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Guest Editors / Rédacteurs Invités:
Charles Menzies and
Anthony Marcus

**Renewing the Vision: Marxism and Anthropology in the 21st Century /
Renouveler la vision : Marxisme et anthropologie au XXIe siècle**

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From 1993 to 1996, small-scale French fishermen engaged the national state in a series of running commando-style direct actions against the growing neo-liberalism of France and the European Union. This photograph illustrates one among many such confrontations between the fishermen and the para-military French riot police—the force of order. It was taken in the fall of 1996 on the steps of the court house in Nantes. A group of fishermen are attempting to enter the courthouse in support of one of their fellow fishers, Armand Le Cossec, who was facing charges of willfully destroying private property during one of the ongoing direct actions (for a more detailed discussion of these struggles see Charles R. Menzies, "Class and Identity on the Margins of Industrial Society: A Breton Illustration," *Anthropologica*, Vol. 38, 1997).

De 1993 à 1996, les pêcheurs artisanaux français ont engagé l'état national dans une série d'actions directes de style commando contre le néo-libéralisme croissant de la France et de l'Union Européenne. Cette photographie illustre une de ces nombreuses confrontations entre les pêcheurs et la police française paramilitaire anti-émeute – la force de l'ordre. Elle a été prise à l'automne 1996 sur les marches palais de justice à Nantes. Un groupe de pêcheurs tentent d'entrer dans le tribunal en appui à l'un de leurs camarades pêcheurs, Armand Le Cossec, qui faisait face à l'accusation d'avoir volontairement détruit de la propriété privée pendant l'une des actions directes dans le cadre de cette série (pour une discussion plus détaillée de ces luttes voir le Charles R. Menzies, «Class and Identity on the Margins of Industrial Society : A Breton Illustration», *Anthropologica*, Vol. 38, 1997).

Renewing the Vision: Marxism and Anthropology in the 21st Century—Introduction

Charles Menzies *University of British Columbia*
Anthony Marcus *University of Melbourne*

A collection on Marxist anthropology, why now? We are at the beginning of a new millennium, looking back at a 19th-century philosophy, with no significant anniversary to lay our work on. It is more than 150 years since the publication of the Communist Manifesto, 130 years since the Paris Commune, 85 years since the October Revolution, and slightly more than half a century since the Chinese revolution. It would seem forced to make this a volume celebrating 20 something years since the Sandinista revolution, 30 something since Paris 1968, or 40 something since the Cuban revolution, and none of our essays really address the specific questions of party and state that emerged from the failed 1905 revolution in Russia. So why now? To use the popular language of contemporary finance, we believe that Marxism is at an all time low and has the possibility for good long-term growth. Call it intellectual bargain hunting.

Robert Brenner has wittily remarked that "Marxist economists are famous for having accurately predicted seven out of the last one international economic crisis" (Brenner 1998: 22). There is a strong argument for sharing Dr. Brenner's scepticism and not claiming the many signs of renewed class struggle and social protest as an indicator of a vast and powerful re-composition of the world working class movement and a new viability for Marxism. There are always mass class struggles and the young are always restless.

As we enter the new millennium, the forces of capitalism and reaction are in ascendance. The dream of a communist society organized for human needs and not for profit is in tatters. A century of bourgeois state terror, social democratic betrayal, Stalinist retreat and appeasement, and many varieties of opportunistic devaluing of the coin of human liberation have left us with what German social theorist Jurgen Habermas has called an exhaustion of utopian energies (Habermas 1989). Political leaders in every country in the world, who barely 15 years ago were committed anti-capitalist militants are joining the bour-

geois governments of their former enemies and trading their AK 47s for elite appointments and government portfolios, while rank and file militants scramble to find legitimate ways to make a living or seek out NGOs as a compromise between politics and professionalism (Petras 1995). Everywhere individual solutions are posed to the collective social problems of daily life and everywhere economies get leaner, meaner and more competitive, pitting neighbour against neighbour.

We predict no coming upsurge. The world proletariat has been bombed, conned, and misled into doubt and aimlessness. Marxism, communism, and socialism as alternative means of organizing society have little credibility for most of the world. There is no current political, economic, or social program of the world proletariat and most of its 20th-century mass organizations are disbanded or hopelessly discredited. So why now? The answer is, because we can. This collection comes at the end of a decade and a half of hunting the corridors of anthropology meetings for co-thinkers and kindred spirits, organizing our colleagues around issues of importance to our social class, and studying the lessons of the past.

A collection on Marxist anthropology, why here? Though true, the simple answer, "because we can", does not say enough about why *Anthropologica* is our chosen venue. There is a simple fact that many of the people we met in those 15 years have long known—the Canadian academy is one of the best homes for Marxism. After the end of the Cold War, it is difficult to imagine a better home for rigorous and independent—but still partisan—Marxism than Canada. It has a Marxist tradition that has not spiralled into post-modern doubt, nor remained enthralled with Cold War shibboleths and dogmas. It is healthy, polemical and well enough supported to provide a home for studies such as ours.

The idea for this volume has its early roots in a session, "Counter Flows: Marxist Anthropology in the New Millennium," organized by Menzies and Marcus for the 1997 American Anthropological Association meetings. At that time we noted that between the publication in 1975 of Bridget O'Laughin's review article, "Marxist Approaches in Anthropology," and William Roseberry's 1988 review article "Political Economy," published on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall, a major sea change had occurred within the social science and humanities disciplines. In an ironic (perhaps tragic is more apt?) twist, Anthropology answered Kathleen Gough's call for "New Proposals" by a radical engagement with the "text," simultaneously subverting and adopting Gough's critique of anthropology as the "child of Western Imperialism" (1968: 403-407).

The aim of our 1997 session was to explore the strengths (and weaknesses) of a new-formed Marxist anthropology emerging along the margins of the academe. In a variety of ways and from divergent perspectives the participants in that session, Kim Clark, Eliza Darling, Thomas Dunk, Belinda Leach, Anthony Marcus, and Charles Menzies understood themselves as part of a project of rejuvenating Marxist-anthropology. Members of our session were part of what was then an emerging—now an active—working group, organized under the rubric of Political Economy and the Production of Culture. The working group, meeting in conjunction with the Canadian Anthropological Association since the early-mid 1990s, has provided an encouraging milieu within which an expanding cohort of Marxist inspired colleagues have been able to develop politically and professionally.

In January 2000 we hosted a conference, *Perspectives on Race, Gender, and Social Class*, at the University of British Columbia.[1] We were fortunate to be able to call upon a multi-aged group of scholars that spanned four decades of political engagement with Marxist Anthropology. Here, in the midst of established and emerging scholars, the idea for this special issue was germinated.

Returning to the questions—why here, why now?—we are compelled to confess that our project is not driven by the rising interest in labour issues on university campuses throughout the U.S., Canada, and Mexico[2], the massive strike waves in Europe in recent years, nor the global opposition to neo-liberalism, free trade and "the war against terrorism" which brought nearly 15 million protesters into the streets of cities across the world during one weekend in February 2003. Our project is driven by the Trotskyist idea, brought to anthropology in the 1950s and 60s by Eric Wolf (1959) and Marshall Sahlins and Elman Service (1960) of the privileges of backwardness. To trade our financial metaphor for one from football, there is an open field.

With social democrats and Greens throughout Europe imposing the kinds of privatizations that "right of centre" parties never could and stealthily rebuilding national armies, rump Stalinists recanting the left nationalism of their communist past for the ultra-right nationalism of their capitalist present and academic Marxists jettisoning the last remnants of Enlightenment universalism for the particularism of post-modern doubt it is time to return to the program of proletarian internationalism, before economic competition and inter-imperialist conflict destroy our planet and extirpate the idea of "humanity" in a frenzy of national action.

A revival of what Edmund Wilson (1972) called "acting and writing history" is long overdue. The retreat of the

structuralism of the 1970s and 1980s has made such a project more conceivable than ever. Objectivist analysis that reduces the social scientist to a Ptolemaic forecaster of glacial movements in the mode of production or development of the forces of production has been hopelessly discredited and replaced by the subjectivism of the particular. No longer certain that the contradictions of history would inevitably work themselves out and yield a new society, social scientists have come to see themselves as witnesses to "post-ideology" local phenomena, cheerleaders for culturalism, or crafters of grand, Wittgenstein-influenced deconstructive word games.

As Marxist scholars of the generation of 2000 whose god never failed us in 1939, 1956, or 1968[3] we have been cursed by developing in a wasteland of doubt, despair and pessimism that leads the best among our mentors to laugh affectionately when we raise the question of praxis and social transformation. But we have also been blessed by the absence of gods. Rather than struggle to chart a course between structure and agency, history and theory, objectivism and subjectivism, or the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., we are developing in a fallow field. We can go back to the basics and do what Marxists have always done: wage an ideological battle in our own work place for a cooperative and proletarian vision. This collection is a modest attempt to renew the struggle for a proletarian centred and Marxist anthropology. We think that the field has been fallow for long enough. The time has come to start planting the old seeds of a new society in the fallow fields of the present.

We open this special issue with a review paper by Marcus and Menzies in which we explore the dynamics and particularities of North American (Mexico, United States, and Canada) Marxism and Anthropology. Our intention is to pull out the key themes and ideas that we see as critical for an engaged anthropology, a Marxist anthropology of the 21st century. As anthropologists we have a limited connection to the physical power of the working class, but we do have a public platform for exerting some small influence on the consciousness of the working class. Our opening paper is one small part of this project and is positioned to open the general debate to which the following three papers provide specific explorations.

Kim Clark contributes a paper that is of importance to those who seek to unite ethnically divided national working classes around programs of social struggle and social justice. Her attempt to view contemporary ethnonationalist rewritings of Ecuadorian history through a Marxist lens takes account of the total social formation, including elite and popular political projects and seeks to ground contemporary struggles for indigenous self-determination in a long-view, working class history that can account for the great variety of changing alliances and shifts in the ideological landscape.

Eric McGuckin uses a Marxist method to bring anthropological literature on tourism down to earth by addressing some of the more direct questions of social inequality that emerge from the intersection of leisure, movement, and world system political economics.

Anthony Marcus's article is based on a presentation given at University of British Columbia in January, 2000. It raises an important set of questions about how safety-net welfare systems, such as that in the United States, are based on social constructions of poverty that divide the working class and set up categories of entitlement that immiserate large sections of it. Furthermore, the most progressive academics are enlisted in the defence of these categories. As the advanced industrial economies increasingly move away from corporatist welfare systems based on national working classes and towards the US safety net system, such discussions among progressive social scientists will likely become more important to addressing the health and economic security of working classes.

We think it is worth pointing out here that these were not the only papers that we were interested in publishing. We submitted several others by co-thinkers whose work did not make it through the peer review process. We mention this only to suggest that there are more of us out there and that rekindling a Marxist pole of debate within anthropology and the social sciences is a long slow process. We second guess none of our reviewers. We might well have made the same decisions had we been doing the reviewing. In fact, we thank the reviewers for their useful and well considered commentaries. We are confident that our colleagues who were rejected will be publishing important Marxist analyses in coming years.

We have seen that there are many Marxist anthropologists scattered among the generation of 2000, and though that number could not, at present, be said to constitute a movement, we want to take this chance to predict an upsurge. To go back to Robert Brenner's sly comment about Marxist economists, we are ready to predict seven of the next one mass radicalization. None of the people contributing to this special issue will mind being wrong six times, if we get it right the seventh. With so many excellent scholars of the generation of 2000 working on the project of Marxist anthropology we are looking forward to eventually being right and contributing in some small way to consolidating and articulating the gains of whatever utopian energies are released.

Just as early 20th-century anti-racist Boasians in Mexico and the United States served the interests of big

capital and sections of the petty bourgeoisie, by helping to consciously articulate and rationalize the ethnic and cultural changes that were occurring in the make-up of North American capitalism, we Marxists of the early 21st-century can aid in the understanding and articulation of the changes in the world workers' movement and the struggle for a socialist future. We can, in classic anthropological fashion, question everyday commonsense and ask challenging questions about the existence, strength, and consciousness of the world working class. We can be workers both challenging our own conditions of production and supporting the struggles of our class brothers and sisters. We can be intellectuals fighting against bourgeois ideology that diminishes the value of the working class in favour of individualism, obscures rationality with mystifications, views the world through the counter-enlightenment lens of human ethnic zoology, counsels passivity in face of so called human nature and naturalizes the market. We can fight for the idea that history is what you make of it.

Charles Menzies, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, 6303 NW Marine Drive, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T1Z1. E-mail: cmenzies@interchange.ubc.ca
Anthony Marcus, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne, Victoria, 3010, Australia. E-mail: amarcus@unimelb.edu.au

Notes

1 The conference was made possible by the support of a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada grant in aid of occasional conferences, the UBC Office of the Dean of Arts, the Museum of Anthropology, and the Department of Anthropology and Sociology.

2 In particular it is worth drawing attention to the shutdown and occupation of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) for ten months from April 1998 to February 1999. This protest at the largest university in the Americas was explicitly over the question of working class rights to a free and easily accessible university education in Mexico. It became a prominent forum and organising pillar of Marxism in the academy and drew anthropologists in on both sides of the struggle and both sides of the US/Mexican border.

3 These dates refer respectively to the Stalin-Hitler pact which disoriented and disillusioned a generation of communist militants; the crushing of the Hungarian uprising and the revelations that accompanied the death of Stalin, leading communists to haemorrhage from parties around the world; and the combination of the Soviet intervention in the "Prague Spring," the betrayals of Paris 1968 by the Communist Party of France, and the eventual failure of the global social movements of the 1960s and 70s.

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Renouveler la vision : marxisme et anthropologie au XXI^{e} siècle—introduction

Charles Menzies *University of British Columbia*
Anthony Marcus *University of Melbourne*

Pourquoi publier aujourd'hui une collection d'articles sur l'anthropologie marxiste? Nous sommes à l'aube d'un nouveau millénaire, tournés vers une philosophie du XIX^{e} siècle, sans aucun anniversaire significatif sur lequel fonder notre entreprise. Plus de 150 ans se sont écoulés depuis la publication du Manifeste du Parti communiste, 130 ans depuis la Commune de Paris, 85 ans depuis la Révolution d'octobre, et un peu plus d'un demi-siècle depuis la révolution chinoise. Il paraîtrait forcé de faire de cet ouvrage un volume célébrant les vingt et quelques années de la révolution sandiniste, les trente et quelques années de Paris 1968, ou les quarante et quelques années de la révolution cubaine. Par ailleurs, aucun de nos articles ne s'attaque véritablement aux questions précises du parti et de l'État qui ont surgi de l'échec de la Révolution de 1905 en Russie. Alors, pourquoi maintenant? Pour emprunter le langage populaire de la finance contemporaine, nous croyons que le marxisme a atteint son point le plus bas et jouit d'un potentiel de bonne croissance à long terme. Appelons cela une chasse aux bonnes occasions intellectuelles.

Robert Brenner a observé avec esprit que «les économistes marxistes se sont rendus célèbres pour avoir prédit avec succès la dernière crise économique mondiale sept fois sur une » (Brenner 1998 : 22). Il y a de bonnes raisons pour partager le scepticisme du Dr Brenner et pour ne pas affirmer que les nombreux signes d'une recrudescence de la lutte des classes et de la protestation sociale annoncent une vaste et puissante recomposition du mouvement mondial de la classe ouvrière et une nouvelle vitalité pour le marxisme. Il y a toujours des luttes de classes et la jeunesse est toujours révoltée.

À l'aube de ce nouveau millénaire, les forces du capitalisme et de la réaction sont en progression. Le rêve d'une société communiste organisée en fonction des besoins humains plutôt que du profit est en ruine. Un siècle de terreur bourgeoise, de trahison social-démocratique, de recul et d'apaisement staliniste, et de diverses

formes de dévaluation opportuniste du concept de la libération humaine nous ont laissé aux prises avec ce que le théoricien social Jürgen Habermas a appelé un «épuisement des énergies utopiques» (Habermas 1989). Dans tous les pays du monde, des dirigeants politiques, militants anti-capitalistes engagés il y a quinze ans à peine, rejoignent les gouvernements bourgeois de leurs anciens ennemis et échangent leurs AK 47 contre des postes d'élite et des portefeuilles gouvernementaux. Pendant ce temps, les militants de la base s'efforcent tant bien que mal de trouver un moyen légitime de gagner leur vie, ou font appel à des ONGs comme compromis entre la vie politique et la vie professionnelle (Petras 1995). Partout des solutions individuelles sont apportées aux problèmes sociaux et collectifs de la vie quotidienne, et partout les économies se font plus dures, plus impitoyables et plus compétitives, dressant frères et voisins les uns contre les autres.

Nous ne faisons pas la prédiction d'une relance prochaine. Le prolétariat mondial a été bombardé, dupé et fourvoyé jusqu'au doute et au désoeuvrement. Le marxisme, le communisme et le socialisme en tant que modes alternatifs d'organisation sociale n'ont guère de crédibilité aux yeux de la majorité des gens de la planète. Il n'y a pas de programme politique, économique, ou social en cours pour le prolétariat mondial, et la plupart des organisations de masse du XX^{e} siècle ont été dispersées ou discréditées sans appel. Alors, pourquoi maintenant? La réponse : parce que nous le pouvons. Cette collection d'articles arrive à la fin d'une décennie et demie passée à ratisser les corridors des lieux de rencontre de l'anthropologie à la recherche de co-penseurs, à rassembler nos collègues autour de questions d'importance pour notre classe sociale, et à étudier les leçons du passé.

Pourquoi publier ici une collection d'articles sur l'anthropologie marxiste? La simple réponse «parce que nous le pouvons», bien qu'elle soit vraie, ne suffit pas à expliquer pourquoi nous avons choisi *Anthropologica* comme lieu de publication. Il y a un fait très simple que beaucoup d'entre ceux que nous avons rencontrés au cours de ces quinze années savent depuis longtemps : le milieu académique canadien constitue l'un des meilleurs foyers pour le marxisme. Depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide, on peut difficilement imaginer un meilleur foyer que le Canada pour un marxisme rigoureux et indépendant, mais toujours partisan. Il y réside une tradition marxiste qui ne s'est pas effondrée dans le doute post-moderne, et qui n'est pas demeurée subjuguée par les slogans et les dogmes de la Guerre Froide. C'est une tradition saine, polémique et suffisamment bien soutenue pour offrir un foyer à des études telles que les nôtres.

L'idée de ce volume prend ses racines dans une session, *Counter Flows : Marxist Anthropology in the New Millenium*, organisée par Menzies et Marcus pour les rencontres de l'*American Anthropological Association* de 1997. Nous avions observé alors qu'entre la publication en 1975 de l'article synoptique de Bridget O'Laughlin, «*Marxist Approaches in Anthropology*», et celle en 1988, à la veille de la chute du Mur de Berlin, de l'article synoptique de William Roseberry, «*Political Economy*», un changement profond s'était opéré dans les disciplines des sciences sociales et humaines. Dans un renversement ironique (pour ne pas dire tragique), l'anthropologie a répondu à l'appel de Kathleen Gough pour de «nouvelles propositions» par un engagement radical avec le «texte». Ce faisant, elle a adopté et subverti simultanément la critique que Gough avait faite de l'anthropologie en tant que «fille de l'impérialisme occidental» (1968 : 403-407).

Notre session de 1997 avait pour objectif d'explorer les forces (et les faiblesses) d'une nouvelle anthropologie marxiste, émergeant alors en marge du milieu académique. Les participants à cette session, Kim Clark, Eliza Darling, Thomas Dunk, Belinda Leach, Anthony Marcus et Charles Menzies, se voyaient comme prenant part, par des moyens variés et selon des optiques divergentes, à un projet de rajeunissement de l'anthropologie marxiste. Les membres de notre session faisaient partie de ce qui était alors un groupe de travail émergeant (et qui est devenu aujourd'hui un groupe actif) organisé sous la rubrique de «l'Économie politique et la production de la culture». Ce groupe de travail, qui se réunit depuis la première moitié des années 1990 conjointement avec la Société Canadienne d'Anthropologie, s'est avéré un milieu encourageant au sein duquel une cohorte grandissante de collègues d'inspiration marxiste ont pu se développer politiquement et professionnellement.

En janvier 2000, nous avons accueilli une conférence, *Perspectives on Race, Gender and Social Class* à la *University of British Columbia.*[1] Nous avons eu la chance de pouvoir faire appel à un groupe de chercheurs de tous âges, couvrant quatre décennies d'engagement politique en anthropologie marxiste. C'est là, au sein de ce groupe de chercheurs établis et de nouveaux chercheurs, que l'idée de cette publication spéciale a germé.

Revenant aux questions «pourquoi ici?» et «pourquoi maintenant?», nous sommes contraints d'avouer que notre projet n'est pas motivé par l'intérêt grandissant pour les questions du travail sur les campus universitaires à travers les États-Unis, le Canada et le Mexique.[2] Il n'est pas motivé non plus par les vagues de grèves de masse de ces dernières années en Europe, ni par l'opposition mondiale au néolibéralisme, au libre-échange, ou encore à la

«guerre contre le terrorisme» qui a amené près de 15 millions de personnes à manifester dans les rues de villes à travers le monde pendant une fin de semaine de février 2003. Notre projet est motivé par l'idée trotskyste des avantages du retard historique, idée apportée à l'anthropologie dans les années 1950 et 1960 par Eric Wolf (1955) et par Marshall Sahlins et Elman Service (1960). Pour passer d'une métaphore de la finance à une métaphore du football : le champ est libre.

Avec les sociaux-démocrates et les Verts qui, à travers l'Europe, reconstruisent furtivement des armées nationales et imposent le type de privatisations que les partis de «centre droite» ne pouvaient imposer, avec les staliniste croupions qui désavouent le nationalisme de gauche de leur passé communiste en faveur du nationalisme d'extrême droite de leur présent capitaliste, et avec les universitaires marxistes qui abandonnent ce qu'il reste de l'universalisme des Lumières pour le particularisme du doute postmoderne, il est temps de retourner au programme de l'internationalisme prolétarien, avant que la compétition économique et le conflit inter-impérialiste ne détruisent notre planète et n'éradiquent l'idée de l' «humanité» dans une frénésie d'action nationale.

Une reprise de ce qu'Edmund Wilson (1972) a appelé «écrire et vivre l'histoire» se fait attendre depuis longtemps. Le recul du structuralisme des années 1970 et 1980 rend ce projet plus facile à concevoir que jamais. L'analyse objectiviste, qui réduit le chercheur en sciences sociales au rôle de devin ptolémaïque de mouvements glaciers dans le développement des modes et des forces de production, a été discréditée sans appel et remplacée par le subjectivisme du particulier. N'étant plus certains que les contradictions de l'histoire doivent inévitablement se résoudre et produire une nouvelle société, les chercheurs en sciences sociales en sont venus à se voir comme les témoins de phénomènes locaux «post-idéologiques», les promoteurs du culturalisme, ou les artisans de grandioses jeux de langage déconstructifs inspirés de Wittgenstein.

En tant que chercheurs marxistes de la génération 2000, qui n'ont pas été abandonnés par leur dieu en 1939, en 1956 ou en 1968,[3] nous avons eu le malheur de nous développer dans un champ dévasté par le doute, le désespoir et le pessimisme, qui pousse les meilleurs d'entre nos mentors à rire affectueusement lorsque nous soulevons les questions de praxis et de transformation sociale. Mais nous avons également été bénis par cette absence de dieux. Plutôt que de lutter pour nous frayer un chemin entre la structure et l'action, l'histoire et la théorie, l'objectivisme et le subjectivisme, ou encore les États-Unis et l'URSS, nous nous développons dans un champ en friche. Nous pouvons retourner à l'essentiel et faire ce que les marxistes ont toujours fait : mener un combat idéologique au sein de notre propre milieu de travail en faveur d'une vision coopérative et prolétarienne. Cette collection d'articles se veut une humble tentative de renouvellement de la lutte pour une anthropologie marxiste centrée sur le prolétariat. Nous pensons que le champ est en friche depuis assez longtemps. L'heure est venue de planter les vieilles semences d'une nouvelle société dans les champs en friche du présent.

Nous ouvrons ce numéro spécial par un article synoptique de Marcus et Menzies dans lequel nous explorons les dynamiques et particularités du marxisme et de l'anthropologie nord-américains (Mexique, États-Unis, Canada). Notre but est de fournir les thèmes et idées clés que nous considérons cruciaux pour une anthropologie engagée, une anthropologie marxiste du XXI^{e} siècle. En tant qu'anthropologues, notre connexion à la puissance physique de la classe ouvrière est limitée, mais nous bénéficions bel et bien d'une plateforme publique pour exercer une certaine influence sur la conscience de celle-ci. Notre article d'ouverture constitue une partie de ce projet, et est positionné de façon à ouvrir le débat général auquel les trois articles suivants apportent des explorations spécifiques.

L'article de Kim Clarke s'avère important pour ceux qui cherchent à unifier, autour de programmes de lutte et de justice sociale, des classes ouvrières nationales divisées selon des lignes ethniques. En tentant d'examiner à travers le prisme du marxisme des textes contemporains ethno-nationalistes et révisionnistes de l'histoire équatorienne, elle tient compte de l'ensemble de la formation sociale, y compris des projets politiques de l'élite et du peuple. Elle parvient également à réinscrire les luttes contemporaines pour l'autodétermination autochtone dans une histoire à long terme de la classe ouvrière, qui rend compte de la grande diversité d'alliances fluctuantes et des transformations du paysage idéologique.

Eric McGuckin adopte une démarche marxiste pour refonder la littérature anthropologique sur le tourisme, en s'attaquant à quelques-unes des questions d'inégalité sociale les plus directes qui émergent de la confluence du loisir, du mouvement et des économies politiques du système-monde.

L'article d'Anthony Marcus, basé sur une présentation faite à la *University of British Columbia* en janvier 2000, soulève un ensemble important de questions sur la façon dont les systèmes d'assistance publique fondés sur le principe du filet de sécurité sociale, tels que celui en vigueur aux États-Unis, reposent sur des constructions sociales de la pauvreté qui divisent la classe ouvrière, et mettent en place des catégories «de droit à l'assistance »

qui appauvrissent de larges sections de celle-ci. Par ailleurs, les universitaires les plus progressistes sont recrutés pour défendre ces catégories. À mesure que les économies industrielles avancées s'éloignent des systèmes d'assistance publique corporatistes fondés sur des classes ouvrières nationales et se rapprochent du système américain basé sur la notion de filet de sécurité sociale, il devient plus important pour les chercheurs progressistes en sciences sociales d'engager le débat autour de ces questions, et ce, afin de mieux aborder les problèmes de santé et de sécurité économique des classes ouvrières.

Il mérite d'être signalé que ce ne sont pas là les seuls articles que nous étions intéressés à publier. Nous avons soumis de nombreuses autres communications de co-penseurs qui n'ont pas été sélectionnées lors du processus d'évaluation par les pairs. Nous mentionnons ce fait uniquement afin de suggérer qu'il y a encore bien des anthropologues marxistes à l'œuvre, et que raviver un pôle de débats marxistes au sein de l'anthropologie et des sciences sociales constitue un processus de longue haleine. Nous ne remettons aucunement en question le travail des membres du comité de sélection. Il est probable que nous aurions pris les mêmes décisions si nous avions fait nous-même la sélection. En fait, nous remercions les membres du comité pour leurs commentaires à la fois utiles et réfléchis. Nous sommes persuadés que nos collègues dont le travail a été rejeté publieront d'importantes analyses marxistes dans les années à venir.

Nous avons observé qu'un grand nombre d'anthropologues marxistes sont disséminés parmi la génération 2000. Et bien qu'on ne puisse pour l'instant affirmer qu'ils constituent un mouvement, nous voulons ici prendre la chance de prédire une relance. Pour revenir au commentaire futé de Robert Brenner sur les économistes marxistes, nous sommes prêts à prédire la prochaine radicalisation de masse sept fois sur une. Aucun de ceux qui ont contribué à ce numéro spécial ne se souciera de s'être trompé six fois, si nous avons raison la septième fois. Avec un si grand nombre d'excellents chercheurs de la génération 2000 qui travaillent sur le projet de l'anthropologie marxiste, nous sommes impatients d'avoir finalement raison et de contribuer de quelque façon que ce soit à consolider et à articuler les bénéfices de toutes les énergies utopiques qui seraient libérées.

Tout comme les boasiens anti-racistes du début du XX^{e} siècle au Mexique et aux États-Unis ont servi les intérêts du grand capital et de certains secteurs de la petite bourgeoisie en contribuant sciemment à articuler et à rationaliser les transformations ethniques et culturelles alors en cours dans la composition du capitalisme nord-américain, nous, marxistes du début du XXI^{e} siècle, pouvons aider à la compréhension et à l'articulation des transformations aujourd'hui en cours au sein du mouvement mondial des travailleurs et de la lutte pour un avenir socialiste. Nous pouvons, dans une perspective anthropologique classique, interroger le sens commun ordinaire et poser des questions stimulantes sur l'existence, la force et la conscience de la classe ouvrière mondiale. Nous pouvons être des travailleurs qui remettent en question leurs propres conditions de production tout en appuyant les combats de nos frères et sœurs de classe. Nous pouvons être des intellectuels luttant contre cette idéologie bourgeoise qui diminue la valeur de la classe ouvrière en faveur de l'individualisme, obscurcit la rationalité avec des mystifications, voit le monde à travers le prisme anti-Lumières d'une zoologie humaine et ethnique, recommande la passivité face à une soi-disant nature humaine et naturalise le marché. Nous pouvons nous battre pour cette idée que l'histoire est ce que nous en faisons.

Charles Menzies, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, 6303 NW Marine Drive, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T1Z1. E-mail: cmenzies@interchange.ubc.ca
Anthony Marcus, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies University of Melbourne, Victoria, 3010, Australia. Courriel : amarcus@unimelb.edu.au

Notes

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2 Il vaut la peine d'attirer l'attention notamment sur la fermeture et l'occupation de la *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México* (UNAM) pendant une période de dix mois, d'avril 1998 à février 1999. Cette protestation, au sein de la plus grande université des Amériques, s'est déroulée explicitement autour de la question du droit de la classe ouvrière à une formation universitaire gratuite et accessible au Mexique. Elle est devenue un forum important et un pilier d'organisation pour le marxisme en milieu universitaire, et a attiré des anthropologues des deux côtés de la lutte et des deux côtés de la frontière États-Unis/Mexique.

3 Ces dates font référence respectivement au pacte Hitler-Staline qui a désorienté et désillusionné une génération de militants communistes; à la répression de l'insurrection hongroise et aux révélations qui ont accompagné la mort de Staline, poussant des communistes à travers le monde à quitter leur parti en masse; et à la conjonction de l'intervention soviétique au «Printemps de Prague», des trahisons de Paris 1968 par le Parti Communiste français, et de l'échec subséquent des mouvements sociaux mondiaux des années 1960 et 1970.

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Towards a Class-Struggle Anthropology

Anthony Marcus *University of Melbourne*
Charles Menzies *University of British Columbia*

Abstract: Dancing between review and argument this paper lays out a foundation for a class-struggle anthropology—that is, an anthropological practice that can be linked to the ultimate goal of achieving a classless society. To this end we will review those anthropologists who have gone before us, pulling out those works of theirs that we see as critical in (re)building a class-struggle anthropology. As part of this process we discuss the relationship between what has stood as Marxist anthropology in North America, the idea of socialism, the political development of the world working class during the nine decades since the October Revolution, and the challenges of intellectual continuity in the face of differing generational experiences of Marxist anthropologists. Ultimately we argue that a progressive anthropology necessarily involves political activism in our work, communities, and schools.

Keywords: Marxism, class struggle, political economy, social justice

Résumé : Alternant entre le synopsis et l'argumentation, cet essai met en place une fondation pour une anthropologie de la lutte des classes, à savoir une pratique anthropologique pouvant être reliée au but ultime qu'est la réalisation d'une société sans classes. À cette fin, nous faisons un survol des anthropologues qui nous ont précédé, et de ceux d'entre leurs travaux que nous considérons cruciaux pour la (re)construction d'une anthropologie de la lutte des classes. Ce faisant, nous examinons les relations entre l'anthropologie marxiste en Amérique du Nord, l'idée du socialisme, le développement politique de la classe ouvrière mondiale au cours des dix décennies qui ont suivi la Révolution d'octobre, et les défis de la continuité intellectuelle face aux différentes expériences générationnelles des anthropologues marxistes. Finalement, nous soutenons qu'une anthropologie progressiste implique nécessairement l'activisme politique dans notre milieu de travail, nos communautés et nos écoles.

Mots-clés : Marxisme, lutte des classes, économie politique, justice sociale

> "The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles."
>
> — Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*

> "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."
>
> — Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerrbach*

For Marx social class is at the centre of understanding and organizing social change. As interpreted by Lenin the working class, organized by its politically advanced vanguard, constituted the path toward emancipation and the realization of human potential. Rosa Luxemburg emphasized—among other things—the critical power of the combined force of the working class, engaged in a general strike, in overthrowing capitalism. Trotsky, through his analysis of combined and uneven development and the thesis of permanent revolution, pointed the way forward toward a global socialist society (even if the revolution began in the most backward of countries).

Anthropology, by contrast, has tended to draw upon the more conservative theoretical frameworks of mainstream scholars such as Emile Durkheim or Max Weber to construct models of society that highlight ways of building and or maintaining "community" connections and social functions (Patterson 2001). This is not, of course, to say that there are no important anthropological contributions which draw upon Marx—there are some.[1] In this essay we detail in broad stroke the history of Marxist anthropology in North America (which for us includes Mexico, the United States, and Canada) and, in so doing, point the way forward towards a class-struggle anthropology, with the ultimate aim of achieving social justice and the elimination of a class-based society.

To carry out the task that we have set for ourselves we balance between review and argument. For our review we have selected pieces that are critical for engaging in our project of a class-struggle anthropology. Because we

are social activists engaged in the social justice movement *and* practising professional anthropologists engaged in the arcane world of publish or perish we have focussed on those anthropological writers and works that we have found contribute toward our project in terms of their intellectual and practical contributions.

For our argument we draw upon the classical call for a class-struggle social science that is intent on reinvigorating hope for a better, more just world.[2] This is a social science that places its analytical eye and its political hopes upon the working class as the pivotal social agent of change and upon the ruling class as the agent of reaction and deception. In so doing we draw directly from the corpus of theory inspired and informed by the writings and political engagements of Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels. In this essay we have attempted to avoid the endless internal debates within Marxism and focus instead upon the ways in which Marxism as theory and practice has informed anthropology. Nonetheless, it would be remiss if we did not at the very least lay out the core concepts of Marxist theory so as not to be waylaid later on in the paper over potentially unfamiliar phrases or concepts new to the 21st-century ear.

First and foremost Marxism is a theory and a practice united in the objective of achieving a classless society. As a theory, Marxism is a body of conceptual tools that allows an informed analyst an effective mechanism by which to make sense of the myriad ways and means the ruling class of a particular society deploy to hold onto their privileged position in society (see, for example: Ollman 1971; Mandel 1969). Chief among Marxism's central concepts is that of social class—defined at its most basic as one's place relative to the means of production, the tools, machines, and knowledge used to transform the world around us into things usable by humans. While primarily focussed upon the workings of capitalism, Marxist theory has also been used to understand the workings of kin-ordered and tributary societies (Wolf 1982, 1999).

As practice, Marxism, through the identification of the key problem of class-divided societies, which is the exploitation of the majority by a minority that controls the ability of society to produce goods and services, suggests ways and means of overthrowing the rule of the minority by the majority. Here the primary focus is upon the social conflict between and among classes. Marxism holds that conflict to be an inevitable part of the economic laws of motion of an expansionary system built on economic competition between capitalists for the social surplus and between workers and capitalists for the social wage.

However, this inevitable economic competition is ultimately underwritten by what Marxists often refer to as "leadership" or the political means and will to fight. There can be various aspects to this leadership. It can be over competing blocs of capitalists fighting each other by leading one working class to slaughter another in war. It can be a "race to the bottom" that reduces the percentage of the surplus that goes to use values (what Marxists refer to as the rate of exploitation). Alternatively, as Marxists advocate and fervently desire, it can be class struggle emerging from a conscious working class that has the political means and will to increase its power over production, eventually fighting for the eradication of classes and thereby the privileges associated with private property: what Marx called class for itself.

To this end we will review those anthropologists who have gone before us, pulling out those works of theirs that we see as critical in rebuilding a class-struggle anthropology—that is, an anthropological practice that can be linked to the ultimate goal of achieving a classless society. As part of this process we discuss the relationship between what has stood as Marxist anthropology in North America, the idea of socialism, the political development of the world working class during the nine decades since the October Revolution, and the challenges of intellectual continuity in the face of differing generational experiences of Marxist anthropologists. In so doing we recognize that much of what we say below is not new, not innovative, and not original in anyway except—perhaps—in its attempt to "confront the present" (Smith 1999), with a new synthesis that addresses the perpetual crisis, and growing economic disparities that characterize the current period.[3]

There are no road maps for what we are trying to do because there is so little in the way of contemporary attempts to synthesize Marxist anthropology into a coherent body of work. Ultimately we argue that a truly progressive, class-struggle anthropology necessarily involves political activism in our work, communities and schools. We are not attempting to provide the definitive synthesis of Marxism and Anthropology, nor finally resolve the contradictions between professional scholarship and political commitment, but rather to provide a provisional history of a present that needs, badly, to be confronted by class struggle. As anthropologists we would like to contribute to this project and hope that we can at least provide a prolegomenon for further research and a more complete synthesis of that which is both Marxist and anthropological.

The "Short Twentieth Century" and Marxist Anthropology

In 1995, Eric Hobsbawm coined the now well-worn phrase "the short twentieth century" to describe the period from

1914 to 1989, which, he argued, marks the boundaries of the major challenges, conflicts and ideological themes of 20th-century history. While we share Canadian writer Ellen Meiksins Wood's (1998) concern with the excessive periodizing of contemporary social theory and the connected problem of multiple generations of "new pessimists" declaring an end to history and a crisis of modernity every couple of decades (Wood and Foster 1997), we also recognize the scholarly wisdom of Hobsbawm's connection between a 75-year global class war[4] that was the end result of the first inter-imperialist world war and the political, social, and intellectual alignments that emerged from the October Revolution.

It is, of course, easy to find harbingers of the October Revolution in the pre-World War I period and continuities between the challenges of the Cold War and the contemporary period (Wood 1998). However, even if, as Ellen Meiksins Wood asserts, 1989 does not mark the end of an epoch of capitalism and its attendant class struggles, it does mark the collapse of huge states that covered most of the old world. It also marks the disappearance, degeneration, splintering, and ideological disorientation of political parties that wielded tremendous influence in the world working class and a crisis of legitimacy for viable alternatives to capitalism. The terrain of political struggle has changed in dramatic ways and we claim the right to join Eric Hobsbawm in using 1989-91 as a heuristic boundary.

As scholars for the Marxist generation of 2000, most of our intellectual development derives from the social science of this short 20th century that is now a decade and a half in the past. The scholars who mentored us through the process of doctoral studies were beneficiaries of the remarkable, nearly millenarian, optimism about progressive social change that characterized the period of early adulthood for what has come to be called the generation of 1968 (Kurlansky 2004). Having done their doctoral research during the heady days of the 1960s and 70s their research was able to explicitly engage broad struggles for social change and even revolutionary transformation as it happened in the "traditional" field sites of anthropology—Africa, Asia, Latin America, or the so-called fourth-world of Aboriginal or Indigenous peoples.

Beginning first with India, China, and Korea the grand movements of decolonization and anti-imperialist nationalism forced anthropologists to reconsider anthropological practice. The existence of two global superpowers defined largely by their differing economic systems provided a geo-political space in which newly independent nations in Asia, Africa, and Oceania, and older, former colonial nations in Latin America and the Caribbean were able to negotiate political and economic advantages by pitting the USSR and the U.S. against each other. Crumbling Euro-American empires made it more difficult for anthropologists to gain access to the so-called Third World on their own terms, as the human subjects of anthropological inquiry were becoming agents in their own right and were claiming control over both the right to speak for their peoples and the right to determine who had access to them (see Menzies 2001: 26-29).

In particular, the unprecedented global expansion of access to education and the opening of universities to the working classes both of imperialist countries and of the former colonial world provided intellectual platforms and scholarly careers to those who might, in a previous generation, have simply been the subjects of anthropological, sociological and ethno-historical studies. Anthropologists could no longer take for granted the fact that their field informants would never read or publicly comment on their work; they often had to share a stage with them and fight for a place in the field site. This was as true for studies here in North America, as it was for exotic places where "servants of empire" had once studied "men in grass skirts."

The expansive optimism of the day gave much room for progressive anthropologists to define themselves by and to participate in the political conflicts and struggles of the short 20th century, but the era of naïve fieldwork—if such a beast ever existed—was over. If one did gain access, the ethical content of one's work was open to question. In North America, for example, the participation of U.S. anthropologists in intelligence activities during the Vietnam war threatened to break apart the American Anthropological Association (see Vincent 1990: 310; Wolf and Jorgensen 1970), domestic disputes over "anthropology at home" touched off political firestorms over the culture of poverty in the United States (see Marcus in this volume; Leacock 1971) and in Mexico, the 1968 generation challenged anthropology's longstanding ties to the Mexican state (see Lomnitz 2001; Warman et al. 1970).

Perhaps most important among the many global political events that were coming together to democratize the academy, undermine old certainties and raise new questions about the relationship between ideas and action was the defeat of the U.S. army in Vietnam. By the late 1960s it was becoming clear to most of the world that the United States could not win its war in Vietnam. Several U.S. governments had done everything short of using nuclear weapons, yet the North Vietnamese government and the insurgency in the South were only getting stronger. The emergence of a defeatist wing of the Democratic Party and the officer's corps in the U.S. army during the late 1960s

and early 1970s (Burner & Marcus 1999), shook the intellectual foundations of world capitalist hegemony.[5]

In the anthropological profession the cracks in imperial hegemony yielded radical reappraisals of the discipline. Most notably, Dell Hymes (1972) *Reinventing Anthropology* (1972), Talal Asad (1973) *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, Arturo Warman et al. (1970) *De eso que llaman antropología mexicana* and Kathleen Gough's (1968) important *Current Anthropology* article "New Proposals for Anthropologists" (Gough 2002) sought to redefine the field in such a way as to make anthropology relevant as an agent of social change. These critiques relied on the personal commitment of the anthropologist to radical change, exhorted the anthropologist to act as an agent of social change and warned of the dangers of doing anthropology too close to the influences of the state. It was these calls for a new and partisan anthropology that could contribute to broad and rapidly emerging progressive social change that drove the work of many of our mentors, and drew us and our colleagues of the generation of 2000 into the orbit of older scholars whom we regarded as part of the solution, not the problem.

While there was nothing as spectacular as the U.S. defeat on the battlefields of Southeast Asia during our coming of age, we did witness and participate in such events as the mass popular uprisings against U.S. cruise missiles in Europe during the early 1980s, the British coal miners' strike of 1984, Operation Solidarity in British Columbia in 1983,[6] the revolutions, popular uprisings and guerrilla struggles of Central America and Southern Africa, and the worldwide battle against privatization and the withdrawal of the welfare state that occurred in the wake of the global economic contraction, following the collapse of the Mexican peso in 1982. Many of us came from student politics and sought careers that could accommodate and help sustain our political commitments. For those of us who had drawn Marxist lessons from the many defeats of the 1980s, the scholars who were most exciting to us were those who were explicitly working within the Marxist tradition and were concerned with key questions about the political development of the working class.

In particular two figures stand out as the intellectual progenitors of Marxist anthropology in North America: Eric Wolf and Eleanor Leacock. Wolf and Leacock shared an intellectual commitment to putting sound scholarship in the service of emancipatory politics. Taken together we would argue that they represent the two most significant Marxist anthropologists of their generation. Wolf has, in concert with his students, placed the critical role played by social labour in the production of culture on the anthropological agenda (1982, 1999). Leacock, a committed activist who paid for her politics, has been central to linking issues of gender and race to the power play of social class in contemporary society. Any serious attempt to build a class-struggle anthropology must necessarily come to terms with the work of these two Marxist anthropologists.

Wolf stands as a founding figure of American Marxist anthropology for having forced the discipline to honestly engage the historical profession and for having published foundational Marxist, Marxian and crypto-Marxist anthropological analyses over six decades from 1952 until 2001 (Marcus 2003). However, it was his 1982 magnum opus, *Europe and the People without History* (1997), and the series of articles and speeches that preceded it on peasant revolution and the rise of capitalism (drawn together posthumously by his widow, Sydel Silverman, Wolf 2001), that drew aspiring Marxist anthropologists from around the world to study with him. Though Wolf was engaged in a variety of forms of political activism, including helping to start the anti-Vietnam war teach-in movement (Schneider 1999), risking his career over revelations that his colleagues had used field data to aid the U.S. war effort in Southeast Asia (Wolf and Jorgensen 1970), and supporting a variety of attempts to democratize the profession (Schneider 1999), his principle contribution was in making Marxist anthropology theoretically viable. Unashamedly Marxist in methodology, Eric Wolf's work in the last two decades of the short 20th century provided an intellectual guide book for scholars seeking their own Marxist explorations and explanations.

Wolf's emergence from the Marxist closet that the 1950s McCarthyite United States had imposed was a slow and painful process, the final results of which are just beginning to be debated (Barrett et al. 2001; Marcus 2003). However for Marxists of the generation of 2000, Eleanor Leacock provides an unambiguously activist influence, inspiration and intellectual genealogy. It was she who best defined the place of the Marxist scholar, engaged in political movements that informed her scholarly work and scholarly work that informed her political commitments. In an autobiographical reflection in the preface to her 1981 volume, *Myths of Male Dominance: Collected Articles on Women Cross-Culturally*, she reflects that "political activity" was "enormously important in helping me keep my feet on the ground both theoretically and personally." She went on to say in the same comment that it had "not let me forget, as academics tend to do (if they ever learned it in the first place), that oppression and exploitation by sex, race, and class are fundamental in the contemporary world, and that theories which ignore this reality are meaningless if not downright destructive" (Leacock 1981: 5).

Her groundbreaking work in the late 1940s and early 1950s on the ability of humans to exist in cooperative economic arrangements directly confronted the McCarthyite academy (Leacock 1954) at great personal expense to her career (Sutton 1993). In the 1960s Leacock contributed to the debate over poverty in the United States, taking up questions of education, training a generation of radical teachers in anthropology (Leacock 1969), and confronting what she believed was an attack on the black section of the American working class (Leacock 1971; also see Marcus' contribution to this volume). Finally, in the 1970s and 1980s Leacock published extensively on the relationship between imperialism and gender inequality (Etienne and Leacock 1980; Leacock 1986) and ultimately raised questions that remain fundamental starting points for contemporary discussions of the relationship between capitalism, patriarchy, gender inequality and women's liberation (Leacock 1963, 1972).

There have, no doubt, been many North American anthropologists who have been members of Marxist political parties, most prominently Oscar Lewis, who is reputed to have been a member of the Communist Party USA (see Marcus's article in this volume) and there were several important founding figures of North American Marxist anthropology from the generation that came of age during World War II, in particular, Sidney Mintz, Stanley Diamond, Elman Service, Paul Kirchoff, as well as Leslie White and Alexander Lesser (who were somewhat maverick figures from the first decades of the short 20th). However, it is our belief that to a certain degree virtually all the Marxist anthropologists of the generation of 1968, upon whose shoulders our efforts stand, are somewhere between Wolf the theoretician, fighting for Marxist methodologies in uncovering the strengths, weakness, and rhythms of the capitalist mode of production, and Leacock the activist, fighting for an explicitly proletarian political project that took up powerful counter-hegemonic names and strategies outside the academy.

If the generation that trained us had the best of parents in these two, we can probably thank what Eric Wolf might have described as the interstitial place that Marxism holds in the North American academy. Unlike European Marxists for whom the question of affiliation (or rejection of affiliation) to a powerful Moscow aligned communist party or a vast and bureaucratic socialist/social democratic party created remarkable opportunities to influence mass struggles, as well as powerful pressures towards intellectual adaptation to immediate political concerns, our professors grew up in something of a barren wasteland where there was little orthodoxy and much room for exploration. They benefited from the privileges of backwardness and explored a variety of issues in heterodox, counterintuitive and often highly original ways.

Amongst this group are several scholars whose work is of particular relevance for our project of a class-struggle anthropology. While the individuals that we have highlighted below are a few among many, they are representative of those aspects of what has passed as Marxist anthropology that have the most to offer our contemporary project of a class-struggle anthropology. While any such grouping is—to a certain extent—an act of arbitrariness, we would point to three key themes at the core of the contribution of this group of anthropologists: gender; nation building and national liberation; and class struggle.

Karen Brodkin's theoretical work, like that of Leacock, helps us rethink the relationship between class, race, and gender in anthropological inquiry (Brodkin Sacks 1974, 1989). Her empirical work demonstrated the centrality of "gendered" and "raced" sectors of the working class that have typically been ignored by the trade union movement. Stephanie Coontz's contributions to post-Leacock discussions of the relationship between family, private property and the state have set the theoretical standard by which all work on Marxism and gender should be measured (Coontz 1992; Coontz and Henderson 1986). Nash, in addition to helping invent the notion of an anthropology of work and having put the class struggle of indigenous, Trotskyist tin miners on our collective radar (1979), has also made a contribution to a Marxist anthropology with her insightful study of impediments to class consciousness in the United States (1989).

Mexicans like Roger Bartra (19743, 1978, 1979, 1982), Luisa Paré (1977), Angel Palerm (1980), Hector Diaz Polanco (1977) and the Marxist pre-Hispanic archaeological school (Olivera 1978, Carrasco 1978; Nash 1980) contributed empirically and theoretically to our understanding of the rise of capitalism and the attendant problems of building nation states and working classes in the Third World, both through their scholarly work that has been translated into English and through their influence on Canadian and U.S. Marxists such as Wolf, Roseberry and Nash. However, this important influence is too often missed due to the lack of bilingualism among many North American academics. We still await an English translation of Arturo Warman and his colleagues' 1970 classic *De Eso Que Llaman Antropología Mexicana* (On What They Call Mexican Anthropology—our translation), which helped start the critical anthropology movement.

Richard Lee, Joseph Jorgenson and James A. McDonald, the first working with indigenous peoples in Africa, the latter two with indigenous peoples in North America,

have each contributed to a Marxist anthropology that is relevant for indigenous struggles of national liberation. Lee, most noted for his work in the Kalahari with the Dobe Ju/'hoansi (Leacock and Lee 1982) has played a critical role in advancing a Marxist anthropology of and for indigenous peoples. Jorgensoen's pioneering work linking dependency theory to Native American Studies, challenged conservative conceptualizations of indigenous peoples as existing outside of history (Jorgensen 1972; Jorgensen and Lee, 1974). McDonald, working with members of the Kitsumkalum First Nation (a northern BC Tsimshian community), has demonstrated through nearly three decades of collaboration that a Marxist influenced anthropology has clear relevance for today's First Nations' struggles (McDonald 1994, 2004).

Kathleen Gough, Gavin Smith, and Gerald Sider have made significant contributions to our understanding of class struggle and the ways in which these struggles manifest themselves in the "messiness" of real life. Gough's work draws attention to the role that we, as practitioners, must play in the wider world within which our research and writing occurs. Long before it was popular to call attention to the reflexive role of the anthropologist, Gough called upon the professional guild to align self-consciously with the oppressed and exploited against the power of the imperialist state. Smith and Sider, both working with rural peoples, have elaborated the ways and means through which issues of struggle link to the material conditions of the everyday and either deflect or lead to explicit class conflict.

In Canada, Gavin Smith and Richard Lee have almost single-handedly created a vibrant pool of Marxist influenced Canadian PhDs.[7] Smith's work, first with peasant struggles (1989) and, more recently, on the possibility of a politically engaged anthropology (1999) has provided us with the theoretical and empirical basis upon which a class-struggle anthropology can be built. While others have focussed on the defeats of the 1960s and 1970s, Smith constantly reminds us that words must be backed up through action (1991).

Kathleen Gough is perhaps most noted for her political involvement in the 1960s/1970s anti-war movement and her Trotskyist political activism, though we should not overlook her more "'traditional'" anthropological work on kinship and the family (see, Gough 1981; Price 2004: 307-326; Schneider and Gough 1961). At Simon Fraser University[8] Gough's name came to be identified with criticism of the McCarthyite tendencies of universities, displeased by what their more radical faculty might say or do. One of a group of seven faculty members who were fired, or denied tenure, or refused contract renewal in the early 1970s, Gough's experience should remind us that the gossamer web of academic freedom can be easily torn when the powerful take issue with what we may dare to say.

Sider's work has explored the "messiness" of the social world and the play of human actors within and against the movement of history.[9] Drawing on fieldwork sites as disparate as outport Newfoundland (2003) and rural sharecroppers in North Carolina (2003), Sider points to the ways in which historical processes intersect with the particularities of local contexts (see also, Sider and Smith 1997). Sider has done much to raise foundational questions about the self-consciousness of the working class, through broadening and deepening the relationship between anthropological and historical knowledge.

If the early scholarly life of the generation of 1968 can be defined by the almost millenarian optimism of that year which filled the space between Fidel Castro's jeep rolling into Havana amidst cheering crowds in 1959 and supporters of the United States dropping off helicopters trying to escape Saigon in 1975, their later life seemed to be measured by defeats and disappointments. It is beyond the scope of this essay to describe the long retreat from the heady 1960s, or weigh in once again with a laundry list of the many communist parties of the world that went down in bloody defeat through attempts to co-exist with their capitalist enemies, or socialist parties that helped manage capitalism through a crisis. Suffice to say that on a global scale the political leadership that did exist and the mass consciousness that created it, was not prepared for the extent to which the capitalist class and its state(s) retained the ability and desire to use every resource up to and including atomic bombs to prevent anybody from getting in the way of the accumulation of capital.

A permanent employers' offensive began to shred the welfare state and ratchet up the rate of exploitation internationally in the late 1970s (Munck 2002)[10]. Such names as Thatcher, Reagan, and Pinochet were the stars of this new class struggle from above, but much of the world followed suit, with neo-liberal austerity often imposed by lesser figures, sometimes from the left or the communist milieu, such as Mitterand in France, Hawke/Keating in Australia, and most spectacularly Gorbachev and Deng in Russia and China respectively. Despite dramatic rises in overall social productivity and societal wealth, the job opportunities and funding possibilities for academics became much more restricted. Academe was, for the first time in human history, largely a working-class profession filled with wage earners primarily dependent on their salaries.[11] As was the case with the rest of the working class, expectations declined and struggles often became mute or simply defensive.[12]

Despite the defensive quality of this period there were many important attempts to pull together and generalize the lessons of Marxist anthropology (Bloch 1983; Fluehr-Lobban 1989; Godelier 1978; Hakken and Lessinger 1987; Medina 1982; Mintz, Godelier and Trigger 1981; Nelson and Grossberg 1988; Palerm 1980). While many of us studied these texts closely, the revolutionary optimism had gone almost before it started, and we found ourselves looking more towards discussions by the best of the generation of 1968 for the reasons for defeat. Many of them went back to Marxists such as Mariátegui, Gramsci, Lukacs, and Williams who had theorized the problems of transforming civil society (Crehan 2002; Lowy 19932). Others who had probably been less serious about their radicalism or perhaps more disappointed, took a turn towards Wittgenstein, retreating into a postmodern world in which the word trumped the act, thought preceded existence, and discourse defined the core of theorizing. One should note, for example, the work of Laclau and Moufee (1985) and the bitingly effective critique by Ellen Meiksins Wood (1986).[13] Declaring the past as positivist and the present as contingent, they came to define social science as an almost purely Weberian struggle over meaning, often separated from history and the material limitations of human life. For some, who followed the path of Foucault, this took the form of a dark but socially progressive Weberian struggle to deconstruct dominant discourses, building endless walls of sand to hold back the rough ocean of meaning (Butler, Laclau and Zizek 2000; Hardt and Negri 2000; Lyotard 1984).[14] For others who were less tied to the soul of the generation of 1968 but more tied to the structuralist methodology, the end of "modernism" with its progressivist narratives, mass production, and giant "fordist" factories belching smoke and exploiting thick-necked industrial workers, released them from the bonds of working-class ideologies (Gorz 19832; Murray 1990; Touraine 1988) and allowed them to ascend like Kafka's bucket rider "into the regions of the ice mountains...lost for ever" (Kafka 1988) to any tie to materiality and the project of the working class.

A particularly interesting example of this postmodern tendency to cut anthropological writing loose from the moorings of material life emerges in Rapport and Dawson's *Migrants of Identity* (1998). In his essay in this volume, Dawson discusses identity and community in a devastated post-Thatcherite coal-mining town in England, through contrasting images of the parochial and the cosmopolitan, the local and the international, homogeneity and diversity, and movement and sedentarism. Wandering in the social wreckage of the great 1984-85 coal-mining strike that brought all of Britain to the brink of civil war and sealed the fate of such towns Dawson de- and reimagines the British working class in its former central heartland.

In his discussion of the poetics of death and belonging, Dawson reduces social class to a performative and symbolic set of identity markers that are almost entirely mental. At the end of the essay, Dawson leaves us with a picture of an aging people whose approaching death neatly mirrors and acts as a stand-in for the death of a coal-mining town: natural, inevitable and bittersweet; thus largely assuming the political, economic and ideological environment in which this poetics of death and belonging has emerged. For Dawson the most important characteristic in this town is its residents' agential abilities to imagine their own moving identities in the future and beyond the material confines of the coal town: "home bodies and migrant minds" (Dawson 1998: 220).

Where progressive British academics such as Rapport and Dawson were liberated from the constraints of "objectively defined" social class by floating off an empty bucket full of symbols, dreams and other working class chimera collected in the wreckage of defeat, scholars on the North American side of the Atlantic did not even have to return to the scene of defeats of the twentieth century in search of new and more motile identities. With little of the long-standing and deeply embedded political organization, social consciousness or "working class culture" of the British working class, the U.S. and Canadian working classes often simply vanished in anthropological writing into a seamless web of individual and particular meanings, "resistant" and not so resistant "identities," and the ever shifting deterritorialization (Appadurai 1991) and transience (Clifford 1992) generated from anonymous locales and de-historicized circumstances where the silence of the working class is less remarkable then at the site of battles between Thatcher's army and Scargill's miners. In an ironic twist, a whole generation of anthropologists answered Kathleen Gough's call for *new proposals* by a radical engagement with text, simultaneously subverting and adopting Gough's critique of anthropology as the "child of Western Imperialism" (1968: 403-407).

