Anthropologica

Vol. 48 N° 1, 2006

Canadian
Anthropology
Society

Société
canadienne
d'anthropologie

Guest Editor / Rédactrice Invitée:
Ellen R. Judd

War and Peace / La guerre et la paix

Editor-in-Chief / Rédacteur en chef
Winnie Lem, *Trent University*
1770 West Bank Drive
Peterborough, ON K9L 1Z7
Tel: (705) 748-1011 (ext. 1617) Fax: (705) 748-1624
Email/courriel : wlem@trentu.ca

Editor, French Manuscripts / Rédacteur, manuscrits en français
Marie France Labrecque, *Université Laval*,
Québec, QC G1K 7P4
Tél : (418) 656-2131, poste 7422
Télécopieur : (418) 656-2381
Email/courriel : marie-france.labrecque@ant.ulaval.ca

Book Review Editor (English) / Rédacteurs des comptes rendus (anglais)
Thomas Dunk
Lakehead University
Thunder Bay, ON P7B 5E1
Tel: (807) 343-8091 Fax: (807) 346-7831
Email/courriel : thomas.dunk@lakeheadu.ca

Book Review Editor (French) / Rédacteur des comptes rendus (français)
Marie France Labrecque, *Université Laval*,
Québec, QC G1K 7P4
Tél : (418) 656-2131, poste 7422
Télécopieur : (418) 656-2831
Email/courriel : marie-france.labrecque@ant.ulaval.ca

Art and Museum Review Editors / Rédacteurs des comptes rendus d'exposition
Barbara Lawson, *Redpath Museum, McGill University*
Email/courriel : barbara.lawson@mcgill.ca
Élise Dubuc, *Université du Québec à Chicoutimi*
Email/courriel : elise_dubuc@uqac.ca

Managing Editor / Administrateur
Advertising / Publicité; Reprinting Rights / Droits de reproduction
For this issue: Andrew Lyons, *Wilfrid Laurier University*
After May 1, 2006: Leslie Jermyn, *University of Toronto*
Mailing Address: Dr. L. Jermyn, 494 Clendenan Avenue, Toronto, ON M6P 2X6
Tel: (416) 761-1952 Fax: (416) 362-6160
Email/courriel : ljermyn@chass.utoronto.ca

Editorial Board / Comité de rédaction

Maurice Aymard
Maison des sciences de l'Homme (France)
Sally Cole
Concordia University
Harvey Feit
McMaster University
Maurice Godelier
École des Hautes Études en sciences sociales (France)
Jean-Guy Goulet
Université Saint-Paul
Dipankar Gupta
Jawaharlal Nehru University
Ellen Judd
University of Manitoba
Michael Lambek
University of Toronto
Guy Lanoue
Université de Montréal
Richard B. Lee
University of Toronto
Andrew Lyons
Wilfrid Laurier University
Marie Mauzé
École des Hautes Études en sciences sociales (France)
Bruce G. Miller
University of British Columbia
Lynne Phillips
University of Windsor
Sharon Roseman
Memorial University of Newfoundland
Alan Smart
University of Calgary
Colin H. Scott
McGill University
Gavin Smith
University of Toronto
James B. Waldram
University of Saskatchewan

Editorial Policy

Open to contributors from Canada and abroad, *Anthropologica* publishes in French and English, articles and reviews in all areas of cultural and social anthropology. All manuscripts are refereed anonymously by two reviewers.

Politique éditoriale

La revue *Anthropologica* publie en français et en anglais, des articles et comptes rendus produits par des chercheurs canadiens et étrangers oeuvrant dans les divers domaines de l'étude académique de l'anthropologie culturelle et sociale. Chaque manuscrit est soumis pour évaluation à deux lecteurs anonymes.

Anthropologica ISSN 0003-5459
Published at Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ontario for the Canadian Anthropology Society. Publiée par Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ontario pour la Société Canadienne d'Anthropologie.
© 2006 Canadian Anthropology Society / Société Canadienne d'Anthropologie. Printed in Canada / Imprimé au Canada.
We acknowledge the financial assistance provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and Trent University. / Nous reconnaissons l'aide financière apportée par le Counseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada et l'université Trent. We acknowledge the financial assistance of the Government of Canada, through the Publications Assistance Program (PAP), toward our mailing costs. / Nous reconnaissons l'aide financière du gouvernement du Canada, par l'entremise du Programme d'aide aux publications (PAP), pour nos dépenses d'envoi postal. Publications Mail Registration No. / Poste-publications enregistrement n° 09373. Agreement No. / N° de la convention 40064165. Return postage guaranteed / Port de retour garanti.

Anthropologica

Vol. 48 N° 1, 2006

War and Peace / La guerre et la paix

Guest Editor / Rédactrice Invitée : Ellen R. Judd

War and Peace
Ellen R. Judd 3
La guerre et la paix
Ellen R. Judd (traduction de Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni) 7
Rethinking the War against Iraq
Richard McCutcheon 11
Ni la guerre, ni la paix: campagnes de «stabilisation» et violence structurelle chez les Tlapanèques de la *Montaña* du Guerrero (Mexique).
Martin Hébert 29
La zone grise des guerres humanitaires
Mariella Pandolfi 43
Governing Peace: Global Rationalities of Security and UNESCO's Culture of Peace Campaign
Suzan Ilcan and Lynne Phillips 59
Engaging the Voices of Girls in the Aftermath of Sierra Leone's Conflict: Experiences and Perspectives in a Culture of Violence
Myriam Denov and Richard Maclure 73
The Mask and the Mirror: Facing up to the Past in Postwar Peru
Kimberly Theidon 87
Construire la paix au Guatemala : Analyse critique des modalités d'intervention mises en œuvre par trois ONG guatémaltèques
Karine Vanthuyne 101
Factional Terror, Paramilitarism and Civil War in Haiti: The View from Port-au-Prince, 1994-2004
J. Christopher Kovats-Bernat 117

Art and Museum Review/ Compte rendu d'exposition

Le Musée de Grand Manan, Île de Grand Manan, Nouveau-Brunswick
France Tardif 141

Book review/ Compte rendu

Rites thérapeutiques dans une société matrilinéaire. Le gèrem *des Pèrè (Cameroun)*, par Charles-Henry Pradelles de Latour
Jean-Claude Muller 143

Note to Contributors/ Note à l'intention des auteurs 150

Cover / couverture

Haitian women and girls rally for peace and security. ©1999 / J. Christopher Kovats-Bernat.

Les femmes et les filles haïtiennes marchent pour la paix et la sécurité. ©1999 / J. Christopher Kovats-Bernat.

War and Peace

Ellen R. Judd *University of Manitoba*

At the Halifax meeting of the Canadian Anthropology Society in 2003, the *Anthropologica* Editorial Board decided to respond to continuing and immediate problems of war with a special issue.[1] In opening its pages to engaged anthropological research on war, this issue seeks to respond to critical demands in a way that is both timely and cognizant of the long-term, intransigent conditions of war in our time. The articles that follow examine war and peace substantively in work located in diverse places—in Iraq, Mexico, Kosovo, UNESCO, Sierra Leone, Peru, Guatemala and Haiti. Many are the product of engagement in war zones during periods of open conflict or its immediate aftermath; all are the result of sustained fieldwork and anthropological reflection.

We will be reading these articles in unavoidable intertextuality with the accounts of war that pervade public discourse in the present. It is nearly impossible to escape such accounts, often marked by vivid images instantaneously transmitted from the front lines. But each of the following articles represents a dramatically different picture. The anthropology of war and of violence—in common with much other scholarship, literature and personal accounts—provides a sharp contrast with prevailing cultural frameworks. Those frameworks are diverse and complex tissues of misrecognition, including such transparent fictions as the idea that wars are predominantly military matters, fought on defined battlegrounds by more or less willing combatants, and the more subtle and compelling myth of the just war. Beyond debating matters of evidence or interpretation, this work questions the implicit concepts within which the prevailing frameworks trap much of even the critical thought on war and peace. The anthropology of war and of violence, as represented powerfully in the articles here, conveys the practical, embodied reality of living in war zones. This does not simply add to what we know of war and peace; it offers a mirror through which the culture of militarism in our comparatively safe worlds can be discerned more clearly.

One of the recurring themes in this endeavour is a questioning of the cultures of war and of peace, exploring how these are created, acquire meaning and are challenged. A major issue here is the way in which war leaks into what is or appears to be peace, and the ways in which peace is deployed in war. The murkiness of the boundary and the ways in which war is nurtured and promoted in apparent peacetime is underlined in the studies presented in this special issue. Much can be understood about war if we understand better the permeability of the frame of peace that provides its margins.

Here, too, lies much of the discourse that generates the legitimacy for state or quasi-state violence. The articles in this collection are not inhabited by the usual fetishized entities of states and quasi-state bodies that populate conventional language on war. Those fetishized entities are real in their ability to mobilize people and resources and shape the discourse of war and peace, especially at a distance, but their fictive organic substance dissolves in the light of examined practices closer to the front lines. The ethnography of war (and peace) zones documents and analyzes people and collectivities crossing boundaries, creating and deploying new or renewed cultural repertoires and exercising agency under extreme conditions.

The articles are sensitive to the relation between the violence of war and the structural violence of both war and peace. As each traces in its particular analytic context, these are interconnected and the cessation of gunfire is not the end of violence. The theme of war *and peace* problematizes this relationship. The thematic foci as developed here (other foci are regrettably possible in this large area) are those of the *legitimation* of state and quasi-state violence and the implications of *intentional killing* with the intensity of loss, trauma and suffering that makes the wounds of war so intractable.

The articles that follow are not, for the most part, harrowing in their depictions of war and violence. Neither do they focus primarily on the political economy or geopolitics of war. Rather, the authors share an analytical stepping backward into the ideational and practical terrains that enable these wars to be waged and to be challenged. The articles fall broadly into two overlapping clusters. The first consists of those that primarily critique ideas and practices of war and peace (McCutcheon, Hébert, Pandolfi, Ilcan and Phillips and Kovats-Bernat). The second consists of those that present and explore popular—spontaneous or organized—responses to war and strategies for working toward substantive peace (Ilcan and Phillips, Denov and Maclure, Theidon, Vanthuyne and Kovats-Bernat).

In the opening paper of this collection, Richard McCutcheon draws attention to the persistence and intensity of the bombing and missile responses in Iraq in the period *between* the Gulf War and the Iraq War. Neither the bombing nor the human toll of the sanctions was secret, but the prevailing characterization of this period was one of peace or, at least, not war. McCutcheon's argument departs from renaming this entire period as constituting one war against Iraq, and proceeds through an examination of the literatures on the anthropology of war and of violence to arrive at a vision of war seen through an expanded concept of violence. He presents a comprehensive set of three conceptual constellations centred on direct/physical violence, economic/structural violence, and cultural/symbolic violence, which he demonstrates through application to this larger war against Iraq.

Martin Hébert's article focusses sustained attention on structural violence and on the continuum of violence from direct to more subtle and shadowy forms where it can elude recognition. His is a study of a primarily structural violence directed against the indigenous Tlapaneques in Mexico that he tells us is not narrowly war but, in that very statement, simultaneously questions the understanding of peace. Hébert traces the pervasive structural violence of market integration as well as the more internalized violence of alcoholism and prostitution. In this context, state structures of violent pacification raise questions about what constitutes peace beyond a cessation of immediate conflict.

Mariella Pandolfi's article moves into the terrain of military-humanitarian intervention, tracing how Kosovo has been rendered into a semblance of Afghanistan, East Timor or Iraq in the course of the world's first humanitarian war. Here is a new innovation in the political imaginary of a just war, emerging from what Pandolfi terms the "grey zone" of the last six years, along a continuum from humanitarian intervention through militarized humanitarianisn to humanitarian war. This is a nuanced mobile anthropology that explores conflict in the post-communist Balkans and also the post-modern discourse of time-space contraction that leaves the Balkans stripped of local specificity (but not of stereotypes) and lost in abstracted universalized models. Pandolfi calls for examining global discursive regimes that legitimize the "quick fix" of a military solution—very selectively (consider Rwanda) and in accordance with political calculations hidden in the apparently apolitical discourse of humanitarian necessity.

Suzan Ilcan and Lynne Phillips further pursue the role of the international community through a form of "studying up" directed toward UNESCO's program of promoting "cultures of peace." UNESCO has interestingly proposed and begun to implement an approach to peace that

attempts to bypass the state structures previously targeted in peace movements or negotiations, and instead mobilize people somewhat more directly. The three aspects Ilcan and Philips examine in this article are building institutions for formal democracy, the training of children and the integration of women. Programs such as these began in the early 1990s in frontline countries such as El Salvador, Mozambique and Burundi. Ilcan and Phillips note the potential such work on the margins of state structures might have for preventing or reducing civil war. But the burden of their analysis is a critical identification of the implicit and explicit implications and limits of conceptualizing peace as security and peace/security as an object of governance. In moving outside conventions of statist discourse, the "cultures of peace" initiative draws upon the cultural resources of neo-liberalism—investing in oneself to create security and managing peace as security through processes of governing. Drawing upon the critical literature on neo-liberalism and on governmentality, Ilcan and Phillips question a concept of peace as security that omits attention to inequality, oppression and suffering. They call for a much more robust concept of peace and point to the more inclusive positions of activist peace groups whose voices and organizations are marginalized in the discourse of peace as security.

Myriam Denov and Richard Maclure report on an international (CIDA) project working with girl soldiers in Sierra Leone, a country devastated by structural violence and by a brutal ten-year civil war in which the combatants were largely young people and children. Thirty percent of the child soldiers were girls. Denov and Maclure start with a critique of the limitations of widespread images portraying child soldiers as either victims or crazed perpetrators, and proceed to paint a complex picture of girl soldiers as both. They show the girl soldiers as active agents located in an environment rife with extremes of coercion, physical and sexual violence and fear, in which they sought power, as is intrinsic to childhood, and in which some also sought the power of cruelty or domination. Possibilities were severely constrained but, within these limits, girls are unflinchingly shown as active killers, and also as devising means of escape, establishing fragile ties of support with other girls, subverting or avoiding the orders given, and occasionally fighting back. The authors argue for an approach to child soldiers that comprehends the reality of their experience and recognizes their agency. Their project applies this approach in incorporating adolescent girl soldiers in the research team.

Kimberly Theidon's paper addresses the aftermath of fratricidal conflict within small communities in Peru between 1980 and 1992. She examines the work people engage in both to induce themselves to kill and then to stop killing, and certain of the mechanisms they use to do this, specifically masking and public secrets. She pushes the study to the almost impossible point of interviewing the killed, in an extensive account from a healer/shopkeeper who had been brought to popular trial in his community by *Senderistas.* He had emerged from this experience, which normally resulted in summary execution, able to recount how his masked neighbours had tried him, how his comadre had spoken up for his life, and how he had been sentenced to days of symbolic labour caring for the Senderista flag. Theidon explores the trauma such experiences leave for individuals and communities and how they can and do move forward amid unresolved structural violence and the unrightable wrongs of intentional killing, injury and betrayal. Sensitive to the precarious and fraught process, she phrases her conclusion in the precisely illuminating terms of coexistence.

In a closely related article, Karine Vanthuyne's addresses the issue of reconciliation as the project of three non-governmental organizations in early 21st-century Guatemala, each pursuing a distinct path and all working—on human rights, on psychosocial effects of violence, and on recovering memory of the conflict—in a context in which memory of the past is part of a dangerously contested present and future. Vanthuyne introduces the remembered substance of 36 years of war and proceeds to explore these organizations' search for a language in which to express truth and memory. The intrinsic difficulty of doing so is heightened by the vulnerability of the channels available and the complicated and explosive potential of the testimony. Where Theidon finds not only memory, but forgetting and remembering to forget to be critical elements in the provisional accommodation that allows co-existence within fratricidal communities, Vanthuyne emphasizes memory and a duty to remember as necessary for the reconstitution of lives and communities in the face of overwhelming resources mobilized against popular memory. As official (or unofficial) histories seek to erase or deny the violence of the past, memory can serve to clarify the choices made and to make possible different choices in a present still immanent with the threat of political violence.

Christopher Kovats-Bernat writes from years spent working with street children in the war zone of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and offers a penetrating ethnographic account of persisting structural violence in one of the most devastatingly poor countries in the world. His article traces the history of Haiti's profound economic and human crisis in which the civil war emerged. Initial hopes for improvement through the election of Jean-Bertrand

Aristide or the subsequent intervention by international forces have been derailed by pervasive violence in which the actors continually shift sides in a flux of factional fighting, personal opportunism and economic need. As if to belie the possibility of simple solution, it was the Aristide government's attempt in 2002 to reduce the violence of a fiercely *pro*-Aristide street clan that toppled the country again into open civil war. Kovats-Bernat not only evokes the devastation of this decade of war, but emphasizes the creativity he witnessed in rebuilding social worlds and cultural meaning. A strikingly powerful instance has been the creation of the category of *zenglendo*, a compound of *zenglen* (shards of broken glass) and *do* (back). It is derived from a tale of the *djab*, a Vodou demon that would appear as an elder asking a young boy to massage his tired back, and whose back would then turn into a mass of broken glass, horribly cutting the boy's hands. This has become a powerful critical expression of the popular imagination, applied first to the former army and then to perpetrators of violence against the people much more generally.

This special issue has two linked themes: a critique of concepts of war and an exploration of popular responses and strategies. The creative image of the *zenglendo* highlights the provocative critique offered in voices from the war zones. Anthropologists and others can serve well by listening attentively to these voices and by exploring what they tell us about the tentacles of war.

Ellen R. Judd, Department of Anthropology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3T 2N2, Canada. E-mail: ejudd@cc.umanitoba.ca

Notes

1 The specific contents of this issue remain the responsibility of the guest editor and of each individual contributor. Winnie Lem and Marie France Labrecque have been tireless in expediting the review process.

La guerre et la paix

Ellen R. Judd *University of Manitoba*
Traduction de Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni

Lors du congrès de la Société Canadienne d'Anthropologie qui a eu lieu à Halifax en 2003, le comité de rédaction de la revue *Anthropologica* a décidé de réfléchir aux enjeux continuels et immédiats qu'engendrent la guerre et la paix. Ce numéro spécial[1] est consacré à la recherche anthropologique engagée sur le thème de la guerre. Il tente d'apporter une critique éclairée qui tienne compte de l'intransigeance caractérisant les guerres de notre époque et leur inscription dans la durée. Les articles qui suivent examinent les concepts de paix et de guerre par le biais de travaux menés en Iraq, au Mexique, au Kosovo, au sein de l'UNESCO, en Sierra Leone, au Pérou, au Guatemala et à Haïti. Nombre de ces articles sont le produit d'un engagement dans les zones de guerre en période de conflits ouverts ou immédiatement après ceux-ci. Tous sont le résultat d'un intense travail de terrain et de profondes réflexions anthropologiques.

Les présents articles entretiennent inévitablement une relation d'intertextualité avec les récits de guerre qui fusent actuellement dans le discours public. En effet, peut-on éluder ces récits instantanément retransmis à partir du front et souvent ponctués d'images saisissantes? Chacun des articles regroupés ici présente cependant des images radicalement différentes, l'anthropologie de la guerre et de la violence tranchant avec les cadres culturels dominants[2]. Ces cadres dominants entretiennent notamment, non sans confusions, les idées aussi simplistes que fictives voulant que les guerres concernent avant tout les militaires, prennent place sur des champs de bataille définis et mettent en scène des combattants plus ou moins volontaires. Le mythe subtil et irrésistible qui soutient l'existence d'une guerre juste représente également une lourde et persistante méprise. Mais le présent ouvrage n'entend pas débattre d'évidences ou de questions d'interprétation; son objectif est plutôt d'interroger les concepts implicites sous-tendant les cadres théoriques qui prennent au piège la plupart des réflexions, même critiques, sur la guerre et la paix. Les articles qui suivent pro-

posent une lecture anthropologique profonde de la guerre et de la violence qui véhicule la réalité pratique et personnifiée de la vie en zone de guerre. En plus d'enrichir les connaissances sur la guerre et la paix, une telle approche produit un effet miroir, nous offrant ainsi l'occasion de mieux discerner la culture du militarisme dans nos mondes relativement plus sécuritaires.

Cette parution s'efforce donc d'interroger les concepts de cultures de la paix et de la guerre afin d'explorer les façons dont ces cultures sont créées, investies de sens ou contestées. Au nombre des questions qui retiendront notre attention figurent la façon dont la guerre s'immisce dans ce qui est ou semble être la paix et dont la paix, en se redéployant, cède sa place à la guerre. Ce numéro spécial souligne également la manière floue dont la guerre est alimentée et encouragée en période de paix apparente. Bien des aspects de la guerre peuvent en effet être élucidés si l'on se penche davantage sur la perméabilité du cadre dans lequel on a conceptualisé la paix.

C'est également dans cet entre-deux que prend corps le discours qui légitime la violence étatique et quasi-étatique. Or, les articles réunis dans cet ouvrage n'invoquent pas ces entités érigées en fétiches qui meublent habituellement le langage conventionnel sur la guerre. Ces fétiches, vus de loin, semblent avoir une réelle capacité de mobilisation des peuples et des ressources et ils façonnent les discours sur la paix et la guerre. Ce mirage disparaît cependant lorsqu'on observe les pratiques à proximité des lignes de front. Les études ethnographiques sur les zones de guerre (et de paix) produisent quant à elles des documents et des analyses sur des gens et des collectivités qui transcendent les frontières en créant et en déployant des répertoires culturels nouveaux ou renouvelés et en exerçant leur capacité d'action dans des conditions extrêmes.

Attentifs au rapport existant entre la violence de la guerre et la violence structurelle, aussi bien en temps de paix qu'en temps de guerre, les articles qui suivent indiquent, dans divers contextes analytiques, que ces types de violence sont interdépendants et que la fin des tirs n'équivaut pas nécessairement à la cessation de la violence. En traitant de la guerre *et de la paix,* nous souhaitons faire état de ce rapport problématique. Les points focaux abordés ici—bien d'autres dimensions auraient malheureusement pu faire l'objet d'analyses dans ce vaste domaine—sont la *légitimation* de la violence étatique et quasi-étatique ainsi que les conséquences découlant de *massacres intentionnels*, dont l'intensité des pertes, des traumatismes et des souffrances rend pénible, voire impossible, la cicatrisation des blessures de la guerre.

La plupart des articles qui suivent ne dépeignent pas d'insoutenables représentations de la guerre et de la violence et ne font pas de l'économie politique ou de la géopolitique de la guerre leurs priorités. Le point commun à ces auteurs est plutôt la distanciation analytique qui leur permet d'explorer le terrain des idées et des pratiques rendant possible la tenue des guerres et leurs contestations. Ainsi, on peut classer les articles de ce numéro en deux catégories qui se chevauchent partiellement. La première comprend surtout les articles formulant une critique des idées et des pratiques ayant trait à la guerre et à la paix (McCutcheon, Hébert, Pandolfi, Ilcan et Phillips ainsi que Kovats-Bernat) alors que la deuxième comprend ceux qui présentent et explorent les réactions populaires—spontanées ou organisées—face aux guerres ainsi que les stratégies mises en œuvre pour parvenir à une paix durable (Ilcan et Phillips, Denov et Maclure, Theidon, Vanthuyne et finalement Kovats-Bernat).

L'ouvrage s'ouvre par un texte de Richard McCutcheon qui rend compte de la constance et de l'intensité des frappes aériennes en Iraq pendant la période s'étalant *entre* la guerre du Golf et celle en Iraq. Même si les bombardements et le nombre de victimes causées par les sanctions étaient connus, l'image globale que l'on conserve de cette période est une image de paix ou, du moins, d'absence de guerre. Le point de départ de McCutcheon consiste à reconcevoir et à rebaptiser toute cette période comme une seule et même guerre contre l'Iraq. Il examine ensuite la littérature anthropologique sur la paix et la guerre avant de proposer une vision de la guerre prenant racine dans une conception élargie de la violence. La violence, pour lui, se décline en un ensemble détaillé de trois constellations conceptuelles : la violence directe/physique, la violence économique/structurelle et la violence culturelle/symbolique. Il illustre ces concepts en les apposant à la vision élargie qu'il propose de la guerre contre l'Iraq.

Quant à Martin Hébert, il se concentre sur la violence structurelle et sur le continuum de violence s'étalant entre des formes directes et des formes d'autant plus méconnaissables qu'elles sont subtiles et élusives. La violence principalement structurelle à laquelle doivent faire face les autochtones Tlapaneques du Mexique est au centre de son étude. Certes, concède-t-il, il ne s'agit pas là d'une guerre à proprement parler. Ce constat l'amène toutefois à remettre en question la notion de paix. Hébert expose le caractère envahissant de la violence structurelle induite par l'intégration des marchés ainsi que les formes de violence plutôt intériorisées que sont l'alcoolisme et la prostitution. Dans un tel contexte, les structures étatiques de pacification violente soulèvent des interrogations sur le sens de la paix, qui signifie

manifestement bien plus que la cessation immédiate d'un conflit.

L'article de Mariella Pandolfi nous entraîne sur le terrain des interventions militaro-humanitaires en démontrant la manière dont on a donné au Kosovo des airs d'Afghanistan, de Timor oriental ou d'Iraq, en déclarant la première guerre mondiale humanitaire. Il s'agit d'une innovation dans l'imaginaire politique prônant l'existence de guerres justes. Cette innovation émerge de ce que Pandolfi appelle la «zone grise» des six dernières années qui s'inscrit dans un continuum comprenant tout d'abord l'interventionnisme humanitaire, puis l'humanitarisme militarisé et finalement les guerres humanitaires. La lecture anthropologique mouvante et nuancée qu'elle propose explore les conflits dans le contexte post-communiste des Balkans ainsi que le discours post-moderne qui contracte l'espace-temps, créant une image des Balkans dénuée de spécificités locales (mais pas de stéréotypes) et perdue dans l'abstraction et l'universalisation des modèles. Il est nécessaire, selon Pandolfi, d'examiner les régimes discursifs mondiaux qui légitiment des solutions militaires à la va-vite, de façon très sélective (prenons l'exemple du Rwanda) et en fonction de calculs politiques camouflés dans le discours apparemment apolitique des besoins humanitaires.

Susan Ilcan et Lynne Phillips analysent pour leur part le programme de promotion d'une culture de la paix de l'UNESCO, privilégiant de fait une forme de *«studying up»*, et remettent encore davantage en question le rôle de la communauté internationale. Notons que l'UNESCO a proposé et commencé à implanter une vision de la paix qui tente de contourner les structures étatiques auparavant visées par les mouvements pacifiques ou les négociations de paix. Cette approche tente dorénavant de mobiliser les populations un peu plus directement. Dans cet article, Ilcan et Philips passent en revue trois aspects : la mise en place d'institutions prônant une démocratie formelle, la formation des enfants et l'intégration des femmes. En effet, dès le début des années 1990, des programmes de ce type ont été entrepris dans des pays en crise tels le Salvador, le Mozambique et le Burundi. Ilcan et Philips soulignent le potentiel de ce travail en marge des structures étatiques dans la prévention ou la réduction de l'intensité des guerres civiles. Leur analyse est avant tout une inspection critique des conséquences implicites et explicites de la conceptualisation de la paix en termes sécuritaires et de la paix/sécurité en tant qu'objet lié à la gouvernance. Aussi se penchent-elle sur les limites inhérentes à un tel resserrement des réflexions. En sortant du cadre conventionnel des discours étatiques, le projet de promotion des cultures de la paix mobilise les ressources culturelles du néolibéralisme : investir à l'interne pour garantir la sécurité et gérer la paix en termes sécuritaires par le biais de processus de gouvernance. Puisant dans la littérature critique sur le néolibéralisme et la gouvernementalité, Ilcan et Phillips remettent en cause une vision sécuritaire de la paix qui ne prendrait pas en compte les questions d'inégalité, d'oppression et de souffrance. Elles posent comme nécessaire le développement de visions plus robustes de la paix, telles celles, plus inclusives, que proposent des groupes de militants pacifiques mais qui n'occupent qu'une position marginale au sein des discours abordant la paix en termes sécuritaires.

Myriam Denov et Richard Maclure rendent compte d'un projet international (de l'ACDI) auprès des filles-soldats en Sierra Leone. Dans ce pays, dévasté par la violence structurelle et par une décennie de guerre civile, les combattants étaient régulièrement de jeunes gens ou des enfants. En outre, trente pour cent des enfants-soldats actifs dans la brutale guerre sierra-léonaise étaient de sexe féminin. Denov et Maclure formulent tout d'abord une critique de la vision réductrice qui dépeint les enfants-soldats soit comme des victimes, soit comme des tueurs fous, et entreprennent plutôt de dresser un portrait complexe des filles-soldats qui révèle ces deux aspects. Les auteurs nous montrent les filles-soldats telles des agentes actives, situées dans un environnement où sévissent d'extrêmes niveaux de coercition, de peur, et de violence physique et sexuelle. Dans ce contexte, leurs modes d'accès au pouvoir sont ceux intrinsèques à l'enfance ou encore ceux de la cruauté et de la domination. Certes, l'accès au pouvoir est sérieusement limité; mais dans ce cadre restreint, les auteurs nous laissent indéfectiblement entrevoir les filles comme des tueuses actives, en mesure de mettre au point des stratégies afin de s'échapper, d'établir des liens de soutien entre elles, renverser ou éviter les ordres donnés et parfois même riposter. Denov et Maclure plaident en faveur d'une approche qui tienne compte de la réalité de l'expérience des filles-soldats et qui reconnaisse leur capacité d'action. Leur projet met en application cette approche en incorporant des adolescentes-soldats au sein de l'équipe de recherche.

L'article de Kimberly Theidon traite des conséquences du conflit fratricide qui a déchiré de petites communautés au Pérou de 1980 à 1992. L'auteure examine le travail dans lequel s'engagent les gens tant pour s'amener à tuer que, par la suite, s'arrêter, et certains des mécanismes mis en œuvre à ces fins, nommément le masquage et les secrets publics. Elle pousse la recherche au point presque impossible d'interviewer les morts en présentant le récit complet d'un guérisseur/commerçant qui a été jugé par des *Senderistas* devant un tribunal populaire dans sa

communauté. Sorti vivant de cette expérience qui se conclut habituellement par une exécution sommaire, il a été en mesure de raconter la façon dont ses voisins masqués l'ont jugé, dont sa comadre l'a défendu et comment on l'a finalement condamné à une peine symbolique l'obligeant à s'occuper du drapeau des *Senderistas.* Theidon explore les traumatismes que de telles expériences causent aux individus et à leurs communautés, ainsi que la façon dont ils parviennent à aller de l'avant malgré la violence structurelle persistante et les injustices irréparables qui découlent de tels meurtres, blessures et trahisons. Consciente du caractère précaire et tendu de ce processus, elle conclut cet article sur la note éclairante de la coexistence.

Karine Vanthuyne aborde un thème analogue, celui de la réconciliation telle que la conçoivent les projets de trois organisations non-gouvernementales œuvrant au Guatemala au début du 21ème siècle. Si chacune a abordé le projet sous un angle différent, toutes ont travaillé sur les droits humains, les effets psycho-scociaux de la violence et le rétablissement de la mémoire du conflit dans un contexte où les souvenirs font partie intégrante du présent et du futur, tous deux dangereusement contestés. Vanthuyne présente les souvenirs de trente-six années de guerre avant d'explorer les recherches entreprises par ces organisations afin de trouver un langage dans lequel exprimer la vérité et la mémoire. Lorsqu'on prend conscience de la vulnérabilité des canaux existants et du caractère complexe et potentiellement explosif des témoignages, on comprend la difficulté d'une telle entreprise. Alors que Theidon conçoit non seulement la mémoire mais également l'oubli et le fait de se souvenir d'oublier comme les éléments essentiels d'un compromis provisoire permettant la coexistence au sein de communautés fratricides, Vanthuyne, quant à elle, pose comme nécessaire le souvenir et le devoir de mémoire dans la reconstitution des vies et des communautés, étant donné l'ampleur des ressources mobilisées contre la mémoire populaire. Puisque les histoires officielles (et non-officielles) s'attachent à effacer ou nier les violences du passé, la mémoire permet de clarifier les choix déjà faits et d'ouvrir la possibilité d'autres choix au présent, alors que persiste les menaces de violence politique.

Pour sa contribution, Christopher Kovats-Bernat puise dans l'expérience de ses années de travail auprès des enfants de la rue dans la zone de guerre de Port-au-Prince à Haïti. Il offre un récit ethnographique saisissant de la violence structurelle qui sévit dans ce pays du monde asphyxié par la pauvreté. Son article retrace l'histoire des profondes crises, tant humaines qu'économiques, dans lesquelles s'enracine la guerre civile haïtienne. Les espoirs suscités par l'élection de Jean-Bertrand Aristide et l'intervention subséquente des forces internationales se sont éteints devant l'omniprésence de la violence mise en scène par des acteurs changeant continuellement de camp dans une valse où priment les luttes entre factions, l'opportunisme individuel et les besoins économiques. Éliminant d'emblée la possibilité de trouver une solution simple à la crise, c'est précisément la tentative du gouvernement Aristide de réduire la violence d'une bande de rue férocement pro-Aristide qui a, en 2002, fait basculer le pays dans une guerre civile ouverte. Si Kovats-Bernat évoque les conséquences dévastatrices résultant des dix années de guerre, il insiste surtout sur la créativité mise en œuvre dans la reconstruction des mondes sociaux et des significations culturelles. La création de la catégorie *zenglendo,* mot provenant de *zenglen* (tessons de bouteille) et *do* (le dos), en est un exemple particulièrement frappant. Ce phénomène tire son origine d'un conte où le *djab,* démon Vaudou qui prend l'apparence d'un vieillard souffrant de courbatures, demande à un garçon de lui masser le dos. Son dos se change alors en un amoncellement de morceaux de verre cassés qui coupent sévèrement les mains du garçon. Cette puissante expression critique des imaginaires populaires qui s'appliquait dans un premier temps à l'ancienne armée s'étend dorénavant à tous ceux qui, de façon générale, perpétuent la violence contre les populations.

Deux thèmes liés traversent donc ce numéro spécial : le premier énonce une critique des concepts de la guerre et le second explore les réactions et les stratégies populaires face à celle-ci. L'image du *zenglendo* met en évidence la critique, aussi troublante que créative, que formulent les voix s'élevant des zones de guerre. Les anthropologues, comme bien d'autres observateurs, feraient donc œuvre utile en portant une attention toute particulière à ces voix et en explorant ce qu'elles ont à dire sur les prolongements tentaculaires de la guerre.

Ellen R. Judd, Département d'Anthropologie, Université du Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3T 2N2, Canada. Courriel : ejudd@cc.umanitoba.ca

Notes

1 Le contenu de ce numéro demeure la responsabilité du rédacteur invité et de chacun des contributeurs. Nous tenons à remercier Winnie Lem et Marie France Labrecque pour leur efficacité concernant les évaluations.

2 Ce à quoi s'attachent également d'autres disciplines, œuvres littéraires et récits personnels.

Rethinking the War against Iraq

Richard McCutcheon *Menno Simons College*

Abstract: A conventional view of contemporary Iraq suggests that there were two short wars in 1991 and 2003 between Iraq and a US led cohort of countries separated by an interval of relative peace. This article proposes an alternate view, arguing that the war against Iraq was one continuous war that began in 1991 and ended in 2003. An expanded concept of violence bridging two divergent literatures—the anthropology of war and the ethnography of violence—is used as a lens to see the war with greater definition. The concept of violence put forward identifies the substance of war and is comprised of three conceptual constellations: direct/physical violence, structural/economic violence and cultural/symbolic violence. Each conceptual constellation is illustrated with examples from the war against Iraq drawn from my experience of living in the country and extensive historical research.

Keywords: violence, war, Iraq, theory, conflict, Middle East

Résumé : Une vision conventionnelle de l'Iraq contemporaine suggère qu'il y a eu, entre l'Iraq et une cohorte de pays menée par les États-Unis, deux courtes guerres en 1991 et en 2003, entrecoupées d'une période de paix relative. Le présent article propose une vision voulant que la guerre contre l'Iraq représente, en fait, une seule et même guerre qui a commencé en 1991 et pris fin en 2003. Une conception élargie de la violence reliant deux corpus divergents – la littérature sur l'anthropologie de la guerre et l'ethnographie de la violence – sert ici de lentille afin d'observer la guerre avec plus de précision. Cette conception de la violence identifie les fondements de la guerre et se décline en trois constellations conceptuelles : la violence directe/physique, la violence structurelle/économique et la violence culturelle/symbolique. Chacune de ces constellations conceptuelles est illustrée par des exemples puisés à même mon expérience alors que je vivais en Iraq ou issus de recherches historiques approfondies.

Mots-clés : violence, guerre, Iraq, conflit, Moyen-Orient

Introduction

A question that had dogged me for years prior to living in Iraq in 2000 came into sharp focus while sitting in the shade of a tree in the courtyard of the Al-Hamra Hotel, located in a suburb of Baghdad.[1] According to mainstream public discourse in Canada, and in places where I travelled in the United States in the years following my first two visits to Iraq in 1991, the country was no longer experiencing war. "The Gulf War," according to this discourse, had ended in 1991. Yet in the years following 1991 everything I knew about the unfolding situation in Iraq suggested neither resolution nor a return to normalcy. While living in Iraq nine years later, I saw and experienced evidence of a country under severe duress. The continuing economic, social and physical devastation of the country, the air raid sirens and the sound of bombs exploding that I heard in the north and south of Iraq, all spoke to a violence that smacked of war. I was disturbed by the disjuncture between my own observations, experiences and perceptions—gained by years of critically reading reports generated by observers and researchers on the ground, as well as by speaking with a constant stream of people returning from the region—and the mainstream understanding of "the Gulf War" as a past event. Sitting in Baghdad under the tree at the Al-Hamra Hotel, I asked: "Why did we stop calling this a war?"

Upon returning to Canada in May 2001, I reread Zygmunt Bauman's *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989). In its opening pages he tells the story of how he searched sociological literature in vain for anything that would elucidate the Holocaust, which had for him a deeply personal significance. He writes:

> Such sociological studies as have been completed so far show beyond reasonable doubt that the Holocaust has more to say about the state of sociology than sociology in its present shape is able to add to our knowledge of the Holocaust. This alarming fact has not yet been

faced (much less responded to) by the sociologists. (Bauman 1989: 3)

While I do not equate the Holocaust with the tragedy of the war against Iraq, this passage did strike a chord with me. First, in a similar vein I am concerned to understand the war against Iraq—not the highly manufactured event that people call "the Gulf War" or later "the Iraq War"; but rather, the war that I came to know over the course of a decade and a half of direct involvement with it.

Secondly, although I found some anthropological literature useful in my efforts to understand the war against Iraq (Bringa 1995; Nordstrom 1997; Nordstrom 2004b; Scheper-Hughes 1992; Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004) overall, the *anthropology of war* contributed very little to my effort. "With a few notable exceptions," one anthropologist observes in a review of anthropology and war, "anthropologists have barely studied modern wars, and when modern war is treated as a subject, it is the why behind the fighting and the aftermath of it—not the how or the process—that receives most attention" (Simons 1999: 74). It is notable that this same reviewer throughout her paper draws attention to numerous wars in the decade prior to her article, but the war against Iraq in any form is barely mentioned in passing (1999: 83n9, 84). Indeed, the war against Iraq is rarely mentioned, let alone analyzed; an oversight which can be seen in numerous collections of essays and review articles published by anthropologists on the subject of war and violence between 1990 and 2003 (e.g., Ferguson 2003b; Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Schmidt and Schröder 2001; Stewart and Strathern 2002). A few anthropologists have addressed this startling lacuna, although they have always framed it with other concerns such as racism, globalization, environmental degradation or "the war against terror," and never with attention to definitional and theoretical problems raised by the war against Iraq as a subject itself (Aziz 1997; Feldman 1994; González 2004; Nordstrom 2004a). Nordstrom identifies the core problem, however, when she observes:

> Being in the USA and trying to understand the [spring 2003] war was perplexing: I could not find the war. I don't mean the constant barrage of news coverage on "the war," the political mud-slinging among people of opposing views, or the video clips of military advancements. I mean the way war smells, feels, tastes, looks, and acts. (Nordstrom 2004a: 247)

Perhaps at this juncture the war against Iraq has more to say about anthropology than anthropology has to say about it?

Like Bauman, I have been "alarmed" by the lack of analytical discourse that has characterized the response of anthropologists to a major world event. How is it possible to reframe the question of Iraq so that the discipline centrally concerned with the study of *anthropos* can address one of the most significant wars since World War II?

My overall objective in this essay is to demarcate the war against Iraq. No existing anthropological model accommodates my main thesis that there was a single ongoing war waged against Iraq from 1991 to 2003. It is vitally important to have a model which allows us to understand how war was waged there continuously for over a decade. My purpose is to establish an alternative set of theoretical and practical questions that will enable us to see the war against Iraq from a different vantage point. I suggest that we start our analysis of war with the concept of "violence" for, although it is a contested concept, it provides multiple lenses through which to *see* the war against Iraq. This essay develops three conceptual constellations—physical/direct violence, economic/structural violence and symbolic/cultural violence—to elucidate the war. Each conceptual constellation is illustrated with examples from my experience of the war against Iraq and extensive historical research. I close the essay by asking, "Why does it matter?"

Reframing the Question

Prior to 1990, Iraq was on the periphery of most people's vision, at least in North America. If known at all, it was commonly known as the country that was at war with the then "evil" Iranian government. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War is considered to be amongst the most significant inter-state wars in the latter part of the 20th century (Chubin and Tripp 1988; Hiro 1989; Pelletiere 1992; Workman 1994). With its attempt to exert control over Kuwait in 1990, Iraq was catapulted into the centre of both controversy and attention on the world stage. The attention, like the controversy, ebbed and flowed over the next decade and a half. At the time of doing final revisions for this essay, there is no indication that the interest will fade in the near future.

Four elements comprise a mainstream conventional view of the war against Iraq:

1. There is an unquestioned belief that what has been labelled "the Gulf War " and "the Iraq War" captures both symbolically and historically the totality of an event understood to be two short wars between "Iraq" (a highly condensed and reified symbol) and an "Allied Coalition," or "Coalition of the Willing" (both politically motivated constructions that need to be deconstructed).

2. The central academic debate arising from "the Gulf War," bolstered by a vast literature (see Arnove 2000; Cordesman 1999; Cordesman and Hashim 1997; Cortright and Lopez 1995; Cortright and Lopez 2000; Doxey 1997; Graham-Brown 1999), concerns the political utility and moral defensibility of economic sanctions as a tool for making peace.
3. Oil and the desire to control it is the primary driving force behind the war against Iraq.
4. An academic discourse primarily informed by the language of political science and strategic studies (including military history) provides an adequate paradigm for understanding "the Gulf War" and "the Iraq War."[2]

These four elements reinforce the perception of a "received wisdom," namely, that these were temporally "limited wars" separated by an extended interval of sanctions, and with minimal "collateral damage." In my experience and analysis this view serves to veil the actual lived experience of men, women and children in Iraq.

In an already large (and repetitive) literature on the subject of Iraq[3] there are only a few writers who make reference to the idea that the war against Iraq did not end in 1991. Unfortunately none of them provides a justification for their view, nor do they systematically apply it to the problem, or develop the implications of it. Both Naseer Aruri (2003) and Christopher Hitchens (2003), for example, assume this argument in general but do not provide a clear rationale and analysis for their use of it. In another example Arundhati Roy explicitly says that "what many do not know is that the war did not end [in 1991]" (Roy 2003: 65). Within the same paragraph she then writes about "the decade of economic sanctions that followed the war [*sic*]," (ibid.) which illustrates how difficult it is to consistently write against the conventional view. Perhaps the most promising of these examples is the work of the Research Unit on Political Economy where the idea is introduced but limited to the economic dimension (Research Unit for Political Economy 2003). These few examples indicate that there are others who see a problem with the conventional conceptualization of what has happened in Iraq. This essay provides a theoretical justification for the argument that the war against Iraq began in 1991 and ended in 2003.

In his pithy analysis of training for conflict transformation across cultures, John Paul Lederach suggests that a critical examination of "whose knowledge, under what package, delivered through what mechanism, and received by what populations are all legitimate and necessary questions for investigation and study" (Lederach 1995: 6). Following his suggestion, I propose that the most effective way to engage the question of Iraq is to move beyond a discourse rooted in political science and military history, that is for the most part still mired in the idea of the sovereign state, to an examination of the local consequences and the social construction of war. To restate the overall purpose in the present essay, my intent is to introduce an informed account of the war against Iraq that has intellectual integrity grounded in experience. It takes as its point of departure the axiom that war is a subset of violence.

The Problem of Violence and War in Anthropology

The subject of war has been a growth industry in anthropology[4] particularly since the initial buildup to the war against Iraq in the late 1980s.[5] A significant benchmark was established when Brian Ferguson and Leslie Farragher published a thorough bibliography of work related to the anthropology of conflict, violence and war (Ferguson and Farragher 1988). Several collections of essays helped to establish the parameters of the subject into the mid-1990s (Ferguson 1984b; Ferguson 1989; Ferguson and Whitehead 1992; Nordstrom and Martin 1992b; Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Reyna and Downs 1994; Sponsel and Gregor 1994; Warren 1993). One of the significant debates that emerged in that literature—I shall return to one subtle effort to address it presently—was found in the differing approaches of an etic, "materialist" view of war (represented by Ferguson 1995a; Ferguson 1995b; Ferguson 2000; Ferguson 2001; Ferguson 2003b) and an emic, "postmodernist" view of violence (represented by Nordstrom 1997; Nordstrom 2004b; Nordstrom and Martin 1992b; Robben and Nordstrom 1995). In brief, what the cultural materialist perspective takes as absolutely essential—scientific rigour, theoretical precision and methodological uniformity (Murphy and Margolis 1995)—the postmodernist view of violence takes as both dangerous and misguided (Nordstrom and Martin 1992b; Nordstrom and Robben 1995).

By the latter part of the 1990s and into the new century those disagreements began to give way to attempts to find more common ground where anthropologists can work collegially on this most pressing of human problems. A significant number of scholars began to bridge the gap with works that tried to take into account a multitude of variables and processes of war and violence (Aijmer and Abbink 2000; Daniel 1996; Ferguson 2003a; Nordstrom 1997; Nordstrom 2004b; Scheper-Hughes 2002; Schmidt and Schröder 2001; Shapiro 1997; Stewart and Strathern 2002). At the same time there was a broadening of the subject to focus on particular forms of mass violence involving ethnicity and identity, genocide, terror, and "suffering"

as an overarching category (Das et al. 2000; Eller 1999; Hinton 2002; Kelly 2000; Kleinman, et al. 1997; Mahmood 2000; Sluka 2000). These efforts run parallel to a burgeoning interest in understanding the transforming dynamics of war and violence in a world characterized by global processes, as evidenced by an expanding catalogue of works on the subject from across the political and disciplinary spectrum (Bertell 2000; Duffield 2000; Enloe 1993; Fisk and Schellenberg 2000; Gilligan 1996; Gray 1997; Homer-Dixon 1999; Ignatieff 2000; Kaldor 1999; Keane 1996; Lutz and Nonini 1999; Maalouf 2000; Norman 1995). This essay participates in the effort to develop models through which we can better grasp the complexities and subtleties of the violence and war that we anthropologists experience and study in a wide variety of settings.

One of the central problems which arises from this literature at a theoretical level and which forms the backdrop for my analysis is the contested nature of the role of "experience" in the study of violence and war. A great deal hangs on this question within the discipline as a whole—professional careers, research dollars and political influence, being a few examples—even if the divide is less sharp than it appears at first blush. Two examples serve to highlight the problem.

In an essay that attempts to bridge some of the differences that appear in the violence and war literature, Schröder and Schmidt (2001: 17) suggest that there are three broad theoretical perspectives currently being used to study the subject.

1. The *operational* approach "links violence to general properties of human nature and rationality and to general concepts of social adaptation to material conditions. It aims to explain violent action by comparing structural conditions as causes affecting specific historical conditions" (ibid.: 17).

2. The *cognitive* approach "portrays violence as first of all culturally constructed, as a representation of cultural values, a fact that accounts for its efficacy on both the discursive and the practical level. Thus, violence is seen as contingent on its cultural meaning and its form of representation. It should be approached with careful attention to the socio-cultural specificity of the historical context" (ibid.: 17).

3. The *experiential* approach, for Schröder and Schmidt "focuses on the subjective qualities of violence. It views violence as something which has a basic impact on life that can only be grasped through its reflections in individual experience. Violence, here, is highly contingent on individual subjectivities, and its meaning unfolds mainly through the individual's perception of a violent situation" (ibid.: 17). They conclude their overview of these three theoretical views with the suggestion that their "degree of compatibility…decreases from the first to the third" (ibid.: 17) of these perspectives:

> While the operational perspective looks for parameters transcending cultural specificity and the boundedness of violent events in time, space and society, the cognitive perspective derives its parameters from the social construction of the world by a collectivity bounded in time and space—which, after all, contains elements well suited for comparison. The experimental [*sic*][6] perspective tends to neglect cultural generality in favour of pure fragmented subjectivity….[T]he extreme proponents of this post-modernist view subscribe to a randomising view of violent events that negate the possibility and usefulness of anthropological comparison. (Schröder and Schmidt 2001: 17-18)

Although Schröder and Schmidt say in passing that all three of these perspectives are necessary to gain a full picture of violence and war, it is clear that when push comes to shove "an anthropological approach should [*sic*] adopt an analytical, comparative perspective in order to contribute to the understanding and explanation of violence" (2001: 18). The not-so-subtle criticism embedded here is that the experiential perspective, characterized as "fragmented subjectivity" generating a "randomising view of violent events," has little to contribute to the understanding of violence and war because it has "abandoned an analytical approach in favour of a subjectivist focus on the impact violence has on the everyday life of individuals (including the researchers themselves)" (2001: 7). Moreover, this perspective may "interfere [*sic*] with any effort to view one specific violent confrontation from a historical or comparative perspective" (2001: 7). Those who hold to what has here been called an experiential "postmodern" view, not surprisingly, have a different view of the matter.[7]

"Violence," according to Nordstrom and Martin, "is not a socioculturally fragmented phenomenon that occurs 'outside' the arena of everyday life for those affected" (Nordstrom and Martin 1992a: 13-14). If we are to understand it, then it is "to people themselves, to the social dynamics and cultural phenomena that inform them, that we must turn" (ibid.). They recognize that this "stands at odds with traditional studies of sociopolitical violence that have long focussed on the formal institutions credited with defining, waging, and resolving aggression: political, (para)military, security, and legal" (ibid.). Within those formal institutions "warfare is viewed as a contest between opponents who consciously, if not rationally, com-

pete for control of resources, employ strategies and develop weapon systems" (Nordstrom and Martin 1992a: 14). In a core passage they explain that:

> It is not only naïve to assume that conflict takes place within an arena demarcated by the formal institutions designated as responsible for waging and controlling aggression. It is dangerous. On average, 90 percent of all war-related deaths now occur among civilian populations. What ethnographic voice conveys the social reality of these unarmed victims of aggression...if researchers focus on the politicomilitary systems whose members may declare war, but certainly do not bear the brunt of it? Worse, who gives resonance to those repressed, tortured, and disappeared in undeclared wars? Violence starts and stops with people that constitute a society; it takes place in society and as a social reality; it is a product and a manifestation of culture. Violence is not inherent to power, to politics, or to human nature. The only biological reality of violence is that wounds bleed and people die. (Nordstrom and Martin 1992a: 14)

In contrast to Schröder and Schmidt's suggestion that this view has "abandoned" an analytical approach, these scholars argue that an experiential approach is the only way to arrive at a theoretically valid model. In her studies of Mozambique, Nordstrom illustrates that "distance from the enactment of violence has a good deal to do with the way we theorize about it. The space between violence and theory has enabled researchers to ascribe a reasonableness to warfare that belies the civilian experience" (Nordstrom and Martin 1992a: 13). Nordstrom and Martin propose that the direction of their work, and that of their colleagues, represents, in fact, "an initial step in designating theoretical frameworks for studying violence that elucidate field realities that enhance knowledge of conflict processes and human(e) dynamics with a more critical and global perspective" (1992a: 15).

While I concur with Schröder and Schmidt that a social constructionist (cognitive) view is to a greater or lesser extent useful to both a materialist (operational) perspective and a postmodern (experiential) perspective, the weight of the argument goes against their conclusion that the social constructionist view better aligns itself with the materialist perspective. Due to a common interest in an elicitive methodology that operates within a socially constructed field reality, the social constructionist theoretical perspective actually aligns itself better with an experiential approach to violence and war. In this paper, my theoretical contribution is to integrate "experience" into a model (a concern common to all of these perspectives) that can potentially be used in a comparative fashion.

The result of my theoretical exploration leads me to look at the relationship of war and violence. In the next section I use an expanded concept of violence as *a lens through which to see war.* Those who provide leadership and justification for war-making regularly avoid the subject of violence, preferring to talk about things like political ends (such as security concerns), weapon systems and "collateral damage." Using violence itself as a lens, the central reality of war becomes unavoidable. Through this *lens,* then, we can see war from the perspective of people who are directly affected in their day-to-day lives. The concern to *see* war is captured by Brian Fawcett, who 20 years ago in his study of Cambodia, said, "The ugly truths of our time are neither dark nor silent" (1986: 14). He goes on to say that they "have been rendered opaque by full-frequency light that admits neither definition nor shadows, and they are protected from the voices of the suffering and the disaffected by an accompanying wall of white noise" (ibid.: 14). In what follows I propose a model that will allow us to set the contrast knob to produce more definition and less white noise. It will serve to highlight the multifaceted impacts of war on those who have lived with it in Iraq for a very long time.

Bridging Violence and War with Conceptual Constellations

As a starting point for this discussion, I accept widely held base definitions of both war and violence. A standard textbook definition of war—"War is large-scale violent conflict between organized groups that are governments or that aim to establish governments" (Glossop 1994: 9)—- sufficiently delineates this human activity from other group activities to make it a viable base from which to work (for an early but still useful overview, see van der Dennen 1981). The same is true of violence. A benchmark was reached recently when the World Health Organization (WHO) identified violence as a global health problem. They define violence as the "intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation" (Krug et al. 2002: 5). This serves as a solid base definition. I understand both of these descriptions as *initial* reference points for our study, i.e., they are not "theoretical models"; but rather, *definitions* with which to work as we move towards explanatory models.

Putting these two definitions side-by-side in the same paragraph serves to highlight the core problem of the relationship between war and violence. What is the connection between these two concepts, both of which try to

capture field realities? Does it matter theoretically that all war is violent, but not all violence is war? While the movement in anthropology to focus on violence as an overarching concept is appropriate (Aijmer and Abbink 2000; Schmidt and Schröder 2001; Stewart and Strathern 2002), it is important that an equally clear focus on war as a concept that reflects a particular slice of human life is not sacrificed. There are two reasons for my concern. First, as omnipresent as violence is in both North America and globally, as a word/concept/symbol it carries significantly different (not worse or better) emotive connotations from the word/concept/symbol war. Elizabeth Colson correctly identifies "war" as a key symbol (à la Ortner 1973) in North American culture (Colson 1992: 281). Second, in my experience of war and in my conversations with those who have lived with it on a daily basis in Iraq, the word "war" resonates with interlocutors in ways different from "violence." To ask how they are different and interconnected moves us to a more nuanced and global understanding of violence and a more particular and meaningful understanding of war.

The following section outlines an *expanded* concept of violence consisting of three conceptual constellations. Conceptual constellations are clusters of sufficiently similar juxtaposed ideas that when taken together create what anthropologist Richard Preston calls a "feeling-tone" that greatly enhances our perception without sacrificing too much precision of definition.[8] The cluster of ideas that are juxtaposed in this section come from Pierre Bourdieu and Johan Galtung (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu 1990 (1983); Bourdieu 1994 (1977); Galtung 1969; Galtung 1990; Galtung 1996). The three constellations include: direct/physical violence, structural/economic violence and cultural/symbolic violence. When Bourdieu and Galtung developed their ideas it appears that they did not intend to use them as lenses to understand war.[9] Bourdieu tends to emphasize processes of domination and hegemonic power and Galtung places greater emphasis on structures and their role in maintaining order. For Bourdieu, a significant part of the point is to explain unequal distribution of capital; while Galtung is intent on understanding the deep structure of peace. To understand the war against Iraq both of their violence models are applicable. Together they constitute a constellation of ideas that embody significant explanatory power. My purpose in bringing them together is not to analyze each with the intent of creating a grand synthesis, but rather, to allow them to interact with each other to generate a fresh way of seeing war.

There are two reasons to expand the definition of violence. First, people who experience suffering at the hands of "invisible forces" understand that invisible force to be violence and name it as such (cf. Nordstrom 2004b: 64). In this I concur with Martin and Nordstrom's observation that expanded definitions of violence "have been useful in giving a voice to systems of violence no less powerful by virtue of their intangibility" (Nordstrom and Martin 1992a: 8). Secondly, a narrow understanding of violence often supports politically motivated decisions that attempt to mask harm inflicted upon civilian populations. By bracketing any violence that is not strictly an overt form of physical force that injures and kills specific people, government policies that do great harm by cutting across a wide swath of social reality can be masked to such a degree that aspects of war can be made to look like peace.

Conceptual Constellations and the War against Iraq (1991-2003)

In this part of my analysis I shall introduce each conceptual constellation and then use it to examine an aspect of the war against Iraq. Although I begin with direct/physical violence, move to structural/economic violence, and finally examine examples of cultural/symbolic violence, the order is not important. It would be best to think of these three forms of violence as mutually reinforcing and reciprocating processes. Together, wherever we choose to start the analysis, these three conceptual constellations constitute a triad of violence. As I use them in what follows, each constellation serves as a "violence lens" through which we can examine a different dimension of war. I postulate that to wage war requires the enactment of all three violence constellations. In other words, together they serve to define the *process* and *substance* of war.

Conceptual Constellation #1: Direct/Physical Violence

This constellation is primarily concerned with conveying the idea of violence mediated directly through force that is applied to persons in the singular or collective. It is the form of violence most narrow in scope but immediate in effect. Bourdieu understands this to be an aspect of overt violence: there is nothing hidden about it. And it is physical in the sense that it impacts directly (and sometimes via the destruction of property) on our corporeal bodies. This is true whether it is actualized through a knife blade entering a rib cage or a stealth bomber dropping a cluster bomb on a village. In either case the harm that is done to persons is immediate and visible. The imaginaries of war, to borrow Schröder and Schmidt's (2001) word, most readily bring this form of violence to mind. Its effects are generally seen and felt for decades in both scarred bodies and scorched earth (cf. Webster 1996). When we see

this form of violence, we see what we do not want to experience ourselves. There is nothing euphemistic about it. And soldiers, who in war are responsible for deploying this form of violence, must go through extensive training to perpetrate it (Grossman 1995) and many pay dearly for it both during and after the fact (Shay 1994).

Examples from the War against Iraq

Direct/physical violence was evident throughout the war against Iraq. While many will recall the technologically enhanced displays of so-called "shock and awe" at the beginning and end of the war in 1991 and 2003, what was masked for the duration of the war was the constant nature of the direct/physical violence. A constant bombing campaign and a consequent effort by the Iraqis to target the airplanes doing the bombing were a permanent feature of the war. While living in Iraq I experienced this bombing campaign in the field.

On an excursion to the city of Nasariyah, a small city to the south of Baghdad, I visited a famous archeological site (Ur) about eight kilometres from the city. While walking through the site I was brought up short by the unmistakable sound of a rocket igniting and the sound of it winging its way skyward. I was quick enough to turn and see the briefest glint of sunlight on its metal casing as it disappeared into the sky. This was followed by the sound of air raid sirens in Nasariyah coming across the desert, a tragic counterpoint to the beautiful sounds that come from the minarets each day. About five minutes later the "ka-thump, ka-thump" of bombs could be heard falling in the near distance. The sound waves rolled over the desert.

This direct experience of bombing in Iraq was not unusual. Internal UN documents produced by the Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq in Baghdad, clearly showed that intrusive sorties and bombing runs were made over Iraq on a daily basis for the duration of the war. One report analyzed 46 of 143 bombing runs conducted during 1999. It records 110 civilian casualties, 350 serious injuries, over 60 houses destroyed and over 400 livestock killed. Livestock, of course, are a significant source of food and income. There was some acknowledgment of these facts in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* (Myers 1999; Suro 1999).

The exchanges of bombs and missiles ebbed and flowed over the years, as is true in all wars. In his well-researched book, Dilip Hiro records high-times in 1991, 1993 (twice), 1996, 1998 and 2000 when the armies of Iraq and the armies of the United States and Britain exchanged bombs and missiles, the intensity of which could not be hidden (Hiro 2002: 6). In between these high tides of direct/physical violence, there was a constant engagement of military force. In an essay called, "Paying the Price," John Pilger documents one period of the military activity, which gives some indication of its extent:

> During the eighteen months to January 14, 1999, American air force and navy aircraft flew 36 000 sorties over Iraq, including 24 000 combat missions. During 1999, American and British aircraft dropped more than 1800 bombs and hit 450 targets. The cost to British tax-payers is more than £800 million. There is bombing almost every day: it is the largest Anglo-American aerial campaign since the Second World War; yet it is mostly ignored by the American and British media. (Pilger 2002: 76)

Aid workers recounted personal stories about the direct engagement of physical force. Carmen Pauls, who worked and lived in Baghdad for a non-governmental organization at the time, recorded one such incident. "At 6pm, Sunday, July 18th, 1999, a plane dropped a bomb on the main road between Najaf, a city 170 kilometres south of Baghdad, and Monathera city. This highway is lined with homes and mechanics' shops. A second bomb fell near a grain storage silo. Fourteen civilians were killed and 18 wounded, including women and children and labourers on their way home from work" (Pauls 1999). Later in her biweekly report she says that since her earlier report, "an additional 18 persons have been killed and 54 wounded in similar attacks" (1999). In one incident, on May 12, air strikes hit shepherds in their pastures near Mosul, leaving 14 persons dead and 22 wounded.[10]

In the many times that I travelled to the north or south of Iraq between June 2000 and April 2001, I always experienced air raid sirens wailing in the cities I visited. There is no shortage of direct empirical evidence that the bombing was happening and that the Iraqi army was attempting to reply. UN officials consistently filed reports about their experience of being in the vicinity of bombing. It is perhaps worth noting that the weapons being used were not so-called precision guided munitions. In February 2001, well before the invasion of Iraq began, they were cluster bombs. As William Arkin notes, commenting on this particular attack, these are weapons "that have no real aimpoint and that kill and wound innocent civilians for years to come" (Arkin 2001).

Conceptual Constellation #2: Structural/Economic Violence

Although he may not have coined the term, Galtung's name is closely associated with the idea of structural violence (MacQueen 1992: viii). In my travels in India, Palestine and Iraq I have heard the word used with varying

shades of meaning and sophistication. Generally speaking, persons using the phrase "structural violence" are attempting to describe a situation wherein, to use Galtung's definition, "their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations" (Galtung 1969: 110-111). Unlike direct/physical violence this conceptual constellation operates at arms length. As global processes come to the fore, structural/economic violence is often mediated by economic mechanisms like trade policies and sanctions, promoting forceful, often unwanted, change in human collectives. The violence of these economic engines is often resisted and even transformed (Ferguson 1990a; Scott 1985), but still, those who experience it, often in the so-called developing world, recognize it as violence. Social structures work hand-in-hand with economic processes to wreak havoc on civilian populations in war-zones.

A narrow focus on "structural" violence is insufficient for capturing the contours of this form of violence. There is clear evidence that economic processes now dominate the global system of exchange, whether it is an exchange of material or information (here I am influenced by Castells 1996; Castells 1997; Castells 1998). By including explicitly the economic dimension in this constellation, a form of violence not all that new when thought of in terms of the ancient art of the siege, I highlight the central role these processes play in contemporary warfare in a global environment. In the case of Iraq, the combination of structures supporting economic processes led to very tangible impacts on the civilian population.

Examples from the War against Iraq

The application of structural/economic violence in times of war happens through numerous channels. This form of violence is a constitutive part of the cumulative process of war-making. In the war against Iraq, conducted in a globalized environment, it is possible to show that this realm of violence now plays a key role in war. Although sanctions are the clearest example of this violence, the process can take many directions. If an adult experiences malnutrition, for example, there are direct impacts on the family and the nation, according to the biologist, George Sorger. Drawing on his research in El Salvador, he explains that "if you're malnourished and you're sick a lot of the time your potential is low and you will not be able to earn enough wages to feed your family. You will not be competitive with other people who are well-nourished and, therefore, your children will also be malnourished, and you will perpetuate a cycle of malnutrition. That's not only true of families, however, it is also true of whole societies and nations" (Sorger 1992: 72). For the men, women and children of Iraq, who experienced over a decade of deprivation at all levels, the full impact of this violence may not be visible for decades to come. But the voice of an Iraqi nurse with whom I was sitting in a small office in 1991 remains clear. She asked, "Why does your country support policies that are killing our children?"

Electrical grid systems were targeted early in the war. During my first visit to Iraq in March of 1991 I saw Baghdad and Karbala which had been without electricity for many weeks. I recorded in a report from that trip that all means of communication were destroyed, water purification and sewage systems were not functioning and public transportation was at a standstill. The entire city of Baghdad was silent (recorded in Bertell 2000: 37-40). Daniel Kuehl, a military strategist, published an article analyzing "Electrical Power as a Target for Strategic Air Operations" in which he documents that "The first week's attacks cut Iraq's generating capacity by approximately 75 per cent, and follow-on attacks extended that even further so that by war's end the system had been reduced to only about 15 per cent of its prewar capacity" (Kuehl 1995: 254). The destruction of this vital power grid inevitably led to the breakdown of the water and sewage treatment facilities. In an important piece of research, Thomas Nagy uncovered US government reports done in 1991 that predicted widespread disease in the civilian population as a result of this breakdown (Nagy 2001).

The negative impact of sanctions on the civilian population of Iraq was carefully documented over the course of the war. A constant stream of reports from the United Nations, NGOs and independent study teams were published at the beginning, during the middle and towards the end of the war against Iraq. They sounded a consistent, and virtually unanimous, tone marked by urgency.

Based on infant mortality rates, the United Nation's Food and Agricultural (FAO) study team members produced a controversial report that concluded that by December of 1995 567 000 Iraqi children had died in the first five years of sanctions (Clark and The UN Food and Agriculture Organization 1996). Their study did not include vulnerable groups like the elderly and homeless. Richard Garfield later produced a study that significantly lowered this figure to about 250 000 (Garfield 1999), also controversially. In either case, the impact on Iraqi families was significant. Nuha al-Radi records in her diary this report from a woman friend in 1994:

> Her daughter said that a lot of kids have stopped going to school, the parents can't afford to buy exercise books and pencils. A friend of hers who lives in Mansur told her that her thirteen-year-old daughter had locked

> herself in her room crying because she wanted to walk down the main shopping street and her mother said no. "I can't afford to let her," she said. "Everything costs in the thousands. I can barely afford to give them a sandwich to take to school." This is a middle class family living in a good neighbourhood, and reasonably well off. (Al-Radi 1998: 65)

The impact of sanctions extended from school age children up to university professors. An Iraqi university student writes of this in December 2002: "I appreciate the role these sanctions had in making a country full of riches so poor. I appreciate watching my professors having to sell their whole personal libraries to survive, and seeing their books being bought by UN staff who take them home as souvenirs. I have so much appreciation it is flowing out of my ears" he says (Pax 2003: 50). Few people in North America have an appreciation for the large quantity of personal possessions that were sold to make ends meet. The extent of it will likely never be known.

The accounts of personal experiences were supported by "official" reports along the way. These reports came up with findings that repeated the *same* findings on a regular basis for those following the issue beginning in 1991: The March Special Report to the UN by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, the Harvard Study Team's careful analysis in May, two months later the Special Report to the UN by Sadruddin Aga Khan, and then the comprehensive study completed by the International Study Team in October. There were also reports by UNICEF, the WHO and numerous first-hand accounts by those who visited the region. Ahtisaari, a Special Rapporteur to the Secretary-General of the UN at the time, invoked in his first postwar report the now familiar metaphor of the apocalypse:

> The recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology. (Ahtisaari 1991: 5)

The Harvard and International Study Teams gave clear warning of the impending disastrous situation for children of Iraq (Ascherio, et al. 1992; Harvard Study Team 1991a; Harvard Study Team 1991b; International Study Team 1991). All indicated a four-fold rise in infant mortality rates and suggested that it would remain stable at that high rate, while health conditions in general would deteriorate further. As noted above, the destruction of the infrastructure had incapacitated water and sewage treatment, resulting in widespread water-borne diseases. Diarrhoea, for example, became a major cause of death (see also Bloom, Miller, Warner and Winkler 1994; Dreze and Gazdar 1991; Middle East Watch 1991). The Center for Economic and Social Rights, UNICEF and the World Health Organization produced similar reports. The WHO closed its 1996 report with this warning:

> The vast majority of the country's population has been on a semi-starvation diet for years. This tragic situation has tremendous implications on the health status of the population and on their quality of life, not only for the present generation, but for the future generation as well....[T]he world community should seriously consider the implications of an entire generation of children growing up with such traumatized mental handicaps, if they survive at all. (World Health Organization 1996: 16-17)

Throughout the intervening years of the war well-researched, credible reports were tabled. In 1995, 1996, 1997 and 2000 UNICEF presented findings that echoed earlier reports. In his October 1996 press release, Philippe Heffinck, then UNICEF representative for Iraq, said: "The situation is disastrous for children. Many are living on the very margin of survival." He added that "around 4500 children under the age of five are dying here every month from hunger and disease." UNICEF's November 1997 report continues to see an alarming situation in Iraq "with 32 percent of children under the age of five, some 960 000 children, chronically malnourished." UNICEF observes that "chronic malnutrition has long term implications on a child's physical and mental development. After a child reaches two or three, chronic malnutrition is difficult to reverse and damage on the child's development is likely to be permanent."[11] The 2000 UNICEF report continued to indicate high levels of infant mortality rates and malnutrition. The report asserted that,

> Iraq begins the new millennium with high child mortality rates (131 per 1000 live births in the south and centre of Iraq) and more than 20% of Iraq's 3.5 million children are suffering from various degrees of malnutrition. The situation is made worse by the lack of progress in arresting the rapid decline in essential social infrastructure. The limitations of the SCR 986 programme prior to SCR 1330 did not allow the Government to plan for the comprehensive rehabilitation of the primary health care system, primary education system, or the water and sanitation systems. These

essential public services have continued to suffer from a lack of maintenance and therefore decreasing capacity, a lack of electricity which further cuts capacity and efficiency, particularly in the water and sanitation sector and rapidly increasing demand through population growth.

The report went on to say that "child malnutrition has remained entrenched" and "diarrhoea leading to death from dehydration, and acute respiratory infections (ARI) together account for 70% of child deaths" (UNICEF Iraq 2000: 6-7).

My brief overview of structural/economic violence demonstrates that between 1990 and 2003 there was significant harm done to the population of Iraq by policies enacted through several large administrative bodies including national governments and the United Nations. Although it would be difficult to hold any one person responsible for this violence, (following Galtung), it cannot be denied that people in Iraq experienced it as a part of the war.

Conceptual Constellation #3: Cultural/Symbolic Violence

The idea of symbolization helps to narrow the use of the word culture in this constellation. By cultural violence Galtung means, "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)—that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence" (Galtung 1990: 291). Culture as I use the term cannot be violent; people are violent. Humans have the capacity to create symbols and rituals that call into being a sense of a person or people to whom some other person or persons want to do harm. In order to facilitate that harm a negative construction of the "Other" is necessary. The negative construction of the "Other" is a dynamic process that goes much deeper than an us/them dichotomy and strikes at the core of another person's "humanness" in a process of dehumanization. Bourdieu's comments on symbolic violence reveal other facets of this idea cluster. He writes,

> Symbolic violence...is a violence exercised, so to speak, in formal terms, and paying due respect to forms. Paying due respect to forms means giving an action or a discourse the form which is recognized as suitable, legitimate, approved, that is, a form of a kind that allows the open production, in public view, of a wish or a practice that, if presented in any other way, would be unacceptable (this is the function of the euphemism). The force of the form...is that properly symbolic force which allows force to be fully exercised while disguising its true nature as force and gaining recognition, approval and acceptance by dint of the fact that it can present itself under the appearances of universality—that of reason or morality. (Bourdieu 1990 (1983): 84-85)

The purpose of this form of violence, then, is primarily to mask what would otherwise be unacceptable. Subsumed in this constellation is the idea of epistemic violence, which I derive from a reading of Gayatri Spivak (1988). Epistemic violence refers to the deliberate attempt to undermine and destroy entire systems of knowledge. Nordstrom, again, helps to clarify this form of violence. "If we accept the premise that reality is socially constructed," drawing on Schutz, Berger and Luckman (Berger and Luckman 1984 (1966); Schutz and Luckman 1973), "then the disruption of the basis of social relations and the shared epistemological truths on which it rests necessarily imperils people's ability to continue to construct a significant reality" (Nordstrom 1992: 268).

> Since culture and epistemology are...naturally regenerating phenomena, the disabling of cultural knowledge per se does not represent irreconcilable devastation. There is a danger in this process, however.
>
> Schutz and Luckman (1973) have postulated that life-worlds—socially constructed knowledge systems so essential to cultural viability they are taken to represent reality in its most fundamental sense—ground human endeavor, conceptual and actual. While knowledge systems are not inherently consummate, the reality of the life-world(s) resting on them depends on the illusion that their integrity remains unchallenged. When the viability of the life-world is challenged, the sense of reality itself is simultaneously challenged....
>
> But during a war—when families are scattered, communities destroyed, and valued life-world traditions have been bankrupt by difficulty, terror, and need—epistemological systems that would normally provide the raw material for repairing impoverished frameworks of knowledge and meaning are being seriously undermined by the viciousness of the widespread violence. (Nordstrom 1992: 268-269)

This cluster of ideas conveys a sense of the intangible, but absolutely necessary process of generating enemies in times of war. When this form of violence works well, "the victims themselves become the template on which power-loaded scripts are inscribed" (Nordstrom 1992: 266). We have all experienced this process either as symbol bearers or as witnesses to the violence perpetrated in its name. At times the culture within which we live demeans the epistemological systems that support the ability of others to survive the more direct forms of violence. Moreover, collectives, as is well-known, studied and illustrated in the

next section, can be led to believe, through the manipulation of symbol and ritual, in blatant falsehoods.

