologie du travail, notamment en s'attardant sur des questions dont plusieurs ouvrages font souvent l'économie. C'est aussi un outil précieux en termes de référence pour les chercheurs. À ce titre, il faut mentionner la bibliographie remarquable de plus de mille trois cents références françaises en majorité. Enfin, c'est aussi un excellent outil didactique. C'est donc un ouvrage que l'on peut facilement utiliser en classe et son caractère fonctionnel le rend facilement utilisable et abordable aussi bien pour les étudiants que pour les enseignants. Finalement, on peut dire que les débats contemporains sont bien représentés dans l'ouvrage. Toutefois, on aurait souhaité une conclusion sur l'avenir de la sociologie du travail et sur les futurs enjeux qui entourent la notion de travail elle-même, ce qui aurait complété avantageusement l'ouvrage. Ceci, bien entendu, à la lumière du travail considérable qui a été entrepris, ne peut pas vraiment être conçu comme une critique, mais plutôt comme un souhait de voir ces deux auteurs reprendre la plume pour nous parler de l'avenir.

Note

1 La première édition est parue en 2003 chez Octares Éditions.

Caroline Désy, Véronique Fauvelle, Viviana Fridman, Pascale Maltais (dirs.), *Une œuvre indisciplinaire. Mémoire, texte, identité chez Régine Robin.* Québec: Presses de l'Université de Laval, 2007, 306 pages.

Recenseure : *Michèle Baussant*
CNRS, LESC, Paris

Ce recueil d'articles autour de l'œuvre de Régine Robin, faisant suite au colloque organisé à Montréal par ses étudiantes et anciennes étudiantes à l'automne 2004, entend faire émerger la figure de cette intellectuelle aux multiples facettes à partir de réflexions sur ses travaux et ses affiliations, tant conceptuelles que personnelles. Plus qu'une analyse, les diverses contributions constituent à la fois une évocation aux accents littéraires des thématiques et des choix d'écriture de Régine Robin et un hommage rendu par des étudiant(e)s, des collègues qui l'ont accompagnée très concrètement dans certaines de ses recherches et expérimentations théoriques, et des intellectuels qui se reconnaissent une parenté conceptuelle avec elle.

À son image, l'hommage qui lui est rendu est riche, complexe, propose des avancées, oblige à des retours, à des mises en perspectives, pose de nombreuses questions, foisonne d'analyses très diverses et personnelles et emprunte de multiples directions : la ville, les langues, la mémoire, la guerre, l'écriture de l'histoire, les sciences humaines et, toujours centrale, la notion d'expérience.

La diversité des auteurs de ce recueil est un premier indice de l'aspect polymorphe de l'œuvre de Régine Robin : intellectuels et chercheurs français, canadiens, anglophones ou québécois, américains, argentins ou allemands, ils l'ont rencontrée sur son parcours aux ancrages multiples, entre l'Amérique et le vieux continent ; qu'ils soient spécialistes de littérature, de sciences politiques, linguistes, sociologues, historiens ou psychanalystes, tous considèrent que leur travail entre, au moins en partie, en écho avec celui de Régine Robin.

Le néologisme indisciplinaire du titre du livre condense bien l'esprit de l'œuvre de Régine Robin tel qu'il est présenté. Il évoque l'interdisciplinarité qu'elle a toujours revendiquée et mobilisée de manière féconde : commençant son parcours intellectuel avec une application pionnière des méthodes de l'Analyse du Discours (AD) naissante en France à l'historiographie lorsqu'elle travaillait à Nanterre, elle n'a eu de cesse, à Paris puis à Montréal où elle exerce aujourd'hui, d'élaborer un style mêlant des motifs sociologiques, historiques, autobiographiques, littéraires et philosophiques—ses références sont, entre autres, Benjamin, Foucault, Freud, de Certeau, Rancière—dans des écrits penchant soit du côté des sciences sociales, soit du côté du roman. Naturellement, cette interdisciplinarité a pour corollaire l'indiscipline, fondée sur la transgression des frontières, le refus de s'enfermer dans des modes compartimentés de décryptage et d'écriture du réel, ainsi que sur l'engagement politique de gauche qui a servi de moteur à sa curiosité intellectuelle et à son désir de réfléchir à plusieurs.

