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Commodities, Capitalism and Globalization / Marchandises, Capitalisme et Mondialisation

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Commodities, Capitalism and Globalization / Marchandises, Capitalisme et Mondialisation

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Cover / couverture

Photo by B. Lynne Milgram, 2003. Two female secondhand clothing traders display their stock of used garments at the weekly Saturday street market in Banaue, Ifugao province, northern Philippines. In the background, a customer looks through the racks of secondhand clothing.

Photo par B. Lynne Milgram, 2003. Deux commerçantes de vêtements usagés déploient leur marchandise au marché ambulant hebdomadaire du samedi à Banaue, province d'Ifagao, au nord des Philippines. À l'arrière-plan, un client fouille dans les éventaires de vêtements usagés.

Commodities, Capitalism and Globalization—Introduction

Pauline Gardiner Barber *Dalhousie University*
Winnie Lem *Trent University*

Much, probably too much, has been written about globalization. According to Kalb (2000: 3), globalization has become the dominant political and economic discourse of the developed world—"a grand narrative of our time." As part of public discourse, it is ideological to be sure, yet also traceable in political action and in social and economic effects. Indeed, before the onset of discourses about globalization, the global itself was exposed, subjected to scrutiny in the various discussions that have interlinked anthropology and different projects focussing upon transnational relations and translocal reconfigurations. The anthropologists who have contributed to these discussions also embrace a global historical perspective in their work and many have noted how our discipline itself became historically embedded in various regions of the world colonized by Europeans and later the United States (e.g. Anderson, 1998; Asad, 1973; Nash, 2002). Thus, discourses concerned with the processes, relations and forces that transcend the local and the national, now discussed as globalization, have circulated widely in the anthropological context through both time and space (see for example Friedman, this volume; Wolf, 1969; Wolf and Mintz, 1957).

In the current context, anthropological writing continues to grapple with the global and efforts are devoted to defining the forces and effects of globalization. Numerous questions have been raised in the many debates that have occurred over the political and economic consequences of globalization as well as its social and cultural possibilities. It is not our intention here to revisit the familiar terrain of different debates in anthropology regarding the nature of globalization, or indeed, to present another exegesis on globalization, itself. It is not the case that we think that enough has been said, nor that new insights cannot be received as processes of globalization continue to unfold. On the contrary, we feel that more must be said and other insights offered. Our contribution here is not to abstractly theorize globalization, nor to

align ourselves with one or other school of thought in the debates. Rather, we offer a view of globalization through the concrete. In this volume, our focus is on the commodity, and the political, economic and cultural conditions implicated in its production and circulation around the globe.

While reflections on the nature of globalization are extensive, the exploration of its relation to commodities seems rather more limited and specialized, taken on by only a very few in anthropology (see Haugerud, Stone and Little 2000, for example). Still, it is arguable if this area of investigation is any more recent or newer than the current focus on globalization. The work of Mintz (1979, 1985), Roseberry (1996) and Wolf (1982) reminds us that indeed discussion about commodities, the development of a world economy of capitalism and global trade, preceded the period when globalization came to be the grand narrative of our time. In problematizing the relationship between globalization and commodities our perspective reinforces Stone, Haugerud and Little's assertion that a focus on commodities "offers a window on large-scale processes that are profoundly transforming our era" (2000: 1). We would add that an ethnographically sensitive study of commodities not only enhances our understandings of globalization as a transformative force in the real world, but it is also a prerequisite, as Friedman (this volume) asserts, for informed engagement in debate. Indeed, we refrain from providing an overview of the contemporary debates in this Introduction as many of these are actually addressed in this volume by the authors themselves. In their efforts to detail the social and political relations of production, distribution, deployment and consumption of such global commodities as wine, cognac, gold, Rai music, olive oil, used clothing and migrant labour, each of the authors locates their discussion within a framework of analysis, or a debate that appears in the globalization literature.

Both Aiyer, whose discussion focuses on gold and Ulin, on wine, engage with the foundational debate over whether global forces represent forms of novel transformation or a phase of predictable cultural and economic changes that accompany the latest stage of capitalism. Ulin, for example, sees that the two positions in the debate are embodied in the work of Wolf, on the one hand and Appadurai, on the other. According to Ulin, Wolf (1982 and 1999) emphasizes the idea that globalization is neither unprecedented as a set of processes nor novel in its effects. As the latest phase of change within capitalism, globalization implies a similarity in the kinds of transformations that occur in different places around the globe. Appadurai (2002), like Lash and Urry (1987), argues that the processes encompassed by globalization are unanticipated and new, involving disjuncture—and thus considerable social, cultural and economic differentiation—within the capitalist world system. Dissatisfied with the dichotomies often produced through this debate regarding homogenization and diversity, oldness and newness, Ulin proposes a compromise. Drawing from the work of the Frankfurt School, as well as world system theorists, he suggests that a bridge between the two positions can be formed by combining the idea of the relative autonomy of culture with the notion that human subjects can be situated in differentiated fields of power. The case of wine-growers in the Bordeaux region of France and also in Michigan in the U.S., is used to illustrate the merits of this perspective.

Aiyer's intervention, by contrast, seeks to make no compromise. His paper challenges claims made by other scholars such as Held (1999) that globalization implies new forms of interconnectedness, as well as the assertion that capitalism is pervasive in all parts of the world. Through a discussion of the changing relationships between small mining, gold production, and globalizing processes in the context of Nicaragua, Aiyer argues that the persistence of small mining and struggles over commodity production highlight the uneven and incomplete nature of capitalist globalization and the role of long-term historical processes in shaping contemporary local-global encounters.

In addition to addressing such central debates, the authors in this thematic issue engage with a series of recurrent questions that emerge in analyses of the nature and effects of globalization. For example the question of the transformative effects that globalization has on identities, both individualized and collective, as well as subjectivities, is frequently raised (see for example Friedman 1994a and 1994b). Many also ask who the agents of globalization are. Are they elites, classes, states, political activists, im/migrants, or combinations of these groups (for example, Edelman, 1995; Gill, 2001; Harvey, 2000; Nash, 2001)?

Meneley's contribution attempts to address these questions in her discussion of the production, marketing and consumption of a luxury commodity—olive oil produced in the regions of Tuscany and Umbria. In addressing the question of why northern Italy's extra virgin olive oil has become such a desirable commodity in urban centres in North America and the U.K., Meneley employs Bourdieu's (1984) idea of class and distinction to argue that marketing strategies which reinforce class as a social and cultural identity have been key to the development of global consumers of extra virgin olive oil. This is particularly the case for oil of Northern Italian origin. Here,

Meneley also documents a process akin to a reversal of what Said identified as "orientalism" as central to the marketing strategies of traders and producers of Tuscan olive oil. Said's concept of "orientalism" emphasizes the devalorization of "otherness." In Meneley's case, there is an over-valorization of Tuscany as an "other" place, which is imagined as desirable—"Tuscanopia"—to be marketed by the global traders and consumed in the commodity.

The question of the relationship between the processes of globalization and identities in relation to the valorization of "alterities" is also taken up by Swedenburg who outlines the paradoxes of marketing Arab society and cultural products. Swedenburg probes the significance of the role of global commodities in reinforcing cultural differences by focussing on the invidious dilemmas of the global marketing and consumption of Middle Eastern music. From this process, he notes, a paradox results. On the one hand, the Arab wave in world music is celebrated, by some, for bringing about greater understanding of Other cultures and contributing to global solidarity. Yet, on the other hand, it is criticized by others for exploiting Third World musicians and employing exoticist discourses to sell products. Swedenburg analyzes the increased production, marketing and consumption of Arab music, also noting how the process of commodification on a global scale has also refashioned the commodity itself through "hybridization." Thus, he also addresses the question that is frequently raised as to how globalization might produce or reinforce the processes associated with what appears to be cultural hybridity, or homogeneity, or indeed, heterogeneity. This of course is a dimension of the larger question of the effects of globalization.

Similar questions are explored in Milgram's article which focusses on the significance of the refashioning and consumption of second-hand clothing in the Philippines. Milgram illustrates the ways in which consumers and traders in Ifugao Province, have remade this transglobal commodity into locally meaningful economic and cultural forms in the market and in dress. Following Miller (1995) and Friedman (1991), she presents consumption as a means to craft a personal modernity, i.e. to craft an identity in a globalizing world. Smart too focusses on the ways in which a global product, in her case, cognac, is refashioned according to local tastes and habits, reinforcing, so she argues, the resilience of cultural diversity in the face of forces of homogenization under globalization. Also addressing questions regarding the agents of globalization, Milgram proposes that in her case, trade is embedded in a "system of provisioning" which places traders as "technicians of globalization." In Smart's case, it is the cognac houses in France that play a key role in selling this product to the newly affluent in the Asian market, for whom cognac represents an item of prestige and a marker of high status in networks of reciprocity and gift exchange that prevail during wedding banquets and business dinners.

The articles contributed by Meneley, Swedenburg, Milgram and Smart reinforce the idea that at each stage of the circuits of the exchange of commodities, people relate to and through commodities in specific ways and the relations of production and exchange take place in specific symbolic contexts. Thus as Carrier (1994) points out, in market economies, transactions that centre on the commodity are not simply economic exchanges. Rather, following Mauss's important work on the social and cultural significance of the non-monetary exchanges of the Kula, the commodity transports, reinforces and shapes cultural messages (see also Haugerud, Stone and Little, 2000). The contributors point out that not only do the relations of commodity production and exchange reinforce class differences, they also reproduce them. The contributions of Meneley, Milgram, Smart, Aiyer and Barber particularly consider the question of how class is reproduced through production and consumption. The commodities and relations mediated through the commodity play a significant role in the social reproduction of class distinctions.

Studies of commodities and globalization often emphasize transnationality focussing on the chains and networks through which people and objects move. These circuits are seen to extend across the globe through borders that have been rendered permeable as both a process and product of neo-liberal transformations in the nature of the nation and the state. (Appadurai, 1986; Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994; Glick Schiller, 1999 and 2004; Shipton, 1986). Academic discourse that emphasises movement, circulation and far-reaching cross-global connections has arisen in a context in which the tenets of neo-liberal ideology have gained such wide acceptance that ideology is taken by many to represent reality. Thus, much research on commodities is articulated in terms of circulation as transnational flows. While we accept the importance of Carrier's (1994 and 1995) call to attend to the social relations of circulation, in our view attention has been drawn away from relations of production, transnational as well as local, toward the consumption of commodities. Hence, for example, in the growing literature that focuses on the consumption of luxury commodities, less attention seems to be paid to the ordinary people whose lives are devoted to producing these items for a luxury market (see Miller, 1995). Meneley reinforces this point by focusing on the political struggles surrounding

the industrialization of food production. In linking the class relations of production and transnational consumption, she exposes how the Slow Food movement, itself, deflects attention from inequalities in production to a concern with relations in consumption.

The commodity indeed offers a window through which to view how consumers' lives are being transformed by processes of globalization. However, in order to understand how these processes operate, we need to redirect attention to the political and economic forces that construct localities as sites where people are engaged in the production of particular commodities, as well as how the labour of people, themselves, becomes transformed into a commodity. Aiyer's and Barber's contributions confront these issues and attempt to redress this imbalance in contemporary studies of commodities. They stress the ways in which local power dynamics in their relation to international economic interests, contour the local conditions for the production of gold, on the one hand, and migrant labour, on the other. In her study of Philippine migrants, Barber, for example, argues that in the current literature on migration there is a discursive elision of the class effects of migration and suggests that this is a consequence of an overemphasis upon the consumption of labour at the expense of questions about its production and social reproduction. While stressing that in order to understand migrants as agents of globalization, attention should be accorded to the consumption dynamics associated with migrants' remittances she argues, nonetheless, that analysis and research has been skewed toward the consumption of migrant labour. Barber further contends that the privileging of consumption is possibly a result of a theoretical turn away from Marx combined with the fetishization of globalization as circuits and flows.

Aiyer's paper also reinforces these points in a case study of gold production in Nicaragua. He documents the cultural basis of local struggles to define rights to gold exploitation against national and transnational corporate interests. By arguing that the struggles over commodity production highlight the uneven nature of contemporary globalization, Aiyer is able to illustrate how the study of the production of gold sheds light on the nature of globalization itself. In addition he questions some of the dominant trends being stressed in the academic debates referred to earlier.

Although references to globalization in its clichéd contemporary form have been traced to the 1960s by some authors (see Held et al., 1999), the concept of globalization did not take hold in academic discourse until later (see also Friedman, this volume). Indeed, the history of the concept of globalization, as we encounter it in current discourse is paradoxically connected to the emergence of postmodern, poststructural and postcolonial thinking in the academy. This is paradoxical for several reasons. First, as has been stressed in many interventions and reiterated by various authors here, claims about the novelty of globalization seem historically inappropriate given that imperial projects and anthropological recognition of these, have a much deeper history than does writing about globalization as such. In addition, "post" thinking, certainly as associated with questions of meaning and identity, is profoundly relativistic and directs a focus upon individuation, albeit complex and diffused. This seems precisely the opposite of what many of globalization's interpreters (pro- and anti-) seek to demonstrate: global interconnections, emergent similarities and, in extreme arguments (from both ideological polarities), global culture. Of course, anthropologists have had much to say about how ethnographic evidence speaks back to these themes. While we have refrained from offering in-depth analyses of the historical articulation of globalization discourse, and tracing in detail its connections to various theoretical perspectives, our contribution to the current discussions of globalization will take the form of a reflection. Therefore, by way of conclusion, we briefly take this opportunity to mention some further themes and take note of some recent trends in the literature in anthropology and more broadly in the social sciences and humanities.

Some Reflections

A critical historical moment for the re-emerging interest in global questions now glossed as globalization occurred during the mid-1980s when various shifts in economic and political relations—for example events in eastern Europe (the communist bloc decline), and Latin America, and Southeast Asia's shifting economic capacities—marked the apparent ascendance of a western-centred capitalist economic paradigm on the world stage. Also influential were the models of British and U.S. politics and economy provided by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, as they launched their respective versions of neo-liberalism and set about undoing their welfare states. Such reconstituted ideologies provided a benchmark for other related efforts, for example in New Zealand, Australia and Canada. The groundwork for claims about a post-modern global economy had been laid in the post-war period with the granting of independence to previously colonized nations whose economies became the target of western development aid, the goal being modernization. By the 1990s, globalization had captured the attention of numerous scholars and become a prominent

feature on the research agendas of many disciplines, among them, anthropology. Globalization as a concept has become associated with a literature on flows, whether of people, products and capital, images and/or ideas as they move across territories and national boundaries. As noted here, there are vigorous debates about whether such flows produce integration or disintegration, homogeneity or diversity and these debates tend often to occur in the rarefied space of metahistory and abstract generalities (see Held et al., 1999). To counter generalized assertions, ideological claims about global cultures and the like, and macro studies, anthropologists have appealed to ethnography. This, of course, is the common thread in anthropological writing and it defines the purpose of this volume. But in addition, anthropologists have often claimed, ethnographically and otherwise, that globalization is unlikely to produce similar cultural outcomes from diverse situations. In this counter claim, perhaps the most common reference to globalization in the discipline, anthropologists see local settings as sites for resistance to, if not refusal of, global processes (see Friedman, 1994 and also this volume).

In reviewing the literature at least two predominant strands can be read in the recent social science literature on globalization, particularly in anthropology. We will just briefly mention them here. There are those writers who are influenced by what Eric Wolf calls Marxian scholarship (1982). There are also those who can be broadly linked to a Foucauldian, poststructuralist mode of scholarship. While some contemporary anthropologists combine both of these perspectives, normally one or other framework remains privileged. Authors in the theoretical tradition of Marxist or materialist scholarship tend to see contemporary globalization as having historical antecedents often linked, as Wolf himself notes, to processes associated with the development and geographies of capitalism. Anthropologists in this tradition often refer to Harvey's (1989) seminal work on flexible accumulation under the postmodern condition. They attempt their "ethnographies of globalization" by problematizing the many ways in which capitalism alters people's living and livelihoods. An emphasis on work and livelihoods is particularly revealing , because such an emphasis draws attention directly to globalization as a set of political and economic conditions. A number of ethnographies posit the globalization problematic explicitly (see for example, Edelman, 1999, Gill, 2000) Others, by contrast, emphasize globalization more in terms of identities that are challenged, constructed and emergent in workplaces directly shaped by the processes of flexible accumulation. For example, Freeman (2000) offers a poststructuralist perspective on globalization and subjectivity in a study of class and gender dynamics in data processing centres in the Caribbean. The emphasis on subjectivity and political economy is revealing. Still other ethnographies frame understandings of local subjects against global processes without as much attention to political economy. Donham (1999) and Rofel (1999) for example, employ globalization discursively as a similar order of trope to modernity (see also Tsing, 2002). A recent discussion of anthropology and globalization (Inda and Rosaldo, 2002) marks out a literature that reflects rather more a fascination with global flows and cultural exchange than with livelihood per se. This is likely in part a product of concerns within U.S. anthropology and perhaps reflects a rejection, distancing, or more accurately, simply a lack of interest in working out understandings of Marx and materialism in cultural anthropology, to the detriment of a deeper understanding of globalization. This point is also reinforced by Friedman (this volume and 2004) and Smith (1999) who suggests that an emphasis on cultural artefacts, performances, and practices makes for a more manageable doctoral research project than detailed historically attuned work on livelihoods and attendant sociopolitical questions.

In terms of interdisciplinary theoretical work, Harvey (2000) and Bauman (1998) both offer important arguments about globalization. Bauman's argument posits a model of space and mobility-related class differentiation and social inequality, with the juxtaposition of the metaphor of the tourist with that of the vagabond. Tourists are those who have the means and resources to travel, literally or virtually. Vagabonds are condemned to their locales and their social locations, disempowered by global processes upon which they have no purchase. Also locked into vagabond status are the swelling ranks of the under-classes. The underclass encompasses those who constitute the partially employed, the working poor, and the unemployed, the homeless, the incarcerated and so on. While there are extreme positions on both ends of this distinction, those in the middle, who function as tourists (*and consumers*), are vulnerable, at risk of becoming vagabonds. Sociologically it would seem Bauman has in mind here the indebted middle classes, the consumers of different places and cultural products who are mobile up to a point but can also risk losing their jobs as companies relocate, down-size and so on in response to globalization's numerous opportunities. Harvey's argument in *Spaces of Hope* (2000) also turns on a distinction between local and global, or universalism. He draws upon his previously expressed interest in ideas developed by Raymond Williams in the volume *Resources of Hope (1989)* on militant particularism (1995); how political expressions in local settings are prone to be reactionary when cal-

culated against progressive political movements across spatial scales. A further strand of Harvey's argument seeks to link two prominent contemporary academic discourses; globalization and embodiment, as discussed by postmodern theorists. It is the connection between globalization and embodied labour in social reproduction (not simply production) that establishes a terrain for thinking about globalized commodities. Kalb's perspective remains relevant here as well. He reminds us that the empirical results of globalization "depend on social power relationships, local development paths, territorially engraved social institutions, and the nature of and possible action within social networks" (2000: 7). Such results, viewed through a lens which "brings society back in" defy reductionist, universalizing versions of the grand globalization narrative, hence Kalb's call for the "End of Globalization."

A similar argument holds true for empirical studies of the relations between globalization and commodities where there is an equally cogent claim to be made about the need to investigate the ways in which global commodities are socially produced and enter into the market place in contingent and complex ways. As authors in this issue demonstrate, commodities are produced in particular local environments and sets of social relations and institutions. They have local histories that become subject to renegotiation as they engage with global markets. Thus globalization is by no means an irreversible or linear process. Each of these papers demonstrate the complexities of global processes by engaging in different ways with the questions that have emerged in the literature on globalization as they focus on the commodities which circulate through the market routes of capitalism.

Pauline Gardiner Barber, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3H 4P9, Canada. E-mail: pgbarber@dal.ca
Winnie Lem, International Development Studies and Women's Studies, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, K9J 7B8, Canada. E-mail: wlem@trentu.ca

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Marchandises, Capitalisme et Mondialisation – introduction

Pauline Gardiner Barber *Dalhousie University*
Winnie Lem *Trent University*

Traduction par Yevgeny Medvedev et Eileen Lyons

Il y a probablement eu beaucoup trop d'écrits au sujet de la mondialisation. Selon Kalb (2000 : 3), la mondialisation est devenue le discours politique et économique dominant dans le monde développé – «la grande histoire de notre époque». En tant que composante du discours public, il a sans doute un fondement idéologique, mais se manifeste également dans l'action politique et dans les effets socio-économiques. En fait, avant l'énoncé du discours sur la mondialisation, le concept même du «global» avait été exposé, et soumis à l'interrogation dans de multiples discussions soulignant l'interaction entre l'anthropologie et des projets différents axés sur les relations trans-nationales et les repositionnements inter locaux. Les anthropologues, qui ont contribué à ces discussions, ont également embrassé une perspective historique globale dans leurs travaux; d'ailleurs, nombre d'entre eux font remarquer comment notre discipline elle-même s'était enracinée dans plusieurs régions du monde colonisées par les Européens et, plus tard, par les États-Unis (e.g. Anderson, 1998; Asad, 1973; Nash, 2002). Or, les sujets inhérents aux processus, relations et forces transcendant le «local» et le «national», aujourd'hui groupés sous le terme «mondialisation», ont librement circulé dans le contexte anthropologique à travers l'espace et le temps (Friedman, présent numéro; Wolf, 1969; Wolf et Mintz, 1957).

Dans un tel contexte, le global demeure au cœur des écrits anthropologiques qui consacrent des efforts pour définir les forces et les effets de la mondialisation. Beaucoup de questions ont été posées dans des débats multiples sur les conséquences politiques et économiques de la mondialisation d'un côté, et sur ses potentiels sociaux et culturels d'un autre. Il ne s'agit ici pour nous ni de revisiter le terrain familier des débats anthropologiques à propos de la nature de la mondialisation, ni de présenter une autre exégèse de la mondialisation elle-même. Ce n'est pas que nous pensons que le sujet est épuisé, ni que de nouveaux éclaircissements ne puissent être produits à mesure

que les processus de la mondialisation s'intensifient. Au contraire, nous admettons généralement que le débat doit être poursuivi et que d'autres découvertes doivent être mises en scène. Notre contribution ne consiste pas en une théorisation abstraite sur la mondialisation, ni en une prise de position au sein d'une des écoles de pensée au sein du débat. Au lieu de cela, nous proposons une vue concrète de la mondialisation. Dans le présent numéro, nous nous concentrons sur la marchandise, et sur les conditions politiques, économiques et culturelles de production et de circulation mondiale.

Tandis que les réflexions sur la nature de la mondialisation sont vastes, l'exploration des rapports avec les marchandises semble plutôt limitée et spécialisée, ne suscitant l'intérêt que de peu d'anthropologues (voir Haugerud, Stone et Little (eds), 2000). Le débat reste cependant ouvert quant à savoir si ce sujet d'investigation est plus récent que la focalisation actuelle sur la globalisation. Les travaux de Wolf (1982), Mintz (1979, 1985) et de Roseberry (1996) nous rappellent que la discussion sur les marchandises, le développement de l'économie mondiale capitaliste et celui du commerce mondial avaient précédé l'arrivée du moment où la mondialisation a gagné une position dominante dans les grands sujets de notre temps. En problématisant les rapports entre la mondialisation et les marchandises, notre position renforce l'assertion de Stone, Haugerud et Little selon laquelle la focalisation sur les marchandises «offre un aperçu des processus de grande dimension qui engendrent la transformation profonde de notre époque» (2000 : 1). Nous voudrions ajouter qu'une étude des marchandises sensible aux aspects ethnographiques non seulement approfondit notre compréhension de la mondialisation en tant que force transformant le monde, mais aussi qu'une telle étude est une condition nécessaire, (voir Friedman dans le présent numéro), pour un engagement efficace dans le débat. En effet, dans cette introduction nous nous abstenons de donner une vue d'ensemble des débats contemporains, car beaucoup d'entre eux sont abordés par les auteurs eux-mêmes. Dans leurs efforts pour dresser un catalogue des rapports sociaux et politiques entre la production, la distribution, le déploiement et la consommation des marchandises à l'échelle globale comme le vin, le cognac, l'or, la musique Raï, l'huile d'olive, les vêtements usagés et la main d'œuvre migrante, chacun des auteurs se situe à l'intérieur de la structure d'une analyse ou d'un débat qui anime la littérature sur la mondialisation.

Aiyer dans son analyse de l'or et Ulin qui se concentre sur le vin, rejoignent le débat essentiel qui tente de déterminer si les forces globales sont des formes d'une nouvelle transformation ou bien une phase des changements culturels et économiques prévisibles qui accompagnent l'étape actuelle du capitalisme. Par exemple, Ulin considère que les deux positions dans ce débat sont incorporées dans les écrits de Wolf et d'Appadurai. Selon Ulin, Wolf (1982 et 1999) met l'accent sur l'idée que la mondialisation n'est ni sans précédent ni nouvelles par ses effets. En tant que dernière phase du changement au sein du capitalisme, la mondialisation implique une similarité dans les modèles des transformations qui se produisent autour du monde. Appadurai (2002), tout comme Lash et Urry (1987), soutient que les processus engendrés par la mondialisation sont inattendus et nouveaux et qu'ils impliquent la disjonction (et, ainsi, une différentiation culturelle, économique et sociale considérable) à l'intérieur du système capitaliste mondial. Ulin propose un compromis transcendant les dichotomies qui apparaissent souvent dans ce débat qui concernent l'homogénéisation et la diversité, l'ancien et le nouveau. En se penchant sur les travaux de l'École de Francfort ainsi que sur les théoriciens du système mondial, il suggère qu'il soit possible de jeter un pont entre ces deux positions en combinant l'idée de l'autonomie relative de la culture avec la notion selon laquelle les sujets humains peuvent se situer dans des champs différenciés du pouvoir. Il utilise l'exemple des producteurs de vin de la région de Bordeaux en France et celui du Michigan aux Etats-Unis afin de confirmer les mérites de cette position.

L'intervention d'Aiyer, par contre, ne cherche pas de compromis. Sa contribution lance un défi aux revendications prononcées par d'autres chercheurs, comme Held (1999), selon lesquelles la mondialisation signifie de nouvelles formes d'inter connectivité et que le capitalisme règne sur le monde entier. A travers la discussion des rapports changeants entre la petite exploitation minière, l'extraction de l'or et les processus globalisants dans le contexte du Nicaragua, Aiyer argumente qu'une persistance de la petite exploitation minière et les difficultés de la production des marchandises soulignent la nature inégale et incomplète de la mondialisation capitaliste et l'impact des processus historiques de longue échéance sur les rencontres locales-globales contemporaines.

Outre leur propre implication dans ces débats centraux, les auteurs du présent numéro s'engagent dans des problématiques récurrentes qui émergent des analyses sur la nature et les effets de la mondialisation. On aborde par exemple fréquemment la problématique des effets transformateurs de l'identité individuelle et communautaire induits par la mondialisation (voir Friedman 1994a et 1994b). Beaucoup de chercheurs se demandent qui sont les agents de la mondialisation. S'agit-il des élites, des classes, des états, des activistes politiques, des immigrants, ou

bien de combinaisons issues de ces groupes (voir Edelman, 1995; Gill, 2001; Harvey, 2000; Nash, 2001)?

Dans sa contribution, Meneley tente d'aborder ces questions dans des analyses concernant la production, le marketing et la consommation d'une marchandise de luxe – l'huile d'olive provenant des régions de la Toscane et Umbria. En explorant les raisons de la popularité croissante de l'huile d'olive extra vierge venant du Nord de l'Italie dans des centres urbains de l'Amérique du Nord et du Royaume-Uni, Meneley se penche sur l'idée de Bourdieu (1984) de classe et de distinction afin d'argumenter que les stratégies de marketing situant la classe en tant qu'identité sociale et culturelle ont été les raisons clés de la croissance du nombre de consommateurs d'huile d'olive extra vierge. Cela est particulièrement vrai pour l'huile d'origine d'Italie du nord. Ici, Meneley souligne également un processus similaire à un renversement de ce que Saïd appelle «orientalisme» qui est au centre des stratégies de marketing des marchands et des producteurs de l'huile d'olive toscane. L'orientalisme saïdien met l'accent sur la dévalorisation de «l'étrangeté». Dans le cas de Meneley, il y a survalorisation de la Toscane en tant qu'endroit «étranger» perçu comme désirable, la «Toscanopie», qui doit être lancée sur le marché est consommée dans un produit, au même titre que ce dernier.

La question des rapports entre les processus de la mondialisation et les identités en relation avec la valorisation des «altérités» est aussi abordée par Swedenburg, qui ébauche les paradoxes du marketing de la société arabe et des produits culturels. Swedenburg explore la signification du rôle des marchandises globales dans le renforcement des différences culturelles en ciblant les dilemmes enviables du marketing global et de la consommation de la musique du Moyen Orient. D'après lui, le paradoxe émerge de ce processus. D'un côté, l'influence arabe dans la musique mondiale est bien reçue par une catégorie de personnes, car elle signifie une meilleure compréhension des autres cultures et contribue à la création de la solidarité globale. Néanmoins, certains observateurs prennent une attitude plus critique en se méfiant de l'exploitation des musiciens des pays du Tiers Monde et de l'emploi de discours «exotiques» pour vendre des produits. Swedenburg analyse la production grandissante, le marketing et la consommation de la musique arabe, et il note comment le processus de marchandisation à l'échelle globale a changé la marchandise même à travers l'«hybridation». Alors il se tourne également vers la question souvent posée, à savoir comment la mondialisation produit ou bien renforce les processus associés avec ce qui semble être l'hybridité culturelle, l'homogénéité, ou bien l'hétérogénéité. Ceci représente, bien entendu, une dimension de la problématique plus vaste des effets de la mondialisation.

Des problèmes similaires sont abordés dans l'article de Milgram qui se concentre sur la signification du refaçonnage et de la consommation des vêtements usagés aux Philippines. Milgram décrit les manières dont les consommateurs et les marchands dans la province Ifugao ont modifié ce produit trans-global dans des formes économiques et culturelles pour l'adapter à l'histoire locale. S'appuyant sur les raisonnements de Miller (1995) et Friedman (1991), Milgram considère la consommation comme moyen de forger une modernité personnelle, c'est-à-dire, de créer une identité compatible avec l'univers de la mondialisation. Smart aussi, traite des façons dont un produit global, dans ce cas, le cognac, est refaçonné selon les habitudes et les goûts locaux en fortifiant ainsi selon elle, la résistance de la diversité culturelle aux forces de l'homogénéisation déclenchées par la mondialisation. Discourant à propos des problèmes concernant l'identité des agents de la mondialisation, Milgram suggère que, dans son cas, le commerce soit incorporé dans un «système d'approvisionnement» qui attribue aux marchands le rôle de «techniciens de la mondialisation». Dans la situation traitée par Smart, les producteurs de cognac en France jouent le rôle clé dans la vente de ce produit sur le marché asiatique aux nouveaux riches, pour qui le cognac est un article de prestige et indicateur d'un statut élevé dans les réseaux de réciprocité et d'échanges de cadeaux qui occupent une place centrale lors des cérémonies de mariage et des dîners d'affaires.

Les articles publiés par Meneley, Swedenburg, Milgram et Smart confirment l'idée que dans chaque étape des circuits d'échange de produits, les gens entrent en relations avec et à travers les produits, et que le rapport entre la production et l'échange a lieu dans des contextes symboliques. Or, comme le remarque Carrier (1994), dans les économies de marché les transactions qui se focalisent sur un produit spécifique ne sont pas les échanges économiques. Selon la contribution importante de Mauss sur la signification culturelle et sociale des échanges non monétaires de la Kula, la marchandise véhicule, renforce et forge des messages culturels (voir aussi Haugerud, Stone et Little, 2000). Les auteurs observent que les rapports entre la production et les échanges des marchandises non seulement renforcent les différences de classe, mais les reproduisent. Les écrits de Meneley, Milgram, Smart, Aiyer et Barber montrent particulièrement comment la classe est reproduite à travers la production et la consommation. Les produits commerciaux et les rapports qu'ils facilitent jouent un rôle important dans la reproduction sociale des distinctions de classe.

Les études sur les marchandises et la mondialisation accentuent souvent la «transnationalité» ciblant les liens et les réseaux du mouvement des individus et des objets. Ces circuits se répandent à travers le monde et traversent les frontières qui sont désormais rendues perméables en tant que processus et produit des transformations néo-libérales au sein de la nature de nation et d'état. (Appadurai, 1986; Basch, Glick Shiller et Szanton Blanc, 1994; Glick Schiller, 1999, 2004; Shipton, 1986). Le discours académique qui souligne les mouvements, la circulation et les connections globales étendues, est apparu dans un contexte où les préceptes de l'idéologie néo-libérale étaient devenus à tel point universellement intégrés que l'idéologie est souvent confondue avec la réalité. Par conséquent, beaucoup de recherches sur les produits sont articulées en termes de circulation commerciale et courants transnationaux. Tandis que nous accordons de l'importance à l'appel de Carrier (1994 et 1995) à étudier les relations sociales des échanges commerciaux, notre position à nous est que l'attention a été détournée des attitudes de la production locale et transnationale au profit de la consommation des marchandises. Or, par exemple, dans la copieuse littérature sur la consommation des produits de luxe, moins d'attention semble être accordée aux gens ordinaires dont la vie est consacrée à la manufacture de ces produits pour le marché. (Voir Miller 1995). Meneley renforce cette observation en se rapportant à la lutte politique autour de l'industrialisation de la production des aliments. En reliant les rapports de classe dans la production et la consommation transnationale, elle démontre comment le Mouvement Lent des Aliments détourne l'attention des inégalités dans la production vers les problèmes de rapports à l'intérieur des processus de consommation.

Les théories des marchandises offrent un aperçu sur les transformations de la vie des consommateurs par les processus de la mondialisation. Pourtant, afin de comprendre le fonctionnement de ces processus, nous devons nous tourner vers les forces politiques et économiques qui convertissent des quartiers entiers en sites de manufacture de produits particuliers et qui transforment le travail des gens en une marchandise. Les contributions d'Aiyer et de Barber font face à ces problématiques, et ils tentent de corriger cette inégalité dans les études contemporaines sur les marchandises. Ils accentuent les façons dont le dynamisme du pouvoir au niveau local dans ses rapports avec les intérêts économiques internationaux, contourne les conditions locales de l'extraction de l'or d'un côté, et de la main d'œuvre migrante de l'autre. Barber, dans son étude des migrants philippins argumente que dans la littérature contemporaine sur la migration il y a une élision discursive des effets de migration sur les classes, et elle suggère que ceci est une conséquence d'une accentuation excessive de la consommation de la main d'œuvre au détriment des préoccupations sur sa production et sa reproduction sociale. En l'accentuant afin de percevoir les migrants comme agents de la mondialisation, nous devons accorder de l'attention aux dynamiques de consommation associées avec l'envoi d'argent par les migrants. Néanmoins, elle argumente que la recherche et l'analyse ont été biaisées vers la consommation de la main d'œuvre migrante. Barber pense également que la raison principale pour privilégier la consommation se trouve dans l'abandon général de la théorie marxiste combiné avec la fétichisation de la mondialisation en tant que circuits et courants.

Le travail d'Aiyer renforce aussi ces observations par l'exemple de l'extraction de l'or au Nicaragua. Il remarque la base culturelle de la lutte locale pour établir les droits légaux sur l'exploitation des mines contre les intérêts corporatifs nationaux et transnationaux. En argumentant que les luttes au sein la production des marchandises soulignent la nature inégale de la mondialisation contemporaine, Aiyer réussit à montrer comment l'étude de l'extraction de l'or met en lumière la nature même de la mondialisation. En outre, il met en question quelques-unes des tendances dominantes accentuées dans les débats académiques auxquels nous avons fait allusion plus haut.

Même si les références à la mondialisation en tant que cliché moderne ont été dessinées dans les années 1960 par certains auteurs (voir Held et al., 1999), le concept de la mondialisation n'est apparu dans les discours académiques que beaucoup plus tard (voir Friedman, ce numéro). En effet, l'histoire de ce concept, telle que nous la voyons dans le discours actuel est paradoxalement liée à l'émergence de la pensée post-moderne, post-structuraliste et post-coloniale dans l'Académie. Ceci est paradoxal pour plusieurs raisons. D'abord, comme beaucoup d'interventions et plusieurs auteurs du présent numéro le font, les revendications de la nouveauté de la mondialisation semblent inappropriées historiquement étant donné le fait que les projets impérieux et leur acceptation anthropologique possèdent une histoire beaucoup plus profonde que celle des écrits au sujet de la mondialisation. En outre, la pensée «post-», surtout dans ses associations avec les questions de signification et d'identité, est profondément relativiste et elle se focalise sur l'individuation, même si celle-ci est complexe et diffuse. Cela semble précisément opposé à ce que bien des interprètes de la mondialisation (les «pour» et les «contre») cherchent à montrer : des interconnexions globales, des similarités émergeantes et,

ce qui n'apparaît que dans les arguments extrêmes (de deux polarités idéologiques), la culture globale. Évidemment, les anthropologues avaient beaucoup à dire à propos des manières dont l'évidence ethnographique communique avec ces thèmes. Tandis que nous nous sommes abstenus d'offrir des analyses profondes de l'articulation historique du discours sur la mondialisation et des traces détaillées de ses liens avec des perspectives théoriques variées, notre contribution aux débats actuels sur la mondialisation prendra la forme de réflexion. Par conséquent, au lieu d'une conclusion, nous allons profiter de cette occasion pour mentionner quelques autres pistes de réflexion et pour prendre note de quelques tendances récentes dans la littérature anthropologique et dans celle des autres domaines des sciences humaines et sociales.

Quelques réflexions

Un moment historique critique qui a renouvelé l'intérêt pour les questions globales parcourues plus haut sous le nom de mondialisation se manifestait au long du milieu des années 1980, quand des changements variés dans les relations économiques et politiques – par exemple, les événements en Europe de l'Est (la destruction du bloc communiste) et en Amérique latine, les capacités changeantes en Asie du sud-est – ont marqué une ascendance apparente du paradigme économique calqué sur le modèle du capitalisme occidental sur la scène mondiale. Également influents étaient les modèles de la politique et de l'économie britannique et américaine mise en œuvre par Margaret Thatcher et Ronald Reagan à mesure qu'ils lançaient leurs versions respectives du néo-libéralisme et entamaient le *démantèlement* de leurs états providences. Ces idéologies reconstituées ont servi de repère pour d'autres efforts de ce genre par exemple en Nouvelle Zélande, en Australie et au Canada. La fondation des théorisations sur l'économie globale post-moderne a été mise en place pendant la période d'après-guerre marquée par l'indépendance des nations colonisées, dont les économies sont devenues ciblées par les fonds de développement occidentaux poursuivant leur modernisation. Au début des années 1990, la mondialisation a réussi à capter l'attention de plusieurs académiciens et devenir le trait proéminent des programmes de recherche dans beaucoup de disciplines dont l'anthropologie. La mondialisation en tant que concept est devenue associée a la littérature sur la circulation des êtres humains, des produits et des capitaux ou des images et, ou des idées dès lors qu'ils traversent les territoires et les frontières nationales. Comme ceci a déjà été mentionné, il y a des débats vigoureux pour déterminer si cette circulation engendre l'intégration ou la désintégration, l'homogénéité ou la diversité, et ces débats ont tendance à se produire dans l'espace raréfié de la méta histoire et des généralités abstraites (voir Held et al, 1999). Pour faire face aux assertions généralisées, aux prétentions idéologiques sur la culture globale et aux études macro, les anthropologues ont eu recours à l'ethnographie. Ceci est, bien sûr, le fil commun dans les écrits anthropologiques, et ceci définit l'objectif de notre numéro. De plus, les anthropologues ont souvent prétendu du point de vue ethnographique et général que la mondialisation a peu de chances d'avoir des effets culturels similaires dans des situations variables. Dans cette observation opposée qui est la référence la plus commune à la mondialisation dans la discipline, les anthropologues situent les cadres locaux en terme de sites de résistance contre et le refus des processus globaux (voir Friedman 1994 et ce numéro).

En parcourant la littérature, nous remarquons au moins deux tendances émergeant dans les écrits récents des sciences sociales sur la mondialisation, surtout en anthropologie. Nous n'allons les mentionner ici que brièvement. Il y a les penseurs influencés par ce qu'Eric Wolf appelle les études marxistes (1982). Il y a aussi ceux qui peuvent être liés généralement à la tradition foucaldienne post-structuraliste. Même si nous observons que quelques anthropologues contemporains combinent ces deux perspectives, les chercheurs privilégient habituellement l'une ou l'autre. Les auteurs qui souscrivent à la tradition théorique de la pensée marxiste ou matérialiste ont tendance à associer la mondialisation contemporaine à ses antécédents historiques liés, d'après Wolf, aux processus ayant à voir avec le développement et la géographie du capitalisme. Les anthropologues de cette tradition se réfèrent fréquemment à l'étude importante de Harvey (1989) sur l'accumulation flexible dans les conditions post-modernes. Ils essayent de fonder leurs «ethnographies de la mondialisation» en problématisant les façons dont le capitalisme change la vie quotidienne et le gagne-pain des gens. L'accent sur le travail et le gagne-pain est particulièrement révélateur parce qu'il attire l'attention directement sur la mondialisation et la définit comme une série des conditions politiques et économiques. Quelques ethnographies posent explicitement la problématique de la mondialisation (voir, par exemple, Edelman, 1999; Gill, 2000). D'autres, par contre, perçoivent la mondialisation en termes d'identités défiées, construites et émergeant dans les lieux de travail directement forgés par les processus de l'accumulation flexible. Par exemple, Freeman (2000) offre une vue post-structuraliste sur la mondialisation et sur la subjectivité dans son étude du dynamisme des classes et des sexes, réalisée dans des centres d'analyse de données dans les Caraïbes. La mise en évidence de la subjectivité de l'éco-

nomie politique est révélatrice. D'autres ethnographies mettent en contraste la compréhension des sujets locaux d'une part, et les processus globaux d'autre part sans pour autant porter d'attention à l'économie politique. Donham (1999) et Rofel (1999), par exemple, utilisent la mondialisation d'une manière discursive comme une métaphore de la modernité (voir également Tsing, 2002). Dans les discussions récentes sur l'anthropologie et la mondialisation (Inda et Rosaldo, 2002) il est possible de distinguer la littérature qui reflète plutôt une certaine fascination pour la circulation globale et l'échange culturel qu'un intérêt distinct pour le gagne-pain en soi. Une telle situation s'explique en partie par les antagonismes au sein de l'anthropologie américaine, et elle reflète peut-être un refus, une prise de distance ou, plus précisément, le manque d'intérêt pour l'approfondissement de la compréhension du marxisme et du matérialisme dans l'anthropologie culturelle au détriment d'une compréhension plus profonde de la mondialisation. Cette idée est également renforcée par Friedman (présent numéro et 2004) et Smith (1999) qui avance que la mise en exergue des artéfacts culturels, des performances et des pratiques rend la recherche doctorale plus fiable qu'un travail détaillé concentré historiquement sur le gagne-pain et les questions sociopolitiques actuelles.

En termes d'un travail interdisciplinaire théorique, Harvey (2000) et Bauman (1998) offrent tous les deux des arguments importants sur la mondialisation. Celui de Bauman propose un modèle d'espace et la différentiation de classe rapportée à la migration et l'inégalité sociale, avec la juxtaposition de la métaphore du touriste et du vagabond. Les touristes sont ceux qui ont des moyens et des ressources pour voyager littéralement ou virtuellement. Les vagabonds sont condamnés à demeurer dans leur état et dans leur situation sociale, rendus impuissants par les processus globaux sur lesquels ils n'ont aucun contrôle. Les populations grandissantes des sous-classes sont aussi enfermées dans le statut de vagabonds. La sous-classe comprend ceux qui constituent les partiellement employés, les travailleurs pauvres, les chômeurs, les sans abri, les prisonniers etc. Tandis qu'il y a les positions extrêmes des deux côtés de cette distinction, ceux qui se trouvent au milieu et qui fonctionnent en tant que touristes (*et consommateurs*) sont vulnérables et courent le risque de devenir vagabonds. Du point de vue sociologique, il semble que Bauman se réfère à la classe moyenne endettée – les consommateurs d'endroits et de produits culturels, capables également de monter l'échelle sociale et de perdre leur travail quand les compagnies déménagent, réduisent leurs effectifs en réaction aux exigences multiples de la mondialisation. L'argument d'Harvey présenté dans *Spaces of Hope* (2000) se base aussi sur la distinction entre le «local» et le «global», c'est-à-dire sur l'universalisme. Il s'inspire de son intérêt préalable pour les idées élaborées par Raymond Williams dans l'ouvrage intitulé *Resources of Hope* (1989) où il s'agit du particularisme militant (1995) et d'une analyse de la vulnérabilité de l'expression politique sur la scène locale à la transformation réactionnaire, surtout quand elle est comparée à des mouvements politiques progressifs à travers les échelles spatiales. Une autre partie de l'argument d'Harvey cherche à relier les deux discours académiques proéminents : la mondialisation et l'incorporation (*embodiment*), tels qu'ils ils ont été argumentés par les théoriciens post-modernes. C'est la connexion entre la mondialisation et la main-d'œuvre incorporée dans la reproduction sociale (non seulement de la production), qui établit le champ d'étude des produits globalisés. La perspective développée par Kalb demeure également pertinente ici. Il nous rappelle que les résultats empiriques de la mondialisation «dépendent des relations sociales de pouvoir, des pistes du développement local, des institutions sociales enracinées sur le terrain et de la nature des réseaux sociaux et de l'action possible à l'intérieur de ceux-ci» (2000 : 7). De tels résultats, observés à travers le prisme qui «fait rentrer la société» lance un défi aux versions réductrices universalistes de la grande narration sur la mondialisation. C'est dans ce contexte que Kalb place son appel en faveur de «la Fin de la Mondialisation».

Un argument similaire s'applique aux études empiriques des relations entre la mondialisation et les marchandises où nous trouvons un argument également convaincant pour l'enquête des manières dont les marchandises globales se produisent socialement et entrent sur le marché de façon contingente et complexe. Comme le démontrent les auteurs du présent numéro, les marchandises sont produites dans des environnements locaux particuliers caractérisés par leurs propres institutions et les séries de relations sociales. Elles ont leurs histoires locales qui deviennent renégociées et réévaluées, quand elles s'engagent dans les marchés globaux. Or, la mondialisation n'est aucunement un processus linéaire irréversible. Chaque contribution ici dresse les complexités des processus globaux en posant, de manière originale, les questions qui sont apparues dans la littérature sur la mondialisation et en ciblant les produits circulant à travers les routes du marché capitaliste.

Pauline Gardiner Barber, Département de sociologie et d'anthropologie sociale, Université Dalhousie, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3H 4P9, Canada. Courriel : pgbarber@dal.ca
Winnie Lem, Les études du développement international et les études féministes, University Trent, Peterborough, Ontario, K9J 7B8, Canada. Courriel : wlem@trentu.ca

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In Search of the Midas Touch: Gold, Güiriseros and Globalization in Nicaragua

Ananthakrishnan Aiyer *University of Michigan—Flint*

Abstract: This paper seeks to interrogate three central claims of discourses on globalization—newness, interconnectedness, and the claim that capitalism is all pervasive in all parts of the world. Using historical and ethnographic materials from a mining town in Nicaragua, this paper explores these issues through a discussion of the changing relationships between small mining, gold production, and globalizing processes. It argues that the persistence of small mining and struggles over commodity production highlight the uneven and incomplete nature of capitalist globalization and the role of long-term historical processes in shaping contemporary local-global encounters. It concludes by suggesting a need for further theoretical refinement and a framework that incorporates older and newer approaches to the analysis of forms of commodity production under contemporary globalization.

Keywords: globalization, mining, Nicaragua

Résumé: Cet article souhaite interroger trois thèses centrales concernant les discours sur la mondialisation, celle de sa nouveauté, celle des interconnections, et l'idée que le capitalisme envahit le monde entier. Utilisant un matériel historique et ethnographique à partir d'une ville minière du Nicaragua, cet article explore ces thèmes à travers une discussion sur l'évolution des relations entre petite exploitation minière, production d'or et processus de mondialisation. L'article argumente sur le fait que la persistance de la petite exploitation minière et la lutte pour la production de biens souligne la nature incomplète et inégale de la mondialisation capitaliste et le rôle d'un processus historique à long terme dans la formation de rencontres locales-globales. Il conclut en suggérant le besoin d'une recherche théorique plus affinée et d'un cadre qui incorpore des approches anciennes et nouvelles pour analyser les formes de la production de biens dans la perspective de la mondialisation contemporaine.

Mot-clés: mondialisation, exploitation des mines, Nicaragua

Boccardi Capital Brings "A Touch of Gold" to Las Vegas

LAS VEGAS, Feb. 12 /PRNewswire/ —Boccardi Capital announced today the beginnings of their much-vaunted branding concept, KING MIDAS WORLD. New partners have come on board for this development that promises to change Las Vegas forever. More than just an innovative way to play with money in Las Vegas and elsewhere, the KING MIDAS WORLD concept introduces an all surrounding lifestyle. Based on the ancient legend of KING MIDAS (The Midas Touch) who turned to gold everything he touched, KING MIDAS WORLD will empower people in much the same way. With the pieces in place, Boccardi is set to deliver to Las Vegas a revolutionary new dimension to the gaming industry, opening new doors of revenue and entertainment.[1]

Random Images:

Snapshot 1: A marriage is taking place in Coimbatore, South India. The 800 or so guests stare with interest at the groom and bride seated in the middle of the large wedding hall. The groom looks mightily uncomfortable in a silk *dhoti* that is embroidered with real gold patterns. The bride sweats through a 9-yard silk *sari* that is also woven with gold. The temperature in the room is about 100° F. The wedding is solemnized by exchanging gold necklaces, each weighing about 15-20 ounces. Although they do not believe in dowry, the bride's family hands over a vast array of "gifts" to the groom's family. Prominent among these, as noted by everyone present, are gold coins, biscuits and jewelry.

Snapshot 2: A small sailboat has left the coast of the United Arab Emirates. In addition to fish, it carries 200 pounds of gold bars. The boat will make landfall somewhere on the West Coast of India. From there, the contraband will make its way into the "formal" precious metals market in Bombay.

Snapshot 3: The hole was bigger. What was once a mountain covered with tropical hardwood trees was now

a gaping dust-ridden crater five kilometres wide. The company's workers labour in their caterpillars and trucks far below, 400 feet below ground level. Gold-bearing ores are brought up to the processing plant where they are added to the large mounds placed on sheets of black plastic over which a pipe sprays a cyanide-based solution. The Indonesian soldier, machine-gun in hand, looks on as the helicopter takes off with gold ingots. A similar scene is being played out simultaneously in the Philippines, Ecuador, and Nevada, U.S.A.

Snapshot 4: June 1999. San Juan Ridge, California. Eighty-five activists from 21 countries meet for a week to discuss the global implications of gold mining. Environmentalists, feminists, indigenous rights activists, scientists, small miners, and mine workers discuss and debate against the backdrop of mountains and streams that were decisively transformed by the California Gold Rush of 1849. Although no consensus is achieved, everyone agrees that large-scale gold mining should be immediately banned.

The stuff of fantasies, dreams and nightmares, gold continues to circulate in peoples' lives around the world. Loved and worshipped by billions, hated, increasingly, by millions, it is a commodity with few equals. Despite the much-vaunted world of high technology, Internet finance, virtual money, or hedge funds, gold continues to play an important economic role in the present context. Although no longer viewed as a counterpart to money in the West, gold nonetheless retains that role in large parts of the developing world. Its global presence signifies past and present linkages that provide a useful window into the nature and shape of contemporary globalization.

Gold is a rather peculiar commodity. At an abstract level, it is a commodity like any other that is produced under conditions of capitalist production. Similar to oranges, shoes or wine, it has use value, exchange value, and value. Gold does not have any special abstract qualities that mark it as an unusual commodity. It is traded in formal and informal markets from stock exchanges to pawn shops and street corners. Like other metals and minerals, it is inorganic and non-renewable. It is found in very specific locales and regions that meet certain geological conditions. Control over space, especially sub-surface rights, is crucially important in gold mining as it is in the case of other precious metals. These three factors have generated tendencies towards cartelization in the mining sector (Fine, 1994). However, these factors and yet others do not add any special properties to gold; they could as easily apply to manganese, copper or platinum. What gives gold its unique status has less to do with its malleability or rare occurrence and more to do with the ways in which it has been and continues to be linked to the changing contours of historical and contemporary phases of globalization.

Unlike most commodities, gold has a rather complicated relationship with globalization. An investigation of all of the facets of this relationship would be useful indeed. Here I will just mention some salient features. For example, one would have to interrogate the notion that gold, like other commodities, is "inserted" into global processes. Indeed, the reverse may equally hold true; after all, in many ways, the pursuit of gold was a precursor to earlier phases of globalization and the formation of a world economy, not least of which was the conquest of the Americas. Additionally, there is the matter of the relationship between gold and the emergence of world money in the modern context (Vilar, 1976). Gold came to occupy an eminent place in the emergent world capitalist market since it underpinned and backed international monetary and financial transactions. The gold standard was initially associated with British imperial power beginning in the 1820s. Later, aided by the discoveries of large ore deposits in California, South Africa, and Australia, an international gold standard was established and, despite the turmoil of late 19th-century industrial capitalism, it persisted as the medium for international currency conversions until the First World War. It was briefly readopted in 1928 and again after the Second World War. The rise of Bretton Woods and U.S. dollar hegemony after the Second World War was based upon the fact that the U.S. government virtually had monopoly control over most of the available gold in the world at the time. Indeed, the unhinging of gold from the U.S. dollar, under the Nixon administration, signified the first step in the collapse of Bretton Woods, the subsequent rise of floating exchange rates and a host of other monetary and financial instruments, and the emergence of the current phase of neoliberal capitalist globalization. This would be an interesting study and the monetarist and financial literature is full of impassioned debates surrounding this long relationship between gold, world money and global capitalism.

Other aspects, especially of interest to anthropologists, might also involve an exploration of the continuing endurance of the symbolic power of gold. Or, how through the different global circuits of legal and illegal networks of distribution, a large part of the world's gold ends up being consumed in countries like India and China, primarily as jewelry and as "savings" in lieu of bonds and shares. Another facet of this relationship might also deal with the large and growing global environmental movement that seeks to ban world gold production, especially

extraction and refinement, since it is so harmful to the environment. Finally, there is the issue of the production of the commodity itself. Despite being dominated by multinational corporations, gold continues to encompass highly varied methods and forms of production.

All these various kinds of relationships emerged in distinct periods and places, and involved different kinds of peoples and social relations. What one finds at the global level is a bewildering variety of relations of production, distribution and consumption, differentially positioned agents, institutions, and social and financial networks, shaped by long-term historical processes, and with their attendant political and cultural motives in distinct local, regional, national and global realms (Roseberry, 2002). We are thus confronted, once again, with the issue of analyzing the nature of a dynamic yet perpetually uneven world capitalist system. My argument of course rests on the premise that globalization or global capitalism is nothing more than the inchoate fusion of distinct processes in different parts of the world. Even as important academic debates revolve around the identification and analysis of the dominant tendencies of this evolving system (Friedman, 1994; Harvey, 2000), what remains an important anthropological task is the analysis of the place-based embeddedness of global capitalism (Smith, 2002).

In this paper, I explore the changing relationships between gold and processes of globalization from the perspective of one "globally" marginal country, Nicaragua. Currently, Nicaragua is not a major gold producer in terms of the global mining industry. Mining's contribution to the Nicaraguan national economy is also minimal. Nonetheless, the transformations and conflicts in the mineral sector, especially gold, expose some of the conflicts and contradictions associated with contemporary globalization. Within Nicaragua, the focus is on the mining town of La Libertad in the province of Chontales. The primary intent is to trace out some of the historically changing patterns of relationships surrounding the production of gold in the area, how it links up to regional, national, and international processes, and the ways in which these have shaped local encounters with the current phase of neo-liberal globalization. By use of this ethnographic material, I want to interrogate three central claims made by globalization theorists—newness, interconnectedness, and most importantly, the claim that capitalism is all-pervasive, in all parts of the world, now, more than ever.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, it outlines the encounter between a transnational mining corporation and the mining town of La Libertad in the mid-1990s, something that cannot be easily bracketed within the concepts of "resistance" and/or "adaptation" (Lewellen, 2002; see also Barber, 2002). Next, the paper moves back in time to briefly consider three earlier phases of globalization. The choice of these periods is arbitrary and one could very well outline more phases than those discussed here. The point of this historical exercise is to explore how the politics of the present are constituted. My argument is that the current local-global encounter in distinct areas has to be placed within a long-term historical framework if we are to make sense of the different reactions to and engagements with neo-liberal globalization. Finally, the paper returns to the present context to chart the contradictory impact of globalization. The paper concludes by suggesting that the first two claims of the dominant strand of writings on globalization (I am referring here to the body of work associated with scholars like Arjun Appadurai, Anthony Giddens, David Held, Joseph Stiglitz and others)—newness and interconnectedness, have been and can be dispatched effectively. However, the third claim, that the world is capitalist, now more so than ever, remains the leading assumption that needs to be confronted. This seems quite important in order to highlight the uneven nature of global capitalism and to understand the nature of the struggles over commodity production that are going on in different parts of the world.

The Differentiated Local

From Revolution to Neoliberlaism

La Libertad is a small town (officially a city by Nicaraguan statutes) and administrative centre of the municipality of the same name. It is located in the province of Chontales in the south-central area of the country. The provincial economy is dominated by extensive cattle ranching, as it has been since the colonial era, and industry is virtually non-existent. La Libertad and a neighboring town Santo Domingo, with sizeable populations engaged in gold mining, remain exceptions to the larger provincial dynamic. With a population of about 4000 people, La Libertad lies right in the middle of hills and valleys crisscrossed with gold-bearing veins that have been exploited for than a century. Despite a long history of gold mining, or maybe because of it, it remains a backwater town with crumbling roads, minimal infrastructure, few services, and high levels of poverty (Lazo, 1995). Indeed, when first time visitors get off the bus on the La Libertad's main and only paved street, they have no visual clues that this was a commercially vibrant and rich town for a good many years. While the majority of the inhabitants make their living directly or indirectly from mining activities, a sizeable number, including the town elite, is involved in cattle ranching. The rest are itinerant merchants or traders,

domestics, or work at odd jobs, and a good number are unemployed. La Libertad is typical of most towns and cities that dot the Nicaraguan landscape and would have likely remained in obscurity had it not been for the fact that both Daniel Ortega, guerilla fighter and President of Nicaragua during the years of the Sandinista Revolution, and Miguel Obando y Bravo, Central America's Archbishop and ideological spokesperson for Nicaraguan conservatives, hail from the town.

On the political and ideological level, La Libertad presents an interesting paradox within the provincial dynamic. Like most parts of Central Nicaragua, Chontales was the staging ground for fierce battles during the decade of the 1980s. The overwhelming majority of the provincial population, primarily rural, was part of and sympathetic to the U.S. backed-and-funded *contras*. This municipality was no exception. But in town the situation was, and remains, quite different. Urban *Liberteños* (people from La Libertad) remain polarized about the Sandinista Revolution and this cleavage largely runs along occupational lines. Urban-based cattle ranchers and many of their *mozos* (field hands), along with the richer mercantile families, who also form the town's political and economic elite, are staunchly anti-Sandinista. Mineworkers and small miners, along with their families, small merchants, domestic workers, and schoolteachers form the core Sandinista constituency in town. This element of significant urban Sandinista support made La Libertad unique within the larger provincial dynamic. Things began to unfold in new and complicated ways as Nicaragua embraced the dictates of neo-liberal globalization in the 1990s.

In 1993-94, Greenstone Resources Inc., a Toronto-based transnational company gained a mining concession from the neo-liberal Violeta Chamorro government. The Chamorro government, elected in 1990 after a decade of radical Sandinista rule, was committed to a dramatic overhaul of Nicaragua's economy. Nonetheless, it could not fully implement this since the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) was the largest opposition party in the Nicaraguan National Assembly. The dream of a quick transformation towards neo-liberalism remained deferred and became an arena of conflicts and compromises through the 1990s.[2] One area where there seemed to be consensus was the opening up of mineral and other natural resources to private ownership and exploitation. Mines previously nationalized under the Sandinista government were slated for privatization. Mines were seen as the central elements of an export-oriented strategy that would bring in not only much needed foreign capital investments but also, so the argument went, generate employment, and contribute revenues in the form of taxes.

Mineworkers in Nicaragua's beleaguered mining industry, especially the gold mines, were caught in a quandary in the period of regime transition. On the one hand, they fought long and hard to retain effective possession over key operating mines. On the other hand, they were also faced with the spectre of minimal government support and poor and deteriorating technology and infrastructure, especially after years of the U.S. led trade embargo and civil war. The pro-Sandinista, national mine workers' union, FETAMINE, had few options. Faced with mounting losses in the country's mining industry, large debts, the possibility of bankruptcy, and with no resources to ensure smooth production, it was cajoled and coerced into becoming party to joint ventures with foreign corporations.[3] Effective control of Nicaraguan mining by foreign corporations was a *fait accompli*.

One of the players in this transition phase was the Canadian firm, Greenstone Resources Inc. (hereafter Greenstone). Key gold mines throughout the country were opened up for bids and La Libertad's mine was acquired by Greenstone. The La Libertad mining concession made Greenstone the largest enterprise in the province. The concession covered sub-surface mining rights to 160 square kilometres that included the entire town of La Libertad. Greenstone was already at work in Panama. Acquisition of the Nicaraguan concession was part of their design to become Central America's largest gold producer. Although it was primarily an exploration company that acquired properties to profitably resell them to other entities, it appears that Greenstone had decided to move into gold production proper with the acquisition of the La Libertad concession. Indeed, this appeared to become true over the next couple of years as the company obtained a concession in San Andrés, Honduras, and also acquired a 5 000 square kilometre exploration concession on the Atlantic Coast in Northeastern Nicaragua (approximately one-tenth of Nicaragua's national territory). By 1995-96, Greenstone was the largest mining company in Central America.

The Company Arrives

When Greenstone officials arrived in La Libertad in mid-1994, they were confronted by a town whose reactions to the company's presence did not run along neat and ordered lines. On one side were the workers of the former national mine. As members of IMISA, they were "shareholders" in the new joint venture and eager to get back to production after a three-year lag. Although some were disgruntled at the lack of government support and felt they had been "sold" out to the *gringos*, the majority felt that this was indeed a better option than no work at all in the

crushing landscape of neo-liberal austerity. The local mineworkers' union, known nationally for its radical postures, promised its workers expanded benefits, higher salaries, and safe working conditions. On the other side were the town's small-scale miners. They referred to themselves as *pequeños mineros* (small miners) although most preferred the term *güiriseros*.[4] At the time, they numbered about 90-100 in all. Like the rest of Nicaragua, they were struggling to make ends meet in the post-revolutionary era where state subsidies for health, education, and welfare had dwindled to a minimum. Their livelihood was based almost exclusively on small-scale gold mining. Unlike the other mineworkers, they had no union or any collective organization. There was a loose conglomeration of individuals and families who worked in small groups of three to five persons using, as they themselves admit, "rustic" tools—pickaxes, shovels, crowbars and hammers.

The reactions of cattle ranchers and merchants were a bit more complicated. Cattle ranchers had dominated the local landscape from the 1950s onward. Those who owned properties close to town were wary of the possible effects of the company's ownership of the concession since by law they could be forced to sell their lands. A few were also concerned about potential environmental and ecological issues stemming from open-pit mining. Others looked forward to gaining lucrative monies as the company's presence dramatically boosted local real estate values. Wealthy merchants were very pleased with Greenstone's arrival as it brought back memories of the commercial bonanzas of years past. The commercial sector had been in the doldrums for most of the 1980s and the early 1990s. Neo-liberalism's promise was yet to materialize. They were tired of handing out commodities on credit to small miners and the unstable workforce; few had accumulated vast sums of money through trading activities alone. The arrival of the company with its promise of expanded employment, regular salaries, and the presence of foreign contractors seemed to indicate the possibilities of new and heightened patterns of consumption. Small merchants and moneylenders were a bit more cautious. They were poor themselves and their livelihoods were intimately connected with the small mining population. Their big fear was the end of small mining and with it the end of their activities. However, many also hoped to snatch a few jobs with the new company.

Protest and Accommodation

Right from the beginning, relations between the small miners and Greenstone were fraught with tensions. In mid-1994, small miners were working on a small hill named El Mojon a few miles outside the town. A "rich find" there, by a small miner prompted most small miners to work on the same hill in hopes of recovering a similar bonanza. Unbeknownst to the small miners, El Mojon was to be *the* location where Greenstone planned to build Central America's largest gold mine. At the time of the find, Greenstone officials had still not formally arrived in the area, but when they did they were rather surprised to find these small miners occupying the company's prime location. Surprise soon turned into frustration and anger when the small miners refused to leave. The latter were making claims on what was their "find" despite the fact that legally (and many did not understand the rapidly changing laws in Nicaragua) they had no valid claim to the area.

Greenstone officials, in conjunction with the mine's Nicaraguan administrative officers, all of whom were staunchly Sandinista, sought to cajole and then threaten the small miners. Facing possible eviction, the small miners armed themselves and decided to hold on to El Mojon by force. A few tense days passed with an armed standoff between military troops, also Sandinistas, and the small miners. Faced with little support in town and the possibility of bloodshed, and with recent memories of 10 years of unrelenting civil war, the small miners decided to negotiate. Finally, negotiations took place and a series of accords were reached.

Part of this encounter had to do with how the situation was being interpreted. The small miners were not opposed to the company's presence *per se*. They just wanted to ensure that they would always have a place to mine on their own within the broader landscape of the town and surrounding hills. Many of them had familial and kin ties to the mineworkers. Additionally, mineworkers and small miners were united in their broad support for Sandinismo in a town, municipality, and region that was vehemently anti-Sandinista. Despite kin ties and political ideology, though, small miners were zealous in their arguments that the gold-bearing veins of La Libertad belonged to all *Liberteños*. Not only did gold belong to them due to their *derechos historicos* (historic rights) but it also was part of the general *patrimonio cultural* (cultural patrimony) of the town. They were the "militants" (*militantes*) who acted on behalf of the interests of the entire community.[5] They were willing to share mineral resources with Greenstone as long as they had rights to their livelihood. This meant that they would produce gold on their own with what little "autonomy" they could muster, using their "rustic" and "artisan" methods of production.

The responses to the small miners' claims varied. Central government officials who were in the area to prevent a potential armed conflict were outraged at such

claims since legally all mineral resources belonged to the nation, and the state, as guarantor of the nation's well being, had to dispense with resources as it saw fit. In the neo-liberal climate of the 1990s, facing IMF imposed austerity measures and seeking to reduce Nicaragua's debt situation, the government had been busy selling off concessions to the country's mineral, forest, and marine resources. By 1997, 60% of the national territory as a whole was handed over to various and sundry shell corporations. Small miners were definitely not part of the salvage plan.

Greenstone officials were bemused and annoyed. As far as they were concerned, gold was a commodity to be exploited following the dictates of the new global economy. Nicaragua's embrace of the free/world market in the 1990s did not give anyone any kind of "rights" to mine unless they could do it in an efficient, competitive, technologically sound, and profitable manner. Their arrival in Nicaragua coincided with massive flows of Canadian mining capital into Latin America in the 1990s. They had never faced any kind of sustained opposition in other countries, least of all, of this sort; a claim by groups to be "partners" in commodity production. As a high-ranking Greenstone official, a British ex-patriate based in the U.S. and working for a Canadian company in Nicaragua, informed me:

> These people...these *güiri* whatever, have no place in the modern global economy. Hell, look at them! They are dirty, poor, backward, illiterate,—Christ! Who works with pickaxes and shovels these days? It's all so sad and backward. They better wise up and work for us, do something with their lives, or they'll be left with nothing.

This was not an isolated comment and reflected quite accurately sentiments shared by many high-ranking Greenstone officials who hoped either to displace the small miners completely from the concession or, as a compromise, incorporate some of them into the company's workforce.

Despite the best efforts of company officials, in conjunction with numerous state functionaries, they were far from successful. A variety of overt and covert tactics aimed at manipulating a negotiated settlement in favour of Greenstone failed. In the aftermath of the armed standoff, and faced with the threat posed by the company and Nicaragua's neo-liberal regime, the small miners legalized themselves as a co-operative, and forced an agreement with the company. The company's heavy-handedness and threats to end small mining had galvanized much of the population that saw the company's policies as mean-spirited and there was increased support for the small miners' efforts to defend their livelihoods. As grumbling and resentment grew in La Libertad and nearby towns, the company finally gave in and signed a set of accords that were quite favourable to the small miners. Small miners were guaranteed rights to work inside the concession as long as all recovered ores were sold to Greenstone at prevalent world market prices. Over the next five years, the number of people engaged in small mining in La Libertad grew from 100 to around 300. This was not an isolated local instance but reflected national trends in small mining growth. Given the 45%-60% rates of unemployment around the country and grinding poverty, a direct result of the imposition of structural adjustment policies by the Chamorro and Aleman governments, small mining offered a possible alternative for many of Nicaragua's poor who eagerly embraced the activity. Even as the government was busy courting foreign mining investments, the number of small miners in the country swelled in the late 1990s.

So, what does one make of a situation like this one in La Libertad? I think it alerts us to the fact that the "local" itself is a site of multiple, overlapping and contradictory interests and class dynamics, all of which play a key role in shaping the local-global encounter (Roseberry, 1989). This is all the more so in places like La Libertad, where about 80% of the population directly or indirectly earned its livelihood from the commodity under dispute, gold. Second, and this is more important, the responses of *Liberteños* was not something automatic, a sort of localist opposition to or embrace of globalization, but borne of deep-rooted and long-term encounters with a variety of globalizing processes. I turn now to briefly explore three snapshots of some of these processes to trace out the contours of the local-global encounter.

Globalizations before Globalization

The Creation of a Small Mining-Merchant Capital Town

There is no pre-global La Libertad. Unlike many parts of Nicaragua and the Americas broadly, where populations have long pre-colonial and colonial histories and have interacted with wider regional processes before being forcibly incorporated into world-systemic processes, the town of La Libertad has no pre-global history. The town/place/local emerged out of a confluence of global processes in the mid-to-late nineteenth century: the California Gold Rush, U.S. filibustering and other imperial adventures in the region, the struggle between U.S. and British forces to establish hegemony in Central America,

the search for gold in Canada and Australia, Nicaragua as a potential trans-isthmian canal route, foreign migrations to the country, and internal migrations and state-formative processes. All of these factors played a role in the establishment of La Libertad as a gold mining town, populated as it was, by a variety of Nicaraguan, European, North American, and Central American gold-seeking miners, merchants, bureaucrats, adventurers and travellers.[6]

Forms of small-scale mining, linked to, and dependent upon combinations of merchant and usury capital, dominated gold production in this time period. This is not to suggest a rosy picture of petty commodity production. There were differences in terms of investment in machinery, number of workers employed, the amounts of production, levels of indebtedness, whether it was family-based or run as a small business, yet, the overall logic was something that cannot be called capitalist. At least for the first 50 years, no large companies dominated the world of mining. The dispersed nature of mine ownership, problems of transportation and communication, an internally differentiated and competitive mercantile and money-lending sector, and the availability of multiple forms of credit ensured the reproduction of small mining, however unstable and precarious the circumstances may have been. There were efforts at monopolizing mining claims but they largely failed. What is relevant to this story is the emergence of a small-miner or *güirisero* identity. Despite the ups and downs of the mining economy, the *güirisero* presence survived until the 1940s.

Mercantile and money-lending profits undergirded the entire small mining economy even as it linked La Libertad to commercial elites in the important city of Granada and, from there, to London and New York. As in other parts of the non-Western world, merchant capital was content to interact with and benefit from diverse forms of production (Kahn, 1981). It was not, as some have suggested, the main factor in causing underdevelopment by extracting values and transferring them to metropolitan countries and corporations (Kay, 1975). In the absence of significant capital investments in the area, merchant capital allowed small mining to sustain itself over time. This is a pattern that has been observed in similar contexts of economies based on the extraction of natural resources and where the sources of waged employment are non-existent (Nugent, 1993). La Libertad was a cosmopolitan town linked to the outside world through commercial and trading circuits and where consumption practices reflected the latest trends and patterns in Europe and the U.S. Briefly, from 1909-19 a British mining company established its presence in the area. Although it strengthened tendencies towards proletarianization, it never displaced small mining. The company's collapse in 1921 saw a resurgence of small mining that continued well into the late 1930s. Through this early period of almost a century, the majority of small miners, although highly indebted to various agents, had access to production space, and controlled the organization, rhythms, and patterns of production. They were not workers but were similar to small and petty commodity producers found in diverse historical and contemporary contexts (see for e.g., Adnan, 1985; Lem, 1998). Many owned, possessed, or leased mines and tools, and most had access to extraction and refining machinery. To be sure, there were some who earned their livelihood from wage labour or others who combined small mining with wage labour or petty mercantile activities. However, the overall dynamic in this period is neither one of increased proletarianization nor of a crystallization of class structures within small mining.[7] The dominant trend remained one of an unstable yet persistent pattern of small and petty commodity production.

Globalization in Reverse

From 1950 to the 1979, La Libertad was, to use James Ferguson's apt phrase (1999), "disconnected" from the world economy as merchant capital fled and an extensive cattle-ranching economy displaced mining completely. This was not something that happened all over Nicaragua, as mining companies did continue to work in other parts of the country well into the early 1970s. It had more do with local dynamics interacting with national and international processes. In particular, policy decisions of the Somoza State and land grabbing and mine monopolization by speculators and elites heightened class differentiation within small mining by 1938-39. The establishment of a large capitalist mining company in 1940, owned by one of Nicaragua's richest families, in league with U.S.-based investors, further weakened small mining as much of the local population ended up working for this company. This was the first time that capitalist mining and wage labour dominated the entire local economy. There was rapid and explosive commercial growth for the next few years as merchant capital increasingly embraced the profits to be garnered from large-scale mining. Proletarianization was widespread but it was short-lived. Economic crisis generated by World War II, the growth of trade unionism nationally, and local conflicts over access and rights to natural resources, forced the company to shut down operations in 1945-46.[8] Instead of the continuation of small mining or the reproduction of full-scale capitalist mining by other companies, there was complete destruction of the mining economy as the Somoza dictatorship's policies

ensured the privatization of national mining lands by cattle ranchers. The effects of embracing capital and global markets, symbolized primarily by La Libertad's airport (built in 1941) that connected local gold production to New York, were devastating. The result was a ghost town and by 1949 three-fourths of the population fled to other parts of Nicaragua.

Mining was forcibly displaced by extensive cattle ranching that created a more insular and "feudal-like" town with few (if any) global connections. The population of miners and their families that remained were socially and economically marginalized. Most remained unemployed while the rest worked as domestics, itinerant merchants, or as peons on the ranches. As expressed by informants, this was a period of abject "backwardness." Although the small mining population had always been poor, this was far worse as they were treated as pariahs and unsavoury elements. The bank, the movie theatre, various skilled workshops, the large commercial stores and small neighbourhood shops—symbols of the vibrant mining economy, all shut down, only compounding the sense of abandonment and decay. Mining was over for all intents and purposes but kept alive in memories.