After the Fall

When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 most historians agreed that it was the end of one period and the beginning of another. Some commentators called it globalization, others post-modernity, and U.S. president, George Bush Sr., described it as a "new world order." U.S. political scientist Francis Fukuyama (1989) attempted a more precise definition in his article "The End of History?" where he argued that mankind's evolution through monarchy, fas-

cism, communism, and other political ideologies was finally over, and Western liberal democracy would be "the final form of human government." He went on to argue; "economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands" would replace the conflicts over big ideas of the past.

For a time it seemed that Fukuyama was right. The Soviet Union peacefully dissolved, Palestinians and Israeli Jews signed a peace accord at Oslo, Irish Catholics and Protestants agreed to settle some of their differences, and South Africa achieved black majority rule under the pro-capitalist, African National Congress. There was still, as Fukuyama had predicted, ethnic conflict, civil war, and a few isolated dictatorships, but the ideological battles that had characterized the mid-20th century seemed to have faded from memory. Though violent, these conflicts appeared to be Fukuyama's "technical problems to be solved." In 1991, an international coalition of more than 20 countries, many of whom had been enemies only a few years earlier, joined forces to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, as multinational peacekeeping forces fanned out across the globe.

The "economic calculation" described by Fukuyama set the tone for the 1990s. Economists sharing Fukuyama's triumphalism claimed that cyclical economic downturns were a thing of the past. Trillions of dollars flowed into the U.S. stock market and into "emerging" economies like Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and for a time Argentina, where free trade policies ended protectionist tariffs and forced the sale of state sector industries, drawing new capital to modernize aging inefficient productive facilities and forcing the layoff of redundant workers. As new wealth was created, skyscrapers and modern metropolises grew in places like Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta while many inner cities "gentrified" in the advanced industrial world (Smith 1996). The information superhighway created a "new economy," producing "dotcom" millionaires, software billionaires, and millions of CEOs, MBAs and workplace "day-traders."

But most of the world's population missed the boom, experiencing it instead as displacement, poverty and blocked ambition. Despite the triumphalist optimism over "the death of communism" and a "peace dividend" driven economic boom in the 1990s, tens of millions of people continued to die each year of preventable or treatable diseases. Neo-liberalism and structural adjustment further institutionalized the war of everyone against all by raising rates of exploitation and pitting neighbour against neighbour for tightening resources. Many took the traditional path out of misery, leaving home and family to migrate to a wealthier region. Mexico lost millions of people to the United States, as the 1994 devaluation of the peso brought landless peasants, laid off workers and suddenly impoverished professionals to the United States (Camarota 2001; United States Congress 2004). In other parts of the world, millions of people joined ethno-nationally defined movements and militias that fought over whatever resources remained in the many desperately undercapitalized countries across the planet (Suny 1993).

As the battle between communism and capitalism—the two great universalist futures offered by modernity in the short twentieth—began to recede people across the globe increasingly looked to what Eric Wolf has identified as the defensive alternate path to modernity: counter-enlightenment localism (Wolf 1999). For some, like Bulgarians, who elected their British born former king as prime minister in 2001, neo-monarchism promised the return of an imagined national past (Vassilev 2001). Others, like anti-globalization protesters at the 1999 "Battle of Seattle," wanted to return to a time when products and communities were more locally or nationally based. Ethnic and nationalist revivals like the Mayan movement in Guatemala seemed immanently understandable after a three decade war of extermination by the army against Marxist oriented indigenous guerrilla fronts (Friedlander 2000; Hale 1997, 1999; Smith 1991). Many yearned for a world ordered by ancient religious principles that could be imagined locally, rather than in corporate headquarters in the United States, France, Germany, Japan or the U.K.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, a series of coordinated suicide attacks by 19 fundamentalist Muslims in hijacked jetliners killed almost three thousand people and destroyed one of the great symbols of universalist modernity and the future, the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. Suddenly Fukuyama's (1989) "centuries of boredom at the end of history" were being replaced by Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1993). Though the people who had destroyed the World Trade Center and the Pentagon emerged from movements previously supported by the United States government that had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan,[15] such terrifying symmetries were no longer important. Throughout the world Left and Right cast off much of the remaining language of Marxist internationalism, enlightenment humanism, and the rhetoric of compassion that often surrounded the welfare state and terms like "the West" and Islamic civilization became hegemonic in the absence of a broader belief that there might be a unification of humanity around "failed meta-narratives." Instead of endless centuries of boredom, dystopian predictions emerged for "war without end."

Now More than Ever

In face of this onslaught, many radical scholars have retreated from their ideals of a society based on justice not power and co-operation not competition, seeing little promise in the current period. Despite huge defeats of those who have claimed to represent these ideals, there is reason for hope. Now more than ever, it is possible and necessary for radical anthropologists to return to the source of utopian energies since the 19th century: the world working class. In the cleared field of post-Cold War political consciousness there are new opportunities to draw balance sheets on past mistakes, strengthen the explanatory power of our work and write and make history.

If there is anything that is to be learned from the postmodern turn it is that all anthropological practice is aligned. Alignment is, in this sense, merely an admission that the participants of a particular social formation cannot separate their production (i.e., ethnographies) from the social relations of which they are a part. As Raymond Williams pointed out, several years in advance of postmodernism, alignment "variously expresses, explicitly or implicitly, specifically selected experience from a point of view" (Williams 1977: 199). He went on to argue that to deny alignment is to grant implicit commitment to the dominant social order, which is also an alignment. Commitment, if it is to mean anything "is surely conscious, active, and open: a choice of position...commitment is a conscious alignment, or conscious change of alignment" (Williams 1977: 200, 204).

For Marxists the relationship between consciously aligned theory and action is the principle purpose of social science. What Wilson (1972) referred to as "acting and writing history" is similar to Marx's insistence, in "thesis 11" of his 1845 "Theses on Feuerbach" that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it" (Marx 1969: 15). It is the goal of Marxist anthropologists to influence the development of society by contributing to the consciousness of the world proletariat, and contribute in some small way to its transformation from "a class in itself" to "a class for itself. This task has become both easier and more difficult.

It is obviously more difficult because of the crisis of legitimacy of Marxism and Marxian visions of how to order society. The world proletariat has probably not been so unable to constitute itself as "a class for itself" since the middle of the 19th century. However, it is easier because, as a class in itself, the world proletariat continues to grow in its size and importance. The existence of an objective working class in itself, defined by relationship to the means of production and bourgeois property relations, has never been more clearly manifest or more internationally ubiquitous. If there is any validity to the Kautskyian idea of globalization that has become popular with contemporary leftists, it is its recognition of the internationalization of the world working class and the greater penetration of capital and direct market relations to the most distant capillaries of the world system, some of which are experiencing such phenomena for the first time, but many of which are ending long hiatuses from the market.

Along with the late 20th-century expansion of marketisation, there has been a concurrent increase in interdependence for the world working class. With the threat of communism removed, and in the presence of the most massive devalorization of capital since World War II, the technological downsizing of key industries and commercial concerns throughout the world, has come the impoverishment of the most educated and skilled working classes in the world (particularly those of the former communist camp). With each year the fears and weaknesses of one national working class directly brings down the wages of another. Whether the method of reducing the social wage as a percentage of the social product is accomplished through national currency devaluations, wage reductions, decapitalization of infrastructure in the form of factory closings or NATO bombing sorties, job sharing, starving of poor or ethnically defined populations, lengthening of the work day/week, reduction in funding for education healthcare and other collective use values, or other economic "shell games," there seem to be few of the mid-20th-century complexities that previously bedevilled our analysis of the capitalist mode of production. In the new world order, the uneasy stalemate between capital and labour that was so often mediated by strong welfare or security states and the threat of communism is gone and everywhere there is directional, class-based action from the capitalists, where an injury to one is an injury to all, everyday and on a global scale.

But it is not just immiseration and vulnerability that makes the world working class look so much like an objectively definable social class. Despite the orgy of bourgeois pundits crowing about Marxism proven false and ex-Marxists declaring that strikes do not work in the information age, the post-Cold War era has been a time of greatly increased class conflict and working-class rebellion. There are daily protests against neo-liberalism throughout the globe and relatively frequent general strikes since the end of the short 20th century. In the last few years there have been remarkable working-class fight-backs. There have been general strikes and national industrial actions in not

so surprising places like Argentina, France, Nicaragua, Bolivia, South Africa, South Korea, Indonesia and Ecuador. There have been surprising actions like the successful International Brotherhood of Teamsters 1997 strike in the United States, the Puerto Rican general strike of 1998, and the many waves of *maquila* shutdowns in Northern Mexico.

Throughout the Americas there has been a level of labour disturbance and violent confrontation with the state over the social wage that in a previous era might have led to a currency crisis, capital flight and the use of napalm. This high level of social conflict has barely been noticed in world financial markets and has been treated with malignant neglect by capitalists and their governments throughout the hemisphere. An example of this is Argentine president Carlos Menem's response to the August 1997 general strike attempt and national march on Buenos Aires. Instead of revamping the death squads, he flippantly suggested that Buenos Aires could use the tourist dollars. Again, in 2001, when the Argentine economy collapsed and the country spiralled into anarchy, with burning, looting, and alternate currency systems springing up in barrios and regional towns, the United States refused to produce a genuine "bailout" and the Argentine army remained unfazed and largely uninterested in a process that removed presidents and destroyed all faith in the government. Even the recent election of left/populist presidents across "America's backyard" in Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and possibly Mexico next year, seems to only raise a few eyebrows in Washington.

The burgeoning anti-free trade protest movements, united in their opposition to liberalized trade and the international organizations that negotiate, finance, and govern such trade such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund have been able to grab media attention. Multinational media corporations seem to revel in displaying images of youthful, energetic protestors gathered in carnivalesque displays of opposition to the economic agenda of the ruling classes. Yet, there has been a negligible response in world financial markets. As with the massive strikes and protests by working people, corporate and political leaders seem unconcerned and dismissive.

This is where the strange disjuncture between objective conditions and subjective consciousness comes in. There was a time when a few hundred peasants marching on a Latin American capital or a hundred thousand workers marching through Paris would cause a crisis of the state. However, in the post-Marxist world, the capitalist class is generally sure that no matter how disruptive a strike, social struggle, or act against the government, they can outlast the working class. After workers and students interrupted the meetings in Seattle the ruling class responded with a taller fence and a larger zone of exclusion in Quebec City.

This renewed confidence in bourgeois rule is probably not misplaced either. As one Paris member of a strike committee during the French working-class uprising of December 1995 was quoted as saying in a New York, *Village Voice* article, "we have got Paris, but where do we go from here?" With no viable alternative vision for social distribution besides the market and no other way of organizing production besides wage labour and capital, working-class struggles are defensive, even when they are victorious.

Materialism Unashamed and Unbound

As the world working class continues its uneven but inexorable growth, even such states as Israel and Pakistan, so deeply infused as they are with religious ideology and fratricidal nationalism, offer some cause for hope. They both have large and highly dissatisfied working classes with what we believe are objective material interests in turning on their leaders and recognizing commonality with their Palestinian and Indian class brothers and sisters. It certainly will not happen next Tuesday, but it could happen. This is where we not only accept the label of economic determinism thrown at and often denied by Marxists, but actually embrace it.

For two writers who have spent the preceding pages and the last two decades waging an ideological struggle for a Marxist academy, we clearly are not suggesting that everything can be reduced to money and immediate economic interest. We reject the reactionary behaviourist fantasy that as the misery of the working class rises, so too will class consciousness and class struggle, or similarly, that rising standards of living necessarily yield declining class politics. Clearly ideas count and the present level of misery in this world is quite high enough, even in our own relatively privileged sections of it. In our experience the weaker and poorer our class is, the less ability there is to project class power and the consciousness that necessarily underwrites it (Menzies 1997). No political force has ever won a battle or a war by increasing its weakness and misery.

Instead we are attempting to ground the future society in the Marxian idea that to be human is to engage in conscious social labour that produces wealth. This is the social undercarriage of human life and we identify the crucial politico-ideological battles in which humans engage

across the planet as, in some way, related to this underlying definition of being human. We remain convinced that if there are indeed clashes of civilizations on the horizon, it will only be because our social class is so deeply weakened by the 40 years of imperial unity in face of the post-World War II Soviet threat and the subsequent triumphalism of their defeat of USSR, that we are unable to create and disseminate our own counter-hegemonic ideological class projects in face of myriad large and small elites reorganizing us into rival armies and re-dividing the bounty of production.

The anti-fascist and anti-colonial "masses" that were often celebrated as the subject of history (as in Mao's statement that "the masses make history, the party leads") during the short 20th century have been replaced by the fanatic, nationalist logic of great protectors of our balkanized selves such as George Bush Jr., Jacques Chirac, Osama bin Laden, Ariel Sharon and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. We have been left with little choice but to look for better, rather than worse protective masters. In such an era the mass of humanity is trapped in terrifying, tessellated political categories such as "the Muslim street," "Schindler's Jews," "Old Europe," and, of course, the pre-New World Order standards "nation," "race" "ethnicity," civilization and "the West."[16]

In rejecting such ideological divisions in the world working class and looking to the deeper levels where we are united, we recognize the importance of the enlightenment and French revolutionary dream of a secular universal "humanity," but stand at a critical distance from this ideology of expanding capitalism. As with the feudal/tributary mode of production (Amin 1980) which spread for thousands of years, eventually bringing most of the old world into its orbit, the capitalist mode of production has found its way to every spot on the planet. While productive forces continue to improve and fixed capital continues to grow, there is little geo-demographic room left for expansion. In two inter-imperialist wars and numerous anti-colonial revolutions the world has seen that the only way for newcomers to get into the imperial club is murder, and usually on a grand and ghoulish scale. Perhaps the last geo-demographic frontier for imperial capitalism is the "limitless markets" of mainland China, where it is easy to imagine a third inter-imperialist war starting over the spoils of capitalist restoration.

In such a world of uneven development, where the Anglo-American capital bloc resolves its governance problems "top down" from air planes, European and Japanese national capital blocs quietly rearm and continue with their political economic war of position, and all manner of blocked elites and their political constituencies across the Third World froth with murderous rage, we believe that there are no Oskar Schindlers in the White House, in Downing Street, or anywhere else, who will genuinely protect an abstract "humanity" through what Hitler called "the night and fog of war." We see this as an age of war, consolidation, and crisis for the world capitalist system. Following Wolf who looked at three modes of production in crisis and observed that "at this millennial transition, the human capacity to envision imaginary worlds seems to be shifting into high gear" (Wolf 1999: 291), we expect the coming period to be one that is continually unsettled by purveyors of myriad "imaginary worlds" in both the heartlands of imperialism and the resistant provinces of the former colonial world.

Though we recognize the best of intentions in many, if not most, humans, such voluntary appeals to moral suasion as compassion, humanity, liberty, brotherhood and equality only go so far in face of a mode of organizing social labour and a logic of production and ownership that is built on the war of everyone against all in a race to accumulate capital. If we are ever able to fulfill the purpose of social science and consciously build a better "imaginary" world, it should be built upon the solid foundation of social class. We claim material interest and the struggle against economic, political, and "species being" alienation, based on the human being as conscious social labourer and political animal, as the only "realistic" future.

It may not seem likely in the present, but we are sure that it is necessary in the future, otherwise, we have the world to lose. Though many of the ideological concerns and conflicts have changed since the short 20th began, we stand on the same economic determinism that led Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Vladimir Lenin, James Connolly, John Maclean, and Kate Richards O'Hare to reject the first inter-imperialist war as an elite attempt to resolve who would own the social labour of the world capitalist system. People, who are so intimately, and more importantly, inherently interconnected in their interests as the world working class, must find ideologies that enable them to fight for themselves, rather than against themselves.[17]

When a pharmaceutical factory in Iraq or the Sudan or an automobile factory in Serbia is destroyed from above, it instantly lowers the price of labour, as well as the productive capacity and the overall class power of a national working class, diminishing the power of the entire world working class by just a little. If this logic suggests economic determinism, then so be it. Many of us of the generation of 2000 watched in horror throughout the 1970s and 1980s as the national trade unions of the United States and Canada aided the U.S. government in purging

so called "communist sympathizers" from the Latin American union movement. With each dead, disappeared or marginalized radical unionist the power of labour dropped just a little. When the tipping point finally came and quantity moved to quality, we found ourselves in a new world order, where workers of the South had lost so many of the gains they made in the short 20th century that the workers of the North came under threat. When the North American Free Trade Agreement finally appeared in 1994 the battle was already lost. North American workers had no space in which to negotiate, little sense of solidarity, and stood against the agreement with the ideologies of their misleaders and masters. Canadians protested losing their jobs and social system to low-wage U.S. workers who were portrayed as lacking civil culture or a healthy sense of entitlement. In the United States, the fight against NAFTA involved a similar rhetoric directed at Mexicans and compounded by traditional forms of Anglo-racism. Finally, in Mexico, which did have the lowest average labour costs in North America, Mexican trade unionists demonstrated against jobs heading north to be "stolen" by what were portrayed as ignorant peasants rushing to U.S. owned *maquiladoras* in northern Mexico and compliant U.S. workers in the Southern United States, who lacked the class-conscious traditions of the Mexican industrial union sector that had won some of the highest industrial wages in the Third World during the short 20th century. In the days before agency became an issue of discourse, this was sometimes referred to as false consciousness. In face of such a tessellated working class, we pose the basic Marxist idea that, regardless of the small or large size of a salary, an injury to one wage earner is an injury to all.

Making Our Own Future

If there is one crucial fact of the post-Marxist academy it is the lack of predetermined historical outcomes. The evolutionist notion that history is an inexorable metanarrative, unfolding from here to there, has been laid to rest in a climate of global millennial pessimism and scaled back political expectations. This is one of the insights that post-modernists recognized even before the fall of the Berlin Wall: those all encompassing structuralist theories that explained everything do not really work and tell us very little that would be useful for writing and acting history. It is time to bring back history, the soul of Marxism for theory and praxis.

We would argue that the USSR was not defeated by the inevitable superiority of a market economy, the lack of incentives under communism, or the Hegelian unfolding of the spirit, but rather by a group of historical actors who were more adept at creating and managing social consciousness, exerting political will and leading vast social forces. There was no inevitable capitalist victory, nor a teleological workers' utopia waiting over the horizon. There was history made by real humans in groups, exerting their wills under inherited historical circumstances, in the name of their interests or perceived interests.

For Marxists this lesson in the role of consciousness in history should force us to abandon the evolutionism, functionalism, positivism and unconscious behaviourist economic determinism that came to call itself Marxism for most of the short 20th century. For many years, Marxist method has been diminished by the positivist evolutionism deriving from the influence of the two main Marxist leadership tendencies in 20th-century history.

The first of these Marxisms was tied to one of any number of Workers' States (Albania, Yugoslavia, Russia, China, etc ...) or progressive experiments in national liberation. In its classic form this Marxism substitutes a chosen socialist or "anti-imperialist" Jerusalem for the interests of the world proletariat and posits an evolutionary track to communism based on that state's outstripping capitalism in some combination of industrial production and progressive development as proven by life expectancy, women's participation in the labour force, athletic prowess, or the number of doctors and teachers per person. This might be described as "the build a better tractor road to socialism." In this road the forces of production reduce the working class to techno-environmental spectators, waiting for the efficiency of socialism to usher in the workers' utopia. Any betrayal of the world working class is justified as long as it can be described as "providing space" for the chosen state and its people to evolve.

In anthropology this tendency has given us the muscular materialism of Leslie White and the scientific positivism of Marvin Harris, and in broader academic writing, structuralist theories such as "dependency" (Frank 1966; Rodney 1981; Wallerstein 1974), communist party "stage theory" typologies (Toledano 1944; see Lowy 1992 or Vitale 1972 for a critical discussion), "Kondratieff cycles" and "the long wave" (Kleinknecht, Mandel, and Wallerstein 1992; Kondratieff 1984; Shaikh 1992; Webber and Rigby 2001) and philosophical structuralism (Althusser 1977; Poulantzas 1974) that suggest the possibility of an autochthonous road to Third World tractor heaven. The substitution of structure for politics and the extreme dependency on objectivist political economy that are connected to these grand portraits of structures of accumulation often missed exactly the question that Marxist academics should have been asking; who is organizing whom for what and how can scholarship be connected to the polit-

ical life that "writes and acts history"? It is this underlying evolutionary approach that has enabled post-structuralists, who no longer see tractors and factories, to believe that socialism has arrived through the back door in the form of post-Fordist, post-working-class flexible specialization, and post-class mercantile driven consumerist utopias (Gorz 1982; LaClau and Mouffe 1985; Murray 1990; Touraine 1988) or pose darker Durkheimian dystopias that present us with network societies and information feudalism (Castells 1996; Drahos and Braithwaite 2003).[18]

The second main tendency has generally been connected to social democracy and workers' parties. This tendency posed evolution as what E.P. Thompson called *process.* In this process there is a gradual evolution from capitalism to socialism based on increasing rationality and self- awareness of the working class. Thompson, in his introduction to *The Making of The English Working Class* actually went as far as to define the existence of the working class in terms of consciousness. Instead of building more tractors these Marxists tried to smooth the conflicts between capitalists and workers, with the goal of avoiding a direct confrontation. They feared that such a clash would result in a dramatic defeat, giving working-class rule a bad name and causing a devolution in socialist consciousness.

This tendency did not bleach out the political agency of the working class quite as much as the tractors to communism variety. However, the gradualist/culturist road to socialist consciousness implied that the world would one day wake up realizing that when it went to bed it was already socialist. In this case consciousness makes socialism grow in the fields as the tractors were expected to have in Stalin's USSR or "Great Leap Forward" China. It was the job of such social democrats to nurture this delicate consciousness, even when it has meant prioritizing the electoral fortunes of the World War I era German SPD over the lives of millions of French and English workers by voting war credits or prioritizing support for the Unidad Popular electoral coalition in Chile over sharpening political contradictions and arming the workers who would eventually die in the *cordones industrials* while fighting General Augusto Pinochet's national army. In the current period, the absence of a working-class socialist consciousness releases those who follow this approach from their now thankless task and allows for the rise of "new labour" and the postmodern of the particular. In a phenomenological world, where theory can only emerge from the grounded aspects of everyday life, consciousness is what you make of it and how you use it.

What these two tendencies shared was a faith in evolution and an inability to envision creating fractures and historical disjunctures. As with the less patient and more subjectivist brand of Marxism that found its expression in Guevarist adventures in the jungles of the Third World, these two tendencies were fundamentally uninterested in the conscious political organization of the vanguard of the working class behind a proletarian political project that could imagine a break with the bourgeois present. This may be one of the reasons that capitalism is now triumphant: the conscious vanguard of the capitalist class has not believed in political evolutionism since World War I, which began the short 20th century. They were not counting on the spirit of history to save them from communism. They and their intellectual advocates acted and wrote history, by organizing to win, as if their lives depended on it. It is only now, after the collapse of the East Bloc that some of their more liberal intellectual spokesmen like Francis Fukuyama could timidly return to the evolutionist paradigm and hesitantly suggest a Hegelian "I told you so."

As Marx said in *Das Kapital* "what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality"(Marx 1954: 174). This was his way of identifying the importance of consciousness in all projects involving human labour. This also points to the relationship between scholarship and action. In this cleared field, where social democrats are embracing neo-liberalism and a global war on terror, guerrillas are coming down from the mountains to join their old enemies in managing the bourgeois state and ex-communist party bosses in the former East Bloc are creating "red/brown alliances" and helping to impose IMF austerity we can discard the notion that humans are techno-environmental bees building their atomic reactors while waiting for communism and the mind-over-matter textual fantasies of Thompsonian gradualists, "Weberian Gramscian Marxists" (Crehan 2002), and what Ellen Meiksins Wood disparagingly calls the "new true socialists" of postmodernism (Wood 1986). As Marxists, scholars, and sentient humans we are bad architects with free will, taking various historical projects from conception to reality. The future is only what we make of it.

Marxism: If It Doesn't Say It, It Isn't

What then can we do to sharpen our analysis and write and act history as Marxist architects in a post-Marxist academy? We can start by keeping our eyes on the new international working class and its new workers' vanguard that is inevitably emerging in regions with young and militant working classes. The current climate of race to the bottom global production seems to allow less and

less room by the year for the creation and financial support of a large layer of trade union social democratic bureaucrats that have traditionally managed industrial working classes for their bosses. Where they do exist, they often ignore the most militant and strategically important areas of struggle that may not even be directly tied to production sites. This presents exciting opportunities for the development of new forms of struggle, new organs of political mobilization, and new anti-capitalist alliances.

We can also look to older sections of the working class, where hatred of the capitalist class and the dream of a co-operative, socialist society remain strong. It is easy to forget, in New World Order North America, that much of the world still remains loyal to the dream of a co-operative and equal society. In South Africa, for instance, the Communist Party, the African National Congress, COSATU and other pro-capitalist working-class leaderships are steadily losing legitimacy and relying on brute force to guarantee the accumulation of capital. In Korea, which remains a Cold War battlefield, it is often said that the South Korean government would not last an hour without U.S. soldiers, despite 15 years of economic catastrophe and a profoundly anti-democratic government in North Korea. Regardless of the veracity of this rhetorical claim, it reflects a widely held hatred for the U.S. imperial project and a counter-position of a variety of socialist, proletarian, and nationalist visions that are strong in the communities, worksites and political organizations on the Korean peninsula.

In Brazil, the recent election of Workers' Party leader and former industrial worker Luis Ignacio da Silva "Lula," suggests a conscious working-class militancy that is threatening enough to have forced the Brazilian capitalist class to use a working-class party to manage austerity. Despite some recent successes by Lula in imposing austerity on the Brazilian working class, his election indicates important class tensions in Brazil that seem to have spread to Uruguay in the national electoral victory of the *Frente Amplia in 2004*. In China where a pro-capitalist Communist Party apparatus attempts to foist capitalism and neo-liberalism on a population schooled in various forms of official, state-sanctioned Marxism, the tensions are particularly acute. Massive industrial strikes break out everyday, while many call for the return of the "iron rice bowl" and everywhere pictures of Mao ZeDong, the founder of the communist state, have become good luck symbols and rallying banners.[19]

In "Old Europe," the first homeland of the labour lieutenants of capital, in the form of early twentieth century social democratic parties that have managed capitalism during its most difficult moments and communist parties that slavishly followed Moscow's on-again, off-again attempts to make friends with the capitalist class, the working class is probably still better organized and more socially conscious than anywhere else in the world. From French industrial workers who retain a strong understanding of the value of blocking highways, shutting down airports, and burning overturned cars in the streets of Paris to Italian white collar civil servants, who go into the streets in defence of the social rights of the entire working class, to Scandinavia where the gender divisions of class society are probably most attenuated, the wealthy and well-organized European working class has many potentially positive features.

It is here in the realm of connecting subjective ideas to objective conditions that Marxist anthropologists can help to write and act history. With bourgeois ideology triumphant, it is necessary for those of us who continue to imagine working-class power to organize ourselves both as workers and as anthropologists. If we refuse to submit to the false god of passivity and look at the way that human history is made, we will see that there is still an important role for those of us who *are* willing to swim against the current. Both the physical power and the consciousness of the world working class are more important than ever.

As anthropologists, whom Gramsci might have called traditional intellectuals, we have only the tiniest connection to the physical power of the working class. We cannot shut down a city the way transit workers can. We cannot stop a war the way soldiers, dockworkers, and weapons factory workers can, but even the most marginal, sessional instructors amongst our cohort has a public platform for exerting some small influence on the consciousness of the world working class. In our goal of a class-struggle anthropology we must heed Jean Paul Sartre's challenge that: "commitment is an act, not a word."[20]

Anthony Marcus, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies University of Melbourne, Victoria, 3010, Australia. E-mail: amarcus@unimelb.edu.au
Charles Menzies, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, 6303 NW Marine Drive, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T1Z1. E-mail: cmenzies@interchange.ubc.ca

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Notes

1 For three key review articles see O'Laughlin 1975, Roseberry 1988, 1997. One may also wish to consult Wessman's Anthropology and Marxism (1981) or Bloch's more European focussed Marxism and Anthropology (1983). All of these reviews outline aspects of the relationship between Marxism and anthropology and, with the possible exception of O'Laughlin, tend to focus on the intellectual as opposed to the activist elements of the relationship. The online journal, *New Proposals: Marxism and Anthropology* (www.newproposals.ca, see also www.npweblog.ca) is a new project that aims to provide a forum for a focus on the more activist element of the relationship between Marxism and anthropology.

2 We are critical of the fashion now popular in the "University of Excellence" that seeks novelty and innovation for its own sake. Excellence has come to be synonymous with innovation and novelty. Reworking or pulling forward old ideas to a new generation is not as appreciated as is riding the euphonious cutting edge of innovation (see: Readings 1996).

3 As Michael Blim has so clearly and passionately demonstrated, even in the face of expanding economic and social capacity, the gap between rich and poor is wider than at nearly any previous point in human history (2005: 1-11). And, that group of rich are themselves becoming fewer and fewer relative to the growing masses (Blim 2005).

4 We use this term as a provisional replacement for the term "Cold War" which makes a number of assumptions that we explicitly reject: (1) that there was no military engagement and no shooting between the USSR and the imperialist countries; (2) that the nuclear Mexican standoff that characterised the post Korean War period can stand for the entire conflict over political-economic systems during the twentieth century; (3) that prior to the Korean War, when the imperialist countries were not united around a politics of global anti-communism the ideological and political challenges to the world working class were significantly different.

5 See Burner and Marcus (1999). See also, the "it is difficult to ask a man to be the last to die" speech by recent Democratic Presidential candidate, John Kerry, before the U.S. Congress in 1971. Kerry was among a large contingent of mainstream Democrats in the U.S. who were advancing a defeatist position. Kerry was also involved with the Detroit war crimes inquest organized by anti-war veterans. He was not alone in his defeat at any cost position. There was a petition from the West Point officers' corps that stated a quick defeat in Vietnam would stop the U.S. army from a crisis of morale that could have serious implications for Western Europe. Navy ships were reporting near mutinies from crews who voted not to proceed into battle, and the "fragging," or killing of officers in the battlefield by enlisted soldiers, was increasing the difficulty of actually prosecuting the war on the ground in Vietnam. By the early 1970s more than 60% of Americans were opposed to continued U.S. presence in Vietnam (see, Kurlansky 2004; Kerry et al. 1971; Joseph 1981; www.moderntribute.com or www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1972VVAW.html).

6 Operation Solidarity was a popular coalition of labour and community groups organized in opposition to one of the early neo-liberal attacks on the welfare state in North America (see Palmer, 1987). Though the agenda had been developed and refined in the 1970s, the new language of fiscal restraint, corporate downsizing, and deficit reduction caught like wildfire in the 1980s (for its impact on the managerial classes, see Newman, 1988).

7 The edited collection by Lem and Leach (2002) draws extensively upon the circle of Canadian anthropologists from the Political Economy and Production of Culture working group discussed in this issue's introduction. See Marcus (1996) for an equivalent collection of papers produced by CUNY trained anthropologists.

8 Menzies was an undergraduate student at SFU in the early/mid 1980s where the memory of Gough was still strong. The bitter fights of the late 1960s and 1970s, which had pitted administrators and conservative academics against radical faculty and students, reverberated long after the details of the fights had been forgotten.

9 As students of Gerald Sider, we have been influenced not only by him, but also by many of his other students. In particular Dombrowski (2001), Bornstein (2002), Carbonella (1996), and Striffler (2002) are all pieces which have helped us to define our own writing and political vision. Sharryn Kasmir and Kathryn McCaffrey, though not students of Sider, have produced works on nationalism, co-operative production and working-class consciousness (Kasmir 1996) and anti-militaristic social movements (McCaffrey 2002) that have been at least as important to our discussions as has been the coterie of students who completed their PhDs with Sider.

10 The unilateral abrogation of the Bretton Woods agreement by the U.S. can be said to mark the beginning of a concerted employers' attack against the meagre gains made by workers during the post-World War II upturn. The political turns that followed and, in more conventional accounts, are said

to mark the dismantling of the welfare state can be dated to the election of politicians such as Margaret Thatcher in the UK (1978), Ronald Reagan in the U.S. (1980), and a host of likeminded politicians across the Western Democracies. The underlying economic factors were, however, present far earlier than the electoral victories of explicitly neo-conservative/neo-liberal politicians. As Tony Cliff methodically documents in his 1970s book, *The Employers' Offensive,* European and North America employers—allied with their respective state governments—were pushing hard to limit the gains the working class had managed to make in the workplace. To do this required combining new attempts to undermine what power workers may have in their workplace through new "productivity" contracts (in which workers were "rewarded" for increases in "productivity") with increasing controls applied to labour by the state. Even in regimes with nominally left of centre governments, such as the UK, the state was engaged in realigning labour laws to the benefit of employers (Elliott and Atkinson 1999[1998]).

11 Thomas Patterson (2001) documents how the growth of a contingent workforce—primarily female—across North American universities beginning in the 1970s played a significant role in undermining the economic security of the majority of practicing anthropologists. The development of a two-tiered workforce became commonplace in North American, unionized worksites. The core ingredient of the two-tiered contract was a first tier of original workers who maintained their wages and benefits and a second tier typically of part-time workers for whom the union negotiated a concessionary agreement usually at significantly lower wages and benefits. Union leaders saw such arrangements as ways to protect the economic conditions of those already working on the shop floor. By the 1980s this pattern of concessionary contracts was firmly entrenched.

12 Alex Callinicos reminds us, however, that the impact of the long downturn upon academic workers was delayed relative to its devastating impact upon the industrial working class. Since the mid 1970s workers' struggles have been defensive and the provisions of the welfare state have come under attack. Yet, the experience of intellectuals who had been radicalized during the 1960s and early 1970s was different from much of the workforce. As the economy contracted the 1960s radicals "began to enter middle age. Usually they did so with all hope of socialist revolution gone—indeed, often having ceased to believe in the desirability of any such revolution. Most of them had...come to occupy some sort of professional, managerial or administrative position, to have become members of the new middle class, at a time when the over-comsumptionist dynamic of Western capitalism offered this class rising living standards (a benefit often denied the rest of the workforce: hourly wages in the U.S. fell by 8.7% between 1973 and 1986)" (Callinicos 1989:168). This is not to suggest that contemporary anthropology is simply the product of radical intellectual disillusionment and co-optation. It is, however, to suggest that the social context within which people live does indeed shape how they come to see the world around them.

13 It is, perhaps, misleading to suggest that the post-modernist turn to text and away from materiality is simply the by-product of revolutionary disillusionment. Certainly, if one were to follow the argument of A. Ahmad (1992), B. Palmer (1990), or A. Callinicos (1989), the reasons are more likely to be found in these scholars' lack of revolutionary commitment and understanding in the first place. As Ahmad points out the most radical of the generation of '68 didn't necessarily make it through the hoops and trials of graduate school or tenure review. While the more radical activists organized, wrote pamphlets, and sold revolutionary newspapers on the street corner, their more reserved peers wrote the academic pieces that granted them entry into the halls of the academy. Furthermore, as Callinicos carefully details, the material conditions did in fact change over the course of the 1970s and 1980s (1989). Following upon the heals of the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement real wages fell for the traditional working class and workers' struggles became defensive. This change in the tone of working-class struggle released the pressure from erstwhile radical academics so that they could focus on more reflective work (see, for example Rabinow 1977). Despite a growing contingent labour force within the academy those ensconced in positions of power and privilege did not feel the bite of cutbacks or the collapse of their real wages until the 1980s (Callinicos 1989). Disappointment, lack of willpower, and changing material conditions all combined to give us a generation of dilettantes more interested in playing with text than in resolving or intervening in the crises experienced by the rest of the working class.

14 Some may well question our groupings, in particular that of Negri with Lyotard and other post-modernists. While we respect the progressivist intentions of Negri, neither of us see anything Marxist in Hardt and Negri's attempt to rewrite capital through the lens of Foucauldian reifications. From our reading Hardt and Negri have explicitly rejected social class as the central dynamic of analyzing capitalism and as the motor force of progressive change.

15 These movements and individuals appear to have transformed themselves following the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 1991 and the very public establishment of U.S. army bases in Saudi Arabia. However, the very fact that the U.S. started these groups on their way points to the Machiavellian nature of Imperialist politics; as long as they were useful in fighting the Soviet Union people like Osama Bin Laden were granted carte blanche to prosecute a proxy war on behalf of the U.S. After that one supposes the U.S. thought they would simply fade away....

16 There is clearly a similar dynamic at work in the current retreat from political women's liberation. The contemporary logic of gender politics seems to be heavily personalized, contained within the family, family based social policy, and family based political discourse. Privatized childrearing has returned to being a given and the abolition, or radical rearranging of the two principle gender roles of the epoch of class society, men and women, seems to be, at best, a subterranean footnote (in this case an endnote). The gender divisions within the world working class are, of course, hugely significant though generally pitched in terms of a far more intimate and personal form of paternalism than the aforementioned ones, which currently threaten the very basis of human existence with their projects.

17 Here we would point to the renewal movement within U.S. trade unions as one path. The renewal movement seeks to expand internal democratic practice while simultaneously breaking down the walls of economic, bureaucratic business unionism. This is being accomplished through grassroots, social justice unionism. We would also point to the left tradition of shop-floor unionism that challenges the hold on unions by bureaucrats, many of whom have long been separated from the real material conditions of the shop floor (McNally 1980).

18 This is not to suggest that structural Marxists have disappeared entirely. Writers such as Giovanni Arrighi, Anwar Sheikh, and Michael Webber continue to look at grand cycles, Kondratieff waves and other large movements in the development of the mode of production.

19 The continuing power of an Asian populist/communist vision connected to Mao ZeDong in Asia is particularly apparent in Nepal and what is currently referred to as the "Naxalite region" of India, where the intersection of caste, class and geo-politics has yielded a longstanding civil war. In addition to this, there are a wide variety of legal and semi-legal communist parties spread across India and Nepal that have recently seen increasing popularity.

20 Quoted in Gerassi, 1971.

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The Culture of Poverty Revisited: Bringing Back the Working Class

Anthony Marcus *University of Melbourne*

Abstract: This article looks at the "unhappy marriage" between the anthropology of poverty in the United States and Marxist social science. It examines the theoretical and methodological assumptions of poverty studies that have excluded a Marxist analysis and identifies the analytic weaknesses of these assumptions through ethnographic field data on homelessness in New York City during the Reagan/Bush years. Finally, an attempt is made to situate the development of poverty studies within the larger political history of the American working class in the 20th century and suggestions are presented for the directions that a Marxist anthropology of poverty might take.

Keywords: Marxism, poverty, homelessness, working class, anthropology of the United States, race

Résumé : Cet article s'intéresse au mariage raté de l'anthropologie de la pauvreté, telle qu'elle est pratiquée aux États-Unis, et des sciences sociales marxistes. Il examinera les suppositions théoriques et méthodologiques des études sur la pauvreté qui font abstraction des analyses marxistes et relèvera les faiblesses analytiques de ces suppositions. Cette critique s'appuie sur des données ethnographiques de la situation des sans-abri à New York sous le règne de Reagan et Bush. Nous tenterons ensuite de situer le développement des études sur la pauvreté au sein de l'histoire politique générale de la classe ouvrière américaine du 20ième siècle et de proposer de nouvelles orientations pour une anthropologie marxiste de la pauvreté.

Mots-clés : Marxisme, pauvreté, sans-abri, classe ouvrière, anthropologie Américaine, race

The Waxing and Waning of Poverty Studies

For Marxists there is no greater bugaboo than the issue of poverty in America. On the surface it would seem that dire poverty amidst the over-capacity, over-production and economic plenty of the United States would be the ideal empirical indictment of the irrational brutality of the capitalist mode of production. Yet there is probably no academic or policy literature that has been more impervious to Marxist analysis than that on poverty in America. This has been particularly true in urban anthropology, where the overwhelming majority of treatments of poverty have been functionalist, a-historical and anti-political. The Weberian typologies upon which this literature relies "disappear" the working class by positing a set of imagined categories, based largely on consumption (or lack of it) and composed of society's most exotically grotty and underprivileged. In disappearing the Marxist category of the proletariat, they also negate working-class political solutions to the continuing problems of capitalist reproduction, U.S. style; thus participating in the ideological suppression of such solutions, while attempting to ameliorate the suffering of those most afflicted.

From the 1962 publication of Michael Harrington's book *The Other America* to the homeless crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s, social scientists have presented many catchy names for this poorest section of the American working class. The most popular and persistent has been simply "the poor," but terms such as "culture of poverty," "other America," "homeless," "underclass," "inner city" and the Marxian "working poor" have come and gone. Since President Lyndon Johnson's "war on poverty" in the mid 1960s the United States government has poured billions of dollars into poverty relief programs directed at this group, despite the endless speculation on how to give it demographic parameters and the difficulty of finding people who actually self-identify by these vague, politically charged and stigmatizing categories.

Over the past 40 years, such programs have not eliminated the poverty they claimed to target, often failing to accomplish such seemingly modest goals as eliminating public sleeping and preventable diseases. Despite these failures anthropologists and other social scientists have continued to use the same research categories to produce literature that is often little more than a tuning mechanism for the government poverty bureaucracy.

Since the 1993 inauguration of Bill Clinton the anthropology of poverty has become far less important (Susser 2001). The post-cold war *pax Americana* that drove almost a decade of continuous economic growth had Democrats and Republicans alike competing to dismantle the New Deal/Great Society poverty relief programs, leaving poverty studies a less attractive area of research. Since the election of George W. Bush the orgy of economic self-congratulation at the end of the cold war has given way to the post-September 11 "war without end," further reducing the importance of domestic social policy and the public face of urban policy research.

The still recent collapse of communism combined with the contemporary retrenchments in poverty studies may seem like a bad period in which to discuss Marxism, poverty, and the failures of our meagre, but sorely missed welfare state. However, this interstitial moment may actually be the perfect time for Marxists to enter the discussion of poverty in the United States and put the working class back into the centre of the analysis.

In the following paper I will discuss how the discourses on poverty have excluded and silenced a Marxist perspective, often reducing social science in general and anthropology in particular to little more than an adjunct of government policy. Then, using ethnographic data from my own research on "homeless" men in New York City in the 1990s, I will demonstrate some of the ways that this instrumentalizing of research categories and excision of Marxist understandings of social class not only removes the liberating potential of social science by colluding in the management of inequality, but also greatly limits the explanatory power of our work. It will be my argument that the difficulty of situating and contextualizing working-class problems such as housing, employment, and health care within vague, impressionistic and often arbitrary categories such as "underclass" and "homeless" forces us to either project imaginary categories onto the data or remain agnostic about exactly who we are studying and why. Finally, I will suggest some possible explanations for the lack of a working-class perspective in poverty studies by challenging the historiography that posits a "Fordist compromise" and imagines the United States working class as an ideologically, politically and economically bounded cultural isolate, removed from the larger history of the world.

Two Nations or Two Classes?

Much of the modern social science of poverty, its definitions, methodologies and relationship to public policy owes its origins to Michael Harrington and his 1962 book, *The Other America*. It is said that John F. Kennedy was moved to tears when he read Harrington's book and many people credit the book with instigating many of the anti-poverty programs of the 1960s. At the centre of his methodology was the category "poor," which was inscribed in the title of his book, by the use of the word "other," to describe a section of the American working class that numbers in the tens of millions. Though often identified with the left and Marxism, Harrington's work was a key part of the discourse that silenced Marxism and systematically excluded a working-class focus from discussions of poverty.

In the final chapter of *The Other America*, Harrington asserts, "...the United States contains an underdeveloped nation, a culture of poverty...They are beyond history, beyond progress, sunk in a paralyzing, maiming routine" (Harrington 1962: 158). He concludes his book by saying that "until these facts shame us, until they stir us to action, the other America will continue to exist, a monstrous example of needless suffering in the most advanced society in the world" (ibid: 191). In this last chapter, Harrington makes two assumptions that were crucial to nearly all subsequent literature on poverty: the poor are different and separate from the rest of the United States, and social shame is the means for ending suffering in America.

The first of these assumptions is the one that most directly excludes a Marxist analysis and confuses attempts to understand the nature of poverty. Harrington's functionalist typology divides society into two groups, or as he calls it, "two nations" (ibid: 158). The first nation is a cross-class group in which the system functions. The second nation, which he calls "the other America," is a place where nothing functions.

Although by the very title of his book Harrington assumes two different Americas, he never clearly defines or justifies his division between the "other America" and an implied "same America." In this sleight of hand Harrington obscures the two most fundamental categories of a Marxist analysis: the capitalist class who own the means of production and derive benefit from channelling a higher percentage of the social product into profit and the employed working class who share with "the poor" an

interest in channelling a higher percentage of the social product into use values and a lower percentage into profit. Harrington's fusion of these two categories, which in a Marxist analysis are separate and structurally opposed, into an implied and unproblematized category, "the same America," nearly guarantees that the working class will disappear from the analysis which focusses on the stated and problematized category of "other."

Though Harrington never denies that "the other America" is populated by people who are spit out of the "same America," his dismissal of the Marxist idea that a minimum wage store clerk, a welfare mother, a $75 000 a year truck driver, and a doctor working on salary for a major health insurer have an economic and political commonality of interest directs the focus of research to a cultural model of difference expressed perfectly by the objectifying adjective "other." By establishing a cultural rather than class model Harrington predetermines that the capitalist competitive labour market is naturalized. It is also assumed that the conflict over working-class demands to expand the social wage, thereby increasing the percentage of the social product that goes to use values (rather than profits), will be absent from the debate over social inequality. Instead we are left with the American working class played by its understudy, the "other America": a group cast for its economic impotence and exotic grottiness.

Harrington's primary category for analysis, "the other America" became the basis for subsequent research in the anthropology of poverty and inequality. Over the nearly four decades since the publication of *The Other America*, debates on poverty in America have focussed on a variety of versions of this imagined category, cobbled together with often arbitrary empirical criteria. With no subjective consciousness, self-identity, or organic social organization defining "the other America" and no two researchers able to agree on a theoretical or scientifically replicable objective definition, research on poverty in America has typically used a unit of analysis defined by the poor people who are most easily seen (Katz 1986; Marcus 2003; Mitchell 1997). This has given anthropologists, who have a strong tradition of empiricism, direct engagement with research subjects, and a tendency to imagine coherence, community and identity, where it may not fully exist, comparative advantage over other social scientists in studying multiple "other Americas." However, it has left much of the theoretical debate on poverty in America focussed on arguments over who the poor actually are and where they came from (Harrington 1984; Katz 1993; Maxwell 1993, Ricketts and Sawhill 1988; Wilson, 1987), rather than the politics of social inequality in America.

The Problem of Praxis

The disappearance of the Marxist category "the proletariat," supports Harrington's second assumption: that social shame will lead America to fight poverty. In a Marxist world view the proletariat, defined by its relationship to the means of production and its dependence on the use values section of the social product, has an overall interest in contesting the division of society's product: at the individual production site; at the national level and globally. In actual fact, these conflicts over the product of labour tend to remain sporadic, unreliable, and conjunctural in the absence of conscious working-class political organization. However, the basis of the Marxist approach to social analysis depends on the conscious recognition and ideological articulation of inherent and irresolvable contradictions in the social relations of production that drive class struggles and other social motion. Within this view, the proletariat is the privileged agent of social change, with a more conscious, combative and unified proletariat more open to anti-capitalist political leadership that challenges the logic of the profit system and protects each of its members from political or economic injury. The end product in this Marxist view of society is communism, which eliminates the class divisions that create and reinforce those injuries.

In *The Other America*, Harrington posits a model of society in which it is the academics and policymakers that study poverty who are the privileged agents of social change. In the tradition of progressive liberal theories that assume the possibility of social equilibrium, harmony, consensus, or rational administration, Harrington presents enlightened experts as the privileged crafters of rationalist discourses that can shame the not-poor into action to help the poor, making the dysfunctional function and turning "other Americans" into "same Americans."

With a social harmony model of life under capitalism and a society that he describes as "advanced," Harrington must find some person or group of people to blame for having deviated from the liberal social imperative of order. In his case it is a combination of unenlightened social policymakers who fail to incorporate the poor into the modern and ever changing capitalist division of labour, and the excesses of the shameless. Though he never precisely defines who is shameless, he mentions "Southern Democrats," "Northern Republicans," and, in a nod to the "American exceptionalism" discussion, the "American party system" (p. 173). However, in his pluralist model of the state we may take him to mean all those who don't share his feelings for the suffering of the poor: anybody who is smug, self-satisfied, opportunistic, wealthy or greedy.

It remained for subsequent literature on poverty to debate what combination of poor and not-poor shamelessness was prolonging the incomplete American consensus. Whether it is the poor themselves who are blamed (Auletta 1982; Matza 1966; McCord 1969; Moynihan 1969), some vague and ill defined "macrostructural" force like deindustrialization, changing work processes under capitalism, lag time in economic regulation, or runaway corporate greed that was not properly addressed by state social policy (Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1982; Hopper, Susser and Conover 1987; Nash 1985; Piven 1997; Susser 1996; Wilson 1978; Wilson 1987), or some caste defined form of isolation (Anderson 1999; Hannerz 1969; Sharff 1987; Stack 1974; Suttles 1968) someone had to be blamed and then shamed back into the social fold. The continuation of pockets of shameless people has generally been attributed to the failure to put enough light and exposure on their transgressions. The prescription for intransigent shamelessness has usually been more social science, educational campaigns around poverty amelioration, new economic structures for regulating and balancing the economy, and increased social work.

Despite this lack of clear parameters for inquiry, poverty researchers have been able to unite into two hostile camps based on their explanation of why people are poor and what should be done about it. The first of these camps, which comprises advocates of the "culture of poverty" theory uses a Weberian/Parsonian concern for values and culture that critics have argued blames the poor for their poverty. They view capitalist economies as natural, the behaviour of elites as normative, and political economic history as having almost no importance in creating "the other America." This leads them to argue for educational programs designed to teach "mainstream" values and re-socialize the "shameless" poor. Despite some prominent advocates attached to the Democratic Party, this camp has traditionally been identified with Republican Party social policy (Moynihan 1969; Parsons and Clark 1966; Poussaint 2003; Rainwater and Yancey 1967; Tyson 1997).

The other camp, which has traditionally been identified with Democratic Party social programs, takes a Durkheimian focus on brute economics and what is sometimes referred to as "macrostructures," or the division of labour in society. For this group of scholars the behaviour of the poor is generally adaptive and acceptable in light of their difficult circumstances. They typically seek solutions in political economic remedies such as expanding the scope of welfare, food stamps and other poverty relief programs, and sometimes use such Marxian terms as "working poor." Like Harrington, they sometimes claim a Marxian method, connecting the "needless suffering" to "American exceptionalism," or the lack of an explicitly working class based party in the United States. However, when applied to poverty studies, even this working-class flavoured perspective, typically views "grassroots" political action as an additional weight on the equal arm balance of public policymaking (Blau 1992; Lyon-Callo 2001; Piven 2001; Susser 1996) and ultimately views poverty as a problem of social imbalance, bad or penurious policy and the shameless behaviour of certain unenlightened elites, rather than an expected outcome of a competitive economy (Gans 1967; Stack 1974; Susser 1996; Valentine 1968).

Though the debate between these two currents has often been bitter, they share a fundamental unity in their social vision and scholarly theory. Like their sociological parents, Weber and Durkheim, both reject Marxist class analysis for a liberal, functionalist model of capitalism that begins with the category "poor" and rejects the Marxist understanding that the working class and the capitalist class have intrinsically counterpoised and unbalanceable interests. Where poverty studies represent American society as an incomplete consensus, a Marxist analysis would necessarily involve looking at the exercise of power by historically contingent groups pursuing political and economic interests that grow out of the inherently contradictory and directional relationship between social labour and the control of social surplus. It is these interested groups and classes, including academics in the poverty industry, that give names to things and people, creating the cognitive map by which we all live.

In the United States, where the working class has very limited consciousness of its own existence and has organized no independent political party to pose its own names, definitions and perspectives, the political and economic fight over the social product is more often disorganized and hidden than open. Identifying the working-class perspective often becomes an exercise, first in clearing away the noise of such anti-working class discourses as poverty studies and then listening for historical silences (Sider and Smith 1997). It is in these silences that we might find the disappeared working-class component to the study of poverty in America. In the following section I will discuss some of the practical problems that I encountered in my own fieldwork among "the homeless," trying to find the words and names for these interests and missing categories that, from a Marxist perspective create, define, and could once and for all resolve the problem of poverty, but from the perspective of poverty studies do not exist.

Who Are the Homeless, Really?

In the summer of 1993, as I neared the end of my contract as staff ethnographer on a large three-year federally funded demonstration project on homelessness, I faced the difficult task of turning thousands of pages of research data into a doctoral thesis. Throughout my three years on the job, friends, neighbours, in-laws, and just about everybody I met at any social gathering had asked me the same question, "who are the homeless, really?" When I came to write up my work, I discovered I still was not any closer to answering this simple question, despite having passed three years with hundreds of "homeless" and learning many of the most intimate details of their lives.

When I approached my colleagues on the project with this question they were unhelpful. "It's a stupid question. It's someone without a home," one said. Another more thoughtful colleague told me that he had worried about this at first, but eventually decided it was more important to try to figure out what would help them the most. He pointed me towards Peter Rossi's book that describes the homeless as one part of the "extremely poor" (Rossi 1989) and some public health literature on the question. One of my professors at the University told me not to worry so much about definitions, "just pick one you are comfortable with and write about the people you met," she said, and "stay close to the ethnography."

As my concern turned to despair, I returned to the literature on homelessness and poverty and looked for others who had worked on this same problem. There were numerous books about the homeless, each with a different definition. Some authors had no concern for the problem of definitions (DeHavenon 1995; Dinkins and Cuomo 1992), others used the first pages of their work to qualify their subject and explain that the term "homeless" wasn't fully adequate to describe this subgroup of the "extremely poor," "working poor," or "underclass" (Blau 1992; Hopper and Hamburg 1986; Jencks 1994; Rossi 1989), other more ethnographically focussed accounts looked for community and cultural coherence (Desjarlais 1997; Gounis 1993; Grunberg and Eagle 1990). Since it was as difficult to find someone who self-identified as homeless as it was to find a self-identifying yuppie, all the studies relied on objective rather than subjective categories. However, nobody could agree on an objective definition, making comparative discussion and substantive conclusions difficult.

Nobody could agree on how many nights sleeping publicly were necessary to make someone homeless. Nobody believed that two nights or even ten nights in a year were enough to define someone as homeless, but some researchers believed that living situations in which someone regularly spent a night or two a week in a semi-public place constituted homelessness. Then there were people who never slept publicly but had no place of their own. Kim Hopper (1991; 1995) called these "the pre-homeless," another subgroup to study, discuss and possibly provide service to.

Nobody was even sure what constituted sleeping publicly. Was a top landing of an apartment building public? Was a basement laundry room after closing time public? What if there was a locked closet in the laundry room where bedding and personal belongings were stored and a key was supplied by the superintendent in exchange for unpaid maintenance and cleaning duties? I had informants who lived in shacks in a garden. Did their homeless status change when electricity was run into the shack and they were given keys to a toilet and shower room in the community center next to the garden? Then there were squatters in abandoned buildings and people who lived in shacks under the highway. Furthermore, nobody was sure how to count three families living in a three-bedroom apartment. Did their status change if sisters headed all three families? What if there was a brother who lived in the living room and was registered at the shelter as an escape for occasions when a sister's boyfriend became violent with him.

For many of my colleagues, being registered at a shelter was what counted. However, we all knew people who registered with the shelter to obtain free meals and keep their personal belongings there, but never slept there, preferring a girlfriend's house. Similarly we all knew people for whom the shelter was an extra bedroom. They kept their belongings at parents' houses, ate meals with family, and took showers at home, but went down the block to the shelter to sleep at night because there was a lack of space or because a same-sex lover lived at the shelter. Many housing situations depended on being registered at the shelter in the event of occasional problems or uncertainties.

Finally, as is usually the case with studies of poverty in America, the race question was never very far below the surface. I had found whole networks of white, ethnic blue-collar types living in the interstices of the suburbs and edge cities around New York. Generally well versed in using the system and sometimes registered at a shelter, many of these people exhibited the homeless life in every way down to the ratty clothes and street corner begging, but they were rarely included in the category. I also discovered networks of young, often college educated, white Americans who had spent nights sleeping in train stations, on roofs, in parks, and on friend's floors because of

economic problems and housing conflicts. However for most people at the time, a black 23-year-old casual cocaine user trying to become a writer and bouncing from bad housing situation to bad housing situation was "homeless," but the same person in white skin was merely struggling with the New York City housing market.

Since none of the work of experts had helped answer my questions and most amelioration projects were failing, partially, I sensed, due to confusion over who was to be helped, I turned to non-experts for help. A 1990 New York Times poll had shown that 82% of New Yorkers saw homeless people daily (Fantasia and Isserman 1994). I decided to test exactly what it was that they were seeing. I had been collecting data on many of the underhoused people, the beggars, street salesmen and mentally ill in my neighborhood (the Upper West Side of Manhattan) and in the one where I was doing much of my fieldwork (Washington Heights in Upper Manhattan). Over the course of a few months I took people I knew from these neighbourhoods around in my car, or walked them through the streets and tried to discover who they thought was homeless.

They pointed to the bizarre looking, middle-aged black men asking for change from passersby. Though I knew that they were long time residents of the single room occupancy hotel (also known as a welfare hotel or SRO) on my block, they presented an image of homelessness. The Vietnam veteran, with military disability benefits that were higher than my salary, who sold second hand books for extra money and in order to pass the time was seen as homeless. Though he had never spent a night on the streets, he was black, passed his days on the street, and dressed in shabby clothes. There was an unbathed black woman dragging children behind her who also got the designation homeless, but she lived two blocks down in a large crowded studio apartment with her sister and her niece. No one pointed to the well-dressed Barbadan man with sharp-creased, brown pants and a stylish dress shirt, sitting on a bench reading a paper on his favourite traffic island in the middle of Broadway: he was a shelter resident. The white man on crutches hawking videos, who slept in Riverside Park, the good looking young black man arguing in a shop, who slept in a basement uptown, and the Latina City University of New York (CUNY) student who worked in the supermarket and alternated nights at an aunt's home in Jersey City, the student government office at City College, and her best friend's bedroom (when there was no boyfriend present) in a shared apartment, all received no notice.

My colleagues had been unable to provide an objective definition of homeless that went beyond "we know em' when we see 'em" and my friends and neighbours were equally perplexed about what a homeless person was, despite seeing them every day. They tended to use a folk category that described people with some combination of dark skin, poor grooming, inappropriate behaviour, and little to do with the day except hang out on the streets. Still operating within the poverty studies model I went in search of help from my informants. I knew that they did not think of themselves as homeless, but I thought they might have special insights into what I was studying.

My informants were the only group that could agree on a definition of the homeless. "Why don't you ask the Spanish guy (director of the Community Support Services office at the shelter). He's the one who decides who stays in the shelter and who gets a place," snapped one informant, summing up the general sense about the category. Throughout field work informants had expressed doubt or disgust towards my research category, but my location within the poverty studies paradigm had usually led me to disregard what they said, often putting it down to race resentment or even mental illness. I went back to my field notes and began to revise my views of what they had told me.