Le sous-titre, Mémoire, texte et identité chez Régine Robin, indique l'approche thématique qui est ici proposée. La première partie, sur l'Analyse du Discours (AD), traite de la manière d'aborder les phénomènes discursifs comme des faits sociaux (Mazière), et comment ils s'articulent avec l'idéologie (Angenot). Le travail de Régine Robin s'inscrit dans un débat autour de l'écriture de l'histoire et de l'espace épistémologique qu'elle définit, dans sa relation au récit, à la fiction et aux formes littéraires. À travers les différents textes proposés dans cette partie, est posé le problème de la mise en texte de l'histoire et du schème narratif dans la construction du récit (Goldman), à partir de la sélection, de l'analyse et de la mise en relation de morceaux hétérogènes du passé. Cette question s'avère particulièrement sensible concernant ce que M. Plon nomme « l'irreprésentable » et la représentation, autour desquels se construit la frontière parfois fragile entre la fiction et le discours historique, décalant le débat sur la notion de vérité pour le replacer autour d'une réflexion sur l'intertextualité, la figuration, l'interdiscursivité (Gomez-Moriana) et l'expérience. Sans pour autant catégoriser l'histoire dans le seul ordre du discours et du langage, cette perspective prend en compte la réflexivité des acteurs sociaux, si tant est qu'« Écrire, c'est d'une certaine façon fracturer le monde (le livre) et le refaire » , rappelle J. Clément, citant R. Barthes (p.74).

La deuxième partie se penche sur l'analyse de l'imaginaire urbain développée par Régine Robin à partir d'une compréhension à la fois subjective et théorique des villes où elle a séjourné et vécu au cours de son expérience nomade postmoderne. Construire une œuvre qui ne serait « d'aucun bord, d'aucune rive » (E. Jabès, cité par P. Klaus, p. 88), composée de fragments; penser le fragment, le traduire, tâche en abîme (Aronoff), l'élaborer, autour des traces les plus infimes, les plus anodines parfois (Magné), puis le déconstruire, pour rendre compte de la pluralité des mondes, des temps, des espaces à travers lesquels, au fil du texte, le lecteur comme le narrateur pourraient habiter, se promener, comme au hasard, errer et se retrouver, se perdre à nouveau (Mavrikakis). À partir de ces fragments, c'est ainsi la thématique des identités multiples et cosmopolites, au cœur de la ville, qui se trouve au centre des récits littéraires de Régine Robin.

Dans les parties suivantes, les auteurs réfléchissent à la conception de l'identité juive de Régine Robin, pour clore sur sa conception de la mémoire comme multiple et fragile, mêlant le biographique et l'Histoire, et préférant toujours les mémoires alternatives à la mémoire collective officielle. Ainsi, la troisième partie nous mène, à travers la question de la judéité, sur les chemins de l'invention de soi et du déracinement, du déplacement, eux-mêmes susceptibles de générer de nouveaux horizons de pensée (Paterson), et de retrouver cette question de l'errance, de la trace, du rapport à « l'Autre », reconnu comme tel (Nouss) ou encore de la langue comme l'un des lieux du processus de créolisation (Fauvelle). Dans un très beau texte, « Les immigrants d'Eva Perón », Viviana Fridman illustre cette problématique à travers la question de la littérature minoritaire, dont elle tente d'élaborer une définition, littérature ici traversée par un projet : celui d'effacer un passé étranger, de se construire une généalogie argentine, de se fabriquer des traces légitimes pour se construire une nouvelle histoire inscrite dans le pays d'accueil. Mais elle montre combien ce projet, miné par le sentiment qui l'anime, celui d'une non-appartenance et d'une marginalité semble-t-il irréductible, aboutit à une forme d'échec qui est aussi aveuglement. Paradoxalement, cette filiation inventée remet systématiquement les émigrants dans une extériorité identitaire, à défaut de fonder l'identité narrative sur une base « réelle » et alors même que des événements de la mémoire familiale se croisent déjà avec l'histoire de l'Argentine.