Examples from the War against Iraq

Perhaps the clearest example of the process of negatively constructing the "Other" was the quick identification of Saddam Hussein with Hitler, a powerful symbol of "evil." This image of Saddam Hussein was laid out in prominent media sources under the banner of "this generation's Hitler" (Safire 1991: 211). He certainly was never granted the status of a "President." By reducing and reifying the person called Saddam to an "evil madman" the work of culturally constructing the enemy was well under way. This same process was engaged in Iraq. I recall distinctly stepping around the inlaid mosaic representation of George Bush's face on the floor at the entrance of the now famous Al-Rachid Hotel.

A key to accomplishing the negative construction of "Iraq" was to tell a story that placed the blame for the deaths of innocent victims squarely on the soon-to-be enemy. Chris Hedges retells the story of how this process was started in the case of the war against Iraq. The story bears repeating in full:

> Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it was widely disseminated that Iraqi soldiers removed hundreds of Kuwaiti babies from incubators and left them to die on hospital floors. The story, when we arrived in Kuwait and were able to check with doctors at the hospitals, turned out to be false. But by then the tale had served its purpose. The story came from a fifteen-year-old Kuwaiti who identified herself only as "Nayirah" when she tearfully testified before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on October 10, 1990. She said she had watched fifteen infants being taken from incubators in the Al-Adan Hospital in Kuwait city by Iraqi soldiers who "left the babies on the cold floor to die." Nayirah turned out later to be the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States, Saud Nasir al-Sabah. She did not grant interviews after the war and it was never established whether she was actually in the country when the invasion took place. (Hedges 2002: 144-145)

In public speaking engagements between 2001 and 2003, I was still asked frequently about the veracity of this story, even though it has been widely reported and shown to be false for over a decade. This gives some indication of the resilience of symbols brought to life in stories that create the context within which more overt forms of violence are then enacted. Those hearing "the baby story" in 1991, as Hedges indicates, became "enmeshed in the imposed language" (Hedges 2002: 145). Meanwhile, any subtlety in this constructed falsehood, a subtlety that may have been felt by those listening to the story when it was first told in 1991, becomes obvious manipulation as it was told in the context of 2003.

To reinforce the idea that Iraqi soldiers and their Commander-in-Chief were a dangerous threat to those who would war with them, it was important that they be able to physically "reach" North America and Europe, for only with the threat of reciprocal direct/physical violence would the symbol take on sufficiently deep meaning to bear the weight of ongoing war. To that end, as is now quite clear, a careful argument was made (Colin Powell's 2003 presentation to the United Nations Security Council being one of the most public enactments of this false information) over the course of the entire war beginning in 1991, that nuclear, chemical and biological weapons were virtually "in the hands" of the Iraqi government. "With remarkable unanimity," says one commentator who has reviewed the documents related to this case, "former Iraqi scientists interviewed since...[2003] about the status of the weapons programs...have all maintained that the regime did, in fact, destroy those stockpiles in the early 1990s, as it claimed" (Scheer, Scheer and Chaudhry 2003: 76). The discourse that reinforced the social construction of "weapons of mass destruction" as a symbol system is a part of the larger process of war.

Another striking example of cultural/symbolic violence came in an article by Fouad Ajami, published in the widely read journal *Foreign Affairs.* Ajami writes:

> No sooner had the Arab/Muslim world said farewell to the wrath and passion of the Ayatollah Khomeini's crusade than another contender rose in Baghdad. The new claimant was made of material different from the turbaned saviour from Qum: Saddam Hussein was not a writer of treatises in Islamic government nor a product of high learning in religious seminaries. Not for him were the drawn-out ideological struggles for the hearts and minds of the faithful. He came from a brittle land, a frontier country between Persia and Arabia, with little claim to culture and books and grand ideas. The new contender was a despot, a ruthless and skilled warden who had tamed his domain and turned it into a large prison. (Ajami 1990-91: 1)

What Ajami has done is to put the symbol/name "Saddam" in direct association with a negative assessment of cultural achievement, for example, a "brittle land" with "little claim to culture and books and grand ideas." This example exemplifies the negative construction of the "Other." In other words, Ajami is effectively disabling cultural knowledge in order to create a sense of "the Iraqi

people," a highly abstracted symbol launched through time and space, that helps to create the cultural conditions whereby direct/physical and structural/economic forms of violence can be enacted.

The trajectory of this process is clear: when "Saddam" is heard or read in this context, a host of symbolic associations are made— the creation of negative knowledge— which mask the epistemic violence that goes into the creation of an enemy. Based on my own experience, many people in North America thought of "evil mad man," "possessor of weapons of mass destruction," and "someone who is capable of attacking 'my country,'" when this symbol/name was seen or heard. Note that when the "real" Saddam Hussein was captured, he was quickly removed from the scene, for to allow him to be seen as a bedraggled soldier for too long could re-awaken the reality that he is as human as he is symbol. The perpetuation of the symbol/image requires that his presentation to the public be well prepared.

What the process of telling false stories about the killing of innocent babies, the repetition of false claims about weapons of mass destruction and the participation of academics in the construction of false knowledge has done is to mask the reality that millions of people in Iraq continue to try to go about their daily lives, in the same manner that people in Canada try to go about their daily lives. The negative construction of the "Other," operationalized through cultural/symbolic forms of violence, was highly effective in the case of the war against Iraq.

Looking Forward to a Conclusion

In this essay I have demarcated the war against Iraq. My approach has been to use an expanded understanding of violence to interrogate the theoretical and practical boundaries of the war. To that end, I proposed three conceptual constellations, each one capturing a form of violence. This model could be applied to other war zones. By doing so, we could test whether these three forms of violence exist in all cases of war. We would need to modify the model if we were to find that another conceptual constellation needed to be included. One that I did not develop here, for example, but which I think bears investigation, arises from a feminist critique of sexism and its relationship to war (Cohn 1988; Elshtain 1987; Enloe 1993; Reardon 1996 [1985]).

This analysis, whatever its shortcomings, does effectively demonstrate that the conventional paradigm used to frame the case of Iraq is but one of many possible ways to understand the war against Iraq. I would go further and contend that what I have called the conventional view of the Iraq case is an ideologically and politically motivated construction (as is this one at another level) and should be challenged by alternative perspectives. For anthropologists one primary source of those alternative views must be the experience of the men, women and children who lived with the consequences of violence on the part of *both* their own government and foreign entities.[12]

The argument I have made imposes a different structure on our understanding of the course of historical events now unfolding in the geographical region of the Middle East. In this narrative there is a series of escalating stages. A long-standing conflict between the governments of Iraq and Kuwait was escalated when the government of Iraq occupied the country of Kuwait. When a cohort of countries led by the government of the United States intervened in the occupation, the conflict escalated into a state of war. Eventually that war was ended by yet another occupation. This time, however, it was the country of Iraq that was occupied. There is a great deal of resistance (the resistance should not be a surprise) to the occupation of the country. The contours of how the occupation will end are still unfolding at the time of writing this essay. To what conclusion do the people of Iraq look forward? Will the occupation be followed by civil war? However the occupation and the resistance to it is brought to an end, I have attempted to point towards a different language to talk about it and a different history not yet written (the subject of a much larger project).

It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the extraordinary amount of energy going into theoretical research and practical development of the instruments of war. That research and development is taking place primarily in the three realms of violence I have identified in this essay. (Obviously, I have not and will not be granted access to information that would verify that this is indeed happening; nevertheless, the evidence clearly points in this direction.) In his analysis of the role of the intellectual, Edward Said suggested that at bottom the intellectual is "neither a pacifier nor a consensus builder, but someone whose whole being is staked on a critical sense, a sense of being unwilling to accept easy formulas, or ready made clichés, or the smooth, ever-so-accommodating confirmation of what the powerful or conventional have to say, and what they do" (Said 1994: 23). If he is correct, then the best anthropologists can do is to develop still more sophisticated analyses of war and violence that do not accept formulas developed by those who wish to justify war for political reasons.

In a remarkable essay referring specifically to the invasion of Iraq, a Catholic nun asks the radical question, "Is there anything left that matters" (Chittister 2003)? Her question is disturbing. Does it matter whether we

think of two short, limited wars, as opposed to one long war? Is it possible that those who prosecute war, expanding and developing their skills at all levels, have realized that there is growing popular opposition to the use of war as a form of conflict resolution? If the war against Iraq had been framed *as a war*, could it have been sustained for 13 years?

The war against Iraq was rendered opaque by a complex set of variables, the net effect of which has been to mask the full extent of the violence it occasioned. If we see the war against Iraq clearly, then our theoretical paradigms will have to be significantly different from those that we have accepted to this point, which were paradigms presented for the most part by political and intellectual representatives who have supported either passively or actively a conventional view. Anthropologists, who by and large have not engaged in the debate so far, *can* speak about the war against Iraq and help to establish new paradigms to study it.

There are hundreds of books already written on various aspects of the case of Iraq based on a mistaken paradigm, namely, that there were two brief wars separated by a period of relative peace. Is this construction true to the reality that people in Iraq have experienced over the past decade and a half? In this essay I have suggested that this is not so. Although I have read scores of books on Iraq published over the past 15 years, I remain puzzled that so few of these books or essays challenge this view. Increasingly voices from the region reflect the reality of war experienced by people in Iraq (Al-Radi 1998; Pax 2003; Riverbend 2005). With those voices, and new theoretical models, it may be possible to resist "the easy formulas, or ready made clichés, or the smooth, ever-so-accommodating confirmations of what the powerful or conventional have to say" (Said 1994: 23). Although resisting those formulas will not be easy, doing so will help to ensure that the path of our inquiry leads us back to children, women and men living in the war zones that we study.

In sum, I reject the conventional view of what happened in Iraq and encourage others to do the same. "The Gulf War" and "the Iraq War" are socio-cultural fabrications in mainstream North American culture, representing in crass form the political and social construction of knowledge with the power to enable and to sustain, for long periods of time, war "right under our noses." There was no "new" war with Iraq in 2003 as an extension of the "war against terrorism;" for the war against Iraq, quite literally, continued for some 13 years. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was indeed the final chapter in the war against Iraq. The effect of the war against Iraq (1991-2003) and the subsequent occupation of Iraq (2003-?) will be felt for decades, if not longer, in the Middle East, North America and globally. For men, women and children in Iraq it was a very long war that came on the heels of another very long war. And now they experience occupation and the violence it occasions. As anthropologists, how do we respond to this alarming fact?

Richard McCutcheon, Assistant Professor, Conflict Resolution Studies, Menno Simons College, affiliated with the University of Winnipeg, 520 Portage Avenue, Suite 210, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3C 0G2, Canada. E-mail: r.mccutcheon@uwinnipeg.ca

Notes

1 My involvement with the war against Iraq began with two trips to Iraq in March and October of 1991 to do needs assessments for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) immediately following the initial heavy bombardment of the country by a United States led cohort of countries. What I saw and experienced during those trips opened my eyes to the reality of war on the ground and was the catalyst for asking questions about the conduct of war in contemporary times. Nine years later, in 2000-2001, I returned to the Middle East, this time with my wife Tamara Fleming, to live for a year as country field representatives for two NGOs. About eight months of the year was spent in Iraq, based in Baghdad with frequent trips to the north and south of the country. Our primary responsibility was to administer and to act as liaisons for rehabilitation and reconstruction projects primarily funded by the aid organizations we represented and facilitated through local NGO partnerships. I thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for three years of doctoral funding that enabled my research at a formative point. Although errors in this paper remain my responsibility, for their help in clarifying the ideas presented here I thank Winnie Lem, Ellen Judd, Mark Vorobej, Richard Preston, Tamara Fleming and anonymous reviewers. This paper is dedicated to my brother Gerald.

2 In common parlance the early phase of the war against Iraq is referred to as "the Gulf War" (1991) while the later phase is commonly referred to as either "Gulf War II" or "the Iraq War" (2003). "The invasion of Iraq" has taken root as a favoured label for those who criticize the US administration's policy. These labels are still contested, although there appears to be a general preference for "the Iraq War" when referring to the later phase. I have used the phrase, "the war against Iraq," to indicate that I situate myself within a North American cultural context deliberately writing against the grain of commonly accepted labels applied to this conflict.

3 To give some idea of how much material has been published, since 1990 I have collected some 18 linear feet of books related to the case of Iraq and a half dozen banker's boxes full of articles, clippings and other gray literature.

4 Whatever its shortcomings, Simons does provide in her article already cited an excellent overview and critical commentary on work published within anthropology and related disciplines on the topic of war (Simons 1999), which in turn

builds on numerous earlier review articles (e.g. Ferguson 1984a; Ferguson 1990b; Harrison 1996; Otterbein 1973; Wolf 1987).

5 There were many indicators of the Government of Iraq's deeply entrenched dispute with the Government of Kuwait during the years immediately prior to the Government of Iraq's decision to occupy Kuwait in 1990.

6 I believe the authors intend this to be "experiential," although it is possible they mean to say that all experiential approaches to war and violence are also "experimental."

7 Wolf provides a useful overview and critical commentary on the contribution of this school of thought to anthropological discourse (Wolf 2001).

8 Personal correspondence.

9 In two previous essays I began to use one or the other and consistently found that when I arrived at a certain point in my analysis I required the other's set of ideas (McCutcheon 2002; McCutcheon 2004).

10 This information is archived at Mennonite Central Committee headquarters in Akron, Pennsylvania.

11 Copy on file with the author. These press releases are available from UNICEF.

12 My wife and I were under constant surveillance while living in Iraq. Out of respect for the people who worked with us in Iraq and as requested by the NGOs with whom we worked, we did not keep extensive notes of our conversations. We were aware that people who we visited often were questioned later by government officials. This raises the thorny question of how to record information and still "do no harm" while living with intensive government surveillance. Mary B. Anderson has provided a useful guide for NGO workers that may have general application for anthropologists as well (Anderson 1999).

References

Ahtisaari, Martti
1991 United Nations—The Impact of War on Iraq: Report to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis Environment by a Mission to the Area Led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, Dated 20 March 1991. Westfield: Open Magazine Pamphlet Series.

Aijmer, Göran, and Jon Abbink, eds.
2000 Meanings of Violence: A Cross Cultural Perspective. Oxford: Berg.

Ajami, Faoud
1990-91 The Summer of Arab Discontent. Foreign Affairs 69(5): 1-20.

Al-Radi, Nuha
1998 Baghdad Diaries. London: Saqi Books.

Anderson, Mary B.
1999 Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Arkin, William M.
2001 America Cluster Bombs Iraq. Common Dreams News Center. Electronic document, http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0226-06.htm, accessed February 15, 2006.

Arnove, Anthony, ed.
2000 Iraq under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War. London: Pluto Press.

Aruri, Naseer
2003 America's War against Iraq, 1990-2002. *In* Iraq: Its History, People, and Politics. S.C. Inati, ed. Pp. 283-301. New York: Humanity Books.

Ascherio, Alberto, R. Chase, T. Cote, G. Dehaes, E. Hoskins, J. Laaouej, M. Passey, S. Qaderi, S. Shuqaidef, M.C. Smith, et al.
1992 Effect of the Gulf War on Infant and Child Mortality in Iraq. New England Journal of Medicine 327: 931-936.

Aziz, Barbara Nimri
1997 Gravesites: Environmental Ruin in Iraq. *In* Metal of Dishonor: Depleted Uranium. Pp. 155-163. New York: International Action Center.

Bauman, Zygmunt
1989 Modernity and the Holocaust. New York: Cornell University Press.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckman
1984 (1966) The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Bertell, Rosalie
2000 Planet Earth: The Newest Weapon of War. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Bloom, Saul, John M. Miller, James Warner and Philippa Winkler, eds.
1994 Hidden Casualties: Environmental, Health and Political Consequences of the Persian Gulf War. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books.

Bourdieu, Pierre
1977 Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1990 In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
1994 (1977) Structures, Habitus, Power: Basis for a Theory of Symbolic Power. *In* Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory. N.B. Dirks, G. Eley and S.B. Ortner, eds. Pp. 155-199. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bringa, Tone
1995 Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Castells, Manuel
1996 The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol 1: The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell.
1997 The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol 2: The Power of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell.
1998 The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol 3: End of Millennium. Oxford: Blackwell.

Chittister, Joan
2003 Is there anything left that matters? Electronic document, http://www.nationalcatholicreporter.org/fwis/fw052703.htm, accessed February 15, 2006.

Chubin, Shahram, and Charles Tripp
1988 Iran and Iraq at War. London: I.B. Tauris.

Clark, Ramsey, and The UN Food and Agriculture Organization
1996 The Children are Dying: The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq. New York: World View Forum.
Cohn, Carol
1988 Sex and Death and the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals. *In* Women on War. D. Gioseffi, ed. Pp. 84-99. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Colson, Elizabeth
1992 Conflict and Violence. *In* The Paths to Domination, Resistance and Terror. C. Nordstrom and J. Martin, eds. Pp. 277-283. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Cordesman, Anthony H.
1999 Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Westport: Praeger.
Cordesman, Anthony H., and Ahmed S. Hashim
1997 Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond. Boulder: Westview Press.
Cortright, David, and George A. Lopez, eds.
1995 Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? Boulder: Westview Press.
Cortright, David, and George A. Lopez
2000 The Sanctions Decade: Assessing U.N. Strategies in the 1990s. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Daniel, E. Valentine
1996 Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropography of Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Das, Veena, Arthur Kleinman, Mamphela Ramphele and Pamela Reynolds, eds.
2000 Violence and Subjectivity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Doxey, Margaret P.
1997 United Nations Sanctions: Current Policy Issues. Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.
Dreze, Jean, and Haris Gazdar
1991 Hunger and Poverty in Iraq. London: Suntory-Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines.
Duffield, Mark
2000 Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies. *In* Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. M. Berdal and D.M. Malone, eds. Pp. 69-89. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Eller, Jack David
1999 From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke
1987 Women and War. New York: Basic Books.
Enloe, Cynthia
1993 The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fawcett, Brian
1986 Cambodia: A Book for People Who Find Television Too Slow. Vancouver: Talonbooks.
Feldman, Allen
1994 On Cultural Anesthesia: From Desert Storm to Rodney King. American Ethnologist 21(2): 404-418.
Ferguson, James
1990 The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Ferguson, R. Brian
1984 Studying War. *In* Warfare, Culture and Environment. R.B. Ferguson, ed. Pp. 1-81. New York: Academic Press.
1989 Anthropology and War: Theory, Politics, Ethics. *In* The Anthropology of War and Peace: Perspectives on the Nuclear Age. P.R. Turner, D. Pitt, and Contributors, eds. Pp. 141-159. Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey.
1990 Explaining War. *In* The Anthropology of War. J. Haas, ed. Pp. 26-55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1995a Infrastructural Determinism. *In* Science, Materialism, and the Study of Culture. M.F. Murphy and M.L. Margolis, eds. Pp. 21-38. Gainsville: University of Florida Press.
1995b Yanomami Warfare: A Political History. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press.
2000 A Paradigm for the Study of War and Society. *In* War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds. K. Raaflaub and N. Rosenstein, eds. Pp. 389-437. Cambridge: Center for Hellenic Studies and Harvard University Press.
2001 Materialist, Cultural and Biological Theories on Why Yanomami Make War. Anthropological Theory 1(1): 99-116.
2003 Introduction: Violent Conflict and Control of the State. *In* The State, Identity and Violence: Political Disintegration in the Post-Cold War World. R.B. Ferguson, ed. Pp. 1-58. New York: Routledge.
Ferguson, R. Brian, ed.
1984 Warfare, Culture, and Environment. New York: Academic Press.
Ferguson, R. Brian, and Leslie E. Farragher
1988 The Anthropology of War: A Bibliography. New York: Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.
Ferguson, R. Brian, and Neil L. Whitehead, eds.
1992 War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press.
Ferguson, R. Brian, ed.
2003 The State, Identity and Violence: Political Disintegration in the Post-Cold War World. London: Routledge.
Fisk, Larry, and John Schellenberg, eds.
2000 Patterns of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Peterborough: Broadview Press.
Galtung, Johan
1969 Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research 6(3): 167-191.
1990 Cultural Violence. Journal of Peace Research 27(3): 291-305.
1996 Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. Oslo and London: International Peace Research Institute and Sage Publications.

Garfield, Richard
1999 Morbidity and Mortality among Iraqi Children from 1990 to 1998: Assessing the Impact of Economic Sanctions. Goshen: Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame and the Fourth Freedom Forum.

Gilligan, James
1996 Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic. New York: Vintage Books.

Glossop, Ronald J.
1994 Confronting War: An Examination of Humanity's Most Pressing Problem. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company.

González, Roberto J., ed.
2004 Anthropologists in the Public Sphere: Speaking out on War, Peace, and American Power. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Graham-Brown, Sarah
1999 Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq. London: I.B. Tauris.

Gray, Chris Hables
1997 Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict. New York: Guilford Press.

Grossman, Dave
1995 On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. Boston: Little, Brown.

Harrison, Simon
1996 War, Warfare. *In* Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology. A. Barnard and J. Spencer, eds. New York: Routledge.

Harvard Study Team
1991a The Effect of the Gulf Crisis on the Children of Iraq. New England Journal of Medicine 325: 977-980.
1991b Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War. Unpublished report.

Hedges, Chris
2002 War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. New York: Anchor Books.

Hinton, Alexander Laban
2002 Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hiro, Dilip
1989 The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict. London: Grafton Books.
2002 Iraq: In the Eye of the Storm. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press.

Hitchens, Christopher
2003 A Long Short War: The Postponed Liberation of Iraq. Toronto: Penguin Canada.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F.
1999 Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ignatieff, Michael
2000 Virtual War. Toronto: Penguin Books.

International Study Team
1991 Health and Welfare in Iraq After the Gulf Crisis. Electronic document, http://cesr.org/node/view/517, accessed February 15, 2006.

Kaldor, Mary
1999 New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Keane, John
1996 Reflections on Violence. London: Verso.

Kelly, Raymond C.
2000 Warless Societies and the Origin of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kleinman, Arthur, Veena Das and Margaret Lock, eds.
1997 Social Suffering. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Krug, Etienne G., Linda L. Dahlberg, James A. Mercy, Anthony B. Zwi and Rafael Lozano, eds.
2002 World Report on Violence and Health. Geneva: World Health Organization.

Kuehl, Daniel T.
1995 Airpower vs. Electricity: Electrical Power as a Target for Strategic Air Operations. The Journal of Strategic Studies 18(1): 237-266.

Lederach, John Paul
1995 Preparing For Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Lutz, Catherine, and Donald Nonini
1999 The Economies of Violence and the Violence of Economies. *In* Anthropological Theory Today. H.L. Moore, ed. Pp. 73-113. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Maalouf, Amin
2000 In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong. New York: Penguin Books.

MacQueen, Graeme
1992 Introduction. *In* Unarmed Forces: Nonviolent Action in Central America and the Middle East. G. MacQueen, ed. Pp. v-xvii. Toronto: Samuel Stevens/Science for Peace.

Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley
2000 Trials by Fire: Dynamics of Terror in Punjab and Kashmir. *In* Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror. J.A. Sluka, ed. Pp. 70-90. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

McCutcheon, Richard
2002 The Iraq War as Globalized War. Waterloo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares.
2004 Global Processes and Violence: Reflections on War with Iraq. *In* Globalization and Community: Canadian Perspectives. J.-L. Chodkiewicz and R. Wiest, eds. Pp. 179-190, 268-270. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Anthropology Papers 34.

Middle East Watch
1991 Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Murphy, Martin F., and Maxine L. Margolis, eds.
1995 Science, Materialism, and the Study of Culture. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Myers, Steven Lee
1999 In Intense but Little-Noticed Fight, Allies Have Bombed Iraq All Year. New York Times, August 13, 1999, A1.

Nagy, Thomas J.
2001 The Secret behind the Sanctions: How the U.S. Intentionally Destroyed Iraq's Water Supply. The Progressive 65(9): 22-25.
Nordstrom, Carolyn
1992 The Backyard Front. *In* The Paths to Domination, Resistance and Terror. C. Nordstrom and J. Martin, eds. Pp. 260-274. Berkeley: University of California Press.
1997 A Different Kind of War Story. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
2004a Postscript: The War of the Month Club—Iraq. *In* Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century. Pp. 245-249. Berkeley: University of California Press.
2004b Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Nordstrom, Carolyn, and JoAnn Martin
1992a The Culture of Conflict: Field Reality and Theory. *In* The Paths to Domination, Resistance and Terror. C. Nordstrom and J. Martin, eds. Pp. 3-17. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Nordstrom, Carolyn, and JoAnn Martin, eds.
1992b The Paths to Domination, Resistance and Terror. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Nordstrom, Carolyn, and Antonius C.G.M. Robben, eds.
1995 Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Norman, Richard
1995 Ethics, Killing and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ortner, Sherry B.
1973 On Key Symbols. American Anthropologist 75: 1338-1346.
Otterbein, Keith F.
1973 The Anthropology of War. J.J. Honigman, ed. Pp. 923-958. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Pauls, Carmen
1999 Report from the Field. Mennonite Central Committee News Service.
Pax, Salam
2003 The Baghdad Blog. Toronto: McArthur & Company.
Pelletiere, Stephen C.
1992 The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum. New York: Praeger.
Pilger, John
2002 The New Rulers of the World. London: Verso.
Reardon, Betty A.
1996 (1985) Sexism and the War System. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
Research Unit for Political Economy
2003 Behind the Invasion of Iraq. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Reyna, S.P., and R.E. Downs, eds.
1994 Studying War: Anthropological Perspectives. Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach.
Riverbend
2005 Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog from Iraq. New York: The Feminist Press of the City University of New York.
Robben, Antonius C.G.M., and Carolyn Nordstrom
1995 The Anthropology and Ethnography of Violence and Sociopolitical Conflict. *In* Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival. C. Nordstrom and A.C.G.M. Robben, eds. Pp. 1-23. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Roy, Arundhati
2003 War Talk. Cambridge: South End Press.
Safire, William
1991 The Hitler Analogy. *In* The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions. M.L. Sifry and C. Cerf, eds. Pp. 210-212. Toronto: Random House.
Said, Edward W.
1994 Representations of the Intellectual. New York: Pantheon Books.
Scheer, Christopher, Robert Scheer and Lakshmi Chaudhry
2003 The Five Biggest Lies Bush Told Us about Iraq. Brooklyn and New York: Akashic Books and Seven Stories Press.
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy
1992 Death without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Northeast Brazil. Berkeley: University of California Press.
2002 Coming to Our Senses: Anthropology and Genocide. *In* Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide. A.L. Hinton, ed. Pp. 348-381. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy, and Philippe Bourgois, eds.
2004 Violence in War and Peace. Oxford: Blackwell.
Schmidt, Bettina E., and Ingo W. Schröder, eds.
2001 Anthropology of Violence and Conflict. New York: Routledge.
Schröder, Ingo W., and Bettina E. Schmidt
2001 Introduction: Violent Imaginaries and Violent Practices. *In* Anthropology of Violence and Conflict. B.E. Schmidt and I.W. Schröder, eds. Pp. 1-24. New York: Routledge.
Schutz, Alfred, and Thomas Luckman
1973 The Structure of the Life-World. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Scott, James C.
1985 Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Shapiro, Michael J.
1997 Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Shay, Jonathan
1994 Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Simons, Anna
1999 War: Back to the Future. Annual Review of Anthropology 28: 73-108.
Sluka, Jeffrey A., ed.
2000 Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Sorger, George
1992 The Political Economy of Malnutrition in Central America. *In* Unarmed Forces: Nonviolent Action in Central America and the Middle East. G. MacQueen, ed. Pp. 70-82. Toronto: Samuel Stevens/Science for Peace.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty
1988 Can the Subaltern Speak? *In* Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg, eds. Pp. 271-313. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Sponsel, Leslie E., and Thomas Gregor, eds.
1994 The Anthropology of Peace and Nonviolence. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Stewart, Pamela J., and Andrew Strathern
2002 Violence: Theory and Ethnography. London and New York: Continuum.
Suro, Roberto
1999 U.S. Air Raids on Iraq Become an Almost Daily Ritual. The Washington Post, August 30, 1999, A3.
UNICEF Iraq
2000 Annual Report—2000. Baghdad: United Nations Childrens' Fund.
van der Dennen, Hans
1981 On War: Concepts, Definitions, Research Data—A Short Literature Review and Bibliography. *In* UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies. Pp. 128-189. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Warren, Kay B., ed.
1993 The Violence Within: Cultural and Political Opposition in Divided Nations. Boulder: Westview Press.
Webster, Donovan
1996 Aftermath: The Remnants of War. New York: Random House.
Wolf, Eric R.
1987 Cycles of Violence: The Anthropology of War and Peace. *In* Waymarks: The Notre Dame Inaugural Lectures in Anthropology. K. Moore, ed. Pp. 127-150. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
2001 Pathways of Power: Building an Anthropology of the Modern World. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Workman, W. Thom
1994 The Social Origins of the Iran-Iraq War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
World Health Organization
1996 The Health Conditions of the Population in Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis. New York: World Health Organization.

Ni la guerre, ni la paix : campagnes de «stabilisation» et violence structurelle chez les Tlapanèques de la *Montaña* du Guerrero (Mexique)

Martin Hébert *Université Laval*

Résumé : Mettant à profit l'acceptation grandissante du concept de violence structurelle en anthropologie, le présent article examine les impacts de diverses interventions gouvernementales faites depuis le début des années soixante-dix dans la région du Guerrero (Mexique) habitée par les Tlapanèques. La compagne militaire menée contre la guérilla de Génaro Vázquez Rojas (1969-72) et les interventions de l'État inspirées par la politique du «développement partagé» (1970-76) et leurs conséquences pour la communauté autochtone de Barranca Tigre sont considérées dans la cadre d'un examen critique de l'idée voulant que le renforcement des structures étatiques et l'intégration au marché soient des gages de paix dans les régions marginales. Compte tenu de la nature des politiques de pacification décrites l'article conclue que la communauté, et la région tlapanèque dans son ensemble, ont connu depuis les années soixante-dix un considérable degré de violence – tant directe que structurelle – qui n'a pas été réduit sensiblement, et à même souvent été augmenté, par les interventions gouvernementales dans la région.

Mots clés : violence, militarisation, peuples autochtones, Guerrero, Mexique

Abstract: Drawing on the growing use of the concept of structural violence in anthropology, the present article examines the impacts of various government interventions and policies that have shaped the Montaña region of Guerrero since the 1970s. The consequences of the military campaign waged against the guerrilla movement of Génaro Vázquez Rojas (1969-72), as well as those of State interventions in the region that have been shaped by the policy of "shared development" (1970-76), are considered here through an analysis of their impacts on indigenous communities in the region in general, and on one Tlapanec community—Barranca Tigre—in particular. This analysis sheds considerable doubt on the oft repeated idea that strengthening State structures in marginalized rural areas, as well as promoting greater integration of these areas in the market economy, will promote peace in such regions. Given the nature of the pacification policies described in this article, which are by no means unique to the time and place considered here, we conclude that the Tlapanecs of Guerrero have known, since the 1970s, a sustained level of violence—both direct and structural—that has not been significantly reduced, and has sometimes been amplified, by governmental "stability promoting" interventions in their region.

Keywords: violence, militarization, indigenous people, Guerrero, Mexico

On assiste, de nos jours, à un effritement important de la distinction traditionnelle faite entre les concepts de guerre et de paix. Ce glissement conceptuel est caractérisé par une utilisation de plus en plus répandue de l'expression passe-partout «ni la paix, ni la guerre» pour désigner une gamme de phénomènes caractérisés par une forme ou une autre de violence, mais qui demeurent néanmoins «en deçà» de l'affrontement armé entre groupes militaires clairement définis. L'expression a été utilisée, par exemple, pour caractériser des conflits qui présentent une certaine accalmie, mais qui peuvent connaître une escalade rapide vers la violence directe à grande échelle (ICG 2001; Manikkalingam 2002) et revêt parfois cette connotation dans la littérature anthropologique (Nordstrom 2004).

Dans le discours des études stratégiques et des *security studies,* l'expression «ni la paix, ni la guerre» sert à rendre compte de l'effet créé par l'accumulation de diverses menaces non militaires sapant le pouvoir étatique. Selon cette perspective que l'on pourrait qualifier de «sécuritariste», ces menaces incluraient :

> [...] widespread population dislocations; ethnic and religious conflicts; epidemic health problems, famine and serious environmental degradation; evolving terrorist organizations and agendas; international organized crime, particularly the burgeoning drug trade; black- and gray-market weapon trafficking [...] and «informal» economic organizations that bypass or avoid state and regional economic systems. (Turbiville, Mendel et Kipp 1997 : 6)

Dans le présent article, nous nous proposons d'examiner de manière critique certains des présupposés implicites à cette seconde vision de l'état intermédiaire entre la paix et la guerre. En particulier, nous nous interrogerons sur l'adéquation qui y est faite entre le maintien du contrôle étatique sur un territoire donné et l'émergence d'un état de paix sur ce territoire. Des données ethno-

graphiques recueillies depuis 1998 dans des communautés tlapanèques de la région de la *Montaña*, située dans la partie sud-est de l'état du Guerrero au Mexique, mises en parallèle avec une littérature grandissante en anthropologie sur le phénomène de la violence structurelle (Farmer 1997, 2003; Hébert 2002; Bourgois et Scheper Hughes 2004), nous permettront de nuancer cette vision des choses.

Le choix de cette problématique vise, à travers l'examen d'un exemple concret, à soulever certaines interrogations à propos de présupposés sur lesquels reposent souvent les processus de paix. Notamment, nous tentons d'examiner plus avant certains effets pervers du renforcement des structures étatiques et du développement économique par l'intégration aux marchés, qui sont souvent deux pôles importants du «peacebuilding» contemporain. L'usage du concept de violence structurelle pour mettre en lumière certaines des limites que présente une vision de la paix limitée à la cessation des combats et la mise en place, ou «reconstruction» de structures étatiques fortes, contribuera, nous l'espérons, à une réflexion en profondeur sur les conditions mêmes de la paix durable.

Le renforcement des structures étatiques et de la présence accrue d'agents de l'État dans une région rurale et autochtone comme celle de la *Montaña* est une entreprise qui peut, en effet, «stabiliser» cette dernière dans la mesure où cette pénétration – un terme utilisé par Armando Bartra (1996) pour parler du Guerrero – peut contribuer à éliminer certains des effets dits de «zones grises» (Raufer 1992, 1993) énumérés dans le passage cité plus haut. Mais le flottement d'une région entre la guerre et la paix ne saurait être réductible à la faiblesse de la présence de l'État dans cette dernière. L'exemple de la *Montaña* du Guerrero, comme nous le verrons, montre que si, en effet, l'interventionnisme accru de l'État mexicain dans cette région depuis le début des années soixante-dix a modestement contribué à atténuer certains effets de zones grises comme les famines cycliques, les insurrections armées et les conflits intercommunautaires, il ne semble paradoxalement pas avoir contribué à diminuer la somme des violences qu'on y retrouve.

Dans les pages qui suivent, nous proposons un examen de la dynamique régionale de la *Montaña* en nous appuyant sur notre propre expérience de sa réalité contemporaine, de même que sur les témoignages de Tlapanèques ayant vécu les importantes transformations qu'ont connues leurs communautés depuis l'incursion massive de l'État mexicain dans cette région à partir du milieu des années soixante. Nous nous abstiendrons ici de revenir sur les limites de la méthode ethnographique, qui a été abondamment scrutée par les chercheurs depuis deux décennies. Par contre, il convient de noter, d'entrée de jeu, que la double nature des données que nous utilisons pour parler de violence, c'est-à-dire d'une part des observations directes et des documents analytiques et, d'autre part, diverses formes de témoignages, nous mèneront à aborder la violence tant sous ses formes «manifestes» que «latentes». Cette distinction, importante pour toute étude qui utilise le concept de violence structurelle comme nous le faisons ici, fut présentée par Lawler de la manière suivante :

> The final dimension of violence under consideration was the distinction between manifest and latent violence. [...] Schmid had argued that latent conflict becomes manifest upon a transformation of consciousness [...] the slave comes to perceive the difference between enslavement and freedom and struggles for the latter. For Galtung, however, latency is not connected to consciousness, it is a structural potentiality; violence is being done to the slave regardless of any subjective comprehension of the fact on the part of any actor in the equation. (Lawler 1995 : 82)

Comme les données que nous avons recueillies dans la communauté tlapanèque de Barranca Tigre (nom fictif) l'illustreront, les violences dont il est question ici, tant directes que structurelles, sont parfois perçues par les acteurs, parfois non. Dans le premier cas, les témoignages que nous fournissent nos informateurs, comme nous le verrons avec l'histoire de María, portent directement sur des phénomènes de violence. Quant aux formes latentes de violence, il est possible qu'elles soient perçues par les acteurs, mais cette perception n'est jamais immédiate (comme c'est le cas de la violence directe et manifeste) et nécessite un travail analytique. Le cas de Maria, que nous considérerons plus loin, remontant la chaîne causale ayant entrainé la mort de son enfant jusqu'à la frayeur causée par les soldats quelques mois plus tôt est un exemple d'une telle perception de la violence latente contenue dans les structures. Mais comme le laisse entendre la citation de Lawler, ces violences agissent indépendamment de leur compréhension ou non-compréhension subjective chez *quelque* acteur (agent ou victime) qui lui est lié. Dans ces cas, l'idée que de telles violences existent nous vient soit de données ethnographiques autres que les témoignages directs, soit du témoignage d'acteurs plus ou moins marginaux par rapport au monde tlapanèque et aux événements décrits.

L'oscillation entre deux registres de données, entre le témoignage «local» et une observation plus distanciée, nous permet d'examiner une explication possible de la marginalité changeante, mais persistante, de la *Montaña*

du Guerrero. Cette marginalité, qui semble s'être transformée plus que s'être atténuée depuis l'introduction massive de programmes gouvernementaux de développement dans la région au début des années soixante-dix, est paradoxalement caractérisée par, d'une part, la diminution réelle de certains des problèmes de «zone grise» liés à la faiblesse des structures étatiques dans la région et par, d'autre part, l'apparition de nouvelles formes de violence structurelle; cette dernière pouvant être définie comme une violence beaucoup moins visible que celle associée aux confrontations physiques, une violence qui tarde souvent à être reconnue comme telle, mais dont les effets sont tout aussi réels que ceux de la violence dite «directe» (Galtung 1969). Ainsi, pour parler dans des termes semblables à ceux utilisés par Sheper-Hughes et Bourgois (2004 : 5) il n'y aurait pas eu dans la *Montaña* une diminution appréciable de la violence, mais plutôt un glissement d'une forme vers une autre sur le «continuum de la violence».

Militarisation, pacification et violences dans la Montaña des années soixante-dix

Tenter d'établir une histoire, ou un inventaire, des formes de violences qui ont affecté l'état du Guerrero et ses populations rurales est une entreprise considérable. Comptant parmi les états les plus pauvres du Mexique, marqué par une histoire de régimes autoritaires, par des relations tendues entre communautés physiques, religieuses et ethniques, le Guerrero a reçu depuis longtemps le qualificatif de «violent» (Oettinger 1974). La plupart des auteurs ayant écrit sur la question insistent à juste titre sur les manifestations visibles et directes de cette violence, de même que sur le fait qu'elle est souvent un moyen de répression utilisé par les élites politiques et économiques – les *caciques* – pour contrecarrer les organisations populaires (Gutiérrez 1998; Canabal Cristiani 2001).

Dans les communautés autochtones de la *Montaña*, région située à l'est du Guerrero, les contours actuels de l'articulation violente entre la contestation et la répression se sont surtout dessinés à la fin des années soixante, époque où un groupe armé dirigé par Genaro Vázquez Rojas devint actif dans la région. Même si aujourd'hui la *Montaña* demeure une région très isolée du pays, cette marginalité géographique était encore plus grande à l'époque. Au milieu des années soixante, la région ne comptait aucune route praticable en camion (Kyle 1996), aucune infrastructure téléphonique ou électrique, ni même de cliniques ou de service de sécurité publique. La région échappait alors largement aux structures et aux formes de contrôle institutionnel étatiques et, pour cette raison, avait été perçue par les guérilleros comme un refuge propice, voire comme un lieu de recrutement. En se sens, nous pouvons dire que la région présentait certaines caractéristiques associées aux «zones grises» dont nous avons parlé plus haut, et en particulier la caractéristique d'être désormais perçue par l'État comme un foyer «d'activités subversives».

Même si Vázquez et ses quelques guérilleros pouvaient se cacher dans la *Montaña*, leurs relations avec les habitants de cette région, et en particulier avec les habitants de Barranca Tigre, étaient loin d'être aussi subversives que n'auraient pu le laisser croire les actions subséquentes du gouvernement. À l'exception d'une poignée de jeunes hommes attirés par l'aventure, et dont le parcours les avait mis en contact avec les idées et des valeurs politiques de la gauche révolutionnaire de l'époque, les habitants de Barranca Tigre, de même que d'autres communautés tlapanèques avoisinantes, ne se sont pas joints en grand nombre à la lutte de Vázquez. Même si cette dernière a été relevée par Avilés Mendoza (1987), la participation des Tlapanèques dans le mouvement de Genaro Vázquez, Lucio Cabañas et de leur Partido de los Pobres n'a jamais pris l'ampleur que les guérilleros auraient espéré. Les facteurs expliquant cet échec sont multiples et intimement liés à l'imaginaire social communautaire et à l'histoire régionale (voir Hébert 2001 : 100-110), mais ce qui est davantage lié à notre propos ici est la réaction que les activités de guérilla de Vázquez ont suscité de la part du gouvernement mexicain.

Au mois de septembre 1971, ayant été informés de la présence probable du guérillero dans la région par les autorités de Barranca Tigre elles-mêmes, un groupe de soldats arriva dans la communauté. Ils établirent un campement provisoire au centre même du village, puis commencèrent à appréhender et à interroger des habitants pour savoir où se cachait Genaro. Le mari de l'une de nos informatrices, qui avait reçu le guérillero chez lui à quelques reprises, dut prendre la fuite dans la montagne pour échapper aux soldats. Cette décision fut bien avisée, car le nom de cet homme, Manuel, vint rapidement aux lèvres des habitants de la communauté, dont plusieurs désapprouvaient plus que jamais les fréquentations de ce dernier.

Les soldats passèrent de maison en maison à la recherche de caches d'armes et de guérilleros et, ce faisant, s'arrêtèrent chez notre informatrice. Ils encerclèrent la maison et sommèrent les occupants de sortir. María se rappelle être sortie de la maison avec ses enfants et se remémore la scène : «Nous cherchons ton mari» lui aurait dit un officier, «c'est un guérillero et nous allons le tuer». Malgré la terreur qu'elle dit avoir éprouvé devant le

groupe de soldat, María raconte qu'elle leur a néanmoins tenu tête et leur a répondu que son mari n'était plus avec elle. «Il est parti avec une autre femme et il ne reviendra pas» dit-elle aux soldats. Mais l'officier se fit plus insistant : «Nous cherchons Genaro Vázquez» aurait-il dit, «nous savons qu'il est venu chez toi et que tu l'as hébergé et nourri».

Malgré la posture intimidante des soldats armés, María dit ne pas avoir bronché : «Je ne sais pas qui t'a menti» leur aurait-elle lancé et, avec une audace que notre informatrice se rappelle encore avec fierté trente ans après les événements, elle aurait ajouté : «Oui, je lui ai donné des tortillas, mais seulement parce qu'il était armé. Il voulait que je les lui vende, mais j'avais si peur que je les lui ai données. La même chose avec toi» a-t-elle dit à l'officier, «si tu me demandes des tortillas je te les donnerai, mais seulement parce que tu es armé».

Cet acte de résistance devant la présence et l'agressivité des soldats ne fut cependant pas sans conséquences. L'officier ordonna à ses soldats de fouiller la maison. Les soldats saccagèrent alors le domicile de María et de Manuel. Ils renversèrent les meubles, ouvrirent les boites contenant les effets personnels de María et de sa famille et mirent, en général, la maison sens dessus dessous à la recherche d'armes supposément dissimulées. Notre informatrice se rappelle avoir indiqué une machette posée dans un coin et avoir dit à l'officier que «la seule arme que j'ai est cette machette, rien d'autre. Si tu la veux, emporte-la et laisse nous tranquilles».

La violence de cette scène ne s'arrêta pas aux actes posés par les représentants de l'État et peut difficilement être réduite à son expression manifeste et directe. Pourtant, l'idée que la violence serait «une pratique hautement visible pour les sens» et qu'elle réside essentiellement dans la «force physique visible» (Riches 1986 : 11) est souvent retenue comme élément central de la définition de ce concept dans les travaux anthropologiques. De récents ouvrages sur la question (Aijmer et Abbink 2000; Schmidt et Schröder 2001) reprennent d'ailleurs, et pratiquement sans modification, la définition de Riches voulant que les manifestations directes et visibles de la violence épuisent les formes de ce phénomène.

Comme la suite de l'histoire de María, et de Barranca Tigre, le révèle, cette intrusion physique de l'État mexicain dans la demeure de notre informatrice et dans une communauté qui n'avait pas vécue de telles incursions violentes de la part des forces politiques nationales depuis la Révolution mexicaine, allait créer une série d'effets en cascade qui, s'ils n'ont pas procédé d'actes physiques, directs et dommageables «hautement visibles», n'en ont pas moins produit des effets très proches de ceux provoqués par des actes de violence directe. Dans la mesure où nous supposons ici qu'un effet violent doit découler d'une cause violente, ces phénomènes nécessitent d'être analysés comme des violences au même titre que la violence directe.

Le contact avec les formes moins visibles de violence perpétrée par l'État commença, pour María, après la fouille brutale de sa maison. L'officier la regarda alors dans les yeux et lui annonça que, si ses hommes croisaient son mari, ces derniers l'exécuteraient sommairement. La belle-mère de María qui avait assisté, terrorisée, à toute la scène fondit en larmes à l'idée qu'on allait tuer son fils.

L'acte de violence psychologique perpétré par le soldat pourrait encore tomber sous la définition de la violence comme violence «directe» citée plus haut. Mais le lien entre les menaces proférées par les soldats et la souffrance endurée par María et sa belle mère, qui durent subvenir seules aux besoins de la famille durant l'exil de Manuel commence, lui, déjà à échapper à une définition minimaliste de la violence. Dans un même esprit, certaines contributions anthropologiques récentes, et notamment les travaux de Paul Farmer, ont démontré l'importance de suivre des chaînes causales complexes pour mettre en lumière les ramifications multiples de la violence. Dans le cas qui nous occupe un lien peut être fait, et *a été* fait par notre informatrice, entre l'angoisse importante qu'ont suscitées chez María les actions des soldats, l'éreintement physique qu'elle subit en ajoutant le travail de la *milpa*, généralement effectué par son mari, à ses tâches quotidiennes déjà lourdes, et la perte d'un enfant qui naquit quelque temps après la fouille de sa maison par les soldats.

María raconte, d'ailleurs, comment elle vivait, à l'époque, avec une peur quasi-constante de voir revenir les soldats. C'est à cette peur qu'elle attribue la perte de son bébé : «J'avais tellement peur en ce temps là que ma fille est née trop faible et est morte. Les événements ont dû l'affecter».

La mort de cette enfant rappelle les morts prématurées dont fait état Farmer en Haïti, en Russie, au Mexique et ailleurs (1996, 1997, 2003) et qui, selon lui, seraient moins le produit de «tragédies» sans causes que de violences inscrites dans la structure sociale elle-même; une idée proposée à l'origine par Johan Galtung (1969) qui, vu son introduction récente en anthropologie, appelle quelques explications.

Pour Galtung, la création du concept de violence structurelle procédait d'un besoin de faire contrepoids à une tendance lourde en sciences sociales. Cette tendance, à laquelle nous avons fait allusion plus haut, consiste à ana-

lyser la violence uniquement dans ses formes visibles et *directes,* c'est-à-dire dans ses formes directement perpétrées par des agents clairement identifiables. Ce choix est souvent sous-tendu par une perspective fonctionnaliste implicite voulant que hors de ces éclats de violence directe «pathologiques», une société donnée fonctionne de manière relativement harmonieuse. Il convient de noter que pour Galtung, le problème n'était pas que les chercheurs accordaient trop d'importance à la violence directe, qui demeure réelle et doit impérativement être étudiée sous ses multiples formes; une tâche que les anthropologues prennent aujourd'hui de plus en plus au sérieux.[1]

Pour l'auteur, le problème auquel devait répondre le concept de violence structurelle était plutôt qu'une attention trop exclusive portée à la violence directe risquait de projeter dans l'ombre d'autres formes de violence qui, elles, peuvent nous être invisibles par leur inscription même au cœur du (dis)fonctionnement normal des institutions sociales et par la difficulté qu'un observateur peut avoir à leur attribuer un responsable direct. Le caractère invisible de la violence structurelle ne fait pas, cependant, de cette dernière un phénomène moins destructeur que sa contrepartie directe (Galtung 1969 :170). En fait, pour Galtung, la proximité même de la violence structurelle et de la violence physique est liée au fait que les deux formes de violence ont des effets très similaires, même si la première peut être dite «sans agent» (Galtung 1969). Paul Farmer, qui a contribué à l'introduction du concept en anthropologie, souligne d'ailleurs l'importance de saisir la violence structurelle dans sa matérialité :

> La vie sociale en général, et la violence structurelle en particulier, ne peut se comprendre sans recourir à une approche profondément matérialiste des phénomènes ethnographiquement visibles. Par cette «matérialité», je désigne l'économie mais avec tout ce qu'elle comporte de politique et de social : les structures économiques sont socialement construites. (Farmer 2001 : 11)

Nous reviendrons sur cette question de la dimension économique de la violence structurelle, car l'histoire de María, et plus largement celle de sa communauté, ne s'arrête pas avec le départ des soldats de Barranca Tigre. La répression et l'intimidation dont les habitants de la communauté ont fait l'objet au début des années soixante-dix marquèrent un sommet de la violence directe perpétrée par des agents de l'État dans la région. Mais, comme nous le verrons, l'apaisement apparent de la région à la fin des années soixante-dix jusqu'au début des années quatre-vingt-dix semble marqué par un remplacement de la violence directe par des structures, et en particulier des structures économiques, servant, que les acteurs impliqués de toute part en soient conscients ou non, des fonctions de pénétration et de contrôle étatique similaires à celles de la militarisation. D'ailleurs, la concordance entre la nouvelle vague de militarisation qui s'est amorcée dans la *Montaña* au milieu des années quatre-vingt-dix (Guttiérez 1998; Tlachinollan 1998) et l'effritement des structures économiques mises en place à partir de 1972 est indicatrice de cette convertibilité entre diverses formes de violence, dont nous aurons à expliciter les termes dans les pages qui viennent.

Pour l'instant, mentionnons que contrairement aux études portant sur la violence directe, celles sur la violence structurelle s'intéressent souvent moins aux acteurs individuels agents de cette violence et davantage au nœud formé par les économies matérielles, politiques et symboliques d'une société. En ce sens, les définitions données de ce concept (Galtung 1969; Galtung 1990; Haviland 2002 : 474; Maas Weigert 1999) semblent converger autour de l'idée que la violence structurelle est présente lorsque les relations sociales institutionnalisées génèrent ou perpétuent une distribution inéquitable des ressources et du pouvoir entre les groupes prenant part à ces relations et que, par l'entremise de la marginalisation, la perte d'agencéité ou la fragmentation, cette iniquité se traduit directement ou indirectement par l'abrogation de la vie physique ou du potentiel humain des acteurs composant l'un de ces groupes (Hébert 2002a : 104).

L'usage du concept de violence structurelle en sciences sociales ne fait cependant pas toujours l'unanimité. Julien Freund, par exemple y a vu un pas vers la dissolution du concept de violence en écrivant que : «La thèse de Galtung est typique d'un état d'esprit actuellement régnant dans certains milieux intellectuels : ils donnent au concept de violence une extension telle qu'on ne sait plus ce qu'elle est ni ce qu'elle désigne (…)» (Galtung 1983 : 103). Thomas Platt, pour sa part, a vu dans ce concept une source de légitimation potentielle pour des contres-violences qui, elles, seraient directes et physiques :

> La notion de violence, au sens traditionnel d'utilisation nocive de la force, a toujours été considérée comme justifiant le recours à la force coercitive par réaction. Donc, plus la signification du terme violence s'élargit et plus on dénombre de comportements qui peuvent être invoqués pour justifier une riposte violente. (Platt 1992 : 191)

Nous ne tenterons pas ici un examen théorique de cette seconde objection qui relève, à notre avis, davantage de considérations éthiques et morales qu'analytiques. Par

contre il convient de considérer le défi analytique posé par l'objection de Freund selon laquelle un élargissement du concept de violence ne laisserait rien qui soit «extérieur» à ce phénomène et, par conséquent, dissoudrait la signification du concept de violence. Les structures sociales sont, par définition pourrions-nous dire, contraignantes et «font violence» à la spontanéité créatrice des individus. En ce sens, le concept de violence structurelle ne peut être un simple synonyme de «contrainte» sociale. Certaines contraintes et institutions permettent, comme le soulignait Raymond Aron, l'exercice et l'expression de cette spontanéité et une spontanéité qui tenterait absolument de «néantiser» le monde social ne pourrait que verser dans la violence (1973 : 184-226). Le potentiel humain que brime la violence structurelle n'est donc pas celui de l'individu de faire «ce qu'il veut quand il veut», mais se définit avant tout à partir de groupes. Même si Farmer a fait un travail remarquable pour donner un visage aux victimes de la violence structurelle à travers des histoires de vie, ces dernières agissent avant tout comme révélateurs d'une violence structurelle, certes, mais aussi structurée dont les effets néfastes ne sont ni répartis aléatoirement, ni répartis équitablement entre les individus inscrits dans une structure donnée. Quand on juxtapose cette structuration de la souffrance sociale à un isolement des groupes affectés par rapport aux mécanismes politiques qui donnent une forme aux institutions et aux structures sociales, on se retrouve en présence d'une paire d'éléments clés à la compréhension de la violence structurelle. La juxtaposition de la définition synthétique de la violence structurelle que nous avons offerte plus haut à l'histoire concrète de Barranca Tigre telle qu'elle s'est développée depuis 1971 devrait mettre en lumière la violence subie par un groupe souffrant des conséquences négatives (planifiées ou non) d'une structure sociale à l'intérieur de laquelle il n'a pas, ou très peu, de pouvoir décisionnel.

Pour la période proprement dite d'occupation militaire de la communauté, nous avons pu recueillir des témoignages relatant une autre mort dont le contexte se situe, comme pour la mort du bébé de María, à l'intersection de la violence directe et de la violence structurelle. Une informatrice, Elena, nous a raconté un incident qui s'est produit dans les champs situés à la périphérie des terres communautaires lorsque qu'un homme de Barranca Tigre retournant chez lui fut pris pour Genaro Vázquez et tué par une patrouille de soldats. Les soldats, confrontés par les habitants de la communauté après la découverte du corps dans un ruisseau au pied d'une chute, quelques jours après l'événement, ont expliqué les circonstances de l'incident à la population de Barranca Tigre en disant que l'accident a eu lieu alors qu'il faisait nuit et sous une averse torrentielle. Les soldats, réfugiés dans une petite cabane, surveillaient le sentier lorsqu'ils auraient vu la lumière d'une lampe de poche s'approcher dans l'obscurité. Pour une raison que notre informatrice ignore, les soldats ont dit avoir immédiatement cru que cet individu, qui se déplaçait de nuit et sous la pluie, ne pouvait être qu'un guérillero. Pour son plus grand malheur, l'homme trempé avait obliqué vers la cabane où étaient les soldats pour s'y réfugier et attendre que l'averse passe. Aussitôt l'homme eut-il ouvert la porte que les soldats firent feu.

Comme ce fut le cas avec plusieurs habitants de la communauté, cette explication des événements peut être reçue avec scepticisme. Mais que l'explication soit acceptée ou non, elle ne porte en définitive que sur la question de la responsabilité la plus *immédiate* de la mort de cet homme. Comme nous le rappelle Farmer, pour le bébé de María comme pour cet homme dans la montagne, la matérialité des conséquences – c'est-à-dire deux morts – elle, demeure. Ces morts peuvent être interprétées comme des conséquences «tragiques» et non voulues d'une présence militaire qui avait pour objectif de «protéger» les habitants de la communauté. Elles peuvent également être interprétées, à la lumière de la définition de la violence structurelle que nous avons donnée plus haut, comme intimement liées à des inégalités institutionnalisées entre les paysans tlapanèques et le gouvernement mexicain, des inégalités déterminant *qui* prendra les décisions quant aux méthodes utilisées lors d'une opération du type de celle qui a été menée sur les terres de Barranca Tigre et *qui* demeurera marginalisé par rapport à ce processus de prise de décision, voire se trouvera victime des méthodes adoptées.

Pendant l'occupation militaire, les habitants de Barranca Tigre, même ceux qui avaient coopéré avec l'armée depuis le début de l'occupation, ne voulaient plus aller aux champs de peur d'être confondus avec Genaro. María se rappelle comment les dix familles que comptait la colonie de El Casquillo à l'époque durent s'organiser pour sortir de leur maison d'un coup et tous ensemble, hommes, femmes et enfants, pour aller chercher ce dont ils avaient besoin aux champs afin de ne plus avoir à sortir par la suite. Des familles entières se précipitèrent à l'unisson pour aller chercher leurs chèvres, des réserves d'eau («je me rappelle, dit-elle, comment des enfants sachant à peine marcher transportaient de l'eau») et tous les vivres qu'ils pouvaient trouver avant de se barricader dans leurs maisons.

Les soldats restèrent une semaine à Barranca Tigre à chercher les guérilleros. Au cours de cette semaine de septembre 1971, la répression exercée contre l'ensemble

de la communauté, de même que contre certaines de ses voisines, semble avoir été suffisante pour être dénoncée explicitement par Vázquez lors d'une entrevue subséquente :

> [...] dans certaines régions du Guerrero les habitants ont été concentrés, à la pointe de bayonettes, dans des centres de population contrôlables [...] entre autres [«hameaux vietnamiens»] nous pouvons noter : Tlacuaxitlahuaca (*sic*), El Rincón, Tierra Colorada et autres enclaves dans la zone autochtone. (Vázquez cité par Bartra 1996 : 141)

Conformément à cette stratégie inspirée de celle du «hameau stratégique» utilisée à la même époque par l'armée américaine au Vietnam, les hommes des familles vivant sur les terres les plus périphériques de la communauté, c'est-à-dire les hommes de la majorité des foyers dans la mesure où à l'époque Barranca Tigre avait toujours la configuration «à centre vide» (Oettinger 1980) traditionnelle dans les communautés tlapanèques, étaient regroupés par l'armée dans le centre communautaire pendant quelques jours pour être interrogés et surveillés. La présence de soldats dans la communauté, cherchant les guérilleros avec une vigueur jamais escomptée et commettant des abus jugés graves par les habitants de la communauté, semble avoir laissé une profonde marque chez les habitants de Barranca Tigre qui vécurent cette période troublée de l'histoire de leur communauté.

De la violence directe à la violence structurelle : quand la guerre se cache dans la paix

Le récit de l'occupation militaire de Barranca Tigre et des violences directes et indirectes qu'elle a imposées à ses habitants doit être situé dans une série d'opérations civiles et militaires visant à mettre fin aux activités du Partido de Los Pobres. Des quatorze opérations de ce genre décrites par Mayo (1980), celles de 1971 et 1972 ont eu un impact particulièrement important dans la *Montaña.* Il est intéressant de noter que si, comme nous venons de le voir, la campagne militaire de 1971 a laissé une marque importante dans la mémoire des habitants de Barranca Tigre, la campagne civile et politique de «stabilisation» et d'intégration de la région aux structures étatiques amorcée en 1972 n'est jamais associée directement à la remémoration d'actes violents. Au contraire, les mesures gouvernementales prises après 1972 sont souvent perçues comme des développements «positifs» pour la communauté. L'ouverture d'une succursale CONASUPO (Compañia Nacional de Subsistencia Popular) à Barranca Tigre permit aux habitants de la communauté de se procurer du maïs, et autres biens de consommation (dont le nombre allait constamment s'accroître au fil des ans) à des prix subventionnés. L'accroissement de la présence d'un autre organisme gouvernemental, l'INMECAFÉ (Instituto Nacional del Café), allait graduellement encourager le passage de l'agriculture locale de la production de subsistance à la production commerciale (Johnson 2001). L'ouverture de routes allait faciliter le déplacement de gens et de biens (Kyle 1996). Pourtant, ces mesures de développement prises par le gouvernement procédaient d'une logique très similaire à celle qui avait motivé l'intervention militaire décrite plus haut. Cette logique voyait, dans les deux cas, la *Montaña* comme une région échappant au contrôle de l'État, une région que les ramifications de la structure et de l'infrastructure nationales ne touchaient, dans le meilleur des cas, qu'imparfaitement.

Cependant, l'insurrection de Vázquez, et la répression militaire qui a suivi dans sa foulée, ne constituaient pas, au sens strict du terme, une guerre. D'une part, les effectifs du groupe dirigé par Vázquez n'ont, selon toute vraisemblance, jamais dépassé la vingtaine de personnes et aucune action armée n'a été entreprise par ce dernier dans la *Montaña.* D'autre part, les actions de l'armée – actions qui de nos jours recevraient l'étiquette d' «opérations autres que la guerre» ou de «guerre de basse intensité» – étaient dirigées, pour l'essentiel, contre la population civile plutôt que contre un adversaire militarisé.

Si les populations autochtones ne vivaient pas exactement en état de guerre, elles ne vivaient certainement pas en état de paix. Même la définition la plus minimale de la paix, qui voit celle-ci comme une simple absence de confrontation physique, demeure au-delà de la réalité de la *Montaña* de l'époque. Au plus, nous pourrions dire que les habitants de la région ne connaissaient qu'un léger répit, qu'une ombre de paix, dans la guerre.

Avec le changement de stratégie contre-insurrectionnelle en 1972, c'est-à-dire avec le passage d'une campagne militaire à une campagne politique et économique relevé par Mayo (1980) et par Bartra (1996), cette relation entre la paix et la guerre allait s'inverser : désormais, c'est la paix qui allait être colorée par une ombre de guerre. La violence, qui fut visible, personnelle, et directe lorsque les soldats patrouillaient la campagne, interrogeaient des mères de famille, fouillaient des maisons et tuaient, ne serait-ce qu'accidentellement, des paysans, allait changer de forme et devenir plus structurelle. L'un des facteurs qui a joué un rôle majeur dans l'intégration accrue des autochtones de la Montaña au sein des structures de l'État mexicain fut l'intensification de la production caféière dans la région.

Au début des années soixante, les habitants d'Iliatenco, l'une des rares communautés autochtones de la région qui produisait des quantités appréciables de café à l'époque, avaient tenté de faire appel à l'INMECAFÉ par l'intermédiaire de l'Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI), installé à Tlapa depuis peu, pour que cet organisme fédéral leur vienne en aide dans la production et la commercialisation de leur café. Comme l'écrit Dehouve : «Le centre indigéniste reçut pour la première fois en 1965 des représentants des producteurs de café tlapanèques, et intervint auprès d'INMECAFÉ pour qu'il s'intéressât à la région». (1990 : 289) Malgré les activités importantes de l'INMECAFÉ dans d'autres régions du pays à l'époque, la requête des Tlapanèques de la *Montaña* demeura, elle, sans réponse pendant plusieurs années. Des auteurs comme Bartra et Mayo ont déjà souligné la proximité temporelle entre les activités de «développement» social et économiques inédites entreprises par le gouvernement dans la région et les interventions musclées faites dans les communautés autochtones. Cette observation jette une lumière importante sur le fait que l'intervention militaire à Barranca Tigre a atteint son apogée en septembre 1971 et le fait que, moins d'un an plus tard, en 1972, était mis sur pied par le gouvernement le Plan de Développement Intégral de l'état du Guerrero (Bartra 2000). C'est dans la foulée de ce plan, et toujours en 1972, que les gestionnaires de l'INMECAFÉ, après avoir fait la sourde oreille aux demandes des autochtones pendant sept ans, entreprirent d'étendre les activités de leur institut dans la *Montaña* (Carrasco Zuñiga 1991 : 139).

Cette concordance entre des activités de répression militaire et des activités de développement social et économique a, d'ailleurs, été notée par Barry et Preusch (1988 : 21-32) pour un bon nombre d'autres régions d'Amérique latine ayant vu l'émergence de mouvements de contestation en milieu rural. Comme le souligne Bartra, cette stratégie de la carotte et du bâton, ou du «fouet et de l'épi» (1998 : 11), tentait d'établir une synergie entre la militarisation répressive, dont nous avons vu un exemple plus haut, et des activités de «développement social» – *labor social,* selon le terme encore utilisé par l'armée mexicaine aujourd'hui (SEDENA 2002) – susceptibles de rapprocher l'armée des populations rurales.

Cette seconde composante de la stratégie anti-guérilla adoptée par les gouvernements de l'époque s'est d'abord manifestée sur la Costa Grande sous la forme de ce qui a été nommé par l'armée l'opération *Amistad* («Amitié»), par laquelle «500 médecins militaires ont distribué de l'aide, des médicaments et des aliments aux populations des municipes de Coyuca, San Jerónimo, Atoyac et Tecpan» (Bartra 1996 : 145). Mais au-delà d'une entreprise de relations publiques, le Plan de Développement Intégral consistait surtout en la construction d'infrastructures et en incitatifs à la transformation des pratiques agricoles locales. Dans ce plan, qui prévoyait d'importants investissements pour la construction de routes, l'électrification des communautés, la constructions d'écoles, l'INMECAFÉ se voyait attribuer le rôle important de principal organisme en charge de la transformation de l'économie des communautés autochtones. La production agricole des communautés avait, jusqu'alors, été centrée sur l'autosubsistance et sur la culture de produits (comme la canne à sucre) seulement commercialisés sur une échelle très réduite, et dont les revenus très modestes servaient à acheter du sel, du poisson et autres produits provenant de la plaine côtière située à quelques dizaines de kilomètres des communautés tlapanèques. Cette agriculture, dans le cadre du Plan de Développement Intégral, allait graduellement passer à la production de café.

Même si l'initiative de demander de l'aide à l'INMECAFÉ était, à l'origine, venue des habitants d'une communauté autochtone, il est clair que les transformations proposées en 1972 par l'INMECAFÉ à l'économie communautaire alla bien au-delà de ce que les habitants d'Iliatenco avaient envisagé. De culture complémentaire pour commerce local, le café produit dans les communautés allait maintenant être produit pour l'exportation et deviendrait, par le fait même, une source de revenus monétaires importants pour la région, et pour le Mexique en général, qui dépendait alors fortement des exportations agricoles à l'étranger. La contrepartie était que les habitants des communautés tlapanèques devraient désormais dépendre des revenus du café pour assurer une part croissante de leur subsistance. Mais là encore, des programmes gouvernementaux allaient pourvoir à la demande en offrant, à travers l'établissement de boutiques dans les communautés, du maïs subventionné.

Cette monétarisation de l'économie communautaire, où le maïs ne serait plus produit directement par les paysans, mais plutôt acheté par ces derniers, fut une conséquence directe de l'extension des structures étatiques dans la «zone grise» qu'avait auparavant constitué la Montaña du Guerrero et une condition de leur maintien.

L'extension de l'intervention étatique dans les économies rurales locales a été nommée la politique du «développement partagé» par le président Luis Echeverría. Les liens entre cette politique et l'apaisement du mécontentement n'ont pas échappé à la plupart des commentateurs qui se sont penchés sur l'économie politique du Mexique du début des années soixante-dix. Ces derniers ont vu dans ces politiques des dépenses immodérées, peu

éclairées en terme de développement économique réel et, surtout, avant tout motivées par des objectifs politiques. Dans certains cas, un parallèle explicite fut établi par des acteurs impliqués dans la mise en place de ces programmes sociaux entre l'intervention étatique dans les infrastructures rurales et la conduite d'une guerre :

> No longer *laissez faire*, the government apparatus in a whole variety of areas of welfare provision was put on a state of alert – "*como un estado de guerra*," as one agency head of the day described it to me. Social and political control was achieved through intervention in the sphere of housing, land, sanitation and infrastructure. [...] Public sector social welfare agencies proliferated, and their rationale was less to do a good job than to be seen to be actively engaged in attending to people's daily needs. It was a sort of smokescreen which gave the impression that the state was concerned and active on the poor's behalf, but which gave the state breathing space. (Ward 1993 : 623-624)

Cette stratégie semble avoir été une constante chez les gouvernements d'Amérique centrale à l'époque et semble avoir eu, comme dividende le plus direct pour l'État, un renforcement du parti au pouvoir dans pratiquement tous les cas. Graham note, en effet, que ce type d'interventions financées par l'explosion momentanée du marché de l'exportation en Amérique latine a considérablement augmenté le support politique dont jouissaient les partis au pouvoir mais, autrement, se sont «avérées beaucoup trop ambitieux et irréalistes» (1984 : 178)

Au Mexique, il a été noté que les montants récoltés du marché des exportations ou ceux acquis en contractant des prêts massifs au début des années soixante-dix ont souvent été utilisés pour essayer de faire face aux problèmes politiques et sociaux du pays (Babb 2001 : 114). La dynamique de cette politique du développement partagé consista en l'usage de ces importantes sommes pour, en quelque sorte, faire d'une pierre deux coups en tentant de «stimuler la demande et agrandir le marché interne» du pays, tout en gagnant un support politique accru chez les paysans en échange de cet «accroissement des dépenses publiques dans les infrastructures rurales» (Mares 1985 : 678).

À la lecture de ces divers diagnostics, deux choses deviennent claires. La première est que la planification et la mise en place de ces nouvelles institutions modernisantes dans les économies rurales du Guerrero fut avant tout une initiative gouvernementale. Les communautés autochtones furent laissées en marge des processus décisionnels qui allaient de pair avec la mise en place des politiques du «développement partagé». Deuxièmement, cette absence de représentation, cette marginalisation politique à une époque où se décidaient les termes mêmes d'une intégration accrue des communautés autochtones aux marchés nationaux et internationaux, fut reflétée dans les objectifs mêmes de cette intégration. Comme les auteurs cités plus haut en font état, les objectifs premiers de ces programmes de développement furent le maintien d'un certain «contrôle» social et politique sur une zone instable, l'élargissement du marché interne national, la production de denrées exportables sources de devises étrangères, le renforcement du parti au pouvoir. Quant au potentiel de développement économique réel à moyen terme de ces mesures, les textes cités plus haut sont également en accord pour dire qu'il était très limité.

Tant que le gouvernement eut les ressources pour subventionner les diverses étapes de la production caféière dans la *Montaña* et pour offrir du maïs à bon marché à travers le réseau CONASUPO, les effets de violence de ces mesures de stabilisation sociale et politique demeurèrent surtout latents et des auteurs comme Dehouve (1989) ont pu parler de convergence réelle entre les intérêts du gouvernement et ceux des communautés tlapanèques durant cette période. Par contre, dès que, à partir du début des années quatre-vingt, des pressions furent faites sur le gouvernement mexicain par le Fonds Monétaire International (FMI) pour réduire la taille de l'État et, plus précisément, pour réduire les subventions accordées aux petits producteurs agricoles, les conséquences de la marginalité autochtone créée par leur intégration accrue aux structures économiques nationales devinrent plus visibles.

La mobilisation des Tlapanèques et des Mixtèques de la *Montaña* face à la véritable crise économique que produisit la dissolution de l'INMECAFÉ en 1989 et le retrait subséquent de la plupart des autres formes de subventions qui avaient rendu économiquement viable la production caféière dans la région a été décrite en détail ailleurs (Carrasco Zuñiga 1991; Hébert 2001, 2002b; Johnson 2001). Ces auteurs soulignent, à juste titre, la capacité d'organisation des habitants de la région, leurs succès dans la création d'une coopérative caféière autochtone qui est venue combler le vide laissé par la disparition de l'INMECAFÉ. Par contre, il est également important de mettre en évidence le fait que cette mobilisation n'a pas réussi à compenser pour toutes les conséquences négatives de l'augmentation de l'intégration des communautés autochtones aux structures et infrastructures étatiques observée à partir du début des années soixante-dix. Comme il a été noté, le développement d'infrastructures modernes dans les campagnes du Guerrero est «souvent allé de pair avec la dislocation des communautés autochtones. [...] Les communautés rurales firent face à un

manque de main d'œuvre, des systèmes sociaux perturbés, notamment par l'augmentation des attentes consuméristes, l'alcoolisme et la prostitution» (Blacker-Hanson 2003 : 4-5).

À part la prostitution, qui se trouve freinée par un contrôle communautaire serré des rapports hommes-femmes en milieu rural, il nous a été possible d'observer à Barranca Tigre chacun des effets mentionnés par Blacker-Hanson, et en particulier une augmentation importante des attentes consuméristes. Entre 1987 et 2004 au moins une dizaine de *tiendas* ou petits commerces de détail, dont une boutique CONASUPO, ont ouvert leurs portes sur les terres de cette petite communauté de 3 500 habitants. Ces commerces offrent, bien sûr, du maïs, des haricots et autres denrées de première nécessité. Mais ils présentent également une gamme élargie de produits de consommation qui, comme l'auteure le souligne, stimulent et crée des besoins de consommation chez les habitants de la communauté. Un inventaire de ces *tiendas* révèle une profusion de friandises et biscuits, de nourriture en conserve, de produits d'hygiène personnelle et divers détersifs, d'alcool, de boissons gazeuses, de cigarettes, de médicaments et d'accessoires rituels (chandelles, rubans).