Henry, an African-American jazz trumpeter with a bad crack habit, had teased me mercilessly throughout my field work about being an anthropologist looking for culture among the homeless. "You the guy who studies culture," he'd say. "How come you can't teach me any of the traditional homeless songs so I can do my improvisations. You holdin out on me?"

I brought my doubts to an articulate older informant named Delaney who had been in the merchant marines for many years, but had lost housing after a mental breakdown. He later found a place in the sunny second story front bedroom of a boarding house in a beautiful historic brownstone in the Bedford Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, owned by the daughter-in-law of an African-American World War One veteran and his French war bride. There were a few other older black "homeless" men renting rooms there, some of whom had briefly passed through the shelter system. We sat in the sunlight on tall antique wooden chairs and he explained to me that I was studying black culture in its most degraded form. "You want to know about the homeless, study the social workers," he suggested, "they're the ones always talking about it." He compared my study to looking for Jewish culture in a concentration camp, "you want to understand the camp, study the damn Nazis."

I even had an informant who responded to an interview question about where he imagined being in five years by claiming that what social workers call homelessness is

sometimes the last phase of youth for late teenage, early twenties black men. "It's kind of like you white folks and your frat parties," he said, "everybody goes around sleeping in big houses with a bunch of different people and they drink beer all the time instead of use drugs. I seen all that in the movies. We just ain't got the fancy cars and the wealthy daddies." He would cite cases of people who had passed through periods without housing and a job, eventually settling down to the lower ranks of the steadily employed and disappearing from the view of social workers and researchers. At the time I merely noted it and moved on. How many of the men I had met might fit such a category of unestablished young black working-class men, I later wondered?

As I saw the category of homeless "melting into air" many of these comments began to make sense. One of my informants, an African-American in his late twenties who was too emotionally unstable for me to bring my doubts to, had once told me that he believed that the shelter was a giant intelligence experiment "to see how many niggers is stupid enough to enter. The guards, the big gorillas that sleep down at the other end, the crazy ones like me, hell even the shelter director, don't know they fuckin' with him. They can call us homeless or whatever the fuck they want, but it's just a bunch of poor niggers." As I looked back, I realized that in a strange and unconscious way he was voicing the same thought that virtually all my informants had: the concept of homeless was a weak abstraction imposed from above on people who may or may not have had housing. None of my informants were sure where and why they fit into my study, but they were all sure that "homeless" was the wrong category.

I approached the social workers, as Delaney and several other informants had suggested. They were busy preparing for the next project and suggested that I was taking the ravings of the mentally ill too seriously. However, there was one who encouraged me to pursue my line of questioning. As he put it, "words are important because they appear on budgets. The word 'homeless' is like triage at the hospital. When you have somebody who is about to freeze to death on the streets, after a knife fight with a family member or being burnt out of his apartment or just out of Attica (a state prison), you gotta find the guy a place to sleep and damn quick. But after a good night's sleep, a shower and a cup of coffee, how ya gonna convince him that his problem is homelessness. Sure he needs to find an apartment, but maybe he has a bigger problem, like no job or nobody to take care of him until he gets on his feet. Maybe he just needs a new prescription for his meds. The guys are not stupid. Only an idiot could convince himself that being homeless is anybody's number one problem." He claimed that he had doubted the value of the concept of "homeless" for a long time, and as he became more frustrated with the project his work life became more untenable. He eventually resigned his position.

As with my struggle to make sense of exactly what it was that I was studying, this social worker was identifying the irrationality of trying to maintain a dichotomy between the "same America" of which he was a part and the special subdivision of the "other America," known as "homeless," that his clients inhabited. Though Harrington's work can be appreciated by Marxists for its dramatic focus on a problem that many Americans did not even know about, its dichotomy between two nations, a functional and non-functional one, helped track subsequent debates over poverty towards discussions of fine tuning programs for individuals and groups of individuals who were thought to be "other," rather than discussions of systemic political economic conflict.

In the 1960s and 1970s, when so called social programs were expanding, the categories of poverty studies such as "the other America," "the culture of poverty," and "the inner cities" did not clarify either cause and effect or solution and motive actor, but they were broad enough that significant numbers of working-class people were able to find some fit between the programs and their lives. However, by the time I started my fieldwork in 1990, the "reluctant welfare state" had given way to a shadow welfare state, yielding the category, "homeless." As my social worker informant had observed, this was a social service relief category that was so narrow and divorced from working-class lives, goals, and perspectives that only the most exotically immiserated could fit its narrow parameters, and only on particularly bad nights.

In my journey through homeless studies and the homeless bureaucracy, I had found many silences: the absence of homeless people chanting at homeless rights rallies that had been organized by social workers and poverty researchers, people who had left their cot, taken their cup of coffee and moved on to pursue a job or repair broken family ties, and more than a few people who had spent a night in a shelter, at a social worker's recommendation, simply to qualify for social support that had been limited only to "the homeless." Though I had found the silences, I needed to find the acts of silencing to explain what was happening at the bottom reaches of the New York City working class.

American Individualism, Fordism and Cultural Economy

Individuals alone cannot create social consciousness; social groups pursuing their interests and fighting for institu-

tional space create consciousness. In order to find the big silences and the big silencers that created an environment where Michael Harrington swayed millions with his fuzzy, class-blind functionalism it is necessary to look for the origins of poverty studies and the homeless crisis in the political and ideological history of the American working class.

The tradition of American individualism has been discussed and celebrated by writers from de Crevecoeur and de Tocqueville to F.J. Turner, but there is also a collective current in American political culture that is less frequently discussed. This is the tradition of counter-hegemonic and working-class politics that during the three decades before World War I started the international general strike day on May 1, fought battles with the armed forces during major strikes at Pullman, Homestead, and Ludlow, and produced one of the only major socialist parties in the world that opposed World War I.

In the two decades after World War I the American working class faced tremendous state repression in the form of detentions, deportations, and assassination, yet organized at least three general strikes that briefly captured major cities (Seattle 1919, Minneapolis 1934, San Francisco 1934) and generated a mass proletarian class consciousness in the 1930s that yielded sit-down strikes, unemployed councils, and nationally significant workers' party initiatives. This combative American working class of the 1930s won national victories such as the right to union representation, social security, unemployment insurance, public housing, low cost credit, public infrastructure, community healthcare, public education and other use value entitlements that few other national working classes had at the time.

However, by the 1950s the very idea of an American working class was disappearing. In 1957, the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) ended production of its newspaper, *The Daily Worker*, leaving the United States with no independent, specifically working-class daily. It was not until 10 years later in 1967 that the CPUSA resumed publication of a daily party press, opting for the class neutral name, *The Daily World.* During this same period many self-described socialists, "revolutionaries," and "neo-Marxists" came to radical politics amidst third world rebellions and the upheavals of 1968. Often embracing Maoist or Guevaraist political programs and organizations that identified "new vanguards" (Trotskyism), "student/peasant alliances" (Maoism), "revolutionary foci" (Guevaraism), and "Third World liberation" (Castroism), many of the most radical voices of this generation of activists and scholars made little reference to the working class or social relations of production. Instead they often used such concepts as internal colonialism, dependency, de-linking, revolutionary foci, revolutionary nationalism (Amin 1990; Breitman 2004; Cruse 2002; Guevara 1992; Limqueco and McFarlane 1983) or vague class neutral terms such as "the people" and "international revolution."[1]

The journey from Roosevelt, who enacted emergency legislation to placate an angry, combative and class conscious U.S. working class and halt the growth of a labour party, to the class blind anti-poverty programs of the Great Society is one that has usually been explained by postulating a "culture" of individualism as the natural state of the American working class and assuming a "complacency born of post-war affluence."

Some scholars who have chronicled the decline of working-class consciousness in the post war period have looked to a functionalist capital/labour social contract, generally referred to as "the Fordist compromise" (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1992; Masters and Robertson 1988; Nash 1985; Nash 1989; Piven 1997; Piven and Cloward 1982). This contract has been described as an exchange by the working class of political and work process power for a rising standard of living and superficial consumerism. Underpinning this notion of a "Fordist compromise" is the economic theory known as "regulationism" that holds that social relations and social solidarities derive from the division of labour in society or the forces of production. In this view, systems of political economic regulation must be identified and enacted by enlightened policy makers, in order to create balanced "regimes of accumulation." Each change in the division of labour requires the creation of a new set of institutions for balancing the socio-economic contradictions of capital accumulation. In the case of the post-World War II period the name given to the regime of accumulation is "Fordist," within which a variety of "Keynesian" economic policies and "Great Society" anti-poverty programs are viewed as part of the regulation that allowed for industrial and social equilibrium (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1986).

This period of compromise and equilibrium, which has often been referred to as "the golden age" (Hobsbawm 1995), is seen as a time when a "Fordist" industrial division of labour produced a working class and an industrial class whose interests could be balanced through state regulation overseeing a capital/labour compromise that was administered by a cradle to grave welfare state and large, powerful pro-capitalist and social patriotic trade unions that incorporated workers into an affluent consensus. Ultimately declining class consciousness in the postwar period is explained by peace, prosperity, and good management. Like the poverty studies model, this

approach also posits a vision of society as an equilibrium-seeking entity, driven by the ministrations of enlightened experts and progressive academics, rather than a socio-political battle over the social wage.

Critics have argued that this model identifies a direct and unconscious relationship between economic cause and cultural effect that is empirically unprovable due to the lack of either documentary evidence of a compromise or convincing specific correlations between Fordist regulation and declining class consciousness at the level of nations, regions, or even individual production sites. They have also pointed to the problem that cultural economy behaviourism of the regulation model reduces politico-ideological history to epiphenomena of the division of labour, raising the question of why there was no swing back to class conflict and consciousness with the withdrawal of the Fordist compromise (Clark 1991; Cohen 1987).[2] Finally, some critics have suggested that, in fact, there was never a balance, but rather a steady rise in rates of exploitation, driven by a long term employers' offensive (Brenner and Glick 1989).

A Marxist explanation for the lack of working-class consciousness in the postwar period must address the concrete histories of conscious actors, political parties, and other institutions of working-class self-organization that operate at the political and ideological level of, what Eric Wolf has referred to as, "structural power" (Wolf 1999). In the following pages I will provide a brief discussion of the history of the politico-ideological organization of the American working class since the end of World War II, as well as some speculations about impacts this history has had on the study of poverty.

Class and Culture in the Postwar Period

It has become generally accepted in anthropology that "old style" holistic studies of cultures and their "master patterns" are inadequate to explain a world where exogenous determinants can create or destroy a culture and its traits almost overnight. However, this understanding has rarely been applied to the anthropology of the United States. In most anthropological studies of the United States, the issues of world culture, world capitalism, or determinants that lie outside the boundaries of the United States are rarely mentioned, much less given explanatory weight. The assumption that generally underwrites the study of the United States is that U.S. culture is something like Felix the Cat's magic bag: objects and ideas emerge from inside the bag and fill the world, but little besides immigrant labour enters. In examining the history of the American working-class movement this discussion will attempt to break with the American intellectual isolation and situate the politico-ideological life of the American working class within an international context.

In most of the countries of the advanced industrial world in the 20th century the working class has had two major political institutions: an indigenous social democratic or "workers" party and a Moscow aligned communist party. One of the key points of American exceptionalism is the failure of the American working class to develop an indigenous workers' party. This has meant that the Communist Party (CPUSA), despite its small size and lack of electoral success, in comparison to communist parties in Japan, France and Italy,[3] has had a particularly strong influence on the consciousness of its country's proletariat, through organized labour, left academe, social movements, and the arts (Aronowitz 1974; Klehr 1984; Murphy 1991; Wald 2002).

The CPUSA began as the U.S. party of the Third International in 1919 and attracted many class conscious militants in the 1920s. Like all the communist parties that developed in this period, the CPUSA was deeply disoriented by the isolation of the October Revolution after the failure of the post-World War I Central European revolutions. Increasing despair regarding the possibility of world revolution made the Soviet leadership defensive and inward looking, yielding the victory of evolutionary objectivist leader Joseph Stalin, who put nearly total faith in technological development carrying the world through stages of government and society until the point of communism. Lacking faith in the conscious and militant activity of the international working class, Stalin's Soviet bureaucracy turned to a national communism in which the protection of the Soviet experiment was prioritized over the world class struggle. They used the prestige of the October Revolution and its powerful workers' state to reduce communist parties throughout the world into transmission belts for Soviet geo-politics and bargaining chips in great power politics, giving Stalin a particularly large influence on the U.S. working class, which lacked its own political party (Draper 1960; Klehr 1984; Mandel 1995).

In 1928 Stalin initiated what he called the third period. Based on the desire to make peace with European ruling classes that faced an upswing in power by social democratic parties, Stalin declared the German social democratic party (SPD) to be social-fascist and set Germany's powerful communist party (KPD) against capitalist Europe's most powerful workers' party. During this period German workers fought each other in the streets while the Nazis seized state power. Newly reinvigorated German imperialism posed an immediate threat to Moscow, which

in 1934 inaugurated its most defensive policy to date: the popular front.

The popular front held that for the foreseeable future communism was not possible, therefore all organizations of the working class, including the communist parties of the world, should ally with what Stalin called progressive bourgeoisie. Systematically liquidating Bolsheviks in the USSR and removing them from party leadership around the world, Stalin used the influence of the Soviet Union to replace Marxism with functionalist theories that promoted co-existence between the USSR and the capitalist world, and posited evolutionary stages that held that workers in the former colonial world should put aside their struggle for communism to join nationalists in the fight for "bourgeois democracy" (Mandel 1995).

Though the CPUSA was never a large mass party and there was no social democratic workers' party in the United States to act as a conduit to the "progressive bourgeoisie," the popular front would have dramatic implications for the development of class-blind American social science discourses. CPUSA militants continued to play an important role in union organizing and social movements like civil rights. However, in its political life the CPUSA was rapidly changing its class goals. Throughout the United States attempts within the labour movement to build a labour party were opposed and sometimes sabotaged by the CPUSA, who ultimately supported the procapitalist Democratic Party. CPUSA militants who had earlier preached revolution found themselves either arguing against revolution and independent self-organization by the working class, or expelled from the party (Cannon 1944).

In 1941 when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor CPUSA militants and sympathizers were as unprepared to draw an international class line on the battlefields of Europe, Asia and Africa as they were at home. Engaging in the ultimate popular front, the Communist Party mobilized all its forces to weld the American working class to the interests of its bosses and no longer even paid lip service to principles of international class solidarity. It abandoned class struggle at the point of production by accepting no strike pledges, refused to support and sometimes sabotaged the wildcat strikes common during World War II, and jettisoned its commitment to struggles for black civil rights (Kelley 1996; Robinson 2000). These alliances had the effect of forcing most of the vanguard of the American working class to choose between its class interests and its one political party. Militants disappeared into wildcat strikes, rogue civil rights actions, the social patriotism of the armed forces, or merely political inactivity (Mandel 1986).

When the war ended the U.S. ruling class turned its scorched earth policy homeward. The ideological void left by 12 years of popular front class-blind agitation and propaganda in the face of the 20th century's most intense period of ruling class economic, political, and social violence had created a deeper ideological silence in the American working class. Through harsh anti-labour laws, domestic political repression against communists, former communists, and sympathizers, war against communists and organized labour in the third world, and the aggressive conformism of the 1950s, the American ruling class actively and consciously attempted to root out all class politics. Anti-communism became the state religion as the United States government publicly executed Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, while encouraging the widespread introduction of school curricula like the "Americanism versus Communism" class that was required for many high school students until the late 1980s.

Though the labour explosions of 1946 won back a small percentage of wages lost during World War II, the vanguard of the U.S. working class had been ideologically disarmed, expelled from unions, physically liquidated, and denied the tools of self-organization. By the mid 1950s, the U.S. working class had no political party to provide intellectual, ideological or political leadership and little in the way of party affiliated socialists or communists to fight for an anti-capitalist perspective in the trade unions. The CPUSA was haemorrhaging members and became separated from its working-class base, due to anti-Communist purges of the trade unions, its slavish commitment to the increasingly discredited Moscow bureaucracy, and loyalty to the Democratic Party, which came to be the only political party that counted a significant base among the organized working class.

As Weberian theories of the managerial class and cross-class caste categories promoted by scholars like W. Lloyd Warner flooded American social sciences, the category of working class, as defined by social relations of production, rarely entered social theory (Sutton 1993; Wolf 2001). It was out of this ideological climate of defeat that the liberal functionalism of poverty studies emerged in the late 1950s.

Within the politically somnolent postwar environment there were still large pockets of economic deprivation, misery, and public dissent. Among the most visible were geographically, culturally, and racially defined zones such as Puerto Rico, the underdeveloped Appalachian region and black ghettoes. Anthropologist Oscar Lewis, who had long standing connections to the Communist Party (Price 1999), combined the Marxist tradition of looking for the underside of capitalist rule with the class blind traditions

of the popular front in his studies of poverty (Lewis 1959; 1968).

He defined the parameters of his study as an exotically poor group seen as distinct from the rest of society and defined by their visible lack of resources rather than class location. However, he did assert that there was something systematic and inevitable about the processes by which industrial capitalism impoverishes the most disorganized sectors of society. The Marxist solution implied in his work was social organization, by which we may imagine some combination of organizing from within these "communities" and external politico-ideological struggles waged by the industrial working classes that Lewis suggests are created by the same processes that spawn the culture of poverty. However, it was the consensus implied by culture, rather than the conflict implied by class in Lewis' work, that fired the imagination of a generation of social scientists influenced by Parsonian functionalism and Harringtonian volunteerism.

Throughout the 1950s African Americans had fought for civil rights and Puerto Ricans for de-colonization, with some success. The Chinese revolution had taken a quarter of the world's population out of the circuits of the capitalist system, Koreans had fought the US/UN forces to a stalemate, and the situation in Vietnam was unstable. However, in the early 1960s the growing anti-colonial revolt across the world and the spectacular USSR victory in the space race shook US hegemony. The rise of a charismatic anti-colonial, anti-racist, liberation government only 90 miles offshore in Cuba, along with the growth of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam helped touch off explosions of anger and protest around the world. Throughout the Americas young people of every background quit university, joined guerilla fronts, political organizations, and "freedom summers," and the questions of national liberation, anti-racism and "revolution" were on the agenda.

This infectious optimism was not lost on blacks, Latinos, the indigenous, and other specially oppressed peoples in the United States. For African Americans the failure of the civil rights movement in the South to yield substantive economic gains in the cities of the North and the continuing political weakness of black capitalism created an explosive situation, where there was little bourgeois leadership to calm smouldering ghettoes. The CPUSA's retreat from civil rights during World War II and its defence of Roosevelt's systematic exclusion of blacks from the New Deal in order to placate segregationist "Dixiecrats" had alienated and disoriented the powerful beginnings of a black communist wing of the American working class. The African American section of the working class, sometimes posited as having a special role in building a vanguard (Breitman 2005), had suffered a particularly great denial of voice by the popular front.

By the mid-1960s urban blacks who confronted desperate poverty amidst the boom had, like whites, few traditions of explicitly working-class political representation. Between 1964 and 1970 there were ghetto riots across the U.S. In the midst of this tumult various attempts at black-centred Marxism emerged, but either remained marginal (Georgakas 1998; Geschwender 1977; Kelley 2002) or embraced class blind anti-colonial liberation theories such as the theory of "internal colonialism" (Cruse 2002). Though many of the frustrations of rioting ghetto masses were class specific and yielded a new militancy, the black working class, like the white one, had little explicit class consciousness, class organization, or experience acting as a "class for itself."

When Oscar Lewis wrote about the "culture of poverty" in the 1950s he had retained some residual notion that poverty was a working-class problem, with a working-class solution: self-organization. However, by the 1960s, when Michael Harrington sat on Lyndon Johnson's anti-poverty task force and helped create programs to address the problems that had created the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and sparked ghetto riots across the nation, it was the class-blind side of Lewis's work that was used. Other scholars in the Harvard Parsonian tradition, like Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, who lacked Harrington's Christian populism, turned the concept of culture of poverty into a stifling class-blind functionalism directed towards psycho-cultural resocialization projects.

As the government pursued austerity in the late 1970s, working-class welfare state entitlements increasingly gave way to the lowest level safety net designed to address the problems of "the poor." Public education was eroded in many urban areas, social security and unemployment insurance declined, public healthcare nearly disappeared and public housing deteriorated. The use value support programs that the American working class had won through class struggles in the 1930s became less a part of a working-class life and more a special provenance of "the poor," which often meant urban African Americans. Unlike many other advanced industrial nations where public support programs were used occasionally as part of a working-class life, these U.S. programs came to be specially adapted to the imagined, class-blind categories of poverty studies.

Specific class-blind crises, such as "homelessness" or the growth of the "underclass," yielded specific class-blind remedies. The "homeless" crisis produced a remark-

able range of finely tuned combinations of psycho-cultural and economic support programs for the already fallen "homeless," but no overall housing policy designed to ensure that decent housing was available and affordable. The crisis of the "underclass" produced countless educational and mentoring programs and NGOs designed to "end the cycle of poverty," in the absence of employment and unemployment policy and with no expansion of public education.

With little political motion by the U.S. working class, class-specific explanations a distant memory, and class-specific solutions to the concerns of everyday life completely absent, the problem of poverty became increasingly bleak. Poverty studies had naturalized the competitive economy and the lack of full employment and there was little vision of a viable road to the elimination of poverty, both within social science and in the broader society. Nearly all scholars had accepted that, for the foreseeable future, a certain percentage of people would live in poverty (Katz 1983; Katz 1986).

The Poverty Industry in the Neo-Liberal Age

In 1981 Thatcherite[4] neo-liberal Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as President and almost immediately broke the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike. This was the beginning of a newly intensified employers' offensive, fuelled by the world economic contraction of 1982-83. The social wage continued to shrink and the United States' division of wealth became more unequal. The lack of a class-specific discourse and class-specific organizations made it increasingly unclear what the immiserated lower sections of the working class had in common with defensive middle and upper sections.

The 1984 election was particularly revealing in this regard, as one of the key debates between Republican, Ronald Reagan and Democrat, Walter Mondale was how to implement austerity and apportion the declining social wage. Mondale argued that austerity should take the form of increased taxes on the steadily employed middle and upper sections of the working class, and Reagan argued against increased taxes and for cuts to social programs, targeting "the poor." Finding themselves pitted against "the other America" many of the steadily employed, not surprisingly, voted for Reagan. After re-election Reagan moved against the New Deal/Great Society bureaucracy.

Though the majority of people living below the poverty line were white, anti-poverty policy and the social problems of the welfare state had for a long time been specifically identified with African Americans and the problems of the inner city. The issue of race became particularly important in Reagan's attack on the welfare state bureaucracy, not so much due to the high percentage of African Americans who relied on the public social programs, but because of their historic ties to the public sector for employment.

Threatened by the "Reagan revolution," welfare bureaucrats, caseworkers, researchers, public sector unionists, anti-poverty professionals and others with a stake in the New Deal/Great Society state sector raised a number of class-blind battle standards. One of the important ones was "the homeless." In cities with powerful public sector unions and large percentages of the working class dependent on receiving or distributing public resources, homelessness became a "symbol of shame" that resonated with still entrenched popular front politics.

In New York City, where a vast public sector bureaucracy had provided European style social democratic amenities such as free higher education, community healthcare, rent control, and an extensive public transportation system, there was strong support for the homeless battle standard (Freeman 2000). David Dinkins, an explicitly "pro-homeless" mayor with longstanding ties to Michael Harrington, who had made his own contribution to the social science debate on poverty and homelessness (Dinkins and Wackstein 1986), was elected as New York's first African American mayor. However, in most of the United States this battle standard had little more than voluntary emotional appeal for workers who were asked to balance their standard of living against paying for "social programs" that did not help them. This New Deal/Great Society alliance eventually ran out of steam even in New York City where David Dinkins was replaced by law and order Republican Rudolph Guiliani after only one term.[5]

The trope offered by the Republican Party of ghetto super-predator Willie Horton, who emerged as a factor in the 1988 presidential election, and the Democratic Party homeless derelict trope helped obscure the society-wide changes in the price of labour (the ratio of use values to profits). As the American working class was pushed to work longer hours, monographs, articles and political speeches revolved around obscure and sophistic debates on the nature of the underclass and other newly imagined socio-economic groups. Who were they? Why were they poor? What did they have in common with each other and everybody else? The Democrats who talked about the homeless never proposed a housing policy, or even mentioned housing, and Republicans who promoted the image of drug-dealing scrape-out-your-mama's-gold-fillings-for-a-crack-pipe, ghetto super-predators, avoided mention of the employment market.

Conclusion

It is said that a scratch can turn into gangrene if not treated properly. The more of the wrong care that is applied, the worse the infection becomes. Similarly with social analysis, the more the wrong methodology is used, the deeper the mistakes. During the homeless crisis vast sums of money and millions of hours of labour often yielded little but deteriorating lives for my informants. The deeper my informants journeyed into the system the more useless they felt and the less they felt their real needs were being met. At base, these tragic consequences were the result of a deeply flawed method for understanding and responding to the problems that my informants confronted in their daily lives.

This flawed method is an ethnicized model for analyzing capitalist reproduction, that takes groups of people with real or imagined differences from "the mainstream" and reifies those differences into a social identity. A key trait or set of traits that the group is thought to share is identified and these traits typically become embodied in their physical selves, making them publicly recognizable as instantiations of a social problem and classifiable in a vast Linnaean social taxonomy. Each group in the taxonomy is imbued with its own history, its own culture, its own strengths and weaknesses, its own successes and failures, and its own distance from a mythic functional mainstream. This hierarchical human zoology is the measure of all of our sins and shortcomings, defines who is fully human and who is of a slightly lower order, and provides the basis for pitting one section of the working class against another, as presidential election campaigns, with their debates over "social programs," often dramatically demonstrate.

It is this American social taxonomy that provided the foundation for Michael Harrington's mechanical functionalist readings of poverty in America and created the nomenclature to describe and classify it. It is the same method that created "the homeless" and the "homeless crisis" out of the attacks on the social wage and changing patterns of accumulation during the Reagan Revolution that affected both white and blue collar working-class America. The misery was more publicly visible (and perhaps more severe) for African Americans who, as a group, often came to be bound up in the public imagination with many of the categories of poverty studies, such as underclass, inner-city, welfare mother and ghetto super-predator. However, the notion of the United States as divisible into poor and not-poor, which is the starting point for even the strongly Durkheimian scholars who look to economics rather than "faulty values" for their explanations of poverty, is part of the same ethnicized, particularist methodology that allowed for the imagination of other equally ill-defined categories of socio-economic difference within the American working class, such as the yuppie, whose antonymous counterpoint to urban problem populations provided the political metonym for the entire period.

Harrington and many subsequent poverty studies scholars, particularly those in the Durkheimian tradition, were often passionately concerned with changing the distribution of resources in society. However, their focus on "the other America," rather than the overall political-economy of American capitalism and the challenges of the American working class represents, at best, the use of "the poor" as loss leaders for progressive welfare state social policy. In its more common form, it was simply a positivist particularism that missed any social whole and blamed the pinky finger for being small, rather than identifying it as part of the morphology of the hand. Regardless of the form taken, this methodology has proven a distraction from discussions of how American capitalism uses, abuses, and divides its poorly organized working class.

My informants' contacts with social services and researchers like myself, as well as their classification by the dominant political discourse of the time, defined them as homeless. However, this description based on an albeit very important aspect of their poverty, tended to obscure the fact that their situation was the result of the same declining public health and education systems, rising housing costs, caustically "flexible" "new" labour market, and other symptoms of the rising rate of exploitation that the rest of the American working class was confronting. In a strange way, this was recognized by nearly everybody who I took on the rhetorical journey to spot the "homeless" on the streets of New York City. The failure to identify people who were actually sleeping in public was, as I have argued, a problem of policy definitions and semantics, not a failure to understand that there was a higher bar that had to be jumped over in order to survive in Reagan's America. Understanding this fact, they inevitably looked to the historically weakest section of the American working class to find "the homeless": African Americans.

In many urban areas during the 1980s homelessness became the most visible representation of the difficulty of working-class social reproduction in Reagan's America. My informants typically viewed the designation "homeless" as a race-specific ritual humiliation that was the price of social support, in much the way they saw living in physically separated public housing or presenting "other America" currency at the grocery store, in the form of food stamps. However, none of these ritual humiliations,

abuses, or instantiations of "otherness" could entirely hide the fact that they were part of an objectively definable working class that was everywhere facing the same loss of security in nearly every aspect of economic life. What hid their connection to the vastly larger section of the American working class that was facing similar concerns was the ideology of the American ruling class—promoted by the pro-capitalist Democratic Party desperate to regain the White House, the centrist trade union leadership always happy to find class blind popular front causes to keep its rank and file under control, and a revanchist anti-labour Republican White House torn between imprisonment and social work for controlling the vast urban tinderbox that would eventually explode in Los Angeles in April of 1992 and spread to cities across the United States.

The failure of the American working class to pose its own class-specific definitions, descriptions and explanations for American Thatcherism in the 1980s may have been the product of the "American exceptionalism" that has been celebrated and lamented in academic and popular literature, though many "non-exceptional" European countries seem to have had similar problems during the 1980s (Brenner 1998; Schaffner-Goldberg and Rosenthal 2002). It may have been the result of a change in the division of labour in society, as suggested by regulationists and a variety of postmodernist writers, or the harvest of a global crisis of proletarian political vision and organization, as I have suggested in the preceding pages. Regardless of the cause, such big challenges can only be addressed by broad historic changes driven by powerful social actors such as new national ideologies, new regimes of sociopolitical management or new political parties and a reconstitution of the world working-class movement.

Such developments are difficult to see over the historical horizon that separates the present from the future and even more difficult to influence, even when seen. However, in war and in peace and in economic sickness and health, the U.S. poverty studies industry, often composed of academics like myself, who think of themselves as Marxists and advocates for their social class, have actively participated in maintaining and nurturing a set of influential intellectual discourses and categories of difference that disappear the U.S. working class and any potential working-class resolutions. These discourses and categories are often shot through with corrosive caste/colour prejudices, illusory notions of social harmony under capitalism, and faith in the moral and ethical behaviour of enlightened elites and their capitalist employers.

However, such discourses are actually quite fragile, due to their deep contradictions, procrustean unwieldiness and declining support from government funding agencies.[6] It is difficult to know exactly what conscious Marxist anthropologies of poverty would look like. There is no roadmap or blueprint that can substitute for conscious and cumulative discussion, debate and practice. However, as a start it is worth reiterating that providing fine tuning for even the broadest program directed at an "other America" represents a "retreat from class" and a barrier to providing a clear Marxist analysis. Following this, the use of Weberian consumption categories such as "poor" and "middle class" or "practical" categories based on emergency considerations such as housing, food, healthcare, or employment as the unit of analysis may be useful or important in a variety of scholarly, professional and policy contexts, but it tends to obscure larger conflicts involving the entire working class and the social product that it produces. These conflicts must be highlighted and examined in order to develop a thoroughly dialectical materialist history of who is doing what to whom. Finally, even in the best of times for class struggles, social movements, and other forms of "agency" and "resistance" the acceptance of the inevitability of a competitive capitalist market ultimately tends to pose social questions and provide "progressive" policy answers that serve bourgeois interests, rather than working-class ones.

None of this is to insist that even the most brutal and divisive program to expand the American capitalist welfare state should be opposed on grounds of "maximalist purity," but rather to suggest that scholars inclined towards a Marxian analysis have far more impact on Marxism and the formulation of a working-class politics than they do on the social policies of the American capitalist class. It is not so much participation in the poverty studies industry that is problematic, but rather the failure, by "those who should know better," to help pose and discuss Marxist alternatives to the competitive capitalist economy that our work so often naturalizes, even when focussed on the most grinding poverty.

Anthony Marcus, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Melbourne, Victoria, 3010, Australia. E-mail: amarcus@unimelb.edu.au

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Notes

1 Robert Brenner (1977) has provided a definitive critique of the theoretical problems of the international revolution without social class approach and Ellen Meiksins Wood (1998) has provided a social movement oriented critique of such perspectives.

2 The primary response to this query has been to posit the existence of a new and ill defined period such as post-Fordism, postmodernism, postindustrialism, etc.

3 Estimating the number of members of the CPUSA remains a difficult task, due to definitions, political agendas, the tendency of the party to inflate numbers, problems with counting the youth section, and the high turnover during the turbulent 1930s. However, Fraser Ottanelli (1991) reports that in 1938 there were 75 000 members of the CPUSA, 20 000 members of the youth section, The Young Communist League, and a yearly recruitment of 30 000 members.

4 The term Thatcherite is used in recognition that Reagan's anti-working-class austerity was never systematized into a coherent and articulate ideology in the way Margaret Thatcher's version was in Great Britain.

5 One can see the seeds of the change in Dinkins's hiring of 7 000 new police and his cuts to city social services that earned him the nickname David (they'll take it from me) Dinkins.

6 An encouraging development along these lines is the recent anthology, *The New Poverty Studies* (Goode & Maskovsky, 2001). The ethnographic focus is working-class issues such as debt, migration and job loss and it prioritises "agency," "resistance," and scholarly independence. However, Goode and Maskovsky's strong grounding in Marxist theories of crisis belie the theoretical commitment that they share with their co-authors to (1) Weberian consumption categories, "poor" (p. 3) and "middle class" (p. 7); (2) an equilibrium model of capitalism built on a regulationist "Fordist compromise" (p. 4); (3) a belief that the state was not oriented "explicitly to service big capital at the expense of the workforce and the larger citizenry" before the Reagan era (p. 5); and (4) a positive assessment of Durkheimian poverty studies (p. 11). It is indicative of the residual power of poverty studies and the silence of conscious Marxist alternatives to capitalism that despite the possibilities suggested by the title the first words in the book regret "that the poor, the homeless, and the hungry have dropped off the political agenda" (Susser, 2001: vii); thus setting the intellectual focus entirely on what has been lost, rather than what may be gained.

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Ecuadorian Indians, the Nation, and Class in Historical Perspective: Rethinking a "New Social Movement"[1]

A. Kim Clark *University of Western Ontario*

Abstract: Today the Ecuadorian Indian movement is the strongest of its kind in Latin America. Such a movement may seem to indicate the declining importance of class as a category of social analysis and basis for identity, and the rise of ethnicity in its place. This article argues, however, that the gains of the Indian movement can best be understood in the context of: an historical analysis of shifting class relations and projects; a modernist state project of inclusion imposed from above (with unexpected consequences); and changing international political-economic processes, reshaping the terrain on which local struggles would be carried out.

Keywords: Ecuador, Indians, class, nation, ethnicity, social movements.

Résumé : Le mouvement indien en Équateur est aujourd'hui le plus fort parmi les mouvements indiens d'Amérique Latine. Son existence peut sembler signifier une diminution de l'importance des classes sociales comme catégorie d'analyse sociale et fondement identitaire, et la montée de l'ethnicité comme remplacement. Le propos de cet article, par contre, est que les gains du mouvement indien sont mieux expliqués dans le contexte d'une analyse historique des transformations des liens entre classes sociales et de leurs projets en voie de changement; d'un projet étatique moderniste d'inclusion imposé d'en haut (avec des conséquences imprévues); et de processus politico-économiques internationaux en mutation, qui ont transformé le terrain sur lequel les luttes locales se déroulent.

Mots-clés : Ecuador, Indiens, classe sociale, nation, ethnicité, mouvements socials.

Unlike so many areas of Latin America with large indigenous populations (such as Guatemala and Peru), Ecuador did not experience widespread civil war in the 1970s and 1980s, characterized by guerrilla movements and severe military repression. Instead, those years saw the emergence in Ecuador of a strong indigenous movement within the bounds of civil society, which since the 1990s has had a growing role in articulating the demands of subordinate groups before the state. In fact, among all Latin American countries it is, strikingly, only in Ecuador that a national indigenous federation has been established; since 1986, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) has become the hegemonic[2] institution representing indigenous projects, proposals and problems before the state. The Ecuadorian Indian movement has received a great deal of scholarly (and political) attention recently, particularly since the broadly based indigenous uprising of 1990. Important analyses have been made of the organizational basis and forms of the Indian movement and the challenges it faces in Ecuador today. The argument presented in this article is rather different: I suggest that to understand current processes of organization and mobilization, it is essential to examine ongoing changes in class relations in Ecuador over the last century, situating Indians in relation to dominant groups.

The Ecuadorian Indian movement appears to fit into the category of a new social movement, eschewing class as its organizational basis, and demonstrating instead the importance of other forms of identity, in this case, ethnicity. However, I argue that the gains of the Indian movement today can best be understood: through an historical analysis of a century of changing class relations and projects[3]; as the result of a series of responses to a modernist state project of inclusion imposed from above (with unexpected consequences); and in the context of changing international political-economic processes, reshaping the terrain on which local struggles would be carried out. To some

extent, in Ecuador space has been generated for the partial incorporation of subaltern projects, in a way that has not occurred in many other Latin American countries. The generation of these spaces was often inadvertent, as elites pursued policies in their own interests, which then opened up unexpected possibilities for indigenous Ecuadorians.

This analysis draws on Marxist resources for an anthropological political economy in two main ways. First, I argue that while class has not proven to be the focal point for identities that inform political movements at the beginning of the 21st century, this does not mean that we should reject class *analysis* as a tool for understanding social processes (for a similar argument applied to Mexico, see Nugent, 1997; and more generally, Thompson, 1978: 148-149). Indeed as Michael Kearney (1996) has pointed out in regard to indigenous movements elsewhere in Latin America, the defence of indigenous identity (an ethnic issue) is closely linked to the protection of access to land and other essential subsistence resources (a class issue). Thus I argue that an analysis of the changing relations among classes over time (including political struggles to impose projects in a particular class's economic interests) is essential for understanding current mobilizations, even if those mobilizations do not themselves emphasize class. Second, this article proposes that we cannot understand subaltern projects in isolation. The concept of the subaltern comes from Gramsci's work (see especially 1971: 44-120), and he situates subaltern or subordinate groups always in relation to dominant groups, within a broad social field of analysis. Often when Latin Americanists have drawn on the school of subaltern studies, they have lost sight of this broader social field as they focus only on subordinate groups (cf. Mallon 1994). I would argue in contrast that neither dominant nor subordinate groups can be fully understood except in relation to each other. It is also essential to recognize the range of both dominant and subordinate groups, rather than simply imagine two basic groups, each with a coherent and unproblematic set of interests: indeed, the unity of either dominant or subordinate groups must be seen as a problem. Finally, the relations between dominant and subordinate groups should be thought of as characterized by contention, struggle and argument. Indeed, Gramsci does not equate consent to rule with ideological consensus, but rather examines a hegemonic process that can seldom be easily achieved. As Roseberry (1994) points out, a hegemonic process is relatively successful not when it eliminates struggle (which rarely occurs), but rather when it leads to the acceptance of a common language of contention.

The period since 1895 in Ecuador has seen processes of incorporation of indigenous groups, who held an important position in elite models of national incorporation. Indians themselves actively responded to these elite projects in various ways. Broad political-economic processes have provided the general context within which changes in the forms of national incorporation in Ecuador have been forged from above. However, the specific way that external processes were internalized in Ecuador clearly was a result of the arrangement of internal social relations (following Cardoso and Falleto's urging [1979] that we examine the specificities of the "internalization of the external" in distinct cases). Moreover, although broad international and national processes may create certain openings to press for inclusion from below, what subaltern groups actually make of the openings is not strictly determined—indeed, attention must be paid to both broader political-economic processes that structure and restructure the limits of the possible for elite and subordinate groups, and forms of subaltern agency. This suggests that the effects at the national and local level of broad economic processes are not pre-determined, but rather are the result of ongoing struggle and manoeuvre among social groups.

International market conditions have profoundly influenced social relations within Ecuador, and the country's economic history over the last century and a half has been characterized by three export booms. The first, based on cocoa exports, began in the last three decades of the 19th century. The cocoa economy encountered problems during the First World War, given transportation difficulties and the closure of European markets for non-essential goods. The export crisis was further deepened by the advent of the World Depression in 1929. The second export boom was based on bananas. Exports began to be promoted in 1948, when United Fruit and Standard Fruit turned their attention to Ecuador due to crop diseases in their Central American plantations. Banana production declined in the early 1960s when new disease-resistant crop strains were introduced into Central America. The intermediate period of the 1930s was one of inward-looking development. The third boom dates to the early 1970s with the export of oil. The two periods of severest economic crisis this century were the inter-boom years of the 1930s and 1940s, and the period of the debt crisis following the height of the oil boom, in the 1980s and 1990s.

Three key eras have been chosen for analysis, given that they marked shifts in processes of national incorporation, with implications for Ecuadorian Indians. They also demonstrate the interplay between global processes, politics, and models of national incorporation. The first is the period after the 1895 Liberal Revolution, when a model of

export-led development through cocoa production was promoted by coastal liberals. The emergence of this powerful group was based on world market conditions that favoured expansion of tropical agro-export production. The other two periods examined are moments of economic crisis in Ecuador (the 1930s-40s and the 1980s-90s), which were dealt with in very different ways. During the earlier economic crisis, there was an elite effort to forge a more national economy in Ecuador, given the difficulty of selling Ecuadorian products in international markets, and the related difficulty of gaining access to imported goods. This was associated with the strengthening of a national ideology of mestizaje (literally racial mixing, but in Ecuador the formation of a population with common cultural characteristics), incorporating Indians from above, in a way that was intolerant of difference. In the 1980s and 1990s, in contrast, the economic crisis was associated not with an interest in promoting a national economy, but rather with an unprecedented globalization of the economy. In this context, and with the weakening of the internal market, there was much less elite concern with the incorporation of subordinate groups into the imagined community of the nation. However, it is precisely in this period of economic globalization that the indigenous movement itself emerged as the articulator of an alternative imagining of the national community.

Liberalism and Ecuadorian Indians: Toward a labour market[4]

In Ecuador in the late 19th century there were two strong, regionally based dominant classes: one in the highlands, associated with *haciendas* (large estates) producing primarily for the internal market and the other on the coast, producing cocoa for the world market on plantations. The existence of these two elite groups which were rather equally matched in terms of power was fundamentally important for the particular way that labour relations developed in Ecuador, and more broadly, for the models of national incorporation promoted by elites. While during the nineteenth century the highland elite were in a position of political dominance, the liberal period represented the rise of the coastal elite. Nonetheless, this group was unable to impose a project that was exclusively in its own interests during the liberal period. This was due in part to the fact that, while the liberals were able to control elections of the executive from 1895 to 1925 (not least, through electoral fraud), it proved much more difficult to control the legislative branch, where the more populous and more conservative region of the highlands tended to dominate. This translated into ongoing conflicts between the liberal executive representing coastal elite interests and an often more conservative legislature where highland interests predominated. As a result, an uneasy working relationship developed between the two dominant classes, creating an atmosphere of competition and tension which had important implications for subaltern groups as well.

The cocoa-producing coastal elite suffered a chronic shortage of labour, given the relatively scarce population of the coastal region. After 1895, cocoa planters looked to the new liberal administration (with which many of them were directly involved) to stimulate the flow of labour to their lands, in part through a loosening of labour ties in the highlands. Liberals saw labour as artificially immobilized in the conservative stronghold of the highlands, by what the liberals saw as the forces of tradition: large landowners, the church, and local political authorities allied with them, the triumvirate of local powers seen as oppressing indigenous peasants of the highlands (see Casagrande and Piper 1969; Guerrero 1994). After the 1895 Revolution, liberal efforts to undermine the power of highland elites in order to stimulate labour migrations focussed on a series of new legal provisions made available to indigenous peasants to combat local abuses that tied them to the highlands.

From the perspective of the liberal agro-export elite of the coast, highland landowners used extra-economic coercion to preserve their control over labour, thus sabotaging the prospects for national development through export production. And indeed, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, indigenous peasants of the Ecuadorian highlands were required to provide several kinds of services to local power holders: these were obligatory labour services required specifically of Indians, outside the purview of market relations. In this context, the liberal state assumed a moral upper hand over highland landowners precisely by insisting on its own role as the protector of Indians from the abuses of both "traditional" highland landowners and the Catholic Church (which was itself a large landowner). The liberal goal of generating a labour market thus involved the development of a discourse about the liberty of contracts, and political measures to undermine highland landowners' power over labour. Importantly, given that the liberal state presented itself as the source of new freedoms,[5] articulated in contrast both to the previous conservative period and to the practices of highland power-holders, state labour policies did not involve the use of force (extra-economic coercion) to generate flows of labour or to dispossess indigenous peasants of their lands.

In order to identify the specificity of the Ecuadorian case, it is useful to compare it with Guatemala, another country with a large indigenous population, which was also

incorporated into the world market through agro-export production in the 1870s (Lovell 1988; Smith 1990). In Guatemala after 1871, the liberal government of Barrios began to promote coffee production in areas adjacent to the western highlands (where the majority of Guatemala's Mayan Indians lived). The drive to modernization initiated by Barrios entailed an assault on native labour. Although there are many ways to cultivate coffee, in Guatemala large estates were developed, given the speed with which land was acquired after 1871 and the means of acquisition (through personal connections to the ruling elite). Because Guatemalan coffee was produced on large estates, coffee planters required a seasonal work force during the harvest season, and that could be dispensed with in other periods. This labour was provided by indigenous migrant labourers, prodded by a series of political measures (that is, forms of extra-economic coercion). Among other things, these included a labour draft (established in 1876) levied on Indian villages, requiring them to send a certain number of seasonal workers to the plantations each year.

Ecuador was like Guatemala, in that a mono-export boom was initiated after 1870 that suffered from a chronic shortage of labour, and this took place in a zone neighbouring the highlands with its dense indigenous population. However, rather than instituting a series of political regulations to forcibly stimulate a labour flow, in Ecuador at the end of the 19th century the liberal state emphasized protecting the rights and freedom of Indian labourers. The "freeing" of indigenous peasant labour to allow it to flow to the coast thus did not occur through a violent transformation of this sector into a proletariat or semi-proletariat, but rather through a series of legal regulations (often in the form of executive decrees which did not have to be approved by the legislative branch) that gradually undermined the power of highland landowners, local officials, and the church to tie labourers to the highlands. These legal measures indeed created conditions that permitted an expansion of the migration process that had begun to occur in previous decades. My reading of the difference between Ecuadorian and Guatemalan labour policies in this era is that it may be largely due to the fact that in the Ecuadorian highlands there was an established elite trying strenuously to hold on to indigenous labour, rather than primarily autonomous Indian communities. While there were also some independent communities in Ecuador, there were proportionately fewer than in Guatemala or Ecuador's Andean neighbours of Bolivia or Peru. The struggle over indigenous labour in Ecuador thus became one carried out in part between two dominant groups, rather than primarily between Indians and an elite group.

Once legal resources were generated by the central state, they took effect principally due to the actions of subordinate groups, who called on the central state to limit local abuses, citing these laws. Given the liberal emphasis on legal measures to undermine highland elites' control over labour, it is not surprising that indigenous petitions had a heavily legalistic tone during the liberal period. Indeed local archives are full of indigenous complaints to higher authorities, claiming their right to protection from the central state, against abusive treatment by local powers. This has led Andrés Guerrero (1994) to propose that the liberal state promoted a "ventriloquist's" image of the Indian. New channels of communication were established between the state and Indians when measures were passed that undermined local powers in the highlands, with the rationale that these groups abused the rights of Indians. In response, Indians duly recreated—and sometimes stretched—government discourse as they reproduced, in their petitions to supra-local authorities, the state's image of them as requiring protection.

For instance, as the Minister of Government sternly stated in response to an indigenous complaint about abuses in local labour recruitment for public works in the highland province of Chimborazo, "The Indians are also Ecuadorians, and as such, and precisely for their miserable condition, they deserve preferential attention from state officials who have the responsibility of offering them the most effective protection, given that their ignorance and natural timidity acquired in long years of servitude prevents them from opposing the arbitrary actions of certain officials."[6] And as a group of Indians complained in 1914 to the provincial Governor (an official appointed directly by the executive rather than locally elected), "We are Indians of the parish of Tixán, Alausí canton, where, violating the constitution and the dispositions of the Law of Internal Administration, our individual rights are assaulted by the authorities of our parish, who martyr us with demands for forced labour....As you are the primary authority of the province, we beg your protection to save our miserable race from this yoke."[7] Repeatedly, Indians appropriated the discourse of the central state, and rather forcefully and cogently argued that they were timid and ignorant and thus deserved protection from the state, particularly in relation to labour issues. I have argued elsewhere that highland Indians were indeed able to use these legal provisions to limit abusive treatment by local political authorities, clergy, and landowners. Even more, in some cases, Indians actually initiated this process as their complaints to the central state resulted in specific orders sent to local officials which became part of the arsenal on which future complaints could be based (see Clark 1994 for

various examples). As these processes unfolded in the Ecuadorian highlands in the early 20th century, local subaltern groups were able to promote their own interests. While space limitations prevent a full discussion of these projects, they centrally included the ability to choose to labour on public works, in the lands or homes of clergy and local political authorities, and on haciendas, under conditions that were of their own choosing—principally, when they were paid adequately and promptly, and when these duties did not conflict with the needs of subsistence agriculture (see Clark 1998c: chapter four; and Clark 1994). At the same time, local powers were undermined, the central state achieved an unprecedented presence and legitimacy in rural areas of the highlands, and, not least, labour migrations to the coast were stimulated. The relations between Indians and the state in the liberal period can only be understood in the context of relations between the two dominant classes, and the particular importance that labour issues achieved in these elite conflicts. In this sense, the openings created for Indians—and which they aggressively pursued—can be seen as the result of the fact that the national project of the Ecuadorian liberals was also a class project.

The Crisis of the 1930s and 1940s: Toward a National Economy[8]

Associated with the crisis in cocoa exports and the closure of foreign markets after 1929, was a period of steep devaluations of the Ecuadorian *sucre*, making imports much more expensive. During the 1910s and 1920s, there had been attention to one aspect of the internal market, with the expansion of food production in the highlands to provision the coastal agro-export zone, which had previously been satisfied by imported foods. In the 1920s there was also some expansion of textile production in the north-central highlands, since textiles and food had been the two largest categories of imports to Ecuador prior to the war. In the late 1920s the establishment of new textile factories in Ecuador was only partly aimed at the internal market, since there was also a profitable trade with Colombia. With the onset of the World Depression, however, that trade declined and Ecuadorian elites began to focus more attention on production for the internal market.[9] These changes occurred in a context of severe economic and political crisis. The decade of the 1930s alone saw 15 different governments. The political instability was not limited to elite circles; it also involved new forms of political organization and protest among Ecuadorian agricultural and industrial workers. This was a period of unionization among workers and peasants, with linkages to new national political parties such as the Communist and Socialist Parties. This point in time was also marked by the emergence of populist politics which drew on the support of the working class and marginalized social groups. It was as a result of economic and political crisis that the interests of industrial elites turned towards the internal market in the 1930s, and specifically, to a particular form of incorporation of subordinate groups, recasting them as potential consumers.

By most estimates at the time, Indians made up about half of Ecuador's population, and elites argued that they were not integrated into the national economy. Ecuador's Indians had little access to cash, and their resulting inability to consume the products of national industry was highlighted in many discussions of the indigenous "problem" and national development issues during this period. As the Minister of Social Welfare argued in 1936,

> Our economic misery, our disorganization, the lack of development of our industry, all of this is due, without doubt, to the fact that the Indian represents a negative factor in the national economy. How could our economy be vigorous, how could there be organization in the country, if the majority of the population remains culturally and economically marginal to the nation, forming a world apart, whose position is diametrically opposed to Western civilization? In the national market consumption is minimal; [...] if we were to be entirely truthful, the country's economy is weak because the Indian does not consume. (Ministerio de Previsión Social, etc. 1936: 14)

Here the reasons provided for the lack of indigenous consumers were twofold: Indians' economic marginality, given both their low standard of living and their emphasis on subsistence production, and their cultural marginality, often glossed in this period as the consequence of a lack of education. Given the difficulties of arriving at a consensus among elites on raising agricultural wages or the prices for peasant agricultural products in urban areas, there emerged instead an emphasis on educational projects, broadly defined, as a way to turn Indians into consumers and full members of the nation. These projects encompassed the hygienic reform of their living conditions, basic literacy, Spanish language training, and the encouragement of expanded engagement with the market in place of their subsistence orientation.

In discussions of the indigenous "problem" during the 1930s and 1940s there were two basic interpretations of its causes (see Clark 1998a). One focussed on the biological roots of indigenous degeneration, while the other focussed on their lack of "culture," defined as education. While these two explanations had different emphases,

they were closely related. The biological perspective, most clearly expressed in the work of the social hygienist Dr. Pablo Arturo Suárez and a generation of his students, emphasized not genetics to explain indigenous degeneration, but more behaviourally oriented issues such as hygiene, nutrition, alcoholism, and disease, which were seen as acting over generations. Indeed, social problems such as alcoholism were seen as racial poisons, which could degenerate the germ plasm that would be passed on to future Ecuadorians (a neo-Lamarckian notion). From this perspective, in order to resolve social problems, one must first improve the biological condition of peasants. Their economic problems could not be addressed first, since in their degenerate condition Indians would surely misuse additional resources, especially for the consumption of alcohol. The cultural explanation in turn emphasized not culture in the anthropological sense, but the lack of education (including hygiene) which prevented Indians from fully participating in the national polity. Illiterate Indians were considered to be dead weights on national progress and "passive" elements who did not participate in national life. Importantly, an element common to both explanations was the emphasis on social reform through the expansion of education, broadly defined. The focus on education was further bolstered by the fact that education was beginning to emerge in the 1940s as an important element of international development discourse, for instance in the Indigenist Institutes that proliferated in Latin America in this period with international support.

In the context of the concern with expanding the number of consumers, in addition to promoting basic literacy and aspects of civic culture, the aim of educational programs in the 1930s and 1940s was explicitly to "awaken necessities" (again revealing the need to reform Indian peasants' subsistence orientation). As one participant in the First Congress of Industrialists, held in the provincial city of Ambato in 1935, insisted:

> The Indian produces, produces, produces, but does not consume; he has no necessities because he has not been taught to take advantage of civilization and consume in order also to increase his production, to cease to be a machine that does not consume, and become a man. The day that we see Indian women wearing patent leather shoes, silk stockings, elegant dresses and hats, and strolling the streets of Ambato on the arms of well-dressed Indians, that day will be a blessing for the history of the national economy, because we will have obtained for our industry a million and a half or two million new consumers, and they will offer to us and to themselves new forms of work and of life. (cited in Luna Tamayo 1993: 114)

This quotation outlines a project of *mestizaje*, which in Ecuador was defined not as racial mixing per se, but rather as the forging of a population with common cultural characteristics. What made all Ecuadorians alike was precisely wearing the same kind of clothing, living in the same kind of dwellings, producing for and purchasing goods through the market, and so on. There appears to have been a sincere perception among Ecuadorian elites that civilization in part was defined by the economic freedom to live better through increased consumption, which of course also depended on increased production for the market.

The kinds of projects for national incorporation promoted by elites were heavily paternalistic towards subaltern groups, especially Indians. Their projects for forming a mestizo nation relied on the promotion of education for Indians, since educated Indians would by definition be mestizos, according to the assumptions of the dominant culture. Indeed, full citizenship rights depended directly on education, since suffrage was limited to the literate until 1979. More broadly, however, it was assumed that once educated, Indians would automatically leave behind their ponchos and small rural plots to partake in national, urban, mestizo culture. The events of the 1980s and 1990s would demonstrate the shortcomings of these assumptions.

In the 1930s and 1940s the response of Indians to dominant ideologies about them was based not on a desire to consume, but rather on what increased consumption would require as a precondition: greater economic well-being, rooted in secure access to land, something that agricultural elites did not readily accept. Indians, in conjunction with socialist and communist labour organizers, developed an alternative analysis of economic crisis and national development problems in this era (Clark 1998b). This can be summed up as a "peasant path" of agricultural development, in which peasants argued that they were the real creators of national wealth, and that improved access to land would allow them to further contribute to national development. For instance, a group of Indian peasants from hacienda Pesillo solicited the sale of an extension of 200 hectares of estate land in the following terms: "If our petition is favourably attended...we will contribute our part to the expansion of agriculture, the increase of national production and the progress itself of the Nation (*Patria*), besides the fact that we will also be able to support ourselves and our children."[10] And similarly another group of Indians argued that "With our gigantic and intensive effort over time, we were able to render productive these lands of volcanic rock and thus contribute to the development of the agricultural economy of the

Nation. The landholders have never even visited this area. Nor can they cultivate it. Nor does it benefit them in any way!! In contrast, these solitary and sterile *páramos* (high-altitude grasslands) can sustain the lives of an entire indigenous community."[11] These quotes, drawn from petitions for land under 1937 legislation dealing with vacant lands, demonstrate that Indians had themselves adopted elite rhetoric about the importance of market production: they argued that they sought land in order to facilitate their own integration into the market economy.

In the 1940s, highland Indians also appropriated another aspect of elite discourse, by promoting education in their own huts, within hacienda boundaries (see Rodas 1989). By 1945, Indians in the Cayambe region north of Quito had established literacy classes in the dwellings of hacienda service tenants, raising the possibility that Indian children would be able to check hacienda account books. Landowner repression forced the schools to move underground soon after their founding. The response of Indians was to rotate the location of the schools, and to hold classes at night. Estate foremen learned to identify the location of schools by looking for a lit lamp in an indigenous hut. Indians resorted to lighting lamps in all of the huts while classes were in session, so that the school could not be distinguished so easily. Peasants also constructed collapsible desks, so that when hacienda employees arrived at what they thought was a school, they found a pile of boards but no direct evidence of a class. The response of the state, too, was to attempt to close down the schools, with the argument that the teachers were not licensed by the government; this culminated in declaring it illegal to use Quichua in the classroom. In contrast, the state did support the rural literacy campaign begun in 1944 by the National Union of Journalists, in which classes were held in Spanish. While we cannot rule out the possibility that this project too might have provided resources for Indians, the preponderance of monolingual Quichua speakers among indigenous peasants in the era suggests that this would likely have been less effective than the bilingual education that the Indians themselves were promoting.

Altogether, it is clear that during the 1930s and 1940s the view of Indians as potential members of the nation was based at least implicitly on a class project of certain elites, to expand the base of consumers of their products, and thus the "productive" members of the nation. It should also be pointed out that the cultural content of what would be seen as full membership in the nation was itself classed: responsible citizenship was equated, in part, with supporting the national economy through full engagement with the market.