La quatrième partie s'intéresse plus spécifiquement à un des axes majeurs de l'œuvre de Régine Robin : celui de la mémoire, s'articulant avec des formes fictionnelles (Green), et s'affranchissant ou non « du fétichisme des origines » et des mythologies des premiers temps, pour s'appréhender à travers une position tierce, en tant qu'elle est toujours, une fois l'événement expérimenté, représentée (Lapierre). Aussi est-il nécessaire de revenir sur les malentendus autour du terme et de ce qu'on lui fait recouvrir : s'agit-il des manifestations institutionnelles ou des différentes formes d'expériences du passé ? Par qui l'expression des souvenirs est-elle portée, à quel moment émerge-t-elle, vient-elle faire sens dans le présent, connaît-elle ou non un processus de normalisation ? Et sous quelles formes ? (Mesnard).

Ensemble, ces textes évoquent le foisonnement et la polymorphie de l'œuvre de Régine Robin, illustrés par exemple dans les multiples lectures qui sont faites de son roman La Québécoite—comme une œuvre autobiographique, un essai ethnographique, une littérature de l'errance, un travail sur la matérialité de la langue -, tout en dégageant des thèmes récurrents qui traversent toute l'œuvre—la mémoire insaisissable, l'hétérogénéité et la multiplicité de l'expérience, l'errance et le déracinement, l'ancrage social du discours, le croisement de la biographie, du collectif et de la fiction—et dont Régine Robin s'attache à rendre compte par le biais de différentes expérimentations d'écriture.

Au final, si certaines des études de ce recueil valent pour elles-mêmes, en ce qu'elles présentent les propres recherches de leur auteur dans leur parenté avec des méthodes et des concepts chers à Régine Robin, exemplifiant ainsi concrètement leur fécondité, la plupart construisent plutôt des passerelles vers l'œuvre de cette intellectuelle. Elles dessinent, par des témoignages d'amitié et des déambulations interprétatives à travers son style et ses thèmes de prédilection, les contours d'un portrait sensible de Régine Robin, qui suscitent fortement l'envie de se plonger dans ses écrits. C'est d'ailleurs le sens de cette phrase du psychanalyste Michel Plon, l'un des auteurs : « l'envie de se taire s'impose à moi, lecteur, pour ne rien dire d'autre aux autres qu'un « lisez-là » impératif, comme s'il n'y avait rien à ajouter à son dire ».

Allaine Cerwonka and Liisa H. Malkki, *Improvising Theory: Process and Temporality in Ethnographic Fieldwork*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, 197 pages.

Reviewer: Mark S. Dolson
University of Western Ontario

Improvising Theory is based on a series of email correspondences between Liisa H. Malkki (an associate professor of Anthropology) and Allaine Cerwonka (who was a Political Science doctoral student at the time, with no experience in anthropology or ethnography). Its aim is to provide a chronicle-style account of communications between mentor and student regarding the inherent complexities, frustrations and joys of conducting ethnographic fieldwork as it unfolds in "real time." During the time of the correspondence (which took place in 1994 and 1995), Cerwonka was embarking on a multi-sited, urban ethnographic field research project for the first time in order to understand and contribute to social, cultural and political theories regarding the spatial and ideological processes of national identity construction in Melbourne, Australia. That Cerwonka's emails reflect her inexperience with the ethnographic approach forced Malkki to articulate and clarify those latent ideas that "often go without saying" in anthropology, thus adding to the particularly descriptive and informative tone of the book.