Revolutionary Globalism and Gold Fever

In the 1980s, Nicaragua and La Libertad became globalized again in new ways. At one level, Nicaragua became the new epicentre for social science, something that had been quite absent prior to the revolution. Unlike Mexico and Guatemala that had long been the focus of social science and anthropological research given the indigenous question, Nicaragua was the subject of only the occasional political science scholarship. All this changed with the Revolution of 1979 as left-wing scholars, including anthropologists, sympathetic to the revolution descended upon Nicaragua, joined by U.S., East European, and Scandinavian solidarity, anti-war, peace and church activists.

If Iran was a potential failure, in terms of its rapid swing to a fundamentalist revolutionary regime, the FSLN, despite its embrace of a mixed economy dominated by private property, at least stressed some commitment to socialist transformation that linked it with regimes in Eastern Europe and guerrilla movements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.[9] The FSLN also sought to promote itself as a global player especially in the arena of Third World solidarity struggles and the Non-Aligned Movement as it tried to generate opposition to the U.S.-led trade embargo and counterrevolution. Even as the Nicaraguan Revolution was being globalized, especially its literacy and health-care programs which were lauded around the world, La Libertad was being linked up to the global economy in new ways.

In 1979-80, world gold prices spiked to their highest levels ever jumping from $80 an ounce to $800 an ounce before finally stabilizing around $400-$450 for most of the 1980s.[10] In the chaos of the aftermath of the revolutionary overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship, thousands of poor Nicaraguans, including *Liberteños*, began to dedicate themselves to small mining. The FSLN government, which had nationalized all mining areas in the country as part of its revolutionary plan, reactivated a modern mining plant in La Libertad with its own salaried work force.

Unlike the mineworkers who laboured in the state mine for regular salaries, small mining was organized by small groups (three to five persons) of independent producers, usually related through ties of kinship or friendship, using their own tools, labour, and machinery. The groups were dependent on each other to address issues of transportation and refining of the ore but no collective organization emerged. The numbers of those engaged in small mining ebbed and flowed as some took up employment with the state mine, were drafted into the military, or migrated to avoid the draft and the civil war. Throughout the 1980s, small miners and the state enterprise worked side by side despite conflicts over the revolutionary state's claims to all gold produced in the country.

Facing an economically devastating embargo and counterrevolutionary war, the revolutionary government badly needed foreign exchange dollars and gold was a key commodity that provided this through its sale in foreign markets.[11] Small miners stubbornly resisted the state's efforts to control all gold commercialization. They had actively embraced a radical nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric that stressed productive autonomy and preservation of cultural patrimony. While they supported the revolution, they opposed the state using precisely those discourses promoted and simultaneously denied by the revolutionary government. Gold smuggling became a key part of the vibrant black market that rapidly grew all over the country and crossed regional and national boundaries (Ryan, 1995).

Local *Liberteño* identity was strengthened even as it was internally pulled apart by the contradictions of negotiating revolutionary nation-building but at the expense of place. The central issue for many was who controls the production and exchange of gold in a revolutionary context. As far as the revolutionary state was concerned, gold as a strategic natural resource and tradable commodity that earned foreign exchange belonged to the state since it played a pivotal role in financing programs

for the welfare of the nation's population. Further, it aided the FSLN in maintaining its global image of a government committed to socialist transformation. To this end, international geology and mining experts, especially from Sweden, were a constant presence in towns like La Libertad. In addition to massive amounts of Swedish foreign aid for machinery and equipment, these experts worked hard to assess gold reserves and increase gold production in the state owned mines. No attention was paid to small mining as it was considered less important even as the state tried, in vain, to capture the significant amounts of gold being produced legally and illegally by small miners throughout the country.

From the perspective of *Liberteño* small miners, gold was not something that belonged to the state but to the *pueblo* (the people), a term that constantly cropped up in FSLN rhetoric about the new revolutionary political economy under construction. From their perspective, there was an inconsistency between the state's efforts to promote a global image of revolutionary development and internal policies toward small mining. The majority of small miners were deeply committed to anti-imperialism and solidarity with other revolutionary movements in the Third World. Many had also enjoyed their interactions with and been impressed by Cuban and other activists who visited the town in this period. But they were firmly opposed to the state's claims over gold. They were sympathetic to goals of social justice and welfare for the country as a whole but not at the expense of their livelihood. The state's efforts to marginalize, and in many cases repress small miners, including several cases of imprisonment for illegal gold sales, was perceived by small miners as deeply anti-revolutionary. For many, the state became, as one informant put it, "*un acaparador de oro*" (gold merchant). The small miners' situation differed from that of other merchants, because this was a mercantile relationship that offered no credit or aid to help in procurement of production materials or to sustain them in times of economic crisis. Worse, the prices paid by the state for gold forcibly purchased from small miners were well below market prices. For small miners this was unconscionable. They perceived their livelihoods to be under threat and that their community was being sacrificed for the greater good of the "nation." Despite these conflicts, there was no "open" opposition on the part of small miners as many turned to the black market. Through the 1980s, they managed to hold ground working alongside more "modern" mining operations in the state mine. The conflict between state and revolution remained unresolved for many even as the FSLN lost power in the 1990 elections. Not surprisingly, small miners in La Libertad, and around the country, voted overwhelmingly for the FSLN. Most were cognizant of the fact that in many ways they owed their ability to work and sustain themselves to a revolutionary movement, government, and political party that had opened up a definite space for them, and which, despite the turbulent relationship, had allowed small mining to re-emerge and flourish.

The Politics of the Present

With this broad historical backdrop, when we turn to the 1990s, it is not surprising that the current global-local encounter in La Libertad over gold seems so messy. A variety of issues related to happy and sad memories of the past, class formations and disintegrations over the years, radical nationalism, de/proletarianization, local autonomy v/s national control, all were at play in shaping the myriad of Liberteño responses to Greenstone's presence in the town. The ability of small miners to forcefully negotiate and draw the majority of the population to their side, including many mineworkers, surprised and bewildered many in Greenstone's management who had assumed that small mining would slowly disappear without much of a struggle. Company efforts to bribe and win over town and provincial elites, and the national media and politicians, did mute opposition to Greenstone's activities. However, as a result of the accords signed in 1995, and once again in 1996, the number of small miners grew to 350.

Greenstone's own gold production was hampered for a variety of reasons ranging from mismanagement to hiring incompetent personnel and use of inappropriate machinery. The company's estimated gold production targets for 1996 and 1997 fell well below target and, ironically, it was ore purchased from small miners, which was high-grade, although a miniscule amount, that boosted production figures. Greenstone shares jumped to $15-$19 on the Toronto Stock Exchange and Nasdaq even though the company was still not producing large amounts of gold. This was the world of Internet-based trading as brokers and stockholders from around the world eagerly traded information on and awaited potential bonanzas from a town none had ever heard about. With online identities like "Mr. Metals," "JoGun," and "Technopeasant," shareholders from Canada, Australia, the U.S., and other countries, encouraged and boosted purchase of company shares.

This project aimed at building Central America's largest and most "modern" mine came to an end rather quickly. By 1998, Greenstone had already borrowed large sums of money and refinanced its debts twice. Despite the "positive" outlooks on the company's production from

financial consultants, lending agencies, and banks, the company was finding it hard to not only pay its contractors but also their workforce in La Libertad. Compounding the slow but steady decline in share values was a deep dip in gold prices as Central Banks in many European countries started selling their gold reserves on the open market. Operations were further hampered by the impact of Hurricane Mitch in 1998. By the middle of 1999, Greenstone was in the red, de-listed from stock exchanges, and by the end of the year it declared bankruptcy. Due to various outstanding debts to multiple lenders, the concession technically lay in the hands of banks in Nicaragua, Canada and Panama.

The impact of the closure on the town was devastating although less so than in the 1940s. Many rich merchants and storeowners were ruined. Mineworkers awaited new investors but, by the middle of 2001, none had arrived. Small mining continued to strengthen itself even as its numbers dwindled slightly. Despite threats from mine supervisors and government personnel, small miners installed grinding and processing machinery that dated back to the 19th century but which was well suited for their activities. The company's shutdown meant that they no longer had a committed buyer for large quantities of ore. This new context meant a return to subterranean and underground small mining that was focussed more on quality than quantity. It meant learning and relearning old skills, methods, and techniques to ensure sustainable livelihoods. It also meant a return to various kinds of mercantile and credit relationships to sustain this form of production. The new neo-liberal globalization came with a bang to La Libertad and dissipated slowly, although not completely, with a whimper. It is a story that continues to unfold even as gold prices are on the rise again globally after the financial shocks associated with the events of September 11, 2001.

Conclusion: Reassessing Globalization and Commodity Production

So, what does this admittedly local case say about the usefulness of the notion of globalization? I think the "newness" and "interconnectedness" (greater connectivity! or lack thereof) arguments can be dispatched effectively through most historically based ethnographic studies. What is more troublesome, however, is the other claim of globalization discourses—that, now more than ever, we have to view the world through a capitalist lens with its attendant concepts, categories, and identities.

Such an approach tends to flatten the struggles over commodity production and pigeonhole it into a *Kapitalogic* straitjacket. Even David Harvey's stimulating alternative to globalization, "uneven geographical development," misses the point because in his scheme there is no space/place for non-capitalist forms of production (2000). This is not an issue that affects only our analysis of 300 *güiriseros* in La Libertad or the 15 000 *güiriseros* in Nicaragua. Once we add thousands of small miners in South America, West Africa, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Philippines, China, and other places, peasants (despite claims to post-peasantness), artisans, fishermen/fisherwomen, and so forth, we get a very different picture of the global economy. The world capitalist system or capitalist globalization is highly heterogeneous and continues to be an articulation of different forms of capitalist and non-capitalist production (Banerjee, 1987). This is not simply a theoretical or academic exercise but is central to issues of identity-formation and the politics of class struggle.

As we remarked, in the 150 years of gold mining in La Libertad what we witness is a protracted albeit uneven struggle between global capitalist processes, different forms of capital, most significantly merchant-usury capital and, what we have termed, non-capitalist forms of production. Local and regional mercantile/usury capital posed obstacles to a transition to a capitalist mining economy and sustained the reproduction of small mining even as it impoverished it over time. I am not suggesting that capitalist penetration and takeover did not occur. They did at different moments but the impacts were varied. In the period from 1909-19, capitalist mining established itself and strengthened processes of proletarianization but without significantly altering the overall small mining dynamic. There was a definite transition to a wage labour economy between 1940 and1946 but there was no sustained transition to capitalism. We do not witness the transformation of one form of production to another but the complete collapse and destruction of the mining economy. When small mining re-emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, it interacted and struggled with first, a state sector, and later, in the current phase, a multinational capitalist firm.

The persistence of small mining and the ongoing struggles over commodity production thus pose awkward questions and raise issues about how we are to analyze this phenomenon. I am not suggesting that nothing has changed in the local, national, or global contexts over this long period or that small mining in La Libertad, and Nicaragua, today is similar to that practiced in the late 1800s. What I am insisting is that our theoretical models still require further refinement and reflection to address the "incomplete" nature of global capitalist transformations. A good number of historically based ethnographies have demonstrated that the struggles between capitalist and non-capitalist forms of production are far from a fore-

gone conclusion (see for e.g. Burawoy, 2002; Gledhill, 1991; Lem, 1998; Nugent, 1993; Roseberry, 1983; Smith, 1989). These studies suggest, along with the example discussed here, that it is not the case that capitalism "maintains" other forms of production for its own benefit nor is it that these struggles indicate some attempt to maintain and defend older forms of production. What we witness instead is the contradictions that are generated in these encounters, the way they shape the nature of class struggles in different contexts, and how this manifests itself in different local, regional, and national contexts and, subsequently, impacts the contours of global capitalism.

In conclusion, I am not suggesting a simple "return" to the literature on the "articulation of modes and forms of production" (Wolpe, 1985). What is needed, I would argue, is a framework that extracts some of the more positive elements of the "globalization" literature—international commodity flows, transnational patterns of migration, the dialectics of space and place, the formation of new identities, and an attention to diverse social and political movements. However, this needs to be linked to older and "outmoded" debates of the 1960s and 1970s surrounding petty-commodity and non-capitalist forms of production that emphasized the importance of class struggles and struggles over production, competition and conflict within and between capitals, the contradictory role of the state, and the dynamics of imperialism. These older debates, broadly known as "articulation," themselves were critical responses to modernization theory that simultaneously avoided falling into the trap of world-system theory (see for e.g. Banerjee, 1985; Turner, 1986; Wolpe, 1985). Indeed, current approaches to globalization swing either in the direction of modernization theory or that of world-system theory. A reformulated focus on contradictory forms of production underpinning the global economy, would be a much more fruitful approach to bravely negotiate the webs of relations between commodities and globalization.

Ananthakrishnan Aiyer, Department of Sociology/Anthropology/Criminal Justice, 522 French Hall, University of Michigan, Flint, MI 48503.

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Notes

1 Available at http://www.hotelnewsresource.com/article1992.html, accessed July 17, 2003.

2 This was despite significant U.S. pressures to usher in a free market economy and return confiscated properties to their original owners, many of whom were associated with the Somoza dictatorship.

3 As part of the negotiations over the transition to neo-liberalism, FETAMINE became a private company owned by former state workers. The new company IMISA, while it had 25% ownership in the mines, effectively handed over decision-making power to its joint venture partners, most of which came from Canada. IMISA later sold its ownership shares to Greenstone by the end of 1996.

4 There is no easy description of the term as its meanings have changed over time. It ranges from fiercely independent artisan miners to high graders and pilferers.

5 Militant was word coined in the 1980s to distinguish "true" and "revolutionary" Sandinistas from others who were just supporters of the Revolution. Many of the Nicaraguans in management positions at the mine brandished their militante credentials all the time, a fact that angered many of the local poor who saw them as "having sold out to imperialism."

6 The town was important enough that several travellers visited and wrote about the mines there (see for e.g., Belly, 1867; Levy, 1976 [1873]).

7 Of course, this is not to imply that merchants, moneylenders, and speculators did not extract profits from small mining. Indeed, many grew wealthy, as did many of Nicaragua's elite families benefit from their involvement in small mining. However, this cannot be read an instance of the functionality of small mining to capitalist accumulation. There were counteracting trends within the mercantile sector itself that posed obstacles to a transition to capitalist mining.

8 This is a highly condensed version of a rather complicated period in Nicaraguan history that was primarily shaped by the efforts of the Somoza State to create an enduring hegemonic project which included a short-lived but important alliance with factions of the labour movement (Gould, 1987, 1990; Walter, 1993).

9 The FSLN's adoption of a mixed economy model generated vigorous debates and a voluminous literature that need not concern us here (see for example Griffin, 1988; Vilas, 1986; Weeks, 1987, 1988).

10 Explanations for this surge in gold prices stress the combination of a variety of factors: the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreements, the emergence of floating currency exchange rates, the OPEC oil crisis of 1972-73, a profitabil-

ity crisis in the centres of capitalist accumulation, and efforts by the U.S. Federal Reserve to clamp down on the world's money supply (Amin, 1990: 66-67; Arrighi, 1994: 308-321; Bernstein, 2001: 346-361; Henwood, 1998: 48-49). In these turbulent times, gold, no longer pegged to the U.S. dollar, afforded a safe haven for investment for diverse entities

11 It is not my intent to minimize the terror and devastation caused by the counterrevolutionary war, especially in the countryside. The war touched all Nicaraguans not only through the daily violence that was felt at multiple levels but also by the military draft that was initiated by the FSLN as it sought to protect the gains of the revolution from U.S. imperialist machinations. For a discussion of the impact of the war on Nicaragua, see Nuñez et. al. 1991.

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Globalization and Alternative Localities

Robert C. Ulin *Western Michigan University*

Abstract: This paper argues against the all too common dichotomy of globalization into a process of homogenization or a process of significant diversification. The paper seeks to bridge this dichotomy by arguing for the relative autonomy of culture with respect to global political-economy, for the plurality of voices that constitute ongoing social interaction, and for a vision of actors operating in fields of power that position human agents differentially. The essay makes use of world systems theory to illustrate the merits and problems of global analysis while focussing on the ethnographic examples of French and Michigan wine growers.

Keywords: world systems theory, globalization, wine growing, France, Michigan

Résumé : L'article s'inscrit en faux contre la vision dichotomique et récurrente de la mondialisation selon laquelle il s'agit soit d'un processus d'homogénéisation, soit d'un profond processus de diversification. L'article cherche à surmonter cette dichotomie en soutenant l'existence d'une autonomie relative des cultures face à l'économie politique mondiale, d'une pluralité des voix qui constituent les interactions sociales en cours et d'une vision qui situe les acteurs au sein de cercles de pouvoir qui leur imposent des positions différentielles. L'essai se sert de la théorie des systèmes-monde pour illustrer le bien-fondé et les défauts des analyses de niveau mondial. Il met l'accent sur des exemples ethnographiques de viticulteurs de la France et du Michigan.

Mots-clés : des systèmes monde, mondialisation, viticulture, France, Michigan

The mobility of capital, manufacture and labour and the increasing influence of technology and mass communications worldwide foregrounds globalization as arguably the dominant theme across the critical social sciences and humanities. However, while there is little disagreement concerning the importance of globalization to social change, scholars often disagree as to how we should make sense of influential global processes. Eric Wolf (1982, 1999) suggests, for example, that globalization is the latest phase in capitalist development. He emphasizes, therefore, continuities in capitalist development and the tendency of capitalism worldwide to produce similar social and economic transformations through the capitalist appropriation of social labour. Arjun Appadurai (2002: 50-51) regards globalization, on the other hand, as a more novel process involving disjuncture and thus considerable social, cultural and economic differentiation within the capitalist world system (see also Knauft, 2002).

I argue in what follows that the current dichotomy between homogeneity and diversity that typifies globalization discourse in the human sciences can be bridged through engaging dialectically the relations between culture as relatively autonomous, praxis or agency, and the positioning of human subjects historically in differentiated fields of practice and power. Such a theoretical move or option preserves Appadurai's emphasis on diversity while incorporating Wolf's emphasis on global political-economy. This is, moreover, a theoretical option that is consistent with recent efforts among critical anthropologists (see, for example, Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992) to integrate political-economy as a global process with cultural theory articulated on the local level as formative human agency.

Homogeneity and Diversity

Wolf bases his argument on globalization upon what he claims to be historical continuities in capitalist development that date from the formative period of European

empires of the 14th and 15th centuries. In his celebrated *Europe and the People without History*, Wolf maintains that Europe in 1400 was weakly organized and not politically powerful until the ascendancy of Genoa and Venice as important mercantile centres. Trade through these two important northern Italian cities funded the warfare carried on by European monarchs and provided the capital for European expansion abroad. Wolf emphasizes though that it is not the circulation of commodities alone that launched Europe's new political destiny but rather transformations in the social relations of production. He distinguishes, moreover, the alternative paths of development between tribute-taking Portugal and Spain, dependent on foreign capital, from those of France and England. Wolf's historical narrative tacks back and forth between international political-economy and the local dynamics of small-scale populations. He thus presents a view of globalization that emphasizes the increasing importance of global markets, wage labour and the process of proletarianization that have similar but not identical effects in diverse world areas. However, as we shall see with respect to world systems theory, Wolf's emphasis on the uniform nature of capitalism has been criticized (Taussig, 1987) for ignoring human agency on the local level and thus acquiescing to the overdetermination of culture on the part of political-economy. While Wolf's (1999) final work addresses the above criticism by arguing for the relative autonomy of local culture with respect to the determinations of the world system of political-economy, in the end, it is social labour that endures as dominant in determining the articulations of both culture and power in social life.

Appadurai follows, on the other hand, Lash and Urry (1987) in supporting a vision of capitalism as a disorganized process and thus maintains that we should view globalization from autonomous "ethnoscapes," "mediascapes," "technoscapes," "financescapes" and "ideoscapes." According to Appadurai (2002: 50-53), ethnoscapes refer to the "landscape of persons" in a world that is constantly changing while technoscapes refer to the "global configurations of technologies," both large and small. Financescapes refer to global capital in its various forms and the multiple channels through which it circulates. Mediascapes are "image-centered, narrative-based accounts of strips of reality" while ideoscapes are concatenations of images that are more specifically political. Appadurai's intention is to elaborate global circulation as a multiple process and thus to evaluate the different avenues or channels through which human subjects, technology, capital, knowledge and political culture are disseminated and locally articulated, reproduced and challenged. Appadurai's vision of global circulation poses, therefore, a serious but not insurmountable challenge to field research typically focussed on circumscribed locales and to the commonly held assumption that globalization is "Americanization" or "Westernization."

While I believe that Appadurai is right in emphasizing the autonomy of different spheres of human practical activity, I am not convinced that the various "scapes" are the appropriate trope with which to grasp the diversity of capitalism or for that matter globalization in that "landscapes" appear to suffer from the same inertness as the once popular "hermeneutic text" (see Ulin, 2001). Textual metaphors of human action based in the influential work of Paul Ricoeur (1971) provisionally bracket out the external references in order to privilege the examination of the text's or action's internal dynamics. While Ricoeur does insist methodologically on returning to the external referents of the text, it is clear that he locates the critical moment of exegesis within the internal structure of the text rather than within the text's formation. Like the text, the visual imagery of a fixed terrain, although perhaps aesthetically pleasing, potentially glosses over praxis and thus the historical formation of the autonomy that Appadurai stresses.

Appadurai's vision of globalization is, in my view, consistent with poststructural theory's challenge to the ontological subject and thus, as we shall see, reproduces a now long-standing theoretical divide between political-economy and poststructural and postmodern social theory.

Although discussions of globalization may appear to be of recent origin, they are not, as Anna Tsing (2002) argues, novel. Early Frankfurt school figures such as Benjamin (1969), Horkheimer (1982), Adorno (1983) and Marcuse (1964) also addressed global themes by identifying hegemonic relations between modernity, capitalism and rationality that in their views produced parallel effects in art, culture and politics worldwide[1]. Marcuse argued, for example, that mutual reliance by the United States and Soviet Union on technical or scientific reason as the arbiter of truth and the medium for managing human affairs was transforming the multiple possibilities of being human into "one dimensional man." More recently, Jurgen Habermas (1984) has written prolifically on the relation between technical reason and domination, what he calls the "colonization of the life world." Habermas's claim is, like Marcuse's, an argument for the uniform consequences of technical reason globally in terms of the increasing capacity of the state to manage and control personal life, a capacity that in turn depoliticizes the public realm.

I allude to critical theory not simply to illustrate long-standing scholarship on global issues but also because critical theory since Marx has been long noted for chal-

lenging the "given" by directing our attention to the formative social processes that are often masked by experienced quotidian life. An emphasis on formation as process suggests that the local autonomy and differentiation associated with globalization, not to mention postmodern fragmentation (see Ulin, 2001), are mediated, that is, historically and socially produced, a point likewise advanced by the Comaroffs (2000) in their critical discussion of millennial capitalism. Moving our attention to the production of autonomy and differentiation is, as we shall see, a reflexive move that potentially avoids theory's uncritical reproduction of its object of knowledge.

Embracing potential continuities in capitalism, however, or arguing for uniformities that underlie diversity is not to dismiss Appadurai's vision of globalization altogether as I believe that he has identified important components of differentiation that challenge monolithic views of capitalism as producing like effects worldwide (see also Watson, 1998) and which in turn challenge a vision of modernity as a uniform process reproduced globally in identical form (Knauft, 2002). Anthropologist Brian Larkin (2002) argues, for example, for parallel modernities[2] and thus, like Appadurai, against the commonly held belief that globalization equals Americanization. Larkin supports his argument ethnographically by elaborating the Nigerian Hausa's preference for Indian films over those produced in America. The Hausa identify closely with the narrative structure of Indian films and representations of character. This allows them "a way of imaginatively engaging with forms of tradition different from their own at the same time as conceiving of a modernity that comes without the political and ideological significance of that of the West" (Larkin, 2002: 351).

Ethnographic examples, like the above, that illustrate parallel or even alternative modernities and the local recasting of globalization are numerous (Inda and Rosaldo, 2002; Lechner and Boli, 2000) and thus compel us to take notice of the considerable diversity of globalization and global processes. One could conclude, moreover, as does Larkin (2002), that arguments for capitalist continuity and increasing social homogeneity tend to replicate Western visions of modernity by ignoring indigenous histories (e.g., precolonial, colonial, postcolonial, etc.) as independent of the West. Recognizing the autonomy of modernity allows us, as Knauft (2002: 1) argues, to think about becoming modern as "contested and mediated through alter-native guises."

If we are to take Wolf and Appadurai as illustrative of the current academic debate on globalization, then we are left with the strong impression that global discourse has been divided into competing and mutually exclusive theoretical visions of homogeneity and diversity. As I suggested earlier, this also reflects the opposition of poststructural and postmodern theory to the "logic of production" (see Baudrillard, 1975) that ostensibly informs political-economy. However, dichotomizing globalization in this manner obscures what I believe to be complementary global processes. As Jonathan Friedman argues, homogeneity and diversification are "but two constitutive trends of global reality" (Friedman, 2002: 233) and thus understanding global processes would require their integration or unity.

Although Friedman, like Appadurai, believes that the hegemonic structure of the West has been largely dismantled, he asserts (1992) that capitalism remains a homogeneous process. For Friedman, it is culture and the cultural articulations of capitalism that are diverse. For example, anthropologists working in the traditions of political-economy and cultural theory have shown—and here Mintz (1985) also comes to mind—that proletarianization or capital accumulation as a general process has dramatically transformed local life in numerous peripheries, an insight that by no means negates the remarkable potential of local communities to forge their own identities and destinies in the light of global economic, political and cultural forces. We see this manifested even in Colin Turnbull's (1968) romantic account of the BaMbuti Pygmies of the Ituri Forest. Although Turnbull is an anthropologist remote from political-economy and global theory, he conveys considerable concern in the last edition of *The Forest People* that proletarianization will dramatically alter the Mbuti's relationship to the forest. Despite these concerns, however, Turnbull shows that the Mbuti find ingenious ways to appropriate Western technology to elaborate their own culture[3] while confronting the challenges of wage labour.

To pursue a complementary vision of globalization, as the above examples suggest, through a discussion of the general ethnographic and theoretical literature on globalization, and by extension modernity, is a task of immense proportion by any means. I propose, therefore, a more modest course in elaborating the merits and problems of an earlier version of global theory, that is, world systems theory. As we shall see, world systems theory anticipates very well many of the salient issues that have come to typify discussions of globalization in the academy, including the arguments advanced by Wolf, and thus pursuing these issues critically offers much to the contemporary theory and practice of anthropology. However, to better understand the merits and shortcomings of world systems theory requires, I believe, the application of this perspective to concrete ethnographic material. Conse-

quently, I turn to my own research among French wine-growers over the past 18 years and Michigan wine growers more recently to illustrate the problems of applying a global perspective to the ethnographically concrete.

Globalization as "System"

The development of dependency and world systems theories in the 1960s and 1970s through Andre Gunder Frank (1969) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) respectively had without doubt an important influence on the scope of anthropological research and especially how anthropologists think about the concept of culture. Prior to their introduction, it was not uncommon for anthropologists to regard the circumscribed village as the unit of analysis which went hand in hand with a culture area concept that identified distinctive cultural traits as representative of a geographically circumscribed way of life.[4] However, both dependency and world systems theories refigured scholarly analysis from isolated societies, or circumscribed life-worlds, to broad regional and international connections of a developing global economy. Gunder Frank argued, for example, that the underdevelopment of Latin American societies was not due to anti-modernist "fetters of tradition" as local obstacles to "progress" but rather to the systemic exploitation of local economies on the part of North American and European metropoles. Wallerstein embraced and in turn elaborated Gunder Frank's emphasis on the unequal structuring of the capitalist world economy by explaining the origins of the global economy in mercantile capitalism dating from the 14th century. Wallerstein explains the global economy as emerging from unequal relations between core, semiperiphery and peripheral world areas. In short, core areas, or nations, are dominant in the world system as centers of trade, finance and production while periphery and semiperiphery areas are the suppliers of raw materials, labour and commodities.

While there are surely practical reasons for why the village was typically the predominant unit of analysis, a number of anthropologists, myself included (Ulin, 2001), have linked the general notion of circumscribed culture to anthropology's colonial legacy and the once dominant tradition of structural and functional analysis, especially among European anthropologists.[5] By establishing a theoretical framework that links reputedly *distinct* areas of the world and thus *distinct* cultures in terms of an inequality structured through an international political-economy, world systems theory (and global analysis more generally) provides a strong corrective to the historical tendency of anthropologists to reify culture as locally circumscribed.[6] Moreover, the critical parameters of international political-economy and global analysis provide, as I illustrate below with respect to French and North American wine growing, a theoretical basis from which to challenge veiled or "naturalized" renderings of a stratified and hegemonic social order.

I faced in southwest France the daunting challenge of demystifying a tradition of voluminous French scholarship that tended to "naturalize" the privileged position of Bordeaux wines while pushing to the margins of history the account of wines produced by small growers (see also Lem, 1999). Arguments that appeal to the "natural" are by no means unique, as Marx recognized early on the tendency of capitalism to mask social relations through the "fetishism of commodities," a theoretical insight that when pursued opens the study of commodities, as Sidney Mintz (1985) has noted, to the anthropology of modern daily life. Global and interregional analyses provided therefore precisely the theoretical insight needed to reconstruct an alternative historical narrative of southwest French wines.

I demonstrated with considerable detail in my *Vintages and Traditions* (1996), and so will only summarize here, that the reputed superiority of elite Bordeaux wines over those produced in the interior was not as numerous French scholars and oenologues suggested (e.g., Dion, 1977; Lachiver, 1988; Peynaud, 1988) based upon favourable climate and soil.[7] Rather, Bordeaux's pre-eminence derives from unique historical circumstances that arose as a consequence of the English occupation of southwest France from the 12th to 15th centuries. In fact, prior to the English occupation, interior wines from the vicinity of Bergerac enjoyed a significantly better reputation than those produced in the vicinity of Bordeaux. These wines were shipped, like those of Bordeaux, to northern Europe, especially England, through the lively coastal port of La Rochelle, a city which enjoyed a significant culture of production and consumption devoted to wine. However, La Rochelle fell to the French king, Louis VIII, in 1224, thus resulting in the closing of La Rochelle to English merchants. The English were in turn forced to search for an alternative port through which they could ship wine to northern Europe. Bordeaux, to the south, became the likely candidate to replace La Rochelle in that its location on the Gironde River gave merchants access to the Atlantic Ocean.

Bordeaux's transformation into the principal port of southwest France had significant consequences for surrounding areas such as the Médoc, arguably the most renowned of the Bordeaux wine-growing regions. In the early part of the 12th century, numerous crops were cultivated in the Médoc and much of the land was covered with forests. As wine commerce through Bordeaux began

to mature in the second half of the 13th century, entrepreneurial growers began to clear Médoc forests to plant vineyards. With the exception of local industries and some crude oil refining, the Médoc is agriculturally speaking monocultural, a significant contrast to numerous other wine growing regions of lesser esteem throughout France.

The most significant boost to the reputation of Bordeaux wines followed, however, from concessions that the Bordeaux councillors received in the 12th century from the English crown in exchange for acquiescing to English rule. The English crown granted special privileges to wine produced in the immediate vicinity of Bordeaux. These gave Bordeaux growers and merchants considerable advantages over wines produced in the interior of southwestern France. For example, Bordeaux wines were exempt from taxes which were levied on interior wines. Moreover, protective legislation designed to support Bordeaux growers prevented interior wines from entering the city of Bordeaux before November 11, a date that later on was changed to early December. This gave a noteworthy marketing edge to Bordeaux growers not distinct from the protective legislation enacted by nation states today to protect local and national markets. Thus the superior reputation of Bordeaux wines owes, at least in its formative period, more to English hegemony and the city's economic history than to the special character of climate and soil (Enjalbert, 1953, Ulin, 1996).

Although the historical narrative of Michigan wine growing is quite different from Bordeaux, the natural qualities of climate and soil are likewise invoked by wine experts to subordinate Michigan wines to those produced in California and to European wines as well. This is especially interesting given that American wine history begins not in California as one would expect but rather in the mid-West of the early 19th century.[8] Nicholas Longworth, an easterner, planted vineyards in Cincinnati and produced wine that was renowned for its quality. His sparkling catawba, for example, won high marks at the 1851 Great Exposition in London. However, vineyard blights made Longworth's efforts short-lived and by the late 1880s California would replace Ohio as the predominant wine producing region.

California wines of the 1880s, like Bordeaux wines of the 12th century, were not remarkable. Much of the wine was produced in bulk and consumed locally. However, this changed in 1900 with Percy Mogran's formation of the California Wine Association (CWA). Morgan, an entrepreneur and skilled financier, convinced wealthy bankers to invest in the CWA, which then managed to gain controlling interests in all the commercially significant California wineries. As Lukacs (2000: 53) relates, "The emergence of the CWA reflects the radical changes that transformed forever California wine growing, taking it from a collection of small, mostly individualized agricultural enterprises to a mercantile industry, from a local concern to a national and even international one." While it is certainly the case that California enjoys a very favorable climate for wine growing, we can see, as with the case of Bordeaux, that California's ascendancy as a wine growing region was surely more than "natural."

Michigan growers, on the other hand, like their California counterparts, replicate French standards by currently planting the European Vinifera stock and by aging some of their wines in oak casks.[9] Moreover, in order to advance the quality reputation of Michigan wines among wine writers and consumers, growers have embraced, with support from the Michigan Department of Agriculture, a system that classifies wine into four appellations state-wide. Michigan growers created appellations to replicate the European notion of *terroir* that wine experts argue links the distinctive quality of wines to a specific place and the unique characteristics of its soil. Ironically, in spite of a subaltern ranking, the cultural capital and potential financial success that follows from replicating French standards has made Michigan growers vulnerable to regional development and globalization. Silvio Ciccone, whose fame ranges from the production of quality white wines to being the father of Madonna, told me that the increasing success of Leelenau Peninsula vineyards, located just to the northwest of Traverse City, has caught the attention of multinational corporations looking to diversify investments by purchasing vineyards. On the development side, wealthy Chicago families have been attracted to Leelenau for its beauty and have been constructing 5 000-square-foot mock Victorian vacation homes on hills overlooking Lake Michigan on one side and the Grand Traverse Bay on the other. The scramble for land has created a situation where rapidly increasing prices for land put succession in wine-growing families in doubt. While the particulars concerning the price of land differ, the situation in Michigan is not unlike that in parts of France where succession has become problematic for growers with small- to medium-size holdings in vineyards.

As another informant, Ed O'Keefe, of Chateau Grand Traverse related, the price of land is too expensive to expand and yet expansion of vineyards is necessary to the economic well being of family wine growing enterprises. O'Keefe's winery is located on the neighboring Old Mission Peninsula, directly northeast of Traverse City. The Old Mission Peninsula is long noted for its production of sour cherries and presently has four wineries compared to the twelve on the Leelenau Peninsula. The local

government on Old Mission has sought, in contrast to the Leelanau Peninsula, to control development. On Old Mission, wineries must be a minimum of 50 acres and there is an absence of motels, golf courses and casinos that typically draw tourists to the Leelenau Pennisula in numbers. Nevertheless, O'Keefe confided that there is a significant difference between the cash value of farm land and development land. He is worried that at his death the vineyards of Chateau Grand Traverse will be taxed at the development rate, thus potentially forcing his two sons to sell the winery.

Although local circumstances that influence the cultivation of vineyards and the marketing of wine may differ on the Leelenau and Old Mission Peninsulas, all the Michigan wineries face a common problem of distribution. The marketing manager of Chateau Chantal, Liz Berger, told me that globalization, and mergers precipitated by globalization, have reduced considerably the number of distributors in Michigan. While wineries may sell directly to customers, they are dependent on distributors to market their wines to the large supermarket chains and to restaurants. Generally, these distributors are only interested in marketing high-volume wines from California and Europe and thus Michigan wines end up being poorly represented in larger commercial enterprises. This is not unlike the challenge of marketing faced by wine co-operatives and smaller producers in southwest France.

While the above examples are unrelated to conventional "village studies," they show that a privileging of the local, especially "climate and soil," can be demystified through historical analysis that like world systems theory focuses on the interregional and the global. In fact, the hierarchical interrelations between French wine growing regions today and the particular circumstances of French wine co-operatives that I researched are dependent upon and thus intelligible through their articulation with a global political economy. That is, what one discovers on the local level in France in terms of the social relations and wine-growing culture reflects the very historical circumstances of interregional exchange that begins with the English occupation and arguably even earlier. How else can one explain wines of distinction which have come metonymically to stand for the Médoc and perhaps French culture in general in contrast to wines of the interior that with few exceptions long ago lost any association with distinction? Contrary to Clifford Geertz's (1983) privileging of local culture as the context that informs ethnographic interpretation, local culture is marked and interpenetrated by a world system of political-economy and the political-economy of the sign (see Baudrillard, 1975). This is surely what John Cole (1977) meant in arguing that there is little that is traditional in tradition as all tradition is a product of political-economic (and I would add cultural) forces of now global import.

If we are to draw Michigan and California wine growing into the above historical scenario, although I am currently on somewhat less familiar ethnographic grounds, we discover likewise that local sociocultural circumstances are interpenetrated by, and to some extent replicate, interregional and global political-economic processes. The cases in point are the concentrations of capital that launch an industry and the consequences such as problems of succession that follow from multinational corporate interventions on the local level. This is surely what anthropologists like Wolf and Mintz have in mind in emphasizing the homogeneous tendencies of development associated with global political economy. Again, this is not to say that the results or consequences are identical, as people on the local level make choices that matter in challenging, redefining or even replicating economic and cultural articulations of global extent. It is in my view noteworthy, and not simply accidental, that Michigan wine growers replicate festivities such as marathons, the "Stompede" to be exact, that have come to typify the celebration of wine in the Médoc.[10]

Global Limitations

Although I have established the importance of a world systems perspective to the local terrain often inhabited through anthropological research, like all terrain the grounds are frequently shifting and so this is the case with world systems and global theories more generally. Some of the most significant critiques of this perspective have come from the very scholars, like Wolf and Mintz, who clearly have theoretical positions of their own which are sympathetic to Wallerstein. Mintz's *Sweetness and Power* established the dialectical connections between Africa, the Caribbean and Europe, while Wolf's *Europe and the People without History* showed that there can be no European history without considering the peoples in the margins through whose exploitation European empires were constructed. Nevertheless, both Mintz and Wolf have argued that world systems theory eclipses local dynamics that enable us to understand resistance and the mediums through which people on the local level struggle to forge their own destinies, what can be called "alternative localities." The localities are "alternative" in recognition of both indigenous histories and the formative capacity of human co-subjects to make as their own expansive social, cultural and economic processes.

To invoke a nearly forgotten figure in the recent history of Marxism, that is Louis Althusser, there is a sort of

overdetermination of the local on the part of world systems theorists. This does not mean that Wolf and Mintz believe that we should atavistically resort to a local or circumscribed unit of analysis. Rather, they suggest that critical research in anthropology must examine how the global is present in the local and the local in the global. Michael Taussig (1980) shows this in describing the resistance to wage labour of Bolivian tin miners who refigure capitalist social relations culturally in terms of making a pact with the devil. Taussig's example is by no means idiosyncratic. It resonates with my own experiences of French and Michigan winegrowers who struggle against, and sometimes borrow from, the cultural capital of elite growers and the forces of multinational corporations.

For all their considerable merits, world systems theory and homogeneous versions of global analysis have the tendency to overdetermine the local and thus eclipse the formative power of human agency. As Bruce Knauft (2002: 37) argues,

> Capitalist analysis is far weaker, however, when it comes to engaging the cultural meaning, motivations, and significations of action, both in the metropole and, even more, in the reticulated periphery. Without an understanding of cultural engagements with and resistances to domination—the focus of modernity's alternatives and alterities—capitalist analysis rings culturally flat.

That is, without some appreciation of formative activity on the local level, human agents simply become a conduit for the realization of the global system. This, I believe, is not unique to world systems theory. It is intrinsic to all systems theory and its predecessors in structural and functional analysis. Structural analysis borrows significantly, as does systems theory in general, from formal linguistics, emphasizing the interrelationship of component units within a self-contained and finite system. Units in themselves have no value except in relation to other units. The scenario is by now all too familiar. While a strong corrective to methodological individualism (the belief that social reality can be reconstructed from the position of the individual as a bounded and distinct entity) systems theoretical and structural approaches joined formal linguistics in overlooking praxis. Praxis is conceived to be the concrete activity through which human subjects engage each other in the collective formation of the social world, inclusive of their potential to self-reflexively monitor their own actions. Contrary to both systems and structural theory,[11] the praxis position accounts for the capacity of human subjects albeit not always consciously, freely or deliberately to shape their own destinies and thus opens the analysis of the social world to historical processes. In fact, it is generally argued that structural theories in particular treat social change and history as superfluous, and in the case of Lévi-Strauss epiphenomenal.[12]

To counter the charge that structural analysis is ahistorical and indifferent to human agency, Marshall Sahlins (1985) has suggested that structured culture prefigures human experience, a position that, like Foucault's, has been influential in poststructural anthropology's deemphasis of the subject. The Hawaiian's identification of Captain Cook as the god Lono rather than a wayward mariner when he arrived at the beginning of their annual ritual cycle devoted to Lono follows, for Sahlins, from this proposition. Sahlins believes, however, that the prefiguration of human experience is not absolute, for if it were, we would never be able to account for anything new. To the contrary, he argues that experience has the potential to transform the cultural code. Nevertheless, despite the acumen Sahlins has applied to solving the perennial problems of structural, and by extension systems analysis, I believe that he too falls subject to a formalism that equates culture to a univocal and automatically enacted code (Roseberry, 1989). This is precisely Gananath Obeyesekere's (1997) point in asserting that Sahlins' structural approach glosses over the multiple voices of Hawaiian subjects by assuming that the indigenous population could not distinguish myth from reality. Obyesekere's critique suggests, moreover, that Sahlins unknowingly imposes a Western vision of rationality and thus precludes the parallel or alternative modernities introduced as a critical alternative to homogenous renderings of globalization (see also Knauft, 2002).

It can be legitimately objected that Wallerstein's world systems theory and global analysis more generally does not participate in the structural and systems theoretical eclipse of history. After all how can one raise questions concerning the formation of capitalism or the interrelations between core, semiperiphery, and periphery without invoking historical analysis and process at some level? However, there is more to historical analysis than the self-evident contention that things change. Without the potential to point to the choices human actors face and how they go about making choices that are interwoven and textured by history, we arrive at social and historical narratives that seem to tell themselves (Taussig, 1987). Stories that tell themselves contribute to what Johannes Fabian (1983) has identified as the "denial of coevalness," and thus align world systems theory with the very historical negation associated with structuralism and Europe's colonial legacy. Moreover, unless attentive to the particulars of a constitutive human agency, it is all too

easy to represent culture as epiphenomenal or to incorporate culture in a fashion (as noted above) that glosses over significant distinctions and points of contestation. While world systems theory identifies how elites profit at the expense of subalterns, the mechanics of the system that postulates core, semiperiphery and periphery risks essentializing local culture as non-differentiated in contrast to the relational positions in the global economy of which it is a determined part.

The treatment of local culture as undifferentiated is the primary point taken up critically by anthropologists like Appadurai and Larkin who regard both the process of late capitalist globalization and responses to globalization as highly diverse and locally articulated. Moreover, while it can perhaps explain the mobility of labour or migration through analysis of the core-periphery relation, world systems theory glosses over subjectivity and intersubjectivity, and so does not help us much in understanding seminal issues of transnationalism such as imagined relations to the homeland. (see Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). To grasp the complexities of peoples on the move and the ever-shifting terrain of local and transnational identities, it is necessary to focus on engaging and engaged human subjects.

Let me, however, re-emphasize that the above criticism is not a dismissal of global analysis or generalizing processes. Such a position would be indefensible in light of my own use of interregional and international economic connections. These connections, as I have argued, are essential to grasping the formation of the wine growing hierarchy in southwest France and beyond. Let me suggest, rather, that ethnographic inquiry must proceed from recognizing how the regional and the global are present in "alternative" localities and how "alternative" localities can in turn be present, as Mintz (1985) illustrated with respect to sugar even when fields of action are transcended. Such a dialectical perspective points to the complementarity of the local and global, and by extension to that of the heterogeneous and homogeneous, rather than to their intrinsic opposition.

Although my own work on French and Michigan wine growers does not speak directly to the very important issue of transnationalism and imagined homelands, the symbolic or culturally contested play of French wine growing history nonetheless illustrates the complementary nature of global and local analysis, and thus the potential to conceptualize transnationalism as playing both sides of the "global divide." I have argued elsewhere (see Ulin, 1996), for example, that the formation of the southwest French wine growing hierarchy arose not only from economic initiatives that linked southwest France to northern Europe and more distantly America and Russia, but also to an invented tradition that established symbolic and cultural ties in the 19th century between a nascent bourgeoisie and a reputedly superseded nobility. That is because, in the post-revolutionary era, the vast majority of lands owned by the French nobility were seized by the Republican government.[13] Wine growing properties were expensive to maintain and thus in the long run numerous of the elite Bordeaux wine growing estates fell into a state of neglect and ill repair. Bourgeois merchants from the large Bordeaux trading houses were the only individuals with sufficient capital to acquire and restore the once celebrated Bordeaux estates, especially in the renowned Médoc. Bourgeois merchants who acquired Médoc estates elected to build their homes as small-scale replicas of the celebrated medieval French chateaux in order to distinguish themselves and their wines culturally from the wines produced by the peasant masses. These same elite proprietors were involved, along with the wine growing associations over which they presided, in the creation of the 1855 classification of Bordeaux wines, initiated at the invitation of the Universal Exposition in Paris in the Spring of 1855. The ranking of wines from first to fifth growths as illustrative of a culturally distinct group of proprietors contributed proportionately to the distinctiveness of French national culture, not to overlook the considerable commercial advantages that ensued from classified wines. Small growers in the Médoc to this day have tried to appropriate the considerable cultural capital, in Bourdieu's sense (Bourdieu, 1984), of the symbolic and hegemonic ordering of human action, and the commercial advantage associated with the elite estates of this region. Because grapes that are brought to the wine co-operatives come from the vast range of members' various small properties throughout a delimited region, in contrast to the more consolidated properties of elite growers, these selfsame small proprietors have sought to negotiate a narrative of wine-growing history that presents their wines as those truly "authentic" to the region. Co-operative growers also have successfully sought to bottle a portion of their wines under the chateau label. This is another indication of local subaltern populations having the capacity to creatively appropriate and reproduce to their own advantage hegemonic discourses.

Globalization as Discourse

The above discussion has focussed, as has much of the debate concerning globalization, on the relationship between the local and regions that lie considerably beyond. It has been my intention to show through ethnographic examples the vitality of general global analysis and, most

importantly, that local and global dynamics and analyses of these dynamics are more complementary than opposed. However, it is also the case that local and global as concepts are often taken for granted, perhaps even, like the anthropological notion of "tradition" (see Cole, 1977), reified, and thus reproduced unreflectively in virtually all the globalization literature. One noteworthy exception is Anna Tsing (2002) who has taken up critically the discourse that produces and reproduces the local and global divide. In her provocative essay on the "global situation" Tsing evaluates the discourse of globalization by examining, for example, the seductive symbolic contiguity of globalization and modernization. Moreover, she also unveils and critiques with acumen the guiding theoretical paradigms or interests of global research by looking at how the discourses of "futurism," "conflations" and "circulation" inform the work of anthropologists. "Futurism" involves a turning away from isolated local cultures to looking at the systemic dimensions of a global capitalism. "Conflations" are focussed less on the systemics of global capitalism and more on the mobility of culture, that is cultural connections across wide terrain. Its fault, like that of "futurism" is looking for a "singular anthropological globalism." "Circulation" has to do with the flow of knowledge, technology, people and culture and suggests the newness of the global epoch, although she rejects, as noted, the novelty of globalization discourse. Tsing concludes (2002: 471) that the "circulation" metaphor often fails to examine "different modes of regional-to-global interconnection."

Tsing (2002: 472) believes that with globalization "scale" must become an object of analysis. She asserts that "Understanding the institutional proliferation of particular globalization projects requires a sense of their cultural specificities as well as the travels and interactions through which these projects are reproduced and taken on in new places." Tsing goes on to say that the evaluation of scale involves two analytical principles: one, to pay close attention to "ideologies of scale," to trace the "cultural claims about locality, regionality and globality"; and second, to "break down the units of culture and political-economy through which we make sense of events and social processes." "Instead of looking for world-wrapping evolutionary stages, logics and epistemes, I would begin by finding what I call "projects," that is, relatively coherent bundles of ideas and practices as realized at particular times and places."

Tsing's discussion of globalization is important in that she deconstructs the language and practices of global theorization, a reflexive move that reminds one of the best of critical theory. Moreover, Tsing argues for the importance of human agency and self-determinations on the local level that are more than the simple responses to determining global processes. This resonates with my own work. According to Tsing (2002: 464):

> No anthropologist I know argues that the global future will be culturally homogeneous; even those anthropologists most wedded to the idea of a new global era imagine this era as characterized by "local" cultural diversity. Disciplinary concern with cultural diversity overrides the rhetoric of global cultural unification pervasive elsewhere, even though, for those in its sway, globalism still rules: diversity is generally imagined as forming a reaction or a backdrop to the singular and all-powerful "global forces" that create a new world.

Tsing is correct in arguing that anthropologists shy away from a homogeneous global future as even political-economists such as Wolf and Mintz who envision capitalism in largely homogeneous terms argue for diversity and the struggle for self-determination on the local level. Tsing is furthermore right to argue that instead of paying specific attention to locally originating projects and local articulations of culture, many anthropologists view diversity as a reaction to global processes. To disregard local determinations is to take away any substance that we would otherwise attribute to local subjects. Hence there is much merit and potential to Tsing's theoretical argument. She avoids the trappings of global and local abstractions or reifications and challenges us ethnographically to recognize the concrete quotidian practice of situated human subjects.

Despite largely agreeing with Tsing on the question of human agency, however, I part ways with Tsing when it comes to her rejection of uniform global processes. Tsing believes, I conclude, in the surpassing of Marxist political-economy as a consequence of the complexities of globalization. In reviewing the discourse of globalization, Tsing asserts that the leading trope in anthropological versions of political-economy is "penetration" and thus anthropologists operating in this theoretical paradigm are ill equipped to address the multiple avenues of "circulation" as represented (in my understanding) by Appadurai's "scapes."

Tsing is right to argue that "penetration" is an important metaphor for Marxist political-economy, one that connotes the violence of capitalism as it disrupts and ultimately transforms subsistence economies. Moreover, as I argued earlier, certain versions of political-economy potentially gloss over, and ironically so, human agency and thus are somewhat theoretically out of step with

locally generated projects and local resistance. Nevertheless, one must not forget that it was Marx who challenged circulation as the dominant trope of classical economics by pointing to the tendency of the circulation of commodities to conceal the social relations of production. Given that circulation has again become the dominant trope for understanding the contemporary human condition in its multiplicity and diversity, one must ask what this figure of speech reveals and conceals in terms of praxis or human formative activity.

No one questions that people, commodities and technology circulate. However, to accept this as simply an empirical condition of life, or as autonomous symbolic or cultural exchange, is to turn away from the historical and social processes upon which circulation depends. As we have seen, the symbolic capital of Bordeaux wines or the subaltern status of Michigan wines is a complex historical outcome. With that said, I ally myself more closely with Wolf and Mintz who emphasize the homogenizing tendencies of capitalist development while acknowledging the potential of peoples on their local levels to make their own destinies. If we are looking for a new trope, it will, as Friedman argues, have to borrow from both global and local domains.

Conclusion

The examples of the wine growing hierarchy in southwestern France and Michigan wine growers point to three theoretical issues that can go a long way towards clarifying the practical importance of global and interregional analyses while mediating and thus potentially reconciling opposed visions of globalization as either homogeneous or endlessly diversified. First, contrary to the economic teleology of some versions of global analysis, it is important to recognize the relative autonomy of cultures with respect to political-economy as well as their historical independence and interpenetration in certain circumstances. Elite growers worked, as did small proprietors, from the context of international political-economy in forming a distinctive cultural and symbolic construct. Michigan growers have sought in turn to reproduce the symbolic capital or distinction associated with European wines while challenging the notion that California wines are superior because of climate and soil.

Second, contrary to systems and structural analyses, local culture is never reducible to a code to be enacted but rather must be recast to account for the plurality of voices that are woven into the social fabric, sometimes at the center and sometimes at the periphery. The various claims for the "authenticity" of particular wines are illustrative of the contested discourse that contributes to the plurality of wine growing culture. Paying attention to differentiated voices within and between social fields of action also speaks to the capacity of human agents to initiate projects on the local level that are more than a simple reflex of global processes, while not neglecting altogether the potential of global processes to weigh upon and penetrate local cultures. It must be kept in mind, however, that just as global processes can be reified, so can those on the local level when human agents are regarded as having unquestioned autonomy to direct or originate projects of their own. Moreover, as Wolf and Mintz have argued, the local is not an undifferentiated social space but is itself fragmented and hierarchically ordered.

Finally, it is important to recognize, as an extension of "differentiated voices," concrete human actors who struggle individually and collectively over the terms of their own existence. These actors must be recognized as operating in fields of power that position human agents differentially in constructing the social world, an insight that forces us to pay attention to the competing narratives and social practices of history.

While the above points are neither comprehensive nor all-encompassing, they do offer to move the discussion beyond what are essentially non-productive dichotomies of the social world. Moreover, with the three correctives above in mind, the relative autonomy of culture, the importance of human agency, and the recognition of differentiated fields of power in which individuals and collectives forge their social existence, it is evident that global analysis continues to offer much to a critical understanding of both past and contemporary human affairs.

Robert C. Ulin, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 49008, U.S.A. E-mail: robert.ulin@wmich.edu

Notes

1 The Frankfurt School never specifically wrote about globalization, probably because the term is of rather recent origin, following especially the collapse of the Soviet Union (see also David Harvey, 2000). However, there is little doubt that the Frankfurt School was interested in a critique of global capitalism through analyzing the relationship between modernity and rationality in its various forms. The Frankfurt School's emphasis on the importance of technical reason globally could lead one to conclude that state bureaucracies are increasingly similar in spite of political differences.

2 Larkin (2002: 352) defines parallel modernities as "the coexistence in space and time of multiple economic, religious and cultural flows that are often subsumed with the term "modernity."

3 The Mbuti appropriated discarded metal drain pipes which then could be used as *molimo*, or horns, that would be blown to wake up the forest. Turnbull was worried, however, that

the trading camps and Western tourism would in the long run take the Mbuti Pygmies away from their life in the forest, transforming them into wage workers.

4 Within the anthropology of Europe, Ernestine Friedl's (1962) *Vasilika* is clearly one of those exceptions in that Friedl examines the articulation of the local to the national economy as well as the long-standing influence of Turkey on Greece.

5 Among contemporary anthropologists, it has been Jean and John Comaroff (1992), Johannes Fabian (1983) and John Cole (1977) who have succinctly connected the notion of circumscribed culture and structural-functional analysis to anthropology's colonial involvement.

6 In spite of this considerable merit, and here the critical intent of Appadurai's "scapes" come to mind, there is a tendency on the part of world systems theory, and by extension, of global analysis, to participate in the very theoretical claims that one would expect it to supersede. However, before proceeding with critique, I look first at what world systems theory in particular and global analysis in general have contributed to my own ethnographic research.

7 I am not saying that climate and soil have nothing to do with the quality of wine produced. However, quality is a subjective judgement, as some consumers prefer aged wines while others have a clear preference for young wines. Generally aged wines are regarded by experts to be better. As for climate and soil, one informant in the Médoc whose vineyards were in close proximity to a famous chateau estate, complained of the enormous price differential between her wine and the chateau wine. Surely, climate and soil were nearly identical. The price differentials arise from historical and social factors that cannot be reduced to the "natural."

8 My account of California wine growing history follows very closely Paul Lukacs's excellent *American Vintage: The Rise of American Wine*.

9 There was considerable difference of opinion in the early 1970s between Michigan State's Agricultural School and grower Ed O'Keefe over whether or not the Vinifera could be grown in Michigan. Michigan State favored what were believed to be robust hybrids while O'Keefe was adamant that the Vinifera would prosper and produce better wine. Today, most growers in Leelenau and the Old Mission Peninsula of Michigan have successfully planted and produced with Vinifera.

10 In 2002, I participated in the "Stompede" finishing third in my age class. It is my intention with my Michigan research to pay more attention to wine festivities than I did in France.

11 Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann are perhaps best know for debating the praxis theoretical and systems theoretical positions respectively. Habermas has maintained that Luhmann does not account for the self-formative potentials of human agency, including the potential of human subjects to monitor their own actions reflexively.

12 For Lévi-Strauss, all meaning, inclusive of history, is reducible to universal structures of mind. It is for this reason that I argue that Lévi-Strauss transforms history to a consequent of invariable structures, thus making history epiphenomenal to structure.

13 The seizure of noble land was not entirely complete. Some noble proprietors managed to reacquire their estates through intermediaries. This was rare, however, in the wine growing sector.

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Extra Virgin Olive Oil and Slow Food

Anne Meneley *Trent University*

Abstract: Extra virgin olive oil is a commodity which enjoys particular prestige in the globalized economy. It is a "healthy" fat that is identified with localized production by artisans. Accordingly it reverses the erasure of the connection between human subjects that characterizes the fetishized commodity. Extra virgin olive oil from Tuscany is particularly prestigious and expensive, being associated with a region famed for its art, architecture, food, and landscape and widely popularized of late by British and American writers. The preference for artisanally produced commodities like extra virgin olive oil is linked to the growing "Slow Food" Movement which seeks to replace mass produced, artificial and sometimes tasteless fast foods by wholesome foods produced in known places by identifiable people. Slow foods which can be consumed at leisure reflect the superior taste of purchasers. Despite Slow Food"s championing of small producers, it is often the big firms rather than families of artisans that are able to access international markets.

Keywords: Globalization, non-fetishized commodities, "Slow Food" Movement, critique of mass production, olive oil, Tuscany

Résumé **:** L'huile d'olive, en tant que marchandise, jouit d'un prestige particulier dans l'économie mondiale. C'est un «bon» gras qui rime avec production locale et artisanale. En tant que tel, cette huile annule l'effacement du lien entre les sujets humains qui donne un caractère fétiche à la marchandise. L'huile d'olive extra-vierge de la Toscane est particulièrement prestigieuse et coûteuse puisqu'elle est associée à une région réputée pour son art, son architecture, sa nourriture et ses paysages rendus célèbres récemment par des écrivains britanniques et américains. L'attrait des marchandises produites de façon artisanale, telle l'huile d'olive extra-vierge, est lié au mouvement «slow-food», qui cherche à remplacer la nourriture artificielle issue de la restauration rapide, produite en série et parfois insipide, par de la nourriture saine produite par des personnes identifiables dans des endroits connus. Cette nourriture, qui peut être consommée à loisir, reflète les goûts supérieurs des consommateurs. Malgré les succès de quelques petits producteurs de «slow food», ce sont plus souvent qu'autrement les grandes compagnies et non les familles d'artisans qui sont en mesure d'accéder aux marchés internationaux.

Mots-clés : Mondialisation, marchandises non-érigées en fétiche, mouvement «slow-food», critique de la production en série, huile d'olive, Toscane

In a recent visit to a Korean greengrocer down the street from my home in Toronto, I went to reach for the Asian hot sauce, only to find that it had been dropped to a lower shelf in favour of a higher-end competitor: the increasingly ubiquitous extra virgin olive oil. Indeed, hot sauce had all but been replaced with at least ten varieties of extra virgin olive oil, with fancy Italian labels and price tags to match, mimicking the stock of the expensive gourmet store across the street. More than an average shopping crisis, this moment made me ask the question of how olive oil, a "healthy" fat, but a fat nonetheless, could make such a positive mark on a public obsessed with fat and fitness. Indeed, well before greengrocers took up this trend, at one moment in the not-too-distant past, butter seemed to vanish from higher-end restaurant tables, replaced by small dishes of olive oil. This move reveals a kind of key shift in what Simmel (1994) would call a "sociology of the meal," or perhaps, more aptly, a "sociology of a hip meal." These scenes epitomize how a commodity—extra virgin olive oil—can move across borders, in the company of diverse cultural and class assumptions and practices. The study of these flows of olive oil illuminates wider issues of culture and class in the commodity-saturated world of contemporary capitalism.

As Stallybrass notes, Marx was concerned with "a specific form of fetishism which took as its object not the animized object of human labour and love but the evacuated non-object that was the site of exchange" (1997: 187). Relations between subjects in capitalist production come to be misapprehended as relations between objects. This misapprehension, as has often been noted, is real in its consequences, erasing the connection between producers and consumers. In what Harvey calls "the condition of postmodernity," the world's geographies are being brought together via the circulation of food commodities to be experienced vicariously and simultaneously as a "simulacrum" yet the social relations of production, producers and place of origin of these commodities are still

erased from the view of the consumer (1990: 300). However, what makes Tuscan extra virgin olive oil such a successful commodity is its craft or non-industrial production; the location of production, the producer's estate, remains embedded in the product. In this respect, the "source identifying indexicals"[1] of craft production, seem to seek to overcome the fetish. Extra virgin olive oil is, at least rhetorically, "de-fetishized" in that the identity of producer remains immanent in the product.

As Mintz (1985) argues, the making of a dominant commodity depends on markets of consumers—the cultivation of particular tastes—as well as production. Is consumption of extra virgin olive oil an example of consumers' resistance to the erasure of the producer that so vexed Marx? Italian extra virgin olive oil producers produce, package and market their oil in ways that are not unrelated, I argue, to the way in which North American consumers imagine and desire it. As well as investigating how extra virgin olive oil is produced and marketed in Tuscany, I consider how consumer imaginings and consumer movements might affect the way in which production of food commodities is carried out. I focus specifically on an international movement, *Slow Food*, which advocates, instead of the harried intake of industrial fast food, the leisurely consumption of artisanally produced food.

Commodities on Display

On my way to Italy to interview extra virgin olive oil producers, I used a stopover in London to visit Harrods' famed food floor, in hopes of gaining insight into how Italian extra virgin olive oils are marketed abroad. I found four substantial olive oil displays. One four-tiered display drew my attention. Although the Harrods brand of olive oil was given the prestige place at eye level, the estate oils from Tuscany immediately followed it. Greek, Spanish and South African olive oils were on a lower tier; and, lowest of the low, at my feet, the mass-produced oils, like Fry "Light" cooking spray and Mazola corn oil. The upper tiers of the hierarchy are ordered by the relative prestige of the known and acknowledged, de-fetishized olive oil: from the claim of the Harrods brand to be the best, to the prominence of Tuscany over all others, European over non-European. Finally there is the move from olive oil whose place of origin is known to "placeless, nameless" oils, which have not been "de-fetishized." The normal form of the commodity provided a lowly background against which the defetishized commodity stood out as the prestigious figure.

Fascinated by this hierarchy, I took detailed notes on each of the labels. As I happily scribbled away, I began to notice two very large men in very expensive suits, reminding me of dapper English gangsters. They circled around me, carrying on a loud conversation while watching me closely. Finally, it dawned on me that their behaviour suggested they were security men and my behaviour might look suspiciously like industrial espionage. I turned around, and with business card in trembling hand, introduced myself as an anthropologist. They were mystified, as many have been, as to what an anthropologist wanted with olive oil, so I gave them a breezy account of changes in anthropological topics—from far away places with palm trees to global commodities! I must have persuaded them that I meant no harm because one of them was soon extolling the healthful qualities of olive oil, and pressing the name of his favourite Tuscan olive oil on me.

Reverse Orientalism?

In contemporary global cultural economies, olive oil's reputation as being healthy provides this commodity with a medico-scientific boost. In popular discourses about health, concerns about heart disease led to the promotion of the "Mediterranean diet" which stars a "good" fat, olive oil. This does not answer the question, of course, about why Italian, or particularly Tuscan olive oil would be favoured, not only by Harrods' plainclothesmen, but by North American consumers as well.

It is now commonplace to note the connections between imaginings of particular places and political and economic relationships in the world, including the circulation and consumption of commodities. So argues Edward Said regarding the impact of Orientalist discourses (1979) in perpetuating negative images of the Middle East, which are both shaped by, and shape, political and economic policies. This kind of analysis proposes that the way in which political and economic relationships interact with popular imaginings of place—presented in books and other media—is not trivial or coincidental. Crucial to the process of imaginary de-fetishizing is being able to imagine the place of production. In a kind of radical reversal of the negative imaginings that characterize the Middle East, where I have formerly worked, we find Italy, particularly Tuscany, presented as an overwhelmingly positive space in many popular texts. These texts provide fuel for lively and picturesque imaginings of a place like Tuscany, to which the lineage of desired commodities like Tuscan extra virgin can be traced.

One recent bestseller, *Under the Tuscan Sun*, for example, recounts Frances Mayes's vacation life in Tuscany, where she bought and renovated a house. The back cover of the book claims that Frances Mayes has done for Tuscany what M.F.K. Fisher and Peter Mayle have done for Provence.[2] While Italian olive oil producers I spoke to

reported that they found the book often saccharine, inaccurate and boring, they argued that it had had a positive impact on the tourist trade, increasingly important to the local economy.[3] Mayes depicts Tuscany as a place where the quest for the authentic food, wine and aesthetically pleasing traditional villas are the chief concerns of existence. Perhaps that is why her book is so popular, as it seems to engage the reader in an idyllic, yet "authentic" space, implicitly rendered timeless by her use of the present tense. In an article entitled "Why I Hate Frances Mayes" Paula Brooks (2001) wonderfully lampoons the romantic "life is a banquet" portrayal of Tuscany, where the worst crisis seems to be something like forgetting to buy fresh ricotta. The market for these books, however, has seemingly yet to be sated. A new memoir by Patrizia Chen (2003) entitled *Rosemary and Bitter Oranges: Growing Up in a Tuscan Kitchen*, follows Mayes's format of offering descriptions of beautiful and succulent local produce, descriptions of quaint Italians devoted to food, and the authentic recipes of her Italian housekeeper. The commodification of Tuscany itself depends on foreign imaginings of it as a desirable place. This process is not unrelated, I suspect, to the relative marketability of Italian olive oil, as opposed to the also delicious and healthful Mediterranean olive oils of Palestine, Tunisia, Syria, Libya or Turkey.

Desires for Tuscany have been generated from abroad in the popularity of Italian cuisine itself, in its sophisticated and rustic forms.[4] One gets the sense that Italian cuisine has taken over from French as the most influential European cuisine in North America; an issue of Bon Appetit (May 2001) claimed that Italian cuisine was the favourite cuisine of 71% of Americans. Pasta, olive oil and Parmesan cheese are prominent in middle-class North American diets. Indeed, basil pesto on pasta is practically the pemmican of the harried, but cuisine conscious, middle-class working parent. Italian cuisine early in the century inhabited a different class location, and in some respects was the "industrial food" par excellence as witnessed in the canned spaghetti of Chef Boyardee and the epitome of fast food, pizza.[5] This fact is somewhat haughtily noted by Lorenza de' Medici in her cookbook (1996: 16) presenting Tuscan aristocratic cuisine (*cucina alto borghese*). But *la cucina povera*, poor rural people's cooking is equally fashionable these days, with its emphasis on simplicity and seasonal produce (Kaspar, 1999: 24.) Food writer Calvin Trillin somewhat theatrically suggests that Tuscan trattorias, which feature "homey, unpretentious, honest" food,[6] are now more common in Manhattan than delis (2003: 17-8). And the Tuscan cooking school is the role model for the increasingly popular cooking vacation in which culture is imbibed through local food products and cuisine (Ferguson, 2003: 8).

Tuscan cuisine has also received much attention in "foodie" magazines. A Special Collector's Edition of *Bon Appetit* magazine (May 2000) entitled "The Soul of Tuscany: Fascinating People, Romantic Places, Delicious Foods," features an editorial introduction entitled "Dreaming of Tuscany" where the editors announce:

> This is the Italy of our dreams—the magical region we have read about, seen in paintings and fantasized about. We can visualize it in our mind's eye—the olive groves, cypress trees and grapevines; the medieval villages, walled towns and Renaissance cities.
>
> It is the land of Florence, Siena and Lucca; of the Uffizi and the Leaning Tower of Pisa and more duomos than we can count. It is the home of Dante, Galileo, Machiavelli, Leonardo, Michelangelo, Puccini, and, yes, Gucci. And then there are the wines and the food. What would life be like without Chianti, Brunello, Vin Santo or the Super Tuscans? Or crostini, biscotti, pecorino, pappardelle and panforte? Not to mention olives and olive oil. (2000: 115)

This is "imagined cuisine" (Bestor, 2001: 85) at its most positive. This edition of *Bon Appétit* features an article by Frances Mayes, who writes "At each season, different foods are welcomed, savoured and honoured—and then the next thing comes into its prime. It's a continuing pleasure cycle. In spring, Tuscans appreciate young fava beans, green almonds, wild asparagus, fresh pecorino" (2000: 117). I suspect that the consumption of Italian extra virgin olive oil, in its premium form, is related to this current fascination with Tuscany as a prestigious vacation destination and with the popularity of Tuscan cuisine. But while place of production is clearly important in consumption, so to is the way in which the commodity is produced and the producers themselves.

Tuscan Olive Oil Producers

I wanted to see how the producers of extra virgin olive oil both produced their products and imagined consumers for it. To this end, I interviewed several producers of extra virgin olive oil in the summer of 2000. I present here vignettes describing three of these producers, each from different classes: owners of an olive mill who identified themselves as former sharecroppers; owners of an internationally renowned vineyard, for whom olive oil was a secondary product to wine; and the aristocratic owners of a large olive oil estate. What united all of these very differently located olive oil producers was a shared love of extra virgin olive oil, a commitment to its artisanal pro-

duction and a claim of the superiority of the extra virgin olive oil made in this fashion. All the producers I interviewed agreed that olives must be picked by hand between mid-November and mid-December in order to retain the low acidity (the olives produce more acid as they ripen) and the distinctive greenish colour and peppery taste of a Tuscan oil.

Central Italy, including Tuscany, has long been a communist party stronghold and land reforms have redistributed land (Shore, 1990). Yet vestiges of the traditional land tenure system (*mezzadria*), although abolished after World War II, continue to structure social interactions as well as the production and marketing of olive oil.[7] In the past, the sharecroppers (*contadini*) worked the land of the owner (*padrone*), to whom they gave at least half of the produce. An overseer (*fattore*), the intermediary between the landowner and the contadini, managed the farm. While the *mezzadria* system of land tenure in Tuscany has largely died out, the hierarchical relationships between *padrone* and *contadini* are still palpable in everyday comportment. Traces of the *mezzadria* system also remain in olive oil production. The olive pickers, often the former *contadini* on large estates, are paid with a share of the olive oil produced, despite EU regulations that technically forbid it.

One sunny June day, I interviewed the owners of a family-run mill, which was situated next to their large, new, but plain farmhouse. Three generations were present: the old patriarch, the middle-aged son, and 10-year-old grandson. The son did most of the talking while his father sat, interjecting humorous commentary, and the little boy wandered about until he became bored and vanished. I had been introduced by a mutual friend, who told them that I was familiar with the place of the *contadini* in the *mezzadria* system. This appeared to please them, for while they now owned the land they worked thanks to the dismantling of the *mezzadria* system, they still identified themselves as *contadini*.

This family operated one of the few traditional mills left in the Cortona region. They proudly showed me the enormous stone wheels used for grinding the olives into a paste. They told me that horses, then steam and now electricity had first powered the wheels. The wheel itself was the guarantor of "authenticity" since there was plenty of new technology in evidence, including a new conveyor belt which washed the olives and a machine which lifted the 30 kilogram discs spread with olive paste, a task very few men could still do. The other marker of authenticity was the "cold" pressing. The olive paste is kept at 17 degrees Celsius as it is pressed. This method was contrasted to "hot" processing when the olive paste is not pressed at all, but put in a centrifuge with hot water. The hot water method produces more oil, but according to my hosts, the aesthetic qualities, the smell and taste, and the healthful qualities, the nutrients and vitamins, are lost. This method of cold pressing is slower, more labour intensive and produces less oil, but it preserves the quality of the oil. As I was offered a taste of their indeed delicious oil straight from the *ziri*, a large and attractive terracotta pot, the old man waxed philosophical. He told me that contemporary consumers who bought their oil from the supermarket did not understand that if we still have the same stomach as "Christo" (Jesus Christ), then we should eat natural things. This family perceived their extra virgin olive oil to be in competition with the much cheaper but highly processed olive oil sold by multinationals, which fooled customers, he said, by bottling bad oil in nice bottles. He told me that industrially produced olive oil was weakening Italian men and if they kept on consuming it, Italian women were not going to be happy. With a mischievous grin, the old man made a descriptive hand motion that clearly indicated that he was talking about their sexual strength.

In olive picking and production, instead of workers selling their labour for a wage, there is often more of a barter (*baratto*) system, where, in the words of one of my informants, "you give something to me, I do something for you." The millers gave a percentage of the oil to the pickers, who were friends and acquaintances, instead of paying them a salary.[8] Those who bring their olives to this mill to be processed give the mill owners a share of their oil instead of paying them, who then try to find markets for the oil.

The mill owners bottle their own oil in a clear glass utilitarian bottle, with a plain label that describes their farm and production style. They asked me if, for a percentage of their oil, I might like to be their wholesaler in Canada, as without connections, English skills, or international experience, they had had difficulty in selling their oil abroad. I demurred, although I momentarily savoured the appealing thought of dispensing olive oil to friends and colleagues from an elegant terracotta vat!

The next estate I visited is described in *The Food Lover's Companion to Tuscany* as "what you would think of if you closed your eyes and imagined a quintessential Tuscan wine estate" (Capalbo 1999: 261). This estate is the Tuscan face of an international company with a wide distribution network. The sons of the owners and other professional experts head up the various marketing divisions. I spoke with one of the sons, a sophisticated and immaculately dressed young man, with impeccable Oxbridge English, who was responsible for the marketing of olive

oil, champagne and finely crafted Tuscan hunting knives. We chatted in the beautiful gardens, surrounded by elegantly restored buildings, complete with a charming covered terrace where they held their wine tastings. When I asked if they paid their workers in kind, I received the firm reply that their pickers were full-time, year round, and legally paid. After the relatively short olive picking season in the late fall, the workers were occupied with wine production, this estate's chief concern and income earner. He told me that they produced extra virgin olive oil for the pleasure of it, because they did not make much money from it. He said that the advantage of selling olive oil for wine producers is that the bottles tend to hang around in people's kitchens, providing a discreet form of everyday advertising, especially persuasive, he thought, because they bottle their oil in replicas of a classic Roman *anfora*. Instead of milling their own oil, he said, they send it to a nearby mill, owned by those known to them, who could be trusted to mill it properly. I was surprised to hear that it was the mill of the former *contadini* family described above. But these wine makers did not have to ask the anthropologist for marketing assistance as their oil is readily available at expensive gourmet food shops in North America.[9] Despite identical production of extra virgin olive oil, the wine estate easily distributed its olive oil abroad while the mill owners could not access a foreign market.