Il est clair que plusieurs de ces produits, incluant certains médicaments périmés ou vendus sans posologie, ont des effets néfastes sur la santé des habitants de Barranca Tigre et que leur distribution produit, du moins potentiellement, des effets de violence similaires à ceux dont nous avons parlé dans notre discussion de la violence directe. L'alcoolisme, le tabagisme, l'auto administration de médicaments contrôlés ou de mauvaise qualité réduisent l'espérance de vie de manière tout aussi réelle que des actes de violence directe. Cependant, les formes de dislocation communautaire qu'ont produit les politiques de «développement partagé», de même que les efforts subséquents entrepris par l'État pour étendre davantage ses ramifications structurelles dans la zone grise qu'avait (supposément) été la *Montaña* au début des années soixante-dix, vont au-delà de ces effets de violence.

La monétarisation de l'économie de Barranca Tigre a eu, par exemple, des effets négatifs directs importants sur la participation au sein des systèmes de charges civiles et religieuses (Hébert 2002a : 121-122). Cet impact a été particulièrement marqué chez les jeunes dans la mesure où la monétarisation de l'économie a créé un fort lien entre les aspirations matérielles de ces derniers et les revenus monétaires. Plusieurs aînés de la communauté nous ont souligné la réticence grandissante des jeunes à servir bénévolement dans le système de charges, ou les hiatus importants créés dans la carrière de ces derniers au sein du système civil-religieux par les absences périodiques – et de plus en plus prolongées – hors de la communauté. Ce désengagement des jeunes par rapport au système de charges est passablement problématique dans la mesure où, comme l'a souligné Dehouve, dans le contexte traditionnel de la communauté tlapanèque, c'est précisément la participation au système de charges qui forme le cadre institutionnel de l'appartenance communautaire. Les frontières de la communauté sont celles de son système de charges civiles et religieuses et est membre de la communauté celle ou celui qui participe dans ce système (Dehouve 1979). Cette fragmentation sociale, effet de l'intégration croissante des Tlapanèques au marché, peut être comprise comme une manifestation de violence structurelle.

Un autre effet négatif de l'introduction de cultigènes commercialisables dans la *Montaña* fut l'intensification, dans certains cas, des antagonismes existant entre communautés voisines, qui se trouvèrent maintenant en lutte pour les ressources amenées par les programmes de développement. Comme le note Dehouve :

> Chez les Tlapanèques, le développement de la culture du café et de la canne à sucre, c'est-à-dire de cultures commercialisables, a suscité chez certains des intérêts spécifiques : accaparer des terres de bon rendement, avoir accès au réseau routier, appartenir à un centre administratif dynamique et commerçant comme peut l'être une communauté située en bordure de route ou un chef lieu de municipe. (Dehouve 1989 : 129)

Même si, après le retrait de l'INMECAFÉ, l'organisation d'une coopérative régionale autochtone pour prendre la place de cet organisme fit intervenir un processus de réconciliation et d'alliance très important entre au moins une quarantaine de communautés de la région (Hébert 2002b), il ne faut pas perdre de vue que les antagonismes les plus profonds – qui coïncident aussi souvent avec ceux entre communautés voisines – eux, ont souvent connu un processus d'escalade marqué pour les raisons citées par Dehouve. Dans le cas de Barranca Tigre, cette escalade alla jusqu'à l'affrontement armé avec la communauté voisine de Istacapan (nom fictif) et jusqu'à la mort d'hommes. Dans la tradition orale locale, le conflit entre ces deux communautés remonte à plus d'un siècle et est relaté par les habitants des deux communautés comme une longue série de frictions et d'affrontements (Hébert 2000 : 144-167), mais les causes proximales de la fusillade de 1989, elles, furent directement liées à l'appropriation de terres aux abords de la route alors en construction.

Voici comment les habitants de Barranca Tigre ont décrit les événements dans un acte envoyé au Procureur

de la République deux mois après l'affrontement[2] : À dix heures du matin, le 24 mai 1989 les autorités de Barranca Tigre ont été informées, par des habitants de cette communauté, que les autorités civiles, de même que plusieurs habitants d'Istacapan, avaient franchi la limite qui sépare les deux communautés et s'étaient introduits, armés, sur les terres de Barranca Tigre. Informé de cette intrusion, le *comisario* de Barranca Tigre entreprit alors immédiatement de rassembler les habitants de sa communauté. Une fois réunis, les habitants de Barranca Tigre se mirent en marche vers la bordure orientale de leur communauté, où ils rencontrèrent le groupe d'Istacapan. Le *comisario* de Barranca Tigre, accompagné de plusieurs hommes, interpella le groupe d'Istacapan, mais ces derniers commencèrent à faire feu. Le *comisario* reçut deux balles et tomba mort, il en fut de même pour trois des hommes qui l'accompagnaient. S'ensuivit un affrontement où une douzaine d'habitants de Barranca Tigre, de même qu'un nombre indéterminé d'habitants d'Istacapan, furent blessés. Un homme de Barranca Tigre fut gravement blessé et mourut dans le mois qui suivit l'affrontement.

Conclusion : Paix et pacification

La fragmentation communautaire liée à la baisse de participation des jeunes gens de Barranca Tigre dans le système de charges de cette communauté, tout comme les personnes qui ont péri lors de la fusillade entre Barranca Tigre et sa voisine Istacapan en 1989 peuvent toutes deux, à travers une chaîne causale complexe, être en partie liées à l'introduction des cultigènes commerciaux dans la région et, plus généralement, aux programmes de développement mis en place à partir des années soixante-dix pour stabiliser la «zone grise» qu'était devenue la *Montaña.* Faute d'espace, nous nous sommes limités à relever seulement ces deux exemples, mais il aurait été possible de parler d'un bon nombre d'autres conséquences «imprévisibles», «fâcheuses» ou «tragiques» qui ont caractérisé l'héritage de ces programmes de développement. Mais notre but ici n'a pas été de faire un tel inventaire. Il a plutôt été de nous situer à un niveau d'abstraction un peu plus élevé et de nous demander si ces conséquences «tragiques» n'étaient pas sous-tendues par des facteurs structurels qui, eux, seraient tout sauf imprévisibles. La mort du bébé de María, un homme qui se fait accidentellement tuer par des soldats lors d'une nuit d'orage, un conflit de génération lié à la participation dans la vie communautaire, un affrontement armé entre deux communautés autochtones voisines : ce sont là très certainement quatre conséquences non voulues, non planifiées et non désirées de diverses interventions gouvernementales. Pourtant, du point de vue des habitants de Barranca Tigre, ces conséquences n'en sont pas moins réelles et pas moins dévastatrices.

Pour reprendre les termes d'une expression courante voulant que plusieurs conflits contemporains tombent dans le flou conceptuel d'un état qui ne serait «ni la guerre, ni la paix», nous avons proposé que les tranches de l'expérience de Barranca Tigre dont nous avons parlé plus haut, et en particulier celles qui sont survenues après l'occupation militaire de la communauté en 1971, montrent certaines des manières dont la guerre peut se dissimuler dans la paix. Un examen de l'idée de violence structurelle nous a suggéré que cette inscription de la guerre dans la paix n'était pas nécessairement le fait de la mise en place *délibérée* d'une structure de domination qui fait mourir des autochtones, les marginalise économiquement en les rendant dépendants de cultures commerciales sur les prix desquelles ils n'ont aucune influence, et fragmente des communautés qui constituent les réseaux d'entraide privilégiés de ces mêmes autochtones. La compréhension de la violence structurelle, comme l'a noté Galtung, ne passe pas nécessairement par l'indentification d'agents qui seraient à la source des effets de violence observés, mais plutôt par l'identification de logiques institutionnelles et de processus de prise de décision qui marginalisent systématiquement un groupe d'acteurs donnés.

Réduire la violence à la manifestation d'une «force physique visible» nous oblige à conceptualiser, décrire et évaluer la paix uniquement comme absence de cette dernière. Or, dans la *Montaña* du Guerrero, comme dans les autres régions marginales, l'éclatement de cette violence directe est avant tout un symptôme d'une autre violence qui doit impérativement être reconnue comme telle. Pourquoi le café a-t-il été introduit dans les communautés autochtones de la *Montaña?* À la lumière des commentaires sur les politiques de «développement partagé» que nous avons cités plus haut, il semble clair que le motif premier de cette intervention n'ait pas été les intérêts des Tlapanèques, mais plutôt ceux du parti au pouvoir. Nous pourrions poser des questions similaires à propos de maintes politiques civiles et militaires dans la région et audelà.

Dans un contexte mondial où les conflits revêtent de plus en plus la forme de «ni la paix, ni la guerre», l'exemple de la *Montaña* nous montre que le renforcement des structures étatiques et le développement économique par l'intégration aux marchés ne sont pas une panacée. Alors que l'établissement de la paix est souvent envisagé comme la cessation des combats et la «reconstruction» de structures étatiques avec, très souvent, peu d'attention portée à la violence générée par ces structures et institutions, une

réflexion en profondeur sur les conditions mêmes de la paix durable devient impérative. L'étude empirique de l'expérience de communautés comme Barranca Tigre peut nous aider dans cette réflexion. Elle nous aide à comprendre la complexité du concept de paix, de même que les nombreux pièges que peut receler une conception de la reconstruction et du développement centrée sur les intérêts de l'État. En cherchant une résolution aux manifestations de violence directe sans prendre en considération les violences structurelles qui les sous-tendent, voire en renforçant ces violences structurelles, il n'y a qu'un glissement sur le continuum de la violence et confusion dangereuse entre la pacification violente et la paix.

Martin Hébert, Département d'Anthropologie, Faculté des sciences sociales, Pavillon Charles-de Koninck, Bureau 3431, Université Laval, Québec, Québec, G1K 7P4, Canada. Courriel : martin.hebert@ant.ulaval.ca

Notes

1 Outre l'abondante littérature anthropologique sur la guerre produite jusqu'au début des années 1990, dont le volume édité par Fried, Harris et Murphy (1968) et celui édité par Haas (1990) marquent deux jalons importants, la discipline a connu une importante revitalisation des études sur la violence à partir du milieu des années 1980. Nous avons déjà mentionné l'ouvrage dirigé par Riches (1986), et les synthèses récentes qu'elle a inspirées. On pourrait ajouter à ces études de la violence directe, l'ouvrage dirigé par Sponsel et Gregor (1994) et un nombre croissant d'ouvrages offrant de véritables ethnographies de la violence (Daniel 1996; Das, Kleinman, Ramphele et Reynolds 2000; Feldman 1991; Héritier 1996, 1999; Malkki 1995; Nordstrom et Robben 1995; Scheper-Hughes et Bourgois 2004; Sluka 2000; Zulaika 1988). Il est important de noter que ces derniers ouvrages marquent une préoccupation croissante pour les formes moins directes de violence.

2 Afin de préserver l'anonymat des communautés impliquées dans cet affrontement, la référence exacte de cet acte a ici été omise volontairement.

Références

Aijmer, Göran et Jon Abbink, dirs.
2000 Meanings of Violence : A Cross-Cultural Perspective. Oxford : Berg.

Aron, Raymond
1973 Histoire et dialectique de la violence. Paris : Gallimard (col. Les esais, CLXXXI).

Aviles Mendoza, Cirino
1987 Los hombres que trabajan la caña. Las formas de organizaciones social entre los Tlapanecos en la producción de la caña de azucar. Mexico : SEP-INI-CIESAS.

Babb, Sarah
2001 Managing Mexico : Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism. Princeton : Princeton University Press.

Barry, Tom et Deb Preusch
1988 The Soft War. New York : Grove Press.

Bartra, Armando
1996 Guerrero Bronco. Campesinos, ciudadanos y guerrilleros en la Costa Grande. Mexico : Ediciones Sinfiltro.
1998 Guerrero : modelo para armar. Trace 33 : 9-19.
2000 Crónicas del sur. Utopías campesinas en Guerrero. Mexico : Ediciones Era.

Blacker-Hanson, O'Neill
2003 La lucha Sigue!(The Struggle Continues). The Continuum of Social Unrest in Guerrero, Mexico 1960-1994. Communication présentée à la conférence History Matters, Social Movements : Past, Present and Future, New York, New School University, 3 mai.

Canabal Cristiani, Beatriz, dir.
2001 Los caminos de la Montaña. Mexico : CIESAS.

Carrasco Zuñiga, Abad
1991 Las comunidades tlapanecas y la producion de café. Thesis de licenciatura, Mexico : Escuela Nacional de Antropologia e Historia.

Daniel, E. Valentine
1996 Charred Lullabies : Chapters in an Anthropography of Violence. Princeton : Princeton University Press.

Das, Veena, Arthur Kleinman, Mamphela Ramphele et Pamela Reynolds, dirs.
2000 Violence and Subjectivity. Berkeley : University of California Press.

Dehouve, Danièle
1979 Comment définir la communauté indienne méso-américaine? Réflexions sur les fluctuations des contours communautaires en pays tlapanèque. Cahiers des Amériques Latines 20 : 47-63.
1989 Le travail gratuit au Mexique : les communautés tlapanèques et l'équipement. Études Rurales 113-114 : 119-130.
1990 Quand les banquiers étaient des Saints. 450 ans de l'histoire économiqe et sociale d'une province indienne du Mexique. Paris : Éditions du CNRS.

Farmer, Paul
1996 Women, Poverty, and Aids. *Dans* Women, Poverty, and Aids. P. Farmer, M. Connors et J. Simmons, dirs. Pp. 3-38. Monroe, Maine : Common Courage Press.
1997 On Suffering and Structural Violence : A View from Below, Social Suffering. A. Kleinman, V. Das et M. Lock, dirs. Pp. 261-283. Berkeley : University of California Press.
2001 Une réalité horriblement intéressante. Le Monde, lundi 12 novembre, p. 22.
2003 Pathologies of Power. Berkeley : University of California Press.

Feldman, Allen
1991 Formations of Violence. The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.

Freund, Julien
1983 Sociologie du Conflit. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France.

Fried, Morton, Marvin Harris et Robert Murphy, dirs.
1968 War, the Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression. Garden City NY : The Natural History Press.

Galtung, Johan
1969 Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research 6(3) : 167-191.
1990 Cultural Violence. Journal of Peace Research 27(3) : 291-305.

Graham, Douglas H.
1984 The Economic Dimensions of Instability and Decline in Central America and the Carribean. *Dans* Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Carribean. D.Schultz et D.H. Graham, dirs. Pp. 157-186 Boulder : Westview Press.

Gutiérrez, Maribel
1998 Violencia en Guerrero. Mexico : La Jornada Ediciones

Haas, Jonathan, dir.
1990 The Anthropology of War. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Haviland, William A.
2002 Cultural Anthropology (10th ed.). Fort Worth : Harcourt.

Hébert, Martin
2000 Sous le regard des ancêtres : conflit et coopération chez les Tlapanèques du Guerrero. Thèse de doctorat non publiée, Département d'anthropologie, Université de Montréal.
2001 Sous le regard des ancêtres : Imagination et mouvements socio-politiques chez les Tlapanèques du Guerrero, Mexique. Discours social / Social discourse 3 : 100-110.
2002a Whose Utopia? Development, Resistance, and Patterns of Structural Violence in a Mexican Indigenous Region. Social Justice : Anthropology, Peace and Human Rights 3(4) : 99-137.
2002b Communal Interest and Political Decision-Making in an Emerging Mexican Indigenous Movement. *Dans* Consensus Decision Making, Northern Ireland, and Indigenous Movements. Patrick G. Coy, dir. Pp 61-84. Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 24. Oxford, UK : JAI Press/Elsevier Science.
2004 Who Defines Sustainable Forestry? Technical Systems, Nature and the Political Imagination in Quebec's Boreal Forest., Communication présentée dans le cadre du congrès annuel de la CASCA, London, Ontario, 5-8 mai.

Héritier, Françoise, dir.
1996 De la violence. Paris : Odile Jacob.
1999 De la violence *2*. Paris : Odile Jacob.

ICG (International Crisis Group)
2000 Burundi : Neither War Nor Peace. ICG Africa Report No. 25. Arusha / Nairobi / Bruxelles.

Johnson, Jennifer L.
2001 What's Globalization Got to Do With It? Political Action and Peasant Producers in Guerrero, Mexico. Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 26(52) : 267-283.

Kyle, Chris
1996 From Burros to Buses : Transport Efficiency and Economic Development in Guerrero, Mexico. Journal of Anthropological Research 52 : 411-432.

Lawler, Peter
1995 A Question of Values. Johan Galtung's Peace Research. Boulder : Lynne Rienner.

Malkki, Liisa H.
1995 Purity and Exile : Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.

Manikkalingan, Ram
2002 Neither War Nor Peace. Frontline 19(9) : 5-8.

Mares, David R.
1985 Explaining Choice of Development Strategies : Suggestions from Mexico, 1970-1982. International Organization 39(4) : 667-697.

Mayo, Baloy
1980 La guerrilla de Genaro y Lucio : analisis y resultados. Mexico : Editorial Diogenes.

Nordstrom, Carolyn
2004 Shadows of War. Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century. Berkeley : University of California Press.

Nordstrom, Carolyn et Antonius C.G.M. Robben, dirs.
1995 Fieldwork Under Fire. Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival. Berkeley : University of California Press.

Oettinger, Marion Jr.
1974 The Voice of the Neighbors, Study of Tlapanec Community Boundaries and their Maintenance. Thèse de doctorat, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1980 Una comunidad tlapaneca. Mexico, D.F. : INI.

Platt, Thomas
1992 Emplois descriptifs et polémiques du concept de violence. Revue internationale de sciences sociales 132 : 185-192.

Raufer, Xavier
1992 La menace des zones grises sur la nouvelle carte du monde. Le débat, 67.
1993 Les zones grises. Paris : Cahiers du CHEAr (Centre des Hautes Études de l'Armement), 16.

Riches, David
1986 The Anthropology of Violence. Oxford : Basil Blackwell.

Scheper-Hughes, Nancy et Philippe Bourgois, dirs.
2004 Violence in War and Peace. Oxford : Blackwell.

SEDENA
2002 Actividades de Labor Social, Misión Social. www.sedena.gob.mx/ejto/labor_so/ls_mission.html, consulté le 4-12-2003.

Schmidt, Bettina E. et Ingo W.Schröder, dirs.
2001 Anthropology of Violence and Conflict. London : Routledge.

Sluka, Jeffrey A., dir.
2000 Death Squad : The Anthropology of State Terror. Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sponsel, Leslie E. et Thmas Gregor, dirs.
1994 The Anthropology of Peace and Nonviolence. Boulder : Lynne Rienner.

TLACHINOLLAN
1998 Informe 1997-1998. Tlapa : Tlachinollan Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Montaña de Guerrero.
Turbiville, Graham H., William W. Mendel et Jacob W. Kipp
1997 The Changing Security Environment. Military Review 77(3) : 5-10.
Ward, Peter W.
1993 Social Welfare Policy and Political Opening in Mexico. Journal of Latin American Studies 25(3) : 613-628.
Weigert, K. Maas
1999 Structural Violence. *Dans* Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, Vol. 3. pp. 413-440. New York : Academic Press.
Zulaika, Joseba
1988 Basque Violence, Metaphor and Sacrament. Reno : University of Las Vegas Press.

La zone grise des guerres humanitaires

Mariella Pandolfi *Université de Montréal*

Résumé : Une progressive naturalisation et standardisation se profile au sein des «zones grises» de l'interventionnisme contemporain. En effet, la présence civile et militaire de la communauté internationale au sein des territoires de l'action humanitaire connote une importante imbrication militaro-humanitaire. Il devient alors impératif de construire une ethnographie critique de ce type d'intervention permettant de rendre compte de l'émergence d'un pouvoir qui évacue toutes formes de résistance locales. En prenant comme exemple le rôle joué par la communauté internationale déterritorialisée et homogène dans les Balkans post-communistes, plus spécifiquement au Kosovo et en Albanie, il s'agira ici d'affirmer la légitimité d'un tel objet pour la recherche anthropologique contemporaine. Ce qui nous permettra ainsi de revisiter le lien entre les sphères politiques et humanitaires.

Mots-clés : action humanitaire, Kosovo, Albanie

Abstract: A progressive naturalization and standardization lies at the heart of the "gray zones" of contemporary interventionism. Indeed, the presence of the international community's civil and military forces in humanitarian intervention connotes an important interweaving of these two arenas. In this context, critical ethnography becomes an essential tool for uncovering how the emergence of a new power obscures the possibility for all forms of local resistance. This work focusses on the international humanitarian community's work in the post-communist Balkans, specifically Kosovo and Albania, and demonstrates that this community, marked by homogeneity and deterritorialization, is a strategic subject of contemporary anthropological research. This approach permits us to revisit the relationship between political and humanitarian spheres.

Keywords: humanitarian intervention, Kosovo, Albania

Prologue

L'historien Tacite avance dans un aphorisme inquiétant que l'être humain crée le désert qu'il nomme ensuite «paix». Notre monde contemporain est particulièrement susceptible de produire et d'édifier des déserts sur des paix instables, sur des conflits opposant groupes ethniques et communautés religieuses, et dans lesquels sont impliqués un nombre toujours plus grand de civils déplacés, réfugiés ou expulsés, parfois même torturés ou tués, parce qu'ils ont été identifiés comme appartenant au «mauvais» groupe. Avec les conflits «ethniques», les génocides et la multitude de réfugiés qualifiée de «nouvelle catastrophe humanitaire» dans le langage bureaucratique des organismes internationaux, gestionnaires de la souffrance vécue à distance ou en direct à travers les médias (Boltanski 1997), apparaît un autre aspect peut-être plus inquiétant encore du monde contemporain : celui de la guerre humanitaire, de la guerre juste et même de l'intervention militaro-humanitaire.

L'expérience souvent traumatique et paradoxale de l'intervention politico-militaro-humanitaire, la contradiction entre l'événement dramatique et l'événement médiatisé, les panoplies standardisées d'interventions stratégiques que l'on exporte d'un bout à l'autre de la planète et qui annulent les spécificités locales et culturelles, la prolifération des rapports confidentiels servant aux stratégies de contrôle et de compétition entre les différents organismes internationaux et les ONG, tels sont les motifs qui composent la toile de fond de cet article qui entend se détacher des logiques de la compassion et de la «souffrance à distance», pour mieux éclairer les zones grises de l'intervention humanitaire.

L'expérience de l'anthropologue œuvrant sur un terrain aussi médiatisé s'avère toujours très difficile, mais son expertise se révèle particulièrement précieuse pour remettre en question les logiques de l'urgence et celle de la «catastrophe humanitaire», car l'humanitaire parasite souvent les institutions internationales et s'acoquine à

certains segments des élites locales, fragilisant du même coup la société qu'il prétend aider à se reconstruire. Il s'agit de comprendre le rôle «politique» assumé par l'humanitaire sur des territoires fragiles, poreux, aux logiques occidentales, et de faire la lumière sur le fusionnement de son action dans la raison d'État occidentale suivant des processus que dissimulent aussi bien les diverses formes de générosité qu'il met en œuvre que sa capacité à se penser et à s'affirmer comme acteur indépendant. Cependant, nombreuses sont les voix qui s'élèvent aujourd'hui afin de distinguer différents types d'actions humanitaires : depuis celles qui confondent intervention armée et humanitaire et opacifient ce type d'action jusqu'à celles qui engagent un réexamen critique de la stratégie de l'intervention humanitaire et qui se veulent «apolitique»[1] au point d'évaluer les risques que la formule du droit d'ingérence contient.

Il s'agit ainsi d'examiner les dispositifs, longtemps considérés comme apolitiques, que les diverses agences des Nations Unies, le Fonds Monétaire International, le Conseil de l'Europe, la Banque mondiale, l'OSCE et les ONG adoptent pour maintenir un contrôle stratégique sur les institutions locales[2]. Autrement dit, le but de cet article est de jeter les bases d'une ethnographie critique de l'intervention humanitaire en évaluant la pertinence d'un discours général sur l'humanitaire d'après l'étude d'un cas particulier : le Kosovo et l'Albanie post-communistes comme territoires d'intervention militaro-humanitaire sous la pression d'une idéologie de la fin de la Guerre froide, de la chute des régimes communistes et de leur possible adhésion à l'Europe élargie. L'entreprise est malaisée pour l'anthropologue qui se trouve de fait devant un dispositif qui opère tel un «oxymore anthropologique». En effet, le dispositif de l'action humanitaire pour être saisi dans sa stratégie d'action «envahissante» doit être appréhendé dans sa dimension universalisante, ce qui de fait peut apparaître comme une lecture «essentialiste» faisant de l'humanitaire un phénomène homogène et identique quels qu'en soient les acteurs, les contextes, les types interventions. Il s'agirait donc, en dernière analyse, d'un humanitaire sans sujet qui serait en réalité la mise en pratique, dans des contextes spécifiques, d'une seule et même logique exportable sur tous les terrains d'intervention. Or, suivant mon hypothèse, même s'il existe effectivement des micro-interventions et des modalités d'action humanitaire différenciées, celles-ci sont ensuite englobées, recyclées et profondément transformées par le même dispositif. Les procédures et les stratégies bureaucratiques configurent en effet l'action humanitaire comme ontologiquement légitimée en termes éthico-politiques. Par ailleurs, bien que cette logique s'impose par des discours universalisants sur l'aide aux victimes, sur la démocratisation de l'État par la pédagogie électorale entendue comme un choix autonome d'autogouvernement, l'action humanitaire s'insère toujours dans une réalité locale bien précise. Je dirais alors que le risque méthodologique est d'opérer à un seul niveau en excluant l'autre, et en renonçant à ce qui m'apparaît comme central : la transversalité du phénomène. La logique du dispositif humanitaire prétend apporter des réponses dans des contextes spécifiques, mais se déploie en utilisant des procédures standardisées et suivant un modèle unique qui correspond à une unique idéologie (secours aux victimes, défense des droits humains, imposition et maintien de la paix, etc.).

L' «oxymore anthropologique» crée également de la confusion entre les genres du militaire et de l'humanitaire. Organismes internationaux, agences onusiennes, dirigeants politiques et centres d'études stratégiques renforcent souvent leur propre légitimité en utilisant toujours plus la catégorie de «guerre» ou d'«intervention humanitaire» pour appuyer l'action des humanitaires ou la présence militaire de *peacemaking* et *peacekeeping.* Il y a une zone croissante de confusion non seulement dans l'usage rhétorique de ces catégories, mais également dans la mise en œuvre de celles-ci dans des domaines spécifiques. Relevons de ce point de vue le rapport produit par la commission internationale indépendante au Kosovo (2000) publié par Oxford University Press sous le titre : *The Kosovo Report : Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned.* Ce rapport montre comment le cas du Kosovo est devenu en terme juridico-politique un cas emblématique pour comprendre les procédures légitimes et illégitimes qui se dissimulent derrière le devoir d'ingérence. Depuis la guerre du Kosovo, il apparaît ainsi de plus en plus évident qu'un grand récit s'est esquissé, puis renforcé dans ce que nous pourrions définir comme la cosmopolis politico-éthico-médiatique : la nécessité d'intervenir sur les plans humanitaire et militaire entendue non plus seulement pour secourir, mais pour prévenir et imposer, selon une logique militarisée, les droits humains.

Le Kosovo : la première guerre humanitaire

Si, au début des années 1990, la dissolution de la confédération yougoslave a entraîné toute une série de guerres et massacres interethniques, la guerre au Kosovo de mars 1999 peut en revanche être considérée comme la première guerre qui se soit déroulée sur la nouvelle scène mondiale[3]. Danilo Zolo, un philosophe du droit, attentif aux changements géopolitiques à partir de la chute du mur de Berlin jusqu'à aujourd'hui, rappelle que l'intervention de

l'OTAN au Kosovo peut être considérée comme une guerre innovatrice puisqu'« il s'agit d'une guerre post-nationale caractérisée par un mélange inédit d'éthique et de politique mondiale, de générosité humanitaire et de logique impérialiste » (notre adaptation, Zolo 2000 : 71-72)[4].

Le livre de Danilo Zolo sur la guerre du Kosovo est intitulé «Qui parle d'humanité» en référence à la phrase du philosophe Proudhon : «Qui parle d'humanité essaie de te tromper». Il affirme dans cet ouvrage : «Qualifier la guerre d'intervention d'humanitaire est une manière typique de légitimer la guerre chez celui qui la fait. Ce mode de qualification fait partie de la guerre elle-même : c'est à proprement parler un instrument de stratégie militaire qui permet de remporter la victoire sur l'ennemi» (notre adaptation, Zolo 2000 : 43). Concernant la doctrine de l'intervention militaire et humanitaire, la guerre du Kosovo et l'intervention de l'OTAN représentent un moment crucial dans l'affermissement de la zone grise entre légalité et légitimité. Choisir d'intervenir militairement sous les auspices de l'OTAN laisse supposer que cette campagne fut illégale bien que légitime[5].

Le rapport de la commission indépendante sur le Kosovo à laquelle prirent part des pays comme la Suède, l'Afrique du Sud, le Canada et la France, cherche à répondre à plusieurs questions brûlantes qui touchent toujours le problème juridique de la légitimité de l'intervention et de ses limites, du rapport entre sécurité et droits humains et de leurs limites, entre crises domestiques et stratégies internationales de sécurité et maintien de la paix; bref, la très problématique ligne de démarcation entre ce qui est légal et ce qui est légitime. Mais, pendant que se fait jour la nécessité d'une doctrine émergente de l'intervention humanitaire, ainsi que celle d'une réforme sans équivoque du rôle et de la responsabilité des Nations Unies et des autres acteurs de la communauté internationale, en réalité, c'est la boîte de Pandore de la constellation de l'action humanitaire qui s'est ouverte cette dernière décennie. Cette nébuleuse éthico-politico-juridique a étendu de manière exponentielle ses effets contradictoires sur tous les territoires de l'action humanitaire où les militaires sont présents : du centre à la périphérie, du sommet à la base, des institutions transnationales aux institutions locales, des sièges de New York, Genève ou Bruxelles à leurs antennes sur les territoires de l'action militaro-humanitaire. La zone grise entre légalité et légitimité a tout d'abord été perçue par les acteurs humanitaires eux-mêmes qui à l'intérieur de leurs organismes ont multiplié les débats sur les limites et les risques que suppose le mélange des genres (Zolo 1998).

Ainsi, bâtir un article en partant de deux citations, l'une de Tacite, l'autre de Proudhon n'est pas un choix rhétorique. Il ne s'agit pas non plus d'une interprétation essentialiste de l'humanitaire, mais d'une attitude critique et d'une invitation à la prudence à partir du moment où le droit/devoir d'ingérence sont invoqués et où s'ébauche une justification hâtive de l'intervention militaire comme moyen le plus performant pour exporter les droits de l'homme et la démocratie. Il s'agit encore moins d'une position pacifiste ou préromantique[6], car ces deux citations ne font que souligner au mieux les paradoxes du monde moderne et mettre en lumière les contradictions qui émergent de concepts tels que «mission de paix», «droit/devoir d'ingérence», «nouvel humanitarisme». La nécessité de rendre tout homogène dans son aspect tragique et, dans un certain sens, la nécessité de simplifier et de rendre les histoires que nous voyons ou que nous lisons, moralement et psychologiquement acceptables, finissent par édulcorer l'horreur du monde (Rieff 2004 [2002]). La position ambiguë entre universalité des droits et universalité des interventions armées pour la protection de ces mêmes droits présente un risque qui affecte aussi bien la lecture médiatique que le travail des chercheurs qui œuvrent sur la scène du monde contemporain. Nous sommes donc aujourd'hui confrontés à une nouvelle menace, à une sorte de «fondamentalisme humanitaire» (Zolo 2003).

Pour une anthropologie de l'humanitaire

Les voix critiques qui se sont élevées ces dernières années pour dénoncer non seulement les horreurs des conflits interethniques et des génocides, mais aussi les risques de dérive qui peuvent se cacher derrière l'urgence et la nécessité de l'action humanitaire-militarisée (Brauman et Mesnard 2000; Chomsky [1999] 2000; Clark 1995; de Geoffroy 2000; Rufin 1999a, 1999b) nous indiquent que la prudence ou la prise de distance par rapport à ce que j'ai défini comme «le syndrome de devoir faire quelque chose» sont désormais à l'ordre du jour (Murdock 2003; Pandolfi 2002). David Rieff (2004 [2002]), dans son livre *L'humanitaire en crise*, écrit :

> C'est probablement au Kosovo, au printemps 1999, que l'on perdit la bataille pour un humanitaire indépendant. L'expérience bosniaque avait été suffisamment destructrice. En Bosnie, les grandes puissances ont refusé d'intervenir car, prétendaient-elles, cela aurait mis en péril l'aide humanitaire. Au Kosovo, les efforts humanitaires furent déployés dans le but opposé [...] L'instrumentalisation politique de l'humanitaire était pratiquement accomplie. (2004 : 179)

Aussi bien Brauman que Rufin, tous deux protagonistes pendant de nombreuses années en tant que responsables

chez MSF[7], ont ces dix dernières années réalisé une autocritique attentive et pragmatique en considérant qu'une réforme globale de l'action humanitaire est nécessaire pour sauvegarder l'humanitaire indépendant. Tous les deux regardent ce glissement entre devoir d'agir et droit d'ingérence comme le risque majeur de légitimation progressive du mélange humanitaire-militarisé. Rufin voit une confusion progressive dans le secteur humanitaire qui apprend et s'habitue à opérer aux côtés des militaires, une confusion progressive également entre les secteurs militaires combattants et les secteurs militaires humanitaires, entre le droit d'ingérence promulgué par les États et l'action militaire. Opérer dans une zone grise a des effets qui peuvent être appréhendés à travers les nombreux résultats artificieux obtenus, les divers protectorats humanitaires qui ont proliféré ces dernières années, et qui apparaissent comme des situations transitoires permanentes qui exigent une présence militaire continue comme par exemple le cas bosniaque presque dix ans après les accords de Dayton.

Quel rôle pour l'anthropologue?

Le rôle de l'anthropologue et la légitimité de son travail sur les territoires de la guerre et de l'ingérence humanitaire ou militaro-humanitaire suscitent de nombreuses questions. Il court sans doute le risque d'opérer sur une échelle macrosociologique, celle de l'histoire mondiale, un domaine dans lequel cette discipline n'a pas encore défini sa propre dimension méthodologique. L'expérience de terrain dans les Balkans post-communistes et en particulier en Albanie et au Kosovo – l'Albanie de l'anarchie et le Kosovo de la guerre et de la «libération» – impose la nécessité d'une réflexion plus ample et plus générale : une position de neutralité à l'égard des territoires des guerres et des interventions militaires-humanitaires n'est plus soutenable; il n'est plus possible de cultiver l'utopie consolatrice de l'expert en développement. La thèse que je veux développer est la suivante : depuis dix ans, on assiste à une augmentation exponentielle et a-critique de ce que je définis comme une «zone grise» entre l'intervention humanitaire, l'humanitaire-militarisée et la guerre humanitaire; et donc à une sorte de mélange de genres entre le politique, le civil et le militaire.

Autrement dit, nous sommes confrontés à une ambiguïté qui sape l'intervention «humanitaire» (Prendergast 1997). La première conséquence est un déplacement hybride du lieu du politique (Appadurai 1996a, 1996b; Pandolfi et Abélès 2002) «construit localement» vers une communauté internationale mouvante, constituée d'experts civils et militaires, qui agit comme un troisième acteur social avec l'utopie apolitique et universalisante de construire la paix, de la maintenir et de porter secours aux victimes. La seconde conséquence est que cette procédure se faisant du haut vers le bas (Top/Down), en se plaçant dans un espace qui n'est ni local, ni national, alimente un discours standardisé et universel, qui élimine progressivement les spécificités historiques, culturelles et identitaires. La troisième conséquence est une marginalisation progressive de la réflexion anthropologique en faveur de schémas préétablis, essentiellement produit par les politologues et les juristes du droit international, en ce qui concerne les violations des droits de l'homme, l'exportation des institutions démocratiques, la construction d'une société civile. La quatrième conséquence est celle que j'appelle la tendance à une attitude consolatrice dans le champ d'une anthropologie de l'humanitaire.

Étant donné que l'objet de notre étude est traversé par des discours et des pratiques universalisantes qui correspondent à des stratégies de pouvoir bien précises (Foucault 1994), il serait dommageable de faire du terrain anthropologique une enclave protégée où l'étude d'une situation locale spécifique est privilégiée. Cette attitude comporte en effet plusieurs risques : le premier serait de produire une histoire téléologique de l'action humanitaire plutôt qu'une théorie du dispositif qui ordonne les mises en pratiques multiformes de l'humanitaire; le second serait de privilégier une analyse des formes d'autonomie locale (ONG locales, projet réalisés en autonomie, émergence de formes particulières de résistance, etc.) en laissant dans l'ombre la dépendance de celles-ci par rapport aux stratégies générales onusiennes, à celles des États et à celles de l'Union européenne; à l'inverse, en privilégiant une lecture systémique, le troisième risque serait d'opérer une homogénéisation progressive et inexorable de toute spécificité locale, n'importe quelle pratique de résistance ou d'autonomie deviendrait alors suspecte et de mauvais aloi puisqu'elle ne correspondrait pas aux procédures prévues par les actions de maintien de la paix; le quatrième et dernier serait de perdre de vue le caractère transversal de la temporalité de l'action militaro-humanitaire qui procède exclusivement selon la logique de l'urgence et de la vitesse (Laïdi 1998) en conservant seulement un modèle géographique, spatial et d'aire culturelle.

Les Balkans post-communistes

L'expérience de terrain en Albanie et au Kosovo a été des plus significatives pour identifier la progression de cette «zone grise» de l'intervention humanitaire, ce mélange entre le militaire et l'humanitaire. Entre 1996 et 2004, j'ai vu se dessiner sur le même terrain de recherche deux scénarios contradictoires et opposés. De 1996 à 1999, ce sont les tensions internes qui dominent sur ces deux terri-

toires; elles apparaissent fortement corrélées au contexte historique et à la situation politique qui s'est créé dans chacun des deux territoires après la seconde guerre mondiale. Au contraire, de 1999 à aujourd'hui, la spécificité «locale» devient la toile de fond d'opérations géopolitiques plus complexes : les acteurs sociaux (à l'exception de l'élite choisie et légitimée par les instances internationales) deviennent «autres» et dans la pratique, l'espace de négociation concernant les formes d'autonomie dans le processus de démocratisation de la société locale reste au niveau des rhétoriques officielles et des protocoles internationaux qui donnent accès aux différentes formes d'aides économiques. Cela peut apparaître paradoxal en un certain sens. En effet, après des décennies de domination communiste, la présence civile et militaire de la communauté internationale semble légitime sur ces territoires où il faut implanter les institutions démocratiques de la société contemporaine, mais en réalité, les discours et les procédures mises en œuvre ont un effet pervers de stagnation dans presque tous les secteurs de la société locale qui, paradoxalement, renforce la configuration sociale qui existait sous le communisme.

Évidemment, il existe des différences entre l'élite du passé et celle d'aujourd'hui qui se présente comme une élite locale cultivée et cosmopolite : cette dernière est certainement plus autonome que celle du passé dans les rapports qu'elle entretient avec les groupes sociaux locaux, mais elle ne l'est pas par rapport à la communauté internationale. Ainsi, mon enquête de terrain, tout en étant inscrite dans des limites spatiales et culturelles précises puisqu'il est question de l'État souverain albanais et du territoire du Kosovo d'abord sous l'autorité de l'ancienne confédération yougoslave puis sous protectorat de l'ONU en attendant une nouvelle configuration politique[8], s'est focalisée par choix méthodologique sur l'ensemble des pratiques mises en œuvre par cette communauté civile et militaire qui, suivant des procédures hégémoniques, légitime sa présence selon le schéma de l'«*Empire lite*» pour paraphraser Ignatieff (2003).

Cette partie des Balkans post-communistes a eu pendant ces cinquante dernières années un parcours parallèle, mais profondément différent. J'ai donc décidé d'ébaucher en quelques traits le profil complexe et multiforme de cette région pour qu'apparaisse ensuite plus clairement le rôle homogénéisant joué par la communauté internationale. Le Kosovo de la confédération yougoslave, conçue et réalisée par Tito, a acquis une autonomie croissante et connu une certaine prospérité économique, n'ayant en commun avec le nord de l'Albanie outre la langue, que quelques interprétations du droit coutumier et parfois une conflictualité religieuse latente contre les chrétiens orthodoxes, qui s'exprimait toutefois de manière ambivalente dans un territoire fortement laïcisé par le communisme. L'Albanie, en revanche, a vécu dans un isolement presque total, avec un régime communiste qui a progressivement coupé les ponts avec la Yougoslavie, la Russie et pour finir la Chine, devenant ainsi le pays le plus pauvre et le plus fermé d'Europe. Au moment de l'ouverture des frontières au début des années 1990 se produit dans les deux territoires une accélération des événements. Ils deviennent le théâtre de violences contradictoires : d'un côté, tensions, conflits, urbanisation massive et en même temps, fuite vers l'Italie de la part des Albanais; de l'autre, perte de l'autonomie, marginalisation et résistance, début d'un nettoyage ethnique qui prend différentes formes, système parallèle d'éducation et émigration des Kosovars albanophones vers la Suisse, l'Allemagne ou d'autres pays européens.

Tandis que les événements du début des années 1990 semblent être placés sous le signe d'une continuité avec l'histoire récente et plus ancienne, ceux de la fin des années 1990 font émerger dans ces territoires un nouveau scénario géopolitique. Le Kosovo, qui, à partir de la mort de Tito a connu une érosion progressive des autonomies des Kosovars albanophones, devient le Kosovo du nettoyage ethnique, de la première guerre humanitaire, des camps de réfugiés en Albanie, du rapatriement volontaire ou forcé à la fin du conflit de tous ceux qui avaient été accueillis dans des territoires d'asile provisoire, des fils de fer barbelés et de la mission des Nations Unies et peu à peu, en vient à ressembler à d'autres territoires qui ont connu des interventions armées et humanitaires. Paradoxalement, la cartographie militaire-humanitaire à partir de la guerre dite humanitaire de 1999 éloigne progressivement le Kosovo de ses racines historico-culturelles et le rend toujours plus semblable à l'Afghanistan, au Timor-Est, à l'Irak. En effet, même si chaque «catastrophe humanitaire», suivant une guerre ou produite par des conflits ethniques, se configure selon un scénario différent, les procédures massives d'intervention internationale de *peacemaking* et de *peacekeeping* tendent à construire des logiques qui uniformisent tous les territoires sous contrôle des missions de paix.

Au cours de ces cinq dernières années, on est passé au Kosovo de la dénonciation de massacres interethniques à l'intervention de l'OTAN, à l'exode massif en Albanie de 500 000 Kosovars albanophones, de 300 000 autres personnes ayant trouvé refuge dans d'autres États occidentaux ou en Grèce et en Macédoine durant le conflit, à la guerre humanitaire de l'OTAN, au retour des réfugiés dans leur patrie, à la mission militaire et civile des Nations Unies, à une présence massive d'organismes internatio-

naux, d'ONG, de militaires, de police, de services secrets, à un progressif retour à la «normalité» caractérisé par un «protectorat international», et par des élections pour des parlements «territoriaux»[9] sans aucune véritable autonomie.

Ces territoires ont d'abord été décrits comme les territoires de la tyrannie communiste, des violations des droits de l'homme, de l'anarchie et de la violence ethnique, du vide institutionnel et de la fragilité démocratique puis, dans un second temps, une fois instaurée la présence militaire et civile internationale, ces mêmes procédures discursives ont proclamé la «libération» de ces territoires, le rétablissement des droits de l'homme, le retour aux libertés individuelles et collectives fondamentales, à l'économie de marché, au développement démocratique et la naissance progressive d'une société civile.

Les Balkans : une cartographie essentialiste dans la longue durée

Ces territoires, considérés comme faisant partie des Balkans, même si cette catégorie géographique est apparemment neutre, sont en réalité, comme le suggère Maria Todorova (1997)[10], pensés et décrits comme le lieu des contradictions nées au cœur de l'Europe. Il existe de nombreuses images des Balkans, qui sont souvent représentés de manière paradoxale : d'un côté, les Balkans sont considérés comme une seule et unique région relativement homogène de l'Europe du sud-est (il suffit de penser par exemple au pacte de stabilité qui a été formulé en juillet 1999 à Sarajevo tout de suite après la fin du conflit au Kosovo); de l'autre, ils sont identifiés comme le lieu de la fragmentation, de la division, de la violence endémique. Ou encore, dans une phase plus récente de l'Histoire européenne, ils sont considérés comme différentes régions appliquant la règle du niveau d'intégration à l'Europe, et donc comme des États membres, États en attente d'intégration et États en attente d'un possible élargissement.

Rappeler toutes les représentations que les Balkans suscitent dans l'imaginaire pourrait sembler contradictoire avec l'hypothèse que j'ai formulée précédemment, à savoir la tendance de la communauté internationale (militaire/humanitaire/diplomatique) à produire des procédures standardisées et «universelles». En réalité, dans les territoires de l'intervention, si d'un côté les procédures et les enjeux s'universalisent, comme le montre bien le protocole d'entente du pacte de stabilité des Balkans[11], d'un autre côté le fait que l'on agisse sur les sociétés locales dans l'urgence de l'intervention armée, du *peacekeeping*, des accords de paix et enfin, de la redistribution du pouvoir (*powersharing*)[12] selon des modèles déjà préétablis, renforce la tendance à réactiver des stéréotypes sédimentés. Cela signifie que, aussi bien au niveau local qu'au niveau international, la présence internationale alimente et fait circuler deux discours que nous pourrions définir également standardisés : celui qui reproduit les stéréotypes sur les Balkans, et celui qui rend le Kosovo, la Bosnie[13] identiques à tous les territoires dans lesquels il existe des situations qui exigent présence humanitaire civile et militaire et maintien de la paix.

Autrement dit, deux niveaux de standardisation s'interpénètrent : dans le public, le modèle universalisant, dans le privé, la récupération et l'usage constant du stéréotype comme stratégie de jugement de la société locale. Tous deux contribuent à bloquer une transition autonome et à créer un phénomène paradoxal de «stagnation identitaire et démocratique» que j'ai qualifié de «transition permanente». Un exemple concret peut être celui de la présence militaire italienne en Albanie. Entre 1992 et 2000, la présence militaire en Albanie a été très forte. La force multinationale AFOR (25 pays impliqués) et celle qui est désignée sous le nom de *NATO's humanitarian mission to Albania* ont été opérationnelles dès le début de la guerre au Kosovo (OTAN 2003a, 2004). Mais avant et après le conflit, c'est essentiellement le contingent italien qui a été présent sur l'ensemble du territoire, effectuant toutes sortes de tâches. De nombreux militaires, carabiniers[14], policiers et, en nombre indéterminé, l'«*intelligence*», ont participé aux deux missions «Aube» et «Pélican» en tant que missions de paix. Ils étaient d'une part chargés de l'instruction militaire, de l'autre des missions de *peacemaking* et de *peacekeeping*. Redoutant une invasion des Albanais en Italie, le gouvernement italien a réussi à créer, malgré une stratégie confuse, un «cordon sanitaire», non seulement sur les côtes italiennes mais aussi le long du littoral albanais pour exercer un contrôle sur le lieu de provenance même et éviter ainsi «l'invasion» des côtes italiennes. En outre, la plupart des Albanais parlaient italien, du moins dans les premières années de la transition, parce que, durant les années de régime, ils avaient réussi à construire un petit transmetteur qu'ils mettaient secrètement dans leurs postes de télévision. L'italien était donc devenu la langue franche, la langue du rêve occidental, et les programmes de télévision qui arrivaient jusqu'à eux contribuaient à cimenter cette «communauté imaginée». Mais l'attitude des militaires qui opéraient sur le territoire avait souvent toutes les caractéristiques d'un «colonialisme compatissant», accentué précisément du fait de pouvoir communiquer directement, sans interprètes. Cette forme de «tutelle charitable», basée sur des pratiques qui tendent à renforcer parfois le clientélisme, la corruption, sur les favoritismes quotidiens de la part des militaires eux-mêmes, alimentait

par ailleurs toute une série de discours sur la société albanaise qui tendaient à dénoncer le clientélisme et la corruption comme des plaies endémiques de ce monde souvent qualifié de «barbare».

Ce clivage apparent entre le discours public de la pitié, de l'aide, et le discours privé qui construit une altérité bloquée et permanente, relative à l'ensemble de la société des territoires occupés, fait partie en réalité des procédures de domination. En effet, le style bureaucratique des rapports militaires, de la Banque mondiale, du Fonds monétaire ou de l'USAID illustre très bien comment la production circulaire de stéréotypes prend peu à peu la forme d'un jugement indiscutable sur un tel état de choses. Dans la production incessante d'«*annual reports*», l'élégance de la mise en pages et du style ne réussit pas à cacher la banalisation et la répétition de catégories qui tentent d'occulter des phénomènes et des événements extrêmement complexes (Pandolfi 2002). À ceci vient s'ajouter l'attitude «confuse» que chaque acteur ou figure sociale occupe sur l'échiquier de la scène locale. Les militaires font figure d'armées de la paix et de l'aide humanitaire. Les organismes multilatéraux recouvrent tour à tour différents rôles : institutionnels, gestionnaires, de programmation et de contrôle.

Souveraineté migrante et empire incohérent

Voilà donc que se dessine de manière plus précise ce que j'entends par zone grise : la progressive «naturalisation» du mélange des genres militaire et humanitaire et la perte, dans un laps de temps relativement bref, de toute autonomie identitaire pour les groupes locaux. Mon hypothèse est que toute la production de discours, les pratiques, les styles de vie dans les territoires des missions de guerre et de paix humanitaires sont «investis» par la logique de l'intervention, une «monologique» renforcée précisément par la production discursive des bureaucraties internationales, des sièges diplomatiques ou des organismes multilatéraux civils et militaires (ONU, OSCE, Agences onusiennes et européennes). Une production discursive universalisante présente sur les sites web ainsi que dans les très nombreux *Annual reports*, rapports ad hoc d'experts, de consultants qui circulent à l'occasion de la signature de conventions internationales, participent à des comités dans les principaux sièges des organismes, tels que Vienne, New York, Bruxelles et Washington, ou effectuent de brèves missions sur les territoires de la guerre ou de l'après-guerre.

La circulation de militaires et d'experts civils dans les zones de catastrophe humanitaire ou de prévention a pris un virage particulier au cours des dix dernières années, d'autant plus qu'il s'agit d'un groupe social capable de se déplacer et d'utiliser toutes les technologies modernes. De nombreux chercheurs ont comparé ce nouvel acteur social qu'est «la communauté internationale» aux missionnaires du passé; d'autres ont plutôt évoqué une ressemblance avec les fonctionnaires et les militaires des empires coloniaux; mais en réalité, dans cette tentative de voir dans l'intervention militaire-humanitaire une continuité avec le passé, on oublie de prendre en considération un nouveau facteur, essentiel, du monde contemporain : l'accélération de la temporalité et la vitesse des technologies modernes. Ces dernières modifient profondément les stratégies de pouvoir de ceux qui interviennent et réduisent sensiblement les stratégies de résistance ou d'autonomie de la société locale. Il y a donc une très grande différence entre un passé militaire ou colonial, et la présence aujourd'hui de la «communauté internationale» civile et militaire sur les territoires des guerres et des catastrophes humanitaires : la technologie, l'expertise créent un réseau d'informations et d'actions qui se font dans une temporalité de l'urgence. Très vite, les effets sont évidents : face aux capacités d'intervention, à l'expertise pour dresser des barbelés, instaurer des camps de réfugiés, répondre à des nécessités urgentes ou mettre en place toutes sortes de contrôles pour la sécurité, il devient progressivement difficile, pour les acteurs et les institutions locales d'élaborer des stratégies alternatives par rapport à celles qui sont proposées : or, toutes ces procédures assurent une standardisation et une universalisation des formes de démocratie, de participation collective, de styles de vie qui sapent l'autonomie et la résistance locale. C'est pourquoi j'ai défini ailleurs la communauté internationale, militaire et civile comme étant «une souveraineté migrante» (Pandolfi 2000b, 2003), et cette définition n'est pas une métaphore : elle désigne un réseau de stratégies, d'actions et de discours qui s'auto-légitiment dans une posture politique ambiguë. C'est une communauté qui doit être observée à la loupe de la méthode anthropologique, mais en opérant un renversement interprétatif par rapport aux chercheurs qui, bien que parlant d'action humanitaire ou d'intervention humanitaire, présentent parfois seulement un historique de la pensée humanitaire d'une part, pour répéter, d'autre part, selon celle que j'ai définie comme attitude consolatrice, une analyse parcellisée et bloquée au niveau local. Autrement dit, considérer la communauté internationale qui intervient dans les zones de crises humanitaires comme un acteur social homogène qui exporte des règles, des stratégies économiques et morales, des styles de vie, peut donner aux anthropologues la légitimité de réfléchir sur elle comme sur tout autre type de communautés auxquelles ils sont d'ordinaire confrontés.

La communauté internationale agit selon des procédures qui sont à la fois flexibles et rigides. La machine bureaucratique des divers organismes internationaux a une mobilité et une flexibilité du point de vue temporel; et une rigidité et une standardisation dans toutes les procédures d'intervention. Autrement dit les procédures discursives liées à la compassion, à la victimisation, à une responsabilité morale parfois ambiguë[15] ont été exportées dans les assemblées des Nations Unies, ou dans les sommets des G8 ou les forums internationaux, créant un effet «placebo» de participation planétaire à la souffrance et en conséquence à une lecture acritique de la démocratie imposée. Comme le rappelle Mann (2003) les effets ne sont pas l'*Empire lite*[16] selon l'expression de Ignatieff (2003), mais un «empire incohérent». Il se crée ainsi une zone grise, confuse, opaque, qualifiée de nouvel interventionnisme auquel tous pensent participer en adhérant aux projets d'aide à l'égard des victimes. Et cette zone grise se renforce encore à travers des témoignages, des «j'accuse» a posteriori[17], des distinguos de militaires, volontaires, experts repentis qui découvrent soudain que dans l'humanitaire peuvent aussi se cacher des stratégies et des réponses opportunistes[18].

La diplomatie parallèle

Le rôle de diplomatie parallèle, pris par les différents acteurs de l'intervention militaire et humanitaire, apparaît progressivement à partir de la fin des années soixante, quand commence à se développer et à prendre forme de manière autonome ce que le politologue Badie (2002) appelle le nouveau marché de la *pietas*[19]. Une transformation radicale qui ne tente plus de limiter les droits des États, mais de se substituer à eux. Sur ces décombres s'installe un jeu subtil qui conduit les États les plus puissants à se faire à leur tour les agents du post-étatique, pour prêcher l'ingérence quand ils y trouvent leur compte ou quand la pression de l'opinion publique se fait trop forte. Il est clair que dans la pratique, la souveraineté est déjà dépassée, sous les tirs croisés de la mondialisation; mais pour pouvoir passer de la responsabilité à l'obligation morale et donc au projet de faire du bien, et faire en sorte que cela devienne un fait accompli, on a recours à cette même souveraineté de manière purement rhétorique. Vouloir faire du bien, c'est la pratique qui légitime aujourd'hui la puissance croissante des «souverainetés migrantes». Il est vrai qu'après l'intervention en Afghanistan et en Irak, des journalistes, des protagonistes de l'humanitaire et même des généraux en retraite ont commencé peu à peu à s'interroger sur la pertinence éthique et sur les limites «politiques» de l'intervention militaire et humanitaire.

La guerre humanitaire au Kosovo, la guerre juste en Afghanistan, la guerre préventive en Irak ont suscité au cours de ces dernières années les premières réflexions critiques sur la pertinence de ces interventions et sur les résultats effectifs, et non pas rhétoriques que de telles interventions ont sur la société locale. Mais ce n'est que récemment, après une bonne dizaine d'années d'interventions humanitaires-militaires, que s'est fait sentir la nécessité d'approfondir la question. Une réflexion s'est donc imposée parmi les acteurs de l'intervention et dans les médias en ce qui concerne d'une manière générale la pertinence politique 1) de la non-intervention au Rwanda, 2) de l'intervention tardive en Bosnie, et 3) du droit/devoir d'ingérence au Kosovo, en Afghanistan, 4) de la justification de la guerre préventive en Irak, et, plus particulièrement, les limites à fixer aux pratiques des souverainetés migrantes, qui en définitive échappent à tout contrôle éthique et politique, mais surtout qui recourent à une négociation fragmentaire et quasi inexistante à l'égard des communautés locales dans les territoires où elles agissent.

Transition permanente et société civile «glolocale»

Environ dix ans après la guerre en Bosnie et l'ouverture des frontières albanaises, et cinq ans après la guerre humanitaire au Kosovo, la dépendance de ces territoires non seulement en termes économiques et militaires, mais surtout politiques et sociaux semble ne jamais devoir prendre fin. Le risque que s'instaure une «transition permanente» s'accroît dangereusement; c'est en effet un phénomène socio-politique qui caractérise tous ces territoires, même si les résultats sont apparemment différents dans les zones du conflit ou dans celles de la «stabilisation des formes de démocratie».

Ainsi l'Albanie, qui a certainement réussi à s'affranchir progressivement de la tutelle militaire-humanitaire, en est cependant sortie profondément transformée en particulier dans les rapports entre villes et campagne, entre la capitale, Tirana, et les villes du nord et du sud, ainsi que dans les rapports entre les différents groupes de la société locale. L'intervention militaire et humanitaire en Albanie a été moins médiatisée (à l'exception du scandale financier défini comme «l'écroulement des pyramides» ou durant les trois mois de la guerre au Kosovo) que les autres interventions : en effet il ne s'agissait pas d'une intervention obéissant à la logique de la guerre ou du conflit ethnique, mais d'une intervention plus ambiguë d'aide pour la «transition démocratique». Elle a servi de banc d'essai, mais elle a cependant profondément influencé les rapports et les stratégies de pouvoir des nouvelles élites, créant en réalité une sorte de société parallèle qui,

invitée par les diplomaties internationales, circule dans tous les réseaux internationaux, participe aux commissions sur les droits de l'homme ou à des conférences des agences onusiennes, fait partie de tous les comités au sein desquels il est nécessaire de démontrer que la «société civile locale» participe aux programmes mis en place par les «souverainetés migrantes», acquérant progressivement une légitimité «médiatique» dont elle peut se servir pour négocier avec les pouvoirs politiques locaux ou pour entrer directement sur la scène politique locale, mais avec le soutien de la communauté internationale[20].

Que ce soit dans le Kosovo de l'après-guerre ou dans l'Albanie de la stabilisation démocratique, les procédures de cette société civile locale apparaissent très semblables. D'ailleurs, elle se meut souvent dans les mêmes circuits, même si par le passé ses membres se sont faits les promoteurs de ce qu'Ignatieff (2003) a appelé *empire lite*, tous pensent que les institutions politiques locales sont emprisonnées dans de vieilles logiques de clans ou de bureaucraties communistes et tous considèrent la «tutelle internationale» comme une protection et non pas une domination. Comme le rappelle Zolo dans les années 1980, la notion de société civile, c'est-à-dire «l'espace social et économique dans lequel des acteurs sociaux émergent en opposition au régime établi sur la base d'une référence à des institutions et des valeurs citoyennes modernes», a été «progressivement remplacée par celle de société civile globale, c'est-à-dire la complexe interaction, au niveau international, de mouvements sociaux et d'organisations non gouvernementales qui s'opposent souvent aux institutions publiques établies» (notre adaptation, Zolo 1995 : 154-156; 2004).

En Albanie la société civile globale se constitue à deux niveaux. D'un côté, nous pouvons qualifier de société civile globale la communauté internationale œuvrant dans l'humanitaire qui, comme nous l'avons rappelé précédemment, échappe en apparence aux politiques nationales et prend une configuration «apolitique» et «autonome» sur la scène médiatique. Le second niveau est celui d'une société civile globale créé sur la scène locale, une élite «bouée de sauvetage» entre l'extérieur et l'intérieur, entre les élites locales (politiques, bureaucratiques) qui exercent un contrôle ou agissent sur le territoire et les souverainetés migrantes qui, en dernière analyse, légitiment ou délégitiment, auprès de tous les sièges institutionnels multilatéraux ou médiatiques la stabilisation, les résultats obtenus par ces territoires placés sous «tutelle». Alors que l'élite politique est fortement enracinée dans les zones rurales et urbaines qu'elle contrôle et où elle a ses fiefs politiques, fonctionnant encore sur la base de groupes unis par des liens familiaux souvent renforcés par l'émigration, qui ont des intérêts économiques communs et conservent les mythes du passé, selon un schéma que nous pourrions définir à mi-chemin entre une pratique de lobby à l'américaine et une confiance «féodale» dans un chef qui défendra ses intérêts économiques, territoriaux et sociaux, la nouvelle élite locale, métamorphosée en société civile globale, échappe aux stratégies et aux règles de contrôle d'un territoire où existe encore une logique de clan ou de lobby. Plutôt que d'obéir aux procédures et aux stratégies des politiques officielles, mélange de *«real politik»* et de mythes nationalistes ou régionaux, la société civile globale albanaise préfère agir dans l'indépendance, dans l'autonomie sur la scène locale, en développant d'autres formes de dépendance sur la scène internationale.

Dans les dernières années, certains intellectuels albanais ont répondu à l'appel de plusieurs organismes internationaux visant à établir une coopération entre différentes antennes de la société afin de constituer une plate-forme permettant un dialogue permanent sur la démocratie. Après l'effondrement des pyramides financières en 1997, ces organismes ont effectivement cherché des partenaires à l'extérieur du gouvernement; des acteurs locaux considérés plus «fiables», «ouverts» et moins «corrompus» que les différents organes de l'État albanais. En se détournant de ces derniers, les organisations ont financé directement des initiatives non gouvernementales, engendrant la prolifération d'ONG locales et l'émergence d'un groupe assez restreint d'intellectuels ayant pour la plupart travaillé dans des organismes tels que la Fondation Soros (qui, précisons-le, cherche particulièrement à appuyer les intellectuels dans les pays post-communistes).

> Ces nouveaux protagonistes de la scène démocratique albanaise ont, pour ce faire, organisé une collaboration entre les centres, les associations et les instituts qu'ils ont créés et qui, malgré des finalités certes différentes, se distinguent de toute une série d'organisations ayant, durant la décennie 1990, pris la forme de bureaux d'offre de services. Le résultat de cette coopération est un *think tank*, noyau dur d'une conception particulière de la communication et de l'information, appelé le Klub (Club) et regroupant une quinzaine de membres se réunissant chaque mardi. (Pandolfi, Lafontaine, Zahar et McFalls 2005 : 22)

Font partie de cette élite des individus ayant une histoire familiale et un parcours politique différents; chacun d'eux a payé un certain prix avec le régime et aujourd'hui ils n'ont pas tous les mêmes positions politiques. Parfois ils sont en proie à de grands conflits intérieurs, mais en dernière analyse, il s'agit d'une élite homogène, cosmopo-

lite, polyglotte, adhérant aux valeurs universelles des droits de l'homme, sophistiquée, et capable de jeter un regard qui englobe à la fois le passé et le futur[21]. La présence de cette élite cosmopolite et polyglotte, ainsi que celle des jeunes *local staff* (Lafontaine 2002; 2003) qui travaillent pour les organismes internationaux, a certainement un effet stabilisateur dans le processus de transition post-communiste; cependant, cette présence ne saurait faire oublier un certain nombre de risques que masque par ailleurs l'exigence «consolatrice» qui nous pousse à ne relever que les initiatives autonomes et les formes de résistance face à la pression politique et économique que font peser les aides externes.

Le premier de ces risques est une progressive «naturalisation» et une incorporation des discours et des pratiques de l'efficacité managériale introduite par la communauté internationale et l'éviction des positions critiques et autonomes qui pourraient remettre en cause les équilibres de légitimation et d'aides qui en permettent la survivance. Le second risque est l'incompréhension croissante, depuis la transition, entre cette élite et les autres groupes sociaux. Cette incompréhension court-circuite en effet les processus d'émancipation et de démocratisation. Paradoxalement, plus l'avancée de ce groupe est importante, plus la reconnaissance internationale dont il bénéficie l'est au point de l'isoler aussi bien des groupes de pouvoir institutionnel locaux que des autres groupes sociaux. Le dispositif qui bloque la transition pour la transformer en transition permanente dépendrait alors, non seulement de la présence de la communauté internationale, mais également de l'impasse dans laquelle se trouve cette société civile globale, incapable de définir son rôle par rapport aux autres groupes sociaux. Les deux éléments sont clairement connectés et interdépendants. Et enfin, troisième risque, on peut observer une progressive «marginalisation» des femmes dans le club de la société civile globale légitimée par la communauté internationale. Paradoxalement, il peut y avoir des femmes dans les institutions locales (dans le gouvernement, le parlement), mais beaucoup moins ou aucune à l'intérieur des organismes internationaux ou dans l'ensemble des circuits de visibilité qui conditionnent les échanges entre l'élite cosmopolite locale et la communauté internationale. Cela apparaît avec évidence à l'occasion des visites officielles dans les pays *donors* ou à l'occasion des conférences internationales organisées dans le milieu de cette élite; quand arrivent les grands médias internationaux ou quand sont publiés les rapports annuels des agences de l'ONU et des autres organismes ou fondations. Trouver une représentation féminine (aussi faible soit-elle) semble toujours plus difficile. En Albanie surtout, les femmes des milieux urbains considèrent cette évolution avec préoccupation, car la propagande du régime communiste avait soutenu des programmes de scolarisation paritaire. Ce n'est sans doute pas une posture nostalgique par rapport aux années du régime, mais beaucoup d'entre elles ressentent aujourd'hui des difficultés à négocier et à être reconnues comme des présences significatives dans les processus de stabilisation et d'autonomie démocratique de la société albanaise.

Les lieux, les zones

L'impact massif de la communauté internationale sur les styles de vie locale, dans les territoires où elle est présente, se révèle aussi à travers l'utilisation particulière des lieux urbanistiques : zones protégées par des frontières bien visibles – fils de fer barbelés, barrières ou murs érigés au nom de la sécurité et par d'invisibles frontières de la nouvelle sociologie post-intervention. On peut imaginer que des procédures semblables sont projetées, dans diverses parties du monde, pour fermer et protéger les lieux de la «libération», de la «démocratisation», du maintien de la «paix», mais paradoxalement, ce sont ensuite les mêmes immeubles, les mêmes hôtels, les mêmes maisons occupés par les régimes précédents qui sont utilisés. À partir des années 1990, à Tirana en Albanie, c'est dans les gracieuses villas de l'ancien quartier appelé le «Bloc» qui appartenaient aux représentants du régime communiste que les divers organismes internationaux et les agences des Nations Unies ont installé leur siège. Et aujourd'hui encore, les sièges de la Banque mondiale, de la délégation de la Commission européenne, du Conseil de l'Europe, de la Mission de monitorage de l'Union européenne (European Union Monitoring Mission), de l'Unesco, du Haut Commissariat pour les réfugiés des Nations Unies, de l'OSCE (Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe), du PNUD (Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement) se trouvent dans le quartier du Bloc.

Je garde de ma première arrivée à l'aéroport de Tirana, vers la moitié des années 1990, et du trajet de l'aéroport de Rinas jusqu'au centre ville un souvenir peuplé d'images de tenues de combat, d'armes, de blindés, de jeeps militaires. La guerre humanitaire n'était pas encore en cours, mais les tenues de combat avaient déjà fait leur apparition, quelques années avant la guerre au Kosovo. Dans les zones de la présence militaire et de l'intervention humanitaire se constitue peu à peu une sorte d'«esthétique» des «occupants» : dans leur façon de s'habiller, il y a toujours quelque chose qui rappelle, soit par un détail, soit par la couleur, la tenue militaire. Les gilets pare-balles sont endossés non seulement dans des zones de

guerre, mais aussi d'aide humanitaire, et dans les magasins ou dans les *shopping centres* des quartiers généraux militaires, on trouve survêtements, tee-shirts, pantalons, bérets, et toutes sortes de gadgets. À Pristina, à la fin de chaque mission, des volontaires ou des experts civils visitaient en grand nombre les *shopping centres* des forces multinationales et de l'OTAN. Dans la Bagdad blessée d'aujourd'hui également, ce qui est appelé «zone verte» est un lieu qui évoque, outre la guerre et la sécurité, des zones qui font plus penser à des villes des États-Unis qu'à la Mésopotamie. Cela est très bien décrit dans un article de William Langewiesche (2004), «Welcome to the Green Zone : The American Bubble in Baghdad» qui me replonge dans la Tirana telle qu'elle était vers la moitié des années 1990, ou au Kosovo, à Pristina, à la fin de ces mêmes années 1990. Chaque zone grise peut devenir «zone verte», zone protégée et donc occupée et militarisée, dans laquelle s'infiltrent selon la nouvelle hiérarchie sociale les acteurs sociaux locaux : des hommes politiques «nostalgiques» du communisme ou du contrôle clanique du territoire, la nouvelle élite que nous avons identifiée comme société civile globale, les nouveaux politiciens, jeunes et cosmopolites (Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge et Chakrabarty 2000) comme le Maire de Tirana.

Souvent les experts, les journalistes ou les hautes hiérarchies militaires des missions internationales construisent leur rhétorique, renforcent leurs stratégies, écrivent et font circuler leurs rapports exclusivement à l'intérieur de ces zones «protégées», reconnues comme zones de la communauté internationale. Les cafés, les hôtels, les lieux de rencontre, dans ces zones où la communauté internationale est présente, dessinent une nouvelle sociologie des rapports de pouvoir. La cartographie des lieux occupés à partir des années 1990 dans le centre de la ville de Tirana illustre de manière emblématique où et comment se construisent les réseaux entre la communauté internationale et la communauté locale. L'atmosphère de ces lieux de rencontre rappelle les films des années quarante, comme Casablanca : lieux plongés dans la pénombre, à l'air chargé de fumée de tabac et d'odeurs fortes, très éloignés du modèle de la rencontre à l'occidentale, rencontre rapide, faite dans un but précis parce qu'un journaliste, un expert, un militaire, un homme d'affaires en quête de nouveaux marchés a un agenda bien rempli; ce sont des lieux «vitrine» où l'on doit passer pour se faire remarquer, pour voir qui il y a, pour comprendre la manière dont oscille la «cote de popularité» de la nouvelle élite auprès des occidentaux.

Pour pouvoir suivre les étapes forcées de la normalisation post-communiste à Tirana, il fallait passer à l'hôtel Dajti, fief des sympathisants de Berisha et symbole d'une résistance souterraine envers les lieux de prédilection des occidentaux, puis, successivement, se rendre dans les trois hôtels «internationaux» : le Tirana Hotel, le Rogner, le Sheraton, construits à des époques différentes mais véhiculant en réalité le même message. Militaires, journalistes, experts de la communauté européenne ou d'agences onusiennes, d'ONG internationales, religieuses ou laïques, agents secrets, tous ont effectué des séjours plus ou moins longs dans ces hôtels. Le style de ces trois hôtels illustre de manière emblématique les différentes étapes de la transition post-communiste, les différents rapports entre la communauté internationale et l'élite locale. Au Tirana Hotel, les militaires de la mission spéciale italienne avaient occupé tout un étage, qu'ils avaient restructuré selon des normes d'efficacité et de technologie moderne. Mais le Tirana Hotel avait aussi une position idéale que les télévisions du monde entier ont longtemps exploitée : une terrasse qui s'étendait sur la place conservant la mémoire du socialisme réel, de l'occupation italienne et plus récemment des grandes manifestations populaires. En outre, se profilait dans le lointain le minaret de l'ancienne mosquée qui rappelait, lors des reportages télévisés, que l'Albanie est en grande partie un pays de religion musulmane. Un peu plus loin, la statue du héros Skanderbeg, et à gauche, un escalier imposant, en haut duquel trônait autrefois la statue du dictateur et désormais vide, évoquaient les héros invincibles et la chute des dieux. Un décor bâti comme un témoignage, ou comme un lieu purement fictif, idéal pour les brèves séquences en direct, pour raconter les phases du processus de «démocratisation», les risques d'infiltration du terrorisme islamique, la générosité dont avait fait preuve le peuple albanais en accueillant les réfugiés du Kosovo, ou retransmettre les interviews faites aux ministres des pays occidentaux durant la guerre au Kosovo.

Même durant la guerre au Kosovo, la configuration urbanistique de Tirana a continué à produire et à évoquer des images, des séquences de films, en occultant étrangement les images de la souffrance humaine pour laquelle ce théâtre de guerre et d'expertise, de logistique militaire et humanitaire était conçu. Les deux camps de réfugiés aux environs de Tirana, qui dénonçaient l'horreur de la catastrophe humanitaire, semblaient être paradoxalement à la périphérie de l'événement : une fois assurés le ravitaillement, le logement, l'identification des réfugiés selon l'ancien usage qui consiste à écrire un numéro ou un nom sur leur main ou sur leur bras, le théâtre humanitaire se concentrait dans les quartiers généraux des militaires, à l'aéroport où l'espace aérien était interdit aux avions de ligne et qui était plein d'avions et d'hélicoptères militaires utilisés pour le transport des volontaires, experts, mili-

taires, journalistes et hommes politiques, ou bien en ville, précisément dans le triangle des trois hôtels de Tirana. Tandis qu'au Dajti et au Tirana Hotel régnait une atmosphère d'espions, de complots, de marchés et d'échanges en tous genres, le Rogner a représenté pendant des années l'hôtel de la «transition» pour construire, dans une atmosphère plus neutre et plus dégagée des mythes nationaux passés et récents, les nouvelles stratégies et le rapprochement entre la communauté internationale et cette partie de l'élite locale que j'ai qualifiée de société civile globale. Jardins et éclairage, atmosphère de «déjeuner sur l'herbe» sont toujours apparus en net contraste avec les salons majestueux et sombres du Dajti et du Tirana. Il est encore aujourd'hui facile de rencontrer au restaurant ou au bar du Rogner certains membres du *Klub*. Évidemment, leurs instituts et leurs centres ne sont pas très éloignés de l'hôtel, et un tel choix a donc sa raison d'être; mais c'est en raison de cette atmosphère libre de toute revendication de mythes identitaires qu'il reste encore en vogue pour les congrès internationaux, les conférences, les *meetings*. Le Sheraton est devenu un lieu de rencontre beaucoup plus tard, quand les phases d'urgence du processus de démocratisation ou de la guerre au Kosovo étaient déjà dépassées, et il est devenu le lieu de prédilection des hommes politiques modernes, des nouvelles élites économiques; un peu à l'écart du centre, il est moins fréquenté par la communauté internationale qui a caractérisé l'Époque du Tirana et du Rogner.