With Cerwonka's lack of experience in ethnographic methods in mind, then, readers are afforded tremendous insight into the firsthand subjective experiences of a novice field researcher. Such experiences include the uncertainties of choosing appropriate fieldsites, searching out informants, and better understanding one's positionality—including the role of the senses (both *inter*-subjectively and corporeally) in ethnographic fieldwork and knowledge production. I found this discussion of the senses and the body to be quite innovative and informative as most methodologically oriented texts tend to efface the heuristic "work of the body" (its epistemological importance, or rather *necessity* in as much as we are *embodied beings-in-the-world*, where emotion and affect can have a tremendous effect on the tone and register of our interpretations) as a vehicle in ethnographic knowledge production.

One of the central themes of Cerwonka and Malkki's book is, I believe, an attempt to address the epistemological debates which continue in the social sciences regarding the status of ethnographic practice as a mode of knowledge production: from the perspective of Cerwonka's mentors in political science, should ethnography be conceived of as a "soft" social science, purportedly based on mere anecdotal evidence, and thus ever-fraught with problems of applicability and generalizability? Or, taken from a more philosophically grounded and humanistic perspective, should ethnography be conceived of as an approach to knowledge production which overflows the rigid and pre-constructed categories and strict methodologies of mainstream, positivist-oriented social science?

Arguing strongly for the latter, the authors state that ethnographic practice is a *social and processual* practice concerned with understanding not fact: it is *an empirical and interpretive process* of acquiring deeply situated knowledges; and it is based on the oftentimes unstable dynamic between the positionality of the researcher and the inter-subjective, emotional and physical terrain that they must navigate and negotiate throughout the course of ethnographic fieldwork. Following suit, the authors deny the all-to-often-assumed distance between subject (researcher) and object (researched)—a stance usually underwritten, in spirit at least, by more positivist oriented researchers—arguing that both are always, already in a state of ontological complicity (locked permanently in a "dialectical dance" as it were).

As such, the ethnographic approach (for I hesitate to call it a strict "method") is more akin to a *sensibility*—as the authors argue cogently—gleaned from the improvisatory tactics one must employ in the sometimes unpredictable nature of fieldwork, rather than an inflexible methodological algorithm to be learned through the inculcation of "rules" gleaned through lectures and the reading of "authoritative" texts. That the ethnographic approach is more a sensibility to be experienced, felt and engaged, than a codex of methods to be "learned" or merely "followed" is, I believe, the central contribution of the email correspondence and thus the ultimate core of the book.

One of the inherent strengths of the book is that both authors *realistically* limn the process of ethnographic fieldwork as: (1) a critical theoretical practice—we are "always, already" theoretical; we bring theory with us to the field, only to revise it *ex post facto* in the face of the "surprises" we encounter in our "data"; (2) a local-level, everyday ethical practice—regardless of bureaucratic ethical protocol, fieldwork is an intensely human and local negotiation between personalities, and thus has to be dealt with from situation to situation, person to person; and (3) above all else ethnography is an improvisational practice, and thus has no "correct" format or series of steps to follow—it is an "autodidactic" (Malkki's word) process where one learns *through doing*. As such, ethnographic knowledge is sometimes spur-of-the-moment, learned in a specific context at a specific time, forcing the ethnographer to adjust their tack accordingly.

Cerwonka's long and sometimes neurotic emails may come as a turn off to some impatient readers, however, I feel that the extremely detailed, repetitive and idiosyncratic nature of the correspondence lends a certain quality of authenticity to the text. While reading it I felt as if I was alongside Cerwonka at her computer as she expressed the many frustrating and joyful undulations of her research process. This, perhaps, may be the best pedagogical feature of the book as Cerwonka's concerns may resonate with or echo the potential concerns first year graduate students may have regarding the dynamics of field research.