The third olive oil producer I'll discuss is a count, and a member of the elite olive oil producer collective known as "Laudemio." In 1992, Laudemio produced an elegant and expensive hard cover volume that pictured the aristocratic owners on their remarkable estates as well as recipes featuring Laudemio oils contributed by film notables like Franco Zeffirelli and Audrey Hepburn. This count's estate proved even more impressive than its picture in the Laudemio catalogue. As we toured their capacious olive oil fields in their SUV, the count and countess noted that even though one of their wines had won an award a few years ago, their primary product was olive oil. The olive trees were impeccably cared for and the count's affection for them was evident when he made a special point of taking us to see a huge old tree that had somehow survived the terrible frost in 1985, when many Tuscan olive groves had been devastated. Like the mill owners, these aristocrats also relied on workers from the area, many of whom had had long-standing ties with their family, to pick their olives in return for a share of the oil. Their old mill had been immaculately restored as a kind of museum. The countess told me that one of their aged former *contadino* had been moved to tears when he saw the restored original olive press. While the countess decried the harshness of the *mezzadria* system, she noted that in olive picking season, these old ties, and shared affection for the oil, seem to evoke nostalgia for the past. The count and countess pick olives alongside the ordinary folk of the neighborhood and the class divisions seem more muted at this time.

While the *fattore* of the past was often a harsh mediator between the owner of the farm and the workers, the present day *fattore* on this estate is an olive oil tasting expert, part of a new cadre of agricultural and taste-making experts. Their old farmhouse (*podare*), which used to house the extended family of the *fattore,* has been transformed into five apartments for a kind of "agricultural tourism" (*agriturismo*). The guests get a chance to experience "country living" and participate a bit in farm production. The old olive mill has been filled with large round tables where the students in their cooking school will eat. They often rent out their remarkable gardens to locals for social events like weddings; the wedding lunch will be catered in the old olive mill. The non-elite borrow some aristocratic cachet by having their wedding photographs taken with the backdrop of the noble estate. These are all ways in which the aristocracy, who have far less land than they used to, continue to afford their luxurious lifestyle for the reform of the *mezzadria* system has not entirely eroded class distinctions.

The Laudemio group provides promotion and screening for all of its 40-some members. To be sold as Laudemio, extra virgin olive oil must be filtered until it is a clear, brilliant green. Each estate bottles their oil in Laudemio's signature bottle, affixing their own distinctive estate labels. Every year each estate's oil is tested to see if it meets Laudemio standards. If it does not pass, they cannot sell Laudemio oil that year. While Laudemio was a good vehicle for promotion, the count told me, they don't actually make a lot of money from it, given the expense of the bottle and the cork.[10] Most of the oil they sell is unfiltered, since most of their customers prefer the peasanty look of the unfiltered oil. The Laudemio group does not handle distribution, so Laudemio producers like Antinori and Frescobaldi, who have prominent wine distribution systems, are much likelier to get their oil marketed abroad (Rosenblum, 1996: 116).

Asserting Local Identities

One must investigate both production and consumption to understand how extra virgin olive oil circulates from its production in Tuscany to North American consumers. The trajectory of its circulation may well have to do with the way in which contemporary lives are lived in conditions of postmodern capitalism. The aestheticization of local

places goes hand in hand with the internationalism of modernism, as David Harvey notes; the fashioning of a localized aesthetic allows a sense of limited identity that endows a sense of security in a shifting world (1990: 303-304). As this process accelerates, local identities are formed and embodied in particular consumables representing particular places. Tuscan extra virgin olive oil is a case in point. Food items increasingly provide an idiom in which concerns about the European Union are expressed and argued (Lem, 1999, Leitch, 2000). Europeans often negotiate, contest and oppose the European Union as an increasingly bureaucratized body that will undermine local produce, local standards of production, and impose a uniformity which will both deprive local production of its taste and style and perhaps expose some to dangers from other nations. This phenomenon has been well publicized in the uproar about *Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy* (BSE or mad cow disease) and genetically modified foods. Lem's work (1999: xi-xii) describes how French producers of wine see themselves as being undermined by the EU regulations that allow sale of foreign products perceived to challenge local production.

The EU regulations for olive oil production seem to have both restricted and enabled production and marketing strategies: while the olive oil producers that I interviewed seemed jaded about the EU in general, they also receive subsidies from the EU, based on the number of trees and area planted. These subsidies are hardly enough to offset the labour costs, if EU standards are followed. One of my informants dismissed this aid as hardly enough for a "cappuccino per tree." The producers I spoke with argued that the EU restrictions on labour and hygiene actually benefited the larger industrial producers over those committed to high quality production.

Extra virgin olive oil is one of the food commodities which is beginning to stand for—affectively and materially—a kind of local identity which may assert a resistance to the incursion of both foreign and mass produced goods. In the tourist promotional material celebrating the "Oil Towns" (Citta dell'olio) of Tuscany and Umbria a message aimed at consumers is that by buying and imbibing the locally produced olive oils, they get a share in the local landscape and gastronomic traditions (Papa, 1998).

Slow Food

The idea that one can access a kind of cultural authenticity via local food is promoted by a prominent international movement, *Slow Food*, which takes as its stated project the encouragement of local food produced by "centuries-old traditions" in an attempt to counter the incursion of fast food and mass-produced food. The movement's founder, Carlo Petrini, formerly a prominent figure in the Italian left, was inspired by the appearance of that controversial icon of food globalization, the first McDonald's, in Rome. Regional cooking, according to Slow Food, is said to "banish" the degrading effects of fast food. And "real culture" is described as being about "developing taste" rather than "demeaning" it through consuming industrially produced food.

Slow Food has become a popular forum for discussing shared problems with globalization through the medium of food. Its message clearly resonates with consumers in many parts of the world who fear the dangers associated with industrial food production: the additives, the unknown origins, potential genetic modifications and the homogenization of tastes. The foods that one ought to acquire a taste for and enjoy, according to Slow Food, are those artisanally produced and locally grown. Through consuming this kind of distinctive food, one can support the artisanal food production that is in danger of being wiped out by competition with industrial food companies, and connect with the people who produced it and the land on which it was produced.

Corby Kummer, food critic for *The Atlantic*, contributor to *Gourmet Magazine*, and advocate of the Slow Food movement in the United States, highlights the three initiatives, "embedded in the Slow Food DNA" (2002: 22). The first is the "Ark of Taste": Slow Food rescues "endangered foods" by sponsoring them and encouraging its members to consume them and thus save them from extinction. This biblical image is used by Slow Food to link gourmets with environmentalists, arguing that ignoring the linkage between the two leads to "stupid gourmets." "The Ark metaphor is explicit: onto this symbolic ship, Slow Food intends to load gastronomic products threatened by industrial standardization, hyperhygienist legislation, the rules of the large-scale retail trade and the deterioration of the environment (http://slowfood.com). The second initiative is the Presidia, grassroots organizations that identify and promote local Ark foods to the public. The third is the "Nobel Prize" of biodiversity, the Slow Food Award (Kummer, 2002: 22).

These initiatives suggest a kind of "virtuous globalization" is possible through a practice of eco-gastronomy, in which the pleasure one derives from artisanally produced food comes with an obligation to consume responsibly. Slow Food's Web site and publishing house, the Slow Food Editore, produces elegant and attractive volumes that show an attention to aesthetics and quality which mime the virtues they find in the foods they champion. Yet it is also a powerful "platform" for publicizing their movement, a platform that, like a cooking show or three Miche-

lin stars for a French restaurant, is seen as increasingly necessary for success in the gastronomic endeavors (Echikson, 2003: 65). Slow Food is clear about the power of their platform, which they use to support and promote their "endangered foods." Slow Food posits, rather uncritically, the unambiguous "goodness" of food biodiversity, but only those "traditionally produced foods" which are tasteful according to Slow Food's experts, are deemed worthy of inclusion on the Ark.[11]

Like the Arts and Crafts movement spearheaded by Morris and Ruskin in 19th-century England in response to industrialization, Slow Food is a response to a perceived loss of core human values as a result of globalization. The solution for the many stresses of life in a condition of postmodern capitalism, according to the The Slow Food International Manifesto, ratified by 20 countries in 1989, is: "sensual pleasure and slow, long-lasting enjoyment."

Slow Food articulates a number of critiques of contemporary life under the conditions of late capitalism. They oppose the hectic pace of contemporary capitalism. They resist the homogenization, anonymity, and placelessness of industrialized food production, championing the distinctive and personalized artisanal production in its stead. They excoriate the quick and solitary consumption of mass-produced foods, devoid of conviviality.

On the surface of things, Slow Food's goals seem unimpeachable. They seem to connect an emancipatory politics of the body (the right to pleasurable and healthy eating) with a politics of the global (saving biodiversity for the good of the environment), a goal which many, including David Harvey (2000) might argue is a positive move for social transformation. Many of the critiques they offer echo those of many critics of capitalism. The Slow Food movement's symbol is a snail, an "amulet against speed." Here we see echoes of themes and concerns familiar to us through Marx and E.P. Thompson's critiques of the profound difference in time reckoning in capitalist regimes, where wage labour structures the day and regiments the bodies of the workers into a breakneck pace of repetitive movements so wonderfully lampooned by Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times*. Slow Food seems to address in particular the conditions of postmodern capitalism, with the "time-space" compression that produces a frantic and overstimulated "structure of feeling" (Williams, 1977). What Harvey calls time-space compression, Slow Food calls the "insidious virus: Fast Life" which forces us to eat fast food. Slow Food urges us to literally slow down, to take pleasure in the selection, preparation and consumption of food, to cultivate one's taste for distinctive products, hence supporting the producers of these distinctive local products. "If you have a good time while you eat, the movement argues, you'll have better meals. And a better life." (Kummer, 2002: 18). In Slow Food's critique of fast food and fast eating, I hear echoes of Mintz's (1985) analysis of sugar becoming so central in working-class diets because of its convenience for wage-labour schedules. Sugar became a "proletariat hunger killer" which, like fast food, replaced nutritionally sounder food whose time consuming preparation did not fit into capitalist work schedules. Slow Food urges the leisured and meticulous preparation of natural foods and its consumption in a convivial manner as a way of combating the demands of work and time in the contemporary world.

However, Slow Food has less to say about assumptions about class and gender that implicitly buttress the movement's touted lifestyle. There is silence on the fact that unless the workday is altered, the slow preparation of food may be impractical or an added burden, presumably for women. One of the recipes included in the Kummer volume promoting Slow Food is for *testaroli*, a crepe dish, which is rarely eaten in Italian homes these days because of the considerable preparation time required. Florentine women, according to anthropologist Carol Counihan, feel ambivalent toward giving up their central role in food preparation because of work outside of the home, as the lunch break, when Italians used to have their main meal, has shrunk to an hour from two or three. Food is the "vehicle for the ingestion of parental—particularly maternal—culture. But food produced by multinational corporations much less directly embodies parental values than food produced in the home" (1999: 58). The gendered division of labour—and the gendered emotional consequences of having to turn to mass-produced foods—is hardly mentioned in Slow Food publications.[12]

Slow Food writers critique fast food and industrially produced food as being like manufactured goods rather than proper food products. Piero Sardo, the Italian cheese expert and Slow Food writer, critiques mass-produced cheeses as "sanitized" and "odourless" made by "machines that spit them out as if they were die-cast" (2001: 5). Eric Schlosser, author of the bestseller *Fast Food Nation*, a searing critique of the health hazards of contemporary fast food, wrote an introduction to *The Pleasures of Slow Food*. He claims, "Fast food is an industrial commodity, assembled by machines out of parts shipped from various factories." (2002: 10). Industrial food is said to be more like a "toaster oven" rather than a meal. Slow Food actively seeks out products that are tied to particular places, which feature an "artisanal" rather than "industrial" production style, and in which the social relations of production (i.e., family farms) are foregrounded. All of these are necessary conditions for Slow Food to champion a particular

product. In the early 21st century there seems to be an alliance of the elite tastemakers and consumers with artisans. Artisans were often viewed as anachronistic in terms of the classic social science divide between premodern and modern, as Terrio points out in her study of French chocolatiers artisans (2000: 14). Artisans were put in a kind of "primitive" slot that made them seem out of time, uncomfortable within modern-premodern distinctions.[13] Yet according to Slow Food's formulation it is precisely this anachronistic quality—the harkening back to a premodern or preindustrial mode of production—that makes them valuable.

Sardo, another prominent Slow Food author, contrasts industrial and artisanal production in the following way: "The industrial food maker is looking to make money. The artisan wants first and foremost consumers who are knowledgeable, respectful and passionate" (2001: 6). Slow Food's simple and in many respects, appealing, framework can be captured by the following binary oppositions:

Slow food	Fast food
Artisanal	Industrial
Handcrafted	Mass-produced
Local	Global
Natural	Artificial
Rural	Urban
Healthy	Dangerous
Pure	Tainted by additives and artificial modifications
Distinctive	Homogenized
Consumed convivially	Consumed alone
Vulnerable	Hegemonic
Appreciation	Profit
Place of origin known	Place of origin erased
Producer known	Identity of workers erased
Defetishized	Fetishized

In Slow Food's solution to the problem of globalization, much depends on the acquisition of "taste" and knowledge about the products that enable one to consume with "pleasure." Taste is seemingly acquired by the cultivation of connoisseurship as is evident in the elegant volume on olive oil published by the Slow Food Editore. There is a conscious attempt to evaluate olive oil in the same way as one might evaluate wine.[14] They give examples of the forms used to evaluate olive oil in terms of taste, colour, and smell, as well as tests to determine the acidity level. The acidity level is vital in deciding the grading of an olive oil, with the classification of "extra virgin" as the most pure, which then determines its price. Presumably, well-off consumers have the time and money to develop the capacity for this type of elite discernment. But here, and elsewhere there is not much sense of how this "taste" and "knowledge" might be passed along to the masses of potential consumers, aside from hints of a Veblenesque trickle-down effect on consumption patterns.

In Sardo's Slow Food publication on Italian cheeses, published by the Slow Food Editore (2001: 5) consumers are rather derisively described as "willing accomplices" with the food multinationals, by "betraying" local producers by favouring inexpensiveness over quality. But while consumers may be berated in this fashion, Slow Food's manifesto suggests that the cultivation of knowledge about artisanal food forms a kind of barrier to preserve us from "the contagion of the multitude who mistake frenzy for efficiency" (1989). There is a silence over who can or cannot afford to have these rarified knowledges of connoisseurship, and one might imagine that a $50 bottle of extra virgin olive oil might well be beyond the reach of many even if they did have enlightened tastes. In fact, as Leitch (2003) notes in her fascinating discussion of how the Slow Food movement emerged from the Italian Left, there is a remarkable absence of straightforward discussion of class in the Slow Food literature.

Slow Food seems similar in some ways to the Arts and Crafts movement in that they situate their solution for the harshness of capitalism in the bodies of individuals. The Arts and Crafts movement suggested that the harsh lives of the working class could be ameliorated through aesthetic means, by making their everyday objects and furnishings, beautiful and hand-crafted, so that when they returned from their hard day's labour mass-producing goods, they could be in an aesthetically pleasing environment.[15] Slow Food locates the solution for the problems created by postmodern capitalism and globalization in the body as well, the bodies of consumers, in the cultivation of their tastes. But it does not address the question of the unequal distribution of resources that make pleasure in high quality food a more obtainable goal for some more than others.

Conclusion

What is clear is that at this point in time, both producers and consumers of Tuscan extra-virgin olive oil desire to retain the identities of the producers, and the place of production *in the product* as opposed to the anonymity of industrially produced food. The olive oil producers of all classes contrasted their oil with the de-territorialized industrially produced oil. They stress the artisanal production of their olive oil: the hand picking of their olives, the crushing of them with stone millstones, and the slow, cold pressing. Italian anthropologist Christina Papa suggests that traditionally produced Umbrian olive oil retains the connection between person and good that Mauss thought particularly characterized gift economies, in that

the identity of the producer remains embedded in the oil (1998: 153). While I agree with the fact that producers want to regain or highlight their identity in their product, I think that invoking Mauss' ideas about the gift takes one in the wrong direction. In extra virgin olive oil, the distinction is not so much between gift and commodity, but between different kinds of commodities. For beloved as it is to its producers, as defetishized as it is, it is still a commodity that they sell to make a living.

Given the fact that all of the extra virgin olive oil producers I interviewed extolled the virtues of their own "slow" production over the mass-produced oil, it is perhaps surprising they were notably ambivalent about the Slow Food movement. One small producer made the point that Slow Food paradoxically serves to promote the interests of the large rather than the small producers it claims to champion. In Slow Food's publication on olive oil, it is not the small producers, like the mill owners discussed above, who get the benefit of Slow Food's publicity: it is the elite producers like the Laudemio group, and ironically, Pieralisi, a company which manufactures modern industrial machines for processing olive oil, who have full page ads in the book. Slow Food sponsors local fairs, *sagres*, but requests donations from producers of wine, oil and other products which often comprise a significant portion of the yearly yield for small producers. Large estates can afford to donate products without crippling their yearly income, but small producers can't. After initial enthusiastic support for Slow Food, small Tuscan producers had become increasingly dissatisfied with the movement.

What the Slow Food movement does indicate is that there is a widespread concern with the current trends in industrial food production and increasing dissatisfaction with a life that only orients itself toward work. Slow Food offers a resonant critique of contemporary life in a capitalist system, though one may be sceptical of the power of pleasure in food as a solution. Concern for those exploited by the capitalist system is replaced by a kind of isolation of the enlightened few who have sophisticated tastes and know how to consume "properly." Concern about the unequal relations of production is replaced by a concern with relations of consumption. The solution they offer to the depredations of modern capitalism places an enormous responsibility on consumers to change their consumption practices, eliding the differing capacities of individuals in different class positions to do so. Consumers are urged to buy products which have the identities of the producers evident in them, in contrast to industrially produced goods, which as Marx noted, rendered the labour of the worker, and the connection between the consumers and producers, invisible. It is ironic, and perhaps a testimony to the remarkable malleability of capitalism that this un-erasure of the labour of the producer is a key element in making extra virgin olive oil a valued commodity for those who bemoan the anonymity and mystified origins of industrial food.

Meanings and symbols attached to food, as Mintz notes, are shaped in particular economic and historical contexts, regardless of claims to "timelessness" and we must assume that marketing practices are part of these contexts. In Tuscany, members of all classes expressed an affective attachment to their cold pressed extra virgin olive oil. The producers from every class showed a concern with the purity of their product in the form of harvesting, processing and bottling with authenticating markers (guarantee of origin of the oil and a date of a vintage). They contrasted their form of production to the mass produced olive oil, which may contain oils from all over Italy, or even from other countries. In this respect, extra virgin oil is in contrast to this mass produced oil, which seems a classic example of Marx's concept of the "social hieroglyphic" (1976: 163-77) of the commodity, where the labour and social lives of the producers are rendered invisible. Yet the fact that the labourers and producers are not entirely alienated from their extra virgin olive oil does not mean all producers are equally successful in marketing. Class differences are most apparent as producers attempt to market their olive oil both in Italy and abroad. Slow Food claims to champion the small producers, but ends up favouring the elite. The cachet of aristocratic heritage or sophisticated international marketing network is not available to the co-operatives to which the former *contadini* may belong. The difference lies not so much in production styles, but with capacities to reach desired consumers. Class impedes or enables access to various markets and affects which producers will be selling their extra virgin olive oil abroad, in expensive gourmet stores, to consumers who have the time and income necessary to acquire a taste for, and knowledge of authentically produced extra virgin olive oil from the much-imagined Tuscany.

Anne Meneley, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada, K9J 7B8. E-mail: ameneley@trentu.ca.

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Notes

1 Moore (2003: 339) uses this term to indicate the qualities of a commodity serve to index, or point to, its origin. In this case, the source identifying indexicals would be the signs that make present the moment and style of its production.

2 Mayes has notable company, of course, in idealizing Tuscany. A bookshop in Cortona stocked many books in English which describe foreigner's lives in Tuscany, including *A Room with a View* by Forster, *Summer's Lease* by Mortimer and a collection of women's writing called *Desiring Italy*, featuring Elizabeth Barrett Browning, George Eliot and Mary McCarthy.

3 An American woman who ran a thriving business renting Tuscan villas to Americans on vacation, told me that many of her clients, particularly middle-aged American women, claimed to have been inspired by Frances Mayes' book, and her house near Cortona was almost a pilgrimage site for them.

4 Of course, "Italian cuisine," like Indian cuisine, as Appadurai (1998) notes, is really a conglomeration of regional cuisines. The term has more to do with contemporary boundaries of the nation state than any inherent unity, a point also made by Marcella Hazan in her preface to *The Classic Italian Cookbook* (1976).

5 Olive oil importation to the U.S. early in the 20th century was the domain of the Mafia. It was Joe Profaci's first legitimate business; he was eventually dubbed the "Olive Oil King" (Rosenblum, 1996: 138).

6 From Patricia Wells' cookbook *Trattoria: Healthy, Simple, Robust Fare Inspired by the Small Family Restaurants of Italy* (1993).

7 This system had notable variations by region (Schneider and Schneider, 1976, Silverman, 1968, 1975).

8 This point was a sensitive one, since it is illegal to not have the proper paperwork, including insurance for the workers and taxes. Completing the paperwork is complicated and expensive and the olive pickers actually only work for a month a year.

9 This oil, which received a first-class rating in *The Olive Oil Companion* (Ridgway, 1997: 56), sold for L27 000 for 500ml from the estate and $40.00CDN at a gourmet store in Toronto. Their promotional material included an elegant small book printed on thick paper, with tiny pictures and descriptions of their products in Italian and English. In contrast, the mill owner's oil sold for L14 000 for one litre. Their promotional material was a single page, thrice-folded flyer, featuring cheerful pictures of *ziri*s full of olive oil, but only a clumsy English translation.

10 Laudemio oil costs between $45-50 at expensive gourmet stores in Toronto.

11 Here, Slow Food is depending on a kind of "authentic" point in the past where tradition was untouched by modern life. Some environmental groups, from whom the concept of "biodiversity" was presumably borrowed, also presuppose a pristine environment from which diversity is lost. Thanks to Stephen Bocking for fruitful discussions about biodiversity.

12 The following is a description of a Slow Food delicacy, *cappon magro*: "The dish consists of layers of mixed seafood, salsa verde, potato and smoked tuna. *With all the boning, shelling, cleaning and chopping, it takes three people five hours to make a real cappon magro.* It is worth every minute though..." (Honore 2002: B2, emphasis mine). Clearly, not every working household could manage this kind of domestic labour.

13 Their contemporary practices are measured against an ideal past and the authenticity of their craft is "judged by how well it conforms to or deviates from its preindustrial ideal type" (Terrio 2000: 14).

14 Roseberry notes the prominence of the wine model as one to be emulated in the marketing of yuppie coffees (1996: 768).

15 As it turned out, the working classes could not afford the handcrafted goods, but that was the intention. The American Arts and Crafts movement attempted to remedy this by producing high quality, well-designed, machine-produced goods, but still, the middle classes ended up being the main consumers (Turgeon and Rust, 2001).

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The "Arab Wave" in World Music after 9/11[1]

Ted Swedenburg *University of Arkansas*

Abstract: This paper investigates the paradoxical surge in popularity of Arab music, post 9/11, in the U.S. world music scene. It charts the gradual incursion of Arab popular music into the U.S. from the late 1980s, showing how this was on the one hand, a progressive phenomenon, given U.S. antipathy toward Arabs and Islam, and on the other, that such gains were won through the deployment of anti-fundamentalist and exoticising discourses. In the post-9/11 period, Arab music has entered the U.S. at a time of both increased public hostility and interest toward Arabs and the Middle East. The heightened popularity of Arab music has arguably been a source of pride for Arab-Americans and a means of creating more acceptance for Arab culture in the U.S. Whether the growing marketability of Arab music will have significant progressive consequences, however, will depend on the nature of political mobilization on Middle East issues in the U.S. and how that activity is aligned with cultural practice.

Keywords: Arab popular music, world music, Orientalism, aftermath of 9/11

Résumé : Cet article examine le paradoxe que constitue la croissance de popularité de la musique arabe aux États-Unis depuis les événements du 11 septembre. Retraçant l'incursion graduelle de la musique arabe populaire depuis la fin des années 1980, l'article établit qu'il s'agit, d'une part, d'un phénomène progressiste compte-tenu de l'antipathie américaine envers l'Islam et le monde arabe, et d'autre part, d'un phénomène attribuable au déploiement de discours à caractère exotique et anti-fondamentalisme. Après les événements du 11 septembre, la musique arabe a réalisé une percée aux États-Unis durant une période qui s'est caractérisée par une hostilité accrue envers les Arabes et le Moyen Orient, mais au cours de laquelle un intérêt renouvelé s'est manifesté envers cette culture. Tout en représentant un moyen de créer une zone de tolérance pour la culture arabe aux États-Unis, l'accroissement de popularité de cette musique du monde a sans doute été source de fierté pour les Arabo-américains. Les possibilités de commercialisation de la musique arabe seraient-elles synonymes de progrès? Cela dépendra de la nature de la mobilisation politique américaine sur les questions touchant le Moyen Orient et de l'alignement de ces activités en fonction des pratiques culturelles.

Mots-clés : musique populaire arabe, musique du monde, orientalisme, conséquences du 11 septembre 2001

I happened to travel to New York City on May 30, 2002, the day that ceremonies were held to mark the completion of the clearing of the rubble at the site of the World Trade Center. At a downtown law firm's expense, I was staying at the Ritz Carleton Battery Park, and could see "Ground Zero" from my hotel room. Walking through the hotel lobby the next day, I noticed to my surprise that *Arab* instrumental music was playing over the loudspeakers. I didn't recognize the piece, but it was clearly Arab, set within a distinctively contemporary musical framework, richly produced, and with a subtle dance rhythm. That Arab music would be played in 2002 at an upscale New York City hotel located just a few blocks from the WTC site, I would argue, is not anomalous, but rather a reflection of the remarkable fact that Arab music acquired a certain "hipness" in the U.S., post-9/11. In this article, I chart some of the twisted and contradictory paths Arab music has taken on its way to becoming cool.

Pre-9/11 Inroads

Ever since the mid-1980s, when "world music"—the Western marketing category that encompasses a wide variety of international music—first emerged, popular music from the Arab world has remained a fairly minor player. Aimed in large part at what could be described as a National Public Radio (NPR)-listening "adult" audience, world music has a small share of roughly 2-3% (comparable to classical music and jazz) of total music sales, but its audibility increased during the 1990s.[2]

It should be underscored at the outset that music from the Arab world faces a particular obstacle on the U.S. scene that is not encountered by musical genres emanating from most other parts of the globe. That impediment is the special antipathy found in the U.S. toward virtually all things Arab and Muslim. This exceptional aversion, as is well known, was discussed and diagnosed intensively by the late Edward Said (see in particular, Said, 1979a; 1979b; 1981). The U.S., as Said argues, not

only participates in the generalized Western discourse of Orientalism, but U.S. Orientalism possesses a particular and often virulent character. This is due, in part, according to Said, to the sheer distance of the U.S. from the Arab world/Middle East, by comparison with Europe, which produces a generalized public ignorance and disinterest when it comes to things Arab and Islamic. Added to this is the strength of sympathy for Israel in the U.S., a force that one finds no where else in the Western world. This peculiar U.S. abhorrence toward Arabs and Muslims, plus the relative weakness of U.S. movements in solidarity with Arab causes, makes it quite difficult for any overtly politicized Arab music to gain acceptance via the U.S. world music market.

This is in marked contrast to other genres of world music which have won audiences in the U.S. In his *Dangerous Crossroads*, for instance, music critic George Lipsitz (1994) investigates the work and Western reception of world music artists such as Fela Kuti (Nigeria), Ruben Blades (Panama/U.S.), Yothu Yindi (Australian aborigines), and Thomas Mapfumo (Zimbabwe), all known to be associated with various progressive causes. In the U.S., however, it is much more politically acceptable to be against white racism in southern Africa or in favour of Aboriginal rights than it has been to be identified with the cause of Palestinian national liberation or with the campaign against the UN sanction regime in Iraq. This has meant that one of the main avenues to world music fame in the U.S., which involves a combination of progressive politics and commercial circuits, has been virtually closed to Arab musicians.[3]

On the other hand, it could be argued that there are fewer obstacles to the penetration of Arab popular music into the U.S. than exist for other genres of Arab culture, such as films or novels. Arab popular music is arguably a more mobile, cheaper, readily consumable and ultimately *accessible* form than are Arab novels or films. In addition, in the U.S. context it could be argued that the gaining of an audience for Arab music constitutes a net progressive gain, since the simple act of making Arabs seem *human* as opposed to "fanatics" or "terrorists" represents a kind of political accomplishment. The peculiar context for the Arab music entry into the U.S. arena, therefore, makes the "politics" of this phenomenon a matter of some complication and ambiguity, as will be elaborated below.

Rai music from Algeria and Algerians in France was the first Arab musical genre to establish a presence in the world music scene, in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Gross, McMurray and Swedenburg, 1996; McMurray and Swedenburg, 1991; Morgan, 1999; Schade-Poulsen, 1999). U.S. and U.K. labels like Mango, Virgin and Shanachie released several recordings by established rai stars like Cheb Khaled, Cheb Mami, Chaba Fadela & Cheb Sahraoui, and Chaba Zahouania. But sales were unremarkable, and so after the initial flurry, rai releases by U.S. labels slowed to a trickle. Nonetheless, something of a buzz was created, rock critics wrote favorably about rai, recordings from the Arab world for the first time became readily accessible—in world music sections at all major record stores—and an audience for Arab music slowly began to build. Rai's early successes, although rather modest, opened the way for other Arab artists to enter the scene during the 1990s.

During the nineties a variety of Arab artists made slow inroads into the U.S. world music market. There is no space here for a comprehensive accounting of the Arab musicians involved in that ingress, but a few important trends can be discerned. These tendencies can be roughly grouped as (1) spiritual; (2) hybrid ; (3) *Gnawa*; and (4) rai, which has continued to have a presence. Representative examples of the first three categories—which in practice are overlapping—will be discussed here.[4]

Among the most prominent "spiritual" artists are Morocco's Master Musicians of Jahjouka, who first made names for themselves in the U.S. "international" and "folk" markets in the early seventies, but had faded from recognition since then. The world music scene provided the opportunity for a Jahjoukan revival, this time under the sign of "spirituality," a growing market category with important connections to the New Age scene, and an important world music niche.[5]

The Master Musicians of Jahjouka, from a village near Tangier, owe their renown to a legend first spread by artist and writer Brion Gysin and later by William Burroughs. Gysin claimed that the annual festival at Jahjouka held on the occasion of the Islamic 'Id al-Kabir is a reenactment of the ancient Roman Rites of Pan, and that the festival's central character, Bou Jeloud, is Pan himself. To listen to the Master Musicians therefore is to channel into "primordial" music, "the oldest music on earth," to hear "a 4 000-year-old rock 'n' roll band."[6] Gysin (as well as Burroughs) were well connected to hip Western cultural luminaries, and the Jahjoukans' fame owes to the fact that Gysin and Burroughs were able to convince so many to believe the myth. The most famous of these celebrities was Brian Jones of the Rolling Stones, who visited Jahjouka with Gysin in 1968 and whose recording, *Brian Jones Presents the Pipes of Pan at Jajouka*, was released posthumously (1971). In 1973 Gysin and Burroughs took noted jazz saxophonist Ornette Coleman to Jahjouka, where he recorded with the Master Musicians.[7] Other

important "scenesters," inspired by Gysin's stories, have also hung out and jammed in Jahjouka, such as Chris Stein of Blondie, the Rolling Stones (post Brian Jones), Lee Ranaldo of Sonic Youth and most recently, in 2000, Talvin Singh, the British-Asian dance music maestro.[8] World music gave the Jahjoukans a new lease on life, and their recordings over a period of thirty plus years make them among the most-recorded musicians on the Arab world music scene.[9]

The second category can be loosely categorized as the hybrid, and among the most interesting figures here is Natacha Atlas. Unlike most "spiritual" Arab music, "hybrid" Arab music is characterized by an aggressively experimentalist and syncretizing aesthetic rather an appeal to primordialism or folk roots.[10] Natacha Atlas, of Egyptian-Moroccan background, first won renown in the early nineties as the vocalist (singing mostly in Arabic) and bellydancer for the England-based "global-trance-dance-fusion" band Transglobal Underground (TGU). As such, Natacha and TGU were part of a large, diffuse, dance music subculture whose aesthetic involved the sampling or incorporation of a variety of non-Western musical styles and instruments.[11] In 1995, Natacha released *Diaspora*, her first recording as a solo artist, and since then has put out four more solo albums, all of which manage to combine highly contemporary dance music Western sounds with the resonances of authentic modern Arab pop music (especially that produced in Egypt).[12] Natacha's music has been so successfully hybrid that it has been difficult to contain it within the world music category; this has been helped by the fact that her guest vocals have popped up in all kinds of surprising places, including, for instance, the anti-death penalty song, "Faye Tucker," on the album, *Come on Now Social*, recorded by The Indigo Girls, a well-known, left-wing, lesbian folk duo.[13]

The third category is *Gnawa* music, produced in Morocco by members of a religious grouping whose practices and music are partly rooted in West Africa. It is the West African sound of Gnawa, which it shares with much U.S. popular music, that is the source of Gnawa's appeal on the world music arena. The deep rumblings of the Gnawa *sintir*,[14] a three-stringed instrument that sounds something like an acoustic bass, thrills many listeners, convincing them that they have been magically transported across time and space to the primeval cultural origins of all humanity. Collaborations between prominent Gnawa musicians and respected U.S. African-American jazz artists like saxophonist Pharaoh Sanders and pianist Randy Weston have underlined the presumed inherent affinities between Gnawa and other diasporic African musics. Gnawa singer and sintir player Hassan Hakmoun, who settled in New York City in 1987, has produced even more interesting and wildly syncretic "fusions," most notable of which is *Gift of the Gnawa* (1991), on which he collaborates with jazz trumpeter Don Cherry. Hakmoun has also recorded with his own electric funk band, Zahar, singing (and on occasion rapping) in Arabic and playing sintir, as well as putting out more traditional, "unplugged" Gnawa releases.[15] In addition to Gnawa's appeal as West African "roots" music, it has been marketed as "spiritual" music, since the traditional ritual function of the music is to induce trance and temporary possession by spirits (known as *mulûk* or *asjnûn*) and to produce a state of emotional and spiritual health. Gnawa recordings, therefore, sometimes participated in the "spiritual" trend, sometimes in the "hybrid" trend, as well as possessing their own, distinctive, African diaspora appeal.

Exoticism and Promise

The slow growth of the Arab presence in the world music scene that began in the late eighties was not connected in any organic way with political mobilization in the U.S. around Middle East issues. The entry of *rai* and other Arab music on the U.S. world music scene did overlap with the 1991 Gulf War and the concurrent flurry of in interest in (as well as antipathy toward) things Middle Eastern, and Arab music no doubt benefited from that momentary upsurge in attention (which also unexpectedly made Albert Hourani's *A History of the Arab Peoples* [1991] a U.S. bestseller). On the other hand, there were no significant or overt connections between the growth in Arab music and the two most important areas of progressive U.S. activity pertaining to the Middle East, Palestinian solidarity work (which in any case fell off considerably after the Oslo peace accords) or the movement against Iraqi sanctions. Activists in these movements, however, were certainly constituents of the world music audiences for Middle Eastern music. The growth of the Arab presence in the world music scene did, however, produce some progressive political effects, as well as help reinforce certain negative stereotypes. Regrettably although not surprisingly, world music publicity about "traditional" Arab musicians like the Jahjoukans or Gnawa artists tended to erase their Islamic context and render them artificially exotic. Publicity on Gnawa music generally focussed on its African roots and downplayed the fact that the *lilas*—the healing/trance rituals which are the main occasion for Gnawa music—consistently invoke Allah, the prophet Muhammad, his companions and family, and prominent Muslim saints, as well as the spirits (*mulûk*) of West African origin. In an effort to sell cultural commonalities with which world music fans can identify,

world music discourse has stressed the *African* side of Gnawa culture, and covered over the syncretic character of Gnawa beliefs and practices, which involve the propitiation of both Arab and Berber Muslim saints and West African spirits (Chlyeh, 1998). Gysin's endlessly recycled myth of the Master Musicians, meanwhile, assimilated Jahjoukan rituals on the occasion of 'Id al-Kabir, a major Muslim feast, to the pagan rites of Pan. This assertion similarly slighted Islam and made the music's spirituality more palatable to a Western audience.

Within the U.S. "spirituality" market, furthermore, the tendency has been to present music like that of the Master Musicians or the Gnawa as expressions of a mystical Sufism that is universalistic and virtually devoid of any Islamic basis.[16] In this rendering, Sufism acquires a warm and fuzzy New Age image and the sweet odour of incense and patchouli, and becomes roughly equivalent to Buddhism, guruistic Hinduism, or Native American shamanism. The other chief representation is of a Sufism that is firmly Islamic, but pacifistic and gentle, in contradistinction to the "bad" Islam of the fundamentalists and the fanatics.[17]

The publicity in the U.S. surrounding rai music has functioned in similar ways. In particular, Algerian rai artists have been depicted as anti-fundamentalist and anti-puritanical, the vanguards of a youth movement against the forces of repressive tradition. By stressing the opposition between rai musicians and the Algerian Islamists, in particular the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), world music discourse has virtually obscured the fact that rai musicians (and fans) are Muslims themselves (Schade-Poulsen, 1999). In addition, by stressing the purported rai-fundamentalism antagonism in Algeria, the fact that many major rai musicians are now located in France, and are important actors in the cultural and antiracist struggles of French Arabs (known as Beurs), is also conveniently overlooked (Gross et al., 1996).

World music discourse on the Arab music entering the U.S., therefore, forged connections between audiences and Arab musicians, in part, through a *dis*-identification with mainstream Islam and Muslims and/or, sometimes, an identification with a partially imaginary mystical Islam. World music discourse also traded on exotic images, enticing listeners with the notion that the Master Musicians of Jahjoukans or Gnawa artists would magically transport them to primordial and authentic time-spaces. In the case of rai, artists like Khaled were depicted as the Algerian analogue of the Sex Pistols or Jim Morrison, fighters against conservative repression, but rarely as cultural actors contesting white racism in France.

On the other hand, the slow penetration of Arab music via world music did at least serve to humanize Arabs, for part of the U.S. public—something that should not be scoffed at as insignificant, given the rampant Orientalism of U.S. public culture. The sounds of Arabic music began to seem less forbiddingly alien to many in the U.S. The music of "hybrid" artists like Natacha Atlas, meanwhile, who managed to insert Arabic music into locations and spaces beyond that of the world music arena, probably did even more to increase the awareness and receptivity to Arab culture. Natacha, moreover, was quite upfront about her admiration for Islam, making this clear both in her interviews and in her recordings (for instance, on "Dub Yalil," which features the Islamic call to prayer, from *Diaspora*, and on "The Righteous Path" from *Gedida* [1999], an assertion of devotion to God).[18]

The Arab Wave

Although Arab music made inroads in the nineties, it never boomed in the U.S. the way Cuban, Celtic or Brazilian music did. Records were sold and modest U.S. tours undertaken, but there were no real hits. But by the summer of 2001 it seemed as though Arab music was finally on the verge of breaking through. A number of articles appeared in the music press that summer, suggesting that what they called the "Arab wave" was about to enjoy unprecedented success.[19] And after September 11, this is in fact happened—both despite, and because, of the 9/11 events.

Arab music is an important element in the complex picture of September 11's after-effects in the U.S., one that includes racist attacks on Muslims and Middle Easterners, racial profiling and assaults on civil liberties that especially affect Arab and Muslim Americans, as well as heightened interest in Middle Eastern culture and Islam, increased sales of books dealing with Arab and Islamic topics and a new ethnic visibility for Americans of Middle Eastern origin. As during the 1991 war against Iraq, 9/11 caused both a spike in antagonism toward the Middle East and a boom in consumption of Middle Eastern commodities of all sorts.[20] Some U.S. cultural entrepreneurs reacted by abandoning the promotion of Middle Eastern culture, or by camouflaging its origins, while others have worked to take advantage of the new interest in things Middle Eastern in a more overt way.[21] To what extent the increased circulation of Arab musical culture will truly matter politically, however, remains to be seen. Greater public familiarity with Arab culture can contribute to a "humanizing" of the Arabs, as I have already suggested, but it is not clear that this humanization has yet had any real effects on public opinion regarding the erosion of civil

liberties or U.S. Middle East policy toward Iraq or Palestine. Increased public awareness of Arab music and the possibilities for corporate profit, nonetheless, do offer certain opportunities, as well as pitfalls, for political activism.

Run-up to 9/11

Natacha Atlas was one of the major artists pushing Arab music toward what critics were to call breakthrough time by the summer of 2001. Her May 2001 release, *Ayeshteni*, was inventive, eminently danceable, and brilliantly produced. It was critically well-received, and did well on college radio.[22]

But it was the stable of Arab musicians assembled by Miles Copeland III, president of Ark 21 Records and its world music subsidiary label, *Mondo Melodia*, that played the major role in bringing on the Arab wave. Son of prominent CIA man Miles Copeland, Jr., the record executive grew up in his father's posts of Damascus, Cairo and Beirut during the fifties and sixties.[23] After earning an MA in economics from the American University of Beirut in 1969, Miles Copeland III entered the rock music business in London, managing successful U.K. acts like Wishbone Ash and Joan Armatrading. In 1977, he became an important business actor in the British punk scene, most famously as manager of *The Police* (which featured his brother Stewart Copeland on drums) and as owner of IRS Records. From 1984 until 2000, Copeland managed Sting's solo career. More recently, he has devoted much of his energy to promoting Middle Eastern pop music.

Over the last five years Copeland has, through Mondo Melodia and *Ark 21*, released a number of important albums by top artists from the Middle East, as well as by Middle Easterners residing in the U.S. and Europe. It was Copeland who put rai star Cheb Mami together with Sting to produce Sting's 1999 global hit "Desert Rose" (which reached the Top 10 in the U.S.). Sting's record company had wanted to eliminate Mami's stunning guest vocals from the cut, but Sting and Copeland insisted on keeping them. Many claim that it was "Desert Rose"—and the Jaguar used in the filming of the music video—that thrust contemporary Arabic music into mass U.S. public awareness. After watching the footage of the music video, Copeland called up the Jaguar Corporation to offer it to Jaguar for a television auto advertisement, on condition that the company make their advertisement look like a record commercial. Jaguar produced a high-profile advertisement which displayed Sting and Cheb Mami singing together and carried a banner promoting *Brand New Day*, the album which includes "Desert Rose." This huge free cross-branding campaign, according to Copeland, doubled Sting's ticket sales (his tour in support of *Brand New Day*, with Cheb Mami in tow, earned $70 million) and album sales (which hit eight million worldwide). Jaguar meanwhile saw its purchasing demographic get dramatically younger (previously the Jag was viewed as a car for older people) (Anonymous, n.d.; Lippert, 2000). As an unintended consequence of this spectacularly successful and fabled exercise in corporate synergy, Arab music took a big leap forward in the U.S.

Copeland and Mondo Melodia's vice president at the time, Arab-American Dawn Elder,[24] were quite public about their aims in promoting the five recording artists and concert performers who rode at the crest of the Arab wave. All the artists in question already had substantial track records. Cheb Mami shot to the top of the rai scene in Algeria in 1982, at the age of fourteen, and moved to France in 1985, where his reputation has grown steadily and he is now an established star. Cheb Mami, known as the Prince of Rai, has been consistently overshadowed by the King of Rai, Cheb Khaled, who also started his career quite young, releasing his first Algerian hit in 1975, at age 15. Cheb Khaled too had relocated in France by the late 1980s, and in 1992 his song, "Didi" (released under the name Khaled) was the first global rai hit, to be followed in 1996 with the huge international hit, "Aicha." By 1999, with the release of *Kenza*, Khaled was a transnational superstar—except in the U.S. Rachid Taha was born in Algeria but moved to France at the age of 10, where he grew up in working class immigrant environs and experienced the hard face of French racism. In 1981 Taha formed the Arab rock group Carte de Séjour, which courageously addressed the pressing issues facing young Arabs in France. In 1989, Taha launched a solo career, and gradually became a major star in France, with a stunning series of eclectic recordings that were variously techno, Algerian *sha'abi*,[25] and—most brilliantly—Arab punk-rock. Hakim, for his part, burst onto the Egyptian scene in 1991 and over the decade developed into one of Egypt's top *sha'abi* singers, selling millions of cassettes. Egyptian sha'abi is the music of the working and popular classes; Hakim's brand is known as "pop" sha'abi, and is more more romantic and heavily produced than regular, raw sha'abi. Simon Shaheen, a New York-based Palestinian from Israel and a virtuoso on *'ud* (Arab lute) and violin, rounded out the Mondo Melodia roster. Shaheen was the only one of the five who is not a big star in his country of residence (in his case, the U.S.), but Shaheen has a very respectable résumé, including releases of classical Middle Eastern instrumentals (most notably on *Turath*, 1992) and wildly hybrid funk (the best examples are on Material's *Seven Souls*, 1989). Except for Hakim, all the artists in the Mondo Melodia stable already had

considerable experience performing before Western audiences prior to 2000.

In the wake of the success of "Desert Rose," Cheb Mami toured extensively with Sting in 1999 and 2000, including a performance before 20 000 in New York's Central Park, sponsored by Best Buy. The rai star also appeared on the "Tonight Show," performed "Desert Rose" with Sting at the 2000 Grammy awards (backed by an Arab orchestra that included Simon Shaheen) and belted out a rai-inflected version of The Police's hit "Roxanne" with Sting at the 2001 Super Bowl. In July 2001, Mami released *Dellali*, featuring Sting and Ziggy Marley on backing vocals, the late Chet Atkins on guitar, and production from Niles Rodgers (of Chic fame). *Dellali* hit the CMJ New World Top 20 and is Mondo Melodia's biggest seller to date.[26] Rachid Taha went on a critically acclaimed U.S. tour in summer 2001 in support of his brilliant album *Made in Medina*, recorded in New Orleans and released in February 2001 on Mondo Melodia. It too made the CMJ world music Top 10. Writing in *Rolling Stone*, veteran rock critic Robert Christgau (2002) opined that "no track released anywhere in 2001 rocks as hard as the opening of 'Barra Barra,'" a cut from *Made in Medina*.[27] Simon Shaheen opened several dates for Sting, performed extensively with his Arab/jazz fusion band Qantara and released (with Qantara) the album *Blue Flame* in June 2001.[28] Egyptian star Hakim toured the U.S. in summer 2001 and released, on Mondo Melodia, *Yaho* (2000) and *The Lion Roars: Live in America* (October 2001), recorded during his first U.S. tour. Khaled meanwhile made several trips to the U.S. to perform during the nineties. He also put out the brilliantly eclectic album *Kenza*, some cuts of which were recorded with the acid-jazz collective, Brooklyn Funk Essentials, on Mondo Melodia in April 2000.

Sold-Out Houses

On September 11, 2001, the Mondo Melodia Vice-President Dawn Elder was in Egypt, preparing to put Hakim and his musicians on a plane bound for the U.S., to tour with Khaled and Simon Shaheen, in the hopes of building on Arab music's considerable momentum. The tour, which was almost sold out, was abruptly cancelled. Simon Shaheen for his part kept on performing and touring—he was even invited to play at an interfaith service in New York City's Riverside Church five days after September 11, and he appeared on the late-night television show "Politically Incorrect," as did Miles Copeland. Shaheen claims that, since 9/11, people in the U.S. "seem much more interested and open" when it comes to the Middle East and are trying to unlearn stereotypes[29] (Armstrong, 2002). Finally, the Hakim-Khaled tour, cancelled in September, was relaunched in February 2002, with Simon Shaheen serving as a backup musician. The tour was extremely successful, drawing full houses in most cities, very enthusiastic crowds and tremendous press coverage. The tour also engendered further CD sales, which in turn were helped as well by Mondo Melodia's publicity campaign that promoted its Middle Eastern artists with posters saying "Banned by the Taliban," prominently featured at many record stores.[30]

The effects of this increased Arab cultural visibility in the U.S. have been contradictory. On the one hand, it is clear from numerous other examples that global capitalism has become very adept at marketing the exotic to sell products, while at the same time managing to mostly avoid troubling political or economic issues associated with "exotic" peoples and cultures. Many capitalist firms have successfully promoted the sensibility that consumption can be a form of progressive political practice: to wit, buy a chocolate bar and strike a blow for endangered rain forests (Hutnyk, 2000; Klein, 2002).[31] On the other hand, the increased circulation of Arab music has offered certain opportunities for community and progressive activists.

Co-optation of Cool

As in the case of Western pop music in general, promoters could co-opt the Mondo Melodia artists' work for purposes that were not necessarily intended by the artists or the company. Media coverage of rai music (Khaled and Cheb Mami) continued to repeat old myths and partial stories, representing rai as Algeria's version of rock n' roll, an agent in the struggle of the modern against the traditional, of youth against the elders, of enlightened bohemianism against fundamentalism. The notion of rai as an enemy of Islamic fundamentalism gained greater resonance after September 11, and Khaled and Mami themselves actively promoted this view to show that Islamic societies are not homogeneous. But this model of rai also ignores the ways Algeria's repressive regime has used rai in its very bloody and dirty struggle with the country's Islamists, and it erases rai's very important role in Arab struggles against racism in France (Swedenburg, 2001b).

Meanwhile, Cheb Mami's half-time performance with Sting at the February 2001 Super Bowl was preceded by the pre-game appearance of Desert Storm commander Norman Schwarzkopf and flag-hoisting soldiers for the singing of the national anthem, which placed Arab culture safely within Western rock 'n' roll and a celebration of U.S. military might. To underscore the point, a Stealth bomber roared overhead at the anthem's crescendo. During their U.S. tour in February 2002, Khaled, Hakim and

Simon Shaheen appeared at the World Economic Forum in New York City, the annual gathering of top corporations and political leaders, while global justice movement activists were meanwhile mobilizing on NYC streets and 60 000 were meeting at the alternative World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil. At the World Economic Forum, Egypt's Hakim performed a duet with Puerto Rico's queen of merengue, Olga Tañón, while Khaled sang John Lennon's song "Imagine" in a duet with Israeli singer Noa, backed by Palestinian Simon Shaheen on *'ud*.[32] Here hybridized Middle Eastern music, safely and profitably contained within the elite circles of global capitalism, was put to the cause of "world peace."

Another example of such containment is the use of Rachid Taha's song "Barra Barra" in the soundtrack to Ridley Scott's film, *Black Hawk Down*, released in January 2001. *Black Hawk Down* is the highly sanitized portrayal of a botched operation by U.S. Special Forces in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993, in which some 1 000 Somalis, many of them women, children and old people, as well as eighteen Rangers and Delta Force members, were killed. "Barra Barra" serves to humanize U.S. Special Forces and to make them appear sympathetic and even somewhat hip, as they prepare for their mission to seize Somali warlord Mohammed Aideed. Taha did in fact give Ridley Scott permission to use his song based on the director's prior work, especially *Blade Runner*, but he was reportedly not happy with his decision, as he considered the film to be "propaganda" (Emerick, 2002).

Kufiya on the Stage

On the other hand, Arab music's newfound public recognition has been a source of pride and mobilization for Arab-Americans. Delighted that Cheb Mami's performance would be the first time Arabic singing was heard at the Grammies, Arab-American political organizations launched an e-mail campaign, urging their members and friends to watch the 2000 awards. The Khaled-Hakim tour with Simon Shaheen in early 2002 was an occasion for Arab community celebration, a sort of reemergence party in the intimidating atmosphere after September 11, and Arabs were a raucous component of the packed houses in New York City and Chicago.[33] In New York, a concertgoer tossed a black-and-white *kufiya* (the Palestinian scarf) on the stage while Khaled was performing, and the Algerian star wore it over his shoulders for the remainder of the show (Pareles, 2002). In February, Simon Shaheen with members of Qantara played two benefit concerts, in New York and Ann Arbor, for Palestinian medical relief.[34] The Hakim-Khaled-Shaheen concerts and Arab audiences' spirited participation are also linked to the mobilization of an estimated 75 000 people in a rally for global justice in Washington DC on April 20, 2002 that was transformed, due to massive Arab and Muslim participation, into the largest-ever demonstration in support of Palestinian rights in the U.S.No doubt there was a great deal of crossover in personnel between concerts and demonstration.

Khaled's pro-Palestine gesture at the New York show was noteworthy because over the years he has repeatedly stressed that he is not a "political" artist. His songs, he says, are about wine and fun, and he wants to make audiences laugh. "Make love not war," Khaled intones, "that's my politics" (Dunlevy, 2002). Khaled has consistently underscored his sharp differences with Islamic fundamentalists, at the same time asserting that he is a Muslim and that Islam is a religion of peace. In a February 2002 interview with Afropop Worldwide's Sean Barlow, however, Khaled was uncharacteristically blunt about his political views. Speaking of the September 11 attacks and Islamist political violence, Khaled said, "at the base of this whole thing" is the question of Palestine. "To end [terrorism]," he went on, "we need to fix the problem, the source of the big problem." Khaled also drew attention to the fact that he, a Muslim, has performed and recorded "Imagine" with Israeli singer Noa (who is known in Israel as Achinoam Nini) (Barlow, 2002).[35] Of Yemeni origin, Noa grew up in New York and is openly affiliated with the Israeli peace camp.

Khaled's claim that he is not a "political" musician in fact provides him with a cover for staking out certain political positions. Although Western media repeatedly depict Khaled simply as an anti-fundamentalist Muslim, Khaled in fact is able to find some room for manoeuvre within this imposed framework. Perhaps even Khaled's duet with Noa at the World Economic Forum is not inherently antithetical to the struggle for Palestine. As Joel Beinin (1998) has argued, the vision of the overwhelmingly middle- and upper middle-class peace forces in Israel and their Palestinian interlocutors within the Palestinian Authority is one of "peace with privatization"—the integration of a technologically advanced Israel into a globalized regional economy as the dominant player, with the Palestinian state as Israel's junior partner.[36]

Pitfalls and Possibility

What have been the political consequences of the Arab wave?[37] Mondo Melodia's Dawn Elder called the Khaled-Hakim tour in early 2002 an opportunity "to share the true values of millions of people from the Middle East who want to live in peace" (Anonymous, 2002). It is difficult to measure to what extent the artists' and promoters' goals has indeed had such political effects, but it does at

least appear that the audience for Arab music has now expanded beyond the stereotypical "world music" demographic. When Khaled, Hakim and Shaheen played in Los Angeles in June 2002, for instance, a large portion of the audience was Hispanic.[38]

Meanwhile, the tour, in bringing together Arab artists from three different countries in the Arab diaspora, had an unprecedented and important pan-Arab dimension, parallel to the reemergence of pan-Arab sentiment forged in large part by the coverage of the Palestinian uprising by global Arabic satellite networks, especially al-Jazeera. But this pan-Arab solidarity was not seamless. When Khaled, Hakim and Shaheen played concerts in Lebanon and Jordan in July 2002, Jordan's professional unions called for a boycott of Khaled on the grounds that his appearance with Noa was furthering "normalization with Israel." Despite the uproar, Khaled's performances in both countries were for the most part well received.[39] Such pressures, however, now serve as a disincentive for Arab artists to record duets with Israeli or Jewish artists.

The increasing popularity of Rachid Taha may offer the best potential for raising awareness of anti-Arab sentiment in Western countries. Taha is well known in France for his scruffy-punk image and his vocal opposition to French anti-Arab racism, and Mondo Melodia's press release about *Made in Medina* emphasizes his experiences confronting anti-immigrant prejudice. Coverage of Taha's U.S. tour in summer 2002, in support of his most recent Mondo Melodia release, *Rachid Taha Live*, played up the antiracist aspect of his persona, in contrast to the press treatment accorded rai stars like Khaled and Cheb Mami. Taha's increasing circulation and visibility could possibly lead U.S. audiences to make connections between the experiences of French-Arabs and Arab-Americans. Of all the artists discussed here, Taha is the most politicized.[40]

In May 2001, Sting was awarded a Kahlil Gibran "Spirit of Humanity" by the Arab-American Institute, in recognition of his work to save the rain forests, to promote the rights of indigenous people and to further cross-cultural exchanges. The Dearborn, Michigan-based Arab-American non-profit agency ACCESS (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services) was also honoured at the event. But the political causes of cultural icons can always be rendered apolitical or worse. Speakers included Queen Noor of Jordan (King Hussein's widow) and Secretary of State Colin Powell, who praised Sting and discussed the Bush administration's positive "engagement" in the Middle East peace process.

The run-up to the U.S. war with Iraq, launched in March 2003, witnessed both massive and quickly organized U.S. street mobilizations in favour of peace. At the same time, Mondo Melodia and other labels continued to offer up even greater numbers of offerings of Arab (and other Middle Eastern) music to U.S. consumers. But there is not much evidence of any direct connection between the two phenomena. Antiwar rallies, depending upon the locale of course, frequently included performances of Arab music by local artists,[41] but I know of no major recording artists who participated in such rallies (of course, most of them live abroad). The only clear connection between the anti-war mobilization and major Arab artists was the release of a single by the African-American rocker Lenny Kravitz called "We Want Peace." The anthem featured vocals from Kazem al-Saher, an Iraqi singer and the Arab world's biggest-selling artist who has been based in Cairo and Canada since the early 1990s. Al-Saher's album *Impossible Love* was released by Copeland's Ark 21 in 2000.[42] Kravitz put his single out on the Web site of *Rock the Vote*, an organization that promotes free expression and has registered over three million young people to vote over the last decade.[43]

Since the invasion, significant Arab releases have continued to appear. Most important perhaps is Natacha Atlas's fifth CD, *Something Dangerous*, released in May 2003. *Something Dangerous*—whose title some commentators say refers to the U.S. intervention in Iraq—enjoyed the best first-week sales of any of her albums,[44] and quickly shot up to the number one spot on the CMJ charts. Atlas also did a brief but successful tour of the U.S. in July 2003. I managed to attend the Detroit date, which was co-sponsored in part by ACCESS (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services) in Dearborn, a Detroit suburb. The crowd at Atlas's show, while not filling the arena, was appreciative and multiethnic, reflecting Detroit's diverse (and important Arab) population. In Detroit, at any rate, the audience was not the stereotypical "NPR" audience.

As for Mondo Melodia, it continued to release Middle Eastern music during the run-up to the Iraq war, including collections like *One Thousand and One Nights* (February 2003) and *Bodega Lounge* (January 2003).[45] But most significant of these was *Bellydance Superstars* (November 2002), the label's fastest-selling album as of September 2003.[46] Miles Copeland and Mondo Melodia first began to move into the bellydance scene as a means of promoting their release of Oojami's *Bellydancing Breakbeats* (February 2002), a bellydance/dance music hybrid produced by a Turkish DJ based in London. A bellydance contest sponsored by Mondo Melodia garnered a phenomenal response, and so the label organized a troupe called Bellydance Superstars. The Superstars did performances at two LA clubs in November 2002, and both

shows were sold out and enthusiastically received. The renowned William Morris Agency then booked the Mondo Melodia-sponsored Bellydance Superstars and Desert Roses troupe into the prestigious indie-rock tour, Lollapalooza for summer 2003. The Superstars performed for 200 to 300 persons a day at Lollapalooza's second tent, and before an average of 12 000 a night on the main stage, right before "supergroup" Audioslave. Although the Superstar bellydancers are not Arabs, the music they perform to is mostly by Arab artists, and audiences are most enthusiastic when the Superstars dance to numbers by Egyptian *sha'abi* star Hakim. Audience response to the Superstars, according to Copeland, has been extremely positive, and he now sees bellydance as the key vehicle for delivering Middle Eastern music to a mass American audience.[47] Copeland and his firm have now refocussed their efforts on releasing bellydance videos, organizing tours of the Superstars troupe, and producing a documentary about bellydancing. The downside of this activity, however, is that Mondo Melodia's promotion of Middle Eastern music has virtually halted, and only five new releases, mostly belly dance music, have appeared since early 2003.

The current growth—now slowed due to Miles Copeland's new priorities—of Arab music on the U.S. scene therefore offers up potential pitfalls as well as opportunities. It is in the nature of capitalist producers to be relentlessly on the lookout for new products to market to consumers who are seeking out the exotic and hip, consumers for whom the purchase of a Khaled CD to "appreciate" Middle Eastern culture can substitute for grappling with serious political issues. Yet it would be a mistake to think of the current main actors involved in marketing Arab music as merely opportunistic, for they are, for the most part, interested in both making money *and* in fostering the appreciation of Arab culture (and thereby, forestalling conflict). Moreover, as Arab music has become a hotter commodity, artists, audiences, political movements and even business entrepreneurs have faced new possibilities for action. Thus far, it seems that the most important political effect of the Arab wave has been a boosting of community building and of feelings of empowerment among Arab-Americans. But it would also be possible for broader political forces to make use of these newly important Arab cultural vehicles. Rachid Taha for one would no doubt be delighted if "Barra Barra" were to be deployed as the theme song for a U.S. movement against the U.S. occupation of Iraq or the Israeli occupation of Palestine, rather than simply as the soundtrack for a paean to the Pentagon.

Ted Swedenburg, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas, 72701, U.S.A. E-mail: tsweden@uark.edu

Notes

1 An earlier version of this article appeared in *Middle East Report* 224 (Fall 2002).

2 Any effort to delineate with any precision the "world music audience" would be very difficult. It is certainly the case that National Public Radio listeners (usually represented as typically white, middle class, professional) are an important target audience, and that NPR is an important vehicle for promotion of world music, both through the attention devoted to it on news programs like *All Things Considered* and on specialty shows like *Afropop Worldwide*. The other key media vehicle for world music is college radio, discussed further below. The world music network also includes nightclubs which feature live world music and DJs spinning world music; specialty magazines (like *Global Rhythm*, *Dirty Linen*, *The Beat*) and online publications (like rootsworld.com); music critics for major publications who often cover world music (Robert Christgau in the *Village Voice* and John Pareles in the *New York Times*); specialty music shops and world music sections of outlets like Tower Records or Barnes & Noble, and so on. In addition there are significant world music subdivisions, like Brazilian or Cuban or African or "world-dance-fusion," and each have heterogeneous, ethnically mixed, and fluctuating audiences.

3 Progressive world music artists who have followed such trajectories have been the focus of a great deal of attention from world music critics, among them Lipsitz (1994) and Timothy D. Taylor (1997).

4 It should be stressed that these are not the only trends, but are among the most important.

5 Nubian 'ud (Arab lute) player and vocalist Hamza El Din enjoyed a similar revival with the emergence of world music. Hamza El Din was a fixture on the U.S. folk circuit in the 1960s, performed at Woodstock in 1969, and can be heard on the soundtrack to the Peter Sellers 1968 comedy, *I Love You, Alice B. Toklas*. Today he is frequently marketed under the Sufi rubric, although this was not an important feature of his image during the 1960s and 1970s. For an excellent in-depth investigation of how the category of the "sacred" (what I call here "spiritual") gets played out in the world music scene with Syrian "Sufi" music from Aleppo, see Shannon, 2003.

6 The formulation "4 000 year-old rock band" is Timothy Leary's (Fuson, 1996). The phrase is repeated by William Burroughs (1992) in his liner notes to *Apocalypse Across the Sky* by the Master Musicians of Jajouka featuring Bachir Attar.

7 Samples of Ornette Coleman's collaborations with the Jahjoukans can be heard on the soundtrack to the film *Naked Lunch* (1992)—based on Burroughs' novel of the same name—and on Coleman's release, *Dancing in Your Head* (1977).

8 See Philip Schuyler's witty critique (2000) of the Master Musicians' allure among what he calls the U.S. "glitterati."

9 Notable (albeit uneven in quality) releases include *Apocalypse Across the Sky* (1992); *One Night @ the 1001* (1998), recently discovered recordings made by Gysin in the 1950s; and *The Master Musicians of Jajouka featuring Bachir Attar*, recorded with Talvin Singh (2000) and referred to above. It should be noted that the Master Musicians of Jahjouka are little known in Morocco; their international

reputation is for the most part the creation of Gysin and his hip offspring.

10 Some spiritual and Gnawa recordings are quite syncretic, but nonetheless are still rooted in a bedrock that is figured as "authentic."

11 Nation Records, based in London, represents the left wing of that movement; see Hesmondhalgh, 1995; Hutnyk, 2000: 50-83; Swedenburg, 2001a.

12 Much of contemporary Egyptian pop is just as syncretistic in its attitude as Natacha's music.

13 I found Natacha's second album *Halim* (1997) for sale in the rock section of Tower Records in Tulsa, Oklahoma in summer 1997.

14 Also known in Morocco as a *hajhouj* or *guimbri*.

15 With Zohar, most notably *Trance* (1993), and in the traditional style, *Fire Within* (1995).

16 See Kinney (1994) for a description of how Sufism entered the U.S. as a universalistic religion that was not tied specifically to Islam. This is a theme that continues in current representations of Sufism, particularly those with a New Age tinge.

17 This representation of Sufism as an alternative to militant political Islamism gained added force after the attacks of 9/11.

18 On Natacha's public advocacy of Islam, see Swedenburg 2001a. The fact that Islam was not erased from the discourse surrounding Natacha Atlas had much to do with the fact that she asserted some control over the discourse, in particular by asserting the importance of her religious views when interviewed by the music media.

19 See, for instance, Bessman, 2001. For the term "Arab wave," see Nickson 2001.

20 Public opinion surveys reveal great hostility towards Arabs in the U.S., particularly at times of crisis. A 1991 ABC News poll found that 59% of Americans saw Arabs as "terrorists," 58% as "violent," and 56% as "religious fanatics." A 1993 Gallup poll revealed that two-thirds of Americans believed there were "too many" Arab immigrants in the country. A poll conducted by *Newsweek* right after 9/11 found that 32% agreed with putting Arabs under special surveillance like that imposed on Japanese-Americans during the Second World War (Levitas, 2003). On the new ethnic visibility of Arab-Americans, see Cainkar, 2002.

21 For instance, the Aladdin Casino in Las Vegas abandoned its Middle East motifs and stopped featuring belly dancers; Rio Hondo Community College in Whittier, California cancelled its sponsorship of Cairo Carnival, an annual belly dance festival, after 9/11, forcing the festival to move to the Glendale Civic Center (interview with Miles Copeland III, September 26, 2003; Pierce, n.d.).

22 According to Fred Navarrete of Beggars Banquet, sales of *Ayeshteni* totalled around 15 000 as of March 2003, a number that the company was quite pleased with (personal communication, March 18, 2003).

23 Miles Jr. describes his undercover role in the successful 1949 coup of Husni al-Zaim in Syria in his books *The Game of Nations* (1970) and *The Game Player: Confessions of the CIA's Original Operative* (1989), On loan from the CIA in 1953-1954, Copeland helped Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser to organize his intelligence service.

24 Elder left Mondo Melodia in 2002, but she still represents Simon Shaheen. A representative statement from Elder: "The more people are able to see and touch and hear these cultures, the better understanding they'll have of that ethnic group, and the more peaceful coexistence we'll have" (Farber, 2001).

25 Algerian *sha'abi* ("popular") is the brand of popular music prevalent in Algeria prior to the coming into vogue of rai. It is characterized by large orchestras playing traditional Arab instruments. Major *sha'abi* artists include Dahman El Harrachi and Mohammad El Anka. Algerian *sha'abi* bears no relation to Egyptian *sha'abi*, discussed below.

26 CMJ (*College Music Journal*) tracks college radio airplay, and plays a crucial role in the promotion of world music, since there are very few other radio outlets for world music other than college radio. As of September 2003, *Delalli*'s sales were 50 to 60 000, according to Miles Copeland III (September 26). Unfortunately, *Dellali* is one of Mami's less interesting recordings, and its success is due mainly to the fact that it was released in the wake of the grand success of "Desert Rose." Better examples of Mami's work are *Meli Meli* (1999) and *Saida* (1995).

27 Total U.S. sales of *Made in Medina* are about 10 to 15 000 (Miles Copeland, September 26, 2003).

28 Released on Mondo Melodia, it was nominated for a number of Grammies in 2001, mostly in the adult contemporary category.

29 *Desert Roses and Arabian Rhythms* is Mondo Melodia's second biggest seller (36 000 as of September 2003, according to Miles Copeland, September 26). Copeland attributes its success, like that of Cheb Mami's *Dellali*, to the Sting/Mami hit "Desert Rose."

30 The logic of the "Banned by Taliban" campaign was that one could support the struggle against fundamentalism by purchasing CDs by artists whose work was banned by forces like the Taliban (Miles Copeland, September 26, 2003). Copeland considered the Khaled/Hakim tour a great success in terms of publicity, but he lost $100 000 on the venture (September 26, 2003).

31 Among the many options in rainforest-saving chocolate is Absolute Chocolate's Chocolate Candy Rainforest Bar (http://www.chocolate-candy-endangered-species.com/chocolate-candy-rainforest.html?mgiToken=0C15B7C83347922CA3).

32 Miles Copeland was asked to set these events up (September 26, 2003).

33 Arab participation in the concerts in Detroit and Los Angeles was less prominent, due to the heterogeneous nature of the U.S. "Arab community." There are substantial Algerian and Egyptian communities in New York City, whereas Detroit's community is mostly Syrian/Lebanese and Yemeni, and these are less likely to be avid fans of Khaled and Hakim than the Algerians and Egyptians (Miles Copeland, September 26, 2003).

34 More remarkably, when Sting performed in Jordan with Cheb Mami in April 2001, at a benefit concert for the Promise Welfare Society attended by several members of Jordan's royal family, the proceeds went, in part, to Palestinian victims of the violence inflicted by the Israeli occupation.

35 The duet with Noa appears on the version of Khaled's *Kenza* that was released in France (1999), but it does not appear

on the U.S. Mondo Melodia release (2000). Miles Copeland states that he did not include the song on the Mondo Melodia release because he was advised that Arab audiences in the U.S. would not buy *Kenza* if it included a duet with an Israeli, and secondly because it is the weakest song on the album (September 26, 2003). I must concur with the second point. Note that although Copeland deleted "Imagine" from the U.S. version of *Kenza*, he did organize Khaled's appearance with Noa at the World Economic Forum.

36 See Shafir and Peled (2002: 231-259) on the role of Israeli business and economic liberalization in the peace process.

37 Useful surveys of this phenomenon are Motavalli, 2002 and Ali, 2002.

38 The Hispanic audience may have been attracted, in part, because of Hakim's collaboration with Olga Tañón (see above). The Venezuelan star Shakira, of Lebanese origin, has also played a role in making Arab-Hispanic crossover popular in the U.S. and Latin America. Shakira sings in Arabic on the hit, "Ojos así," from *Dónde Están Los Ladrones?* (1998) and—as all MTV viewers are now aware—is a decent bellydancer. Rachid Taha's *sha'abi* hit "Ya Rayah" (from *Diwan*, 1998) charted throughout Latin America.

39 Khaled responded to his critics by noting that Palestinian singer Nabil Khouri also performed at the concert, which was attended by Yasser Arafat's advisor, Mohammed Rashid and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and by affirming his support for the Palestinian cause (Awadat, 2002).

40 This emerges clearly in published interviews with Taha. Steve Hillage, Taha's producer and lead guitarist, who I met in London in July 2003, is very sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, and spoke with fondness of performing with Taha in concert in P.A.-controlled Bethlehem in 2000.

41 Thanks to Tim Fuson, Joan Mandell, George Bisharat, Lisa Hajjar, and John Iskander for this information. In Oakland, on March 22, 2003, The Cosmik Casbah put on Beats NOT Bombs: The Bay Area Anti-War Dance. The event featured, among others, noted DJ and Six Degrees recording artist DJ Cheb i Sabbah. Cheb i Sabbah is best known for his releases of Indian classical-trance fusion, but has also been spinning Middle Eastern music for years once a week at Nickie's in the Haight, and has produced many Bay Area shows featuring Middle Eastern musicians.

42 Al-Saher received substantial media coverage after the outbreak of the Iraq war, and he guest vocals on "The War is Over," a cut from eclectic classical-pop artist Sarah Brightman's new album *Harem* (June, 2003). Simon Shaheen is also heard playing on Kravitz's "We Want Peace." According to Copeland, Kazem al-Saher's music, because of the nature of its sound, is not likely to "cross over" into the U.S. market (September 26, 2003); I agree with his judgment.

43 The single got good media coverage from such outlets as MTV News.

44 Personal communication, Fred Navarrete, Beggars Banquet, June 10, 2003.

45 Copeland has also expressed his skepticism about the U.S. military intervention in Iraq, saying "I'm suspicious of the outcome of the war," at a press conference in Singapore in May (Wee, 2003); also in my interview with him, September 26, 2003.

46 Total sales as of September were near 20 000 (Copeland, September 26, 2003).

47 Copeland, September 26, 2003. David Lindquist wrote—in a classic Orientalist formulation—in *Rolling Stone* (2003) that the Bellydance Superstars were the "must-see" at the festival's Second Stage—because they were "[like] a troupe of NBA cheerleaders doing a routine in Arabian garb." Photos of the Superstars are available at www.bellyqueen.com/lollapalooza/index.html.

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Refashioning Commodities: Women and the Sourcing of Secondhand Clothing in the Philippines

B. Lynne Milgram *Ontario College of Art and Design*

Abstract: Since the mid-1990s, the increasing export of the West's used clothing to southern regions may initially appear to be another marker of northern exploitation. But to consider the southern flow of this commodity in such terms sees people as passive recipients of global commodity chains and overlooks the alternatives they create in dress and work practice. Focussing on women's roles in the secondhand clothing industry in the Philippines, this paper argues that traders and consumers reconfigure the logic of the market and the meaning of this transnational commodity by incorporating cultural practices into a global trade marginal to state influence. By dialectically engaging this commodity across diverse cultural and economic spheres, women dissolve assumptions of fixed dichotomies and dominance to reconceptualize global processes from a gendered perspective and as multiple and ongoing.

Keywords: secondhand clothing, commodity flows, globalization, gender, Philippines

Résumé : Depuis le milieu des années quatre-vingt-dix, l'augmentation de l'exportation de vêtements de seconde main vers les régions du Sud peut paraître de prime abord comme un autre signe de l'exploitation des pays du Nord. Mais considéré sous cet angle la circulation de ces biens vers le Sud dépeint les gens comme des destinataires passifs du réseau global d'échange et néglige les solutions de rechanges créées dans les pratiques vestimentaires et les modes de travail. Cet article traite de l'industrie du vêtement usagé aux Philippines pour démontrer que les négociants et les consommateurs, les femmes en particulier, reconfigurent la logique du marché et le sens de cette marchandise transnationale en incorporant des pratiques culturelles sur la scène d'une économie globale, en marge d'une influence étatique. En engageant dialectiquement cette marchandise, à travers diverses sphères économiques et culturelles, elles dissolvent les suppositions entre des dichotomies et dominances fixées pour re-conceptualiser les processus globaux en fonction de la répartition des sexes dans une perspective multiple et continue.