Epilogue : l'utopie humanitaire ne fait pas exception

Dans cet article, j'ai essayé de bâtir «l'édifice de la Cosmopolis humanitaire» (Milner 2004 : 49), comme le suggère l'article de Milner apparu dans le numéro spécial des *Temps Modernes* consacré justement à l'humanitaire; j'ai également tenté de mettre en évidence tous les éléments qui en ont progressivement sapé et altéré l'utopie. De nombreux éléments ont, au fil des ans, concouru à cette usure, mais dans la crise de l'humanitaire, le point déterminant a été la crise de la doctrine de l'indépendance et de la neutralité : certes, en tant qu'utopie, une telle doctrine reste de tout intérêt, mais dans la pratique un grand nombre de procédures ambiguës ont été utilisées et elles sont aujourd'hui largement remises en discussion.

Confrontée à la présence militaire, la «politique de l'apolitique» a créé une confusion, une vulnérabilité et a par conséquent accru ce que j'ai défini comme étant la zone grise. Aujourd'hui, aussi bien au sein de la Cosmopolis de l'humanitaire qu'à l'extérieur, il est nécessaire de revisiter le lien qui existe ou qui doit exister entre la sphère humanitaire et la sphère politique, autrement dit, les rapports entre les Nations Unies et les ONG, entre les «donors», les acteurs humanitaires et les fonctionnaires internationaux, l'interdépendance entre les ONG internationales et les ONG locales, entre l'intervention militaire et la «neutralité» et l'impartialité humanitaire; en d'autres termes, il est indispensable de reconnaître la dimension politique qui se cache dans chacun des segments qui constituent la Cosmopolis humanitaire. Les Balkans ont été la plaque tournante de cette crise et ont révélé sans aucun doute possible «que la question militaire est redevenue, avec toutes les variantes dont elle est susceptible, une question décisive» (Milner 2004 : 54). C'est pourquoi j'ai voulu mettre en lumière un autre aspect, en lui ôtant une sorte d'ambiguïté méthodologique, à savoir la pertinence de faire de la communauté internationale, déterritorialisée et homogène, un objet légitime de la recherche anthropologique.

L'ethnographie de «l'ambiance humanitaire», retracée dans cet article dans les rues de Pristina et Tirana, est en réalité une ethnographie «mobile» et exportable aujourd'hui ou demain dans d'autres zones entourées de barbelés et émaillées de tenues de combat, quand sont présents des fonctionnaires internationaux et les *local staff.* C'est une ethnographie qui prend comme objet une communauté déterritorialisée confrontée à des spécificités, des segments, des acteurs des réalités locales, ayant comme projet d'étendre partout cette nature «élastique» du concept de l'humanitarisme (Suhrke et Klusmeyer 2004). Une ethnographie qui veut soustraire la réflexion globale sur l'humanitaire à la seule sphère du modèle «rationnel» construit par les politologues. Une ethnographie qui soit capable de faire apparaître les nouvelles tensions qui émergent de ces stratégies de pouvoir et qui, jusqu'à maintenant, semblent avoir mises en échec toutes les formes de résistances locales. L'action de la souveraineté migrante s'insère dans un rapport de force qu'elle-même modèle avec l'appui et l'apport de ce que j'ai défini comme la société civile globale. Une fois que l'on a accepté que les rapports entre les institutions et les citoyens aient été profondément modifiés, il faut alors considérer les nouvelles configurations de pouvoir déterritorialisé qui sont mises en œuvre. De cette manière, uniquement, on pourra faire apparaître un ensemble de réflexions que nous pourront définir comme une ethnographie critique de la responsabilité, prise dans son acceptation la plus forte, c'est-à-dire sous celle de l'imputabilité.

Mariella Pandolfi, Département d'Anthropologie, Université de Montréal, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150, rue Jean-Brillant, Montréal, Québec, H3T 1N8, Canada. Courriel : pandolfm@anthro.umontreal.ca

Remerciements

Je voudrais remercier Marie-Claude Haince et Lynda de Matteo pour une attentive et généreuse disponibilité. Les recherches en Albanie et au Kosovo ont été possibles grâce au support du CRSH et du FQRSC.

Notes

1. Dans un intéressant article intitulé «Between Principles and Politics: Lessons from Iraq for Humanitarian Action», A. Suhrke et D. Klusmeyer soulignent : «In securing a humanitarian space, it was argued, the aid agencies had to observe conventional humanitarian codes that called for neutrality and impartiality. By the end of decade, however, this view was increasingly challenged. Some academic observers argued that all humanitarian activity had an inherent political element» (2004 : 277). Mais les auteurs de l'article ne sont certainement pas les seuls à adopter une posture critique à l'égard de cette prétendue impartialité et neutralité.
2. Et en effet, si nous réexaminons dans cette perspective les années 1970, 1980 et 1990, une réalité se constitue graduellement : aux difficultés que les États nationaux rencontrent dans leur devoir de répondre aux nouveaux défis internationaux se substitue une action progressive des nouveaux acteurs de l'humanitaire : les nouveaux liens de solidarité sociale occupent de plus en plus de place, mais cette place a toutes les nuances du privé, d'une dépolitisation institutionnelle en faveur d'une transformation apolitique de la victime (Agamben 1997, 2002; Fassin 2000; Fassin et Vasquez 2005).
3. L'attention médiatique de toute la communauté internationale à l'égard de ce que Luc Boltanski (1997) appelle la «souffrance à distance» a légitimé progressivement le concept d'«intervention»; les technologies et la mise en pratique des différents types d'interventions, et par conséquent la nécessité politique d'une critique ou d'un contrôle, ont été occultées par les images qui ont été diffusées dans le monde entier. Pensons à l'année 1991 et aux Albanais fuyant leur pays isolé pendant 50 ans; des milliers de corps humains entassés sur des bateaux, tentant de traverser l'Adriatique en quête de l'occident (en ce cas l'Italie); pensons aux images de l'année 1999, quand les télévisions du monde entier ont montré les 500 000 Albanais du Kosovo, expulsés ou en fuite, qui cherchaient refuge en Macédoine, en Albanie. Ces images ont provoqué un accord quasi unanime en faveur de l'intervention; et par conséquent un silence qui cautionne les procédures utilisées et une légitimation politique, économique et juridique pour «les experts» militaires et humanitaires.
4. Il suffit en effet de consulter le site web de l'OTAN à la section du Manuel de l'OTAN, «Chapitre 5 : Le rôle opérationnel de l'Alliance dans le maintien de la paix» qui parle de rôle de l'OTAN en rapport avec le conflit du Kosovo (http://www.nato.int/docu/manuel/2001/hb050301f.htm), pour se rendre compte du double message «guerre et humanitarisme». Dans cette même page, on peut lire : «L'intervention de l'OTAN au Kosovo a mis fin à une catastrophe humanitaire et rétabli la stabilité dans une région stratégique» (OTAN 2003b), et quelques lignes plus loin : «Les forces alliées ont pris part à plus de 38 000 actions durant les 78 jours d'interventions armées; 10 484 de ces actions ont comporté des bombardements aériens, sans qu'aucune perte ne soit enregistrée parmi les forces alliées (notre traduction)».
5. «Such conclusion is related to the controversial idea that a "right" of humanitarian intervention is not consistent with the UN charter if conceived as a legal text, but that it may, depending on context, nevertheless, reflect the spirit of the Charter as it relates to the overall protection of people against gross abuse» (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000 : 186).
6. Le concept de pacifisme apparaît pour la première fois en 1901 (Grossi 1994). Cependant, comme le rappelle Marc Angenot dans son livre *L'antimilitarisme, idéologie et utopie,* le projet de paix universelle remonte à 1713, avec le «Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe» élaboré par l'abbé de Saint-Pierre et plus tard par Kant (1765) dans son écrit «Projet de paix universelle et de formation d'une société des nations».
7. Médecins sans frontières.
8. La «conditional independence» a été suggérée par la commission indépendante sur le Kosovo.
9. L'une des procédures internationales pour le maintien de la paix consiste à créer des parlements nationaux ou territoriaux, mais qui restent sous tutelle des missions des Nations Unies. Au Kosovo par exemple, on a procédé deux fois à des élections depuis la fin de la guerre, mais dans les deux cas, la soi-disant pacification entre les groupes a été vouée à l'échec étant donné l'abstention massive enregistrée dans les enclaves serbes présentes sur le territoire. La nature et le mandat de ces parlements, surtout lorsqu'ils ne correspondent pas à l'identité d'une nation souveraine comme c'est le cas au Kosovo restent ambigus et sont potentiellement des foyers de nouvelles violences. Cette tutelle militaire et civile alimente le phénomène que j'ai qualifié de «transition permanente».
10. Si nous considérons les Balkans d'un point de vue géographique, la péninsule au sud-est de l'Europe qui relie cette dernière à l'Asie mineure (Anatolie) comprend : Grèce, Albanie, Macédoine, Roumanie, Serbie, Monténégro, Kosovo et la partie de la Turquie européenne. Certains considèrent également la Croatie comme faisant partie des Balkans. Sur le site web de la BBC, en 2003 les Balkans sont une entité politique (Slovénie, Croatie, Bosnie Herzégovine, Serbie, Monténégro, Macédoine, Albanie).
11. Résumé des onze points de la «Déclaration de Sarajevo» adoptée dans la capitale bosniaque par les participants au sommet sur le Pacte de stabilité des Balkans (notre adaptation à partir du site Internet «Pacte de stabilité», http://www.paixbalkans.org/pacttextes.htm#sommet%20sarajevo).

    1) RÉSOLUTION POUR LA PAIX—Engagement à soutenir les accords de Dayton et le processus de paix au Kosovo. Est réaffirmée la volonté de donner un sens concret au Pacte «en promouvant des réformes politiques et économiques, le développement et le renforcement de la sécurité dans la région». Est réaffirmée la détermination à «surmonter les tragédies qui se sont abattues sur l'Europe du sud-est pendant toute une décennie» et «soutien aux accords de Dayton-Paris et au processus de paix au Kosovo».

2) RÉSOLUTION POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE ET LA COOPÉRATION—Est réaffirmée la décision de tout mettre en oeuvre pour réaliser la démocratie, le respect des droits de l'homme, le développement économique et social, le renforcement de la sécurité, «pour promouvoir l'intégration du sud-est de l'Europe dans le continent».
3) INTÉGRATION DANS LES STRUCTURES EURO-ATLANTIQUES—«Les pays de cette région aspirent à l'intégration dans les structures euro-atlantiques» et «croient fermement que le Pacte et son application favoriseront un tel processus».
4) APPEL AUX SERBES POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE—La population de la république fédérale de la Yougoslavie est appelée à «accueillir favorablement le changement démocratique et à oeuvrer activement pour la réconciliation régionale».
5) PROCESSUS DE STABILISATION—Plein soutien aux efforts entrepris en faveur de la stabilité et à toutes les initiatives qui permettent à ces efforts d'aboutir à des résultats positifs.
6) COOPÉRATION RÉGIONALE—La coopération régionale activera les aspirations des pays de la région vers une intégration réciproque dans des structures plus vastes.
7) DÉMOCRATIE ET DROITS—Engagement à soutenir les efforts de la région vers une démocratie stable, une économie de marché et une société pluraliste et ouverte.
8) DÉMOCRATIE ET DROITS DE L'HOMME—Le processus du Pacte de stabilité sera axé sur la démocratie et les droits de l'homme, la coopération et la sécurité.
9) RÉFUGIÉS—Sont réaffirmés le droit de tous les réfugiés et des personnes évacuées de regagner librement et en toute sécurité leurs habitations, ainsi que la détermination «à coopérer pour conserver les diversités multinationales et multiethniques des pays de la région et assurer la protection des minorités».
10) DÉVELOPPEMENT ET COOPÉRATION—Est soulignée l'importance des relations économiques des pays de la région avec l'UE et de leur intégration dans le système mondial du commerce.
11) SÉCURITÉ—Détermination à agir pour mettre fin aux tensions, réaliser pleinement le contrôle des armes, promouvoir le contrôle civil sur les forces armées et des mesures efficaces contre criminalité organisée et terrorisme.

12 Voir l'article de Marie-Joelle Zahar (2003) en bibliographie.

13 Le 14 décembre 1995, après trois ans et demi de guerre , 2 millions de réfugiés et 200 000 morts, ont été signés à Paris les accords de Dayton. Ils proclament la souveraineté de la Bosnie-Herzégovine et d'un État divisé en deux entités : la Fédération croate musulmane (51% et la République des Serbes de Bosnie (49 %). Un haut représentant de la communauté internationale impose des lois, peut renvoyer des fonctionnaires et sanctionner les politiques. Paddy Ashdown occupe ce poste aujourd'hui. Depuis Dayton il est le quatrième. En novembre 2005, 10 ans après Dayton un changement de l'architecture pléthorique des deux entités s'impose. Mais le risque de l'effondrement de la construction de l'État est souligné par un rapport interne et informel du 2 décembre 2004 de l'Office du haut représentant (OHR) (voir à cet effet l'article de Vaulerin 2005).

14 Corps spécial militaire italien.

15 Michael Ignatieff (2003) souligne que les images télévisées ayant trait aux catastrophes humanitaires et aux guerres contribuent aujourd'hui à briser les frontières de notre espace moral, ces frontières qui par le passé étaient basées sur la citoyenneté, la religion, l'ethnie et en l'absence desquelles nous devons aujourd'hui instituer une nouvelle frontière de responsabilité commune.

16 L'*empire lite* est un empire sans conscience impériale qui dispose d'une hégémonie indiscutée et d'un rayon d'action inégale. Il accepte les règles qui l'arrangent et s'excepte de celles qui le dérangent (voir également Hardt et Negri 2000).

17 Un exemple de cette participation au témoignage et au «j'accuse» est le fort impact qu'a eu l'expérience, puis le livre du Général Roméo Dallaire, lancé par une vaste campagne médiatisée.Commandant en chef de la Mission d'observation des Nations Unies Ouganda-Rwanda et de la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda en 1993-94, il vit une expérience qui le marquera profondément. Il reste un an au Rwanda (d'août 1993 à août 1994). Dans le quotidien «La Presse» de Montréal il déclare dans une interview : «Je vis la culpabilité d'un commandant qui a vu sa mission ne pas aboutir à un succès. Je vis aussi avec cette culpabilité vis-à-vis des Rwandais à qui on a donné l'espoir du succès de leur projet de paix et qui, dernièrement, se sont fait massacrer en nous regardant avec des yeux d'incompréhension pendant que nous étions impuissants à faire quelque chose» (Marissal, 2000). Nommé sénateur en mars 2005, il siège au Sénat à titre de membre de Parti libéral du Canada. Il est également conseiller spécial pour l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI) sur les questions liées aux enfants victimes de la guerre. Il a rédigé plusieurs articles sur les droits de la personne, sur la résolution de conflits ainsi que sur l'aide humanitaire. Il est régulièrement invité dans les universités canadiennes et américaines. Son livre sur le génocide rwandais *J'ai serré la main du diable,* (édition originale en anglais *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda,* 2004 Random House) a remporté en 2004 le prix du gouverneur général à Ottawa et le prix du public du Salon du livre de Montréal.

18 Voir la «mission d'enquête» en 2003 par Bernard Kouchner pour le compte du groupe pétrolier Total. Confronter l'article de Erich Inciyan et Jean-Claude Pomonti (Le Monde, 6 janvier 2004).

19 La nouvelle industrie de la pietas s'impose dans les années quatre-vingt-dix, mais la profonde transfiguration de l'humanitaire avait commencé bien avant, alimentée par une «profonde modification du statut des victimes et par la délégitimation des États qui en résulte...ultime conséquence d'une gestion fortement privée du nouvel humanisme» (Badie 2002 : 241).

20 Un exemple de ce genre de légitimation politique progressive qui se crée dans le circuit international parallèle est Veton Surroi chef d'un nouveau parti lors des dernières élections au Kosovo en d'octobre 2004. Fils d'un ambassadeur dans la Yougoslavie de Tito, Surroi s'est présenté sur la scène internationale comme journaliste, directeur du plus important quotidien au Kosovo Koha Ditore, puis directeur d'une télévision privée financée par les «donors» internationaux et accrédité comme interlocuteur privilégié du

Kosovo dans tous les sièges internationaux. Représentant du Kosovo au sommet de Rambouillet, il jouit d'un crédit illimité dans tous les secteurs internationaux.

21 Les membres du Klub s'occupent des thématiques émergentes dans la société contemporaine albanaise, telles que les droits humains, l'économie de marché et l'éthique de l'information, à partir d'approches appartenant à différentes disciplines : les relations internationales, l'économie, les études politiques, le droit et le journalisme.

Références

Agamben, Giorgio
1997 [1995] Homo Sacer I. Le pouvoir souverain et la vie nue. Paris : Seuil.
2002 [1996] Moyen sans fins. Notes sur la politique. Paris : Rivages.

Angenot, Marc
2003 L'antimilitarisme, idéologie et utopie. Québec : Presses de l'Université Laval.

Appadurai, Arjun
1996a Modernity at Large : Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press.
1996b Sovereignty without Territoriality. Notes for a Postnational Geography. *Dans* The Geography of Identity. Patricia Yaeger, dir. Pp. 40-58. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press.

Badie, Bertrand
2002 La diplomatie des droits de l'homme : entre éthique et volonté de puissance. Paris : Fayard.

Boltanski, Luc
1997 La souffrance à distance : morale humanitaire, médias et politique. Paris : Métailié.

Brauman, Rony et Philippe Mesnard
2000 Champ humanitaire et champ de force. Mouvements 12 : 8-12.

Chomsky, Noam
2000 [1999] Le nouvel humanisme militaire : leçons du Kosovo. Montréal : Éditions Écosociété.

Clark, Anne Marie
1995 Non-Governmental Organisations and Their Influence on International Society. Journal of International Affairs 48(2) : 507-525.

Dallaire, Roméo
2004 Shake Hands with the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. Toronto : Random House.

de Geoffroy, Véronique
2000 Militaro-humanitaire ou civilo-militaire? Mouvements 12 : 49-54.

Fassin, Didier
2000 Entre politiques du vivant et politiques de la vie. Pour une anthropologie de la santé. Les notes de recherche no. 1 du CRESP. Bobigny : Université Paris 13.

Fassin, Didier et Paula Vasquez
2005 Humanitarian Exception as the Rule : The Political Theology of 1999 Tragedia in Venezuela. American Ethnologist 32(3) : 389-405.

Foucault, Michel
1994 Dits et Écrits 1954-1988 (Volumes 3 et 4). Paris : Gallimard.

Hardt, Michael et Antonio Negri
2000 Empire. Paris : Exils.

Grossi, Verdiana
1994 Le pacifisme européen 1889-1914. Bruxelles : Bruylant.

Ignatieff, Michael
2003 Empire Lite : Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. London : Vintage.

Inciyan, Erich et Jean-Claude Pomonti
2004 Kouchner, Total et la Birmanie. Le Monde, 6 janvier : 15.

Independent International Commission on Kosovo
2000 The Kosovo Report. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Kouchner, Bernard
1991 Le malheur des autres. Paris : Odile Jacob.

Lafontaine, Annie
2002 Réfugié ou «local staff»? Changement de statut et enjeux de pouvoirs au Kosovo d'après-guerre. Politiques jeux d'espaces. Anthropologie et Sociétés 26(1) : 89-106.
2003 Le rapatriement des réfugiés albanais au Kosovo (1999-2001) : discours, pratiques et effets sociaux. Thèse de doctorat, Département d'anthropologie, Université de Montréal.

Laïdi, Zaki
1998 L'urgence ou la dévalorisation culturelle de l'avenir. *Dans* Urgence, souffrance, misère : lutte humanitaire ou politique sociale? Marc-Henry Soulet, dir. Pp. 43-59. Fribourg : Presses Universitaires Fribourg Suisse.

Langewiesche, William
2004 Welcome to the Green Zone : Our Fortified Bubble in Baghdad Is a Microcosm of America and of What Has Gone Wrong in Iraq. The Atlantic Monthly, November, 294(4) : 60-88.

Mann, Michael
2003 Incoherent Empire. London : Verso.

Marissal, Vincent
2000 800 000 morts sur la conscience. La Presse, 15 avril : B7.

Milner, Jean-Claude
2004 La roue de l'humanitaire. Les Temps Modernes 627 : 43-56.

Mouvement de la paix
2003 Pacte de stabilité. http://www.paixbalkans.org/pacttextes.htm#sommet%20sarajevo, site consulté le 24 septembre 2003.

Murdock, Donna F.
2003 That Stubborn "Doing Good?" Question: Ethical/Epistemological Concerns in the Study of NGOs. Ethnos 68(4) : 507-532.

OTAN
2003a Operation Allied Harbour (AFOR). http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/harbour/default.htm, site consulté le 9 novembre 2003.
2003b Chapitre 5 : Le rôle opérationnel de l'Alliance dans le maintien de la paix. http://www.nato.int/docu/manuel/2001/hb050301f.htm, site consulté le 27 février 2003.

2004 Official Web Site of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html, site consulté le 18 décembre.

Pandolfi, Mariella
2000a Une souveraineté mouvante et supracoloniale. L'industrie humanitaire dans les Balkans. Multitudes 3 : 97-105.
2000b Disappearing Boundaries: Notes on Albania, Kosovo and the Humanitarian Agenda. Psychosocial Notebook 1 : 27-40.
2002 «Moral Entrepreneurs», souverainetés mouvantes et barbelés : le bio-politique dans les Balkans post-communistes. Politiques jeux d'espaces. Anthropologie et Sociétés 26(1) : 29-50.
2003 Contract of Mutual (In) Difference : Governance and Humanitarian Apparatus in Contemporary Albania and Kosovo. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 10(1) : 369-381.

Pandolfi, Mariella et Marc Abélès
2002 Présentation. Politiques jeux d'espaces. Anthropologie et Sociétés 26(1) : 5-10.

Pandolfi, Mariella, Annie Lafontaine, Marie-Joëlle Zahar et Laurence McFalls
2005 Paradoxes et démocratie de l'information en Albanie contemporaine. Intellectuals and the Media: East-West Dialogue on Democracy for the Balkans. Transitions 44(2) : 11-30.

Pollock, Sheldon, Homi K. Bhabha, Carol A. Breckenridge et Dipesh Chakrabarty
2000 Cosmopolitanisms. Public Culture 12(3): 577-589.

Prendergast, John
1997 Crisis Response : Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia. London : Pluto Press.

Rieff, David
2004 [2002] L'humanitaire en crise. Paris : Le Serpent à plume

Rufin, Jean-Christophe
1999a Pour l'humanitaire. Dépasser le sentiment d'échec. Le Débat 105 : 4-21.
1999b Les humanitaires et la guerre du Kosovo. Le Débat 106 : 3-26.

Suhrke, Astri et Douglas Klusmeyer
2004 Between Principles and Politics : Lessons from Iraq for Humanitarian Action. Journal of Refugee Studies 17(3) : 273-285.

Todorova, Maria
1997 Imagining the Balkans. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Vaulerin, Arnaud
2005 Chaos constitutionnel en Bosnie. Chargé d'appliquer les accords de Dayton, Paddy Ashdown veut renforcer l'Etat central. Libération, samedi 5 et dimanche 6 février : 11.

Zahar, Marie-Joëlle
2003 The Limits of Powersharing in Post-Civil War Settings. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 28-31.

Zolo, Danilo
1995 Cosmopolis. Milan : Feltrinelli.
1998 I signori della pace. Una critica del globalismo giuridico. Rome : Carocci.
2000 Chi dice umanità. Guerra, diritto e ordine globale. Turin : Einaudi.
2003 Fondamentalismo humanitario. *Dans* Una ragionevole apologia dei diritti umani. Michael Ignatieff, dir. Pp. 230-240. Milan : Feltrinelli.
2004 Globalizzazione. Una mappa dei problema. Bari : Laterza.

Governing Peace: Global Rationalities of Security and UNESCO's Culture of Peace Campaign

Suzan Ilcan *University of Windsor*
Lynne Phillips *University of Windsor*

Abstract: This essay interrogates the relationship between governance and peace, and explores how campaigns for peace are being developed on global scales. We analyze how UNESCO's Culture of Peace program governs peace through "global rationalities of security." These rationalities—embodied in programs of action, training and capacity-building schemes and information-sharing practices—are geared towards investing in people in ways that individualize them and govern their conduct in the future. Campaigns for "a culture of peace" attempt to make particular individuals and groups responsible for acquiring certain kinds of values of "peace" and "security." In light of the current wars, violence and conflicts that besiege lives and livelihoods, the processes of governing peace force us both to question the contradictions that inhabit global peace efforts and to offer alternative thinking about peace.

Keywords: governmentality, globalization, peace, security, UNESCO

Résumé : Cet essaie remet en question la relation entre la gouvernance et la paix et explore comment on en vient à développer des campagnes de paix à l'échelle internationale. Nous analysons la manière dont le programme de promotion d'une culture de la paix de l'UNESCO tend à régir la paix par le biais de logiques sécuritaires mondiales. Ces logiques – mises en œuvre à l'aide de programmes d'action, de formation, de renforcement des capacités ou encore à l'aide de pratiques encourageant l'échange de renseignements – ont pour objectif d'investir au sein des populations de façon à les individualiser et à régir leur comportement futur. Les campagnes de promotion d'une culture de la paix tentent de responsabiliser certains individus et certains groupes afin qu'ils acquièrent certains types de valeurs face à la paix et à la sécurité. À la lumière des guerres, des violences et des conflits qui menacent actuellement des vies et des moyens de subsistance, les processus de gestion de la paix nous obligent non seulement à interroger les contradictions émanant des efforts de promotion d'une paix mondiale, mais également à proposer d'autres façons de concevoir à la paix.

Mots-Clés : gouvernementalité, mondialisation, paix, sécurité, UNESCO

Introduction

This essay is concerned with the relationship between governance and peace, and explores how campaigns for peace are being developed on global scales. Keeping in mind that international agencies have a history of rendering legitimacy for the deportment of other powerful agents, we examine one international organization that mobilizes peace initiatives. We illustrate how these initiatives constitute a multitude of plans to shape the conduct of individuals, groups and populations for the future. This organization is the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). It serves as a powerful example for illustrating how peace is conceptualized and rendered as a problem of security. Specifically, we analyze how UNESCO's Culture of Peace program governs peace through what we call "global rationalities of security." These are rationalities or ways of thinking that are developed, disseminated and embodied in a diverse range of activities across the globe, including programs of action, training and capacity-building and the dispersion of information. Through interviews conducted with UNESCO policy and research personnel[1] and through an examination of archival and policy documents, international declarations and plans of action, our analysis points to the ways in which international campaigns for "a culture of peace" are based upon orientations that attempt to make particular individuals and groups responsible for acquiring certain kinds of values associated with "peace" and "security." These campaigns are future-oriented and call for new (governed) spaces of peace education and institutional capacity training, and the circulation of information to prepare minds and bodies for a particular notion of peace. In light of the current wars, violence and conflicts that besiege lives and livelihoods, the processes of *governing peace* force us both to interrogate the contradictions that inhabit global peace efforts and to offer alternative thinking about and collectivities of peace.

Peace and Governance

Why is it that we hear or read so much about "peace" now? Some groups might say that it is related to the recent and heavy deployment of military forces in countries across the globe which seductively appear under the banner of "peace-keeping." Other groups might claim that it is tied to the sheer volume of individuals annihilated (such as the estimated 800 000 people in Rwanda over a short period of weeks in 1994) and the large numbers of people left homeless and suffering from hunger and abusive treatment as a consequence of recent ethnic conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and other sites. Many more claims could be recounted on the events relating to peace. However, in a political climate where there is an increasing demand for security (Hudson 2003) and a move towards a "new individualization of security" (Rose 1999: 236), peace-related events are often reckoned as guarding against future misfortune. Within economic orientations of neo-liberalism—especially those that foster investing in oneself as a way of taking responsibility for one's personal security and that of one's children or family—there are efforts to act upon social and cultural environments in an attempt to secure the problematic zones and the life of a population. Such endeavours aim to reduce the future likelihood of conflicts and threats to security, and often involve promoting a particular understanding of and avenue for peace. This notion of peace not only becomes associated with the problem of security but is used as a defence of certain security plans and rationalities. Within this context, peace as a social justice issue concerned with resolving the problems of poverty, unequal access to resources, and social conflicts undergirding the global economy remains marginal to those conceptions of peace which are primarily concerned with the preservation of security. As evident in the sections that follow, we demonstrate how peace is governed by global rationalities of security. As a form of power, these rationalities hinge on investing in people across the globe as an attempt to promote individual conduct that is consistent with particular kinds of peace efforts, such as those related to global peace programs, institutional capacity training plans, information sharing and environmental sustainability schemes. This style of thinking has inscribed not only "peace talks," "peace summits" and "peace-building" but also the future-focussed character of international peace programs and initiatives.

There is a plethora of internationally oriented initiatives that aim to promote peace in the face of conflicts resulting from social and political activities. At one level of the spectrum, there are transnational peace activists who continue to target state policies, especially those of superpowers, as encouraging militarization and arms races (see Lynch 1998: 159) to the detriment of the "security" of peoples and populations in various places of the globe. This kind of activism may well give credence to the view that we are living in a period of revolutionary change in warfare, particularly in the development of military technology and the organization of the armed forces, or what its proponents call the "revolution in military affairs" [RMA] (Hirst 2001: 7; see also Reid 2003). At another level, there are governments and international organizations that intervene in conflicts around the world to end violent ethnic struggles and the humanitarian suffering engendered by them, and to strive to prevent such violence by promoting the conditions for sustainable peace. For example, the United Nations has embarked on almost as many "peacekeeping" operations in the four years between 1989-93 as it did in the four decades prior to the early 1990s (Ghosh 1994: 412). Similarly, UNESCO has been and continues to be an instrumental participant in mobilizing peace initiatives and in fostering global rationalities of security that aim to shape the future conduct of individuals, groups and populations.

Yet, and in light of the diverse efforts to promote peace at international levels, there remains a lack of critical attention paid to the complex relationship between peace and governance, and how peace is thought of and governed in distinct ways. Given the multifaceted character of the processes of governance, it is not possible to delimit the concept of peace in an easy, definitive way. Its meaning varies and depends on the context of its use, and the extent to which it is deployed by particular groups or organizations for certain purposes and not others. From our perspective, the concept of peace is not merely a reflection of what stands in opposition to warfare or violent conflict; it is more aptly a problem of and metaphor for security. It is a notion that is employed by governing bodies to incite the need for change. Through specific initiatives and plans, for example, particular kinds of people, economies or events are deemed to be harmful, to cause instability, or to stimulate actions against security. They are what Johnson and Shearing (2003) might call "security threats." Thus, the concept of peace can be linked to various rationalities of security or ways of thinking about security that are used to act on the security of a group or population. As discussed later in this paper, we illustrate how one global organization, UNESCO, governs peace through global rationalities of security. Based on the organization's programmatic statements, policy documents and speeches, we illustrate how these rationalities of security, as a form of power, hinge on investing in and indi-

vidualizing particular peoples. We also show how these rationalities, in an era of cultural engineering, are constituted through particular means, procedures and vocabularies that articulate with the organization's peace programs, capacity training efforts, and information sharing practices. In tracing what might be called the "field" of global rationalities, we take a different kind of ethnographic journey in the study of globalization and power, one akin to Nader's notion of "studying up" (Nader 1972). Interestingly, UNESCO has not been examined with respect to its particular peace efforts. We offer our analysis with the hope that others working on or examining peace initiatives in other ("local") contexts might see how such initiatives articulate with or are excluded by this new cultural framing of peace as security.

Our analysis here is unique in that it focusses on how UNESCO peace efforts are inextricably linked to global rationalities of security. This argument is informed by the literature on governmentality that draws on inter-disciplinary resources and provides a key entry point into investigating the ways in which rationalities of governance shape ideas and events as well as the conduct of people and populations. The governmentality literature offers alternative ways of thinking about contemporary forms of governance that go beyond formal state policy and legislation. The forms of governance initiated by UNESCO, and other United Nations organizations, exceed those belonging to nation-states and can therefore open themselves to the insights of the governmentality literature. This literature recognizes that diverse forms of governance are premised on rationalized schemes, programs, techniques, and devices that seek to shape conduct in particular ways in relation to certain objectives (e.g., Ilcan and Phillips 2003; Isin 2000; Phillips and Ilcan 2003, 2004; Rose 1999). Governance may be oriented towards achieving prescribed goals in the future and responding to issues and events in the past (Johnson and Shearing 2003: 24). Scholars working from this orientation have explored how the strategic arrangement of particular kinds of rationalities (e.g., punishment, risk-management), knowledge and expertise may assist in shaping the conduct of groups and populations. Such orientations have been applied to topics ranging from the environment, community, poverty, unemployment, empowerment and development, to that of law and criminality, psychology and space and architecture (e.g., Appadurai 2001; Cruikshank 1999; Dean 1999; Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Foucault 1991; Ilcan and Basok 2004; Rose 1999, 1994). For example, in an analysis of "government through community," Tania Li notes how the apparent naturalness of community is always in tension with "community as a project." She points to how efforts to intervene in and reform communities for the purposes of government always produce an excess (of histories, memories, commitments) that moves beyond the limits of governmental projects and opens up a new terrain of politics (2002).

In a recent study on "governing security," Johnson and Shearing (2003) consider that one of the most significant dimensions of governance is the rationality or the "mentality" that is brought to the task. A mentality is a "mental framework that shapes the way we think about the world" (2003: 29). There are many different kinds of mentalities. For example, a risk-management mentality is future-oriented and favours a mode of governance "at a distance." In contrast, a punishment mentality is focussed primarily on past events and emphasizes coercive physical force and involves direct governance through the state. A noteworthy point in their analysis that parallels Li's argument (2002) is that a mentality is not situationally specific. It can spread and affect other areas of social, cultural, and political life (Johnson and Shearing 2003: 29-38), and give rise to the unanticipated effects and contradictory outcomes of governing populations, what we prefer to call the *unintended* consequences of governmentality.

Although governmentality studies convincingly demonstrate how various kinds of rationalities, knowledge and expertise are used to govern ideas, peoples and populations beyond the state, the complexity of approaches within the field invites additional research. In comparison to the abundance of work that focusses on specific governing practices situated within local or national sites of intensity and engagement, more detailed studies need to address the transnational and international dimensions of governmentality. The reasons for greater attention to be given to this field of inquiry relate to: the colossal emergence of global governing and non-governmental organizations since the end of World War II—including the United Nations organizations with their focus on issues ranging from peace, disarmament, justice and human rights, to issues of poverty, unemployment, economic development and globalization; and the global emphasis and dissemination of discourses and practices on "peace" and "security." In light of these occurrences, more sustained attention should be directed towards examining how specific kinds of rationalities of governance are deployed by global organizations to shape the way people perceive themselves and others in the world, and react to situations and events occurring around them. Such research may go far in illustrating the specific ways that processes of globalization bring about "new forms of governmentality" (Appadurai 2001: 26). As we show, inter-

national peace projects attempt to shape the conduct of particular populations and make particular individuals (such as women and children) responsible participants in these governing endeavours. We also suggest that the incorporation of women in the peace process can essentialize women as peaceful and men as warlike through the use of culturally defined gender stereotypes. For these and other reasons, it is important to ask not only why particular individuals are seen as potential peace participants but how peace is governed.

In an effort to analyze the global dimensions of governmentality, one needs to interrogate how global governing organizations engage in processes of governance that can produce both *intended* and *unintended* consequences.[2] The term "intended consequences," in this context, refers to a governing organization's stated objectives which are to be the outcome of projects, programs, plans and so on. However, there is little analytical purchase to focus only on the intended consequences of an organization's stated objectives. This focus can lead to interpretations that would be unable to account for the distinctions between an organization's functional aims, and how these are deployed and circulated, and how they may articulate with other seemingly different technical and institutional practices. Based upon many years of working for UNESCO, a senior UNESCO advisor comments on how the politics of the organization itself could shift its intended consequences:

> From a knowledge point of view, perhaps the key difficulty was the heterogeneity of the different constituencies which make UNESCO. In other words, at the level of the member states and their representatives, the diplomats, it proved difficult to develop a truly independent and critical social science in UNESCO. They always preferred to see education and other areas in...less critical ways, in less analytical ways. And, they always preferred a fuzzy language rather than a critical, rigorous language, and this has been detrimental to UNESCO.

At the level of global governing organizations, it is important to inquire into "effects rather than interests" (Valverde 2003: 12) and to identify "the differences in what is said...and what allows it to be said and to have an effectivity" (Rose 1999: 57). More generally, we need to ask ourselves how particular rationalities of governance can simultaneously produce certain types of knowledge, arguments or solutions to a given problem and exclude or marginalize other knowledge, arguments or solutions to the same problem. For example, peace initiatives promoted by global governing organizations often exclude or ignore the efforts and effects of feminist peace collectives, such as: Women for Peace [South Africa]; Women in Black [Israel, Palestine, Serbia]; Organizacion Femenina Popular [Columbia]; Saturday Mothers [Turkey]; Mothers' Movements [South America]; SOS Femmes en Detress [Algeria]; The Association of Women of the Mediterranean Region; and, Red Ecuatoriana de Mujeres Líderes por la Paz [Ecuador]. We consider that these kinds of exclusions may be critical dimensions of the unintended consequences that stem from the practices associated with ruling or governing bodies.[3]

Particularly insightful on the issue of unintended consequences are case studies involving global governing or non-governmental organizations. For example, in Ferguson's research in Lesotho, it was the unintended effects, what he calls "the anti-politics machine," of international development agencies and foreign-led development projects that ultimately failed to alleviate poverty (1994). Paralleling the implications of the "anti-politics machine," Bryant's case study on non-governmental organizations and governmentality in the Philippines moves away from a focus on non-governmental organizations' utilitarian aims and intended outcomes, such as field projects completed, political processes altered, social attitudes transformed. Instead the author documents the unintended effects (e.g., the marginalization and subjection of poor peoples) produced by particular NGO-led conservation agendas (Bryant 2002: 272). Likewise, Elyachar (2002) indicates the unintended effects of "empowering" the poor through micro-lending projects when she documents the sudden enthusiasm of shop owners in Egypt to transform themselves into the kinds of informants that international organizations want to fund. This paper highlights the intended and unintended consequences of peace initiatives, focussing primarily on the efforts of UNESCO and the ways in which they have left out, reshaped, or marginalized other peace initiatives.

Peace Initiatives

In response to the perception of prevailing security threats, peace initiatives today have come to symbolize the necessity of bringing about change.[4] With the rise of global flows of capital, images, ideas and practices of governance, numerous international peace organizations, programs, institutes, workshops and activities have been launched to deal with issues of security. The sources of authority on peace (as security) have expanded from the nation-state to international organizations and institutes, such as: Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Oxfam International, The International Institute on Peace Education, the United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNESCO. There is much variation in how the conditions of peace are thought to work and to work best. In an effort to promote peace in post-conflict situations, the UNDP views peace in relation to issues of development and supports peace agreements of this nature, such as the ones it held with El Salvador in 1992 and with Guatemala in 1996 (see Santiso 2002: 562). Likewise, the United Nations' *Agenda for Peace,* initiated in 1992 under the former UN Secretary General Butros Ghali, encompassed diverse peace initiatives (including peace support operations and post-conflict peace-building schemes)[5] that attempted to shape actions, processes and outcomes in specific directions by linking peace, development and democracy (United Nations 1992). In contrast, the International Institute on Peace Education is an organization that holds annual peace workshops and relies on peace educators and advocates to work towards its objectives.[6] In what follows, we examine the ways in which UNESCO's peace programs highlight the individual, over the nation-state, as the key arena for fostering a culture of peace.

UNESCO's Peace Programmes

> Other "rights" have been added [to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights] since 1948. These should all be taken into account, and to them should be added the right which underlies them all: the right to peace—the right to live in peace! The right to our own "personal sovereignty," to respect for life and dignity. (UNESCO Director-General 1997: 13)

Created in the wake of WWII, UNESCO has for 60 years conceived and implemented activities intended to promote education for peace, human rights, democracy, international understanding and tolerance. The Constitution of UNESCO, adopted in 1945, states that the "purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations" (Article 1). Throughout much of this period peace was closely aligned with the concept of national security, and peace and security were envisaged together as products of a "collaboration among nations" in an emerging international setting.

In the early 1990s, with dramatic changes in the international context,[7] UNESCO's orientation shifted more explicitly to the promotion of "global'" perspectives and global rationalities of security. Thinking and acting globally, rather than nationally or regionally, pervades the organization's recent strategic frameworks. The United Nations General Assembly recognized UNESCO's culture of peace program as a "global movement" when it heard its proposal for an International Decade for a Culture of Peace in 2000 (United Nations 2000: 2). From its inception, the promotion of a "culture of peace'" was intended as a search for values beyond national interests.[8] As the preface to the second edition of a UNESCO teaching guide for peace promotion states, "It is essential to think on a global scale and advance universal values with which everyone will be able to identify. 'Planetary ethics,' 'global citizenship' and 'holistic thinking' will then be able to emerge..." (Weil 2002 [1990]).

UNESCO's initiatives to produce and globally disseminate new ways of thinking about and acting upon peace have shifted the terrain of security and its relation to peace. One of UNESCO's web fora states that "the clear distinction...between national security and international security is now meaningless: the abolition of distances and growing interdependence give credence to the idea among those who govern, and increasingly among the governed, that these two forms of security are inseparable" and calls for a "rebuilding of security, which is now human rather than inter-State" (UNESCO 2001a: 1). Within the context of developing a culture of peace, security efforts have taken on a new meaning, encapsulated in the concept of "human security." As the previous Director General of UNESCO, puts it: "'Security' is being redefined as a civil, even scientific issue, and no longer seen as a matter of warheads and delivery systems" (Mayor 1995: 2).

It is not surprising that the principal agent for developing a culture of peace is thought to be the individual and not so much the state. The activities associated with fostering a culture of peace would enhance the social promotion of the individual through her/his own action, and the state would no longer be the stake in such peace initiatives. René Zapata, head of the co-ordination unit of UNESCO's transdisciplinary project, "Towards a Culture of Peace," states that the "prime mover" for peace is "each and every one of us. For surely the road to peace must start within ourselves..." (Zapata 2000: 1). According to Zapata, the barriers to peace are those that we create ourselves due to our ignorance, fanaticism or selfishness (ibid.: 1-2). This idea forms the backdrop to the general recognition within UNESCO that peace requires the education of people to become "responsible citizens knowledgeable about and respectful of humanistic val-

ues, human rights, and democracy" (UNESCO 1997a: 4). It is within this context that the organization envisions globalization as an important part of the solution to the problem of peace. However, one of UNESCO's prominent senior policy advisors suggests that UNESCO's engagement in processes of globalization to solve particular problems places limitations on this global governing organization:

> There is a world in which prevails a balance between private interest and public interest, if I may say so. Of course, now, this is one of the reasons why UNESCO is in a difficult position: there is no more balance between private interest and public interest. The only thing that matters is private interest. So this is the difficulty of global governance. In global governance, why globalization is so unjust and so distorted is because it is based on the idea that the only thing that matters is private interest.

Nevertheless, it is globalization processes that enable the circulation of UNESCO's rationalities of security and it is through these processes that the need for a global transformation in values, attitudes and behaviour can be signalled. As we illustrate in the following sections, by establishing contained programs of action that invest in the apparent values associated with particular people (such as women and children) and by identifying distinct "capacities" for improvement, UNESCO is intimately involved not just in promoting but in governing "cultures of peace."

An examination of UNESCO's Culture of Peace program illustrates how the organization's specific intentions articulate with rationalities of security that globally govern conceptions and practices of peace. The early linking of peace with culture can be found in the organization's Constitutional statement that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed" (Preamble of UNESCO's Constitution). Current campaigns for promoting a culture of peace not only draw on UNESCO's historical recognition that peace is something that can be made (and unmade) by people,[9] but it reflects a new era of cultural engineering in the name of peace and security. It is perhaps not a coincidence that this new era is imbued with a sense of urgency, particularly with the identification by many of the world-wide "instabilities" arising from terrorism, aggressive nationalism and the development of new "cultures of war." This problem of security has helped to justify not only the increasing demand for security (see Hudson 2003) but also the building of intrusive plans to invest in particular people as a way to promote peace throughout the globe.

The intention of UNESCO's Culture of Peace program was to bring about a more co-ordinated and pervasive effort at promoting international peace beyond Declarations and International Conferences. The building of peace was to take place everywhere: "First and foremost, a culture of peace implies a global effort to change how people think and act in order to promote peace....Its mission also extends beyond war situations to schools and workplaces around the world, to parliamentary chambers and newsrooms, to households and playgrounds" (UNESCO 1998: 1). Such a broad scope has required the co-ordinated effort not only of all sectors and units of the organization, but of other UN bodies and beyond.[10] That the United Nations General Assembly agreed upon a long term program for peace in the form of the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2001-10) reflected an understanding that changing "how people think and act'" requires action beyond the establishment of treaties and declarations. This ambitious program encompasses many pressing global issues[11] which operate as a "motivating discourse" (Paley 2002) that draws a wide range of people into the net of responsibility for achieving peace. For example, UNESCO's strategic planning report on peace notes that, since poverty puts people "at risk," economic development itself is a security issue: "Human security is inconceivable without sustainable development including environmental protection. Its attainment will require profound changes in peoples' and societies' attitudes and their patterns of behaviour..." (UNESCO 2002b: 2).

While the call for a "culture of peace'" attempts to responsibilize populations, UNESCO's programs set the parameters for how the development of peace should proceed. Promoting itself as a "standard setter,'" the organization highlights its "role in gathering, transferring, disseminating and sharing available information, knowledge and best practices in its fields of competence, identifying innovative solutions and testing them through pilot projects" (UNESCO 2002b: 6). As a "standard setter," it mobilizes specific information and expertise, as well as particular conceptions of social transformation. Gathering together academics, policy-makers, religious leaders, and other "experts,"[12] UNESCO is more than a facilitator in shaping what constitutes "best practices" and "innovative solutions" for peace. By forging universal agreement on such issues, it plays a vital role in global information management.

Through a complex set of agreements, UNESCO focusses on investment through training, educating and building the capacities of people and institutions. A discussion of these activities is the subject of the next section.

What is important to keep in mind is how, by undertaking such activities, UNESCO's programs for peace work to govern notions of peace and encourage a wide variety of institutions and populations to make themselves responsible for adhering to these prescribed activities.

UNESCO: Building Human and Institutional Capacities

UNESCO does not just set standards; it also identifies itself as a *builder* of the particular values that it has identified as central components of a culture of peace. Its current strategic plan stresses this point by setting the parameters of what it considers essential for a peaceful future.[13] In attending to these parameters, UNESCO's programs focus to a large degree on developing human and institutional capacities through education, broadly defined. Investing in education is the pathway to achieving "personal sovereignty," a means by which "each [person] may become the master and architect of his or her own destiny" (UNESCO 1997d: 10). To illustrate the degree to which such investment is the object of governance, we focus on three areas of activities: the strategic support of institutional development, the training of children and the integration of women.

UNESCO articulates its investment in education in part through its mandate to member states. Its underlying concern in the global development of a culture of peace is the identification of countries without suitable democratic institutions and/or histories. Viewing democracy as the link between development and peace (UNESCO 1997b: 3; UNESCO 1997c: 3), UNESCO encourages all member states to develop National Programmes of Action for a Culture of Peace (Breines 1999) and to promote democratic institutional development. The official Action Plan for the Culture of Peace promotes a wide range of activities related specifically to enhancing democratic principles, including the implementation of democratic educational systems, the training of public officials and the establishment of democratic elections (United Nations 1999: 8-9). Investing in such institutional development is part of UNESCO's methodology for building "defences" such as democracy in people's minds and lives. Because of a special concern with "struggling democracies," Central and Eastern European countries and war torn nations in Africa and Central and South America have been particularly drawn into this rationality of security (UNESCO 2001b: 137). With initial programs in El Salvador, Mozambique and Burundi in the early 1990s (UNESCO 1995a), UNESCO has developed formal relationships within such countries in order to promote what it refers to as basic principles of a culture of peace.[14] In projects ranging from developing radio programs on peace to offering training workshops to parliamentarians, the idea of democracy is not seen to conflict in any way with UNESCO's peace initiatives. From UNESCO's perspective, establishing a "harmonious convergence" of peace and democracy is in fact a necessary "mentality" for future security, and thus investment in countries with suspect institutional bases is seen as especially legitimate.

Given that the models for democracy in these programs are implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) western, and based on systems of economic and social inequality, a number of unintended consequences of this convergence emerge to the forefront. UNESCO is silent, for example, on how weapons figure in the development of a culture of peace. Indeed little is said about the military side of United Nations' "peace-keeping" efforts. Since such efforts occupy the majority of the UN's time and budget (UNESCO 1995a: 53), investing in peace appears to be a more highly ambiguous project than the organization indicates. There is also little room for voicing alternative forms of democracy and peace. The question is never raised, for example, about whether there exist political institutions or values outside of UNESCO's parameters that might well be more conducive to reconfiguring peace in a given locale. Thus an unintended consequence of UNESCO governance of peace may well be the marginalization and silencing of peace initiatives that slip outside the organization's particular rationalities of security.

While all member states are encouraged to develop national peace programs, UNESCO's priority is on the development of training programs for particular populations—disadvantaged groups, demobilized soldiers and other vulnerable populations (Breines 1999: 137). The mandate of the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World (2001-2010) upholds the world's children as a site for investing in global peace. Children, increasingly viewed as victims and instruments of war and violence, are especially mobilized as the future participants in UNESCO's culture of peace. The Declaration on a Culture of Peace specifically resolves to: "Involve children in activities designed to instil in them the values and goals of a culture of peace" (United Nations 1999) so that this future can be secured. Formal and informal education and the use of the media (internet communications) are considered the most salient activities to "inculcate" non-violent values in children everywhere (UNAC 2004; United Nations 2000: 4).

A focus on training children in peace reflects the view that educational systems themselves may harbour values and attitudes related to violence and intolerance. In this

respect, UNESCO considers its Associated Schools Projects (ASP) central to its efforts for investing in tolerance, peace and understanding. Projects focus on non-violent education and conflict resolution and involve the development of handbooks, seminars, workshops and teaching guidelines for schools at all levels in over 120 countries (UNESCO 1995a: 31). The Declaration on a Culture of Peace also encourages requests to UNESCO for technical co-operation in revising textbooks and educational curricula to reflect a culture of peace orientation. In addition, the Culture of Peace program has developed The Interregional Project of Schools to Promote Community Conflict Management in Violence-Prone Urban Areas to offer training in mediation and conflict management in schools located in violent neighbourhoods (UNESCO 1995a: 35). A related project, "Peace Education through Art," is intended to sensitize artists and art educators to use art as a means to convey peace and non-violence in schools. "Draw me Peace—Children Colour the World" is a project involving drawing and painting contests for children between four and seven years of age that seeks to explore children's ideas about promoting a culture of peace (UNESCO 2003: 12).

In "safeguarding" its investment in children, whereby "each child is our child" (UNESCO 1997: 10-11), UNESCO folds its notion of a culture of peace into rationalities of security in ways that unintentionally individualize children. Within the parameters of UNESCO's plan, children are to achieve a peaceful orientation "each according to his own plan. Each according to his own way of thinking" (ibid.: 10). As the former Director-General (1993-1999) of UNESCO put it:

> We must tell [our young people]—they who represent our hope, who are calling for our help and who seek in us and in external authorities the answers to their uncertainties and preoccupations—that it is in themselves that they must discover the answers, that the motivations and glimpses of light that they are seeking can be found within themselves. (UNESCO 1997d: 9-10)

This individualist perspective complements global projects of neo-liberalism that emphasize how people must take personal responsibility for their own future, and hints again at the kind of unintended consequences that UNESCO's programs may effect. There is no doubt that UNESCO's stated objective of building peaceful children around the world circulates through other projects and, in the process, may help to reinforce the objectives of those projects even when their stated goals appear to be quite different. The idea that children are being considered "conflict-free zones" for purposes other than peace, for example, further indicates how the intersection of international programs may unintentionally produce children as instruments of security in the name of other rationalities.[15]

Women, too, are drawn into UNESCO's global rationalities of security. Like children, women are identified as particularly victimized by war and conflict, but women do not appear to require training in developing peaceful values. Instead, UNESCO documents emphasize the historic exclusion of women from policy-making and government and the need to reverse this situation in order to enable a culture of peace. Its plans of action focus on women's *right* to participate in a culture of peace:

> Today more than ever [women] have the right to take an active part in their country's political life and to assume the concomitant responsibilities. Building peace and consolidating democracy are only possible if more attention is paid to women's views in the places where decisions are debated and made. They have a decisive role to play in the transition from a culture of war to a culture of peace. (UNESCO 1997c: 5)

Thus, UNESCO's vision of peace specifically mentions the need to ensure equal access to education, equality between women and men in political spheres, the strengthening of women's networks, and the inclusion of women in initiatives to resolve conflict. In South Africa, where more women are parliamentarians than in most other parts of the world, attention has been paid to making day-care facilities and meeting times more accommodating for women so that they can contribute more effectively to government (UNESCO 1995a: 49).

For UNESCO, women are "peacemakers" and "peace promoters" (UNESCO 1995a; UNESCO 2001:139). If they are to receive training, it is to learn how to extend their peacemaking skills beyond their communities and to become effective leaders for peace initiatives. That the emphasis is placed on women being included and involved rather than trained in the culture of peace indicates an assumption that women are naturally peaceful and that their very presence will make a difference to peace initiatives.[16] UN-supported women's conferences are not immune to the tendency to equate women with peace, and have also identified women as life givers and life sustainers who have special skills for creating a peaceful world (UNESCO 1995b: 2). In this sense, women's essentialized disposition becomes an important component of peace as a global rationality of security. Thus, while the stated goal of UNESCO is to break down gender stereotypes (UNESCO 1995a: 46), the unintended consequences of involving women in the organization's peace plans indi-

cate the active reinforcement of gender stereotypes that emphasize women as caring and peaceful and men as violent and warlike.

Through an emphasis on investing in democratic institutions, training children as the future peaceful generation and facilitating women's involvement in peace promotion, UNESCO's Culture of Peace initiatives mobilize the globe's populations into the new mentalities of peace and security. Tremendous resources, spread over large areas of the earth, have been deployed so that people may become peaceful "citizens of this planet'" (UNESCO 1997b:1), a process that forms part of, what Cruikshank has called, the "technologies of citizenship" (1999). By focussing on both the interests and effects of UNESCO's programs, the link between peace and governance is made more salient. We have seen how the activities of UNESCO have moved the space that peace has occupied from an idealistic goal to a good "security'" investment. Drawing new rationalities and strategies around the populations and ideas that are to contribute to peace in the future has effectively shifted the ground of what we come to think of as "peace." Peace becomes a problem in which we must "invest," with particular consequences for how we think about children, women and social institutions. This perspective reveals how UNESCO has thus been playing a major role in domesticating the space of peace,[17] its activities laying the groundwork for how peace and non-violence are to be pursued.

Still, peace appears to be fragile, especially when fed by the "new ignorances" produced by rapid globalization (UNESCO 2002c: 2). For UNESCO, this means that the responsible citizen within a culture of peace requires continual access to information so that challenges to "personal sovereignty" may be anticipated. Individuals are obligated to seek information, and UNESCO obliged to supply it, as part of a commitment to personal security and, more generally, to the "securitization of their habitat" (Rose 1999: 249). The constant circulation of information by the organization forms part of the future-focussed character of its peace initiatives. There are many examples of this orientation. On September 14, 1999, the day the United Nations proclaimed the International Year for the Culture of Peace, which was spearheaded by UNESCO, students, artists, intellectuals, public figures and others participated in the Year's message of peace and tolerance in world-wide marches, seminars and other events. These events precipitated the sharing of information on a global basis. In some situations, such events were marked by debates and discussions from members of grassroots[18] and non-governmental organizations. In other situations, these events highlighted the "fields of visibility of government" (Dean 1999: 30) that embodied the Year's message, including, for example, the establishment of a Peace Park in Islamabad; the designation of the city of Trincomallee in Sri Lanka as a "City of Peace;" the creation of a Culture of Peace Office by the Presidency of the Republic of Ecuador; the launching of a series of radio programs on the Culture of Peace in Costa Rica; and the formation of a UNESCO Peace Room at a school in the Jordan Valley of Jordan (UNESCO 2000a). Information-sharing is advanced through UNESCO's massive global network: its field offices, UNESCO Chairs, Institutes and National Commissions, national committees of intergovernmental programs, UNESCO clubs and federations, affiliated women's organizations, and its Associated Schools Programme (UNESCO 2002c: 4). The organization also plays a major role in creating, extending, and bringing together networks of researchers, educators and civil society organizations (UNESCO 2000b), thus in many cases producing information through high levels of international scientific and intellectual co-operation. With electronic communication interchange most often facilitating these activities (UNESCO 2002b: 4; see also Dutt 2002: 153-5), it is evident that multiple processes of globalization fuel the proliferation of UNESCO's rationalities to govern peace.

Conclusion

International organizations have produced many possible pathways for formulating ideas, programs and practices of peace. In exploring the work of UNESCO's Culture of Peace program, we have attempted to register how the concept of "investing" in distinct notions of peace involves particular kinds of rationalities that require the incorporation of some things and the setting aside of other things. As a form of power, these rationalities, what we have called *global rationalities of security*, have drawn diverse individuals, groups and populations into restricted circuits of security and new forms of governance. Alongside their potential benefits, they have brought consequences as unsuitable as they are unpredictable, though the latter have been commonly played down or disregarded at the planning stage on the pretext of the grandeur of the overall objectives. As such, these rationalities of governance encourage a limited conception of security, of peace programs and of the practices related to security and peace.

As we have argued in this paper, peace is thought of in terms of security and as a problem of security. While we might agree that a peace that is governed through global rationalities of security interests is still preferable to civil war, it seems prudent to ask, at what cost does this take place? UNESCO's focus on democracy as a pre-

cursor for peace, for example, never brings into question the inequalities that form part of the democracies in which people may live. Current democracies are underlined by concepts of the free market which have been documented to subvert notions of peace, equality and social justice, in a similar way that the current demand for security has undermined "support for justice" (Hudson 2003: 203). Yet the contradiction of "investing" in peace does not appear to be one which UNESCO seems willing to explore or revise in this new era of cultural engineering.

In establishing specific human and institutional capacities for the transformation from a "culture of war" to a "culture of peace," one may wonder what other spaces of transformation might be eclipsed in the process. One may also wonder about what values of democracy or the market are attached to these spaces of transformation to peace, how such values may domesticate spaces of transformation, and how these spaces are made more available to some than to others. In this regard, are capacities for successful peace-building only recognized when governing bodies like UNESCO create them? This possibility points to the need—when there are calls for new global spaces of advocacy, education and capacity-building by international organizations—for social scientists to explore what other kinds of collectivities and mentalities about peace and peace-building are marginalized or squeezed out as a consequence.

Suzan Ilcan, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Windsor, Chrysler Hall South, 401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4, Canada. E-mail: silcan@uwindsor.ca
Lynne Phillips, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Windsor, Chrysler Hall South, 401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4, Canada. E-mail: lynnep@uwindsor.ca

Acknowledgments

The research herein has been supported by research funds from the Social Sciences and Humanities research Council of Canada. Lead authorship alternates with every study produced through our collaboration. Upon invitation, the authors presented a close version of this paper at the Institute of International and Security Studies, York University, January 27, 2005.

Notes

1. The authors collected archival and policy documentation, and conducted interviews at UNESCO headquarters during the summer months of 2003 and 2004. This study received ethical clearance by the University of Windsor's Research Ethics Board; the transcribed interviews have been made anonymous.
2. In this global context, see: Ilcan and Phillips (2003) on the role of expertise and knowledge; Phillips and Ilcan (2003) on the role of science and the imagination.
3. One of our current research initiatives deals with the political and cultural dynamics of particular women's organizations located within and beyond the United Nations.
4. An important historical example of this relationship between security threats and change is the Paris conference of 1919. The conference was viewed as a moment in global governance in which an international community would be formed through legal and moral principles, enunciated in the Treaty of Versailles and through the establishment of the League of Nations (The United Nations' predecessor), to set the terms of peace in the aftermath of WWI (Charnovitz 2003: 63).
5. See Halliday's analysis of the intervention of the United Nations in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement efforts (2000: 32).
6. For example, the Institute organized an educational program on "Human Security: Building a Culture of Peace" in Istanbul, Turkey in August 2004.
7. UNESCO documents often cite the fall of the Berlin Wall as the beginning of a new era of globalization that mobilized the Organization to construct a new vision of peace (e.g., UNESCO 2002a: 2).
8. The concept of a "culture of peace" was first elaborated at the International Congress on Peace in the Minds of Men in Yamoussoukro (Côte d'Ivoire) in 1989. The concept was further developed at the National Forum of Reflection on Peace, Education and Culture (San Salvador 1993) organized under the auspices of UNESCO. The First International Forum on the Culture of Peace was held in El Salvador in 1994 (UNESCO 1994). The Culture of Peace became an official component of UNESCO's strategic plan in 1995 and the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1999 as Resolution A/53/243 (see UNESCO 2002a: 2-3).
9. This point reflects Margaret Mead's often quoted remark (Mead 1940) that "war is a social invention."
10. UNESCO's peace efforts dovetailed with other global efforts including: the Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights, and Democracy (Paris, 1995); the Plan of Action for the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995-2004); the Declaration of Principles on Tolerance and the Follow-up Plan of Action for the United Nations Year of Tolerance (1998-2000); and the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations (2001).
11. The programmatic base for the Decade, for which UNESCO is lead agency, involves eight domains of action: "culture of peace through education; sustainable economic and social development; respect for all human rights; equality between women and men; democratic participation; understanding tolerance and solidarity; participatory communication and the free flow of information; international peace and security" (UNESCO 2002b: 1; see also United Nations 1999).
12. Examples include: the Seville Statement on Violence (1986) written by an international team of scientists proclaiming certain propositions regarding violence, war, and aggression to be "scientifically incorrect"; the Venice Declaration (1986), the product of a symposium of experts on Science and the

Boundaries of Knowledge; the Barcelona Declaration (1994), formulated by religious leaders and academics on the role of religion in the promotion of a culture of peace; the Declaration of the 44th International Conference on Education (Geneva 1994) signed by attending Ministers of Education; and the Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Women's Contribution to a Culture of Peace (Manila, 1995).

13 The two principal "axes" are: universal principles to protect the "common public good" and the full participation of people in the emerging knowledge society (UNESCO 2002b: 5). What UNESCO refers to as pluralism is also important in this schema, but only to the degree that it does not interfere with "the" knowledge society and "the" common good. For example, see UNESCO (1997a: 9) for the recommendation that the "international language of culture of peace" be translated into many other languages "so as to be comprehensible to the people in their specific context."

14 These principles derive from UNESCO's definition of a culture of peace as "a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life" based on respect for a variety of specified rights and freedoms (see Article 1, Declaration on a Culture of Peace).

15 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) employed the method of declaring children a conflict-free zone to provide immunization to children in El Salvador. According to one UNESCO document, the ICRC "has come to symbolize the peace work of the international community" (UNESCO 1995a: 79.

16 An interesting parallel is the identification of indigenous knowledge and indigenous rights with initiatives on "tolerance" (see Action 14 in the Declaration on a Culture of Peace).

17 See Phillips and Ilcan (2000) for an analysis of how the processes related to "domesticating spaces in transition" have circumscribed various places of the "developing" world and have underscored the gender and development literature.

18 While there have been feminist approaches to women's grassroots interventions that could be relied upon in formulating international peace policies, Rabrenovic and Roskos (2001) argue that these approaches are often appropriated by mainstream bodies in piecemeal ways that limit their effectiveness for creating or fostering conditions of what Betty Reardon has called "positive peace" (2001: 42). Positive peace consists of a set of dynamic "relationships among people and nations based on trust, cooperation, and recognition of the interdependence and importance of the common good and mutual interests of all peoples" (Reardon, 1993, 4-5 cited in Rabrenovic and Roskos 2001: 42).

References

Appadurai, A.
2001 Deep Democracy: Urban Governmentality and the Horizon of Politics. Environment and Urbanization 13(2): 23-43.

Breines, I.
1999 A Gender Perspective on a Culture of Peace. *In* Towards a Women's Agenda for a Culture of Peace. I. Breines, D. Gierycs and B. Reardon, eds. Pp. 33-56. Paris: UNESCO.

Bryant, R.
2002 Non-governmental Organizations and Governmentality: "Consuming" Biodiversity and Indigenous People in the Philippines. Political Studies 50: 268-292.

Charnovitz, S.
2003 The Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global Governance (Paris 1919). Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 10(1): 45-77.

Cruikshank, B.
1999 The Will to Empower. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Dean, M.
1999 Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage.

Dutt, S.
2002 UNESCO and a Just World Order. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Escobar, A.
1995 Encountering Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Elyachar, J.
2002 Empowerment Money: The World Bank, Non-governmental Organizations, and the Value of Culture in Egypt. Public Culture 14(3): 493-513.

Ferguson, J.
1994 The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticisation, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Ferguson, J. and A. Gupta
2002 Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality. American Ethnologist 29(4): 981-1002.

Foucault, M.
1991 Governmentality. *In* The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller, eds. Pp. 87-104. London: Harvester.

Ghosh, A.
1994 The Global Reservation: Notes Toward an Ethnography of International Peacekeeping. Cultural Anthropology 9(3): 412-422.

Halliday, F.
2000 Global Governance: Prospects and Problems. Citizenship Studies 4(1): 19-32.

Hirst, P.
2001 War and Power in the 21st Century. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hudson, B.
2003 Justice in the Risk Society. London: Sage.

Ilcan, S. and T. Basok
2004 Community Government: Voluntary Agencies, Social Justice, and the Responsibilization of Citizens. Citizenship Studies 8(2): 129-144.

Ilcan, S. and L. Phillips
2003 Making Food Count: Expert Knowledge and Global Technologies of Government. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 40(4): 441-461.

Isin, E.
2000 Governing Cities without Government. *In* Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City. E. Isin, ed. Pp. 148-168. London and New York: Routledge.

Johnson, L. and C. Shearing
2003 Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice. London and New York: Routledge.

Li, T.
1999 Compromising Power: Development, Culture, and Rule in Indonesia. Cultural Anthropology 14(3): 295-322.
2002 Government through Community in the Age of Neo-Liberalism. Paper presented at Agrarian Studies Conference, Yale University, October 11.

Lynch, C.
1998 Social Movements and the Problem of Globalization. Alternatives 23: 149-173.

Mayor, F., with collaboration of T. Forstenzer
1995 The New Page: Culture of War and Culture of Peace. Paris: UNESCO.

Mead, M.
1940 Warfare Is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity. Asia 40(8): 402-405.

Nader, L.
1972 Up the Anthropologist—Perspectives Gained from Studying Up. *In* Reinventing Anthropology. Dell Hymes, ed. Pp. 284-311. New York: Pantheon Books.

Paley, J.
2002 Toward an Anthropology of Democracy. Annual Review of Anthropology 31: 469-496.

Phillips, L., and S. Ilcan
2000 Domesticating Spaces in Transition: Politics and Practices in the Gender and Development Literature, 1970-99. Anthropologica 42(2): 206-216.
2003 "A World Free From Hunger": Global Imagination and Governance in the Age of Scientific Management. Sociologia Ruralis 43(4): 434-453.

Rabrenovic, G., and L. Roskos
2001 Introduction: Civil Society, Feminism, and the Gendered Politics of War and Peace. NWSA Journal 13(2): 40-54.

Reardon, B.
2001 Education for a Culture of Peace in a Gender Perspective. Paris: UNESCO.

Reid, J.
2003 Foucault on Clausewitz: Conceptualizing the Relationship between War and Power. Alternatives 28(1): 1-28.

Rose, N.
1994 Expertise and the Government of Conduct. Studies in Law, Politics and Society 14: 359-397.
1999 Powers of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Santiso, C.
2002 Promoting Democratic Governance and Preventing the Recurrence of Conflict: The Role of the United Nations Development Programme in Post-Conflict Peace-Building. Journal of Latin American Studies 34: 555-586.

UNAC (United Nations Association in Canada)
2004 UNAC website. Electronic document, http://www.unac.org/peacecp/decade/background.html, accessed February 5, 2004.

UNESCO
1994 Final Report of the First International Forum on the Culture of Peace. February 16-18. San Salvador, El Salvador: UNESCO.
1995a UNESCO and a Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement. Paris: UNESCO
1995b Statement on Women's Contribution to a Culture of Peace. Fourth World Conference on Women. September 4-15. Beijing, China: UNESCO.
1997a Advisory Committee on Education for Peace, Human Rights, Democracy, International Understanding and Tolerance. Final Report. Paris: UNESCO Headquarters.
1997b Address by Mr. Federico Mayor, Director-General of UNESCO at the opening session of the International Conference on Culture of Peace and Governance. Maputo (Mozambique), September, 1, 1997, DG/97/32.
1997c Address by Mr. Federico Mayor, Director-General of UNESCO at the opening of the Forum on the Culture of Peace. Bamako (Mali), March 24, 1997, DG/97/13.
1997d The Human Right to Peace: Declaration by the Director General. Electronic document, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001055/105530Eb.pdf, accessed September 10, 2004.
1998 Transdisciplinary Project "Towards a Culture of Peace." Electronic document, http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/projects/infoe.html, accessed September 7, 2003.
2000a International Year for the Culture of Peace Celebrated Worldwide. Electronic document, http://unesco.org/bpi/paix2000/roundup.html, accessed February 25, 2004.
2000b Address by KoVchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO, on the occasion of his visit to the Kyiv Tara Shevchenko Institute for International Relations. Kiev, September 18, 2000.
2001a Sécurité humaine/Human Security. SecuriPax Forum. Electronic document, http:unesco.org/securipax/secpax.htm, accessed February 23, 2004.
2001b Report of the Director-General, 1998-1999. Report of the Director-General on the activities of the Organization in 1998-1999 communicated to Member States and the Executive Board in Accordance with Article VI.3.b of the Constitution. General Conference, Thirty-first Session. Paris: UNESCO.
2002a Mainstreaming the Culture of Peace. Culture of Peace Coordination Unit of the Bureau of Strategic Planning. Paris: UNESCO.
2002b Medium-Term Strategy (2002-2007). Contributing to Peace and Human Development in an Era of Globalization through Education, the Sciences, Culture and Communication. Paris: UNESCO.
2002c Address by Mr. KoVchiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO, 165th session of the Executive Board, Items 3.1.1. and 4.1., UNESCO, October 7, 2002.
2003 Promoting Peace and Security through Education and Science: Elements for a UN Strategy against Terrorism. Bureau of Strategic Planning. Paris: UNESCO.

United Nations
1992 An Agenda for Peace—Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31.
1999 Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace. Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, October 6, 1999. A/RES/53/243.
2000 General Assembly Hears 19 Speakers address "Culture of Peace." 55th General Assembly Plenary, November 2, 2000, GA/9807.

Valverde, M.
2003 Law's Dream of a Common Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Weil, P.
2002 [1990] The Art of Living in Peace: Guide to Education for a Culture of Peace. Paris: UNESCO.

Zapata, R.
2000 The Fabric of Peace. UNESCO Courier, January.

Engaging the Voices of Girls in the Aftermath of Sierra Leone's Conflict: Experiences and Perspectives in a Culture of Violence

Myriam Denov *University of Ottawa*
Richard Maclure *University of Ottawa*

Abstract: Despite the protections provided to children under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the issue of child soldiers has become a major global concern. More than 250 000 soldiers under the age of 18 are fighting in conflicts in over 40 countries around the world. During Sierra Leone's decade-long civil war, thousands of children were actively engaged as participants in armed struggle. While there is ample descriptive evidence of the conditions and factors underlying the rise of child soldiery in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in the developing world, most of the literature has portrayed this as a uniquely male phenomenon. Yet in Sierra Leone an estimated 30% of child soldiers in oppositional forces were girls. So far, however, there is a paucity of empirical information that distinguishes the experiences of these girls from those of boys. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 40 Sierra Leonean girls formerly in fighting forces, this paper traces girls' perspectives and experiences as victims, perpetrators and resisters of violence and armed conflict.