The Indian Movement of the Late 20th Century[12]

The 1960s and 1970s saw the establishment of new forms of government intervention in the rural areas of the Ecuadorian highlands, associated with projects of national modernization carried out by the military governments in power at the time. Particularly after the 1972 inauguration of oil production in Ecuador's Amazon region, the state became an agent of accumulation as it participated directly in oil production along with the Texaco-Gulf consortium. This allowed it to greatly expand state expenditures, which soared from 13 035 million sucres in 1972 to 86 627 million sucres in 1979 (during which time the exchange rate remained stable). Revenues from oil were invested in the expansion of social policy—health, education, and housing—and resulted in great improvements of social indicators. Between 1960 and 1980, ten years were added to Ecuadorian life expectancy, death and infant mortality rates were reduced by 40 per cent, and by 1980 the vast majority of children attended primary school (Moser 1993: 177). Consistent with the nationalistic policies of the state, oil revenues were also spent on incentives and subsidies for local industry, with the promotion of an import substitution industrialization model, very much concentrated in urban areas. The rural areas in turn were affected by a model of agricultural modernization that involved two agrarian reform laws, both passed under military governments (in 1964 and 1973; see Barsky 1984).

With the advent of agrarian reform, the large hacienda in its traditional form disappeared from the countryside of the Ecuadorian highlands, to be replaced by smaller, mechanized estates with fewer but waged labourers (i.e., rather than receiving a subsistence plot in exchange for their work), alongside revitalized peasant communities with independent access to land (with great variations in the quality of land received). The land distributed was seldom sufficient for full subsistence production, particularly as it began to be fragmented by inheritance; nonetheless in political terms the disappearance of the traditional agricultural estate implied the final undermining of the system of ethnic administration through private, local powers, wherein the large landowner dominated indigenous peasants, in alliance with the priest, the local political authority, and the white-mestizo inhabitants of highland towns (Casagrande and Piper 1969). The decline of these "private" forms of ethnic domination, in haciendas, public markets and the homes and lands of white townspeople, created a power vacuum in the rural areas of the highlands (Guerrero 1995).

From the 1960s to the present, this power vacuum has gradually filled with indigenous grassroots organizations. This occurred with the increasing establishment of indigenous communities (rooted in and facilitated by the 1937 Ley de Comunas), as well as cooperatives, associations, village improvement committees, women's groups, students' groups, and so on (Carrasco 1993). Overall, the period dating from the first agrarian reform has been characterized by both the legal registration of existing indigenous organizations of all kinds, and a multiplication of new organizations in areas that are predominantly indigenous, in comparison with those that are predominantly white-mestizo. This can be seen in part as a direct result of the practices of governmental and non-governmental organizations.

In the 1970s, with the resources generated by the oil boom and the aim of the military government to modernize the countryside, there was a proliferation of development projects in rural areas. This was part of a project to integrate the Indians through creating direct linkages between state agencies and the emerging indigenous grassroots organizations. The social spending by the military government of the 1970s was clearly designed as a form of incorporation from above, where the population affected was meant to be the passive recipient of an authoritarian paternalism. Nonetheless, in the emergence of grassroots organizations, the importance of various educational services offered by the state, as well as by the church and non-governmental organizations, should be recognized. The state, through its investments in rural education, unwittingly promoted the formation of local indigenous organizations (although it had always been assumed that education, equated with modernization, would lead to an abandonment of indigenous identity). In some cases, projects directed by non-governmental organizations incorporated important elements of cultural revitalization. In others, the decision to use Quichua in educational programs for pragmatic reasons had the effect of encouraging cultural pride (Carrasco 1993; Muratorio 1980). Another important influence was the establishment of development programs that created a demand for local interlocutors to promote and even administer these projects. The strategy of the progressive church was particularly important in this regard, because it identified the indigenous community itself as the preferred unit of intervention (Carrasco 1993). Altogether, these processes resulted in the generation on multiple fronts of local indigenous leaders, educated and with increasing experience in dealing with both governmental and non-governmental institutions.

With the economic crisis of the early 1980s, triggered by the debt crisis (associated, among other things, with the rapid rise in interest rates during the U.S. economic recession), state investment in rural areas of the Ecuadorian highlands was paralyzed: as elsewhere, so too in Ecuador the retreat of the state meant especially a retreat from the countryside (Lucero 2002). The result was not that the incipient indigenous organizations disappeared, but rather that they became more autonomous, as they began to mobilize to claim the development promises—especially for basic services—that the state had made in the 1970s. The proliferation of grassroots organizations since the 1960s was complemented in the 1980s with the emergence of important regional and national indigenous organizations. Rather than the definitive disappearance of indigenous identity that both the right and the left had expected to come with "modernization" in Ecuador, indigenous identity has been strengthened through these processes. This strengthening is seen not only in the increasing importance of indigenous organizations and leadership, but also in the increasing indigenization of the countryside itself.

Although, at the national level, there was a net decline in the indigenous population during the last three decades of the 20th century (due to assimilation), as well as a net decline in rural population compared to urban population, nonetheless the rural areas of the highlands that are predominantly indigenous have grown (Zamosc 1995). That is, in a context of widespread rural-urban migrations, the population of indigenous areas of the highlands migrates less than does the population of white-mestizo areas. While the populations of provincial capitals are growing, the populations of cantonal and parish seats are declining. There seems to be increasing migration of white-mestizo townspeople to cities, combined with an increasing stability on the part of indigenous peasants in the countryside—moreover, some peasants have returned there. Indeed, indigenous peasants have often engaged in temporary labour migrations within Ecuador, or semi-proletarianisation, precisely in order to buy additional land in the countryside, resulting in re-peasantisation (Carrasco 1990). Contrary to all expectations, the data suggest that the specifically rural population of the Ecuadorian highlands is becoming more rather than less indigenous.

Given the processes of formation of indigenous leadership at the grassroots level and the indigenisation of the countryside, it is not surprising that the leadership of resistance to legislative changes undermining the situation of peasants in Ecuador is increasingly undertaken by indigenous organizations rather than mestizo peasant groups. In June of 1990 a massive civic strike erupted in the Ecuadorian highlands, led by indigenous groups, to

protest a number of issues including the effects on their communities of the economic crisis and the structural adjustment policies promoted by the International Monetary Fund. Mestizo peasant groups also joined the movement in some areas, under the leadership of CONAIE.

In July, 1994 indigenous leadership of these issues was even more powerfully represented in the image of Indian leaders entering into direct and prolonged negotiations with the national government and agricultural elites over proposed changes to the Agrarian Law, which would have turned back the clock on many aspects of the agrarian reform. This struggle was related to policies of structural adjustment, which in some cases have benefited Ecuadorian elites directly, especially through cheap credits for the production of high-value export products (with the goal of generating foreign exchange for debt payments, one of the principal goals of structural adjustment programs). Non-traditional agricultural exports, such as the new rose plantations that proliferated in the northern highlands of Ecuador in the 1990s, need relatively small amounts of land, but large amounts of inputs, including water. One of the central issues in the new Agrarian Law was that water was to be privatized in the interests of increased production of non-traditional export crops, and at the expense of peasant production. During negotiations over this law, indigenous leaders, in indigenous dress, negotiated with representatives of the national government on the behalf of both indigenous organizations and other peasant groups, and succeeded in holding the line against some of the worst of the proposed reforms. The negotiations were followed closely by the television, print and radio media.

For the first time in the 1996 national elections, politicians from across the political spectrum actively courted the indigenous vote and listened to their proposals. Among these, the Indian movement proposed that limits should be placed on the indiscriminate privatization of government services and industries, despite the proddings of international lending institutions. Then in January, 2000, in a dramatic move, the indigenous movement precipitated a change of government in Ecuador (see Gerlach 2003), when it allied itself with progressive military officers to oust President Jamil Mahuad, who among other things presided over an economic crisis where real salaries declined by well over 50%, and oversaw a national banking collapse while doing little to ensure that the bankers involved took responsibility for their contributions to this crisis. Mahuad's vice-president was almost immediately installed by Congress in Mahuad's place, and continued many of his predecessor's economic policies. Two years later, however, retired Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, a leader of the 2000 uprising, was elected President of Ecuador, the first time that a recognized political ally of the indigenous movement has held such a post. One of his first actions upon assuming the presidency in January 2003 was to name Nina Pacari—a leader of CONAIE, Ecuador's first Indian lawyer, a prominent figure in the 1994 negotiations over the Agrarian Law, and in 1998 the Second Vice-President of Congress—as the Minister of Foreign Relations, and Luis Macas, former president of CONAIE, as the Minister of Agriculture. Thus the indigenous movement has succeeded in producing not only organic intellectuals within indigenous society, who have been instrumental in analyzing indigenous problems in a way that has facilitated mobilization of the Indian population and in articulating indigenous demands before the state, but also public intellectuals at the national level in Ecuador, who intervene much more broadly in discussions of national problems. The fact that the Indian ministers have since resigned from the government does not change the fact that the Indian movement has clearly achieved an unprecedented presence in national politics.

It should be noted that the Indian project of the last decade draws explicitly on a rejection of some aspects of the 1930s state project for the incorporation of Indians. Underlying much of the 1930s project was the assumption that if Indians were only educated (and hence more "rational"), they would automatically accept the values of the dominant society. As Galo Ramón (1993) has pointed out, however, it is precisely the most educated Indians who became the organic intellectuals of the indigenous organizations of the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, in some ways the more educated these leaders are, the more "ethnic" they have become. Moreover, among the 16 points of the indigenous program presented during massive mobilizations in June of 1990 was the rejection of the increasingly consumeristic values of the dominant society, and a call to live a simple life in line with indigenous values. While the 1990s Indian project may reject the suppositions of the 1930s and 1940s state and elite projects of incorporation, it may well be that the current movement has its roots in precisely those kinds of projects, although in unexpected ways. Most importantly, the emphasis over several decades on incorporating Indians into the nation through the expansion of education provided the basis for the eventual emergence of indigenous leaders at the local, regional and national levels.

Before concluding, I also want to emphasize here the political power of an organizational focus on ethnicity, both in a changing international context and internally within Ecuador.[13] From an international perspective, in the post-1989 period, support for class-based mobilizing has

been on a decline, while indigenous rights have become an important focus of international funding and mobilizing. Indeed, in 1989 the International Labour Organization (ILO) passed resolution 169, stressing the obligation of governments to protect the rights of indigenous peoples. The United Nations has become increasingly active in this area since the early 1980s, declaring the year of indigenous peoples in 1993, and then the decade of indigenous peoples from 1995-2005. The World Bank itself has used ILO 169 to develop a policy to require informed participation by indigenous peoples in its projects, insisting that they must benefit from the Bank's operations (somewhat paradoxically since so many of the Bank's policies have undermined the living conditions of the poor, among whom are surely the vast majority of indigenous people worldwide). At the national level, within Ecuador itself, the emphasis on ethnicity, in the form of indigenous *nacionalidades* (nationalities) and *pueblos* (peoples), may well be what has allowed the emergence of a national indigenous federation in Ecuador in the first place (see Lucero 2002). One of the specificities of the early history of indigenous movements in Ecuador is that mobilizing began first in the Amazon region in the 1960s, where there were not strong regional elites who might have crushed these early organizational efforts. Instead, the presence of foreign oil companies and religious missions in the region provided clear targets for mobilization, which facilitated the early development of organizational networks among the various Indian groups in the zone. In the Amazon, given the very different social and economic organization of the indigenous population (compared to the highlands), the emphasis has been on ethnicity (rather than class) and territory (rather than land). In the highlands, in contrast, there was a greater emphasis on class issues, due both to links with national political parties of the left, and the pressures associated with land problems. When the highland and lowland (and less important coastal) organizations joined to create the umbrella organization CONAIE in 1986, the relative strength of the Amazonian groups facilitated the adoption of the concept of indigenous nationality as a basic organizing unit. The class-based organizing of the highland movement had little appeal in the Amazon, and the emphasis instead on ethnicity came at a propitious time given the international changes to come in the post-1989 period. Over time, this concept has been transformed to encompass both nationalities and peoples, since the many different Indian nationalities of the Amazon would otherwise overwhelm the single, but numerically much larger, highland nationality of the Quichua. (As a result, in the highlands the Quichua nationality has been divided up into several different peoples, including the Otavalos, the Cayambes, the Saraguros, and so on, each with the same weight as the various Amazonian nationalities.) Thus CONAIE, through often heated internal debate and negotiations, has succeeded in arriving at a unit of indigenous representation that can encompass groups from different areas with different concerns, through its adoption of the organizing concept of nationality. Given the direct participation of Indian leaders in the popularly elected 1997 Constituent Assembly that wrote the new constitution, Ecuador's constitution itself now recognizes and institutionalizes the rights of the Indian nationalities and peoples of Ecuador. Lucero, in his thorough-going comparison of Indian movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, determines that the focus on ethnicity, in the form of nationality, has allowed the Ecuadorian movement to develop a structure that can encompass all regions (unlike the much more fragmented movements in Bolivia), and thus has strengthened it considerably.

A focus on nationality—on ethnicity rather than class—has allowed the Ecuadorian movement to navigate potentially divisive internal differences and to draw on international support. Their growing strength then allows them to negotiate more successfully to protect resources and livelihoods. One example is the success encountered in the mid-1990s in securing title to territories in the Amazon for indigenous nationalities. Another is the achievements of the 1994 negotiations over the Agrarian Law. And another comes in the highly paradoxical image of Nina Pacari, one of the important critics of economic globalization and structural adjustment in Ecuador, poised in 2003 to engage in direct negotiations of the external debt in her role as Ecuador's Foreign Minister. While in the end the alliance of the Indian movement with President Gutiérrez did not survive the realities of his first year of government (leaving the movement again in an oppositional role where it frankly seems most comfortable), again I emphasize the high level of influence the Indian movement has achieved, and that it is using to press for more inclusive economic policies for Indians and the Ecuadorian poor in general.

Conclusions

Current processes in Ecuador must be analysed in the context of changing forms of national incorporation over time, which themselves have been forged through the intersection of global processes—both changing market conditions and more recently, changing development discourses—and specific local histories of social relations. This requires examining the "internalization of the external," as local elite and subordinate groups respond in various ways to the restructuring of local

possibilities due to global changes. The latter did not determine events within Ecuador, but did change the terrain—the structures of opportunity—on which local struggles have been carried out. In this article an effort has been made to move between elite projects and the ways in which subaltern groups responded to them. In addition, attention has been paid to the unexpected consequences of elite projects: the current situation is the result of what indigenous groups have made of various elite and state projects over the last century, which provided them with some of the political resources to deal with threats to livelihood today. In Ecuador, the fact that there was a relatively inclusive (in comparison with many other Latin American countries), although heavily paternalistic model of national incorporation, allowed the formation of spaces that could be used for the promotion of subaltern projects, within certain limits. It is in this sense that we can conclude that a hegemonic process has been successful, to the extent that it channels conflict within the bounds of civil society, which it has done by at least partially accommodating certain subaltern projects. The material presented in this article can also be read as a series of struggles over competing definitions of modernity, as Indians have incorporated some elements of elite and state discourse into their own political struggles, often stretching their meanings. However, a shared but contested language—a language of contention—clearly does not imply that there is an absence of contestation from subordinate groups over the form that national incorporation should take.

During the liberal period, Ecuadorian Indians used new legislation and channels of communication with the state to resolve some of their most immediate, everyday problems, such as abuses by local officials in regard to labour issues. This was enabled largely by the specific forms taken by conflict between the two dominant social groups. Then, in the 1930s and 1940s, with the onset of the World Depression, certain industrial elites began to argue that at least one way the economic crisis could be dealt was through undertaking policies that would increase indigenous consumption. Clearly, if there was a project of national incorporation in that period, it was very much tied to elite interests. During the crisis of the 1930s, elites had a national project to which indigenous peasants responded in various ways (Clark 1998b), but which did not originate with them. Indeed the struggles in which indigenous peasants engaged, in conjunction with socialist and communist labour organizers, focussed on local issues such as wages and access to land. Only recently has the indigenous movement directly engaged national and global processes. In part this comes as a response to the effects of globalization on their communities, including the economic crisis in general, structural adjustment policies, and the promotion by international financial agencies of non-traditional agricultural exports, which often generate conflicts with peasants. Nonetheless it is even more important to recognize how the paternalistic forms of incorporation over time in Ecuador, focussing on education and new channels of communication between Indians and the state—especially since the 1970s, but clearly based on earlier processes—have allowed for the gradual generation of public intellectuals among Ecuadorian Indians. It is in this sense that the Indian movement of today must be seen as the product of the ongoing rearrangements of social forces in Ecuador over at least the last century.

A. Kim Clark, University of Western Ontario, Department of Anthropology, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 5C2, E-mail: -akc@uwo.ca

Notes

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2 I use the term hegemonic here in the political sense emphasized by Gramsci (1971: 44-120), indicating the importance of both *leading* and *dominating*. CONAIE has clearly succeeded in leading Indians and their local organizations from many areas of the country, by including their projects in its own, but no less importantly it has succeeded in dominating some of the alternative organizations, such as the evangelical indigenous federation. Space limitations prevent a more detailed discussion of this issue, but see Lucero 2002 for an interesting analysis.

3 By class projects I mean the ways that social actors come together to pursue projects rooted in livelihood and production issues, which have been some of the most important sites and forms of mobilization and contention over the last century (and indeed, longer).

4 This section draws on arguments presented at greater length in Clark 1998c: chapter 4.

5 There were forms of extra-economic coercion—rather than strictly market forces—through which labourers were tied

to coastal plantations as well, but the important point here is that the liberal state *represented itself* as a source of new freedoms and as promoting the "natural" functioning of market forces so that labour could flow to areas where better wages were paid.

6 In governor of Chimborazo province to the political administrator of Alausí, Riobamba, Nov. 13, 1913, Archivo de la Jefatura Política de Alausí (AJPA).

7 In governor of Chimborazo province to the political administrator of Alausí, Riobamba, Nov. 10, 1914, AJPA.

8 This section draws on some of the material presented in Clark 1998a and 1998b.

9 To say that there was a shift in priorities towards production for the internal market is not to say that no production occurred for the external market: indeed, sugar and rice export production expanded on the coast in this era. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the balance between the efforts devoted to production for the internal versus the external market shifted in these years, in the context of changing global market conditions.

10 In Subsecretario del Ministerio de Previsión Social y Trabajo to Director de la Junta Central de Asistencia Pública, Quito, Jan. 29, 1943, Archivo de la Asistencia Pública/Museo Nacional de Medicina (AAP/MNM), Libro de Comunicaciones Recibidas (LCR) 1943-I h. 679-681.

11 Petition from the Indians of Pucará to the Ministro de Previsión Social, Quito, Feb. 2, 1943, AAP/MNM LCR 1943-I h. 707.

12 This section draws on part of the argument presented in Clark 1997a, as well as on a large literature on the indigenous movement, including: CEDIME 1993, Cornejo 1991, Field 1991, Guerrero 1995, León Trujillo 1994, Lucero 2002, Pacari 1996, Pallares 2002 and Zamosc 1994.

13 The following paragraph draws extensively on the analysis presented by Lucero 2002.

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Travelling Paradigms: Marxism, Poststructuralism and the Uses of Theory

Eric McGuckin *Sonoma State University*

Abstract: As tourism is extending commoditization into every corner of the globe, poststructuralist approaches to the anthropology of tourism tend to focus on consumption, the ironies of cultural hybridization, and the instability or "virtuality" of identity and authenticity. While useful in the representation of highly particularized intersections of discourse and desiring bodies, poststructuralist discourses may tend to dematerialize political and economic processes with significant impacts on communities subjected to the tourist gaze. Using the author's fieldwork on the tourism industry in Dharamsala, India for context, this paper argues that by reemphasizing a focus on material production and class relations, and by transcending discourses of authenticity and virtuality through Marxist conceptions of alienation, an "engaged anthropology" of tourism can more usefully link the ironies of postmodern consumption with the inequalities that continue to be structured through capitalist production.

Keywords: tourism, poststructuralist approaches, Marxism, consumption, material production, India

Résumé : Alors que le tourisme répand l'édification de biens matériels en fétiche aux quatre coins du globe, les approches post-structuralistes de l'anthropologie du tourisme ont tendance à focaliser sur la consommation, l'ironie de l'hybridité culturelle et le caractère instable ou virtuel de l'identité et de l'authenticité. S'il est vrai qu'ils sont utiles pour représenter l'intersection de discours et de désirs grandement particularisés, les discours post-structuralistes ont cependant tendance à dématérialiser des processus politiques et économiques. Ces processus entraînent des conséquences considérables pour les communautés soumises au regard des touristes. Les recherches de l'auteur sur l'industrie du tourisme à Dharamsala, en Inde, servent de base à cet article qui soutient qu'en remettant l'accent sur la production matérielle et les rapports entre les classes sociales ainsi qu'en transcendant les discours d'authenticité et de virtualité à l'aide des conceptions marxistes de l'aliénation, une «anthropologie engagée» du tourisme a le potentiel de créer efficacement des liens entre l'ironie de la consommation post-moderne et les inégalités continuellement engendrées par la production capitaliste.

Mots-clés : tourisme, approaches post-structuralistes, Marxisme, consummation, production matérielle, Inde

I was sitting in the Shangri-La cafe in Dharamsala, India, drinking a beer and reading a much-valued *Newsweek* when I spotted the Boeing advertisement. "Travel," it commanded. "Flight turns the world into a single marketplace" (*Newsweek International* 1993: 26-27). Because I was in Dharamsala, the seat of the Tibetan government in exile, studying the impacts of ethnic and spiritual tourism on Tibetan crafts, the ad struck me immediately. A tasteful two-page spread in reds and browns displayed exotic goods, each evoking some distant locale, artfully arranged around a tattered Union Jack, a nostalgic icon of an imagined, benign colonialism that resonates with many travellers from the imperial nations.

"Ethnic tourism" in postcolonial states is a strange new form of economic imperialism, one in which finished goods and memories are carried from periphery to center, where many are hungry for hand-made, "authentic" crafts and experiences that, unlike mass manufactured goods or imagery, escape commodity status in the minds of many consumers (Kopytoff 1986; Nash 1993; Waterbury 1989). In the words of Boeing: "ordinary citizens now have easier access to the world's goods than did the kings of old" (*Newsweek International* 1993: 26-27).

Tourism in the new millennium penetrates every corner of the globe, entering once restricted sacred realms in search of ever more unique goods and experiences. Anthropologists in even the most remote field sites often find themselves preceded by "adventure travellers," and indigenous communities sometimes treat anthropologists as another species of customer (Brewer 1984). In the face of continuing poverty and the transfer of capital to the wealthy nations, many communities are attempting to cash in on this explosion of world travel, transforming domestically produced crafts into factory manufactured souvenirs, and sacred objects, ritual performances, and even their bodies into marketable commodities. Household and sweatshop craft production is growing and rates of exploitation increasing as communities subject to the

"tourist gaze" (Urry 1990) are integrated into an unevenly developed global economy (Nash 1984; 1993; Tice 1995).

Since my original research was conducted (1992-94), there has been a boom in academic literature on tourism, and a proliferation of approaches in conjunction with an increased delineation of the diversity of "tourism." Some of the literature, such as the work of June Nash (1993) Lynn Stephen (1993), and Karin Tice (1995), closely examines the material production of crafts and their circulation in transnational markets, with local consequences for class, gender and ethnic stratification. Another literature is highly "theoretical," such as Clifford's *Routes* (1997), Adams's *Tigers of the Snow and Other Virtual Sherpas* (1996), and the edited volumes *Touring Cultures* (Rojek and Urry, eds. 1997) and *Travellers' Tales* (Robertson et al; eds. 1994). They share "poststructuralist" influences: self-reflexive, suspicious of any monolithic theories or conclusions about tourism, and the incredulity to metanarratives that Lyotard highlighted as the postmodern condition (1985). "Unlike the polemic, authoritative, and homogenizing discourse of modern tourism, the discourse of postmodern tourism consists of compromising statements and stresses the multiplicity of tourist experiences" (Uriely 1997: 983-984). In this paper I will refer to postructuralism as a diverse array of theoretical strategies that deconstruct "modernist" universalisms, essentialisms and foundationalist epistemologies, highlighting "difference" and the slippage of signifiers. "Postmodernism" will denote a cultural condition of instability and hybridity under a regime of globalized capitalism characterized by "flexible accumulation"(Harvey 1989). Many writers cited here, however, do not make such a distinction, and it is debatable that there has been any radical shift in the evolution of capitalism. Some recent anthropological literature deploys the terminology of travel and the Internet as general metaphors for postmodern disjuncture and displacement. "Modernist" critiques of the destruction of "authenticity" have been displaced by more pluralistic, dialogic approaches influenced by both Bakhtin and Baudrillard, e.g., Vincanne Adams (1996), who posits "virtual" identities constructed in dialogue with the "purchasing observer." Admittedly "local" in aim, this discourse, like all discourses, is always already partial; it tends to foreground consumption, bringing particular intersections of discourses and desiring bodies into high resolution. As Gottdiener writes, a focus on consumption means that "other things are ignored," and a "different kind of partial truth emerges that creates the same single-minded blindness as did the putative predecessors who allegedly ignored consumption in favour of the work world of production" (2000: x).

While acknowledging the theoretical contributions of poststructuralism (as well its productivity for publishing), I will argue that an "engaged anthropology"—one that aims to facilitate collective political agency in the face of local and global oppressions, exploitation, and environmental degradation—must also remain loyal to the disciplinary traditions that sustain our unique contribution, *our difference* from feminist, media and cultural studies. In representing tourism, we must re-emphasize participant-observation, ethnographic realism, and accessible prose, or our increasingly abstract discourse may deserve the fate it seems headed towards—burial in an avalanche of popular travel literature. I propose we move away from the endless possibilities for deconstruction, and more thoroughly wed our "readings" of social phenomena to economic processes through a revival of Marxist conceptions of *alienation.* Following Miller's neo-Hegelian conception of culture as "self-objectification" (1987), tourism can be analyzed in terms of the various projects through which both "hosts" and "guests" construct themselves through the consumption of Others, always linked to and having consequences for material practices of production. Consumption and production are thus seen as two sides of a dialectical coin (Gottdiener 2000). I will argue that in contrast to discourses of authenticity or virtuality, *alienation* more sharply brings into focus how the possibilities for self-objectification are stratified not only by cultural "difference," but by class and capitalism.

Influenced by philosophical pragmatism (James 1995 [1907]; Rorty 1982) and Marx's grounding of theory in practice in the *Theses on Feuerbach* (McLellan 2000: 171-174), I am not claiming for "materialism" any status as a final vocabulary, nor for class as the master key to all social relations. I am merely asserting that such an approach provides a more useful lens for an engaged anthropology, facilitating global comparisons and policy recommendations amidst the proliferation of discourses surrounding postmodern tourism. Alienation is "not merely a (descriptive) concept; it is also an appeal, or call for a revolutionary change of the world (de-alienation)" (Petrovic´ 1983: 10).

Until another paradigm emerges that can unify progressive theory and practice, the rich conceptual toolkit of the Marxist tradition, with its focus on labour and its faith in internationalism, is vital in generating empowering and systemic critiques of the forces of inequitable globalization—such as tourism—that highlight the mutual interests of disparate working peoples around the world, both hosts and guests.

Doing and Teaching Theory

The Boeing advertisement made me laugh out loud, but also tempted me. My research attempted to use a relatively narrow focus on the production of Tibetan exile crafts and commoditized ritual objects as an entry into a broader description of the tourism economy and shifts in ethnic, class, and gender politics. Following Appadurai and Kopytoff (1986), I aimed to construct "biographies" of particular artifacts, linking these to more global economic processes as found in the work of June Nash (1981, 1984, 1993). However, the causal forces and impacts of tourism on craft production are extremely diverse and far-reaching, weaving together a complex dialectic of cultural consumption and material production. Perhaps the advertisement provided an easy target of discursive deconstruction and an entrée into a deeper consideration of consumption. In short, this was an opportunity to *do theory,* something a number of reviewers had indicated was relatively lacking from my grant proposals and manuscripts, which were characterized as simplistically "materialist."

I left for the field in 1992 with an admittedly inadequate understanding of the vital contributions poststructuralism offers to the analysis of power (particularly as it circulates through discourses, including discourses of "resistance") and my own positioning in both the academy and vis-à-vis my research subjects. It was through teaching undergraduates about "race," ethnicity, and gender years later that I discovered the usefulness of the work of Derrida, Foucault, and Stuart Hall in demolishing commonly held essentialisms, and encouraging critical analysis of all manner of cultural representation (including my own lectures). I required my students to construct biographies of their favourite commodities. I found them fascinated by the multiple meanings latent in consumption, and pushed them to compose self-reflective essays. But I also found that if I emphasized deconstruction and difference—leaving students with destabilized notions of identity, culture, and truth—they frequently despaired of finding grounds for uniting with any "Other" to work on solutions to global problems. I must concur with Hennessy that "frequently learning about human diversity means celebrating or appreciating 'difference' rather than acquiring the critical frameworks to understand how and why social differences are reproduced" (Hennessy 1993: 11). Focussing on the micro-circulation of power in particular contexts sometimes "eclipses any sort of causal explanation of the relationship between language and all the rest" (ibid: 41).

While perhaps not as "sexy" as examining consumption or local exotica, focussing on production, on structures of "surplus extraction" and class, can powerfully reveal to students the linkages between the local and the global, opening up causal connections and avenues for political intervention. For all its purported universalism, Eurocentric arrogance, and reduction of culture, gender, and ethnicity to the category of class, I have found the *Communist Manifesto,* with its call for international labour solidarity and vision of global citizenry, more relevant in my teaching than ever. Marx and Engels predicted that capital would "nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere," creating "a world after its own image" (1998 [1848]: 39-40). Over 150 years ago, they saw that "in place of old wants satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes" (ibid: 39). The "exploitation of the world market" would lead to a "cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country" (ibid). These passages remind students of the transnational character of their own consumerism, and that globalization is not really so new a phenomenon. The assertion that capitalism has "drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood" (ibid) leads naturally to discussions of multinational corporations, of downsizing at home and outsourcing abroad, of NAFTA and the World Trade Organization. When students discover that working conditions in the sweatshops producing their jeans rival the brutality of Marx's time, when they see that wages in Northern California are tied to those in Mexico, and that rising tuition and shrinking course offerings are tied to both political and corporate discourse as well as regressive tax structures, they begin to discover mutual interests with working peoples across differences of culture, ethnicity and gender.

Fieldwork in Dharamsala: Cultural Production and Consumption

In my own work on Tibetan refugees and tourism, I am impelled to analyze Tibetan cultural production and consumption as dialectical processes. Tibetan arts and religion have become entangled with the desires of new tourist, spiritual, and academic consumers who themselves become producers of a reified Tibetan culture. Dharamsala, in the foothills of the Himalayas, is host to the Dalai Lama, the Central Tibetan Administration, and a Tibetan refugee community of some 5000. Exiles in Dharamsala engage in co-operative and private enterprises including hotel and restaurant services, petty trade, handicraft production and religious instruction. My research aimed to describe the lives and practices of Tibetan and Indian artisans and merchants, groups relatively neglected in prior research that largely emphasized the transmission

of identity or Buddhist philosophy and practice. I also aimed to integrate an account of the "host" or producing population—the ethnic "Other" that is the usual focus of anthropological monographs—with an equally detailed and differentiated account of the "guests," the consuming travellers often stereotyped in both popular and academic literature. Over the course of my fieldwork I conducted interviews with seventy Tibetan and Indian artisans, merchants, hoteliers, lay and religious consumers of handicrafts, and government and monastic officials. I also interviewed 60 travellers and long-term foreign residents in Dharamsala, including a number of religious scholars, art historians, and anthropologists, and solicited responses to a questionnaire from 33 travellers.

In line with more recent emphasis on the diversity of tourisms—such that the very category "tourism" must itself be interrogated (Rojek and Urry 1997)—I tried to be careful to differentiate between types of foreign consumers. I found Cohen's (1979) five (essentially psychological) types of traveller—Recreational, Diversionary, Experiential, Experimental, and Existential—useful for thinking about motivations for travel and demands for "authenticity" in crafts. However, I also found that motivation did not predict consumption patterns in any simple way. Demands for authenticity vary not only between and within categories of consumers, but between different types of goods and cultural productions. In Cohen's terms, many travellers locate an "elective centre" of spirituality in Tibetan culture. Yet despite his generalization that "authenticity" is most important for these consumers, many spiritual seekers in Dharamsala are quite aware of and satisfied with invented traditions and hybrid crafts, and are in fact often themselves a source of innovation. A consumer may demand authenticity of spiritual teachings, but not of crafts. Consumers who commission *thangka* (sacred Buddhist paintings) or butter lamps produced by individual artisans according to strict canons, may also buy cheaper ready-made goods and hybridized souvenirs.

I ended up defining categories of travellers based on behavioural or "etic" criteria—what are they (primarily) doing here?—rather than on presumed motivations. (I consider etics to be, ultimately, the useful emics of the observer). I was fortunate that my etic categories very neatly paralleled emic self-characterizations:

Tourists and Travellers—those who visit Dharamsala, for brief or longer periods respectively, without engaging in extended work or study.
Volunteers ("Do Gooders" or "Idealists")—those working for Tibetan exile institutions.
Dharmas (or "Seekers")—those engaged in sustained Buddhist studies and/or practice.
Researchers (also labelled "Geeks," "Spies," and by one "post-tourist," "Anthropological Terrorists")—those conducting academic or journalistic research.

A simpler categorization might be made between "Doers" and "Seers"; between those passing through Dharamsala and those staying to work or study with the Tibetans. One American (self-described researcher) divided foreigners into "those who stay to really learn about the culture" and "those who just come through to see and don't learn much." Another woman contrasted "those who study" and "those who don't." I make no special analytic claims for any such categorizations other than that they provided a crude tool to distinguish major varieties of what I called "projects of self-construction" through travel, highlighting their cultural, political and economic impacts in Dharamsala.

While useful heuristically, "membership" in the categories was quite fluid. Some travellers, for example, had returned with degrees and grants to study various aspects of Tibetan culture, while other travellers were social scientists on holiday. The class backgrounds of these travellers, while almost universally self-defined as "middle class," if defined in Marxist terms as structural position in relations of production, were quite diverse. Most, but not all, were in some sort of liminal state—in between jobs, just graduated from school or about to return, or seeking some new life pathway. Ultimately, one could particularize the varieties of motivation and behaviour right down to the level of each individual at a specific time and space.

But despite this diversity, the political and economic impacts of their presence could be generalized. While many in the three "Doer" categories vehemently denied they were "tourists," (in fact, no one described themselves with that term—the tourist is always the other person), I found that many of their interactions with the locals paralleled that of other travellers, and they consumed much the same services and commodities. In fact, despite a commonly held status hierarchy privileging travellers over tourists, Doers over Seers, some Tibetans preferred those merely passing through town, spending and donating money, to the sometimes (temporarily) impoverished Doers who became involved in Tibetan cultural production, and began making criticisms and demands.

In Dharamsala, I found that the cultural and economic alienation of craft producers often had little to do with how various consumers understood objects. Handi-

crafts may be appealing in part because of their apparent status as products of non-alienated labour, allowing consumers to imbue them with personal meanings—to "singularize" them (Kopytoff 1986)—more readily than mass produced goods through often imaginary and idealized histories of their production and exchange. Miller suggests that with such types of object "production becomes reified as having a separate connotation and it is not the actual process of manufacture which is important, but the ability of the object to stand for a particular type of production and its attendant social relations." An object may "proclaim one technological origin while actually deriving from another" (Miller 1987: 115). With tourist arts, objects rapidly produced by piece workers with little control over cultural motifs may masquerade as the products of artistic care, and invented traditions may signify timeless essences. Like the written sign that escapes authorial control, material signs too escape the control of their producers; the plasticity of motifs and meanings facilitate the passage of tourist arts across geographic and cultural boundaries. Souvenirs may also stand for a singularized type of exchange, as bargaining over a commodity—a new experience for many travellers—is remembered an intimate encounter with the Other. For many consumers, Tibetan handicrafts in particular connote more than "authentic" ethnic goods. The purchase of a *thangka* was often considered both a spiritual and political act, involving patron and artist in the protection of Tibetan spiritual culture from the onslaughts of the secular Chinese state. For many travellers, this local drama is but a particular instance of a global struggle to preserve, resurrect, or invent ancient wisdom, folk traditions, and human-scale production in a rationalized, disenchanted world from which they feel alienated. But attempts by the consumer to transcend commodity fetishism do not necessarily end the alienation of the producer (McGuckin 1997).

I was truly surprised by the extent to which both moving travel and located work and study could lead to deep involvement in Tibetan cultural production. Through the consumption of local knowledge, researchers produced texts and films through which the world comes to know Tibetans, and through which the Tibetans, at least in part, come to see themselves. There were at least 12 other anthropologists in Dharamsala during the period I conducted my fieldwork, and a few used their expertise to become guides. The often-stated aim of "preserving Tibetan culture" reifies it into an essentialized, exchangeable, and researchable commodity. New foreign consumers appropriate this reified Tibetan culture for their own diverse projects of recreation, spirituality, entrepreneurialism and research.

Tibetans are both agents and subjects of these projects. While the refugees and their supporters advertise an urgent need for the salvation of authenticity, craft production, artistic forms, and even religious teachings are sometimes radically altered for the tourist and export markets. A growing interest in Buddhism in the West has led several Tibetan monastic sects to establish businesses and meditation centers worldwide. Foreign sympathizers and entrepreneurs initiate many enterprises, and a few Tibetan souvenirs are actually designed and manufactured by non-Tibetans. Ethnic crafts need have little continuity with any artistic traditions to function as signs of authenticity on the market. In the global handicrafts trade, certain motifs function as signifiers (trademarks?) of Tibetan identity even as they are grafted onto foreign objects and thrown into surreal combination with other goods. Ritual daggers become letter openers for New Agers (Kleiger 1996). Tibetan Buddhist icons are stitched by Indian labourers onto woven backpacks otherwise indistinguishable from those for sale in the crafts markets of Cuzco or the East Village. The transnational market celebrates and profits from difference just as it obliterates it. Here I am presented with a wonderful opportunity to *do theory.*

The commoditization of Tibetan culture is certainly fascinating in its often-humorous confabulations, and Shangri La debunking now rivals Shangri-La fantasizing as an intellectual industry. However, despite the continuing critique of essentialisms by academics like me indigenous peoples themselves often hold fast to them, a lesson I painfully learned when my criticism of the Shangri-La myth was met with considerable hostility by some in the Tibetan exile community. While some intellectuals are themselves contemptuous of foreign projections (Norbu 1989; Shakya 1992), which they believe trivialize their culture and political struggle, they are simultaneously alienated from and seek ownership over both myth and its deconstruction. If the postmodern condition entails a hyperactive transnational circulation of things and meanings such that cultural boundaries, identity, and authenticity are increasingly impossible to define, this has by no means entailed an end to quests to construct and solidify a self, a status, a community, and to stake its claims. Representations of an idealized past and assertions of cultural univocality are means by which the Tibetan diaspora claims political rights and authority over Tibetan cultural production. My concern to highlight class, gender, and regional conflicts within an "imagined community" (Anderson 1983) were not much help in that project. Shangri-La functions as a fantasy, a trademark, a hope and a protest simultaneously.

The romantic and essentialist notions that underlay many "modernist" critiques of tourism and authenticity have been largely abandoned, but that is only half the chore. We must follow with detailed analyses of how the very concepts we have deconstructed are still deployed by hosts and guests, and perhaps more significantly, how these discourses support a tourism industry brimming with exploitation and foreign dominance, as well as resistance. Poststructuralism taught me that culture is always already dialogic, contested, and hybridized, and I can no longer think about authenticity as the re-production of static goods, motifs, or practices. Marxism leads me to think instead about *alienation*, about the practical conditions of cultural production, exchange, and consumption that promote or impede individual and community self-objectification (see also Miller 1987; Tomlinson 1991).

Handicraft Capitalism

The impacts of tourism are complex and contradictory, and must be specified for each locale, and each type of cultural production. Yet these particularities can be compared across cases and linked to global structural forces. I found that tourism in Dharamsala led not to a uniform commoditization or "degradation" of the arts, but rather to a multiplicity of productive structures and a diversification of artistic forms and meanings, as well as struggles within and outside the community over the direction of cultural production. The case of Tibetan handicrafts—where co-ops and domestic production often occurs side by side with sweatshops—might seem to support the notion that unilineal theories of capitalist development are misleading (Cook and Binford 1986; Nash 1981, 1984, 1993). But while non-capitalist relations of craft production persist, they remain inextricably tied to an overall capitalist market (Tice 1995) and can be compared across cases.

Dependency on external markets increases competition, speeds up production, and often cheapens products, reducing artisans to piece-workers (Nash 1993; McGuckin 1996b; 1997). Design is often modified not only to cater to foreign tastes, but also to facilitate standardized manufacture. I found that a dual productive structure had developed in Dharamsala, with higher quality, lower volume production of sacred objects, such as *thangka* (Buddhist paintings) on the one hand—what Graburn (1984) called "traditional embedded" goods—and lower quality, higher volume "souvenir novelty" goods like carpets on the other. At the sacred end the spectrum, artisans are most commonly Tibetan males, while at the secular end artisans are often poor women and even non-Tibetans who often cannot afford to buy the goods they produce (McGuckin 1996b; 1997). Social, political, and religious projects have meshed with the pursuit of profit and with class, ethnic, and gender relations to generate a shifting variety of productive structures—domestic, co-operative, capitalist—and varying degrees of economic profit and exploitation, cultural inventiveness and alienation.

For handicraft production in Dharamsala, the most significant differences between consumers are their possession of time and money. Low budget and short-term travellers provide much of the market for ready made, inexpensive, mass manufactured goods. Large objects weigh them down, and they are likely to buy only those goods they can carry or wear, such as clothing or jewellery. Designs may be quite innovative, targeted directly at the tastes of external consumers. Profits then flow primarily to capitalists and vendors, and artisans are alienated both from the artistic form of the goods (which one craft worker said "looked like shit"), and from returns on their labour. However, the low budget market also provides opportunities for merchants with little capital to sell petty goods in competition with the larger producers and vendors. Finding meaning in a deeper experience of one locale, longer-term travellers and Volunteers, Dharmas and Researchers are more likely to buy relatively expensive commissioned goods, manufactured more closely in accord with Buddhist iconographical canons. For may consumers, however, artistic or technical "authenticity" is not as significant as whether the producers are Tibetan and benefit from the exchange. Money from commissioned goods flows more directly to the producer, and innovations may be introduced by the artisan or the consumer, rather than indirectly through the vendor.

The small scale of craft production sites, the aim of the Dalai Lama's Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) to employ unskilled refugees, and the desire to preserve artisan traditions limits the speed and capacity of many enterprises. Social and political interests also limit the accumulation of surplus value available for reinvestment. On the one hand, gossip and pressures for conformity serve as levelling mechanisms sometimes discouraging individual accumulation and display of wealth. On the other, the costs of the Tibetan administration and its provision of jobs and training, medical and social support, and education drain much of the profits generated by the CTA's co-operatives. These entitlements allow artisans to survive on less than a living wage, to the benefit of private employers.

Most entrepreneurs in Dharamsala are properly categorized as merchants rather than capitalists. These merchants may take advantage of extremely favourable exchange rates, selling goods in Europe or the United States for many times the South Asian price of production.

A number of merchants become petty capitalists, providing looms and wool for production carried out in weavers' homes. Some Tibetans pay Indian women low rates to knit sweaters and other woollen goods for resale to travellers. However, private industry remains relatively small, limited by the CTA's absorption of unskilled labour, and its dominance of the local market. Those aiming to really enrich themselves must expand their businesses with the aid of kin networks and foreign "sponsors" to Delhi, Nepal, and even to Tibet, where there are new opportunities for trade. The new Tibetan petty bourgeoisie is doing better than much of the surrounding Indian population, and ethnic tensions have intensified in the last decade. While some refugees in Dharamsala employ Indian children as domestic servants and restaurant workers, child labour in the carpet industry is minimal. Were children employed in the Dharamsala co-operatives, there would likely be an outcry from the tourists, students and volunteers that form a large part of the market.

The Tibetan carpet industry in Nepal, a secondary field site for my research, is less constrained. Its growth benefiting from an explosion of tourism in the Kathmandu valley, by the 1990s the carpet industry was Nepal's leading source of foreign exchange. It employed thousands of women and children driven into the factories at substandard wages by unequal land distribution and environmental degradation in the countryside. Labourers are sometimes physically and sexually abused, working conditions in the carpet factories are hazardous, and carpet production often pollutes rivers and streams with caustic dyes and solvents. Unfortunately, the small size of the factories, the young and shifting work force, and a deceptive subcontracting system make the industry difficult to regulate. In the last decade the anti-sweatshop and Fair Trade movements have raised awareness of child labour and brutal conditions in the global carpet, garment and shoe industries. In part due to this activism, the Tibetan carpet industry took a major downturn in the late 1990s, and many exporters now guarantee they do not employ children.

Clearly, even postmodern consumption may entail some rather traditional forms of production and nasty modes of exploitation. While broad generalizations regarding cultural and economic commoditization, alienation, and victimization may be misleading, global comparisons can be profitable. The dynamics of Tibetan craft production in India and Nepal, for example, are similar to those of Kuna craft production in Panama as described by Karin Tice, who concludes that "the commercialization of crafts can, but does not have to, lead to the alienation of producers from their craft," and may, "enrich and benefit both producer and buyer" (Tice 1995: 188).

Tourism is always intertwined with political interests and discourse, and the opportunities and brutalities that tourism provides are structured along interpenetrating axes of "difference," of age, gender, ethnicity and nation. It is simply impossible to get a politically useful handle on these differences and discourses, or on the practical impacts of travellers' diverse motivations and definitions of authenticity, without closely considering production and class relations. A reversal of the Marxist primacy of production, by emphasizing consumption and discourse, is sometimes nearly silent about the material consequences of tourism. An emphasis on the local and particular in the name of avoiding "totalization" may discourage comparison across cases and linkage to global systems, providing little guidance for producing communities to limit, shape, and profit from their own commoditization. It is not a matter of the "truth" of various paradigms, rather one of emphasis and use. It seems to me that my primary responsibility in representing, for example, the Tibetan carpet industry in Nepal—with all its ironies—is to those Nepali children still labouring in suffocating carpet factories, sometimes shackled to the looms.

Travels in Discourse

> "To examine travel is to examine theory." (Arshi et al. 1994)

Tourism might be the type case of postmodern cultural production. It was a "post-Fordist" industry before the term was coined—consumer driven, largely non-industrial, highly mobile, volatile, and structured into a two-tiered hierarchy wherein a few monopolies and entrepreneurs employ masses of low-paid service workers. There is tremendous investment in advertising and impression management. The often surreal and humorous nature of tourism lends itself to ethnographic experimentation, to considerations of desiring bodies and inventions of tradition, to deconstruction of discourses of authenticity and the primitive.

The peculiarities of tourism led Crick (1985) to advise us to take a more "ludic" approach, and Georges van den Abbeele went so far as to claim that "Discourse on travel can only produce a meta- or theoretical discourse....It is radically impossible to talk about travel in empirical terms" (van den Abbeele 1980: 12). More recently, in an essay on "post-tourism," Ritzer and Liska conclude that there are "no grand conclusions to be made" as there is " no 'truth' to be uncovered about the contemporary world of tourism." Social scientists must be modest in their aims, they aver, because if "the post-modern perspective has done nothing else, it has alerted us to the dangers,

even the terrorism, associated with grand narratives" (1997: 109).

Dean MacCannell's influential *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (1989 [1976]) was the first analysis of tourism fully deploying social theory (in this case, structuralism and semiotics). MacCannell called for a "sociology of leisure," arguing that "the tourist is one of the best models for modern-man-in-general" (1989 [1976]: 1). He read in the "system" of attractions "an unplanned typology of structure that provides direct access to the modern consciousness" (ibid: 4). MacCannell further claimed that an analysis of mass leisure has become more salient than that of productive relations, and that modern social identities are primarily constructed in consumption rather than work. Thus, he suggested, social analysis cannot make sense of modernity by studying class, status, power and "related sociological antiquities" (ibid: 35). "Work becomes the site of touristic interest," and sightseeing constructs a false impression of a unified and direct relation between the self and a fragmented social totality. "Sightseeing," he wrote, " is a kind of ritual played to the differentiations of society" (ibid: 13). With his most brilliant concept, "staged authenticity," MacCannell highlighted the disappearance of the very attribute tourism both promotes and demolishes.

Despite MacCannell's claim of having carried out an ethnography of tourists, there is little empirical description of their practices. Rojek criticizes "modernist" structuralism of the sort practised by MacCannell as too monolithic for representing the diversity of tourism. While modernist texts "stressed the exploitation and artificiality of tourist experience," postmodernism "sees tourist experience as fragmented, plural, and without a dominant overarching belief in absolute value (e.g., absolute authenticity or absolute inauthenticity)" (Rojek 2000: 53). Although MacCannell can be faulted for his sweeping generalities and abstractions, his work has proved very influential and productive, providing useful hypotheses for the kind of empirical research MacCannell had not himself provided (e.g., *Coping with Tourists,* Boissevain, ed. 1996).

Another modernism—Marxism—has been faulted for offering the kind of grand generalizations always under suspicion in our particularizing discipline. Marx and Engels were prone to claims to a scientific objectivity inadmissible in the postmodern academy. In the case of tourism, Marxists have been accused of fetishizing production to the neglect of the imagery and consumption central to the industry. Although in the *Grundrisse* Marx wrote that production, distribution, and consumption "form a perfect connection," he privileged production as the causal variable. "Production," he wrote, "creates the consumer" (Marx 1971 [1858]: 24-26). Baudrillard argued that Marx's privileging of work as the site of self- realization and the creation of value mirrors the instrumental rationality of the bourgeois world-view—"Man" is economic man, and value is reduced to "the sign of utility" (Baudrillard 1975).

Indeed, the labour theory of value has not proved very useful for deciphering the economics of imagery. MacCannell (1989) argues that the value of tourist commodities is not determined by their direct labour, rather by the experience they produce (or, I would add, promise). But as Hardt and Negri assert: "Even if in postmodern capitalism there is no longer a fixed scale that measures value, value nevertheless is powerful and ubiquitous. This fact is demonstrated first of all by the persistence of exploitation, and second by the fact that productive innovation and the creation of wealth continue tirelessly" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 356).

In many current studies of tourism, although producing "hosts" may be the focus of ethnography (partially a result of the requirements for academic career building—indigenous artisans are more "Other" than Western workers on holiday) there tends to be a reversal of the Marxist priority of production over consumption, and sober considerations of rates of exploitation are displaced by more playful representations of hybridization and simulation. Vincanne Adams suggests "a way to move beyond the discourse of authenticity...[is] that we look instead for a discourse through which cultural differences are always reflective of desires of the purchasing observer" (Adams 1996: 73).

If the postmodern condition generates in consumers nostalgia for the real, for "authentic roots," capital is ready to manufacture simulations to meet the demand. Umberto Eco titled his road trip through the roadside attractions and theme parks of the western U.S. *Travels in Hyperreality.* He read the cheesy dioramas and wax museums he encountered as attempts to simulate a history that has already disappeared. Simulations are constructed which are more elaborate than the original. More real than the real, they are "Hyper-real" (Eco 1986). Unfortunately, semiotic readings of tourism may lend themselves too easily to breezy accounts that reproduce some very old-fashioned stereotypes, offering us only the simulacra of politics. Baudrillard's depiction of the United States in his book *America* (1988), like Eco's, is a fleeting, shallow, and nearly depoliticized vision glimpsed through the windshield of an automobile. These texts tell us very little about the complexity and material conflicts of American life, and provide a poor example for *ethnography,* let

alone any useful guide to active intervention in political arenas. They do more to reveal that Eco and Baudrillard, as Bruner (1994) points out, unwittingly reproduce an essentialist original/copy dichotomy (for them, the original is Europe). More recent accounts of "Disneyization" and "MacDonaldization" (Ritzer and Liska 1997; Ritzer and Ovadia 2000), while greatly influenced by Baudrillard, are more nuanced and careful to avoid overgeneralizations, noting both homogenization and diversification in tourism industries. Still, they are most useful in thinking about "new forms of consumption" (Gottdiener 2000), and full-length ethnographies are still needed of the working conditions of actual theme park employees, who labour not only under the tourist gaze, but under the gaze of security teams deployed by corporations offering a hug from Goofy in place of a living wage.

Like the semioticians, some contemporary theorists of tourism essentially *read* social phenomena, centering on an abstracted Discourse that de-emphasizes descriptions of the actual speech acts and behaviours of hosts and guests. I remember vividly a provocative and creative paper presented in the "Consuming Identities" panel at the American Anthropological Association conference in 1991. In the paper, later published as "The Body and Tourism" (1994), Jokinen and Viejola enacted a tour of tourism theory. The two took snapshots of the audience of academics as they recounted a fictional trip to Spain, eavesdropping on conversations between theorists like MacCannell and John Urry on the plane, at the beach, in the disco. Even our most abstract theorizing, they noted, is a gesture of the body. Indeed so, but I could not help noticing that there was little mention of the *labouring bodies* that made their leisurely narrative possible. What of the waiters who brought them cocktails as they considered Judith Butler and Foucault?

In the collection *Travellers' Tales: Narratives of Home and Displacement* (Robertson et al. 1996) various contributors rehearse decentered identities, transgression, alterity, and mimesis, but we seldom hear the voices of any actual travellers, save for the odd reading of an 18th-century diary. Instead, travel serves as a metaphor for the disjunctures of the postmodern era, and travellers become a species of "nomad" along with diasporas, for whom, notes Clifford, "decentered, lateral connections may be as important as those formed around a teleology of return" (1994: 306). I must observe that Tibetan exiles, while certainly relying on lateral transnational economic networks, advertise and promote their interests precisely around a teleology of return. Their perception of failure has more to do with the military power of the People's Republic of China than with any postmodern ontology of displacement. While "metaphors of travel" may usefully "destabilize fixed and ethnocentric categories of culture" (Rojek and Urry 1997: 10), they can also, as Caren Kaplan argues, obscure differences in power between and within global communities (Kaplan 1996). I am not sure we know enough yet about what travellers actually do and think to appropriate them very usefully as general metaphors for the current era.

Another set of metaphors has been appropriated from cyberspace. As international tourism is expanding and drawing ever more consumers into an asymmetric transnational market of hybridized goods and meanings, Rojek has written of "indexing" and "dragging" experiences as one does with computer files (1997). Other writers have posited the construction of "virtual" identities. Dean MacCannell had earlier distinguished between the "constructed ethnicity" of the colonial era—a dynamic product of resistance—and the "re-constructed ethnicity" of tourism, in which identity is performed for the consumption of others (MacCannell 1992 [1984]). The end result of tourism, he claimed, is the "staged authenticity" of "ex-primitives" and the final victory of "white cultural totalization" (ibid: 167). Poststructuralist work on tourism has largely abandoned such critique of lost authenticity as dependent on essentialist and static notions of identity and culture. In Vincanne Adams's *Tigers of the Snow and Other Virtual Sherpas* (1996) the reader is advised to avoid thinking of Sherpa identity as anything *sui generis*. In dialogue with tourists, mountaineers, and anthropologists, Sherpas have become "virtual" through "the imitation of what is taken to be one's 'natural' self by way of the Other" (1996: 17).

I read Adams just as I was wrestling with similar issues, and struggling to finish my dissertation at long last. I admit to some jealousy at her brilliance and theoretical sophistication, and to a feeling of being scooped. But I also wondered just who was virtual. It appeared to me that Western travellers, journalists, seekers, and even anthropologists in Dharamsala were far more virtual than Tibetan refugees. Certainly, much Tibetan cultural production caters to Western consumers (although the exiles generally take on more attributes of "the West" than they "perform" Tibetan identity). Interviews I conducted with travellers revealed that many actually seek hardship in the Third World, the global bargain basement for experience. For these *bricoleurs* of Eastern spiritual traditions, a difficult bus ride, a filthy hotel, or a bout of amoebic dysentery offer some sort of "real experience," an escape from the comforts—virtuality?—of First World life.

Many of Adams' assertions about ethnic identity are well taken, but hardly new despite the sometimes-obfus-

cating deployment of the vocabulary of seduction and mimesis. That identity is constructed through dialogue and conflict with the Other is an old insight, systematically applied to ethnicity as least since Barth (1969). "Virtuality" seems to imply, though Adams surely does not intend this, the existence of something non-virtual. Unless we posit that there is anywhere, anytime some essential Self or Culture—some stable "Being"—we must regard projects of self-objectification as "Becoming;" always already dialectical, historical, and structured through practices of both consumption and production.

Cultural productions are indeed mirrors in which ethnicities are envisioned. It has always been so, but tourism certainly multiplies the mirrors, refracting the desiring gazes of ever more far-flung consumers. Perhaps virtuality signifies that the dialogues through which identity is formed have widened tremendously, and are engaged through new electronic media. There is new intensification of capitalist "space-time compression," commoditization, and the reproduction of images (Harvey 1989). But this need not leave us, as Christopher Norris (1990) wrote, "lost in the funhouse," satisfied to endlessly represent representation. Without falling back on essentialist conceptions of authenticity we can still usefully distinguish between Tibetan monks raising funds through performances of modified sacred dances, and Nepali children labouring to produce Tibetan carpets catering to foreign tastes. One might argue that the "postmodern condition" demands a new vocabulary, but distinguishing new eras and inventing new jargons is not very significant outside of academia. The language of virtuality, far from or providing truly original insights into the creation and recycling of cultural motifs, merely updates and re-jargons ideological issues treated with clarity and force by Hobsbawm and Ranger in *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), and much earlier by Marx in the opening passages of *The 18th Brumaire.* In contrast to discourses of virtuality and nomadology, the virtue of MacCannell's "modernist" definitions of constructed and reconstructed ethnicity, like Ahmad's distinction between expatriation (through choice and opportunity) and exile (through coercion) (Ahmad 1994), is that they highlight *politics* and differences in *power.*

The significant concerns for an engaged anthropology are not so much with virtuality or authenticity, but with alienation, with exploitation and self-determination at sites of both production and holiday frolics. It is increasingly difficult, at any rate, to decide just what is "our" culture and "theirs." Tibetans or Sherpas or Mayans, like North Americans or Europeans, are part of a transnational system both constructed from below and determined from above. Madonna T-shirts are really not much more mine than theirs, except so far as I am relatively privileged by the economic and political structures that allow Madonna and the media conglomerates to profit from us all. We must be careful not to prematurely celebrate the possibilities of resistance in grassroots appropriations of commodities and commoditized identities, since control over globalized production is, as Marx predicted, ever more concentrated. Time-Warner and other publishers of innumerable coffee table books on Tibet, the Hilton chain, and Disney have truly become world powers. The terminology of virtuality too easily elides political-economic asymmetries, lending instead to descriptions of the ironies of cultural hybridization, the postmodern mirror image of static authenticity (minus the politics).