Mots-clés : circulation de biens, globalisation, répartition des sexes, vêtement de seconde main, Philippines

> With Asian Spirit's regular flights to Baguio City starting on October 25 [2002], pine-scented breezes, strawberry jam and even *ukay-ukay* adventures are just a flight away (Asian Spirit Airlines, 2002).
>
> Among teeners, the *wagwag* [secondhand clothing] craze is called "WW.COM" to give it a more Internet-like sound. Cell phone texters call it "WAG2" (Sanidad, 2001: 4).
>
> Just check out the new wagwag line displayed at the city's first rummage festival last week: a checkered Prada Scots suit, a pair of conservative Gias Italia footwear, a body-fit dark blue Versace blouse.... The *wagwag* industry has blossomed into Baguio's official tourist attraction.... (Cabreza, 2001b: B1)

Popular media releases like these, now common throughout the northern Philippines, highlight how traders and consumers have transformed the West's secondhand clothing into innovative and alternative practices in dress and work. Since the mid-1990s, the export of used clothing from North America and northwestern Europe to "developing" regions has increased dramatically. The southern flow of this commodity is not simply another marker of passive incorporation into a northern-dominated global capitalist system, but rather a process that traders and consumers have exploited to fashion personal statements of identity and new livelihood opportunities. *Ukay-ukay* (to dig) or *wagwag* (to shake and sell) are terms that graphically describe how people in the northern Philippines choose pieces of secondhand clothing from boxes and bales that are imported in ever-increasing volume and sold in shops and open markets throughout the region (see also Hansen, 2000b: 2). The brisk sales of these goods epitomize how people move a globally traded commodity across diverse cultural spaces and practices, shaping and redefining its meaning and value in each site along its trajectory.

Following the players who enable such commodity flows, this paper argues that Philippine traders and consumers in the northern Cordillera provinces use second-

hand clothing to reconfigure work and identity by incorporating cultural practices into a global economic trade marginal to state influence. As women are the primary family caregivers and work as the region's foremost *ukay-ukay* traders, I focus particularly on women's multiple activities in this emerging sector. Consumers, for example, selectively choose secondhand garments, tailoring them and combining pieces with new locally manufactured clothing, to fulfill their families' needs. Female traders in secondhand clothing build on their history in local and regional informal sector vending to engage in *ukay-ukay* at different levels of business—from part-time sales and trade to full-time work. Those who engage in trade full time (wholesale and retail) are the more successful *ukay-ukay* dealers and invest substantial capital in goods and in national, as well as international real estate (e.g., in Hong Kong) to secure the warehouse facilities they require for their growing businesses. Their forays into such transnational investments and activities distinguish them from female entrepreneurs in other locales who also use such cross-border trade to increase income. In the latter case, however, such as that outlined by Carla Freeman (2001) for contemporary Caribbean "higglers," (female market intermediaries) women's earnings from such international trade tend to supplement their low formal-sector wages but do not involve investing capital and employing workers internationally or making the leap from part-time to full-time cross-border work.

To understand how women in the Philippine Cordillera transform the international flow of secondhand clothing, I draw on recent scholarship that adopts a "gendered window" through which to analyze such global processes (e.g., Freeman, 2001). Seeing women's engagement in *ukay-ukay*, as instrumental in determining the character of the global movement of goods, "(not as a result of them)," introduces alternative renderings of the relationship between gender and globalization (Freeman, 2001: 1012). As Carla Freeman (2001: 1012) argues, this approach "disrupts familiar formulations in which the 'third-world woman' is defined either outside globalization or as the presumed back upon which its production depends." It makes clear that women, through their work in *ukay-ukay*, for example, actually shape and redefine the very sites in which global processes take place—not simply by responding to such processes, but by "dialectically engaging" with them (Freeman, 2001: 1013, 1014). Philippine women's work in secondhand clothing—a specific transnational commodity—indexes an international order with which traders and consumers engage as they set prices and marketing practice and choose garments based on local cultural preferences and hierarchies of these goods. At the same time, because traders and consumers continue to operate according to customary community expectations, credit arrangements and competitive practices, they negotiate a complex cultural matrix across household, community and class in both rural and urban spaces. In so doing, they use local practices and values to re-craft the global to form something new within specific commodity chains. Fashioning new spaces of agency, innovation and resistance, Philippine women engaged with *ukay-ukay* reconfigure opportunities and consolidate identity and class positions despite the ever-present potential of these positions to shift.

To demonstrate the multifaceted nature of women's work within processes of globalization, I first review studies that dismantle the lingering dichotomies between social and economic sectors. I then outline the Philippine's secondhand clothing industry generally, and how women move across multiple spheres to establish new business opportunities and improvise on consumption options. This paper demonstrates that Cordillera women, as small-scale actors, domesticate the logic of the market and the meaning of a global commodity to recognizably local signs of status and value at the same time that they transform them (see also Brenner, 1998).

Gender, Work and Globalization

Exploring Cordillera women's work in the trade and consumption of secondhand clothing offers a useful lens for the analysis of gender and the economic consequences of globalization as women's workforce participation throughout the Philippines is among the highest and most varied in the "developing" world (Broad, 1988; Ofreneo and Habana, 1987; Torres, 1995). Recent studies examining women's micro-activities treat as an analytic whole both the economic and cultural practices that women use to shape their living and working conditions (Seligmann, 2001; Simon, 2003; Ypeij, 2000). By considering how the cultural dimensions of a global economy and of state and international agency interventions either constrain or facilitate women's activities, these studies demonstrate that women fashion a plurality of routes through global capitalist processes. They emphasize the complexity of women's changing positions and the cultural configurations women craft to participate, more on their own terms, in the global flow of goods and money (Seligmann, 2001: 2; see also Horn, 1994; Lockwood, 1993).[1]

Current studies on gender and work worldwide challenge determinist ideas about bounded socio-economic categories by clearly demonstrating that women work across different spheres—household and market, rural and urban spaces, local-to-national arenas, formal and

informal economic sectors (Babb, 1989; Clark, 1994; Freeman, 2001). This scholarship also links the spheres of production and consumption. As Carla Freeman (2001: 1026) demonstrates for female Caribbean "higglers," their work in production—sourcing a variety of goods for their clients—is simultaneously work in consumption. While traders such as Philippine women in *ukay-ukay*, procure goods from geographically diverse locations to increase their cash income, at the same time they are making consumption choices about clothing styles and taste for the customers they supply with these goods. Consumption emerges then, as a form of economic activity equally important to and interdependent with production (Freeman, 2001: 1025-1026; see also Fine and Leopold, 1993: 33; Hansen, 2000b: 4, 16-17). Women borrow social and economic practices from each of these sectors adapting and reapplying them to the other. As Wazir Karim (1995: 28) argues for Southeast Asia, women secure a "continuous chain of productive enterprises" for family and personal well-being by establishing "a repertoire of social units" linked to household, market and environmental resources; and they "unlink" themselves when situations change. Women thus create an "open-ended" and "multi-focal" system of socio-economic relations with "undifferentiated boundaries" and "varying connotations of 'space'" (Karim, 1995: 28).

In both rural and urban communities, women develop extensive social networks as potential sources of economic, social or political capital on which they can draw for work or subsistence needs (Horn, 1994: 147-149; Narotsky, 1997: 190; Seligmann, 2001: 8; Ypeij 2000: 13, 136). In the Philippine Cordillera, many business or patron-client associations in secondhand clothing (as in other trades) are, in fact, rooted in pre-existing kin- and community-based relationships; and in rural areas these relationships are often established through reciprocal labour exchanges (see Milgram, 1999). Such networks result from and continue to depend on nurturing long-term associations. On a practical level, since women often lack the collateral (land or capital) necessary to obtain formal credit, good social networks provide female traders with ready access to informal loans that require little if any paperwork and encompass negotiable interest rates and repayment terms (Milgram, 2004a). Given the increasing competition among self-employed traders generally, strong informal bonds are a key factor to ensure the loyalty of clients and reliable access to stock from suppliers (often obtained on credit).

In order to make a living and meet their families' subsistence needs women work in different income-generating activities across formal and informal economic sectors to engage in "occupational multiplicity" (Comitas, 1973; Illo and Polo, 1990). While this multifaceted nature of women's local-to-national work in different trades has been studied worldwide (e.g., Clark, 1994; Simon, 2003; Torres, 1995), of particular note here is that Cordillera traders and consumers use the emerging opportunities in the growing imports of secondhand clothing to carve new cross-border avenues of connection. Moving beyond the national, they innovatively transform their activities, originally rooted in self-employed, informal sector work, into a more fluid form that expands from this base to formal sector capital investments and then back again. Women engaged in *ukay-ukay* thus reconfigure oppositional assumptions across spheres to highlight the cultural and gendered dimensions of global economic processes, and in so doing, render globalization as more than simply a growing transnational network of "interconnectedness" (Inda and Rosaldo, 2002: 5). They employ secondhand clothing as a harbinger of modernity in a process of translation; what it means to be modern, or globally connected, materializes new social, cultural and economic patterns that are, in fact, intimately rooted in practices that have their own local precedents (Bestor, 2001: 77).

Commodity Flows and Identity

Because a commodity such as secondhand clothing crosses borders between sites of production and consumption, it develops a personal history (Appadurai, 1986; Kopytoff, 1986)—but a biography in which the meanings and values of goods are mutable depending upon how people understand and use them (Thomas, 1991). As Jonathan Friedman (1995: 88) argues, "the products of a global field of interaction [take] variable forms of incorporation into the practice of local strategies;" and "the relation of these processes" to the construction of identification is an "ongoing practice." Recognizing that people's intent can differentially transform everyday goods (such as used clothing) into highly desirable objects (Hansen, 2000b: 15), highlights how values and practices are contested, negotiated and forged, historically and jointly with other variables, at critical interfaces in the transnational flow and cross-cultural consumption of commodities (Carrier and Heyman, 1997; Fine and Leopold, 1993; Hannerz, 1987, 1992; Stone et al., 2000). The influx of goods from northern to southern countries then, does not lead to a wholesale adoption by the latter, but rather, such processes are best understood in terms of "positioned practices such as assimilation, encompassment and integration in the context of social interaction (Friedman, 1995: 87-88).

The scholarship on cloth, dress and culture clearly argues this point by demonstrating that clothing is a spe-

cial commodity that "mediates between self and society" in multiple ways across the production-distribution-consumption cycle (Hansen, 2000b: 4; see also Eicher 1995; Entwistle and Wilson, 2001; Hendrickson, 1996). John Picton's (1995: 11-12) discussion of current shifts in African textiles and dress, for example, suggests that changes in local clothing styles have been ongoing; they are about "constantly revised design agendas" that maintain a "contemporary relevance...in a series of engagements among artists, patrons and local and imported materials." Thus any trickle-down effect of northern fashion on southern dress practice is qualified by the "trickle-up corrective" that people apply to personalize such influence (Hansen, 2000b: 5). Historical studies also document that the trade and consumption of secondhand clothing have long provided avenues through which people crafted not only their livelihoods but also personal spaces, feelings of well-being and identities in a changing world (Ginsberg, 1980; Lemire, 1997; McRobbie, 1988). Hansen's (1999, 2000a, 2000b) important work on the current global trade in secondhand clothing and its application to Zambia brings this issue into a sharp contemporary focus. She (2000b: 6) demonstrates that understanding people's preoccupation with clothing and their long-standing use of imported garments is essential to understanding the process of becoming modern in Zambia—what Friedman (1995: 88) terms "the identity space of modernity." Extending this inquiry to the Philippine context, this paper demonstrates how Cordillera women, as traders and consumers, use local customary practice across multiple sites to indigenize imported secondhand clothing, thereby challenging any unilineal materialization of the cross-cultural flow of these goods.

The Philippine Cordillera Setting

The Gran Cordillera Central mountain range that extends through much of northern Luzon creates a landscape characterized by dramatic rice terraces. The main economic activity in the Cordillera provinces (Ifugao, Mt. Province, Benguet, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao), as throughout the Philippines, is wet-rice cultivation carried out in irrigated pond-fields. Except for Benguet's commercial vegetable industry and a few pockets of market vegetable gardening and fruit farming in more lowland areas, there is little agricultural surplus for sale and the region remains predominantly rural and subsistence-based. Most family members who do not out-migrate to find work, combine cultivation with non-agricultural income-generating activities such as producing crafts for the tourist market, working in the tourist and general service industries and most recently engaging in *ukay-ukay*. The Cordillera provinces do not support a manufacturing sector and thus most production remains based in households or in small workshops employing less than five people (NCSO, 2002: 104). With such limited opportunities, women have built on their historical engagement in formal and informal sector trade to emerge as the region's primary businesspeople in secondhand clothing, a role they also hold with regard to handicrafts (Milgram, 1999, 2001). The differences among women's positions, however, depending upon factors such as social class (landed elite, tenant or landless) and education, means that some women may have more of an advantage than others to gain social prestige and accumulate capital through work in new enterprises such as *ukay-ukay*. The local-to-regional trade in *ukay-ukay*, as with other regional businesses, remains closely connected with markets in Baguio City (Benguet province), the administrative capital of the Cordillera and the main regional service and trade centre supporting a population of approximately 260 000 people.

The regional position of the Cordillera provinces means that national macroeconomic policies do not always have the same affect on this area as they do on the more heavily populated lowlands. After World War II and with Philippine independence in 1946, the new Philippine government initiated a policy of "import substitution" through local industrialization, supported, in part, by the export of primary commodities (Aguilar and Miralao, 1984: 2). This policy was designed to promote domestic manufacturing and preserve foreign exchange through the limiting of imports (Aguilar and Miralao, 1984: 2-3). In the 1950s and 1960s, within this environment of a protected domestic market, textile mills were established in southern Luzon. Although dependent upon cotton imported from the United States, this industry produced a supply of cheap textiles that, in turn, fostered the development of a national garment industry in parts of the Philippine lowlands closer to Manila. The widespread availability of ready-to-wear (RTW) clothing throughout the Cordillera provided alternatives to the household production of locally woven cloth, although indigenous weaving continues to be produced in all provinces to fulfill the need for traditionally styled garments in ceremonial events (Aguilar and Miralao, 1984: 5; Milgram, 1999).

The accessibility of second-hand clothing from northern countries started to grow in many parts of Southeast Asia, generally, with increases in development aid following the end of World War II. In the Philippines, more dramatic increases in the importation of used clothing, as well as with other manufactured goods, coincided with government measures to loosen the stringent import restric-

tions in the Philippines in the last half of the 1980s with the establishment of a new democratic government in 1986 (Chant, 1996). The boom in the export of secondhand clothing to southern countries worldwide occurred in the early 1990s fueled by a large surplus of usable clothing in the North and the economic liberalization of many southern economies that enabled more people to enter the market as consumers of northern goods (Haggblade, 1990: 508; Hansen, 2000b: 249-251). Charting the international trade of secondhand clothing, Hansen (2000b: 99-126) states that the bulk of used clothes that enter the West's export trade to regions such as Africa, Asia and Latin America, originate in donations made to charitable organizations; these garments are then channeled to different European and Asian centres for collection, packing and redistribution. As the practice of wearing Western-style clothing was firmly in place by the mid-1900s throughout the Philippines, people simply exercised their option to purchase *ukay-ukay*, as well as locally manufactured ready-to-wear garments, to meet their clothing needs.

The Secondhand Clothing Trade in the Philippine Cordillera

During my initial fieldwork in the Cordillera in 1995, residents in rural areas purchased Western-style ready-to-wear (RTW) clothing from itinerant traders who participated in the region's weekly markets. Female traders, primarily from the lowlands, brought Philippine-made RTW clothing, along with a host of other manufactured goods (kitchenware, grooming accessories, tools, audio equipment) to display in the towns' central markets. Throughout the provinces, RTW was available for purchase only from such market vendors and from grocery stores that stocked a small selection of garments. Those seeking more choice had to travel to some of the larger neighbouring lowland towns or make the eight- to ten-hour trip to Baguio City. By 1998, itinerant market women had started to stock used clothing along with RTW, and between 2000 and 2003, many of the rural, village-based RTW shops that had sprung up throughout the Cordillera, had changed their stock from RTW to secondhand clothing to meet local consumer demand. During this time, the number of Baguio City businesses selling used clothing expanded dramatically both within the central market area and along the main street where they took occupation of abandoned movie theatres and vacant shops. Newspaper headlines such as "Baguio Means Berries, Veggies and 'Ukay-Ukay'" (Cabreza, 2001a) and "'Wagwag' Fashion Pushed for Pinoys," (Cabreza, 2001b) testify to the ongoing popularity in the trade and consumption of this desirable commodity.

Shipping containers of secondhand clothing, originating in countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan and northwestern Europe, arrive at Philippine ports such as that of Manila. Clothing brokers, some of who are also involved in wholesaling new ready-to-wear clothing, distribute the shipments to larger towns in the north, central and southern Philippines. Of particular note is the fact that Hong Kong functions simultaneously as one of Asia's largest importers of used clothing (presumably destined for local consumption) and as a major textile and garment exporter (Hansen, 2000b: 115). In 2000 and 2001 there was an approximately 50-50 split between Philippine marketers who purchased their stock from suppliers dealing with clothing coming from Hong Kong and those who purchased stock from suppliers dealing with goods coming from Europe, the United States, Australia and Japan. By 2003, a larger percentage of Philippine traders were obtaining their stock from Hong Kong, either by traveling there directly or by purchasing from suppliers importing these goods. This suggests a dramatic shift in the industry whereby Philippine suppliers sourcing secondhand clothing now increasingly exploit the country's close relationship with Hong Kong (geographical and the history of women out-migrating to work in domestic service)[2] to carve new cross-border avenues of trade. Their actions recall what Hannerz (1980; quoted in Bestor, 2001: 77) refers to as "provisioning relationships"—how those in the middle negotiate opportune market niches to refashion the character of such commodity flows.

In northern Luzon, Baguio City has emerged as the main retail outlet for *ukay-ukay* boasting over one thousand shops or stalls in mid-2002 (Cimatu, 2002). Baguio City also operates as the pivotal distribution point from which wholesalers supply stock to *ukay-ukay* vendors with smaller businesses throughout the Cordillera provinces. Indeed, the trade in *ukay-ukay* had grown to such an extent by early 2002, that the Philippine government, lobbied by RTW clothing retailers, repeatedly threatened to impose a total ban on used clothing imports and to dramatically restrict *ukay-ukay* businesses (Lacuarta, 2002: 7). But these proposals, a subject of ongoing debate, never came to fruition (Manila Standard, 2002: 2; Ronda, 2002: 9).

Secondhand clothing arrives in the Philippines packaged in either boxes, which contain assorted garments (as well as special boxes of assorted handbags or shoes), or in bales, which contain only a single type of garment. Standard-sized *balikbayan*[3] boxes (72 x 42 x 48 cm) arriving from Hong Kong contain assorted garments either for adults—men and women—or for children. These boxes

are priced according to the quality of the garments they contain, A, B, or C grade. Prices range from 9 000 pesos ($243)[4] for a class A box, to 8 500 pesos ($230) for a class B box or a box of assorted children's garments. Many traders feel that they are throwing away their money when they purchase a class C box of assorted garments at 7 000 pesos ($190). Traders also try to purchase class A boxes to increase their chances of finding "signature items," garments with well-known designer labels such as Nike, Lacoste and Levi's. Such items are always highly sought after by fashion-conscious consumers.

Sacks or bales of used clothing, unlike boxes, are packaged in 50 or 100 kilogram amounts and contain one garment-type only such as T-shirts, men's and boy's pants, women's dresses, women's pants, or bed linens and blankets. Many of the wholesalers importing these bales into the Philippines operate businesses in the well-known Manila (Santa Cruz district) clothing and textile market known as *Dulong Bayan* (end of the town). Baguio City suppliers purchase bales of clothing from these Manila businesses; they then sell the bales to traders working in the other Cordillera provinces. Like boxes from Hong Kong, bales are priced according to quality. On the outside of each bale, however, the country of origin is often boldly proclaimed. Traders carefully scrutinize this fact as clothing from Japan, the United States, Australia or Europe is involved in a hierarchical system of status in which bales of particular types of garments from specific countries are sought after for their quality and fit. For the majority of items the standard price per 100 kilogram bale of class A garments is 15 500 pesos ($420), class B is set at 10 000 pesos ($270) and class C at 7 000 pesos. Bales of children's clothing, 9 000 to 6 000 pesos ($243-$162) contain garments to fit either ages one to six or from six years old and up. A 100 kilogram bale of bed sheets (which includes thin blankets) is priced at 17 500 pesos ($473) for class A and 16 000 pesos ($433) for class B while traders can purchase a 50 kilogram bale of each of the above types of clothing for one-half the price of the 100-kilo bales plus 500 pesos ($13.50). I found, moreover, that prices of both bales and boxes vary slightly with some traders paying up to 500 pesos more for their stock depending upon their relationship with their urban supplier in either Baguio City or Manila. The higher price means that these traders must then increase their mark-up to recover their investment. In a competitive market in which consumers can easily do comparison shopping, even a one or two peso variable can make the difference to a successful sale.

The significance of the substantial capital required for such purchases becomes evident when we consider that, in the rural Philippines, the average monthly salary of those people regularly employed generally ranges between 3 500 to 7 000 pesos ($100-$190) (for jobs such as school teachers and nurses at the high end and government clerks and small store owners at the low end) while those engaged in informal sector jobs such as contract wage labour, fresh produce vending and handicrafts often earn as little as 1 000 to 2 000 pesos ($27-$54) a month. The formidable start-up capital required to purchase this stock means that those women most likely to establish businesses in *ukay-ukay* are from middle- or higher-income families. Such circumstances also demonstrate the importance for traders to maintain good credit relationships with their suppliers and to nurture loyalty in clients, points to which I will return in more detail.

The Business of *Ukay-Ukay*

From their first foray into *ukay-ukay*, traders strategize to successfully navigate the uncertainties of informal-sector businesses characterized by lack of control over stock quality, fierce competition, changing tastes of consumers and shifting fashion trends (see also Hansen, 2000b: 165-171). Cecilia Lango,[5] a trader in Banaue, Ifugao who has been selling secondhand clothing since mid-2000 explains that she cannot be assured that each box or bale she purchases contains the quality or number of items that she expects:

> I always try to purchase class A or class B garments to ensure that at least one-half of the package is usable. But even this tactic is not always guaranteed. Sometimes those who put the tag on the sack make a mistake; it depends on the packer. Often I have received items such as miniskirts, short pants, swimming suits, or women's fancy dresses with beads or with a long slit in the back; these items are not very saleable here. I have also received bales in which many of the clothes were in poor condition and thus unusable, and this occurred with a class A bale from Australia!

Such economic vulnerability means that regional traders, consumers and urban wholesalers continue to ground many of their new business dealings in pre-existing social and economic networks while simultaneously developing international linkages for sourcing and distribution. Traders facilitate the sustainability of their business by negotiating a mutual understanding with their suppliers through customary *suki* relations. Throughout the Philippines, the *suki* bond, a type of personalized relationship, is marked by "subjective values and extralegal sanctions which encourage individuals to meet obligations

to others" (Davis, 1973: 211). Economic personalism is essential to Philippine entrepreneurs because it is only by forming personal networks of obligatory relationships that they can overcome the barriers posed by a lack of trust and a weakness of institutional credit facilities (Davis, 1973: 211-212). As I have argued elsewhere, however, with increased competition among suppliers and traders, this taken-for-granted relationship no longer endures unquestioned (Milgram, 2004a). Women, in particular, innovatively nurture the *suki* bond by drawing, for example, on aspects of customary gift exchange, a practice common to special occasions. To cultivate consumers, especially kin relations, traders may offer good customers a discount on their purchases or an extra item of clothing; and to obtain the stock and credit they need, traders keep avenues of communication open with their wholesalers. Wholesalers may similarly offer traders a small discount on the latter's debt in return for traders' promise of regular repayments, however small the amount.

When Karen Tayadan, for example, first established her business in Banaue, she was able to receive stock on credit from Helena Tungal, a supplier in Baguio City, because the two women's husbands had been classmates together in school. Although ready access to credit certainly enables Karen to purchase the stock she needs, her debt also ties her to her supplier in an ongoing patron-client relationship (see Milgram, 2001). Karen explains that she usually owes Helena money for goods, but that even in such circumstances Helena continues to give her other items of clothing. Karen admits that in order to sustain her business, given the challenge of increasing competition, at times she has used her income from sales to purchase new stock from a different supplier instead of paying her debt to Helena. Karen acknowledges the risk she takes by betraying her *suki* obligation, but states, "Sometimes such actions are necessary—it is part of doing business here now." At the same time, because Helena does not want to lose her investment in Karen nor Karen's loyalty, she encourages Karen's repeat business by periodically giving her gifts; these include, for example, one dozen plates, cups and saucers that she gave to Karen at Christmas in 2000. Karen, however, promptly sold these to customers who were furnishing a house for their recently married children.

As Janet MacGaffey and Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000) similarly demonstrate for Congolese street traders in Paris, while personal networks are crucial for organizing such marginal trade practice, these community and kinship ties can also serve as impediments that result in outstanding debts from relatives or neighbours. Although, in most cases, customers eventually repay traders, Karen explains that her capital (like that of Helena's) can be tied up in unpaid bills for long periods of time. Karen explains: "If my customers do not pay me, I often have to collect the debt by visiting their houses; and on one occasion I took one of my customer's "native" [free-range] chickens when she had no cash." The juxtaposition of designer brand clothing and chickens in the exchange process foregrounds how modernity here is worked out on a creolized terrain that channels secondhand clothing through well-worn patterns of consumption and trade. Balancing the opportunity to operate one's own business with the actuality of realizing a profit remains an ongoing challenge for traders in many small enterprises throughout the Cordillera. In some instances, although such business transactions may lead to exploitative situations between suppliers and traders, they also open channels of resistance that smaller traders such as Karen Tayadan and her clients might pursue (see Milgram, 2004a).

To maximize earnings and reduce risk then, most traders follow similar tactics in pricing their merchandise. After opening a newly arrived bale or box of clothing, some traders count the number of pieces in each package and then divide the purchase price by the total number of pieces to give them their basic break-even price per piece. Traders then add their mark-up to their base cost, which may be higher for the better pieces and lower for those that are less desirable. Other traders first sort the garments into categories they identify as "new, slightly used, well-used and destroyed" or unusable. Not surprisingly, the items in the first two categories sell most quickly. Traders using this second system divide the purchase price of the box or bale using only the number of items in the first two categories. In this way, traders explain that they cover their costs with the new and slightly used garments. Sales of the very used pieces comprise their clear profit. As I surveyed the different *ukay-ukay* dealers, however, it became evident that there is a general price range for garments of a similar type in similar condition. Most traders confirm that once they have determined their basic pricing, they make the rounds of other *ukay-ukay* shops to gauge their competition and fine-tune their prices.

Traders with permanent shops must also decide the most advantageous way to organize their stock given that similar items may be differentially priced depending upon the quality of the shipment or upon whether the items are "on sale." Many traders keep their different shipments of clothing separated by placing the items received at specific times on separate racks or confined to their original boxes in specific store locations. Sometimes prices

are marked, but more often customers need to make inquires and thus personally engage with shop owners. Knowing the break-even price they need to receive for the specific garments on each rack, traders can thus make any last minute price adjustments, up or down, as they personally negotiate with clients. Traders confirm that they purposely omit pricing in some instances; this practice enables traders to give special discounts to their favoured clients and thus encourage the latter to shop first at their stores in future.

Mary Bunag, a Baguio City trader outlines her personal pricing strategy for items in good condition, a strategy that seems to be common practice among many Cordillera dealers:

> If my buying price is 54 pesos for that item, I will start my selling price at one hundred pesos. Some shoppers just get it, but others always want to bargain. Once I earn back one-half of the capital that I have spent on the bale or box, then I will start to offer a 10 to 25 peso discount on all items in that shipment. When I have mostly the overused clothes remaining from a box or bale, then I will further discount my stock by offering special sales such as three T-shirts for 100 pesos, or buy two and take one free.

Throughout the Cordillera, traders carefully time the opening of a new box or bale of clothing in order to garner the most attention and thus maximize their sales. When a new shipment arrives in town, the opening is much like a feeding frenzy as Hansen (2000b: 169) has similarly noted about the used clothing trade in Zambia. "When I post signs that announce 'New Arrivals,'" a trader explains, "everyone crowds around the open box or bale to secure first pick of the contents; at this time I do not discount items. But then the customers are fewer and fewer until there is another new shipment to open." Traders agree that they earn a large percentage of their profit within the first hours following the opening of a new box or bale; and that they depend upon the strength of their informal networks to spread the word when new stock arrives.

In late 2001, a small group of female Baguio City traders, primarily those at the frontier of the *ukay-ukay* industry who had made early substantial gains, forged an international linkage with Hong Kong suppliers in order to assume more control of this trade. Taking advantage of Hong Kong's geographical proximity, and thus the ease of securing travel visas, as well as of personal connections with kin and community members working in the city as domestic helpers, these traders began direct negotiations with charitable organizations such as the Salvation Army, a major source of secondhand clothing.[6] At the outset of this initiative, these traders would travel to Hong Kong every four to six weeks to choose, sort, pack and ship the garments back to the Philippines. To store the stock that relatives and agents had assembled for them, prior to their arrival, traders rented warehouse space in Hong Kong on a weekly basis. By late 2002, their enterprises had grown to such an extent that many of these businesswomen renegotiated their warehouse leases to a yearly rental arrangement and hired family or former community members already living in Hong Kong to oversee the warehouse operation when they are in the Philippines. During their time in Hong Kong, traders supervise the job of packing the assorted garments that have been assembled in their warehouses into standard-size *balikbayan* boxes; they then address the individual boxes to different Filipino residents, indicating the contents as personal possessions of returning Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) as such personal goods enter the Philippines duty free. The ongoing debates over the law prohibiting the importation of secondhand clothing into the Philippines for resale seems to leave loopholes, however risky, that some traders are willing to navigate (Baguio Midland Courier, 2001: 6).[7] This means that periodically when government officials decide to enforce the law, some shipments are stopped and held indefinitely at customs, but the majority of boxes continue to enter the country. Traders explain that to facilitate safe shipments, it is to their benefit to maintain good personal relations with their shipping and custom agents in both Hong Kong and the Philippines—relations that entail customary gifting or favours.[8]

Through their hands-on engagement in sourcing clothing directly from Hong Kong suppliers, these female traders gain access to the quantities and quality of stock they seek; and in so doing, some have opened branch stores both in Manila and in smaller towns throughout the Cordillera. In each instance, they employ primarily family members to operate these outlets. As Baguio is renowned as the "home" of *ukay-ukay* (Cabreza, 2001a), these branch shops, even the ones in Manila, proudly advertise that their stock of clothing comprises the best that Baguio City *ukay-ukay* has to offer, conveniently overlooking the fact that these are imported garments. The growing prevalence of such promotions visibly demonstrates the extent to which this group of female traders has succeeded in indigenizing or instilling a locally rooted provenance into this globally traded commodity. By extending their reach to encompass a global arena of personal, business and commodity networks, these traders, in effect, connect institutions or social structures that pre-

viously existed as unarticulated segments of different societies and politics (Bestor, 2001: 77).

Hierarchies of Preference

Cordillera traders agree that an important part of their business success depends upon keeping up with the latest fashion trends and familiarizing themselves with the changing tastes of their customers.[9] Consumers take pride both in finding a bargain and in dressing in accordance with their personalized style sense. Traders state that their customers know the type of items to purchase, whether they are looking for contemporary styles or durability. As Hansen (1999: 356) points out about secondhand clothing consumers in Zambia, most shoppers look for "value for money" in terms of both quality and fashion, regardless of their income status. Those with low incomes or women shopping for functional garments for their families look for "durability and strength" while adolescents, boys and girls, are most concerned with seeking the most up-to-date styles (Hansen, 1999: 356). Indeed, in Banaue, the word "bargains," the more common term for secondhand clothing, captures the feeling of pride and the skill consumers exercise when shopping for and obtaining a good deal.

Consumers insist, moreover, that it is not only that the cost of "bargains" is often as much as one-third to one-quarter that of retail prices, but that the quality of *ukay-ukay* is more likely to be good because the garments are "coming from other countries and thus they are better than clothes manufactured here in the Philippines." In the course of my conversations with both consumers and traders, the women and men with whom I spoke would sometimes comment on the T-shirts that I wore confirming that the colours of my shirts will not run when washed as "these shirts are from your place." Philippine manufacturers are certainly aware of this "allure of the foreign" (Orlove and Bauer, 1997) as many of the products they manufacture in the Philippines proudly sport their own slightly revised versions of labels such as Levi's, Wrangler and Reebok. By altering only a single letter of these world-renowned brands, Philippine manufacturers succeed in closely aligning their products, labeled Levy, Rangler and Reeboc, with the former signature names. *Ukay-ukay* thus encapsulates the close association between "foreignness and progress" the latter associated with North America and Europe. As such, used clothing in the Philippines emerges, across the economic spectrum of households, as a key "token of modernity" that people use to situate themselves at the forefront of their changing world (Hansen, 1999: 344; see also Orlove and Bauer, 1997: 13; Langer, 1997: 16).

Consumers are aware of the newest styles as they see them advertised on television and worn by their favourite actors. When students, who have attended urban universities in Baguio City or Manila, return to visit relatives in smaller Cordillera towns, they bring with them knowledge of the most contemporary fashion trends and, indeed, return wearing the newest clothes they can afford to purchase often sourced from Baguio City's extensive *ukay-ukay* markets. Traders point out that, "Our customers look first for "signatures, Levi's, Nike, Adidas, and the alligator symbol [Lacoste] are always the most popular. They want a bargain and they want to wear garments that are widely recognized, but they also want to assemble these in accordance with their personal style." Traders confirm that they can always charge higher prices for garments that bear brand names, and these are the hidden treasurers for which they search in every box and bale of secondhand clothing.

Young adult consumers, especially, patiently dig through the mounds of clothing displayed at periodic markets or through the racks of clothing in town shops in order to find just the right item. Coordinating colours, finding the correct fit and combining the right mix of garments is a priority for teenage shoppers (see also Hansen, 1999: 356). One teenage boy patiently explains that this season he is looking for cargo pants with six pockets, especially a pair from Japan as these are a style that many of his friends have already purchased.

I also accompanied many teenage girls on their fevered quest from stall to stall hunting for short, fitted tops that expose their midriffs. "This year," (2003) one female teenager points out, "we are all asking for fitted blouses and the 'hanging top' or the 'topper' with three-quarter length sleeves. We are also looking for black tops, a colour that is often difficult for us to find; gray and khaki are also colours we prefer, but most desirable are the tops with signatures." Another young women states that she likes straight-leg pants, but "I am also looking for denim jeans that are fitted at the top and flare out at the bottom." Shops in Baguio City and in outlying towns often devote special racks to the display of blue jeans that have decorative finishes added to the lower sections of each leg of the pants; such embellishments include embroidery, fringes, buttons and pieces of traditionally patterned Cordillera cloth. In 2002 and 2003, the capri-style or three-quarter length pants were especially popular. Indeed, in Baguio's larger shops, owners periodically hire sewers to alter long pants into this saleable shorter style. In the Cordillera, however, such tailoring contracts remain the individual initiative of larger businesses; tailoring secondhand clothes into specific localized styles has not yet

developed into the thriving spin-off industry that Hansen (2000b: 177-179) has identified in Zambia.

Most traders try to follow the rapidly shifting trends in taste in order to maintain their marketing edge. They explain that they always try to purchase bales of pants from Japan as the garments are small in size and thus the best fit for the Philippine body. One trader points out:

> The sacks of garments from the U.S. are of variable quality and many items are often too big for Filipinos. My customers complain if I only have these oversize items, but women might buy the American T-shirts and use them as a dress or a nightshirt.

The consensus among traders and consumers is that the best quality T-shirts are from Australia, especially for teenagers, both girls and boys (although sizing remains a problem), while the best quality children's wear is from the United States; and Australia and the United States are known for their fine bed linens and blankets. When shipments arrive from particularly desirable locations, some retailers leave the empty bales conspicuously displayed in the corner of their shops proudly declaring their labels of origin, (e.g, Japan, Washington, DC). Unlike the situation that Hansen (1999: 357) notes for Zambia, in which people want to dress in style, but are not particularly concerned about designer labels or the garment's origin as long as it is not Zambian, in the Philippines, the provenance of *ukay-ukay* is very much a part of its caché.[10]

Consumers exercise their preferences by choosing and manipulating goods to construct messages about themselves. By assembling selected garments into a style that either displays their knowledge of wider clothing practice or subverts the received meaning of such goods, they assert "local authorship over the West's used clothing" (Hansen, 1999: 357), thereby effecting personalized visual statements. Globally traded commodities such as secondhand clothing then do not mean any one thing. "They 'mean' only because they have already been arranged, according to social use, into culture codes of meaning, which *assign meanings to them*... (Hall and Jefferson, 1976: 55, emphasis in the original).

Women selling *ukay-ukay* also explain that because consumers now have more choice in the quality and quantity of secondhand clothing available to them, they are increasingly purchasing these goods as gifts for special occasions such as birthdays or weddings. Instead of cash or new ready-to-wear garments, *ukay-ukay* is often the gift of choice. Godparents and grandparents, for example, give items of secondhand clothing at the baptisms and birthdays of their god- and grandchildren and in June, just before the beginning of school, parents buy *ukay-ukay* as presents for their children before the latter don their school uniforms. Indeed, the growing popularity of *ukay-ukay* among middle- and high-income families, as well as for those with less income, demonstrates the positive association of secondhand clothing with customary giving and receiving. *Ukay-ukay* is in no way regarded as a second-class gift, because both givers and receivers pride themselves on their skills in sleuthing out bargains and proudly tell stories of the hunt for their fashionable, yet reasonably priced outfits.

The meaning of secondhand clothing in the Philippines has shifted from its humble origins as an inexpensive, functional commodity that fulfilled the clothing needs of the "poor," to a commodity desired and actively pursued across class and space. The stories of consumers' experiences and triumphs in regular "shopping junkets" organized from Manila to Baguio City for the well-to-do are repeatedly reported in major Philippine newspapers (e.g., Cojuangco 2001; Subido 2003). The recent publication of the *ukay-ukay* shopping handbook, *What To Do In Baguio When You Have Seen the Sights*, guides consumers through Baguio City's sprawling *wagwagans* (Cimatu, 2002; Masadao, 2002) testifying to the revaluing of this commodity. Newspaper headlines such as "Wagwag Tourism" (Cimatu, 2002: A14) and "A Guide to the Ukay-Ukay Safari" (Subido, 2003: H2), along with Baguio City's mounting of a yearly *ukay-ukay* street festival (Cabreza 2001b: B1), increasingly draw lowland consumers to the Cordillera in pursuit of shopping bargains and adventures. Cordillera traders and consumers, and indeed government officials, have thus carved a variety of channels through which to transform and claim this transnational commodity as their own.

Conclusion

By operationalizing new opportunities in the trade and consumption of secondhand clothing, women in the northern Philippines situate their actions within economic and cultural processes that are central to globalization itself (Freeman, 2001: 1009). Their indigenization or localization of the West's used clothing needs to be understood then not merely as a result, but as a "constitutive ingredient" of the changing configuration of global commodity movements (Freeman, 2000: 1013). By recontextualizing global trends with regard to local custom, Cordillera traders and consumers establish pivotal positions to craft how commodities such as imported secondhand clothing are actually used and understood in on-the-ground practice.

Female traders, in particular, maintain continuity with past practice by marketing used clothes through estab-

lished paths that utilize kin and community networks and customary credit relations in rural and urban settings. At the same time, they employ innovative business strategies to expand their operations beyond the national level. Traders' cross-border trips to, and capital investments in, Hong Kong, for example, firmly link their activities to this Asian hub for the collection and distribution of secondhand clothing securing them a place in the network of this global flow of goods. That some women, many of whom are related, are increasingly using this international business option means that there is an opportunity for a small group of elite traders to dominate the supply of secondhand clothing to vendors throughout the Cordillera. Such a situation makes smaller vendors vulnerable. The parameters of cultural practice, however, keep these globally engaged traders tacking back and forth between social and economic systems. The community expectation of redistributive gifting, obligations to employ family members in business expansion, as well as the specific debates, in this case, over the legality of the *ukay-ukay* trade, in fact, constrain traders' actions and limit opportunism.

Similarly, consumers construct multifaceted statements of identity by wearing locally manufactured garments side by side with imported secondhand clothing and decorating the latter with local embroidery or pieces of traditionally patterned cloth. They demonstrate their agency and ability to expropriate, as well as to appropriate, the social meanings that *ukay-ukay* may have 'naturally' had in the West, by combining the West's discarded garments with other elements that may change or inflect their meaning (Thomas, 1991: 83). Consequently, acquiring such globally traded clothing does not necessarily mean adopting the ideas and meanings embedded in them at the moment of production at the beginning of their life history. For goods such as secondhand clothing to retain their relevance over time and their appeal amongst diverse groups, they must "allow those who employ them to supply part of their meaning" (Guibernau, 1996: 81). Philippine consumers ensure that *ukay-ukay* maintains its porous borders and thus its relevance as an identity marker by reconfiguring any constraints of uniform meaning that the adoption of such commodities might initially imply.

The variety of channels through which Cordillera women engage in *ukay-ukay* makes visible how local-to-global practices of consumption and trade are sorted out "in the contingent and compromised space" between market demand and the "cultural intimacy" and expectations of family, community and customary practice (Li, 1999: 295). As both traders and consumers, they establish some kind of agency in a process that has otherwise been used to identify them as passive recipients of Western initiatives. These women's actions clearly demonstrate that understanding the changing dynamics of global commodity chains, complexes and regimes means placing cultural factors, gender and everyday practice at the centre of analysis.

B. Lynne Milgram, Ontario College of Art and Design, Toronto, Ontario, M5T 1W1, Canada. E-mail: lmilgram@faculty.ocad.ca

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Notes

1 Recent studies clearly demonstrate that understanding contemporary global economic transformations means making "room for a host of alternate scriptings" [e.g., other than "capitalist"] of economic relations (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 147), and considering each of the different channels through which actors (men and women) carve these relations (Tsing, 2000: 327, 330; see also Marchand and Runyan, 2000).

2 For research on Philippine women's out-migration see, for example, Chant and McIlwaine, 1995.

3 *Balikbayan* is the pan-Philippine term used to identify returning Overseas Filipino Workers. The term is commonly applied to the boxes that returning Filipinos use to pack their personal belongings and gifts after out-migrating for work. The size and weight of the box corresponds to that allowed by airlines for standard check-in luggage.

4 All figures are in Canadian dollar amounts. In mid-2003 the exchange rate was CAN $1.00=37 Philippine pesos.

5 All personal names of individuals are pseudonyms.

6 From approximately the late 1980s, Filipina women working in Hong Kong as domestic helpers would send back to their Philippine relatives boxes of used clothing that they had sourced from their employers or from Hong Kong charitable organizations such as the Salvation Army. Courier services such as Door to Door, that Filipinos had used in the past to send back personal belongings or family gifts, facilitated deliveries of these new shipments. As the trade in

secondhand clothing increased dramatically through the 1990s, the limited shipments that individual women were able to pack and send, given that they had only one day off work each week (Sunday), proved insufficient for suppliers' need for larger quantities of stock.

7 The Philippine Republic Act No. 4653 (June 17, 1966) states that it is "unlawful" to import "textile articles commonly known as used clothing and rags." Yet, Baguio City municipal officials issue daily vending permits to street vendors selling secondhand clothing—a new move to control this growing trade; and Baguio's numerous permanent *ukay-ukay* stores routinely obtain their business permits to sell dry goods, which are quite visibly used clothing. Presidential Decree No. 2033 (February 6, 1986) seeks to clarify the earlier Central Bank Circular No. 1060 (May 22, 1985) that outlined some exceptions to the commercial importation of used clothing. Although, in theory, the importation and resale of used clothing is illegal, the on-the-ground parameters of the *ukay-ukay* trade continue to be negotiated and debated throughout the Philippines.

8 The character of this development in the secondhand clothing trade is part of my current research project. I am exploring the new avenues of collection and distribution within Hong Kong and between Hong Kong and the Philippines, specifically, and Southeast Asia more generally. I am also examining the extent to which Philippine traders can negotiate the constraints in their expanded business dealings in Hong Kong given the debates over the legality or illegality of this trade that currently employs a large number of men and women. The size of this trade is indicated in the volume of shipments as reported by respondents in mid-2004. In the busy season, December to May, traders might ship one container every four to six weeks. One container holds 270 to 290 *balikbayan* boxes, the number depending upon how full the boxes have been packed. The group of women running businesses at this level, both as retailers and suppliers, number about ten to twelve, the majority of whom are originally from Sagada, Mountain Province and share a kinship connection.

9 Some parts of this section draw upon previously published material and expand upon its insights (see Milgram 2004b).

10 Hansen (1999: 357 notes, however, that this lack of attention to brand name clothing may change as evidenced by the 1997 display of designer clothing in one man's speciality shop.

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Contradictions of Class and Consumption When the Commodity Is Labour

Pauline Gardiner Barber *Dalhousie University*

Abstract: This paper poses a critique of globalization discourse through an examination of Philippine migration ethnography. With the dramatic increase in scale in the mid-1980s, Philippine gendered labour migration has been subjected to scrutiny by academics and other protagonists raising the possibility of a critical Philippine transnational politics. However, the relatively new ethnographic literature explores the constrained labour process of domestic service work and cultural practices which condition migrants for exploitation. Class issues remain largely unexplored in this literature for theoretical and methodological reasons. Here, multisited research enables the mapping of contradictions of class and consumption associated with the normalization of migration in Philippine society and politics. The complexities of production and consumption surround the migration industry are also discussed.

Keywords: globalization, Philippine labour migration, transnationalism, production and consumption, economic transformation, social class

Résumé : Cet article formule une critique des discours sur la mondialisation en examinant le corpus ethnographique qui traite de la main d'œuvre itinérante d'origine philippine. La hausse spectaculaire du nombre de travailleuses philippines au milieu des années 1980 a suscité l'intérêt des universitaires et d'autres acteurs qui ont révélé le potentiel d'une critique politique philippine transnationale. Les travaux ethnographiques qui en résultent traitent davantage des modes d'asservissement au travail et des pratiques culturelles qui conditionnent la main d'œuvre philippine à être victime d'exploitation. Pour des raisons théoriques et méthodologiques, les questions relatives aux classes sociales demeurent largement inexplorées dans ces études. Le présent article expose que la banalisation du phénomène migratoire par les sphères politique et sociale engendre des contradictions qu'il est possible de mettre à jour grâce à des enquêtes à ancrages multiples. Ces contradictions ont précisément trait à la classe sociale et au pouvoir d'achat. L'article fait aussi état des complexités de l'industrie migratoire sur le plan de la production et de la consommation.

Mots-clés : Main d'œuvre itinérante, rapports sociaux des sexes, classe sociale, Philippines

Why Philippine Migration?

> How could a country with so many gifted, so many nice people, end up in such a mess? —Benedict Anderson
> (quoted by Patricio Abinales in the Introduction to the Philippine edition of *Imagined Communities*, Anderson, 2003: xxvi)

> For us, overseas employment addresses two major problems: unemployment and the balance of payments position. If these problems are met or at least partially solved by contract migration, we also expect an increase in national savings and investment levels.
> —President Ferdinand E. Marcos, 1982
> (cited in Gonzalez, 1998: 57)

At first glance migration studies seem well positioned to confront theoretical and methodological challenges posed by globalization discourses. Migration compels researchers to consider political, economic and social conditions in multiple nation states and raises questions about migrants' social identities and agency. And yet, paradoxically, much migration research remains bound to theoretical conventions of "methodological nationalism"; migrants and migration flows are considered from the vantage points of particular nation-states (both migrant-sending and receiving). This parallels but disguises earlier research conventions premised on migration as a radical break or rupture in the lives of migrants. Alternatively, some new approaches celebrate flows which remain ungrounded (see the Introduction to Inda and Rosaldo, 2002). However useful in their descriptive detail, fragmented social science conventions can also limit enquiry to the institutional and policy frameworks of im/migration reception and incorporation, or obstacles thereto. Mindful of such limitations, this paper draws upon 10 years of multisited ethnographic research which explores the migration experiences of Philippine women (*Filipina*)—in the Philippines, Hong Kong and Canada—and the gendered class and consumption contradictions of their transnational, globalized livelihood practices.[1]

The paper examines how the increasing globalized consumption of Philippine gendered labour produces various contradictions in four related areas. The first contradiction lies in public policy which juggles the social and political effects of increased reliance on migration. The second set of contradictions relates to the normalization of migration as an important livelihood option for Philippine women, *Filipina*. Many of these women leave children, marital partners and other significant kin needing care in the Philippines while they provide caregiving services to overseas employers. Thirdly, in the Philippine economy the significant influx of migrant remittances contributes to the national balance sheet and enables new forms of consumption and migration-related industries to flourish. However, the benefits of such changes are precariously tied to volatile labour market conditions beyond the control of Philippine policy. And, fourthly, for migrants themselves (women for the purposes of this paper), migration enables new forms of consumption, economic subjectivity and class agency—but in problematic ways given the nature of their typically de-skilled employment, and the transnational location of their work and political expressions. Here, the contradiction is that they do not directly experience the "fruits"of their labour and when they support the migration preparations of female relatives, they perpetuate cyclical migration. Also, when migrants are politically active, the institutional frameworks that result from their activism serve to normalize migration. Throughout the paper I explore theoretical and methodological issues relevant to writing ethnographies of migration framed against globalization discourse. I also discuss the class effects attending Philippine gendered migration while engaging in a dialogue about the absence of attention to class in related migration research.

Migration Ambivalence in Policy and Practice

Since President Marcos's commitment to a labour export policy in the 1970s, Philippine gendered labour migration has increased dramatically both in scale and geographic scope. While some migrants (both men and women), particularly professionals and skilled workers, continue to leave permanently, there has been an increase in the volume of *Filipina* participating in temporary overseas work (Go, 2002: 2) a situation which the Philippine state has increasingly relied upon to solve brooding economic and political problems (Gonzalez, 1998). The last 30 years have also seen shifts in the primary destination labour markets for contract workers. For example during the 1980s and 1990s there was an increase in Southeast Asian destinations and a decline in previously prominent Middle Eastern destinations, fluctuations responding to conditions in the national economies and labour markets of host countries. The newly industrializing countries in Asia produced a demand for service sector workers, especially women domestic workers, while demand for unskilled male labour in production, transport and construction declined, translating into a marked and relatively rapid feminization of most migration streams, but especially that from the Philippines (Go, 1998). Philippine migration circuits now also make a wider global sweep taking in most regions of the world with over 130 countries receiving Filipino workers (Gonzales, 1998: 39). But it is perhaps the significant increase in women's migration during the 1980s which has had the greatest impact upon how migration is understood and responded to within the Philippines and its diaspora (see Abrera-Mangahas, 1998; Tsuda, 2003).

Two sensational murder trials in 1995 revealed the depth of Filipino concern for the dignity and personal security of all migrants but particularly women because they are prone to sexual and physical abuse as domestic and entertainment workers. The first trial involved Flor Contemplaçion in Singapore and resulted in her execution. She was accused of the murders of her domestic worker friend Delia Maga and Maga's employer's child (Hilsdon, 2000). Later the same year Sara Balabagan was accused of murdering her male employer as he attempted to rape her in the United Arab Emirates. On this occasion, massive Philippine protests, international outcry and vigorous diplomacy averted the execution sentence and Balabagan received a public flogging and jail term. In his review of Philippine migration policy Gonzalez (1998) examines the "volcanic" insertion of migration issues into the political struggles of the 1995 general election occasioned by Contemplaçion's tragic story. The public outcry caused President Ramos's ruling coalition to produce a showing of diplomatic strength in dealing with Singapore (to be repeated later in the year with the United Arab Emirates) and the depth of national concern was instrumental in migration policy reform. Some senior staff were also removed from their positions. Ramos himself is reported to observe "that he had not seen the Filipino people so enraged since the assassination of Marcos nemesis, Senator Benigno Aquino in 1983" (cited in Gonzalez, 1998: 7). As Gonzalez puts it:

> No one expected that people would display such angry emotions about another Filipino being executed overseas. Filipinos had been witnessing OCW casket after casket and hearing one OCW horror story after another. In the meantime, their

> pleas for assistance and action were to no avail. Bitter emotions were building up.[2] (1998: 6)

Hence the Contemplaçion and Balabagan cases marked a turning point in recent Philippine migration politics and policy symbolizing the widespread frustration about the longevity of national reliance upon an economics of contract labour migration. Also at play but on a much less explored level, I argue, are the gender, class and consumption contradictions associated with the normalization of migration as a prominent livelihood strategy for women in particular.

It is worth emphasizing (see Gonzalez, 1998: 6, 7) that both of these high profile cases of Filipina under threat of execution by foreign states had been preceded (and followed) by other controversies accompanied by Philippine public outcry but these two have been the most subjected to critical scrutiny by academics and assorted other protagonists in national and transnational locations. Indeed, as a result of their location in Philippine migration history and political economy, the names Contemplaçion and Balabagan have taken on symbolic qualities representing the dark side of Philippine migration. By the mid-1990s, the normalization of migration was coming more clearly into view as were the gendered cultural and familial tensions provoked by such reliance (Asis, 2001; Chant and MacIlwaine, 1995). The changed consciousness (culturally and politically) towards migration is marked by shifts in political discourse seen in the ongoing valorization of migrants' heroic contributions (primarily economic) to their families and the nation. Routine reference to the heroic sacrificial migrant collides with—yet paradoxically reinforces—the prominent theme of victimhood characterizing until very recently, most of the writing about Philippine women migrants (see Barber, 1997, 2000).

But, as the political responses to the trials of 1995 reveal, there have been various policy changes ostensibly directed towards migrant security and the standardization of labour contracts inasmuch as such arrangements are within reach of Philippine national policy. Additional efforts have also been made at the state-to-state level to initiate various bilateral labour and related agreements, although not with great success (Go, 2003). The most recent round of migration policy modifications (in process during the early 2000s) reveals a slippage from the idea that the acceleration in migration is temporary—in Philippine public discourse "a stop-gap measure"—to allow for economic development configurations to take hold and perhaps create new local labour markets.[3] And, as the epigraph by Ferdinand Marcos indicates, a further, not insignificant effect of the labour export policy is political. The intent was to allow for alternative livelihood measures through migration which, in theory at least, functions as a safety valve to diminish political unrest caused by the continuing high rates of poverty, unemployment and underemployment experienced by the majority of Filipinos.

So in tandem with the policy adjustments, basically bringing discourse closer to everyday social practices, the status quo of Philippine dependence on a labour export policy continues (Asis, 2001). Ironically, such dependence is strengthened by transnational political activism which contests the scale of migration yet at the same time encourages greater state involvement in managing the scale of migration flowing from the Philippines and migration associated industries. Philippine migration thus remains mired in contradictions and continues to flow along seemingly well-grooved circuits where little change is apparent but for the deepening of commitment to migration as an economic strategy both at the level of individual and household decision-making, and for the nation. Not surprisingly, a number of recent ethnographic studies to be described below dwell upon the severely constrained labour process of domestic service work and/or its embedding in a brutalizing, racialized global political economy. Cultural practices explored in the literature are seen to condition migrants for their exploitation and perhaps deflect their resistance with self-disciplining modes of conduct. Hence Philippine women's labour exemplifies that globalization is decidely problematic, the politics tense yet ambivalent, the cultural terrain contradictory at best. Is this a sufficient rendering of migration as cause and consequence?

I commence from observations made elsewhere (Barber, 1997, 2000, 2002) of the discursive elision of the class effects of migration in the new work by anthropologists and other social researchers. One possible reason why class remains relatively unexamined is that there has been an overemphasis placed upon the consumption of labour (for example, discussion of the relations between domestic workers and their employers) at the expense of questions about the production and social reproduction of labour, the tricky anthropologically "unfashionable" terrain of class dynamics. The spatial separation between the labour markets and Philippine migrants' points of origin confounds the methodological difficulties for ethnographers, as does the tendency of migrants to want to speak of migration's hardships, in effect to dwell on the conditions of labour consumption. The theoretical turn away from Marx and questions of class, combined with the current widespread interest in globalization discourse and related concerns with mobility and cultural hybridity, does

not help matters. The second part of the paper explores class and consumption from a transnational vista that includes Philippines sites.

The Research

My research on Philippine gendered labour migration in the Asia-Pacific began in the 1990s as a multisited investigation of women's migration in several Philippine Visayan communities—Dumaguete and Bais city, Negros Oriental and Iloilo city and surrounding areas on Panay Island. In the Philippines I talked to return migrants and migrants "in-waiting," plus the kin of migrants currently working overseas. I have also spoken with key players in the Iloilo overseas workers' recruitment industry and with Visayan region government workers who process and document migrants prior to departure. Similarly, at the Manila head office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) I sought insights from policy researchers and those who "manage" migration. Approaching one million workers, the majority of whom are women, now leave the country each year with their official travel documents and labour contracts in hand. I continue discussion about the complexities of migration scenarios (most recently in Manila in June, 2003) with Philippine academics and community activists who study and respond to migration issues.

Moving beyond the Philippines, I have traced one predominant Philippine migration flow to Hong Kong where I again talked to migrants, some of whom were introduced to me by their kin back in the Philippines. In Hong Kong, the labour market I am most familiar with and where ethnographers have been most productive, 92.8% of Philippine labour migrants are women. Moreover, of the 180 000 foreign domestic workers resident in Hong Kong in 2002, the vast majority are Philippine women. Also in Hong Kong, I have spoken with workers in a range of migrant organizations (the ubiquitous non-governmental organizations or NGOs that now figure prominently in everyday conversation and Philippine political discourse) who typically deal with the darker side of labour migration. But some migrant advocates also struggle to imagine national and international policies which could better support migrants through the migration process, as well as curb migration by redirecting Philippine productive effort towards more socially and economically sustainable development initiatives. Increasingly, Philippine groups in Hong Kong are also taking on a more regional orientation both in the provision of support services for migrants in need, regardless of their countries of origin, and in their public activist roles. As noted above, such activities are transnational in scope and perhaps gain some visionary edge from their comparative vista, a subject I hope to explore in subsequent research.

Some further clarification about the scale and significance of Philippine gendered migration is in order here. In 2000, Philippine government representatives reported that 841 628 Philippine workers, approximately 70% of whom were women, were deployed (with documents) to work overseas. During this period local employment shrank and from 1994-01 more Filipinos received jobs overseas than there were new jobs created in their local labour markets (Go, 2002). The annual head count of officially deployed migrants takes on dramatic form in the bustling Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Manila which, according to a *Philippine Star* newspaper report in April 2002, processed 2 748 daily departures (Go, 2002). The *Star* articles provide the figure of 7.3 million persons as the most recent estimate (from the Interagency Committee on Tourism and Overseas Employment Statistics) of the total number of Filipinos working or living permanently abroad. As Stella Go (2002) cautions, a sizeable number of people (1.84 million) included in these estimates are irregular migrants in as much as they have departed the Philippines carrying tourist visas but with the intention of taking on employment with or without legal contracts.

Remittances make a sizeable contribution to the Philippine economy. Between 1990 and 2001 the average annual total of remittances recorded by the formal banking system was 4 082 billion U.S. dollars which amounts to an average of just over 20% of the country's export earnings (Go, 2002). Obviously the size of the amounts remitted is tied to migrants' salaries and national economies. It bears repeating that the majority of migrants are now domestic service workers whose productive efforts reveal the interdependency of productive and socially reproductive labour. Their labour holds great value to the Philippine economy—hence the praise heaped upon them—but it is also grossly undervalued in all the ways feminist theory reminds us (for example, Anderson, B., 2000; Chant and McIlwaine, 1995; Eviota, 1992).

Globalization as a Problem

As Benedict Anderson notes in his recent comparative project *Spectres of Comparison* (1998) the region now defined as Southeast Asia is a relatively new imagined community of common political and economic interest. On the other hand, it seems important when assessing the transnational aspects of migration to recognize the complexities of interests through which the region is constituted (including the iteration now called the Asia-Pacific). This is, in part, my purpose here. I argue that

migration complexities are best understood through a transnational vector taking account of both the structural issues of political economy—the main "logic" underscoring globalization's imagined communities of region—and the classed agency of the subjects of migration. Their lives and livelihoods, aspirations and histories, give form and meaning to a geography and political economy of region. Indeed they comprise the lived experience of what we call globalization. Moreover, to view labour as a commodity and to consider the social reproduction of such labour in conjunction with the consumption of commodities associated with labour migration, exposes the complexities of globalization and transnational political responses to globalized social inequalities, in this case in feminized global labour markets.

Anthropologists are particularly well positioned to study the local and global intersections—indeed the contradictions—of the transnational and international processes associated with globalization. A growing literature explores the complexities of social and cultural differentiation that globalization both conditions and responds to. This is true both in the contemporary so-called postmodern world and in the past (see for example, Friedman, 1994). As anthropologists have struggled to configure the layers of connection and influence that can be read in the communities they study, they have begun to interrogate the idea of transnationalism and the question of citizenship as a means to sort through the many ways in which global effects are present in local settings.[4] Time does not permit me here to explore these debates in any depth (see two excellent critiques in *Public Culture*; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000; Rouse, 1995). However a brief review of the main issues is imperative to my argument about the social relations of Philippine transnationalism, its class effects and politics. Let me mention a mere four of the many significant tensions, or contradictions, that have surfaced in the theoretical and empirical literature we may call "the ethnography of globalization."

In the first instance, globalization is not global, its processes are uneven. However, widespread class effects can be seen in relations of production and consumption. Such relations create new forms of social inequality and indebtedness. In the Philippines the cluster of activities surrounding migration—including the distribution of remittances, increased commitments to education, and a proliferation of migration-oriented businesses (for example labour recruitment and training agencies)—contribute to an emergent migration-based middle-class. But this is a precarious class shift subject to political and economic processes within the Philippines and beyond its borders in the various regional labour markets where Filipinos become subject to conventional processes of labour supply and demand, and also currency fluctuations. Likely the changes confirm capital's upper hand and the power of those whom Rouse (1995), after Gramsci, calls the "ruling bloc," a group that expands its imperious reach into the many aspects of commoditization associated with Philippine labour migration.

Secondly, transnationalism as a concept celebrates flows rather than the grounded yet multisited connections of migrants' lived experience. Migrants' transnationalism produces a form of double-consciousness as articulated by postcolonial theorists; for example, Bhabha's (1994) idea of mimicry, Brah's (1996) "diaspora space," and in anthropology, Appadurai's "ethnoscapes" (1996). For migrants and those living in diaspora, the here and the now is always interpellated with the there and the then, imbricated as pastiche. The content of the consciousness, and the meaning accorded its sequencing, shifts in conjunction with events in both locations. For this simultaneity, I really appreciate Anderson's (1998) metaphor of "spectral" afterimage, seeing simultaneously something close up and far away, like looking through an inverted telescope. I shall give some examples. Some Philippine-born Canadians find political debates in the Philippines cause for concern. For others, the health status of relatives remaining behind produces reflection on the migration process and sometimes, new, unanticipated regret at time missed with family. Such alternating perspectives can also span generations. One Canadian student told me her Philippine-born parents described their early lives in the Philippines as "a kind of hell." When I asked her if she had been to the Philippines, she replied: "Yes, when I was younger, about 13. For me it is a kind of heaven. I want to go there again and I care what happens there. That's why I am taking development studies." So, I argue that globalization is materialized in the local which should be the purview for assessment of its effects and affects. On the other hand, transnationalism has critical purchase in understanding both the limits of globalization discourse and how local and global processes intertwine. And a transnational vista offers potentially new momentum for political organizing, potentially about class issues, as when members of the diaspora participate in political debates over migration and development policy in the Philippines.

My next point concerns the manner in which globalization and transnationalism are increasingly offered up in popular discourse as evidence for global consciousness, the fruition arguably (perhaps) of McLuhan's much celebrated liberal ideal of the "global village." In a counter move, it is also the vision of world systems theorists, such

as Wallerstein (1990), who imagine a globalized political economy segmented by racism, class and gender, with no local cultural integrity left untouched by capitalism's homogenizing sweep. Here we have a conundrum. There is compelling evidence that global processes confirm localized commitments. However, these are often simultaneously viewed against new global horizons, fundamentalism being the most obvious example. Can such double moves, global and/or transnational yet at the same time profoundly local, produce a critical transnational political subject? I would argue that the Philippine example suggests this is a possible, if fractious outcome.

Finally, there is the most ideologically transparent conceit in globalization discourse; the "death of the state," or at least its erosion of power. All states concern themselves with border regulation and im/migration, as Filipinos living abroad, or trying to, know very well. In the 21st century, migrant-receiving states such as Canada face the curious paradox of needing to increase migration for demographic adjustment at precisely the moment when there is considerable pressure to subject im/migrants, particularly from global sites implicated in the U.S. "war against terrorism," to intensified regulation and surveillance.

Let me now turn to my ethnographic data to respond to the issue of state power more concretely. Philippine migrants understand the incredible power of states in an immediate, indeed embodied manner. And as Foucault and ethnographers who follow him suggest, they carry this burden and discipline themselves as they travel. For example, when I met her in Hong Kong, Marisol was about to turn herself into the immigration authorities because she had lost her job. She did this because without proper documents she feared she would always feel subject to surveillance. "They are so strict here" she told me. Eva's story, about her experiences some 23 years ago is also relevant here. Eva is now a Canadian citizen but I met her first in Iloilo (in June 2001) when she was on a rare visit "home." She began her overseas journey working as a cook for an Iranian family in the south of France. She was 33 years old at the time. The year was 1978, a time of relatively more "open borders" yet her initial application for a long-term visa in France was rejected. She had initially hoped for a student visa but was refused on the grounds that she was too old. Even without official documents she remained in her job for over a year before locating a Canadian employer and securing the official documents to enter Canada as a domestic service worker. The wages in Cannes were excellent, the employers considerate but still Eva fretted. The "we" she refers to in the following commentary is a second Philippine woman employed in the same household. They became firm friends and migrated together to Canada. The experiences are so vivid she locates them primarily in a present tense, a common aspect of migration narratives.

> It was difficult. We don't have a permit. We're working illegally, so you know, I'm not used to working like that. Every time I have my day off I'm so scared. Whenever I see police, I am so scared because I feel like they're going to get me. I have in my mind that they know if you are illegal. So one time I have my day off, right, and then I see this policeman running, right? When I see the police behind me running, I run too because I am so scared. I thought he was running for me and I keep running and I fall down. (She laughs...)

Even if migrants are bolder than Marisol and Eva, they encounter state power at every border they cross, including their own. Rose, my final example on this point, left the country for Singapore, traveling on a tourist visa. It took her three attempts spread over weeks to convince Philippine immigration officials that she was not bound for illegal employment and let her leave the country. On arriving in Singapore, even though her job placement was set up in advance through a network of friends, she found her employer cruel, the work unbearable. She was back in the Philippines within three months having been subjected to a scolding from embassy and border officials. Clearly then, state power in sending and receiving contexts, remains a real force, perceived and actual, for labour migrants to reckon with. Arguments about shifts in power to supra-state transnational and or global institutions must also account for local and national state practices seen in the above examples of border-crossing power relations. I will now explore the nature of changing class consumption associated with Philippine migration. The third part of the paper returns to the matter of globalization, labour consumption and critical transnationalism.

Contradiction and Class in Migration

My method here engages the globalization critique to outline some compelling features of contemporary Philippine migration, understood ethnographically. Here the classed aspects of Philippine migration, that is how migration creates new subjective and material class promise to migrants, are key components to the argument. Class promise is realized through the social relations of both production *and* consumption. These relations are geographically separated and yet united again through transnational circuits of class and capital set in motion by this particular migration flow. As always these newly configured class relations and subjectivities are contra-

dictory but they do promise a new politics that I describe as critical transnationalism.

A quick sketch of migration's class contradictions must begin with the reminder that Philippine women's labour migration is terribly exploitative, lathered as it is with gendered emotionality—Filipina taking care of other people's children because they are supposed to be especially talented nurturers, while separated from their own families. Related to this is the idea that many Philippine women feel the pull to migration through a familial idiom of "duty" articulated around various factors relating to economic need combined with a culturally valourized desire "to help their families," as daughters, wives and mothers, as sisters and aunts. Such sentiments play into the resulting feminized labour subordination in labour markets which cheapen women's paid service work because it is considered unskilled, a natural female function. The exploitative conditions of the labour process are worsened in contexts, for example Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Middle Eastern states, where employers are empowered by racist public discourses about the questionable sexual morality of Philippine women. This occurs despite the fact that Philippine domestic workers, "nannies," as a group, are considered in many Western locations to be superior to other migrant domestic workers (Bakan and Stasiulis, 1997). Moreover, Filipina labour migrants are increasingly skilled and well educated.

Such contradictions attend the valorization of many forms of women's work, especially gendered reproductive work culturally defined as inherently feminine. But the contradictions become particularly acute in the case of migrant Filipina who may be described as "doubly subordinated others" in Southeast Asian regional labour markets. It can be argued that exploitation is a major characteristic of most feminized labour migration flows but recent works such as Rachel Parreñas' "Servants of Globalization" (2001) highlight the particular cultural and economic dynamics of Philippine women's exploitation. Similarly, the grim working conditions of migrant domestic workers who take care of the affluent world's "dirty work," are captured in the title of Bridget Anderson's (2000) book on global politics and migrant domestic labour.

Despite the victimizing conditions attested to in these book titles and much of the earlier work documenting the situation of Filipina working abroad, the Philippine migrants with whom I have spoken often recognize the exploitative aspects of their work. Maria Luisa, now a student at the University of the Philippines, worked for only one year of her two-year contract in Hong Kong. She was one of approximately 40 return migrants and migrants-in-waiting interviewed in Iloilo. Speaking about her employers she said: "The main problem was their attitude. They treat me like a maid. (There is a long pause.) So I can manage the work but I don't like the attitude." Catriona, unprompted, revealed a classed identification drawn from her more extensive experience in Hong Kong. She told me:

> We go (t)here as a domestic helper and they look at us as a slave—a maid or slave. And then, although I work there, some of the Filipinas say that if their employer is so very abusive or arrogant we can say to ourselves that "although we work for them, we only make money... in our place we are not like this."

Yet class exploitation is less explored in the literature than issues of gender and racism, and there is little discussion about the class effects of gendered labour migration within migrant sending communities, Gamburd's (2000) study of Sri Lankan domestic workers providing one strong exception. More common is reference to the class dynamics differentiating migrant household workers and their employers, for example in some lower middle-class households described in Constable's (1997) study of Filipina in Hong Kong. Bridget Anderson's (2000) comparative study also advances compelling feminist arguments about Western European women sloughing off the gendered work of maintaining their middle-class lifestyle choices onto migrant women.

I argue that it is possible to read a complex story about class within the lives of Philippine migrants and that this can be extracted from migration narratives. Moreover, this story needs to be translated in the light of shifts in Philippine political economy and its classed dynamics. To date, however, the ethnographic literature has provided more insights into how Filipinos discipline themselves, rather than their class circumstances. Theoretically, Foucault rather than Marx directs our interpretation. Aside from theoretical sensibilities, there are some very good methodological reasons for the ethnographic occlusion of class, including questions of access to informants and the siting of the research, and the problem of which field methods to use.

Siting Class Agency in Ethnographic Narratives

Regarding access, there are a number of difficulties involved in research with domestic workers. How do you meet workers and then convince them to talk with you? This is particularly true if workplace conditions are tense and workers fearful about losing their jobs. Such problems

are compounded when workers "live-in" and are tightly controlled by employers. Migrants working overseas are often situated in a different, usually hostile culture resulting in an ethnically charged social environment, a feature of migrant experience noted above and much commented upon in the literature (Constable, 1997, 1999; Chang and Groves, 2000; Chang and Ling 2000; Groves and Chang, 1997).

Ethnographers writing about Philippine migration have been very creative in addressing issues of access in the local siting of their research. They describe their difficulties in making contact with migrants, sometimes resolving the problem by situating their research in an institutional framework. Hong Kong researchers Chang and Groves (2000, see also Groves and Chang, 1999) used a church as their point of contact and their participation in a choir as their mode of observation. My research confirms that church attendance sustains many Filipinos working abroad who are experiencing intense homesickness and loneliness. Church attendance is also encouraged by many employers because this is paternalistically viewed as a means of distracting their employees from fraternizing in troublesome public gathering places. Well documented in Constable (1997) and still very apparent during my fieldwork, Hong Kong media regularly convey critical commentary about the large gatherings of migrant workers, predominantly Filipinos, who congregate each Sunday near the Hong Kong ferry terminal buildings called "Central"; in the ferry walkway, subway tunnels, at bus stations, in several nearby parks and (poignantly) in the shelter of towering high rise buildings in the downtown business district. These sites are routinely associated (with much exaggeration) with ethnic criminality in media reports but more correctly if mundanely, they allow a Philippine transnational fraternity, a chance to be Filipino for a day and trade news, food and friendship, sometimes with people from the same province or city, sometimes with new friends.

During my brief stay in Hong Kong, I visited with one group of Iloilo migrants who had occupied the same Sunday space for several years. They referred to this space as "our house" using their identification with that particular locale as a base from which to launch such small business endeavours as the reproduction of coloured images on greeting cards and the sale of favourite Filipino foods, the noodle based *pancit* and rice treats made with brown sugar. Some Philippine women I spoke with in Hong Kong also conceded illicit activities do sometimes occur in the public gathering spots, gambling and prostitution being their most obvious examples. However, I was also told, some women simply take pleasure in their encounters with foreign men and it is only as a result of the racialized conditions of their migration that such women are considered morally suspect, potentially participating in prostitution. Hence as these examples show, critical readings of their behaviour are countered by migrants in complex and sometimes ambiguous ways.

Churches may be more convenient and contained sites of access and as such they may seem more reputable to controlling employers but, as the ethnographies reveal, the complexities of migrant workers' lives, their friendships and sexual expressions defy simplistic renderings of morality superimposed on public and/or institutional spaces. Such interpretations whether from public officials, employers, journalists or even migrants themselves, by turn distort, if not dehumanize, migrant sociability (in public sites), and/or romanticize it in churches. For example, Chang and Groves (2000) describe how some Philippine women church goers express moral disapproval of other Filipina who seek male-female sexual expression, particularly when women liaise with foreign men. Expressions of lesbian sexuality in the church diaspora studied by Chang and Groves are seen by some migrants as less contentious than more publicly displayed heterosexuality. Such an interpretation reverses conventional norms and further exposes contradictions of gender and sexuality created by such a sizeable migration of women.

So Chang and Groves' innovative church-based study provides important windows into how migrants manage some of the more intimate aspects of their migration sojourn. Their ethnographic work, however, is not concerned with the material conditions and consequences of migration. Similarly, in her pioneering Hong Kong ethnography, Nicole Constable (1997) relied upon volunteer work with a Philippine NGO that provides support to distressed migrants. Her study is particularly helpful in revealing how Filipina respond to personal hardship and employer abuse. Both of these institutional solutions to the dilemma of access, where and how to contact migrants, provide insights into the lives of migrants but there are also limitations. In Constable's case, migration narratives are mostly construed in terms of the self-disciplining conduct of migrants. The ethnographer highlights migrants' individualized struggles seeing them as unproductive of collective resistance.[5] This conclusion makes sense given the NGO location of the researcher but is also somewhat limiting given the political activism I found characteristic of many NGOs in Hong Kong and the broader Philippine diaspora extending into Canada, but more on this later.