Keywords: children and war, war-affected girls, child soldiers, Sierra Leone

Résumé : Malgré la protection garantie aux enfants en vertu de la Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant de l'ONU, la question des enfants-soldats s'est érigée en une préoccupation majeure sur le plan international. Plus de 250 000 soldats de moins de 18 ans combattent en effet dans plus de 40 pays en crise. Durant la guerre civile sierra-léonaise qui a duré une décennie, des milliers d'enfants ont activement participé aux combats. Alors que les conditions et les facteurs sous-tendant la montée de ce phénomène en Sierra Leone et ailleurs dans les pays en développement sont largement documentés, la littérature a généralement fait état des enfants-soldats uniquement au masculin. Or, en Sierra Leone, on estime que 30 % des enfants-soldats dans les forces de l'opposition était des filles. Il y a jusqu'à présent une carence de renseignements empiriques comparant les expériences de ces filles à celles des garçons. Résultat de profonds entretiens avec 40 filles qui combattaient en Sierra Leone, le présent article fait état des perceptions et des expériences de ces filles en tant que victimes, agentes et résistantes dans la violence du conflit armé.

Mots-Clés : enfants et guerre, fillettes affectées par la guerre, enfants-soldats, Sierra Leone

Introduction: Sierra Leone's Civil War and Gendered Representations of Child Soldiers

In March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), led by former Sierra Leone Army corporal Foday Sankoh, and backed by Liberian warlord Charles Taylor, invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. Although initially claiming to be a political movement espousing "liberation," "democracy" and "a new Sierra Leone of freedom, justice and equal opportunity for all" (RUF/SL 1995), the RUF in reality was a loosely consolidated organization of largely disaffected young people that wreaked murderous havoc on the country. With its message of political revolution failing to attract popular support, the RUF embarked on a savage 10-year civil war that had devastating consequences for civilians, particularly children.

In many ways the RUF's campaign of cruelty and destruction was rooted in a long history of structural violence. With its legacy of colonialism and slave re-settlement, Sierra Leone had been integrated into the world system in such a way that its traditional social institutions were largely shattered and its economy was controlled by a small group of international enterprises and a kleptocratic governing elite (Clapham 2003; Richards 1998; Zack-Williams 1999). In this context of misrule and weakened social systems, the welfare of children[1] was severely undermined. Children, who make up nearly half of Sierra Leone's population, had limited access to good quality education, and suffered from the effects of high unemployment and maldistribution of resources. By the end of the 1980s, disillusion and anger among young people were widespread. With civic life increasingly overtaken by avarice and violence, children were highly vulnerable to forces of aggression and "war-lordism," and to perceptions of violent aggression as a legitimate means to attain power and prestige (Abdullah et al. 1997; Krech and Maclure 2003). Following the outbreak of hostilities, children were

rapidly engulfed by the conflict. Thousands of young people under 18 years of age became actively engaged as participants in Sierra Leone's armed struggle. As documented elsewhere, many of the children appear to have derived a sense of personal empowerment and family-like solidarity from their attachment to militarized groups (Peters and Richards 1998). For many others, however, acquiescence to the norms of violence and terror, either as aggressors or as unwilling victims, was the only recourse for survival.

As the war progressed and became more horrific, children engaged in the conflict were depicted by the world's media as being lost in a vortex of iniquity and madness. The image of child soldiers carrying out acts of horrible brutality became widely seen as the quintessence of youthful violence and irrationality (Skinner 1999). Moreover, once implicated in armed conflict, they were generally assumed to be permanently damaged:

> Even if [children] survive the rigors of combat, it's often too late to salvage their lives. Unrelenting warfare transforms them into preadolescent sociopaths, fluent in the language of violence but ignorant of the rudiments of living in a civil society. (Newsweek 1995)

By portraying child soldiers as largely perverse and uncivilized, the bulk of international news reporting, and indeed much of academic and policy-oriented discourse, has tended to "pathologize" children who have been caught up in armed conflict and to discount the complex realities of the experiences and perspectives of the children themselves. In addition, this image has almost always been reified as a masculine phenomenon, one that is persistently reinforced by familiar photographs of pre-pubescent boys armed with AK-47s. Because the majority of reports and international initiatives continue to regard the notion of "child soldiers" as either male or gender neutral, the effects of armed conflict on young girls, and the gender implications of children in combat, are rarely considered (McKay and Mazurana 2004).

In Sierra Leone, while girls made up approximately 30% of fighting forces[2] (Mazurana et al. 2002), very little is known about the wartime experiences of these girls, both as victims as well as active agents in the conflict. In order to begin to fill this critical knowledge gap, in this paper we present the results of a case study that has attempted to "de-pathologize" girls who were involved in the Sierra Leonean civil war. By eliciting their own narratives of their experiences, and by involving a number of former girl child soldiers as research collaborators, we aim to highlight the gendered effects of the conflict on children. Before considering these narratives, however, we discuss briefly why it is essential to seek out and listen to the voices of children who have been involved in, or directly affected by armed conflict.

The Discourse of the Voiceless Child: Implications for Policy and Research

The prevailing image of child soldiers as largely "deviant males" has had important implications for both policy and research within post-conflict Sierra Leone. In light of what clearly has been a major humanitarian disaster, an understandable element of urgency has led to the rapid conceptualization and implementation of postwar development assistance projects and programs oriented specifically for children. For example, the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), various ministries of the Sierra Leonean government, multilateral organizations such as UNICEF, and a multitude of NGOs have all identified the rehabilitation of child soldiers as a top priority of social assistance. Guided by the experiences of previous peace-building efforts in Mozambique, Uganda, El Salvador and Rwanda, prominent attention has been directed towards demobilization of child combatants, the reunification of families, the reconstitution of community organizations, the reconstruction and expansion of the national educational system and the integration of young people into productive community life (Women's Commission 2002). For a country struggling to emerge from years of bloody civic strife, and hampered by profound institutional weakness and a fragile political economy, these are enormously challenging goals.

Yet precisely because of the complexity of these goals and the range of institutional actors involved, there are real risks that efforts to assist war-affected children may be further marginalizing them and leaving many feeling disoriented and frustrated. This has become particularly evident among girls who, despite their direct involvement in war, have tended to be regarded as "afterthoughts" during the phases of demobilization and reconstruction (Gardam and Charlesworth 2000; Machel 2001). Just as girls were peripheral to the locus of decision-making at all levels of society in Sierra Leone before the war, so too there are indications that in the aftermath of the conflict they are being rendered voiceless by the structures of government and international development assistance. When the DDR program was initiated, for example, it featured a "cash for weapons" approach to disarmament where individuals were required to turn weapons in to authorities in order to qualify for financial benefits. This rendered many children, predominantly girls, ineligible for DDR assistance since most either had no weapons of their own,

or had been forced to give them up to their male commanders[3] (McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Women's Commission 2002). By February 2002, of 6 900 demobilized children, a mere 529 were girls (Women's Commission 2002).

That girls in fighting forces have remained invisible and have had little say in the conceptualization and implementation of social programs designed to meet their psycho-social needs is in part a reflection of the predominant view of children as individuals who are not fully formed and are thus incapable of rational, far-sighted actions. Reinforced by the dominant discourses of academia, policy-making and development assistance practices that emphasize the formative influences of motherhood, families and other supervisory adult institutions, children are generally considered to be "appendages to adult society" (Caputo 1995). Valued essentially because of their current dependency and their future roles as adults, they are perceived to be in a state of psychological and social transition. Reflecting conventional notions of power where adults are expected to exercise authority over children who are not yet capable of responsible collective action, childhood is widely perceived as being inexorably subordinate to the conventions and institutions of an adult world (Hart 1997; James and James 2001).

In light of these prominent discourses, girls and boys who have been caught up in circumstances of severe disadvantage and prolonged violence tend to be viewed as objects of assistance rather than as agents of their own welfare. They almost never have opportunities to publicly articulate their own concerns, needs and aspirations. As Downe has observed:

> Despite the undeniable visibility of children in...academic and popular representations of despair, rarely are the experiences, thoughts, actions and opinions of the children explored analytically in a way that gives voice to these marginalized social actors or that elucidates what it means to be a child under such conditions. In effect, the children are seen, but not heard. (Downe 2001: 165)

This prevailing view of childhood as a problematic period of transition that is distinctive from the world of adults and is defined by fixed and consolidated power arrangements is fortunately not immutable. As Foucault argued, dominant discourses are fluid and invariably subject to challenge: "We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy" (Foucault 1981: 71). In line with this premise, a growing number of scholars working in the fields of child and youth studies have argued that young people often actively and successfully resist adult authority as a way to attain a strong sense of identity and social attachment (Cahill 2000; Ferrell 1997; Furlong and Carmel 1997; Maclure and Sotelo 2004). Such resistance is manifested particularly in impoverished or hostile social environments. As Wyn and Dwyer (1999) have argued, "where structured pathways do not exist, or are rapidly being eroded, individual agency is increasingly important in establishing patterns...which give [children] *positive meaning* to their lives" (Wyn and Dwyer 1999: 14, emphasis in original). In an era marked by weakened states and eroding social systems, growing numbers of disadvantaged children appear to be seeking self-assurance and the exercise of power through violent means (Caputo 2001: 186). Yet when such violence occurs, rather than being acknowledged as evidence of children's agency and of their search for power as "an intrinsic part of childhood" (ibid.: 186), it is widely viewed as a manifestation of pathological behaviour that must be contained and rectified by the instruments of adult authority (Griffin 1993).

The continued pathologizing discourses surrounding child soldiers in Sierra Leone, as well the ongoing marginalization and voicelessness of children, clearly limit scope for understanding and insight. There is a compelling rationale, therefore, to develop alternative visions and strategies that are grounded in the perspectives of the children themselves. A reasonable first step, as Rudd and Evans (1998: 41) have argued, is to "map out young people's attitudes and beliefs," and the ways they create their own opportunities and social identities in extraordinarily harsh circumstances. By engaging former child soldiers to talk about their own personal experiences and to reflect on the forces that led them to participate in war, researchers and those desirous of facilitating processes of reconciliation and reconstruction should come closer to de-pathologizing children who were involved in armed conflict (Unger and Teram 2000).

In addition, however, it is essential to account for diversity among young people and to acknowledge how factors such as gender, race and class shape as well as constrain children's realities (Caputo 2001). This is particularly significant in relation to girls who were engaged in fighting forces in Sierra Leone. Because of the gendered nature of society and the tendency to exclude girls and women from realms of social, political and economic power (Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2003), significant attention needs to be placed on war-affected girls. Accordingly, in this study we focussed on girls who were caught up in the RUF as victims and as agents of conflict. By relying on the voices of girls themselves, we examined their experiences and perspectives of the conflict, both in terms

of their victimization and their active participation in hostilities. We also traced girls' strategies for survival, their capacity for independent action, and their ingenious modes of resistance within a pervasive culture of violence.

In acknowledgment of girls' intrinsic agency, and to ensure that the subsequent accumulation of knowledge can contribute in some way towards the strengthening of girls' involvement as genuine participants in processes of social reconstruction, we opted to conduct the study in the context of a rights-based framework. By referring to the *UN Convention on the Rights of the Child* which views children as ideally participating in reflections and decisions pertaining to their own development, we considered it important to focus essentially on the voices and perspectives of our female "subjects" (Berman 2000) and to be sensitive to their intrinsic agency and their gender differentiated perceptions, experiences and behaviours. To further these ends, we also engaged a number of girls as collaborators in aspects of the research process itself.

Methodology

This study, sponsored by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), has been conducted by the University of Ottawa in conjunction with a Sierra Leonean NGO, Defence for Children International, Sierra Leone (DCI-SL). Through the study we have examined the life histories and circumstances that led to children's (both boys and girls) involvement in armed conflict, the nature and extent of this involvement and the long-term effects of the experience.[4] In eliciting the narratives of war-affected girls, a series of semi-structured, one-to-one interviews and subsequent focus group sessions were conducted. A key aim of the fieldwork was to gain, not only a *thick description* of girls' experiences during the armed conflict, but as well their reflections and interpretations of these experiences, and their psycho-social effects.

The entire research team consisted of 16 individuals: eight Sierra Leonean researchers (five males and three females) from DCI-SL, two Canadian researchers from the University of Ottawa (the authors) and six female adolescent researchers who had been part of the RUF fighting forces during the conflict. The adolescent researchers were selected by the adult research team on the basis of the earlier contact between NGO staff and war-affected children, and their evident interest in the project. Besides our conviction that adolescent researchers would enhance the richness of the discussions and therefore the quality of the data, we were keen to involve a group of girls in a purposeful activity that could prove to be educational and empowering.

Once the entire team was established, the project leader (Denov) conducted in-depth research training workshops with the team. This included separate training sessions for the adolescent researchers. Training focussed on the goals of the research, on interview techniques with children, on gender and cultural aspects of interviewing, on ethical issues and on the potential challenges they were likely to face in the field. As part of the training, young female researchers undertook mock interviewing and mock focus-group discussions as a way to hone their new skills. On completion of their training, the research team embarked on fieldwork that lasted from May, 2003 to February, 2004. Travelling together, the adult and adolescent research team conducted interviews and focus groups with 40 girls living in the northern, southern, eastern and western regions of Sierra Leone. One-to-one interviews by the adult researchers usually preceded the focus group sessions led by the adolescent researchers.

The girl respondents, all of whom had been under the age of 18 years before the end of the conflict, were identified and recruited for the study with the assistance of DCI-SL who had close ties with community inhabitants. At the time of research fieldwork, all participants were between 14 and 21 years old. All of the girls had been abducted by the RUF and remained under their control for a period ranging from a few months to seven years.

The majority of girls were interviewed twice. The first set of interviews was conducted in each child's native language (either Krio, Mende, Temne and Limba) by the adult researchers from DCI-SL. These interviews explored girls' life histories and recruitment into armed conflict, their experiences and coping strategies, as well as the long-term effects of participation in war. Interviews were audio-taped and later transcribed and translated into English. Several months later, with the assistance of interpreters, Denov conducted a second round of one-to-one interviews with the same girls. These interviews were likewise audio-taped and transcribed.

Focus groups were conducted with the same 40 research participants. The purpose of the focus groups was to explore the psycho-social needs of girls in fighting forces, to assess what they themselves deemed important for their well-being and healing, and how this could best be achieved. Focus groups were led and facilitated by the adolescent researchers. Similar to the earlier round of interviewing, all focus groups were audio-taped, transcribed and translated into English. Once the focus groups were completed, the adult research team solicited feedback from the adolescent researchers on their experiences and perspectives of the focus-group discussions.

With hundreds of pages of interview and focus group transcripts at hand, the authors conducted an initial analysis of the data in Canada. With the use of *NVivo* qualita-

tive analysis software, all of the data were organized and coded around a number of thematic categories. The initial thematic organization of interview and focus group data, along with the authors' own interpretations of the data, were the subject of several days of discussion with DCI-SL and our six focus group leaders. This was followed by a conference involving most of the child participants who had the opportunity to comment on the research findings and on implications for child social assistance policies and programs.

The Culture of Violence: Girls' Experiences of Sexual Victimization

As recounted by our female participants, the RUF's culture of violence was one that none of them was drawn to voluntarily. All participants revealed that they had been abducted by the RUF under circumstances of extreme coercion, violence, and fear. Once attached to the RUF, this aura of violence whether verbal, physical, psychological or sexual, became an integral feature of daily interaction. As these girls reveal:

> There wasn't a single day in RUF territory that was trouble- and violence-free. People were always maltreated and any wicked act you can think of in this world was perpetrated by the rebels.
>
> If you refused or failed to do what you were told, they would put you in a cell or tie you up. In some cases, one of [the commanders] might pass a command saying "Kill that person for not taking orders."

While the threat of violence was always present and manifested in a variety of forms, girls reported that it was the pervasive sexual violence that was most debilitating. All but two participants revealed that they had been subjected to repeated sexual violence—gang rape, individual rape and/or rape with objects:

> The more senior men had the power to say "this [girl] is mine, this one is mine." After they captured women, they would rape them. I was raped the moment they captured me at 12 years old...and I bled and bled...I could not walk. The man who raped me later carried me on his back.
>
> We were used as sex slaves. Whenever they wanted to have sexual intercourse with us, they took us away forcefully and brought us back when they finished with us. Sometimes, other officers took us up as soon as we were being finished with and subsequent ones were particularly very painful...I don't even know who might have been the father of my child.

Alongside ongoing sexual violence, many girls were forced into becoming the sexual "property" of specific males in the group. In Sierra Leone, this sexual slavery was euphemistically referred to as "bush marriages" or "AK-47 marriages." At times "marriage" to male commanders who held senior rank would actually provide girls with a modicum of protection:

> The girls were serving as wives were treated better, and according to the rank and status of their husbands....At the beginning, I was raped daily....I was every man's wife. But later, one of them, an officer, had a special interest in me. He then protected me against others and never allowed others to use me. He continued to [rape me] alone and less frequently.

Given the potential protection that "marriage" brought, girls reported trying to gain the attention of powerful men:

> I was married in the bush...it was more advisable to have a husband than to be single. Women and girls were seeking [the attention of] men—especially strong ones for protection from sexual harassment.

While most of the worst excesses of sexual violence on girls and women appear to have been perpetrated by boys and young men, one participant reported that sexual violence was also perpetrated by females:

> Female officers treated us like slaves. The females were even more wicked to us than the men...I was raped by a male officer [and he was] interested in having further relationship with me, but my female commander stopped him. Little did I know that she was also after something. She was a lesbian and each time we went very close to the men, she would punish us. We were four in her group and she slept with all of us. At night, she told us to "play love" with her.

Girls' Experiences as Combatants

Girls' brutal experiences of violence and victimization are clearly disturbing and reveal the constraints and crude authority structures that ensured girls' subservience. Yet it is misleading to focus solely on situations of victimization, for this tends to obscure the layers of complexity that surrounded girls' experiences with the RUF. Reflecting the need to explore girls' agency, it is equally important to trace the ways in which girls actively became drawn into the conflict as active participants and combatants. By promoting the voices of girls in fighting forces and soliciting their views and perspectives, we came to appreciate

the complexity of girls' experiences within the RUF's culture of violence, not only in terms of their experiences of severe victimization, but as well as in terms of their participation in violence.

As we learned from our interviews, girls who were victimized by their commanders often became their unwitting soldiers and allies. The "enemy" was thus transformed from the individuals who captured and coerced them, into those who fought against these same individuals. Although girls reported that their status as combatants tended to be low in relation to that of most boys, they revealed that carrying and using arms nonetheless gave them a sense of power and control that they otherwise lacked in the norms of gendered inequity within the RUF.

> I was not very powerful in my own group, but I had a lot of power over civilians. The commander would give us each a civilian—he would say, "This one is yours, this one is yours," and you would kill the one that was given to you. At that time, I was quite enthusiastic about it—I was proud and confident. I felt good....That was one way of building confidence in me that I am just like them.

To handle a gun was, for many girls, a means of recourse from utter powerlessness and victimization.

> I felt powerful when I had a gun. As long as you are holding a gun, you have power over those who don't. It gave me more status and power.

> It was exciting...I was eager to become a soldier so that I would be able to resist threats and harassment from other soldiers.

In becoming fighters, a minority of girls gained powerful positions as leaders of other combatants. One of our respondents was promoted to the rank of a commander:

> I became a soldier and later a commander. My job was to mobilize soldiers and lead them to fight....As a commander, I had six [child] bodyguards who protected me....I was a commander not only for children but even for some older soldiers....We were cherished by the senior officers for our wicked deeds.

An array of factors and circumstances propelled some girl into combat and acts of atrocity. A prominent factor was the presence of a powerful and calculated indoctrination process, both formal and informal, which made girls more receptive to the rebel cause and thus more willing to fight. Once abducted into the ranks of the RUF, girls reported attending formal "lectures" given by adult commanders which addressed the working "philosophy" of the rebels, and conveyed the urgent necessity to overthrow the corrupt and inefficient central government. More informally, girls were promised significant financial benefits and social status in the aftermath of the conflict. For these girls, who had been displaced from family and living in circumstances of extreme poverty and social marginality, with little or no educational or employment prospects, such potential rewards were enticing. Equally important was the sense of group solidarity and empowerment that girls encountered during the latter phases of their attachment to the RUF.

As recounted over and over by our female respondents, an aura of menace, repeatedly manifested through verbal abuse and acts of wanton cruelty, was an integral feature of daily interaction in the RUF. The process of acculturation was a violent one that promoted terror and compliance among young recruits. All our respondents suffered physical abuse from those who commanded on them. They likewise all witnessed the perpetration of outrageous forms of brutality that were clearly intended as public displays of horror. In the face of persistent violence and threats of assault, mutilation and death, a primary compulsion among all recruits was to survive.

Yet over time, for some girls the abhorrence and fright that they experienced during their initial attachment tended to diminish as the commonplace nature of violent behaviour gradually assumed a semblance of normality. Immersed in a social environment that rationalized violence, for some girls, terror gave way to acquiescence and cruelty came to be trivialized. What was once frightening and intolerable not only became acceptable, but in fact synonymous with excitement and even skill.

> By then I felt good, especially when I was with my colleagues....I was an expert in burning houses....The flames form large chunks of fire like those in the movies. They were very exciting.

As our respondents recounted, a few girls evolved from being frightened disoriented recruits into de-sensitized combatants, steeped in a sense of collective purpose and power, and perpetuating the relentless culture of violence that defined the RUF.

> I didn't have the mind to kill someone initially...but later on I enjoyed the wicked acts...I was responsible for killing anybody that was assigned to die. I was so happy and vigilant in carrying out this command.

> [Among the RUF] our only motive to exist was killing. That is the only thing that we thought about...I burnt

> houses, captured people, I carried looted properties. I was responsible for tying people, and killing. I was not too good at shooting, but I was an expert in burning houses. This was less risky. We could just enter the house after the enemy left the area and set it on fire with kerosene or petrol.

As recounted by our respondents, power and privilege came to those who were particularly violent both in combat situations and towards civilians.

> Very active and obedient soldiers were given promotion. You only needed to show some enthusiasm and be very active at the war front. [That would mean] fighting and terrorizing civilians, including abducting them.

As these last commentaries indicate, ultimately some girls came to be infused with an intoxicating sense of the power that accrued from cruelty to others. In such cases, the sheer force of acculturation and structural upheaval transformed their state of mind and behaviour. The sentiment of supremacy that arose from acts of wanton cruelty may have been tantamount to an expression of release at no longer being objects of terror and abuse themselves. Likewise, the realities of chronic poverty, a weak and venal state and the loss of their families and communities left these girls without the institutional and normative buffers needed to protect them from the coercive persuasion of rebel forces. Once they were absorbed into the ranks of the RUF, often after the trauma of witnessing and experiencing unspeakably brutal acts, sheer survival necessitated adhering to the dictates of the new community into which they had been propelled. Without family and community support and the capacity to escape daily bouts of cruelty, they were caught up in a severe culture of violence. Once incorporated into this "culture," some girls were easily socialized into the norms and behaviours that fomented and perpetuated it. This transition from disoriented and highly impressionable youngsters into often ruthless combatants was fueled by the spate of small arms that inundated Sierra Leone throughout the conflict and by the abundant use of alcohol and hallucinatory drugs (Clapham 2003; Peters and Richards 1998). These drugs greatly facilitated the manipulation of children and the diminishment of their capacities for comprehension and self-control, and ultimately fostered desensitization to the culture of violence.

More research is required to fully understand why some female child soldiers were more prone to acts of cruelty than many others. However, previous studies of coercive persuasion and the so-called Stockholm syndrome in which terror-prone victims can easily become psychologically and emotionally attached to tormentors as a form of survival conditioning (Galanter 1989) tend to reinforce interpretations of children's unwitting de-sensitization and participation in atrocities during the Sierra Leonean conflict. While this generally occurred among boys, it clearly also affected girls. Nevertheless, it is extraordinarily difficult to delineate distinctions between girls who were victims and those who perpetrated actions of violence and cruelty. In many respects all children who were caught up in Sierra Leone's civil war can be considered victims even though many were implicated in perpetrating severe acts of violence (Sherrow 2000). Moreover, the transition from "victim" to "perpetrator" is not a linear one and we are cautious about suggesting that all—or even most girl combatants—experienced the entire transition from victim to hardened perpetrator. Instead, it would appear that girl combatants continually drifted between committing acts of violence, and simultaneously being victims of violence by others. The blurred line between victimization and perpetration is clearly illustrated by the narrative of this girl:

> [The] Colonel gave me a gun and instructed me to fire a shot. I told him I didn't want to hold a gun. He threatened me to do whatever he commanded otherwise he was going to kill me. I then did as he commanded and fired my very first shot in the air nervously.

Despite the shame and confusion that often accompanied such complex circumstances, many of the girls appeared to have maintained a substantial degree of sensitivity and abhorrence to social situations and actions over which they had no control:

> [The combatants] were very nervous and wept bitterly when out of sight of the rebels. Some even fainted at the sight of dead bodies.

> Yes, the [combatants] felt bad, lonely and always kept to themselves. They cried secretly.

It is within this context that, despite being bound by severely constraining authority structures, girls revealed their capacity for deliberative choice and independence of action through unique modes of resistance.

Agency and Resistance in the Culture of Violence

There is little doubt that within the context of armed conflict, a multitude of nefarious social forces controlled and hampered girls' behaviour and actions. Despite such powerful forces, amazingly, many girls responded to the culture of violence with individual autonomy, resilience and resistance. While interviews with girls uncovered dis-

turbing examples of sexual victimization and participation in violence, they concurrently highlighted the unique, resourceful, and often subversive ways that other girls resisted these same forms of victimization and participation. Apart from being highly functional means to protect themselves, these modes of resistance enabled the girls to assert, however minutely, their individual agency with the aim to subvert the culture of violence.

Resisting Sexual Violence

Girls' abhorrence and disgust with ongoing sexual violence was clear:

> I felt so depressed about the rape incident and since that day I hated the man and I still hate him. He was so dirty with a very awful odour which suffocated me and made me vomit.

In response, participants were found to use ingenious and resourceful forms of resistance that protected them from sexual violence. For example, one girl would pretend that she was menstruating which thwarted any potential sexual victimization:

> [To avoid being raped] I would fix a pad as if I was observing menstruation.

Other girls reported using violent forms of resistance to retaliate against male perpetrators of sexual assault:

> I stabbed one guy to death—he was always harassing me for sex. On that day he wanted to rape me and I told him that if he tried, I would stab him. He underestimated me and he never knew I had a dagger. He met me alone in the bush on my way to town after using the bush toilet. I knew that he and others were observing my movements...and I took the dagger along [to protect me from] rapists. As he attempted to rape me, I stabbed him twice...I was tired of the sexual harassment. He later died [from the stabbing].

> I always wanted to take revenge against men [because they raped us]. This is why I was so wicked and aggressive to men during the conflict. Men are heartless and some of us [girls] were killing them for their wicked acts.

Another means of resisting patriarchal authority and reducing the threat of sexual violence was through the establishment of close relationships and a sense of solidarity among other girls and women. Fostering supportive female relationships not only brought a degree of solace, comfort and solidarity, but also created a unique physical and emotional "space" where males were inherently excluded. One girl explained the importance of talking to and sharing with other girls about her experience of rape:

> One day a girl was brutally raped and she bled so badly she died...I had heard about it and was so affected by it, but I was afraid to discuss it....Two girls began discussing it and I overheard them. We all sat down and started sharing our stories [of rape]....I felt much better after this because I thought that I was the only one to have this happen to.

Another girl, who became pregnant as a result of rape at the age of 12, illustrates how the younger and inexperienced girls relied on the older women for knowledge and mentorship, as well as for the unique sense of female community.

> I heard from the older women in the bush that if you didn't menstruate for two months, you were pregnant. I didn't menstruate for more than two months, so I went to an older woman and told her. She told me that I was pregnant...I really didn't believe it and I began to cry. So after the woman told me that I was pregnant, I continued to go to other women in the group and tell them the same thing. I kept hoping that they would tell me something different. They all said the same thing and I was devastated.

This sense of female solidarity and male exclusion was reiterated by this same girl in describing the eventual delivery of her child:

> The delivery happened in the bush....The men stayed away....The older women helped me. They knew what to do.

Resisting Participation in Violence

Alongside resistance to sexual violence, it became apparent that girls also resisted RUF authority, command structure and participation in violence. For example, some girls deliberately refused to kill. During combat they fired their weapons in such a way that human targets were able to escape without being hurt. As these former combatants explained:

> While on patrol if we came across [unknown] people they would order us to kill them. But I was not really interested in killing people...[I] would normally fire, intentionally not aiming well. [I] would then report that the mission was completed without really killing the people.

> My first time in combat I was just firing sporadically. I was not really aiming at anything at all. I wasn't interested in harming anyone.

As the aforementioned statements illustrate, the retention of sentiments of compassion and outrage, however muted, appeared to give rise to acts of subtle resistance and extraordinary courage.

Aside from rejecting orders to kill, girls resisted the culture of violence by socializing covertly and engaging in forbidden or surreptitious discussions about their former lives as civilians. As this girl explained:

> If we came from the same place and we knew each other, we would share a few jokes or sit together and share thoughts and memories of home. This would go on until perhaps one of commanders came and said, "What are you sitting here for? What are you doing?" We would then pretend we were doing something else so that they would not learn of what we were actually engaged in. Because at those times, if you were caught in acts like that you [could be killed].

Resistance among girls also came in the form of mobilizing themselves to escape. Some girls fled from their captors, fully aware of the consequences of violence or death if they were discovered:

> I was about ten years old at the time....Several of us small children sat together and planned our escape.... We decided that when and if we are attacked by the CDF [Civil Defence Forces], we would not go with the rebel group, but we would go with the CDF. Everyone knew about the plan so when the CDF did attack, we ran away.

Although numerous respondents reported being unsuccessful in their attempts to escape and to protect themselves and others from violence and victimization, these efforts at resistance nonetheless reveal examples of children's remarkable courage and ingenuity.

The Implications of Girls' Agency and Resilience in Post-Conflict Circumstances

This analysis has outlined the main themes elicited from the narratives of girls who were attached to fighting forces during Sierra Leone's civil war. Through interviews and peer-led focus group sessions, girls depicted a complex and extraordinarily harsh reality that engulfed them as a result of their attachment to the RUF. Almost all of them experienced sexual abuse and other forms of physical and psychological victimization. Yet while victimization was a shared experience, these narratives demonstrate that war-affected girls were often more than passive victims carried along by forces that overwhelmed them. Instead, as many girls in this study revealed, at different times during the conflict they demonstrated their resilience and their capacity to act autonomously. Some participated actively in armed aggression. For these girls, the occasion to exercise violent aggression enabled them to gain a sense of personal power over others, and was a clear departure from relations of subservience and victimization. More common, however, were instances of subtle resistance and female solidarity that helped girls to withstand the effects of oppression and cruelty, and to preserve a "space" for sisterly compassion. Through our interviews and focus groups, it became apparent that despite harsh circumstances, girls exercised resistance and individual agency in ways that enabled them to avoid engaging in violent acts. As we were told as well, on at least one occasion a girl lashed back at her oppressor.

While the accounts of most of these girls are highly disturbing, their stories and perspectives reveal a spirit of volition and a capacity for independence of action that counters a deterministic and commonly held depiction of girls as supine victims with no capacity to resist or to modify the circumstances imposed upon them. This has implications for current post-conflict policies and programs that are being developed for girls, and indeed for children in general. If, as the narratives of our research participants consistently indicate, many children were able to demonstrate a capacity for willfulness and collective agency during the war, albeit with often tragic consequences, then it would seem imperative that current strategies of social assistance should be designed to steer the energies of young people towards ends that are personally fulfilling and socially constructive. Likewise, given the unique experiences and perspectives of girls who were attached to fighting forces, there is a need to make special provisions for female ex-combatants in post-conflict forums of deliberation and decision-making. For societal reconstruction to succeed, it is essential to adopt approaches that aim to redress female marginalization and subservience by tapping into girls' agency and resilience.

For Sierra Leone, however, the pursuit of reconciliation and societal reconstruction is enormously challenging. Although substantial humanitarian assistance is aimed at helping to improve the welfare of children, the foundations of structural violence, patriarchal authority and the marginalization of the young are deeply rooted in Sierra Leone's social fabric. Within this framework of a fragile political economy, therefore, the connection between societal reconstruction and the satisfaction of

the psycho-social needs of war-affected children is fraught with uncertainty and complexity, particularly when there is still widespread resentment against those who committed unspeakable atrocities during the conflict. While undoubtedly justice must be served and the perpetrators of the worst forms of violence must be held accountable for their actions, it is also necessary to recall that vast numbers of individuals involved in the conflict were *children* for whom the line between victim and perpetrator was extraordinarily ambiguous. As stipulated by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), it is imperative that war-affected children be accorded special rights. One right is that of being regarded as *subjects* of actions undertaken on their behalf. That is to say, instead of being considered as passive recipients (*objects*) of interventions that are formulated and implemented entirely by adult authorities, the voices and perspectives of children must be systematically sought and incorporated into decisions and actions that directly affect them.

Accordingly, not only is it imperative to address and overcome the effects of child soldiery in Sierra Leone, but as well girls and boys must be invited to actively contribute to the development and implementation of reconstruction policies and programs. As outlined by the articles of the CRC, a document that resonates deeply in relation to post-conflict Sierra Leone, a critical step in this process is to engage girls and boys in reflective dialogue, particularly with respect to the lingering effects of their wartime experiences and their immediate needs and long-term prospects. Policies and programs oriented specifically towards the improvement of children's welfare should be attuned to the capacity of young people to reflect on their own situations and to the prospects of children's participation in the processes of formulation and implementation.

In addition, for girls in particular, programs that concentrate on providing education, job training, psychological counselling, and community integration must be sensitive and responsive to the realities of gender differentiation. Just as we have attempted to do in a modest way in this study of girls in fighting forces, so too must there be specific policies and programs for former girl combatants that are designed to facilitate the public articulation of their own voices and experiences.[5] If interventions enable girls to exercise their demonstrable capacity for independence of thought and action, then they are likely to enhance the prospects of greater numbers of war-affected girls assuming more public roles in a society that is struggling to substitute violent conflict with a social and institutional framework of peace and good governance.

Conclusion: Benefits and Challenges of Girls' Participation in Field Research

To date this inquiry into the experiences and perspectives of war-affected girls in Sierra Leone has benefited from the involvement of six girls as research collaborators. Similar to the observations of others who have engaged children as participants in the research process (Alderson 2000; Alderson 2001; Hart 1997; Johnson et al., 1996), we have found that the involvement of our child focus group leaders has been mutually rewarding. It has greatly contributed to the depth of the oral narratives that were elicited during the fieldwork and to the insights that have helped us to "de-pathologize" young girls who were caught up in the fighting as victims and as perpetrators of violence. By encouraging their powerful narratives through peer-led focus groups, we have gained insights into girls' unique experiences of victimization, survival, perpetration of violence themselves and modes of resistance in a war-induced culture of violence. Girls' narratives highlighted their resilience, their diverse reactions to violence and their capacity for independent action in the most dire of circumstances. And likewise, as the focus group leaders themselves indicated in a de-briefing session held after research fieldwork, their involvement in the project appears to have strengthened their own sense of identity and purpose.

Relying on sensitivity and intuition, focus group leaders reported being able to read the verbal and non-verbal cues of girl child participants. On several occasions, when girls were evidently reticent to talk about their experiences at any length, the focus group leaders eased their anxieties through the use of humour, empathy, and above all self-disclosure regarding their own past experiences during the war. Through their own candour and efforts to minimize the power imbalances inherent in the research relationship, they were able to foster group trust among the participants and a willingnessness to be open and candid about their wartime experiences. The following statement reflects to varying degrees what all focus group leaders experienced:

> One girl in my focus group was very shy…she was so shy to talk. I tried to coax her to talk. I explained that I was a girl just like her. I told her what happened to me, that I became separated from my parents, that I was with the rebels, and that I was raped. The she began to open up.

In addition to their contribution to the research, the focus group leaders spoke of their own personal gains from participating in the study. All of them

expressed an appreciation of the learning experience, both from the exchanges they had with peers in the focus groups and also with the principal researchers. Besides being able to discuss and reflect upon the lives and the overall plight of children in the aftermath of the conflict, they became aware of the discourse of children's rights as outlined in the articles of the CRC. The experience likewise helped to reduce for at least a short period of time their sense of isolation and social exclusion. As they indicated, participation in the research provided an opportunity to develop friendships and to assume leadership roles. One focus group leader captured this common sentiment:

> I enjoyed sharing ideas with other [girls]...they would ask me what I thought about their situations and I gave them the best advice that I could. I think that I was a good leader.

For those of us who initiated this project, the evidence of self esteem and burgeoning leadership skills exemplified by this statement has been the most gratifying result of this project.

Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of the limitations and risks of encouraging war-affected girls to articulate their war-time experiences, particularly in group settings led by their peers. Participation of girls as research collaborators has so far been limited to serving as focus group leaders. Although we recognize the enormous potential of engaging children as research partners, the realities of distance (the authors being permanently based in Canada), the stipulations of proposal submission (i.e., the need for a pre-determined research design in order to procure funding) and time frames (i.e., the contractual obligation to complete the project within a specific period) foreclosed any early "ownership" of the project by the young subjects of research. For similar reasons, preliminary analysis of all interview and focus group transcripts has been conducted solely by the authors in Canada.[6] This was mitigated, however, by a community conference held during the summer of 2004 in Sierra Leone. Organized by DCI-SL, our partner NGO in Freetown, and attended by all focus group leaders and many of our young female participants, the seminar provided a forum for reviewing and discussing the findings of the research, and proposing policy and program recommendations to various representatives of civil society, government and the international donor community that attended. In this way, we were able to include research participants in the data analysis and preliminary dissemination phases of the research as well.

Throughout the project we have been keenly sensitive to the wrenching nature of the stories that we have sought, and the psychological risks that this might have entailed for the participants. While gaining an understanding of girls' experiences within the RUF's culture of violence is essential to challenging the male-oriented images and discourses of child soldiers, and to recognizing diverse realities of girls caught up in the maelstrom of war, it can have serious implications. Recounting the personal and painful memories of victimization and perpetration of violent acts could, for some participants, re-open newly healed wounds, potentially exposing them to a form of secondary victimization. While it appears that the overwhelming number of girls who participated in interviews and focus groups for this study found the experience to be something of a catharsis, a key facet of fieldwork was to pay scrupulous attention to the ethical dimensions of the research and to conduct follow-up visits and informal exchanges with all female respondents to ensure that their safety and psychological well-being had not been jeopardized by their participation in the project. This risk of emotional turmoil has become a feature of life in post-conflict Sierra Leone, and will likely underline all efforts to engage children as participants in research and in other forms of outside intervention. Yet by openly recognizing the risk, and by anticipating the necessary measures to minimize the effects of re-lived traumas, it would seem that in the long run the benefits of engaging children as partners far outweigh the potential limitations and drawbacks.

Myriam Denov, PhD, Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa, 25, University Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada. E-mail: mdenov@uottawa.ca
Richard Maclure, PhD, Faculty of Education, University of Ottawa, Lamoureux Hall, 145 Jean-Jacques Lussier Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada. E-mail: rmaclure@uottawa.ca

Acknowledgments

We are very grateful for the generous support of the Canadian International Development Agency's Child Protection Research Fund which enabled us to undertake this research. Our deepest thanks go to the young people who participated in this study, as well as our youth focus group leaders. These young people offered their time, insights and were unwavering in their commitment to this project. They opened their lives to complete strangers and in doing so, enriched our own. We thank all of them for their openness, candour and for sharing their energy, their unique and insightful ideas and their stories and experiences.

Notes

1 For this paper, the definition of a child will coincide with the definition set out in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. According to the Convention, a child is defined as "every human being below eighteen years" (Article 1). "Children" refers equally to both boys and girls.
2 In this paper, the term "girls in fighting forces" includes not only girls who are carrying or have carried arms, but also girls who act as cooks, porters, messengers and those accompanying such groups. Importantly, this definition also includes girls who are recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage.
3 The one-person, one-weapon approach was later changed and group disarmament was instituted where groups would disarm together and weapons would be turned in jointly.
4 Future articles will focus on the differentiated experiences and perspectives of war-affected boys.
5 A gender differentiated approach to social interventions is nothing new in Sierra Leone or in Africa as a whole: conventional development strategies have long adhered to the ideals of WID movement that was prominent during the 1970s and 1980s.
6 We point out, however, that raw transcript data were voluminous (hundreds of pages), and hence it is difficult to envision any other method of managing the data in a timely and efficient manner.

References

Abdullah, I., Y. Bangura, C. Blake, L. Gberie, L. Johnson, K. Kallon, S. Kemokai, P.K. Muana, I. Rashid and A. Zack-Willams
1997 Lumpen Youth Culture and Political Violence: Sierra Leoneans Debate the RUF and the Civil War. Africa Development 22(3 and 4): 171-214.

Alderson, P.
2000 Children as Researchers: The Effects of Participation on Research Methodology. *In* Research with Children: Perspectives and Practices. P. Christensen and A. James, eds. New York: Falmer Press.

Alderson, P.
2001 Research by Children. International Journal of Social Research Methodology Theory and Practice 4(2): 139-154.

Berman, H.
2000 The Relevance of Narrative Research with Children Who Witness War and Children Who Witness Woman Aabuse. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment and Trauma 3(1): 107-125.

Cahill, C.
2000 Street Literacy: Urban Teenagers' Strategies for Negotiating Their Neighbourhood. Journal of Youth Studies 3: 251–275.

Caputo, V.
1995 Anthropology's Silent "Others": A Consideration of Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues for the Study of Youth and Children's Cultures. *In* Youth Cultures. V. Amit-Talai and H. Wulff, eds. Pp. 19-42. London and New York: Routledge.

2001 Telling Stories from the Field: Children and the Politics of Ethnographic Representation. Anthropologica 43(2): 179-189.

Clapham, C.
2003 Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Internal Conflict. Clingendael Institute (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), The Hague, Conflict Research Unit.

Downe, P.J.
2001 Playing with Names: How Children Create Identities of Self in Anthropological Research. Anthropologica 43(2): 165-177.

Ferrell, J.
1997 Youth, Crime, and Cultural Space. Social Justice: Journal of Crime, Conflict and World Order 24(1): 21–8.

Foucault, M.
1981 The Order of Discourse. *In* Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader. Robert Young, ed. Pp. 48-78. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Furlong, A., and F. Carmel
1997 Young People and Social Change: Individualization and Risk in Late Modernity. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.

Galanter, M.
1989 Cults: Faith, Healing, and Coercion. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gardam, J., and H. Charlesworth
2000 Protection of Women in Armed Conflict. Human Rights Quarterly 22: 148-166.

Griffin, C.
1993 Representations of Youth. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hart, R.
1997 Children's Participation: From Tokenism to Citizenship. London: Earthscan Publications.

Human Rights Watch
2003 We'll Kill You If You Cry: Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict.

James, A., and A.L. James
2001 Childhood: Toward a Theory of Continuity and Change. *In* The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: Children's Rights. J.L. Fernando, ed. Pp. 25-37. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Johnson, V., J. Hill and E. Ivan-Smith
1996 Listening to Smaller Voices: Children in an Environment of Change. Chard: Action Aid.

Krech, R., and R. Maclure
2003 Education and Human Security in Sierra Leone: Discourses of Failure and Reconstruction. *In* Comparative Education, Terrorism and Human Security: From Critical Pedagogy to Peacebuilding? W. Nelles, ed. Pp. 141-158. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Machel, G.
2001 The Impact of War on Children. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Maclure, R., and M. Sotelo
2004 Structured Individualization and Youth Gangs in Nicaragua: De-pathologizing Gang Membership. Journal of Youth Studies 7(4): 417-432.

Mazurana, D., S. McKay, K. Carlson and J. Kasper
2002 Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilization and Reintegration. Peace and Conflict 8(2): 97-123.
McKay, S., and D. Mazurana
2004 Where Are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War. Montréal, Québec: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.
Newsweek Special Report
1995 Boy Soldiers. August 7.
Peters, K., and P. Richards
1998 Why We Fight: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone. Africa 68(2): 183–199.
Revolutionary United Front
1995 Footpaths to Democracy. Electronic document, http://www.sierra-leone.org/footpaths.html, accessed June 12, 2004.
Richards, P.
1998 Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey.
Rudd, P., and K. Evans
1998 Structure and Agency in Youth Transitions: Student Experiences of Vocational Further Education. Journal of Youth Studies 1: 39–62.
Skinner, E.P.
1999 Child Soldiers in Africa: A Disaster for Future Families. International Journal on World Peace 16(2): 7–22.
Sherrow, V.
2000 Encyclopaedia of Youth and War: Young People As Participants and Victims. Phoenix, AZ: The Oryx Press.
Unger, M., and E. Teram
2000 Drifting toward Mental Health: High-risk Adolescents and the Process of Empowerment. Youth and Society 32: 228–252.
Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
2002 Precious Resources: Adolescents in the Reconstruction of Sierra Leone. Electronic Document, http://www.womenscommission.org/reports/sl/index.shtml, accessed June 12, 2004.
Wyn, J., and P. Dwyer
1999 New Directions in Research on Youth Transition. Journal of Youth Studies 2: 5–21.
Zack-Williams, A. B.
1999 Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98. Third World Quarterly 20(1): 143–162.

The Mask and the Mirror: Facing up to the Past in Postwar Peru

Kimberly Theidon *Harvard University*

Abstract: In this article Theidon draws upon research conducted with communities in Ayacucho, the region of Peru that bore the greatest loss of life during the internal armed conflict of the 1980-1990s. The fratricidal nature of the conflict means that in any given community,former enemies live side by side. What is it like to live in such a context? What is it like knowing just who one lives with—and living with what oneself has done? As a way of thinking about these questions, Theidon focusses on a figure that appeared incessantly in her conversations: the masked ones. What lies behind the masks that haunt these narratives, particularly in those communities in which the "masked ones" were frequently neighbours and family members? Theidon demonstrates that talk about masks, faces and "facelessness" is talk about morality and immorality, and about the challenges of forging co-existence among intimate enemies.

Keywords: Peru, civil war, masking and unmasking, narratives, morality, immorality

Résumé : Dans cet article, Theidon rend compte de la recherche qu'elle a menée au sein des communautés d'Ayacucho, région du Pérou où les pertes en vies humaines ont été les plus élevées durant le conflit armé interne des années 1980 aux années 1990. Le caractère fratricide de ce conflit implique que, dans une communauté donnée, d'anciens ennemis doivent vivre côte à côte. Comment peut-on vivre dans un tel contexte, en sachant exactement qui nous entourent et la nature des actes que l'on a posés? Pour Theidon, une des façons de réfléchir à ces questions consiste à focaliser sur un thème qui revenait sans cesse dans ses conversations: les gens masqués. Qu'est ce qui se cache derrière les masques qui hantent ces récits, particulièrement dans les communautés ou les «gens masqués» étaient fréquemment des voisins ou des membres de la famille? Theidon démontre que parler des masques, des visages et de l'absence de visage revient à parler de moralité et d'immoralité, ainsi que des difficultés émergeant d'une volonté de forger la co-existence entre des ennemis intimes.

Mots-clés : Pérou, conflit armé interne, masquer et démasquer, récits, moralité, immoralité

> The *Senderistas* (Shining Path guerrillas) attacked at night. We'd be asleep. The smell of smoke woke us up, the roofs all in flames. Then the screaming. We'd grab our children and run toward the river. It was dark, but they wore masks. If they'd taken off those masks, we would have recognized them. They were our neighbors. *Díos Tayta*, we've seen what our neighbours can do.
>
> —Interview, a community in the highlands of Ayacucho[1]

Introduction

On August 28, 2003, the Commissioners of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) submitted their Final Report to President Alejandro Toledo and the nation. After two years of work and some 17 000 testimonies, the Commissioners had completed their task of examining the causes and consequences of the internal armed conflict of the 1980s and 1990s.

Among the most striking conclusions in the Final Report is the number of fatalities—69 280 deaths, three times the number cited by human rights organizations and the government prior to the TRC—and the responsibility for these deaths. In the section of the Final Report regarding accountability, the Commissioners state that the Shining Path guerrillas (*Senderistas*) were responsible for 54% of the fatalities reported to the TRC (TRC 2003).

I would like to follow the implications of this statistic, which supports what campesinos have been telling me throughout my years of research in Ayacucho, the region of Peru that bore the greatest loss of life and infrastructure during the war. There is a lament in the communities with which I have worked: "*Jesús Cristo,* look what we've done among brothers."[2] Although the *Senderista* leadership was composed of university-based provincial elites, the rank and file were peasants. Certainly I do not seek to diminish the atrocities committed by the armed forces; rather, I note the level of civilian participation in the killing. The forms of violence suffered *and* practised influ-

ence the reconstruction process when the fighting subsides. The fratricidal nature of Peru's internal armed conflict means that in any given community, ex-*Senderistas*, current sympathizers, widows, orphans and veterans live side-by-side. This is a charged social landscape. It is a mixture of victims and perpetrators—and that sizeable segment of the population that blurs the dichotomy, inhabiting what Levi called the grey zone of half tints and moral complexity (Levi 1989).

What is it like to live in such a context? What is it like knowing just who one lives with, and living with what oneself has done? What are the social and psychological strategies that people use to address this reality and attempt to reconstruct social relationships?

As a way of thinking about these questions, I would like to focus on a figure that appears incessantly in my conversations with members of campesino communities in Ayacucho. I refer to the figure of the *mascarayuqkuna*, the masked ones. Certainly there were masked people during the political violence; however, more than the physical presence of masked armed actors, what interests me in the insistent, reiterative symbol of the "masked ones." What lies behind the masks that haunt these narratives, particularly in those communities in which the "masked ones" were frequently neighbours and family members?

In his study of public secrecy, Taussig asks, "[What] if the truth is not so much a secret as a *public secret*, as is the case with the most important social knowledge, *knowing what not to know?*" (1999:2). He suggests that such secrets are essential to everyday life. I believe there is a public secret at work in these communities, and the construction of anonymity and distance where neither of the two exists. It is to everyday life that I turn, convinced it is the realm in which people rebuild social relationships. As I will demonstrate, talk about masks, faces and "facelessness" is talk about morality and immorality. Local moral discourse is embodied, leading me to think in terms of a phenomenology of justice and injustice, as well as the complicated alchemy of remembering and forgetting that characterizes postwar social worlds. Indeed, morality is bound up with memory, forgetting and *remembering to forget.* In tracing a genealogy of the demoralization and "remoralization" of everyday life, I am also tracing what is at stake in forging co-existence among intimate enemies.

Background

From 1980-1992, an internal war raged between the guerrilla group *Sendero Luminoso*, the *rondas campesinas* (armed peasant patrols) and the Peruvian armed forces. The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso)* began its campaign to overthrow the Peruvian state in 1980 in a calculated attack on the Andean village of Chuschi.[3] Founded by Abimael Gúzman, this band of revolutionaries positioned themselves as the vanguard in a revolution to usher the nation toward an imminent communist utopia (Degregori 1990; Palmer 1994). Drawing upon Maoist theories of guerrilla warfare, they planned a top-down revolution in which *Sendero Luminoso* would mobilize the peasantry, surround the cities and strangle the urbanized coast into submission. However, the relentless march toward the future was doubly interrupted: The initial governmental response was a brutal counterinsurgency war in which "Andean peasant" became conflated with "terrorist," and many peasants themselves rebelled *against* the revolution (Starn 1995).

While some communities remained *in situ*, many others fled the region in a mass exodus. Indeed, an estimated 600 000 people fled from the sierra, devastating over 400 campesino communities (Coronel 1995). Although the guerrilla war spread from the countryside to the capital city of Lima, it was the rural population that suffered the greatest loss of life during the internal armed conflict. As the TRC's Final Report states, 75% of the dead and disappeared spoke Quechua as their first language, and three out of every four people killed lived in a rural region (TRC 2003). An epidemiology of political violence in Peru demonstrates that death and disappearance were distributed by class, ethnicity and geography.

As late as 1991 there were concerns that *Sendero* would indeed topple the Peruvian government. However, in September 1992, the Fujimori administration located the leader of Shining Path, who was hiding in a "safe house" in Lima. The arrest of Abimael Gúzman literally decapitated the guerrilla movement; although various would-be successors have vied for power, *Sendero* now remains an isolated group pushed into the jungles of the interior. Peru is a case of a triumphant state: unlike Guatemala, for example, there were no negotiations between the government and the guerrilla because *Sendero* had been largely defeated.

The man credited with "pacifying" the country was former president Alberto Fujimori. Elected in 1990, he campaigned on a platform to end hyperinflation and defeat the two guerrilla movements that had been waging war for a decade.[4] In fulfilling his promises, Fujimori used Draconian measures, staging a self-coup that shut down a recalcitrant Congress, rewriting the constitution and dismantling political parties and other institutional intermediaries in the development of his self-described "direct democracy." Popularity and a vast patronage apparatus enabled Fujimori to handily win re-election in 1995; however, his authoritarian impulses increased during his sec-

ond term. To remain in power, he removed members of the Constitutional Tribunal who blocked his illegal run for a third term and reinterpreted the constitution to allow for the perpetuation of his presidency.

Following a highly tainted presidential campaign in 2000, Fujimori finally fled the country, faxing in his resignation from Japan. The massive corruption of his two administrations had become increasingly visible. Indeed, visibility was a key component in his downfall: thousands of videotapes were discovered, showing both Fujimori and his crony, former head of internal intelligence Vladimiro Montesinos, bribing a cast of characters that ranged from congressmen to talk show hosts to body builders. It was the corruption charges that forced Fujimori from office and provided the political opening for the establishment of the TRC. Interim president Valentín Paniagua created the truth commission by executive decree in 2001; it was his successor president Alejando Toledo who added the word "reconciliation" to the commissions' name and mandate. That mandate was to clarify the processes, facts and responsibilities of the violence and human rights violations attributable to the terrorist organizations as well as agents of the state.

It was within the context of collaborating with the Ayacucho office of the TRC that I directed a research project on community mental health, reparations and the micropolitics of reconciliation practised at the communal and intercommunal levels (Theidon 2004). In this article, I draw upon that research, focussing on four communities located in the department of Ayacucho. These four communities, Accomarca, Cayara, Hualla and Tiquihua, were support bases for Shining Path, in some cases until the mid-1990s. While members of these communities had different degrees of commitment to *Sendero*'s revolutionary ideology—and certain individuals may well have been in outright opposition to *Sendero*—the region was one of the guerrillas' strongholds. Importantly, many of the Shining Path leaders were *lugareños*, people from the same communities in which they were waging war.

However, this history of militancy is only narrated in hushed conversations. At the community level, there is a discursive process of "exteriorizing" *Sendero.* When people speak about the *Senderistas,* it is common to hear the rhetorical questions, "Where could they have come from?" and "Who could they have been?"

I emphasize the importance of a cultural logic of exteriority, which is also reflected in theories regarding the etiology of illness and certain strong emotions (Theidon 2002). Villagers are "grabbed" or "seized" (*qapiy*) by an external agent, and this "grabbing" results in a variety of illnesses and unpleasant emotions. For instance, several women spoke to us about the sadness (*pena*) that follows them, looming right over their shoulders, "just waiting until I'm alone to grab me." Similarly, angry gods (*apus*) may grab the person who carelessly walks or sits where they should not. The punishment for ignoring one's obligations to the gods can result in *daño* or *alcanzo*, a potentially life-threatening illness. This etiology is important: the harmful agent is not located within the person; rather, the "badness" enters and grabs hold of the individual.

The theory that "bad things" are exterior to and enter the person is reflected in the forms of treatment people seek. Many healing techniques emphasize cleansing or purgation, and have as their goal the extraction of the "evil" or the illness from the person. This etiology is important for a variety of reasons, among them the tendency to insist that "bad things" in general have arrived from elsewhere and should be purged. The logic of exteriority works at both the individual and collective levels. When I reflect upon how villagers exteriorize the violence ("the violence arrived here") and the *Senderistas* ("where could they have come from?"), it seems people also locate the causes of sociopolitical problems outside the boundaries of the community. These ideas influence the processes of reconciliation, and the emphasis on exteriorizing harmful agents has psychological consequences: it permits villagers to more slowly assimilate just whom they are living with. Within the context of dangerous intersubjective worlds, there are useful social fictions that play a role in staying the hand of vengeance, a theme I will return to later in the text.

Genealogies

> It seems that during the violence everything was solved by death. Many things happened here, killing among families. Jesus, even now I still don't understand.
> —Maurino Vega, Tiquihua, 2003

Writing about violence in the sierra is a delicate task given the long history of presenting highland peasants as the "intrinsically violent Other" of the Andes. Whether invoking the "telluric environment," the "violent nature of the Indians" or the "archaic culture" that ostensibly characterizes highland peasants, the literature has reflected the ethnic discrimination that molds Peruvian society.[5]

I have been concerned with *historicizing* the violence of the 1980-1990s, exploring the changing moral codes that shaped life before, during and after the armed conflict. I have attempted to trace a genealogy of morality and of the use of violence. As people told us, since the "time of the grandparents" there have been conflicts in these com-

munities. Throughout Ayacucho, campesinos described the bloody fights or "battles" that preceded the internal armed conflict. Within and between communities, villagers would fight each other with rocks, slingshots and sticks. These "battles" tended to coincide with fiestas—and heavy drinking—and could last for several days.[6]

For instance, in Tiquihua and Hualla people described "las batallas de los años atrás" ("the battles of years past"). As don Máximo Quispe explained, villagers from each community would meet in a large field called Matarapampa: "We would all go, carrying ash mixed with garlic, slingshots, rocks and sticks. With all of this we would go fight. There were injuries, broken heads, blood, but there were no deaths."

There is a consensus that killing was not the objective of these battles. Indeed, in one community villagers recalled the year when a family exceeded the fighting norms and killed a young boy with a crushing blow to his head. The communal authorities rounded up the guilty and turned them in to the police in the nearest town.

These ritualized battles were finite in time and space and were part of maintaining the social order rather than posing a threat to it. I do not consider myself a functionalist, but the battles did afford a space for channelling and expressing accumulated envy and resentment.[7] I repeat that this violence was not outside the social order but rather one component in maintaining it.

Similarly, I was interested in exploring the use of lethal violence prior to the internal armed conflict. According to my oral and archival sources, killing prior to the war was quite exceptional. As Degregori insists, a leitmotif among the rural population was "punish but do not kill" (1990). Peña Jumpa confirms that the harshest punishment administered was banishment from the community and the loss of *comunero* status (1998).

However, even though killing was exceptional prior to the armed conflict, there were some cases in which the "death penalty" was applied. For example, in 1976, villagers in one community killed a family of cattle rustlers who had ignored communal authorities' repeated warnings to cease and desist, and to move on to another zone. Following a common pattern, authorities had given the cattle rustlers three punishments *and* three opportunities to stop thieving before taking this fatal step. When an ex-president of the community told me about the Quispe family, he finished by shaking his head and thinking out loud: "Why didn't they listen, being intelligent people?"

It is important to note that the decision to kill was made in communal assemblies, and the action was carried out in the name of the community. This was not mob hysteria, nor a personal act of revenge. Rather, punishment was a collective right and responsibility.

Thus something shifted during the war: people began killing one another, using rocks, knives and guns. Lethal violence became widespread as the local moral order deteriorated.[8] Campesinos have offered various explanations for the lethal violence that involved their entire communities. We were told that people were drugged when they were killing, or that the devil had taken possession of them. In other cases, people insisted the killers (always referred to in the third person) had lost their *uso de razón* (use of reason), a very important aspect of being fully human.

Uso de razón is a term that cuts across social fields: in the religious sense, it is the age at which a child can commit sin; in the political sense, it is related to accountability as a member of the community; in a legal sense, it refers to the capacity to discern right from wrong. Children are said to acquire the *uso de razón* around the age of six or seven; this is also the age at which children are said to remember things.

Identity is understood as fluid and mutable. Human status is achieved; thus it can be both lost and regained. Just as the *uso de razón* makes *criaturas* (infants and small children) more fully human, so does the accumulation of memory. When parents spoke to me about their children, they differentiated between the younger and older children by using *yuyaniyuq* for the older ones. *Yuyay* is Quechua for "remember," and the older children were described as the remembering ones, in contrast to little children who are *sonsos* (witless, senseless). People with *mucha memoria* are considered better people, more intelligent—and they have more *conciencia*.

The question of conscience and culpability figures into national legal standards as well. In the *Diccionario para Juristas, uso de razón* is defined as: "possession of natural discernment that is acquired passing through early childhood; the time during which discernment is discovered or begins to be recognized in the acts of the child or individual" (Palomar 2001: 1597). *Discernimiento* refers to the capacity to judge, to choose, to distinguish. Thus *uso de razón* implies volition, memory and the capacity to judge right from wrong. This is a central phase in becoming a moral person and entering communal life as an accountable member of the collective. To lose one's *uso de razón* implies that one cannot be held accountable for one's actions, and neither is one fully human without this faculty.

Adding to the change in moral codes were the soldiers and the *Senderista* cadres. Both groups were indoctrinated into lethal ideologies that stressed "eradicating the

enemy," the enemy being defined as anyone who was not on their side. This black and white morality was at odds with long-standing practices that emphasized the rehabilitation of transgressors, and the blending of retributive and restorative justice that characterizes communal mechanisms of adjudicating conflict.

Finally, there were other important changes within these communities during the internal armed conflict. In many cases, communal authorities were killed if they offered any opposition to Shining Path. In the four communities I am focussing on here, the authorities *were* Shining Path members who practised the lethal ideology they preached. Internal order was massively disrupted, latent conflicts were exacerbated and long-standing routes to adjudicating conflicts and settling them pacifically were abolished with the killing or co-optation of communal authorities. Magnifying the chaos within these pueblos was the absence of state institutions that might have intervened to re-establish order in a non-lethal manner. Aside from the soldiers stationed in the military bases, the state was absent. Between the abandonment of the state and the elimination of communal mechanisms of containing conflict, the alternatives were limited—and increasingly lethal.

Living with Impunity

In these former *Senderista* bases, the military played a particularly repressive role during the internal armed conflict. In conversations with community members and in the *Actas Comunales* (notes from communal assemblies) that we were able to access, the role of misguided state policy is evident. During the first half of the 1980s, the Belaunde administration pursued an aggressive and lethal counter-insurgency campaign. However, Alan García was elected in 1985 on a platform assuring a new respect for human rights and a re-orientation of military strategy regarding *Sendero.* Although the massacres did not stop, there was a shift in counter-insurgency. In the four communities with which I have worked, people recall the military arriving in the mid-to-late 1980s to tell them "we've changed—we don't kill anymore."

Part of this new counter-insurgency strategy included rounding up entire communities, and allowing the Senderista leadership to "repent," "name names" and be reintegrated into the community.[9] Importantly, this reintegration was decidedly top-down, as the following conversation indicates.

> The soldiers brought them from the prison, brought those *terrucos* (*Senderistas*) so they would talk. They brought them and told us "Now you're going to live as a community. You're going to pardon each other and reconcile. You're going to reconcile and live like one community." Those people (the *Senderistas*) are still here. If we say anything, they could come at night and slash our throats with a knife. They could make us disappear and no one would ever know. When I remember everything that's happened, my heart hurts. It rises from my stomach to my chest, and I can't breathe. It reaches my heart and it's as though it wants to come out of my mouth. My eyes roll back, my heart aches, I tremble when I remember. Not even pills help me. What am I going to do? Sometimes I see them and I greet them. But I lower my head because I want to spit in their faces. But what if they come at night? What am I going to do? I can't do a thing.
>
> —Sra. Angelina Pariona, Accomarca, November 15, 2002

Thus the armed forces imposed "peace" in formerly militant communities via the installation of military bases and the selection of local authorities who served as both "puppets" and informers. Serving as a communal authority under military control meant being at the beck and call of the officials in the base. In many conversations people told us the soldiers acted like *reyes, Dioses, mandamasas*, kings, Gods, omnipotents. Again, the order established blocked local processes: the *Pax Militar* silenced these pueblos, forcing the population to tolerate the presence of both the soldiers as well as the former *Senderistas*, both groups composed of "untouchables," people located beyond the reach of communal law.

In Accomarca, Cayara, Hualla and Tiquihua, the population concurs there has been no sort of punishment for the ex-Senderistas at the local level. Various people talked to us about the amnesty the state had offered to the *arrepentidos* who "arrived here already pardoned" and rejected communal efforts to encourage them to apologize for their actions. There were no local processes of rehabilitation; rather, many comuneros expressed how frustrating it was to feel impotent vis-à-vis those they consider "the guiltiest."

Living with impunity makes social life very tense, and the fear of violence at the hands of one's neighbour is a constant. Indeed, the impact of living with impunity was made clear in a conversation with Mario Aquise, a *curandero* working in Accomarca. Mr. Aquise explained to us that he visits these communities in a rotating fashion, treating people in pueblos that were affected by the political violence. He told us that the most common complaint in Accomarca is ulcers.

Why ulcers? How might we understand the prevalence is this affliction? In Accomarca, our conversations

were punctuated with elbow jabs and whispered warnings to our interlocutors to "Shut up! You shouldn't be talking!" Silence has been imposed, and there are (public) secrets that eat away at one's insides. When we asked the women why they suffered from ulcers, they shrugged at a question with so obvious a response: "Of course we have ulcers. We've spent so many years swallowing our rage."

My fieldwork has convinced me that a frustrated desire for justice is a *felt* grievance: nerves that open and throb, stomachs lacerated with ulcers and the "irritation of the heart" prompted by seeing "those people" (*huk kuna,* the perpetrators) walk through the streets "as though they had never killed people." As Shklar as written in her work on injustice, "Is there nothing much more to be said about the sense of injustice that we know so well when we feel it? (1990: 16). The *sense of injustice* permeates the body as a politics of the senses is brought into play (Seremetakis 1994: 13).

Doubling and Duplicity

> We never knew who we were dealing with. I couldn't talk—not with my mother, not with my brother, not with my neighbour. *Todos eramos doble cara*—We were all two-faced. —Anonymous, Accomarca, 2003

I mentioned that one of my interests was tracing a genealogy of morality, and the shifts in moral codes that characterized the *sasachakuy tiempo* (the difficult years). During ambiguous moral periods, many aspects of daily life are in flux, including one's own identity. People became "two-faced," trying to manage the competing demands of the military and of *Sendero,* as well as their own shifting allegiances. Still others turned to hiding their faces completely: The masked ones wore black woollen masks that left only the eyes and lips exposed.

In his work on masks, Napier suggests that masks are almost invariably related to transition, and that masking is a means of transgressing boundaries because it provides an avenue for manipulating certain paradoxes (1986). It is certain than ordinary daily interactions in these communities can be elaborately florid, leaving scant space for the expression of negative emotions (Allen 1988). So let me begin with a rather pedestrian observation, and then consider its inverse.

In various conversations with men in these villages, they told us "You change when you put on a mask"—that "I'm another person with my mask on." In communities where social relationships are lived face-to-face and in which justice is administered face-to-face, one needs to think about what it means to mask oneself and change identity. This process of doubling, of assuming a mask that permits the appearance of a shadow self, functions in two directions, hence my interest in the inverse. It permits aggressors to distance themselves from their own actions and delegate those actions to their doubles, *and* it permits others to maintain some degree of denial when interacting with the perpetrators among them—to not *face up* to the perpetrators, a theme powerfully expressed by don Feliciano Huamán.

Don Feliciano Huamán and the Masked Ones

We had just returned from Tiquihua and were interested in locating a few Tiqueños who had left during the violence to settle in the city. Many migrants had decided to stay in the city and start new lives, some because their children were accustomed to the city life, and others because they feared returning to their pueblos. There were still others who visited each year during fiestas or to check up on family members who had stayed behind to watch the land or livestock.

We headed for the outskirts of Huamanga, following the map someone had sketched on a piece of paper so that we could find their relative's house. We walked about utterly lost. It was almost impossible to find people in the barrios, a space not so different from the *campo* with children pasturing goats and sheep alongside their houses.

On one futile search we met up with an acquaintance and explained what we were doing. "Oh, I'm from Canaria, I was born there. It's been a long time since I've been back there. I have family all over there—Tiquihua, Canaria, the whole zone. But I hardly remember anything because I was so little when we left. My brothers could tell you about it. I remember them telling me they escaped from the house to go to the classes the teachers were giving in the *escuelas populares.*[10] They were preparing them for the party."

Her efforts to put us in touch with her brothers failed, but fortunately she recalled her uncle. "He's sick because of the violence. It affected him so much that for years he was in bed. He lives on pills and tranquilizers. He never wanted to talk with anyone about his problem. I'm going to see if he might let you visit, but I can't promise you anything."

Fortunately, her uncle agreed to our visit, and it was in late December 2003 that we headed toward his house. A handwritten sign to the side of the doorway said "Injections given here." Evidently don Feliciano was still working as a health technician.

We knocked on the aluminum siding that served as a door. A slender elderly man peered out. "Good morning. Are you Señor Feliciano Huamán?"

"Yes. You've come to talk to me, no?"

We nodded, and he swung the door open to let us pass. I realized he could barely walk. He dragged his feet behind him and his hands were trembling uncontrollably. I followed him into the kitchen, and he gestured toward a chair around the table. He sat across from us, offering us a glass of *chicha de cebada.*

Señor Feliciano Huamán was 69 years old and lived in Huamanga, returning to Tiquihua infrequently to check up on his land. Both his wife and children had tried to convince him not to keep going back, and they refused to accompany him when he did so. The motives behind their refusal became clearer when Sr. Huamán and his wife told us about how the war years had changed their lives.

I took out my notebook and began to set up my taperecorder when Sr. Huamán slurred to me, "Wait—don't turn the recorder on yet. Let's wait a few minutes until this passes. I took my pills half an hour ago—they're starting to calm me. Look, my mouth doesn't work, my hands tremble, my feet too. But I'm used to this, they say it's Parkinsons." He leaned over and began rubbing his hands together, trying to control their movements. "I have to take tranquilizers (*calmantes*) so I don't get like this." He sat back, and several minutes passed before his hands were still. "Now we can start."

"When did you start to have Parkinsons?" I asked.

"1982 when the Senderistas harmed me. August 4, 1982—since then."

"What happened? Can you tell me about it, don Feliciano?"

"*Bueno,* the *Senderistas* arrived on August 4 at 12:30. Four masked people entered my house, pointing a machine gun at me. I had a dog, Rintintin. He lunged at them and they almost killed him. I held him back, thinking they were good people. But one of them pulled a machine gun out from under his poncho and yelled at me: 'Shut up, shit. Fuck your mother, damn it!'" Sr. Huamán shook his head. "He mentioned my mother that way. So I asked him 'What's wrong, friend? I haven't offended you—I don't know you. Why are you talking like that about my mother?' 'Shut up, damn it!' he shouted at me. They tied my hands behind my back. Kicking me they dragged me out the door to the church. My wife wasn't there. She'd gone to Huamanga to pay the rent on our house. My daughter was in the university. I was alone with my son. With my little ones, with my three kids. They were crying. They hit them and locked them in the kitchen. Well, they had me from one until six in the afternoon. From that moment until six in the afternoon I prayed 50 Our Fathers. I was there to die. I didn't even remember I was a person. Nothing. At six o'clock they came for me, for a *juicio popular.*[11] They asked me, 'All right, little friend—talk, damn it!' So I asked 'what am I going to say? I don't know anything,' I said. 'Why are you doing these things to me? I haven't harmed anyone. Oh, I must have some enemy. Let him say it to my face. I haven't robbed, I haven't done anything. I've helped people in this community. Ask them,' I said. But there the people were, looting my store. My wife had everything, stacked in large quantities. Rice, sugar, noodles. They took everything. Everything. Damn it, they took everything, even our clothes. They even took my wife's underwear. There were no blankets left either. So at six in the afternoon they made me speak to the pueblo. They made me speak. 'Talk, damn it, talk!' they shouted."

And then, as he would at various points in our conversation, don Feliciano suddenly shifted into the present tense. "But I can't talk. I have no saliva. They're putting a red rag in my mouth...." Don Feliciano did not move for several mintues. The table began to shake, his trembling hands rocking it and the water glasses. He was staring intently toward a corner of the room.

After several minutes he turned back toward me and we continued our conversation. "So they put a rag in your mouth?" I prompted.

Don Feliciano looked at me intently and replied, "Everything. They made me open my mouth and put a pistol in it. I almost bit his hand, but I controlled myself. I had no saliva, dry, dry already. So I was there for a few seconds and I was a bit better. People knew me. There was a woman there from Canaria. A teacher, Morales. She spoke well. 'Why are you harming this man? He's a good person, he's cured me for free. Why are you doing this?' One of them said, 'Oh, damn it! You're his comadre!' It was just because I was an employee. They said, 'Pimp of the government, that's what these are. Have to kill all of them."

"So you were in the plaza?"

He nodded.

"And everyone was there?"

Don Feliciano continued. "They gave me a *juicio popular.* Everyone was there. They didn't talk. Some of them were drinking beer—I had about 40 cases. The store was full. Ask anyone. Everyone knows my house."

"Don Feliciano, was there a military base there in '82?"

"Not yet," he replied, raising his hand, palm facing me. "I'm going to tell you everything. They let me go and took me back to my house. 'I'm going to turn you over to your kids. You're saved. You have to fight with us, you have to take care of the flag.' They raised the *hoz y martillo* in the tower. 'You're going to take care of this. Make sure no one touches it. If someone does, you're going to tell me.' I said to him, 'But I won't be here. I'm leaving. You've

taken everything I have. My medicines—how will I settle my accounts?' He said, 'Tell your boss the *Senderistas* took everything and nothing will happen to you. If they say anything, tell me.' So they gave me 15 days to take care of the flag. I'm there for 15 days. My wife arrived: 'Enough. Let's get out of here.' So I came to Huancapi. That night they got an ambulance ready and brought me to Huamanga, they wanted my statement. Doctor Chino Lee was the director for Ayacucho. He was waiting for me in the hospital. That calmed me down. He asked me about it but I didn't tell him anything. If I'd talked, they would have killed my wife and children for revenge. All of them. That's why I didn't talk. The commandante said, 'Surely you know where they are from."

Don Feliciano stopped talking. His hands began to tremble again, and he began staring at the dark room in the corner. His whole body trembled, and he was biting his lips to hold back his tears. He began repeating, "I can't talk, I can't remember more. I've forgotten." I nodded and reached out to console him. It was no time for questions.