As such, I would highly recommend this text to first year social science graduate students who are either interested in

engaging in ethnographic fieldwork for the first time or who have designed their project and are about to leave for the field. *Improvising Theory* succeeds tremendously, then, in comparison to standard "field guides" or methods books insofar as it provides a highly detailed, step-by-step account of what actually happens in the "thick of things"—when things go wrong and when things go incredibly well.

Shirley Fedorak, *Anthropology Matters!*, Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2007, 234 pages.

Reviewer: *Karl Schmid*
York University

Shirley Fedorak offers teachers a relatively new and unique tool for introducing and interesting students in anthropology with *Anthropology Matters!* The book is designed to supplement introductory textbooks and it has similar attributes such as a glossary, bolded key terms, questions for consideration and suggested readings. That Fedorak has been the lead author of the Haviland *Cultural Anthropology* text is demonstrated in its organization and overall accessibility. *Anthropology Matters!* is clearly useful for students of anthropology and allows the instructor to go beyond the limited examples in textbooks without having students read (or not read) longer academic articles and it provides more depth when ethnographies are not practical.

The first part of the book, "How Does Anthropology Work?," has three chapters addressing ethnographic fieldwork, culture shock, and the use of anthropology. The first chapter on fieldwork competently introduces the subject. Chapter 2, which examines culture shock, should interest students because of the frank perspective on the everyday trials of fieldwork. It is the third chapter, "Of What Use is Anthropology to the Business World? The Anthropology of Shopping," that demonstrates both the attractiveness and limitation of the book. I liked the attempt to draw students into economic anthropology through a study of shopping mall culture—a subject that should be familiar to them. The problem, however, is that this is the book's central example of the practical (real world) application of anthropology. Although Fedorak clearly points out that we should consider the ethics of applied work while acknowledging the contributions made, the chapter leaves open the question of how corporations utilize the expertise of anthropologists. A few examples of these relationships would have been useful here. Although there is some critical discussion of power, consumption and space, instructors might want to ensure that students are not left with the impression that anthropology matters only when its applications "uncover new and meaningful ways to entice consumers to purchase more merchandise" (p. 35). Although this is not Fedorak's intention, there is a risk that the reliance on this example communicates to students that the discipline's relevance should be judged on market contributions.

Why does anthropology matter according to the book? Despite other occasional references to public and applied contributions, Fedorak emphasizes that the real public value of anthropology is to answer questions about cultural practices and relationships by providing context, complexity and cross-cultural examples. Part Two, in nine chapters, tackles a number of questions that I found relevant and interesting. Each chapter poses and answers a question such as "What are the Underlying Reasons Behind Ethnic Conflict, and the Consequences of these Conflicts?" (ch. 4). Other topics include immigration (ch. 5), women's bodily self-image (ch. 6), female circumcision (ch. 7), aging (ch. 8), missionism and indigenous cultures (ch. 9), the practice of Purdah (ch. 10), same-sex marriage (ch. 11) and the impact of television (ch. 12). There is also a thematic guide to the book that indexes these chapters under twenty-one headings; these are the usual headings of many introductory texts (gender, kinship, ethnicity, sexuality, globalization and cultural imperialism).

Most thematic chapters stress the cross-cultural aspects of the topics, while integrating the language of anthropology into the discussion. Only rarely is the effect overly simplified or too overloaded with concepts. Mostly, the questions are well examined, the examples useful and illuminating, and the overall thrust is to introduce context and complexity to the subject without drowning the reader. Chapter 7 is probably the strongest chapter in the book, highly recommended for its ability to broaden debate on the question "Is Female Circumcision a Violation of Human Rights or a Cherished Cultural Tradition?" Fedorak integrates debates on ethics and cultural relativism, critically examines Western viewpoints and deftly works through connections with Islam, medicalization, criminialization and much more. Another current topic is the discussion of purdah and the question of oppression or liberation (ch. 10). Here is a highly accessible account of a cultural practice examined in numerous contexts that incorporates power and resistance.