Singing in choirs, attending church and volunteering as a migrant advocate are definitely innovative modes of participation. Actual live-in domestic work is a much more

difficult form of ethnographic engagement to sustain. A further question relates to the issue of how we compare and interpret "migrant experiences" as researchers. Migrant surveys have been completed, often, by government agencies and Philippine based NGOs, although, here again, there is a certain predictability to the results of such research. From surveys, we learn much about the difficulties encountered by migrants, also their concerns. Survey research also contributes useful information for policy debates. But we learn less about the ambivalence, resistance and what passes for personal success than is revealed through ethnography. Moving beyond the generalities of surveys, ethnographic narratives provide the primary means to understand migration experience. Experience is, however, both fluid and contingent and lends itself to multiple and contradictory interpretive possibilities. The complex renderings of exploitation in migrant narratives, I suggest, are not only stories about disciplined social subjects, they can equally be read for classed subjectivity.[6] Thus the apparent silence about class is in part a consequence of theory, plus, on occasion perhaps, insufficient attention to attendant histories. Gavin Smith (1999) has pointed out that without a deliberate investigation of political histories—the presence *and* absence of collective struggle—ethnographers can overlook what has been and is important to historically produced subjects, the people in our ethnographies. Historical oversight, I suggest, limits those ethnographies that fail to acknowledge the strong histories of Philippine-based collective action directed at state practices and the (mis)management of migration policies.

But, most significantly, I also suspect the ethnographic avoidance of class becomes more possible when research is located in key migrant receiving cities outside of the Philippines. In such single-sited studies the meanings and effects of migration, material and social, are not as available to the researcher. Similarly, single-sited studies completed outside of the Philippines can obscure the extent of the ongoing political struggles over the long term effects of migration that now occur at every level of the socio-spatial scale (from individual embodiment to national and transnational practice). Similarly, and of equal importance, is the likelihood that migration, as a profoundly transnational experience, is not fully understood from a solely Philippine-based ethnographic vista.

Also at issue is the ever-present risk of our ethnographic over-reliance on narrative and simplification of the complexity of narratives. Narrative is "a critical instrument of human agency" (Peel cited in Donham, 1999: 180). In narrative, memory is configured and reconfigured to match a historically articulated present. Transnational narratives of labour migrants adjust to events in the places called home. Often things at home are chaotic—mainly because money is short and families are large. Discussion of home then calls forth a narrative of hardship. Many of my discussions about Iloilo migrant's lives commence with the statement that "my parents are just poor farmers." Also, because of the nature of their work, domestic workers have little positive to report about their work experiences even when they can state that their employers are "kind," as many do. Migrant domestic workers typically live-in. In most countries referenced here, including Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, this is a legal requirement and where it is not, employers often demand it for the convenience of having their workers on 24 hour call.

Domestic work is tedious and the hours long; typically in Hong Kong from 6 a.m. until completion of a final clean-up after the employer's family retires for the night, usually around 11 in the evening. Where infants and young children are present in the household, the women tend to the children through the night and domestic workers in Hong Kong often sleep in the children's rooms, usually in bunk beds, shared with their young charges, leaving them no personal privacy. Some employers restrict the mobility of their workers and monitor their phone calls. Thus opportunities for ethnographic interview and/or conversation are infrequent and deliberate. As conversation begins, talk often turns to the hardships of the work and it can often be difficult to get beyond this. Hence discussion often calls forth what I will call the "accommodated subject," so a disempowered voice may be all that is heard and reproduced. As I have argued elsewhere, accommodation and disempowerment are, however, Janus-like (Barber 2002). Let me elaborate. When migration is discussed, whether by migrants or in popular culture, it is cast as a duty and a personal sacrifice, a form of deferred gratification for the collective national good. One correspondent in Tinig Filipina (a Hong Kong newsletter circulated in the diasporic Philippine community) expressed her conflicted class subjectivity thus:

> Through your good works in those places where you are temporarily working you will become instruments in the economic improvement or progress of your "sick nation" through the dollars you send back home. In the future, through your perseverance and hard work, your children and your children's children will be the ones to benefit from your nation's progress. (Layosa 1994: 6, also cited in Chang and Groves, 2000: 82)

Contrast this with another, yet more explicit class expression. Marilyn was 26 years old when I met her in the Philippines (June, 2001). She recounted with bitterness the indignities suffered while working in domestic service in Singapore. She was 18 years old when this happened, completing the first of a series of overseas contracts. In her narrative class is more firmly understood, its indignities confronted:

> My lady boss would say "You're so stupid." For one year I just kept quiet. I didn't answer back. But after a year I think this is too much. One day she scolded me very bad, so I answered back. (I ask, "What did you say?" She repeats the conversation so etched in her consciousness, it's as if lines rehearsed.) "It doesn't mean that I am just working here...You scold me like that...But I'm a human being. I can feel. If I am so stupid I would not be here. Because a stupid person cannot speak English, cannot do anything, cannot write...I'm not stupid. I work here. You just pay for my service but you'll never buy me...my whole individual. You can say anything. You think I am just a slave for you. But I have rights. I have feelings." (She pauses and shifts tense). I often cried but for the next year I kept on fighting. I want(ed) to fight for my right. I want(ed) to let her know that even though we are poor and I am her maid, but I have emotions.

Marilyn is now focussed upon her studies in nursing in the Philippines, in defiance of her treatment in domestic service. If she has to migrate again, and she is torn about this, she would rather travel in a more clearly defined skilled migrant stream. She has invested in a "top nursing school" hoping that if/when she leaves it will be as a "nurse" not an "aid" or "domestic." She wants her labour to be more highly valued which she hopes will protect her from the humiliations of domestic service so scorched in her memory.

In nursing, the exploitation seems less apparent. However, should she chose to work overseas in nursing, it is not necessarily the case that Marilyn will be able to work on the same footing as locally trained nurses. Philippine nurses with appropriate educational credentials are recruited to work as nurses in particular labour markets in the United States, also in England. One recruiter in Iloilo who specialized in sending nurses to the U.S. told me that his nurses receive the same wages as U.S.-trained nurses but this would need to be confirmed because in other national contexts, wage parity is not necessarily immediate. He also told me the people he recruits for U.S. jobs (women and some men) are not contract labourers but can proceed to become immigrants in the United States. However, in the British context, newly recruited Philippine nurses are placed on trial and paid a probationary wage. The sister of a Philippine woman I spent time with in Hong Kong had recently moved to London to practice nursing and was complaining bitterly that she was working alongside British nurses who were paid much higher wages. My friend reported that her sister was uncertain whether her wages would be sufficient to live on given the debts she had to repay for her travel expenses and the high cost of living in London. In many ways, she told her sister in a letter which I read, she was better off in the Philippines where her wages and her costs of living were more balanced.

In Canada it is also becoming more possible for Philippine trained nurses to work as nurses. For example the Province of Manitoba has an agreement with the federal government that it can directly recruit a set number of Philippine nurses. In 2002, I met with staff at the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) in Manila who were working with Manitoban officials to recruit the nurses and finalize the contractual arrangements for the im/migrant nurses travelling to Canada. But the majority of *Filipina* who enter Canada still do so under the Live-in Caregivers program. Once they have permanent residency status and they are able to seek employment appropriate to their training, their Philippine qualifications typically do not translate into jobs as registered nurses. Within Canada, the failure to recognize Philippine credentials is a source of intense political lobbying by Philippine women's support groups. Alternatively, some Canadian provincial nursing associations are protective of local jobs and concerned about the importing of foreign trained nurses. So Marilyn's path away from domestic service work is not likely to be without further frustration should she elect to leave the Philippines again.

It needs also to be said that migration narratives reveal that not all migrants see migration as a means to familial and national economic improvement. Some speak of migration as a personal journey, an escape route from home-based troubles and/or a grand adventure where labour seems almost incidental. Eva's journey to Canada via France (cited earlier in the paper) is much like this. As is often the case, Catholic faith enables a culturally pronounced "fatalism" that is presented in narratives as a means to sustain courage in the face of the risk-prone work environments of domestic service. For example, Jocelyn was only 19 years old and working on her first overseas contract when she managed to escape a near

rape from her intoxicated Saudi employer. Despite this trauma she found the strength to complete that contract by remaining vigilant and "trusting in God." She ended our conversation with: "My hope is that I will get to Italy soon 'if it is God's will.'" For the dutiful and the adventuresome, the knowing and defiant subjects of exploitation, however, migration always offers the promise of material improvement and its social consequences. Here again, however, ambitions are conflicted.

Tracing Migration as Consumption

I turn now to how migration is changing material conditions in Philippine communities. Most basically, migrant incomes typically pay for the education of children, siblings and their children. Education is a major industry in the Philippines, much more varied in its provision than, for example, in Canada. When migrants educate young relatives they do so with the hope and dread that education will become a pathway to future economic security. The path leads far from home so a family's "investment in education" threatens to sever culturally valued proximate familial networks. Paradoxically, such networks produce the social capital upon which local livelihoods depend. They are also the foundation for material and practical support in the migration process of individuals.

So migration, in as much as it has become part of quotidian livelihood scenarios, well integrated into local cultural practices, may also be threatened by its very success. This is because the new class sensibilities, in production and consumption, are becoming more individuated, more "cosmopolitan" than "vagabond" like (Bauman, 1998) despite the nature of the labour engaged. Contemporary Philippine migration in its present form both disrupts and depends upon historical postcolonial precariousness (as noted by Layosa in *Tinig Filipina* and by Marilyn, referencing in the first instance "a sick nation" and in the second a proud class dignity). A primary forum for securing migrants' loyalty to the migration project has been the familial ethic in Philippine catholic culture. Responding to precarious livelihood, Filipinos draw heavily upon their large kin and social capital networks (sometimes with conflict) for access to resources. History and religion both accord ideological significance to discourses about migration and its inevitability in current Philippine realities. This has been made all the more possible in the post-Marcos period because of its democratic national promise. Yet, we see a potential undermining of migration through increased levels of education and consumption which have the potential to initiate more individuated (less familial) subjectivities and an erosion, or disentanglement, of the cultural meanings of kinship obligations, sometimes transferred to citizenship (as in Layosa's case above).

When class issues and their transnational realization are brought to the fore (through subjective and material conditions)—questions about the Philippines of the future emerge. All migrants imagine a more promising future—they have to. But for now, what they imagine that future to be and the role they play is linked to institutional and social relations sustained through national colonized subordination. How long can this consciousness prevail? How long will national and personal reliance upon migration endure as a protracted yet still temporary set of arrangements through which migrants tolerate dreadfully exploitative labour and living conditions? Migration has become a permanent fixture of Philippine economic development at great cost to local and national productivity. This is true even if some sectors of the Philippine economy seem well served by migration remittances as evidenced in the earlier discussion of labour export and education.

Housing upgrades and property improvements provide further dramatic evidence of migration's role in Philippine development; the contradiction here relates to the accelerating demand for cash set in motion by property development. Contemporary housing and rural production technologies require modernized, (that is "individuated, flexible"), subjectivities and represent insertion into middle-class forms of consumption and indebtedness. Consumption and indebtedness feed into a vicious circle and render labour and familial mobility inevitable. Small-scale entrepreneurial activities fuel every migrant's economic dream and although very few migrants reach this third level of remittance spending, those that do achieve it have also inserted themselves into fickle local market niches; such as the buying and selling of clothing (see Milgram in this volume), cooked food services and the provision of transportation. As independent small business brokers, they are, however, the ideal neoclassical class subjects, independent, resourceful and willing to shoulder economic risks, perhaps by increasing their indebtedness, not just to kin but in the formal marketplace! In other words, the changes suggest a reworked historical pattern of class transformation under new conditions of contemporary globalization's political economy. The prognosis seems grim given readings of globalization by scholars such as Rouse, Bauman and Harvey. However, in the new transnational sites in which the migrants are social actors, wherever they end up living—at home or abroad, there is also the promise of what David Harvey (2000) calls "spaces of hope." That is hope for a renewed regionally articulated political effort, one which intervenes in the transnational circuits of labour and capital with the promise of a different model of Philippine

development. To become successful, Harvey contends, such effort must transcend the particularized concerns of local communities. Herein lies the promise of what I am calling critical transnationalism.

Globalization and/in the Local

Anthropological critiques of globalization often commence with arguments about how globalization discourse typically projects a totalizing global project, one that is already accomplished as distinct from an emerging and contested system of transnational political and economic governance. Globalization, critics suggest, is but one further iteration of world capitalism and its many faces, yet pro-globalization discourse posits novelty, sometimes dramatically so. Some critics, myself included, would argue from the insights of Eric Wolf's *Europe and the People without History* (1982) a masterful study of European history and its many forms of capitalism, that there is nothing new about a globalization project (see Inda and Rosaldo, 2002). Others would use even deeper time frames to reveal global imperial projects sometimes expressed as economic conquest, sometimes religious conquest, often both (Anderson, 1998 for instance). The point here is that much in globalization rhetoric is fundamentally ahistorical if not anti-historical in nature.

Closer to the Euro-American "home" of globalization boosterism, there is the compelling critique that what is presented as a relatively recent globalized phenomenon, appears quite similar in form and content to what was described as modernization in the postwar period. It is modernization on a grander spatial and technological scale. Much critical energy has been expended on challenging the ideological nature and Western self-interest of modernization's development logic. There is chilling predictability to the ways in which so-called globalization scenarios are replicating the production of new inequalities much as modernization did in the second half of the previous century. For example, see Gill's (2000) study of how structural adjustment programmes in Bolivia produced new forms of impoverishment. Edelman (1999) paints a similar picture for Costa Rica. Both are ethnographies of the lived experience of globalization. They do not bode well for the promise of shared benefits for developing countries. If globalization is what Harvey (1990) describes as flexible and fast-paced capitalism with its time-space compression, the ethnographic evidence suggests it has better served investors than poor and middle class people in economically vulnerable countries. Neo-liberal restructuring scenarios in these studies and others reveal new forms of economic insecurity, even amongst previously more secure middle-class people such as teachers. This pattern is not unfamiliar in Western economic contexts where skilled workers and middle-managers have experienced a recent scaling down of their incomes, if not class aspirations.

Nor is the pattern unfamiliar to those who follow the social configuration of Philippine labour migration. As noted, this migration flow is starkly gendered. Increasingly women are relying on tertiary education to bolster their employability yet they are still forced to settle for low-skilled service sector work in foreign labour markets. In other words, education accords little added value to the price of their labour. This is the pattern Marilyn (cited above) is determined to break. Indeed, my research reveals that the market value accorded highly skilled Filipina is itself contradictory. In preparing to leave the Philippines, women who will work as domestic workers in Hong Kong (along with Taiwan, the currently most highly desirable regional destination) recognize that they should have some form of college education. This is because education confirms to employers that Filipina have the English language and conceptual skills particularly sought after by Hong Kong employers who imagine their domestic servants as a means to increase their children's cultural capital. Note here that Hong Kong's migrant Philippine community was instrumental in the opening up of new gendered labour markets in Hong Kong. As Constable (1997) notes, such markets also facilitated new class configurations in Hong Kong society. Many Filipina work in lower middle class Hong Kong households where they are vulnerable to economic shifts and the vagaries of class and cultural politics of the kind described by Marilyn in Singapore; being looked down upon by employers whom migrants consider their class equal. In Hong Kong they may also have higher levels of education than their "lady bosses."

Catriona, whose comments about being regarded as "a maid or a slave" were cited earlier, is also acutely aware of class differences within the employment contract and, it would seem what development theorists refer to as the penetration of capitalism. For example, she compares life in Hong Kong and the Philippines from her Philippine location:

> In freedom, at least, I prefer here. When you work here it's okay. When you don't have work, you can eat. There it's different. If people do not work, they cannot eat because they cannot pay the rent. So they get maids so that they can work. If they will not get a maid then they will not work. Not all Chinese who get a maid are rich. Some hire maids because they need to work also, to

earn more. So even though we have less money here, we can live better.

Often domestic workers are hired by men (the boss *qua* boss) but they are "managed" by women, many of whom have their own work stress to deal with. Even this is apparent to their Philippine employees.

In the Philippines, where women begin their job search, they present themselves (literally, poetically it seemed to me) in short video clips that recruitment agencies in the Philippines distribute to their counterparts in Hong Kong. In their video performances most women appreciate the requirements are contradictory. They must appear as potentially loyal and subservient, and yet capable of taking charge of complex extended family households sometimes containing three generations of kin. They should appear educated but not too much so. This is because employers often seek Filipina who can tutor children in English, which women seeking employers like to imagine themselves doing, more so than other forms of domestic service work. Also, everyone, it seems, would love a job in Hong Kong's European expatriate communities because they have heard the wages and conditions are typically better than the government regulations articulate. (This is only sometimes true). Some college education then is useful capital, but not too much. Poorly educated Filipina (almost a contradiction in terms in the currently highly regulated competitive Hong Kong market) may be viewed by potential employers as lacking in initiative. On the other hand, over-educated women threaten a potential assertiveness.

The stock of knowledge in the cultural politics of Philippine everyday life is now infused with wisdom about such contradictions. Migrant narratives also encode ideas about class and cultural negotiation within the privatized workplaces of gendered labour markets. Most understand the distinct possibility that their own aspirations for class mobility are prone to sabotage through a seemingly bottomless pit of familial obligation for financial support. Such support creates cycles of obligation and indebtedness in the lives of migrants even as their remittances contribute billions of American dollars and fuel consumption practices that contribute further to what some critics and activists argue is an illusory Philippine development. This observation returns us to the crucial critical argument that links this whole discussion.

The celebratory discourses of globalization, be they political, academic or popular, also obscure just what is being globalized (namely, markets for capital accumulation) and the social and cultural relations and cultural politics that underlie these processes. The question begged is just who will benefit from the emergent political and economic arrangements? For critics such as Harvey (2000) and Bauman (1998), globalization refers to market processes that have contributed to new forms of social inequality, such as those that underlie global migration flows. The Philippines fits this example, even when migrants themselves are listened to as agents rather than victims. Globalization in Harvey and Bauman's view also facilitates further vehicles—globalized—for the concentration of wealth. Globalization thus presents a reconfiguring of class structures with a downward levelling social process at play. As with similar historical shifts, for example in the development of industrial capitalism in the West, the reconfiguration of class is accompanied by an assertion of novel identities (individualized subjectivities—ethnic, multicultural, gendered selfhoods) translated into a presentation of self put together through new and intensified consumption practices. This last point has resonance in Philippine communities such as Dumaguete and Iloilo where new shopping malls compete and seduce consumers for remittance pesos. Here migration feeds consumption which articulates with the "globalized," or less cynically, more modern, more cosmopolitan, desires of labour migrants and their kin. Diasporic experience and imaginations help in the articulation of such desires—the translation of needs into wants.

But here again, Bauman's (1998) cryptic metaphors for the new forms of globalized mobility—tourists and vagabonds—and their dialectical interconnection offer pause for thought. In his rendition, Philippine migrant subjects, those who achieve a form of material class shift in conjunction with a different sense of themselves and their social and economic potential, are prone to further exploitation. They are the socially and economically disadvantaged in the new global arrangements. Does it end here? In closing I want to briefly explore the other two components of globalization and transnational critique, for I feel compelled to reassert the ethnographic optimism of globalization's defiance in the local. I also wish to mention a promising political debate about alternative regional economic scenarios. The debate relies upon a transnational optic but it is modelled from Philippine experience.

Globalization and Critical Transnationalism

As I have already noted, briefly, two main critical fault lines surface in the ethnographic literature discussing transnationalism. First, in focussing on transnational flows, often celebrated for their scale, form and pace (as noted by Harvey, 1990, 2000), attention is deflected from

the actual conditions that are associated with how the flows are localized. Also, celebration of the global overlooks the point that the global is in fact the sum of many locals; it is a spatial scale that commences from and returns always to particular localities, localities that have particular histories and social configurations. Thus the local and the global are a dialectic, not a binary.

I have also argued that Philippine localities express all manner of transnational articulation and contradictions. Here I have spoken of these as both material and subjective, relating to social processes of class and consumption. In political terms, the individuating processes of consumption and the social isolation within which class is challenged can be, and has indeed been offset, through important moments of multisited political mobilization. For example, in 1995 new legislation was drafted precipitously after a particularly contentious year that witnessed Contemplaçion and Balabagan's personal tragedies. That year positioned all migrant women as symbolic of the perilous national dependence on gendered migration and highlighted the suffering endured by many individual migrants who are put at personal risk during their overseas sojourn.

Philippine migrant support groups are present in most countries outside of the Middle East where they are outlawed. Using Hong Kong as my example, such groups work tirelessly and with some success to resolve labour and legal disputes. To the degree that they are successful, these efforts make a significant difference in the lives of individual migrants. They also challenge cases of abuse, again sometimes with success. Moving up the register of political effort, groups such as United Filipinos in Hong Kong (UNIFIL-HK) and the Asian Migrant Centre (AMC) also co-ordinate political and critical responses to policy. In this they communicate with and represent Filipinos and other migrant groups, although Filipinos are by far the largest Hong Kong-based group.

Further up the register again, UNIFIL, comprised of domestic workers and AMC, an NGO support group, are engaging in a proactive political debate about where return migrants might position themselves in Philippine development. One activist spoke of this effort as a "rights and root campaign." There is insufficient time to review this debate here but the ideas under discussion model different visions of class and community in Philippine society; they move beyond particularized local concerns to offer a transnationally inspired "space of hope." On the other hand, as noted in the first section of the paper on the ambivalent aspects of Philippine dependence upon migration, the transnational political activism of Philippine migrant support groups has encouraged more explicit accommodation to the needs and concerns of the labour diaspora. Migration is more closely monitored at the Philippine border and the recruitment industry is more tightly regulated, with more effort expended to track down unlicenced recruiters. Health care and pension support for return migrants reduce the disparities between local and global labour markets. All such measures are indicative of the national long-range commitment to migration and in as much as they smooth the journey to overseas work, they also contribute to the routinization of migration as a predominant livelihood strategy for Philippine women and often, their families. Border control and regulatory policies also restrict the conditions under which Filipinos obtain overseas work, making it more difficult for migrants who are hard-pressed to raise the required capital, to follow regular migration channels. Since the 1980s, Philippine migration politics reflect this tension.

This paper has navigated through the ambivalence and paradoxes of Philippine migration in the global context. While women's labour is the main commodity examined here, the paper also touches upon how migration contributes to the development of new commodities and forms of consumption (including education, housing, healthcare, transportation, clothing and other goods). Of particular concern throughout the paper is the question of the class effects of Philippine migration. I have argued that Philippine labour migrants are classed subjects who often express understandings of the class dynamics attending their work despite the fact that the ethnographic literature has tended to emphasize the accommodated (victimized) and compliant migrant subject. I have also suggested that women's labour migration sets in motion new class dynamics in Philippine society as migrants and their beneficiaries engage in new forms of consumption and, potentially at least, take on newly individuated subjectivities sometimes through personal consumption and sometimes through economic commitments and insertion in novel economic niches. In latter cases, the forms of indebtedness may extend into the market place well beyond those previously devised from kin and community-based networks. To some extent, the deflection of class agency in the literature to date is an artifact of interviewing members of a controlled labour force and of the constraints of studying migrants in their overseas work locations where Philippine histories and struggles over labour and migration politics are invisible. For studying the global flows, chains and connections arising through labour migration—a topic of significant contemporary importance in most regions of the world—I propose a critical transnational perspective, attentive to multisited historical struggles, as a means to identify the contradic-

tions of class and consumption when the commodity is labour.

Pauline Gardiner Barber, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3H 4P9, Canada. E-mail: pgbarber@dal.ca

Notes

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2 In the Philippines overseas contract workers are routinely referred to as OCWs.

3 Go (2002) reviews various policy documents to conclude: "Thus, from managing the flow, government now seeks to actively promote international labour migration as a growth strategy, especially of the higher skilled, knowledge-based workers." This latter group can be relied upon for higher rates of remittance.

4 Relatively early on in the articulation of transnational approaches in anthropology Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc (1994) outlined contours for the debate. Also relevant here is Ong and Nonini (1997) with compelling examples of Chinese and Southeast Asian transnationalism. More recent work links transnationalism to questions of citizenship (Ong, 1999 and Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001).

5 In a later publication, Constable (1999) acknowledges the importance of class processes within the Philippines to the Hong Kong migration scenarios discussed in her earlier ethnography (1997). However, such processes remain unexplored in her work.

6 As I completed work on this paper, I came across the work of Australian based geographers Gibson, Law and McKay (2001) who raise preliminary questions about the complexities of class subjectivities and political performativity flowing from migration experiences, drawing on Philippine and Hong Kong data.

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Globalization and Modernity—A Case Study of Cognac Consumption in Hong Kong

Josephine Smart *University of Calgary*

Abstract: Hong Kong is one of the top consumers of cognac. Yet the Chinese population in Hong Kong is extremely light in their drinking habits with less than 4% of the population described as regular drinkers. This paradox of light alcohol consumption habit and high level of actual consumption of cognac can be explained by the successful integration of cognac as the liquor of choice at wedding banquets since the 1970s, and a common item in gift exchange at important calendar and social occasions. The successful marketing of cognac in Hong Kong is shown to be closely linked to local economic conditions, symbolism and culturally appropriate conspicuous consumption. While the success of cognac in Hong Kong is an example of effective global circulation of goods, it also serves as an illustration of the resilience of cultural diversity within an increasingly integrated global economy. The consumption formats and meanings associated with cognac have been given "local colours" in Hong Kong.

Keywords: cognac, Hong Kong, Chinese wedding banquets, conspicuous consumption, globalization, modernity

Résumé : Les résidents de Hong Kong sont parmi les plus grands consommateurs de cognac au monde. Pourtant la consommation d'alcool chez la population chinoise de Hong Kong est plutôt légère : moins que 4% de la population se considère comme habituée. Ce paradoxe d'un faible taux de consommation générale d'alcool accompagné d'un taux élevé de consommation de cognac s'explique par l'intégration du cognac comme la boisson du choix dans le contexte de réceptions de mariages depuis les années 1970 et de son statut de don typique à l'occasion des diverses fêtes dans le calendrier annuel tout comme d'autres occasions sociales d'importance. Le marketing réussi du cognac à Hong Kong s'associe étroitement aux conditions économiques locales, au symbolisme, et à la consommation patente appropriée dans ce contexte culturel. Bien que le succès du cognac démontre une circulation mondiale efficace des biens de consommation, il exemplifie aussi la flexibilité de la diversité culturelle au sein d'une économie mondiale de plus en plus intégrée. À Hong Kong, les formes de consommation du cognac et leurs significations respectives ont acquis des «couleurs locales».

Mots clés : cognac, Hong Kong, réceptions de mariages chinoises, consommation patente, mondialisation, modernité.

Introduction

One of the most readily observable aspects of globalization is the global circulation of goods and consumer cultures, even though this is only part of a much wider phenomenon which entails policies, processes and outcomes at global, regional, national and community levels (Rees and Smart, 2001). The highly successful marketing efforts of brand products of American and European origins create the widely held impression of the Westernization or Americanization of everyday life in all corners of the world, leading to a concern about the lost of cultural diversity and the inevitable consequence of cultural homogenization (see Klein, 2000; Sklair, 1991). Within the popular thinking that "[w]hen foodways change, the culture also changes" (Visser, 1999: 120), the ubiquitous presence of MacDonald's presents the possibility that a bit of American culture is transmitted to every consumer around the globe. It cannot be denied that the circulation and consumption of global commodities have a certain impact on local cultures, but it cannot be assumed that the direction of this change and the magnitude of the impact are uniform and regular in every geographical and cultural region. A growing body of ethnographic data points to the unlikelihood of complete cultural homogenization despite the continuing growth of imported goods in non-Western societies (García Canclini, 1997; Hannerz, 1992; Jussaume Jr., 2001). Any given product and its consumption convey very different meanings in different parts of the world for people of different class background, gender, age group and ethnicity (see Howes, 1996; Scholliers, 2001; Watson, 1997). Coca Cola, a truly global product of American origin, epitomizes the perfection of market penetration that reaches every household in the United States on the basis of its affordability and availability. In China, a nation of 1.3 billion people where Coca Cola was not reintroduced until the 1980s, it is a symbol of modernity and Western sophistication. Its relatively high cost compared to locally produced beverages means

that its consumption is largely restricted to the middle- and upper-classes. While Coca Cola is considered a beverage akin to water in Western societies today, its original intent as a medicinal tonic persists in many non-Western markets. For example, a well-known folk remedy for common cold in Hong Kong is Coca Cola boiled with lemon slices. It should be noted that a new format of consumption is created by local culture. Who would have thought of "cooking" Coca Cola in the United States?

Within the literature of globalization, there is a tendency to assume that global cultural change is largely influenced by American or Western products and practices, ranging from hamburgers to business management structures. This assumption is both misleading and overly simplistic. First, not all foreign products and practices are unconditionally accepted by consumers in new markets. This is a well-known fact within business circles (Bretherton, 2001; Ferraro, 1998). Successful imports are often subjected to modifications to accommodate local cultural values and practices. MacDonald's lamb burgers in India and burdock burgers in Japan are good examples of the localization of global products and the strength of cultural factors in shaping consumer demands.

Second, the global circulation of goods and knowledge offers equal opportunity for non-Western products and practices to penetrate American and other Western markets. The popularity of sushi, green tea, Tai-chi, acupuncture and vegetarianism throughout Europe and North America serve as a reminder that Western cultures are also changing under the influence of globalization. This change is not entirely driven from without, however, as evident from the escalating anti-brand movement in the United States since the mid-1990s that has spread worldwide (Klein, 2000: 325-343).

Third, global trade is not a new phenomenon (Appiah, 1998; Rees and Smart, 2001); the history of trade between the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia provides plenty of evidence to show that the European dietary traditions and economies were greatly affected by the importation of goods—sugar, chocolate, coffee, spices—from other parts of the world and vice versa (Mintz, 1996; Toussaint-Samat, 1992). Put in another way, cultural diffusion is a given in human history; while the rate of diffusion today may be greatly accelerated as a result of globalization, past history points to the resilience of cultural heterogeneity.

The complex mutual influences in global ideological and material exchanges demand a re-consideration of our thinking about the directions and processes of change in a given locality within the context of global economy (Rees and Smart, 2001: 1-15). This paper uses a single commodity—cognac—in a case study to show the social and economic complexity in the global circulation of goods. Cognac is used as a lens through which Hong Kong society and culture can be studied in its recent history of economic development and transformation. The use of "food...as an instrument for the study of other things" (Mintz, 1996: 3) has been fruitfully employed by other scholars and proven to be an excellent way to situate wider economic and global issues within the everyday life of the people under study (see Fischler, 1988; Marshall, 1979; Mennell, 1985; Scholliers, 2001; Wu and Cheung, 2002). This paper hopes to answer questions of how and why an imported product—cognac—became integrated within the local culture of consumption and what this successful product integration in Hong Kong society may reveal about the local social and economic changes in the past few decades.

This paper is informed by several dominant themes in the social studies of food. The foremost is the well-established and often cited theories of symbolism and meanings associated with food and eating (Douglas and Gross, 1981; Levi-Strauss, 1968). The act of consumption, the choice of items for consumption, and the items themselves convey and are encoded with layers of symbolic meaning; these symbolic meanings are not automatically transparent to all observers. Observers familiar with the cultural code within which the meanings were originally encoded will "get it," others may give different meanings and interpretations according to their cultural competence. Using art as an illustration, Bourdieu (1984: 2) explains this organic relationship between cultural knowledge and shared meanings as follows,

> A work of art has meaning and interest only for someone who possess the cultural competence, that is, the code, into which it is encoded.... A beholder who lacks the specific code feels lost in a chaos of sounds and rhythms, colours and lines, without rhyme or reason.

A person's cultural competence has multiple functions. In Bourdieu's description above, it is a tool to give meanings to his/her social universe. It reflects and validates the person's social identity, an identity with many variations rooted in distinctions by class, ethnicity, gender, education and profession. In light of the multiplicity of identities, distinctions and cultural codes, it is risky at best to presuppose that any given object or experience may generate the same meanings for most people. The other function of cultural competence is its utility as a tool of communication. It enables a person to conduct himself/herself in ways that convey the specific messages that s/he intends. Mintz (2002: 26) compares this culturally encoded communication to the use of language, " [a]s with language, on many occasions people define them-

selves with food, at the same time, food consistently defines and redefines them."

Consumption in general, and consumption of food-specifically, are well studied within the context of modernity. Modernity is a "local experience" with a "global reality" that is "interactively everywhere"(Appadurai and Breckenridge, 1995: 2, 14). It can be conceptualized as an elastic matrix of practices and cognition that point to the future and in doing so distinguish themselves from the past. Naturally the historical legacy of a culture or place has great influence on what is recognized as "modernity" by its participants. Voluntary simplicity in lifestyle and consumption may be a symbol of modernity for a segment of the population in Canada and other developed countries, yet in China today the ultimate symbol of modernity is material wealth and conspicuous consumption. Many Chinese people want everything that they were deprived of for the past five decades. Personal and material wealth are the strongest symbols of success and modernity in China today. This path—dependent emergence of symbols and experiences of modernity in specific locations is a reminder to us that divergence and heterogeneity co-exist with the convergence and homogeneity that globalization may produce.

Inherent within the elastic net of practices and cognition that define modernity is the possibility of incorporating new experiences or giving new meanings to old experiences. This possibility is the life line for marketing companies who are dependent on the successful creation of new consumer demands in neverending succession. The advertisements provide a form of mediated experience for the consumers, the symbolism associated with the products is carefully assembled and projected with the hope that consumers will operationalize the mediated experience into consumption, or lived experience (Elliot and Wattanasuwan, 1998: 141). The highly complex and rarely predictable transformation between mediated and lived experiences is precisely what this paper hopes to explore. How does the marketing image of cognac as a luxury product translate into actual consumption in a cultural group that remains extremely light in drinking habits regardless and in spite of significant gains in affluence and intensive exposure to Westernized foodways? How can we account for the empirical discrepancy between the drinking habits of Hong Kong Chinese and the actual consumption level of cognac? This paradox, as I will show in this paper, can only be resolved by turning our gaze to the actual processes of "cultural docking." Similar to the site-specific molecular coupling of oxygen and haemoglobin, or pathogen and human cells, a newly introduced product must find a point of entry into the consumer society by docking onto compatible sites of cultural praxis. For cognac, its image of luxury and prestige and its actual high level of consumption in Hong Kong are greatly enhanced by its successful normalization as the drink of choice at Chinese wedding banquets.

The interesting and dynamic interplay of post World War II economic development, foreign product introduction, Chinese culture and social politics in Hong Kong will be explored in the remainder of this paper.

Cognac Production and Distribution

Cognac is a drink described as a "symbol of luxury, refinement and *art de vivre*" (India Today, 1997), and is known for its high costs and "incomparable richness and delicacy" (*Economist*, 1999). This image of luxury and prestige today belies its humble beginning in the 17th century when wine was distilled in an attempt to dispose of the surplus crop when Bordeaux wines gained greater popularity (Larousse, 2000: 319). Spirit distilled from fruit is brandy, cognac is a brandy twice distilled from wine, the most common grapes used are of the *ugni blanc* variety. Brandy had been around for many centuries, the name "cognac" was not applied to the brandy produced in the Charente region of France around the town of Cognac until 1783 (Larousse, 2000: 319). This brand name monopoly is fiercely protected and reinforced by the French government, and the cognac production and quality control is carefully regulated by the *Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac*. The intensity of state intervention in the cognac industry in France has a parallel in its champagne industry (Edwards, 1999: 6-10)—not surprisingly both products are high value commodities with a great global presence. 92% of all cognac is exported (*Economist*, 2000) involving billions of U.S. dollars in revenue. By 1985, 90 000 hectares were devoted to cognac production in the Charente region involving 18 000 independent growers. The cognac industry supported the livelihood of 70 000 people in the region (New Beverages Publication, 1998). Cognac, the town with a population of 30 000, is situated about 100 km north of Bordeaux and 60 km east of Angouleme in the southwestern part of France along the Bay of Biscay. The cognac industry is dominated by four big companies—Hennessy, Martell, Rémy Martin and Courvoisier—who are key players in the global marketing of the product, but they are dependent on the smaller growers for the supply of grapes, wines or newly distilled spirit to support their production for export. Only grapes grown in the delimited Charente region are used in the production of cognac (*Economist*, 2002).

TABLE 1
Market Share of Major Cognac Producers, 1995-96

Major Cognac Companies	World Wide Sales (1995-96) in bottles
Hennessy	33 000 000
Martell	25 000 000
Rémy Martin	20 000 000
Courvoisier	12 000 000
Others	38 000 000

Source: Cognac Torula News Market Data, http://swfrance.com/torula/torulamarkets.htm.

In total, over 145 million bottles of cognac were sold worldwide in 1996. While the European region remains the largest market for cognac at 46.6% of the market share in 1996 (see Table 2), the United States is the single biggest importer of cognac in the world at over 40 million bottles in 2000-01 (see Table 3). Yet it is Asia that has the undivided attention of the big cognac companies. The Asian market accounted for 59.7% of cognac exports by value in 1996 and 47.3% in 1997 (New Beverages Publication, 1998). The Asian market buys exclusively the high-end superior quality cognac (see Table 3). The region also accounts for 34% of the revenues of French luxury goods sold worldwide, three times higher than the American market (*Economist*, 1997). Asia is a very important export market for cognac and other luxury goods.

TABLE 2
Global Cognac Sales in 1996 and 1995

	Cognac bottles sold in 1996	Market share % in 1996	Market share % in 1995
Europe	68 000 000	46.6	47.1
Asia	45 000 000	31.0	31.6
Americas	31 300 000	21.5	20.3
Oceania	900 000	0.6	0.62
Africa	400 000	0.3	0.27
Total	145 700 000		

Source: Cognac Torula News Market Data, http://swfrance.com/torula/torulamarkets.htm.

TABLE 3
World Wide Cognac Sales in Bottles (2000-01)

	Cognac bottles sold in 2000-01	% superior qualities
United States	40 700 000	25
Britain	11 300 000	15
France	8 600 000	33
Germany	7 200 000	38
Japan	6 000 000	100
Singapore	5 000 000	100
Hong Kong	4 500 000	100
Finland	3 300 000	33

Source: Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac, www.cognac.fr.

The appearance of wealth in the town of Cognac and its surrounding areas hides an undercurrent of crisis that is directly tied to the cycles of boom and bust in the world sales of luxury goods in the shadows of the same cycles in world economy. Over 10 000 hectares of vines in the Charente region have been uprooted since 1985 in an effort to diversify the local economy by growing new varieties of vines (e.g., Chardonnay, Merlot) or other crops (e.g. sunflowers) (*Economist*, 1999). The downsizing strategy proved strategic given the decline in world sales throughout the 1990s so much so that by 1998, the total sales in volume of 110 million bottles of cognac was at the level of the early 1970s (*Economist*, 1999).

The substantial budget allocated to the marketing of cognac worldwide is a necessary strategy to maintain and create market share for a commodity that is geographically restricted to a small region in France for its production as a result of its specific legacy of brand monopoly. Brandies are produced worldwide, but only those created within the delimited Charente region can be called cognac. The widely deployed backward integration strategy of setting up production in locations closer to the material source and consumer markets that many multinationals have in place cannot be utilized by the cognac producers; their only alternative is to strengthen their forward integration efforts to reach the consumers through marketing efforts (see Talbot, 1997 for a discussion of these two integration strategies in the instant coffee industry). Since consumers in export markets are rarely socialized into the cultural history of cognac, their product loyalty tends to be weak. The marketing strategies employed by the cognac houses are based on the principle that images sell products, and cognac's image of luxury and prestige has been a bedrock for its marketing campaigns worldwide (New Beverages Publication, 1998).

The established market share of cognac in Asia has been declining from a peak of 22 to 24 million bottles per year in 1988-1992 to 6 million bottles in 2000 in Japan, and from a peak of 10 to 18 million bottles per year in 1987-1995 to 4.5 million bottles in 2000 in Hong Kong (Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac, 2002). To counteract this loss of sales in Asia, recent campaigns aim to attract the younger drinkers by marketing cognac as a "long drink for all occasions" mixed with ice, tonic water, sparkling mineral water, fruit juice, or other spirits as in martinis (India Today, 1997; New Beverages Publication, 1998). This new image of cognac is a departure from its established image as an after-dinner drink for rich old men. It is too early to tell if this recent effort to market cognac as a cocktail will attract the Asian young drinkers or boost the sales of cognac in the weakening Asian markets.

Cognac in Post-World War II Hong Kong

An obvious issue in the consideration of consumption is the economic factor. For a luxury product like cognac, its successful entry into a new market must be supported by the existence of a critical mass of affluent consumers with the purchasing power to support the market. Based on this rather simple economic correlation, it comes as no surprise that cognac only made a successful entry into the Hong Kong Chinese market in the 1970s (see Figure 1 for GDP growth 1961-2000). Using interview data collected in 2002 from Hong Kong, Taiwan, United States and Canada involving a total of 26 individuals (15 male, 11 female) aged 35 and older, published statistics and other secondary sources, the following sections will attempt to tease out the social complexity of cognac consumption within the broader rubric of economic development in Hong Kong.

The awareness of "foreign spirits" (*yang jiu*)[1] including brandy, whisky, gin, beer, wine and port developed in Hong Kong and other major city ports in China more than 60 years ago. One informant in his eighties recalled Shanghai during the 1930s-40s when drinking Johnny Walker Red Label whisky and Hennessy brandy was in vogue among the young and the rich. Coming from an elite family of engineers and government officials, he was part of the local elite for whom the consumption of imported liquor, music, fashion, English language education and travel were distinguishing markers that separated them from the ordinary masses. In contrast, post-1949 Hong Kong was in poor economic shape (see Table 1) under the multiple burdens of a sharp population increase from half a million to over two million within a short span of a few years, damages in the local economy sustained during the Japanese occupation of 1941-45, and the threat to its entrêpot trade during the American embargo against China (1953-55). Two couples who married in the early 1950s in Hong Kong did not recall any alcohol being served at their wedding. They were part of a growing population of refugees in Hong Kong who left China after the Communist government took over in 1949. Extreme poverty was so common in Hong Kong throughout the 1950s that it was placed within the same league as Burma and Sri Lanka in a report by the United Nations which expressed a rather pessimistic view of its economic future. Even the colony's governor, A. Grantham, described Hong Kong as a "dying city" in 1955 (Zhang, 2001: 133). With the exception of a small community of economic elites (both Chinese and international) and expatriates (mostly British) who could afford imported liquor and other items of luxury, the masses in Hong Kong were barely coping with basic subsistence during the 1950s. Real and significant GDP growth only took place beginning in the late 1960s (see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Hong Kong Gross Domestic Product Per Capita, 1961-01. Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department.

A Hong Kong resident in his early seventies recalled serving Three Star brandy at his own wedding banquet in 1964. His working-class background as a truck driver for a trading company in those days normally would not be associated with a luxury product like Three Star brandy which retailed for many times more than the liquor imported from China. The company he worked for carried this particular brandy and he was given a good discount. He paid HK$16[2] for a bottle instead of the retail price of HK$22. In his own words, serving Three Star brandy in 1964 among people of his class background (which accounted for the majority of the Hong Kong population at the time) was a "big deal," it was a highly prestigious and face-gaining event for him and his family. In 1964, the monthly tuition for public primary school was HK$5. A bottle of Three-Star brandy at retail cost covered one semester's tuition for a lucky child. Brandy and cognac were luxury goods out of reach for most people in Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s.

The first mention of cognac being served at a wedding banquet came from a university-educated professional in Hong Kong who married in 1974. Both bride and groom were university graduates with well-paying jobs; they held their wedding banquet at one of the biggest restaurant chains (Maxim's) at considerable costs. Cognac was included in the wedding banquet menu. Being non-drinkers, they could no longer recall which cognac was served at their own wedding banquet 30 years ago. It was also in the 1970s that cognac became a popular drink among business owners and investors in Hong Kong. Business dinners were/are almost exclusively male affairs

marked by abundances of food, alcohol and women (prostitutes or hostesses). Some private clubs and restaurants have special display cases for regular clients to leave their personal bottle(s) of cognac in between visits. These bottles are carefully labeled with their owner's names, and their placement is calculated to maximize their visibility to convey the symbolism of status and "face" associated with cognac as an item of conspicuous consumption. Cognac consumption became part of the "culture of affluence" that arose in Hong Kong around the mid-1970s (Leung, 1996: 70). A retired shoe manufacturer now in his seventies first learned to drink cognac from his business associates in the 1970s. The factory owners that he associated with were mostly men of humble background like himself who worked their way from the bottom up, and many became rich from the 1960s when Hong Kong became a workshop of the world producing labour intensive commodities for world consumption (Chiu et al., 1997). The business climate in Hong Kong remained rosy throughout the 1980s and 1990s when nearly all the productions were moved into the Pearl River Delta (China) which is now the new workshop of the world (*Economist*, 2002; Smart and Smart, 1991). Up to 1986 when he took semiretirement, this now retired shoe manufacturer consumed up to a bottle of Martell Cordon Bleu (his favourite brand of cognac) a day over business meetings and meals. He eased off his cognac consumption throughout the 1990s for a combination of reasons: a desire to stay healthy as he gets older by restricting alcohol consumption and a greater care about expenditure when he finally retired in 1992.

The impact of cognac on household consumption is similarly tied to the wider economic conditions in Hong Kong (see Table 2 and Table 3) and affected by issues of gender, life cycles and class as indicated by the following ethnographic account of the drinking history of an ex-civil servant who passed away at age 79 in 2000. Even though he had been a regular drinker since early adulthood, this mid-rank ex-civil servant did not begin drinking cognac until after his retirement in 1974. Before retirement, he consumed mostly the cheaper locally produced rice wine or other liquor imported from China. He was familiar with cognac and brandy which were served at various special banquets over the years. He liked them but could not afford them other than as an occasional treat once in a long while. By the time he retired in 1974 at age 55, his six children were all grown and gainfully employed. He supplemented his government pension with a job as a security guard. His improving economic situation enabled him to indulge in cognac drinking on a regular basis throughout the 1980s until he came down with cancer in 1996. His children brought him gifts of cognac on special occasions. He considered cognac, especially the XO cognac, superior to the Chinese spirits. He distinguished brandy from cognac by their degrees of "smoothness." Despite his sustained economic ability to afford cognac, this informant returned to the traditional Chinese spirits in his later life when he was saddled with arthritis and cancer. Many traditional Chinese wines and spirits are known for their medicinal properties, and he turned to these for health purposes.

Of the 11 women interviewed for this paper, none is a self described regular drinker; nearly 20% (2 of 11) are non-drinkers, the rest are "social drinkers" who may have a glass of wine, a beer, or a shot of cognac at special occasions. Interestingly, two women (they are sisters) in this group profess to have a particular fondness for cognac, a fondness arising from early exposure to alcoholic beverages at the family-run liquor retail shop. Another female cognac drinker learned to like cognac through her husband who was the ex-civil servant mentioned above. Among the 15 men interviewed for this paper, three (20%) are non-drinkers for allergy or preference reasons; the rest are occasional drinkers. Only two men in this group were regular consumers of cognac at one point in their life. Two observations can be made from this limited interview data: first, even though Hong Kong has one of the highest rates of consumption of cognac in the world, most people only occasionally sample it at special occasions. Second, drinking was/is not a serious activity in Hong Kong based on the interview responses, an impression confirmed by a recent survey which reported that less than 4% of the Hong Kong population drinks regularly (New Beverages Publication, 1998).

Lastly, the recent trend of declining cognac sales in Asia requires a closer examination. The general correlation between global-local economic downturns and decline in sales of luxury goods is well established (*Economist*, 1997; Stein, 1997; Van Westering, 1994: 6). It should be noted that each nation state or region has its own cycles of boom and bust rooted in its specific articulations with the global economy, its historical legacies of political structure, state ideology, economy and culture. For Japan, the sharp decline in cognac consumption began in 1989, just before the burst of the Japanese economic bubble became full blown in the 1990s. Despite the decline, Japan remains a major importer of cognac at over five million bottles a year. The decline in cognac import in Hong Kong began in 1992 despite the fact that its GDP keep climbing steadily until 1997 (see Table 4 and Table 5). The loss of manufacturing jobs in Hong Kong throughout the 1980s and 1990s as productions moved inland to the Pearl River

Delta (China) and the drastic drop in property value since 1997 are two main likely factors that contributed to the decline in cognac sales and non-essential consumption in general (Kwong and Miscevic, 2002: 24; see *South China Morning Post*, various issues as listed in the References). Singapore is an exception in that its import of cognac keeps rising steadily to catch up with Japan and Hong Kong. China is another market that shows a steady increase in cognac imports and it is considered to be the next major market for cognac and other luxury goods (*Economist*, 1997; India Today, 1997).

The rising popularity of wine in Asia may have taken away some of the market shares of cognac (*Economist*, 1998). This rising preference for red wine is quite noticeable in Hong Kong. Many hotels and major restaurants that host wedding banquets are including red wine on their menu (see Table 4 for more details). Cognac used to be the signature liquor associated with wedding banquets in Hong Kong since the 1970s.



Figure 2: Sales of Cognac by Country in Millions of Bottles, 1981-01. Source: Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac. www.cognac.fr.

Cognac Consumption with Hong Kong Characteristics

The spectacular success of cognac in Hong Kong begs two questions which have not been addressed so far: first, given the fierce competition for market share among a large variety of expensive premium alcoholic beverages, what gives cognac the edge to dominate the Hong Kong market? Second, given that less than 4% of the Hong Kong population drinks regularly, what happened to the millions of bottles of cognac imported every year?

According to Singer (1979: 320, Table 3), the average consumption of alcohol in Hong Kong in 1960-69 was the equivalent of 70 bottles of wine (10% alcohol) or 4.55 litres of absolute alcohol per person per year. Recent figures indicate that Hong Kong Chinese remain light drinkers in 1998 at an average of 22 litres per person. Germany tops the list with an average of 100 litres of alcoholic drinks per person per year, the United States among the top at 73 litres per person, Canada at 60 litres per person, and Japan is the heaviest drinking Asian country at 57 litres per person (*Economist*, 1999). Unfortunately these recent figures did not specify the alcoholic content of the volume consumed. Given that only 4% of the population in Hong Kong is reported to drink regularly (New Beverages Publication, 1998), those who drink are drinking more than a glass of wine a day or 22 litres per year. And if this small portion of regular drinkers were responsible for the consumption of all alcoholic beverages sold in Hong Kong each year that include cognac, beer, wine, whisky, gin and many varieties of Chinese alcoholic products, one would expect alcoholism to be a problem. Yet problems associated with alcohol abuse are rare in Chinese societies in China or overseas, and Hong Kong has not experienced any problem with alcoholism before or now (Lin and Lin, 1982; Singer, 1979).

As I have explained in another paper (Smart, forthcoming), the Chinese drinking culture discourages solitary drinking for personal gratification. The normative code regarding drinking implies a social function of cementing social solidarity and/or completing an important event. Drinks can be shared among guests of all ages and both sexes, or offered to the gods or ancestors or ghosts; no important ritual or event (such as weddings, birthdays, New Year and other significant calendar dates) is complete without this act of real or symbolic drinking (Man, 1998: 111; Zhang, 1982: 13-14; Zhang, 2000: 59). This established social function of sharing drinks at significant events provides the cultural framework for occasional drinking as an approved practice among people who otherwise do not drink. It also explains some of the idiosyncratic formats of alcohol consumption in Hong Kong which mostly are rooted in an attempt by non-drinkers to cope with the unfamiliar flavour or strong alcoholic content of the drinks offered. Adding Coca Cola or Sprite (or 7-Up) to whisky, cognac and wine are common, so is the adding of ice. The Chinese tradition of serving drinks only during a meal also contributes to another highly localized format of alcohol consumption. Regardless of the cultural history of an imported alcoholic beverage as an aperitif or after-dinner drink in its country of origin, its use in Hong Kong is localized to become a dinner drink. Cognac, whisky, beer,

wine, soft drinks and Chinese tea are served throughout a dinner in high ball glasses in generous portions both in commercial and private settings. Due to its prestige associated with high costs and acknowledged high quality (Ma, 2001: 124), cognac is a favourite drink at banquets even for people who normally do not drink cognac at home.

Formal banquets held in restaurants and hotels are major occasions of alcohol consumption in Hong Kong, and the strong association of cognac with banquets since the 1970s contributes in a significant way to the high volume of cognac sales in Hong Kong (for more detail see Smart, forthcoming). The serving of cognac at banquets has became a signature of Hong Kong, it is a practice not found in China, Taiwan or Japan. Mention cognac at a wedding banquet, and everybody knows it must be a Hong Kong Chinese wedding banquet. A recent survey of selected banquet menus from Hong Kong indicates that cognac is still strongly associated with wedding banquets. Over 60% of surveyed wedding menus include cognac in addition to other drinks (beer and soft drinks) within the set menu price of HK$3 000 to 5 000 for a table of 10.

TABLE 4
A Comparison of Beverages Included in the Published Set Menus for Three Types of Banquet in Hong Kong, 2002

Number of restaurants that offer listed beverages[a]/description of beverages	Wedding	Birthday	Chinese New Year
cognac	5	2	2
red wine	3	2	1
beer	8	8	5
soda pop	8	8	5
non-alcoholic punch	1	none	none
champagne	2	none	none
total number of menus surveyed	8	8	6

[a] Several beverages are usually included in each set menu.

Household consumption and business dinners are two other major sources of cognac consumption. Lastly, it is estimated that nearly one third of all cognac is bought as gifts. The importance of cognac in the gift economy in Hong Kong[3] is readily observable in the supermarket advertisements during major Chinese calendrical events like the Chinese New Year or the Mid-Autumn Festival when gift exchanges are common. Many of these gifts of cognac are circulated within the family such as a gift to the parents or grandparents, or to uncles and aunts. Some are circulated between friends, and many are given to preferred clients or one's superior in the workplace. Reproduced below is a summary of the brands and prices of cognac in newspaper advertisements by three major supermarket chains in Hong Kong in February 2002 for the Chinese New Year period. The total number of brands of cognac carried by each supermarket is far greater than what appeared in these advertisements.

TABLE 5
Price Range (regular/discounted price in HK$) and Brands of Cognac and Brandy in Hong Kong Chinese Newspaper Advertisements, February 1-13, 2002

Brand/Store	Wellcome (HK$ range)	ParkNShop (HK$ range)	CRC Shop (HK$ range)
Bisquit VSOP	305/223	305/218	
Courbret VSOP	268/213	268/218	
Courbret XO8	435/358	435/338	
Courvoisier VSOP	332/248	332/258	
Courvoisier XO	1 438/1 068		
Denis M FOV	418/358	418/373	416/358
Hine VSOP	328/248	338/253	
Hine Fine Champagne		389/318	
Hennessy XO	1 375/1 035	1 150/1 035	1 349/1 035
Hennessy VSOP	345/258	345/258	345/258
Hobson Napoleon brandy		65/55	
Jules Gautret VSOP	238/168		
Jules Gautret XO	699/438		
Major XO brandy			160/148
Martell Cordon Bleu	1 102/958	1 102/958	
Martell VSOP	328/263	328/258	325/258
Otard VSOP	325/248	325/253	
Rémy Martin Club	498/358	498/373	498/368
Rémy Martin VSOP	344/248	344/258	325/248
Rémy Martin XO	1 265/995	1 265/995	

Source: *Apples Daily* and *Oriental Daily*

The successful integration of cognac into the social fabric of Hong Kong—gift exchange, wedding banquets, business dinners, household consumption—is a key to its stake of a certain market share in Hong Kong. Given the fierce competition for market share among a large variety of expensive premium alcoholic beverages, what gives cognac the edge to dominate the Hong Kong market? Part of the reason may be found in its timely penetration in the Hong Kong market during the 1960s-70s when the growing population of nouvelle riche was seeking symbols to distinguish itself from the masses. Cognac, marketed in its image of luxury and finesse, provides an ideal object to include in lavish dinners in business and private settings which were a well-established form of conspicuous consumption (Mathews and Lui, 2001: 3-4). The fact that cognac is a French product may have contributed to its favourable reception in Hong Kong in two ways. First, it did not arouse any of the ambivalence about British colonial presence in Hong Kong that products from Great Britain might have had. Secondly, the French origin of

cognac projects an image of modernity and sophistication that enhances its reception. Its status as a luxury good with a high price tag matches perfectly the emerging Hong Kong ideology that money is everything. Unlike the French mode of distinction based on cultural knowledge and sophistication described by Bourdieu (1984), social-class distinction in Hong Kong is measured by material wealth (Mathews and Lui, 2001: 8). The economic growth and optimism generated since the late 1960s created a great deal of wealth that modernized Hong Kong everyday life with Western technologies and products ranging from colour TV to kitchen gadgets (Rooney, 2001). The Hong Kong Chinese have always looked to the West for symbols of modernity (Cheng, 2001; Mathews, 2001), like the Caribbean people took to refined sugar as a symbol of "the modern and industrial" during the 19th century (Mintz, 1985: 193). Cognac was embraced as a symbol of distinction within a growing and evolving repertoire of material and cultural consumption in affluent Hong Kong society. Subsequently, cognac consumption becomes a part of an Hong Kong lifestyle that provides a model of Chinese modernity for Chinese in other societies (Friedman, 1994).

The incorporation of cognac into restaurant and hotel banquet menus since the 1970s further consolidated the market position of cognac in Hong Kong and expanded its consumer base beyond the business and nouvelle riche groups. The proliferation of supermarkets throughout the 1980s provided the efficient distribution networks to bring cognac to the urban populations for private consumption and gift exchanges. The success of cognac is interwoven within a complex web of economic development, cultural traditions, symbolism of modernity, conspicuous consumption, social/economic distinctions and gift exchanges. It is interesting to note that the success story of cognac in Hong Kong is achieved in the absence of a rise in drinking habits among the local population. Given this context, it is doubtful that the new marketing campaigns by the major cognac houses to appeal to the young people to consume cognac as "tall drinks for all occasions" will find much success in Hong Kong (India Today, 1997). This new marketing campaign assumes that young Chinese consumers have similar drinking habits to their Western counterparts, that drinking is a social activity for fun, a form of personal gratification, and something that is done on a daily basis. This assumption runs against the grain of the established Chinese normative code regarding the functions and formats of drinking. Cultural tradition aside, there is no indication that the young generations in Hong Kong or other Chinese societies are taking to drinking like their North American or European counterparts. This is a Chinese paradox that the alcohol producers must deal with.

Conclusion

Cognac consumption in Hong Kong is a case study of a French product with Chinese characteristics. It is a case study that illustrates the successful introduction and subsequent integration of a foreign product in a Chinese market. The success of cognac in Hong Kong is even more remarkable given that it happened in a society without a strong drinking habit. This success may be seen as a celebration of globalization, but readers should be reminded that the experience of cognac marketing in Hong Kong highlights the power of local culture in making or breaking the entry of a global product or service. Cognac consumption in Hong Kong is coloured by localized drinking formats and the culturally defined contexts for drinking. The success of a new product or service in any given market requires strategic and timely marketing in response to local economic conditions and local cultural ideas and practices. In the case of cognac, the strategic coupling of cognac with wedding banquets beginning in the 1970s was the key to its success. Without the strong and well-established association with wedding banquets, the loss of market share of cognac in Hong Kong in the post-1997 period could have been much worse. The cognac producers are well advised to strengthen this established cultural linkage between cognac and banquets in their future campaign to hold or gain their market shares in Hong Kong and other Chinese societies.

Josephine Smart, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, T2N 1N4. E-mail: smart@ucalgary.ca

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Notes

1 This term in Putonghua (Mandarin) is made up of two Chinese characters—*yang* means "ocean" or "foreign," *jiu* is is an alcoholic brew made from grains or fruits with an alcoholic content of 10-40 % by volume. Beer in Chinese is *bi jiu*, medicinal wine (up to 40% alcohol by volume) is *yao jiu*, rice wine (10-25% by alcohol) is *mi jiu*.

2 The exchange rate in 1964 was HK$5.7143 to US$1 (Pacific Exchange Rate Service, 2003). As of October 1983, the Hong Kong dollar was pegged with the U.S. dollar at a fixed rate of $7.8 to US$1.

3 See Bosco (2001) for an interesting discussion of the gift-giving culture in Hong Kong. He suggests that gift-giving " is culturally shaped...is also shaped by social pressure...most

people...gave gifts...to increase the love and esteem in which they are held by the recipient of the gift" (2001: 278-279).

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Anthropology of the Global, Globalizing Anthropology: A Commentary

Jonathan Friedman *Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris and Lund University, Sweden*

The articles in this volume successfully tackle the challenge of doing ethnographic analysis of global/local processes, a sorely needed remedy to the general lack of such empirical grounding in much of the literature on globalization. While I myself have often been associated with such overgeneralized statements about the world system, I must confess here that my own introduction into the global was via ethnographic encounter, primarily that of my partner Kajsa Ekholm Friedman who wrote the first articles on this issue in the early seventies (1975, 1976). These were hard times for global thinking and I was quite negative to it myself at the start. However, long battles convinced me of the necessity of this approach. Ekholm Friedman's confrontation with the global resulted from her fieldwork in northern Madagascar, on the island of Nossi Bé where she discovered that it was impossible to account for the nature of the local societies without an understanding of the way in which they were constituted in (if not by) their position within the Indian Ocean trade with all its shifting power relations over the past 500 years. This led to what we felt was a need to delve into the understanding of the mechanisms of what was then designated as the global system. As virtually no anthropologists were interested in the global in this period and were even quite hostile to the approach, we began working with ancient historians, archaeologists and geographers. This co-operation led to a series of publications that were obviously external to the community of social and cultural anthropologists who were quite anchored in the local until well into the eighties when "globalization" became a popular topic in a whole range of discourses that filtered into anthropology. This required a great deal of theoretical and quite abstract reasoning from our point of view, but after several years of this we did in fact return to a series of ethnographic based studies, in Central Africa, in Hawaii and more recently in Sweden.

We are not of the opinion that there is any contradiction in maintaining a theoretical position as well as insist-

ing on ethnographic detail. But I think it can be argued that following the decline of materialism in the social sciences in the early eighties, there emerged a clear rejection of any sort of theory in anthropology. Geertz (1973) championed this kind of strategy in arguing against the theoreticism of Lévi-Strauss and insisting that anthropology was primarily about the amassing of exotica, an argument that reduced theory to a kind of western folk model. This was not an idea without its merits of course and was worthy of discussion, but there was no discussion. Instead this kind of totalizing relativism in which all propositions about the world could be reduced to culture became institutionalized in the early work of Rorty (1979) and postmodernism. The entire relativist project was reinterpreted as cultural radicalism by Marcus/Fischer (1986) and others who saw the *revelation* of cultural difference as an exposure in and of itself to alternative ways of going about the world, a kind of museum of revolutionary futures, in which Marx was replaced by Mead, followed by Geertz, implicitly designated as a kind of Lenin of relativism. One product of this was a plethora of atheoretical monographs in which it was not always clear what issue was to be tackled. Globalization, which was imported into anthropology from already existing discourses in cultural sociology, business economics, economic geography and cultural studies (especially in its postcolonial variant) emerged in this period in which culturalism was dominant as an understanding of the world. Thus globalization was dealt with as a cultural process or at least culture was identified as the substance that was to be globalized. The logic of this argument is as follows: culture is textualized in Geertz and most post-Geertzians including the postmodernists although this is messed up by the proliferation of voices. The textualization is equivalent to a substantialization of culture as a thing in itself that can be read, stored, interpreted without the necessity of always placing it within an interactive context of social life. Globalization then operates on this substance via the action of diffusion, which is why certain globalists, such as Appadurai (1990) and Hannerz (1996) are so positive to the notion of diffusion.

I have argued in this context that there is a crucial difference between the globalization approach and that developed within global systemic anthropology and even world systems models. Globalization in other fields was based on empirical analysis, not least in business economics and economic geography where it was measured and located physically (Dicken, 2001; Harvey, 1990). This is also the case for Castells's (2000) work which relates globalization to the rise of network-based society. For most of these authors, globalization is accounted for in terms of new technologies, especially computer and internet-based technologies. All of these more empirical works detail the intensification of global interconnectedness over the past two decades and especially the increase in global flows of financial capital that has been facilitated by new technologies. This is no doubt the case at least at a descriptive level, but the account of globalization in these works is based on a relatively short historical perspective that post-dates World War II. This misses the fact stressed by a number of researchers, quite early by Bairoch and Kozul Wright (1996) and later by Hirst and Thompson (1996), that the same kind of globalization occurred in the period between 1880 and 1920. More important still is the fact that after 1920 there is a clearly documented de-globalization of the world that continued until the 1950s when American capital export again triggered a similar process that took off on a major scale in the 1960s and 70s. This kind of data falsifies the simple technological argument. While new technology has clearly speeded up the process there is no evidence that it is an evolutionary phenomenon. On the contrary, at least in the past centuries globalization has been a periodic phenomenon. Technological change has had the effect of time-space compression but this has not as yet transformed the nature of the world system.

Globalization versus Global Systems

Cultural globalization as a discourse has none of the benefits of empirical analysis of the kind referred to above. It is based on the general image of globalization that exists in the media and which is greatly reinforced by the immediate experience of privileged travel among academic elites and the vantage points of elite global institutions such as CNN, Bilderberg, UNESCO and the World Bank. For Robertson (1992) it begins at the turn of the century, with the increasing conscience of the world as whole that saturates the League of Nations and continues up to today's New Age religion. Although he has modified this position he still takes a position that is evolutionary. For Appadurai and Hannerz, it is all even more recent and for Comaroff and Comaroff (1999) it is the sign of things to come. The metaphors that saturate the latter are the end of the nation state, a diasporic world in which hybridity becomes dominant in a post national or transnational world order. Without in anyway denying the existence of contemporary globalization, this discourse leaves much to be desired with respect to the analysis of both dynamics and class. But it is also entirely unreflexive in its participation in this increasingly hegemonic ideology.

Global systemic analysis has a very different source as indicated above. Braudel (1984) wrote of globalization

as a phenomenon that happens at the end of hegemony wherein an old centre finances the development of a new centre as the result of large scale capital export. This is a strictly economic definition of course, but in the Braudel scheme of things the capitalist world can be understood as a complex of social, cultural and political relations that are very much dominated by macro-economic forces even as the former partly constitute the latter. In this approach, transnational connections are ubiquitous if variable in intensity, and they are themselves the product of the changing structure of transnational relations in which they are embedded. War and trade are not entirely different phenomena but aspects of the same set of processes. For globalization adherents, the lack of existence of global connections is seen as the opposite of globality, whereas, for the global systemic approach, isolation and separation are most often systemic products. Further, it is not simply the relations between units in the larger arena that are the subject of analysis but the way in which both the relations and the units themselves are constituted. This is indicated in the studies by Wilmsen (1989) and Gordon (1992) on the way in which the San became a hunting gathering small scale representative of an evolutionary past rather than a more recent reconfiguration of social existence within a larger transforming world system. This kind of analysis is not about crossing borders but about the ways borders are formed and transformed and the way in which they disappear. My critique of globalization approaches is based on this lack of systemic as well as historic depth in their analyses and the way they fall into or perhaps champion a boundary bashing cosmopolitanism without seeking to understand where such a position might come from. The results of this approach are that globalization is historically a periodic and even cyclical phenomenon the evidence for which can be found in the history of all commercial civilizational systems.

Boundaries are the practiced and represented (thus also practiced) mechanisms of differentiation within such systems, both in class and in regional terms. The transfer of things, people and information across boundaries is as old as society and more so it is not simply a fact of transfer that is important but the way in which such relations are constitutive of social worlds, not because of the cultural information that is born in such movement and which can be mixed in any one place, but the way in which social structural arrangements are organized around such movements, from the elementary structures of kinship which are based on the necessity of external exchange to the massive slave and capitalist regimes of labour and capital movement that characterize capitalist civilizations.

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These articles focus on concrete aspects of global/local relations while making it clear that the global is a property of interlocality rather than an autonomous level of reality, a place of its own. Thus it might be a good idea to find another vocabulary to express such relations, one that acknowledges that all intentional action is localized even as the effects of such action and the description of relations in larger interlocal space can be said to be global. This avoids the misplaced concretizing of the global as if it were an actor associated with a place, the globe. Milgram and Smart examine the way in which global commodities are inserted into particular projects. Barber stresses the often ignored class aspect of Filipino labour migration. Aiyer, Meneley, and Ulin investigate the relation between world products, such as gold, wine and olive oil, and the instabilities of the world market. They discuss the dependent relation between the latter and the functioning and social transformation of local areas of production. Swedenburg finally takes up the way in which global shifts in identity politics affect the markets for regionally identified music. This is much more than globalization. It is about broader sets of relations, the conditions of action and of social reproduction in the world system as they are revealed in the concrete relations that can be discovered on the ground.

Thus the use of cognac among Hong Kong Chinese is informed by local strategies that have assimilated foreign goods as well as global colonial hierarchies of values into their lives. In this respect Milgram's insistence that social lives have things and not the reverse as suggested by Appadurai is important to keep in mind. There are real actors possessed of real intentionalities that cannot be reduced to figments of the globalization of goods. It is those intentionalities that account for much of the particular in globalization. Most of the articles here are critical of the celebratory tendency of much of the globalization literature in anthropology and they clearly document the basis for their arguments. The properties of the local are also an important aspect of these analyses and here I think it is important to stress that the global as such refers only to properties of relations in space that are by definition always "local"...even in the space of an airplane, as any terrorist knows. Wine, is clearly a geopolitical product, global for hundreds or even thousands of years. Bordeaux, of course, obtained its position in the world market as part of the British occupation and investment in the region. The fact that migration is a highly differentiated phenomenon, and that it is not equivalent to the mere circulation of culture and the formation of

hybridity, is another important critical counterpoint to recent celebratory literature on this theme. The fact that Filipino migrants must be understood in terms of class, both at home and abroad, that the state has become a major exporter of remittance-producing cheap labour resonates with other similar examples in the literature (Glick Schiller Basch and Szanton Blanc, 1992). The circulation of people, things and information cannot be understood in terms either of diffusion-globalization or hybridization. Instead, what these articles offer is an ethnographic corrective to such shorthand representations of what is going on the world, and the shorthand is by and large a misrepresentation of reality. When commodities enter the life worlds of people who did not fashion them themselves, they are assimilated to the social projects of those life worlds and this occurs at the same time as those life worlds as wholes are integrated into the global system, an integration that can transform the way lives are constituted and thus the way in which commodities are eventually appropriated. This is a more complex picture than the juxtaposition or flat mixture implied by hybridity or creolization (in the cultural if not in the linguistic sense). The word articulation is certainly a better choice to cover such processes since it allows us to specify exactly what is going on. It also allows us to relate the process of circulation to its changing conditions of existence.

Articulation versus Hybridity

A clear example of the systematic complexity of this kind of articulation is illustrated in recent work on the emergence of child witchcraft accusations in Central Africa. Ekholm Friedman in a recent study in Angola (2003) has argued that the roots of the current and unprecedented accusation of young children lie in warfare and total impoverishment. These dire conditions have triggered the collapse of the basic family relations of socialization and aroused the concomitant fear of children who are still *in Nature*, thus powerful and dangerous (as well as potential armed child soldiers). This is a particular historical situation, of course, but the logic of witchcraft remains unchanged. Now for some anthropologists, modern witchcraft is necessarily a question of an alternative modernity. It must be modern because to assert anything else is tantamount to racism (Meyer and Geschiere, 1999). From my point of view the usage of modernity here is nothing more than the assertion of contemporaneity with the added interpretative assumption that the latter implies modern. This leads to a definite stance with regard to history and the notion of cultural continuity. Meyer and Geschiere admonish me at one point for falling back upon such a colonial notion of continuity. I cite this in its totality because it is such an interesting example of the way globalists have defined the issue.

> He emphasizes that globalisation goes together with "cultural continuity." This makes him distrust notions like "invention of tradition" or "hybridization;" instead, one of the aims of his collection of articles seems to be to understand the relation between the "global reordering of social realities" and "cultural continuity." This makes him fall back, in practice, on the highly problematic concept of "tradition," which—especially in his contributions on Africa—seems to figure as some sort of baseline, just as in the olden days of anthropology....Similarly he relates the emergence of *les sapeurs*, Brazzaville's colourful dandies, so beautifully described by Justin-Daniel Gandoulou (who again is hardly mentioned), to "certain fundamental relations" in Congo history which "were never dissolved;" as an example of such "fundamental relations" Friedman mentions: "Life strategies consist in ensuring the flow of life-force. Traditionally this was assured by the social system itself." This is the kind of convenient anthropological shorthand which one had hoped to be rid of, certainly in discussions on globalization....Friedman's reversion to such a simplistic use of the notion of tradition as some sort of base line—quite surprising in view of the sophisticated things he has to say about globalization—illustrates how treacherous the triangle of globalization, culture and identity is. Relating postcolonial identities to such a notion of "tradition" makes anthropology indeed a tricky enterprise. (Meyer and Geschiere, 1999: 8)

Aside from the insinuations with respect to Gandoulou (1984)—I cite his work throughout the article without necessarily agreeing with his interpretation (this was an MA thesis)—the remarks of these authors imply that I have made a serious moral-political error in arguing for historical continuity. My argument in this chapter consists in trying to demonstrate the historical continuity of a strategy of accumulation of life force as it articulates with changing conditions, determined largely by the transformations related to Congo's integration into the European sector of the global system. This is not a question of globalization, not about flows of the kind referred to in Meyer and Geschiere's edited volume (1999). It is about the transformation of conditions of existence. The continuity is not a simple example of tradition, but a question of the differential transformation of life strategies. In a situation where the kinship structure is not dissolved but only transformed, however drastically, conditions for the maintenance of a certain kind of socialization, of a certain kind of selfhood, may remain relatively stable. This I argue may account for the way in which a certain way of relating to

objects of consumption (in our terms) is continuous with the past. Meyer and Geschiere miss this entirely because they operate with a flat notion of culture as a collection of things, where the structure of experience is no issue, and where life is not apparently structured in any but globalizing terms which themselves are reduced to flows of goods, ideas, capital, information and people. In this sense doing potlatch with sewing machines is for them something entirely different than doing it with coppers. Thus if new *things* are introduced or if *new people* are implied in a relation, we are in a new ball game called modernity. My argument here is that this is not the case unless the properties of the relations themselves change. This occurs when the material integration of a particular population leads to the replacement via destruction of one form of socialization by another. In this issue the articles by Milgram and especially Smart demonstrate the way in which worlds are constructed locally and the way in which global circulation of commodities is not equivalent to the circulation of meaning as such. The practice of life, the constitution of social worlds is not the same kind of phenomenon as circulation but exists always in counterpoint to the latter.