A few minutes passed befote Don Feliciano wiped his mouth. "I'm going to keep talking. It's already passed. For a few seconds I stopped existing. I lost my sight and died. Like at night when you close your eyes and you die in your dreams. At times it's like that, when I remember. But I'm a new man now. Those are the things they did to me. I'd prayed 50 Our Fathers and a creed to die. I prayed since one o'clock until six in the afternoon. I prayed 50 Our Fathers."

"Until late in the afternoon?"

He nodded. "They're giving me a *juicio popular.* That's what they're doing—what was I going to do"

"And then what happened?"

"They wanted to kill me. They wanted to crucify me. But because I have *El Señor* here," showing me his crucifix, "that's why they couldn't. It's blessed and they couldn't kill me. Later I went to my house and my children were there. Little ones. They were in the kitchen. The *Senderistas* said to my son—the one that's an engineer now—'We're giving you back your father alive.' That's when they gave me the order to take care of the flag or they would kill me."

"Ah. Why did they do this to you, don Feliciano?"

"Because I was a state employee," he explained.

I was puzzled. "Just because you worked for the state?"

He nodded. "I'm a sergeant with the Air Force. So they wanted me to teach people how to use weapons."

"Oh, so they were trying to force you to teach people?"

"Yes. I had argued with one of them—since then, they didn't like me," he explained. "Because I was an employee, I travelled around. I had no enemies, no one. I didn't do anything to anybody. Everyone knew me. They just did this to me because I was a state employee and in the air force."

"Where were they from?" I asked again.

"They were from Hualla—in Hualla they were all together. Apongo, Asquipata, Apae—they all came to kill me."

His wife had just been listening without saying anything. But she spoke up: "They ran *escuelas populares* in Hualla, Tiquihua, Cayara. The people had been *concientizada* (literally "consciousness-raised," or indoctrinated) with all of that. But us, we didn't know anything. We didn't know a thing. People came for us—we didn't know them."

"But lots of people participated, no? Like in Accomarca, Hualla?"

"Oh, lots of them! Everybody. Yes, it must have been everyone. Everyone was afraid. Only I was against them." Don Feliciano began to describe his store and the merchandise he had. "That's where the *envidia* started. They swept my store clean. They didn't even leave a thing to eat. My children were so hungry! I looked everywhere and found some wheat in the kitchen, wheat we used to feed the chickens. I had to peel that and feed it to my kids. They were crying they were so hungry. I had to grind it. What else could I do? There was no one around to borrow anything from. There were no people. Everything was silent. Everyone had gone to the puna, to sleep outside in the puna."

"Don Feliciano, who did this? Was it people from Tiquihua, or did they come from somewhere else?"

"People came to incite them. People kept joining, *pues*" he explained.

"Of course," I nodded.

"He returned again to the theme. "They were all from Tiquihua. Everyone is coming."

"But people from Tiquihua—well, I imagine they knew you?" I asked, hesitantly.

"Yes," he replied slowly.

"Do you know who they were? And those who came....Who put the rag in your mouth, don Feliciano?"

"The *Senderistas* were masked. I don't know who they were, *pues.*"

"They were masked?"

Don Feliciano stared at the wall for several minutes before answering. "*I can't see their faces. Well, more or less. I imagined who they were. Their faces are covered with masks.* Some have guns, grenades—they have everything. That's how it is."

"And they are all masked?"

"The ones who took my statement, all of those, they're masked. The ones I don't know—they don't wear masks."

There was a pause before don Feliciano began to speak again. "People, I don't know, like ants they are taking everything. The community took anyway everything we owned."

His wife added, "How can it be that they did this to someone who helped so much in the pueblo? People don't recognize that."

Don Feliciano remembered. "I cured them. People got pneumonia. I cured them with injections. I didn't have a car, but I would travel with a burro, carrying medicines. People really liked that."

"They looked at him with such admiration," added his wife. "He cured people."

"Don Feliciano shook his head as he remembered. "They did these things to me in Tiquihua. I haven't been back since."

"You've never been back?"

"As an employee I never went back. As a *vecino* (neighbour) of the pueblo, yes. I went last year. Just recently, after all those years."

"And how did people act?"

"All the people who knew me came to visit. 'Don Feliciano, how are you?' But the people who harmed me—*no me dan la cara* (they don't give me/show me their face).[12] When I approached, they left immediately. They went pale, they're afraid of me. Back then, they thought I was going to denounce them. They thought I was going to put them in jail. But I didn't. Oh God, I know so many of them, about 30 authors (*autores*)."

"Did you note their names?"

"Every single one. They are alive now. Killing their own people—they killed."

"And don Feliciano, for you, what would justice be? What would justice be after everything that happened?"

"Among human beings, it seems there is no justice. There isn't. Only God makes justice."

Past Present

> If people here began to face up to everything they've done, there would be more problems. It would be impossible to live.
> —Anonymous, Cayara

Our conversation with don Feliciano crystallizes a variety of key themes, among them the "masked ones" who were not anonymous at all. Although he has a list of 30 "authors," don Feliciano has never said anything for fear of retaliation against him or his family. He lives trying to manage the images that torment him, erasing the faces, insisting on the masks: "I can't see their faces. Well, more or less. I imagined who they were. Their faces were covered with masks." Evidently it is a bit easier to live with what he knows if he does not have to see the faces of his tormenters in his mind's eye. Anonymity, even when artificial, permits some distance between a painful past and a haunted present.

Additionally, I have noted the processes of exteriorization that operate in these pueblos, at the individual level with the *males* (afflictions) that "grab" the person as well as at the community level and the "violence that arrived here." Part of reconciliation is processing what people have done and *interiorizing who Sendero was.* People live seeing the "guiltiest ones" on a daily basis and these encounters are painful. Thus the masks keep covered a constant source of rancour: the faces of the perpetrators. I frequently heard that "we've grown accustomed to living with them"—but "they" are, to a great extent, the villagers themselves.

The insistence on "the masked ones" may be a form of "healthy denial" that has permitted people to process a bit more slowly the tensions between them. Slowly they are removing the masks, assimilating what they have done "between brothers." There is a liminal space between remembering and forgetting, and not putting a face to one's grief or loss may be a temporal strategy that stays the hand of vengeance in these communites. By not "facing up" to one another, the public secret is maintained—as long as one can remember what to forget.

In Cayara people spoke at length about the *soplón* (spy, traitor) who sold his own brothers and still lives in the community. As one man told us, "No one says anything to him because they're afraid that he might bring the soldiers again and kill them all. That's why they don't say anything. We were afraid of our own brothers. We weren't afraid anymore of the witches, the condemned. We were terrified of our neighbours. Everyone here dirtied themselves (*se han embarrado*) with that situation and now no one wants to recognize themself because of shame" (*nadie quiere reconocerse de vergüenza*).

This was not an isolated reference to shame, which was coupled with guilt in many conversations. For most people, killing someone they know is not a trivial act. As David Apter states, "People do not commit political violence without discourse. They need to talk themselves into it. What may begin as casual conversation may suddenly take a serious turn. Secret meetings add portent. On public platforms it becomes inflammatory. It results in texts, lectures. In short it engages people who suddenly are called upon to use their intelligence in ways out of the ordinary. It takes people out of themselves" (Apter 1997:

2). And yet, at some point they have to "get back into themselves."

Numerous people I have spoken with refer to the war years as *huk vida*, "another life," and to themselves during that time with the expression *hukmanmi karqani*—"I was of another form." The masking, the doubling, the shadow self: there is a sort of dissociation, as if one had become unrecognizable to him or herself. People are distancing themselves from what they have done in the past, and expressing their reluctance to recognize their own actions, to look themselves in the face (*encararse*), in the present.

Facing Up to the Past

Hualla, field notes, May 2003

We were headed to the cemetery when we met up with Feliciana Ipurre, doubled over beneath a heavy load of cornstalks. My friend insisted on carrying the load for her, and her heavily creased face folded into a smile. "Oh, which of the souls sent you?"

We fell in beside her, and I noticed she kept looking around, back and forth. I had also picked up the habit as everyone was so concerned with who was talking and with whom in this troubled pueblo.

"Oh, they say the *terrucos* are coming again. My niece was in the puna and she saw a group of armed men. Oh, during the *tiempo de muerte*, so many people died. We had to bury people as quickly as we could, their bodies still warm. We didn't even have time to dig a hole. We just had to throw dirt on top of the bodies because if they found us they'd kill us too."

We nodded, reflecting upon the number of people who shared her lament. As we rounded the corner, a drunken woman came staggering down from the cemetery. Feliciana shook her head, a murmur of disapproval escaping her lips.

"Did people drink before the tiempo de muerte?" I wondered.

She shook her head emphatically. "No, none of the women drank like that. We learned to drink during that *mal tiempo*. We began to drink while we waited for death. It was only with *trago* that we could sleep. We lived on fear. As soon as the sun began to set, we escaped to the hills. Everything was death here. More and more bodies appeared and we couldn't even gather them up. They didn't let us. The dogs and the pigs were eating our dead. *That life was like hell. No one could see each other face to face. Whether from shame or from fear, we were all running without seeing anyone. We lived without seeing anyone—we lived without being able to clearly see faces.*[13] *We couldn't even talk with each other—it was as though we were grabbed by rabia (rage)."*

We circled back around, arriving at mama Feliciana's house. She grabbed my arm: "What I've told you—you can't tell anyone because something could happen to us. We live with fear because those *canallas puka ullas* still live with us. They've never asked for forgiveness. Ha! They're doing better than we are! They have everything, even stores. I think this pueblo is blind. They've never punished them—they should cry in front us like we cried. Now it's their turn to cry, to learn to suffer like we did. Then we'd feel better. How can we live well with them if they don't ask for forgiveness (don't apologize)? We'll always be fighting, insulting each other. You can't live well like that."

I was struck by the insistence on "facelessness" in doña Feliciana's description of the war years. "We lived without being able to clearly see faces." Her lament was coupled by others who insisted "We want authorities with faces now, not like it was before. We want faces again." What does the erasure of the human face mean? I began by noting that talk about masks, faces and facelessness is talk about morality and immorality, and that there is a phenomenology of justice and injustice in these pueblos. Local ethics are grounded in the lived body.

As I began my efforts to understand the complexity of postwar social life, I found the work of Emanuel Levinas profoundly useful. In his philosophy of ethics, Levinas insisted upon the primacy of the face of the other as the basis for any sort of ethical system. He argued that justice responds to a call: "The absolute that upholds justice is the absolute of the interlocutor. Its mode of being and of making its presence known consists in turning its face toward me, in being a face" (1998:22). The human face is thus the condition of possibility for ethics; indeed, "The face of the other who commands justice for others dwells itself on this side of right and wrong, of good and evil. The other's face is not a case of justice, but its very source" (Waldenfels 2002: 70). Levinasian ethics is an ethics rooted in a phenomenology of the body, and an ethical relation is one in which we *face* the other person. Thus "ethics is *lived* in the sensibility of an embodied exposure to the other" (Critchley and Bernasconi 2002: 21).

Thus the paradox. While understanding how important the public secret has been to staying the hand of vengeance and permitting the resumption of social life with all of its tensions and discomfort, I also see the toll that impunity takes on people in these communities. How can there be justice when people cannot look themselves or each other in the face?

Huancapi, April 2003

The team had barely arrived in Huancapi when the driver announced there would be a brief stop so that passengers could have lunch. We headed out in search of a restaurant, and crossed paths with Vladimiro, a young man we had met in Tiquihua. He approached us and we all headed off on the search.

Over plates of chicken with rice, Vladimiro began talking about a communal assembly in Tiquihua, and the ex-Shining Path leader who had asked for forgiveness.

> This thing about apologizing, well we had something like that in Tiquihua. In a communal assembly, an ex-Senderista started to participate in making decisions and people began to reject him, to insult him. "*Terruco*! *Malo*! You assassinated people here!" But his reaction wasn't what we expected—he didn't try to shut up everyone who was insulting him. Instead, he lowered his head and spoke so humbly, asking people to forgive him because he couldn't live with a bad conscience. "We all committed errors. Why did we act as we did? Was it the water we drank, or the blood that flows through our body? Maybe that's what made us so bad, so demonic. But I'm asking you for forgiveness so that I can live at peace with myself, my family, with all of you." He ended up crying, but some of the women didn't stop insulting him. They said they would never forgive him and would never forget what happened, that his presence made them remember everything, remember how they'd suffered. This was in 2000, when Alejandro Carhua arrived back from Lima. I tell you, that guy was macho to stand up and apologize because people were going to react. But the authorities calmed them down by saying that we can't continue to live with so much resentment in our hearts. We needed to learn how to forgive each other because all our lives we're going to be here and we can't keep hating, having so much envy and rancour. They told people we needed to try to forgive him, that at least he'd apologized. He was the only one, not like the rest of them who live without saying anything, acting as though nothing ever happened. At least he apologized.

Reconciliation is a long process and among the steps are apologizing, punishment and reparation. Retributive and restorative justice are not mutually exclusive: rather, they are two facets of the Judeo-Christian legacy that has greatly influenced legal consciousness in these communities. It is a constant affront to the moral economy that the "guiltiest" have not publicly apologized and that they have not assumed the forms of social reparation that constitute a central step in the rehabilitation of perpetrators.

The desire for justice has prompted many people we spoke with to demand that the ex-*Senderista* leaders apologize for what they have done. Why are apologies so powerful? Why the insistence on an apology from the ex-*cabecillas?*

In his work on war and apologies, O'Neill has written, "Face involves the group's common belief about how much deference will be given to someone, especially in interactions that are face-to-face and publicly known. It sets behaviour toward the individual by giving each group member expectations about how others will behave and what the individual will accept" (1999:139). He also suggests that face is involved in making a credible commitment, and that apologies grant the other person face, and thus the promise of better treatment in the future (ibid.: 191). Apologies work in two directions: they grant face, dignity, to the other, as well as allow the perpetrator to regain face—moral standing and accountability—vis-à-vis those they have wronged. An apology engages the interlocutors in a moral discourse and, as Tavuchis has suggested, calls for apology are conspicuous in ongoing moral projects (1991).

There is also a temporal aspect to these demands. Defarges has argued, "Only the losers repent, those who see that history is not on their side" (1999:35). If indeed repentance is a gesture of the vanquished, then the refusal to repent or to apologize has various implications. I have been told the ex-*cabecillas* continue to be very *ideolizados*, referring to their continued embrace of *Sendero's* revolutionary ideology.

I suggest that campesinos are distinguishing between military and moral defeat. Despite a few overwrought reports from the US State Department, *Sendero* no longer represents a credible threat to the Peruvian state; however, this reality does not reflect local experience. Without local level juridico-religious rituals designed to administer both retributive and restorative justice, these campesinos have not had the symbolic closure that could frame the atrocities in the past tense. The lack of apologies means that these ex-*Senderista* leaders are not sorry for what they have done, nor have they had the "change of heart" that accompanies moral conversion. Consequently, the refusal to apologize implies that history is still in the making, echoing the *Senderista* refrain, "the leadership never dies." The past continues to be very present in these pueblos, personified in the faces that slip out from behind their masks.

Conclusions

> Truth is not a matter of exposure which destroys the secret, but a revelation which does justice to it.
>
> —Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*

My aim in this article has been to explore how people "remoralize" their social worlds following lengthy periods of intimate violence. My research demonstrates the centrality of interpersonal processes and issues of justice to postwar reconstruction. Rama Mani has written, "Justice is at once philosophical and political, public and intensely private, universal in its existence and yet highly individualized and culturally shaped in its expression" (2002: 186). The "cultural shape" of justice in Ayacucho is embodied, and emphasizes forms of social reparation that grant dignity to those who have been wronged and the possibility of rehabilitation to the transgressors. Engaging with the elaborate talk about masks, faces and facelessness permits us to enter into the ethical discourse that circulates in these communities, and illustrates the need to conceptualize non-medicalized approaches to "recovery" in postwar contexts (Kleinman 1998).

I began this article with the idea of the public secret. I want now to return to Taussig and his work on defacement (1999). He suggests that through a "drama of revelation…unmasking amounts to a transgressive uncovering of a 'secretly familiar'" (51). The secretly familiar in these communities is a recent history of fratricidal violence. While I believe co-existence is based upon a complicated alchemy of remembering, forgetting and remembering to forget, I am equally convinced that co-existence is impeded by the sense of injustice that permeates these communities. If unmasking implies a confrontation with what is secretly familiar, it also implies some sort of reckoning. That reckoning—that "settling of accounts"—will at some point require that people can look themselves and one another in the face. Co-existence will thus involve both the mask and the mirror.

Kimberly Theidon, Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, William James Hall 406, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A. 02138, E-mail: ktheidon@wjh.harvard.edu

Acknowledgments

I thank Edith Del Pino Huamán, José Carlos Palomino Peña, Juan José Yupanqui, Leonor Rivera Sulca and Dulia Lozano Noa for their *calidad humana* and for their commitment to the people with whom we conducted this research. For generous financial support throughout my research, I thank the Social Science Research Council, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos-Siembra Democracia* and the United States Institute for Peace. For insightful conversations on the themes I address in this article, I thank Arthur Kleinman, José Coronel Aguirre, William Kurth, Barry O'Neill and Billie Jean Isbell. Finally, I thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.

Notes

1 This paper is based upon research conducted in Peru from 2002-2003 in collaboration with the Ayacucho office of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and from 2003 to present with support from the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.

2 I use the term community in two senses. Campesino communities are rights-bearing entities, recognized as such in the Peruvian Constitution. I also define community as a historically situated, strategic collective identity.

3 For detailed ethnographic accounts of Chuschi, see Isbell 1978 and 1994.

4 The other guerrilla movement was the MRTA, Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru. MRTA was always considered a lesser threat, although the group succeeded in invading of the Japanese Embassy and holding dozens of hostages for several months. When government troops stormed the embassy, members of MRTA were killed after they had surrendered. One of the images repeatedly shown in the media was Fujimori strutting through the rubble in a flak jacket.

5 The "archaic culture" argument infused the *Informe sobre los Sucesos de Uchuraccay*, a product of the government appointed commission sent to investigate peasant violence in 1983. This report, under the direction of Mario Vargas Llosa, reveals his flair for fiction. For an astute analysis of the environmental arguments, see Poole 1987. The best critique of the "archaic culture" framework is Mayer 1992. This same author also offers an important analysis of the "endemic violence" arguments (1993).

6 The literature regarding these "battles," which have different names, is vast. See Villalobos 1992. For an insightful critique of this literature and its tendency to construct the "exotically violent campesinos," see Remy 1991. For an analysis of *tinkuy* (one name for these ritual battles) that focusses on the role of *tinkuy* in affirming both group identity and complementary opposition, see Allen 1988.

7 When I speak of envy and resentment, I am reflecting on the seemingly eternal conflicts over boundaries as well as the economic stratification within and between these communities. Although macroeconomic indicators correctly capture widespread poverty throughout the department of Ayacucho, the difference in wealth within these communities can be substantial. For instance, the poorest community members may have an average of eight to 10 livestock, while the wealthier campesinos have between 100 and 150 (Theidon 2004).

8 I have benefited greatly from Kleinman and Kleinman 1993 and 1997 in thinking about these processes.
9 These processes preceded the National Repentance Law that was in effect from May 1992 to November 1994. See Tapia 1997 for an analysis of this law.
10 Shining Path infiltrated communities via the education system because many rural teachers received their training at the provincial Universidad San Cristóbal de Huamanga, where Shining Path began. The *escuelas populares* were meetings in which Shining Path doctrine was taught.
11 *Juicios populares* ("popular trials") were held by *Sendero* members and usually resulted in summary executions of the accused.
12 *Dar la cara* is literally "give the face." It can mean showing one's face; it also implies having the courage to face up to someone.
13 "Nadie podía verse cara a cara. Habrá sido de vergüenza o de miedo, todos corríamos sin ver a nadie, vivíamos sin ver a nadie, vivíamos sin vernos bien la cara."

References

Allen, Catherine J.
1988 The Hold Life Has: Coca and Cultural Identity in an Andean Community. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Apter, David E.
1997 The Legitimization of Violence. New York: New York University Press.

Aguirre , José Coronel
1995 Recomposición Del Tejido Social y el Estado. Paper presented at Foro Nacional Sobre Desplazamiento Interno Forzado, Lima, July 13-14.

Coronel, José Aguirre
1995 Recomposición del Tejido Social y el Estado. Lima, Peru: Foro Nacional Sobre Desplazamiento Interno Forzado. July 13-14.

Critchley, Simon, and Robert Bernasconi, eds.
2002 The Cambridge Companion to Lévinas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Defarges, Philippe Moreau
1999 Repentance et Reconciliation. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Degregori , Carlos Iván
1990 Ayacucho 1969-1979: El Surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Isbell, Billie Jean
1978 To Defend Ourselves: Ritual and Economy in a Highland Peruvian Village. Boulder: Westview Press.
1994 Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho. *In* Shining Path of Peru. 2nd edition. David Scott Palmer, ed. Pp. 77-100. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Jumpa, Antonio Peña
1998 Justicia Comunal en los Andes. El caso de Calahuyo. Lima: PUCP.

Kleinman, Arthur
1998 Experience and Its Moral Modes: Culture, Human Conditions, and Disorder. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Stanford University, April 13-16.

Kleinman, Arthur, and Joan Kleinman
1993 Face, Favor and Families: The Social Course of Mental Health Problems in Chinese and American Societies. Chinese Journal of Mental Health 6: 37-47.
1997 Moral Transformations of Health and Suffering in Chinese Society. *In* Morality and Health. A. Brandt and P. Rozen, eds. Pp. 101-118. New York: Routledge.

Levi, Primo
1989 The Drowned and the Saved. New York: Vintage International.

Levinas, Emanuel
1998 On Thinking-of the-Other. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mani, Rama
2002 Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Mayer, Enrique
1992 Peru in Deep Trouble: Mario Vargas Llosa's "Inquest in the Andes" Re-examined. *In* Rereading Cultural Anthropology. George E. Marcus, ed. Pp. 181-219. Durham: Duke University Press.
1993 Patterns of Violence in the Andes. Latin American Research Review 29(2): 141–171.

Napier, A. David
1986 Masks, Transformation, and Paradox. Berkeley: University of California Press.

O'Neill, Barry
1999 Honors, Symbols and War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Palmer, David Scott, ed.
1994 Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Palomar, Juan DeMiguel
2001 Diccionario para Juristas: Tomo I. Mexico: Editorial Porrúa.

Poole, Deborah
1987 Qorilazos, abigeos y comunidades campesinas en la provincia de Chumbivilcas (Cusco). *In* Comunidades campesinas. Cambios y permanencies. Fernando Oshige, ed. Pp. 107-141. Lima: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología.

Remy, María Isabel
1991 Los discursos sobre la violencia en los Andes. Algunas reflexiones a propósito del Chiaraje. *In* Poder y Violencia en los Andes. Henrique Urbano, ed. Pp. 83-105. Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Regionales "Bartolomé de Las Casas."

Seremetakis, C. Nadia
1994 The Senses Still: Perception and Memory As Material Culture in Modernity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shklar, Judith N.
1990 The Faces of Injustice. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Starn,Orin
1995 To Revolt against the Revolution: War and Resistance in Peru's Andes. Cultural Anthropology 10(4): 547-580.

Tapia, Carlos
1997 Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso: dos estrategias y un final. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Taussig, Michael
1999 Defacement: Public Secrecy and the Labor of the Negative. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Tavuchis, Nicholas
1991 Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Theidon, Kimberly
2002 Traumatic States: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley.
2004 Entre prójimos: el conflicto armado interno y la política de la reconciliación en el Perú. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2003 Final Report, Nine Volumes. Lima: Peru.

Vargas Llosa, Mario, et al.
1983 Informe de la Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay. Mimeograph.

Villalobos, Bernardino
1992 De fiestas, ritos y batallas. Algunos comportamientos folk de la sociedad andina de los K'anas y Ch'umpiwillcas. Allpanchis 40: 147-172.

Waldenfels, Bernhard
2002 Levinas and the Face of the Other. *In* The Cambridge Companion to Levinas Critchley, Simon and Robert Bernasconi, eds. Pp. 63-81.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Construire la paix au Guatemala : analyse critique des modalités d'intervention mises en œuvre par trois ONG guatémaltèques

Karine Vanthuyne *Centre de recherche sur la santé, le social et le politique (CRESP), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris*

Résumé : A partir d'une étude menée en avril 2003 auprès de trois ONG guatémaltèques impliquées dans le processus de paix, cet article cherche à interroger les registres dominants en ce qui concerne les modalités de réconciliation de pays ayant connu la guerre. En étudiant les registres locaux de la reconstruction du «vivre-ensemble», l'économie morale et politique dans laquelle ils s'inscrivent, et les champs du discours auxquels ils renvoient, je veux montrer les limites que pose un contexte encore répressif aux approches et pratiques actuellement en vogue dans le domaine de la paix et de la réconciliation.

Mots-clés : Guatemala, ONG, politiques de la mémoire, vérité, justice, violence politique

Abstract: Based on a study conducted within three NGOs involved in the Guatemalan peace process, this article interrogates dominant discourses and practices upon which strategies of reconciliation in postwar countries are based. Examining local idioms of the reconstruction of the principle of "living together," and in particular the moral and political economy in which these idioms are embedded and the discursive fields to which they refer, enables us to identify the obstacles that a repressive political context may impose on processes of peace-building and reconciliation.

Keywords: Guatemala, NGO, politics of memory, truth, justice, political violence

Mardi 20 août 1996. Alors que le soleil se lève entre les montagnes enveloppées de brume de San Juan Ixcan, département d'El Quiché, Guatemala, le village se prépare fébrilement pour un grand jour de son histoire : le désarmement de ses *Patrouilles d'autodéfense civiles* (PAC)[1].

San Juan Ixcan est un des 440 villages qui ont été rasés durant les 36 années de guerre civile au Guatemala. Suite au massacre de sa communauté en 1982, il fut abandonné à la jungle pour être ensuite recolonisé six ans plus tard par 56 familles de déplacés internes. Amenés à ces terres par l'armée, ces paysans durent en contrepartie accepter de s'organiser en PAC, devenant ainsi partie prenante des politiques de répression et de terreur mises en place par le gouvernement pour écraser tout mouvement d'organisation de la population rebelle mais aussi civile. Chaque homme de la communauté dut alors monter la garde 24 heures par mois, faute de quoi il était châtié par une amende et la fort dangereuse accusation d'être «communiste».

Lorsqu'en 1994 se répandit la rumeur du retour des anciens propriétaires des terres de San Juan Ixcan, jusque là réfugiés au Mexique, la peur ébranla les nouveaux occupants. Pour éviter d'éventuels affrontements, ces derniers lancèrent alors des négociations avec les futurs arrivants, conclues à Cantabal le 21 avril 1995 par la signature de l'*Accord de Réconciliation.* Des fusils étaient cependant toujours entre les mains d'une partie de la communauté, celle-ci demeurant embrigadée dans les PAC. S'engagea alors un deuxième processus de négociation, cette fois entamé par les récents retournés.

> Nous ne leur en voulions pas d'avoir pris les armes. Nous comprenions que nos compagnons y avaient été obligés. (...) Aussi, en conversant avec eux, nous leur fîmes comprendre qu'il (...) n'était plus nécessaire de garder ces armes, qu'il ne fallait plus penser à la guerre mais à notre avenir et à améliorer notre communauté en nous unissant les uns aux autres. Que nous soyons

réfugiés ou déplacés, nous avons la même histoire : (...) la racine de notre souffrance est identique.[2]

Le 20 août 1996, «pour la paix et la terre»[3], les PAC rendirent leurs armes.

Si l'on se fie aux rapports faisant état de l'évolution du processus de paix au Guatemala ces dernières années (Amnesty-International 2002; MINUGUA 2002; ODHA 2002), le cas de San Juan Ixcan ne serait pas du tout représentatif de la situation plus généralement trouvée dans les autres communautés du Guatemala de l'après-guerre. Le dialogue et la bonne entente dont j'ai été témoin lors de mon premier séjour au Guatemala en 1996 seraient plutôt choses rares au sein des communautés les plus touchées par le conflit armé. Malgré la signature des *Accords de paix* en 1996, le Guatemala demeure aujourd'hui un pays divisé et marqué par la violence. Outre une montée sans précédent du crime organisé, lesdits rapports (Amnesty-International 2002; MINUGUA 2002; ODHA 2002), de même que de nombreux témoignages recueillis sur le terrain dénoncent l'augmentation d'actes d'intimidation auprès d'employés d'organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), de juges, d'avocats, de journalistes et d'autres acteurs impliqués dans la lutte contre l'impunité. Par ailleurs, ces rapports font aussi état de l'accroissement de la violence au sein des communautés rurales et urbaines, alors qu'un nombre croissant de Guatémaltèques, frustrés par un système judiciaire corrompu, ont pris en charge l'exécution des criminels par le biais du lynchage.

Les obstacles au processus de paix du Guatemala sont nombreux, et documentés par un nombre grandissant d'études (Armon, Sieder et Wilson 1997; Molkentin 2001). Ces études font état de l'achoppement du processus de démilitarisation et de démocratisation de l'État guatémaltèque, de l'aggravation des inégalités socioéconomiques en raison du processus de néo-libéralisation que connaît depuis quelques années le continent américain et du maintien du climat d'impunité eu égard à la continuelle faiblesse et perpétuelle corruption du système de justice de ce pays. Ce faisant, la plupart d'entre elles se concentrent davantage sur les dimensions structurelles portant entrave à la reconstitution du tissu social du Guatemala que sur les processus microsociaux que met en jeu cette reconstitution au sein des populations les plus affectées par le conflit armé. Or que se passe-t-il au niveau local? Comment les acteurs se représentent-ils la «paix», la «réconciliation» voire la reconstruction du «vivre-ensemble» de leurs communautés? Quels projets mettent-ils en œuvre pour engager la pacification et la démocratisation de l'espace public?

En prenant pour fenêtre le travail de trois ONG engagées dans le processus de paix du Guatemala, cet article cherche à interroger les registres dominants en ce qui concerne les modalités de réconciliation de pays ayant connu la guerre. Je me centre, d'une part, sur les dilemmes devant lesquels se trouvent placés les intervenants, eu égard aux tensions qui opposent leurs constructions relatives des victimes à la complexité des situations dans lesquelles se trouvent placées ces dernières. Puis j'examine, d'autre part, les présupposés épistémologiques et éthiques qui sous-tendent leurs actions, ainsi que le contexte politique et les registres nationaux et internationaux d'aide aux victimes dans lesquelles s'inscrivent leurs interventions. En étudiant les registres locaux de la reconstruction du «vivre-ensemble», l'économie morale et politique dans laquelle ils s'inscrivent, et les champs du discours auxquels ils renvoient, je veux montrer les limites que pose un contexte encore répressif aux approches et pratiques actuellement en vogue dans le domaine de la paix et de la réconciliation.

Description de l'étude

Cet article s'inscrit dans un projet de recherche doctoral portant plus largement sur les enjeux que pose la reconstitution du tissu social au Guatemala. Il découle d'une enquête préliminaire de terrain[4] menée en avril 2003 auprès de différentes associations proposant des projets de réparation des dommages et de restauration de la justice dans les communautés les plus touchées par le conflit civil armé. Le Guatemala compte un bon nombre de ce type d'institutions, qu'elles soient nationales ou internationales, gouvernementales ou non gouvernementales. Pour ma part, je me suis concentrée sur trois organisations nationales non gouvernementales : une d'assistance juridique, une autre d'intervention en santé mentale, et une troisième de reconstruction de la mémoire historique.

Le *Centre d'action légale pour la défense des droits humains* (CALDH) fut fondé à Washington en 1989 par un avocat guatémaltèque en exil. En 1994, il s'est réimplanté dans la capitale du Guatemala. Il a pour objectif de contribuer à l'établissement de la vérité et de promouvoir l'exercice de la justice pour les victimes de violations des droits de l'homme au Guatemala. Son action a débuté par la prise en charge de recours individuels et collectifs, ignorés ou déboutés par la justice guatémaltèque, en amenant ces derniers devant la *Commission Inter-Américaine des droits de l'homme* (Washington, États-Unis)[5]. Il y a actuellement une vingtaine de ces cas devant la commission. Face à l'avalanche de ce type de cas au CALDH, ce dernier opta il y a environ cinq ans pour le regroupement de ces plaintes au sein de deux recours

collectifs : l'un contre le Général Romeo Lucas García, président du Guatemala de 1978 à 1982, l'autre contre le Général Efraín Ríos Montt, président du Guatemala entre 1982 et 1983. Lucas Garcia est accusé de crimes contre l'humanité et de crimes de guerre et Ríos Montt est accusé de génocide, de crimes contre l'humanité et de crimes de guerre. Dans le cadre de ces deux recours, cette équipe agit à titre de consultant auprès des plaignants – appelés «témoins» par le CALDH. Ceux-ci proviennent pour leur part d'une vingtaine de villages éparpillés à travers les cinq départements du pays les plus touchés par le conflit civil armé : Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, Chimaltenango, Huehuetenango et El Quiche. J'ai rencontré deux employés de cette association : Susana[6], une diplômée canadienne en sciences politiques et Orlando, un juriste d'origine guatémaltèque, tous deux co-responsables des recours.

L'*Équipe d'études communautaires et d'action psychosociale* (ECAP) vit le jour en 1997 au Guatemala. Elle cherche à développer des processus de réflexion et d'action psychosociale auprès des victimes de la violence politique, et ce dans le but de promouvoir la restructuration des aspects de la vie et de l'identité communautaire (organisationnels, religieux, culturels, etc.…) qu'elle juge les plus signifiants eu égard à la «cosmogonie» des personnes affectées. Pour ce faire, cette ONG réalise et/ou appuie des programmes et des projets visant à promouvoir : 1) l'affirmation des victimes en tant que sujets de leur propre histoire, 2) le recouvrement de la mémoire collective, 3) la lutte contre l'impunité, 4) la quête de justice et 5) la reconstruction du tissu social communautaire. En ce sens, elle travaille en collaboration avec le CALDH par la réalisation, d'une part, d'une enquête sur les dommages et les séquelles psychologiques engendrés par le génocide chez les survivants et, d'autre part, par la mise en œuvre d'un programme d'accompagnement psychosocial auprès des témoins impliqués dans les deux recours collectifs coordonnés par le CALDH. Par ailleurs, en plus de participer à la diffusion et à la promotion du thème de la santé mentale tant au niveau local (par le biais des radios communautaires) qu'au niveau national (par le biais de son appartenance à un réseau national des associations œuvrant dans le domaine de la santé mentale auprès des victimes de violence politique), elle a aussi mis sur pied un programme d'études à l'*Université nationale de San Carlos du Guatemala,* soit une *Maîtrise en psychologie sociale et violence politique.* Enfin, l'ECAP travaille également en collaboration avec le *Mémorial pour la paix,* une ONG qui travaille au recouvrement de la mémoire historique, que j'ai aussi étudiée et vais décrire ci-dessous. J'ai rencontré la directrice de cette association, Elena, une psychologue d'origine guatémaltèque, et la responsable d'un des programmes d'assistance psychosociale, Mercedes, une psychologue d'origine espagnole.

Le *Mémorial pour la paix* a été mis sur pied en 2000. Dirigé par l'ancien directeur de la *Fondation d'anthropologie légiste du Guatemala* (FAFG, une ONG guatémaltèque prenant en charge nombre de demandes d'exhumation de cimetières clandestins à travers le pays), cette organisation implique la participation de l'ECAP, de la Fondation Rigoberta Menchú (une ONG guatémaltèque mettant en œuvre différents projets de promotion d'une «culture de la paix» au sein des communautés les plus touchées par le conflit armé) et de la *Coopération Internationale* (COOPI, une ONG d'aide humanitaire italienne). Il vise à favoriser le recouvrement de la mémoire historique des victimes du conflit, à reconstruire l'histoire du Guatemala – de manière à y (ré)intégrer le conflit civil armé et la population autochtone – et à promouvoir le devoir de mémoire au sein de la population. Pour ce faire, cette ONG cherche à mettre sur pied un réseau de musées communautaires à travers le pays, en plus d'un musée synthèse au sein la capitale. Actuellement cependant, son action se centre sur la municipalité de Panzós, département d'Alta Verapaz, où a eu lieu le premier des massacres commis par l'armée. Elle consiste en une série d'enquêtes historiographiques, anthropologiques et psychosociales (analyses d'archives, entretiens individuels et collectifs) et en la formation de promoteurs historiques parmi les membres des villages composant cette municipalité, qui prendront alors chacun en charge la mise sur pied et la gestion des musées de leurs villages. J'ai mené mes entretiens auprès du directeur de cette association, Marcos, un anthropologue d'origine guatémaltèque et auprès de la responsable des enquêtes historiographiques, Lydia, une historienne d'origine guatémaltèque.

Dans les lignes qui suivent, après une brève description du contexte socio-historique dans lequel s'inscrit l'intervention des ONG étudiées, j'analyserai la manière dont elles cherchent à constituer des langages permettant la narration du passé et l'action, pour instaurer le «devoir de mémoire» et à rétablir les bases du vivre-ensemble. La dimension «culturelle» du travail de ces ONG, un enjeu crucial compte tenu de l'importance que prend la défense de l'identité ethnique maya dans le processus de paix de ce pays, fait quant à elle l'objet d'un autre article (Vanthuyne 2004).

36 années de guerre au Guatemala

Suite au renversement militaire (appuyé par la CIA) du gouvernement d'Arbenz, qui mit brutalement fin au très

court «Printemps démocratique», divers mouvements de guérilla virent le jour au Guatemala. Après une première offensive insurrectionnelle en 1962, rapidement écrasée par une campagne militaire contre-insurrectionnelle (1966-67), les guérilleros cherchèrent à gagner davantage d'appui tant au sein de la capitale qu'en région rurale, en infiltrant les organisations populaires, les associations étudiantes, les syndicats et les communautés rurales mayas. Le mouvement rebelle atteignit son apogée en 1978-79, alors qu'il comptait entre 6 000 et 8 000 combattants dans ses rangs, disposait de l'appui de près d'un demi-million de collaborateurs et opérait dans la majorité des départements du pays.

La répression militaire fut brutale et sans merci. Menaces de mort, arrestations, enlèvements, torture et exécution des leaders populaires, syndicaux et associatifs en constituèrent la première phase (1960-78). Lui succéda une seconde phase davantage axée sur l'élimination des bases de support mayas (1978-83). 440 villages furent rasés et plus de 200 000 personnes tuées, sans compter le million de réfugiés et de déplacés internes – pour une population totale d'environ 9 millions d'habitants (CEH 1999). S'en suivit la militarisation du quotidien des survivants de ces massacres à travers les *Patrouilles d'autodéfense civile* (PAC). Obligeant tous les hommes du village âgés de plus de quinze ans à surveiller et à dénoncer leurs voisins, de même qu'à participer parfois à des actes d'intimidation ou de violence massive, ces patrouilles exacerbèrent le processus de désintégration du tissu social de ces villages, en ravivant et en aggravant les conflits et antagonismes intra et intercommunaux déjà existants (Lovell 1995).

Les politiques d'extermination qui sévirent dans les régions rurales et la militarisation des campagnes qui s'en suivit entraînèrent, selon Linda Green (1999), le développement d'une «culture de la peur», qui modifia considérablement le champ du social et du politique de ces collectivités. Le spectacle quotidien d'enlèvements, de corps torturés à mort et jetés à la rivière, de viols et de massacres collectifs eut tôt fait de semer la terreur, et de profondément déstabiliser les relations familiales, communautaires et intercommunautaires de ces régions, les marquant de méfiance, d'appréhension et de suspicion. Ce faisant, la vie politique de ces villages en fut grandement affectée, alors que les PAC devinrent vite des autorités en matière de justice locale, bouleversant les structures de pouvoir traditionnelles (Green 1999; Zur 1998).

Malgré l'élection en 1985 d'un président civil, et l'initiation en 1987 d'un dialogue de paix entre le gouvernement et les guérilleros (regroupés au sein de l'*Union révolutionnaire nationale guatémaltèque* – URNG), ce n'est qu'en 1993 que débuta réellement le processus de paix au Guatemala (Armon, Sieder et al. 1997), alors que l'ONU vint arbitrer le dialogue. Au total, 14 accords furent signés, dont le dernier le 29 décembre 1996 pour une «paix ferme et durable». Ces accords de paix proposent une série d'objectifs de portée considérable, dont plusieurs mesures visant à intégrer la population civile au développement économique et démocratique du pays. Toutefois, leur mise en œuvre est loin d'avoir atteint un niveau satisfaisant (Molkentin 2001). Malgré la place de plus en plus importante qu'occupe le discours des droits de l'homme dans l'espace public, la présence de l'ONU pour surveiller la mise en application des accords de même qu'un nombre important d'organisations locales et internationales, gouvernementales et non gouvernementales proposant différents programmes de reconstruction et de démocratisation de la société guatémaltèque, un climat de violence et d'impunité continue de régner au Guatemala, et ce en ville comme à la campagne (Foxen 2002). C'est donc dans un contexte où le processus de paix est sérieusement mis à mal qu'opèrent les acteurs associatifs que j'ai rencontrés.

Construire la paix

Le pouvoir de la vérité... questionné

La reconstruction des événements passés, voire l'éclaircissement de la vérité historique, sont de nos jours perçus comme un pré-requis indispensable au processus de pacification et de démocratisation de pays déchirés par la violence politique. Et ce, non seulement afin de rétablir les faits dans le but d'identifier et de punir les criminels. Les commissions de vérité qui ont accompagné la plupart des transitions démocratiques des dernières années prétendent aussi servir de leçon d'histoire nationale, «puisqu'elles questionnent ou confirment la version officielle mais mutilée du passé» (Wilson 1997d: 52).

Le Guatemala a connu deux commissions de la vérité. La première, intitulée *Recouvrement de la mémoire historique* (REMHI), fut initiée par l'Église catholique[7] en 1994, soit un peu avant la signature de la paix. Initiative du *Bureau des droits de l'homme de l'Archevêché du Guatemala* (ODHA), et indépendante des instances gouvernementales, cette commission avait pour objectif de recueillir les témoignages des secteurs les plus marginalisés de la société guatémaltèque, et ce afin de compléter le travail de l'éventuelle commission publique de vérité. La seconde, appelée *Commission pour l'éclaircissement historique* (CEH), et co-mandatée par le gouvernement et l'ONU, fut mise en place en 1996.

Dans un contexte où des années de censure et de manipulation des faits avaient fini par produire des représentations particulièrement fragmentées et défigurées de la réalité, ces deux commissions constituent des acquis importants pour la collectivité guatémaltèque. Selon Judith Zur, les 36 années de violence pourraient en effet être lues comme une «guerre contre la mémoire» (Zur 1998: 159). Elle donne l'exemple des veuves des hommes enlevés et assassinés par les PAC de la communauté qu'elle a étudiée : ces PAC menaçaient de violer ces femmes si elles osaient évoquer en public ce qui était advenu de leurs époux. Ce faisant, «la veuve devait d'un côté enregistrer et témoigner de la version autorisée des faits, de la "vérité officielle," tout en gardant sous silence et en "oubliant" sa vérité propre, la "vérité vraie"» (Zur 1994: 14, guillemets tels que dans l'original).

Les retombées de la CEH (1999) et du projet REMHI (ODHA 1998) demeurent toutefois partielles et parfois même problématiques. Le projet REMHI fut mis en œuvre dans un contexte où la paix n'avait pas encore été signée, où les PAC étaient encore actives et où la réintégration des guérilleros dans la société civile continuait de soulever bon nombre d'interrogations. Il rencontra par conséquent beaucoup de résistance au sein des communautés où il fut mis en œuvre, plusieurs ayant encore très peur de témoigner de ce qu'elles avaient vécu (Sanford 2003). De plus, son auteur principal, l'Evêque Monseigneur Gerardi, fut assassiné deux jours après le dépôt du rapport final, soit le 26 avril 1998, signalant le danger encore présent de remettre en question la version officielle des faits. De son côté, la CEH, bien que mandatée par le gouvernement, s'est heurtée à l'opposition de ce dernier. Suivant la publication de son rapport vers la fin de 1999, le président de l'époque, Alvaro Arzú, a refusé de considérer la plupart des recommandations qu'il contenait et a aussi nié qu'il y a avait eu actes de génocide, réalignant le gouvernement guatémaltèque du côté des militaires[8] (Sanford 2003). Enfin, que ce soit pour le rapport REMHI ou celui de la CEH, plusieurs acteurs sociaux et politiques s'entendent pour dire que leurs conclusions ont été peu diffusées en dehors de la capitale et du nombre très restreint de gens sachant lire et écrire[9] (Molkentin 2001).

Présentes dans différentes régions rurales, les ONG que j'ai étudiées semblent avoir rapidement constaté les limites du travail accompli par les commissions de vérité dans ces régions. D'où l'importance de leur travail de documentation de l'histoire et d'éclaircissement de la vérité. Celui-ci, en poursuivant le travail inachevé des commissions de vérité, semble en effet donner lieu à la construction de langages qui, en proposant des interprétations des faits qui interrogent celles qu'en ont données l'armée, aident les survivants à réévaluer tant leur participation aux brutalités commises que la mesure dans laquelle ils en étaient responsables. Ce faisant, ces associations semblent permettre à ces personnes de dépasser la simple verbalisation du passé traumatique; elles leur donnent aussi la possibilité d'accéder à une parole politique, c'est-à-dire de s'approprier un langage qui leur permette d'articuler l'expérience du passé non plus comme une inexorable souffrance mais comme une série d'injustices au nom desquelles elles sont en droit de réclamer réparations.

Pour le CALDH, bien qu'il se fût agi de mobiliser des communautés pour qu'elles participent aux recours collectifs contre Lucas García et Ríos Montt, il n'en reste pas moins que c'est avec surprise et fierté qu'il a vu les témoins rompre le silence, exprimer leur souffrance pour ensuite sortir du registre des émotions et s'approprier une parole politique. De victimes silencieuses d'un passé douloureux, soutient Susana, ces personnes sont devenues des acteurs importants au redressement des torts subis.

> Ça a été vraiment intéressant d'être témoin de ce changement chez les gens, qui de victimes se sont transformés en acteurs pour la justice. La première fois qu'on a rassemblé les gens de ces communautés, les témoins des massacres, ils avaient le regard rivé au sol, ils avaient peur de parler, et c'est peu à peu, en brisant la glace, qu'ils ont commencé à raconter leur histoire. (...) Maintenant, au cours des deux dernières rencontres que nous avons eues, (...) la différence est incroyable. Les gens posent des questions telles «si notre poursuite est rejetée par le Ministère public [du Guatemala], pouvons nous la porter devant la Commission Inter-Américaine des droits de l'homme».[10]
> – *Susana, CALDH*

L'ECAP affirme travailler dans la même direction. En créant des groupes de discussion où les participants sont invités à exprimer leurs préoccupations, cette équipe de psychologues semble chercher à provoquer une verbalisation du passé traumatique, inscrivant dès lors son action dans le domaine du psychologique. Toutefois, comme cette association travaille étroitement avec des ONG tel le CALDH, il n'en reste pas moins que derrière l'effet psychologique et davantage individuel recherché se trouve aussi un objectif politique – celui du recouvrement d'une parole efficace, d'une parole qui revendique justice et réparations.

> Nous, on essaie de créer des espaces où les victimes puissent parler de leurs sentiments, mais aussi puissent créer des propositions. – *Mercedes, ECAP*

> Pour qu'ils parlent de justice, pour qu'ils parlent de réparations, d'indemnisations, de façons de résoudre les conflits (....) Pour donner le pouvoir aux personnes de prendre une décision avec toute l'information, avec la puissance, la force. – *Mercedes, ECAP*

Cette combinaison chez l'ECAP d'un traitement psychologique à une action de mobilisation politique fait écho au type de dévoilement auquel Rousseau et ses collègues font référence dans une étude sur les stratégies mémorielles des survivants du conflit guatémaltèque : *el testimonio* (Rousseau, Morales et al. 2001). Il s'agit en fait d'un modèle de traitement très populaire en Amérique latine. Utilisant le témoignage comme principal outil thérapeutique, ce modèle se veut une réponse originale et innovatrice aux limites des modes de traitements que prescrit la littérature psychiatrique[11] pour la prise en charge des survivants de conflits armés (Weine, Kulevonic, Pavkovic et Gibbons 1998). S'affranchissant de l'impératif de neutralité généralement imposé à la pratique de la psychiatrie, ce type de traitement préconise la prise de position des thérapeutes du côté de leurs patients et la médiatisation des témoignages de ces derniers, transportant le traitement au-delà du cadre plus restreint d'une verbalisation de la souffrance dans le contexte «stérile et isolé» de la dyade patient-thérapeute. Ce faisant, ce modèle de prise en charge veut renforcer le déplacement vers l'extérieur de la cause psychopathologique – un déplacement déjà amorcé par le diagnostic du Syndrome de stress post-traumatique (SSPT) (Fassin, Rechtman, D'Halluin et Latte 2002) – en «recadrant le récit [de l'événement traumatique] du survivant dans le contexte social et historique au sein duquel le facteur étiologique de violence politique a généralement pris forme» (Weine, Kulevonic et al. 1998: 1725). Selon ce modèle, ce n'est pas la personne mais la société qui est source du mal-être ressenti.

Les travaux de Cécile Rousseau et de son équipe (2001) nous mettent cependant en garde contre certaines limites de ce type de traitement. Ce dernier repose en effet sur le présupposé de l'existence d'un système de justice intègre, en mesure de répondre aux requêtes des survivants. Or, cela est bien loin d'être le cas au Guatemala. Et les ONG que j'ai interrogées en sont bien conscientes. Il reste la possibilité de faire appel aux ressources internationales de justice, telle la *Comission Inter-Américaine des droits de l'homme* – vers laquelle le CALDH s'est d'ailleurs tourné – mais la procédure reste complexe et remplie d'embûches, et nécessite donc l'appui d'organisations spécialisées dans le droit comme le CALDH. Pour la plupart des habitants des communautés où cette organisation travaille, celle-ci (et les autres organisations effectuant un travail similaire) reste donc la seule garantie de justice. Ce qui pose dès lors la question du maintien de ces institutions dans les communautés. La plupart de ces organisations dépendent en effet de financements limités dans le temps, la «réconciliation» étant perçue par les bailleurs de fonds (surtout internationaux) comme un processus inscrit dans un temps court.

En ce sens, les ONG que j'ai étudiées semblent être conscientes de la fragilité de leur action. Faute de ne pouvoir assurer leur survie à long terme, elles mettent l'accent sur le développement d'une certaine autonomie des sujets politiques qu'elles sont en train de produire, en s'attachant à ce qu'ils prennent l'action en mains le plus possible, et en leur offrant la formation nécessaire à cet effet.

> Nous impliquons les témoins dans le processus. Nous ne sommes pas arrivés dans leurs communautés pour nous approprier leurs témoignages et pour, par la suite, nous en aller poursuivre seuls le travail. Ils ont formé leur propre association, qui est co-plaignante dans le procès, et aident donc aussi à monter la preuve. – *Susana, CALDH*

Cela dit, ces ONG reconnaissent toutefois les limites de leur travail, en raison de la persistance du climat d'impunité et de la conséquente permanence des structures de répression héritées du conflit.

> Q : Et dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que ces acteurs parviennent-ils à transposer cette émancipation politique dans leurs communautés?
>
> R : Ça dépend des communautés. (...) A Cuarto Pueblo, ils ont fondé leur propre organisation des droits de l'homme, ils ont trouvé leur propre financement, et ils organisent toutes sortes d'activités. (...) Mais si tu vas dans d'autres communautés de la région de Rabinal, ou Ixil, tu y trouves des gens qui ont participé aux massacres et tu dois être très prudent [dans ces communautés]. Les gens [qui participent aux activités du CALDH] ne parlent pas de ce en quoi ils sont impliqués, c'est pour eux une chose très difficile.
>
> – *Susana, CALDH*

La formation de sujets politiques conscients de leurs droits ne semble pas suffire au démantèlement des structures de répression héritées du conflit. Pourtant, en s'appuyant sur les propos de Michel Foucault (2001) sur la vérité, Victoria Sanford (2003) soutient que l'éclaircissement et l'énonciation de la vérité ne s'attaquent pas uniquement au silence officiel; la vérité, lorsque adressée au pouvoir, contient une force correctrice. Dans une analyse critique de la *Commission Vérité et Réconciliation* en Afrique du Sud, Deborah Posel (2002) interroge toutefois

ce présupposé d'une relation de cause à effet entre la vérité sur l'histoire et la démocratisation du futur. Inscrits dans un impératif moral de redressement d'un passé profondément injuste et/ou honteux, souligne Posel, ces projets de reconstitution de la vérité ont en général pour objectif de mettre un terme au silence social, pour ainsi servir de barrage à ses effets pervers, tant individuels que collectifs. Or la réalité semble ici un peu plus complexe, et la force correctrice du «dire la vérité», un peu plus nuancée. La «vérité», comme le rappelle Jewsiewicki (2002), est un concept difficile à saisir et à manier, et est plus souvent négociée que tout simplement éclairée. Aussi, à elle seule, et même adressée au pouvoir, la «vérité» n'engage à rien. C'est plutôt à travers leur expression selon certains registres, reconnus dans le champ social et politique, que les voix individuelles et collectives s'approprient le pouvoir de mobiliser l'action d'autrui. De plus, comme en témoigne la dernière citation de Susana, l'énonciation même de ces expressions exige d'abord qu'ait déjà été amorcé un processus de démocratisation de l'espace public, c'est-à-dire qu'il existe déjà minimalement une possibilité pour ces voix d'être entendues. Or cela semble encore loin d'être le cas au Guatemala. Aussi, s'il faut saluer le travail de ces ONG en ce qui concerne l'ouverture d'espaces de parole et, dans certaines communautés, l'amorce de certains processus de démocratisation de l'espace public, il demeure qu'il ne faut pas en exagérer le succès, et continuer de travailler via d'autres voies à la lutte contre l'impunité qui sévit encore dans ce pays.

Entre une mémoire conciliatrice et une mémoire revendicatrice

Le travail de documentation du passé et d'ouverture d'espaces de parole de ces associations ne se limite pas, cependant, à une volonté de produire un sujet politique revendicateur de justice. Il semble également se greffer à une volonté de lutter contre le déni social en cherchant à «rendre présent» le passé violent.

> Le silence social est un phénomène important au Guatemala. Les gens ne parlent pas du passé parce qu'à l'école on n'en parle pas, au travail on n'en parle pas, dans les journaux on n'en parle pas. Ainsi, les gens finissent par dire «si personne n'en parle, peut-être que je me suis trompé. Ou peut-être qu'on n'en parle plus parce que c'est déjà une affaire qui a déjà été réglée». *– Elena, ECAP*

> [Nous voulons que les gens nous racontent] comment ils se sont enfuis, comment ils ont survécu (…) Pour que s'éclaire, s'éclaircisse, devienne présent le massacre. *– Lydia, HISTORIAL*

Pour lutter contre ce silence les acteurs associatifs que j'ai rencontrés mettent l'accent sur la diffusion de la mémoire historique, dans l'espace plus élargi que celui des communautés où ils opèrent. Ainsi, non seulement travaillent-ils à documenter le passé et à amener les survivants à témoigner, mais ils s'attellent aussi à transmettre et à propager ces mémoires dans l'ensemble de la société guatémaltèque, tant par le biais des radios communautaires que par celui des écoles.

> À travers les radios communautaires, nous pouvons transmettre tout ce qui a trait à l'histoire. (…) Cela facilite le travail d'ouverture d'esprit des gens, ou leur permet d'être informé sur ce qui s'est passé, parce que plusieurs ne savent pas lire, ni ne peuvent écrire. *– Lydia, HISTORIAL*

> Ou par le biais de l'école. Que ton fils revienne de l'école et qu'il te dise, «papa, figure-toi qu'ils m'ont raconté aujourd'hui qu'ici à Rabinal, ici dans ma communauté, il s'est passé ceci durant les années 80.» Et le père devra réagir. *– Elena, ECAP*

À travers ces efforts de médiatisation du passé, ces ONG semblent en fait chercher à «rendre présente» la mémoire historique du conflit pour ainsi favoriser l'émergence d'une «culture de la mémoire», qui trouve aussi son expression dans le cadre des rituels de commémoration. L'idée qui se cache derrière cette «mise en valeur» du passé semble d'abord être celle d'une intégration de ce dernier tant à la mémoire individuelle que collective. En effet, alors que pour l'ECAP on parle de vouloir faire le lien entre les problèmes actuels et les souffrances du passé, il semble s'agir pour le *Mémorial pour la paix* d'incorporer cette sombre période de l'histoire aux annales nationales :

> Ce que nous essayons de voir, ce sont les problèmes actuels. Qui ont généralement un lien avec le contexte social plus large. Comme par exemple les problèmes familiaux, la violence intrafamiliale. (…) Puis nous essayons d'une certaine manière de faire le lien entre ces problèmes et ce que les gens ont vécu par le passé. *– Elena, ECAP*

> [Dans le cadre d'une exposition réalisée à la capitale du Guatemala, le Mémorial a cherché à] exposer l'époque précolombienne, la colonisation, l'Indépendance, la République et le conflit armé comme parties prenantes de l'histoire. Parce qu'il y avait encore des gens (…) qui concevaient cette période non pas comme une partie essentielle de notre histoire, équivalente à la Conquête ou l'Indépendance, mais comme un accident ou une erreur. *– Marcos, HISTORIAL*

Cette lutte des associations contre le déni social, en favorisant l'émergence des mémoires des survivants dans l'espace public, pourrait être lue comme le désir de promouvoir le «devoir de mémoire» de la société guatémaltèque. Le concept de «devoir de mémoire», de plus en plus présent dans le jargon commun, provient de celui de «travail de mémoire» de Freud (Ricoeur 2000). Le point de départ de la réflexion de Freud, rapporte Ricœur, se trouve dans l'identification de l'obstacle principal que rencontre le travail d'interprétation sur la voie du rappel des souvenirs traumatiques. Cet obstacle, attribué aux résistances du refoulement, est désigné par Freud en termes de «compulsion à la répétition», et est caractérisé par une tendance au passage à l'acte que Freud dit «substituée» au souvenir. Le patient «ne reproduit pas [le fait oublié] sous forme de souvenir mais sous forme d'action : il le répète sans évidemment savoir qu'il le répète» (Freud 1913-17: 129, cité par Ricoeur 2000: 84). Pour mettre fin à cette compulsion, et favoriser le travail de remémoration, Freud suggère, poursuit Ricœur, qu'on demande au malade de ne plus regarder sa maladie comme quelque chose de méprisable mais comme une partie de lui-même dont la présence est bien motivée et où il conviendra de puiser des éléments positifs pour sa vie ultérieure.

Bien que ces propos de Freud se rapportent à la situation analytique clinique, il n'en reste pas moins, affirme Ricœur, qu'ils en sont venus à fortement influencer la manière dont on conçoit les processus de deuil et de réconciliation collectifs dans les pays sortant d'une guerre. Aussi, dans le cadre du travail d'ONG telles que celles que j'ai étudiées, la promotion du devoir de mémoire serait motivée par un désir de «jamais plus» et se traduirait comme une incitation adressée à la société à faire face au passé violent, à cesser de le repousser au loin comme un accident de parcours, mais à plutôt l'intégrer à la mémoire collective pour en assumer les conséquences et travailler à ce qu'il ne se reproduise plus.

Cette action de promotion de l'émergence de la mémoire des survivants au sein de l'espace public s'inscrirait donc dans un effort de légitimation des requêtes de justice et de réparations de ces derniers auprès du reste de la société guatémaltèque. Face au refus de l'État de reconnaître les conclusions de la CEH, ces ONG espèrent selon moi élargir, par divers moyens, le cercle de ceux qui connaissent et reconnaissent les atrocités commises, et à mobiliser ainsi l'appui social et politique nécessaire pour obliger le gouvernement à répondre aux demandes des survivants.

Selon Paul Ricœur (2000), le développement d'une telle culture de la mémoire comporterait toutefois certains dangers. Dire «tu te souviendras» peut en effet selon lui devenir «tu n'oublieras pas». Le désir de dignification, de justice et de réparation pourrait déboucher, poursuit-il, sur un phénomène d'idéologisation de la mémoire, sur une lecture de l'histoire ayant un parti pris, celui des victimes. Ce faisant, une telle mémoire historique finirait par occulter les zones plus grises de l'histoire (où les victimes sont parfois devenues des bourreaux), justifiant l'élaboration d'un statut de peuple victime à qui revient de droit la mise en œuvre de nouvelles violences. «Avoir été victime vous donne [alors] le droit de vous plaindre, de protester, et de réclamer» (Todorov 1995: 56, cité par Ricoeur 2000: 104). Une posture qui «engendre un privilège exorbitant, qui met le reste du monde en position de débiteur de créance» (Ricoeur 2000: 104). Une mémoire heureuse doit être une mémoire équitable, rappelle Ricoeur. Or dans quelle mesure les associations que j'ai rencontrées parviennent-elles à proposer une «mémoire équilibrée» du conflit armé civil guatémaltèque?

Toutes les associations que j'ai étudiées ont en fait d'abord cherché à intégrer les différentes mémoires du conflit et à en tenir compte dans leurs activités et leurs interventions. C'est à dire, à travailler à la fois avec les *victimas* et les *victimarios* – les victimes dites «pures» et les bourreaux–, reconnaissant le contexte d'assujettissement[12] au sein duquel ces «bourreaux» avaient commis leurs exactions. En mettant l'accent sur une souffrance partagée, l'équipe du CALDH, du *Mémorial pour la paix* et de l'ECAP ont ainsi chacune tenté de promouvoir une lecture du conflit qui permettrait de mettre en commun et de réconcilier des vécus hétérogènes et contradictoires des évènements violents.

> Avant, nous nous présentions dans les communautés et nous leur précisions que c'était un projet qui traitait du recouvrement de la mémoire du conflit, et que tous devaient y participer. – *Marcos, HISTORIAL*

Toutefois, le contexte actuel permet de moins en moins, affirment ces associations, de maintenir une telle approche. L'annonce, en novembre 2002, de l'indemnisation des PAC par le président guatémaltèque est venue profondément bouleverser les avancées et les stratégies de ces ONG. Surtout dans un contexte où ce dernier avait jusqu'alors pratiquement ignoré le *Programme national de dédommagement* présenté par la *Coalition des organisations pour le dédommagement des peuples maya*[13], une coalition regroupant les trois ONG étudiées et d'autres acteurs associatifs. En proclamant qu'il allait verser aux PAC le salaire qui leur était dû pour «services rendus à l'Etat», le gouvernement a, selon ces ONG, rouvert la voie à la légitimation des politiques de terreur déployées par ses prédécesseurs, et ainsi relancé la pola-

risation du pays – avec d'un côté les «victimes», comprenant surtout des Mayas, appuyées par le secteur associatif (où œuvrent nombre d'ex-guérilleros), et de l'autre l'oligarchie, soutenue par les militaires et le gouvernement.

> Ce problème des ex-PAC complique vraiment tout projet de réconciliation. Juste au moment où les gens se sentaient à nouveau à l'aise au sein de leurs communautés, on a soudainement plein de monde qui s'inscrivent sur les listes d'ex-PAC, créant cette division à nouveau. – *Susana, CALDH*

Le travail de lobby déployé par les ex-PAC, de même que la création de listes où doivent s'inscrire ces derniers s'ils veulent recevoir leurs indemnisations, a tôt fait de raviver le souvenir des méfaits commis par cette branche de l'armée et ainsi redivisé des communautés qui commençaient à peine à se rapprocher. Face à cette recrudescence de l'animosité, l'ECAP, le *Mémorial pour la paix* et le CALDH ont d'abord tenté de décourager les ex-PAC de réclamer leur dû et de plutôt militer pour le *Programme national de dédommagement,* ce dernier se rapportant à l'ensemble des victimes et non pas à une seule de ses factions. Mais à quel point peut-on ainsi compter sur la bonne volonté des ex-PAC, demandent les acteurs associatifs, alors que ces derniers vivent une situation d'extrême précarité, tout en faisant face à un gouvernement peu désireux apparemment de prendre en compte les besoins, les demandes et les revendications de leurs communautés? Car, comme le souligne Susana :

> [Bien que] plusieurs victimes soient demeurées en dehors [de ces listes], (...) un bon nombre d'entre elles connaissent une situation financière si désespérée qu'elles s'incorporeraient à n'importe quel projet si elles pensaient pouvoir en retirer des sous.
> – *Susana, CALDH*

En proposant de récompenser les bourreaux, le gouvernement guatémaltèque va à l'encontre du travail de légitimation des mémoires des survivants que tentent de mettre en œuvre l'ECAP et les autres associations étudiées.

> Au lieu de suivre les recommandations de la Commission pour l'éclaircissement historique, qui établissent bien clairement la nécessité d'honorer les victimes, (...) le gouvernement récompense les bourreaux. Au niveau communautaire, cela a un impact terrible. Les victimes ont cheminé à petits pas pour être reconnues socialement et rendre leur histoire valide. (...) Et l'Etat leur dit : «Non. C'est le bourreau le héros national et maintenant on va le payer pour ça». Alors ça, ça veut dire pour nous à nouveau se moquer des victimes et amener leurs communautés à se dire : «S'ils vont récompenser les bourreaux, peut-être que cela veut dire que ces derniers avaient raison de commettre les massacres». Chaque fois fermer, et de manière croissante, l'espace des victimes, ou du moins dévaloriser cet espace...
> – *Elena, ECAP*

Les communautés étant divisées à nouveau, les acteurs associatifs estiment qu'il faut abandonner l'idéal d'une action regroupant les deux camps, celui des victimes et celui des bourreaux. Et le gouvernement «fermant l'espace des victimes» pour plutôt se ranger du côté des bourreaux, ces acteurs sentent qu'il est par conséquent de leur devoir de prendre le parti des victimes.

> Nous n'allons probablement plus être en mesure de travailler avec les ex-PAC, mais seulement avec les victimes. (...) Du moins pour les prochaines années. Jusqu'à ce que la situation se détende à nouveau. Parce qu'il serait impossible de réunir victimes et bourreaux au sein d'un même espace pour qu'ils se racontent mutuellement leur expérience du conflit armé, alors que les bourreaux reçoivent de l'argent pour avoir commis les crimes. – *Marcos, HISTORIAL*

Ce qui n'empêche pas ces ONG de déplorer la situation. Elles reconnaissent en effet le danger d'un renforcement de la polarisation qu'a réamorcée la promesse d'indemnisation des ex-PAC. En ne travaillant qu'avec les victimes, elles craignent de reléguer à un futur encore plus incertain le projet d'une réconciliation intra et intercommunale.

> La relation *victimas-victimarios*...Moi je pense qu'il faut réfléchir beaucoup plus à ça. Ca ne veut pas dire que je travaille juste avec les victimes et qu'avec les autres, je ne travaille pas. Parce que sinon on continue à faire les même divisions. Qui existent depuis longtemps. Alors, il faut savoir aussi comment travailler, disons les *victimarios* avec les *victimas*.
> – *Mercedes, ECAP*

Il faut toutefois souligner combien ce réalignement du côté des victimes ne semble pas uniquement provenir d'un sentiment de compassion pour ces dernières. Il traduirait également une identification des acteurs associatifs à ces personnes, ces acteurs souffrant eux-mêmes du processus de militarisation de nouveau à l'œuvre dans le pays.

> Nous avons constamment peur. Depuis deux ans nous avons observé une augmentation des menaces portées

> contre notre organisation, et les autres. (…) Le problème de l'ECAP et de ces autres organisations est celui-ci : quand est-ce que c'est sur moi que ça va tomber? Et chaque évènement de la sorte qui surgit au Guatemala est comme un coup, parce qu'il réactive la peur, une peur que tu ressens constamment.
>
> *– Elena, ECAP*

Ainsi, tout autant que leur sentiment de devoir face à ceux que le gouvernement ignore, l'extrême vulnérabilité dans laquelle les plonge la recrudescence des actes d'intimidation perpétrés contre eux et leurs pairs (actes parfois justement commis par des ex-PAC) oblige ces associations à mettre de côté l'idéal d'une mémoire équitable, voire à abandonner le registre de la conciliation pour plutôt se réinscrire dans celui d'une lutte au nom des opprimés.

Responsabilités différenciées : choisir entre la justice symbolique et la justice locale

Bien que les obstacles à la construction d'une «mémoire équitable» au Guatemala semblent découler en grande partie d'un contexte encore très répressif, ils paraissent également liés à la dimension limite de l'expérience de la violence politique et au non-sens moral qu'elle suppose. Faisant référence au génocide juif, Agamben (1999) affirme que, grâce à une série de recherches toujours plus amples et rigoureuses, la question des circonstances historiques dans lesquelles fut mise en œuvre l'extermination des juifs est suffisamment éclaircie. Or on ne peut en dire autant poursuit-il, de la signification éthique et politique de l'extermination, ni même de la compréhension humaine de l'événement.

> Non seulement il nous manque ici quelque chose comme une tentative de compréhension globale, mais même le sens, les raisons du comportement des bourreaux, des victimes, et souvent jusqu'à leurs propos apparaissent comme une énigme insondable, confortant dans leur opinion ceux qui voudraient qu'Auschwitz demeure à jamais incompréhensible. (…) L'aporie d'Auschwitz est l'aporie même de la connaissance historique : la non coïncidence des faits et de la vérité, du constat et de la compréhension. (Agamben 1999: 9-11)

Les difficultés que pose la question de la mémoire et de sa représentation ne procèdent en effet pas uniquement de la quasi-impossibilité de concilier différentes expériences du passé. Elles proviennent également, rappellent Das et Kleinman (2001), du fait de ne pouvoir produire une lecture moralement et politiquement neutre de ces évènements. Toute reconstruction historique d'épisodes de violence politique entraîne leurs auteurs à devoir se prononcer sur la responsabilité pour les crimes commis – comme le démontre d'ailleurs Charles Hale dans un article où il compare différentes interprétations anthropologiques du conflit armé au Guatemala (1997). Or cette responsabilité n'est pas sans provoquer de débat[14], tant au Guatemala (Sanford 2003), que dans d'autres régions du monde, telle l'Afrique du Sud, aussi en plein processus de réconciliation nationale (Jewsiewicki 2002). En dehors de ceux qui prônent l'amnistie, et donc l'effacement de toute responsabilité, il y a d'un côté ceux qui voudraient que *tous* ceux ayant participé aux atrocités soient reconnus coupables, qu'ils y aient contribué de force ou non, et de l'autre ceux qui préfèreraient que *seuls* les auteurs intellectuels de ces crimes le soient, reconnaissant la «zone grise» de la culpabilité criminelle qu'induit de tels contextes liminaux.

Il est important de souligner que le débat qui porte autour de la question de la responsabilité dépasse le cadre purement juridique de cette dernière pour plutôt toucher sa dimension morale, deux modes d'«être responsable» qu'il est essentiel de distinguer. Comme le rapporte Agamben (1999), «être responsable de», c'est se porter garant de quelque chose devant un autre. «Se porter responsable de» est donc un geste foncièrement juridique, et non éthique. L'éthique, la politique, la religion, poursuit Agamben, ont cherché à se définir en dépassant cette responsabilité juridique, et ce, moins en explorant une responsabilité d'un autre genre qu'en explorant des zones de non responsabilité. Ce qui ne veut pas dire impunité, mais une responsabilité infiniment plus grande que celle que nous ne serons jamais capables d'assumer. Une responsabilité à laquelle on peut au mieux être fidèle, c'est-à-dire revendiquer ce qu'il y a en elle de proprement inassumable.

Or plusieurs travaux portant sur la Shoah et autres génocides de ce siècle soulignent l'effondrement d'une telle conception morale de la responsabilité dans le cadre d'atrocités de masse. Selon Agamben, la découverte qu'a faite Primo Levi à Auschwitz, c'est celle qui concerne un matériau réfractaire à tout établissement d'une responsabilité, «la zone grise».

> En elle se déroule la «longue chaîne qui lie la victime aux bourreaux», l'opprimé y devient oppresseur, le bourreau y apparaît à son tour comme une victime. Alchimie incessante et grise, où le bien, le mal et avec eux tous les métaux de l'éthique traditionnelle atteignent leur point de fusion. Il s'agit donc d'une zone d'irresponsabilité, (…) d'où nul *mea culpa* ne nous fera sortir, et où, de minute en minute, se grave la leçon de la «terrible, l'indicible, l'impensable *banalité du mal*» (Agamben 1999: 22, citant Arendt 1966 – italiques et guillemets tels que dans l'original).

Le sujet, continue Agamben, est un champ de forces toujours traversé par les courants historiquement déterminés de la puissance et de l'impuissance d'être ou de ne pas être. L'être humain est en effet le sas par lequel passent sans cesse les courants de la subjectivation et de la désubjectivation. Auschwitz constitue, dans cette perspective, la négation la plus radicale de la «puissance d'être» ou «de ne pas être», donc l'impuissance la plus absolue. Aussi, conclut l'auteur, Auschwitz signe-t-il l'arrêt de mort de toute adéquation à une norme. La «vie nue»[15], à quoi l'être humain se trouve ici réduit, n'exige rien, ne se conforme à rien. Elle est soi-même l'unique norme, est absolument immanente.

Cela nous condamne-il à une impossibilité de justice? Dans l'absolu de l'éthique, oui. La justice morale exige que l'auteur d'actes criminels «prenne sur lui» (Ricoeur 2000) la faute commise. Or celui qu'on a dépourvu de sa puissance d'être et d'agir ne peut prendre sur lui une faute. Toutefois, cette impossibilité morale n'empêche pas la possibilité juridique de juger des coupables. La justice a pour seul but le jugement, indépendamment de la vérité et de la justice : la production d'une sentence, aussi fausse et injuste soit-elle, telle est la fin dernière du droit (Agamben 1999). Aussi, Agamben et Ricœur n'affirment-ils pas qu'un jugement ne puisse ou ne doive être prononcé. Ils nous rappellent seulement qu'il est crucial que les deux choses ne soient pas confondues, que le droit ne prétende pas régler la question, qu'il y a une consistance non juridique de la vérité et de l'éthique.