Don't Ask for the Meaning (or its Deconstruction) Ask for the Use

Richard Rorty writes in *Deconstruction and Pragmatism* (1996) that philosophy outruns politics rather quickly, and starts playing with itself. I suspect that in the anthropology of tourism, deconstruction has outrun ethnography and started playing with itself. I concur with Rorty (and Marx) that it makes no sense to claim that any text is "inadequately theorized" outside of theory's use as a tool to grapple with particular problems—outside of *practice.* We must consider what poststructuralist approaches are best suited for, which problems they highlight, and what additional tools might help interrogate the arenas of which discursive analysis is sometimes silent.

We must recognize the diversity of both Marxisms and poststructuralisms, and acknowledge the rich cross-fertilizations they have provided (particularly in feminist literature). Hennessy, borrowing from Teresa Hebert, distinguishes between "ludic postmodernism," which "signals an emphasis on the mechanics of signification, with language as a system of differences," and "resistance postmodernism," which is "concerned with the politics of the production and maintenance of subjectivities, that is, with language as a social practice (1993: 3). "Emphasis on the slippage of signifiers in many postmodern theories of subjectivity," she continues, often merely celebrates a fragmented, dispersed and textualized subject" (ibid: 5). "Resistance postmodernism," on the other hand, "insists that social totalities like patriarchy and racism *do* continue to structure our lives" (ibid: 3). In my analysis of Tibetan exile cultural production I must also attend to "totalities" of class and productive relations.

At a general level, poststructuralist interventions in our discipline are a vital part of a (relatively) newfound anthropological reflexivity; we certainly can never go

back to a stance of scientific objectivity, never again consider any concept the master key to unlocking "the truth" about a social formation. Yet, even should we recognize the limitations and internal contradictions of all narration, an engaged anthropology must continue to narrate. "If we could do away with all grand narratives," asks Kaplan, "...what kind of micro-isolation of infinite particularity might we find ourselves in? We will always need theories and accounts of social relationships" (Kaplan 1996: 19).

Ludic poststructuralism is very good for highlighting the ironies everywhere in tourism, in describing the mirroring of desire between hosts and guests. We have become very adept at deconstructing the Orientalism of scholars, colonial elites, travel literature and advertising, but still have far to go in generating empirical accounts of the everyday Orientalism of tourists and its impacts on material production and class relations, a far more significant problem than academic discourse for peoples subjected to the tourist gaze. By "treating all tourist sites with an ironic, playful, deconstructive attitude, postmodernism is unable to generate the necessary moral distinctions between tourist cultures" (Rojek 2000: 60). Deconstruction is necessary, but never sufficient. If we examine current corporate discourse and practice, particularly in the tourism industry, we might find that theorists who "advocate a politics of difference, fluidity, and hybridity in order to challenge the binaries and essentialism of modern sovereignty have been outflanked by the strategies of power. Power has evacuated the bastion they are attacking and circled around to their rear to join them in the assault in the name of difference. These theorists thus find themselves pushing against an open door" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 138).

Because the fantasies of consumers have direct impacts on the lives of producers, because producers shape the goods and services demanded by consumers, and because tourist goods and experiences are negotiated both through the exchange of desiring gazes and cold hard cash, the anthropology of tourism must grapple simultaneously with production and consumption, with both symbolic and economic exchanges. If we follow Adams's lead and analyze capitalism largely as a cultural construction—Production as Seduction—we may end up with a virtual politics that minimizes the empirical realities of extra-discursive exploitation. Tourism is surely shot through with seduction, but "if these sign worlds also entertain and give pleasure, that is simply Late Capitalism's way of making money" (Gottdiener 2000: 29). The surfaces valorized by Baudrillard are ultimately somebody's productions, and under the regime of capitalism, its economic benefits are inequitably distributed. The virtue of "the class perspective" is that it "highlights the role of inequality and exploitation in tourist experience and tourist cultures" (Rojek 2000: 57). Research relevant for public policy may not really need to *do theory* after all (e.g., Polly Pattullo's *Last Resorts: The Cost of Tourism in the Caribbean*, 1996).

If we are to acknowledge the hybridities, instabilities, and ironies of tourism and globalization, but highlight the stubborn economic asymmetries that continue, we can largely abandon the somewhat metaphysical discourses of authenticity and virtuality, and revive the politicized language of *alienation.* We might follow Daniel Miller's reconstruction of Hegelian and Marxist conceptions of culture as *objectification,* and pragmatically determine the political and economic conditions that empower individuals and communities to autonomously construct their worlds (Miller 1987; Tomlinson 1991).

In contrast to virtuality or authenticity, alienation refers to political and economic processes as clearly as cultural and psychological ones. Its various connotations are superbly suited to the study of tourism and ethnic identity, signifying estrangement, belonging to another place, feelings of powerlessness and meaninglessness, as well as the transference of political and economic control. It is a rather uninteresting question at this point whether Tibetan exile crafts are authentic, and asserting they represent some "virtual" culture does not help much. Instead, an engaged anthropology can focus on how artisans are at once alienated from material *and* cultural capital, and how they might gain control over both. We need to recognize that "certain groups retain control over the very means of objectification, while others are forced to attempt to objectify themselves through forms which are produced in the image of other people's interests" (Miller 1987: 45). The task is to discover how tourism under the regime of global capitalism stratifies these possibilities. We must be careful not to exaggerate the power of the "purchasing observer" such that "they" are considered an effect of "us." Both "hosts" and "guests" are entangled in global political and economic processes beyond their control. As Bruner writes, the "practices and behavior of the tourist and the native are defined for them by the dominant story" (1991: 240).

An engaged anthropology, fully leavened with the contributions of poststructuralism, must generate "fine-grained descriptions of historical rupture...actual expressions of the 'valorization of surfaces,' and concrete examples of the 'simulacrum'" (MacCannell1992: 289). We must add to such ethnographies comprehensive and comprehensible linkages to global economic analysis. It is not quite sufficient to assert with Errington and Gewertz

that the anthropology of tourism "needs not a heightened sense of the ludic [playful] but of the political" (1989: 39). What is needed is a clearer description of how the ludic *is* political.

Eric McGuckin, Director, Hutchins School of Liberal Studies, Sonoma State University, 1801 East Cotati Avenue, Rohnert Park, CA 94928-3609, E-mail: mcguckin@sonoma.edu

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Citizenship and the Social Geography of Deep Neo-liberalization

John Gledhill *University of Manchester*

Abstract: From the vantage point of the bleak social landscapes of the "divided cities" of Latin America, the meaningfulness of the focus on deepening the rights of citizenship that accompanied the shift to more democratic political regimes is far from obvious, despite some apparently positive developments accompanying the transition to neo-liberalism. This paper examines the reasons for the resilience of neo-liberalism despite the popular protests that neo-liberal economic policies have provoked in many countries, arguing that the logic of neo-liberal rule systems has now permeated even the most "socially progressive" political parties and feeds off the diffuse effects of social transformation.

Keywords: neo-liberalism, citizenship, diffused power, urban space, politics, poverty

Résumé : Du point de vue des sombres réalités sociales qui caractérisent les «villes divisées» d'Amérique latine, l'accent porté sur le renforcement des droits de la citoyenneté qui a accompagné la transition vers des régimes politiques plus démocratiques revêt une signification qui est loin d'être évidente, et ce, malgré certains développements en apparence positifs qui ont accompagné le passage au néo-libéralisme. Cet article examine les causes de la résilience du néo-libéralisme en dépit des protestions populaires que les politiques économiques néo-libérales ont suscitées dans de nombreux pays, et soutient que la logique des systèmes de domination néo-libérale a pénétré jusqu'aux partis politiques les plus «socialement progressistes» et se nourrit des effets diffus de la transformation sociale.

Mots-clés : néolibéralisme, citoyenneté, pouvoir diffus, espace urbain, politique, pauvreté

Introduction: Neo-liberalism and Its Counter-movements

Surveying ways in which social science perspectives on urban Latin America have changed since the 1970s, Bryan Roberts notes that citizenship "has largely replaced class as a means of analyzing the political struggles of the poor" (Roberts 2004: 195). The change clearly relates to the transition from developmentalist to neo-liberal states. Traditional class-based politics depended on the labour force of organized workers with stable jobs. In practice only a minority of Latin American workers ever enjoyed such jobs and received benefits from the state. Nevertheless, even if they were first offered by authoritarian populist regimes to preemptively demobilize challenges from below, workers' rights tended to expand through further political negotiation. Since the 1980s, neo-liberal economic "reforms" have eroded these gains, making it difficult to contest the overall assessment of Petras and Veltmeyer (2002) that the new regime has proved "a catalyst for social regression," even if there are longer-term differences between countries in terms of poverty alleviation that should not be ignored, since they suggest that redistributive policies remain feasible as well as desirable.[1]

During the 1980s and 1990s downward mobility not only of skilled workers but of people who had come to see themselves as at least lower-middle class created a situation in which, as Mexican researchers Boltvinik and Hernández (2000: 14) argue, an increasing mass of "socially anonymous" urban poor did not figure as "subjects of rights" but as receivers of politicized discretionary income supplements, with the implication that: "where citizenship ends, charity and manipulation for electoral purposes begins." Yet electoral manipulation is not the whole story. As Roberts points out, while the social services that neo-liberal governments provide to the poor have been downsized, poor people are now subject to more rather than less intervention, not simply on the part of NGOs but also by local instances of government to which

central state functions and budgets have been delegated in accordance with World Bank and IMF prescriptions (Roberts 2004: 197). All this is done in the name of fostering "the rights and the responsibilities associated with citizenship and participation." For Roberts, far from diminishing with the slimming-down of the state, "governance" has deepened by becoming more efficient and "managerial." The question he poses is whether these interventions can actually "create new spaces of participation and a stronger and more diverse sense of rights among urban populations," or simply lead to "greater control from above and to the fragmentation of collective action below" (ibid.).

This paper seeks to address that question. "Greater control from above" might, however, suggest the kind of "state-centred" account that governmentality theorists such as Nikolas Rose argue is an obsolescent way of analyzing politics and power in the 21st century. Rose (1999: 5) does not argue that the state has become unimportant, but that it needs "relocating" as simply one element "in multiple circuits of power, connecting a diversity of authorities and forces, within a whole variety of complex assemblages." My interest in what Rose terms realist "sociologies of governance" is stronger than my interest in an "analytics of governmentality," which is "empirical" in a different sense to my discussion of urban social geographies in the second half of this paper. Anthropologists can bring to a focus on capillary processes of power and the creation of "regimes of truth" an understanding of how the socially situated reactions of "ordinary" people unintentionally contribute to the conditions that are sustaining neo-liberalism. Yet ethnography also shows that the limits of neo-liberal governmentality lie in the resistance of popular cultures to total colonization by power and continuing organization on the part of such "ordinary people" to effect change in their lives. I do, however, accept the value of the "space for critical thought" that an analytics of governmentality opens up (ibid.: 19). The core argument of this paper is that realistic assessment of the possibilities of "progressive" politics today requires us to abandon all illusions about the depth of the transformation of the political field produced by neo-liberal systems of rule.

Although I will return to Rose's analysis frequently, my starting point is the less Eurocentric framework of Peck and Tickell (2002), who make a distinction between the "roll-back" neo-liberalism of the Reagan-Thatcher-Pinochet eras and a subsequent "roll-out" phase that also accommodates shifts in World Bank discourse such as its invocation of "strengthening civil society" to forge a new partnership between states and NGOs (World Bank 1997). Defining neo-liberalism as a political and cultural rather than simply economic project, Peck and Tickell (2002: 383) emphasize that like globalization, it "should be understood as a process, not an end-state."

The neo-liberalization process is contradictory. It produces counter-tendencies and exists in "historically and geographically contingent forms" (ibid.). Local histories influence paths of neo-liberal transformation. Differences between, say, Blair's Britain and Mexico under Vicente Fox, who in 2004 publicly affirmed his conviction that neo-liberalism represented the only possible route to a more prosperous national future, are neither theoretically nor politically trivial (Gledhill 2001). Nevertheless, Peck and Tickell argue that the diverse forms of neo-liberalization share common underlying logics. The "roll-back" phase involved "the active destruction of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions" but remained "shallow" (ibid.: 384). The "roll-out" phase is "deeper" in multiple senses because it is *constructive* in Foucault's sense.

Like many anthropologists who conducted fieldwork through the years of neo-liberal transition in the 1980s and early 1990s, I initially found it difficult to imagine that the massive social dislocations the new economic model produced could be contained politically. As I show below, there are clear senses in which they are not being contained, but explaining the resilience of neo-liberalism has now become an unavoidable issue. In seeking to address it, Peck and Tickell argue that the "roll-out" phase has created "a more formidable and robust pattern of proactive statecraft and pervasive metaregulation," even if the current "diffuse, dispersed, technocratic institutionalized form of neo-liberalism" has "spawned a free market in social regression" (ibid.: 384-385). What they point to here is that neo-liberalization has created a pervasive system of "diffused power" in the sense of Hardt and Negri (2000) that makes it "qualitatively different from 'competing' regulatory projects":

> It shapes the environments, contexts and frameworks within which political-economic and socio- institutional restructuring takes place. Thus neoliberal rule systems are perplexingly elusive: they operate between as well as within specific sites of incorporation and reproduction, such as national and local states. Consequently they have the capacity to constrain, condition and constitute political change and institutional reform in far-reaching and multi-faceted ways. Even if it may be wrong-headed to characterize neoliberalization as some actor-less force-field of extra-local pressures and disciplines—given what we know about the decisive purposive interventions of think-tanks, policy elites and experts, not to mention the fundamental role of state

> power itself in the (re)production of neoliberalism—as *an ongoing ideological project*, neoliberalism is clearly more than the sum of its (local institutional) parts. (ibid.: 400-401, emphasis in the original)

For Peck and Tickell, the problem posed by neo-liberalism as a system of diffused power is thus that "contemporary politics revolve around axes the very essence of which have been neoliberalized" (ibid.: 400).

In what follows, I explore how and why this system of diffused power seems to have rooted itself so deeply in Latin America, with particular attention to Brazil. Nevertheless, some readers may remain scandalized by the suggestion that neo-liberalism is proving "successful" politically, although I am not alone in asserting this. As Charles Hale has remarked:

> Key premises of the neoliberal doctrine now form part of the common sense of virtually every political party seriously in contention for state power in Latin America, and underlie all but the most peripheral of economic activities in the region. Debates over the consequences of neoliberal policies have been intense, and organized resistance to their consequences may well be on the rise, but these serve only to underline the general ascendancy of the doctrine. (Hale 2002: 487)

Political parties are not, however, the only players in the contemporary political field, and Latin America continues to produce social movements that manifest strong popular opposition to neo-liberalism. In the case of Mexico, they have covered a wide range of social sectors, including middle-class anti-debt movements as well as a variety of lower class urban popular movements and the Zapatista indigenous movement in Chiapas, which triggered a wave of militancy in other areas (Gledhill 2002). Yet the inability of these disparate social forces to coalesce in a coherent movement for change seems symptomatic of wider problems of fragmentation found in many other countries, and as fewer and fewer Mexicans feel it worthwhile to cast their ballots in elections, more and more have decided to vote with their feet by emigrating from Mexico to the United States.[2] Nevertheless, in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, popular mobilizations calling for an alternative to neo-liberalism have actually forced changes of government. This is, however, precisely why I think it essential to explore neo-liberalization as a deeper and more diffuse kind of process. To date, these militant challenges to neo-liberalism have failed to produce the changes that the movements sought, and seem consistent with Peck and Tickell's claim that neo-liberalization can endure despite provoking counter-movements.

In Ecuador, the activism of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) over the 1990s represented a real challenge to the existing political class and its institutions, culminating in two mass uprisings in 1999. Yet the six months during which the indigenous movement actually participated in the administration that its militancy finally brought to power, headed by Lucio Gutiérrez (a military officer who supported the protestors in the short-lived coup that overthrew President Mahuad in 2000), proved sharply divisive as the grassroots logic of the movement, based on indigenous communal institutions, conflicted with the logic of Gutiérrez's embrace of neo-liberalism. Withdrawal from government reduced CONAIE's official political influence, but proved the only way of avoiding its decomposition (Zibechi 2004: 3). In the case of Argentina, President Kirchner's "unorthodox" policy of focusing on boosting internal demand and employment while telling the nation's creditors, including the IMF, to wait until the country is able to pay has produced some economic recovery and reduced the proportion of Argentine citizens living below the poverty line from over 50% to 44% in two years (Rohter 2004). Yet Kirchner and his wife, Senator Cristina Fernández, built their power base in the tiny but oil rich state of Santa Cruz by running an efficient patronage machine based on the translation of oil revenues into public employment. His application of the same skills to national job creation programs has entangled many segments of the Movement of the Unemployed (the *piqueteros*) in relationships with the state, as administrators of funds and distributors of work, that have again had divisive consequences (Zibechi ibid.: 4). Although Kirchner talks the language of the anti-globalization movement, his economic "unorthodoxy" has little to do with alternatives to capitalism (though it has quite a lot to do with lack of immediate need for foreign investment) or with forms of statecraft antagonistic to those employed by self-avowedly neo-liberal regimes.

It is interesting to compare Argentina with Venezuela, arguably the most radical threat to the status quo in the region. Hugo Chávez's democratically elected government has fought off a series of challenges in which multiple forms of covert U.S. intervention have been implicated, along with personal connections between the Bush family and the Venezuelan transnational capitalists who financed the 2002 coup attempt (Aharonian 2002; Talbot 2002). Chávez's "Bolivarian Revolution," again born of the popular effervescence of the 1989 *Caracazo*, has revealed the potential of an anti-oligarchic movement that exploits the racial fractures of a country in which part of the military apparatus is willing to defend the consti-

tution and support alternative social projects. The overwhelming endorsement that Chávez secured in the 2004 recall referendum reflected the conjunctural benefits of rising world oil prices, since he could use revenues from the state oil company PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.) to fund social development projects. Yet the fact that the old PDVSA management had joined forces with the corrupt and despotic trade union leaderships nurtured by previous regimes to support his political opponents made it easier for Chávez to bring about shifts in power relations that are materially and symbolically significant for poorer Venezuelans. The redirection of PDVSA's revenues to improve their lives—rather than to subsidize other branches of Venezuelan capitalism or provide rents for a political class and union bosses—is another example of what can still be done through the national state in the era of globalization. With land reform also underway, only time will tell whether Venezuela can continue to advance on a distinct course, but *how* distinct that course will be remains an open question.

Since the Venezuelan economy is critically dependent on oil exports, the country has suffered from the multiple contradictions endemic to "petro-states," which have poor track records on mass impoverishment (Karl 1997). The capacity of a hostile United States to do harm remains a major preoccupation, not least because of its influence in neighbouring Colombia. Chávez has sought to reassure foreign investors and thus has limited scope for pushing confrontation with the national economic elite beyond the level that can be justified by their anti-democratic activities. PDVSA is run on commercial lines, and Chávez's anti-imperialist rhetoric disguises a willingness to leave the articulation of the economy, including "alternative enterprises," to market relations. The extent to which developments in Venezuela represent a decisive break with neoliberalism should not, therefore, be exaggerated. They reflect another attempt to use the residual room for manoeuvre of the national state to make market economies less socially destructive, bolstered by the dream (also being promoted in Brazil) of forging regional ties that would offer a counterweight to U.S. hegemony.

Bolivia also saw "regime change" via popular insurrection in October 2003, when Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who had been returned to power in the previous year despite the unpopularity of the "structural reforms" forced through by the government he headed from 1993 to 1997, was forced into exile. As vividly charted in the multi-sited ethnography of Lesley Gill (2000), the consequences of neo-liberalism for the social fabric of Bolivia have been profound, producing a myriad of dislocations, even within families. Yet there have been regular confrontations between the state and popular coalitions that have crossed class and ethnic boundaries to challenge major neo-liberal economic projects, notably the attempt to privatize the water system of the Cochabamba region and place it in the hands of the Bechtel Corporation. The problem is once again that of holding coalitions together. The new government of Carlos Mesa has continued the plan to export gas that triggered the latest uprising by exploiting divisions between the coca growers' movement led by Evo Morales, the Bolivian Workers' Central, the landless movement and the neighbourhood assemblies of the El Alto "peripheral city."

While Morales has adopted an institutional strategy focused on his personal presidential ambitions, the Aymara organizations led by Felipe Quispe are now pursuing an increasingly separatist path, abandoning the idea of further participation in the state and aiming to build a new Bolivia from the bottom up, composed of self-governing communities substituting communal for capitalist economic principles (Zibechi 2004: 4). This project may have further radical (if risky) consequences, but it is important to note that it is still competing with others. As Sian Lazar has shown, the people of El Alto are subject to intense campaigns on the part of NGOs and donor agencies to implant a neo-liberal governmentality project based on the creation of "active" citizens (Rose 1999: 164-165) "who will take responsibility for their own and their families' welfare, and who are prepared for the market rather than the state to provide for them" (Lazar 2004: 302).

The women who participate in micro-credit schemes in El Alto behave in a manner that reflects embedded economic rationalities that differ radically from those envisaged by the planners of these schemes, with ironic results, such as the dependence of loan repayments on kinship relations and the (highly stressful) collective group sanctions that operated within older (high-interest) local lending arrangements (ibid.: 308). Many women fail to use the loans for their intended purpose or to internalize the messages that the capacity-building sessions organized by NGO facilitators seek to inculcate (ibid.: 315). Nevertheless, as Lazar notes, the point here is not simply that neo-liberal governmentality projects are failing to operate in the manner envisaged by their architects, which is a relatively common occurrence, but that they are displaying the adaptability typical of the roll-out phase of neoliberalism. As the focus shifts from "the individual" to collective "social capital" and "community," intervention continues to extend into the intimate spaces of social life and is being modified in ways that threaten to draw upon "deeply rooted collective traditions of organization, com-

munity and kinship" to strengthen a process of "privatization of citizenship" (ibid.: 316).

This brings us back, then, to the way in which citizenship lies at the heart of neo-liberal governmentality projects. In the next two sections I review how the neo-liberal concept of citizenship differs from older, classically liberal and social democratic models, as a prelude to considering the limits of the "participation" and "empowerment" that are possible under conditions of deep neo-liberalization.

A Brief History of Citizenship, North and South

Citizenship has a special significance for the British, still "subjects" of a monarch languishing without a written constitution or citizens' bill of rights despite our precocious struggles against the "Old Corruption" of the Absolutist State. There are people in my country who continue to fret about that situation. They are, however, probably less numerous than those for whom the question of citizenship is principally a matter of excluding unwelcome "others" from the benefits of life in a former imperial metropolis much given to xenophobic and racist post-imperial nostalgia.

There we have the paradox of the form of citizenship that people fought and died for in early modern Europe. The politics of citizenship was about rights in the positive sense that people struggled to have more and new rights in ways that extended and deepened a basic "right to have rights" (even amongst subjects). Yet the construction of European citizens was also part of the process of construction of nation-states and state-nations of a historically novel kind. One aspect of this novelty lay in the way that the task of governing became tied to a conception of particular territorial space, the "national economy" and a population whose unity was defined in terms of shared language and culture, giving rise, from the 18th century onwards, to the "modern" conception of the government of "conduct" that inspired Foucault's original notion of "governmentality" (Rose 1999: 8-9). Yet these were also imperial nations, and as Stoler (1995) suggests in seeking to rectify Foucault's Eurocentrism, the capitalist disciplining of the Western European masses on the basis of the construction of racialized class differences had much in common with systems developed in the older colonial world of the 16th to 18th centuries. The same logic was then deployed to exclude colonials from the new citizenship rights being extended in Europe, so that the mirror of liberal society based on "free and equal" citizens was constant recourse to naturalized notions of "difference" to qualify capacities to enjoy rights, in what was an interdependent history of transformations in North and South.

Political democracy was not part of the original 17th-century package that enunciated the virtues of a liberal market society based on possessive individualism. Even a 19th-century "progressive" such as John Stuart Mill not only regarded "barbarous" segments of humanity as unworthy subjects of liberal freedoms, given the underdevelopment of their capacities to enjoy them, but continued to regard illiteracy and dependence on parish relief as valid reasons for excluding some members of the "labouring classes" from the right to vote (Gledhill 1997: 83-84). The achievement of a more extensive political citizenship was therefore the product of intense struggles punctuated by defeats by populist, authoritarian, fascist and totalitarian alternatives in some countries. Even after the class basis of the electoral franchise was widened, further battles remained to be fought over exclusions related to gender and race (which remain all too salient for "immigrants" today).

Nor should we lose sight of the history of internal colonialism that accompanied the formation of an imperial entity such as the "United Kingdom." In both Ireland and Scotland, an enormous wave of violence was unleashed against a rural population considered by English elites to be an "impediment to progress," forcing millions to emigrate to the Americas, though not without a considerable amount of resistance to dispossession in the name of "traditional rights" and just treatment (Logue 1979), a reminder that the history of rights-based politics in Europe is not coterminous with the development of liberalism.

Modern liberal doctrines themselves have reflected a variety of positions, ranging from the extreme represented by "libertarians" such as Hayek, who became an obligatory points of reference for "roll back" neo-liberals thanks to his insistence that any redistributive principle of justice is incompatible with liberty (Lukes 1991: 53), to strong advocates of redistributive policies such as John Rawls, for whom the ability of citizens to "fruitfully exercise" their rights and liberties depends on their "basic needs" being met (Rawls 1993: 6-7). At the heart of debates within liberalism lies the problem of balancing individual autonomy and freedoms with substantive equality of rights for all. In the now classic formulation of T.H. Marshall (1950), citizenship was defined in terms of political, civil and social rights. Political and civil rights constitute defences against the abuse of power by the state, whereas social rights are those that require the active intervention of the state to equalize citizens' opportunities to enjoy the political and civil rights to which all are equally entitled. Civil rights include rights to freedom of expression and religious creed alongside the rights to

peaceful enjoyment of property and legal guarantees for contracts seen as essential to the functioning of a market economy. They remained in potential tension with social rights in Marshall's formulation, opening the door to the neo-liberal counter-offensive centered on the disadvantages of state intervention for the formation of properly "autonomous" and "capable" citizens, including the alleged undermining of a sense of personal responsibility provoked by the Welfare State.

Classical Euroamerican liberal notions of citizenship privilege a narrative of modernity focused on the relationship between "the State" and "Civil Society." The archetype of the state is the Absolutist Monarchy, whose arbitrary power cannot be tamed by the individual alone, but requires individuals to form the (free) associations that constitute "civil society" as an intermediate level of organization between state and individual in order to advance their freedoms. This model (hardly appropriate for understanding the development of "modern" government in a country such as Germany) places the "rising bourgeoisie" in the role of hero, leading "society's" conquest of the state and the separation of "public and private" on which individual rights and freedoms depend. It is reworked today under the rubric of "strengthening civil society" so as to invoke a wider range of collective actors as participants in the construction of less arbitrary and corrupt state orders. Yet the notion that "civil society" is of necessity opposed to the state is a problematic extension of the term from its original historical context, and we should also remember that movements that are "emancipatory" at one historical moment may cease to be so once structures of social power have been transformed (Brown 1995: 98).

Criticizing the way civil society is opposed to the state in debate about achieving "good governance" in Africa, Chabal and Daloz (1999: 19) note that it can be defined as "the creation of social networks distinct from the state and capable of transcending primordial family, kin or even communal ties." This definition might, however, also embrace mafias, and if we included only "recognized bodies," such as trade unions and professional or business associations, we would have to include some that had especially privileged access to and influence upon the state (ibid.: 20). Chabal and Daloz argue that African countries are likely to continue to pursue a distinct course, based, for the moment at least, on the political "instrumentalization" of apparent "disorder," but they also invite us to question whether deviation from Western paths of modernization is always catastrophic.

Making similar points about the problems of all-inclusive definitions of civil society, while striving to avoid the "Afro-pessimism" that ignores cases such as Botswana (Werbner 2004), Monga (1996: 4) argues for a more restrictive definition that includes "only those groups, organizations, and personalities that pursue freedom, justice and the rights of citizenship against authoritarian states." His "civil society" constitutes "new spaces for communication and discussion over which the state has no control." Yet although Monga offers fascinating insights into how an alternative kind of "civic culture" can propagate through informal rural-urban networks beyond the gaze of the state, in addition to being forged by dissident artists and intellectuals, the fact that he also reveals how dissidence is so frequently co-opted by the holders of state power makes the notion of a completely uncontaminated civil sphere beyond the reach of the state problematic. Furthermore, much of what "civil society" is called upon to do in pressing for substantiation of citizenship rights entails engagement with the state: in the case of demands for indigenous rights, for example, absolute refusal of relations (of the kind now practiced by the Zapatistas in Chiapas) remains the exception rather than the rule since the goal is generally legislative change that must still be enacted through whatever kind of regime enjoys national power.

Yet even if we conclude that "civil society" is more an ideological construct than a coherent analytical concept, the progressive story embedded in the foundation myth of liberal citizenship as birth of "civil society" seemed to offer the currently excluded—whether colonials or lower class Europeans—the hope of future inclusion through education in the civic virtues assumed alien to their original dispositions. The coupling of political citizenship to the nation complicates the issue, depending on whether ties of blood are deemed constitutive of national belonging, or the nation is built in politico-territorial terms that base membership on commitment from people of diverse origins. Yet an obvious anomaly is that the United States as a paradigmatic "nation of immigrants" has reproduced inequalities based on notions of "fitness" and "model minority" models that racialize cultural distinctions (di Leonardo 1998: 126). The way in which such qualifications affected formally liberal notions of citizenship is equally apparent in the case of "Latin" America.

Jorge Klor de Alva (1995) may be technically correct to argue that only the region's pre-Columbian aboriginal inhabitants were and remain a truly "colonized" population, given that *criollos* and *mestizos* became "natives" of nations in formation. Nevertheless, the post-imperial history of Spanish and Portuguese America was marked not only by a redefinition of "the Indian problem" that owed much to the importation of 19th-century European ideas

about race, state- and nation-building (Larson 1999), but also by spectacular episodes of violence on the part of the "civilizing" forces of the nation-state against dissident regional movements of ethnically mixed people which seemed to reflect the threat posed by "fanaticism" and rejection of "civilized virtues" to modernist state projects, a particularly chilling example of which was the Canudos massacre in the Bahian backlands of Brazil in 1897, immortalized by Euclides da Cunha's book *Os Sertões*. A renaissance humanist such as Mexico's Bishop Vasco de Quiroga saw Indians as "pliable clay" fit to be moulded into practitioners of the civic virtues of the European polis through the benign imposition of the utopian community of Thomas More (Verástique 2000: 121). Yet by the 19th century a strong body of elite opinion argued that worthy modern citizens could only be created by either "whitening out" the indigenous population through miscegenation or its displacement by European immigrants.

The adoption of liberal constitutions by newly independent Latin American nations brought in its wake a series of efforts to achieve "modernity" by measures of social engineering such as hygiene campaigns, the privatization of corporate landholdings, and, eventually, the extension of public education, but the anomalies continued. While the law served mainly as a weapon of privilege, everyday structural inequalities were rationalized in terms of the innate differences of a spiritual or racial kind between subalterns and elites, and men and women (DaMatta 1991).

Yet Latin American history abounds with struggles to make constitutional promises of fuller rights of "citizenship" real, even by what seemed the "weakest" elements of what is often dubbed a weak "civil society" on the grounds that a "progressive" capitalist bourgeoisie did not take the leading role (Díaz Polanco 1996: 25). To take simply one example, Sieder (2000) has shown how, under the patriarchal rule of the dictator Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, men and women living on the plantations of Alta Verapaz sought to exploit the cleavage between the local exploiting class and judges representing a state with centralizing pretensions. Men demanded payment of the wages specified by the law, while women demanded the right to leave husbands who abused them and compensation for violence. The fact that the supplicant was an Indian meant that the administration of justice continued to be affected by class and racial bias, a situation that continues to be salient today. Yet the fact that subalterns are active agents exploring concrete options for improving their situations made an unlikely "articulation of discourses" possible.

This kind of struggle did not, however, necessarily entail the embrace of a "modern" concept of citizenship based on the autonomy of the individual (Harvey 1998: 24). While the "rights" enshrined in classical liberal doctrines are rights assigned to, and constitutive of, individuals, as are those of modern international human rights law (Overmyer Velázquez 2003), contemporary indigenous rights politics orientated around mutual respect for "difference" within a multicultural nation threaten to reassert the collective rights and legal personalities expunged by liberal "reformers" in the 19th century. That such demands are more feasible today is related to the differences between classical liberal and neo-liberal rule systems, as I show in the next section. Change is equally manifest in the way that the once irredeemably "fanatic" culture of the Bahian backlands is now seen as a rich "folkloric" patrimony worthy of state promotion for religious tourists (Pessar 2004). Nevertheless, today as in the past, the more certain means of getting one's rights as a citizen attended to in Latin America is to resort to the levers of personal patronage or negotiation of bureaucratic favours, a framework from which deeply sedimented practices of discrimination are not easily erased.

Classical liberalism's claims to universalism, based on the creation of a society of citizens "free and equal under the law," were therefore frequently subverted, in the North as much as the South, while Marshall's model of social citizenship now seems like a half-forgotten dream in a North Atlantic world in which welfare has given way to workfare. There are, however, significant variations in terms of global paths to "modernity" that I have not touched upon so far.

In East Asia we have examples of politically "illiberal" states such as Singapore that built legitimacy and tranquilized social and ethnic tensions on the basis of generous attention to social rights (Castells 2000: 261). Public housing provision was central to the social engineering projects of both Singapore and Hong Kong, in the latter case offering de facto citizenship even to immigrant workers. Starting their economic development processes from the basis of a radical dominance of the state over "civil society" that in South Korea and Taiwan led to the elimination of the existing landowning oligarchies, the larger "Asian Tiger" states practiced redistributive policies that had impressive effects in terms of the reduction of social inequalities between nationals and produced affluent middle classes. These social changes eventually brought more middle-class engagement with liberal politics, along with social movements that became more questioning on issues such as gender and the environment. If, as Castells (ibid.: 377) argues, fundamental structural changes in the global economy are producing "a crisis of the nation-state as a sovereign entity, and related crisis of political democ-

racy," these tendencies are becoming equally relevant to the new "active citizens" of East Asia.

Liberal versus Neo-liberal Citizenship

If, following Roberts, we place citizenship at the centre of analysis of the political struggles of the poor, neo-liberalism has displayed the paradoxical quality of both expanding the ways in which citizenship can be defined and "hollowing out" its substance. At first sight, "hollowing out" is the result of the socially polarizing effects of changes within global capitalism, even if measures of social and personal welfare based simply on cash incomes fail to tell the whole story.[3] As Kruijt, Sojo and Grynspan (2002) document for Latin America, the symptoms of regression include growth of economic "informalization" and increases in violence, both organized (on the part of paramilitary and private security units as well as official security forces and organized crime) and everyday (robbery, assault and domestic violence). This leads them to describe the urban poor as enjoying a second-class, "informal" kind of citizenship, despite the enhancement of political rights produced by transitions from military rule to democracy. Yet as Sassen (1998: 154) has shown, the growth of economic "informalization" in New York City cannot be seen as a result of "Third World" immigration but is integral to the logic of U.S. "advanced capitalism," underscoring the need to avoid seeing changes in the South in isolation. Neo-liberalism has increased insecurity for citizens even further up the social scale, and again not simply in the countries of the South (Gledhill 2001: 135-138).

Nevertheless, the transition from what Hardt and Negri (2000: 70) define as a Eurocentric "modern sovereignty" to neo-liberal rule systems also appears to have extended rights through an apparent revaluation of "difference." We now have "ethnic" citizenship. In the case of Latin America, assimilationist projects have given way to programs that offer material support for the reproduction of distinct cultural identities: both indigenous and Black groups have become beneficiaries of schemes to reconstitute communal landholdings and administratively autonomous territories, even in war-torn countries such as Colombia.[4] Such concessions now enjoy the active support of the World Bank, which is increasingly insistent that recalcitrant states accept the need for them as NGOs and advocacy groups fortified by the catastrophic results of earlier Bank-sponsored mega-projects have made headway in forcing change by finding allies within the institution, in what Fox and Brown (1998: 489) describe as a mutually reinforcing process of external pressure and internal division.

It is easy, and perhaps necessary, to be cynical about these developments. There is frequently a vast gap between the rights recognized by revised constitutions and the lived daily realities of the mass of these new "subjects of rights." Where rights to control real resources are handed over, they tend not to be strategic from the point of view of contemporary capitalism, which often takes particularly predatory forms in the tropical regions in which many indigenous people live—one of the factors, along with more positive changes in the political climate produced by democratization, that has fostered increasing indigenous activism. While NGOs and transnational advocacy groups may have had tangible impacts on World Bank policies, their practical results are limited by procedural and bureaucratic strategies that limit the substance of changes (Fox and Brown 1998: 531). Where powerful private interests operate in close alliance with local states with the backing of a military superpower, prospects for mounting a successful defence remain limited.

Even where such interests are not central, grants of land to indigenous people still provoke conflict when poor people who cannot successfully play the "identity card" feel themselves unfairly discriminated against (Gledhill 1997: 95-96), and stir up backlashes from more privileged groups such as the middle-class *ladinos* that Hale (2002) discusses in the case of Guatemala. Ethnic categories are not transparent but are rather the historical legacy of processes of nation-building and elite projects of socio-economic transformation, made yet more problematic by "neoliberal multiculturalism's investment in neatly bounded categories of cultural difference" (Hale 2002: 324). Hale suggests the need for a new kind of politics to deconstruct such difference-making. Yet as the Zapatistas' efforts to foster a reworking of mestizo identities from below in Mexico demonstrate, advancing this counter-hegemonic form of cultural politics remains difficult in practice (Gledhill 2002: 246-247).

From the perspective of indigenous people themselves, even if they are appreciated in their own terms, "cultural rights" alone may not have a substantial impact on everyday problems of economic survival. The principal beneficiaries of such concessions may be community leaders, spokespersons or intermediaries who become increasingly socially distanced from those that they represent as they move into the urban worlds of NGO funding and government and multilateral agencies (Gledhill 2004: 338-339). Yet the irony here is that these new rights and definitions of citizenship have not been won without struggle, and often the kind of struggle that provokes suffering and loss of life. They are the product of rooted demands for recognition. Yet they may have become concessions

that can be more easily made as new global regimes of accumulation call for new modes of "governmentality."

Free markets and deregulation are not sufficient to define what is "new" in neo-liberalism. What would shock Adam Smith about neo-liberalism is its extension of the concept of "market society" to embrace the production of personhood, identity and social life itself. The injunction on individuals to take responsibility for their futures within a "knowledge-based economy" by learning how to "market themselves" acquires the force of an ethical imperative that is equally integral to the "softer" brand of neo-liberalism associated with "Third Way" politics (Gledhill 2004: 340). Failure to accept the opportunities presented by labour markets (however poorly remunerated and socially degrading) or to exercise prudence in providing for one's own future security becomes an individual moral failure. As Rose puts it:

> As the twentieth century draws to a close, political reason from all quarters no longer phrases itself in the language of obligation and social citizenship. It now justifies itself by arguing over the political forms that are adequate to the existence of persons as essentially, naturally, creatures striving to actualize themselves in their everyday, secular lives. Within such rationalities, it appears that individuals can best fulfil their political obligations in relation to the wealth, health and happiness of the nation not when they are bound into relations of dependency and obligation, but when they seek to *fulfil themselves* as free individuals. (Rose 1999: 166, emphasis in the original)

For Rose, as I noted earlier, "advanced liberal" forms of government rest on the promotion of "active citizenship." As a consumer of "services" the citizen becomes "an active agent in the regulation of professional expertise," while "the citizen as prudent is to become an active agent in the provision of security" (ibid.). Other central characteristics of neo-liberalism, such as the insistence that the public sector adopts "internal markets" to maximize "efficiency" and a pervasive bureaucratic culture of audit, follow from this broadening of the concept of market society (Gledhill 2004: 340-341).

Yet neo-liberalism does not invoke the individual as the isolated atom of a free market society in which the greatest good of the greatest number is to be achieved by everyone pursuing their purely personal interests. U.S. neo-conservatives and Blairite social democrats alike became alarmed at the apparent decline in "civic virtues" that accompanied the socio-economic transformations of the 1970s and 1980s, so that rising individualism and autonomy could not been seen as a wholly positive good. Despite their differences, communitarians from the North American Right, Third Wayers and advocates of the rebuilding of "social capital" such as Robert Putnam (1995) agree that, in Rose's words—reworking Bentham's description of the benefits of the panopticon—"the Gordian knot of State versus individual" can be "not cut but untied" by "a simple idea in politics: community" (Rose 1999: 186).

The further hardening of the position of the Right in the "culture wars" of the United States following Bush's re-election demonstrates that a project of rebuilding community by no means necessarily endorses respect for the culture differences embodied in the smaller communities to which diverse ethnic groups hold allegiance within larger national political communities. Disciplinary and normalizing tendencies are evident in all the projects that I have just mentioned (Gledhill 2001: 137; Rose ibid.: 194). Nevertheless, as Hale notes, once primary responsibility for the restoration of the civic virtues that the individual has lost is placed in the hands of non-state entities that include not simply churches and NGOs but "communities" with historically shared ties of culture, from the standpoint of governmentality the logic of the new relationship between community, identity and political subjectivity gravitates towards multiculturalism. Through this kind of multiculturalist strategy "the state does not merely 'recognize' community, civil society, indigenous culture and the like, but actively reconstitutes them in its own image, sheering them of radical excesses, inciting them to do the work of subject-formation that would otherwise fall to the state itself" (Hale 2002: 496). In this case, the professionalized NGO becomes the neo-liberal substitute for the panopticon (ibid.).

Theories devised for North America and Western Europe clearly require qualification when transposed to a region such as Latin America (ibid.: 497). Hale suggests that "it seems likely that the neo-liberal model in Latin America confronts considerably more autonomy, variability, and volatility in the civil society groups that purportedly serve as agents for individual subject formation" (ibid.). I exemplified this problem earlier with Lazar's discussion of the implementation of micro-credit schemes in Bolivia. Nevertheless, as Hale emphasizes, there is no straightforward tension between neo-liberalism as a set of political and economic policies and state-endorsed multiculturalist policies in the field of indigenous rights. The tensions lie in the way that the cultural project of neo-liberalism pro-actively endorses some kinds of cultural rights while drawing a clear line between such concessions and demands that are classified as "too radical," a distinction again readily illustrated by the vicissi-

tudes of the Zapatista campaign in Chiapas. Yet the dilemmas this construction provokes for indigenous activists and movements themselves are evident. There are political costs in complete refusal of the embrace of the state and NGOs conforming to a neo-liberal agenda, as exemplified by the Zapatista strategy. Yet there are also costs in occupying the spaces opened up by neo-liberal multiculturalism, in the form of regular tendencies to become "articulated with the dominant bloc" (Hale 2002: 522).

Multiculturalism helps neo-liberal states to "govern at a distance" (Rose 1999: 49-50) by offering once excluded actors the opportunity to participate in a way that is in constant danger of containing and redirecting mobilization, even if it is strongly grounded in an historically-rooted sense of injustice and identity. The "democratizing" force of neo-liberalism's offers of "participation" and "empowerment" create mechanisms for manufacturing "civil society," managing chronic social crisis, and bringing conflictive sectors into government and NGO-mediated processes of intermediation. We might conclude that this simply implies that we are dealing with a simulation that masks underlying structural power inequalities. So, in a sense, it is, but it is not *simply* a simulation. There are real spaces for negotiation, up to a point, and this is also where, from a theoretical point of view, Foucault's account of power in terms of governmentality fails to capture the agency of subaltern groups. That neo-liberal governmentality projects face continuing challenge is not simply because of the negative socio-economic consequences of the new order, nor even because of resistances to the neo-liberal cultural project arising from the realities of the everyday life-worlds, cultural strategies and internal conflicts within politically recognized "communities." Many of the actors are self-reflexively conscious of the limits of what is on offer and the political costs of co-optation, even if it is difficult in practice to avoid the risks of engagement routinely produced, for example, by the election of social movement leaders to office in local government.

In thinking about the positive possibilities opened up by the new era, there is a strong body of opinion that focuses on the implications of the "progressive" consequences of globalization, stressing the way that the growth of reticular, transnational coalitions and networks leads to the empowerment of "resistant" subaltern groups (such as the Chiapas Zapatistas) that were unable to make an impact on a less "connected" world. For example, the Mexican political theorist Benjamin Arditi has argued that "the spectre of socialism, or better, the imaginary driven by the socialist tradition, is re-entering the public scene in the form of a new and informal internationalism that looks to counter the weight of its conservative counterpart by emphasizing the themes of equality and solidarity on a global scale" (Arditi 2002: 476). Following Derrida, he suggests that the virtue of this new international solidarity is that no state, political party, labour union or civic organization can control or institutionalize it, while it generates multiclass pluralistic convergences capable of transcending social and cultural differences.

There is clearly some justification for arguing that local "progressive" projects are better able to prosper with the support of transnational networks that can increase pressures on nation-states that violate the rights of their citizens and can confront supranational powers in a more effective way than any local movement could. Ten years after the Zapatista rebellion, it requires a dose of optimism to see global neo-liberalism being significantly challenged from the rebels' last redoubt in the Selva Lacandona, however inventive their politics remains. Yet I doubt that the Zapatista movement would still be developing its innovations in autonomous government were it not for the fact that it enjoys an unusual degree of external funding through its international solidarity network. Nevertheless, to join the proponents of the bright side of globalization in celebration of the decentred subject of resistance without pondering the countervailing weight of decentred neo-liberal techniques of rule means risking an optimism of the spirit often inconsistent with ethnographic evidence.

Most of humanity does not live in places like the Selva Lacandona. Even when they have not left for the cities or adopted the life of a worker crossing international borders, indigenous people today frequently face serious problems making a livelihood in rural spaces, thanks to generalized agricultural crisis and environmental degradation. So I now turn to examples from other kinds of spaces to explore the force of deep neo-liberalization in a more concrete way that illustrates some mutually reinforcing relationships between neo-liberalization and social change.

Redeveloping the "Divided Cities" of Brazil

The victory with more than 60% of the vote of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Worker's Party (PT) in the 2002 Brazilian Presidential elections represented an overwhelming defeat for Fernando Henrique Cardoso's Partido da Social Democracia Brasileiro (PSDB), and an explicit expression of public desire for an alternative to neo-liberalism. Given the profusion of political parties, Lula can only govern Brazil in coalition with other parties which range ideologically from Liberals to Communists.[5] Some of his allies on the Right are now gravitating towards new alliances following the PT's dismal per-

formance in the local government elections of 2004, when it lost most of the cities it controlled in the South of the country. Yet the PT has long advocated political positions that focus on the achievement of greater social justice through the "empowerment" of poorer citizens via their inclusion in public decision-making rather than simply the electoral arena. This makes analysis of its performance in power particularly pertinent to an analysis of deep neo-liberalization.

The immediate causes of Lula's problems are clear enough. Brazil, like Mexico, faces the problem not only of generating enough new jobs to satisfy a growing labour force, but of ending a pattern in which even reductions in unemployment are accompanied by a continuing decline of real wages. With 2.3 million people officially unemployed in the six largest metropolitan areas, a fall in October of 1.2% in real earnings, concentrated in low pay sectors such as construction (*Folha de São Paulo,* 26th November 2004), did not make for optimistic conclusions about the prospects for reducing chronic poverty.

The metropolitan city itself is something rather special in Brazil. Clinging crab-like to coastal mega-cities whose separation from a still under-populated interior underpins a sharp cultural-ideological divide between town and countryside, Brazilians themselves seem as fascinated as outsiders by the forms of social exclusion that their urbanization process has created, as witnessed by the huge domestic success of the mini-series *Cidade dos Homens* (City of Men) that TV Globo spun-off from the internationally acclaimed movie *Cidade de Deus* (City of God). It might be too cynical to suggest that this reflects a strategy of "if you can't eliminate the slums, then why not aestheticize and exploit them commercially," since the authors of these media creations clearly intend them to humanize the people of the slums (*favelas*). Yet they are also in danger of flattening our sociological understanding of the Brazilian city, not to mention making us forget about the many smaller rural towns whose economies have been hollowed out during the neo-liberal decades, to lend further impetus to the growth of the shanties.

Not all working-class Brazilians live in *favelas,* and there are a great many Brazilians in between the wealthy inhabitants of gated condominiums and the segment of the middle class that shares the elite obsession with privatizing security and keeping away from public spaces. In fact, the term "lower middle class" is quite a strongly marked category. Occupationally speaking, it contains, for example, teachers, minor functionaries, secretaries and clerks, office workers and some shop keepers and self-employed people. As Teresa Caldeira has shown, lower-middle-class people and the working-class people who live in neighbourhoods (*bairros*) not stigmatized as *favelas* differ from the elite and upper-middle classes in their attitudes to sociality. Although they too are fearful of crime and insecurity, they still value interaction with neighbours in public space, and prefer family homes to condominiums, even if they have been obliged to add fences, walls and bars on the windows to make them more secure (Caldeira 2000: 289-296). Ironically, for the upper classes to accept condominium living has involved abandonment of previous associations of collective living with the old working-class tenements called *cortiços* found alongside the mansions of the rich in the centre of São Paulo before the dictator Getúlio Vargas shipped the working classes off to the urban periphery in the 1930s and 1940s (ibid.: 219-220). Caldeira's studies have shown that, locked inside their "fortified enclaves," the rich are remarkably unsociable, even with each other. So the direct and indirect effects of neo-liberalism, in particular the decline in personal security experienced by all social classes, have produced strong, though still contested, tendencies towards privatization and fragmentation in the fabric of Brazilian society (ibid.: 258-259).

The fact that the most frequent victims of crime are poorer, working-class people has additional important consequences, since the same people are also the victims of a policing and justice system that persecutes them as "usual suspects" while shamelessly favouring the upper classes by granting them and their children impunity (ibid.: 277). Ordinary Brazilians have learned to exercise their political rights in an electoral regime in which voting is compulsory. Yet working class Brazilians are generally antagonistic towards campaigns to enhance human and civil rights. Notwithstanding their frequent experiences of humiliation by both public and private security forces, they continue to view retributive justice and police who kill as a better option than "giving privileges to criminals" in the name of human rights (Caldeira 2002: 251-252). Brazil's power structures therefore configure a spontaneous convergence between elite projects and popular reactions to situations of economic stress and physical insecurity that facilitates containment of the poorest sectors of the urban population, defence of extreme social inequality and perpetuation of social indifference to the fate of slum dwellers.

This example of the capillary effects of the pervasive violence promoted by economic inequality illustrates the importance of taking a more decentred view of power relations and considering the more diffuse way in which their effects shape contradictory subjectivities throughout society. A different type of example is the evolution of the social movements that have attracted the interest of

so many analysts as possible catalysts of radical change in Brazil. Much of the reputation of the PT rests on the idea that it represented an alternative to the old parties, born out of social movement activism in the period when the military suspended normal political life.

One important way of looking at the impacts of neoliberalism on social movements is to emphasize the effects of sustained economic hardship and the "disappearance of work." In the words of González de la Rocha (2004: 194), the bonds of inter-household reciprocity and solidarity that were once one of the "resources of poverty" that households could draw on to adapt to hard times have become increasingly eroded by the absolute "poverty of resources" produced by a sustained decline in real income. Social movements have not disappeared, but as the state has reduced public service provision, they have been weakened and fragmented by the way NGOs and political patronage networks may foster clientelism and individualized solutions to problems (Auyero 2000: 110). Yet this is not the whole story, since there is also a problem with seeing social movements as purely spontaneous responses "from below."

In an analysis of Recife, one of the showcases for what the PT can achieve in city government, Willem Assies (1999) has challenged the idea that Brazil's "new politics" was founded in the purely spontaneous development of grassroots social movements under military rule, noting that the role of the Catholic Church and other "institutional" actors should not be underestimated, while middle-class professionals played a significant role in building the movements. Politicized under the peculiar circumstances of the military regime, with the consolidation of democratic governance these professionals have now found themselves in a changed relationship with their popular "base." Assies argues that under present conditions, what were once "radical" demands for "participation" and "empowerment" "blend into a strategy of neoliberal reform" by acquiring "connotations of self-advancement and self-reliance to participate as economic subjects" (Assies 1999: 222-223).

This gives us some windows onto the inter-locking forces that have entangled the political project of the PT in the process of "deep neoliberalization." To take the discussion further, I will go back to the end of the 1980s, when the party first took control of the city government of São Paulo.

Despite the PT's previous criticisms of the program of the Jânio Quadros administration to clear *favelas* from an area to the south-east of the city that was to be redeveloped to enable São Paulo to becomes a "global city" with a World Trade Centre, once in office the party accepted the principle that municipal governments in fiscal crisis should attempt to solve social problems through public-private financial partnerships (Fix 2001: 74). This meant accepting Quadros's plan to finance slum clearance and the resettlement of the *favelados* with funds provided by the very property speculators who had been behind the scheme to revalorize an urban landscape colonized by the poor through the construction of high-rise office blocks, shopping malls, and "first world" quality apartment blocks located in "ecologically rehabilitated" parklands.

The full realization of this scheme had to await the Prefecture of Paulo Maluf, of the right-wing Progressive Party, whose political career began under the patronage of the military, took him to the state governorship, and entered a period of crisis in 2001 as charges of graft and money laundering prompted investigation of his offshore bank accounts. Nevertheless, by 2004 Maluf's level of unpopularity with electors was not much worse than that of the next PT Prefect of São Paulo, Marta Suplicy, whose ratings dropped alarmingly as floods destroying precariously built homes added to the miseries produced by rising rates of unemployment. Suplicy, born into a *paulista* elite family, made a major political mistake by visiting the people who had lost their homes wearing a particularly up-market trouser suit, retreating in confusion as they hurled mud at her fashionable person. This may well have contributed to the failure of her campaign for re-election later in the year, when she was defeated by José Serra, Lula's vanquished PSDB opponent in the presidential elections.

There were, however, deeper reasons for this popular anger. Despite a massive political marketing exercise for new style public housing projects whose social engineering pretensions were marked by the choice of the name "Cingapuras," very few of the families expelled from their homes by Maluf's policies were satisfactorily relocated. The money raised by the consortium of capitalist developers was only sufficient to cover the needs of around 12% of the families of the principal *favela* to be bulldozed, Jardím Edith (Fix 2001: 94). The minority of families that did obtain some compensation needed to invest in a great deal of militant action and devote time to outmanoeuvring community leaders constantly being offered sizable sums to "sell out" their followers. At the end of their struggles, they found the alternative housing offered far beneath the promised standard, located at unattractive distances from places of employment, and it still had to be paid for.

The result was very Brazilian. What remained of the *favelas* in this new enclave of global corporations and

consumerism was discreetly shielded from the gaze of motorists passing on the new urban freeways by fences, while the evicted majority either moved to other established *favelas* or built new ones in a previously uncolonized zone, which happened to be a water conservation area (ibid.: 99). The overall environmental effects of this development made nonsense of the idea that private-public partnerships save taxpayers money. Not only has the state been burdened with further future costs in terms of transport and other infrastructure, but there was a complete failure to predict the costs of the development for that scarcest of urban resources, clean drinking water.

The poor thus lost land and homes for at best a pittance, whilst the speculators reaped spectacular capital gains as the land they colonized was re-valued by entering the "First World." The *favelados* were not, however, the only group to be affected by São Paulo's ascent to "global city" status. As Fix shows, middle class people living in family homes and low-rise apartments along leafy suburban streets were also caught up in the redevelopment process because of the need to improve road communications with the old urban centre and allow residents of the global city fast transit into transnational hyperspace through a heliport. Although their leaders, who included an architect and a functionary of the municipal urban planning department, suffered some harassment from the Prefecture, their "citizenship" counted enough in political terms for plans to be modified and a modicum of "preservation" to be introduced into the restructuring of their part of urban space. So it is not that "citizens" had no voice at all in these contestations around the social functions of cities and the social responsibilities of their governments. It was a question of whose voice counted, which made the existence of "second class" citizens patently obvious.

The Limits of Neo-liberal Empowerment of "Civil Society"

As Caldeira and Holston (2004) demonstrate, the language of modernist rule in the days of the Brazilian developmentalist state focused on rational state planning to overcome "underdevelopment." Although "development" was conceived as a means of reducing social inequality, the masses were imagined as "non-modern," to be incorporated into the plans as a labour force but marginalized as citizens on grounds of incapacity (ibid.: 401). Yet although they were consigned to living in irregular settlements, by building their own homes, often after buying land in good faith from swindlers, and by paying their taxes, the politically excluded increasing came to understand that they could claim "rights to the city" (ibid.: 402). By organizing themselves, again often with the help of the Catholic Church, neighbourhood movements from the urban periphery not only contributed importantly to the return of democracy but greeted it with demands for inclusion, not merely demanding that the state meet their social needs materially by providing services and infrastructure, but that it should accept their right to participate in planning decisions.

The fruits of this struggle were manifest in the 1988 Constitution and the incorporation of new ideas about the "social function" of cities and "urban self-management" involving popular participation into new municipal codes and master plans for urban development in cities such as São Paulo, Recife, Porto Alegre and Curitiba (ibid.: 405). The neo-liberal 1990s thus brought a deepening of political democracy and a new concept of the inclusion of the poor as citizens, who, even if they lacked resources and had their rights disrespected, were no longer seen as "incapable of making good decisions" (ibid.: 407). Yet since this more pluralistic vision emerged in an era of debt crisis and deepening fiscal austerity addressed through public-private partnerships that put market interests before social justice, under city administrations that "disregarded the practices of participatory democracy," this period saw the deepening erosion of public space and intensified urban segregation that I have just described (ibid.: 411). Nevertheless, the PT repeatedly sought modifications to municipal statutes that would enable city governments to do more for poor residents not only in terms of land regularization but in terms of taxing real estate profits and regulating building activity to address broader social and environmental goals (ibid.: 408). Although the Suplicy administration in São Paulo was unable to get all its proposals approved, it did enact a new Master Strategic Plan in 2002, and took the question of "participation" more seriously (ibid.). Suplicy also apparently managed to limit the backstage power of the property developers relative to the days of Maluf. Yet this was not enough to secure her re-election.