Comaroff and Comaroff (1999) are somewhat more sophisticated than Meyer and Geschiere in their argument which they conduct without naming anyone in particular, although one suspects a colleague of theirs at Chicago:

> This move is typically rationalized by affirming, sometimes in an unreconstructed spirit of romantic neoprimitivism, the capacity of "native" cultures to remain assertively intact, determinedly different, in the face of a triumphal, homogenizing world capitalism. Apart from being empirically questionable, this depends upon an anachronistic ahistorical idea of culture. Of culture transfixed in opposition to capitalism—as if capitalism were not itself cultural to the core, everywhere indigenized as if culture has not been long commodified under the impact of the market. In any case, to reduce the history of the here and now to a contest between the parochial and the universal, between sameness and distinction, is to reinscribe the very dualism on which the colonizing discourse of early modernist social science was erected. It is also to represent the hybrid, dialectical historically evanescent character of all contemporary social designs. (1999: 294)

Here capitalism is incorporated into the cultural as if its particular properties were so different in different social and/or historical situations that one could even equate it with the notion of culture. But there is no evidence for this. The hybridity of capitalism is a superficial misnomer that could have been used to criticize the early work of Wallerstein (1974) or Frank (1969) when they assumed that slavery and feudal exploitation could well be parts of the world capitalist system, on the grounds that capitalism must be based on wage labour alone. The fact is that the process of capital accumulation possesses a logical form that is not variable except in terms of the way in which it can be elaborated upon. To reduce capitalism to a notion of culture as in "models of/models for" is to truly mystify the issue. The same can be said of African witchcraft or magic or other structures. These phenomena cannot be reduced to recipes. They are embedded in complexes of practices and conditions of action. The fact that things exist in the contemporary world cannot be used to deny that they display a historical continuity. The same is true for capitalism of course, which is why the very term "millennial capitalism" is totally misleading. For Comaroff and Comaroff this term is simply a reference to globalization as if the term implies that we are truly in a new era. Yet the logics of capital are identical. Harvey (2000) whose name is listed in the issue of the journal in which the term is introduced, has a clearer understanding of what is continuous and non-continuous in globalized capitalism. In fact he makes it quite clear that the current "New Imperialism" is the product of a logical sequence, historically determined and not the discontinuous phenomenon implied by Comaroff and Comaroff. Marshall Sahlins to whom their critique seems to have been addressed has argued this point quite powerfully in a recent article (Sahlins 1999). On the contrary advocates of the globalization approach, which began as a celebration of globality and then was confronted by the dark side of the phenomenon, have retrenched to some extent while maintaining a basically discontinuist position in which we really *are* in a new world, whether brave or not. It is equivalent to saying that witchcraft is actually a new phenomenon in Central Africa, a form of capitalism, rather than an articulation of very different logics of accumulation.

Of course there is newness in the world, but it should not be conflated with epochal change especially when it is on the basis of one's own globetrotting experience rather on finer ethnographic analysis. The point of ethnography has always been to gain an understanding of *other people's* worlds. But many of the globalization inspired analyses simply label populations in an attempt to fit them into the popular categories, locals and globals, hybrid versus essentialist. Let me illustrate briefly:

Liisa Malkki (1992) in her book and in a well known article proceeds as follows: after dividing up the "Hutu" refugees from the former war in Burundi who inhabit Tanzania into "nationals" who remain in the camp and

"cosmopolitans" who manage to get to the local township of Kigoma and identify as other than Hutu (but why one might ask?), she takes a further ideological step. She criticizes what she understands as the moral support for indigenous peoples and asks why they should be more important or valued than migrants (Malkki, 29). But there is more! The very notion of refugees and people who have *lost* their homelands, who are thus deterritorialized, is attacked as part of Western ideology. Malkki suggests that this is the product of the national mapping of the world in which cultures are territorialized, even rooted in the earth in specific localities. This creates a certain notion of purity or perhaps homogeneity that, besides being itself the source of most evil and violence in the world, also generates categories of non-belonging that can be applied to refugees, thus stereotyping their situations. She suggests, invoking the enormously popular Deleuze and Guattari (1987), that perhaps (although she guards herself against seeing displacement as a positive phenomenon) being deterritorialized ought to be understood as progressive in some way, as the expression of the rhizomatic. Thus her "cosmopolitans" are imbued with the capacity to challenge the order of the nation state (as if Burundi and Tanzania are obvious examples of the latter). The stress on relations to "places of birth" and "degrees of nativeness" (Malkki, 1992: 38) blinds us to a greater cosmopolitan phenomenon, "the multiplicity of attachments that people form to places through living in remembering and imagining them" (ibid.).

There is no attempt here to document this division of the world into cosmopolitans and locals, good guys and bad. Rather her subjects are simply *used* to elaborate her own set of classifications. Ethnography is thus reordered in order to exemplify pre-existing abstract categories. Even if such were the case, i.e., that people actually identified as they are labelled, the usage of such terminology requires a more thorough analysis. Ekholm Friedman's fieldwork in Congo revealed one case, at least, of a man who claimed to be a "citizen of the world," a man who had never been outside of the Congo. His use of the word indicated something other than cosmopolitanism. It indicated an urgent wish to get out of his collapsing world and to come to Europe. The term "citizen" may have been a premonition of assumed rights in a world full of such discourses, but this is all a far cry from cosmopolitan identity. The articles in this volume are inherently critical of this approach insofar as they attempt to grasp the emics of those involved in global relations rather than imposing categories on them. Barber's article on migration demonstrates the way in which migrating subjects are truly active subjects who engage in constructing worlds that cannot be reduced to notions on the position of an observer who has access to an external understanding of such processes.

In a sparser and more polemical tone, John Kelly (1995) has written of Fiji in similar terms, local nationalist Fijians versus cosmopolitan Indian immigrants. This is extended to Hawaii where members of the Hawaiian movement are contrasted to the Japanese.

> Across the globe a romance is building for the defense of indigenes, first peoples, natives trammeled by civilization, producing a sentimental politics as closely mixed with motifs of nature and ecology as with historical narratives....In Hawaii, the high-water mark of this romance is a new indigenous nationalist movement, still mainly sound and fury, but gaining momentum in the 1990s....This essay is not about these kinds of blood politics. My primary focus here is not the sentimental island breezes of a Pacific romance, however much or little they shake up the local politics of blood, also crucial to rights for diaspora people, and to conditions of political possibility for global transnationalism. (Kelly, 1995: 476)

More recently he has gone somewhat further in the affirmation of transnationalism, citing an Indian Fijian member of parliament as saying "Pioneering has always been a major element in the development of resources for the good of mankind...(Kelly, 1999: 250)." The latter continues:

> People who move inherit the earth. All they have to do is keep up the good work, "in search for better opportunity." (ibid.)

Kelly aggressively criticizes one of the leaders of the Hawaiian movement for her nationalist penchant while lauding the Japanese for their service to the United States. Yet this is a population that has maintained the highest degree of endogamy in the Islands, and which has become, especially in the past 30 years, the most powerful political block in Hawaii, linked to numerous land scandals. But this is irrelevant for the simple dual classification project that is Kelly's. What is important is that the Japanese just as the Indians in Fiji are immigrants that "shake up the local politics of blood" represented by native peoples.

This is truly surprising for anyone coming at these issues without any particular moral prejudice, for here there are good guys and bad, cosmopolitans and locals. This is moral politics translated into ethnographic interpretation. If representatives of this globalizing position think that there is something basically evil in indigenous

movements then they should really do some serious research into the issues rather than simply labelling. And here the ethnographic ethic, if it exists, would insist on maintaining neutrality with respect of other peoples' *emics* for the sake of understanding. When the "invention of tradition" was at its height in Pacific anthropology, indigenous movements were suspected of inauthenticity because their members weren't *real* natives, weren't really *traditional*, if there ever was such a state of existence. For globalizing anthropologists a further step is taken: not only are natives inauthentic, they are also the archetypical representatives of the world's major problems—essentialism, nationalism and racism, as opposed to migrants who represent the future solution to the world's problems. Hardt and Negri (2000) reify this position in their Marxist version of globalization ideology:

> Nomadism and miscegenation appear here as figures of virtue, as the first ethical processes on the terrain of Empire. (Herdt and Negri, 2000: 362)

This celebration of movement is opposed just as in these other authors to a dangerous localism.

> Today's celebrations of the local can be regressive and fascistic when they oppose circulation and mixture, and thus reinforce the walls of nation, ethnicity, race, people and the like. (ibid.)

The parallels are striking and clear evidence of a powerful ideological turn, but certainly not a research result. This is spontaneous interpretation of the world and not the product of analysis. Otherwise there would be some evidence that such were the case. The reason, I suggest for this confluence of interpretations is precisely the lack of grounding in the globalization approach which is based on a set of categorizations of reality that are not products of research but immediate interpretations based on the experience related to this position, one that is above it all, globally distanced from the real world. This is truly airplane anthropology, a postmodern version of cosmopolitanism, one that encompasses the world's differences in its own self-identification. From a global systemic point of view this perspective ought itself to be an important object of analysis, but it is certainly not another *theoretical* position.

Ferguson in his recent book on Zambia (1999) presents yet a further if clearly superior variation on this globalization ideology. The title itself, *Expectations of Modernity*, expresses the problem perfectly. Zambian proletarianization was related to copper mining and it had formidable transformative effects on the zone known as the Copper Belt. But to invoke the notion of "modernity" in this is to side step the issue which should lead one to ask what this term actually means rather than simply accepting its existence, conflating in this way the contemporary with the modern. The fact that the copper mining economy declined is certainly not a discovery (see for example the work of Arrighi and Saul, 1973.). And the fact that it led to a feeling of deception in the Copper Belt is certainly no discovery but an issue that has been discussed for years. The story told in this well written work is one in which an engagement in the future is replaced by an attempt to find other values, a return to the rural, to "tradition" in local terms. This is precisely what is to be expected from the kind of model that I proposed back in 1994 in suggesting that neo-traditionalism, the renaissance of roots, the emergence of indigenous movements, religious sects and the like were products of economic decline and the collapse of formerly dominant social projects. At the same time the globalization folks are totally submersed in issues of modernity, hybridization, and the like. I am taken to task for insisting that Congolese *sapeurs* are not simply participating in modern consumption, but practicing a relation to clothes that is deducible from a more general logic of accumulation that has not been replaced in the contemporary world. The critique which echoes that of Meyer and Geschiere is based on my assertion of structural continuity. Ferguson rejoins that the *sapeurs* are, of course, African and that they are also part of the modern world. But these were not the issues. On the contrary the goal has always been the understanding of lived experience even if the latter is in its turn is dependent on larger global forces. There are, of course, two possible twists to this understanding. One might say that *sapeurs* buy modern haute couture like all other people who buy such clothing, but that they do it in a slightly different way, i.e., they attribute magical qualities to it. But these are not simply different sets of attributes. The so-called magical qualities related to life force imbue their bodies as a result of wear in a logic that equates wealth to health to beauty, in which the outside, the skin and clothing are not symbols of prestige, but prestige/wealth/health itself. To call this hybrid because two kinds of qualities are joined, i.e., modern clothing and magical attributes, is to say nothing about the way the qualities are joined, i.e., the nature of the articulation of the two, which is one where the clothing is incorporated into a strategy of life force accumulation, and not one that is about collecting things merely to wear. As I argue in the article on the *sapeurs*, the example of the depressive shopper may share some of the same attributes insofar as shopping itself revitalizes the shopper and is a kind of cure for depression. But I also argue that the specific

logic of *la sape* is quite different. Similarly to argue that modern witchcraft is a kind of alternative modernity that includes elements of a particular African world view misses the nature of the strategic logic involved in which it is the modern elements that are assimilated to the "African" strategy. Ferguson denies the existence of such articulations and is able to do so because what we observe is simply a "cultural style":

> The styles of which I speak are not expressions of something "deeper" (habitus, worldview, ideology)—they are neither "cultures" nor residues of once-distinct social types; nor are they manifestations of transition between distinct social types distinguished as traditional and modern. They are, instead, just what they seem to be: modes of practical action in contemporary urban social life. (Ferguson, 1999: 221)

This argument neatly does away with any historical continuity in the way people behave. There are only contemporary situations, totally discontinuous with respect to the past. In fact the past as such has no meaning here, and historical process is limited to the political and economic. In this way he can take me to task for arguing such continuity.

> His method is to invoke a generic "Congolese" culture within which the apparently Western pursuit of Parisian fashion can be understood as "really" being an indigenous pursuit of "life force." But if the European origin of concepts like haute couture of cultural forms like the fashion show do not suffice to make the young men's fancy dressing "Western" why should we accept that the African origin of a concept such as life force should be sufficient to make the practice "African?" (Ferguson, 1999: 290)

I am not sure why Ferguson asserts that I invoke a "generic 'Congolese' culture." I suggest that there is a logic underlying the way in which desire and forms of consumption are strategically organized and that it is structurally derivative of a logic that existed previous to the accessibility to European clothing. Ferguson refuses to see that there is a difference between objects and the logics in which they are incorporated. This is the old problem of doing the potlatch with sewing machines and blankets rather than coppers and other older objects. The claim would be that with the new objects we have a new phenomenon, perhaps the *modernity* of the early 1900s. Milgram's article in this volume demonstrates convincingly the way in which local strategies socialize foreign objects into a specific scheme of meaning. My position here is that it is arguments like Ferguson's that are absurd. Of course what has to be understood is the way people go about their lives, but it is not irrelevant, as Ferguson insists, to argue for historical continuities in their strategies. The problem here seems to be the culturalism that is the point of departure for all of the globalization discourses and which is so dominant in much of American Anthropology as to have achieved the status of *doxa*. Culture, understood as a text, a coherent set of elements, a homogenized whole, as meaning-substance, is problematic to say the least and it is totally devoid of any notion of structure, which is why even the notion of habitus is rejected by Ferguson. It is this assumption of substantial homogeneity that invokes so much fear in a postmodern anthropology that finds respite for the former in the notion of hybridity. Thus, places, social places, like the Congo are empty spaces in which generalized people do their things, but those things are specific enough that they need to be associated to some kind of identifiable origins, part A and part B. They are thus hybrid and they are modern which here means simply contemporary, as we all are, of necessity.

Instead of specific logics of action articulated to one another in specific ways, we have two life styles, cosmopolitan and local and all related in some way to a notion of "modernity" which is confused with "contemporary" and thus empty of any specificities. The cosmopolitan is simply the urban, the rejection of village and kinship ties and the embracing of the Western. But why is this reality cosmopolitan? African societies have almost always embraced the Western. They didn't need cities to do so. In the history of the Congo it is the specific logic of the accumulation of prestige goods which set ever higher value on imports embodying life force, a logic that was implicated in the slave trade as well as in *la sape*. Ferguson is clearly aware of what is more like a set of social relations between the rural and the urban. Here he closely follows that Manchester School while rejecting its evolutionism. In fact his basic argument is that what he calls "cosmopolitanism" develops on the basis of the copper economy and returns again to localism as the latter declines. I could not agree more with this analysis, as it is exactly the kind of approach that we have been arguing since the 1970s (see reference to Friedman, 1994 above). But to classify Zambian reality into cosmopolitan and local also obfuscates the degree to which the logics of organization are identical within the two categories. The same problem applies to his use of the term modernity, in the title, *Expectations of Modernity,* where the emic question is never asked? Do his Zambian informants mean something equivalent to our modernity when and if they use the term. Spitulnik (2002), taking up the actual local terminology, has argued that this is a fatal

error in his analysis. If modernity is associated with the West as the source of prestigious items that possess a magical quality, then does the word mean the same thing in any sense? Why, one might ask, is the issue of continuity such an anathema to certain anthropologists? It would appear to have more to do with their own identities than with the subject matter itself. *If what is out there is completely new, then I am also a pioneer!* Good for careers perhaps but bad for understanding.

Finally

From a global systemic perspective, the production of this discourse and its clearly ideological usage to redefine ethnographic reality is an important object of analysis. Such discourse resonates successfully among a certain number of elites, cultural, academic, media and political in the Western world. The argument proffered here is that what is needed is something radically different which takes a more critical stance to the contemporary constitution of social reality. The articles here are serious contributions to such an endeavour. They are to my mind a critical step in redefining the nature of global-local relations by means of ethnographic analysis. In a certain sense they develop a global approach that is already present in the work of Braudel who insisted on grasping the relations between macro processes of exchange and production and the logics of everyday life. There is no moral politics involved in this approach. Boundaries are not the root of all evil, something to be criticized, surpassed or transgressed. Rather we should strive understand the way they are constructed and transformed over time.

Jonathan Friedman, Directeur d'études, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Laboratoire de Genèse et transformations des mondes sociaux, 54 boulevard Raspail, 75006, Paris, and Professor, Department of Social Anthropology, Lund University, Box 114, 221 00 Sweden. E-mail: jonathan.friedman@soc.lu.se or jonathan.friedman@ehess.fr

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L'anthropologie du global, l'anthropologie globalisante : un commentaire

Jonathan Friedman *Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris et Université Lund, Suède*

Traduction par Yevgeny Medvedev et Eileen Lyons

Les articles contenus dans ce numéro relèvent avec succès le défi de l'analyse ethnographique des processus globaux et locaux, proposant ainsi un remède dont on a bien besoin devant l'absence généralisée de fondement empirique d'une grande partie de la littérature sur la mondialisation. Alors que j'ai été moi-même souvent associé à ces généralisations excessives sur le système mondial, je dois avouer ici que ma propre introduction au «global» a eu lieu par l'intermédiaire d'une rencontre ethnographique, celle en particulier de ma partenaire Kajsa Ekholm Friedman qui avait écrit ses premiers articles sur le sujet au début des années 1970 (1975, 1976). C'était alors une période difficile pour les études du «global», et moi aussi j'y étais opposé au début. Pourtant, de longues batailles m'ont convaincu de la nécessité de cette approche. La confrontation d'Ekholm Friedman avec le «global» était un résultat de ses recherches sur le terrain au nord de Madagascar, sur l'île de Nossi Bé, où elle a découvert qu'il était impossible d'expliquer la nature des sociétés locales sans une compréhension de la façon dont elles s'étaient définies dans (sinon par) leur position au sein du commerce de l'océan Indien avec toutes les oscillations des rapports de pouvoir au cours des derniers 500 ans. Ceci nous a fait pressentir le besoin de comprendre les mécanismes de ce qui, à l'époque, était appelé le système global. Puisqu'il n'y avait presque pas d'anthropologues intéressés par le «global» et qu'ils étaient en effet plutôt opposés à cette approche, nous avons commencé par collaborer avec des historiens de l'antiquité, des archéologues et des géographes. Cette coopération a abouti à une série de publications qui étaient évidemment externes à la communauté des anthropologues sociaux et culturels qui étaient très enracinés dans le «local» jusque dans les années 1980, alors que la «mondialisation» est devenue très populaire dans un large éventail de sujets qui ont filtré jusqu'en anthropologie. Ce développement a exigé beaucoup de raisonnements abstraits et théoriques de notre part, mais après quelques années de ce travail, nous sommes revenus

à des études ethnographiques sur le terrain en Afrique Centrale, à Hawaii et, plus récemment, en Suède.

Nous ne soutenons pas l'opinion selon laquelle le maintien d'une position théorique s'oppose à l'étude d'un détail ethnographique particulier. Mais, je pense qu'il est possible d'argumenter que suite au déclin du matérialisme dans les sciences sociales au début des années 1980, on a vu émerger un rejet clair de toute théorie en anthropologie. Geertz (1973) a été le champion de cette stratégie en s'opposant au penchant à la théorisation de Lévi-Strauss arguant que l'anthropologie devait en premier lieu s'attacher à l'exotique, un argument qui a réduit la théorie à une sorte de modèle folklorique occidental. Cette idée avait, bien sûr, ses avantages et méritait d'être discutée, mais il n'y eut pas de discussion. Au lieu de cela, et dans ce contexte de relativisme évident, où toutes les propositions à propos de la structure du monde pouvaient se réduire à des enjeux de culture, cette idée fut admise par l'académie à partir des premiers travaux de Rorty (1979) et du postmodernisme. Le projet relativiste tout entier a été re-interprété en tant que radicalisme culturel par Marcus/Fischer (1986) et par d'autres qui s'étaient aperçus que la *révélation* des différences culturelles était une porte d'entrée aux manières alternatives de voir le monde, qu'elle était une sorte de musée des avenirs révolutionnaires possibles, où Marx a été remplacé par Mead, suivi de Geertz, désigné implicitement comme le Lénine du relativisme. Un des effet de cette situation a été une surabondance de monographies anti-théoriques dans lesquelles on ne savait pas trop de quel débat il s'agissait au juste. La mondialisation, importée en anthropologie à partir des discours déjà existants dans la sociologie culturelle, l'économie des affaires, la géographie économique et les études culturelles (surtout dans leur variante postcoloniale), est entrée sur scène pendant cette période où le culturalisme était une forme dominante de la compréhension du monde. Or, la mondialisation était maniée en tant que processus culturel, ou, à tout le moins, la culture elle-même était vue comme une substance à globaliser. La logique de cet argument est la suivante : la culture est mise en texte chez Geertz et chez les post geertziens y compris les post-modernistes, bien que ce processus soit rendu chaotique par la prolifération de voix discordantes. La textualisation est équivalente à l'incarnation de la culture en tant qu'objet en soi qu'on peut lire, entreposer, interpréter sans nécessairement devoir toujours la placer à l'intérieur du contexte interactif de la vie sociale. La mondialisation pouvait dès lors opérer dans ce contexte par le simple fait de la diffusion. C'est pourquoi certains globalistes comme Appadurai (1990) et Hannerz (1996) sont si bien disposés envers la notion de diffusion.

J'ai argumenté dans ce cas qu'il y a une différence fondamentale entre l'approche de la mondialisation et celle développée au sein de l'anthropologie systémique globale et, même, des modèles de systèmes mondiaux. La mondialisation dans d'autres domaines a été basée sur l'analyse empirique; il en va ainsi pour l'économie des affaires et la géographie économique, où on la mesurait et localisait physiquement (Dicken 2001; Harvey, 1990). Ceci est aussi le cas chez Castell (2000) qui relie la mondialisation à la montée des sociétés basées sur les réseaux. Pour la plupart de ces auteurs, la mondialisation est mesurée en termes des nouvelles technologies, surtout celle basée sur les ordinateurs et l'Internet. Tous ces travaux plus empiriques montrent de façon détaillée le resserrement de l'interconnectivité globale depuis les deux dernières décennies et, surtout, de l'intensification de la circulation globale des capitaux financiers facilitée par ces nouvelles technologies. Ceci est, sans doute, le cas, au moins au niveau descriptif, mais l'analyse de la mondialisation dans ces écrits se base sur la perspective historique relativement courte, postérieure à la deuxième guerre mondiale. Et cela explique pourquoi ces travaux ignorent le fait, souligné par nombre de chercheurs, assez tôt par Bairoch et Kozul Wright (1996), et plus tard par Hirst et Thompson (1996), que le même type de mondialisation avait eu lieu entre 1880 et 1920. Il est encore plus crucial de noter qu'à partir de 1920, on a pu observer une «démondialisation» globale clairement documentée qui s'est poursuivie jusque dans les années 1950, quand l'exportation des capitaux américains a de nouveau déclenché un processus similaire qui s'est considérablement accéléré pendant les années 1960 et 1970. Ce type de données falsifie l'argument technologique simple. Même si les nouvelles technologies ont clairement accéléré le processus, il n'y a pas d'évidence qu'il s'agisse d'un phénomène évolutionnaire. Au contraire, au moins dans les derniers siècles, la mondialisation a été un phénomène périodique. Le changement technologique a eu un effet de compression de l'espace-temps, mais cela n'a pas changé la nature du système-monde.

La mondialisation versus les systèmes globaux. Le discours sur la mondialisation culturelle n'a pas bénéficié du type d'analyse empirique à laquelle on faisait allusion plus haut. Il se base sur une image générale de la mondialisation tirée des médias et fortement renforcée par l'expérience immédiate et privilégiée du voyage par les élites académiques, de même que par la perspective des institutions élitistes globales, comme CNN, le Bilderberg, l'UNESCO et la Banque Mondiale. Selon Robertson (1992), la mondialisation commence au début du siècle avec la prise de conscience croissante du monde en tant

qu'unité qui se met à dominer l'esprit de la Ligue des Nations jusqu`à la religion «new age». Bien qu'il ait modifié cette position théorique, il s'en tient encore à une position évolutionnaire. Pour Appadurai et Hannerz, c'est encore plus récent, et pour Comaroff et Comaroff (1999), il s'agit d'un signe de choses à venir. Les métaphores qui parcourent les travaux de ces derniers indiquent la fin de l'État nation, et l'avènement monde diasporique dans lequel l'hybridité devient dominante dans l'ordre mondial post national ou transnational. Sans pour autant nier l'existence de la mondialisation contemporaine, ce discours laisse beaucoup à désirer en ce qui concerne l'analyse des dynamiques et des classes. Mais il est aussi largement incapable d'introspection sur sa participation dans cette idéologie de plus en plus hégémonique.

L'analyse globale systémique a une source toute différente, comme on vient de l'indiquer. Braudel (1984) a décrit la mondialisation en tant que phénomène qui se produit à la fin de l'hégémonie où un vieux centre fournit des financements pour le développement d'un nouveau centre comme résultat des exportations de capitaux à large échelle. Ceci est une définition économique, bien entendu, mais d'après Braudel, le monde capitaliste peut être appréhendé comme un complexe de relations sociales, culturelles et politiques dominées par les forces macro-économiques, même si celles-là constituent partiellement celles-ci. Dans cette approche, les connexions transnationales sont omniprésentes même si leur intensité est variable, et elles sont le produit et une composante de la structure changeante des relations transnationales. La guerre et le commerce ne sont pas des phénomènes complètement opposés l'un à l'autre. En fait, ils sont deux aspects d'une même série de processus. Pour les partisans de la mondialisation, l'absence de connexions globales est perçue comme une opposition à la globalité, tandis que dans l'approche systémique globale, l'isolation et la séparation sont le plus souvent des produits systémiques. De plus, le sujet de l'analyse n'est pas uniquement le rapport entre les composantes sur une scène plus vaste, mais la façon dont ce rapport et les composantes sont constitués en eux-mêmes. Cela ressort des études de Wilmsen (1989) et Gordon (1992) sur la façon dont les San vivant de la cueillette et de la chasse sont devenus les représentants à petite échelle d'un passé évolutionniste, plutôt qu'une reconfiguration plus récente de la vie sociale au sein d'un système mondial plus large en pleine mutation. Dans ce type d'analyse, il ne s'agit pas du franchissement des frontières, mais des manières dont les frontières se forment et se transforment, et de la façon dont elles disparaissent. Ma critique des approches de la mondialisation est basée sur ce déficit de profondeur tout autant systémique qu'historique dans les analyses et sur la façon dont elles adhèrent à ou, encore, se portent à la défense d'un cosmopolitisme qui renie les frontières, sans chercher à comprendre d'où vient cette position. Les résultats de cette approche font de la mondialisation un phénomène historiquement périodique et même cyclique, dont les traces se retrouvent dans l'histoire de tous les systèmes de civilisation basée sur le commerce.

Les frontières sont aussi les mécanismes de différentiation pratiques et représentés (donc aussi pratiqués) au sein de ces systèmes, à la fois en termes régionaux et de classe. Le transfert des objets, des êtres humains et de l'information à travers les frontières est aussi ancien que la société, qui plus est, le fait de ce transfert n'est pas aussi important que la façon dont ces relations constituent les mondes sociaux, non pas à cause de l'information culturelle qui naît de ce mouvement et qui peut se mélanger dans n'importe quel autre lieu, mais de la manière dont les arrangements structuraux sociaux s'organisent autour de tels mouvements depuis des structures élémentaires de parenté basées sur la nécessité de l'échange externe jusqu'aux régimes majeurs d'esclavage et capitalistes de mobilité de la main-d'œuvre et des capitaux qui caractérise les civilisations capitalistes.

Le présent numéro

Ces articles ciblent les aspects concrets des relations globales/locales tout en insistant sur le fait que le «global» est une propriété de l'interlocalité plutôt qu'un niveau autonome de la réalité, sa propre localité. Or, c'est peut-être une bonne idée de trouver un autre vocabulaire afin d'exprimer de telles relations, et qui reconnaisse le fait que toute action voulue est localisée quoique ses effets et la description des rapports dans un espace interlocal plus vaste puissent être perçus comme globaux. Cette stratégie évite une concrétisation mal placée du «global» comme s'il s'agissait d'un acteur associé avec un endroit, le globe. Milgram et Smart examinent la manière dont les produits globaux sont insérés dans des projets particuliers. Barber accentue l'aspect de classe souvent ignoré de la migration de la main d'œuvre des Philippines. Aiyer, Menelye et Ulin font une enquête sur la relation entre les produits mondiaux, comme l'or, le vin et l'huile d'olive, et sur les instabilités du marché mondial. Ils discutent de la relation dépendante entre celui-ci et le fonctionnement et la transformation sociale des régions locales de production. Swedenburg entreprend une étude pour déterminer comment les changements globaux des politiques de l'identité affectent les marchés pour la musique identifiable régionalement. Ceci est beaucoup plus que de la mondialisation. Il s'agit d'ensembles plus larges de relations, de conditions

d'action et de reproduction sociale dans le système mondial qui se révèlent dans les échanges concrets et qui sont par ailleurs visibles sur le terrain. Pour cette raison, la consommation du cognac chez les Chinois de Hong Kong est influencée par les stratégies locales qui ont assimilé les produits étrangers aussi bien que les hiérarchies de valeurs coloniales globales dans leurs vies. À cet égard, il est important de garder à l'esprit l'observation de Milgram à l'effet que les vies sociales possèdent des objets et non le contraire comme le suggère Appadurai. Il y a de véritables acteurs mus par de véritables intentionnalités qui ne peuvent pas être réduits à l'invention imaginaire de la mondialisation des produits. Ce sont ces intentionnalités qui expliquent en grande partie le «particulier» de la mondialisation. La plupart des articles ici prennent une attitude critique par rapport à la tendance claironnante dans beaucoup de littérature anthropologique sur la mondialisation, et ils documentent clairement la base de leurs arguments. Les caractéristiques du «local» constituent également un aspect significatif de ces analyses, et je pense qu'il est important d'accentuer le fait que le «global» en soi se réfère seulement à des caractéristiques des rapports spatiaux qui sont toujours, par définition, «locaux», même dans l'espace d'un avion, comme le sait n'importe quel terroriste. Le vin est clairement un produit géopolitique global depuis des centaines ou même des milliers d'années. Le Bordeaux, bien sûr, doit sa position sur le marché mondial à l'occupation britannique et à l'investissement dans la région. Le fait que la migration soit un phénomène très différencié et qu'il ne soit pas équivalent à la simple circulation de la culture et à la formation d'hybridité, est un autre argument contre la littérature claironnante récente sur ce thème. Le fait que les migrants philippins doivent être perçus en termes de classe aussi bien dans leur pays qu'à l'étranger, et celui que leur pays soit devenu un exportateur majeur de main d'œuvre bon marché source de traites monétaires, font écho à d'autres exemples similaires dans la littérature (Glick Schiller Basch et Szanton Blanc, 1992). La circulation de la main d'œuvre, des objets et de l'information ne peut être appréhendée en termes ni de diffusion-mondialisation ni d'hybridation. Au lieu de cela, ces articles offrent un démenti ethnographique à de telles représentations superficielles des événements mondiaux, et ces représentations ne sont autre chose que la sous représentation de la réalité. Lorsque des marchandises pénètrent la vie quotidienne de gens qui n'ont pas participé à leur production, elles sont assimilées aux projets sociaux de ces existences, et cela se produit en même temps que ces dernières dans leur ensemble sont intégrées dans le système global, une intégration capable de transformer la façon dont ces vies sont constituées, et ainsi, de changer la façon dont les marchandises sont éventuellement appropriées. C'est une représentation plus complexe qu'une juxtaposition ou un mixage sans relief insinué par l'hybridité ou par la créolisation (dans le sens culturel et non pas linguistique). Le mot «articulation» est certainement un meilleur choix pour décrire de tels processus, puisqu'il nous permet de spécifier exactement ce qui se passe. Il nous permet également d'établir le rapport entre le processus de circulation et les conditions changeantes de son existence.

Articulation versus hybridité

Un exemple clair de la complexité systématique de ce genre d'articulation est traité dans des travaux récents sur l'émergence de la mise en accusation d'enfants dans des cas de sorcellerie en Afrique Centrale. Ekholm Friedman, dans son étude récente en Angola (2003) a argumenté que les racines des accusations contemporaines sans précédent de jeunes enfants se trouvent dans l'état constant de guerre et de pauvreté totale. Ces conditions précaires ont déclenché l'effondrement des relations élémentaires de famille ou de socialisation et ont suscité la peur concomitante des jeunes enfants qui sont encore dans leur état *naturel*, ce qui les rend puissants et dangereux (aussi bien que les enfants soldats potentiellement armés). Ceci est une situation historique particulière, bien entendu, mais la logique de la sorcellerie demeure inchangée. Pour certains anthropologues contemporains, la sorcellerie moderne représente nécessairement une problématique de modernité alternative. Elle doit être moderne, car affirmer autre chose serait équivalent au racisme (Meyer et Geschiere 1999). De mon point de vue, l'emploi de la modernité ici n'est rien de plus qu'une revendication de la contemporanéité avec l'a priori que celle-ci signifie le «moderne». Ceci mène à une prise de position définitive à l'égard de l'histoire et de la notion de continuité culturelle. Meyer et Geschiere m'ont à un certain moment reproché le recours à une telle notion coloniale de continuité. Je les cite ici intégralement parce que ce texte est un exemple intéressant de la façon dont les mondialistes ont défini le débat.

> He emphasizes that globalisation goes together with "cultural continuity." This makes him distrust notions like "invention of tradition" or "hybridization;" instead, one of the aims of his collection of articles seems to be to understand the relation between the "global reordering of social realities" and "cultural continuity." This makes him fall back, in practice, on the highly problematic concept of "tradition," which—especially in his contributions on Africa— seems to figure as some sort

of baseline, just as in the olden days of anthropology. ...Similarly he relates the emergence of *les sapeurs*, Brazzaville's colourful dandies, so beautifully described by Justin-Daniel Gandoulou (who again is hardly mentioned), to "certain fundamental relations" in Congo history which "were never dissolved;" as an example of such "fundamental relations" Friedman mentions: "Life strategies consist in ensuring the flow of life-force. Traditionally this was assured by the social system itself." This is the kind of convenient anthropological shorthand which one had hoped to be rid of, certainly in discussions on globalization....Friedman's reversion to such a simplistic use of the notion of tradition as some sort of base line — quite surprising in view of the sophisticated things he has to say about globalization — illustrates how treacherous the triangle of globalization, culture and identity is. Relating postcolonial identities to such a notion of "tradition" makes anthropology indeed a tricky enterprise. (Meyer and Geschiere 1999: 8)

(*«Il souligne que la mondialisation va de pair avec la «continuité culturelle». Cela explique sa méfiance envers les notions d' «invention de la tradition» ou d' «hybridation». Au lieu de cela, l'un des objectifs de son recueil d'articles semble être la compréhension des relations entre le «réarrangement global des réalités sociales» et la «continuité sociale». La poursuite de ce but le fait revenir en pratique sur le concept très problématique de «tradition» qui, surtout dans ses écrits sur l'Afrique, paraît une sorte de socle, tout comme dans le passé de l'anthropologie. De manière similaire, il établit la relation entre l'émergence des sapeurs, les dandys colorés de Brazzaville, si bien décrits par Justin-Daniel Gandoulou [qui est à peine mentionné] et de «certains rapports fondamentaux» persistants dans l'histoire du Congo. Comme exemple de ces «rapports fondamentaux» Friedman indique : «Les stratégies vitales consistent à assurer la circulation des forces vitales. Traditionnellement ceci était assuré par le système social même.» Ce raisonnement est une sorte de superficialité commode dont on espérait se débarrasser, surtout dans des discussions sur la mondialisation. Le retour de Friedman vers une telle utilisation simpliste de la notion de tradition en tant que point de départ* [*très surprenante, d'ailleurs, étant donnée la sophistication de ses analyses de la mondialisation*] *démontre le caractère fatal du triangle mondialisation, culture et identité. L'établissement des rapports entre les identités post coloniales et cette notion de «tradition» assure que certainement l'anthropologie est une entreprise pleine de défis.* [*Meyer et Geschiere 1999 : 8*])

Mis à part les insinuations à l'égard de Gandoulou (1984) – je cite son travail tout au long de l'article en question sans nécessairement être d'accord avec son interprétation (ceci était un mémoire de maîtrise) – les remarques de ces auteurs suggèrent que j'aie commis une grave erreur morale et politique en prenant position en faveur de la continuité historique. Mon argument dans ce chapitre consiste à démontrer la continuité historique d'une stratégie d'accumulation des forces vitales à mesure qu'elle s'articule aux conditions changeantes, déterminées largement par les transformations engendrées par l'intégration du Congo dans le secteur européen du système global. Ce n'est pas une question de mondialisation, pas plus que de circulation tel qu'y fait référence le volume édité par Meyer et Geschiere (1999). Il s'agit de la transformation des conditions d'existence. La continuité n'est pas un simple exemple de tradition, mais bien une question de transformation différentielle des stratégies de vie. Dans une situation où les structures de parenté ne sont pas détruites mais seulement transformées, peu importe la sévérité des transformations, les conditions pour maintenir un certain type de socialisation, un certain sens de soi, peuvent demeurer relativement stables. J'argumente que ceci peut expliquer la continuité historique dans l'attitude envers les objets de consommation (entendue dans notre sens). Meyer et Geschiere n'ont vraiment pas saisi cet argument parce qu'ils ont recours à une notion de culture qui ne la considère que comme une collection d'objets, où la structure de l'expérience n'a pas d'importance, et où la vie n'est pas structurée autrement qu'en termes de mondialisation qui, eux-mêmes se réduisent à la circulation des produits, des idées, des capitaux, de l'information et des personnes. En ce sens, pratiquer le potlatch avec des machines à coudre est, pour eux, quelque chose de complètement différent que de le pratiquer avec des pièces de cuivre. Donc, si de nouvelles *choses* sont présentées ou si de *nouveaux individus* sont impliqués dans une relation, nous nous retrouvons dans une situation complètement nouvelle appelée modernité. Mon argument ici consiste à dire que ceci n'est le cas que si les caractéristiques des relations elles-mêmes se trouvent modifiées. De tels changements se produisent quand l'intégration matérielle d'une population donnée mène à un remplacement par destruction d'une forme de socialisation par une autre. A cet égard, l'article de Milgram et, surtout, celui de Smart démontrent comment les mondes sont construits localement et pourquoi la circulation globale des produits n'est pas équivalente à la signification qu'ils véhiculent. La pratique de la vie, la constitution des mondes sociaux d'une part et la circulation d'autre part sont des phénomènes de nature différente, mais ils coexistent toujours en contrepoint l'un de l'autre.

Comaroff et Comaroff (1999) sont un tant soit peu plus sophistiqués que Meyer et Geschiere dans l'argumentation qu'ils développent, sans nommer personne en particulier, quoique l'on puisse aisément soupçonner qu'il s'agit d'un de leur collègue de Chicago :

> This move is typically rationalized by affirming, sometimes in an unreconstructed spirit of romantic neoprimitivism, the capacity of "native" cultures to remain assertively intact, determinedly different, in the face of a triumphal, homogenizing world capitalism. Apart from being empirically questionable, this depends upon an anachronistic ahistorical idea of culture. Of culture transfixed in opposition to capitalism—as if capitalism were not itself cultural to the core, everywhere indigenized as if culture has not been long commodified under the impact of the market. In any case, to reduce the history of the here and now to a contest between the parochial and the universal, between sameness and distinction, is to reinscribe the very dualism on which the colonizing discourse of early modernist social science was erected. It is also to represent the hybrid, dialectical historically evanescent character of *all* contemporary social designs. (1999 : 294)
>
> (*Cette démarche est rationalisée par une revendication dénuée de sens critique et dans l'esprit original du néo primitivisme romantique. L'assertion de déterminisme qui sous- entend la capacité des cultures aborigènes de demeurer intactes et différentes, face au triomphe du capitalisme mondial homogénéisant. En plus d'être douteuse, cette affirmation empirique résulte d'une interprétation non historique et anachronique de la culture. De la culture transpercée dans son opposition au capitalisme, comme si le capitalisme n'était pas culturel dans son essence, partout rendu indigène comme si la culture n'était depuis longtemps traitée comme une denrée sous l'influence du marché. Quoiqu'il en soit, réduire toute l'histoire d' «ici et maintenant» à l'opposition entre le propre et l'universel, entre l'uniformité et la distinction, c'est redéfinir le dualisme même sur lequel a été érigé le discours colonisateur de la jeune science sociale moderniste. C'est aussi représenter le caractère hybride, historiquement dialectique et évanescent de toutes les structures sociales contemporaines.*)

Ici le capitalisme a été incorporé dans le culturel comme si ses traits particuliers étaient tellement différents dans différentes situations culturelles et/ou historiques qu'on pourrait même le faire équivaloir à la notion de culture. Mais il n'y pas de preuve de cela. L'hybridité du capitalisme est une appellation superficielle impropre qui aurait pu être utilisée pour critiquer les premiers écrits de Wallerstein (1974) ou de Frank (1969) dans lesquels ils présumaient que l'esclavage et l'exploitation féodale pouvaient faire partie du système capitaliste mondial, car le capitalisme devait se baser entièrement sur le travail humain rémunéré. Le fait est que le processus de l'accumulation des capitaux possède une forme logique qui reste invariable sauf dans la façon dont on en parle. Réduire le capitalisme à une notion de culture comme dans les «modèles de/modèles pour», revient inéluctablement à mystifier la problématique. Le parallèle existe à propos de la sorcellerie africaine, ou de la magie ou d'autres structures. Ces phénomènes ne peuvent pas être réduits à des recettes. Ils sont enchâssés dans des complexes de pratiques et de modes de comportement. Le fait qu'un élément existe dans le monde contemporain ne peut pas servir à nier sa continuité historique. La même observation s'applique bien sûr, au capitalisme. C'est pourquoi le terme même du «capitalisme millénaire» est complètement trompeur. Pour Comaroff et Comaroff, ce terme est tout simplement une référence à la mondialisation comme s'il voulait dire que nous vivons vraiment dans une nouvelle ère. Mais, malgré tout, la logique du capital est toujours la même. Harvey (2000), dont le nom apparaît dans un numéro de la revue dans laquelle ce terme a été utilisé pour la première fois, témoigne d'une compréhension plus claire de ce qui est continu et non continu dans le capitalisme mondialisé. En fait, il rend assez explicite le fait que le «nouvel impérialisme» actuel est le produit d'une séquence logique déterminée historiquement et non le phénomène discontinu suggéré par Comaroff et Comaroff. Marshal Sahlins, à qui leur critique paraît s'être adressée, a argumenté avec beaucoup d'éloquence en faveur de cette observation dans un article récent (Sahlins, 1999). Au contraire, les partisans de l'approche de la mondialisation, qui aurait commencé par une célébration de la globalité et par la suite se serait confrontée aux effets pervers du phénomène, se sont dans une certaine mesure retirés tout en maintenant une position de discontinuité selon laquelle nous *sommes* vraiment dans un nouveau monde, fut-il meilleur ou non. Cela équivaut à prétendre que la sorcellerie est, en fait, un nouveau phénomène en Afrique Centrale, une forme du capitalisme plutôt qu'une articulation de logiques très différentes d'accumulation.

Évidemment, le monde est caractérisé par la nouveauté, mais il ne faut pas la confondre avec un changement très important, surtout quand on se base sur sa propre expérience de globe-trotter plutôt que sur des analyses ethnographiques plus fines. L'objectif de l'ethnographie a toujours été l'acquisition de la compréhension des mondes d'*autrui*. Mais beaucoup d'analyses inspirées par la mondialisation ne font que coller des étiquettes

sur les populations dans une tentative de les ranger dans des catégories populaires, locales et globales, hybrides versus essentialistes. Permettez-moi de l'illustrer brièvement :

Liisa Malkki (1992) dans son livre et dans son article bien connu procède comme suit : après avoir divisé les réfugiés Hutu de la récente guerre au Burundi habitant en Tanzanie en «nationaux» (qui demeurent dans un camp) et en «cosmopolites» (qui réussissent à s'installer dans une petite ville à la proximité, Kigoma, et à ne plus s'identifier avec les Hutu (on peut se demander pourquoi)), elle fait un autre pas idéologique. Elle critique ce qu'elle perçoit comme un soutien moral aux populations indigènes et se demande pourquoi elles doivent être plus importantes ou précieuses que les migrants (op.cit.29). Mais il y a plus! La notion même de réfugiés et de personnes qui ont *perdu* leur patrie, et qui en sont déracinés, est attaquée en tant que partie de l'idéologie occidentale. Malkki établit que ceci est un produit de la division du monde en pays nations où les cultures sont territorialisées, même enracinées dans des localités spécifiques. Ceci suggère également une certaine notion de pureté ou, peut-être, d'homogénéité en tant que source de la plupart des maux et des violences dans le monde, et génère en même temps des catégories de non-appartenance qui peuvent s'appliquer aux réfugiés et, ainsi, stéréotyper leur situation. Elle argumente, en évoquant le travail énormément populaire de Deleuze et Guattari (1987), qu'éventuellement (quoiqu'elle fasse attention à ne pas considérer le déplacement forcé en tant que phénomène positif) être déraciné doit être compris en termes positifs en tant qu'expression de la rhizomatique. Alors, ses «cosmopolites» sont doués d'une capacité de défier la structure de l'État nation (comme si le Burundi et la Tanzanie en étaient des exemples évidents). L'insistance sur les liens aux «endroits de naissance» et sur les «degrés d'autochtonie» (Malkki, 1992 : 38) nous empêche de voir un phénomène cosmopolite plus important, «la multiplicité des liens que les personnes nouent avec les lieux tout au long de leur vie en se les rappelant et en les imaginant» (ibid).

Il n'y a pas de tentative ici de documenter cette division du monde en cosmopolites et en locaux, en bons et en mauvais. Ses sujets sont plutôt *utilisés* pour élaborer son propre système de classification. L'ethnographie est, alors, réarrangée pour exemplifier des catégories abstraites pré-existantes. Même si cela s'avérait, i.e. que les gens s'identifiaient selon les étiquettes qu'on colle sur eux, l'utilisation d'une telle terminologie exigerait une analyse plus approfondie. Le travail d'Ekholm Friedman mené sur le terrain au Congo a révélé au moins un exemple d'homme qui prétendait être un «citoyen du monde», d'un homme qui n'avait jamais voyagé à l'extérieur du Congo. Son utilisation du terme indiquait quelque chose d'autre que le cosmopolitisme. Il indiquait le désir urgent de fuir son monde qui s'effondrait et d'aller en Europe. Le terme «citoyen» aurait pu être une prémonition de droits présumés dans un monde rempli de tels discours, mais tout cela est très loin de l'identité cosmopolite. Les articles dans ce numéro sont fondamentalement critiques de cette approche dans la mesure où ils tentent de saisir les particularités de ceux qui sont impliqués dans les relations globales au lieu de leur imposer des catégories. L'article de Barber sur la migration démontre la façon dont les sujets migrants sont de vrais sujets actifs qui s'engagent dans la construction de mondes qui ne peuvent être réduits à des notions issues de la position de l'observateur et de sa compréhension externe de tels processus.

Sur un registre plus modéré et polémique, John Kelly (1995) a utilisé des termes similaires dans ses écrits sur les Iles Fiji : les Fijiens nationalistes locaux contre les immigrants Indiens cosmopolites. La portée de cette analyse touche aussi Hawaii où les membres du mouvement hawaiien sont opposés aux Japonais.

> Across the globe a romance is building for the defense of indigenes, first peoples, natives trammeled by civilization, producing a sentimental politics as closely mixed with motifs of nature and ecology as with historical narratives....In Hawaii, the high-water mark of this romance is a new indigenous nationalist movement, still mainly sound and fury, but gaining momentum in the 1990s....This essay is not about these kinds of blood politics. My primary focus here is not the sentimental island breezes of a Pacific romance, however much or little they shake up the local politics of blood, also crucial to rights for Diaspora people, and to conditions of political possibility for global transnationalism. (Kelly, 1995: 476)

> *(A travers le monde le nouvel élan romantique se mobilise pour la défense des indigènes, des peuples originaux entravés par la civilisation. Cet élan produit de la politique sentimentale qui est aussi étroitement mêlée avec les motifs de la nature de l'écologie qu'avec les narratifs historiques...À Hawaii, l'apogée de ce romantisme se manifeste dans la naissance d'un nouveau mouvement nationaliste indigène qui n'est pour le moment que du bruit et de la rage, mais qui, néanmoins, se fortifie considérablement depuis les années 1990...Cet article ne s'implique pas dans ce type de politique de liens sanguins. Mon objectif principal n'est pas d'explorer les brises sentimentales des îles du Pacifique, quelque important ou insignifiant que puisse être leur impact sur la politique locale des liens*

sanguins qui est cruciale pour les droits des diasporas et pour les conditions de la possibilité politique du transnationalisme global.)

Plus récemment, il s'est rangé un peu plus du côté des affirmations du transnationalisme en citant un membre Indien-Fijien du parlement qui a dit : "Pioneering has always been a major element in the development of resources for the good of mankind... (Kelly, 1999: 250)." (*«Être le premier a toujours été un élément majeur dans le développement des ressources pour le bien de la civilisation...»*) et poursuit :

> People who move inherit the earth. All they have to do is keep up the good work, "in search for better opportunity." (ibid.)
>
> (*Ceux qui sont mobiles reçoivent la terre en héritage. Tout ce qu'ils doivent faire, «c'est de s'appliquer à la recherche d'une meilleure opportunité».*)

Kelly critique de façon virulente l'une des leaders du mouvement Hawaiien pour son penchant nationaliste alors qu'il applaudit les Japonais d'être au service des Etats-Unis. Malgré cela, c'est la population qui a maintenu le plus haut degré d'endogamie sur les Îles, et qui est devenue, surtout depuis les trente dernières années, le bloc politique le plus puissant à Hawaii, lié à beaucoup de scandales de spéculation foncière. Mais cela n'a pas d'importance dans le contexte de la simple classification duale de Kelly. Ce qui l'intéresse au premier plan est que les Japonais tout comme les Indiens sur les Iles Fiji sont des immigrants qui «bouleversent la politique locale du sang» représentée par les autochtones.

Ceci est vraiment surprenant pour quiconque aborde ces problématiques sans préjugé moral particulier, car il y a ici les mauvais et les bons personnages, les cosmopolites et les locaux. Il s'agit de jugements moraux traduits en interprétation ethnographique. Si les représentants de cette position globalisante pensent qu'il y quelque chose d'intrinsèquement mauvais dans les mouvements des indigènes, ils doivent alors entreprendre une recherche sérieuse de la problématique au lieu de simplement coller des étiquettes. Et ici l'éthique ethnographique, si elle existe, insisterait sur le maintien de la neutralité envers les particularités des autres peuples afin de promouvoir la compréhension. Quand l'«invention de la tradition» était à son apogée dans l'anthropologie du Pacifique, les mouvements indigènes étaient soupçonnés d'un manque d'authenticité, parce que leurs partisans n'étaient pas les *vrais* indigènes, et pas vraiment *traditionnels*, pour autant que la réalité d'un tel mode d'existence soit avérée. Pour les anthropologues de la mondialisation, un autre pas est franchi : les indigènes sont inauthentiques, mais ils sont aussi les représentants archétypaux des problèmes majeurs du monde, - l'essentialisme, le nationalisme et le racisme, à l'opposé des migrants qui représentent la solution future à ces problèmes mondiaux. Hardt et Negri (2000) réitèrent cette position dans leur version marxiste de l'idéologie de la mondialisation :

> Nomadism and miscegenation appear here as figures of virtue, as the first ethical processes on the terrain of Empire. (Herdt and Negri, 2000: 362)
>
> (*Le nomadisme et le métissage sont présentés ici comme des figures de la vertu, comme les premiers processus éthiques sur le terrain de l'Empire.*)

Cette célébration de la mobilité fait contraste, tout comme dans le cas de ces autres auteurs, avec un dangereux localisme.

> Today's celebrations of the local can be regressive and fascistic when they oppose circulation and mixture, and thus reinforce the walls of nation, ethnicity, race, people and the like. (ibid.)
>
> (*Les célébrations actuelles du* local *peuvent être régressives et fascistes quand elles s'opposent à la circulation et au mélange, et, renforcent les murs de la nation, de l'ethnie, de la race etc.*)

Le parallèle est saisissant, et représente la preuve irréfutable d'un virage idéologique puissant, mais, il ne s'agit pas ici de résultats de recherche. C'est une interprétation spontanée du monde et non pas le produit d'une analyse. Autrement, il y aurait des preuves. La raison que je suggère pour cette confluence d'interprétations est précisément son manque d'enracinement dans l'approche globalisante qui est basée sur une série des catégorisations de la réalité qui ne sont pas des produits de recherche mais des interprétations immédiates basées sur l'expérience liée à cette position, celle qui se trouve au-dessus de tout, distanciée globalement du monde réel. Ceci est vraiment une anthropologie survolante, une version postmoderne du cosmopolitisme, celle qui embrasse les variétés du monde dans sa propre identification de soi. Du point de vue global systémique, une telle vision doit elle-même devenir un objet d'analyse, mais elle n'est certainement pas une autre position *théorique*. Dans son livre récent sur la Zambie (1999), Ferguson présente encore une autre variante plus poussée sinon supérieure de cette idéologie de la mondialisation. Le titre lui-même, *Expectations of*

Modernity (*Les attentes de la modernité)*, exprime parfaitement la problématique. L'unification ouvrière zambienne était liée à l'exploitation minière de cuivre et elle avait des effets transformateurs formidables sur la zone connue sous le nom de Ceinture du Cuivre. Invoquer ici la notion de «modernité», c'est ignorer la problématique qui doit encourager l'enquête sur la signification de ce terme plutôt que de simplement accepter son existence, confondant ainsi le contemporain avec le moderne. Le fait que l'économie basée sur l'exploitation minière du cuivre se soit effondrée n'est pas une découverte (voir le travail d'Arrighi et Saul, 1973). Et le fait que ceci ait provoqué un sentiment de déception dans la zone de la Ceinture du Cuivre n'est certainement pas une découverte non plus, il s'agit d'un problème récurrent, perpétuel sujet de débats. L'histoire racontée dans ce texte bien écrit est celle où l'engagement dans l'avenir est remplacé par une tentative de trouver d'autres valeurs, de retourner au rural, à la «tradition» en termes locaux. Ceci est exactement ce qu'il faut attendre du type de modèle que j'ai proposé en 1994 et où j'ai suggéré que le néo-traditionalisme, la renaissance de racines, l'émergence des mouvements indigènes et des sectes religieuses étaient les produits du déclin économique et de l'effondrement des projets sociaux anciennement dominants. En même temps, les partisans de la mondialisation sont complètement submergés dans le domaine de la modernité, de l'hybridation et d'autres catégories similaires. Moi-même, je deviens objet de critique à cause de mon insistance au sujet des *sapeurs* congolais ; ils ne sont pas que des participants dans la consommation moderne. Ils entretiennent une relation aux vêtements qui peut être déduite d'une logique plus générale d'accumulation qui n'a pas été remplacée dans le monde contemporain. La critique qui fait écho à celle de Meyer et Geschiere est basée sur mon assertion de la continuité structurale. Ferguson admet que les *sapeurs* sont, bien entendu, africains et qu'ils font en même temps partie du monde moderne. Mais ces observations ne constituent pas le problème. Au contraire, le but a toujours été la compréhension de l'expérience vécue même si elle dépend à son tour des forces globales plus importantes. On peut, bien entendu, la comprendre de deux façons. On peut prétendre que les *sapeurs* achètent de la haute couture moderne tout comme les autres consommateurs de ces vêtements, à une différence près, soit qu'ils leurs attribuent des qualités magiques. Mais ces dernières ne sont pas simplement des ensembles d'attributs différents. Les soit disant qualités magiques associées aux forces vitales empreignent le corps qui porte ces vêtements dans une logique qui fait équivaloir la richesse à la santé et la beauté, et où l'extérieur, la peau et les vêtements ne sont pas des symboles de prestige, mais bien prestige/richesse/santé en soi. Parler d'hybridité dans ce cas parce que deux sortes de qualités se rejoignent, i.e. les vêtements modernes et les attributs magiques, ne dit rien sur la manière dont ces qualités sont jointes, i.e. la nature de leur articulation, où le vêtement est incorporé dans la stratégie d'accumulation des forces vitales, et où il ne s'agit pas simplement d'amasser les choses à porter. Selon mon argument dans l'article sur les *sapeurs*, l'exemple d'un consommateur dépressif peut avoir quelque unes des mêmes qualités à tel point que le *shopping* lui-même revitalise le consommateur et le guérit de la dépression. Mais j'argumente aussi que la logique spécifique de *la sape* est assez différente. De la même manière, l'argument selon lequel la sorcellerie moderne est une sorte de modernité alternative qui comprend des éléments d'une vision africaine particulière du monde néglige la nature de la logique stratégique qu'elle implique, et selon laquelle ce sont les éléments modernes qui sont assimilés dans la stratégie «africaine». Ferguson nie l'existence de telles articulations, et il est capable de le faire, parce que ce que nous observons n'est qu'un «style culturel» :

> The styles of which I speak are not expressions of something "deeper" (habitus, worldview, ideology)—they are neither 'cultures' nor residues of once-distinct social types; nor are they manifestations of transition between distinct social types distinguished as traditional and modern. They are, instead, just what they seem to be: modes of practical action in contemporary urban social life. (Ferguson, 1999: 221)
>
> (*Les styles dont je parle ne sont pas les expressions de quelque chose de plus «profond» (habitus, vision du monde, idéologie) – ils ne sont ni «les cultures», ni les résidus de types sociaux anciennement distincts, ni les manifestations de la transition entre différents types sociaux énoncés comme traditionnel et moderne. Ils sont, au lieu de cela, seulement ce qu'ils semblent être : des modes d'action pratique dans la vie sociale urbaine contemporaine.*)

Cet argument écarte habilement toute continuité historique dans la façon dont les êtres humains se comportent. Il n'y a seulement que des situations contemporaines, totalement discontinues par rapport au passé. En fait, le passé en tant que tel n'a pas de signification ici, et le processus historique est limité à ses aspects politique et économique. C'est ainsi qu'il peut me reprocher d'avoir argumenté en faveur de la continuité.

> His method is to invoke a generic "Congolese" culture within which the apparently Western pursuit of Parisian

> fashion can be understood as "really" being an indigenous pursuit of "life force." But if the European origin of concepts like *haute couture* of cultural forms like the fashion show do not suffice to make the young men's fancy dressing "Western" why should we accept that the African origin of a concept such as life force should be sufficient to make the practice "African?" (Ferguson, 1999: 290)
>
> (*Sa méthode consiste à invoquer une culture congolaise générique à l'intérieur de laquelle la poursuite purement occidentale de la mode parisienne peut être perçue comme la «vraie» poursuite indigène de la «force vitale». Mais si l'origine européenne des concepts comme la haute couture, de formes culturelles comme les défilés de mode, ne suffit pas pour faire de l'habillement sophistiqué des jeunes hommes quelque chose d'occidental, pourquoi devrions-nous accepter que l'origine africaine d'un concept tel que la force vitale doivet suffire à rendre une pratique «africaine»*?)

Je ne suis pas sûr de comprendre pourquoi Ferguson prétend que j'invoque la «culture congolaise générique». Je suggère qu'il y a une logique expliquant la façon dont le désir et les formes de consommation sont organisés stratégiquement, et que cette logique est structurellement dérivée de celle qui avait existé avant que les vêtements européens ne soient devenus accessibles. Ferguson refuse de voir qu'il y a une différence entre les objets et la logique selon laquelle ils sont incorporés. C'est un problème ancien de faire du potlatch avec des machines à coudre et des couvertures au lieu des pièces de cuivre et d'autres vieilleries. Un argument serait qu'avec de nouveaux objets nous faisons face à un nouveau phénomène, peut-être même à la *modernité* du début des années 1990. L'article de Milgram dans ce numéro démontre d'une manière convaincante la façon dont les stratégies locales ramassent les objets étrangers dans un schéma spécifique de signification. Ma position ici est que les arguments comme ceux de Ferguson sont absurdes. Évidemment, nous devons comprendre comment les gens vivent leur vie, mais il n'est pas vain, comme veut le faire croire Ferguson, d'argumenter en faveur des continuités historiques dans leurs stratégies. Le problème ici semble être le culturalisme comme point de départ de tous les discours sur la mondialisation, et qui est tellement dominant dans la plus grande partie de l'anthropologie américaine qu'il a atteint le statut de *doxa*. La culture, appréhendée et tant que texte, série d'éléments cohérents, entité homogène et substance porteuse de signification, est pour le moins problématique, et complètement vide de toute notion de structure. C'est la raison pour laquelle même la notion d'habitus est rejetée par Ferguson. Cette présomption d'homogénéité substantielle suscite des craintes telles au sein de l'anthropologie postmoderne qu'elle se replie sur la notion d'hybridité. Or, les endroits, lieux sociaux comme le Congo, sont des espaces vides où les peuples, envisagés de façon générale, mènent leur existence, mais cette existence est suffisamment spécifique pour être rapportée à une sorte d'origine identifiable, partie A et partie B. Ils sont donc hybrides et ils sont modernes, ce qui veut ici dire simplement contemporains, comme nous le sommes tous, nécessairement.

Au lieu des logiques spécifiques articulées les unes aux autres dans des combinaisons spécifiques, nous avons affaire aux deux styles de vie, cosmopolite et local, qui sont tous les deux liés d'une certaine façon à la notion de «modernité» qui est confondue avec celle de «contemporain», et, à cause de cela, est dépourvue de toute spécificité. Le cosmopolite n'est que l'urbain, le rejet du village et des liens familiaux et l'acceptation de l'Occidental. Mais pourquoi cette réalité est-elle cosmopolite? Les sociétés africaines ont presque toujours embrassé l'Occidental. Pour ce faire, elles n'avaient pas besoin d'urbanisation. Dans l'histoire du Congo, c'est la logique spécifique de l'accumulation des produits prestigieux qui a ajouté de la valeur supplémentaire aux importations symbolisant la force vitale, la logique qui a régi le commerce des esclaves tout comme la *la sape*. Ferguson est clairement conscient de ce qui ressemble à une série des rapports sociaux entre le rural et l'urbain. Ici, il suit de près l'École de Manchester tout en rejetant son évolutionnisme. En fait, son argument de base est que ce qu'il appelle le «cosmopolitisme» se développe sur la base de l'économie du cuivre et retourne vers le localisme à mesure que celle-ci perd de sa vigueur. Je ne peux pas m'empêcher d'accepter cette analyse, car il s'agit exactement de la même approche pour laquelle nous militons depuis les années 1970 (voir la référence à Friedman, 1994, plus haut). Mais classifier la réalité zambienne dans les catégories cosmopolite et locale, obscurcit la plage dans laquelle la logique d'organisation est identique à l'intérieur de ces deux catégories. Le même problème se pose dans l'emploi du terme «modernité» dans le titre *Les attentes de la modernité* (*Expectations of Modernity*), où la question *emic* n'est jamais posée. Ses informateurs zambiens veulent-ils signifier quelque chose d'équivalent à notre modernité lorsqu'elles utilisent ce terme? Spitulnik (2002), s'armant avec la terminologie locale actuelle, a argumenté que ceci est une erreur fatale dans cette analyse. Si la modernité est associée avec l'Occident en tant que source d'objets prestigieux qui possèdent des qualités magiques, le mot «modernité» veut-il dire la même chose dans tous les contextes? Nous pouvons poser la question : pourquoi la

problématique de la continuité constitue-t-elle un anathème pour certains anthropologues? Cela semble s'expliquer par leurs propres identités plutôt que par l'intérêt porté au sujet lui-même. *Si le monde dehors est complètement nouveau, alors, je suis aussi pionnier !* Excellent pour la promotion des carrières mais déplorable pour l'avancement de la connaissance.

Pour Finir

A partir d'une perspective systémique globale, la production de ce discours, et son utilisation clairement idéologique pour redéfinir la réalité ethnographique, est un objet d'analyse important. Un tel discours trouve assez facilement son auditoire parmi certaines élites, culturelles, académiques, médiatiques et politiques du monde occidental. L'argument avancé ici est qu'il faut prendre une option radicalement différente, qui prenne une position plus critique vis-à-vis la constitution contemporaine de la réalité sociale. Les articles recueillis ici sont des contributions significatives à cette entreprise. Je pense qu'ils constituent un pas critique sur la voie de la redéfinition de la nature des relations entre le global et le local à l'aide de l'analyse ethnographique. Dans un certain sens, ils développent une approche globale qui est déjà présente dans les écrits de Braudel qui insistait sur l'appréhension des relations entre les processus macro d'échange et de production d'un côté, et les logiques de la vie quotidienne de l'autre. Il n'y a pas de politique morale qui sous-tendent cette approche. Les frontières ne constituent pas les racines de tout les maux, un élément à critiquer, surpasser ou transgresser. Nous devons plutôt tenter de comprendre les structures de leurs constructions et leurs transformations dans le temps.

Jonathan Friedman, Directeur d'études, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Laboratoire de Genèse et transformations des mondes sociaux, 54 boulevard Raspail, 75006, Paris, et Professor, Department of Social Anthropology, Lund University, Box 114, 221 00 Sweden. Courriel: jonathan.friedman@soc.lu.se or jonathan.friedman@ehess.fr

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Articles

Gendering Colour: Identity, Femininity and Marriage in Kerala

Amali Philips *Wilfrid Laurier University*

Abstract: This paper uses ethnographic material on the Christian middle class in the South Indian state of Kerala, to explore the significance of skin colour as symbolic capital for marriage and dowry negotiations. Within the social contours of caste, community and marriage circles, fair-skin colour and other female embellishments operate as "boundary markers" to accentuate marital, caste and class positions and feminine gender identity. South Indian and South Asian perceptions of "fair skin colour" as a defining feature of female beauty ideals and feminine gender identity incorporate other related qualities such as health and moral conduct. Skin colour, along with dowry negotiations, serves to disempower women both symbolically and materially in the matter of their own marriages.

Keywords: skin colour, group identity, femininity, symbolic capital, marriage, dowry.

Résumé : Ce travail utilise les données ethnographiques sur les Chrétiens appartenant à la classe moyenne provenant de l'état Kerala au sud de l'Inde, afin d'explorer la signification de la couleur de la peau en tant que capital symbolique dans les négoces sur le mariage et la dot. A l'intérieur des contours sociaux d'une caste, les cercles communautaires et familiaux, la peau claire et d'autres embellissements féminins jouent le rôle des «marqueurs de frontière» pour accentuer les positions de classe, de caste, de mariage et l'identité féminine. Les perceptions sud-indiennes et sud-asiatiques de «la peau claire» en tant que le trait le plus significatif des idéaux de la beauté et de l'identité féminines, incluent d'autres qualités voisines, comme la santé et les attitudes morales. La couleur de la peau avec les négoces sur la dot servent à subjuguer les femmes autant symboliquement que matériellement en ce qui concerne leur propre mariage.

Mots-clés : la couleur de la peau, identité de groupe, féminité, capital symbolique, mariage, dot

As every South Asian woman knows, the words "fair" and "beautiful" are often used synonymously in female beauty descriptions and feminine gender identity constructions. Writing about her childhood experiences of colour in "The Politics of Brown Skin," Karumanchery-Luik (1997), a Kerala Christian sociologist, recalls her mother warning her to avoid the hot sun as it would make her skin dark. One of my East Indian students wrote in her undergraduate dissertation that her mother often referred to her endearingly as the "black cat" and chastised her for spending a great deal of time outdoors in the hot sun. Hellman-Rajanayagam (1997: 109), in "Is there a Tamil 'Race'?," recalls the negative reaction of her South Indian Tamil friends whenever she described her Tamil *ayah* as "one of the most beautiful women I have ever met": "No she is not pretty, she is dark," her friends would demur. In South Asian cultures, "dark skin" is considered an undesirable physical feature for a woman, and, being a South Asian myself, I can personally relate to the claim that fair skin and beauty are inseparable as defining elements of feminine gender descriptions. This association is made almost at the birth of a female child, and in India, where the dowry has reached frightful proportions as a compulsory requirement in most arranged marriages, it is not uncommon for relatives to make remarks about the female child's complexion along with subtle reminders to the newborn's parents of the dowry they must put by for her future marriage: the darker the complexion, the higher the dowry. Matrimonial columns in South Asian newspapers at home and in the diaspora attest to the high premium placed on a prospective bride's light-skin colour.

The concept of skin colour in India, and more generally in South Asia, embraces much more than chromatic qualities, for the semantics of colour include cultural perceptions and judgments about associated moral and behavioural qualities, health and appearance, and individual and collective identities. Ideal womanhood, feminine

beauty ideals and communal and national identities are mutually constructed with women bearing the burden of carrying the symbols associated with all three (for example, see Bannerji, 1994; De Alwis, 1996). A recent example from India illustrates the symbolic associations between women and national identity in the controversies surrounding a beauty pageant. India hosted the 2001 Miss World Pageant to "showcase India to the world" as a liberal and modern nation (Oza, 2001: 1067). Although beauty contests were already popular in India's schools and communities (Kishwar, 1995), and Indian beauty queens frequently represent the country in international beauty competitions, hosting the 2001 pageant in India was opposed by women's groups and Hindu nationalists. Their contention was that encouraging the "exhibition of beautiful bodies" (Oza, 2001: 1081) was contrary to Indian values and would lead to the commodification of Indian women (*via* tourism, sex trade, the influence of Western values). The role expectations of South Asian women "as the symbolic space of the nation" (Jayawardena and De Alwis, 1996: xv), as carriers of national, communal and caste identities, as the repositories of authentic traditions and the transmitters of moral values to their children are well documented. What is less discussed is the role of skin colour in identity assertions and their embodiment through women, as well as their implications for marriage arrangements.

Beauty and health are no doubt universally valued categories and are desirable attributes in a marriage partner. But as culturally defined categories, beauty and health also encode values and ideas about position and privilege in their myriad manifestations in specific cultural contexts. Beteille (1968: 175) has noted that "while there is clearly a preference for light-skin colour in almost all sections of Indian society, it is difficult to say how far this preference influences social action," and that "the most concrete expression of it is to be found in the choice of marriage partners." As Mandelbaum (1970: 101-105) in his survey of Indian society notes, apart from the "explicit" rules of marriage such as endogamy or exogamy, "fairness of skin" and a woman's general appearance are among the "implicit rules of the game for maneuvering for family advantage." Among the Buddhist Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, "the ideal Sinhala-Buddhist bride is described as a '*pancha kalyani*,'" or the bride with the five desired merits, namely, "fair skin, long black hair, attractive body, youthful appearance and beautiful teeth" (Jayawardena and De Alwis, 1996: xi). According to a Japanese proverb, "white skin makes up for seven defects" in a woman (Wagatsuma, 1968: 129), and, in the Japanese notions of beauty, "white skin" for a woman signifies ideal womanhood, "purity and moral virtue" (ibid., 139). In China, the now extinct practice of foot binding for women was intended to achieve a crippled shape that men found attractive in women (Papanek, 1990: 176). In Sudan, female genital circumcision (or mutilation) is believed to make a women's genitals "pure, white and smooth," and is linked to other cultural practices such as pre-wedding cosmetic preparations which involve skin lightening techniques (Boddy, 1982: 690-691). In general, as Davis (1997: 376) points out "social stratification, whatever its causes, hinges upon certain objective bases or marks—e.g., sex, age, birth, race, residence, achievement and appearance—tangible pegs whereon are hung the more intangible realities of invidious discrimination. These same objective bases also serve as axes for marital selection."

In this paper, I draw largely from my data and study of over 100 Syrian Christian and Latin Catholic households among middle-class Christians in Trivandrum, the Capital City of Kerala in southern India,[1] to reflect on the importance of skin colour in three related areas: in the construction of caste and sub-communal identities; in defining beauty norms and feminine gender identity; and in influencing marriage and dowry negotiations. In dowry transactions "skin colour" as an index of "beauty" is symbolically associated with health and moral qualities and acts as one set of symbolic markers articulating social location, female gender identity and the marriageability of women. In making these associations, I do not ascribe a privileged place to skin colour while minimizing the importance of other social variables. Skin colour is one variable among other interlinked and interdependent variables such as class and caste status and kinship connections that enter into marriage and dowry transactions within the Christian middle class.

For the general reader, as well as for anthropologists, the discussion about skin colour cannot be easily isolated from discussions about "race." Recent writings on race and caste in South Asia attempt to trace "pre-colonial" conceptualizations of identity and difference, and to "discover the interplay between Western and Indian ideologies" (Robb, 1997: 45). These writings have raised a number of leading questions: To what extent was colour used in indigenous conceptions of "difference" apart from and independent of colonial influences (Brockington, 1997)? Is colour awareness a "primordial quality," as Shils (1968) argues, or one that is "ingrained in human beings" (Wheale, 1910: 229 in Cox, 1970: 83), or a "continuation of age-old Indian attitudes which happened to coincide with race theories"—i.e., theories based on notions of taxonomy and evolution, environment and physiognomy (Robb, 1997: 7-8)? Did attitudes about colour as learned behaviour,

emanate from externally imposed, arbitrary labels that came to be grafted onto other diacritics of social differentiation such as language, caste and community (Robb, 1997)? These questions need to be dealt with at the outset.

Colonial Theorizing on Colour, Caste and Race and the Indian Context

The general anthropological consensus on the colour-race-caste conundrum is that phenotypical variations within the human species have no meaning except the social constructions that humans put on them (Harrison, 1999; Smedley, 1999). The colour views of the ethnologists, colonialists and orientalists in British India were undoubtedly influenced by the intellectual climate of the time and the environmental and racial theories of the 18th and 19th centuries that sought to explain both the unity of humankind and the diversity of human populations. In India, the task was to explain the dilemma of superior Indian civilization and the physical and moral endowment of particular communities, especially those that boasted fair skin and demonstrated valued martial qualities like their dominant British rulers (Caplan, 1997). Environmental and racial theories coalesced to mark off those with presumed superior physical and moral qualities and who were capable of civilizational progress from those who were incapable of similar advances. Thus, Susan Bayly (1999b: 72), argues that European race theory was much more than a "crudely self-glorifying tool of colonial rule," and one that emphasized the possibilities of civilization and advancement of peoples who were blessed with superior endowments and environmental conditions.

However, as Issacs (1968: 76) has rightly noted, "racial mythologies built around differences in skin colour and physical features were among the prime tools of power used in the era of the western empire." Racial prejudice against peoples of colour had a strong economic basis (Keesing and Strathern, 1998) even as enslavement required the attribution of particular essentializing qualities to those enslaved as justifications for slavery.[2] The ethnological classifications and statistical compilations of Indian castes and communities during the height of colonialism in 19th-century India were part of the colonial project of knowledge making which Asian scholars, following Edward Said, have characterized as "orientalism" (see Breckenridge and van der Veer, 1993). The "Aryan theory of race" was the most significant of Indologists' (European scholars writing on India) contributions to orientalist knowledge (Thapar, 1977). It not only seemed to provide indigenous evidence for a racial theory of "caste" but, in asserting a linguistic and racial affinity between the dominant Europeans and fair-skinned Aryans who conquered the indigenous and supposedly "dark skinned" *dasas*, it also provided a justification for the dominance of the "lighter-skinned races" over the "darker races."

Thus, the British in India used colour, dress and conduct to distance themselves "physically, socially and culturally" (Cohn, 1996: 111; Tarlo, 1996) from the Indian population even as they used skin colour, attire and conduct to mark out the "Aryan North" from the "Dravidian South," the high from the low castes, and the martial and ruling castes from those among whom such traditions were absent (Elliot, 1869 and Forbes, 1813, cited from Bayly, 1997, 1999a and 1999b). The British commentators also attributed different moral qualities to Indians of different castes, communities and regions. For instance, Herbert Risley (1915: 14), the ethnologist, offers a dramatic description of the extreme divergence in skin colour across India:

> ...the dead black of the Andamanese, the colour of a black-leaded stove before it has been polished, and the somewhat brighter black of the Dravidians of southern India, which has been aptly compared to the colour of the strong coffee unmixed with milk...the flushed ivory skin of the typical Kashmiri beauty and the very transparent brown-wheat coloured is the common vernacular description...of the higher castes of upper India....