Par conséquent, si l'historien et le philosophe doivent tenir compte et analyser la «banalité du mal» dont témoigne Auschwitz ou le S21 des Khmers rouges, le sociologue, le politicologue et l'anthropologue doivent de leur côté penser par quels moyens une société de l'après-guerre peut reconstituer la communauté morale, refonder les bases du vivre-ensemble. Avoir recours à la justice, si fausse et injuste puisse-t-elle être ? Et dans ce cas, à quel type de justice? Une justice «symbolique», ou une justice «locale»? Tel semble en fait être le dilemme qui se pose pour les acteurs associatifs que j'ai rencontrés.

La justice symbolique est avant tout revendiquée au nom de la «réconciliation nationale». Il vaut mieux, affirment ceux qui défendent cette position, promouvoir une «culture de la paix» et concentrer les poursuites juridiques sur le haut commandement de l'armée. Bien qu'ils soient mal à l'aise par rapport au fait de laisser impunis des tortionnaires qui continuent aujourd'hui d'abuser de leur pouvoir, ils semblent préférer maintenir cette position afin d'éviter de réactiver les clivages sociaux qu'a jusqu'alors nourris l'armée dans le but de diviser, pour mieux la contrôler, la population.

> Q : Et est-ce que tu penses que ce serait nécessaire de poursuivre chaque *victimario*?
>
> R : Non, je pense que non. (...) Ça ferait (...) plus de catégorisations sociales entre victimes et bourreaux. Il faut comprendre aussi qu'il y a beaucoup (...) de *victimarios* qui ont fait tout ça [participer aux exactions] parce que le contexte était comme ça. Il faut donc travailler dans un autre sens. Pour une culture de la paix, pour une résolution de conflits d'une façon différente, avec un [renforcement] du système judiciaire.
>
> *– Mercedes, ECAP*

Ces acteurs se consolent de cette solution judiciaire, bien qu'imparfaite, en espérant qu'une «sentence paradigmatique», en envoyant un message de «jamais plus», pourra satisfaire la soif de justice des victimes tout en rétablissant les bases de la communauté morale.

> S'en prendre au haut commandement envoie aussi le message aux dirigeants de l'Etat. Ça leur dit que de tels actes ne sont pas acceptables au Guatemala, et que quiconque les commettra sera puni. De manière à ce que ça n'arrive plus. *– Susana, CALDH*

Toutefois, ces mêmes acteurs que j'ai interrogés reconnaissent en même temps les limites de la justice symbolique. Tout en défendant cette dernière, ils affirment que celle-ci «laisse des trous», et que «la réconciliation doit venir de la base». Se rapportant à des exemples où des tortionnaires locaux ont été reconnus coupables puis incarcérés pour des crimes commis durant le conflit, ils soulignent l'importance de s'attaquer aux structures de répression qui perdurent au sein de ces communautés.

> Nous avons pris en charge la poursuite juridique pour le massacre de Río Negro à Rabinal. Ce cas se rapportait au meurtre perpétré, par un PAC, du père de la voisine de ce dernier. Et les effets de l'incarcération [qui s'en est suivie] ont été particulièrement positifs. Depuis lors, les gens de la communauté ne sont plus ni intimidés, ni persécutés. Il y eu une sorte de relâchement des tensions au niveau des relations interpersonnelles dans la communauté. Tant et si bien que ce type d'expérience t'encourage.
>
> *– Orlando, CALDH*

Pour les différents intervenants que j'ai rencontrés, le dilemme entre une justice symbolique et une justice locale demeure insoluble. C'est plutôt en approchant les villages un par un qu'ils abordent la question du rétablissement de la communauté morale.

Un tel dilemme renvoie plus largement à quelques-unes des tensions que soulèvent la reconstitution du passé

et la question de la justice dans des pays ayant connu pareille violence. Le passé devient extraordinairement politique dans des situations d'après guerre, chacun des protagonistes sachant combien celui qui «contrôle» ce dernier contrôle aussi, d'une certaine manière, l'avenir. De la lutte armée, on passe à une lutte discursive, où différentes lectures des évènements violents se rencontrent, s'appuient ou s'affrontent. Inscrites dans des programmes politiques particuliers et contradictoires, comme celui de «punir l'ensemble des tortionnaires locaux» versus celui de «ne punir que les hauts responsables», ces lectures impliquent de nombreux processus de négociation où diverses expériences du conflit, différentes situations de co-habitation avec les tortionnaires locaux et divers univers moraux entrent en tension. Les choix des ONG étudiées semblent ainsi relever de conceptions particulières de ce qui est juste. Par exemple, bien qu'elles reconnaissent le danger de renforcer la polarisation de la société en ne prenant que le parti des victimes dites «pures», elles sentent en même temps qu'il est de leur devoir de soutenir ceux que le gouvernement ignore.

Ce qui m'amène dès lors à m'interroger sur l'idéal de la réconciliation que semblent prôner un nombre croissant d'institutions locales et internationales dans des pays ayant connu une telle violence. Alors que la construction d'une mémoire équitable et que la poursuite d'une justice symbolique sembleraient, aux dires de ces organisations, favoriser la réconciliation nationale, il apparaît bien qu'au niveau local la situation soit plus complexe. Il est certes parfois possible pour les organisations étudiées de convaincre les victimes de ne pas poursuivre les bourreaux du bas de l'échelle militaire. D'arriver à concilier les vécus hétérogènes et contradictoires du conflit par le biais de lectures «objectives» du passé, qui montrent bien comment tous furent au bout du compte victimes du gouvernement et de l'armée. Toutefois, certains contextes semblent empêcher ce type de normalisation des relations de se produire. Lorsque sont à nouveau réactivées les divisions manichéennes de la société, avec d'un côté ceux que l'Etat et l'armée protègent, et de l'autre, la population autochtone et un bon nombre d'ONG locales et internationales qui lui sont associées, il apparaît en effet improbable de maintenir la distance nécessaire à cette objectivation du passé, celui-ci ressurgissant à nouveau dans le moment présent, tel un refoulé que la société n'a pas encore assumé.

Ce constat va d'ailleurs dans le sens de bon nombre d'études réalisées sur la question de la justice en situation post-conflit. Par exemple, à partir de son étude du processus de paix en Afrique du Sud, Richard Wilson (2000) avance que c'est à travers le prisme local du politique que les notions de la vérité et de la justice doivent être comprises et mises en œuvre. La réconciliation au niveau local a en effet peu à voir, affirme-t-il, avec la poignée de mains qui suivait l'aveu du tortionnaire devant la *Commission Vérité et Réconciliation* de ce pays. La revitalisation de la communauté morale exige plutôt, poursuit cet auteur, le jugement des parias, c'est-à-dire dans ce cas des Noirs ayant trahi les leurs durant les longues années de l'apartheid. Plutôt que de provoquer une repolarisation de la société, ce traitement des traîtres pourrait au contraire favoriser, pense Wilson, leur réintégration au reste de la communauté, en exigeant d'eux le paiement de leur dette, aussi impayable puisse-t-elle être.

Conclusion

En cherchant chacune à leur manière à reconstituer la vérité, à favoriser l'émergence de la prise de parole politique, et à promouvoir le devoir de mémoire et l'exercice de la justice, les trois associations étudiées participent à la construction de nouveaux espaces de discours et d'action proposant différentes conceptions concernant les pré-requis nécessaires à la reconstitution du tissu social au Guatemala. Grâce à ces registres, il devient possible pour les survivants d'explorer d'autres manières de donner sens à l'expérience du conflit armé, d'envisager de nouvelles façons d'y répondre, et ce, tout en retrouvant une certaine foi dans le processus judiciaire et politique de leurs communautés et de leur nation. Après des années de mensonges, d'injustice, de froide indifférence ou de violente répression, de tels espaces constituent une contribution considérable des associations étudiées.

J'ai toutefois montré dans cette analyse combien cette diversité d'approches en ce qui concerne les mesures à prendre pour la reconstruction des bases du vivre-ensemble était considérablement circonscrite en raison d'un contexte fortement polarisé. La réactivation des divisions manichéennes de la société a récemment poussé les acteurs associatifs à rigidifier leurs positions et à radicaliser leurs interventions. Ce faisant, l'établissement de la vérité, la prise de parole politique, la culture de la mémoire et l'exercice de la justice en sont venues à s'imposer comme des mesures *absolument nécessaires* à la reconstitution du tissu social des communautés. Sans nier le bien-fondé d'une telle croyance, mon analyse a cependant montré combien ce raidissement des représentations et de l'action tendait à obscurcir la complexité de la réalité dans laquelle se trouvent placées les communautés, et même à lui faire violence quelquefois. En inscrivant leurs pratiques dans ce qui leur semble «être moralement juste», ces associations tendent à adopter un point de vue normatif qui ignore les limites du pouvoir «cor-

recteur» de la vérité et de la mémoire publique. Or, la mise en mots de l'expérience du passé à travers le registre de la revendication, de même que la propagation des mémoires dans l'espace public ne sont pas *nécessairement* réparatrices : cette réparation passe également par des *processus propres* aux communautés, des processus qu'une vision normative de la reconstitution du vivre-ensemble semblerait négliger.

Certes, j'ai aussi montré combien le fait que ces associations se sentent elles-mêmes victimes de la répression d'agents de l'État contribue sans aucun doute à ce durcissement de leurs positions et à ce rétrécissement de leur champ de vision. Contraintes de sortir du registre de la conciliation pour plutôt reprendre celui de la revendication, ces organisations sont ainsi amenées à délaisser des modalités d'approches et de prise en charge plus sensibles à l'hétérogénéité de l'expérience du conflit des survivants et à la multiplicité de réponses à laquelle celle-ci renvoie. Le poids des discours dominants dans le domaine de la réconciliation, et les limites imposées par les programmes de financement qui leur sont associés, jouent sans doute aussi un rôle dans la manière dont les ONG construisent leurs approches et leurs actions. Je ne l'ai que très peu étudié dans le cadre de cet article, mais il s'agit d'un point important sur lequel il faudrait éventuellement revenir.

Il serait également important d'examiner de plus près le rapport qui se joue entre les modalités d'intervention des ONG et les manières propres aux survivants de se représenter, et de vivre, les processus rattachés à la gestion du passé et la redéfinition des bases du vivre-ensemble. Les interprétations et les actions que mettent en œuvre les ONG étudiées participent, je crois, à l'élaboration d'une mémoire officielle du conflit armé. Or de nombreux travaux d'anthropologues et d'historiens ont noté le fossé qui se creuse entre ces lectures officielles et les mémoires individuelles des survivants (Chartier 2002; Pandolfo 1997; Seremetakis 1994). Bien qu'il soit peut-être possible au niveau symbolique et collectif de prendre suffisamment de distance par rapport au passé pour en arriver à une lecture «objective» de ce dernier, il n'en reste pas moins que demeure bien souvent, au niveau local et personnel, un «reste inassumable» (Agamben 1999), propre aux situations ayant dépassé tous les cadres moraux possibles et imaginables.

Ce faisant, il faudrait aussi s'interroger sur le peu de place que semblent attribuer les ONG étudiées au silence des survivants du conflit armé. Comme le soulignent Wilson (1997c) et Foxen (2002), la lecture des faits et l'identité de victime que mettent en avant ces associations ne parviennent pas toujours à éliminer la confusion et le sentiment de culpabilité que les survivants peuvent ressentir par rapport à leur expérience du passé. Pour ces personnes, l'oubli est parfois le seul remède, la seule manière pour elles de faire la paix avec elles-mêmes et se réengager dans le monde. Pour faire face à cet intolérable passé, suggèrent en outre Rousseau, de la Aldea et leurs collègues, les survivants préfèrent d'ailleurs parfois l'oubli au rappel afin de pouvoir se concentrer sur leur survie dans un présent à nouveau de plus en plus violent (Rousseau, de la Aldea, Rojas et Foxen 2005). Les travaux de Mehta et Chatterji (2001) vont dans le même sens, et interrogent eux aussi cette tendance des associations à ne miser que sur la verbalisation du passé pour la «normalisation» des relations familiales et communautaires :

> Le quotidien [de ces communautés] est non seulement marqué par un nouveau savoir, et une nouvelle mémoire, de la perte. Il est aussi marqué par une sagesse pragmatique quant à la manière de gérer cette perte. Cette sagesse stipule que la réparation ne peut prendre la forme de la justice, et que la co-existence n'est possible que si le passé est délibérément mis de côté (Mehta and Chatterji 2001: 238)

Sans toutefois prôner la généralisation de cet «oubli» et l'abandon du discours revendicatif de justice que mettent en œuvre ces ONG, il convient toutefois de s'interroger si ces dernières ne tendent pas à exagérer le bienfait de cette «culture de la mémoire» qu'elles mettent en avant, et à ainsi faire violence aux stratégies propres aux survivants de construire et gérer cette mémoire.

La reconstruction du tissu social de pays qui, comme le Guatemala, ont connu un conflit d'une envergure magistrale, est semée d'embûches. Et les associations telles que celles que j'ai étudiées jouent un rôle essentiel quant à la façon dont les communautés affectées donnent sens à l'expérience de la violence politique et se réengagent dans la vie quotidienne. Certes, le rôle que jouent les ONG que j'ai étudiées au niveau de la construction des langages est essentiel. Grâce à ces derniers, il devient possible pour les survivants de verbaliser un passé dont ils se sentent coupables, et même d'interpréter celui-ci de manière à le transformer en une série d'injustices en vertu desquelles ils sont en droit de réclamer justice et réparations. Toutefois, il serait tout aussi primordial que ces associations, et plus généralement leurs homologues oeuvrant dans des pays en processus de paix, reconnaissent les limites de ces registres, tant en raison du maintien des structures répressives dans les communautés, qu'eu égard au «reste inassumable» que portent leurs habitants.

Karine Vanthuyne, Doctorante, Centre de recherche sur la santé, le social et le politique (CRESP), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS). Courriel : karine.vanthuyne @mail.mcgill.ca

Notes

1 Les PAC obligèrent tous les hommes du village âgés de plus de quinze ans à surveiller et à dénoncer leurs voisins, de même qu'à participer parfois à des actes d'intimidation ou de violence massive. Comme je l'expliquerai dans la section *36 années de guerre civile au Guatemala*, celles-ci constituent un des corps militaires ayant le plus profondément divisé la population rurale.

2 Les citations proviennent de témoignages que l'auteure a recueilli sur le terrain en 1996 lors d'un séjour de 6 mois au Guatemala comme Accompagnatrice internationale auprès de réfugiés guatémaltèques de retour au pays après 15 ans d'exil.

3 La communauté qualifia ainsi la remise des armes.

4 Dans le cadre de cette étude, j'ai d'abord mené des entretiens auprès des intervenants de ces organisations afin de les inviter à me parler des origines, du fonctionnement et de leur rôle au sein de celles-ci. Je voulais relever les dilemmes auxquels étaient confrontés ces acteurs, eu égard aux tensions qui opposent leurs modes d'intervention à la complexité des situations dans lesquelles se trouvent les communautés autochtones. Une analyse critique de documents de ces associations fut ensuite réalisée pour identifier les registres selon lesquels celles-ci abordent et traitent les questions de la violence, de la mémoire, de la vérité et de la justice. Puis, par le biais d'une recherche bibliographique, j'ai enfin cherché à déceler comment les choix de registres de ces ONG s'inscrivent dans un champ de politiques nationales et internationales d'aide aux victimes de violence politique.

5 La commission et le CALDH font pression sur le gouvernement pour en arriver à un accord à l'amiable. Lorsque cette procédure achoppe, la commission envoie alors les cas devant la Cour Inter-Américaine des droits de l'homme (San José, Costa Rica), qui peut ordonner au Guatemala de reprendre l'affaire en mains ou de veiller à l'indemnisation des plaignants.

6 Par mesure de sécurité, étant donné le contexte de persécution dont sont victimes ces ONG et leurs employés, j'ai préféré préserver l'anonymat des personnes que j'ai interviewées en remplaçant leurs noms par des pseudonymes.

7 L'Église catholique fut officiellement du côté du gouvernement militaire durant le conflit armé, et ce jusqu'en 1982. C'est au moment où le nouvel archevêque, Monseigneur Gerardi, prit la tête de l'Église que celle-ci changea radicalement de camp, pour plutôt se ranger du côté du peuple. Devenant alors elle-même victime de la répression sanglante, l'Église créa le *Bureau des droits de l'homme de l'Archevêché du Guatemala* (ODHA). Il convient toutefois de noter que, même avant 1982, existait déjà au sein de celle-ci un nombre croissant d'acteurs s'étant ralliés au mouvement de la théologie de la libération.

8 Contrairement à la guérilla, qui offrit publiquement ses excuses pour les exactions commises contre la population civile durant le conflit, l'armée, responsable de plus de 93 % des actes de violence perpétrés durant la guerre n'a jamais publiquement reconnu ses torts.

9 Au Guatemala, le taux d'analphabétisme chez les personnes âgées de plus de 15 ans s'élève à 23,9 % pour les hommes et 38,8 % pour les femmes, selon les statistiques de 2002 de l'ONU. Toutefois, ce taux est nettement plus élevé au sein de la population autochtone selon des chiffres provenant des *Statistiques nationales sur le revenu et les dépenses familiales* (ENIGFAM) de 1998-99. Le taux d'analphabétisme chez l'ensemble des femmes autochtones varie entre 50 % et 90 % selon les départements, et ce sont dans les départements à plus forte concentration autochtone qu'on trouve les taux d'analphabétisme les plus élevés du pays.

10 Toutes les citations ont été traduites par l'auteure de l'espagnol au français, à l'exception des citations de Susana, qui ont été traduites de l'anglais au français, et de celles de Mercedes, qui n'ont pas été traduites, l'entrevue ayant été conduite en français.

11 Cette littérature se base généralement sur le *Diagnostical Statistic Manual* (DSM), un outil diagnostique sur lequel s'appuient la majorité des praticiens d'Amérique du Nord et du Sud, ainsi qu'un nombre croissant de praticiens ailleurs dans le monde.

12 Par exemple, l'enrôlement forcé dans les PAC, qui créa une situation où des victimes devinrent subséquemment des bourreaux (Green 1999; Zur 1998).

13 Ce programme de réparation a été réalisé au nom de l'ensemble des victimes du conflit armé. Déposé il y a quelques années devant le Congrès du Guatemala, ce n'est que depuis le tollé (national et international) soulevé par la promesse d'indemnisation des PAC qu'il a donné lieu, le 16 juillet 2003, à la mise sur pied d'une commission gouvernementale chargée d'administrer ce programme.

14 Ce débat n'est pas d'ailleurs sans faire écho, rappellent Das et Kleinman (2001), à une polémique propre aux sciences sociales, où on s'interroge s'il faut donner priorité aux structures ou à l'action des agents dans la création, le maintien, l'entretien ou la remise en cause de ces structures.

15 Giorgio Agamben (1997) suggère de rendre compte du gouvernement de la vie à partir de l'opposition de deux termes grecs qui signifient le mot «vie» : la *zoé*, la vie biologique, qu'il appelle la «vie nue», et la *bios*, la vie en société, qu'il nomme aussi la «vie politique».

Références

Agamben, G.
1997 Homo Sacer 1. Le pouvoir souverain et la vie nue. Paris : Seuil.
1999 Ce qui reste d'Auschwitz. Paris : Payot & Rivages.

Armon, J., Rachel Sieder et Richard Wilson, dirs.
1997 Guatemala 1983-1997 : ¿Hacia dónde va la transición? Guatemala : Conciliation Resources et FLACSO-Guatemala.

CEH
1999 Guatemala : Memoria del Silencio. Guatemala : Comision para el Esclarecimiento Historico.

Chartier, R.
2002 Le passé au présent. Le débat 122 : 4-11.

Das, Veena, et A. Kleinman
2001 Introduction. *Dans* Remaking a world : Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery. Veena Das, A. Kleinman, M. Lock, M. Ramphele et P. Reynolds, dirs. Pp. 1-30. Berkeley : University of California Press.

Fassin, D., R. Rechtman, E. D'Halluin et S. Latte
2002 Traumatisme, victimologie et psychiatrie humanitaire. Paris : Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales et PRI Médecine, santé et sciences sociales.

Foucault, M.
2001 Fearless Speech. Los Angeles : Semiotext(e).

Foxen, Patricia
2002 K'iche' Maya in a Re-Imagined World : Transnational Perspectives on Identity. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, McGill University.

Green, L.
1999 Fear As a Way of Life. New York : Columbia University Press.

Hale, C. R.
1997 Consciousness, Violence, and the Politics of Memory in Guatemala. Current Anthropology 38(5) : 817-838.

Jewsiewicki, B.
2002 De la vérité de mémoire à la réconciliation. Comment travaille le souvenir? Le débat 122 : 63-77.

Lovell, G.
1995 A Beauty That Hurts : Life and Death in Guatemala. Toronto : Between the Lines.

Mehta, D., et R. Chatterji
2001 Boundaries, Names, Alterities : A Case Study of a "Communal Riot" in Dharavi, Bombay. *Dans* Remaking a World. Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery. Veena Das, A. Kleinman, M. Lock, M. Ramphele et P. Reynolds, dirs. Pp. 201-249. Berkeley : University of California Press.

Molkentin, G.
2001 Los difíciles senderos de la paz en Guatemala : resultados de un estudio empírico con énfasis local. Guatemala : FLACSO-Guatemala / Ministerio Federal de Cooperación Económica y Desarollo de Alemania.

ODHA
1998 Guatemala nunca mas. Guatemala : Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHAG).
2002 Informe Anual Sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en Guatemala. Guatemala, Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHAG).

Pandolfo, S.
1997 Impasse of the Angels : Scenes from a Moroccan Space of Memory. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.

Posel, D.
2002 The TRC Report : What Kind of History? What Kind of Truth? *Dans* Commissioning the Past : Understanding South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. D. Posel and G. Simpson, dirs. Pp. 147-172. Johannesburg : Witswatersrand University Press.

Ricoeur, P.
2000 La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli. Paris : Éditions du Seuil.

Rousseau, C., E. de la Aldea, M.V. Rojas et P Foxen.
2005 After the NGO's departure : Changing Memory Strategies of Young Mayan Refugees Who Returned to Guatemala as a Community. Anthropology & Medicine 12(1) : 1-19.

Rousseau, C., M. Morales et P. Foxen
2001 Going Home : Giving Voice to Memory Strategies of Young Mayan Refugees Who Returned to Guatemala as a Community. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 25(2) : 135-168.

Sanford, V.
2003 Buried Secrets : Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala. New York : Palgrave Macmillan.

Seremetakis, N.
1994 The Senses Still : Perceptions and Memory as Material Culture in Modernity. Boulder : Westview Press.

Vanthuyne, K.
2004 Guatemala. Des ONG œuvrant pour la «paix». Journal de la Société des Américanistes 90(1) : 241-258.

Weine, S.M., A.D. Kulevonic, Ivan Pavkovic et Robert Gibbons
1998 Testimony Psychotherapy in Bosnian Refugees : A Pilot Study. American Journal of Psychiatry 155(12) : 1720-1726.

Wilson, R.A.
1997a Comments : Consciousness, Violence, and the Politics of Memory in Guatemala. Current Anthropology 38(5) : 832-835.
1997b Verdades Violentas : Las políticas de recordar el pasado en Guatemala. *Dans* Guatemala 1983-1997. ¿Hacia dónde va la transición? J. Armon, R. Sieder, R.A. Wilson, G. Palma Murga et T. Palencia, dirs. Pp. 49-70. Guatemala : Conciliation Resources et FLACSO-Guatemala.
2000 Reconciliation and Revenge in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Current Anthropology41(1) : 75-98.

Zur, J.
1994 The Psychological Impact of Impunity. Anthropology Today 10(3) : 12-17.
1998 Violent Memories : Mayan War Widows in Guatemala. Boulder : Westview Press.

Factional Terror, Paramilitarism and Civil War in Haiti: The View from Port-au-Prince, 1994-2004

J. Christopher Kovats-Bernat *Muhlenberg College*

Abstract: Twelve years after a United Nations invasion of the country, civil violence in Haiti has escalated to unprecedented proportions as local politics have again devolved into a street fight over vacuums of power left by failed constitutional processes. The instability of the government and the ongoing violent aftermath of a rebel uprising that began in February 2004 has transformed the capital of Port-au-Prince into a war zone, where civilians caught in the crossfire are modifying their social relations to the state and to one another in the interest of individual and community survival. This paper constructs a theoretical model for studying the current civil war in Haiti and calls for a deep ethnographic exploration of the violence, one that draws on a comprehensive political history, social analysis and cultural contextualization in assessing changing relations between the state and the civil society since the end of the Cedras coup d'etat in 1994.

Keywords: Haiti, violence, terror, police, ethnography, theory

Résumé : Douze ans après l'invasion du pays par les Nations-Unies, la violence civile à Haïti a atteint des proportions sans précédent alors que la politique locale a une fois de plus dégénéré en des combats de rue ayant pour objet le vide des pouvoirs laissé par l'échec des processus constitutionnels. L'instabilité du gouvernement et les conséquences violentes du soulèvement rebelle qui a débuté en février 2004 ont transformé Port-au-Prince, la capitale, en une zone de guerre où les civils, pris entre les échanges de tirs, modifient les relations sociales qu'ils entretiennent avec l'État et entre eux pour leur survie individuelle et communale. Le présent article construit un modèle théorique afin d'étudier la guerre civile haïtienne et souligne la nécessité d'explorer la violence en profondeur et de façon ethnographique, en prenant en compte l'histoire politique, les analyses sociales et le contexte culturel dans un effort de retracer la mouvance des relations qu'entretiennent l'état et la société civile depuis la fin du coup d'état de Cedras en 1994.

Mots-clés : Haïti, violence, terreur, police, ethnographie, théorie

[Orthographical note: Haitian Krèyol is a language in the midst of lexical formalization. Local expressions and terms are presented here in accordance with the orthography of the Institute of Haitian Studies' Haitian-English Dictionary, *edited by Freeman and Laguerre, 1996 and published by the University of Kansas (Lawrence, KN) and La Presse Evangélique (Port-au-Prince), to date the most comprehensive and thorough. Institutional and governmental names are given in French, as is customary in official Haitian discourse and publication.]*

When I arrived on the street in Port-au-Prince in early March of 2004, most of the city was still largely outside the control of the government. A rebel insurgency movement made up of former members of the now-disbanded Haitian army (Forces Armées d'Haïti, FADH) had successfully unseated President Jean-Bertrand Aristide who won re-election to office in 2000 amid opposition electoral boycotts, disputed results and accusations of fraud. With Aristide's resignation and exile to the Central African Republic and later South Africa, state paramilitary police forces have fanned out into the capital to hunt down armed supporters of Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas party. A concentrated rebel effort is now underway to reinstitute the FADH, with recruitment of new soldiers and their outfitting with new uniforms financed by wealthy families with an interest in restoring the pre-Aristide status quo. Factions of heavily-armed Aristide loyalists calling themselves *chimère*[1] are also on the offensive, and the city has descended into violent anarchy. The Haitian National Police (*Police Nationale d'Haïti*, PNH), routed by the rebels just about everywhere in the northern two thirds of the country, fire their weapons indiscriminately into civilian crowds, often in the most destitute of the capital's slum districts.[2] Arson, riot, looting and summary execution have once again formed the lexicon of political conflict on the street. Vigilante bands and entrepreneur assassins roam the Port-au-Prince slums of Bel

Air, Cité Soleil and La Saline with Uzis, semiautomatic handguns, combat-grade shotguns, assault rifles, bayonets, whips and machetes. Amid the chaos and a state of siege on the streets, and in the complete absence of legal authority, political scores are being settled alongside of personal animosities being avenged. Summary executions are being carried out on roadsides, the bodies littering the streets with single bullet holes through their foreheads. Dozens of others are being killed in less formal ways, their bodies machine-gunned, hacked to death, decapitated, mutilated and burned alive. Some victims of the conflict have been disembowelled, some strangled with their own underwear. There are rumours of a young girl from the militantly pro-Aristide Cité Soleil slum having been raped to death by rebels after the departure of Aristide. By October of 2004, pro-Aristide gangs had begun the systematic beheading of PNH officers killed in factional clashes under the rubric of "Operation Baghdad" (though unlike similar beheadings in Iraq, the decapitations are typically post-mortem and are not filmed). Haiti is not teetering on the brink of civil war, it is in the full throes of civil war. What else to call this protracted armed conflict among competing factions for control of state power? Many Haitians refer to it as *lagè* (war) as often as they refer to it as *la violenz* (the violence). Much of the war is now being waged in Port-au-Prince, and it is not being fought around the civil society as much as it is being fought directly through it. At the time of this writing, there have been over 500 Haitians killed in factional clashes since the fighting began in earnest in late February 2004.

While the government has periodically imposed curfews and urges residents of the capital to seek shelter indoors when shooting is heard, the truth of the matter is that when a bullet is fired in Port-au-Prince there is little difference between inside and outside; here, in the most volatile slums, most homes are made of cardboard and tin. Haiti's violent history of successive coups d'état has shown how political conflict can become a civilian bloodbath when the fighting reaches the capital, even when people do stay indoors. There appears to be no end to the violence in sight. Though the rebel army had pledged to lay down their arms now that a Brazilian-led UN peacekeeping force has arrived to re-establish order, they have shown little real interest in doing so, even as the foreign troops conduct disarmament and policing operations throughout the country. Outfitted in new fatigue uniforms and brandishing automatic weapons, members of the "New Army" depart daily from their Petionville headquarters and descend on the capital down the hill in a show of force intended to quell the pro-Aristide gangs and assuage the concerns of a business elite growing impatient with the insecurity and the toll it has taken on their commercial interests.

The destruction in the capital is being superimposed onto an urban landscape already devastated by the crushing poverty of the Western Hemisphere's most destitute economy. Long the poorest country in the Americas, Haiti was further crippled by the floodwater obliteration attributed to Hurricane Jeanne which struck the island in September 2004 and claimed over 3 000 lives while leaving 200 000 homeless. In the northern city of Gonaïves—the first city to be routed by the rebels in February 2004—the floodwaters have caused a hunger crisis like never before seen. Mothers picked through the muck to salvage fallen fruit, washing it in septic water before feeding it to their starving and emaciated children. Men chopped away with machetes at collapsed shanties, searching for what remains of their families' homes. In the third week of October, some in the north had not eaten for three weeks. The "New Army," made up of former FADH rebels, had soon stepped forward in Gonaïves, brandishing their weapons at international relief workers who they charged were ineffective at the distribution of food aid, which continues to be looted from World Food Program warehouses. Everyone involved in the relief effort agrees that insecurity continues to be the greatest obstacle to feeding the victims of the floods and the violence.

In Port-au-Prince, where the hurricane "merely" resulted in the overflow of raw sewage into the homes of the poor living in low-lying slums, street boys zombified by their glue-sniffing habit and suffering from oozing vapour burns around their noses and mouths sleep against the wall surrounding the National Cemetery. That wall is itself scarred with the dimpled craters of gunfire, and is covered with a cacophony of vicious political graffiti and counter-graffiti, variously in condemnation or support of the deposed president. One of the street girls congregating there in March 2004 told me bluntly, "I am beyond hungry. I am already dead." Inside the cemetery, tombs have been looted, caskets smashed, corpses strewn about. I stoop down to examine the splintered coffin of a child, wedged between two mausoleums. Some of the small corpse is inside, but much of it has been scattered about the space, here and there among the bones of many others. In these times, the desecrations are as often the work of political partisans targeting the tombs of opposing families as they are that of the common grave-robber, or less frequently still, the necromancer.

In the Bel Air slum I step through gutters filled with raw sewage mixing with coagulated blood from an earlier street shooting. The upside-down shells of burned out

cars line streets obstructed by heaps of smouldering garbage, some as high as 10 feet. In one such car the charred skeleton of the driver sits bolt upright in his seat, his blackened skull grimacing at the Armageddon playing out before him. In the first days after the departure of the deposed president, bodies and pieces of bodies in varying states of decay could be found stuffed in trash-clogged drainage culverts and thrown like so much litter against the side of the city morgue. Formidable roadblocks of burning tires, often manned by armed and masked factions, occasionally by street kids, stop traffic and pedestrians in search of victims and valuables. The cityscape is a wrecked vision, the absurd and impossible but nonetheless real consequence of a profound civil destruction imposed on pre-existing urban disorder. The war in the capital has left chaos and mayhem in the middle of a slum constructed not by logic or symmetry but by human necessity and the struggle for space in which to live, eat, love, reproduce and die. For the poorest Haitians who depend everyday on the city for life itself, the ruination of Port-au-Prince writ large has completely shattered an already cracked mirage of an ordered and just world, as it has compelled entire communities to again bear witness to the carnage of machinegun politics. Since February 2004, spectacular acts of violence in the capital, a place where over one-and-half million people are crammed into the least amount of space per capita of any other city in the Americas, have made close to one-quarter of the city's population direct witnesses to and thus participants in the violence. Even this troubling statistic betrays the reality of hundreds of thousands more who in one way or another are suffering because of the incidentals of war.

Somehow, Haitians manage to maintain a semblance of normalcy even as their social and cultural worlds are crumbling around them. Street children recover from the loss of their friends to gunplay by expressing firm and certain knowledge of their understanding of what has happened to them. They impose a logic born of the war-torn conditions that frame their lives of poverty, scarcity, fear, and death. Some say that their friends were taken to be made into *zombi.* Others say that they were *manje* (eaten, consumed, exhausted, destroyed, disappeared) by monsters, which is not so far from the truth. But they also recover their comrades by speaking their names and telling stories of their good friendship and humanity. Social and cultural lives go on. Women give birth, vendors sell candies and cigarettes on street corners, welders ply their trade on the sidewalks in front of their shops, *tap-taps*[3] carry passengers between markets and homes, children make their way to school, street kids wipe the hoods of passing cars. Labourers lay cinderblock around a memorial commemorating Haiti's 200 years of independence from French rule—2004 marked Haiti's bicentennial as well as its descent into anarchy and war. They are seemingly undeterred by the bullet holes that already mar their work from yesterday. In these and many other ways, Haitians in Port-au-Prince are demonstrating the resilience, resistance and creativity that anthropologists are increasingly realizing are qualities characteristic of communities transformed by violent conflict. The business of everyday life must go on even in a civil war zone, where a façade of the ordinary masks the reality of lives lived under truly extraordinary circumstances.

Beyond Bodies and Fetishes: The Meaning of Violence

How is anthropology to contribute to an understanding of the *meaning* of the political violence in the Haitian capital today, violence of a type that is so absolutely pervasive throughout the slums that constitute most of Port-au-Prince that everyday life simply cannot be lived without some engagement, or at least negotiation, of it? The problem is as much one of methodology as it is of theory, insofar as it implies a request for reliable ethnographic methods for approaching violence as much as it is a request for a hermeneutics of violence itself. The challenges of doing ethnography in a war zone are often prohibitive enough to preclude most researchers from even trying, which has left many of us who work at the epicentres of conflict without the fundamental methodological tools to so do safely and effectively. Ethnographers of violence have increasingly bemoaned this lack of field technique for studying the lived reality of conflict, and have begun to craft new strategies for dealing with it in the field (Bourgois 1990; Daniel 1996; Feldman 1991; Kovats-Bernat 2001, 2002; Lee 1995; Nash 1976; Nordstrom 1997, 2004; Nordstrom and Martin 1992; Peritore 1990; Robben and Nordstrom 1995; Sluka 1990, 1995). Even once a method has been established, how can we confidently use it to comment on the meanings of violent social processes that are still unfolding? This last problem should really be a small one for anthropology, as our discipline alone among the social sciences is charged with *in situ* descriptions and articulations of meanings behind immediate cultural processes that are "in the making." But it is the intensely oppressive nature of violence, and its ability to absolutely contaminate an entire community, that makes it fundamentally unlike all other fluctuating aspects of social life that we study. The civil war in Haiti today serves as an apt illustration of the problem. A disorderly and disordered violence has reduced the country to a state of emergency where ethnography is complicated by "sensory and nar-

rative distortion" and "surrealistic particularities" (Feldman 1995: 228) that make the country, and the capital that is now at the centre of the crisis, resistant to ethnographic truth-telling. The black smoke of a thousand unchecked fires chokes city streets and limits visibility, gunfire barks out in sputters at unpredictable moments, schoolchildren leap over gelatinous puddles of blood and mud, street kids are paid by gangs to keep tire barricades burning, bodies long since cold and still are nonetheless furiously hacked by machetes as they lie in the street, and market women step around the corpses, their burdens borne expertly atop their heads in the Haitian way. These are hardly ideal circumstances amid which to conduct a traditional kind of ethnography.

Under such circumstances, individual perceptions, the actions based upon them, and in fact all of social life are bent to the service of human survival and community sustainability, rendering the validity and usefulness of otherwise decontextualized and matter-of-fact ethnographic observations highly suspect. An alternative cultural code continuously adapted to prevailing circumstances, a sort of reactive social coping, takes over in fields fraught with violence, for both the subjects and the researchers of anthropological investigation. The immediacy and graphic nature of violent conflict skew objectivity and seduce the ethnographer into believing that the meaning of the events unfolding is *embodied by* the violent acts themselves, rather than seeing those violent acts as *embedded within* a larger process of war that culminates rather than erupts in acts of profound brutality that produce lasting effects for entire communities. The real impact of social violence penetrates far deeper than the bodies rendered and transformed by acts of aggression themselves. The very immediacy of violence in dangerous fields—concretized by gunfire, intimidation, corpses out of place, burned-out autos, grimacing skulls, threat of arrest, blood in the street—distorts the social reality and can misinform, confuse or paralyze ethnographic analysis through the creation of "feeble fictions in the guise of realism...flattening contradiction and systematizing chaos" (Taussig 1987: 132). The result is an "epistemic murk" that extends the problem of ethnographic observation and representation beyond the merely philosophical—obscurity becomes a "high-powered medium of domination" (Taussig 1987: 121), compelling the ethnographic gaze to fixate on isolated, patently manifest acts of war and terror—troop movements, summary executions, riot events, massacres, armed clashes, arrests, beatings, torchings, lynchings. A great deal of anthropological accounts of war and violence fall prey to this seduction, this fetishization of violent acts. The danger here lies in the flawed assumption that soldiers, rioters, executioners, torturers, their weapons, and their victims are the very *embodiment of violence* and the only data that matters. This assumption is fed by "official" accounts of war in the news media, embedded journalism, after-action reports and the formal histories of conflict that confine their attention to the acts of decision makers, soldiers, battle scenarios and technologies, rather than on the longer-term social impact that war has on the everyday lives of the people it is being fought through. The very instruments of terror (soldiers, executioners, torturers, rifles, machineguns, napalm, machetes, grenades, landmines, rocks, fists, batons, firebombs) and their targets (bodies, buildings and landscapes) are indeed aspects of war, but they do not in and of themselves embody and isolate it from the fabric of community life. Perpetrators, weapons and victims are embedded in a wider set of political histories and social relations that extend spatially and temporally far beyond the moments of bloodletting, fire and destruction. Carolyn Nordstrom writes that:

> Before I was caught in these riots [in Sri Lanka in 1983], media and literary accounts had taught me to think of communal violence as consisting only of "rioters" and "victims," and of riots as being explosive one-day events. These accounts did not convey the fact that there is no escaping the riots—for anyone. It never occurred to me...that riots involved looking for nonexistent food and medicines long since burned and looted; that people "of the rioter's side" risked their lives to protect people "on the other side"; that young children were caught in the violence, standing with eyes too wide, wondering what to do and what was happening to their world—and that these experiences were as much the meat of political violence as the rioters attacking the victims. (2004: 29-30)

The present conflict in Iraq brings Nordstrom's point into stark relief. American news accounts of the human toll of the war fixates on the over 2400 U.S. troops killed since combat operations began in March 2003, rarely mentioning the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians killed during the same period. This is before one considers the displaced, the homeless, the wounded, the crippled and the amputated; and it is also before one considers the devastating impact that the war will have on market systems, family life, community relations, utilities distribution, education, health care and more for generations to come. Nordstrom describes this secondary political process of war and conflict as "erasure," "deletion," "editing out"; a process of "making things invisible" in the interest of lim-

iting the crisis to chosen embodiments of it in order to make it strategically palatable to certain audiences. She points out that much of the meaning of war lies in these unanalyzed domains of social life on the frontlines:

> Violence is set in motion with physical carnage, but it doesn't stop there. Violence reconfigures its victims and the social milieu that hosts them. It isn't a passing phenomenon that momentarily challenges a stable system, leaving a scar but no lasting effects. Violence becomes a determining fact in shaping reality as people will know it, in the future. So while a study of violence may begin with direct and immediate carnage, it shouldn't end there....Researchers are still in scientific infancy in charting the progress of cultural trauma on the body politic. We are far from knowing if cultural wounds lead to ongoing cycles of social instability and violence. (Nordstrom 2004: 59-60)

How are we to write legitimate ethnographies of social and cultural milieus so profoundly distorted by violence? Can and should it be done at all? The ethical implications of these questions are hardly negligible. After all, how representative of the facts can any ethnography of violence be if it is carried out in a field fraught with the ambiguities intrinsic to a war zone? The answer surely does not lie in a structural analysis that posits violence as a momentary, inexplicable lapse in the organic solidarity of the social whole. Indeed, our studies of the impact of war and conflict on cultural worlds reveal anything but enduring, static social structures that revert to internal harmony in the aftermath of fighting. What is needed is a recognition that when war comes home, it is not simply an interruption of local norms and behaviour that return to themselves when the bloodletting ends, but a dynamic modifier of community identity that, incredibly and so often, endures in the midst and aftermath of violent conflict by way of creative adaptation.

In war zones like Port-au-Prince, the ethnographic task is thus twofold: first to identify and record the sites, acts, agents and artefacts of the violence itself (the embodiments and fetishes of conflict), and then to contextualize those elements in relation to the conflict as a whole with the goal of extracting some degree of cultural meaning from the community torn apart and reconstituting itself throughout and after the crisis. This is no easy task. It requires that we not only work under hostile research conditions of danger and terror, but that we follow the antecedents to and the ripple effects of war beyond the frontlines, the slums and the killing fields and into the homes, the markets, the neighbourhoods, the families and the communities that are torn apart and reconstituted for years after the fighting has ended. That means that our task is as much an ethnographic and historical one as it is anthropological.

Like any set of events in a dynamic system, violence cannot be understood except in its specific contexts. War is flux, not static; it defies theoretical reduction to discrete, isolated events and embodiments. It exists as a set of complex, ever-transforming social relations. Like most if not all other categories of anthropological inquiry, violence is only understandable in its situational relationship to histories of power, extant material conditions and ideological superstructures that give anchorage to the cultural meanings of individual acts, and offer empirical benchmarks for cross-cultural study. Put another way, every act of violence is embedded in a complex material, structural and cultural reality that must be elucidated by way of thorough ethnographies written from the level of combatants and sufferers, not policy makers and strategists. The meanings of violence are expressed in social action, and cannot be effectively extracted for ethnographic study after the fighting is over any more than the social fact of kinship can be extracted for study outside the bounds of family relations, or economics outside the bounds of the market. As a social contaminant, violence acts to transform customary relations and community norms, and its pervasion of social life in the context of war means that it cannot be filtered out of human experience to access some fictive cultural "real" believed to lie beneath. To be studied as anthropological phenomena, violence, warfare and conflict must be experienced and recorded firsthand in the same manner that we study other aspects of social and cultural life—in context—because they are so inseparable from human experience. The consequences of locating violence in this way, *in situ* and at the theoretical and methodological center of study, are ones that bear directly on the mission of the discipline. If we are unable or unwilling to orient anthropology to the study of violence where it is in process (as we have done for virtually all other objects/subjects of our studies), then perhaps we have reached the end of the ethnographic project. However, I don't believe that we have.

Conflict as Dialectic: Studying Violence as a Contextualized Social Process

In her critical development of an ethnography of war that seeks to track patterns and networks of interest, profit and power "across cultural landscapes, sovereign borders, and theoretical domains," (Nordstrom 2004: 3) Nordstrom offers a model for the study of violence as a radiating *process*, rather than as an event occurring in a

particular circumscribed locale.[4] Such a model invites the researcher to consider the larger causes and consequences of war and the diverse interests of its multivariate protagonists, all of which transcend the immediate experience of the acts of violence themselves. Nordstrom's approach challenges the Hobbesian perspective that war is a wholly destructive, innately human enterprise that can be confined to a particular time and place and limited to the actions of stereotyped, binary-opposed warring factions. Her model casts violence as part of a dialectical movement that also stimulates creativity in rebuilding devastated social worlds, albeit under the least desirable circumstances. That perspective resonates with my own field experiences of war in Haiti. Patterns of innovative thought and behaviour are spontaneously created by communities living with the spectre of social violence. The generation of tacit cultural meaning systems—oblique innuendoes, rumours, symbolic gesture sets, strategic silences—these form a small part of the adaptive sensorium that members of communities innovate and deploy in surviving war.

While working on the boulevards of Port-au-Prince, I could speak freely with street children one moment, and perhaps even take notes. But the next moment, suddenly under the scrutiny of paramilitary agents, we would have to *pa dan nou*—"shut our mouths," hide the notes, and let the anxious, sweaty silence that now prevailed bespeak the volumes of data that hours of testimony could never provide. Because "silence can operate as a survival strategy" (Green 1995: 118), it is not simply a symptom of fear but is an aspect of cultural reality, and as such can be a valuable piece of datum. Silence, like rumour, constitutes a unique form of cultural adaptation that ethnography is well-poised to access and interpret. Neighbourhood rumours of an act of political rape contribute to a social discourse of violence not unlike other forms of testimony that ethnographers routinely gather in the field in cobbling together community narratives of market life, kinship, or religion. Rumours say something *meaningful* about violence by presenting embellished or censored or otherwise reconfigured versions of fact as seen from the perspective of individual social agents. Rumours are a creative means of "remaking a world" (Das, Kleinman and Lock 2001) devastated by conflict.

Nordstrom's model generates a sophisticated approach to war ethnography by recognizing that an entire host of actors are directly and indirectly implicated in cultures of conflict: foreign journalists, humanitarian aid workers, civilian collaborators, extrajudicial death squads, informers, profiteers, military advisors, arms dealers, health workers, tactical strategists, looters, bandits, opportunistic assassins and ethnographers. And these before we consider the street children, market women, labourers, teachers, students, peasants, merchants, priestesses, healers and other civilian non-combatants who bear witness to, mediate, negotiate, survive or are collateral victims of the crisis. Seen in this way, violence is "essentially polysemic; it speaks with and through myriad and often contradictory voices" (Nordstrom 1997: 45), often producing a cacophony of competing discourses about the conflict at hand and how it should best be interpreted. The meanings and relevance to be taken from violent conflict are easily obscured by a complicated web of agendas, motivations, intentions, goals, incentives, justifications, political perspectives, emotional states, comportment to structures of power and social vantages that the diverse array of actors have on the conflict. Thus the profound ambiguity (though not inaccessibility) of the cultural data gathered in fields of violence, and the need for a multi-layered, hermeneutic approach to ethnographic analysis that draws on local, even individual, experiences of violence in piecing together a meaningful and relevant ethnographic account of war. In so doing, the focus of study shifts away from the particular agents, spaces and times of fighting (the embodiments of war) and toward the actions, reactions and symbolic meanings brought to them by the broader civil society affected by it.

While it is true that violence has an empirical reality in its observable effects, it is equally true that as the fundamental units of violent causality and experience, the bodies of persons are as socially effective as cultural subjects (contemplative, innovative and malleable selves and persons) as they are as objective embodiments of agency (targets, antagonists, protagonists, agents, soldiers, children) moving about in space. This fact introduces the problem of locating the role of shifting individual comportments and multivariate perspectives on acts of violence. As Setha Low and Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga point out, "[t]he space occupied by the body, and the perception and experience of that space, contracts and expands in relationship to a person's emotions and state of mind, sense of self, social relations, and cultural predispositions" (2003: 16). Put another way, identity, context and culture inform the meanings of bodies in violent relation to one another, mandating a need for detailed accounts of both the sociocultural and the spatial contexts within which particular conflicts occur and are experienced. Insofar as "humans are historical and culture-bearing social beings engaged in relations of meaning-creation and symbolism" (Abbink 2000: xiii), there is an ongoing need in the discipline for well-developed, sophisticated approaches to violence that take into account the multiplicity of critical identities that individuals acquire as members of soci-

ety in conflict: the objective person, the subjective self and the political body in culturally-structured space. These categories of identity are similar to the divisions of the person identified by Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Margaret Lock (1987) as the "individual body," the "social body" and the "body politic."

Insofar as this is the case, I suggest that any sophisticated anthropological analysis of conflict should include a description of the political history, a social analysis of material conditions, and an elaboration of the cultural context of any given violent act. *Political history* locates the conflict within a temporal field conducive to its examination as a phase in a dialectical movement toward creative community adaptations and relational innovations that are responsive to a suddenly transformed and disordered social world. By *social analysis of material conditions* I mean an examination of the empirical facts of the conflict (who did what to whom, when and how?), as well as the material, institutional, relational and economic conditions amid which it is being carried out. This includes a definition of what has been called the *landscape* of social action, which develops from a tension between idealized or imagined spatial settings against which the real, everyday life of the "foreground" of social life is actually cast (Hirsch 1995: 4). I refer to this aspect of the social context as the *architecture of space and utility,* implying not just the arrangement of bodies and things in relation to one another, but also individual perceptions and engagements of those bodies in that space. Finally, an elaboration of the *cultural context* of violent acts situates individual and community narratives of violence (testimonials, stories, folklore, mythology, rumours, "official" and journalistic reports of events, accusations, confessions, rituals) within a larger symbolic worldview, and permits comparative categories of violence to emerge from interpretive descriptions. Ethnographic analyses of violence that derive from this tri-faceted approach allow a responsible kind of meaning to emerge from conflict, one forged from a complex analysis of empirical facts, social contexts and local interpretations. This is not to simply reduce culture to text (Das et al. 2001: 9), nor is it to give anthropology over to a radical cultural relativism (Abbink 2000: xiii) that alienates the meaning of violence by utterly localizing its significance. Conversely, it is to recognize that all conflicts have a universal quality to them, insofar as they all entail symbolic exchanges that take place within particular sociocultural contexts, necessitating the need for a thorough accounting of violence that engages both the subjective and objective dimensions of social life at the epicentres of conflicts.

This article employs this processual-contextual model in providing an anthropological assessment of the current violence in the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince that began as a rebel uprising in the northern town of Gonaïves in February 2004. While Nordstrom's ethnological approach to the study of violence as a transcendent process rather than as a phenomenon that occurs in a circumscribed locale is essential to the broader anthropological project of theorizing violence cross-culturally, there remains first a need for ethnographic detail on particular conflicts. Drawing on a decade of political historiography and ethnographic fieldwork that I have conducted in Haiti since 1994, this article diverges from Nordstrom's broader model in that it is grounded in a specific set of locales—the streets of urban Haiti, principally Port-au-Prince. The capital is at present the centre of the conflict and the nexus of confrontation, what Vodouisaints call *lakafou danjere:* a dangerous ontological crossroads, a vital liminal space where bodies and their related identities are in dire jeopardy and in the midst of adaptive transformation. It is in Port-au-Prince that the violence is at its worst right now, and so it is here also that the labour of reconstructing devastated social worlds is most difficult and most imperative.

Given limitations of space, my purpose is not to present a comprehensive theoretical explanation for the pervasion of violence in Haitian political relations, but rather to describe the unique set of historical, social and cultural circumstances that have led to the current crisis. Specifically, my intention here is to (1) elaborate on the sophisticated political developments that have led to the war raging on the ground in Port-au-Prince today, (2) integrate that history with an ethnographically informed social analysis of the immediate embodiments of the violence that has resulted and (3) demonstrate how the war extends beyond the immediacy of the fighting and into the everyday lives of Haitians suffering at its peripheries and reconstituting their cultural worlds. The larger project of extracting grander meanings from the conflict will surely be an ongoing one as the Haitian civil society continues to remake itself from the shattered pieces of its failed democracy. What the war *means* in a full anthropological sense is as much dependent upon what Haiti creates in the midst and in the aftermath of the fighting as it is upon the historical circumstances that led to the outbreak of violence in the first place.

Spaces of Conflict and the Spectre of Human Suffering in Port-au-Prince: Some Social and Cultural Considerations

Over 1 500 000 people live in Port-au-Prince, and it can be reasonably said that virtually all have been affected in some way by this war. The bullet fired, the machete swung,

the rock thrown, the tire ignited, the order to kill given, the deathblow received are all discrete, localized examples of violence; but they are also tidal forces that generate expanding currents of secondary violence that resonate from the epicentres to the cultural (if not geographic) peripheries of the conflict. These secondary currents follow pre-established social networks of kin and community that diminish in import the farther one is removed (intimately and culturally) from the site and subjects of the bloodletting. A Haitian shot dead, a UN peacekeeper wounded, an adolescent girl raped to death; these are more than just attacks on social or political categories of citizen, soldier and child. The gunman, the target, the minor and the rapist are variously mothers, sisters, fathers, brothers, daughters, sons, friends, lovers, wives, husbands, mentors, enemies, neighbours, rivals and more. Witnesses to and victims and perpetrators of violence are enmeshed in overlapping webs of social relations that make every act "culturally deep," with effects that radiate outward, fraying the social fabric at its edges. As the centre burns, the periphery is singed. This is why war is far more complicated than just a dispute between opposed political factions. This is also why our method for understanding it must be as meticulously interpretive as it is exhaustively contextualized.

Robert Fatton (2003) has suggested that the violence in Haiti today is the product of an "authoritarian habitus" of Haitian cultural life, whereby the paradigm of political life is wholly prefigured and determined by the despotism under which Haitians have lived since the post-independence dictatorships of Dessalines, Christophe and Boyer throughout the early 1800s. Fatton envisions the current crisis as an aspect of Haiti's second revolution, an ongoing conflict of transition from serial absolutist regimes to a still-distant democratic one. In the meantime, Haitian politics are dictated by the priorities of a "predatory state" informed by the 200-year-old adage of creole totalitarianism: social control is most effectively maintained through the terrorization of society into prima facie conformity (Kovats-Bernat 1999).

While the violence on the street in Haiti today may have come to be politically normalized through a habitus of history and state, its underlying causes are more infrastructural than ideational. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with close to three-quarters of the population living in abject poverty. The rate of infant mortality (79:1000) is among the highest in the world, and life expectancy (around 45 years) and gross national income (US$440) are among the lowest. Right now, the Haitian gourde is worth a little more than US$.02, the lowest exchange rate in over 15 years. As a report by the Catholic Institute for International Relations has pointed out, "[d]emocracy cannot thrive in such misery; sustainable and equitable economic development is a prerequisite" (1996: 3-4).

Writing in the wake of the 1995 UN intervention in Haiti, Irwin Stotzky noted that "[i]n order to foster real stability…the root causes of poverty in Haiti must be addressed" (1997: 111). Stotzky, a professor of law and former attorney for the first Aristide government, recommended an expanded involvement of the civil society, especially the poor, in the national dialogue concerning poverty-reduction as a means of more effectively addressing the immediate economic needs of the deeply impoverished 70% of Haitians who stand the most to win or lose in policy shifts. Despite his promises to increase dialogue, neither Aristide administration (1990-1995, 2000-2004) showed much effort in actually doing so. The establishment of the Aristide Foundation for Democracy (*Aristid Foundasyon pou Demokrasi,* AFD) in 1995, a Fanmi Lavalas union of peasants, workers and supporters of the liberation church in Haiti, did appear to be an overture to consider the interests of the poor and it did in fact encourage a civic dialogue on economic matters of popular concern. I worked extensively with street children at Lafanmi Selavi, an orphanage founded by Aristide and associated with the AFD, and was encouraged by him and the orphanage staff to observe a number of AFD meetings from 1995 to 1999. My earlier work (Kovats-Bernat 2001) has demonstrated that the AFD served as little more than a political machine for the Aristide regime, one which did little if anything in the way of concrete poverty-reduction. Besides providing a handful of low-interest loans to farmers, the AFD was quite ineffective in addressing the core problems of rural decline, inadequate sanitation, widespread hunger, limited access to health care and low popular access to clean water. Most of Aristide's programs for the poor ended up with little effect on the ground, notably the Lafanmi Selavi orphanage. Founded by Aristide in 1986 to provide food, shelter and literacy to a handful of Port-au-Prince street boys, the population of children served by Lafanmi Selavi steadily rose to over 400 by 1998. The facility was shuttered after a 1999 uprising by 30 street boys who blamed Aristide personally for the filthy and scarce conditions at the orphanage that I myself had been documenting over a six-year period conducting ethnographic fieldwork there (Kovats-Bernat 2006). After firing tear gas into the orphanage compound, troopers from CIMO (Compagnie d'Intervention et de Maintien de l'Ordre, a tactical intervention unit of the National Police) stormed the gates and dispersed the children. After its closure and the return of its 400 children

to Port-au-Prince street life, Aristide converted the facility into the Fanmi Lavalas radio and television station. This incident helps to explain why the main AFD facility near the Toussaint L'Ouverture International Airport and the Lafanmi Selavi compound in the middle-class Pacot neighbourhood of the capital were both sacked and looted during the February-March 2004 rebel uprising. Aside from their symbolic identification with the deposed president, both institutions came to be widely regarded as political and economic juggernauts of the Aristide regime, with little efficacy in relieving the country's poverty woes.

Haiti's profound economic crisis is ultimately linked to the collapse of the agricultural sector which began in earnest in the 1980s, and has since resulted in a continuous mass exodus of peasants into the capital. With virtually no bureaucratic authority regulating urban settlement, Port-au-Prince has,

> acquired the physiognomy of a slum. Instead of adapting to the city, rural-to-urban migrants now appropriate it, assault it, and transform it, in accordance with their needs and vision. This inversion of the classical logic of migrant acculturation and adaptation has profound repercussions for the relationship between the social classes in the urban setting. Entire neighbourhoods are constructed in the course of a month, as the pace of family-organized construction of makeshift dwellings accelerates. In no time at all, spaces where before construction was prohibited, or that were scarcely populated, are covered by networks of houses completely lacking in basic services....The marginalized people hurl themselves at the task of conquering any chink of available terrain. The city is the contested terrain of this struggle. (Manigat 1997: 90)

Subsequent urban overpopulation has in turn led to a critical impact on people's access to basic needs for survival in the city. It has also led to a very particular construction of urban space amid social instability in Port-au-Prince. The capital's chaotic terrain contributes significantly to the civil perception of the city and its streets as lawless. By their very nature and utility, the streets form spaces of contest and inform customs of conflict among those who use and live on them.

If the cityscape of Port-au-Prince is one dominated by the problems that so often attend urban overpopulation—poor sanitation, high unemployment, low wages, unstable market economies, rampant crime, blight, unplanned settlement—and if the city's rapidly rising population is the result of a relentless increase in rural-to-urban migration, then the formation of both the capital's urban architecture and its culture of violence ultimately find their origins in the countryside. The devastating, long-term effects of the colonial plantation agricultural system that dominated Haitian agriculture for over 200 years—land clearance, soil depletion, monocropping, unsustainable cultivation techniques—began under French rule in the late 17th-century and continue to have a woeful impact on Haitian agro-production today. Additionally, intensified deforestation has stripped the canopy from the countryside (Haiti is 95% deforested), removing the arbor root support system that is essential to protecting the integrity of the topsoil stratum from loss to erosion. The wanton natural destruction of life and livelihood in the flash floods of Hurricane Jeanne provides apt illustration of the scope of Haiti's manmade erosion problems. The combined effects of aggressive agriculture and deforestation have undermined the fertility and arability of Haitian farmland, lowering annual yields and contributing to an increased national dependence on imported foodstuffs. This too has aggravated the problems of the rural economy, as local markets are flooded with foreign crops priced below those produced locally.

With the Haitian state conspicuously absent in urban planning, management, security and settlement patterns, the capital has sprawled into a squatter metropolis and has slipped into almost total destitution. The rapid expansion of the city's slums has had a critical impact on people's access to public utilities and basic needs for survival. Electric service is patchy at best, and access to clean water and sanitation is limited to less than half of the population. This too has contributed to a dramatic transformation of how the street is perceived by the state and its citizens. Foreign visitors to Port-au-Prince are immediately struck with the harsh realities of an urban landscape wholly given over to spatial mayhem. An absence of sidewalks and traffic regulation, poor street maintenance, open sewer inlets and sanitation ditches, piles of garbage and other obstacles render the landscape into something to be negotiated rather than simply traversed. Vendors, market women, tradesmen, trucks, cars, insects, rats, stray dogs, street children, pedestrians and more all compete with one another for a private claim to sparse public terrain.

What results is a city in which all public space is contested space, the streets of the capital less transitory channels and more extensions of the household or place of work. This too—the idea that the private domain extends well into the public—has been imported from the countryside as well. Peasants live in clusters of extended family units, arranging their modest houses in a loose orientation around a common hearth and courtyard to form the traditional *lakou*. Here, limited residential space is supplemented by co-opting the common space

beyond the doorsill of the home. In the city, where living space is even more constrained, the household is extended beyond the residential threshold and into the street immediately surrounding the dwelling itself, much as the rural home subsumes the courtyard of the *lakou* as an extension of the familial residence. In Port-au-Prince, the house is where one sleeps, but the street is where one lives. Under ordinary circumstances, it is a safe and acceptable place to prepare meals, gossip, wash clothes, sell things, eat, socialize, play, and if need be, sleep. The street is, in the words of one of my street child informants, *salon pèp*—"the people's living-room." For street kids and other truly abject persons, this *salon pèp* is itself home, a house without walls or roof. With so many people using the street for so much in Port-au-Prince at any given time of day or night, the city's public spaces are predisposed sites for political conflict. Like all urban environments, the streets constitute an architecture characterized by "complex structures and differentiated social entities that collude and compete for control over material and symbolic resources" (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003). Now that the war has come to the capital, the streets remain *salon pèp,* just as they remain public spaces that out of necessity must be aggressively claimed for private or commercial use; but now they have been given over to open violence, brutality and confrontation that eclipses all other contests of daily life. As one street child put it to me,

> I want to work, but I am afraid because the police have left. I even sleep near my enemies now because we are all afraid of what will happen to Haiti. We sleep near this place because there are soldiers here [he gestures to a French UN peacekeeper positioned in one of the guardhouses of the National Palace]. We are very afraid. We cannot live.

Fear, insecurity and uncertainty are the immediate social effects of the architecture of space and utility in Port-au-Prince. The result is an urban environment predisposed to war, in that it is already halfway destroyed.

The profound level of poverty, the scarcity of potable water, the insidious pervasion of exposed sewage in residential areas, the shortage of food nationwide and the lack of a sustainable reforestation and subsistence agricultural program, all of which have been aggravated by the fighting and the more recent hurricane, have long been everyday fixtures of daily life in Haiti. All of the nation's internal conflicts through 200 years of history are rooted in the decline of the land and in the consequential sufferings of the country's majority poor who have lived against the overwhelming statistical odds that under such conditions they ought not to survive. Worse, whereas the war began with a public frustration with the abject conditions of life, so now the war is aggravating the abject conditions of life. The war is now reproducing itself, and time is running out. In March 2004, the Pan-American Health Organization reported that,

> [t]he intensifying socio-political crisis in Haiti is having a negative impact on the health of the Haitian population. Haiti has the highest infant and maternal mortality, the worst malnutrition and the worst AIDS situation in the Americas. The general mortality rate was 1057 per 100 000 population during the 1995-2000 period, also the highest in the Americas. A quarter of the children suffer from chronic malnutrition, 3 to 6% of acute malnutrition. About 15% of newborns have a low birth weight. Acute respiratory infections and diarrhoeas cause half of the deaths in children under 5 years of age. There are complications in a quarter of the deliveries. The coverage of services is very low: 40% of the population has no real access to basic health care, 76% of deliveries are made by non-qualified personnel, more than half of the population has no access to drugs, and only half of the children are vaccinated. (PAHO 2004: 1)

Aid workers are portending nationwide famine in the very short term. The onset of mass starvation has already begun as food relief in the wake of Hurricane Jeanne has been stalled by the loss of most of the country's grain stores to looters during the initial stages of the rebel uprising and in the wake of the storm's floodwaters. UNICEF (2004) has reported that the distribution of its food, health and sanitation aid to critical parts of the country is difficult, and has required them to negotiate with rebel groups over access to the most desperate regions. Clean water for drinking and cooking is perilously limited and worsened still by the pollution of previously clean streams and wells by raw sewage flushed into these sources by the floodwaters. Customary recommendations for the purification of contaminated water, such as boiling and chlorinating, are practically impossible or prohibitively expensive so as to preclude their consideration by most of the 55% of Haitians who lack access to potable sources. This scarcity of resources has prompted desperate faith in the widespread folk belief that the addition of juice from the *citron* fruit to the water will decrease its pathogenicity. The upshot has been the aggressive re-emergence of the doppelganger of child death in Haiti: diarrhoea. Over one million Haitian children were already considered "at risk" before the civil war began because of dehydration associated with intestinal disorders, and that number is generally believed to have increased since February 2004 when the fighting interrupted the flow of clean

water and left almost three-quarters of the population in the north of the country cut off from access to it. Drinking water in Haiti regularly carries the risk of parasites invisible to the eye. When I asked how she tests her family's drinking water for potability, Clè-Ann, a mother of two in Port-au-Prince replied, "We drink it. If it is bad water, we get sick. First the children, then myself."

The political situation in Port-au-Prince today has precipitously deepened human suffering in the city. With the interruption of food and medical aid to the capital during the February-March 2004 uprising, starvation among the urban poor has intensified. In the days of anarchy and police flight that followed the departure of Aristide, many took to looting World Food Program warehouses. Human and social services, already among the least developed in the Hemisphere, have further atrophied. The war has not so much made new casualties of the citizenry as it has simply increased the number of those citizens already dying of a general deprivation of arable land, trees, food, water, medicine, jobs and space. As a Haitian friend once put it, "it is easy enough for anyone to die in a place like Port-au-Prince." Long before the rebels arrived in the capital to unseat Aristide, the citizens of the capital were suffering and perishing at wartime rates. These are the hundreds of thousands of war victims that have been "erased," "deleted," "edited out" and "made invisible" in most official accounts of the present Haitian civil war.

Prelude to War: A Political History of Factionalism and Terror in Port-au-Prince

The abrupt halt of the rebel assault on Port-au-Prince that left over 130 dead by the end of February 2004 has since given way to guerrilla warfare, looting, chaos and anarchy on the streets of the capital, some of which is now driven not by political motivation but by personal opportunism and economic desperation. Well over 300 Haitians have been killed in street violence since the departure of Aristide, with over 50 dying in a three-week period of partisan clashes in October 2004 alone. A Brazilian-led UN force took over control of stabilization operations from the United States in June 2004, an interim government was chosen, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in February 2006, and food aid has resumed its flow into the country. These events appear to mark the beginning of a potential reaggregation of Haitian society back into itself, with an albeit fragile space being carved out within which people can begin to recreate new social lives. But few Haitians are optimistic and the immediate future appears grim. The 9500 multinational peacekeepers on the ground now seem unable to maintain order, disarmament of warring factions remains stalled, the International Monetary Fund has postponed its talks on financial aid to Haiti that it had scheduled for November 2004. CARICOM member states continue to be sceptical of the legitimacy of the provisional government, and the distribution of food aid and disaster relief in the wake of the hurricane has been hampered by the general state of insecurity that prevails throughout the country.

Haiti has been building to this moment for some time. Long the poorest and most volatile country in the Western Hemisphere, the 1990 election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide (a Roman Catholic priest from Haiti's destitute La Saline slum) to the Haitian presidency was seen by most as a victory for Haiti's social justice movement, then known as Lavalas.[5] Aristide was overwhelmingly elected in internationally monitored polling by over 67% of the popular vote out of a field of 10 candidates. Running on a charismatic platform deeply influenced by the Latin American Catholic Church's liberation theology movement, Aristide almost immediately made enemies in virtually all of the traditional centres of power in the country. Because of his participation in democratic politics, Aristide was chastened and alienated by conservative Catholic authorities in the country and in the Vatican. His acerbic homilies against the military junta ruling the country at the time, and the fabulously wealthy elites who backed them, invited the ire of the customary power brokers of coup d'état in the country. His intention to double the Haitian minimum wage to US$4.00/day troubled foreign business interests. When he forced the retirement of high-ranking members of the Haitian army, he instigated military agitation against his government which would ultimately lead to his first tenure in exile. After only eight weeks in office, Aristide was overthrown in a bloody army coup in 1991 that would claim the lives of over 5000 Haitians in the four years of violence that ensued. Aristide was restored to power by a U.S.-led military intervention 23 000 troops strong following his signing of the Governor's Island Accord in 1994. Though that agreement paved the way for his return, the terms of the accord stipulated that he forfeit his three-and-a-half years as president spent in exile as a requirement of his reinstatement.

Throughout September-October 1994, American soldiers staged security operations throughout Haiti, breaking up heavy weapons, raiding the headquarters of pro-army militias, providing protection and assistance to democracy activists and eventually seizing control of the National Palace in Port-au-Prince on 11 October, paving the way for Aristide's return to power four days later. Upon his reinstatement, Aristide disbanded the Haitian army (FADH) and suspended their pensions. With inter-

national assistance, he then founded the Haitian National Police (PNH), a civilian force established to provide law and order in the army's stead. U.S. forces in Haiti declined to assist the Haitian government in the disarmament of former soldiers and their civilian proxies, and large caches of military-grade weapons disappeared into the shadows of the civil society. A 1995 report of the UN Commission on Human Rights suggested an interrelationship among these stolen firearms, the failure of U.S.-led UN forces to locate and confiscate them, and the dramatic post-invasion rise in both criminal and political street violence that is ongoing (UN Commission on Human Rights 1995). That same year, the local police chief of the sprawling slum of Cité Soleil estimated the membership of the Red Army (*Lame Rouj*), a pro-army gang in that area, to number over 200 individuals, all armed with FADH weapons. Residents of Cité Soleil today argue that the large majority of armed civilians in their neighbourhoods, including some from the Red Army, are former secret police and paramilitary agents who have seized upon the civil distrust of the PNH (the force has been scandalized since its founding with civil and human rights violations) as an opportunity to stir up trouble and to blacken further the already tarnished image of the police, widely believed to have been politicized into loyalty to Aristide since its establishment.

In 1995, disgruntled former soldiers launched an insurgency campaign against the Aristide government and individuals and institutions closely associated with the reinstalled president. A wave of violence attributed to army agitators throughout November 1995 claimed the lives of three Haitian civilians and a member of Parliament. Prohibited by constitutional term limits from succeeding himself, and despite Lavalas demands that he be permitted to remain in office until 1998 (thereby granting him the years of his term lost to exile as stipulated in the Governors Island Accord), Aristide agreed to arrange a presidential election to be held in December of 1995.

The 1995 elections were marked by low voter turnout. Many Lavalas supporters boycotted the polling over what they viewed as an unjust limitation on their incumbent's term in office. Although election day was mostly free from violence, the week leading up to the vote was not. Days before the balloting began, the home of candidate Leon Jeune, the opposition front runner, was sprayed with bullets, the first implication of Lavalas supporters in acts of political violence since Aristide's restoration. René Preval, the Lavalas candidate and a close associate of Aristide, succeeded in winning the election out of a field of 14 candidates. Preval's term was marred by intensified political violence, much of which was variously attributed to or admitted to have been carried out by former officers of the disbanded army. In August 1996, 20 former soldiers sacked the police headquarters in Port-au-Prince killing a civilian and wounding several others. Later that year, it was confirmed that a plot hatched by the Committee of Soldiers' Demands (a group representing former army officers) to undermine the government was thwarted by the PNH.

Political infighting within the Lavalas party over the choice of a prime minister paralyzed the Preval government from 1997 to 1999. Breaking ranks with his fractioned party, Aristide began to prepare for a run in the 2000 presidential election by forming a new party, Fanmi Lavalas, that would represent his own platform as distinct from that of other interests spawned within the ranks of the Lavalas movement. On January 11 of that year, parliamentary terms expired and President Preval announced that he would bypass the legislature and appoint a new government by decree, which he did two months later. Port-au-Prince exploded in a flash of street violence carried out by partisans opposed to the new government. The day after Preval's announcement, motorcycle gunmen opened fire on a vehicle carrying the sister of the president, seriously wounded her and killing her driver. More political deaths would follow. A month after presidential elections were scuttled because of a disorganized voter registration campaign in March 2000, a street war in Port-au-Prince between pro-Aristide and anti-Aristide gangs erupted. Street shootings, fire-bombings, rock-throwing and arson re-emerged as the lexicon of political factionalism. Scores of non-partisan civilians were killed in the violence, including dozens of children and adolescents caught in the crossfire. Suspect parliamentary and presidential elections, boycotted by opposition parties and virtually ignored by most of the population, eventually took place between May and November 2000. Fanmi Lavalas candidates predictably swept a majority of the seats in the Senate and House of Deputies, and Aristide won the presidency, claiming 92% of a vote indicted as fraudulent by the international community.

Immediately following the elections, violence in the capital flared once again, as "clans" (by then a Haitian euphemism for political street gangs) loyal to Aristide waged a campaign of intimidation against the opposition. In January 2001, Father Paul Raymond (a priest of the fiercely pro-Aristide liberation theology movement) read a public statement in the capital that openly threatened death to over 80 politicians, journalists and religious leaders who had previously voiced dissent against the Aristide government. Offices of parties opposed to the electoral results were fire-bombed, street assassinations of anti-Aristide dissi-

dents continued and Port-au-Prince descended further into political and economic mayhem. Unemployment skyrocketed and the value of the gourde had declined in value by half since 1998. By this time, a political resistance opposed to Fanmi Lavalas was formed, a coalition of 15 opposition parties united under the name Democratic Convergence.