In allowing poor citizens a voice in the public sphere through their organizations and representatives, the neo-liberalized Brazilian political field projects the possibility of a plural society in which the interests of all should be balanced, even at the price of accepting a degree of social inequality that would have been unthinkable for Left projects in the past. This gives local politics a depoliticized tone, even when the different groups shout at each other in City Hall. In the shouting, everyone appears equal, and it becomes difficult to distinguish one type of association of "active citizens" from another. Yet they remain structurally differentiated in terms of class and power, and

with regard to access to the broader public sphere through mass media. The "communities" recognized and constructed by neo-liberal "government at a distance" proliferate in often quite virtual forms, as comparatively tiny NGOs may gain a voice as interlocutors. Even activists who articulate a "voice" on behalf of a substantial popular constituency may become increasingly socially distanced from their putative "communities" (or co-opted). Neo-liberalism continues to disarticulate the bonds of "community" through the hardships inflicted on families. NGOs, development agencies and party political machines fail to operate in a manner that would foster their reconstruction when they manage scarce social development resources in ways that promote socially divisive competition for their patronage. Although grassroots efforts to build community organization in the slums (and to counter stereotyping) have not been extinguished in countries such as Mexico and Brazil, and by no means all of the NGOs, churches and charitable foundations that support social activism should be portrayed in this negative way, these processes often make neo-liberal rhetoric of "helping the poor help themselves" via the "thickening of social capital" ring hollow (Molyneux 2002).

The privatization of the public sphere has also opened up spaces for other kinds of actors. In case of the *favelas*, the armed bands of *traficantes* have come to be seen, thanks to the movies, as the quintessential sources of casual economic aid, rough justice, and a modicum of protection for the powerless against the systematic violence and abuse of police. To the very limited extent to which this image corresponds to reality, it is an unhappy and far from desired kind of dependence as far as most *favelados* are concerned. Furthermore, these are not simply phenomena of the social margins. Early in 2004 in Salvador, Bahia, one of the leading *traficantes*, not only mysteriously escaped capture in a theatrical police action that did apprehend several policeman caught *em flagrante*, but subsequently roamed around the city trying to get his patrons in the state congress to honour their promises of protection and was sighted several times in the company of state deputies. In Mexico, the understanding that the rise and fall of the *narcos* is a political question is widely diffused. Mexico is also one of the countries that best illustrates the affinity between neo-liberalism and the regeneration and modernization of boss rule or *caciquismo*, a reflection of the way Mexican neo-liberalism is underpinned by "shadow state" power that implicates members of political parties that compete in the electoral arena in a deeper web of elite complicities that are strongly inconsistent with a healthy democratic life and the personal security of those who seek greater social justice (Gledhill 2002).

"Right" versus "Left" after Neo-liberalization

Whilst Marta Suplicy's efforts to combat corruption in São Paulo must be applauded, there is sobering food for thought in Bahia, where the outgoing Party of the Liberal Front (PFL) Prefect of Salvador, Antônio Imbassahy, received the highest approval ratings in the country in 2003. Imbassahy's urban policy focused on beautifying his city for tourism and promoting the conservative brand of multicultural politics pioneered by the chief of his party, the great Bahian *cacique* Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM), whose political machine has dominated the state for decades.

Once again a protégé of the military, ACM achieved notable popularity in key sectors of Bahia's majority Black community by fostering pan-Africanism and subsidizing Black culture in a way that produced both political and commercial benefits. Although the popular imaginary of ACM as an epitome of the corrupt and violent exercise of power indicates that few citizens are deluded about the nature of his project, we can learn much about Brazilian politics from his ability to survive demands for his expulsion from the Senate after a wire-tapping scandal and public disengagement from his person by Imbassahy and other allies. While ACM still controlled most of the jobs, his dark reputation, far from being an impediment, was part of the magic of his rather uncharismatic charisma.

Nevertheless, in Brazil's volatile political climate, even the likes of ACM may need to reinvent themselves. Although the PFL scored some important victories in the 2004 city government elections, with Rio's controversial Prefect César Maia securing re-election, ACM's candidate in Salvador, César Borges, was roundly defeated in the second round of the elections by João Henrique of the Partido Democrático Trabalhista. The PDT embodies the legacy of the "labourist" Left that was the more progressive outcome of Getúlio Vargas's populism. Formal ideological positions are, however, less important than the longer-term failure of ACM's efforts to boost employment in Bahia through the creation of a petrochemical complex and attraction of a Ford plant. As the children of workers who once enjoyed stable jobs look forward at best to casual work in the increasingly impoverished areas that Salvador dubs *suburbios*, the PFL's traditional means of buying votes in the city have lost their effectiveness, although the PDT's overwhelming victory may also have reflected ACM's failure to build the alliances that would have prevented all the other political parties from uniting against Borges in the second round.

Yet nationally the PFL is now seeking an alliance with the PSDB, a far from unlikely scenario despite apparent ideological differences between these parties of the Right and the Centre-Left. Although the PT's performance under Lula has prompted PDT calls for a regrouping of the "genuine" Left around a reworked "national project," and economic nationalist ideas are not yet extinct in Brazil's technocracy,[6] it is difficult to envisage a return to the developmentalist state. Yet the PT's problems also suggest that "socially progressive politics" are unlikely to make headway while parties of the Left and Centre-Left offer themselves to the electorate on the basis that they can manage capitalism better than the Right.

Recent corruption scandals afflicting Mexico's equivalent of the PT, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), also illustrate the possibility of all political spaces becoming contaminated by shadow networks of power that cross apparent ideological boundaries in an age in which "realism" has tended to evacuate party political differences of real substance. The PRD administration of Mexico City under Andrés Manuel López Obrador has made a difference in some areas, such as concern for the elderly, but not produced a sea change in urban development strategy. Its promotion of the addition of a "second tier" to one of the city's major traffic arteries has scandalized environmentalists. The remodelling of the city's historic centre, which involved an intense police campaign against street traders, was led by the transnational telecoms entrepreneur Carlos Slim, while the peripheral "global city" of Santa Fe, located on the edge of a national park, has worsened the already precarious lives of the shanty dwellers perched precariously along the gullies and hills surrounding the new utopia of concrete, steel, glass and First World apartment prices around the Jesuit Universidad Iberoamericana.

Polls show, however, that, despite the scandals within his party, López Obrador himself is still widely considered one of the few honest politicians in the country and stands a good chance of election to the presidency in 2006, a situation that prompted the old ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party and Fox's National Action Party to join together in an extraordinary legal manoeuvre based on a technical act of maladministration to try to debar the Mayor from standing again for public office. The hand of former PRI President Carlos Salinas, the architect of Mexican neo-liberalism who has now beem rehabilitated following temporary disgrace in the second half of the 1990s, thanks to backstage agreements with the Fox government, is clearly visible in the seamier side of recent political life. The defence of the neo-liberalism can therefore involve far from transparent political processes, orientated towards thwarting any popular democratic will, even if comparison between Mexico and Brazil suggests that there are differences in the quality of the democracy achieved in different Latin American countries.

Diffuse Power, Invisible Walls and Class Violence

I have argued that neo-liberalism is proving resilient because it is a system of diffuse power on multiple levels, and I see no inconsistency between this contention and the fact that states still regularly deploy repressive power both domestically and in relation to imperialist projects involving far from invisible interest groups. As I noted earlier, another of neo-liberalism's key dimensions is its fostering of the production of social life through the capitalist market.

One episode of *Cidade dos Homens* focuses on the symbolic impact of the latest style in air-cushioned trainers across the social divide that separates the two black kids who are the chief protagonists from the *favela* from two white middle-class boys who look out over the slum from bedrooms whose windows are best kept shuttered in case a bullet strays. The urban and rural landscapes of austerity of neo-liberalism are ever more landscapes populated by people striving to participate in the market as consumers in an important kind of way. Where the horizontal social relations of kinship and neighbourliness that once fortified a sense of "personhood" are increasingly fractured, and elites are increasingly indifferent to the fate of what now seems an inexhaustible reserve of exploitable bodies, maintaining a sense of cheerfulness through the cultivation of the self makes increasing sense.

Yet this is not the only way in which the self can be cultivated. Another important way in which individuals seek new anchors for their lives in Brazil is through the non-Catholic churches that continue to proliferate not simply in big cities but in smaller, rural towns and villages, offering an increasing range of alternatives to (seldom exclusive) Catholic and Afro-Brazilian religious practices. The profusion of "choice" visible in so many streets as one passes churches of the Seventh Day Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses interspersed with a variety of Evangelical and Pentecostalist churches indicates that the market for religious services is as broad as that for trainers. Some of the wealthier churches, especially the controversial *Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus,* founded in Rio de Janeiro but now also well established in the United States and Europe, offering healing and blessings to the faithful in return for cash donations, display a clear capitalist ethos in their own operations. There is no simple

relationship between "choice" and "social message," since the meaningfulness of their religious practice for the different congregations is also related to the distinct embodied spiritual experiences on offer, but what perhaps can be argued is that there are few strong contradictions between the growth of non-Catholic religious identities and the ethical imperatives of neo-liberal market society.

The most severely disadvantaged Brazilians also retain a pleasurable awareness that racialized understandings of difference lead their social superiors to think (probably correctly!) that they have more fun, but the music and tourism industries have managed to build extremely effectively even on that. So while the everyday lives of the socially segregated denizens of the city become matters of increasingly tense encounters, in the hollowed out ethico-political spaces of neo-liberalism, the dreams of all converge in the illusions of consumption.

They are not the only dreams that the poor dream, and they are not pure illusions. Self-built houses can become comfortable homes and those who live in self-built houses sometimes get more dignifying jobs. As Janice Perlman's latest research in Rio's *favelas* has shown, thirty years on from her classic critique of "The Myth of Marginality" (Perlman 1976), *favelados* remain as racially, socially, culturally and economically heterogeneous today as they were in 1968 (Perlman 2004: 191). What has changed is that middle class people are being forced to take jobs once destined for more disadvantaged citizens, and they are using less paid domestic help, while jobs that once only required completed primary education now demand much higher qualifications. Access to public education has had a significant impact on the lives of the urban poor since the 1970s. In this respect, they have not been so much "marginal" or completely socially excluded as included in an unjust social system in a differentiated way (Roberts 2004: 196). Yet the potential gains have been seriously eroded, especially for black Brazilians in a city such as Salvador, now that a university diploma is required to gain entry into the lower-middle class through a job in a bank or public service (Sansone 2004: 53). Lula's government has adopted affirmative action policies to try to increase the number of black university students. Yet a politics of compromise with elites that have every reason to wish to defend and deepen the neo-liberal model does not seem likely to reverse the negative tendencies.

Social mobility is difficult in societies in which some citizens remain subjects of spatial segregation that make better-off people comfortable with the persistence of chronic poverty. Rio de Janeiro has seen a decade of programs designed to transform *favelas* into "neighbourhoods" integrated with surrounding districts, through the construction of central public spaces and amenities, well-lit streets and walkways, canalization of rivers, and relocation housing projects of low-rise apartment blocks of the same kind as São Paulo's *Cingapuras*. Although, as noted earlier, such homes are not attractive to all working class people, Perlman shows that there has been movement of families from *favelas* to housing projects and to neighbourhoods not socially stigmatized as *favelas* , even where they are difficult to distinguish in terms of the quality of their built environments. The move from *favela* to *bairro* does constitute social mobility. Perlman therefore argues that Rio cannot be understood in terms of Wacquant's bleak conception, derived from U.S. experience, of consignment of the poor to "bounded territories of urban relegation" (Perlman 2004: 192).

Yet it is important to recognize that the "city of walls" is not constructed simply from the physical barriers which protect the fortified enclaves of the rich. There are also intangible walls between less privileged social groups in these divided cities. The divide between *favela* and *bairro* is structured by fear, loathing and enthusiasm for violent retributive justice. We saw earlier that these sentiments were another capillary effect of the way that elite strategies of substituting private for public order subject the poor to "new forms of surveillance, control, disrespect and humiliation" without solving their basic problem of being the chief victims of both criminality and police abuse (Caldeira 2002: 247). It will be difficult to break such vicious circles of causality in cities of visible and invisible walls in which the incomes of the lower-middle and working classes continue to deteriorate.

In an analysis of police death squads, Martha Huggins argues that these were a by-product, along with vigilantism, of a "functional symbiosis" between at first sight contradictory tendencies towards "re-centring of state control over internal security" and decentring of social control (Huggins 2002: 223). The secret arm of the police system operated in a liminal space perpetuated by the inevitable failure of regular policing to "win" a war against crime that transforms itself into a war against the poor. Yet winning is ultimately not what this war is really about. In April 2004, Luiz Paulo Conde, Vice-Governor of Rio state, suggested the construction of a concrete wall around the huge Rocinha *favela* in Rio de Janeiro. Prefect César Maia rejected Conde's proposal as "governmental autism."[7] Instead he decreed a "state of defence" and called for deployment of federal troops in Rocinha to put an end to the violent disorder created by its drug wars. Yet Rocinha offers "safe" *favela* tours on the Internet, thanks to its community associations, and it also where *Cidade dos Homens* is filmed. Thus, while the media try to

humanize the persons within the *favelas,* some sections of the elite still dream of walls that will hide the Third World from the First, reproducing the power of capital while maintaining forms of social stigmatization that simply conceding "voice" and fuller recognition of political citizenship cannot erase. Others seek to intensify the militarization of "containment" of social problems in an environment in which extra-judicial execution can be applauded by poorer citizens.

That is why space and the enjoyment of full citizenship are so intimately related. Radical rethinking of the urban built environment must be a crucial component of any truly alternative model for development, along with a more radical approach to the problems posed by the rights enjoyed by the rich. Once one questions the city as a container for social life that reproduces profound forms of inequality, then the future of the rural also comes up for discussion, particularly now that so many rural places sustain themselves from migrant remissions. It is time for Latin Americans to consider proposals for a radical spatial reorganization of modern life that would end the era of the mega-city confronting an increasingly impoverished and demographically emptying countryside, such as the "agropolitan" modular cities proposed by John Friedmann (1996).

Every now and again popular movements also question the rationality of contemporary urban development, as did the peasant farmers of Atenco by rising up with machetes and the symbols of an apparently long defeated revolution to challenge the construction of Mexico's City's new airport in Texcoco, thwarting the plans of some of the most politically powerful economic interests in the country. Yet until such uprisings find a broader echo in political projects that give substance to promises of empowerment, participation and plurality by underpinning them with more radical redistribution of power and assets, they will remain dreams that unexpectedly come true for a moment before the darkness of contemporary life returns to engulf the future for so many of the new citizens of the 21st century.

John Gledhill, Max Gluckman Professor of Social Anthropology, School of Social Sciences, The University of Manchester, Roscoe Building, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 6UR, UK. E-mail: john.gledhill@manchester.ac.uk

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Notes

1 Chile has produced a less dismal statistical picture over the longer term than Mexico, for example. Although the number of Chilean households living in poverty doubled during the first decade of Pinochet's precocious neo-liberal experiment, and even an annual average growth rate of 7.4% in the 1980s failed to reverse further deterioration that brought 44.7% of households below the poverty line by 1987, democratic governments adopted "equity-enhancing reforms" that included progressive direct taxation of the upper-middle class and corporate profits to fund social programs, restoring some rights and benefits that the Pinochet government removed from labour (Sharma 1998). By 1998, the proportion of families living in poverty and extreme poverty stood at less than half their levels a decade earlier, at 17% and 4% respectively, although one in five young people was unemployed, whereas in Mexico only a third of the population remained above the poverty line (Boltvinik and Hernández 2000: 192-193; World Bank 2001).

2 In 2004, migrant remissions overtook oil revenues as a source of overseas earnings, contributing 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (*La Jornada,* 11th November, 2004).

3 Although the World Bank summarized its 2004 World Development Indicators as showing that "the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (less than US$1 a day) in developing countries dropped by almost half between 1981 and 2001, from 40 to 21 percent of global population," the aggregate result principally reflects dramatic economic growth in China and India. The surprise victory of the Congress party in the 2004 Indian elections reflected the degree to which the neo-liberal model was judged unsatisfactory by poorer citizens, but the fact that the communist government of West Bengal was quick to assure Congress that it would not insist on reversing "economic reform" as the price of support for the formation of a new government and had already made considerable efforts to attract private investment into its state, is highly consistent with the argument of this paper. The percentage of Latin Americans living below the poverty line failed to show significant improvement through the 1990s using World Bank measures (http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/index.htm).

4 For comparative reviews of different countries, see Assies, van der Haar and Hoekema (eds.) 2000, and Sieder (ed.) 2002.

5 The plethora of political parties reflects the extent to which political power still resides in regions. Individual politicians quite frequently switch allegiances in the games of patronage politics and power plays that accompany coalition-building.

6 Although, as major players in world agro-export markets, Brazil's powerful agrarian capitalist interests have some reasons to challenge the policies of the United States and European Community, their main preoccupation is with the militant efforts of the Movement of the Landless to transform Brazil's agrarian structure, a cause that has advanced

little under Lula. The state oil company Petrobras is now, thanks to Cardoso's dismantling of Vargas's legacy, a public corporation with shareholders and aspirations to grow as a global energy company, while the big winners from neoliberalism are also interests linked to globalization, such as the media industries, financial service sector and property developers.

7 Maia promoted the *favela*-neighborhood urban transformation programs during his first term as Prefect in the 1990s, and was once a political ally of Conde, who succeeded him in the Prefecture in 1997.

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"They Are Our Brothers and Sisters": Why Zapatismo Matters to Independent Labour in Mexico

Alex Khasnabish *McMaster University*

Abstract: In this paper I seek to illuminate the bases upon which the Mexican independent labour movement and the indigenous Zapatista movement have been able to engage in a politics of accompaniment, a politics based on mutual respect and support without sacrificing autonomy or difference. I examine how this intersection emerged, the grounds that make it possible, and the significance of such an intersection for the Zapatistas and independent labour. This analysis is also an attempt to explore political relationships and possibilities that transgress traditionally understood boundaries and to begin to imagine new relationships and ways of envisioning and practicing politics.

Keywords: social movements, Mexican independent labour movement, Zapatista movement, political alternatives, political theory, political anthropology

Résumé : Dans cet article, mon intention est d'apporter un éclairage sur les raisons fondamentales qui ont incités le mouvement travailliste indépendant du Mexique et le mouvement autochtone zapatiste à se rapprocher afin de mener une politique complémentaire. Cette politique, fondée sur la considération mutuelle et le soutien réciproque, ne remet cependant pas en cause l'indépendance de chacun des mouvements ni leur particularisme. J'examinerai l'émergence de cette alliance, les conditions qui l'ont rendue possible et son importance pour les Zapatistes et les travaillistes. Mon analyse répond à une volonté d'explorer des rapports et des possibilités politiques qui transgressent les frontières conceptuelles traditionnelles et d'imaginer de nouvelles façons d'envisager et de pratiquer la politique.

Mots-clés : Mouvements sociaux, Mouvement travailliste mexicain indépendant, Mouvement zapatiste, Politique alternative, Théories politiques, Anthropologie politique

On January 1, 1994 an indigenous army of some 3000 Mayan peasants emerged from the jungles and canyons of the southernmost Mexican state of Chiapas and declared war on the federal executive and the Mexican army. On New Year's Day 1994, an insurgent guerrilla army calling itself the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) made its existence publicly known by seizing several towns in the highlands of Chiapas including the colonial city of San Cristóbal de las Casas and declaring "Ya Basta!," "Enough!," to 500 years of genocide, colonialism, racism, slavery, and, most recently, neoliberalism embodied by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Invoking the constitutional right for Mexicans to alter their form of government and laying claim to a legitimacy rooted in 500 years of indigenous suffering and resistance as well as the legacy of Emiliano Zapata and the Mexican Revolution, the EZLN called for a national uprising to topple the corrupt government of President Carlos Salinas and the Institutional Revolutionary Party which had ruled Mexico for over 70 years.

In the days that followed the New Year's Day uprising, several things would become clear. First, there would be no national uprising to topple the government. Second, there would be no military solution sanctioned by national or international public opinion. Third, the legitimacy of the Zapatista insurgents and their demands would not only find acceptance throughout the Mexican nation and even the world, it would resonate with the demands of others. Fourth and finally, the indigenous Zapatistas had managed to catalyze and inspire a broad front of social opposition to the longest-ruling dictatorship in the contemporary world. One of the most significant actors to support the Zapatista struggle was the independent labour movement in Mexico. In this paper I seek to illuminate the bases upon which two movements, one of them "urban" and "class-oriented," the other "rural" and "indigenous,"—the labels themselves require unpacking—are able to find common ground and engage in a politics not

only of solidarity but of accompaniment. A politics of accompaniment is a relationship built upon mutual respect and support which reaffirms rather than denies autonomy and difference. The linkages which emerged between the Zapatista movement and the independent labour movement did not foment revolution in Mexico nor were they always effective or successful in terms of promoting the interests of each of these movements. What makes these linkages significant, however, is the fact that they occurred in the absence of pre-existing links, direct channels of communication, or organizational infrastructure, and in the face of a revolutionary history troubled by the inability of urban workers and the peasantry to articulate their struggles as a common one. In this paper, I examine how this intersection emerged, the grounds that make it possible, and the significance of such an intersection for both the Zapatistas and for independent unionism in Mexico. This analysis is also an attempt to explore political relationships and possibilities and to begin to imagine new relationships and ways of envisioning and practising politics that may allow for the realization of new political spaces and practices.

This paper is not an attempt to engage once more in the well-worn debate of class versus identity politics either as organizational and mobilizing principles or as analytical frameworks. As both Marc Edelman (2001) and Charles Hale (1997) note, not only has this debate become increasingly dated, it has also become decreasingly useful both in terms of evaluating recent scholarship as well as analyzing social movements themselves. In this respect, this paper responds to Hale's call "for intellectuals to develop methods and analytical categories that engender more constructive engagement with the multiple inequalities that organize the worlds we live in and study" (1997: 584). Some recent work by social movement scholars has sought to materialize the spirit inspiring Hale's call, stressing a "multilayered view of social movements" capable of highlighting "the interplay between collective identities, political opportunities, and culture" (Whittier 2002: 289) and even invoking the need for a "more dialogic analysis" of cultures of power and contention, the ways in which they are mutually constitutive of each other and the consequences this implies for the infusion of meaning into collective action (Steinberg 2002: 224).

Marc Edelman's *Peasants Against Globalization: Rural Social Movements in Costa Rica* (1999) is an excellent anthropological example of a work which seeks to engage issues not only of culture but of power, politics and history as they relate to social movements and their struggles. Edelman's critique of new social movement theory in his work is also particularly lucid, problematizing the "just-so" characteristics ascribed so often to "new" social movements such as their basis in identity versus class politics, their focus on cultural versus material struggles, and their disavowal of a politics based on power (ibid.: 17-21). While acknowledging the important contributions made by NSM theory such as a renewed focus on issues of identity, culture and subjectivity, Edelman astutely draws connections between some NSM characteristics and the most "dehumanizing aspects of contemporary neoliberal economics" such as a focus on identity politics, individualizing and even commodifying subject positions and an emphasis on difference reproducing social fragmentation (ibid.: 20). Furthermore, Edelman also questions the accuracy and usefulness of the "new" versus "old" social movement paradigm, a distinction which often serves to erase significant histories and continuities on the part of activists and organizations as well as to obscure the fact that many important struggles have emerged precisely out of the intersection of class and identity-based movements (ibid.: 20). In response to this, Edelman's suggestions for social movement analysis are centred around the following principles: a profound skepticism of grand theoretical categories and the paradigms which give rise to them; a renewed commitment to viewing movements and their participants and opponents as situated relationally—socially, politically, economically and culturally—and thus characterized by these relationships rather than outside of them; and a commitment to engaging issues of history and self-representation (ibid.: 185-189). The contours of analysis delineated by Edelman constitute an analytically and politically efficacious approach to the study of social movements and this paper is an attempt, albeit a preliminary one, to take up its promises and challenges.

The structure of this paper is designed to highlight the most relevant points with respect to the intersection between the Zapatistas and independent labour in Mexico. To begin with, I briefly examine the historical dimensions of independent unionism in Mexico in order to situate it in its political context. I then turn to matters of indigenous and peasant organizing in Chiapas since the Mexican Revolution. While sketching the broad contours of the socio-political and cultural context within which to situate the intersection of the Zapatista movement with that of independent labour, I return frequently to the reflections offered by my research partners involved with the independent labour movement in Mexico City during the summer of 2000. These comments offer essential insights into the Zapatistas and the significance of this intersection of movements for independent unionism in Mexico. Finally, I examine the broader political ramifica-

tions of the intersection of the Zapatista movement with independent labour, particularly with respect to the lessons it offers movements struggling for similar recognition and projection. It is important to note that this paper is largely a preliminary analysis of the connections between independent labour activists and the Zapatista movement in Mexico. The interviews conducted for this research were with leading and militant members of the independent labour movement in Mexico City and by no means represent the full range of sentiment within the independent labour movement toward Zapatismo. Additionally, my methodology focused primarily upon asking labour activists to share their perceptions of the Zapatista movement with me and consider its significance with respect to their own struggles rather than observing their political and solidarity activity at the time. My focus in this paper is thus centred upon issues of consciousness and perception as they relate to the culture of social struggle rather than the "actualization" or materialization of these phenomena within the structure of the independent labour movement itself.

In order to achieve a sense of perspective on the thoughts offered by the members of the independent labour movement in Mexico City with whom I spoke, it is of value to briefly review the organizations they represent. The issue of greatest significance here is the difference between "official" unionism and "independent" unionism in Mexico. All of the individuals with whom I spoke situated themselves and the organizations they represent firmly on the side of independent unionism and clearly opposed to official unionism. During my six-week fieldwork period in Mexico City I spoke with: four members representing the cooperative, national coordination and the Mexican Network of Action Against Free Trade sectors of el Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT, Authentic Labour Front); one senior member from la Organización Revolucionaria del Trabajo (ORT, Revolutionary Labour Organization); one member from la Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (CNTE, National Council of Education Workers); and one member from el Sindicato Mexicano del Electricistas (SME, Mexican Electrical Workers Union). While all of these organizations are significant actors identified with "independent" unionism in a broad sense, they each have their own orientations and agendas which do not always coincide. The FAT is a labour organization which, according to its own description, groups individuals and organizations including "industrial workers, peasants and farm workers, agricultural and industrial cooperative members and neighborhood community activists" in the pursuit of "justice, freedom, and democracy" and in order to improve the lives of its members in the community and in the workplace. The ORT is a political organization rather than a union which seeks to promote a radicalization of Mexican workers in terms of their social and political activity as well as concerning itself with the immediate conditions of work which face them in the current social and political context. The CNTE is an "independent" co-ordinating committee of the official Teachers' union in Mexico, the SNTE, and is therefore more of an independent and dissident democratic movement within a national official union rather than an entirely separate entity unto itself (de la Garza Toledo 1991: 179). The members of the CNTE have been and continue to be among the most active participants of the independent labour movement in Mexico. Finally, the SME is a national independent electrical workers' union which was among the first unions to declare independence from official unionism and which is now deeply involved in the struggle against the privatization of the national electrical industry. Their history of independence and the size of their membership make them one of the most significant voices within the independent labour movement today.

"A Genuine Defence for the Workers' Concerns": Independent Labour in Mexico

The history of unionism in Mexico is a long, complicated and dramatic one, however, for the purposes of this analysis a brief overview will suffice in order to provide the necessary contextualization. One of the most salient points in this history is the emergence of official unionism in post-revolutionary Mexico. During the Mexican Revolution from 1910-1917, workers and peasants active in the Partido Liberal Mexicano, also known as the Precursor Movement, as well as the revolutionary armies of Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata were in fact largely responsible for the success of the revolution and the defeat of the dictator Porfirio Diaz. Their strength is testified to by the concessions ultimately made by the elitist Constitutionalist camp led by Venustiano Carranza in order to pacify radicalized peasants and workers in the aftermath of the revolution itself. While there were several concessions made by the government to the peasantry and the working classes, the significant aspect of this move was to incorporate these diverse groups into the larger project of "national development."

While the mobilization of labour and other "mass actors" was necessary for the success of the revolution, it also presented the post-revolutionary elites with the dilemma of finding ways in which to "institutionalize opportunities for worker participation" that would be

acceptable to the vision of the new regime (Middlebrook 1991: 3). In pursuing this goal, the new regime employed two primary strategies. The first was the development of a legal and administrative framework in order to regulate labour participation and to centralize political power. The second strategy of the new regime was the co-optation of labour organizations through the forging of a political alliance with the leadership of the industrial labour movement (ibid: 4-5). In return for their compliance with state-set agendas that necessitated low wages, no freedom of association and no labour unrest, workers received certain assurances of job security and a share of the social wealth generated through their sacrifices (Roman and Velasco Arregui 1997: 99-100).

During the years which followed the 1910 Revolution, the social pact which existed between organized "official" labour and the ruling regime, eventually enshrined as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party), operated in a distinctly corporatist and paternalistic manner. In exchange for political backing during times of crisis, a steady and reliable basis of mass support for PRI candidates, and the control of rank-and-file demands and mobilization, official labour, their leaders and even their members received material support for union activities, social and economic benefits such as government-subsidized housing, health care and basic commodities and worker profit sharing (Middlebrook 1991: 9). However, while this social pact offered support to both ruling elites and official labour unions and their members, the terms of the pact remained fundamentally and profoundly unequal. Through its control of coercive force and its "well-developed administrative capacity," the post-revolutionary state and its political elites were able to change the terms of the pact as best suited them. Meanwhile, the labour movement's own weaknesses such as small worker concentrations per firm, low overall levels of unionization compounded by variation across sectors, "poorly-developed representational structures in many enterprise-level unions," and a tendency toward factionalism left it in a poor position to effectively respond to these challenges (ibid.: 9). Thus, a system which ostensibly existed for the purposes of "national development" in fact resulted in an effective and subtle framework by which ruling elites could maintain their control over subordinated groups and ultimately justify their position with reference to an overarching revolutionary vision. This project was, of course, a careful balance between appearance, that labour unions represented workers and fought for their best interests, and the reality, that they existed only within predetermined boundaries established by the state. As long as there were concessions being made, as long as there was even a limited commitment to a reciprocal obligation between the state and the working class, this system maintained its integrity. It was only when this commitment was abandoned entirely by the state during the debt crisis of the 1970s, combined with the failure of official labour unions such as the Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM, Mexican Workers Confederation) to respond effectively to the resulting assault on workers' rights, that the social contract lost its efficacy as ideology. Once this occurred, the bases of these official unions came to see their leaders as tools in the service of national and transnational elites, and workers began to turn to independent action to achieve their goals.

The core characteristics of independent unionism are, in many ways, reflective of the broader struggles engaged in by independent labour organizations on a daily basis in Mexico. Alejandro,[1] a senior member of the FAT, summarized the characteristics of independent unionism by stating that it is "independent, democratic and autonomous. We are independent from the government, from the official political party, from all the political parties, from the private sector. We practice democracy in all the workers' organizations." Similarly, Pedro, a representative of the cooperative sector and the Mexican Network of Action Against Free Trade and a member of the FAT stated that independent unionism in Mexico is "very important because it represents the opportunity for a genuine defence for workers' concerns. We call it independent to distinguish it from the official unionism that has ties to the government party." Pedro also echoed Alejandro's comments with regard to democracy when he remarked that "independent unionism has been fighting for the internal democratization of unions." Expanding upon this, Carlos, a member of the CNTE, noted that there are three characteristics which distinguish independent unionism:

> the first is the search for democracy...we try for a democratic participatory process. The second is looking for better working conditions, more than anything better salaries, but it could be any condition. And the third characteristic is the politicization, more oriented towards the left, more than anything it's people who are more oriented towards socialism.

The notion of union democratization and autonomy is central to the project of independent unionism in Mexico. Benedicto, a member of the ORT, reflected that independent unions "are fighting for democracy, for independence from the political parties and for keeping the union leaders from re-electing themselves many times"

but that with respect to neo-liberal capitalism their work is also much more specific and defensive because "they have to protect their collective contract, they have to stop the neoliberal industries from building a stop-point for the salaries and wages of workers . . . and they also want to stop them from getting the constitution and the federal law reformed." Finally, Cecilia, a representative of the cooperative sector for the FAT, perhaps summarized this amalgamation of the central themes characterizing the independent labour movement best when, speaking in regard to the goals of cooperative organizing and workers' rights, she said: "what we are proposing won't only affect us, it will also affect other sectors of the population, because we think, what we are proposing is solidarity, support, the freedom of association, the right to live, the right to work, and the right to be happy, even if this sounds a little too sweet." Indeed, from these words it should be clear that it is not at all an act of fantasy to draw a connection between the goals of the Zapatista movement and those of independent unionism in Mexico. It is a connection which will become even more apparent upon further examination of the words offered by these Mexican labour activists.

"They Don't Care That We Have Nothing, Absolutely Nothing": Indigenous and Peasant Organizing in Chiapas

The history of indigenous and peasant organizing and resistance in Chiapas is perhaps even more rich, complicated and powerful than that of the labour movement in Mexico's urban centres. Stretching back more than 500 years, indigenous resistance and organizing are constant features of the history of the state. To echo the words of Adolfo Gilly, this resistance should be understood in its most general sense as the embodiment of "*the will of...communities to persist.* The participants resist and rise up in order to persist, because they can persist only by resisting the movement of a world that dissolves and negates their Being" (1998: 264). This sentiment is crucial in understanding the Zapatista uprising and its resonance amongst independent labour organizers and it is one about which I will say more shortly.

It is impossible to do justice to this history within the contours of this article but I do wish to illuminate some of the most relevant elements of this history during the 20th century which would set the stage for the emergence of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. Perhaps the first issue that needs to be understood is that there was no revolution in Chiapas. Rather, it would only be after the Mexican Revolution and the "guided reformism" which occurred in Chiapas, and which created fissures in existing systems of domination, that indigenous and peasant organizing would begin in earnest. Beginning in 1919-1920, class-based political polarization began to increase in response to the politicization of the countryside during the preceding years of conflict (Benjamin 1996: 139). Governments at both the federal and state levels were confronted with "radicalized masses" whose support could no longer simply be taken for granted and whose demands would need to be addressed if the regime were to survive. In Chiapas, addressing the demands of these "radicalized masses" often involved outright attempts at cooptation through the creation of "official" and elite-dominated peasant and labour organizations which served to channel dissent and co-opt support in return for ever-decreasing influence and gains (ibid.: 178-199), a situation evocative of the circumstances faced by the labour movement on a national scale.

While the 1950s and the 1960s were decades of economic growth in Chiapas, it was private landowners who benefited most from this situation and *ejidatarios,* people who lived and worked off of communally held land, who continued to suffer.[2] A measure of social peace was preserved, for the time being, largely through the employment of socioeconomic "safety valves" such as the continuation and expansion of land reform, involving the opening of the Lacandon Jungle to colonization and programs of social and economic improvement organized by the National Indigenist Institute (ibid.: 228). However, these initiatives could not stem the emergence in the 1970s of a "grassroots, widespread, and increasingly organized agrarian struggle" in Chiapas (ibid: 229). Against a national backdrop of increasing agitation, militancy and the inability of the PRI regime to suppress dissent, the rural poor of Chiapas were moving toward direct confrontation with the elite, their institutions and their interests.

Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the rural poor of Chiapas, after learning the bitter truth of "institutional organizing," increasingly turned to independent labour, agrarian and community organization. The Zapatista rebellion of 1994 is a direct continuation of this type of organizing. Indigenous politicization in Chiapas was assisted by the First Indian Congress of 1974 sponsored by Bishop Samuel Ruiz, himself one of the most important factors in the organization of indigenous peoples through his diocese's "preferential option for the poor" (ibid.: 235). Significantly, the well-organized indigenous movement which emerged from this congress was assisted not only by clergy and church workers but also by radical political activists from urban centres who had fled police and army repression or decided that the countryside would be a

more fruitful venue for the emergence of a radical political movement (ibid.: 235). Several political parties and organizations also began grassroots organizing in Chiapas including Proletarian Line, People United, the Independent Organization of Agricultural Workers and Peasants-Mexican Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party and a democratic union movement which had emerged among the state's teachers (Hernandez 1994: 7). During this period, the Unión de Uniones Ejidales y Grupos Campesinos Solidarios de Chiapas (UU, Union of Ejidal Unions and Peasant Solidarity Groups of Chiapas), the Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos (CIOAC, Independent Central of Agricultural Workers and Peasants) and the Organización Campesina Emiliano Zapata (OCEZ, Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organization) emerged in the eastern, northern and central areas of the state (Benjamin 1996: 235-236). While facing both private and state-based attempts at repression and co-optation, these independent and combative mobilizations would form the basis for the new forms of popular contestation of government abuses and elite exploitation and provide the context within which new strategies of struggle and innovation would begin to emerge.

During the early 1980s, into this matrix of liberation theology, political and physical repression, and peasant and worker mobilization, cadres from a Che Guevara-inspired urban guerrilla movement were thrown to add one of the last elements necessary to give rise to the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. Formed in the north in 1969 by survivors of earlier guerrilla initiatives, the Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional (FLN, Forces of National Liberation) had sent new cadres into the highlands of Chiapas to initiate a new front in preparation for the long military and political national struggle against the bourgeoisie in order to install a socialist system (Womack Jr. 1999: 36). Indeed, Subcomandante Marcos, a military leader and spokesperson of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation would recount years later that the EZLN was born on November 17, 1983 in a meeting attended by three indigenous people and three mestizos, including himself (Harvey 1998: 164). In 1984, along with the first group of guerrillas, Marcos went to live in the Lacandon Jungle's harsh mountainous terrain and it is there that the urban and Marxist core of the EZLN came face to face with the indigenous culture and heritage of Chiapas, a confrontation which would force the former to reconfigure and subordinate itself to the latter (ibid.: 165-166). The "defeat" of Marxist dogma by the cultural and historical force of indigenous reality in Chiapas allowed the EZLN to expand and to begin recruiting new members from communities.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the state attempted to respond to the increasingly mobilized and politicized rural poor in Chiapas through various programs designed to ameliorate their suffering while at the same time accelerating the neo-liberal economic policies which were responsible for exacerbating it.[3] Land invasions by independent campesino organizations continued, followed by violent expulsions and repression (ibid: 249). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the federal government of Carlos Salinas would bring neo-liberal economic policies to their highest pitch yet. Even as the government established the National Solidarity Program, a national anti-poverty program "for small projects of community development and improvement," and with no state receiving more money than Chiapas, Mexico was also preparing to enter into a new economic pact with the U.S. and Canada through the North American Free Trade Agreement (ibid.: 251). NAFTA necessitated the reform of Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992. It removed the rights of campesinos to petition for land redistribution and made ejido land open to privatization in order to encourage investment in agriculture. This reform was not simply a blow to the socio-economic aspirations of the working poor; it was also the most unabashed betrayal of the principles of the Revolution and the agrarian struggle of its greatest hero, Emiliano Zapata.

As Adolfo Gilly insightfully explains, the Mexican state community was consolidated through the Mexican Revolution and the nature of this community and the social pact that binds it together were enshrined in the Mexican Constitution of 1917 (1998: 268). One of the central features of this social pact, attributable to the central position of peasants in the revolutionary struggle itself, was that "peasants figured in the Constitution of 1917 (Article 27) with *status* and specific rights as peasants, not abstractly as citizens; a *status* that includes their expectation of protection by the state in exchange for their obedience to the rulers of the state" (ibid.: 268). The significance of this, contends Gilly, is that "rural rebellion ended up establishing itself...as one of the elements with a potential for constituting the very relationship between rulers and ruled," and that once the pact had been broken, "the right to take up arms is once again ours" (ibid.: 268-269). In this context, a new grassroots peasant organization emerged in the highlands, eastern frontier and north of Chiapas calling itself the Alianza Nacional Campesina Independiente Emiliano Zapata (ANCIEZ, Emiliano Zapata Independent National Peasant Alliance) (Harvey 1998.: 253). Indeed, ANCIEZ was in fact the first public face of the Zapatista Army of Liberation (Womack Jr. 1999: 39). For some time, the need to take up arms had

been advocated by people working in the Lacandon Jungle and several communities in the highlands, a position persuasively argued on the basis of "the explosive combination of unresolved land claims, lack of social services, institutional atrophy, authoritarian political bosses, monstrous deformations in the justice system, and the general lack of democracy" (Hernandez 1994: 8). On October 12, 1992 during a massive protest commemorating 500 years of indigenous and popular resistance thousands of peasants took over the streets of the colonial city of San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas and smashed the statue of the city's founder, the conquistador Diego de Mazariegos (ibid.: 8). It would later be learned that the Zapatista communities in Chiapas had already embarked on the path of armed resistance and at the beginning of 1993 ANCIEZ went underground. The stage was now fully set for the explosion of January 1, 1994 and the emergence of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation.

On January 1, 1994 the Zapatista Army of National Liberation seized the towns of San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Ocosingo, Las Margaritas, Altamirano, Chanal, Oxchuc and Huixtán in the highlands of Chiapas (Harvey 1998: 6). Later it would be known that in mid-1992, Zapatista communities had made the decision to go to war "to coincide with 500 years of resistance" (ibid.: 198). In the *First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle,* the Zapatista declaration of war, the General Command of the EZLN states that "we are a product of five hundred years of struggle," explicitly narrating a history of struggle not only of indigenous peoples against Spanish invaders, but of the people of Mexico against invasion, dictatorship, poverty and repression (EZLN 1993) While asserting their goal to advance on the Mexican capital and depose the federal executive in order to allow "the people liberated to elect, freely and democratically, their own administrative authorities," the Zapatistas also outline the central goals of their struggle, namely: "work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace" (ibid.). These demands evoke not only the concrete concerns of peasants living in the far southeast of Mexico today, but also echo the demands of Mexican revolutionaries for almost 300 years. Furthermore, these demands echo, and would resonate with, the struggle of workers involved in the independent labour movement.

"For Everyone, Everything, for Ourselves, Nothing": The Politics and Symbolism of Zapatismo

It is vital to note that in calling themselves "Zapatista," the insurgents of the EZLN and the civilian base which comprises the bulk of the movement have adopted the name of one of the greatest Mexican revolutionary heroes, but also one who was neither active, nor particularly well known in Chiapas until relatively recently (Collier and Quaratiello 1999:158). By invoking the man, his image and his legacy, the Zapatistas are currently involved in a process not only of engaging the national imaginary and reaffirming the "Mexicanness" of their movement, but also one of holding the state accountable to the revolutionary ideals of a man whose image it has actively sought to appropriate (ibid.: 158). The source of the image and ideology of Zapata in Chiapas can be traced primarily traced to organizers from the Mexican urban left who went to work in the countryside after 1968 (Stephen 2002: 150).[4] But the image of Zapata ultimately employed by the EZLN is one which "was forged through the melding of [Zapata] with a supposedly Tzeltal mythical figure," resulting in a hybrid known as Votán Zapata embodying the spirit of indigenous Zapatismo and providing a symbolic, unifying point of reference for those engaged in the Zapatista struggle (ibid.: 158-164). Thus, the use of Zapata by the EZLN needs to be seen as a conscious move on the part of the insurgents not only to employ a revolutionary icon to give themselves legitimacy, but, more significantly, to use such an icon to evoke a particular revolutionary imaginary within the minds of the indigenous communities specifically and the Mexican people in general.

While the Zapatista rebellion took both Mexico and the world by storm, the EZLN was driven back into the canyons of the Lacandon Jungle almost immediately by the Mexican military. While still technically at war with the Mexican army and the state, the EZLN has in the years since the uprising foregone the route of armed struggle in favour of an approach which has emphasised dialogue and connection with national and international civil society. In his article "Chiapas and the Rebellion of the Enchanted World" (1998), Adolfo Gilly explores the bases upon which the resonance of Zapatismo within the Mexican nation occurred. Gilly considers the "adoption and protection" of Zapatismo by Mexican civil society to be based upon seven central points which I will briefly discuss in turn as they are significant with respect to appreciating the reaction of independent labour to Zapatismo. The first basis of resonance emerged from the nationally transmitted symbolic gesture of columns of armed and masked but clearly indigenous men and women taking control of the colonial plaza of San Cristóbal de las Casas. This, Gilly argues, evoked "the historical memory of the country....Indians, those about whom the urban society bore an ancient and unconfessed guilt, had organized themselves and risen up with weapons in their hands"

and through the transmission of these images the rebellion legitimated itself before Mexican society (1998: 309). The second basis, related to the first, is that the word *zapatismo* instantly explained the rebellion to the nation in "terms accessible to all"; furthermore, this movement's right to invoke this word and its history, so often co-opted by ruling elites, was demonstrated by the fact that "entire Indian communities had organized an army" (ibid.: 309). The third basis of resonance resulted from the state's negotiation with the Zapatistas because, as Gilly explains, "[o]ne doesn't negotiate because one has the right to, but because one has the *force* to make that *right* recognized," a principle "rooted in the common culture within which the Mexican state community has sustained itself, above all since the revolution of 1910" (ibid.: 309-310). Situated in relation to these three initial historical, cultural, and political points of reference, the reasons for the "adoption and protection" of the Zapatistas on the part of Mexican civil society begin to crystallize.

The resonance of Zapatismo is not based purely on historical, cultural and political antecedents however. As Gilly asserts, the fourth basis of this resonance was established through the demands issued by the Zapatistas in their declaration of war, their invocation of Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution and their call for the removal of Carlos Salinas and his government to allow for free and democratic elections to occur. These calls demonstrated that the Zapatistas did not want to destroy the Mexican state, they wanted to reinvigorate it with a spirit of deep inclusivity and radical democracy. In the fifth instance of this resonance, Gilly explains that the Zapatista movement "aroused in Mexico an *Indian movement independent* of the government," a movement which has since been materialized in the form of the National Indigenous Congress (ibid.: 310). This independent indigenous movement has in turn reinvigorated the "Indian question, especially about culture and autonomy," a moment which Gilly considers to be marked by a "diversification and democratization of Mexican political culture" that is entirely new and to which other broad sectors of Mexican society could relate (ibid.: 310-311). Gilly asserts that the sixth basis for the resonance of Zapatismo is that the Zapatistas, along with the national indigenous movement, put the issue of national identity back on the agenda "during a period when that notion was (once again) the subject of debate," particularly in light of NAFTA and other globalizing forces (ibid.: 311). The Zapatistas were not calling for an abandonment of the Mexican nation and the identities which comprise it, instead they called for a direct and explicit consideration of national identity, who it currently excluded and who it privileged.

Gilly's final point with respect to the "adoption and protection" of Zapatismo by Mexican civil society is that it is also due to the communicative ability of the Zapatistas, their management of modern media and their profoundly original discourse. This discourse, Gilly contends, is so powerful because it is articulated in a language "of modern images and ancient symbols, [which] does not propose a return to a past either distant or near," rather, "[i]t suggests instead the possibility of a *nonexcluding modernity,* one that does not destroy history and those who carry it with them but, rather, integrates then into a reality where none are excluded" (ibid.: 312). As Gilly convincingly demonstrates, both this set of interwoven factors and the social resonance of Zapatismo to which they have given rise ultimately rests upon the central pillar of the Zapatista movement itself, namely, "the *material, human, and historical substance* of this rebellion: the *indigenous communities* and the *Indian leadership* of the movement, without which the combination [of factors] would be impossible" (ibid.: 312). As for Marcos' role in all of this, Gilly situates it brilliantly in relation to this set of bases of resonance by simply stating that Marcos "knew enough, first, to comprehend and assimilate that substance [of the indigenous communities] and, then, how to be the mediator or the guide through which its image is transmitted to urban society" (ibid.: 312; also see Higgins 2000). Through a complex interplay of cultural, historical and political reference points, a deep rootedness in the indigenous communities from which it emerged, a communicative approach at once profoundly evocative of indigenous culture and yet capable of speaking powerfully to urban audiences, and a political project which challenges relations of power and domination (both longstanding and newly emergent) and seeks to enrich democracy and reinvigorate the Mexican nation, Zapatismo has initiated a powerful resonance on a multiplicity of levels within Mexican civil society.

"They Are Our Brothers and Sisters": The Reaction of Independent Unions to the Zapatista Uprising

In his editorial comments in *The Zapatista* Reader, Tom Hayden reflects upon the place of indigenous peoples and their movements within the scope of the organized Left in a manner that is profoundly evocative of the absences and obstacles about which I wrote in the introduction to this paper:

> while there always has been a romantic movement concerned with indigenous culture, spirituality, and rights, the general thrust of both conservative and progressive

> political thought has accepted the notion of their "backwardness." The Left's tendency has been to place greater emphasis on the working class than the indigenous, viewing the latter as primitive or traditional. In effect, the end of indigenous cultures, however tragic or brutal, was prelude to the formation of a proletariat with supposed revolutionary potential. (Hayden 2002: 318-319)

While Hayden notes that "Marcos and the EZLN have returned the question of the indigenous to its central place in our memory and the organization of our world" I contend that the relationship between independent labour in Mexico and the Zapatistas has come to embody much more than this. In a climate where voices of opposition such as independent unions had been struggling for years against a system which appeared to offer less and less to most Mexicans in order to serve the interests of a few, the Zapatistas veritably exploded onto the national and international stage demanding "Democracy! Liberty! Justice!" not only for themselves, but for all Mexicans. Nevertheless, why did this message not only reach but resonate with movements such as independent labour? I posed this question to my research partners and what I was told says much about the capacity of movements founded in very distinct traditions to find common cause with one another without seeking to subordinate the other to their own agenda.

Reflecting upon the Zapatista uprising, Pedro from the FAT spoke not only of the initial reactions of independent labour to it but also upon the aspects of it which allowed independent labour activists to actively engage with it:

> in general, this event was received with a lot of sympathy, with a lot of support. Because in Mexico, the sector with the worst conditions of justice, of human rights, of the lack of citizens' rights, are traditionally indigenous sectors....So, for the majority of independent unions of democratic organizations, the defence of indigenous rights is a duty, it is principal, and the indigenous uprising was an opportunity to put indigenous rights on the national agenda. In Mexico, there is a very strong folklore tradition, right? The memory, our past, the Hispanic, the Aztecs, the pyramids; a person would have a sculpture in their house, something, right? But when it concerns indigenous rights, the situation is more complicated. So, this permitted the indigenous issue to be put on the agenda, to be put on the list of national priorities. Also, the platform with which the uprising presented itself was a very advanced platform. Politically very advanced, no? It wasn't, let's say, just an uprising. It was a questioning of the lack of indigenous rights and the general population.

The notion of the "Indigenous Question" is central to understanding the impact of the Zapatista movement upon other sectors of Mexican society, particularly in light of the fact that the Mexican state has long claimed a "pre-Hispanic Indian ancestry for itself while denying the rights common to all citizens to those Indians actually living in Mexican territory" (Gilly 1998: 277). While peasants were included in the revolutionary Constitution of 1917, indigenous peoples were not, instead, their relationship to the Mexican state was expressed through the official ideology of "indigenismo" involving the "assimilation and absorption of the indigenous in the Mexican, and the 'citizenization' of Indians through public education, state protection, and economic development" (ibid.: 278). As Carlos Monsiváis notes with respect to the "durability" of the EZLN, "[i]ts sticking power isn't due to the spirit of armed resistance (with its fatal implications), nor even to the charisma of its leadership, but rather to the way in which they have brought the Indians of the zones some social visibility" (2002: 126). Not only this, but as Pedro's comment reflects as well, this "visibility" has forced an explicit consideration of "the recuperation or incorporation of Indianness into the notion of the nation," not as a co-opted and desiccated tribute to some imagined Indian past but in the form of actually-existing social subjects (ibid.: 127). Homero Aridjis (2002) also picks up on these points as he argues that in 1994 the EZLN "not only called attention to the plight of the indigenous peoples, but to the plight of all the indigenous in Mexico, a Mexico torn apart between its indigenous past and its attempts to insert itself into the economic future of North America" (2002: 142). The Zapatistas have not only forced Mexicans to think about indigenous people, they have forced them to explicitly consider them in contemporary relation to the Mexican nation-state in terms of how the indigenous themselves want to be included.

While there were certainly expressions of sympathy and support for the Zapatista uprising from the independent labour movement in the early days of 1994, many of the sentiments expressed during those first days also extended beyond sympathy and concern. Carlos from the CNTE elaborated on this point when he related to me his impressions of the initial reaction of independent unions to the Zapatistas:

> Euphoria. Joy. Green with envy. It stimulated us, motivated us a lot. We were worried, especially at first because we knew the people would be killed, and weren't so much worried about them because they were indigenous, that wasn't so much of our worry at first. We were worried about them because we knew that they were struggling, and millions of Mexicans

> have wanted to do the very same thing before, which is to raise arms up against the system. They identified immediately with the Zapatista movement because they were asking for things, all kinds of things that many other Mexicans were asking for, for example: land, better salaries, health, democracy, justice, and the ousting of the PRI. Everything that we've been working for and that we've always fought for they were fighting for too.

These reactions are emblematic not of instrumental or convenient linkages between the Zapatistas and the independent labour movement, rather, they speak to the deep sense of people in struggle together despite the acknowledged differences of their particular circumstances. As Lynn Stephen and George Collier reflect, the resonance of Zapatismo amongst diverse sectors of Mexican society "responds to a growing sense of hopelessness that Mexicans feel in the face of stark economic realities" connected to the neo-liberal policies pursued in Mexico by successive PRI governments since the 1970s (Collier and Stephen 1997: 10). Furthermore, as Shannan Mattiace asserts, "the Zapatistas offered a critique of modernity as defined by the Salinas administration" in a way which "straddled" both the more traditional class-based argument, in which poverty is the result of a subordinate economic position with respect to the economic system, and the "ethnic argument" which attributed unequal relations between Indian and mestizo society to "cultural differences" (Mattiace 1997: 36). Instead, the Zapatistas' message explained "current injustices and inequality, both for the indigenous as well as for other groups within Mexican society, in terms of political power" (ibid.: 36). This ability to create bridges is a defining feature of Zapatismo and is central to appreciating its resonance within Mexican civil society.

In "The New Zapatista Movement: Political Levels, Actors and Political Discourse in Contemporary Mexico" (1998), Xochitl Leyva Solano examines the reasons inspiring the connection between the Zapatista movement and what she refers to as "*México Rebelde.*" According to Leyva Solano, "México Rebelde" includes "traditional parties of the left and centre-left, cells of clandestine political organisations and 'legal' peasant, indigenous and sector organisations together with non-governmental organisations and civil associations" (1998: 38). Independent unionism could thus also be grouped within "México Rebelde" and there are several bases for identification between it and Zapatismo, including: worsening living conditions for people throughout Mexico; the entrenchment of ruling party power and privilege; the fragmentation of the organized left and its electoral defeat through massive fraud in 1988; and, finally, the "unanimous rejection of armed struggle as an option to solve the country's problems" (ibid.: 38). Leyva Solano argues that the Zapatista rebellion reverberated so strongly within Mexico because it came at a particularly delicate time, on the eve of both the NAFTA and the six-year ritual of PRI presidential succession (ibid.: 38). Leyva Solano also contends that the "convergence of different political actors" which the Zapatista uprising appeared to stimulate should in no way be seen as peripheral or accidental "since the EZLN discourse had always emphasised the necessity of fomenting ties between the various popular struggles that had taken place in Mexico, in 'isolated nuclei,' over the past five decades" (ibid.: 48). As I hope will become increasingly clear, these factors resonate powerfully with the insights shared by my research partners in the independent labour movement.

The expressions of sympathy and solidarity which characterized the reaction of members of the independent labour movement to the Zapatista uprising are not simply the product of vaguely similar commitments or support for any movement which seeks to challenge the existing power structure. Rather, this reaction was born of a mutual acknowledgement of suffering and subjugation as well as a deep recognition of sharing a similar struggle in spite of significant differences. Samuel of the SME described his perception of the nature of this connection in the following manner:

> the first reaction when we saw the Zapatista uprising in '94 was surprise. It was amazing, it was unbelievable. In those days society was numbed by Carlos Salinas' promises of becoming part of the First World, of which this country was about to become, that was just around the corner. And all of a sudden, in the middle of that numbness, they have this uprising, this untraditional guerrilla, an army of poor people that rose up and we just couldn't believe it. There was no background for this, we didn't even know they existed, actually these people, the indigenous people, seemed to have ceased to exist, we didn't know they were there...what the society and especially us, the independent unions, have seen is we have recognized the poverty and similar problems that the Zapatistas have, we have seen them in our houses. We have seen people die from perfectly curable diseases because they don't have the minimum health insurance, we have seen children that cannot even complete their elementary education, and we have seen people and families that don't even have a piece of land to work on. We reflect on that and we recognize our problems in their problems and that is what has generated this astounding response from the people and from independent unions. We have the same cause as

> them, independent unions have supported the Zapatistas all the way....So the role of the independent unions in the Zapatista movement has been really important. The SME has about 35 000 active members, 14 000 retired members, and we as a union had kind of a late reaction. The bases, most of the members, accepted and embraced the cause of the Zapatistas, but the leaders were not so sure of how they should react. About a year ago there was a beautiful encounter between the workers and the indigenous of the Zapatista army....From that encounter we have formed really strong bonds between their army and our union, solidarity has even grown from that day. We have sent fellow workers to give the Zapatistas the service of electricity, we do it on our own, we take the cables and the generators and everything they need and leave them there so that they can have electricity. And most of the independent unions have done things like this to show solidarity like the SITUAM, the independent union of the university workers, they have done this kind of thing, they have sent poets and artists so that they can teach people how to read and how to write and they paint murals and they read poetry to them, so they can have a little of what we do and what we have...the solidarity with the Zapatistas is not in question. There is not a single independent union that dares to question the solidarity or that dares to stop the support to the Zapatistas....the Zapatistas have lots of political authority with us and much respect. They are our brothers and sisters.

The Zapatista struggle needs to be appreciated not as simply another moment of resistance to an oppressive and exploitive regime, because this in and of itself is insufficient to explain the manifestations of sympathy and solidarity for the Zapatista movement. As Samuel related to me, the reason the Zapatistas were so compelling is because members of the independent labour movement could see their struggle reflected in that of the Zapatistas. While there are indeed specificities to each movement which remain located within certain geographic or socio-economic spheres, the relationship the Zapatistas seek with movements such as independent labour is one premised not on vanguardism but mutual accompaniment, a relationship not of the "masses" but as brothers and sisters.

In many ways, the uprising which began on the first of January, 1994 could be seen as the tearing of a veil or the shattering of a silence that had allowed the dominance of the ruling party and its allies to continue for so long. As Cecilia from the FAT explained to me:

> I think [the Zapatista uprising] opened people's eyes to the injustice that has been going on in Chiapas for over 500 years and especially for the last 50 years with the neoliberal politics and the repression the government has established there. So when the Zapatistas appeared, when they rose up with their weapons and their army and everything, it was something very different and very strange in this official control that the government had, so I think it broke with everything that was established before, it was something very radical....It's obvious to me that their struggle is absolutely valid, it's so obvious that it's shameful to even say it because their struggle is for life, for freedom, for the satisfaction of their needs and ultimately for dignity so their struggle is absolutely valid.