For Risley, this served as proof of the racial distinction between the "pale-skinned Aryans" of the North and the "dark-skinned Dravidians" of the South (also see Forbes, 1813: 72 and Huxley, 1868-69, cited from Bayly, 1997). Forbes (1813: 384, cited from Bayly, 1997: 175), describes the South Indians in general (*i.e.*, Tamils of Tamil Nadu the Malayalis of Kerala, the Telugus of Andhra Pradesh) as indolent, mediocre and passive, with "civilization among them having long attained its height." At the same time, he elevates the martial castes among them, such as the Nairs of Kerala, to the superior position of "a well-made handsome race, of fairer complexion than the lesser castes." There are also references in Risley's work (1915: 16) to the Syrian Christians of Kerala, who, having a martial tradition like the Nairs, are praised for their skill and described as "having red moustaches" and their babies "red carroty hair." Lionel Caplan (1997: 261) relates British views on the superiority of these martial castes and communities in India to biological race theories that placed a high premium on martial qualities and their transmission through blood lines and hereditary inheritance. These ideas would no doubt have influenced their treatment of the Syrian Christians, and Christians generally, who were

accorded privileges not given to other castes, such as the wearing of footwear "wherever Europeans would normally wear their shoes" (Cohn, 1996: 134).

What is pertinent to my discussion is that most colonial descriptions of Indians centred on the Indian women and their appearance, skin colour, gait, walk and attire as markers of identity and separation between different castes and communities (Risley, 1915; Rothfeld, 1928). These descriptions would have provided European readers with enough grist on the "mysterious east," and the exotic and sensual orient of European imaginings (e.g., Balfour, 1885, cited from Cohn, 1996). In European descriptions, Dravidian women on the whole, with the exception of the Hindu Brahmin and Nair castes and the Syrian Christians of Kerala, are "dark, stunted, hardly attractive" (Rothfeld, 1928: 80). In contrast, a high caste Brahmin woman is portrayed as one who "...with steady untroubled eye, straight nose and sensitive nostril, fair skin, pride in their port and self restraint in every gesture, they move through the mass of common men, as if conscious of a higher mission ..." (ibid., 92). Thus, colonial theorizing on race and caste went further to attribute essentializing physical and moral qualities to women of different castes and communities, although such renderings about race, caste and gender are now justifiably dismissed as orientalist and essentialist imaginings (Dirks, 1989 and 2001).

The origins of colour attitudes and their association with caste and racial groupings will continue to be a matter of debate and contention, since it is difficult to determine what is essential and what is extraneous to these concepts. Historical and literary evidence from India suggests that colour and physical characteristics were among several factors that defined indigenous social and moral categorizations. Susan Bayly (1999a: 103-104) argues that the "pronouncement of sweeping generalities about other people's 'essences' was not an invention of white men, or of the colonial state," and that long before British rule in India the Mughal rulers and commentators had begun to distinguish the Indians on the basis of their "moral and physical essences" and use skin colour as a system of classification, identification and evaluation. What is certain, however, from the reading of South Asian writings on the subject is that the colour-race-caste connections are not definitive, unambiguous or inflexible (see Robb, 1997 and Trautmann, 1997 for a discussion of this point). Colour values, as Peter Robb (1997: 8) notes, were "not unambiguously related to merit or status;" nor did they enjoy a more important status than behaviour or social conduct for making moral judgements or for defining social placement. The varna (colour) scheme, which formed the basis for the "Aryan theory of race," has been described as a marker of linguistic differences, an expression of social conduct (Brockington, 1997) or social order (Gupta, 2001), and the caste organization of society based on occupational differences (Thapar, 1977). Colonial perceptions of racial and caste distinctions have now been acknowledged to have been influenced by an erroneous reading of the Brahminic creation myth in the Rig Veda and spurred on by the works of orientalists who propagated the Aryan theory of race in the process of establishing a theory of the linguistic affinity between Indo-European languages.[3] While physical differences between the dominant *Arya* and the subjugated *Dasa* may have existed, the evidence is not unambiguous (Gupta, 2001) and cannot be taken as the basis of caste distinctions (Trautmann, 1997). Furthermore, Dipanka Gupta (2001: 3) observes that in early Vedic texts "fair skin" probably referred to "light," meaning "knowledge" which the Aryans claimed for themselves. The functional integration of caste society within Aryan culture hardened into more racialist attitudes over time (Brockington, 1997) as "material and intellectual changes" may have provided the conditions for the emergence of racial attitudes (Robb, 1997: 9). In Sri Lanka, according to John Rogers (1997: 163) "ideas of difference with quasi-biological character were already prevalent long before British rule...." However, Rogers also makes the important point that modern racial theories and ideologies selectively appropriated "existing labels and symbols" in ways that transformed their indigenous meanings (ibid., 163-164).

The origins of colour values notwithstanding, colour, like caste or ethnicity, as a legacy of the colonial and precolonial pasts continues to shape and influence cultural perceptions of identity and difference. Gupta (2001: 2) refers to the sociological cliche that the aesthetic standards of the "superior" community are often adopted by others. The colonial privileging of fair-skinned communities would have given certain economic and political advantages to these groups at the expense of other communities. This was undoubtedly the experience of the Syrian Christians whose privileged treatment by the British and indigenous traditional leaders underlined their claim to "high caste status."

Caste and Sub-Communal Identities among the Kerala Christians

Christianity arrived in Kerala long before the advent of the Europeans in India. Trade links with West Asia in the early Christian era had brought communities of Jews and other seafaring immigrants to the Malabar coast (present day Kerala) in Southwest India. The Kerala Christians are

divided into "Syrians" and "non-Syrians," who are both further divided into Catholic and Protestant sects and denominations. The Syrian Christians comprise the two main sub-communities of Northists (*vadakkumbhagar*), or "St Thomas Christians" as they are also called, and Southists (*Thekkumbhagar*), or *Knanaya* Christians as they are more popularly known. The two communities are subdivided into Catholic (Romo Syrians, Syro-Malankara Catholics, *Knanaya* Catholics) and Protestant sects (Jacobite, Orthodox, Marthomite, Anglican, Church of South India, Evangelical, etc.,). The Northists claim to be the descendants of Brahmin and Nayar converts of St. Thomas, the Apostle, who is believed to have come to Kerala in circa 52 AD, and consider themselves the "old division" (*pazhayakuttukkar*), in contrast to the Protestant sections of the community that transferred their allegiance to the Jacobite Patriarch of Antioch. The latter are known as the new division (*puttankuttukkar*). The Southists, or *Knanayites,* claim descent from Syrian migrants who came to Kerala in AD 345, under the leadership of a merchant named Thomas of Cana (*Cnai Thomen).* Some Southist families also claim to have Jewish origins. The descendants of these early Jewish immigrants were themselves divided into white and black Jews and have different conceptions of their origins and identities (Mandelbaum, 1970). The Southists I interviewed seldom referred to the colour distinction among the Jewish immigrants, but some of them are proud of their Jewish descent and continue to nurture their Jewish cultural origins. The Southists are endogamous to the point that marriage outside the community results in excommunication from their respective Catholic and Protestant Churches. The Northist-Southist divisions are not caste divisions as Dumont (1970: 203) seems to suggest because of the endogamous preferences and prescriptions among the two sub-communities. Endogamy is not a sufficient condition for defining caste divisions and neither the Northists nor Southists explain the difference between them in caste terms.

Anantakrishna Aiyar (1926: 50), whose documentation of Kerala Christian culture is well known, writes: "The Southists are fairer in complexion and have finer features than the Northists and boast of their descent from the parent church with genuine Syrian blood in their veins." My Southist informants made similar claims and used fair skin as proof of their extra-Indian origins. To the outsider, however, the distinction of colour is less evident, with a good mix of "fair" Northists and "dark" Southists, but informants from each community were consistent in using colour as one defining mark of their superior identity *vis-a-vis* each other. The Northists and Southists also use genealogical (pedigree, clan, biogenic), spatial (area of origin), temporal (time of conversion/origin), and cultural (food habits, degree of communal solidarity, differences in dowry, occupation, educational achievement and mental health status) distinctions as markers of identity and separation.

The Syrian Christians on the whole, according to Kurian (1961:36) have "intense pride of race and tradition." Although the term "Syrian" "has little relationship to the 'inhabitants of Syria'" but refers rather to their use of the Syriac language in their liturgical services (Maclean, 1924: 1670), the term has come to denote a caste-like community with claims to Brahmin, Nair, or "pure" Syrian origins. The Northists and Southists have traditionally been assigned a privileged position vis-a-vis caste Hindus (Fuller, 1976; Lewandowski, 1980), and are treated as Brahmins and Nairs whom they are said to resemble in physical appearance i.e., fair complexion. To quote Anantakrishna Aiyar again (1926: 242),"The Syrian Christians are a fine race of people, and are mostly like Nairs in their physical characteristics. They are seen in all shades of complexion. The women are short in stature, and are as handsome as their sisters in the higher Hindu castes." Early writings also place the Syrian Christians on par with the matrilineal Hindu Nairs, but below the patrilineal high-caste Nambudiri Brahmins (Buchanan, 1819: 146). Several writers also allude to their role as "pollution neutralizers," i.e., the handling of an object by a Syrian Christian that was previously touched by a member of a lower caste would neutralize its pollution effects and allow its use by members of the Hindu high castes (Forrester, 1980; Fuller, 1976 and 1977). Syrian Christian men were also allowed to carry a sword as an emblem of their superior status (Kurian, 1961: 36), while there are Syrian Christian families that still carry titles such as *Pannikkar* (warrior), *Vaidyan* (physician) and *Tharakkan* (tax collector). These titles were given to their ancestors by Malabar Kings as rewards for services to the king or to honour them for their good deeds in society. These symbols of prestige serve as markers of family pedigree and social position and are used to define status-based marriage circles within the Christian middle class. Distance pollution, menstrual restrictions, the rules and taboos underlying cross-caste commensal relations, dietary practices, as well as marriage rites and other life-cycle traditions that they share with high-caste Hindu groups have placed the Syrian Christians at the apex of the Christian caste system (see also Visvanathan, 1993: 3).

For Syrian Christian women, their high-caste status endows them with both privileges and restrictions. As Vom Bruk (1997: 180) has poignantly observed, women's

bodies, including skin colour, dress and other feminine embellishments may be regarded as "symbolic artifacts" that mark the boundaries of castes, sub-communities and classes (also see Douglas, 1966; Ramaswamy, 1998). For instance, the traditional dress of the Syrian Christian woman is the *Chatta Mundu*, a seamless white "garment, with or without a coloured border seven yards long and one or one and a quarter yard broad, worn folded with a number of fringes behind" (Aiyar, 1926: 244). Seamless cloth in Indian symbolic constructions represents purity and auspiciousness (see Altekar, 1938; Bayly, 1986; Cohn, 1996) and was worn by the higher castes, since unstitched clothing was believed to attract and hold less pollutants than stitched clothing. According to Kurian (1967: 27), traditionally Syrian Christian women wore "completely white garments." White garments are still worn on auspicious occasions such as weddings, given as gifts to near relatives at the *Katcha koddukkal* (gifting of cloth) ceremony during a marriage, and are worn by elderly widows to indicate their high-caste status. Syrian Christian women, unlike the women of the lower castes such as the Shanars, Izhavas and Nadars (toddy tappers), were granted the privilege of wearing the *kuppayam* (jacket), which was adopted by the higher- caste Hindus during the colonial period, and were allowed to carry a *muthukudda* (umbrella) to shield themselves from the sun and from the eyes of men. The carrying of *mutukudda* forms part of Syrian Christian marriage rituals even today.

According to Anantakrishna Aiyar (1926: 242), the Syrian Christian women's "dress and deportment correspond very much with their character;" and further, "notwithstanding the heat of the climate and their freedom of intercourse with their neighbors, they are seldom or never known to violate the law of chastity." The privileges of modest dress and other embellishments were denied to women of the lower castes who could only wear a cloth of coarse texture, not lower than the knee or higher than the waist (Cohn, 1996; Hardgrave, 1968). When the lower caste women, with the help of the missionaries attempted to cover their breasts for the first time, there were riots on the streets of Kerala, with the upper-caste men pulling the breast-cloth off the women of the lower castes (Hardgrave, 1968). However, wearing the breast cloth (or the blouse) is no longer a caste privilege, or the monopoly of Syrian Christian, or high caste, women; all women can now wear blouses.

The non-Syrian Christians are the descendants of Hindus who were converted during the later (post-16th century) Portuguese, Dutch and British periods, and are known as *Latinkar* (Latin Catholics) and *putiya Christiani* (new Christians). Each of these groups comprises several lower castes whose ancestors might have become Christians to escape the debilitating effects of the Hindu caste system. The Latin Catholics are the descendants of converts of Portuguese missionaries from the 16th century onwards. They are so identified because of their liturgical rites. They belong to three traditionally endogamous castes, *viz.*, the *Ezhunutukar* (Seven-hundred), the *Munnutukar* (Three-hundred) and the *Anjutukar* (Five-hundred, and are also known as the fisher castes, or Mukkuwars). In the past, the Seven-hundred and Three-hundred castes could be identified by their attire, hats, turbans, trousers and the Western-style dress worn by the women. The Seven-hundred caste members were also called *mundukkar* (wearers of white cloth), while the Three-hundred caste people were referred to as *topasses* (wearers of hats) and are even now called *sattakar (*those who wear dress) because of the Western attire of their women.

These hybrid and western outfits were ridiculed by other Indians in colonial times, particularly when they were worn by the lower castes, although the Western attire was adopted by the Indian elite men to gain the respect of their British rulers (Tarlo, 1996). The Syrian Catholics regard even the relatively well-to-do Latin Catholic families as "culturally different;" the symbolic indicators of this difference are dark complexion, food habits, dress, a Westernized life style and, more importantly, the relative freedom enjoyed by Latin Catholic women. The Latin Catholics are not generally preferred by the Syrian Catholics as marriage partners for their sons and daughters but there are instances of cross-caste marriages. The "New-Christians" are the Protestant converts from the British period and are generally from the more depressed castes and classes whom the Syrian Christians still refer to by their caste names, *viz.* Pulaya Christian, Paraya Christian, Nadar Christian, etc. They are generally described by the Syrian Protestants as dark skinned, backward and culturally different. For example, Kurian (1961: 26-27), a Syrian Christian, remarks "it is not far from the truth if one says that the higher castes are noted for their comparatively light complexion, while the lower castes are mostly black."

When Syrian and non-Syrian marriages do occur, they are between families of similar class status, or they are hypergamous arrangements involving upwardly mobile Latin families using their acquired wealth and status to marry into "traditional" (*parambariya*), "well known," "good" (*nalla*), or old (*pazhaya*) Syrian-Catholic families (*kudumpams*). These adjectives describe the prevalent status groups and marriage circles within the Christian community. Alternatively, Syrian families of

modest resources but belonging to traditional or good families may secure hypogamous marriages for their daughters to avoid giving large dowries or to secure an educated groom.

The mobile, middle-class families among the Latin Catholics are dismissive of Syrian superiority and offer counter stereotypes of their own to demonstrate Latin/Syrian differences. Syrian Christians are described as materialistic and money minded people, who demand large dowries for their sons and hold rigidly conservative attitudes towards the behaviour and expectations of women. At the same time, the Latin Catholics use the symbols of dress, fair-skin colour and genealogical links to Nairs and Brahmins to stake their own claims to higher status. In making these claims, they are not dismissing the hierarchy of caste or the caste status of the Syrian Christians. On the contrary, the Latin Catholics who make these claims, draw on the physical and symbolic markers of superior caste status to assert their own rank. Like the Syrian Christians, they too claim descent from the Nair sub-castes and cite as evidence their shared clan names. The Latin Catholic families who assert their high caste status also avoid marriages with other Latin castes, although, in general, caste endogamy among the Latins is less restrictive than among the Syrians. Among the Latin Catholics, those of the Seven-hundred caste claim the highest caste status and dismiss the fisher caste, or the Five-hundred caste, as "shore people" and "backward Christians," while describing themselves as "original Christians." Latin families also invest in property and jewelry for their women, and seek marriage arrangements outside their community.

According to Visvanathan (1993: 118-119), the Syrian Christians' obsession with fair skin and the prenatal practices that Syrian women observe to ensure that their children are fair in complexion, stem from the Syrian Christians' desire to prove their Brahmin ancestry, since Brahmins are considered to be fair skinned. Syrian Christians also desire to distinguish themselves from other Christians such as the Latin Catholics and the New Christians, who are generally seen as dark in complexion. The Syrian Christians consider the usurpation of the traditional Syrian dress and genealogical connections by the Latins as presumptuous attempts to claim Syrian or upper caste status. During my fieldwork I experienced the caste curiosity of a Syrian Christian woman whose family had recently rented their apartment to a young couple. The woman was curious about the caste of her tenants who she thought were Latins even though they were fair complexioned. The young woman's mother was also attired in the traditional Syrian dress. The Syrian woman urged me to find out the caste of her tenants. As it turned out, the tenants belonged to the Mukkuwars (fisher) caste, but when I asked the mother whether the *chatta mundu* she was wearing was a Syrian dress, she vigorously asserted that the garment was not the monopoly of the Syrians but the traditional dress of all Malayalis (i.e., speakers of Malayalam, the language of Kerala).

Ayurveda, Skin Colour and Feminine Beauty Ideals

Skin colour, as an element of female beauty also plays an important part in feminine identity constructions and finds articulation in the ayurvedic health-care practices of the Syrian Christians. The use of ayurvedic medicine (*ayur*—knowledge, *vedic*—of the *vedas*) to secure well-being, positive health and longevity has been widely known and practised in Kerala and is an essential part of household medical practices (Osella and Osella, 1996a; Visvanathan, 1993). Generally, good-health and a long life (the purpose of ayurveda) could be achieved by active effort and are not predetermined by karma (Basham, 1976; Obeyesekere, 1976).[4] A balanced body (between hot and cool, see Beck, 1969) is believed to manifest itself in culturally valued physical features such as fair (not pale), smooth and oily skin, loose and flexible limbs, plump body (not fat), and black, straight or wavy hair (Osella and Osella, 1996a). A fair skin, plump body and black hair are generally regarded as attractive traits for women among most South Indian communities including Kerala Christians. Young girls are chastised if they are too "thin," as it will reduce their chances of a good marriage. Christians also believe that a thin body would make conception difficult (see also Egnor, 1980: 23; Zacharias, 1994: 43). Thinness and dark skin are also the most "tangible physical expression of suffering and rejection" (Egnor, 1980: 7) and are often associated with the impoverished lower classes who have poor diets and toil long in the hot sun (see also Basham, 1976; Wadley, 1984). I have often been informed by Syrian Christian and Nair men and women that one can always identify a Harijan (untouchable), a Nadar or Parayan (toddy tapping untouchable castes) by their colour and/or frail appearance.

In physical terms, *white*[5] corresponds to coolness, and in the case of a widow or a virgin, coolness signifies the state of sexual inactivity. Writing about the hot/cool opposition in South Indian world view, Daniel (1984: 186) has suggested that a "protracted unmarried state" for a girl may be associated with a cool body, an imbalance that might lead to illness. Hence pale skin as a sign of *coolness* is disliked for this reason. However, as Daniel (1984) has noted, hot and cold are both caste and person specific

and have much to do with diet, character, body type, time and stages of life. Hot (*choodu*) and cold *(thanu)* by themselves produce negative physical states unless controlled, combined and balanced to provide an ideal physical state. Too much heat is dangerous and powerful (sexual energy, *sakti*—female power, strength) and physically translates into *dosham* (affliction) reflected in specific bodily characteristics such as "thinness," "tightness," "dark and coarse skin," "facial blemishes" (pimples—*muha-kuru*, skin boils—*kuru*) and "curly, brown hair" (Osella and Osella, 1996a). Certain physical stages are believed to bring about an increase in heat or cold: thus, menstruation and pregnancy increase body heat (sexual energy), while childbirth brings about coolness; old age, on the other hand, is a time of tightness and coolness (reduced sexual energy).[6]

The health, well-being and the beauty of a woman are interconnected and, in terms of ayurvedic philosophy, the physical and moral health of a woman are also linked. Feminine beauty ideals encompass many of these same ideas, as beauty is seen as the most tangible and objective manifestation of physical and moral health contributing to ideal womanhood (see Kishwar, 1995 on India in general). Syrian Christian women, especially the older women, assume the role of "keepers of ayurvedic knowledge," or kitchen ayurveda, that is used to prepare traditional medicines for domestic use, for curative and preventive purposes and to enhance the beauty, well-being and health of younger women (Visvanathan, 1993: 117). As Visvanathan also states, Syrian Christian women take several ayurvedic oil preparations (*pinnathailam, kashyam, arishtam, lehiyam* and *nei*) for loosening the uterus, increasing respiration, for skin rashes, boils, lactation, and for strength and fitness. Since black hair is a preferred beauty trait, Kerala Christian women apply different kinds of oils and herbal remedies to their hair to obtain healthy, black hair. Chemical hair dyes are seldom used by older women whose black and healthy hair is attributed to careful nurturing and frequent oil applications.

Ayurvedic principles also reinforce the intimate association between the mother and the unborn child who is believed to be influenced by the thoughts, deeds, emotions and the diet of the pregnant mother (see also Das, 1988). This association is stronger in the case of mothers and daughters since South Indian understandings of conception emphasize the mixing of gendered substances (Busby, 1995: 36-37; Daniel, 1984), with daughters inheriting a greater proportion of their mother's female substance. Pregnant women take elaborate care to ensure the fair skin colour of their new born. Syrian Christian women informed me of a concoction they make, adding the gold dust scraped from the wedding ring of the mother to the mother's milk to make the baby fair (see also Visvanathan, 1993: 119). Pregnant women also apply turmeric (as a purifying substance) to their body, massage the body with ayurvedic oils, and consume the juice of bitter gourd to dissolve poison and to purify, loosen and soften the skin pores and to enhance the complexion. Oil massages are administered to pregnant women with the expectation that the oils would filter through and strengthen the fetus (Visvanathan, 1993). After childbirth, strict dietary taboos are followed along with purificatory herbal baths to purify the mother and the newborn. Overall, Syrian Christian women's preoccupation with ayurvedic practices is inspired by the need to have "healthy, strong and slim bodies" (Visvanathan, 1993: 120) and to ensure the beauty and health of their children.

Among Christians, as in other Indian communities, the ideal woman—fair skinned, black haired with a voluptuous and healthy body—is at once sexualized, feminized and moralized, and the depiction of women in these ways serves to define Christian ideas of marriageability. Sexual differences are culturally accentuated by magnifying and exaggerating sex-specific natural traits (Agacinski, 1998: 18) through artificial means such as whitening creams and body embellishments such as female jewelry. Traditional skin-care remedies are commercialized in Kerala today, and brand-name skin care products, boasting ayurvedic sources and true and tested powers to make a woman's skin fairer, softer and spotless, flood the urban market. These products cater to the younger, middle-class Christian women, who are unfamiliar with "kitchen ayurveda," but who, like their female counterparts in other communities in Kerala and all over India, are caught in a web of what has been called India's "beauty craze" (see Chopra and Baria, 1996), and the "commodification and objectification of women" (Ramachandran, 1995: 123; Shirali, 1997) created by media advertisements and the infectiously popular Indian cinema. Market consumerism further augments a woman's cultural preoccupation with fair skin and appearance as essential traits of femininity and marriageability. The *Fair and Lovely* beauty cream and the advertisement bearing its name selling fairness and beauty to enhance women's chances of both employment and marriage is a case in point. It was taken off the market after women's groups protested against its racial connotations and for equating beauty with fair skin, but it has since found its way back and is a much advertised beauty product not only in India but also in neighbouring Sri Lanka.

Female Gender Constructions and Marriage Requirements

A woman's body as Das (1988) has noted, is both a sexual body—beautiful, erotic, desired and admired—and a maternal body—revered and sanctified. The twin concepts of erotic sexuality embodied in Indian cultural concepts such as *sakti* (dangerous, inauspicious/auspicious energy) and fertility (auspicious motherhood) are essentialized in Kerala Christian perceptions of "womanhood." Ramachandran's (1995: 121) analysis of female sexuality in Kerala refers to this "fascination/repugnance dyad," which is reflected in the portrayals of women's sexuality in the folk tales, songs and dances (e.g., the *Kathakali* dance) of Kerala. As Das (1988:201) notes, a woman's sexual body is the "domain of marriage" and her sexuality must be contained and channelled for reproduction through her submission to the male in marriage (also see Kapadia, 1995). Images of women's erotic sexual potential contribute to Christian women's own self-image and affect the way in which women experience their own bodies and their pre-occupation with being modestly attractive. While Christian women admire and envy beautiful women within their communities, beautiful women are also the targets of gossip, judgement and moral evaluations, particularly if they are single or young widows.

Christian women's, and men's conception of marriage separates the genders in terms of their conjugal and gender related functions. Men need marriage to make them more responsible, while women view marriage as the ultimate fulfillment of their destiny, closely tied to the birth of children, and dependent on husbands and sons for economic security and well-being. The importance of marriage for women cannot be exaggerated in a culture that does not countenance the status of a single woman. The unmarried state is negatively viewed since marriage, as Daniel (1980: 67) has observed, "provides the structured setting" for the elimination of "rumors of promiscuity," and protects women from "the watchful eyes of men." Young and attractive single women and widows are particularly vulnerable to public scrutiny and suspicions of sexual misconduct. Christian women describe an unmarried woman as *"pothuppen"* (common or shared woman), her unattached and unbounded body signalling her use as public property by men who wish to take advantage of her.

A 48-year-old Syrian Christian woman who was widowed at the young age of 27 married seven years later to avoid the ignominy and ostracism of widowhood. In explaining her decision to remarry, she insisted that a woman without a husband is "nothing," since a woman's social identity comes from having a husband. Her concerns are not unfounded as other Christian women who knew her described her as a "beautiful, independent, socialite" to whom her present husband (a widower) had been attracted long before the death of his sick wife. Another young widow of 42, described herself as "attractive" and painted a gloomy picture of her life as a recluse, watched and "gossiped" about by her community and neigbours, and blamed for her involuntary independence which widowhood had thrust upon her. She believed that young, attractive widows are expected to present a docile demeanour, to dress plainly and to restrict themselves as much as possible to the private space of their home. While she is employed as a teacher and is the sole supporter of her three school-going children, she is convinced that even her educated colleagues at the school expected her to dress down and be inconspicuous on special public occasions. In contrast to the widow, the ideal married woman among Christians, as among Indians in general, must display "beauty of face, clarity of eyes, luminescence of skin, dress, jewelry and comportment which are markers of the auspicious married state" (Hancock, 1995: 918).

Beauty, or skin colour as its surrogate, is also a threat to male freedom and the social hierarchies of caste and class through boundary-crossing, cross-caste/class sexual encounters or marriages. Thus, individually contracted marriages, as opposed to marriages arranged by parents, are called "love marriages" and are viewed as "immoral" since they are assumed to be based purely on physical appearances rather than on the explicit individual and collective attributes that are believed to make a marriage firm, creating strong and lasting affinity (*bendam* among affines—*bendakkarar).* More importantly, "love marriages" are also popularly associated with cross-caste or inter-communal marriages. Through the institution of the "arranged marriage," women are allowed to transcend the "dissolutionary pull" of erotic sexuality (see Zacharias, 1994: 40) and realize the ideals of transcendent "wifehood" and "motherhood." Christian Women themselves, view the arranged marriage as a life saver, since it would help even dark and unattractive women to get married. Besides, there is always the dowry to compensate for any physical shortcomings in a girl. They believe that left to her own devices, an unattractive female would be forced to live a life of inauspicious solitude as an unmarried woman. Anantakrishna Aiyer (1926: 77) had noted that among the Christians belonging to the Jacobite denomination, "a girl is never left unmarried. Even a deaf, dumb and blind girl must get married, because girls receive no share of the parent's property except marriage dowry."

Arranged marriages among Syrian Christians follow specific marriage rules and selection criteria in regard to prospective partners. Unlike other Dravidian communities such as the Latin Catholics of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, Syrian Christians do not practise bilateral cross-cousin marriage and other kinds of close-kin marriages. Explaining cross-cousin marriage in South India, Cecilia Busby (1995: 22) questions Dumont's insistence on alliance and affinity as the defining principles of preferential cross-cousin marriages. Busby offers an explanation of cross-cousin marriages based on South Indian notions of shared substances that are contingent on gendered links (e.g., transmission from mother to daughter). Her argument is that marriage rules are based on prior considerations of marriageability. Thus cross cousins are non-sharers of bodily substances and are ideal marriage partners, while parallel cousins are sharers and are prohibited as marriage partners. However, while Syrian Christians do entertain the notion of gendered links based on shared substances as in the mother/daughter relationship, these ideas are not the basis of their marital preferences. Syrian Christians prohibit both types of marriages, and their marital norms are analogous to the North Indian pattern of *sapinda* exogamy, which prohibits the marriage of all "near relatives by birth" (Trautmann, 1981: 246). The ideal prohibited degree of marriageability among the Syrian Christians is five degrees on the mother's side and seven degrees on the father's side. This rule is sometimes breached by the *Knanaya* Christians, given their group endogamy within a numerically smaller marriage pool. Syrian Christians also practise clan (house or *veedus*) exogamy which means that individuals who share the same house names (*veedu peyer*) are prohibited from marrying.

Latin Catholics follow the Dravidian pattern of preferential bilateral cross-cousin marriages which are directed by practical concerns as much as categorical preferences. For instance, the restrictive connubial rules of the Syrian Catholics against marriage with Latin Catholics as well as the higher dowries transacted by Syrian Christians encourage cross-cousin marriage among the Latins. While Catholics and Protestants seldom marry, and there is a preference for intra-denominational marriages within each of the Catholic and Protestant sects, this preference may be overlooked to accept inter-denominational marriages within the same caste. Women who marry outside their denominations join the denominations of their husbands and must pay the required compensation to their natal churches.

Marriage arrangements also take into account the collective attributes and achievements of families (i.e., lineage or pedigree as reflected in "house names" or *veedu payer*, family reputation, kinship connections, caste, wealth, class status and titles) and the individual attributes and achievements of the prospective partners (e.g., professional and educational qualifications, reputation, appearance, mental and physical health). Daniel, a 19-year-old described his expectation of his future wife thus: "she must be educated, city-bred, smart and able to accompany me to social events and must know what I want." He insisted, however, that she must not be a working woman. Most Christian families emphasize and invest in the education of daughters (Kerala has a high rate of literacy for India, over 70% for females and 80% for males) not so much to increase her economic autonomy or independence within marriage as to maximize her chances of securing a good match for her (see Chacko, 2003). Few young men today are interested in a girl with little education, unless she can compensate materially with a good dowry or good looks. In many instances, however, educated Christian women, particularly in the professions, pay high dowries since they have to compete for equally or better qualified grooms in the right age and status group. The "marriage squeeze" (Billig, 1992) in Kerala is the result of the short supply of grooms in the right age and marriageable category and not the result of a shortage of grooms overall. Educated women are at a disadvantage when competing against women with attractive dowries but little education, or women with "good looks," but the marital success of all these women depend on the criteria emphasized by the grooms and their families during marriage negotiations. For instance, when Peter, a Knanayite Protestant was arranging the marriage of his second daughter, who is a dentist, to an engineer, his future son-in-law was getting "many offers of high dowries," much higher than the Indian Rupees of 100 000 that Peter was able to offer for his daughter. Eventually, the groom's family chose Peter's daughter over the others, as more consideration was given to his daughter's professional status and earning potential besides the dowry.

Women entering marriage have also to meet the gender specific expectations of ideal "wifehood" and "motherhood." The ideal wife and mother is expected to be chaste, pious, devoted and respectful to her husband, while the ideal mother is the self-sacrificing woman who keeps a good house and looks after the moral upbringing of her children. As Mathew, a 60-year-old Syrian Catholic lawyer described it: "Obedience is a wifely virtue, which reflects culture and upbringing. Obedience is a reflection of wifely love and devotion." Traditional families are harsh in judging, as negative types, women who are quarrelsome, who are in careers that are deemed inappropriate

for women (e.g., beautician, nursing), and who are locked in natal family disputes.

Christians believe that a prospective bride's appearance and moral character can be deduced from her mother's looks and character, for as Das (1988:205) has noted, "resemblance and non-resemblance are means of positing connectedness, continuation and contiguity" (Busby, 1995). Mothers and daughters are related in specifically gendered ways (Fruzzeti and Ostor, 1976 on Bengali kinship) and this connection extends to the sharing of physical and moral characteristics which define the female self or personhood and influences the marriage prospects of daughters. For instance, since prospective marital partners among Syrian Christians rarely meet until dowry negotiations have been completed, the "mother's looks" serve as an indicator of the prospective bride's "looks." Phillippose confirmed this point when he said that during the marriage proposal for his son, the latter made discrete inquiries about the prospective mother-in-law's "looks" because he wanted "a fair, slim girl whose mother was also fair and slim." Marrying a "fair" woman would ensure the fair complexion of the future female generations. Women are also believed to be the repositories of good or bad moral behaviour, and the producers and transmitters of positive/negative moral traits to their children, particularly to daughters. Cruz, a Latin-Catholic retired teacher, cited a pithy adage to sum up the marital implications of mother-daughter extension: "It is easy to marry a bad girl of a good mother, but it is difficult to marry a good girl of a bad mother." Chako, a Syrian Catholic man informed me that the "girl's character, her mother's character and the character of all the women in the family" are considered when a marriage proposal is discussed. When he was seeking a bride for his son, who was an Indian Administrative Service (IAS) Officer (the highest echelon in Civil Service), one of the marriage proposals was rejected on the grounds that the mother was rumoured to have been a "flirt" as a college student, and another marriage proposal was unsuccessful because the girl's mother had delivered a baby prematurely. Thus, the perceived shortcomings of women as wives and mothers are visited on the marital prospects of their children, particularly daughters, as more of the same is expected of the daughter. For the sake of their daughter's future women would steer clear of conjugal conflicts and disputes over property shares in their natal families even when inheritance or dowry practices are disadvantageous to them.

The marriage prospects of a woman also depend on the marital status of her sisters. Chako noted that the presence of an unmarried older sister in the family does not bode well for the marital prospects of the younger sister as questions are raised about family reputation, stability and the likelihood of genetic flaws. Similarly, the type of marriage of one sister can affect the marriage prospects of her female siblings. When Peter's (previous example) elder daughter married a Hindu Nair she was excommunicated by the *Knanaya* Protestant Church, Peter and his wife worried that their second daughter's chances of contracting a good marriage were ruined by their older daughter's mismatched, interreligious and intercaste marriage. The professional qualifications of their second daughter, however, proved to be more important to the groom's family than their older daughter's love marriage to a Hindu Nair.

Appearance and skin colour are desirable attributes more for a bride than for her groom and are taken into consideration during marriage and dowry negotiations (see Visvanathan, 1989: 134), although some women do look for appearance and personality in a prospective groom, in addition to his job and qualifications. Lizzy Simon, a Syrian Catholic woman in her mid-thirties, pointed out that she had always wanted to marry a "fair, good looking man." She considered herself to be "pretty" and believed that "if the girl marries a boy who is dark and not good-looking, people will laugh at the couple." In the end, she did not marry a "fair, good-looking man" because her preferences were dismissed in the light of other more favourable qualities that her parents found in their future son-in-law. Lizzy's experience is typical of women's situation in general, for as Beteille (1968: 175) has noted, "the matching of looks," or even the preference for "physical features of a particular kind," is only "marginally important...other things being equal;" and the "dark skin may be more of a liability for a daughter than for a son." Also, as Bourdieu (1977: 68) has suggested in the case of Middle Eastern marriages, here too, the urgency of marriage for Christian women places limits on the bargaining strategies of parents and on the personal preferences of their daughters.

Pennu Kaanal (Viewing the Bride)

The ritual of *pennu kaanal* provides an interesting instance of the differential operation of colour values between men and women. Many of the elderly couples whom I met during my fieldwork, had not seen their partners until the wedding day. The arrangement of marriage was left to the parents and paternal and maternal uncles and aunts who decided the marriages of their children based on considerations of caste, family wealth and reputation (see Aiyar, 1926: 70). As couples were usually very young, even as young as 10 or 15, they were not considered

mature enough to express their preferences. Early marriages were also favoured for preventing "sexual irregularities" (Aiyar, 1926: 74) and mismatched marriages resulting from caste and communal exogamy. Skin colour and appearance would have been marginally important in the older marriages. In current marriage arrangements, prospective partners see each other in the *pennu kaanal* (bride viewing) ceremony at the bride's home, or the parish church, after the dowry negotiations have been completed. This ritual would have acquired greater currency as the practice of child marriages became illegal in the early 20th century. The marriage of cross-cousins and other close relatives would hardly warrant a formal meeting as in the case of Latin Catholics, although here too, depending on familiarity and closeness, certain formalities are to be followed. Young men now expect a personable and sociable wife and companion whose good looks can be an additional boon; thus, viewing the bride has become a necessary part of marriage arrangements.

The *pennu kaanal* ritual takes on particular meanings when considered in relation to Indian theories of vision (Babb, 1981; Osella and Osella, 1996b). The demure deportment of a prospective bride when presenting herself to "be seen" by the suitor has been described in many studies on Indian marriages. Karve (1968: 86) notes that, in the case of the North Indian ritual of *seeing*, "when the affinal kin take their first look at her face, she must keep her glance demurely lowered or her eyes entirely shut." Glancing and eye contact in Indian theories of vision, according to Osella and Osella (1996b: 195) who studied flirting encounters among young women and men in Kerala, are to be seen as "direct aggression," or "confrontation," as "an actual exchange and offer of something" (affection, hope). In the context of *pennu kaanal* what is being offered is the girl, who faces the dim prospect of being snubbed or refused by her suitor and his family. *Pennu kaanal* is thus a serious encounter, even a sombre event in which the normal rules of gender and social hierarchy are meticulously observed, unlike in the case of flirting behavior among Kerala youth, where the normal rules are subverted or transcended (Osella and Osella, 1996b on Kerala). The correct etiquette to be followed during *pennu kaanal* is for the girl to enter the room looking demure and modest in a saree; she may take a quick glance at the prospective groom if she serves him sweet meats, while he may have glanced her way when she entered the room. Few words are spoken, although in many of the cases I studied, the couples had spoken, since young men are anxious to find socially compatible wives. A male parent informed me that when his son met his future wife at the *pennu kaanal*, he "talked and talked for hours, asking her many questions." Sushila, a Syrian Marthomite with a master's degree in sociology, observed that when she met her future husband, his only conversation with her was to inform her that his future wife should not work. Questioning the groom, would be seen as "pushy" behaviour on the part of the bride. Annamma, a social worker and sociologist, whose marriage I discuss later, recalled the reactions of some of the men who had responded to the advertisement she had placed in the newspapers for prospective grooms. Although several men had answered the advertisement, they had been put off by her questioning them when she had met with them at her work place. She was considered to be "too pushy" to be a desirable partner in marriage.

The ritual of *pennu kaanal* is viewed by some Christian women as a "direct challenge or aggression" (Osella and Osella, 1996b), where the power of the *look*, the male gaze, might indicate refusal, interest or acceptance. Christian women see this as a degrading experience, but a ritual that they must go through to be married. Thus speaking of the *pennu kaanal* ceremony, Ammukutty (age 40) noted: "The woman is supposed to show herself to the man who has come to see her. She must serve him tea and refreshments and answer his questions, and then to be told that he has refused her. Even educated women must go through this humiliation." The humiliation and the shame of refusal must also be understood in relation to the act of *seeing* or *being seen* as signifying physical connection. *Seeing* and *sight* in the Hindu ritual of seeing the deity imply connection, sharing of substance, benevolence and worship (Babb, 1981). The act of seeing coincides also with the "physiological aversion to seeing dangerous things (evil eye)," as "sight is the means of contagion in primitive science" (Aiyar, 1926: 95). Thus, eye power must be contained and carefully regulated in male-female interactions. In the context of marriage, "being seen is both mandatory and dangerous" (Shirali, 1997: 66). A woman's demure countenance is necessary because, although her body is pleasing to the male gaze, it is dangerous and disruptive in its sensual and sexual aspects. Thus it is unbecoming for a woman to boldly challenge the male gaze (Shirali, 1997). The masking (modesty) and the revealing (showing the girl) of the body and glancing and lowering of eyes in the context of the ritual of *pennu kaanal* are acts whereby the female body is "feminized and sexualized" (see Vom Bruk, 1992: 182 on this point). The implied familiarity in the act of "seeing" is often controlled and managed by a change in the site of "seeing," from the familiar surroundings of the woman's home to the more formal setting of the parish church, or the home of a friend/relative. Some prospective suitors manage to

steal a glance at the proposed woman at her workplace or, if she were a student or a lecturer, at the college before the formal *pennu kaanal* ritual, since refusing a woman after the *pennu kaanal* can be embarrassing to the woman and her family. Mary John, a college lecturer threatened to resign after her marriage proposal fell through after the *pennu kaanal* since her colleagues and friends knew about the proposal and the viewing ceremony. Her family managed to persuade her to take a leave of absence instead.

Women who are turned down after the *pennu kaanal* ritual, tend to take the refusal as an indication of their unattractiveness. On the other hand, the woman's "dark skin" or "appearance" could be used as an *excuse* for rejection, especially in cases where the groom's family is dissatisfied with the dowry offered. A threat of refusal after the "viewing" may also be used as one last attempt by the groom's family to claim a higher dowry. When Betty, a Jacobite *Knanaya* Christian, attempted to arrange a marriage between her niece and her husband's nephew, the young man refused saying the girl was "dark and plain looking." Betty was not convinced since she claimed that her niece was "quite sweet"; she believed that the real reason for his refusal was because the dowry offered was lower than the dowry received by his older brother in the same year. The intended marriage of Ammani, a Syrian Marthomite and an engineer, failed to take place because her suitor's mother made one last attempt to increase the dowry from the agreed amount of Rs. 150 000. Ammani's family saw this as an indication of "money mindedness" on the part of the suitor's family and called off the engagement after the *pennu kaanal*. When we met soon after, Ammani was confused about the young man's passive reaction to his family's demands since she had a pleasant conversation with him during the viewing. She was convinced that he had not found her attractive enough to persuade his family to reconsider their demands. A few months after "viewing" Ammani, the man married a non-working and high-school graduate who offered a much bigger dowry.

Colour and the Negotiation of Dowry

Davis (1997: 386) has remarked that marital selection is a great deal more than birth or caste considerations and "involve a trade, a reciprocity which ensures a certain kind of equality by balancing between the two mates all the qualities which enters into the calculation of marital advantage ... achievement, beauty, intelligence, youth and wealth." In emphasizing the role of fair skin as one criterion of marriage, I would argue that "colour" becomes part of the symbolic capital, to use Bourdieu's (1977) term, in marriage considerations. Lionel Caplan (1987: 117) takes a similar approach in his analysis of marriage and dowry among urban Christians in Madras City (now Chennai) in Tamil Nadu. Using Bourdieu's ideas on marriage as a game of cards, in which the "outcome depends on the deal, the cards held (i.e., material and symbolic capital), and the players' skill, Caplan analyses Christian marriages in the context of class, caste, dowry and family reputation as well as the personal merits and demerits of prospective spouses. However, marriage, as Caplan (1987) has also argued, does not favour the players equally. It affects men and women differently and favours some women over others, depending on their individual attributes and the collective merits of their families.

The role of colour and appearance in arranged marriages is situational, variable and discriminatory, and it does not operate in the same way in every marriage or influence the outcome or success of all marriage negotiations. A light-skin colour and "good looks" can be used to compensate for what Lenski (1954) has called "status inconsistencies" in cross-caste marriages, as well as inadequate dowry, lack of education or employment. Conversely, larger dowries may be demanded from women without education, employment, and women who are considered to be dark or unattractive. Daughters and daughters-in-law are unequally favoured in the allocation of dowry payments by their natal families while dowry differences among sisters-in-law (*nathoonmar)* within an affinal household can be the source of jealousy and conflict, especially if a woman of fair-skin colour carries a lower dowry than one who is dark skinned (see Bumiller, 1990: 54 for a similar point). The dowry may also reflect the balancing of spousal attributes in marital negotiations. Rosie, a *Knanayite* woman, received a higher dowry than her younger sister who married 14 years later. Rosie married into a "prestigious family" and had to take a dowry befitting the status of the groom's family, but her sister married at a late age and the only son in a family of four daughters and modest means. Rosie observed that her sister was "not good looking and was not educated," while her brother-in-law who being the only brother of many sisters could not have found a better match.

The dowry amounts have increased significantly from the nominal cash dowries that were paid in the past (see Anantakrishna Aiyar, 1926). Family wealth, family name and reputation were the main considerations in the past, and the dowry was matched with the inheritance of the groom. Liza, a Marthomite woman, noted, "in those days it was a case of getting the right connections more than a question of money." With the expansion of the urban Christian middle class, educational qualifications, earning

power and jobs in the urban employment sector, and ownership of urban property have become essential requirements for both men and women in the marriage market. The financial burden has now shifted exclusively to the bride's family in contrast to the past when both families shared it equally by matching the bride's dowry with the groom's inheritance. Although the practice of dowry was made illegal in 1961 by legislation for all of India the practice continues among Kerala Christians, and indeed in every part of India, as a compulsory part of marriage transactions (Philips, 2003). However, Kerala in general has been spared some of the more abhorrent practices associated with dowry, such as the frequently reported "dowry deaths," mostly in the northern parts of India.[7]

The dowry in arranged marriages is an indication of the relative status and standing of the families of the bride and groom. The offer of a dowry below expectations may be an assertion of superiority of the bride givers over the bride takers; it could equally convey the unequal treatment of a daughter by her natal family. The offer of a dowry above expectations, on the other hand, becomes a favourite subject of community gossip and insinuation that the large dowry is being used to "marry off" a girl who is either dark, unattractive, or "sickly," or has some dubious attribute. Among Syrian Christians in particular, there are strict conventions regarding the appropriate dowries to be given and received by families of particular status groups and marriage circles. While many traditional families still adhere to these conventions and reject offers of exceedingly high dowries for their sons or the high dowry demands made by prospective suitors for their daughters, there are the "new rich" (*puthupanakkarar*), who offer large dowries to gain attractive alliances with traditional and well-known families. "Good" or "traditional families" who have seen their wealth dwindle and have only their reputation to recommend them might also attempt to get the maximum dowries for their sons, or negotiate lower dowries for their daughters.

Varghese, an 85-year-old respected scholar belonging to the Marthomite denomination, took pride in the fact that he had successfully "married off" his six daughters to Syrian Christian men of good standing. He was not a wealthy man but belonged to a lineage of educated families. He considered all of his daughters to be "very beautiful" with the additional qualification of being educated and employed. He used them as trade-offs to give modest dowries at their marriages, compared to the dowries offered by other families of the same status and the high dowries his sons received for their marriages. The one exception was his third daughter who had only a tenth grade education and was not employed. He used her "good looks" to negotiate a dowry he could afford, but he still had to pay a higher dowry for her compared to her older sisters, and had "to settle for less" in marrying her to an army officer even though he did not meet the family's expectations for an educated groom. In the case of his sons, on the other hand, Varghese exploited their professional qualifications to secure high dowries for them. One of his sons, a doctor, married a woman with a serious heart condition. The Varghese family chose to ignore the woman's health because she was from a wealthy and prominent Syrian Christian family, not to mention the impressive dowry of a substantial cash amount and partnership for the groom in the father-in-law's medical business.

There are other instances where large dowries and/or family status have been instrumental in "marrying-off" women who are considered to be dark, unattractive or unhealthy. Cherian, a Syrian Christian college lecturer, described his sister, who had a grade 12 education, as being "neither fair nor pretty." The family had a difficult time finding a groom for her but finally arranged her marriage to a groom belonging to a Protestant denomination and holding "only a clerical job" in the Middle East, for a relatively high dowry of Rs. 80 000 in 1984. Thomas, a Syrian Catholic, related the case of his nephew (his sister's son) who first refused to marry his present wife as she was "rather dark." Thomas's sister prevailed on her son to agree to the marriage, noting "what is the harm if the girl is dark, all that will be of no account with three lakhs of rupees in the bank."

The colour and physical appearances of prospective spouses can affect marriage choices and dowry payments in other interesting ways. Achamma is a 70-year-old Syrian Catholic widow and the mother of 14 children, 13 daughters and one son. When the oldest daughter's marriage to her son-in-law was being arranged, her daughter was not "impressed with his looks because he was bald and looked old." But the groom was attracted to her daughter who "was very beautiful." Achamma managed to persuade her daughter to marry him because he was from a good family and did not insist on dowry. Achamma gave a token dowry of 40 gold sovereigns. Her second daughter, a doctor, married a Syrian Christian doctor working in the United States. He had come looking for a bride in his native Kerala and had wanted "a girl of good character" and "good looks" but was not concerned about dowry. Achamma gave this daughter a token dowry of 40 sovereigns as well. She believed that her daughters' good looks had worked to their advantage since marrying them off would have been a daunting task given her rather modest wealth. Achamma's only son married outside his caste, the

circumstances of which are described later on in this section.

Dowries are comparatively lower among the strictly endogamous *Knanayite* community because of the smaller marriage pool and the lower achievement level of this community in the professions. But communal endogamy has certain practical advantages insofar as unattractive women or women lacking competitive dowries can be married into families with previous marriage connections. Peter, a *Knanayite* college lecturer, whose daughter's marriage to a Hindu Nair was previously mentioned, described how he and his wife had managed to persuade one of his younger brothers to marry his present wife, whom his brother perceived as being "too thin and sickly." The bride's family was distantly connected to them through marriage and Peter and his wife had insisted that "a known family is better than an unknown one." The bride's mother was a widow and had little to offer as dowry. The marriage was an ideal arrangement as it did not contravene the rules of clan exogamy. On the other hand, in the case of Peter's brother's daughter Nirmala, who married her cross-cousin Arjuna (Peter's sister's son), a special dispensation was granted by the Jacobite Syrian Church, since this was a marriage that broke the rule of *sapinda* exogamy, which prohibits the marriage of near relatives by birth. This "wrong marriage" was permitted on "sympathetic grounds," for the bride had no dowry, she was well passed the age of 35 and her widowed mother had difficulty getting her daughters married. Arjuna was not educated and was also unable to find "a good match" within the community.

Latin Catholic women, unlike their Syrian Catholic and Christian counterparts, have strong inheritance rights in land and houses which are often given as dowry at their marriages. However, compared to dowries in the Syrian community, the dowry amounts are low. I attribute this to communal/caste endogamy and close-kin marriages. But here too, wealth and appearance can be used as bargaining counters in inter-status, inter-caste and inter-community marriages. Daisy Das is a Latin Catholic woman whose daughter married a rich contractor from Tamil Nadu, the region bordering Kerala. Daisy described her son-in-law as "very dark, but rich." His main requirement for a bride was that she should be "fair and good looking." Her daughter fitted this description and Daisy and her husband were overjoyed that they could get a wealthy son-in-law for their daughter since they had little wealth to offer as dowry or inheritance.

Intercaste marriages involving Syrian and Latin Catholic families illustrate the playing out of caste, dowry and colour/appearance in specific marriage arrangements. Lilly, a Latin Catholic teacher, married Thomas, a Syrian Jacobite, who became a Catholic to marry Lilly. Lilly is from a wealthy Latin family claiming "Nair caste origins." Lilly referred to her mother as a "fair lady," who was pressured to marry a "dark man" (Lilly's father), because he was a doctor in Malaysia. Lilly described herself as "very dark and not good looking unlike my other family members." She made many references to her skin colour during our conversations, particularly since her husband, who is also a teacher, is of a light complexion. He was referred to as *"veluzha"* (fair) man by their neighbour who directed my field assistant and myself to their home. My research assistant, who is a Nair woman, was frankly surprised at the "colour- mis-matching" of Lilly and Thomas, since this was also a cross-caste marriage. Lilly made no secret of the fact that her husband, Thomas, married her for her dowry, which was 100 sovereigns in jewelry and Rs. 10 000 in cash, a substantial dowry in 1959. She went on to suggest that "Syrians are very money-minded, demand high dowries, and would marry Latins who are willing to provide high dowries."

Achamma's (the Syrian woman with 14 children) only son Joseph, is an officer in the prestigious Indian Administrative Service (IAS), and he married the daughter of Stephen, a wealthy Latin Catholic politician from the *Mukkuwar* (fishing) caste. Stephen, Joseph's father-in-law, is a self-made man, who rose from humble beginnings to establish lucrative businesses in the export of fish and in the hotel industry. His wife (Joseph's mother-in-law), is an attractive Syrian Catholic woman and the daughter of a young, impoverished widow, who is described in the community as a "fair, pretty widow of ill repute," who had difficulty getting her children married into respectable families within the Syrian-Catholic community. Stephen's marriage to her daughter provided him with the credentials he needed to claim Syrian connections, while his wife, an attractive woman like her mother became the respected spouse of an enterprising businessmen and prominent politician in Kerala. It was rumoured that Stephen had deliberately prevented his daughter from marrying a Latin man of her choice so that he could arrange her marriage to Joseph, Achamma's son. He dangled the carrot of a large dowry before Achamma and her family: a cash component of Rs. 100 000, shares in a restaurant, a new house, jewellery, etc. Although this marriage was a cross-caste marriage, there were exceptional circumstances that influenced their decision to cross caste boundaries. Stephen's reputation as an influential politician and the impressive dowry that was being offered were hard to resist and Achamma and her husband had been willing to overlook

caste, for as Achamma put it, "these days, class is more important than caste." They were, however, disturbed by Stephen's claim to respectability through their son's prestigious job as a civil servant. Subsequently, when a Latin IAS officer who was a friend of her son was attracted to one of Achamma's daughters and proposed marriage to her, Achamma could not refuse his request as her son's marriage had already set a precedent. No less important was the suitor's prestigious job as a civil servant. However, Achamma refused to give more than Rs. 30 000 as dowry, provoking the groom's father to remark "even a fisherman would get that much." Generally in Syrian/Latin marriages, Syrian families have an advantage over Latin families in that they can negotiate lower dowries for their daughters, using superior caste status as well as fair skin and appearance as trade-offs. In contrast, Latin women, whom the Syrians consider to be darker in complexion and of inferior caste status, must pay high dowries to marry Syrian men. Thus, while cross-caste marriages endanger the caste purity of families, there are circumstances such as these when caste rules are breached to offset disadvantages in dowry, and/or when occupation and political and class connections confer advantages to traditionally wealthy families such as Achamma's whose economic circumstances have changed.

The example of Annamma (previously cited) presents a unique instance of a cross-caste marriage. Annamma is a 30-year-old Syrian Catholic from a "good family." She is employed as a social welfare officer and insisted, as a matter of principle, on marrying without a dowry. Her parents worried that their daughter would remain single as all arranged marriages involve a dowry transaction even as a formality. Annamma is strikingly beautiful, educated, employed and independent. She placed an advertisement in the papers, calling for prospective suitors who would be willing to forego dowry. She interviewed the applicants at her workplace, most of whom described her as being "too smart," "independent," "pushy" and "frank." Her eventual husband, a Latin Catholic, had answered the advertisement while on one of his brief vacations from the Middle East where he was working as a technician. Annamma's mother-in-law informed me that her son had refused a number of marriage proposals from his own community because he found the dowries offered to be inadequate, since "Gulf returnees" as they are called, can often demand high dowries. After his meeting with Annamma, however, her son dropped the dowry issue and decided to marry Annamma because "he was attracted by her good looks and intelligence." Annamma's insistence on a dowryless marriage resulted in her marriage outside her community, but it is a moot point whether her fair skin and good looks, or her Syrian caste status, influenced the marriage choice of her Latin Catholic husband. Perhaps it was a little of both, whereas for her other unwilling suitors, her good looks were not enough to mitigate her independent character or her insistence on a marriage without dowry.

Discussion

This paper considered skin colour, in its many manifestations as beauty, health and moral conduct, as a symbolic artefact marking the boundaries of castes and communities, defining feminine-gender identity, and influencing marriage and dowry transactions. Skin colour, as a communal and gender marker is indeed a "social myth" (Wolfe, 1962) perpetuated by society and imposed almost exclusively on women and not on men. Colour values are also differentially applied to women, depending on their relative position in caste and communal hierarchies. Whereas upper-caste women are expected to exhibit the ideal body type, i.e., fair skin, black and straight hair, and a healthy body, women of the lower castes and communities must carry the burden of being excluded from such culturally desirable physical traits. Although colour variations between and within communities exist, women are defined by qualities that are considered "essential" to different groups, and gender becomes fragmented at the boundaries of caste and sub-communal identities.

The cultivation of sexual differences as Sylviame Agacinski (1998) has noted, involves both embellishments and exaggerations of the body. For women, these embellishments are particularly important as they accentuate the health and beauty of their bodies and enhance their sexuality, marriageability and reproductive potential. Body embellishments take the form of jewellery and clothing that mark the life-cycle stages of women while also operating as significations of individual differences and collective identities. They also include brand-named beauty products that flood the Indian market, equating "fairness with beauty" and advertising beauty as the means to both employment and marriage.

The ideal woman is not only the beautiful woman (fair, moral, healthy), but one whose sexual, erotic and disruptive sides are muted, concealed and contained within the secure confines of marriage and male attachment. While beautiful women are sensual and pleasing to the male gaze and are desirable as marriage partners, beauty in its sensual and sexual meanings poses a threat to the caste and communal hierarchies of Christian society. The arranged marriage and the dowry system allow Christian women to transcend the negative associations of this dual image of themselves while also allowing them to over-

come the limitations of colour impediments and physical imperfections.

Marriage makes a woman socially visible, but her social identity through marriage must be secured through her physical visibility (desirability) and material endowment in the form of dowry or inheritance. A woman's prospects in the marriage market are thus dependent on the extent to which she embodies the desired cultural qualities of ideal womanhood, in addition to her material worth and her individual achievements. Women are thus defined by their individuality and by their gender positioning and the two are mutually constructed. Fair-skin colour, in its multiple manifestations as femininity, morality and health, is tied to marriageability and conjugality, and hence to motherhood and gender identity.

Skin colour, as symbolic capital, is one attribute among many others that is used in marriage and dowry bargaining. Dowry is the monetary measure of a woman's *value* as a person and as a representative of her caste, class, or community, and mirrors her degree of conformity to cultural ideals of beauty and other attributes of feminine gender identity. Despite the high educational achievements of Kerala Christian women, there has been no dramatic reduction in the dowry that even educated women should put up to get married (see Philips, 2003). A woman must also be pleasing to men's eyes, and since the opportunity is seldom given for prospective couples in an arranged marriage to socialize in any meaningful way, physical appearance operates as one criterion in the list of attributes underlying the selection of a bride. It is not the only measure of marriageability, however, and the cases I have described reveal the ways in which colour operates in Christian marriage arrangements.

Colour values are an intrinsic part of constructions of female sexuality and femininity; and the "ideal woman" and the "ideal physical type" are defined synonymously in Kerala Christian cultural constructions. Such constructions inevitably result in divisions among women based on the degree of conformity to such cultural ideals. Christians' preference for fair skin works to the advantage of certain categories of women by positioning them for better marital outcomes but they are not necessarily the victors in the marital game. On the other hand, social norms that compel women from supposedly "superior" communities to display the ideal beauty standards and corresponding attributes that define their superior status, tend to marginalize other women who fall short of the expected standards. They lead to the "erasure"(Jayawardena and De Alwis,1996: xi) of women from other communities who are collectively excluded from similar expectations based on cultural definitions of caste identity and social placement. Thus, in Kerala and elsewhere in India, the marriage market works materially and symbolically to undermine women's status and their achievements in education and in employment.

Amali Philips, Department of Anthropology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 5C5 Canada. E-mail: aphilips@wlu.ca

Notes

1 Kerala State, located in the South West coast of India, has the largest concentration of Indian Christians (20% or 6.4 million) in a total population of 32 million and is the home of the oldest Christian community in India, i.e., the Syrian Christians who number around five million.

2 Historical and ethnographic evidence, however, challenge simplified links between "fair" skin and economic or political privilege and domination. The enslavement of fair-skinned groups was common before Africa became an alternative source for black slaves for the Mediterranean and Near Eastern slave trade (Evans, 1980, cited from Trautmann, 1997: 225). Fair-skinned Slavs were more desired as slaves by German tribesman (Smedley, 1999: 693). Slavery existed among people of colour while indentured servitude existed in parts of Europe and Britain (Robbins, 2002).

3 For a discussion of the Aryan theory of race see Cox, 1970; Robb, 1997; Thapar, 1966 and 1977; Trautmann, 1997.

4 In ayurvedic theory, illness is caused by humoral imbalances, and a healthy body requires a balance between the three humours: wind, bile and phlegm. Ayurvedic medicine involves the use of three basic treatments to increase fluidity in the body and to loosen and soften the body and its passages (Raheja, 1988): a proper diet to maintain humoral balance and a balance between heat and cold states; the application of oils and other herbal substances to the body and parts of the body that are affected by ill health, or as preventive anointment; and the ingestion of ayurvedic concoctions.

5 While a virgin bride or a widow would wear white (signifying sexually inactivity), a new bride will wear a red sari after the ritual tying of the *tali* or *minnu* by the groom. The colour red symbolizes fertility and active sexuality.

6 Menstruation results in the seclusion of the young girl, with the purificatory bath and the eating of cooling foods. Among Syrian Christians, the painting of the palms and feet with henna (*mailanchi*) serves as a means of containing body heat and neutralizing the poisons in the body and the evil spirits that might attack the body (Anantakrishna Aiyar, 1926: 95; see also Kapadia, 1995 for other South Indian communities).

7 According to a more recent study (Chacko, 2003), violence against women, dowry-related deaths and suicides among women connected to the dowry problem are on the increase in Kerala.

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Manufacturing Mammies: The Burdens of Service Work and Welfare Reform among Battered Black Women[1]

Dana-Ain Davis *Purchase College, State University of New York*

We cannot become a nation of short-order cooks and saleswomen, Xerox-machine operators and messenger boys. (Felix Rohatyn, 1981)[2]

Abstract: The impact of economic restructuring from industry to service that began in the 1970s continues to leak across cities in the United States. One outcome of restructuring has been the targeted focus of corporate interests in realizing profits. To that end, corporations have become increasingly engaged in policy issues, specifically decreased wages and deregulation. The confluence of economic restructuring, corporate interests and neo-liberal policy have converged at the lived experience of battered Black women on welfare. This paper examines the links between these broader processes that have influenced welfare reform policy, battered Black women and historically constructed images of Black women.

Keywords: welfare reform, neo-liberalism, Black women, battered women, Mammy, economic restructuring

Résumé : L'effet de la restructuration économique à partir de la manufacture jusqu'à l'industrie des services datant des années 1970 continue à se propager à travers les villes américaines. Un des résultats de cette restructuration a été une convergence des intérêts corporatifs sur la réalisation des profits. Pour ce faire, les corporations sont devenues largement impliquées dans le domaine politique, surtout en ce qui concerne la dérégulation et la diminution des salaires. La confluence de la restructuration économique, des intérêts corporatifs et de la politique néo-libérale a convergé sur l'expérience de la vie quotidienne des femmes noires abusées qui dépendent de l'assistance sociale. Le présent travail propose d'examiner les liens entre ces processus plus larges qui ont influencé la reforme de l'assistance sociale, les femmes noires abusées et des images historiquement construites des femmes noires.

Mots-clés : reforme de l'assistance sociale, néolibéralisme, femmes noires, femmes abusées, «Mammy», restructuration économique.

Introduction

Contemporary welfare reform in the U.S. has been praised by conservative policy elites for its role in disciplining the poor and reducing the numbers of people receiving public assistance and focussing on work, not welfare (Horn and Bush, 2003; O'Neil and Hill, 2003). However, outside those circles, social scientists including anthropologists have generated a considerable critical body of work emphasizing the tensions within welfare reform. They have pointed out the corrosive effects of reform in structural terms showing how it actually produces new forms of poverty and increases inequality. This is the case, they argue, in part because people on welfare must now work or engage in work-related activity—for very low or no wages—in return for assistance. For example, Goode and Maskovsky (2001) have suggested that welfare reform is flawed because it sustains inequity in two ways. The first is related to the economic context of restructuring, specifically de-industrialization, in which such policies are implemented. Economic restructuring has meant a decline in the employment options for workers as well as falling wages for those employed. The second is related to the context of the prevailing neo-liberal ideologies that pervade the design and implementation of welfare reform. The result is the devolution of the responsibility for social policy to state governments, the implementation of incoherent tax policies, and forcing people to work to alleviate poverty even though there has been a decline in real earnings. Thus, although neo-liberal policies appear to decrease "dependency" of the poor on the state, ultimately they generate new forms of inequality (Morgen and Maskovsky, 2003). Other scholars have focussed on race in their critiques, both the role it played in facilitating welfare reform's implementation as well as

the disparities it has aggravated (Davis, Aparicio et. al., 2003). These writers indeed offer a serious challenge to the merits of welfare reform often touted by policy elites. However astute such critiques are, they do not necessarily capture the complex intersection of economic restructuring, neo-liberalism, and racism on the conditions of work, living and making a living for a particular group who constitute up to 60% of welfare caseloads (Curcio, 1997; Kenney and Brown, 1996). This group is made up of people who have experienced intimate violence. They are Black women who are battered.

The goal of this article is to examine the implications that welfare reform, specifically the mandatory work policy, has for Black women who have experienced violence. The political and economic changes that have been taking place is the U.S. beg an analysis of the distinctive ways that battered Black women are triply punished by the interacting dynamics of intimate violence and public welfare policy, which skate on racism. Battered Black women have been pressured to participate in work or work related programs that are dead-end, precarious and low-status, that do little to enable them to move out of the traps of poverty and violence, and to achieve economic security and independence from abusive partners. I will argue that there are consequences from the interplay of the proliferation of negative racial images, neo-liberal social policy and, the effects of de-industrialization on a local labour market. In exploring the relationship between these domains I argue furthermore that welfare reform work mandates have resuscitated one particular historical image of Black women—"Mammy," a derogatory image that has been mapped on to Black women. I raise two questions in this article. First, to what extent is this historical construct of Black women contemporarily reproduced in the context of welfare reform? Second, what are the material disadvantages of this construct for battered Black women as they navigate welfare reform? To address these questions, my discussion focusses on the impact of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), known as welfare reform, on battered women. PRWORA is the act that ended assistance as a federal entitlement for poor and working poor people. Through the PRWORA a new program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), was ushered in along with the imposition of time-limited assistance and rapid entrée of welfare recipients into approved workforce participation activity. I address these questions using a critical race analysis.

A Critical Race Analysis

With the exception of Josephson (2002) few scholars have attempted analyses of battered women and welfare reform from a racial perspective. Moreover, few have looked beyond the physical violence that poor Black women experience to include an analysis of the materiality of structural violence. By this I mean that few authors have problematized the relationship between de-industrialization, neo-liberalism and racism. To remedy this gap, I will first argue that there is a confluence between current social policies influenced by economic shifts, neo-liberalism, and racism. Second, I explore, using my research, the question of how welfare policy mandates draw on stereotypes of Black women through what I call "mute racism" that circumscribes Black women's access to economic security and independence. Although I discuss mute racism below, I want to clarify here that it is a covert form of racism, a vehicle through which racial tensions and hierarchies are articulated and sustained. Mute racism may be expressed in a verbal and/or non-verbal communicative exchange that indexes race—generating a type of racial profiling without using racial terms, but rather using associations whose meanings are understood to be raced by those involved in the interaction. Labelling is one form of mute racism. To illustrate, the label "teenage mother" opportunistically profiles a young Black woman. Another example of a label that profiles race and attaches particular types of work, abilities or statuses to racial/ethnic groups is "migrant worker" associated with Mexicans and illegal immigrant status. One final example germane to this discussion is the term "welfare queen" or "welfare mother," indices for race without direct reference to race, but nonetheless understood to represent a poor Black woman receiving public assistance.

My research with battered Black women on welfare reveals another example of muted racism manifested in the implementation of welfare reform's mandatory work policy, which has become a prominent feature of neo-liberal governance in U.S. social welfare programs. This is the image of the Mammy. As Black women are coerced into low-status jobs in the low-wage service sector in order to receive benefits, the work they tend to do conforms to distorted ideas about the traditional occupational roles historically filled by Black women. This dynamic as I will show resuscitates the Mammy.

The Research

This article draws on 23 months of research at Angel House, a shelter for battered women in New York State where I began fieldwork in February 1998. The project examined various dimensions of the lives of Black battered women on welfare just as welfare reform was being implemented nationally. Fieldwork took place in an area which

I refer to as River Valley County, in the city of Laneville, New York. River Valley County is located in the Upstate Region of New York and has over 280 000 residents of whom 84% are White. River Valley residents live in one of over 20 municipalities, including the city of Laneville, which has a population of nearly 30 000 and is where most of the county's Black population resides.

Participant observation was conducted and life histories were collected from 22 women, of whom 13 were Black, 4 White, 3 Latina, 1 Asian, and 1 Indian out of a total shelter population of 125 (see Davis, forthcoming).[3] Participants were self-selected and all had applied for social services to ensure payment to the shelter. Whether or not a woman has previously received social services, in New York she must apply or reapply for assistance. If an applicant is eligible for assistance, shelters submit requests to the Department of Social Services for reimbursement of a per diem rate to cover the cost of the client's shelter stay. Through this process eligible women living in shelters are able to secure food stamps, Medicaid, cash and housing assistance which often facilitates their ability to leave their batterers. These supports are available during the maximum 90-day shelter stay and often continue after departure. The average age of the interviewees was between 30 and 39 years old and the average income, upon shelter entry, was less than $9 999. Fourteen of the women were single when they arrived at the shelter and 13 had children. While 17 women had achieved a high school diploma or higher, Black women were more likely to have had a high school degree or some vocational training than Latina, White and women of other ethnic backgrounds. In addition to the 22 interviews with battered women, 40 interviews were conducted with 8 community residents, 19 battered women's and poor people's advocates, and 13 professional staff of public agencies such as the River Valley County Department of Social Services (RVCDSS) and the New York State Department of Labor. Of the public agency staff and advocates interviewed, all but five were White.

This article is organized into four sections. The first explores how Black women have been imagined in U.S. ideology and examines four prevailing stereotypes; "Jezebel," "Mammy," "matriarch" and "welfare queen." Discussion of these images will serve as the theoretical context used to critique welfare reform policy. The second section attempts to draw out the logic of neo-liberalism in relation to economic restructuring. The expansion of the service sector with its need for workers feeds the idea that the market place is the most effectual sphere to address social problems like poverty. It is within this logic that specific forms of Black women's work rests in balance. The third section provides the ethnographic background of River Valley County the research site. Here I examine the impact of de-industrialization on River Valley as it paved the way for exploiting poor Black battered women. In the fourth section I consider how the Mammy is manufactured in the localized context of River Valley and offer several case examples to illustrate the process by which she is produced. I conclude with a discussion of why the Mammy image is an ideological framework through which to understand the basis and bias of mandatory work programs.

Theorizing Images of Black Women: Jezebels, Mammies, Matriarchs and Welfare Queens

Four stereotypes have cloaked Black women since the 19th century; each in some way representing public imaginings of Black women's failure as women. The stereotypes are the Jezebel, the Mammy, the matriarch and the welfare queen. Stereotypes typically are deployed as a form of control; a mechanism marking members of a group as "other." These public representations have essentially functioned to justify Black women's exploitation, maintaining gendered/racial subjugation. Jezebel is a construction describing lascivious and seductive women but actually reveals and rationalizes the sexual violence to which Black women were subjected during slavery. The Mammy, envisioned as an older Black woman, also has her origins in the slave economy and evolved from late 19th-century fiction as a capable, valuable character. However, she acquired repugnant characteristics in the visual media which typecast Black women as defeminized and performing menial services for Whites (Jewell, 1983). The matriarch is the middle-aged Black woman who severely emasculates men with her dominant and aggressive behaviour. This image "came to life" in Moynihan's report, The Negro Family (1965) and was the impetus for policy agendas directed toward "fixing" the problems of poverty and the matriarchal Black family in the 60s and 70s. Finally, the welfare queen and/or welfare mother represents Black women's failure as "productive" members of society. Welfare queen was a phrase originally used by the Chicago press to describe one woman, apparently imaginary, who managed to live a lavish lifestyle while collecting welfare checks. The welfare mother simply produces children while receiving government money. This image, although fictitious, became ingrained in the national psyche when presidential candidate Ronald Reagan grossly exaggerated one Black woman's fraudulent actions.[4] Despite the fiction, the terms "welfare queen" and mother established for the public an association between Black

women and welfare use, situating them as cheaters of the welfare system, presumably living better than the White working class. The term has been egregiously appended onto almost all Black women on welfare who are viewed as "lazy, breeding machines, living off the largesse of the state" (Roberts, 1997: 17).

There are a number of ways to organize these images revealing their persistence and the harm they have done to Black women. The most general formulation is to historicize the stereotypical images from slavery to the 20th century, each one's emergence corresponding to a period of heightened anxiety about Black women's role in U.S. society. Organized in this way, we see an ideological evolution of Black women's representation that directly correlates with U.S. racial and economic relations. Legislated forms of racism in the 19th century and a slave economy motivated the genesis of the Jezebel and the Mammy as "degenerate sexual others" (James, 1999: 140). Whereas positioning Black women as libidinous Jezebels rationalized and comforted uneasiness about sexual abuse, the ascription of asexuality to the Mammy was an ideal counter-image that rectified "slavery's racial intimacy" (Morton, 1991: 10) and pacified gender and racial anxiety that Whites felt. Products of the industrial and postindustrial economies, the matriarch and welfare queen have been positioned, respectively, as emasculating and, economically non-productive. Societal angst about the constitution of the Black family unit and Black women's role as heads of household are reflected through these stereotypes since they are considered to be non-normative.

A second schema considers a life-stage trajectory of Black women's images. Across the lifespan, from young to old, the stereotypes would be Jezebel, welfare queen, matriarch and Mammy. This order cumulatively casts Black women as dysfunctional both historically and throughout their own life cycles; hypersexual in youth, economically incompetent as adults, toxic as middle age women and desexualized as older women. Thus, from adolescence to menopause, Black women are afflicted by pathology. A third schematic organization is to place the images in dyads representative of temporal shifts in nomenclature and conflicting assessments of similar characteristics. In the Jezebel/welfare queen (mother) dyad sexuality and reproduction are the thread connecting both. Sexual licentiousness attributed to the Jezebel is a necessary adjunct to her reproductive potential, which was deemed important to the slave economy based on the need for her offspring. Alternatively, in the industrial and postindustrial economy, the supposed hyper-fertility of the welfare queen/mother is problematic. The other dyad is the Mammy and the matriarch where the former is revered as the ideal caregiver while the latter is castigated for caregiving in the absence of a male partner. While both are motherly, their status is differentiated according to the house in which nurturing takes place, the White household or their own. Although the matriarch cares for her own family, the Mammy is always a caregiver for others, most commonly for White children.