The country's devastating political violence and crushing poverty slowly eroded the already shaky confidence of the civil society in the Aristide government. A plummeting gross national product, ballooning inflation, the budget deficit (which amounted to nearly 2.2 billion gourdes as early as 2001), the depreciation of the gourde, and rampant unemployment made life for most about as difficult as it had been in Haiti since the international embargo of the Cedras coup regime of 1991-93 (radio interview with Haiti Prime Minister Jean-Marie Cherestal, January 15, 2002). Anti-Aristide graffiti were scrawled throughout the capital, accusing him and the Fanmi Lavalas party of corruption, incompetence, heavy-handedness and drug profiteering.[6] Strikes and demonstrations against the government began in earnest, some turning violent as the National Police engaged the dissidents with tear gas, rubber bullets and live gunfire.

Economic paralysis and anti-government unrest prompted a resurgence of army violence as well. On December 17, 2001 33 gunmen, all former soldiers of FADH, attacked the penitentiary at Fort National in Port-au-Prince. The assailants were staved off by prison security, and moved on to the National Palace where they were repelled by the PNH, but not before eight policemen were killed in the exchange of gunfire. Suspecting that political rivals were responsible, pro-Aristide factions in the street attacked opposition party buildings. While the government referred to the Palace attack as a failed coup attempt, opposition party members countered that the attack was staged by Fanmi Lavalas in order to create a pretext for crushing political dissent. A former soldier who was arrested in the imbroglio later said that the attack was indeed a coup attempt and that the conspirators included a former FADH colonel and two former military police chiefs (National Coalition for Haitian Rights 2001). One of those named was Guy Phillipe, who would take command of New Army forces in the February 2004 uprising against Aristide.

By January 2002, the tentative stability of the Aristide government began to crumble. Prime minister Jean-Marie Cherestal resigned at the start of the year over mounting criticism of his government's failure to alleviate the country's economic and political woes. Cherestal had also been dogged by opposition doubts of his legitimacy since questions arose about the suspect nature of the government that Preval had named by unilateral decree in 2000. In the north of the country, Aristide's popular base had eroded significantly. In Gonaïves, strongman Amiot Métayer, the local chief of a fiercely pro-Aristide street clan called the Cannibal Army (*Lame Kanibal*), was arrested by the National Police in July 2002 in a crackdown on street violence. Métayer's men had been firebombing several buildings in town associated with a rival clan rumoured to be supported by former FADH officers. His shocking arrest was intended to rebut opposition accusations that Aristide was using unruly street gangs and hired thugs to affirm his control of the country. Métayer's detention would not last long. A month after his arrest, members of the Cannibal Army used a tractor to break through the wall of the Gonaïves prison, freeing Métayer along with 158 of the 221 inmates interred there with him.

The political situation was steadily growing out of the government's control. In Gonaïves, by then a stronghold of anti-Aristide insurgency, dissidents clashed with whip-wielding pro-Aristide gangs in a messy confrontation that left dozens injured. Sporadic violence throughout the north reached frenzied proportions in 2003 when Métayer's bullet-riddled, hacked and mutilated corpse was found on an isolated road 25 miles south of Gonaïves. He had been shot at point blank range in both eyes, and his chest was hacked down the midsection with a machete. The graphic political overtones of the killing enraged members of the Cannibal Army, who accused Aristide of ordering Métayer's assassination because of the incriminating leverage he could bring against the Fanmi Lavalas government that had imprisoned him the year before. Dozens were killed and wounded in Gonaïves in angry riots that raged for days after the discovery of Métayer's body. Amiot Métayer's brother Butteur assumed control of the Cannibal Army, rechristened it the Artibonite Resistance Front (Front de Résistance de l'Artibonite, FRA), and turned it aggressively against the Aristide government. Civil war was now imminent, and would begin with an FRA uprising against the PNH in Gonaïves, less than five months after the discovery of Amiot Métayer's mutilated corpse.

Shapeshifters in the Margins: *Zenglendinaj* and the Ever-Changing Face of Urban Disorder

Despite the political rhetoric that has infused Port-au-Prince street violence since the 1990s, there has always been a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the specific motivations for the perpetration of acts of urban terror. This ambiguity has been maintained by the tendency of

Haitian paramilitary groups and civil gangs to rapidly shift their loyalties and methods in response to changing economic and political terrains. No complete understanding of the war in Haiti can be achieved without an examination of this phenomenon, given that much of the violence today is carried out by individuals, groups, clans and institutions that have been in a nearly constant state of flux over the past 10 years. Their allegiances, loyalties, tactics, support, methods of operation, sources of weapons and popular support are ever-shifting, occasionally multiple, sometimes contradictory, and more than frequently leased out to the highest bidder.

Clearly many of the street clans and civilian militia groups are well-organized. Some, like the Cannibal Army in Gonaïves, and the Red Army, the Army of the Motherless (*Lame San Manman*) and the Beheading Army (*Lame Sans Tèt*) in Port-au-Prince are backed by political factions; they often publicly claim responsibility for violent attacks on political adversaries. Others, especially in Port-au-Prince, work as independent contractors or as triggermen for smaller, neighbourhood clans. A few of these hired guns have achieved individual notoriety in the press for their brash acts of brutal violence and are known nationwide simply by their *nom de rue:* Ti Loulou. Pouchon. Patatou. Labanyè. Colibri. Amiot Métayer, also known by his street alias "Cubain," was one of these. The fluid loyalties of these men and their loose relationships to political parties and issues is considered of secondary concern to most Haitians who regard the careless violence that they perpetrate, whether as gangsters or privateers, and whether motivated by profit or politics, as a menace to society. The frustrated and frightened citizenry is disinterested in knowing the cabalistic motivations for most street violence, a fact made evident by the ambiguously folkloric and decidedly apolitical term that is used to describe the perpetrators, be they politically or criminally motivated: *zenglendo.* Though the word was originally used to describe the extrajudicial crimes of soldiers of the Haitian army, it has since expanded in meaning to include any form of excessive street violence, criminal, political or otherwise. This lexical transformation blurs the lines that differentiate among the political, the criminal and the cultural. *Zenglendinaj* is rooted in the public imagination as a social fact allegorized to a folkloric menace.

Zenglendo is a compound of *zenglen* (shards of broken glass) and *do* (back) and was originally used in an old yarn told to children about the *djab,* a demon of Vodou folklore. In the story, the *djab* is described as a malicious trickster, charged with the tireless torment of children. Always seeking ways to lure the young into despair, the *djab* takes the form of an elder who appeals to a hapless young boy to massage the tired muscles of his back. When the child obliges and begins to rub the back of the elder, the demon transforms itself into *zenglendo;* the muscles of the creature's back ripple into a twisted mess of broken glass, horribly cutting the hands of the boy. The moral of the tale is clear: sometimes those that we trust can turn on us with malice.

Though the term *zenglendinaj* is used today as a general signifier for any number of different forms of street violence prevalent throughout Haiti today (arson, banditry, street execution, carjacking, disappearance, homicide), the origins of *zenglendinaj* can be traced directly to the former Haitian army. In 1988, after a succession of brief coups following the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier's dictatorship, a military junta assumed power of government. Large blocks of international aid monies to Haiti were suspended, leaving the army with little capital to pay the soldiers of the rank and file. In response to this crisis, soldiers turned their weapons against the citizenry for profit, staging armed bank robberies and home invasions. The military government did little to bring the soldiers under control, seeing the situation as an effective means of quelling what might otherwise have become a mutiny within the unpaid ranks. By the end of the 1980s the problem had worsened, with the army now the main obstacle to law and order. In 1989 a popular radio host in Port-au-Prince coined the folkloric term *zenglendo* to describe the soldiers, implying that with their involvement in armed crimes at a time when the Haitian people needed to trust state authority the most, the army had transgressed the public confidence (to say nothing of its constitutional mandate) and had turned on the populace in new and treacherous fashion. The army had become a "glass-back," and was mangling the hands of the Haitian people.

During the Cedras regime, *zenglendo* often functioned in loosely organized gangs who received special protections from the military while carrying out civil crimes. Some were off-duty soldiers of the FADH. They were at times actively encouraged in their crime sprees by the army in order to assist in the destabilization of pro-democratic neighbourhoods. Occasionally *zenglendo* worked in complicity with less-organized neighbourhood gangs and strong-arm vigilance brigades (*brigad vigilanz*) to sink whole communities into a state of looting, rape, murder and plunder. Many *zenglendo* were directly armed by the FADH and carried out intimidations and extrajudicial killings on the army's behalf, earning them the title of *attaché,* proxy gunmen "attached to" the Haitian army.

By 2000, animosities between Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas party and the Democratic Convergence were

being hashed out in neighbourhood firefights throughout the urban slums, and *zenglendo* operatives and militant clans like the Cannibal Army became the parties' foot soldiers. Fanmi Lavalas now has a well-established history of farming out the intimidation and execution of opposition party members to fiercely pro-Aristide *zenglendo* calling themselves *chimère*, after the fire-breathing demon of Haitian folklore. In December 2001 Brignol Lindor, the news director for Radio Eco 2000, was stoned and hacked to death by a gang of *chimère* near the town of Petit-Goave. Lindor had received death threats the week before his assassination after he invited members of the Democratic Convergence to speak on his radio show. *Chimère* have since used gunfire and barricades to shut down the capital a half-dozen times in the past three years in displays of pro-government loyalty, and they remain agitators of the violence on the streets of Port-au-Prince today. Since Aristide's resignation and exile from Haiti in February 2004, *chimère* have been responsible for a number of shootings and firebombings against his detractors, and together they form the insurgency movement battling the PNH and UN forces on the ground in Port-au-Prince today.

Zenglendo gangs supported by the rebel forces who helped to oust Aristide in 2004 have responded to *chimère* violence in kind. In May 2003, five Fanmi Lavalas supporters were shot and killed in Cité Soleil and Fort-Liberté by members of the Army of the Motherless, a *zenglendo* clan that claims to have ties to the Democratic Convergence. That same month, 20 individuals were killed in street battles between competing *zenglendo* gangs fighting for political control of the Boston and Bois-Neuf neighborhoods of Cité Soleil.

While a great deal of *zenglendo* killings are carried out for criminal profit and without political motivation—most *zenglendo* gun down citizens not over politics but simply to facilitate banditry—it is widely believed that some of them are working under the protection or tacit consent of certain precincts of the PNH, and that their criminal activities may also be intended to intimidate those neighbourhoods most opposed to police authority. I first heard such rumours on the street in 1995 shortly after the UN Commission for Human Rights issued a report suggesting the complicity of Haitian police officers in crimes attributed to former members of the FADH. The suspected officers were allegedly operating out of uniform and using their service weapons in criminal attacks. The report goes on to conclude that this violence was:

> aimed, in some cases at least, at intimidating sections of the democratic opposition and goes hand in hand with the upsurge in arbitrary executions for political reasons. In the working-class districts, *zenglendo* are creating a climate of general fear, for their victims are not necessarily political militants or sympathizers.... The [UN International Civilian] Mission has further reported that their investigations into [*zenglendist*] human rights violations have indicated that they were armed with automatic weapons (Uzis and M16s) and operated in red and white [PNH] pick-up vehicles, sometimes with government plates. In several cases there was information regarding a direct link between the perpetrators and the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH) and the impunity and logistical support of their operation is strongly indicative of FADH involvement. (UN Commission for Human Rights 1994: 6)

This suspicion is not without basis. Between May 19 and May 21, 1999, *zenglendo* in the Poste Marchand district of Port-au-Prince went on a violent crime spree, indiscriminately robbing stores, houses, pedestrians and motorists. Six days later, 18 armed men sealed off two streets in the same neighbourhood for several hours, and while working systematically in two groups robbed over 20 homes, frisked residents and passers-by for money, stole over US$300 from a small boutique, raped a woman and shot a man in the foot. Many of the *zenglendo* involved were known to area residents, who identified the weapons used in the attacks, 9mm semiautomatic handguns and .38 calibre revolvers, as identical to those the PNH issues to its officers. Some residents of the neighbourhood named several of the *zenglendo* as former or current police officers. A month later, seven *zenglendo* returned to occupy Poste Marchand, this time firing their weapons in the air, robbing street merchants, and stealing rice, beans and plantains from market women. It was four hours before the police arrived to quell the violence by which time the perpetrators had fled the area. When I arrived in the neighbourhood shortly after the attacks, a rumour was circulating that the *zenglendo* involved were police officers from the very precinct responsible for security in Poste-Marchand. Street children swore to a modified version of the rumour: the *zenglendo* involved were gang members from the neighbourhood angered at merchant resistance to "clan protection."

Choking Off *Zenglendinaj*: The Paramilitary Solution

Civil pressure on the government to eliminate the violence from the streets has prompted a violent, martial crackdown on street crime. In June 2001, during a public visit with the Inspector General of the PNH, Aristide reiterated his "zero tolerance" policy toward street violence—first

announced in his February 2000 inauguration address—in a speech to the National Police (June 20, 2001) that appeared to endorse summary executions of *zenglendo:*

> If it's a *zenglendo*, zero tolerance. If a *zenglendo* stops a car in the street, puts his hand on the key to make the driver get out so he can take the car, he is guilty, because the car is not his. You do not need to lead him to the court to have him judged because the car is not his...he is guilty. If a criminal grabs someone in the street by the collar and puts him on the ground to beat him or shoot him, [the police] do not need to wait to go to court with him to prevent him from doing that.

In the aftermath of his remarks, Haitian and international human rights organizations condemned Aristide for what they saw as an explicit presidential sanction of police extremism, brutality, arbitrary arrest and vigilantism. Less than three months after Aristide made his "zero tolerance" speech to the PNH, Ronal Francais, a member of the Movement Demanding Haitian Development and Democracy (Mouvman Revandikatif Ayisyen pou Developman ak Demokrasi, MOPRADD) was ruthlessly beaten by a PNH officer, Jean-Marie Dominique. A witness reported that officers of the Port-au-Prince district of the PNH delivered a suspected *zenglendo* into the hands of an angry mob. Within eyesight and earshot of the National Palace and the Port-au-Prince headquarters of the PNH, the suspect was stoned by the crowd, pushed to the ground and killed with a bullet to his head.

Aristide's zero tolerance policy for dealing with suspected *zenglendo* and the heavy-handed policing with which it has come remains the law enforcement protocol of the street. Amnesty International's Annual Reports since 2003 have cited numerous cases of deadly officer recklessness, intimidations, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances of suspects in PNH custody, and a 2004 press release by that organization cites growing suspicion of PNH involvement in summary executions (Amnesty International 2004b). In one case, a PNH officer fired his weapon indiscriminately into a crowd as he was pursuing a *zenglendo* through a market in Port-au-Prince. One woman was killed and a pregnant woman and a child were wounded in the shooting. In another instance, Fleury Lysias of Haiti's Justice and Peace Commission was arrested without a warrant by police officers who were accompanied by three other armed men in civilian clothes. Lysias was taken to the Bon Repos police station where he was systematically kicked and beaten with clubs (breaking one of his arms) and struck repeatedly on the ears (damaging his eardrums). Lysias was released without charges the following day.

In one of the more scandalous cases of police excess and corruption, three brothers, Andy Philippe, Angélo Philippe and Vladimir Sanon, were taken from their home in the Carrefour section of Port-au-Prince by PNH officers in December 2002. Their bodies were discovered in the city morgue the next day with bullets lodged in their foreheads. After the parents of the boys filed a formal complaint with the public prosecutor, an internal investigation was conducted, resulting in the firing of the police commissioner and three PNH officers. One officer implicated in the incident went into hiding during the investigation to avoid arrest. A potential witness to the assassinations was killed by hooded men days later in Carrefour (Amnesty International 2003a).

Given historical precedent, the current excessive nature of police violence in Haiti is unsurprising, having long been pervasive throughout the ranks of the specialized paramilitary units that both preceded and are contemporary with the PNH. Haiti's Anti-Gang Service (Service Anti-Gang, SAG*)* offers a good example. SAG is technically a subunit of the National Police infrastructure, but it has always operated with a certain degree of autonomy from it. SAG in fact precedes the National Police in origin by at least seven decades. It is a descendant of the Bureau of Criminal Intelligence and Identification (Bureau de Recherche et d'Identification des Criminel, BRIC), formed in 1921 in order to institutionalize the state's domestic intelligence efforts (Corvington 1974). Though a military police unit and therefore under the direction of the Haitian army, BRIC nonetheless operated almost completely outside the bounds of the army hierarchy, answering directly to the highest echelons of government. Under the Duvalier dictatorship, the unit's name was formally changed to the Anti-Gang Investigation and Intelligence Service (Service d'Investigation et de Recherche Anti-Gang). In 1986, Anti-Gang was divested of some of its intelligence responsibilities when the Ministry of the Interior created the National Intelligence Service (Service d'Intelligence Nationale) in order to take jurisdiction over domestic intelligence efforts, which mostly amounted to surveillance and harassment of anti-Duvalierist elements. Anti-Gang continued to be housed in the headquarters of the military police until the army's dissolution in 1995, when the unit became a demobilized state paramilitary force, its offices and detention centre relocated to its present headquarters in the Port-au-Prince central police precinct.

In November 1994, Parliament passed a law creating the PNH in anticipation of the dissolution of FADH. In early 1995, along with the establishment of a Code of Conduct and an Office of Inspector-General, an Interim

Public Security Force (IPSF) was formed and composed largely of former soldiers and refugees from rapid-training camps at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Its mission was to quickly establish and maintain civil security and order as the country demobilized the army and until the first contingent of regular PNH officers could be trained and deployed. As police officers successively graduated the four-month training course at the National Police Academy (Académie Nationale de Police) in Petionville, individual IPSF officers were steadily deactivated from service until the PNH's ranks were sufficiently filled for the complete dissolution of the interim force by presidential decree in December 1995. Over the course of their demobilization, IPSF officers were absorbed into a range of newly created, specialized security units, among them the Palace Guard (Unité de Sécurité Générale du Palais Nationale)— which together with the Presidential Guard was originally composed of over 450 former soldiers—and the Ministerial Security Corps (Corps de Sécurité Ministérielle) whose commanding officers until fairly recently were all former military personnel. The remaining 1598 IPSF officers were incorporated into the PNH, over 600 of whom were former FADH soldiers (Organization of American States 1997).

From its inception, the PNH has been fraught with civil and human rights violations, a tendency from which it has never truly divorced itself. Since its activation, the force has been indicted annually by international human rights groups (including the UN High Commission on Human Rights) for a broad spectrum of abuses ranging from the beating, torturing, and killing of suspects to the blind discharging of weapons into peaceful crowds (Amnesty International 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Drummond 1997; Human Rights Watch 2003; Organization of American States 2002; UN Commission on Human Rights 1996; U.S. Department of State 1999).

Since 1994, some paramilitary subunits of the PNH have incrementally divested themselves of control by government authority and today operate as almost completely autonomous agencies that are answerable directly to executive authority. Among these are the Compagnie d'Intervention et de Maintien de l'Ordre or CIMO (a tactical riot control unit), the Groupe d'Intervention de la Police Nationale d'Haïti or GIPNH (a rapid-response intervention group, similar to American SWAT units) and the Bureau de Lutte contre le Trafic des Stupéfiants or BLTS (the counter-narcotics unit). These recent descendants of the PNH (many seeded with former FADH officers), along with the various domestic intelligence agencies with clear FADH pedigrees like SAG, display the strongest paramilitary tendencies and repressive proclivities of the many other state and civil groups wielding arms in the current civil war.

Up until their recent orders to defend the Haitian government against the rebel insurgency, Haiti's police paramilitaries have functioned primarily as the principal state weapon against the *zenglendo* gangs perpetrating a diverse array of civil and political crimes from banditry and bank robbery to neighbourhood occupations and street assassinations. Few of the operations executed by the units have had much of an impact, perhaps because individual *zenglendo* are much more fragmented in their political loyalties to one another than is generally believed. Most arrests are of solitary armed bandits who are picked up on neighbourhood sweeps for anti-government clans. Specifically targeting the hyper-violent slum areas of the capital, the paramilitaries employ rapid intervention operations to comb the neighbourhoods for political suspects. Given the civil sector's collective fear of the carelessness of *zenglendo* violence and their frustration with the craven lawlessness of the public domain, swift and aggressive paramilitary action has been sanctioned by many of the city's residents, especially merchants, market women, vendors and tradesmen whose livelihoods have been most crippled by Port-au-Prince's disorderly streets. By the time the rebel uprising began in February 2004, the various tactical units of the PNH had assumed a distinctly militant posture toward the civil society at large, one reminiscent of the army police units under Cedras.

Confrontation: The Civil War Begins

In early February 2004, four bystanders were killed and 20 wounded when the loosely organized FRA (Front de Résistance de l'Artibonite), armed with an assortment of handguns and old (some rusty) bolt-action M14s left over from last century's army, overran the PNH barracks in Haiti's third largest city of Gonaïves. The attack touched off an already brewing war between supporters of then-sitting President Aristide and his opponents who contend, along with most of the international community, that the elections that won him the National Palace and his Fanmi Lavalas partisans 13 of the available 15 seats in Parliament were rigged.

In its vehement turn against the Aristide government, the FRA orchestrated a series of terrorist attacks and violent demonstrations throughout the towns and cities in the country's north which has left scores dead and hundreds wounded since September 2003. The FRA easily overtook Gonaïves after the poorly armed and utterly overwhelmed police officers fled their posts under the onslaught. FRA rebels cut cellular and landline commu-

nications in the area and erected barricades of rubble, tires and flaming vehicles around the city limits, intermittently blocking roads and bridges leading from the capital, a defence intended to slow government response.

From his base camp in Gonaïves, Butteur Metayer broadcasted a call over the radio to anti-Aristide factions throughout the country to take up arms against the Fanmi Lavalas government and the National Police, now widely seen as an institution loyal to the president. Out of hiding and exile came a host of rebel groups, including the "New Army" made up primarily of former members of the FADH. One of their leaders is former army sergeant Louis Jodel Chamblain, whom Haiti's Truth and Justice Commission had suspected of engineering the massacre of over 30 voters who lined up to cast their ballots in a civilian-run election in 1987. In 1993, Chamblain helped to found the viciously anti-Lavalas Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (Front pour l'Avancement et de le Progres d'Haïti, FRAPH), a Port-au-Prince terrorist organization with Duvalierist and FADH support held responsible for the killing of hundreds of Aristide loyalists during the Cedras coup. In 1994, Chamblain fled to the neighbouring Dominican Republic after it became clear that he was to be held accountable for the 1987 voter massacre. He returned to Haiti with his former military colleagues to take the northern city of Cap Haïtien on February 23, 2004.

Chamblain drank rum and danced in the streets that day with Guy Philippe, a former FADH soldier who fled Haiti for Ecuador after the Cedras coup government was ousted from power by U.S. forces in September 1994. Upon his return to Haiti in 1995, Philippe was integrated into the fledgling police corps, and served as the police chief of Delmas and later Cap Haïtien. He fled to the Dominican Republic after a warrant for his arrest was issued for his role in plotting the failed coup attempt against Aristide in 2001. Philippe re-entered Haiti in February 2004 to merge his own crew of rebels with New Army forces. After the seizure of Cap Haïtien, Philippe took command of the now-confederated New Army,[7] christened them the Front for the Liberation of Haiti (Front de Libération d'Haïti) and began plotting an assault on the National Palace to arrest Aristide on charges of corruption. After this, the plan was explicit: to reinstitute the Haitian army, which the Front claimed had been illegally dissolved by Aristide in violation of the standing constitution of the Republic, ratified in 1987.[8]

As the north burned, the sprawling capital of Port-au-Prince was put under a state of siege. Government forces presided over all auspices of social life in the public domain, preparing for a showdown with the rebels on the streets of the capital. Clad in the dichromatic drab of Haiti's paramilitaries (all gunmetal-black and khaki) the troopers are the very spectacle of creole colony, a fusion of indigenous authoritarian police labour equipped with hypermodern hardware imported from the United States. Unlike the postcolonial army of the past, Haiti's paramilitaries are well-outfitted with state-of-the-art materiel that 10 years of foreign military aid (ostensibly intended to support a stronger civilian police force) can buy. Sporting riot helmets, face shields, gas masks, Kevlar vesting, composite plastic knee and elbow pads, M16A2 assault rifles, combat shotguns, machine pistols, hand grenades and steel-spring batons, tactical units of SAG, CIMO, GIPINH and the PNH braced themselves against the walls of the government district as fiercely pro-Aristide *chimère* (rumoured to have been issued their less sophisticated but sufficient weapons by Fanmi Lavalas partisan bosses) littered the streets of Port-au-Prince with *bwokay*, barricades of many types, most of them set aflame. The noxious smell of burning tires fed to the *bwokay* settled into the very fabric of street life in the capital, gagging the city with black soot that mixed with the choking smog of auto exhaust and charcoal smoke that has long been typical of the city's ecological woes. As I made my way around Bel Air on the eve of an apparent rebel assault on the neighbourhood, a street boy named Mathias who I had known from years before ran up to me and gleefully waved a fistful of gourde notes. "Kwis! Kwis!" he called to me,

> If my eyes did not tell me so, I would believe you were not really here. It is a bad time here, man. You will not be able to work here now. It's crazy. The army is back, Kwis. The police are frightened. The people have no security, nothing.

I asked him about the money he held in his hand. "Are you working while this is going on?" He had always made a decent living on the street washing cars.

> Oh yes, man. There is much money for us street kids to have now. These men came to me, they are with Titid [Aristide], see. And they find me and Jimmi and Ti Frè—they are kids that you know, Kwis. We were wiping cars in Delmas and they say to us, "come with us to [Rue] Capois [the large boulevard near the National Palace] and you will make a lot of money." Now they pay us to work the *bwokay*. We throw tires on the flames, we keep them burning. Look at my money, Kwis! I make a lot of gourdes now!

We talked some more and he wished me good courage before running back to work the blockades. As I watched Mathias take up his dangerous post with other boys beside

the fires, I thought about how few cars there were on the street, and how few motorists in this time of war would stop to get their car wiped down by a street boy. Mathias had adapted well to the war economy.

Since January 2004, a fragmentary coalition of students, political dissidents, merchants, civic and church groups and businessmen known as the Group of 184 (Groupe de 184) had been agitating for Aristide's resignation and have clashed with armed *chimère* in several skirmishes and demonstrations-cum-riots in which people have been killed and wounded in the ensuing exchanges of gunfire. The PNH and the paramilitaries have fired ambivalently into the crowds, often panicking and fleeing as the crowds have turned ugly and against them. Despite the arrival of international peacekeeping forces, violent confrontations among *chimère,* rebel clans and their sympathizers, the PNH, paramilitary troopers, student demonstrators and partisan street clans have continued and have been added to the matrix of Haitian social violence already woven with the crimes of the *zenglendo,* FRAPH terrorists, FADH loyalists, drug gangs and vigilance brigades. This is before we consider the sporadic attacks of homicidal vengeance and sexual brutality (long a social concern in Haiti) that now may opportunistically pose as political, rather than pathological, violence.

As the rebels moved from village to town during the early days of the uprising, they sacked and torched police precincts and private homes, freed hundreds of violent prisoners from criminal detention,[9] and seized stores of automatic weapons, uniforms, helmets, identity cards and badges from the provincial arsenals of the PNH. Markets and schools throughout 60% of the country, some in regions that remain rebel-held territory outside of government control, are still shuttered because many farmers, vendors, teachers and students are unable or unwilling to travel dangerous roads to return from their places of internal exile in the Haiti's west and south.

A full-scale New Army assault and a certain civilian massacre in the capital was only averted when Aristide, under strong pressure from the U.S. and France, resigned his duties as president and quit Haiti for the Central African Republic on February 29, 2004, later to take up exile in South Africa where he resides today. An advance contingent of U.S. troops arrived in the country the day following his departure, in support of American forces already defending the U.S. Embassy in downtown Port-au-Prince. They were later joined by Canadian, French, Venezuelan and Argentine peacekeepers, and were eventually replaced by a Brazilian contingent that arrived in mid-2004 to assume control of UN forces. Since then, peacekeepers have started the long and treacherous task of disarming a civilian population with tens of thousands of illegal side-arms, semi-automatic rifles and machineguns. The job will be all the more difficult now that vast stores of police hardware and uniforms are now in the possession of rebel insurgents. In some villages in the north, rebels have completely replaced the National Police and are dressed in the full uniform of the PNH, badges, weapons and all. They have begun to assume a semi-official role in security operations, their activities condoned though not overtly supported by the provisional government which has come close to full paralysis under the onslaught of pro-Aristide violence and police and paramilitary retaliations. Days after U.S. troops arrived in March 2004, a fierce gun battle erupted in the seaside Port-au-Prince slum of La Saline as rebel soldiers attempted to disarm a gang of *chimère.* Several civilians were wounded in the exchange of fire. Neither the PNH nor the peacekeepers were anywhere in sight. Since September 2004, two UN peacekeepers have been wounded in clashes with the *chimère,* and during the second week of October 2004, five beheaded bodies were discovered on the streets of the capital. They remain unidentified: erased, deleted, edited out, made invisible.

It is difficult to tell if there can now or ever be a public trust in the Haitian police, regardless of who is wearing the uniform. The history of instability within the PNH and its disparate and fragmented paramilitary units has caused nationwide uneasiness over their tactical similarities to the old FADH. Their tenuous grip on authority and control in the country has been severely compromised by rebel victories, and this has led to the restoration of what is essentially martial law in the capital where the struggle to regain state control is presently at its fiercest. The New Army is energized and mobilized, empowered by the failure of anyone to disarm them or to contain their return to the political arena. The upshot is that Port-au-Prince has acquired the now-hallmark characteristics of large cities in post-industrial, post-occupation, democratizing nation-states in the developing world: an utterly militarized public domain, irreconcilable political polarization, upstart neighbourhood warlords, criminal opportunists, incipient opposition parties, authoritarian governance, a profound scarcity of basic resources and legions of poor, disaffected, unseen citizens who are every day reconstituting their broken worlds—social, cultural, familial, moral worlds—that have been left bleeding and fragmented on the pavement in the wake of political terror.

Ethnography and the Anthropology of Violence

In her important study of the symbolic representations and exchanges that mediate the social relations between occupying Israeli and Egyptian armies and their Bedouin subjects in the Sinai, Smadar Lavie argued that everyday life was so transformed by omnipresent occupation that it "had permeated...discourses as delicate and intimate as those between husbands and wives" (1990: 6). It is amid such transformations, recreations of cultural relations, that the meanings of violence are to be found. Any anthropology of violence must therefore pay as much attention to the poetics of lives lived in war as to the structural and infrastructural realities that produce them, insofar as violence is far more than embodied acts of physical aggression. War itself must be seen first as a larger macro-dialectical move through factional political histories marked by ever-shifting alliances and social relations that culminate, rather than erupt, in spontaneous acts of brutality and aggression. But war is more than this. It is also a micro-dialectical move through the liminal, shattered worlds of citizens forced to suffer, labour, survive and adapt on their way to reconstituted ones. Seen in this way, the aftermath of war is all at once the end of fighting and the beginning, if not the continuation, of social, cultural, emotional and moral recovery. For anthropology to be effective in its explications of violent conflict, it must be prepared to engage an exhaustive analysis of the historical, economic and political realities which give rise to conflict in the first place, catalyzing transformations of individual and collective selves.

Throughout this article I have attempted to apply this strategy of analysis to the war that is raging on the streets of Port-au-Prince today. Rather than draw broad anthropological conclusions about the conflict from specific, decontextualized and isolated acts of aggression that I have documented over the course of my work in Haiti, I have opted to pull back the ethnographic lens and take a more sophisticated approach; one that does not limit the analysis to sweeping claims of an abstract Haitian "authoritarian habitus," and one that avoids oversimplifications of the war as a momentary crisis of social structure. By linking the state of rural decline in the Haitian countryside to the abject poverty, spatial mayhem, political chaos and human misery that occur on the streets of the capital, the underlying causes of popular frustration and desperation are brought into stark relief as the persistent catalyst of national instability. The exhaustive history of crime and factional partisanship and the state's paramilitary responses to it illustrate the complexities and shifting nature of violence as a dialectical political process in Haiti, giving lie to the notion that the war in Port-au-Prince is being fought by neatly compartmentalized fighting units: the "pro-Aristide gangs" and "government forces." Finally, the narrative accounts of those who live the war, who work the war, who leap the puddles of blood on their way to school and market, who traipse around the burned out cars with grimacing skeletons inside as they look for an open pharmacy, who are beheaded in rioting, who lose everything to the looting, who are shot in the foot by *zenglendo* as they sell mangoes on the street, who are raped and then strangled with their own underwear, who are making a living now by throwing tires onto flaming barricades, who are struggling to worship, to eat, to sleep, to work, to breastfeed, to marry, to mourn, to buy, to sell, to love, in a word to *survive;* it is these stories that serve anthropologies of war by reminding us that as our ethnographic gaze is seduced by the movement of soldiers and materiel, by the gunplay and its victims, there are hundreds of thousands more who are equally touched by the conflict and who are simply struggling to live. In the midst of the war and in its aftermath, it is these citizens who are carrying on and who will continue to carry on the work of re-aggregating society back into itself.

Ethnography remains the database for this anthropology, providing the raw material from which broad ethnological generalizations may be made. More detailed ethnographies of the social and political contexts of "ethnographic states of emergency" (Feldman 1995) must be made in the interest of developing not a set of general principles about the causes of violence, but a better understanding of the particular contexts out of which it emerges. Ethnographies written from the epicentres of war and conflict (Nordstrom 1997), wherein lie the seeds of cultural creativity, will be the most beneficial to our ongoing attempts to elicit cross-cultural meanings from localized violent acts. Such ethnographies ought to be firmly grounded in the theoretical understanding of the complex and interrelated dynamic that imparts violence with nascent cultural creativity.

If ethnographies conducted in the midst of conflict are the foundation of the anthropology of violence, then a place like Haiti can provide many bricks in support of that foundation. Though Haiti has seen more than its share of violent episodes throughout its history, it would be irresponsible and sweeping to argue that the causes and consequences of each are repetitive or that they are tied to a particular class conflict or cultural habitus. While each of Haiti's past and present crises appear to be of the same type as the last, we are pressed to recall that each conflict, like each brick in a wall, is atypical with a unique

history of formation and context that the apparent uniformity of the present whole belies. As we continue to develop meaningful (ethnographic, dialectical, narrative, interpretive, historicized, contextualized) understandings of the processes of destruction and re-formation that have produced the entire phylogeny of unrest in Haitian politics, so will we be able to formulate ever clearer perspectives on our comparative study of particular violent events across space and time. Only from a growing base of descriptive and interpretive data on human conflict in specific spaces will broad ethnological understandings of the mortar that binds all wars together as one processual system emerge, making a realistic and meaningful anthropology of violence all the more viable.

J. Christopher Kovats-Bernat, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Muhlenberg College, 2400 Chew Street, Allentown, Pennsylvania, 18104, U.S.A. E-mail: bernat@muhlenberg.edu

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to the reviewers of this article for their insightful suggestions and critiques. Grateful acknowledgment is made to my partner Dina and to my departmental colleague Dr. Tammy Lewis, for their support and encouragement during the fieldwork for the project upon which this article is based.

Notes

1 A folkloric, two-headed, fire-spitting monstrosity, part-lion, part-goat, and with a serpent for a tail.

2 Residents in the volatile Bel Air slum of the capital, an Aristide stronghold, claim to have witnessed the summary killing of 13 people by PNH officers in October 2004. That same month, one Brazilian and one Argentine UN peacekeeper were shot in disarmament operations in Port-au-Prince.

3 Lowest-cost public transportation in Haiti, and therefore the transit of the masses. *Tap-taps* are colourfully painted minibuses and pick-up trucks, often blaring loud Haitian pop music, that each day carry multitudes throughout the country for a few gourdes each.

4 Sidney Mintz (1985) adopted a similar approach in his seminal examination of the role played by global commercial interests and colonial power struggles that have guided and resulted from the production and consumption of sugar throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries.

5 Lavalas means "a cleansing flood," and here refers to the tremendous flow of people-power behind Aristide's political rise.

6 Haiti serves as a major trans-shipment port for Colombian cocaine entering the United States. Profit-taking from the lucrative drug-trafficking trade has long been a perquisite of political office in the country. Much of the graffiti covering the walls of downtown Port-au-Prince during the 2004 rebel uprising condemned Aristide as *sal diye dwòg*—a filthy drug dealer.

7 On March 2, 2004, with U.S., Canadian and French forces entering the capital, Philippe proclaimed himself "chief" of the military clans united under the umbrella of the New Army.

8 Title XI of Haiti's current constitution (1987) does provide for a Haitian Army. In a strange and perhaps intentional oversight, Aristide did not pursue a constitutional dissolution of the army when he disbanded it by presidential decree in 1995. Rebel soldiers continue to enlist new members in Haiti today, in preparation for a full reconstitution of the Haitian army. They are growing in boldness. Following the disaster of Hurricane Jeanne in 2004, UN forces had to raise their weapons to disperse uniformed New Army soldiers and prevent them from seizing food aid from a World Food Program warehouse, which the rebels said they intended to distribute to those who most needed it in Gonaïves. One rebel soldier whom I met in Port-au-Prince in March 2004 cited Title XI, Article 266 of the constitution in forcefully declaring the obligation of "his army"—the rebel insurgency—to "defend the country in the event of war" (subsection a) and to "lend assistance to the police when [they] are unable to handle a situation" (subsection d).

9 In a report issued during the uprising, Amnesty International warned that among those freed in rebel jailbreaks were high-ranking members of FADH incarcerated for massacres and atrocities committed during the Cedras coup d'etat. Jean-Claude Duperval, Hérbert Valmond, Carl Dorelien and Castera Cénafils were sentenced to forced labour for life for their involvement in the 1994 Raboteau (in Gonaïves) massacre in which almost 50 Haitian civilians were killed by the Haitian army. Jackson Joanis was sentenced to forced labour for life for his role in the assassinations of Antoine Izméry and Father Jean-Marie Vincent, both fervent Aristide supporters. Prosper Avril was leader of the 1988 coup d'état and indicted in a 1990 assault on the village of Piatre by proxy strongmen hired by local landlords and FADH soldiers. Eleven were killed in the massacre that ensued, almost 400 homes were razed, livestock were slaughtered and defiled in the fields and crops were uprooted. The conflict originated with a disputed land tenure claim between poor farmers in the village and two absentee landholding families suspected of having bankrolled the attack (Amnesty International 2004a; National Coalition for Haitian Rights 2004).

References

Abbink, John

2000 Preface: Violation and Violence as Cultural Phenomena. *In* Meanings of Violence: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. Goran Aijmer and John Abbink, eds. Pp. xi-xvii. New York: New York University Press.

Amnesty International

2000 Haiti: Unfinished Business—Justice and Liberties at Risk. AMR 36/01/00.

2002 Haiti: Political Leaders Must Reject Violence. AMR 36/016/2002.

2003 Annual Report 2003. POL 10/003/2003.

2004a Haiti: Perpetrators of Past Abuses Threaten Human Rights and the Reestablishment of the Rule of Law. AMR/36/013/2004.

2004b Haiti: Amnesty International Calls on the Transitional Government to Set Up an Independent Commission of Enquiry into Summary Executions Attributed to Members of the Haitian National Police. AMR 36/060/2004.

Aristide, Jean-Bertrand
2001 Address to a gathering of the Haitian National Police. Port-au-Prince, Haiti. June 20.

Bourgois, Phillipe
1990 Confronting Anthropological Ethics: Ethnographic Lessons from Central America. Journal of Peace Research 27(1): 43-54.

Catholic Institute for International Relations
1996 Haiti: Building Democracy. London: CIIR.

Cherestal, Jean-Marie
2002 Radio Interview. Radio Vision 2000. Port-au-Prince, Haiti. January 15.

Corvington, Georges
1974 Port-au-Prince au cours des ans: 1804-1888. Port-au-Prince: Henri Deschamps.

Daniel, E. Valentine
1996 Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropology of Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Das, Veena, Arthur Kleinman and Margaret Lock
2001 Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering, and Recovery. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Drummond, Tammerlin
1997 A Constabulary of Thugs. Time Magazine, February 17: 62-3.

Fatton, Robert Jr.
2003 The Haitian Authoritarian Habitus and the Contradictory Legacy of 1804. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association, Belize City: Belize. May 28.

Feldman, Allen
1991 Formations of Violence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1995 Ethnographic States of Emergency. *In* Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival. Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C.G.M. Robben, eds. Pp. 224-252. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Freeman, Bryant C., and Jowel C. Laguerre, eds.
1996 Haitian-English Dictionary. Lawrence: University of Kansas.

Gledhill, John
1994 Power and Its Disguises: Anthropological Perspectives on Politics. London: Pluto Press.

Green, Linda
1995 Living in a State of Fear. *In* Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies in Violence and Survival. Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C.G.M. Robben, eds. Pp. 105-127. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hirsch, Eric
1995 Introduction: Landscape—between Place and Space. *In* The Anthropology of Landscape: Perspectives on Place and Space. Eric Hirsch and Michael O'Hanlon, eds. Pp. 1-30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Human Rights Watch
2003 World Report 2003. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Kovats-Bernat [Bernat], J. Christopher
1999 Children and the Politics of Violence in Haitian Context: Statistical Violence, Scarcity, and Street Child Agency in Port-au-Prince. Critique of Anthropology 19(2): 121-38.
2000 Anti-Gang, Arimaj, and the War on Street Children. Peace Review September 12(3): 415-21.
2001 The Impact of Poverty, Violence, and State Repression on the Cultural Identity and Social Agency of Street Children in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Temple University: Philadelphia.
2002 Negotiating Dangerous Fields: Pragmatic Strategies for Fieldwork Amid Violence and Terror. American Anthropologist 104(1): 208-222.
2006 Sleeping Rough in Port-au-Prince: An Ethnography of Street Children and Violence in Haiti: Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.

Lavie, Smadar
1990 The Poetics of Military Occupation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lee, Raymond M.
1995 Dangerous Fieldwork. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Low, Setha, and Denise Lawrence- Zúñiga
2003 Locating Culture. *In* The Anthropology of Space and Place. Setha Low and Denise Lawrence-Zúñiga, eds. Pp. 1-48. Oxford: Blackwell.

Manigat, Sabine.
1997 Haiti: The Popular Sectors and the Crisis in Port-au-Prince. *In* The Urban Caribbean: Transition to the new Global Economy. Alejandro Portes, Carlos Dore-Cabral, and Patricia Landolt, eds. Pp. 87-123. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.

Mintz, Sidney
1985 Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History. New York: Penguin Books.

Nash, June
1976 Ethnology in a Revolutionary Setting. *In* Ethics and Anthropology: Dilemmas in Fieldwork. Michael Rynkiewich and James Spradley, eds. Pp. 148-166. New York: Wiley and Sons.

National Coalition for Haitian Rights
2001 Human Rights in Haiti—December 2001 Report. Electronic document, http://www.nchr.org/hrp/haiti_office/report_dec_2001.htm, accessed April 11, 2004.
2004 Piatre Massacre. Electronic document, http://www.nchrhaiti.org/article.php3?id_article=142, accessed November 6, 2004.

Nordstrom, Carolyn
1997 A Different Kind of War Story. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
2004 Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Nordstrom, Carolyn, and JoAnn Martin
1992 The Culture of Conflict: Field Reality and Theory. *In* The Paths to Domination, Resistance, and Terror. Carolyn Nordstrom and JoAnn Martin, eds. Pp. 3-17. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Organization of American States

1997 The Haitian National Police and Human Rights. Special Report of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. Electronic document, http://www.upd.oas.org/special/hnpe.htm, accessed March 12, 2000.

2002 The Haitian National Police and Human Rights Summary. Electronic document, http://www.upd.oas.org/ special/Haiti/resumee.htm, accessed July 7, 2003.

Pan American Health Organization

2004 The Haiti Crisis: Health Risks. Electronic document, http://www.paho.org/english/dd/ped/HaitiHealth Impact. htm, accessed April 11, 2004.

Peritore, Patrick N,

1990 Reflections on Dangerous Fieldwork. American Sociologist 21(4): 359-373.

Ridgeway, James

1994 The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis. Washington, DC: Essential Books.

Robben, Antonius C.G.M.

1995 The Politics of Truth and Emotion among Victims and Perpetrators of Violence. Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C.G.M. Robben, eds. Pp. 81-103. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Robben, Antonius C.G.M., and Carolyn Nordstrom

1995 The Anthropology and Ethnography of Violence and Sociopolitical Conflict. *In* Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival. Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C.G.M. Robben, eds. Pp. 1-24. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Scheper-Hughes, Nancy, and Margaret Lock

1987 The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to Future Work in Medical Anthropology. Medical Anthropology Quarterly 1(1): 6-41.

Sluka, Jeffrey A.

1990 Participant Observation in Violent Social Contexts. Human Organization 49(2): 114-126.

1995 Reflections on Managing Danger in Fieldwork: Dangerous Anthropology in Belfast. *In* Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival. Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C.G.M. Robben, eds. Pp. 276-294. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stotzky, Irwin P.

1997 Silencing the Guns in Haiti. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Taussig, Michael

1987 Colonialism, Shamanism, and the Wild Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

UN Commission on Human Rights

1994 Situation of Human Rights in Haiti. Report to the Special Rapporteur. E/CN.4/1994/55.

1995 Situation of Human Rights in Haiti. Report to the Special Rapporteur. E/CN.4/1995/59.

1996 Situation of Human Rights in Haiti. Report to the Special Rapporteur. E/CN.4/1996/94.

UNICEF

2004 Haiti: Country in Crisis. Electronic document, http://www.unicef.org/emerg/haiti/index.html, accessed April 10, 2004.

U.S. Department of State

1999 Haiti Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998. Washington, DC. February 26.

Art and Museum Review / Compte rendu d'exposition

Le Musée de Grand Manan, Île de Grand Manan, Nouveau-Brunswick

Recenseure : *France Tardif*
Université du Québec à Montréal

L'île de Grand Manan est située au Nouveau-Brunswick dans la Baie de Fundy, près du Maine, une île accessible seulement par traversier. C'est un lieu reconnu par les ornithologues et amateurs de baleines. Pour ceux qui s'intéressent à l'histoire locale, on y trouve aussi un musée, une maison blanche avec sous-sol, qui a été agrandie à deux reprises. L'institution prend son origine dans la *Gerrish House Society,* fondée en 1961 par L. Keith Ingersoll et d'autres résidants de Grand Manan. Le musée ouvre ses portes en 1967 et prend son nom actuel en 1974. Son objectif est de «conserver, d'exposer et de préserver le patrimoine naturel et social de l'île». Comme beaucoup de musées d'histoire locale, l'intérieur est très chargé. Néanmoins, une visite attentive révèle une diversité insoupçonnée. Mille et un détails, par touches successives, nous font découvrir la vie et l'histoire des habitants de ce lieu si particulier.

Dès l'entrée, le foyer principal présente l'histoire locale à travers certains habitants qui se sont distingués. On y trouve un espace consacré à Willa Cather, écrivaine états-unienne renommée, qui a passé ses étés à Grand Manan du milieu des années 1920 jusqu'aux années 1940; une autre partie propose de l'information et des objets ayant appartenu à L. Keith Ingersoll et Elmer Wilcox, principaux fondateurs du musée. On y offre aussi une exposition de photographies de fleurs sauvages de M. Wilcox, un métier à tisser et différents accessoires pour travailler les textiles, ainsi qu'une courtepointe faite à la main commémorant le bicentenaire du Nouveau-Brunswick. Cette pièce unique est composée de 200 carrés réalisés par différentes personnes de l'île lors d'un concours de courtepointe sur le bicentenaire.

À gauche de l'entrée, nous pouvons admirer The Moses Memorial Collection, la plus grande collection du musée, présentée dans 18 grandes vitrines. Elle comprend plus de 300 espèces oiseaux qui vivent à Grand Manan ou dans les îles autour. Ornithologue très connu et excellent taxidermiste, M. Moses a légué sa collection d'oiseaux aux enfants de l'île de Grand Manan en 1953.

Derrière le foyer principal, deux galeries proposent des petites expositions sur différents sujets : l'histoire des premiers colons et des premiers médecins de l'île, ainsi que l'histoire des gardiens de phare. Une partie de ces espaces est réservée aux artistes et artisans qui habitent l'île et rend hommage à leur talent et à leur ingéniosité. Finalement, un îlot est consacré à l'explication d'une recherche sur le brouillard qui est en cours depuis plusieurs décennies sur l'île de Kent. L'une des galeries abrite une spectaculaire lentille de Fresnell pour phares. De dimension imposante, la lentille occupe deux étages : sa tête surgit du plancher du rez-de-chaussée, alors que sa base est déposée sur le plancher du sous-sol. Cette lentille, installée en 1902 sur Gannet Rock, constituait à l'époque le deuxième phare le plus brillant au monde.

Un escalier circulaire mène au sous-sol. Au moment de notre visite, le mur au pied de l'escalier offrait une exposition de photos sur la vie des enfants à Grand Manan. L'une d'elles, montrant des enfants qui reviennent de l'école, a accroché notre regard : les enfants ne descendent pas d'un autobus scolaire, mais d'un traversier, à l'époque où il n'y avait vraisemblablement pas d'école sur l'île. Les salles du sous-sol proposent de l'information sur la pêche, les naufrages et l'histoire de l'équipement agricole. Un espace est consacré à Ernest Guptill, un physicien natif de Grand Manan, qui a inventé un type d'antenne à micro-ondes. Une autre pièce est dédiée aux formations géologiques très variées de l'île et comprend de l'information écrite et des spécimens rocheux. Au cours de cet été 2005, des dessins et graphiques explicatifs réalisés par des écoliers suite à une visite au musée, étaient exposés tout près de la même information donnée par le musée.

Le musée conserve également les archives de Grand Manan, qu'il gère conjointement avec la Société historique de Grand Manan. Une petite boutique offre tout un éventail d'articles, ayant tous un rapport avec l'île et réalisés par des artisans qui visitent ou habitent Grand Manan. Le musée, aujourd'hui financé principalement par les dons, est ouvert durant la période estivale. On y propose des conférences deux ou trois soirs par semaine portant sur des thèmes reliées à l'île; nous avons pu assister à deux soirées, toutes deux très différentes

et très intéressantes : l'une sur les baleines et l'autre sur la photographie.

Certains points sur les expositions demeurent obscurs : parmi toutes ces expositions, lesquelles sont temporaires ou permanente? Est-ce que les objets et photos sont prêtés temporairement par les gens de la communauté? Est-ce que le musée possède une collection et, dans l'affirmative, tous ses artefacts sont-ils mis en exposition? Finalement, nous sommes restés sur notre appétit concernant la petite école de Deep Cove (1889-1947) qui se trouve sur le terrain, derrière l'édifice du musée. L'intérieur est bien entretenu et contient tous les pupitres, livres, cahiers et meubles d'époque, du moins selon ce que nous avons pu voir, car elle était malheureusement fermée. Nous ignorons si le musée entretient un projet pour ouvrir éventuellement cette école aux visiteurs.

Ce musée dynamique, qui comprend aussi un centre de documentation, a éveillé notre intérêt et suscité notre admiration : ceux qui s'en occupent arrivent à présenter un bon éventail de thèmes, avec des moyens fort limités, sans prétention, tout en donnant de l'information juste dans une ambiance agréable.

Book Reviews / Comptes rendus

Charles-Henry Pradelles de Latour, *Rites thérapeutiques dans une société matrilinéaire. Le* gèrem *des Pèrè (Cameroun),* Paris : Karthala, 2005, 248 pages (Collection «Hommes et Sociétés»).

Recenseur : *Jean-Claude Muller*
Université de Montréal

Les Pèrè sont une petite société vivant dans l'Adamaoua, à la frontière du Nigéria. Originellement une ethnie acéphale formée d'un certain nombre de matriclans nommés, la colonisation peule du XIXe siècle leur a imposé des chefs peuls qui perpétrèrent leurs exactions jusqu'en 1950, date très tardive à laquelle les administrateurs français délivrèrent les Pèrè du joug peul et instaurèrent une nouvelle structure administrative qui n'a cependant pas transformé l'organisation sociale et matrimoniale traditionnelle. Les Pèrè sont matrilinéaires et, en principe, patrivirilocaux, ce qui cause maints problèmes. La nomenclature de la parenté est de type Crow mais la structure d'alliance n'est pourtant pas un système semi-complexe. Un homme peut épouser l'une ou l'autre de ses deux cousines croisées mais il y a une nette préférence pour la cousine croisée patrilatérale, à tel point que l'auteur qualifie ce mariage de préférentiel, puisqu'il représente 14 % de tous les mariages. Cette cousine est une nièce du père de son mari, donc elle appartient au même matriclan et il n'en a rien à craindre. Ce type de mariage permet aussi aux possesseurs d'un *gèrem,* l'attirail thérapeutique principal d'un matriclan mais qui, néanmoins, se transmet de père en fils, de rester au plus près du matriclan du possesseur en systématisant ce type d'alliance génération après génération, un petit-fils héritier d'un *gèrem* étant du même matriclan que son grand-père. La possession d'un *gèrem* alterne ainsi entre deux matriclans car il ne faut pas qu'il «s'éloigne» trop de son matriclan d'origine. Le mariage avec la cousine croisée patrilatérale est un moyen élégant de le récupérer à chaque génération alternée.

Les rôles contrastés de père et d'oncle maternel sont hiérarchisés de manière ambiguë, les Pèrè disant que le père est premier et l'oncle second mais avec des nuances car dans certaines prérogatives, l'oncle est clairement premier. L'oncle maintient la continuité des sous-clans par la transmission des traditions et l'héritage des biens, alors que le père préside aux rites des étapes du cycle de la vie—rites de la naissance, mariage des filles et cérémonies funéraires de ses propres enfants, initiations de ceux-ci au *gèrem* (une initiation collective) –, les incorporant ainsi dans son groupe patrilocal dans lequel ils sont connus sous le nom «d'enfants de clan».

Ces *gèrem* sont des cloches de fer accrochées à un anneau et des trompes faites de gourdes collées bout à bout. Les cloches servent à administrer des médicaments et les trompes à initier les jeunes garçons et à «arrêter» les sorciers par des menaces de rétorsion. Les accusations de sorcellerie se font entre les membres les plus proches du matriclan, fils et mère, frères et sœurs, mais surtout entre oncle maternel et neveu utérin. La sorcellerie pèrè est «enracinée dans l'appartenance au clan maternel», l'action du *gèrem* étaye la fonction paternelle. La religion des ancêtres, qui inclut les deux côtés de la parenté, tend à résorber ces différences sur un plan supérieur. On confesse quelquefois ses mauvais penchants, pensées et ressentiments aux ancêtres pour éviter ou faire cesser une quelconque infortune.

Les détenteurs de *gèrem* sont appelés *dugi* et une de leurs prérogatives est de montrer aux enfants à initier, dans une série de rites compliqués, que le *gèrem* n'est pas le monstre griffu aux grands crocs et à la longue queue qui vit dans l'eau et dévore les enfants. Les femmes ont aussi des *dugi,* qui sont recrutées de mère en fille et qui pratiquent également des rites curatifs précédés d'une initiation, aussi bien pour les hommes que pour les femmes et les étrangers. Mais ce n'est pas exactement le pendant des rites d'initiation masculins. Ils en sont même l'antithèse. Rien n'y est montré ou, plus exactement, on ne montre rien et les initiés prétendent voir quelque chose.

Les causes des infortunes ou des maladies font d'abord l'objet d'une divination, dont il existe plusieurs sortes, qui indiquent diverses marches à suivre, la plus commune étant l'un ou l'autre des traitements par le *gèrem.* Les *dugi* effectuent des rites qui incluent les proches du matrilignage du patient, ce qui est l'occasion d'exposer en public les tensions latentes entre les membres du matrilignage et les accusations plus ou moins ouvertes de sorcellerie contre l'un ou l'une d'entre eux que le *gèrem* est chargé de combattre et, au moins temporairement, de désamorcer. Ces allégations de sorcelle-

rie sont, en effet, sans fin comme plusieurs exemples nous le montrent. Mais les *dugi* ont aussi d'autres traitements pour des maux qui relèvent de différentes instances que la sorcellerie.

Les plus grosses infortunes chez les Pèrè étaient une naissance par le siège et celle de jumeaux. Un siège est un signe de bouleversement naturel qui, s'il est caché, fera en sorte que les lions envahiront le village et que les singes dévasteront les champs de sorgho. Il faut donc que les *dugi* qui connaissent la procédure soumettent les deux parents à des rites d'apaisement fort compliqués qui empêcheront ces deux fléaux et qui remettront le monde en ordre. Les Pèrè avancent plusieurs raisons qui font des jumeaux des monstres. L'une d'entre elles soutenait qu'un jumeau était un membre en trop du clan et qu'il ou elle annonçait la mort d'un autre membre du clan. Un des jumeaux était tué et les parents devaient se soumettre à des rites de purification très élaborés. Quelques animaux tués à la chasse faisaient aussi l'objet de rites de purification pour prévenir des catastrophes. Un dernier rite, celui de faire revenir la pluie est examiné en conclusion.

Au travers de tous ces rites se déploie la philosophie complexe des Pèrè que l'auteur nous dévoile pas à pas. Jamais clairement explicitée, l'auteur nous la révèle d'une manière originale au travers de l'interprétation des rites, la récitation des contes et des mythes ainsi que l'évocation de nombre de proverbes.

Indian Country

Essays on Contemporary Native Culture

Gail Guthrie Valaskakis

$28.95 Paper • 304 pp.• 0-88920-479-9 • **Aboriginal Studies** series



"*Indian Country* is a perceptive analysis of the interrelated histories and family encounters of Natives in Canada and the United States. Gail Guthrie Valaskakis weaves the distinct narratives of personal experiences, political practices, treaties, and social science observations into a mature, memorable collection of critical essays."

– Gerald Vizenor, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley

"*Indian Country* is an excellent example of the emerging paradigm of indigenous scholarship in its blend of the personal with indigenous and mainstream academic theory. It is firmly grounded in the personal lived experiences of the author, which ground and inform the theoretical analysis and reflection."

– David Newhouse, Trent University, Peterborough

"Offers a unique perspective on Native political struggles in both Canada and the United States....Literate, well-researched, and matter-of-factly introducing the reader into how the American government, among other entities, regards Native Americans in modern times, *Indian Country* is a welcome contribution to contemporary Native studies shelves and recommended reading for individuals of all backgrounds striving to better understand the Native American experience."

– *The Native American Shelf*

Walking a Tightrope

Aboriginal People and Their Representations

Ute Lischke and David T. McNab, editors

$34.95 Paper • 0-88920-484-5
Aboriginal Studies series
NOW AVAILABLE IN PAPER





Blockades and Resistance

Studies in Actions of Peace and the Temagami Blockades of 1988-89

Bruce W. Hodgins, Ute Lischke, and David T. McNab, editors

$65.00 Cloth • 0-88920-381-4
Aboriginal Studies series

Earth, Water, Air and Fire

Studies in Canadian Ethnohistory

David T. McNab, editor for Nin.Da.Waab.Jig.

$39.95 Paper • 0-88920-297-4
Aboriginal Studies series





Circles of Time

Aboriginal Land Rights and Resistance in Ontario

David T. McNab

$34.95 Paper • 0-88920-338-5
Aboriginal Studies series

Wilfrid Laurier University Press

Toll-free: 866-836-5551 • www.wlupresswlu.ca



Pursuing Giraffe

A 1950s Adventure

Anne Innis Dagg

Paper $28.95 • 0-88920-463-2 • Life Writing series

"At heart, the story is certainly about what she observes, studies, films, and chronicles in 1956 and 1957, details and understandings that had never before been documented about her subject, the beloved giraffe of Africa. But this book is also about one person's intellectual imagination, spirit of adventure, and daring: where she has long dreamed of going, where others either say she shouldn't or cannot go.... Anne Innis Dagg has written a brave and moving account of her time as a young white woman travelling and doing research in Southern and East Africa."

– Mark Behr, from the foreword of *Pursuing Giraffe: A 1950s Adventure*

In the 1950s, Anne Innis Dagg was a young zoologist with a lifelong love of giraffe and a dream to study them in Africa. Based on extensive journals and letters home, *Pursuing Giraffe* vividly chronicles the realization of that dream and the year that she spent studying and documenting giraffe behaviour. Dagg was one of the first zoologists to study wild animals in Africa (before Jane Goodall and Dian Fossey); her memoir captures her youthful enthusiasm for her journey, as well as her naïveté about the complex social and political issues in Africa.

Once in the field, she recorded the complexities of giraffe social relationships but also learned about human relationships in the context of apartheid in South Africa and colonialism in Tanganyika (Tanzania) and Kenya. Hospitality and friendship were readily extended to her as a white woman, but she was shocked by the racism of the colonial whites in Africa. Reflecting the twenty-three-year-old author's response to an "exotic" world far removed from the Toronto where she grew up, the book records her visits to Zanzibar and Victoria Falls and her climb of Mount Kilimanjaro. *Pursuing Giraffe* is a fascinating account that has much to say about the status of women in the mid-twentieth century. The book's foreword by South African novelist Mark Behr (author of *The Smell of Apples* and *Embrace*), provides further context for and insights into Dagg's narrative.

Anne Innis Dagg graduated with a biology degree from the University of Toronto and earned her PhD in animal behaviour from the University of Waterloo—before many women made careers in science. She has published numerous books and articles on animal behaviour and on feminist issues, including *The Feminine Gaze: A Canadian Compendium of Non-Fiction Women Authors and Their Books, 1836-1945* (WLU Press, 2001).



Toll-free: 866-836-5551 • www.wlupresswlu.ca

Note to Contributors / Note à l'intention des auteurs

Anthropologica is a peer-reviewed journal and publishes original manuscripts in all areas of research in cultural and social anthropology. Articles already published or which are about to be published elsewhere will not normally be considered.

MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION
Manuscripts may be submitted electronically by email attachment in MSWORD or WORD PERFECT. Electronic submissions must be accompanied by 3 paper copies of the manuscript. The paper copies and the electronic copy of the article must be identical in content and follow the style guidelines.

STYLE GUIDELINES
Format
Double-spacing is required for all text including notes, bibliography, quotations, and headings. The manuscript should not normally exceed 9000 words or 35 double-spaced pages on 21 x 27 cm (8 1/2 x 11") paper in 12-point font. The name of the author must appear only on the title page.
Title Page
Please indicate title, author, institutional affiliation, mailing address and e-mail address.
Abstract and Keywords
Manuscripts must be accompanied by an abstract not exceeding 100 words. Abstracts and the title of the manuscript should be included on a separate page. A list of 6 keywords in square brackets must follow the abstract. Manuscripts accepted for publication should provide an abstract in both English and French. If this is not possible, the editorial office will provide the translation.
Notes
All notes must follow the text as endnotes and must be double-spaced in 12-point font. Please restrict notes to material that is relevant to the text. Endnotes should begin on a new page and be listed consecutively throughout the article using superscript numerals.
References
Intra-textual references should appear in the form (Godelier 1973: 116-119). If the author's name already appears in the text, it is sufficient to indicate the year and page. To distinguish between multiple entries by the same author published in the same year, use letters (1973a, 1973b). When several entries by multiple authors are cited, they should appears as follows: (Godelier 1973a; Poulantzas 1978).

References cited in the bibliography should be double-spaced and appear after the notes on a separate page. Authors should use the style of referencing which follows:

Articles in journals:
Augé, Marc
1986 L'anthropologie et la maladie. L'Homme 26(1-2): 15.
Books:
Smith, Gavin
1999 Confronting the Present: Towards a Politically Engaged Anthropology. Oxford: Berg.
Saillant, Francine, and Manon Boulianne, eds.
2003 Transformations sociales, genre et santé: Perspectives critiques et comparatives. Paris et Québec: L'Harmattan et les Presses Universitaires de l'Université de Laval.
Chapters in Books:
Muratorio, Blanca M.
1995 Amazonian Windows to the Past: Recovering Women's Histories from the Ecuadorian Upper Amazon. *In* Articulating Hidden Histories: Exploring the Influence of Eric R. Wolf. J. Schneider and R. Rapp, eds. Pp. 322-335. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Graphics
Maps, figures and tables must be captioned and presented in camera-ready form on separate pages with their position in the text indicated. Size should not exceed 16 x 12.5 cm (5 x 8"). Photographs to accompany the text should be high quality black and white prints. Electronic images may also be submitted in high resolution digital format (at least 300 dpi). Images on disk or CD-Rom should be supplied as TIF or JPEG files scanned in high resolution. Please label each file following this example: jsmith_01.tif or jane-d_fig3.jpg.

REVIEWERS
Research articles published in *Anthroplogica* have undergone double-blind peer review. Authors are asked to provide a list of suggested reviewers (with institutional and email addresses). The provision of this list does not determine the selection of reviewers.

Anthropologica publie des manuscrits originaux sur tous les sujets qui touchent à l'Anthropologie. Les manuscrits déjà publiés ou devant l'être ailleurs ne peuvent normalement être acceptés.

SOUMISSION DES MANUSCRITS
Les manuscrits peuvent être soumis sur support électronique et transmis en annexe de courriel en MSWORD ou WORD PERFECT. On devra toutefois faire parvenir à la rédaction 3 copies « papier » du manuscrit. Les deux versions (électronique et papier) doivent être identiques sur les plans du contenu et de la présentation.

PRÉSENTATION DES MANUSCRITS
Les manuscrits doivent être dactylographiés à interligne double y compris les notes, la bibliographie, les citations, les titres et sous-titres. Ils ne devraient pas dépasser 9000 mots ou 35 pages à interligne double sur papier 21 x 27 cm (8 1/2 x 11") au recto seulement, en utilisant une police de 12 points. Le nom de la personne qui soumet le manuscrit ne doit être indiqué que sur la page titre.
Page titre
Veuillez indiquer le titre, l'auteur ou l'auteure, l'institution, l'adresse postale et l'adresse électronique.
Résumé et mots-clés
Chaque manuscrit doit être accompagné d'un résumé n'excédant pas 100 mots. Le titre et le résumé du manuscrit devraient être placés sur une page à part. Une liste de 6 mots-clés devrait être placée entre parenthèses carrées à la fin du résumé. Les manuscrits acceptés pour publication doivent être accompagnés de résumés en français et en anglais. La rédaction peut se charger des traductions de résumés si la personne qui soumet le manuscrit ne le peut pas.
Notes
Les notes doivent être placées à la fin du texte, à interligne double et en caractères de 12 points. Veuillez limiter les notes à des sujets directement reliés au texte. Les notes doivent commencer sur une nouvelle page et correspondre à des appels consécutifs dans le texte indiqués par des chiffres en exposant.
Références
Les renvois bibliographiques dans le texte sont mis entre parenthèses en indiquant l'auteur, l'année de publication et la page, comme par exemple (Godelier 1973 : 116-119). Si le nom de l'auteur apparaît déjà dans le texte, il suffit d'indiquer l'année de publication et la page. On distingue les renvois multiples à un même auteur pour une même année en utilisant des lettres (1973a, 1973b). Plusieurs renvois inclus dans une même parenthèse sont séparés par des points virgules (Godelier 1973a; Poulantzas 1978).

Les références citées dans la bibliographie doivent être dactylographiées à interligne double après les notes et sur une page séparée. Ces références devraient être citées selon le protocole suivant :
Articles dans des revues :
Augé, Marc
1986 Anthropologie et la maladie. L'Homme 26(1-2): 15.
Livres :
Smith, Gavin
1999 Confronting the Present: Towards a Politically Engaged Anthropology. Oxford : Berg.
Saillant, Francine, et Manon Boulianne, dirs.
2003 Transformations sociales, genre et santé : Perspectives critiques et comparatives. Paris et Québec : L'Harmattan et les Presses Universitaires de l'Université de Laval.
Chapitres dans un livre :
Muratorio, Blanca M.
1995 Amazonian Windows to the Past : Recovering Women's Histories from the Ecuadorian Upper Amazon. *Dans* Articulating Hidden Histories : Exploring the Influence of Eric R. Wolf. J. Schneider and R. Rapp, dirs. Pp. 322-335. Berkeley : University of California Press.

Graphiques
Les cartes, figures et tableaux doivent être présentés prêts pour l'impression et ne pas dépasser 16 x 12,5 cm (5 x 8"). Ils sont placés sur des feuilles à part et leur place est indiquée dans le texte. Les photographies à insérer dans le texte doivent être fournies en impression noir et blanc et être d'excellente qualité. Les images électroniques doivent aussi être fournies en format digital en haute résolution (au moins 300 dpi). Les images sur disque ou CD-Rom devraient être acheminées dans des fichiers TIF ou JPEG numérisés en haute résolution. Veuillez identifier chaque fichier selon le protocole suivant : jsmith_01.tif ou jane-d_fig3.jpg.

ÉVALUATION
Chaque manuscrit est soumis pour évaluation à deux personnes choisies en fonction du sujet du texte. On demande aux personnes qui soumettent un manuscrit de fournir une liste de personnes aptes à évaluer leur texte (en indiquant leur affiliation institutionnelle et leur adresse électronique). Le choix de ces personnes, n'est cependant pas limité à cette liste.

Canadian Anthropology Society

Subscriptions

Anthropologica is published twice a year.

2006 Subscription and Membership Rates

Individuals	
In Canada	$80
Outside Canada	U.S. $80
Students	$30
Students outside Canada	U.S. $30
Family	$125
Retired	$30
Unwaged	$30
Sustaining	$100
Institutions	
In Canada	$90
OECD Countries	U.S. $90
Non-OECD Countries	U.S. $45

Subscriptions and address changes should be sent to:

WLU Press
Wilfrid Laurier University
Waterloo, ON
N2L 3C5

Cheques in payment of subscriptions should be made out to **Wilfrid Laurier University Press**

Société canadienne d'anthropologie

Abonnements

Anthropologica est publiée deux fois par année.

Les tarifs d'abonnement et d'adhésion 2006

Individus	
Au Canada	80 $
En dehors du Canada	U.S. 80 $
Étudiants	30 $
Étudiants en dehors du Canada	U.S. 30 $
Famille	$125
Retraité	$30
Sans-emploi	$30
Membre de soutien	$100
Institutions	
Au Canada	90 $
Dans pays-membres de l'OCDE	U.S. 90 $
Dans tout autre pays	U.S. 45 $

Les abonnements et changements d'adresse doivent être envoyés à :

WLU Press
Wilfrid Laurier University
Waterloo, ON
N2L 3C5

Tout chèque pour frais d'abonnement doit être fait à l'ordre de **Wilfrid Laurier University Press**.

Web Addresses / Adresses de Web

Anthropologica: http://www.anthropologica.ca
CASCA: http://www.cas-sca.ca
WLUP: http://www.wlu.ca/~wwwpress/jrls/anthro.html

Back Issues / Anciens Numéros

In-print back issues of *Anthropologica* and *Culture* can be obtained at the above address.
Certains anciens numéros de *Anthropologica* sont encore disponibles à l'adresse ci-haut.
Out-of-print back issues can be obtained from: / Les numéros épuisés sont disponibles chez :
Swets Backsets Service, P.O. Box 810, 2160 SZ, Lisse, The Netherlands

Legal Deposit / Dépôt Légal

National Library of Canada / Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Indexing / Répertoires

Indexed and/or abstracted in: / Répertoriée dans :

Abstracts in Anthropology
America: History and Life (ABC-Clio Press)
Anthropological Index Online
Anthropological Literature: An Index to Periodical Articles and Essays
Bibliographie internationale d'anthropologie sociale et culturelle / International Bibiliography of Social and Cultural Anthropology
Biological Abstracts
Bulletin signalétique 521 Sociologie / Ethnologie
Canadian Periodical Index / Index des périodiques canadiens\fP
Culture, Langues, Textes : la Revue de Sommaires
International Bibliography of Periodical Literature
Psychological Abstracts
Science Culture
Sociological Abstracts
ZellerDietrich Bibliographische Verlage

Anthropologica Vol. 48 N° 1, 2006

War and Peace / La guerre et la paix

Guest Editor / Rédactrice Invitée : Ellen R. Judd

War and Peace
Ellen R. Judd
La guerre et la paix
Ellen R. Judd (traduction de Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni)
Rethinking the War against Iraq
Richard McCutcheon
Ni la guerre, ni la paix: campagnes de «stabilisation» et violence structurelle chez les Tlapanèques de la *Montaña* du Guerrero (Mexique)
Martin Hébert
La zone grise des guerres humanitaires
Mariella Pandolfi
Governing Peace: Global Rationalities of Security and UNESCO's Culture of Peace Campaign
Suzan Ilcan and Lynne Phillips
Engaging the Voices of Girls in the Aftermath of Sierra Leone's Conflict: Experiences and Perspectives in a Culture of Violence
Myriam Denov and Richard Maclure
The Mask and the Mirror: Facing up to the Past in Postwar Peru
Kimberly Theidon
Construire la paix au Guatemala : Analyse critique des modalités d'intervention mises en œuvre par trois ONG guatémaltèques
Karine Vanthuyne
Factional Terror, Paramilitarism and Civil War in Haiti: The View from Port-au-Prince, 1994-2004
J. Christopher Kovats-Bernat

Art and Museum Review/ Compte rendu d'exposition

Book Reviews/ Comptes Rendues

PUBLICATIONS MAIL AGREEMENT NO. 40064165
REGISTRATION NO. 9373
RETURN UNDELIVERABLE CANADIAN ADDRESSES TO
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY PRESS
75 UNIVERSITY AVENUE WEST
WATERLOO, ON N2L 3C5
e-mail: press@wlu.ca

0003-5459(2006)48:1;1-V