The uprising can be interpreted not simply as an indigenous uprising but as an act of rebellion against a system which has betrayed every principle of the Revolution of 1917 and even the Mexican nation itself. As Chris Gilbreth and Gerardo Otero (2001) argue, the Zapatista message is so radical not only because the Zapatistas have sought to open spaces "in which new actors in civil society could press for democracy and social justice from below" but because in pressing for this "the EZLN established a cultural strategy that called into question the PRI's hegemony by reinterpreting national symbols and discourses in favor of an alternative transformative project" (Gilbreth and Otero 2001: 9). In this sense, the resonance of the Zapatista political project amongst groups such as independent labour activists needs to be understood as rooted in specific cultural, political and historical coordinates of the Mexican nation while at the same time inspired by a dynamic democratizing and diversifying energy directed toward re-envisioning the Mexican nation-state itself.

This challenge to the corruption of Mexican economic and political elites resonated with the independent labour movement because the Zapatistas articulated their challenge in a way that spoke to issues rooted in but not limited to their own particular historical experiences and their identity as indigenous peoples. In the words of Samuel from the SME:

> the Zapatistas reflected us in their particularities and we reflected them in our struggle and in our problems. Nonetheless, they were even worse, they were even poorer, and they had even worse problems than us and yet they demanded things not only for themselves but for workers and poor urban people. Seeing our brothers in such inhuman conditions, in such low conditions, shook us, and it shook us even more to see them fight so fearlessly and with such passion...[Subcomandante] Marcos and the EZ [Zapatista Army] in general, they built a new way of talking, a new speech that was fresh and radical and incisive, and this new speech, this new

> way of talking, put us in front of the mirror and showed us this is what we are, we're not the First World, neoliberal politics are not the way, this is what we are, these are our problems.

The notion of reflection is a vital element in understanding Zapatismo's resonance for independent labour in Mexico. The reflection that Samuel describes is not one in which the Zapatistas and members of the independent labour unions are identical images of one another, rather it is one of affinity. This reflection reveals a shared struggle but not necessarily identical paths or destinations. The issue here is *resonance.* As Nicholas Higgins (2000) asserts in his analysis of the Zapatistas' "poetics of cultural resistance," for a Mexican state increasingly tied to implementing the "rationalizing" demands of a neo-liberal agenda, the Zapatista discourse is difficult to counter precisely because it is not a discourse aimed simply at eliciting sympathy, rather, "as Marcos says, 'we are not saying that we want to create a sentimental discourse, one that's apolitical, or atheoretical, or antitheoretical, but what we want is to bring theory down to the level of the human being, to what is lived, to share with the people the experiences that make it possible to continue living" (2000: 371). Through this message, rather than feeling subordinated, activists in the independent labour movement instead felt inspired, embraced, and vital as participants in this shared struggle.

During our conversation, Antonio from the FAT related the significance of the Zapatista movement on a national level by situating it "not only as an indigenous movement but also as a movement for the poor people...the poor class of the country...[the Zapatista movement is a] matter of poverty, it's a matter of oppressed classes, it's something that has been created by the globalization process and by the neoliberal politics in Mexico." Seen in this light, the Zapatista movement is a marker not only of the injustices suffered by the indigenous peoples of Mexico since the time of the conquest, but also for the suffering endured by those exploited by the politics and economics of neo-liberalism and globalization in Mexico today. They serve, in other words, as a symbol, symptom and response to the neglect and abuse suffered by Mexicans throughout the nation.

"Something Has Told Him That His Dream Is That of Many, and He Goes to Find Them": Conclusions on False Dichotomies and New Possibilities

Through this article, I have attempted to illuminate how the Zapatista movement and the independent labour movement in Mexico have been able to engage in a politics of mutual accompaniment. The bases for such a politics which does not seek to subordinate one movement to the dictates or agenda of the other are extensive and powerful, laced with historical threads and inspired by a profound commitment to principles of social justice which recall the hallmarks of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917. Through this article I have also sought to demonstrate how movements regarded largely as incompatible from the perspective of the "traditional" Left can find common cause in shared struggle without operating from identical political paradigms. While a shared history with respect to co-optive and repressive state apparatuses as well as a common commitment to principles such as democracy, justice and liberty and a deep-seated feeling of social abandonment and betrayal certainly form part what makes this relationship possible, it is by no means the entire story.

So how do movements with no pre-existing common infrastructure, no direct links of communication and with different political agendas, goals and tactics nevertheless find not only grounds for solidarity with one another but manage to articulate a relationship like that of "brothers and sisters"? From the perspective of the independent labour activists I spoke with, this is possible precisely because despite all the particular differences between the Zapatista struggle and that of independent labour there is an awareness of suffering, oppression and abandonment which is broadly shared as well as a sense that the source of these circumstances emerges from a commonly acknowledged socio-economic and political system and the elites who benefit from it. In addition, the linkage of a labour movement with an indigenous movement is possible because both these movements root their struggles not only in the specific demands of their "constituencies" but upon principles such as "democracy," "justice," and "liberty" which speak across difference by providing common points of struggle without insisting upon a unitary political project, ultimate goal, or even upon strict definitions for what these terms may embody. No organizational structure emerges from this approach, no hierarchies of either tangible or theoretical nature, and no broad coalition dedicated to the seizure of state power. What does emerge, however, are the makings of a broad front of social and political opposition to neoliberal capitalism and the political and economic elites who execute it. The shared recognition of the vital importance of a radically democratic process within both the Zapatista movement as well as the independent labour unions serves as the foundational structure for this approach to politics.

Rather than getting lost in debates about whose interpretive framework is correct or about the precise dimensions of the struggle itself, the Zapatista movement and independent labour have instead affirmed the right of others to struggle for what they need and in the ways that they see fit without seeking permission from anyone else. While each movement may not support or agree with every aspect of the other's struggle or even upon where the struggle should go, these judgements are subordinated to a deeply democratic process of a politics of accompaniment. In this way, the differences between urban and rural, worker and campesino, indigenous or non-indigenous, "class-based struggle" and "identity-based struggle," become not barriers to a common struggle but paths which need to be walked by those who know them if the struggle is to be successful.

Alex Khasnabish MA, PhD Candidate, Department of Anthropology, Chester New Hall Rm. 524, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4L9. E-Mail: khasnaa@mcmaster.ca

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Notes

1 All the names of my research partners have been changed to preserve their confidentiality.

2 In 1960, while small landholders constituted nearly half of all landowners, they occupied less than 1% of the land; large landowners holding properties of more than 1 000 hectares constituted 2.4% of the landowning population but owned nearly 60% of the land (Benjamin 1996: 226).

3 The World Bank sponsored $300 million "Plan Chiapas," as well as the Program of Agrarian Rehabilitation which operated by compensating estate and plantation owners for lands invaded by peasants, were both implemented in the 1980s (Harvey 1998: 247). At the same time the federal government issued 2932 certificates of agricultural ineffectability and 4 714 certificates of ranching *ineffectability*, protecting "productive," and elite-owned, land from reform (ibid.: 248).

4 In the statutes of the Forces of National Liberation, written 14 years before the Zapatista uprising, the choice of Emiliano Zapata as the icon for the revolution is attributed to the fact that "Emiliano Zapata is the hero who best symbolizes the traditions of revolutionary struggle of the Mexican people" (Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional 1980, cited in Stephen 2002: 152).

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Représentations de l'accueil et de l'Humanitaire dans les sites internet des organisations transnationales, nationales et locales reliées à l'intervention auprès des réfugiés

Francine Saillant *Université Laval*
Marguerite Cognet *Université du Québec à Montréal*
Mary Richardson *Université Laval*[1]

Résumé : L'article propose une analyse du discours concernant l'Humanitaire et les réfugiés à partir d'une sélection de sites internet des organisations transnationales, nationales (canadiennes) et locales (québécoises) dont l'action est dirigée de façon significative sur les réfugiés eux-mêmes. Les auteurs proposent de suivre, du transnational au local et à travers les textes clefs des sites, les termes de réfugié, de humanitaire, de communauté et de citoyen et de saisir les déplacements de sens et les mouvements de dé-territorialisation et re-territorialisation. Les résultats permettent de mettre en évidence la désubstancialisation de ces termes de même que leur localisation au sein de chacun de ces sites. La vision de l'Humanitaire qui se dégage de notre analyse en est une qui remet en cause son universalisme de même que l'intérêt de mettre en perspective les conceptions localisées de ses diverses significations, incluant celle qui émane des organismes transnationaux.

Mots-clés: analyse de discours, Internet, Humanitaire, réfugié, communauté, citoyen, transnational, national, local

Abstract : This article sets forth an analysis of discourse concerning humanitarianism and refugees, based on a selection of the Internet sites of transnational, national (Canadian) and local (Quebecois) organizations whose action is to a significant degree focussed on refugees themselves. The authors propose to cover both the transnational and the local as they search key texts in these sites for the terms for refugee status, humanitarianism, community and citizenship, and try to apprehend the shifts of meaning and movements of de-territorialization and re-territorialization. Our findings enable us to accomplish the deconstruction of these terms as well as their localization in the core of each one of these sites. The vision of humanitarian action which emerges from our analysis is one which puts its universality in question at the same time that it stimulates us to develop our perspective on localized concepts and their various significations, including those which emanate from transnational organizations.

Keywords: discourse analysis, Internet, humanitarianism, refugee status, community, citizenship, transanational, national, local

Les réalités sociales, politiques et culturelles entourant la mondialisation ont favorisé l'émergence de deux phénomènes inter-reliés : l'importance grandissante des migrations, au sein desquelles s'accroît le nombre des personnes réfugiées (Abélès et Pandolfi 2002; Agier 2002, 2004; Appadurai 2001; HCR 2000; Maalki 1995, 1997), et la montée des interventions humanitaires, tant sur les plans transnational, national que local (Conoir et Verna 2002; Fassin 2004; Milner 2004).

Nous assistons à travers ces deux phénomènes au flux des populations, d'images et d'idées qui caractérisent l'actuelle modernité, décrite par plusieurs, dont Appadurai (2001), Auger (1990, 1994), Hannerz (1992), Abélès et Cuillerai (2002), comme un flux multiconnecté et déterritorialisé. Les réseaux diasporiques de migrants et de réfugiés communiquent entre eux au moyen de divers circuits économiques, sociaux et culturels qu'ils développent par-delà le territoire de l'État-Nation comme c'est le cas de Montréal à Vancouver (Clifford 1994); les grandes organisations humanitaires se sont multipliées, ont pris aussi de plus en plus un caractère transnational[2] et elles ont pignon sur rue dans toutes les capitales de l'Occident (Conoir et Verna 2002; Dauvin et Siméant 2002; Humanitarian Studies Unit 2001; Pandolfi 2002; Les temps modernes 2004); leur action est le plus souvent éloignée de leur centre de décision et dépasse aussi le cadre de l'État-Nation. Les images médiatiques de l'Humanitaire sont devenues iconiques dans un monde instable et mouvant (Pandolfi et Abélès 2002), juxtaposant des visions contradictoires comme le point de vue étonnant de l'humanisation possible du contrôle politique et de la violence guerrière et l'utopie affirmée de l'extension transfrontiériste des solidarités entre les humains, et du coup de la responsabilité des individus contemporains qui déborderait le contexte du face à face (au sens de Lévinas 1982) ou celui des futures générations (comme l'entend Jonas 1997) pour s'étendre à l'ensemble des sociétés et cultures à travers une forme plus ou moins explicite de cosmopo-

litisme (Derrida 1997). La dé-territorialisation[3] des personnes (Appadurai 1996; Giddens 1990) et des actions que représentent les flux de réfugiés et de l'action humanitaire transfrontiériste[4] interpelle quant à ce qui advient des obligations et responsabilités des collectivités face aux individus rejoignant à travers de multiples intermédiaires un nouveau territoire qui prendra pour eux plusieurs noms et significations (nation, pays, société d'accueil, communauté d'accueil, communauté culturelle, diaspora).

La dyade réfugié-humanitaire persiste au plan des représentations collectives tant elles co-existent de façon constante tout au long du 20ième siècle (HCR 2000), surtout depuis la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale et de façon plus accentuée, à partir de la guerre au Vietnam puis ensuite en suivant les grands conflits survenus en ex-Yougoslavie, au Rwanda, en Afghanistan et plus récemment en Iraq[5]. Dans les médias comme dans l'internet, des représentations les plus prégnantes nous dirigent vers une vision marquée par la dé-territorialisation des personnes et des pratiques, la double perspective de la perte et de la quête de la communauté et une socialité caractérisée par la fragmentation et la discontinuité des expériences (Agier 2002; Pandolfi 2002). Ce point de vue est le résultat d'un regard qui privilégie une vision à partir des ONG humanitaires transnationales, négligeant leur appréhension sous l'angle d'un circuit permettant de passer du transnational au local et aussi d'aborder l'Humanitaire à partir de ses organisations les plus petites et les plus reliées au tissu social où elles s'insèrent (par exemple, en passant du Haut Commissariat aux réfugiés des Nations Unies [UNHCR] à des petits organismes locaux agissant sur un territoire restreint d'une région ou d'un quartier). Plutôt que de présenter l'Humanitaire et les réfugiés de façon univoque et monolithique, ou à partir d'un seul point du circuit, nous proposons de les étudier comme un circuit pluriel de pratiques et de sens plaçant en tension dé-territorialisation et re-territorialisation. La pluralité de sens et de pratiques renvoient, dans le présent contexte, à des notions comme celles d'accueil, de réfugié, de citoyenneté, de communauté et aussi d'Humanitaire, que nous verrons plus spécifiquement ici.

La première partie de cet article présente l'importance du phénomène migratoire et plus particulièrement des réfugiés dans le monde, au Canada et au Québec, et situe le problème que posent ces populations quant à leur position problématique face à ce qu'il est convenu d'identifier comme la perte ou la brisure des liens sociaux, d'où l'insistance des sociétés, à diverses échelles, à fournir des réponses aux difficultés de cette perte, par des interventions gouvernementales (État-Nation) mais aussi humanitaires et communautaires (société civile) dont la teneur peut varier entre une gestion politique des liens et une éthique de l'ouverture aux différences tout en suggérant toujours une vision particulière de l'accueil. La deuxième partie expose brièvement la place de l'Humanitaire dans l'internet en tant que matrice de discours et de sens, porteuse de représentations non homogènes des pratiques concernant l'accueil, les réfugiés, la relation à l'État-Nation (citoyenneté), à la société civile et aux divers groupes ethno-culturels (communauté). La méthodologie d'analyse des sites permet de situer le corpus que nous avons voulu représentatif de divers types d'organismes agissant aux niveaux transnational, national et local. La troisième partie décrit en détail les populations visées par ces organismes, les finalités de l'action et les moyens essentiels. Enfin, la dernière section inclut une discussion sur les similarités et les différences dans les représentations de l'accueil dans les sites selon les niveaux en prenant pour fil conducteur les significations attribuées aux termes réfugié, citoyen, humanitaire et communauté. Il semble ainsi possible de saisir la désubstantialisation de l'Humanitaire, du réfugié, de la citoyenneté, à travers des représentations polysémiques de l'accueil. La conclusion ouvre sur des hypothèses identifiant les transformations de ces catégories, du transnational au local, mettant en valeur des définitions non essencialisées et non universalisées, de même que sur des propositions sur le développement de l'anthropologie de l'Humanitaire.

Importance du phénomène des réfugiés dans les flux migratoires et de l'intervention humanitaire

La recherche de refuge suite à des conflits, des désastres naturels ou de la persécution est un phénomène vieux comme l'humanité et constitue l'une des principales causes des grandes migrations de populations, lequel gagne le Québec et la plupart des pays euro-américains. Cependant, ce phénomène a pris des significations nouvelles au cours du dernier siècle, en raison des instabilités sociales, économiques et politiques associées à la formation de nouveaux États-Nations après la fin de l'ère coloniale, la fin de la guerre froide, de même que les actions militaires et les politiques étrangères des nations industrialisées (Boyd 1999). Au début de l'année 2002, 19.8 million de personnes étaient sous le mandat du Haut commissariat aux réfugiés des Nations Unies (UNHCR). Parmi elles, 61% (12 051 000) sont des réfugiés, 940 800 (5%) sont des demandeurs d'asile, 5.3 millions (25%) sont des personnes déplacées à l'intérieur de leur pays, 472 700 (3%) sont des réfugiés retournés et 241 000 sont des personnes

déplacées retournées (Haut Commissariat aux réfugiés des Nations Unies, UNHCR www.unhcr.ch).

Des actions humanitaires pour venir en aide aux personnes déplacées se sont déployées autant dans les pays affectés que dans les camps de réfugiés dans les pays limitrophes. De plus, certains pays acceptent d'apporter une aide humanitaire aux réfugiés en leur accordant asile, soit temporairement, soit de façon permanente. Des organismes tels que l'ONU (particulièrement à travers le Haut Commissariat aux Réfugiés) mais aussi de nombreuses ONG internationales, interviennent de plus en plus dans divers pays en guerre auprès des populations civiles au nom de principes humanitaires et du Droit Humanitaire International (DHI)[6], basé sur l'universalité et la neutralité. La formation des camps de réfugiés au Rwanda, au Kosovo dans les années 1990, et en Afghanistan plus récemment, mais aussi les interventions d'urgence comme on l'a vu en Irak, découlent de l'intention de «protéger» les populations civiles et de «réduire» les méfaits de guerre. Les camps se veulent en principe provisoires, les interventions à court terme. Le Canada agit à la fois en conséquence de ses politiques internationales lors d'interventions humanitaires hors de son territoire, et de ses politiques nationales reliées à l'accueil des réfugiés et à leur intégration sur son territoire. Le Canada accueille, pour des raisons humanitaires, à titre d'immigrants reçus (ou réfugiés publics) nombre de personnes fuyant des situations de guerre et de catastrophes, mais aussi des demandeurs d'asiles.

Contexte canadien

On dit que le Canada est un pays d'immigration et il est certain que la structure démographique et ethnique de la population canadienne est en grande partie le résultat des politiques d'immigration et des mouvements de population tout au long de l'histoire du pays. En 2003, il y avait 133.094 réfugiés et 41,575 demandeurs d'asile au Canada, soit un total de 174,669 (UNHCR, www.unhcr.ch).

C'est le gouvernement fédéral (Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada, CIC) qui accorde le statut de réfugié. Le mandat du CIC (www.cic.gc.ca) révèle l'importance du principe de l'aide humanitaire: «La Direction générale des réfugiés joue un rôle important dans le maintien de **la tradition humanitaire du Canada** en assurant la protection des réfugiés et des personnes qui ont besoin d'une aide humanitaire.» [les caractères gras sont de nous]. Les réfugiés, qui ne forment pas un groupe homogène, sont accueillis au Canada à travers une multitude d'organisations (gouvernementales et non-gouvernementales) plus ou moins reliées entre elles ayant au moins en commun une certaine idéologie humanitaire, mais également une variété d'autres perspectives.

Contexte québécois

«En vertu de l'article 95 de la *Loi constitutionnelle de 1867*, la compétence en matière d'immigration est partagée avec le gouvernement canadien. L'accord Canada-Québec relatif à l'immigration et à l'admission temporaire des réfugiés reconnaît au Québec la pleine compétence à l'égard de l'intégration des nouveaux arrivants et de la sélection des candidats se destinant à son territoire : candidats indépendants, réfugiés se trouvant à l'étranger et autres personnes en détresse» (*Plan Stratégique 2001-2004*, MRCI). Au Québec, c'est le ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et l'Immigration (MRCI) qui s'occupe de l'intégration et de l'accueil des réfugiés. Les réfugiés composent environ 25% des immigrants au Québec. De plus, le Québec a reçu 27% de ce qu'on appelle «l'immigration humanitaire» canadienne en 2000 et 31,4% des personnes qui ont sollicité l'asile au Canada, ce qui est la proportion la plus élevée au pays (*Plan Stratégique 2001-2004*, MRCI). Dans sa planification pour la période de 2004-2007, le MRCI prévoit accepter annuellement 2,500 réfugiés sélectionnés à l'étranger (qui seront dirigés vers les diverses régions du Québec) et 4,500 demandeurs d'asile par année (concentrés surtout dans la région montréalaise) (Ministère des Relations avec les Citoyens et les Immigrants, MRCI, www.mrci.gouv.qc.ca). Il en acceptait un nombre annuel semblable entre 2002 et 2005.

Tout comme ailleurs au pays, les réfugiés arrivant au Québec sont accueillis à travers une multitude d'organismes gouvernementaux, non gouvernementaux, ou «traditionnels» tels que l'Armée du Salut, les associations religieuses, ethniques, ou féminines. Qu'il s'agisse de réfugiés demandeurs d'asile ou de réfugiés sélectionnés à l'étranger, ces deux populations ont affaire à un réseau d'organismes et d'acteurs qui doit les accompagner dans leur processus «d'intégration» dans les diverses régions du Québec. La diversité de ces organismes et acteurs, de même que des expériences singulières des réfugiés, suppose des formes de relations, de liens, et de significations qui leur sont données, qui débordent ou juxtaposent la signification universaliste de l'idéologie humanitaire.

Les réfugiés, leurs liens à la société d'accueil et le prisme de l'Humanitaire

Au-delà des motifs, humanitaires ou non, qui justifient l'accueil, les expériences d'intégration des réfugiés sont susceptibles de varier fortement selon les cohortes et circonstances de départ, les régions d'origine et de destination, les services offerts, les expériences singulières des personnes incluant leurs relations à la culture et/ou au milieu d'origine, les attentes des réfugiés eux-

mêmes, le fait que les réfugiés fassent partie ou non d'un groupe de personnes sélectionnées à l'étranger par le Canada ou d'un groupe de demandeurs d'asile, pour ne nommer que ces variables. Des différences peuvent aussi survenir entre les idéaux humanitaires et/ou communautaires[7] des grands organismes internationaux et ceux des organismes nationaux et locaux ayant joué un rôle dans la trajectoire migratoire. Mais les réfugiés ont en commun de vivre une rupture douloureuse des liens avec la société d'origine, au moins temporairement, ce qui les amène à devoir créer des relations plus ou moins intenses avec les membres de leur communauté d'origine mais aussi avec les personnes qui les guident, qui deviennent alors, potentiellement mais pas nécessairement, des «autres significatifs». De l'autre côté du miroir, les intervenants sont aussi nombreux que diversifiés. Que l'on pense à ceux qui transportent leur pratique et expertise en milieu de crise ou à ceux qui accueillent les réfugiés à leur arrivée en pays hôte, ce sont autant de trajectoires de professionnel(le)s ou de bénévoles qui multiplient les profils. Les expériences ici évoquées renvoient au face à face et aux interactions dans l'établissement de liens, ce qui ne signifie pas pour autant que ces rencontres ne soient pas déjà enchâssées dans un ensemble de discours et de significations précédant cette rencontre et suggérant en partie ses modalités. C'est en tous cas ce que notre incursion dans l'internet avait pour intention d'explorer.

L'Humanitaire dans l'internet : matrice de discours et circuit de sens

De par les larges diffusions qu'on lui connaît, l'Humanitaire apparaît comme un ideoscape et un mediascape (Appadurai 1996), et selon notre point de vue, comme une matrice de discours et de sens à caractère englobant et en principe universaliste, plaçant les droits humains et le droit humanitaire comme une motivation et une base idéologique justifiant son action, généralement allant du monde occidental vers les autres régions du monde. L'Humanitaire, tout en étant à la fois universaliste dans son idéologie et sa référence aux droits humains et humanitaires, situe son action dans des lieux précis et auprès de populations précises, et peut se manifester de façon très variable selon les problématiques privilégiées, les circonstances de l'action, les liens plus ou moins étroits avec les acteurs et populations locales, quel que soit d'ailleurs le sens donné à ces notions de populations locales et de monde local. L'Humanitaire est aussi un phénomène très médiatisé; les images diffusées à la télévision des réfugiés et des déplacés, tout comme celles des «humanitaires»[8] et de leurs actions, sont fortement imprégnées dans les consciences de tout un chacun et viennent certes marquer l'imaginaire contemporain (Boltanski 1990)[9], ce qui n'est pas sans rejoindre l'expérience des intervenants locaux qui en sont tour à tour les destinataires privilégiés, les véhicules et les témoins, tout comme d'ailleurs celle des réfugiés qui pour leur part ont eu à vivre le «parcours de l'Humanitaire», de la terre d'exil à la terre d'accueil. Il n'est toutefois pas certain, comme on le verra, que cette vision soit si monolithique et qu'il faille nécessairement conclure que l'Humanitaire ne soit qu'un outil au service de la dé-territorialisation. Le problème est plus complexe qu'il ne paraît.

Enfin, un autre lieu de circulation des images des réfugiés et de l'Humanitaire se trouve bien entendu dans l'internet. Les mouvements sociaux, les mouvements des droits auxquels s'associent des ONG de tous ordres, mais aussi les États, ont bien su utiliser avec force ce médium qui permet d'articuler des actions à caractère transnational et de leur donner leur saveur et incarnation locales à travers les circuits et liens que donnent à voir ces sites. Les ONG humanitaires ne font pas exception, et celles dont les moyens sont suffisants se servent de cette vitrine du monde pour présenter leurs visions, finalités et actions, en bref leurs idéaux et idéologies (pour plus de détail cf. Saillant, Paumier et Richardson, 2005, à paraître).

Nous avons au total retenu 41 sites internet, présentant tous la caractéristique d'être des organismes clefs dans l'intervention auprès des réfugiés et ce au niveau transnational, national et local. Nous avons inclus des organismes identifiés clairement comme humanitaires et d'autres pour qui cette identité n'était pas nécessairement déclarée, pour retenir d'abord et avant tout, des organismes significatifs dans le parcours de nombreux réfugiés partant de divers endroits dans le monde et se retrouvant au Canada et au Québec. Il ne s'agissait donc pas de ne retenir que des ONG s'auto-qualifiant de «humanitaire», ce qui explique l'hétérogénéité du corpus qui rend compte de l'hétérogénéité des acteurs au cœur ou à la périphérie de l'Humanitaire[10]. Les pages retenues des sites devaient nous permettre de répondre aux questions : qui accueillir, au nom de quoi, comment, où, tout en observant leur réseautage, l'iconographie, et les textes clefs comme des déclarations de principes. Pour la présente discussion, nous avons décidé de n'inclure qu'un certain nombre de sites d'organismes (N=13), de façon à effectuer une coupe en profondeur de ces derniers, et à ainsi développer nos hypothèses de travail pour l'ensemble du corpus. Nous avons suivi plus attentivement quatre mots clefs pour comprendre les représentations de l'accueil et de l'Humanitaire : ceux de réfugié, de citoyen et de communauté et de celui d'humanitaire lui-même. Le tableau 1 présente la liste des organismes selon leur position au sein

des espaces Transnational [T], National [N] ou Local [L], et selon leur année de fondation, leur type, leur rayonnement et leur mission. Ils reflètent assez fidèlement la composition et la proportion des sites de l'ensemble du corpus.

Les organisations humanitaires **transnationales** peuvent se classer en trois catégories : (A)-les organisations **gouvernementales** (sous autorités politiques et administratives des gouvernements et financées par eux, mais dont l'action et la portée seront transnationales). Ce sont des organisations de type bureaucratique. (B)-Les organisations **intergouvernementales** dont les financements sont à la fois publics et privés. Ce sont des structures avec un personnel important de permanents. Leurs actions et leurs territoires d'interventions sont définis en accord avec les instances gouvernementales dont l'ONU. (C)-Les **organisations non gouvernementales** qui comme leurs noms l'indiquent ne sont pas placées sous l'autorité politique et s'annoncent en général comme neutres et non-confessionnelles. Leurs financements strictement privés confortent leur position. Nous avons retenu quatre organisations transnationales dont une de type gouvernemental (HCR), une de type intergouvernemental (CICR) et deux ONG (CICR; MdM).

Les organisations **nationales**, ici canadiennes, peuvent aussi être classées en catégories selon leur plus ou moins grande indépendance politique vis-à-vis du gouvernement canadien, leur mode de financement, leur rattachement ou non à une ou des organisations transnationales et leur lieu géographique d'intervention externe ou interne au pays. Nous avons retenu cinq organismes dont deux de type gouvernemental (le CCR et la CISR) et trois ONG dont deux sont des membres d'organisations internationales (MdM Ca et Care Canada) mais avec la différence que la première intervient sur le sol canadien alors que la deuxième intervient à l'extérieur du Canada; et enfin une organisation canadienne non rattachée au niveau international et qui intervient sur le sol canadien (CCVT).

Comme les organisations des autres niveaux, nous avons classé les organisations **humanitaires locales;** les critères pertinents de catégorisation seraient **la proximité ou non avec le politique** et **l'implantation territoriale**. Sur cette base, nous avons sélectionné quatre organisations : le MRCI qui est une émanation du politique québécois et trois ONG dans trois régions différentes (Montréal avec le CSAI, Sherbrooke avec le SANC et enfin une ONG implantée dans la région Laurentides-Lanaudière, le COFFRET).

Qui accueille-t-on, au nom de quoi et comment?

Le transnational

Bien que toutes les organisations transnationales sélectionnées oeuvrent à des degrés divers auprès des réfugiés[11], les références et connotations varient d'un organisme à l'autre. Le Haut Commissariat aux réfugiés (UNHCR) réfère aux réfugiés (au sens de la Convention de Genève) mais fait apparaître la notion de personnes déplacées et de civils déracinés. La Croix-Rouge internationale (CICR) cible pour sa part les civils tout d'abord car elle «veille à ce que les civils qui ne participent pas aux hostilités soient épargnés et protégés, et ne soient pas attaqués». Certaines organisations visent des groupes plus spécifiques parmi les réfugiés, comme les enfants et les femmes (HCR, CARE) et en plus, pour le CICR, des enfants-soldats et en captivité. Certaines organisations se donnent des mandats plus larges, comme Médecins du Monde (MdM) qui cible les populations les plus vulnérables en général; c'est aussi le cas de CARE qui réfère plutôt aux communautés locales menacées et aux besoins fondamentaux, sans s'intéresser de façon spécifique aux réfugiés.

Dans les organisations transnationales, on peut noter deux pôles organisateurs autour des motivations de l'aide : le premier renvoie à l'idée d'urgence, et le deuxième à celui de développement. On veut apporter du secours direct, et surtout protéger les réfugiés des dangers; on les aide à leur rétablissement dans le nouveau pays ou le nouvel espace de vie, on les aide aussi au rétablissement lors d'un retour au pays d'origine et à se refaire une vie. Le pôle développement renvoie davantage au combat contre la pauvreté et à la misère, à la lutte contre la morbidité et la mortalité, mais aussi au soutien pour des conditions favorisant le bien-être, la stabilisation, l'autonomie, ainsi que le développement social dans le pays d'accueil et une ouverture sur la diversité culturelle. Au-delà de ces deux pôles, c'est la notion de Droit qui sert de référence générale à la justification de l'action pour les quatre organisations : les droits humains et les libertés fondamentales pour le HCR, le Droit Humanitaire International et les Droits de l'homme pour le CICR, le droit à la protection égale pour tous pour MdM et enfin la justice sociale et la dignité pour CARE.

Le national

Dans les organisations nationales proches des gouvernements, les populations concernées sont à la fois les immigrants de manière générale et aussi spécifiquement les réfugiés. Le Conseil Canadien pour les Réfugiés (CCR) porte par exemple une attention particulière aux groupes

TABLEAU I
Ensemble des sites présentés selon le niveau, le type, l'année de fondation, le rayonnement et la mission
*** Ensemble des sites (N=13); Corpus total (N=41)**

Organisation	Année fondation /Type	Rayonnement	Mission
	Organismes transnationaux		
1. Haut commissariat aux réfugiés (HCR)	1950 *Gouvernemental*	Monde	Coordonner l'action gouvernementale, protection des réfugiés, résolution des problèmes des réfugiés
2. Croix rouge internationale (CICR)	1863 *Intergouvernemental*	Monde	Protection de la vie et de la dignité des victimes de guerre et de violence interne
3. Médecins du monde (MdM)	1980 *Non gouvernemental*	Monde	Assurer l'accès aux soins mais en insistant sur les droits humains
4. Care international (CI)	1945 *Non gouvernemental*	Monde	Éliminer la pauvreté et maintenir ou restaurer la dignité
	Organismes nationaux		
1. Conseil canadien pour les réfugiés (CCR)	1993 *Gouvernemental*	Canada	Défense des droits, protection des réfugiés au Canada et dans le monde, faciliter leur établissement
2. Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié (CISR)	1989 *Gouvernemental*	Canada	Rendre des décisions sur des questions touchant les immigrants et les réfugiés, conformément à la loi
3. Centre canadien pour les victimes de la torture (CCVT)	1980 *Non gouvernemental*	Canada	Supporter les *survivants* des actes de torture et de guerre lors du processus d' intégration à la société canadienne
4. Médecins du monde Canada (MdM Ca)	1996 *Non gouvernemental*	Canada, Monde	Soigner et protéger les populations les plus vulnérables, ailleurs comme ici. Valorisation de la capacité critique à interpeller les gouvernements en matière d'accès aux services de santé
5. Care Canada	1946 *Non gouvernemental*	Monde	Développement à long terme dans les domaines de la santé, de l'eau potable, des petites entreprises, de l'agriculture, de la protection de l'environnement et de la réhabilitation. communautaire
	Organismes locaux		
1. Ministère des relations avec les citoyens et l'immigration (MRCI)	1996 *Gouvernmental*	Québec	Renforcement du sentiment d'appartenance des Québécois au Québec; présenter une vision moderne de la citoyenneté; affirmer la volonté gouvernementale de renforcer le sentiment d'appartenance à la société québécoise des citoyens et citoyennes
2. Centre d'orientation et de formationpour favoriser les relations ethniques (COFFRET)	1990 *Non gouvernmental*	Laurentides Lanaudières	Conseiller les nouveaux arrivants dans le but de faciliter la prise de décisions et pour stimuler leur autonomie
3. Centre social d'aide aux immigrants (CSAI)	1947 *Non gouvernmental*	Montréal métropolitain	Accueil des nouveaux arrivants, qu'ils soient des réfugiés au sens de la Convention, des requérants au statut de réfugié, des cas Humanitaires ou encore des immigrants indépendants qui éprouvent des difficultés Sa mission essentielle est orientée vers les secteurs de l'emploi, de l'accessibilité aux services et la concertation régionale
4. Service d'aide aux néo-Canadiens (SANC	1999 *Non gouvernmental*	Sherbrooke	Accueillir la clientèle immigrante venant s'installer dans la région de Sherbrooke. Faciliter leur intégration pleine et entière à la vie sociale, économique et culturelle de notre région en collaboration avec les ressources du milieu. Travailler au développement et au maintien de relations harmonieuses, à l'acceptation mutuelle des personnes immigrantes et des membres de la société d'accueil

de réfugiés et aux immigrants accueillis sur le sol canadien et à certains groupes en particulier comme les femmes et les enfants. L'action de la Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié (CISR) est aussi dirigée vers les immigrants et les réfugiés. Par ailleurs, le Conseil Canadien pour les Victimes de Torture (CCVT) définit de façon plus spécifique sa population, qu'il cible comme celle des «survivants de la torture et de la guerre», les familles de ceux-ci y sont le plus souvent associées. Les organismes qui sont des chapitres locaux d'organisations transnationales semblent se donner un mandat plus large. Ainsi, Care Canada ne s'adresse pas spécifiquement aux immigrants et aux réfugiés, il s'adresse aux membres de ce qu'il appelle la *société civile* et ses *communautés* qui sont autant de «personnes touchées par des désastres (naturels et provoqués par l'homme)»; personnes qui selon les interventions effectuées seront déclinées en sous-groupes particuliers. Il perçoit cette société comme un ensemble fragilisé qu'il faut aider à développer des liens pour en faire «un cadre social robuste et vibrant, qui garantisse le respect et fournisse une voix à tous les membres et à tous les groupes d'une société». MdM Ca fait de même en ne dirigeant pas spécifiquement son action vers les immigrants et réfugiés : il intervient auprès des «populations vulnérables», avec un accent particulier sur les exclus et les personnes minorisées ou/et marginalisées (usagers de drogues, itinérants, sidéens).

Dans les organisations nationales, la protection des populations est le motif le plus souvent invoqué pour déployer l'aide humanitaire, lequel suggère l'importance d'apporter un soutien aux populations déplacées et aux nouveaux arrivants. D'autres motivations sont aussi invoquées, semblables à ce que l'on trouve dans les organisations transnationales, comme l'apport de secours direct, le soutien au retour et au rétablissement dans les pays d'origine quand cela est possible, mais aussi, la contribution au bien-être et à l'autonomie des personnes dans les pays d'accueil, l'aide à l'intégration. Fait intéressant, la prise en compte de la société d'accueil apparaît dans les sites canadiens par des motifs tel que la contribution des réfugiés à l'enrichissement de la société d'accueil, à son développement social, économique et culturel, à sa diversification interne (une valeur positive), à son dynamisme. La notion de Droit n'est pas directement évoquée par tous les organismes contrairement au niveau transnational : on la retrouve au CCR (on parle alors de la Déclaration universelle des droits de la personne), à MdM Ca (droits d'accès aux services de santé) et à Care Ca (on intervient au nom de la démocratie, on fait le promotion de la société civile, des Droits de la personne et de l'équité). Le CISR qui a le mandat d'appliquer les lois canadiennes de l'immigration se réfère plutôt à la tradition humanitaire du Canada et à son devoir : «Le Canada est tenu d'accorder l'asile à des réfugiés et à d'autres personnes à protéger en vertu d'un certain nombre de conventions des Nations Unies». C'est ici que le DHI (au dessus de l'État-Nation) rencontre la politique réelle de la Nation qui encadre l'accueil quand accueil il y a. Le justificatif de soutenir les liens caractérise le point de vue national canadien, en articulation avec ses politiques nationales. On le voit apparaître clairement au CCVT qui donne une importance particulière à la place des médiateurs pour rétablir la confiance de ceux qui ont été victimes de torture, mais on le voit aussi dans les points de vue présentés par le CCR à travers ses actions éducatives et de parrainage, par le CISR qui «contribue à forger le tissu social canadien» en participant à l'atteinte des objectifs du gouvernement «visant à faire de la société canadienne une société forte, où l'on peut vivre en sécurité, et qui est ouverte à la diversité et à l'innovation, dans l'esprit de la tradition humanitaire du Canada, reconnue à l'échelle mondiale», par MdM Ca qui intègre le travail du lien auprès des itinérants. Au niveau national, cette insistance sur les liens est particulière aux organismes agissant en sol canadien; on ne le retrouve pas à Care Ca qui agit à l'extérieur du Canada. On voit aussi apparaître un aspect qui était absent au niveau international à savoir la gestion sur le territoire canadien de la rencontre entre «indigènes» et nouveaux arrivants et donc les risques de racisme.

Le local

Dans les organisations locales, les populations desservies sont les immigrants de façon générale; certains organismes ont une préoccupation plus spécifique pour les réfugiés, mais pas tous. Il faut se rappeler ici que les réfugiés publics se confondent avec les immigrants puisqu'ils arrivent au Canada/Québec avec leur papier d'immigrants reçus. Ainsi, le Ministère des relations avec les citoyens et l'immigration, le MRCI, dirige son action envers les immigrants (entrepreneurs, travailleurs et investisseurs) et les réfugiés. Pour les premiers, ils jugent de l'intérêt à les recevoir «sur la base de leurs compétences et des objectifs poursuivis par le Québec, notamment en ce qui concerne la connaissance du français». Pour les réfugiés, l'accueil est jugé en regard de «leur besoin de protection, leur capacité d'intégration au Québec» qui voit d'un bon œil «la présence, dans certains cas, d'un parrainage par un groupe ou un organisme québécois». Le Centre d'orientation et de formation pour favoriser les relations ethniques (COFFRET) s'intéresse aux nouveaux arrivants et il a une intervention hyper localisée et extrêmement concrète (logement, écoles, emploi,

démarches administratives, etc.). Le Centre social d'aide aux immigrants (CSAI) décrit aussi son intervention de façon localisée : «l'installation, l'adaptation et l'intégration au sein de la communauté québécoise». Enfin, le Service d'aide aux Néo-Canadiens (SANC) a aussi un objectif très concret et localisé qui cible les *nouveaux venus* ou encore ceux qu'il appelle les *Néo-Canadiens*.

La question des droits disparaît des justifications de l'action, en même temps que celle de l'importance de la stimulation des liens (au sens de l'intégration) prend de l'ampleur. Le MRCI est le seul organisme à se référer à l'Humanitaire non pas en parlant de la tradition (comme le fait le Canada) mais en se référant à l'effort humanitaire qui est le devoir de solidarité internationale «lié aux valeurs promues de la société québécoise, et que cette dernière cherche à affirmer par ses politiques d'immigration permanente». Le MRCI, tout comme les autres organismes locaux, réfère aux réfugiés et immigrants comme une source d'enrichissement tant sur les plans économique que culturel, luttant ainsi contre l'idée de fardeau que pourraient représenter ces derniers pour la société d'accueil. Dans cette perspective, les divers organismes communautaires (COFFRET, CSAI, SANC) stimulent l'autonomie mais en accompagnant (par le jumelage, la guidance, l'orientation, la formation) et par ceci, créent des liens étroits (de proximité). Mais il faut ici, et c'est là la préoccupation de tous les organismes, contribuer à créer le nouveau citoyen dans ce nouvel immigrant, qu'il soit réfugié ou non. Le «travail des liens»[12] doit donc ici prendre un sens autre qu'instrumental, comme on le fait par exemple au SANC : cette intégration des nouveaux venus requiert des actions concrètes (les ingrédients pour faire «prendre» l'intégration) : accueil au motel, recherche d'appartement, inscriptions aux écoles et garderies, ouverture d'un compte bancaire, première épicerie, achat de vêtements, installation du téléphone, orientation dans la ville, etc. tout en tenant compte des réalités locales et des besoins de gérer la rencontre. «Soutenir les nouveaux venus dans leur établissement. Outiller ceux-ci afin de faciliter leur intégration à la société d'accueil. Inciter notre clientèle à établir des relations avec les membres de la société d'accueil».

Les représentations de l'Humanitaire et de l'accueil

Voyons maintenant ce qu'il est possible de dégager des éléments qui précèdent en rapport avec les représentations de l'accueil, en suivant plus attentivement les significations attribuées selon les organismes et les niveaux aux termes de réfugié, de citoyen, de communauté mais aussi d'humanitaire.

La figure du réfugié

Dans les organisations transnationales la plupart du temps, les réfugiés apparaissent comme ces sujets dont les droits sont bafoués, soit comme population globale, soit comme sous-groupes spécifiques suggérant les figures classiques des personnes vulnérables dans les conflits : les femmes, les enfants, les vieillards, les malades actuels et potentiels. Les personnes réfugiées sont surtout des victimes de la guerre, comme le sont les veuves, les détenus, ceux qui sont séparés de leurs proches, les innocents comme les enfants soldats.

Le réfugié apparaît également comme une catégorie groupale universalisée. Les organisations transnationales n'ont pas d'approche individualisée, l'individu se trouvant occulté derrière la catégorie générique, aussi théorique que les droits qui sont invoqués en son nom et aussi universelle que le discours humanitaire que l'on argumente à son endroit. Le réfugié est en même temps dé-territorialisé, produit d'un système social en totale anomie et pour lequel les organisations transnationales définissent un statut et des critères d'inclusion/exclusion.

Dans les organisations nationales, les réfugiés changent quelque peu de figure : il sont souvent confondus avec d'autres catégories, et perdent une part de leur spécificité en étant associés aux immigrants de façon générale. Le réfugié paraît comme une personne qu'il faut installer, intégrer et finalement re-territorialiser/localiser, ce qui conduit à l'émergence d'une approche plus centrée sur l'individu que sur la catégorie générique de réfugié. Les individus sont alors pris dans leur entité groupale aux titres de leurs droits et des devoirs du Canada à leur endroit, par exemple comme entité administrative (CISR), ou comme survivants (CCVT). Toutefois, dans certaines organisations, comme MdM Ca ou Care Ca, les réfugiés ne sont qu'une catégorie parmi les vulnérables du monde, soit à l'extérieur du Canada, soit à l'intérieur du pays comme itinérants, ou sans abri.

Les organisations locales nous transportent pour leur part dans l'univers des catégories administratives, comme le MRCI pour qui les réfugiés sont une catégorie des politiques d'immigration aux côtés des immigrants indépendants. Le COFFRET, le CSAI et le SANC parlent pour leur part globalement de nouveaux arrivants ou de nouveaux venus ou bien encore d'immigrants mais sans vraiment distinguer de catégories au sein de ceux-ci hormis peut-être, ici et là, les références aux *minorités visibles*, aux *cas humanitaires*, aux *communautés culturelles*. En revanche c'est dans leur discours que nous voyons émerger la notion de nouveaux citoyens et de Néo-Canadiens. L'individualisation est très nettement

privilégiée selon un discours humaniste où il est fortement souligné qu'il faut respecter la personne, le devoir d'installation devenant à ce niveau extrêmement concret. C'est là que se fabrique la citoyenneté mais au travers de tous les éléments qui sont nécessaires à la formation du nouveau citoyen (travail, logement, langue, etc.). La singularité ethnique disparaît ainsi que les aspects de victimisation et de souffrance.

Les figures de la citoyenneté

Les organisations transnationales posent la question de la citoyenneté au travers des droits humains. Pour chacune des catégories déclinées (femmes, enfants, etc.) s'assortissent des droits à la fois universaux et spécifiques (dans la mesure où comme les droits humains, ils sont au-dessus du particularisme des États, des religions ou des cultures) et spécifiques (appliquées à chacune de ces catégories). Les organisations transnationales renvoient à une citoyenneté universelle. Même si le terme est rarement cité, la notion de citoyenneté universelle est implicite dans l'appel aux droits humains dont toutes les catégories qui en sont déclinées appellent des droits qui transcendent les appartenances nationales ou infra nationales.

C'est au niveau des organisations nationales que la notion de citoyenneté est sans doute la plus floue. Si la question de la place du Canada comme pays humanitaire lié par tradition aux valeurs de l'accueil est rappelée, la formation des futurs Canadiens, et donc des futurs citoyens, n'est pas clairement abordée si ce n'est dans le discours de la CISR qui souligne l'importance de *forger le tissu social canadien*. Cependant, on peut voir des différences selon que l'organisation est plus ou moins placée sous la tutelle du gouvernement canadien. Ainsi, la CISR situe son action dans le cadre de l'engagement du Canada dans l'accueil et l'aide, alors que le CCR n'hésite pas à rappeler ses devoirs à l'État et ses engagements traditionnels dans l'accueil des immigrants et des réfugiés, se plaçant au dessus de l'État. Il s'agit cependant pour l'une et l'autre de travailler le tissu social sur le sol canadien. Dans cette mesure, les organisations nationales (hormis Care Ca) ont une préoccupation importante pour l'intégration. Ainsi le Conseil Canadien pour les Réfugiés (CCR) souligne la nécessité de l'éducation du public pour déconstruire les mythes et empêcher le racisme, une approche qui se définit en termes civiques et où la question de la citoyenneté est abordée au cœur de la relation entre les nouveaux arrivants et la population canadienne.

Au niveau des organisations locales, cette préoccupation de l'intégration et des risques inhérents à la rencontre, s'accentue encore. On quitte l'Humanitaire universalisant pour entrer dans le concret de la communauté locale. Le terme s'incarne dans la possibilité de l'exercice des droits de la personne et dans l'approche des sujets (qui ne sont plus alors déracinés, nus, privés de citoyenneté) que l'on s'attache à former, reformer, fabriquer à leur entrée dans le territoire. La re-territorialisation des déracinés passe par des pratiques concrètes, des techniques et des ingrédients. La re-territorialisation c'est aussi la rencontre entre les nouveaux arrivants et la population locale, ce qui se traduit par une gestion de la rencontre et une prévention des effets négatifs. C'est donc bien aussi ici qu'apparaît la notion de citoyen. Les notions de citoyenneté ou de civisme apparaissent comme les deux faces d'une même médaille que la rencontre met en écho appelant des opérations d'éducation de la population locale en parallèle de la formation-transformation des nouveaux arrivants. Pour que le réfugié soit la source d'enrichissement que les organisations vantent, il faut qu'il devienne fonctionnel rapidement afin d'éviter l'élaboration de représentations racistes ou simplement dévalorisantes; situation qui n'est pas exempte d'ambiguïté puisque c'est au nom de la richesse de sa culture qu'il faut l'intégrer et que cette intégration requiert une adaptation, voire une enculturation des normes et valeurs de la communauté locale qui exige sans doute en partie une certaine oblitération de la culture de l'immigrant. La citoyenneté, du transnational au local, passe donc d'une vision universaliste et abstraite, enchâssée dans l'ordre juridique de l'État-Nation, à une vision élargie, plus près des idées de citoyenneté sociale (Gallissot, Kilani, Rivera 2000) et de citoyenneté flexible (Ong 1999).

Les figures de l'Humanitaire

Les organisations transnationales sont orientées autour de la notion d'Humanitaire et celle-ci est au service des grands principes des droits humains et des droits humanitaires internationaux. Humanitaire et Droit s'associent dans une rhétorique et une éthique de l'intervention qui justifie l'action. Les organisations soutiennent la vision d'un Humanitaire universaliste qui transcende les appartenances nationales et culturelles. L'univers de référence est l'universel même lorsque l'on invoque des catégories sociales spécifiques comme les femmes, les enfants et les vieillards chacune étant d'ailleurs associée à d'autres catégories (droits des femmes, des enfants, des personnes âgées). Silence est toutefois fait sur les hommes en tant que catégorie spécifique[13]. L'usage de la notion d'Humanitaire vise à servir de grands desseins et légitimer de larges principes. Curieusement, plus l'organisme est important en taille mais aussi en pouvoir politique, plus la terminologie est inflationniste et prête le flanc à une surenchère idéolo-

gique pour mieux s'adapter aux discours sur les actions et les orientations prônées. La terminologie est criblée d'associations les plus diverses : «affaires humanitaires», «principes humanitaires», «acteurs humanitaires», «praticiens humanitaires», «terrains humanitaires», «grandes crises humanitaires», «activités humanitaires», «initiatives humanitaires».

Au niveau national, la notion d'Humanitaire se fait moins centrale, et lorsqu'elle apparaît, cela se fait de façon moins abstraite et universaliste : l'individu et éventuellement sa famille apparaît, comme dans le CCVT, et l'idée de l'aide à lui apporter s'incarne dans l'idée d'intégration à la société canadienne. La notion renvoie à deux niveaux d'ordre rattachant alternativement le discours de niveau national à celui des organisations transnationales (au nom des principes et des valeurs humanitaires). C'est alors un énoncé qui situe l'Humanitaire au rang des engagements de l'État canadien, de ses valeurs et traditions humanitaires – ou de celui des préoccupations plus concrètes des autres organisations nationales (où l'action est inscrite au nom du devoir et des responsabilités citoyennes).

Au niveau local et québécois, l'Humanitaire avec ses grands principes universels tend à disparaître comme référence explicite pour tous, derrière des préoccupations concrètes dont nous pouvons voir se dégager principalement deux pôles. Le premier est l'installation matérielle avec tout ce qu'elle requiert dans l'immédiateté mais aussi à moyen terme et qui, en gros, concerne l'intégration socio-économique. L'autre pôle est celui des liens sociaux, de l'intégration socio-culturelle en articulation avec des moyens de facilitation comme les activités de francisation et de jumelage. Lorsque la notion d'Humanitaire apparaît elle renvoie à un ordre moral : celui du devoir et des responsabilités de tout un chacun envers les citoyens du monde et en tant que citoyen du monde. L'Humanitaire, du transnational au local, revêt d'abord un caractère juridique (les droits) et de nécessité (les besoins) pour endosser progressivement une éthique de la responsabilité (au sens de Lévinas 1982) traduite en termes d'obligations et de devoirs envers l'Autre devenu proche.

Les figures de la communauté

Quand la notion de communauté apparaît dans les organisations transnationales elle réfère à deux figures qui s'opposent. Une première est la communauté politique, non pas celle des communautés nationales mais plutôt celle de communauté politique élargie au sens de la Cité du cosmopolitisme. On va jusqu'à nommer, comme le HCR le fait, la *communauté humanitaire* ou la *communauté internationale*. Une deuxième figure dessine la communauté des autres, elle apparaît dans son anomie, c'est la communauté sociale éclatée et déchirée que l'on invoque, et qu'il faut retisser de l'intérieur. Il faut alors travailler le lien social, le re-territorialiser, le renforcer.

Au niveau national, la communauté apparaît sous une première facette : celle de la communauté nationale telle que la société dans son ensemble. On parle par exemple de la *société canadienne*. Sous sa deuxième facette, la communauté est plutôt fragments, dans l'idée de segments de société, comme de groupes communautaires ou d'associations oeuvrant auprès des réfugiés. Leurs actions s'inscrivent dans le concret de relations sociales et à ce titre le communautaire apparaît sous la figure des partenaires de l'action. Lorsque l'action des organisations humanitaires et communautaires dont le niveau national procède d'une segmentation d'un niveau international (comme dans le cas de MdM Ca ou de Care Ca), le communautaire national se présente alors comme un partenaire relais de l'action.

Au plan local, la communauté apparaît comme la référence explicite par excellence, première, cernée autour de la communauté locale (notre communauté; notre société) et ancrée dans son territoire (notre région).

Ainsi, la communauté se transforme entre les niveaux transnational et local; elle est d'abord large et empreinte de cosmopolitisme; elle se fait plus restreinte au territoire de l'État-Nation, aux fragments de la société civile puis au territoire.

Conclusion : circuits de l'Humanitaire, matrice discursive et territoires de sens

Notre conclusion nous amène maintenant vers deux ordres de remarques, touchant d'une part l'Humanitaire en tant que matrice discursive et d'autre part l'anthropologie de l'Humanitaire.

Nous avons voulu faire apparaître l'Humanitaire en tant que matrice discursive se déplaçant sur le web en tant que lieu ou circuit de déploiement de diverses significations qu'il peut prendre, significations que nous avons tenté, à travers un cas particulier, celui de l'action touchant les réfugiés, du transnational au national canadien puis au local québécois, de saisir les passages, les transformations, les glissements, et bien sûr le mouvement et les tensions entre les réalités de la dé-territorialisation et de la re-territorialisation. Nous cherchions en cela à saisir l'Humanitaire autrement que par sa rhétorique universaliste et une vision surplombante. Nous avons posé la dyade réfugié-Humanitaire comme fondatrice des représentations de l'Humanitaire, sans toutefois les épuiser. Par cette démarche nous voulions entrer dans une logique de dé-substancialisation des catégories de réfugié et d'Hu-

manitaire. Ainsi, **l'Humanitaire** s'est-il présenté comme une catégorie se voulant universelle au plan transnational et progressivement dé-territorialisée en direction du local. Dans le circuit du transnational au local, on passe des responsabilités envers tous aux responsabilités concrètes, face à ces personnes-là, dans ce monde-là, dans ce milieu-là, en un lieu et en un temps donnés. On note cependant que localisation ne signifie pas pour autant perte de toute référence à la globalité. Ne nous a-t-on pas dit à l'été 2002 dans un groupe communautaire en territoire québécois lors d'une entrevue de groupe : «Vous êtes ici dans une mini ONU»?. Les **réfugiés** passent quant à eux, au sein du même circuit, de sujets sans droits au statut de citoyens acquérant un nouveau statut mais devant arborer les habits sociaux du nouveau monde qui les accueille, de là toutes les techniques de fabrication du citoyen mises en œuvre qui vont à la fois localiser et «humaniser» la personne. Le réfugié est d'abord associé à la masse des sans droits, ne disposant que de l'identité de réfugié puis, une fois arrivé à la terre d'accueil, il perd à nouveau cette identité pesante et fugitive (s'il est un réfugié public), pour rejoindre une autre masse anonyme de migrants, puis devenir peu à peu, dans le discours, ce citoyen, cet individu, cette personne devant faire des choix quant au sort d'une appartenance à redéfinir dans le milieu qu'il a rejoint. Ainsi, la relation à la **communauté** passe d'un point à l'autre du circuit d'une sorte de cosmopolitisme dépourvu de limites territoriales, éclatant la relation nous/eux dans un territoire sans frontières, pour ensuite se refermer sur une nation, laquelle cherche à éviter trop de différenciations nous/eux, puis sur le territoire local, qui est le lieu de création d'un nous que l'on veut enrichi et ennobli par la présence des autres tout en assurant une certaine gestion des liens.

L'Humanitaire, les réfugiés, leurs relations à la Nation et au territoire local, on s'en rend compte, se présentent comme des catégories plurielles mais interreliées et spécifiées localement : il y a bien là matrice de sens et cette matrice a pour centre la question du Droit et des droits humains mais elle s'articule (et se localise) aux autres termes différemment selon les lieux du circuit. La localisation n'est pas que le fait du local : elle agit aussi dans le contexte transnational qui, dans le circuit de sens que nous avons parcouru, n'est qu'une localisation parmi les autres, dont la raison universalisante perd de sa pertinence ailleurs que dans cette «localité du transnational». L'épreuve du local sur le plus grand circuit de communications du monde montre bien que même les catégories les plus universalisantes, comme celle d'Humanitaire, ont besoin pour exister de se localiser. La dé-territorialisation de l'Humanitaire se donne à voir comme une tension avec les exigences de la re-territorialisation, peut-être devenue nécessaire pour humaniser l'Humanitaire lui-même. Il est certain que ces avenues mériteront d'être précisées et confirmées plus fermement sur l'ensemble du corpus mais aussi en reliant les données discursives aux données d'expérience dans la suite de nos analyses.

Notre travail s'inscrit dans une anthropologie de l'Humanitaire en train de se constituer, compte tenu des publications de plus en plus nombreuses qu'on lui consacre, à la croisée des théories anthropologiques du développement, de la globalisation, du don, de la santé, du droit et de la modernité. Il est certain qu'une telle anthropologie ne saurait se constituer à partir d'un seul cas de figure (ex. : une catégorie de population visée par l'intervention ou un évènement donné), à partir d'un seul lieu du circuit, en isolant le local ou le transnational, à partir d'un seul groupe d'acteurs (ex. : sujets de l'aide ou les intervenants locaux) ou enfin, à partir d'une seule logique (ex. : la compassion, le conflit, la catastrophe); la démarche proposée vise à multiplier les modes d'entrée sur plusieurs cas et lieux pour rendre compte de la complexité. Cette même anthropologie ne saurait également se mettre en place en se limitant bien entendu aux seuls discours : la jonction des univers de sens et des univers de pratiques permet toutefois de remonter au cœur de l'imaginaire et de l'agir humanitaire, renvoyant en miroir l'inflation accusée des mots et des gestes dans cet univers. Cette démarche évite surtout une vision de haut en bas, qui reproduit partiellement l'universalisme hiérarchisant des organisations transnationales, tronquant ainsi l'Humanitaire de sa base la moins visible et la moins accessible. Cette perspective suppose l'évitement d'un trompe-l'œil méthodologique. Enfin, ne faudrait-il pas en venir à repenser l'Humanitaire à partir de paramètres non occidentaux? Lors des évènements du tsunami de décembre 2004, il a été répété que l'essentiel de l'action se passait au niveau local, à travers des organisations non visibilisées par les médias et plus ou moins interreliées sur le plan continental. La mondialisation des logiques d'aide n'est certes pas que le seul fait de l'Occident et de l'Humanitaire. Car une anthropologie de l'Humanitaire ne saurait s'élaborer sans la mise en perspective et la comparaison des logiques en cause dans les expressions différenciées de l'aide dans diverses sociétés, de mêmes que des formes de socialité et d'éthique qu'elles sous-tendent.