A few chapters would benefit from additions or might require more unpacking by the instructor. The chapter on the impact of television (ch. 12) does cover social and personal meanings of the activity and analyses the *Star Trek* television series phenomenon, however students are likely to find this somewhat dated. It may be a reflection of a lack of available anthropological research, but it would add to the allure to have any of the following included: scrutiny of reality shows, discussion of the rise of news-taking through comedy and talk shows or explanation of the ubiquity of the dumb and even dumber male figure. The chapter on women's self-image and health is likely to be popular, and many of the main issues are addressed, but it could be more ethnographic and comprehensive. On the other hand, the chapter on same-sex marriages seems to be a little over-stuffed with issues and ideas. It could also benefit from more of the Canadian perspective that Fedorak deftly weaves in without overdependence or underutilization of non-Canadian material. For example, "What Challenges do Immigrants in Canada Face?" is an effective

chapter with obvious Canadian relevance, complimenting discussions of multiculturalism and cultural pluralism found throughout the book.

On the whole, many instructors will find *Anthropology Matters!* a useful addition and supplement to introductory materials. We are fortunate to have a book that addresses current topics of interest in such a lively way and by means of a Canadian–global point of view. The book addresses what may be pedagogical gap that instructors are not always able to fill, although questions of how anthropology can become public or how applied anthropology works in practice need to be explored further. Fedorak's book is a link between the superficial skimming of anthropological topics students are exposed to in introductory textbooks, and the more demanding case studies, articles and ethnographies they encounter beyond.

Film Review / Revue de film

Stefan Haupt, *A Song for Argyris*, Distributed by First Run/Icarus Films, 2006. (Greek, French and German with English subtitles).

Reviewer: *Kendra Coulter*
University of Windsor

Now in his 60s, Argyris Sfountouris looks at a photograph of himself at age 4 taken following the massacre of his parents and over 200 other people living in the Greek farming village of Distomo by Nazi soldiers in 1944. He remembers wanting to ask the world, "Is this the way you want it?" His question frames both the life of the boy in the photo and the powerful film that explores the personal, emotional, cultural and political issues arising out of war, trauma and struggles for peace.

Stefan Haupt's documentary, *A Song for Argyris*, weaves together archival and contemporary footage to trace the life of Argyris and illuminate the way complex social processes are experienced, remembered and resisted by real people. The film presents Argyris' own remarkable journey with great honesty, but also uses his story as a way to encourage viewers to confront the impacts of war and violence on people, communities and nations. At its core, the film is driven by a clear picture of the horrors of war and prompts consideration of what can be done to promote peace cross-culturally.

The foundation for Argyris' life and the key emphases of the film are laid through an extensive embodied portrayal of the Distomo massacre and Nazi violence in Greece. We hear of SS soldiers admiring the Parthenon, walking down its steps, and then breaking the arm of a starving Greek child for stealing a bread crust, a telling lesson about the dangers of disengaged intellectualism. Survivors describe how they discovered the mangled bodies of their family members, or hid under the floor and heard their parents being tortured and killed above them. One woman's story stood out for me as a particularly powerful depiction of how children are thrust into cultural worlds far beyond their control and comprehension, especially in times of war and collective grief. The woman recounts in graphic detail how her parents and siblings died but also how she found a bracelet given to her by her late parents and in it, a glimmer of comfort. However, her grandmother took the bracelet away and told her she was now an orphan and must wear black and live a life of mourning, thereby reinforcing the pain of loss and suffering.

What to do after collective violence? How to mourn? What to do with the life one is left with? These questions inform Argyris' postwar life. We follow his journey through Greek orphanages to the Pestalozzi Children's Village in Switzerland, then on to doctoral work, and a life of political activism against war, inequity, war profits and Greece's own fascist military junta of 1967-74, the Regime of the Colonels. Through tracing Argyris' life, we learn how he grapples with the sorrow and anger of loss, and decides to dedicate himself to working for peace and social justice. Throughout the film, we also hear the diverse voices of Argyris' relatives, neighbours, teachers, colleagues, and fellow activists from across Europe, including Germany, as well as those of politicians and the Greek composer, Mikis Theodorakis. Thus Haupt reveals the multifaceted and sometimes nuanced pieces that make up collective experience, memory and historical guilt.

Individual experiences are effectively interwoven with the broader historical context shaping the local, national and international social terrain. The roles of music, education, literature, law, policy, custom and social relationships are considered. Haupt also situates Argyris' life within the burgeoning Cold War and the establishment of contemporary global capitalism, providing valuable empirical data on both the political-economic climate and the work of resistance movements. As part of his ongoing political work, Argyris struggles with the development of anti-war strategies and complex questions that plague survivors of violence, affect daily life, and, certainly, inform activism. Remember? Forgive? Forget and let go? These questions take on added meaning given contemporary campaigns for truth, reconciliation and justice among First Nations peoples, black South Africans and others, and anthropological engagements with these campaigns. The film does not posit tidy answers, but rather brings to us the dynamic and complex struggles of Argyris and others to construct possible answers, and question the questions themselves. The reflections and actions of Argyris and others are grounded in memories of the past, in efforts to confront the present, to borrow Gavin Smith's term (1999), and in visions of a better future.

The documentary explores enduring questions about violence and how it can occur and why, as well as what individual and collective work can and should be done to stop it. Links to contemporary violence, restrictions on human rights, food and famine, imperialism and the political-economic engines of warfare are apparent throughout the film, but elucidation of these connections would be an important pedagogical exercise and a valuable intellectual and political activity if this film were

used in the classroom—as it should be. Haupt has captured a compelling individual journey, moving personal reflections, important historical contexts and questions of continuing importance, giving us an important film to complement and inspire anthropological thought and action.

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

A Kindly Scrutiny of Human Nature

ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RICHARD SLOBODIN

RICHARD J. PRESTON, editor

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A Kindly Scrutiny of Human Nature

Essays in Honour of Richard Slobodin

Richard J. Preston, editor

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A Kindly Scrutiny of Human Nature is a collection of essays honouring Richard (Dick) Slobodin, one of the great anthropologists of the Canadian North. A short biography is followed by essays describing his formative thinking about human nature and human identities, his humanizing force in his example of living a moral, intellectual life, his discernment of people's ability to make informed choices and actions, his freedom from ideological fashions, his writings about the Mackenzie District Métis, his determination to take people's experience seriously, not metaphorically, and his thinking about social organization and kinship. An unpublished paper about a 1930s caribou hunt in which he participated finishes the collection, giving Dick the last word.

Richard J. Preston is nominally retired (Professor Emeritus of Anthropology, McMaster University) and hopes to continue his forty-plus-year span of sojourning and work with the people of the James Bay region, focusing on the cultural dimensions of globalization and tracing the emergence of the Cree concept of community. His publications include *Cree Narrative: Expressing the Personal Meanings of Events*, second edition (2002), and a great many papers.

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

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

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Steckley's source material includes the first dictionary of any Aboriginal language, Recollect Brother Gabriel Sagard's Huron phrasebook, published in 1632, and the sophisticated Jesuit missionary study of the language from the 1620s to the 1740s, beginning with the work of Father Jean de Brébeuf. The only book of its kind, *Words of the Huron* will spark discussion among scholars, students, and anyone interested in North American archaeology, Native studies, cultural anthropology, and seventeenth-century North American history.

John L. Steckley has taught at Humber College since 1983 in the areas of Aboriginal languages, culture, and history. His books include *Beyond Their Years: Five Native Women's Stories*; *Full Circle: Canada's First Nations*; *Aboriginal Voices and the Politics of Representation in Canadian Introductory Sociology Textbooks;* and *De Religione: Telling the 17th-Century Jesuit Story in Huron to the Iroquois*. In 1999, he was adopted into the Wyandot tribe of Kansas.

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

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