Francine Saillant, Professeur, Département d'anthropologie, Pavillon Charles-De Koninck, local 3419, Université Laval, Québec, G1K 7P4. Courriel : Francine.Saillant@ant.ulaval.ca
Marguerite Cogent, Professeur associé, département de communication, Université du Québec à Montréal, Case postale 8888, succursale Centre-ville, Montréal, Québec H3C 3P8

Mary Richardson, Département d'anthropologie, Université Laval, Québec, G1K 7P4

Notes

1 Francine Saillant et Mary Richardson sont respectivement professeure et étudiante au département d'anthropologie et membres du CELAT (Université Laval). Marguerite Cognet est professeure associée au département de communications (UQAM) et chercheure au Centre de recherches et de formation (CRF) du CLSC Côte des Neiges. La recherche dont découle cet article porte sur la construction des identités des réfugiés et intervenants dans le contexte de l'intervention humanitaire et communautaire. Cette dernière comprend deux volets : l'analyse de discours et un travail de terrain auprès de 5 organismes communautaires du Québec mandatés pour l'accueil des réfugiés publics. Cet article porte sur le premier volet uniquement.

2 Transnational et transnationalisme renvoient à cette pratique des organisations internationales les amenant à outrepasser les frontières des États, sur les plans aussi bien politique que culturel. Les ONG humanitaires dont l'activité se situe dans plusieurs pays sont internationales, mais en même temps transnationales quand elles suppléent aux responsabilités de l'État et de la société civile face aux populations desservies.

3 Les phénomènes de dé-territorialisation ou de délocalisation, caractéristiques de la modernité avancée, renvoient aux représentations et aux pratiques de sujets et groupes qui ne seraient plus liés obligatoirement par un territoire commun évoluant sans notion de lieu, dans un monde rhizomatique. Appadurai (1996) applique cette notion aux flux financiers, populationnels, idéologiques, médiatiques, technologiques. Giddens (1990) insiste plutôt pour sa part sur la dissociation espace temps.

4 Les termes «sans frontières» ou «Without Borders» naissent avec Médecins sans frontière (MSF) dans les années 1970. Les organismes transfrontiéristes se détachent en principe du style caritatif des organisations des années d'avant 1970 en plaçant les droits humains au cœur de leur philosophie d'intervention.

5 L'Humanitaire contemporain, certes, se déploie auprès de diverses populations et contextes dépassant les conflits armés et la question des réfugiés : les catastrophes, l'aide aux populations minorisées (ex. : Aborigènes) ou très «carencées» (quart-monde des mégapoles) sont maintenant monnaie courante. Toutefois, à son origine, que la plupart des auteurs situent à la naissance de la Croix-Rouge (1863), c'est dans le contexte de la nécessité des soins aux blessés de guerre, d'abord les soldats puis ensuite les civils, que se concrétise l'intervention. Avec la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et la Convention de Genève, interviennent deux phénomènes concomitants : la multiplication des ONG humanitaires et de leurs actions auprès des civils, des réfugiés et des déplacés et l'instauration du Droit Humanitaire International 1949). C'est ici que se trouve le creuset historique des associations entre l'Humanitaire et la question des réfugiés.

6 Le Droit Humanitaire International est décrit sur le site internet de la Croix Rouge internationale (www.cicr.org)

7 Les idéaux humanitaires renvoient au Droit Humanitaire International et aux pratiques des organisations qui s'identifient à ce dernier. Les idéaux communautaires renvoient ici aux pratiques des milieux associatifs et des groupes communautaires qui se déploient selon une logique de proximité et d'intervention d'aide et de soutien, d'éducation et d'*advocacy*.

8 Avec la situation iraquienne, on a pu entendre de multiples fois l'expression «les humanitaires». D'un qualitatif associant une idéologie et une pratique, il devient dans certains contextes un substantif servant à nommer les acteurs intervenant sur le terrain, une dénomination qui les met d'ailleurs mal à l'aise. Il y a là substantialisation de la pratique et réification des acteurs.

9 Toutefois, parmi les actions humanitaires fortement médiatisées (elles ne le sont pas toutes), il faut souligner la place prépondérante occupée par les interventions en situation de catastrophes naturelles et de désastres écologiques. Personne n'oubliera les images du 26 décembre 2004 et des jours suivants concernant la couverture médiatique du tsunami au Sud-Est asiatique.

10 Nous avions lors de la première étape de notre recherche 38 sites comme nous le mentionnions dans une publication à venir (Saillant, Paumier, Richardson 2005), puis, lors de la préparation du présent article et afin de mieux équilibrer le nombre de sites dans chacun des niveaux et catégories de sites, nous avons finalement retenu 41 sites. Nous ne pouvions bien sûr retenir tous les sites existant. La sélection fut basée sur les critères suivants. Pour chacun des niveaux : reconnaissance et notorité de l'organisme, lien avec le territoire canadien, action auprès des réfugiés, référence explicite à l'Humanitaire. Nous avons exclu les sites d'information aux réfugiés pour les démarches d'émigration, les sites spécifiques s'adressant à une seule catégorie, par exemple les femmes ou un groupe ethno-culturel. Au niveau local, notre choix d'organismes fut inévitablement plus restreint dans la mesure où les organismes sont beaucoup moins souvent dotés de sites internet. Nous avions établi un quota maximum de 50 sites. Les données des sites ont été recueillies entre juillet 2002 et juillet 2003.

11 Nous rappelons aux lecteurs et lectrices que le contenu de cette section ne réfère d'aucune manière à des univers d'action existant absolument dans la réalité, mais à des représentations de l'action.

12 Le «travail des liens» concerne ces pratiques que l'on retrouve entre autres chez les intervenants communautaires visant à inclure des personnes en situation d'isolement et d'exclusion dans une vie signifiante à leurs yeux et à ceux de la société en général (Saillant et Gagnon 2001).

13 Notons que les hommes n'apparaissent pas comme catégorie à l'inverse des femmes. Quand il s'agit des femmes, on tombe dans le domaine du particulier alors que les hommes sont intégrés sans autre interrogation dans l'universel.

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Book Reviews / Comptes rendus

Carmen Mozo González et Fernando Tena Díaz, *Antropología de los géneros en Andalucía. De viajeros, antropólogos y sexualidad,* Sevilla: Mergablum, 2003.

Recenseure : *Marie France Labrecque*
Université Laval

Le livre nous arrive du Groupe pour l'étude des identités socio-culturelles en Andalousie (GEISA) auquel les anthropologues espagnols Carmen Mozo González et Fernando Tena Díaz appartiennent. Comme le titre l'indique, le livre traite de l'anthropologie des genres et ce, à travers les récit de voyageurs au XIX^{e} siècle et les écrits des anthropologues au XX^{e} siècle qui se sont intéressés à l'Andalousie. Les auteurs se penchent sur la production des connaissances par les uns et par les autres, mais surtout sur les continuités et les discontinuités dans cette production.

La façon dont les voyageurs et les anthropologues ont considéré l'Andalousie participe directement de l'histoire de l'anthropologie. Le façonnement de la discipline s'est en effet appuyé, dans les premiers temps, à la fois sur les expéditions scientifiques systématiques et sur les récits des fonctionnaires, des administrateurrs, des missionnaires et des voyageurs. Cependant, comme on le sait, la curiosité des Européens des métropoles, et en particulier celle des Anglo-saxons, ne s'exerçait pas seulement à l'endroit des populations lointaines mais aussi à l'endroit des populations européennes considérées comme ayant un mode de vie traditionnel. Les Andalous faisaient partie de cette catégorie et c'est la raison pour laquelle ils ont éveillé l'intérêt de différentes catégories de «curieux», dont les voyageurs romantiques du XIX^{e} siècle. Bien que cette région n'ait pas été colonisée au sens politique du terme, la façon dont elle sera intégrée à la pensée européenne s'inscrit dans la même mouvance globale.

De tous les auteurs desquels s'inspirent Mozo González et Tena Díaz, c'est Edward Said qui leur fournit le cadre le plus explicite. En effet, ils appliqueront les considérations de Said sur la façon dont l'Orient a été construit par l'Occident à celle dont les Anglo-saxons ont construit l'Andalousie. Cette région se prête particulièrement bien à l'application du cadre élaboré par Said, dans la mesure où juifs, musulmans et gitans y ont laissé leur empreinte et où cette combinaison particulière constitue l'excuse pour la tenue d'un discours primitiviste à la fois sur la région et sur sa population. Au-delà du modèle, les auteurs montreront que non seulement le discours est primitiviste, il est aussi sexiste. Comme dans bien d'autres régions du monde, les terres à explorer par le colonisateur – un homme – étaient considérées comme des terres «vierges» à transformer par la masculinité «civilisée», une rhétorique élémentaire mais ô combien efficace.

Dans la première des trois parties que comporte le livre, les auteurs s'emploient à faire ressortir le regard déformé que les voyageurs portent sur l'Andalousie et surtout la genèse et la consolidation de l'imaginaire occidental sur cette région tout au long du XIX^{e} siècle. Ils s'arrêtent particulièrement à la Carmen de Mérimée – qui a fait le tour du monde –, pour dénouer les différents mécanismes de la constitution de cet imaginaire, en faisant ressortir particulièrement l'utilisation de marqueurs différents en fonction du sexe – ce que d'autres chercheurs s'étant intéressés à la question n'ont pas fait. De façon intéressante, ils font ressortir que dans ce cas, comme dans plusieurs autres, l'insistance sur les traits sexuels des hommes et des femmes andalous résulte en des notions de masculinité et de féminité essentialisées qui fournissent un contrepoint aux modèles normatifs – et moralement adéquats – du nord de l'Europe (p. 51). La femme, surtout, représente un danger en raison de sa sexualité supposément sans entrave. À travers des œuvres comme la Carmen de Mérimée, l'Andalousie devient une terre «de sexe, d'amour, de jalousie et d'assassins» (p. 73). En somme, ces modèles ont contribué à la construction de l'altérité de la population andalouse.

La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage s'appuie sur l'affirmation des auteurs selon laquelle les récits des voyageurs ont été recyclés dans les travaux anthropologiques postérieurs qui ont commencé à essaimer dans la deuxième partie du XX^{e} siècle. La culture andalouse semble avoir particulièrement attiré les anthropologues à la recherche d'un «certain primitivisme exotique» (p. 75). Les auteurs montrent que l'œuvre de Pitt-Rivers non seulement est paradigmatique mais aussi que sa monographie sur Grazalema (*People of the Sierra*) a contribué à fonder l'anthropologie méditerranéenne. Il s'agit d'une anthropologie dans laquelle l'analyse des rapports sociaux de

sexe, du genre et de la sexualité occupent une place privilégiée (p. 81). C'est aussi une anthropologie androcentrique puisque la construction de l'altérité va passer essentiellement par l'étude des hommes.

Dans cette partie de leur livre, les auteurs se livrent à une recension des ouvrages tant britanniques qu'américains portant sur l'Andalousie. Peu d'auteurs échappent à leur enquête, qu'il s'agisse de Pitt-Rivers bien sûr mais aussi notamment de Stanley Brandes, David Gilmore, John Collier, ou encore de Jane Schneider. Le fil conducteur de la plupart de ces études réside dans les concepts d'honneur et de honte que les auteurs qualifient d'ailleurs de «syndrome». Les deux concepts font référence aux valeurs morales de la société et sont liés à la transgression sexuelle qui, plus que tout autre chose, vient remettre ces valeurs en question. Or, toutes les études postérieures à celle de Pitt-Rivers ont touché d'une façon ou d'une autre ces concepts qui en viendront à être incorporés comme des traits constitutifs de la société rurale andalouse, l'honneur en venant à former une partie constitutive de la masculinité andalouse et la honte de la féminité. En d'autres termes, ils ont été «naturalisés». C'est à ce point de l'ouvrage que la critique des deux auteurs se fait le plus sévère. En premier lieu, ils remettent en question la notion même d'aire culturelle, du moins dans le cas de la Méditerranée, en soulignant la diversité des populations et des cultures qu'on y retrouve. Ils qualifient de «myopie intellectuelle» le fait que les anthropologues anglo-saxons aient systématiquement ignoré les études régionales réalisées par des anthropologues de la région même. Ensuite, ils montrent que plusieurs des caractéristiques attribuées, par exemple, aux hommes andalous par les anthropologues anglo-saxons, font carrément partie des stéréotypes hégémoniques de l'imaginaire occidental. Dans plusieurs cas d'ailleurs, ces anthropologues masculins n'ont pas eu accès à des femmes comme informatrices, ce qui a contribué à véhiculer une vision doublement masculine de la culture locale. Quant à elles, les notions d'honneur et de honte auraient été incorporées de façon non critique à l'analyse des rapports sociaux. Enfin, les rapports de domination entre les sexes ont été naturalisés et considérés comme faisant partie du patrimoine masculin.

L'anthropologie féministe n'échappe pas à la critique : ses auteures ont en effet adhéré sans esprit critique à l'approche de la Méditerranée comme aire culturelle, une vision homogénéisante. En outre, les anthropologues féministes ne se sont pas gênées pour projeter leurs études microsociologiques des femmes andalouses sur les femmes espagnoles, en assumant que les localités de cette région sont représentatives d'une étape pré-industrielle propre à l'ensemble du pays. À cet effet, signalons d'ailleurs l'un des paradoxes intéressants du regard primitiviste porté à la fois par les voyageurs et les anthropologues sur l'Andalousie : au contraire de ce que ce regard suggère, c'est dans cette région que la révolution industrielle en Espagne a commencé, particulièrement par le biais de l'industrie sidérurgique et textile. Alors que l'homme andalou, notamment, est un paysan, un pêcheur, un journalier ou, depuis le XIX^{e} siècle, un ouvrier, le regard porté sur lui en a fait un personnage marginal, soit un héros, soit un bandit, absent des rapports de production.

Dans la troisième et dernière partie du livre qui sert de conclusion, les auteurs reviennent sur les éléments qui ressortent le plus de leur étude tout en insistant sur le fait que les chercheurs ont déduit les marqueurs de la féminité et de la masculinité à partir de figures peu représentatives de la vie quotidienne (page 159). Ils soulignent également que dans l'ensemble des discours des voyageurs et des chercheurs, le genre apparaît comme fortement articulé à la sexualité et qu'il en découle bien évidemment une forte sexualisation des habitants de l'Andalousie (page 165). Si l'étude de la sexualité constitue un sujet légitime, il importe que celle-ci ne soit pas contributoire à la construction de l'altérité mais qu'elle permette une interrogation sur les différentes façons dont cette sexualité s'exprime d'une culture à l'autre.

Le livre de Mozo González et Tena Díaz constitue une intéressante étude des conséquences de l'hégémonie de l'anthropologie anglo-saxonne sur la construction de l'altérité. Son originalité est d'avoir montré que cette construction s'effectue différemment selon qu'elle s'appuie sur les hommes ou les femmes. Parce que les auteurs se sont concentrés sur une région européenne qui se situe d'une certaine façon au carrefour de l'Orient et de l'Occident, ils ont pu montrer de façon concrète comment fonctionne ce processus que Said a qualifié d'orientalisme mais ils ont aussi pu décortiquer ce dernier au sein même de notre discipline. Ironiquement, les personnes les plus directement concernées par ce processus, comme les auteurs mêmes de ce livre, n'échappent pas aux embûches de l'hégémonie discursive comme en fait foi leur usage, à quelques reprises du possessif «nos hommes» et «nos femmes» pour parler des hommes et des femmes andalous (notamment à la page 176). Comme quoi, et ils en conviendront sûrement, beaucoup de travail reste encore à faire pour se débarrasser des réflexes dont nous avons hérité dans le contexte du discours hégémonique.

Michèle Villanueva, *Le peuple Cubain aux prises avec son histoire ¡Qué viva Cuba!* Paris : L'Harmattan, 2004.

Recenseure: *Sabrina Doyon*
Université Laval

Michèle Villanueva offre dans cet ouvrage un portrait très personnel de Cuba. Les souvenirs et la nostalgie de son enfance en Afrique du Nord se mêlent à sa perception de la réalité actuelle de l'île, qu'elle découvre à travers ses rencontres avec ses habitants. Cette vision teinte toutes les analyses et interprétations que l'auteure fait du système social, économique et politique de Cuba. Le livre, qui s'apparente plutôt à un «essai romanesque», présente une vision contemporaine de Cuba, des enjeux quotidiens auxquels fait face la population, et de l'organisation politique du pays. Se centrant sur une observation

de la Havane, l'auteure nous présente ses impressions ainsi que différents personnages qu'elle interview, et tente de nous offrir une interprétation équilibrée du contexte cubain, des situations et problèmes auxquels font face ses habitants.

On découvre ainsi dans la première partie du livre, qui prend la forme d'un journal intime, les opinions de différentes personnes sur la manière dont fonctionnent, entre autres, la *libreta*, le carnet de rationnement alimentaire que possèdent tous les Cubains, le tourisme international, le système de santé, le blocus économique américain, et la «période spéciale en temps de paix» dans laquelle se trouve le pays depuis la chute du bloc de l'est. Les voix de certains sont favorables à Castro, le système qu'il maintient à bout de bras et les décisions qu'il prend, alors que d'autres y sont farouchement opposés et sont davantage critiques du régime. Il est ainsi intéressant de découvrir à travers un tableau impressionniste ces différentes opinions. Toutefois, l'auteure ne précise pas dans ces entrevues, qui ont été conduites lors d'un premier très court voyage sur l'île, qui sont ces personnes, comment elle les a connues, pourquoi elle les questionne, et dans quel contexte. De même, il est très surprenant de voir dans ces entrevues des Cubains critiquer ouvertement, et lors d'un premier entretien, le système devant une inconnue venant de l'étranger, compte tenu de la pression que la population subit face à la divulgation d'idées politiques divergentes de celles du Parti.

Dans la deuxième partie du livre, l'auteure nous explique divers éléments de l'organisation sociopolitique cubaine à travers son expérience d'enseignement de la littérature française à l'université de la Havane lors d'un séjour prolongé dans la capitale. Elle présente brièvement ce que sont le Parti communiste cubain (PCC), les Comités de défense de la révolution (CDR), la Fédération des femmes cubaines (FMC), la Centrale des travailleurs Cubains (CTC), l'Association des étudiants (FEU). Villanueva expose les paradoxes de ces institutions qui représentent le cœur du système politique cubain et un des éléments rassembleurs et mobilisateur principaux de la population, tout comme ils sont des instruments de surveillance et de discipline de l'État sur ses habitants afin de s'assurer de leur loyauté à la révolution. L'auteure nous parle aussi de la place de plus en plus importante qu'occupe la religion à Cuba, où se mêle la *santería* au catholicisme, et de l'inconfort de l'État par rapport à ce nouveau phénomène. Elle aborde aussi la question des médias et de l'information, à travers entre autres les tables rondes télévisées quotidiennement et les tribunes ouvertes hebdomadaires organisées par le gouvernement qui offrent un lieu où des questions d'actualité politique sont traitées à la lumière de l'idéologie révolutionnaire et des positions de Castro. La crise économique et ses impacts pour la population sont aussi abordés à travers leurs aspects quotidiens, dont le système de monnaie à trois niveaux (dollars américains, monnaie convertible cubaine et pesos), et la prostitution à laquelle trop d'hommes et de femmes de tous âge et milieu social se dédient afin de subvenir à leurs besoins.

Le livre nous offre enfin une mise en commun d'expériences circonstancielles vécues par l'auteure, telle que sa participation à une exposition littéraire, un colloque de psychiatrie, et son expérience du passage de l'ouragan Michelle. Ces récits se présentent sous forme de chroniques personnelles et nous informent sur d'autres volets de la vie à Cuba, bien qu'ils soient parfois répétitifs. Quelques photos, ainsi que des informations anecdotiques, comme par exemple les messages de propagande d'État qui se retrouvent sur les panneaux routiers, ponctuent le livre. Cet ouvrage représente ainsi un condensé intéressant d'histoires et d'informations plus approfondies contemporaines sur Cuba relaté dans un style facile à suivre. Toutefois, l'auteure garde une vision encore trop romantique de l'île, souvent idéalisée et naïve des enjeux en cours. Une explication du parcours de l'auteure, des raisons de son intérêt pour Cuba et de son séjour aurait éclairé davantage la position du livre et son manque d'analyse scientifique. Le tableau que dresse Villanueva aurait aussi pu être complété par davantage d'information sur, par exemple, la place de l'environnement au sein de la révolution, des ONG nationales et internationales par rapport aux questions de démocratisation, ainsi que du rôle du gouvernement local dans le processus de décentralisation. Malgré ces réserves, les lecteurs ne connaissant pas Cuba et cherchant à découvrir ce pays autrement que par les livres d'histoire à travers un récit d'événements vécus y trouveront sans doute leur compte. L'ouvrage recèle de nombreux détails intéressants et représente un portrait assez juste de Cuba. Ce livre a aussi le mérite de présenter une vision locale de la vie à Cuba que l'on retrouve encore trop peu dans la littérature et qui doit être développée davantage.

Martine Piquet, *Australie Plurielle. Gestion de la diversité ethnique en Australie de 1788 à nos jour*, Paris : L'Harmattan, 2000, 253 pages.

Recenseur : *Etienne Carbonneau*
Université Laval

Paru chez L'Harmattan dans la collection «Racisme et Eugénisme», *Australie Plurielle* de Martine Piquet propose l'histoire des rhétoriques biologisantes qui stigmatisent l'Australie d'idéologies, politiques et pratiques racistes depuis sa colonisation en 1788. Il s'agit d'un ouvrage dont l'objectif est de mettre au jour, par le biais d'évidences statistiques et documentaires, les étapes trop souvent rudes de la négociation de l'identité australienne. On y traite de la xénophobie des Blancs envers toute «pollution raciale provenant d'humains inférieurs» qui caractérisa l'établissement de la colonie britannique – et persiste toujours dans un certain discours politique – jusqu'aux revendications territoriales aborigènes fondées sur la fragile preuve orale et picturale de leur permanence sur un territoire spolié. Ce livre constitue un document pertinent pour qui s'intéresse à la constitution problématique de nations et d'identités dans un contexte politique et

social évoluant non sans heurts, dans un spectre idéologique qui oscille de l'eugénisme racial au pluralisme ethnique.

Australie Plurielle aborde trois périodes historiques correspondant aux trois parties de l'ouvrage. Au plan de la construction de l'argument, ceci permet de distinguer les étapes-clés des rapports entre les ethnies et les classes qui ont marqué le développement économique, politique et démographique de l'île continent. Bien que ceci produise occasionnellement un effet de discontinuité pour décrire une réalité suivie, le procédé didactique en est efficace et les références dans les derniers chapitres aux propos tenus dans les chapitres précédents corrigent en fin de lecture cette impression initiale.

La première partie intitulée «La Période Coloniale» s'ouvre sur un chapitre abordant «le bagage racisant européen». Celui-ci vise sinon à expliquer, du moins à mettre en contexte l'idéologie colonialiste britannique, par extension occidentale. Dans ce dessein, l'auteure résume en quelques pages près de 2 500 ans de pensée produite par l'occident sur l'Humain, d'Hérodote – que Piquet décrit audacieusement comme «l'un des premiers anthropologues» – aux penseurs du darwinisme social. On pardonnera à cette section probablement destinée aux lectrices et lecteurs novices dans le domaine de l'histoire de la pensée occidentale son caractère fort réducteur. Or, de telles prémisses sont incontournables; elles permettent d'introduire un sujet qui traverse l'ensemble des chapitres, soit la conviction de la supériorité blanche en Australie sur laquelle «allait se construire le mythe de l'homogénéité de la nation australienne». Les chapitres qui bouclent la première partie sont construits selon une même structure et abordent tour à tour les situations des «Aborigènes», des «Asiatiques» puis des «Kanaks» au temps de la colonisation. En somme, Martine Piquet montre que dans un contexte où ces «étrangers» sont toujours des sous-humains, l'élite britannique considérera qu'il vaut mieux les éliminer simplement, les confiner au statut de «main d'œuvre à bon marché» ou encore les gérer via un étroit contrôle de l'immigration. Ainsi, l'élite répond à «la menace» qui pèse sur le caractère blanc de la terre des «Britanniques des mers du sud».

De manière plus spécifique, le deuxième chapitre portant sur la question des Aborigènes australiens s'attarde à montrer les «effets destructeurs de la colonisation». Les lectrices et lecteurs y sentiront la profondeur du mépris envers les peuples et cultures aborigènes dont font preuve les colonisateurs britanniques. Motivés par la certitude scientifique d'une supériorité raciale, les actes tels les raids préventifs et des épisodes d'éliminations massives commis par les pionniers britanniques sont décrits sans ambiguïtés. Bien que les quelques occurrences de résistance recensées aient permis à une minorité de survivre physiquement et culturellement, elles auront aussi eu pour effet de rendre les Aborigènes encore plus vulnérables et divisés. Toutefois, et il s'agit d'un point fort de son argumentation, l'auteure se base sur l'existence de divers programmes et politiques voués à l'assimilation des Aborigènes parallèlement à ces événements pour indiquer que la violence de la colonisation ne répondait pas à un projet génocidaire programmé. Pour Piquet, il réside plutôt au cœur de l'épopée coloniale une volonté de transformer en «sujets britanniques» les humains qui se trouvent sur le territoire approprié.

Dans le même esprit, Piquet montre dans les troisième et quatrième chapitres abordant l'attitude britannique envers les minorités immigrées comment s'est développé et entretenu le racisme dans la colonie australienne. Ces chapitres sont l'occasion de montrer l'existence de cette attitude dans de nombreuses législations visant à réguler l'immigration massive et le travail de ressortissants non-britanniques dont les Asiatiques et Kanaks sont les tristes emblèmes. Par exemple, on évoque une série de mesures restrictives, tels que tarifs et quotas d'immigration, qui furent prises pour limiter l'envahissement par une «main d'œuvre docile et bon marché». S'inspirant des documents légaux du 19ième siècle et de l'esprit général de la presse écrite, Piquet suggère que l'argument racial, plus qu'économique ou démographique, régnait dans les propos et sentiments aux sources des mesures anti-asiatiques et anti-kanaks. Cette idée, ancrée dans l'idée d'une hiérarchie des races, est particulièrement bien exposée dans le chapitre dédié au cas des insulaires du Pacifique. On y explique que la présence de travailleurs kanaks dans les régions humides et dans les plantations de canne à sucre allait de soit. Ceux-ci étaient les représentants d'une espèce humaine qui, par essence, était à la fois docile et bon marché, sans oublier son endurance au labeur sous la chaleur humide.

Cette première partie concernant la période coloniale se conclut par un retour sur l'idéologie en vogue dans le monde occidental. Celle-ci consistait à catégoriser les peuples selon la race et infléchissait le degré de sympathie exprimé par les Blancs envers les Autres. Piquet situe les fondements du projet de société que fut «l'Australie blanche» en cette idéologie et s'affaire à décrire la forme particulière qu'elle prit dans ce pays.

Dans les deux chapitres qui forment la seconde partie de l'ouvrage, Piquet décrit de manière informée le climat social dans lequel se constitue l'Australie en tant que fédération, puis les positions ambiguës de la nouvelle Australie unifiée en ce qui a trait à l'immigration. Plus en détail, le premier chapitre montre que dans l'esprit populaire, l'idée selon laquelle «l'unité de la race était une condition absolue à l'unité de l'Australie» faisait consensus. La période précédant la fédération fut en ce sens caractérisée par des mesures directes d'exclusion ou d'expulsion de catégories de migrants. La définition de la forme et du contenu de ces mesures était par ailleurs laissée à la discrétion des colonies du territoire. Par ailleurs, dans le contexte de l'Australie fédérée, le pouvoir en place a choisi d'adopter une législation de restriction plus indirecte – plus insidieuse comprend-on à la lecture du livre – afin d'éviter les ennuis diplomatiques. Ce contexte orientera le développement d'une législation nationale fondamentalement raciste, particulièrement en ce qui a trait à l'immigration. Par exemple, la célèbre épreuve de la dictée éprouvée par certaines colonies fut adoptée à plus grande échelle par la Fédération dans un éventail de formes et d'intentions répressives que l'auteure

décrit longuement. L'exploration des rhétoriques politiques au sujet de l'emploi et des marchés de même que des politiques d'immigration changeantes au gré de l'opinion publique ajoute à l'intérêt de cette section dense en citations et exemples.

Martine Piquet aborde aussi de manière originale la question des Aborigènes dans le contexte de l'Australie blanche. Elle décrit l'attitude de la classe politique envers eux comme une «tentative de gestion de la disparition de la race aborigène». Leur destin étant scellé par l'Histoire, si on ne peut généraliser le traitement que chaque clan reçut des autorités politiques ou des grands propriétaires, «tous pourtant, avance Piquet, furent victimes d'un système législatif qui consacrait leur infériorité et leur déniait la reconnaissance des droits de l'Homme les plus élémentaires». Sa description des rapts d'enfants aborigènes effectués jusqu'en 1970 afin d'en faire de «bons Blancs» reflète malheureusement bien cette idée.

L'imaginaire de l'Australie blanche, relate Piquet, à mi-chemin entre le racisme et la paranoïa, fut frappé de plein fouet par l'attaque japonaise des côtes nord du continent par les Japonais en 1942. Suite à cet événement, la question de la population prit une importance renouvelée. Piquet décrit cette époque floue durant laquelle l'Australie dut confronter ses politiques xénophobes à ses intérêts stratégiques. Elle décrit cette époque comme étant caractérisée par l'adoption successive de politiques officielles d'assimilation et par une certaine ouverture à une notion peu développée d'intégration. Ce contexte allait finalement permettre le développement d'un regard critique sur les pratiques et politiques australiennes. La question des Aborigènes refait surface à ce moment dans l'exposé. Piquet montre que c'est dans ce contexte de critique que les Aborigènes ont d'abord reçu une certaine reconnaissance de droits et atteint une égalité dans les faits. En témoigne la disposition de 1965 qui établissait l'égalité des salaires dans les exploitations d'élevage où bon nombre d'Aborigènes étaient confinés. Par contre, elle note que même dans cette nouvelle ère de l'intégration des minorités qui commençait, les «clauses échappatoires» dans de telles politiques n'étaient pas rares. Un exemple de celles-ci est la clause sur les «travailleurs lents» qui ponctue la disposition sur l'égalité salariale...Comme quoi la politique de l'Australie blanche n'était pas chose du passé dans la seconde moitié du 20ième siècle. Une pléthore de remarques de la sorte assaisonne l'ouvrage d'éléments frappants qui rendent la lecture de cette seconde partie passionnante.

Alors que les deux première sections situent les grands courants idéologiques au cœur des politiques et pratiques en matière de gestion de la diversité culturelle en Australie, la troisième partie s'ouvre sur un axe différent. L'auteure nous entretiendra dans cette section finale sur les influences qu'ont eu les partis, voire les hommes politiques au pouvoir, dans les nouvelles positions officielles concernant les questions des minorités et de l'immigration. Le premier chapitre fait en ce sens l'histoire de la politique multiculturaliste de l'Australie à la lumière de ces influences. Derrière une certaine lourdeur induite par un nombre important de citations et de références qui peuvent étourdir les lectrices et lecteurs non-initiés au système politico-électoral australien et son histoire récente, ce chapitre a l'avantage de bien montrer en quoi d'une part des ruptures idéologiques s'effectuent pendant la montée de l'idée du multiculturalisme alors que d'autre part certaines tensions eugénistes perdurent. Ceci eut pour effet et résultat de créer un contexte dans lequel partisans et négateurs du multiculturalisme se succédèrent au pouvoir. Piquet montre qu'encore à cette époque, le principal facteur qui fait varier l'opinion publique en ce qui a trait au multiculturalisme est bien l'état de l'économie nationale. En guise d'exemple, le parti travailliste au pouvoir durant la crise économique du début des années 1980 dut réviser ses positions axées vers la mise en pratique du multiculturalisme en coupant dans ses programmes clés du domaine de l'intégration des minorités. Ce fait confirme que la position de l'État sur les questions relatives au multiculturalisme en Australie, jusqu'à récemment, relève plus de stratégies économiques et électoralistes que d'une véritable position éthique, du moins en ce qui concerne l'identité politique et les stratégies diplomatiques australiennes. Le second chapitre appuie ainsi cette assertion avec la description de certains faits concernant les législations contemporaines sur les droits d'asile.

Le troisième et dernier chapitre de cette partie est consacré à la situation des Aborigènes au temps du multiculturalisme. L'autodétermination, la réconciliation et la réparation y sont les trois éléments discutés en profondeur. De la même manière dont furent abordées les situations des autres minorités des colonies, puis de la fédération australienne, Piquet discute de la question aborigène surtout à partir de la perspective des lois, décrets et débats politiques la régissant officiellement. Bien que l'argumentaire soit en continuité avec le style développé au cours de l'ouvrage, il aurait été souhaitable d'ancrer davantage les propos dans les discours exprimant les revendications soulevées par les Aborigènes et les groupes les supportant. Il n'en demeure pas moins que l'ensemble de la troisième et dernière partie de cet ouvrage constitue une source de données importante et articulée habilement qui mène au constat qu'en Australie, bien que dans l'opinion publique et les programmes politiques l'idée du multiculturalisme ait bien fait son nid, la réalité des populations historiquement exclues de la constitution de la nation demeure déplorable, celle des Aborigènes faisant particulièrement triste figure.

En somme, Piquet signe un ouvrage admirablement documenté bien que parfois lourd de statistiques et de citations. Il offrira aux lectrices et lecteurs du milieu académique une excellente introduction à la question de la diversité culturelle telle que gérée du point de vue d'une rationalité politique issue du régime britannique, mais dont la particularité australienne reste le point focal. On déplorera en ce sens que les quelques passages comparant ces questions avec les situations étasuniennes et canadiennes ne soient pas plus développés. Par ailleurs, les lectrices et lecteurs en général y trouveront un document qui relate une histoire peu racontée qui est celle des

incidences et contrecoups contemporains du choc de la rencontre passée entre deux mondes éminemment différents.

Béatrice Kasbarian-Bricourt, *Les Amérindiens du Québec. Les héritiers de la Terre-Mère*, Paris : L'Harmattan, 2003, 117 pages.

Recenseur : *Martin Hébert*
Université Laval

La première chose qui frappe le lecteur de cet ouvrage est la disjonction importante et évidente qui existe entre les intentions explicites de son auteur et la présentation qui y est faite des sociétés amérindiennes. D'entrée de jeu, l'auteur affirme, en parlant des pages qui viennent que «Ces incursions dans le monde amérindien n'entendent pas se payer de phrases creuses; elles essaient de dépouiller les non-indiens de leurs idées reçues et de leurs certitudes face au plus affolant mystère, celui de la nature que les Amérindiens tutoient quotidiennement» (p. 7). En quatrième de couverture on nous annonce, dans une formulation également un peu énigmatique, que l'ouvrage vise à souligner «les valeurs initiales des Amérindiens» et de les «prendre en compte». Or, dès le premier chapitre du livre, force est de constater que la montagne iconoclaste et porteuse d'une meilleure compréhension des réalités autochtones promise n'accouche, en fait, que d'une monographie à tiroirs.

Ce premier chapitre de mise en contexte est, par ailleurs, truffé d'erreurs factuelles qui se succèdent à un rythme tel qu'il n'est plus justifié de parler de simples coquilles. L'auteur nous apprend, par exemple, que «de nombreux historiens» soutiennent la thèse d'une traversée du détroit de Behring «il y a 10 millions d'années» (p. 9), qu'il existerait une famille culturelle «iriquoïenne» (p. 10), que les Cris du Québec ne compteraient que «1 200 personnes» (p. 11), qu'il existerait une «tribu» d' «Hurons-Wandats» (p. 11), de même que les Français seraient arrivés au Québec en 1648 (p. 12). Malheureusement, le rythme des erreurs factuelles, approximations et coquilles en tous genres ne s'atténue pas au fil des chapitres.

Le chapitre de mise en contexte, de même que le titre du livre, nous annoncent qu'il sera question des Amérindiens du Québec. Cependant, on constate une fâcheuse tendance du texte à oublier de prendre en compte les limites de l'aire géographique dont il est question et à dévier sur des affirmations qui frisent l'absurde; par exemple lorsque l'on apprend que «pour leur habitation les Amérindiens du nord utilisent des matériaux adaptés à leur environnement tels [...] les feuilles de palmier» (p. 15). Il est également question de consommation d'avocats pour contrer les carences vitaminiques (p. 36), ou de «pulpe de cactus» comme source d'eau (p. 37), de chasse au bison (p. 51), de *potlatch* (p. 65), ou encore de peyotl (p. 101).

Contrairement à ce que le titre du livre pourrait laisser croire, l'unité de cette présentation n'est donc pas géographique. En bout de ligne, et malgré les ambitions humanistes de l'auteur, le fil conducteur de cet ouvrage demeure une quête et une mise en vitrine de l'exotique. L'auteur exhibe des pratiques qu'elle qualifie de «curieuses» (p. 26 et p. 67) sans les lier à des systèmes de sens. Elle s'attarde sur les pratiques sexuelles, la préparation des scalps, les poupées aux attributs phalliques, les lambeaux de chair qui pendent dans les rituels d'automutilation et pratiquement tous les autres tropes qui faisaient retrousser les orteils aux lecteurs de récits de voyage au XIX^{e} siècle.

L'auteur tente de légitimer son intervention et de s'attribuer une position d'autorité en écrivant que «si, pour les habitants de l'Amérique du Nord il est difficile d'être objectif lorsqu'on parle des premiers habitants de cette partie du monde, il en est tout autrement pour les Européens» (p. 7). Outre le fait que les bases épistémologiques de cette affirmation soient pour le moins douteuses, il semble clair dans le cas présent que la distance par rapport au sujet discuté n'a pas porté les fruits promis par l'auteur. À nombre de pages comparable (c'est-à-dire environ une centaine), les lecteurs cherchant une introduction aux réalités amérindiennes du Québec qui soit au diapason des perspectives théoriques et méthodologiques actuelles et non à celui d'un exotisme malsain et dépassé auraient tout avantage à commencer leur exploration par des publications comme *Mythes et réalités sur les peuples autochtones* de Pierre Lepage (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse du Québec, 2002) ou lire quelques chapitres d'un ouvrage d'Olive Patricia Dickason.

Kenneth M. Bauer, *High Frontiers: Dolpo and the Changing World of Himalayan Pastoralists,*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

Reviewer: *Sharon Hepburn*
Trent University

In *High Frontiers*, Bauer presents an ecological history of Dolpo, a remote region in the high Himalaya just south of the border between Nepal and the Tibet Autonomous Region (China). He traces developments in the lives of Dolpo agro-pastoralists through the changes wrought by successive political waves in both Nepal and China. Although Bauer's work grew out of his training and work in ecology and development, particularly for the WWF in Nepal, it is also based on ethnographic research in Dolpo from 1996-97, and archival work on the histories of Nepal and Tibet. The fruits of this multidisciplinary methodology and approach are readily apparent in this account of social adaptation to political and ecological change that takes full account of wider processes, yet remains rooted in the details and conditions of daily life. For anthropologists, the book offers an interesting and highly readable account of the effects of large-scale transnational and state processes on the daily lives of people concerned with yaks, trade and wresting crops from the steppe.

Chapter 1, "Dolpo's Agro-Pastoral System," gives a sense of daily life in the harsh climate and marginal physical environment of Dolpo, circa 1997. In what is perhaps the most ethnographic chapter of the book, Bauer describes a triad of interrelated and overlapping forms of production—agriculture, animal husbandry and trade—linking these to daily household practices, and to a religious and ceremonial life closely tied to subsistence concerns. The second chapter, "Pastoralism in View and Review," considers the situation in Dolpo in terms of two influential approaches in academic interpretations of pastoralism, the first giving analytic primacy to social organization, the second giving primacy to the workings of ecological relations. Drawing from both approaches, Bauer contextualizes Dolpo herding practices and rangeland management strategies as variations of general types of subsistence patterns found elsewhere. Through this description, he questions assumptions commonly made, for example, in discussions of the "tragedy of the commons" by showing how the commons in Dolpo is not exploited through capricious acts of self-interest, but is instead regulated through a variety of cooperative social practices such as lotteries (administered by religious specialists) in which all have a chance at the best pastureland, and others take their turn making do with less desirable ranges. Likewise, he describes how collective labour groups ensure the equitable distribution of essential commodities gathered from the commons, like dung (fuel).

Chapter 3, "A sketch of Dolpo's History," is based largely on archival and published sources, and sets the stage for the following two chapters by describing Dolpo's changing relationship with neighbouring populations from 650 to 1950, and by demonstrating how similarly lengthy and fluctuating relationships between (what are now) India, China, Tibet and Nepal influenced the region, particularly in terms of trans-border trade and pastoral movement.

Chapters 4, "A New World Order in Tibet," and 5, "Nepal's Relations with its Border Populations and the Case of Dolpo," describe how the Tibet Autonomous Region (China) on the one side, and the Nepalese state on the other have influenced Dolpo livelihoods since the 1950s. These two parallel chapters describe how critical events in state manoeuvrings and policy-making had dramatic influences on centuries-old subsistence patterns. Chapter 4 (based on the published scholarly work), for example, describes how Chairman Mao's successive campaigns to unify and reorganize China and repress resistance, resulted in changes in transportation, settlement and the organization of agricultural production that disrupted and all but severed Dolpo-pa patterns of seasonal grazing and trade in Western Tibet. Chapter 5, for example, outlines how during the same time period the Nepalese state's changing political systems and policies regarding border areas, and the establishment of borders drawn by politicians in response to international negotiations, disrupted trade and economic relations based on kinship, language, culture and ecology in which such arbitrary lines had not previously figured.

In Chapter 6, "The Wheel is Broken," Bauer shifts his discussion from wide-scale political processes to the effects of these on daily life in Dolpo. He demonstrates how Dolpo-pa variously adapted to two significant alterations in their ecological situation wrought by the political changes outlined in earlier chapters. The first, the closing of the Nepalese-Tibetan border, forced pastoralists to seek alternative winter pastures and rework their trade-based economy, while the second, the influx of Tibetan refugees and their animals, precipitated a rangeland crisis. These events led to a reconfiguration of both economic strategies and the social networks which facilitate them. The new practice involved turning south for trade partners and grazing land, linking Dolpo-pa more closely than before with their (Hindu) Nepalese neighbours.

Chapter 7, "Visions of Dolpo," critically examines the conservation and development initiatives undertaken by the Nepalese state, international aid agencies and nongovernmental organizations since the 1960s, as the agro-pastoralists themselves were seeking productive solutions to the new, politically derived changes in circumstance and opportunity. Bauer argues that the Nepalese government's policies and disposition towards local people has undermined the efficacy of livestock development, and he uses Dolpo as a test case to argue against the applicability of Western range management techniques (such as the "carrying capacity" approach) to pastoral areas, specifically those with a dynamic, non-equilibrium system like Dolpo's.

Chapter 8, "A Tsampa western," is a surprising but interesting and non-unrelated diversion from the major themes of the book. Bauer considers the long and short-term consequences for the people of Dolpo of the production of the Academy Award-nominated film *Himalaya* (shown as *Caravan* in Nepal). Bauer relates the film to the representations of Tibet and Tibetanness perpetuated by the popular media that the film both trades in and reproduces, and argues that the result is a film which is inaccurate and which better reflects the motives, imaginations and interests of the producers than the lives of Dolpo-pa. Based on personal observations and interviews in Dolpo, Bauer points most tellingly to the negotiations around the film which the Dolpo-pa and producers entered into with different expectations and terms of cultural reference: the former assumed a community-based, verbally legitimated understanding of negotiations and economic relations; the latter's argument reflected individualistic and literacy-based conceptions of economic relationship and responsibility. The last chapter provides some general "Perspectives on Change," and Bauer contemplates the future, and speculates on which forces—political and ecological—will prove decisive in shaping the future of the Dolpo economy and way of life.

Bauer's clear affection for the place and people of Dolpo comes clearly through, but so also does a recurring negative tone when describing China's policies. Many readers might be in full sympathy, and to many this would go unnoticed. In so casting parts of his account, Bauer seems to be participating

in the very practices of pro-Tibet/Tibetanness (and implied anti-China/Chineseness) that he presents as having problematic outcomes in the production of *Himalaya*. Nonetheless, the text presents a well-grounded account of resourcefulness and adaptation in an environment that is indeed marginal, both politically and ecologically. Bauer's presentation is far from the romantic accounts, or the scholarly accounts focussed on religious practices, as opposed to the everyday struggle to make a living, and so is a welcome addition to the ethnography of the Himalayan region in particular, and the study of interactions between culture, politics and environment in general.

Michael E. Harkin (ed.), *Reassessing Revitalization Movements: Perspectives from North America and the Pacific Islands*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004.

Reviewer: *John Barker*
University of British Columbia

In 1956, Anthony F.C. Wallace introduced the concept of "revitalization" to draw attention to what he perceived as "a uniform process" underlying such apparently diverse religious and political movements as Christian revivals, utopian communities, cargo cults and revolutions (1956: 264). Around the same time and into the 1960s, other sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists introduced their own schemes and terminologies, although few surpassed Wallace's model in terms of its empirical and theoretical ambitions. While "revitalization movement" has gained some limited popularity as a general label for religious movements, particularly among North American ethnohistorians, the concept remains closely associated with Wallace, whose elegant study of the Handsome Lake movement amongst the Iroquois provides its primary exemplar (Wallace 1970). The "reassessing" in *Reassessing Revitalization Movements* thus carries a double load: it refers to the extension of Wallace's model into the new terrain of Oceanic movements where it has rarely been applied and it refers to a critical re-examination of the model itself.

The book is comprised of a short graciously written Foreword by Wallace, an Introduction by Michael E. Harkin and twelve case studies. The first of the descriptive chapters, running to more than 60 pages, is a *tour de force* by Maria Lepowsky that juxtaposes a detailed analysis of a 1785 mission Indian uprising in Spanish California with reflections on cargo cult activities in eastern Papua New Guinea that first appeared in the 1880s. The remaining chapters rotate between Native North America and the Pacific Islands, examining movements that date from the late 18th century to the present. All but two of the contributors are anthropologists, but all make excellent use of documentary and oral evidence to present fine-grained historical perspectives on these varied movements.

The case studies are uniformly excellent, written in engaging prose at a high level of theoretical sophistication. Taken on their own, they are worth the price of admission. The juxtaposition of studies from the two regions is often very revealing, especially as one moves closer to the present. That said, readers who come to the volume expecting to find a sustained engagement with revitalization theory or the creation of an updated comparative framework based on it will be disappointed. All of the authors use revitalization movement as a general label and all comment upon aspects of Wallace's 1956 model. This provides the chapters with a common touchstone. Yet only three of the authors actually attempt to update and apply the model as an analytic tool and even then only in the most general way. Everyone is very polite. Jennifer S.H. Brown's comments on the relevance of revitalization theory for an appreciation of an early prophetic movement amongst Hudson Bay Cree, however, reveal what I suspect is the consensus opinion: the model is useful as a rough starting point but a "distraction from deeper issues of documentation and meaning" (pp. 121-22).

Harkin asks in the Introduction, "Why Revitalization?" (p. xi). It's a good question, although one that he never answers clearly. Harkin states, as a *belief*, that "revitalization is the most sophisticated theoretical lens through which to view [religious] movements" (p. xxv). He does not say why he believes this. Indeed, he does not even provide a synopsis of Wallace's model. Instead, the Introduction rambles between postmodern critiques of cargo cult studies, the colonialist legacy of revitalization theory, dialogic approaches to understanding movements, the role of deprivation in Wallace's theory and so forth. His most direct defence of Wallace appeals to "the classic virtues of anthropology as a social science"—empiricism, holism, the comparison of institutions and so forth—rather than the details of the model (p. xix). He complains that anthropologists have been "too quick to discard theories that have certain remediable problems, rather than to experiment with, play with, and 'riff off' them" (p. xxxv). Harkin's "belief" in the theoretical sophistication of a specific theoretical model, then, dissolves into an invitation to treat it, at most, as a textual form (a theme that he draws out in his chapter on the Warm House Cult in western Oregon), as a foil or as a source for a few useful ideas. This nicely describes how Harkin and his collaborators treat Wallace's theory.

Lepowski's opening chapter comes closest to the spirit of Wallace's model in its attempt to systematically compare two movements in widely separated times and places and to come up with a general perspective on the causes and key attributes of revitalization movements. She insists that "All revitalization movements are oppositional, arising among cultural minorities, catalyzed by the moral and political crises of colonial and postcolonial hegemony" (p. 48) which, in turn, leads to an emphasis on "ritual violence." Linn Poyer and Lisa Henry, in studies of Second World War movements in Micronesia and the rise of Tahitian nationalism respectively, also draw attention to the colonial oppression as a crucible for revitalization movements. Both, however, see the movements as involving far more than reactions and oppositions. Henry, for instance, writes about

how a movement that originally was highly political and oppositional has spun off a variety of revived practices, such as indigenous forms of healing, that speak directly to an evolving sense of Tahitian identity. Most of the contributions stress the positive and creative aspects of the movements they review. Both Jukka Siikala and Paul Roscoe complain that Wallace's model is too static. Siikala's study of Polynesian movements suggests that they contribute to social differentiation rather than returning to a state of integrated equilibrium, as revitalization theory maintains. Roscoe argues that long-term religious movements, like the eighty year run of cargo cult activities among the Yangoru-Boiken of Papua New Guinea, show clear evidence of creative evolution and cannot be understood as reactions to stress. Joel W. Martin more directly attacks the notion of relative deprivation that informs earlier approaches to revitalization movements in a lively essay reviewing the role played by an early Christian convert in the transformation of Cherokee society in the early 19th century.

Martin presents an interesting typology of power shifts that would expand the categorization of revitalization movements from situations of clear oppression to ones in which people embrace a new or renewed culture for positive reasons. Jason Baird Jackson provides a good illustration in his study of the adoption of peyote religion by members of the Yuchi tribe near Tulsa, which has occurred in a relaxed ecumenical religious environment in which members have experimented with diverse religious traditions. If revitalization movements can no longer be explained in terms of stress and opposition, however, one has to wonder what is left of Wallace's theory. Drawing upon more recent debates concerning the politics of culture, the final three essays credit Wallace for the insight that revitalization movements represent *conscious* efforts to change. Larry Nesper thus traces the dialogic processes by which Chippewa bands in Wisconsin have developed a sense of cultural identity in the aftermath of a landmark court decision in 1983 that recognized off-reservation hunting, fishing and gathering rights. Ann McMullen presents revitalization as a kind of political strategy employed by Native people in southeastern New England as they work to define themselves in a region where, only a century ago, they were said to be extinct. She notes that cultural "inventions" are a by-product of this general process, a point also taken up by Henry in her study of Tahiti.

The arguments put forth by these various authors are far more subtle and sophisticated than can be conveyed in a short review. I am struck, however, by the wariness voiced in many of the essays concerning comparative generalizations. This anti-essentialism hits its most extreme expression in Larry Carucci's analysis of the interpretative frames that Enewetak people in Micronesia apply to the extensive sequence of rituals and exchanges centred upon the celebration of Christmas, where he claims that the reductionism inherent to comparative models does "nothing other than lend credence" to the stereotyping of indigenous rituals and, by implication, the silencing of Native voices (p. 221).

The essays in this volume are well worth reading as exemplars of the strengths and (perhaps) weaknesses of the present state of anthropological studies of indigenous politico-religious movements. The quality of analysis is often dazzling and always stimulating—an impressive display of the extraordinarily productivity created by the combination of anthropological and historical approaches pioneered by figures like Wallace. All the same, the volume cannot be truly said to provide anything like a full reassessment of revitalization theory let alone the creation of a common theoretical framework. In addition, one can only be disturbed by the degree of theoretical amnesia on display, particularly in the Introduction, about a subject that so preoccupied anthropologists for more than three decades. While it may be questionable whether we should revitalize revitalization theory, one can hope that volumes like this will help stimulate a renewed interest in the earlier highly sophisticated work of our anthropological ancestors that continues, often silently, to inform contemporary perspectives.

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Fariba Adelkhah, *Being Modern in Iran,* New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, xiv + 190 pages.

Reviewer: *Parastou Saberi*
Lakehead University

Scholarly interest in Iran waned in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Due to the real and perceived logistical difficulties of conducting long-term field research, Iranian studies were limited in terms of topics and approaches. Many works addressed macro-level research questions regarding the causes of the revolution, overemphasizing the revolution's radical break with the past and giving most attention to its religious dimension, while ignoring its complexity. With the gradual opening of Iranian society in the second decade after the revolution, scholarly interest in Iran has also shifted toward studying the consequences of the revolution and a full range of research techniques are being used.

Fariba Adelkhah's *Being Modern in Iran* is a strikingly original, informative and challenging study, which all students of contemporary Iran will enjoy and find stimulating. She seeks to move beyond the cliché view of Iran that epitomizes a nation of 60 million people through photographs of women wearing the *chador*, a symbol in the West of the totalitarian nature of the Islamic Republic.

The book is based on the author's extensive ethnographic fieldwork in Iran since the beginning of the 1990s. It asks

questions about the interaction between social and political transformations and the concept of modernity. The question of whether or how Islam is compatible with elements of modern life such as democracy, capitalism and the international system has an importance that goes far beyond the Islamic Republic. It is at the heart of debates in the West about immigration, terrorism, war and peace, especially after 9/11. As Adelkhah argues, Iran has a very special place in these debates in so far as it is the only example of Islamism arising from a true revolutionary mass movement which is now institutionalized.

Adelkhah examines the relationship between modernity and social and political change in Iran by describing and analyzing "life-styles'" respected by Iranians. Although the lifestyles considered differ, they share a common root, the ethic of the *javanmard* "the man of integrity." She argues that the very diversity of the personalities and contexts in which the images of the ideal social man (*javanmard*) have emerged, suggest that it is neither a purely traditional legacy, nor an expression of Islamic ideas, though it does not necessarily go against them, and that the ethic of *javanmard* can be best comprehended as the emergence of "the individuality of eminence." It affirms certain socio-cultural values that can be turned into political qualities. It is also about the importance of gifts in Iranian society and the changes in, and especially the institutionalizing of, the idea of trust, which is at the heart of practices involving gifts and the operation of the economic networks of the bazaar. Above all, it is another expression of the autonomy of society in relation to the ideology of the regime and, to some extent, to religious orthodoxy.

Approaching modernity from a Weberian perspective, the book starts with what Adelkhah and other Iranian and non-Iranian analysts describe as Iran's political earthquake of 1997, during the seventh presidential election. Although many perceived the outcome of the presidential election as another revolution inside the Islamic Republic, Adelkhah views it as a logical consequence of the internal matrix of socio-cultural, political and economic movements which had started in the early 1990s.

The first chapter starts with the study of the dynamics of taxation in Iran, especially the tax boom of the 1990s in the capital city of Tehran. In between the macroeconomic and macropolitical analyses of the relationship between taxation and state building, Adelkhah focusses on the symbolism of the Mayor of Tehran's public gardens, and his attempt to bring colourful flowers both into public and private spaces after a decade of war. She perceives the Mayor's symbolic initiative as seeking to replace the "geography of nostalgia" of the old Tehran, with the "geography of desire." The Mayor was recognized as *javanmard* because he used the proceeds of taxation for public parks.

Chapter 2 gives a comprehensive historical sketch of *javanmard*, showing it as an existential ethic and, thus, a matter of lifestyle. Coming from the idea of youth (*javan*, young; *mard*, man), the ethics of *javanmard* are distinguished by two essential traits: the spirits of generosity and courage. It draws on four categories of conduct: giving and receiving, being supported by the public, practical ability involving skill and purifying acts. All of these have been institutionalized during the past decades, especially through the economic dynamics of the bazaar, charitable organizations and financial networks. The bureaucratization and even democratization (in the sense of differentiation) of the *javanmard* ethos has not been a straightforward process; at every level of society the classical code of the 'man of integrity' is seen intermingling with that of Weberian rationalization. In Chapters 3 and 4 Adelkhah shows, for example, how public generosity has gained a business orientation. The Islamic credit networks, based on the same ethics and rationality, have created a booming "second economy" in the Republic over the past two decades. She sees this process of bourgeoisification as creating a social and cultural space whose full complexity was revealed by the parliamentary elections of 1996 and the presidential elections of 1997. Politics gained their own rational logic separate from sacred. Politics have also been commercialized, albeit through public generosity. This demonstrated the economic power of corporations, and also helped create social and cultural space for both sexes, which eventually brought political reform.

The last two chapters articulate how institutionalized public generosity has penetrated religion. It has rationalized this sphere and made it more money oriented. This has reinforced an individualizing process that is not monopolized by the state. The culture of giving has penetrated religion, resulting in changes in the roles of clerics, uses of the Koran, the social roles of women, the understanding of death and even dreams. In the broader society there are other changes, a growth of competition in all areas of life, from national Koranic and school competitions to the nation-wide soccer craze, and a renewed interest in the arts, self-help manuals, cosmetics, bodybuilding, beauty, business and national and international relations. Reflecting the influence of Foucault, Giddens and Habermas on her Weberian analysis, the author concludes that the new *javanmard* "imaginaire" follows a mode of self-reflexivity. The relationship between ethics and social domain, based on the Islamic political "imaginaire," though disenchanted and diversified, has resulted in an Iranian modern "moral being" who constantly and critically renegotiates the relation between private and public. Key to this process is the image of Iranian public space as a "garden or an oasis," a key symbol in both pre-Islamic and Islamic-Iranian culture.

Being Modern in Iran is a must-read book for all those interested in Iranian society. Adelkhah successfully shows that Iranian society and culture does not conform to common Western stereotypes. The detailed analyses in parts may make it difficult to follow for a reader with only a basic knowledge of Iran. Its main weakness, however, is the overly homogeneous picture that is painted of the Iranian middle class, or what Adelkhah calls the majority. This segment of Iranian society is highly diversified, especially in Tehran. The cover picture reflects the message of the book. It is a close-up photo of a typical urban newspaper kiosk covered in a jumble of posters of

famous soccer players, religious personalities and ideologues and journals of every day life. One has to be deeply familiar with this scene to be able to comprehend the symbolic message of the cover. Like the book itself, it might be even more successful if the camera had been located a bit further away and the angle was slightly changed.

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