Despite the degrading connotations associated with each of these figures, in this paper, I will argue that the Mammy may be viewed as a corrective to all of the other images of Black women, particularly the Jezebel and welfare queen/mother images. She is the most redemptive of the four and, in fact, holds the most promise for the service economy—the economic context of welfare reform.

Welfare Reform, Welfare Programs and Battered Black Women

When President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996 (PRWORA or the Act) a number of changes occurred including; reassignment of welfare program administration from the federal to the state level. The Act also dismantled a former program used primarily by poor women and children, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and instituted a temporary program called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and developed a program for single adults called Safety Net. The Act imposed five-year lifetime limits on the receipt of TANF and strict and extensive employment obligations on adult recipients of benefits (Nathan and Gais, 1999). Receipt of assistance became contingent upon a number of conditions, one of which is the focus of this article, participation in mandatory work and work related activities. Work activity may include employment for wages, being assigned to public service sector work sites (such as parks and food pantries) to work off benefits, and attending vocational training or other programs leading to work such as substance use and job readiness programs.

While historically the U.S. has been the least generous welfare state of any advanced industrial democracy (Huber and Stephens, 1999: 10), it is here that stiff eligibility for welfare programs has been ideologically driven along gender and racial lines (Howard, 1999; Mink, 1990; Mink, 1998). Major revisions in welfare law, notably diversion of public funding from social welfare programs to reliance on market-based strategies for dealing with poverty represent new forms of gender control, especially over single mothers, who constitute the largest percent of adults needing assistance. Control through social welfare policy is exaggerated through Black women who,

as others have shown, have been denied assistance since 1935 when welfare policy was institutionalized (Fraser and Gordon, 1994) and stigmatized since the 1960s (Quadagno, 1984). This stigma has continued and facilitated passage of PRWORA because the public viewed welfare first and foremost as a "Black" program. Thus, it is not unreasonable to view work requirements for recipients as gendered racism and social control especially since the low-wage sector benefits from tactics employed to push poor women towards it (O'Connor, 2001).

These measures were seen as problematic and were met with criticism for many reasons although only three are highlighted here. First it was noted that welfare reform made the working class and poor responsible for ending their own poverty in a compromised economic climate (Goode and Maskovsky, 2001). As the quintessential neo-liberal project, welfare reform unambiguously draws poor people into wage labour, forcing consumption patterns that serve the interest of gross capitalism (Maskovsky, 2001). As noted earlier reform was criticized because of how it played the race card. The passage of the PRWORA was facilitated by warped representations and the public's view that welfare was a program solely intended for Black women (Hancock, 2000; Neubeck and Cazenave, 2001). Further, critics charged that welfare reform intensifies racialized inequalities because racial discrimination exists as a barrier to employment (Burnham, 2001; Schram, Soss and Fording, 2003). Finally, early in the welfare reform debates, the issue of intimate violence was posited as an impediment to meeting various requirements, particularly the work mandate (Brandwein, 1999; Chanley and Alozie, 2001). But few have examined how neo-liberalism, racism, and intimate violence overlap within the context of economic shifts and coalesces into a web that victimizes Black battered women because they are unable to secure permanent employment, a situation which could cause them to return to their batterers.

One strategy to address the particular needs of women on welfare was the Family Violence Option (FVO or The Option). The FVO exempts victims of violence from having to meet certain welfare reform policy mandates including the work requirements for a specified time period.[5] A corollary of the FVO was that battered women were rhetorically distinguished as deserving of welfare in contrast to other women, who risked being viewed as undeserving and resistant to the disciplines of work (Chanley and Aloize, 2001). At the same time, however, persistently antagonistic images of Black women complicate effective use of The Option because Black women have also been depicted as a population pathologically dependent on welfare. Furthermore, as Ammons (1995) and James (1996) suggest, Black women are rarely viewed as victims of violence because it is believed that violence is normative in Black life. I suggest that for Black battered women on welfare, social welfare policy is not only motivated by economic imperatives but is informed by racial images and ideology facilitated by the shift from a manufacturing to a service economy.

Neo-liberalism and the Burden of Service (Work)

During the 1970s as manufacturing industries lagged and the service economy rose, many who had skilled labour and manufacturing jobs were disproportionately left unemployed. At the same time, the labour needs of the service economy favoured low-waged, unskilled workers. The proliferation of technology led to labour force bifurcation resulting in more skilled professionals clustered at one end and low-wage service workers, or in many cases unemployed workers, at the other. It is only vaguely unclear how much labour force division in the past 20-30 years is the result of conscious policies by the government, egged on by crises in corporate profits and by the move toward off-shoring production. But one thing is very clear: The dissolution of the Keynesian welfare state overlapped with the motivations of changes in the global economy.

According to Huber and Stephens (1999) welfare states contract within the context of globalization, because they constitute an interference with the goals of achieving unencumbered markets. Unencumbered markets require international competition typically attained via compression of labour costs, consequently resulting in reduced wages and reductions in welfare state program contributions. One way to maintain low wages is by glutting the market with job-seekers, intensifying competition among workers and cheapening labour power. Economic transformations through the 1980s and 90s unevenly affected poor communities, a situation exacerbated by devolution initiatives (Susser, 1998). Concurrently, businesses capitalized on poor people's labour through subsidies and tax credits because TANF recipients are forced to work in order to remain eligible for cash assistance. Both Piven (2001) and Helleiner (1994) suggest that unfettered greed is at the root of policy forcing people to engage in work with little or no job protections. In mandating people with similar skills to enter training programs leading to specific occupational niches, welfare reform policy may be seen as a handmaiden to the larger project of consolidating employer dominance thereby contributing to increased profitability. Further, relocation of the global economy has moved manufacturing away from the U.S., while domestic economies have become reliant on service

sectors, and has created a regime of control in which policy and institutions (i.e., government agencies, business and labour markets) interact, (see Huber and Stephens, 1999).

The retrenchment the U.S. welfare state is one outcome of this shift as public sector resources have contracted and public funds are used to "seed" private ventures. Since welfare reform is based on the assumption that government "handouts" have created a "culture of poverty" that will only be cured by work, the market orientation of new policies restructures the poor as consumers of public services (Cruikshank, 1999). But given that subjects of poverty are constituted in gendered and racialized ways, the work mandate, not surprisingly, reinforces labour force hierarchies. As Williams notes:

> ...African-American women had always been expected and required to do wage work in U.S. Society, predominantly as domestic and agricultural workers. Thus as the new image of welfare recipient was constructed as African-American, it was only to be expected that they (unlike white women) should be required to work. (Williams, 1997: 5)

Williams' analysis accurately portrays the paradox between White privilege and Black disenfranchisement elaborated upon by Stafford, Salas, and Mendez (2003). They note that middle-class White women, benefiting from corporate maternal leave policies, are encouraged to stay home with their infants while poor women of colour with children are forced to work for low wages. Whereas social policy uses Black women as instruments in regimes of labour control, White women are offered latitude to revive the ideology of domesticity. These profound differences in work obligation based on race and class, which have been historically constructed, demand constant manipulation of policies to organize labour participation. Accordingly, we find that Black women have had an almost uninterrupted employment trajectory as low-wage workers, rather than as high-wage earners or caregivers for their families. This observation is corroborated by my own research with Black women who were battered, on welfare, and who were guided toward training programs incongruent with their personal interests. They were discouraged from pursuing higher education, and coerced into low-paying service work, mostly as day care workers, home health aides, and cashiers—positions historically held by Black women.

Black Women and Service Work

Black women's relationship to work, according to Mullings (1997), has straddled the space of coercion and contradiction. They have been forced to work outside their homes, first by slave-owners, then out of economic necessity, and currently by virtue of welfare reform policy. In addition, for Black families to maintain a middle-class lifestyle due to the lower pay earned by Black men and women, two incomes are necessary. Often, Black women are engaged as service workers, including domestic, clerical, health service, food-service and retail work, jobs they entered in growing numbers after World War II.

In the early 1900s, barred from nearly all forms of employment, approximately 44% of African-American women were employed as domestic servants or laundresses (Amott and Matthaei, 1991). Industrialization created few opportunities for Black women until World War I, when a small number benefitted from war related employment (Harley, 2002). By the 1930s although Black women's occupational choices expanded, they continued to be segregated in the lowest rung of the economic ladder working primarily as domestics. The World War II wartime economy incorporated Black women into industrial occupations, but again after the war, they lost their jobs. Instead of returning to domestic labour, a four-decade entrée into the service and clerical field ensued, reflecting the growth of the postindustrial economy.[6]

Black women's participation in service work continued through the 1970s and 1980s, with one in four employed in this sector compared to one out of every six White women (Harley, 2002). In the 1990s although educational attainment precipitated a rise in Black women's employment opportunities, in 1995, 1.7 million were employed in the service sector (U.S. Department of Labor, 1997). In the 21st century, they continue to be over-represented among those working in service occupations and according to the U.S. Department of Labor (2001) nearly 25% of Black women or 2 million, were employed in service occupations in 2001 compared to 16% of White women. One explanation for their dominance in this sector is offered by Jewel (1983) who argues that standards of occupational segregation are established through the circulation of negative images (Jewell, 1983: 44). The very fact of their historical participation in service work rationalizes the expectation that Black women will continue filling those types of jobs. Of course, this assumption obscures the fact that they have broader interests and skills. Black women's role as service workers is neither unique nor new. What is unique is that their continued participation in this occupational segment is maintained through the advent of policy situated at the interstices of neo-liberalism and de-industrializaton.

De-industrialization: Labour Needs in Laneville, New York

In this section I discuss how de-industrialization shaped the employment needs of a small city as both prologue and context to understanding the backdrop against which Black battered women are poised as they entered into the newly reformed welfare system. By localizing their experience with work mandates in Laneville, the processes that move Black women into the service sector and serve as a mechanism to revive the city's economy begin to unravel.

Over nearly half a century Laneville mushroomed, becoming home to a major manufacturing corporation, which will be referred to as Zytron. Zytron began its sprawl just before World War II and by the 1980s, employed 30 000 people in River Valley supporting one in three jobs in the county (Surdey, 1992). As the major manufacturer facing little competition, the company perpetuated a "job for life" image and positioned the area as one of New York's most stable manufacturing economies.

In July 1990, as the nation went into recession, River Valley County's economy and by extension Laneville's, spiralled downward. Zytron downsized and the dynamic of labour saving technologies coupled with the expansion of international labour markets resulted in the company posting its first-ever financial loss. Layoffs continued, as manufacturing moved overseas. Businesses in Laneville closed and there was population flight. Re-employment rates were low, as wages offered by companies absorbing former Zytron employees were less than what the company had paid. By 1995, 52% of the city's 12 000 households fell into the low, very low and extremely low-income categories, and 30% of those households were headed by women.

In the interest of economic revitalization an aggressive plan was developed to lure new businesses to the area. Occupational outlook studies and economic analyses showed the major area of economic growth for the county lay in the service sector especially with respect to health care and retail sales (State of New York Department of Labor, 2001). Welfare reform policy, with its attendant mandatory work requirements, became a strategy to resolve River Valley's economic problems as the River Valley County Department of Social Services (RVCDSS) developed a workforce plan to move poor people to service industry jobs. This was done in collaboration with the county's economic development corporation, the Laneville Chamber of Commerce, the Department of Labor, and other agencies. Essentially the River Valley County Department of Social Services was an employment broker, recruiting for and satisfying corporations that contributed to the local economy. The RVCDSS Commissioner saw these partnerships as positive:

> ...We wanted to develop that trust with business...I told them I have over a million dollars in training monies. What training are you going to need in the next five years for people that are in your business? Do you want keyboarding skills?...At this meeting [set up with business by the Chamber of Commerce, the Department of Labor and RVCDSS], we said we were going to put our money into the skills...how a person should come to work everyday, how you should dress, what you should do when your boss may be crabby.

It was this milieu in which Black battered women found themselves, as they applied for social services. While they wanted an opportunity to create their own lives, free from violence and domination, their need for social services placed them at the cusp of Laneville's compromised economy while welfare reform policy dictated the course of their lives. Black women were not encouraged to obtain training or college degrees, even when they expressed a desire to do so because most of the jobs available demanded only a high school diploma. Instead, they were used to meet local low-skill labour needs under threat of being sanctioned or having their benefits cut. The situation in Laneville is one localized example of a national phenomenon taking place in other cities like Philadelphia and deserves ongoing investigation (see for example Coll, 2004).

Manufacturing "Mammies"

One of the most pervasive of all the images symbolizing African-American womanhood (Jewell, 1983: 37) is the Mammy who has served as a security blanket in the effort toward racial social control (Williamson, 1986). The Mammy image is produced within particular social, economic and political contexts "related to the distribution of power" (Mullings, 1997: 110) and is subject to many interpretations.[7] Here I rely on the version that soothes contemporary anxieties about the racial politics of labour needs. Both friendly and protective as far as Whites are concerned (Santiago-Valles, 1999: 24), "her" accommodation and devotion to White needs are viewed favourably by Euro-Americans, and epitomize one fiction of Black women's role in U.S. society (Collins, 2000).

Expansion of the service sector and mandatory work requirements act upon pre-existing images, invoking job segregation and settling problematic behavioural characteristics. Concretized through policy, we may consider this nexus of policy, images and ideology as a mechanism used in the service of mobilizing Black women to labour

under circumscribed occupational possibilities. As service workers, Black women's labour is aligned with White hegemonic views of their place within capitalism. As a recipient of temporary assistance, Black women work hard and are to be satisfied with their station in life, articulating the idea of the Mammy which presumes Black women will not challenge welfare reform's work requirement, which is ensured through sanctioning measures. Welfare reform updates the Mammy by transforming her from an icon into a contemporary figure well-suited to fill an occupational niche in the service sector. This is achieved by policing Black women's work activities and by directing them primarily to low-wage jobs. As Amott and Matthei (1991) point out, jobs are often connected to ideas about who should do what type of work in relation to gender, race and ethnicity. Evidence of how occupations are racialized in River Valley County is corroborated in labour force data, which shows that presently 3.1% of women in the labour force are Black, but are over represented in one occupational category; making up 8.4% of service workers, more than any other minority group.

When the Black women in the study went for their interviews at the Department of Social Services, caseworkers immediately told them they had to find a job. If no job was found they had to enter into a training program that would lead to work, or participate in community service work for a total of 30 hours each week. Rarely were women's self-determined goals taken into account, I would argue, in part because some caseworkers perceived the women as welfare queens or Jezebels. And although no caseworker ever called them either, women sensed they were viewed as such. For example, one caseworker raised her eyebrow, and peered over her glasses upon finding out that Iliana, a mother of two, was pregnant. She inquired: "Why do you *keep* having children?" Burdened by the subtext, Iliana was both defensive and shamed by the muted racist question. Attention must be paid to these unspoken but taken-for-granted presumptions; what Billig (1995) calls "ordinaries"—things that should be said but are not. In Iliana's case the ordinary that was omitted was "Are you going to keep having more babies to get more welfare? Are you a welfare queen/mother?" Ordinaries hold some explanatory power in clarifying women's non sequiturs. For instance take the comment made by Michelle, a young Black Latina. Upon her return from a meeting at the Department of Social Services, I asked Michelle how things went during her appointment with the caseworker. She responded, "*I did not grow* up on social services. We got it one year, when my father was laid off." Michelle's proclamation did not specifically follow my question. I asked her if the caseworker *said* Michelle grew up on social services, and Michelle reported she had not. Thus, we can interpret her response to me as a response to an "ordinary" an unarticulated, but inferred, accusation. Like Michelle, other women responded to "ordinaries" by drawing on their own life histories to challenge unspoken beliefs that they were long-term dependents on welfare who inculcate a "culture of poverty" in their children.

Women interpreted muted racism from interactions with caseworkers. One woman, Sherita, spoke directly about the negative association between Black women and welfare: "They (caseworkers) think only we (Blacks) use it. A lot of us have *real* needs [emphasis, hers]. But when we have need, we get looked at and treated badly." Sherita's comment reveals that she thinks caseworkers view welfare as solely as a "Black" program. Her comment that "a lot of us have *real* needs" suggests awareness of the myth that Black women on welfare do not *really* need assistance and are therefore fraudulent or that they are pathologically dependent on public assistance and know no other way of life. A case of muted racism was evident to me during a conversation with the RVCDSS Commissioner who linked race, welfare and fraudulence when he praised welfare reform for reducing the number of welfare "cheats." Applauding the success of new mechanisms that monitor and discipline recipients, he summoned up "Black" when he said, "Now they can't be thinkin' they can take free trips to Disney." Race was indexed by his use, of what I took to be, a Black tone of voice. Reports of a similar conflation between race and welfare through voice comes from Roberts (1997) who relates that Bob Grant, a New York Radio Talk show host used a "Black" accent and addressed the problem of welfare by mimicking a Black woman, saying "I don't have no job, how'm I gonna feed my family?" (Roberts, 1997: 18).

Poor Black women are up against tenacious racializing and according to current welfare policy only seem able to counter stereotypes by complying with work mandates. Doing so constitutes proof of their ability to be "responsible," their willingness to follow requirements and being remade as "good" citizens. However, this forced compliance manufactures the Mammy in three ways. It reproduces racially segmented occupations, it engenders acceptance of restricted educational attainment, and it demands selflessness. With this in mind, case examples drawn from my fieldwork represents the three manifestations linked to historical material exploring the Mammy. The first indication of Mammy production shows how Black women were disproportionately directed to subordinate occupations. The second exemplifies how Black women's formal educational opportunities were circumscribed, effectively limiting their job options. And the

last shows evidence of the expectation that Black women should be engaged in acts of self-sacrifice.

Sherita and Iliana

Discouraging Black women from professional competence had particular meaning in 1910 when the "Black Mammy Memorial" Institute was vigorously lauded in Athens, Georgia (Patton, 1980). The Institute was designed to raise the industrial and moral standards of the workers who did not constitute W.E.B. Dubois' "Talented Tenth." Those attending the industrial school were essentially the other 90% of Blacks who would be trained in the arts and industries, such that they could "go forth and serve" (Patton, 1980: 153). Ultimately, the Institute focused on the merits of *reliable service*. For Black women, this meant working as domestics for which they were considered particularly well-suited (Patton, 1980). Interestingly, this same goal of fostering reliability and responsibility in subordinate jobs, is found in welfare reform policy and illustrated by Sherita's experience and to a lesser degree that of Iliana.

Sherita is a 38-year-old single Black woman who moved to River Valley County from New York City to start her life anew. She found temporary employment at Zytron as an administrative assistant, but she lost the job because she did not have reliable transportation to work. She met her batterer, who was on disability, at a low point in her life but tried to sustain the relationship even after he began using cocaine. His increasing violence included banging Sherita's head against the bathroom floor. She applied for welfare in order to flee the beatings, but was not approved, although she indicated she was a victim of violence. The denial was attributed to Sherita's dismissal from Zytron and she was labelled irresponsible, an assessment she often challenged.

Subsequent beatings forced Sherita to find safety at Angel House. Only after resubmitting her application to social services for shelter payment did Sherita discover she had been wrongly denied access to the Family Violence Option and was then certified to receive benefits, including housing assistance. She also found a job working part time at K-mart.

Later, after moving into her own place, Sherita's caseworker told her that she had to either work more hours at K-Mart or enter a training program to meet the 30-hour-a-week work activity requirement and continue receiving benefits. Presumably this would foster the kind of responsibility spelled out in PRWORA's title, (Personal Responsibility) even though Sherita's past achievements included completing high school, finishing one year of community college, and having been an administrative assistant for all of her adult working life primarily at one company. Sherita's history suggests that she was anything but irresponsible and unmotivated, but her positive attributes were lost on the caseworker, who constantly referred to Sherita's having been "let go" as proof that she was unreliable. The caseworker shepherded Sherita into a certified nursing assistant (CNA) program, despite the fact that Sherita clearly stated that she really wanted to be a social worker. Sherita attended the CNA program 3 and 1/2 days each week, and worked at K-Mart on weekends. To meet the work-activity requirement, Sherita was assigned to a community work experience program (CWEP) distributing food at a local pantry. As she put it:

> I was doing everything. They wanted to me work full time, but I was in training 3 1/2 hours a day...I would go to work...then they put me in a CWEP, which meant I would have to work off my grant. I go to school, I go to CWEP, and I go to work. Every other weekend I work 12 hours....

Sherita completed the CNA program and obtained a job at a nursing home making $8 per hour. Shortly after securing the job, she was informed by her supervisor that the nursing assistant certificate was unacceptable and that she needed to be certified as a personal care assistant. The news was devastating. Sherita wondered, "How am I going to find time to go back to get training as a personal care assistant and work?" The availability of health-related jobs in the area permitted Sherita to change jobs three times over eight months, which she did in an effort to make practical use of her existing certificate, never earning more than $8 an hour and never securing full-time employment.

Similarly, Iliana, a 23-year-old Dominican woman of African descent with three children, wanted to work in the tourism industry, another growth sector in River Valley. She told me that she had been directed to the certified nursing assistant program by her caseworker and subsequently found part-time work making $8.25 an hour working 25 hours a week, again, not full time.

When questioned about the contradiction between recipients' desire for training of their choice, and the training programs they are permitted to enter, the RVCDSS Commissioner commented that Social Services only trains recipients for employment where the demand was greatest, not based on self-interest, and that training was not based on the recipients' own interests.

On one level Sherita and Iliana's training and job placements meet the demand for health care workers a labour need identified by the county based on occupational surveys. On another level being guided toward low-

wage health care work echoes ideas of what Black women are supposed to do. They are to take any service job to prove their worth, just as the Mammy did. Women on welfare are obliged to take any job or risk losing their benefits, so it is not surprising that they would be directed into specific job tracks that mirror the identified labour needs of the county. Neither Sherita nor Iliana viewed themselves only as subjects of domination and both questioned why they were funnelled to health care work. Yet they were also clear that in order to live free of male domination and violence, they had to take those jobs.

Shawnice and Joanne

The second manifestation of the Mammy actualized through work mandates is the focus on experiential learning. Restrictions on formal educational attainment were notably associated with the "Mammy Memorial Association" Institute. The founder believed that Mammies did not require classical education but, though she might be unlettered, "her" lessons learned, through contact and experience afforded her the benefit of dignity (Parkhurst, 1939: 353). The benefit derived from work experience is, of course, the trump card that renders work an acceptable alternative to education. The logic of experiential rather than formal education is scripted in welfare reform policy that limits access to higher education and focusses on short term or vocational training, similar to the educational attainment scripts for the Mammy. The cases here represent an ideological continuity about what some poor Black women should be taught to do.

That Black women's caseworkers value experience more than education is apparent in the case of Shawnice, the 19-year-old daughter of a woman I interviewed. Shawnice's mother Clemmie is 38 years old and has four children all of who moved with her to Laneville. They came after Clemmie's abuser had perpetrated several acts of violence including putting a gun in her mouth in front of the kids. The family's TANF budget was based on a family of five, even though one of her daughters returned to the elite college from which she had received full scholarship. In this new environment Shawnice decided to attend River Valley County Community College, studied in the mornings, attended class from 12 to 4 p.m. each day, and worked daily from 6 to 9 p.m. at a college internship program.

However, Clemmie was informed that her TANF grant hinged on Shawnice leaving school and finding employment. Shawnice was traumatized because she found school stimulating and was doing well. It was also shocking to Clemmie who had instilled the importance of higher education in all of her children. She went to great lengths to explain her perspectives on educational attainment to the caseworker, who according the Clemmie, said: "DSS does not care about school. College doesn't mean anything. She has to get a job. If she has to miss school to get a job, she has to go look for a job."

Clemmie inquired about the possibility of removing Shawnice from her budget so she could continue attending classes, but the caseworker informed Clemmie that in order to receive adequate funds to cover the family's needs, Shawnice would have to remain on the budget. If she did, then searching for employment was mandatory. She said to me: "...My daughter does not understand why school is not important, when everybody is telling [her] that [you] need an education to get a job." Clemmie could think of no reason why a caseworker would demand she pull her daughter out of school unless she thought that Shawnice was not worthy of going.

Shawnice had to complete a minimum of 10 job searches each week and had to bring in a job search log verifying that applications had been submitted, every two weeks. Shawnice tried to juggle both school and job hunting for a few weeks and then dropped out of school.

Joanne, another Black woman, 28 years old with one child and pregnant with her second, shared with me her interest in completing her education. Joanne had finished one year toward her Associates' Degree, but was told she could not complete the program if she wanted to receive assistance. As she explained,

> If you're receiving social services, you have to do like a community work thing. They send you to places...to work to put in hours like a regular job would be...When I came here [to the shelter] I wanted to go to school, but I had to do that [the community work experience program]. I couldn't finish school, and that was something I wanted to do. I'm not a school person, but I know you need a degree.

Instead of pursing her education, Joanne worked as a clerk at a small company.

Redirecting poor women from higher education to work in low-wage work exemplifies a distorted sense of a person's abilities, or seen another way represents the failure to recognize where the client's greatest potential lies. Hillary is a White woman in her fifties with a Masters Degree and is an advocate at Angel House. She expressed dismay about elimination of support for college education as result of reforms:

> ...It keeps the underclass in place and is destructive to human beings that want to learn and grow. It is one of the worst things about welfare reform—not being

> able to go to school. We used to have a programme that allowed a woman to get her Associates Degree....[a] woman could get tutoring, child-care and a range of supportive services. Now it has been transformed into a certificate programme. It doesn't have the same quality or meaning as it did when it was an Associates Degree programme. In terms of human rights, welfare reform, time limits and not being able to get an education ensures people will live their lives without dignity.

One study of Black and White women on welfare living in Virginia conducted by Gooden (1998) found that while African-American program participants were on average better educated than Whites, none were encouraged by caseworkers to go to school. On the other hand, 41% of Whites were encouraged to pursue further education. One explanation for decreased educational support, according to the White co-director of the River Valley County Department of Social Services Temporary Assistance Unit, Ms. D'Angelo, is that,

> ...We are now (unintelligible) on actual training classes as opposed to a college education....The idea is that we are time-limited. I mean, we're time-limited...so that if we put them into some sort of training that takes too long, we will end up...losing money. We are under pressure to get people into the work force.

It is ironic that college is restricted when it is known that every semester of college adds several thousand dollars to one's lifetime earnings, leading to economic stability (Carnevale and Reich et. al., 2000). However, under the PRWORA guidelines only 20% of a locality's caseload is permitted to go to school, for up to a period of 12 months. Despite both Shawnice and Joanne's self-initiated enrolment in college, their efforts were undermined by policy. However, there must also be some link between caseworkers' perceptions about the abilities of these women, if they—the caseworkers—can in theory, exercise some discretion in terms of approving a particular client's eligibility to attend school. Their refusal to give women information about education can be analyzed from the perspective of labour needs. Low-skilled positions were difficult to fill in the county in three industries: construction, services and retail trade; industries that do not require greater than a high school diploma. One solution to address labour needs is to restrict access to education and to force a vulnerable segment of the population (i.e., welfare recipients) to take those jobs and loosen the labour market.

Leslie and Iliana

The Mammy has been cultivated in popular imagination as a nurturer who puts aside her own needs in the interest of others. "Her" acts of self-denial are applauded and viewed as positive testament that she will do anything. This inappropriate expectation was thrust upon Leslie an 18-year-old Black woman who was 6 months pregnant when we met; her pregnancy had recently been diagnosed as "high risk." Leslie came to the shelter to get away from her boyfriend, Dre who had pushed Leslie causing her to hit her head on a metal pole in the park. When she first arrived at RVCDSS, the caseworker was quite taken by Leslie's demeanour and soft-spoken affect. Within 10 minutes, after discovering that Leslie was pregnant, she became hostile and I had to intervene. Because of her age, the caseworker denied Leslie's application on the basis of a new welfare policy which allows minors to receive assistance only if they live with an adult. The caseworker told Leslie the only assistance she could receive was a bus ticket to Ohio where her mother lived. But Leslie's mother also had a history of abusing her. With some coaching from me, Leslie asked to see the Domestic Violence Liaison, but the caseworker accused Leslie of lying about parental abuse to get out of moving to Ohio and said it "sounded suspicious." The decision denying Leslie public assistance was overturned after a human rights violation was filed.

Once her eligibility was established, Leslie was immediately directed to see a job counselor at social services who she told of her high risk pregnancy. Having been warned to limit her physical exertion, Leslie requested a medical waiver from the work requirement. No waiver was provided. During the meeting with the job counselor Leslie said she had a GED as well as some culinary experience and inquired about attending culinary school, an interest that she viewed as a realistic career option since there was a culinary school in the vicinity. The job counsellor dismissed her career interests, and instead strongly recommended that Leslie apply for one of two jobs; one as a cashier at a home improvement store and the other as a cashier at clothing store at the Mall. Leslie questioned why culinary school was unacceptable given her experience and interests, yet work was not, given her health limitations. Instead of taking a job that required standing all day, which she had been told not to do by her doctor, Leslie found a job through the Private Industry Council working 25 hours a week at a day camp earning $5.25 per hour.

From June to August when she was eight months pregnant, Leslie met the work mandate putting her own health at risk as well as that of her unborn child in order

to care for other people's children at a day camp, a job which, as one might imagine, involves physical exertion. At the summer camp's conclusion in August, and with one month left to before the baby's birth, Leslie was informed that she would have to find *another* job.

> You know those people at Social Services want me to get another job and work until the baby is born? They've sent me letters about coming in. What kinda job am I going to get for a couple of weeks being eight months pregnant?

Iliana, who is briefly mentioned earlier, found herself being forced to work though her pregnancy. She told me:

> I worked 28-30 hours a week...I still had to go to the [Food Pantry]. They sent me a letter saying I had to be there from 8:30 am to 2:00 p.m. But I worked from 7:00 to 2:00 p.m. I called them and said "This conflicts with my work schedule. I have to be at work by 7:00 am." They told me I had to work on my day off...I told them I have a hard job, I lift people and I'm pregnant. On my day off I should relax, I don't want my baby to be born sick.

Leslie and Iliana's significance and value was in a way calculated in terms of their acts of self-denial. Their worthiness was "rewarded" with the receipt of assistance in part because they "proved" themselves by responding to directives. It is interesting to note that these two cases underscore other aspects of the Mammy, inasmuch as both women were encouraged to be nurturers and caretakers for *other people's children*, and the elderly, respectively, despite the fact that their own health and well being and that of their own children was knowingly jeopardized.

Josie

For the sake of comparison a brief discussion of a White woman's story underscores differences between Black and White women's experiences with welfare reform to show that it was in fact more positive for some women. Although this discussion relies on only one woman, her experience replicates those of other women in the study whose whiteness produced emotional and informational support from mostly White caseworkers.

Josie is a 25-year-old White woman with a high school diploma and the mother of eight-month-old Shaneva. Shortly after Shaneva was born her boyfriend Luke, began abusing Josie. She left him and came to Angel House, where like all the other women she made an appointment with a social services caseworker. Josie, who had been an informal child-care worker for most of her adult life, told her caseworker that she wanted to go to school. The worker was incredibly supportive and encouraged Josie to enroll at River Valley County Community College. The offer was sweetened with incentives that would be covered by RVCDSS including paid transportation costs to get to school and the provision funding for day care. She was even told about the Family Violence Option by her caseworker who noticed Josie had not checked off being a victim of violence on her application. Clearly Josie's treatment at RVCDSS was quite different from that of Sherita, Iliana, Shawnice, Joanne and Leslie. Whereas the Black women were limited to certain jobs and training that kept them in the service sector, making no more that $8.25 an hour, Josie was offered an opportunity that might ostensibly lead her away from low-wage service work, possibly into some other sector.

What are we to make of these differences? Is it possible to look at these situations and not at least consider why some Black women are steered toward low-wage contingency work that demarcates the service sector, toward certificate level training and away from educational attainment? What is it about welfare reform that consolidates subordinate status and occupational segregation and reifies women's positive attributes which are supposedly based on acquiescence to circumstances that restrain their possibilities? One obvious reason is the value of their labour within a bifurcated economy. The other reason lies in the colour of their skin, which influences the value and content of their labour.[8] By using the Mammy as a lens, we see that women like Sherita, Iliana, Shawnice, Joanne and Leslie were manipulated. They worked in contingent service jobs, were unable to attend school, and were expected to nurture others. These expectations in many ways replicate the work responsibility, achievement, and behavioural characteristics associated with Mammy training and work in the 19th and 20th centuries (Morton, 1991). This analysis is a compelling point at which to end this discussion, but as I continue to mull over the impact of welfare reform's mandatory work obligations, I think it is incomplete. In the concluding section I attempt to offer a more nuanced interpretation to explain why the Mammy is such an important lens through which to examine economic restructuring, neo-liberalism and battered Black women's experience with welfare reform.

Conclusion: From "Welfare Queen" to "Mammy"—The Corrective

The lack of debate about the PRWORA's work-first policy was reinforced by the racialization of both poverty and welfare utilization. Neubeck and Cazenave (2001) argue that welfare reform used cultural representations

that positioned Blacks as illegitimate interlopers on the nation's emotional and economic psyche. Distortions of Blacks have driven U.S. social policy in the past, for example in the 1960s when the deviant head-of-household matriarch spawned legislation and programs to quell riots and support Black male privilege. Having lived with the welfare queen or welfare mother long enough since the 1970s, U.S. social policy has been poised to dismantle welfare (Zucchino, 1999), in no small measure to put people to work. The need for workers can be addressed by implementing policy that demands participation in the wage labour market. Those most easily moved to meet that demand are among the economically vulnerable. Poor people on welfare are already viewed as irresponsible (like Sherita), unintelligent (possibly like Shawnice and Joanne), sexually promiscuous women (like Leslie and Iliana) who cheat the system. They are the Jezebels, welfare queens and mothers who have been invoked by conservative scholars like Mead who claims that "the worldview of blacks makes them uniquely prone to the attitudes contrary to work and thus vulnerable to poverty and dependency" (Mead, 1997: 148). Welfare queen/mother discourse in particular has circulated in academia, the press and in Congress, collectively solidifying "her" public identity as a Black woman (Hancock, 2000). Full blown analyses of "her" dependency have found their way into the public domain for instance when Jon Mica (R-FL) held up a sign during the 1996 welfare reform debate comparing women on welfare to animals stating "Don't Feed the Alligators. We post these warnings because unnatural feeding and artificial care create dependency" (Connolly, 2000: 154) and caseworkers translate this discourse into their interactions with clients. This discourse clearly promotes disgust for poor Black women on welfare especially since the "welfare queen" is incompatible with a capitalist vision of production and had to be transformed.

I suggest that one way to transform the image of the welfare queen so "she" may be seen as industrious and compliant, dignified, and reliable has been to turn her into a woman like the Mammy, who both works hard and, knows her place in society (Morton, 1991: 35). I argue that the welfare queen has been transformed into a Mammy through forced labour and training, through educational deprivation and self-denial, moves not at all likely to reduce Black women's poverty or increase economic autonomy, but certainly likely to engender greater social and political acceptance of poor women. Public support for welfare and work requirements reveals the threat of and hate for the welfare queen or mother who simply had to be replaced with a re-manufactured Mammy. This contemporary Mammy is not only seen as more benign and compliant but also as one who does her "fair share" rather than living off the generosity of taxpayers and who just so happens to fit a particular niche in the service economy.

For Black battered women on welfare this mutation also has the effect of adding another form of violence to the physical, which they already experience, that is structural violence. Structural violence includes social and government policies that withdraw support from the "undeserving." It emphasizes disciplinary techniques and exposes people to risk by limiting their access to resources (Anglin, 1998). I recognize that this perspective of the Mammy may reflect meanings and elisions that may not have been originally intended or predicted but ideologies, as Arendt points out, are often transformed into unanticipated projects (Dolan, 1994: 169).

In trying to understand what was so seductive about welfare reform and work requirements in an economic climate that is generating neither survival nor security, I suggest that current welfare policies invoke the idea and image of the Mammy as both a funnel and a filter. As a funnel the image justifies directing specific groups to certain jobs to meet specific labour demands and to support elite consumer needs. As a filter the image and the work she does "protects" Black women on welfare from ideological demonization because the Mammy is beloved, rather than an outcast. In other words work mandates have "rescued" Black women from the image of the demonic welfare queen and welfare mother image and have resolved those deficits by shaping poor Black women into Mammies. Through this resolution, women like Sherita, Iliana, Shawnice, Joanne and Leslie lubricate the service industry in Laneville, and are praised for doing so. But none of them are any closer to economic stability, because they work in jobs with no protections and are unable to access a level of education that will help them move away from the violence of poverty.

In closing it is important to consider that those who laud the success of welfare reform do so because I think they knowingly or unknowingly rely on the idea of Mammy. By so doing they offer reassurance to elites that poor Black women are under control; they are forced to take any job, participate in any work experience or training program and can therefore be tolerated. But we should not forget that as the service sector continues to grow and as racial/ethnic demography shifts, there may very well be others who can fill the role of the Mammy.[9]

Dana-Ain Davis, PhD, Department of Anthropology, Purchase College, State University of New York. E-mail: dana-ain.davis@purchase.edu

Notes

1 An earlier version of this paper, "The Burdens of Service: Economic Restructuring, Welfare Reform and Battered Black Women" was presented at Society for the Anthropology of North America Conference, May 2002. I thank Gail Garfield, Jeff Maskovsky and John Clarke for encouraging me to write and revise this article. I am deeply grateful to Gail Garfield, Kim Christensen, Mamadi Matlhako, Pem Davidson Buck, Susan Hyatt, Rich Nasissi and the two anonymous reviewers for their instructive comments.

2 Felix G. Rohatyn, as quoted in *Newsweek.* See Alpern, 1981.

3 I use the term "Black" fully cognizant that it is a social construction rooted in the mythology of biological racial difference and knowing that there are multiple tensions and consequences in its meanings. Even though the term "Black" is a problematic category, at the same time it is also a social category that people use to refer to their own existence as members of a group with specific histories and political trajectories in relation to others in the U.S. (Lubiano, 1992). Research participants often identified themselves in ethnic terms, as Afro-Latina and African-American, however the category Black was relevant to the extent that race was signified in their status as poor women. For example some forms requested race data, a reflection of the subtle way that the category Black is embedded in mainstream American culture. Also as a Black woman, I was acutely aware of the ways that race and racism were reproduced during observations of caseworker/client interaction. Often, welfare use and race converged, influencing Black women's treatment by caseworkers.

4 According to Zucchino (1997), Ronald Reagan described the woman as "having eighty names, twelve Social Security cards and collecting veterans' benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands...Her tax-free income alone is over $150,000" (65). Although the facts were dramatically different, the public bought the story and by the time it was revealed that the woman had defrauded the state of only $8,000 and used four aliases, not eighty, the welfare queen was inserted into American lore.

5 The Family Violence Option is an amendment introduced by Senators Patty Murray and Paul Wellstone. The FVO allows states to provide exemptions for their welfare population if a person is battered, as long as the percent of those exempted does not exceed 20% of the state's caseload. Implementation of the FVO was problematic evidenced by a New York City study (Hearne, 2000) and my own study (Davis, forthcoming) which found that women were not always informed about the Option.

6 The service sector includes high-wage positions such as dental hygienists and nurses requiring higher educational levels.

7 The Mammy has been cast as a traitor, martyr and as worldly. For a discussion of various interpretations of the Mammy, see Morton, 1991.

8 In a study of the impact of welfare reform, Davis, Aparicio, Jacobs, et. al. (2003) found racial differences in work assignments.

9 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999) projected a total employment increase of 14.4%, adding 20.3 million jobs between 1998 and 2008. The service-producing sector will remain the dominant source of employment, accounting for 3 out of every 4 jobs (or 19.1 million) by 2008. Similar occupational trends are anticipated in River Valley County (Rodick, 2001) and I suspect that poor Black women on welfare will continue to be the labour force of choice for those positions. Of course given the racial/ethnic composition of the United States, with current trends in Hispanic population growth and in poverty it is likely that Hispanics will also bear the burden of service work.

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Book Reviews / Comptes rendus

George Stocking, *Delimiting Anthropology: Occasional Inquiries and Reflections*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001, 406 pages.

Reviewer: *Vered Amit*
Concordia University

This is a collection of assorted essays by George Stocking, composed at various points over the course of his career. All but two of these essays were previously published. In his general introduction to this volume, Stocking describes all these essays as "at the time of writing tangential" to his main research concerns (2001: x) although they significantly resonate with the larger body of his work. They thus largely focus on key figures and institutions in the historical development of the Anglo-American traditions of anthropology. However, with one exception, the original impetus for these writings did not come from Stocking himself. They were developed in response to invitations variously to deliver lectures or conference papers or to contribute to edited volumes.

The "occasional" nature of these essays imposes a decided challenge to the integration and coherence of this volume. Stocking has attempted to address this challenge in two primary ways. Firstly, he has organized the essays into four general thematic sections: Boasian culturalism, British evolutionaries, Institutions in National Traditions as well as Mesocosmic Reflections, a thematic division which gradually expands the vista of analysis by moving from representative figures to national institutions and finally onto broader disciplinary issues. Each of the sections includes four chapters. The section on Boasian culturalism thus includes a chapter discussing the late 19th-century racial thought and discourse that were subsequently subjected to trenchant critique by Franz Boas. A second essay outlines the basic assumptions of the Boasian orientation in anthropology. The third and fourth essays in this section remind us of the happenstance origins of much of this volume since, in response to conference invitations respectively from the Societies for Psychological and Humanistic Anthropology, they take up more peripheral aspects of Boas' work, specifically his writings on psychology which were largely restricted to the earliest of his publications and the nascent traces of much later anthropological concerns with textuality and reflexivity.

The second section focusses attention on the field that has engaged Stocking throughout much of his career, the history of British anthropology. In it, Stocking focusses on three early figures in British sociocultural evolutionism: two of them are Edward Burnett Tylor and James G. Frazer who are regarded as canonical figures by anthropologists; the third is an earlier Scottish precursor, Lord Kames. not generally regarded by anthropologists as a significant disciplinary ancestor. Stocking however draws attention to the contribution of Lord Kames—if primarily as provocation for disagreement—to a succeeding early 19th-century anthropological debate about the unity or plurality of the human species. An essay on Tylor provides an overview of his life and work, in particular his establishment of the principle of cultural evolution. Another reproduces lengthy excerpts from Tylor's diary that detail his investigation of the spiritualist movement, inquiries which appear to have significantly shaped Tylor's theory of animism. A fourth chapter reviews Frazer's prominence among the few anthropologists who have spoken directly to a large non-anthropological audience, his eclipse by the growing preeminence of a fieldwork-based functionalist anthropology and the more recent reconsideration of his work in the light of reorientations in anthropology towards science and literature.

The third section turns towards scholarly institutions that are conceived as mediating the relationship between individual anthropologists, their discipline and in turn the larger social world. One chapter in this section probes the history of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Britain through a review of changing emphases in the six editions of the Notes and Queries on Anthropology edited by members of the Institute. A second chapter moves somewhat beyond Stocking's usual Anglo-American focus to provide a comparative review of the distinction between ethnology and physical anthropology in France through the shifting fortunes of the Société d'Ethnographie Américaine et Orientale. The endurance of this distinction in France stood in contrast to the synthesis of ethnology and physical anthropology in Britain. A third chapter in this section provides a highly detailed history of the foundation and development of the Sante Fe Laboratory of Anthropology originally occasioned by the 50th anniversary of the Laboratory. The fourth chapter in this section departs somewhat from the circumstances of most of the other essays in this

volume since it was initiated by George Stocking himself as the introduction to one of four collections he edited as part of his History of Anthropology series. The introduction reproduced here focusses on museums and material culture.

The fourth and final section in the book shifts from Stocking's usual preference for micro-analyses towards essays that seek to "reflect upon themes of broader temporal, spatial, or historiographic significance" (2001: 262). Specifically, these "themes'" include the ambivalent status within anthropology of the idea of progress; a view from the "centre'" of more peripheral anthropological traditions; the difficulties of delimiting disciplinary boundaries within the embracive tradition of anthropology; and finally an intriguing essay using cases of unfinished books as an index of the tension between the "scientizing" and "relativizing" impulses of anthropology. The broad thematic ambit of the essays in this section will probably make them the most accessible to the general anthropological audience as opposed to specialists in the history of anthropology.

The essays in all four sections have for the most part been reproduced in their original form. Rather than being updated to reflect more recent concerns and perspectives both of the discipline as a whole or of their author, they have been historicized through a set of introductions. Each section and each essay in turn is prefaced with an introduction which explains the circumstances in which these writings were initiated and developed and situates these within Stocking's longer career. Together these introductions constitute the second organizational vehicle employed by Stocking for integrating these occasional essays, an approach which is both illuminating and frustrating: illuminating because Stocking has applied to his own career biography the preference for micro-vignettes which has characterized many of his historical analyses; frustrating because like most of the essays these introduce, their full import and context is elusive. The introductions assume that the reader has more than a passing acquaintance with most of Stocking's better known and more substantial publications. They refer to these works without much in the way of explanation and even more frustratingly, invoke with enigmatic brevity, shifting orientations in Stocking's epistemological approach, in particular the "softening" in his stance for "historicism" against "presentism." While in some cases highly detailed, most of the essays in the first three sections of the volume also assume a fairly broad knowledge of the historical contexts in which these vignettes are situated. In one of the essay introductions, Stocking justifies this style of analysis as "writing between the lines" (2001: 220) but he accurately notes that such an approach "puts a burden on the general reader, insofar as it may require prior knowledge to appreciate relationships that are suggested rather than elaborated" (ibid.). In the case of this volume, the burden of readership is doubled, requiring both knowledge of the historical periods, figures and institutions described in the essays themselves as well as intimacy with Stocking's own career history and contributions. Thus by design, this volume is best addressed to and appreciated by a highly specialized and hence select audience.

Isabelle Daillant, *Sens dessus dessous, Organisation sociale et spatiale des Chimane d'Amazonie bolivienne*, Nanterre, Société d'ethnologie, Collection Recherches Américaines 6, 2003, 517 pages.

Recenseur : *Bernard Arcand*
Université Laval

Il est assez décevant de penser que ce livre risque fort d'être limité à un auditoire restreint. Du simple fait qu'il s'agit d'un ouvrage considérable (plus de cinq cents pages en caractères relativement petits) consacré en grande partie à l'étude d'un système de parenté et d'une cosmologie autochtones rédigée dans une langue parfois technique pas toujours facile et qui traite d'une population située à la frontière de deux zones, les Andes et l'Amazonie, nettement mieux connues et plus populaires. Bref, c'est un ouvrage savant qui mériterait une bien meilleure diffusion. Car ce travail admirable, sans être un manuel, fournirait un excellent guide d'enquête moderne en anthropologie sociale. Isabelle Daillant construit avec minutie et grande intelligence un modèle d'analyse attentive, complexe et pénétrante.

Pour exemple, prenons la question fondamentale de comment définir les Chimane. Il serait facile d'affirmer qu'ils forment une population de quelques milliers de personnes habitant le piedmont bolivien, vivant d'agriculture, de pêche ou d'emplois ponctuels, et devenues relativement riches suite à la reconnaissance de leurs droits sur les ressources forestière de la région. Très au delà de cette définition banale, le chapitre résumant l'identité collective des Chimane tient compte, bien sûr, de l'ethnographie régionale, mais intègre également la géographie, la mythologie, l'imaginaire et la mouvance des préjugés, les transformations sociales récentes, ainsi que les contrastes entre riches et pauvres et les distinctions entre hommes et femmes, ce qui, en somme, permet d'atteindre une vision particulièrement riche et subtile de ce que *Chimane* veut dire.

Une partie importante de l'ouvrage traite du système de parenté, des règles de mariage et de résidence ainsi que des relations sociales sous l'influence directe des liens de parenté. La section sur l'analyse de la terminologie de parenté et du cas très particulier d'une cyclicité intergénérationnelle sur fond de mélange subtil entre les systèmes Dravidien et Kariera n'est certainement pas facile, mais la démarche est habile et fascinante. La solution élégante et novatrice à l'énigme de comment concilier deux systèmes logiques qui paraissaient inconciliables aurait pu être sèchement abstraite, mais en faisant appel à l'histoire et à l'évolution démographique, l'auteure réussit à donner de la parenté une interprétation vivante et dynamique. Daillant utilise même le «je» à bon escient et

l'anecdote de ses réponses aux Chimane cherchant à comprendre la parenté française est tout à fait savoureuse. Notons que l'histoire des Chimane devrait intéresser tous les américanistes du seul fait que, suite aux épidémies, la société ancienne s'est effondrée au XIX^{e} siècle et que les survivants ont créé une société distincte réinventée sous un mode nouveau qui s'éloigne assez radicalement de l'organisation sociale antérieure. Un cas exceptionnel de rupture de tradition culturelle et de capacité à faire du neuf sur les cendres du vieux.

La seconde moitié du livre est consacrée à l'étude de la cosmologie dans son sens le plus large, c'est-à-dire à l'analyse de la mythologie, religion, chamanisme et des principaux aspects de la pratique rituelle. Encore ici, l'auteure parcourt et analyse avec élégance des matériaux complexes. Car il faut dire que la cosmologie Chimane est intellectuellement exigeante. Les héros mythiques cheminent sur le sentier du passé qu'emprunteront désormais les morts, la terre s'est autrefois retournée sur ses deux axes vertical et horizontal et ainsi, du coup, le passé était là-bas «avant» et l'avenir sera lui aussi là-bas «après». C'est dire qu'un même lieu représente simultanément le passé et l'avenir des vivants. Autre exemple, certains esprits sont considérés comme vivant au dessus de nous parce qu'ils habitent la montagne, mais en dessous de nous puisqu'ils habitent sous terre. Claude Lévi-Strauss disait avoir appris l'analyse structurale de ses maîtres Bororo et l'on imagine facilement Isabelle Daillant reconnaissant sur le même ton sa dette envers les constructions brillantes et le pur génie de la culture Chimane.

Les Chimane appliquent la notion de renversement à la fois au domaine de la parenté, dans le récit du parcours mythique des ancêtres, puis, dans l'interprétation de l'histoire de la terre et du cycle lunaire. Ces renversements sont des événements historiques qui marquèrent les débuts du monde, soit des phénomènes cycliques et répétitifs, soit des catastrophes majeures qui pourraient demain se reproduire. Seconde idée centrale de la cosmologie, on utilise un contraste entre les notions d'intérieur et d'extérieur, lequel permet de distinguer parmi différents types de parents, un peu de la même manière que l'on sépare la montagne et la savane. Autrement dit, les Chimane sont des maîtres de la topologie et de l'aménagement dynamique de l'espace. Espace qui peut être à la fois physique, social et mythologique.

Il n'est donc pas surprenant que l'ouvrage se termine sur un retour à la géographie et une mise en situation des Chimane en position intermédiaire au sein d'un vaste système de transformation qui inclut les sociétés andines et celles de l'Amozonie. De façon un peu lapidaire, on pourrait dire que si les Andins construisent des modèles sous forme de carré et les Amazoniens adoptent couramment le mode circulaire, les Chimane optent pour une pensée en croix formée par l'intersection de deux axes souvent complémentaires et parfois contradictoires.

Les analyses et les conclusions de cet ouvrage sont-elles discutables? Bien sûr! Mais la discussion sera de très haut niveau.

Nigel Rapport, ed., *British Subjects: An Anthropology of Britain,* Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002, 340 pages.

Reviewer: *Cathrine Degnen*
University of Manchester

Despite its subtitle, *British Subjects* is intended to highlight anthropological endeavour which addresses contemporary Britain rather than, as Rapport writes, to offer a definitive anthropological account *of* "Britain" or "British." Rapport argues for the strengths of such an approach, as well as the ways anthropology about Britain can be "paradigmatic of the discipline's possibilities, skills and significance" (p. 15). Such aspirations are largely borne out by the collection of 17 essays which make up this volume.

The essays are grouped into five broad topical clusters: *Nationalism, Contestation and the Performance of Tradition*; *Strategies of Modernity: Heritage, Leisure, Dissociation*; *The Appropriation of Discourse*; *Methodologies and Ethnomethodologies*; and *The Making (and Unmaking) of Community: Ethnicity, Religiosity, Locality*. This placing of chapters within the groupings is well thought out and Rapport has written useful introductions to each cluster, drawing out the thematic intersections amongst the chapters appearing in them. The first cluster begins with Anne Rowbottom's considerations of the paradoxical relationship between hereditary privilege and democracy. Through fieldwork with people who regularly attend events where members of the royal family appear in public, Rowbottom builds an argument about practices of "vernacular religiosity" amongst this dedicated group of people who call themselves "Real Royalists." She demonstrates in turn how Real Royalists alternate between frameworks of difference and of national unity in order to circumnavigate the inherent contradictions of civil religion, constitutional monarchy, and democracy in Britain. The second chapter in this cluster is based on the Isle of Man where Susan Lewis describes a different sort of civic event: Tynwald Day. She traces some of the contested meanings this national day holds and argues that despite such contradictions, the event can still serve as a site of collective identity. Helena Wulff's chapter, exploring national ballet styles, is the final contribution to this section. Her research, based on the British Royal Ballet, demonstrates "the ongoing symbolic construction of national difference in the transnational world of ballet" (p. 79); the ways in which aesthetics, dance styles, performance costumes, rehearsal clothing, and bodily decoration are employed towards these ends; and the contradictions of a discourse of a "national" style in the face of the transnational flow of dancers.

The second topical cluster, *Strategies of Modernity*, begins with a contribution by Sharon Macdonald. She draws on fieldwork at the Museum of Island Life on the Isle of Skye, Scotland, to explore "the 'fetishization' of past everyday life" (p. 89) as a form of cultural practice. Macdonald's illuminating piece describes how once everyday objects (tools, crafts, domestic items, mass-produced goods) come to reside in a museum,

they become in effect sacralized, and in turn "de-alienated" from being "just" commodities. She goes on to contextualize this practice within the particular contours of social uncertainty, arguing that the valorization of everyday things is a way of seeking "existential anchors" (p. 103) in the face of social fragmentation as well as a way perhaps of talking back against an all-pervasive consumerism. The next chapter, from Andrew Dawson, takes up the theme of social upheaval and strategies for managing it but within the context of a former coal-mining town in the north-east of England. Dawson is the first author in the collection to explicitly address gender relations. He does so through an exploration of the ways in which the pursuit of leisure (allotments, writing poetry, attending local football matches) serve to help people "work out" social change, and postindustrial change in particular. Dawson interweaves ethnography of postindustrial transformations, gender relations, and the lived experiences of older people with the notion of leisure practices as cultural resource. The last "strategy of modernity" to be analyzed in this section is that of altered states of consciousness, by Tanya Lurhmann. Lurhmann brings together two sets of research experiences (people practising magic in Britain; an American psychiatric setting) to develop a model of dissociation which can be understood as a "social technology" rather than the pathological state that the psychiatric profession insists all episodes of dissociation to be. She argues that the techniques used by people practising magic are learned social processes, "socially organized and more or less systematically learned" (p. 136). Lurhmann illustrates her argument with a case study of one woman who suffered severe trauma as a child but who did not come to suffer from Multiple Personality Disorder. Rather, she has mastered bodily techniques which spark dissociative states, permitting her to mediate her social environment and life-experience in a positive rather than pathological manner.

In the third cluster, *Appropriation of Discourse*, Allison James' work on childhood and identity politics is juxtaposed with Jeanette Edwards' processual approach to scientific understandings of biotechnology and with Sarah Green's essay on ICTs (information and communication technologies) and social disconnection. James charts the processes of childhood socialization through ethnography with primary schoolchildren in an urban setting in the north of England. She seeks to better understand "how children encounter and respond to...versions of the self as 'child' and of 'childhood'" (p. 144), choosing to focus on one aspect of socialization in particular: children learning that they are relatively powerless in respect to the adults in their lives. By selecting power rather than, say, belonging, the chapter becomes one largely about conflict and antagonism in terms of childhood identities. While this is a perfectly reasonable angle to pursue, James runs the risk of distorting her presentation of childhood identity by not explicitly engaging in a discussion of the implications of focussing on power for the conclusions she draws. Edwards' contribution also engages with questions of power, but in this case in terms of knowledge. In particular, she is concerned with "what counts as 'scientific knowledge'" (p. 163) and wishes to counter the view that the only kind that counts is being able to recite "bits and bytes of information" from a liturgy of knowledge, perceived to be either "quantitatively present or absent" (p. 172). Instead, through ethnography on public understandings of new reproductive and genetic technologies, Edwards demonstrates how engagement with science is also part of everyday life experience and knowledge, and that scientific understandings are not bounded but instead "co-produced" (p. 168). Knowledge of another kind is the subject of Green's piece in this volume. Like Luhrmann, she synergistically draws on two periods of fieldwork (with lesbian feminists in London in the late 1980s; the Manchester Women's Electronic Village Hall in the late 1990s). Green starts with an intriguing account of the ideological conflicts confronting a group of lesbian feminists nearly twenty years ago. She shows how within this group "too much connection between differences generated disconnection in located networks" (p. 187), a process that mirrored similar conundrums in a different context in Manchester 10 years later. In response to over-connection, the specific and the located/local became all the more important in both field-sites, and Green explores the implications of networks as a "paradigm for talking about culture" (p. 198) while unpacking some of the hype surrounding ICT.

The fourth cluster takes methodology and the "doing" of fieldwork as its subject. Jenny Hockey reflexively addresses some of the implications the ascendancy of participant-observation has made to the discipline. She argues for interviewing to be seen not as the poor cousin of participant-observation but rather as a window of opportunity to engage in moments of experience which open up insights beyond observable dynamics of human behaviour. Christine Brown, seeking a way through the labyrinthine process of gaining permission from local research ethics committees (LRECs) in order to work with people in high and medium secure psychiatric care, turns her frustrations into reflections on the ways in which gatekeeping powers of LRECs intersect with ethnographic projects. She says that the standardized forms and vocabulary of the LRECs to which all researchers must submit, "rooted in the dialect of bio-medical research" (p. 229), severely handicap researchers employing an ethnographic methodology. Brown argues that the very presence of LRECs and their adjudicating powers reveal significant cultural boundary work in the construction of the other within Britain. Carol Trosset and Douglas Caulkins' chapter, based on fieldwork in Wales, completes this cluster. They set out to test the ways in which cultural values may or may not be hegemonic and the extent to which such values are linked to ethnicity. In the only non-qualitative contribution to this volume, the authors emphasize their preference for "empirically grounding" (p. 239) their research, but do not convincingly argue for valorizing this approach. Using a program called ANTHROPAC and the approach of consensus analysis, they tested for the hegemonic values of egalitarianism, martyrdom, emotionalism, nostalgia and performance, and analyzed their results according to

three types of groups resident in their field-sites (Welsh-speakers, non-Welsh speakers of Welsh ancestry, and English immigrants). With this data, they then propose four ideological categories for respondents' cultural values of Welshness.

Community is the final topic under consideration. In a sort of cautionary tale about social scientific over-exuberance with the notion of diaspora, Vered Amit reviews the ways in which the concept has been embraced by postcolonial, postmodern, and globalization theorists. She argues that it needs to be treated more critically and uses the ethnographic example of her research amongst London Armenians to think through the implications of "fragmentation, dispersal, transnational contact and hybridity" (p. 274). Often celebrated as liberating aspects of diaspora, Amit demonstrates how the very same characteristics were worried over by Armenians in London she came to know. Additionally, she convincingly elaborates on how the concept threatens to support primordialism and essentialism within anthropology, two ideologies the discipline has struggled for so long against. Peter Collins' chapter in turn draws on Bakhtinian theory to work through a transition in his work: from perceiving a Quaker Meeting in the north of England as being about religion and ritual to coming to understand it instead as being about "discursive venture" (p. 286). Making community and making Quakerism here come through melding discourses of canon, of localised practice, and of individual action. In the last chapter of this cluster, Nigel Rapport unites fieldwork experiences in a small rural village in Cumbria with his reading of *A Room with a View* to highlight the role of a reciprocal physicality (including working, fighting, playing, gossiping, business, and extra-marital affairs) in the forging of community and of belonging. Within this paradigm, the Church and vicar remain perpetually excluded from the community as there is no physical exchange or bodily "doing" of Church or vicar within community life. Finally, the volume as a whole is capped by Anthony Cohen's epilogue. Cohen traces three stages of development of an anthropology about Britain which serves nicely to historicize and contextualize the authors' contributions within the volume. He also asks "how does the anthropology of Britain enhance our understanding of Britain" (p. 326), and proposes that an anthropological concern with disclosing and interrogating "otherness" has been a significant, ongoing, contribution.

Taken individually, each chapter is imaginative and thought-producing about different aspects of contemporary Britain, and the volume as whole is a good introduction to the range of possibilities offered by anthropology. However, despite Rapport's clear statement that the volume makes no pretence of offering a comprehensive account of "Britishness," I am left wondering why not. In a volume about Britain, it does not seem unreasonable to try and go beyond demonstrating diversity of social life and of research questions. Why are studying sociocultural practices, processes and conditions privileged over trying to say something more generalisable (without needing to be fixed and unchangeable) about Britishness or Englishness or Welshness or Scottishness, or indeed the state of these categories themselves? This question is not directed only at this particular volume, but more broadly at the sub-discipline as a whole (by which I also implicate my own work). Can and should an anthropology of Britain go further to say something broader and bolder about Britishness *et al*, or are these containers just so leaky as to be meaningless? If so, thinking through possibilities as to why this might be the case offers a rich vein of intellectual endeavour to be pursued.

Thomas A. Gregor and Donald Tuzin, eds., *Gender in Amazonia and Melanesia: An Exploration of the Comparative Method*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, 343 pages.

Reviewer: *Ellen E. Facey*
University of Northern British Columbia

This is a collection of 14 articles, the first of which is Thomas Gregor's and Donald Tuzin's "theoretical orientation." Even from the Acknowledgments, it is clear that Gregor and Tuzin are proud, and justifiably so, to have produced "...the first book to systematically compare the cultures of Melanesia and Amazonia, and to consider the remarkable parallels and illuminating differences that exist between them" (p. ix). Taking the two regions as one (the imaginary "Melazonia," as Hugh-Jones dubs it) is a big task, and one that I suspect many anthropologists have wondered about, but found too daunting to take further than imagining what might explain those parallels and differences. So I congratulate the editors on putting together this project. They are also to be commended, as are the other authors, for doing what is all too seldom done in relatively large collections of articles: each author specifically engages other contributors' articles; in addition, each article is introduced by a paragraph which briefly summarizes the focus of the article and recommends other articles that could fruitfully be read in relation to it.

Gregor and Tuzin's introduction reviews the history of comparative method in the discipline, particularly in American anthropology. They assert that comparison is indeed possible and, in fact, is anthropology's primary contribution. They choose gender as the organizing principle for their comparison because "...the resemblance among the societies in Melazonia that stands out most dramatically is gender" (p. 8). Moreover, "[Gender] is an inherently integrative subject, bringing together intellectual perspectives derived from such diverse areas as human biology, environmental studies, psychology, social anthropology, and the humanities" (p. 8).

As the editors point out (p. 10), Descola is the only contributor who takes issue with this perspective, arguing that gender is not so central, at least in Amazonia. However, I question the conclusions of a researcher who refers to gender as a "fashionable anthropological topic" (p. 92) and who

describes Jivaroan Achuar co-wives' opposition to a violent husband as culminating in "...even a strike in the kitchen" (p. 100). This sort of comment implicitly degrades the extra-domestic roles of women/wives, and perhaps more so demonstrates an inappropriate application of the domestic/public dichotomy. It also implies an employer/labourer relationship between husband and co-wives which is quite thoroughly inappropriate.

Many of the articles (including Bonnemère, Hill and Biersack) focus on "male initiations" as "making men" (Papua New Guinea case studies) as opposed to "renewing the cosmos" (Amazonian examples). This difference is then related in interesting ways to differing ideas of the origins of the cosmos and of living species (Bonnemère, 41). Hill compares "marked" and "unmarked cults" across the two regions, and looks also at the parallels in childbirth rites. Biersack (rather unfairly) criticizes Turner and Van Gennep for not seeing the reproductive politics in male-focussed rituals. In her analysis of a ritual practiced by the Paiela of the Papua New Guinea Highlands in order to grow boys' hair and bodies,she makes an original point that the goal is to make them into not men, but husbands. One might reasonably ask, though, whether it is indeed making them into potential fathers instead, and whether that is an important distinction to draw.

Fisher, Conklin and Strathern all focus on definitions of personhood, variously taking into account bodily substances, age, age roles, and same-sex and cross-sex orientations. Jolly adds a consideration of sexuality, fertility and food in South Pentecost, Vanuatu. For a collection that uses the term "Melanesia" in its title, Jolly's is the only piece that is based on ethnographic research outside of Papua New Guinea. Brown also introduces some material little noticed in the literature: cases in which women or girls have taken prominent leadership roles in religious movements. As in Jolly's article, there is welcome attention paid by Brown to historical alterations in sexuality and gender.

With Hugh-Jones' article, the volume returns to "male cults" as fields of sociocultural conceptualization—of bodies, both male and female, and their substances, of the flow of life through reproduction. Roscoe interprets male cults as efforts to establish and maintain a masculine identity based on strength; Gregor and Tuzin show how difficult this is to accomplish. As they put it, they try to show how "...the cult reflects an effort, at times desperate, to hold together an all-too-fragile masculine self" (p. 309).

Gregor and Tuzin provide a short concluding chapter which puts it all into focus very nicely. I did have a good chuckle, however, at their assertion that in much of Melazonia, "Gender is still King" (p. 340). How ironic to use such a Western masculinist metaphor for non-hierarchical societies in which gender relations are a site of such contestation, as evidenced especially in their own article (chap. 13).

Overall *Gender in Amazonia and Melanesia* is a theoretically sophisticated, ethnographically rich resource. There is still some tendency, however, to prioritize men's rites, even though many of the authors do acknowledge the important roles of women, even in those so-called "men's rites." As Jolly puts it, "...we still tend to naturalize and dehistoricize maternities, while we proliferate types of 'men' (big men, great men, men-men, clan-men) and culturalize and historicize paternities. The varieties of women, femaleness, and maternities are more rarely plotted and, if they are, are typically seen as derivative (cf. Strathern, 1988)" (p. 191). Nonetheless, this volume represents the anthropologist's anthropology, fascinating for those who crave ethnographic detail and the thrust and parry of contrary interpretations. It is a great text with which professionals can continue the debates and on which graduate students can cut their intellectual teeth.

One reservation remains, especially with students in mind. For my liking, too few of the articles come to grips with historical change in gender relations and with contemporary circumstances and cultural experiences, Jolly's and Brown's articles being notable exceptions. It might be argued that, given the book's purpose, this was not required; but it is certainly possible that where much change has occurred much light could be shed on that same purpose by looking at the nature of that change. Gregor and Tuzin themselves recognize this when they note that the gender inflections of the Ilahita Arapesh "...are extreme even by New Guinea standards, brought about by the latter's sudden increase in settlement size and social complexity" (p. 340).

Andrew Strathern, Pamela J. Stewart, Laurence M. Carucci, Lin Poyer, Richard Feinberg and Cluny Macpherson, *Oceania: An Introduction to the Cultures and Identities of Pacific Islanders*, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002, 249 pages.

Reviewer: *Ellen E. Facey*
University of Northern British Columbia

The material is presented in three independent parts: "The South-West Pacific" by Strathern and Stewart (67 pp. of text), "The Eastern Pacific" by Feinberg and Macpherson (53 pp.), and "The West Central Pacific" by Carucci and Poyer (52 pp.).

In their very brief Introduction to the volume, Strathern and Stewart reject the common anthropological areal terms—Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia— in favour of compass directions, except where they use the older terms in quotations marks, to signify their dissatisfaction with them. Feinberg and Macpherson are of a different opinion, as indicated by the quotation marks they place on the phrase the "Eastern Pacific" in the title of part 2. Strathern and Stewart say that the sections ("parts") into which the book is divided "... correspond to geographical, historical, and cultural differences within the region as a whole, but we do not stress these broad divisions as such." Yet, having named the parts of the book for those divisions does indeed give stress or emphasis to them.

Stewart and Strathern provide the volume's aim: "... to provide an overview of ethnography, history, and contemporary changes in a broad range of societies across the Pacific region" (p. 3). They say that their intended audience is undergraduate college students; however, knowing that the average college/university student already finds Mela/Micro/Polynesia sufficiently hard to keep straight, I would rather that Strathern and Stewart had either used the traditional terms, or had taken the more sophisticated approach of avoiding this classificatory problem altogether. They state that "contemporary processes," "common ethnographic themes" and "dynamic differences" in Oceania as a whole are their primary interest (p. 4). Actually organizing the book around these concepts, rather than according to geographic areas (whatever one might call them), would have provided a unique treatment of Oceanic ethnography.

Additionally, in their Introduction, Stewart and Strathern note that they "...have written this book in the conviction that this Pacific world...is a world worth knowing, as much today as it was perceived to be by its earlier explorers, whether captains of ships or writers of books" (p. 3). While I agree with this, I also wonder why they feel they need to make this statement. The underlying issue is not how "worth knowing" Pacific cultures are, but the noxious habit of Westerners' judging other cultures as more or less interesting and therefore worth knowing in direct correlation with how "exotic" they appear to be. I wonder which audience Stewart and Strathern are trying to convince of the value of knowing contemporary Pacific cultures: students, their own colleagues, or the general public?

Part 1 of the book focusses on the South-West Pacific. The first section is overly detailed. For an undergraduate textbook, providing accurate content is essential, of course, but so is building a sense of place and context, visual clues and cues to aid students' memory and understanding, and that sense of "being there." What few pictures there are—nine—only appear at the end of the text of this section, preceding the References, very much like footnotes. None is in colour. Five are from Mt. Hagen, and not one is from outside Papua New Guinea.

The pictures seem like archival footage, frequently focussing on ritual moments—the *National Geographic* type of native (Lutz and Collins, Ch.5), strangely dressed, frightening or scowling, and more often than not, nameless: "a female mourner," "a male dancer," "a newly married bride," "a younger man."

Part 1 also contains 16 "Case Studies": two on Fiji; one each on New Caledonia andVanuatu; three on the Solomons; and nine focussed on Papua New Guinea. These are all written by Strathern and Stewart, but each relies heavily on another author. As they summarize, Strathern and Stewart frequently refer back to their own ethnographic experiences—as in "... and here also we find a clear similarity with the Highlands of Papua New Guinea..." (35)—a strategy that at times detracts from the material in the case studies themselves. PNG is overrepresented in part 1 in relation to other parts of the south-west Pacific. It does not also need to be treated as the reference point for comparison for all the other Melanesian case studies.

The rationale behind the choice of subjects for the case studies is not clear, but the main focus is on politics and political changes of the 20th century. Part 1 closes with "An Overview of Political Problems," followed by the photographs and collected References.

Part 2 concerns the "Eastern Pacific." Written by Richard Feinberg and Cluny Macpherson, it hangs together much better than part 1, without giving priority or centrality to one nation. As an overview I found it much more useful than part 1, especially the portions that are concise summaries of common themes: honor, *mana*, *tapu*, *aloha* and descent (although this last is surprisingly brief).

In lieu of many shorter case studies, the latter section of part 2 focusses on contemporary issues relating to the Maori of Aotearoa (New Zealand), Samoa, and Anuta, as three "variants of the Polynesian experience" (p. 130). Each of these is a solid and readable historical overview. Again, photographs and references follow the text rather than being incorporated into it. There are a few more photos than in part 1, and they are spread more evenly among the different nations and are linked to the different activities discussed in the section.

I would feel comfortable assigning part 2 to undergraduates. It provides a comprehensive, yet manageable, introduction to the commonalities and diversity of the cultures classed as the "Eastern Pacific," their prehistory, historic experiences and more contemporary processes and concerns. Feinberg and Macpherson have given us a valuable document, a scholarly overview which neither becomes mired in detail nor overemphasizes the authors' own ethnographic areas.

The West Central Pacific is treated in part 3 by Laurence Carucci and Lin Poyer. It is a stylistic halfway house between parts 1 and 2. There is considerable general information, and most parts of the sub-region are discussed, especially with reference to ecological variation, political systems and colonial histories. The focus is on the varied senses of identity which have evolved out of these situations.

As in the first two parts, case studies are presented to exemplify the processes involved. In the last major section of part 3 Carucci and Poyer concentrate on religious change— a dizzying array of Christian influences brought by Spanish, German, American, and even Japanese. The final major section is called the "Reification of Culture and the Politics of Tradition." The nine photographs that complete this part of the book are an interesting and appropriate mix of "traditional" and modern.

Of the three parts of this book, the most coherent and useful for teaching Pacific ethnography are parts 2 and 3, in that order. Ideally, it would have been wonderful to have a fully integrated consideration of Oceania as a whole, as the title seems to promise. However, the complexity of each of the book's three parts shows just how difficult that would be. Until someone manages that, this will be the closest thing we will have to

it. As such, it is an extremely valuable effort. But, if you plan to use it for undergraduates, they will need to be senior students. The book's length is deceptive; these are 249 pages of densely compacted material.

References

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Desjardins Michel, *Le jardin d'ombres. La poétique et la politique de la rééducation sociale.* Préface de Gilles Bibeau, Collection Problèmes sociaux et interventions sociales, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 2002, 235 pages.

Recenseur : *Raymond Massé*
Université Laval

Le Québec n'a pas échappé à la mouvance qui amena plusieurs sociétés occidentales à proposer une désinstitutionnalisation des personnes présentant des déficiences intellectuelles et à promouvoir leur réinsertion sociale. Ce mouvement qui a pris par exemple des allures parfois radicales, en Italie par exemple, fut officialisé au Québec en 1988 par son inscription dans les politiques explicites du Ministère de la santé et des services sociaux. Mais quels furent les résultats de cette entreprise, aux fondements idéologiques lourds, mais récupérée pour des motifs largement utilitaristes par l'État gestionnaire? Dans les termes de Michel Desjardins, tant les anthropologues que les sociologues, ont la responsabilité de questionner de quelles façons s'est effectué cette intégration des personnes? Leur intégration est-elle réelle ou symbolique? Bénéfique ou source alternative de marginalisation et de stigmatisation? Quel est leur mode de vie? La nature et l'adéquation de leur réseau social? Peut-on parler de réussite de cette politique à la lumière des moyens investis? C'est à des questions de ce type que répond l'auteur suivant une démarche ethnographique classique qui l'amena à étudier la vie quotidienne des bénéficiaires d'un Centre d'accueil montréalais, pionnier par ses programmes de «rééducation sociale» de déficients mentaux légers.

Sans nier les contributions des théories de l'étiquetage, du stigmate et du façonnement social des «modèles d'inconduites» qui ont marqué les études de la construction sociale des déviances, Michel Desjardins aura ici plutôt recours aux approches de la signification et de la sémiotique de la culture pour, non plus analyser la socialisation à l'incompétence des personnes déficientes intellectuelles mais pour s'intéresser au «rite de purification que notre société a élaboré afin d'éradiquer leur différence et de les intégrer au reste de la communauté» (p. 13). S'inspirant des quatre fonctions de la signification que D'Andrade définit comme étant la représentation, la construction, la direction et l'évocation, Desjardins s'attaque aux signes et aux interprétations qui, dans le Centre d'accueil, «induit des manières de faire, de penser, de percevoir et d'éprouver spécifiques à ces personnes et à leur entourage» (p. 14). Il s'intéressera alors non pas à la construction sociale de la déficience, thème plus classiquement traité par l'anthropologie, mais à la construction des «catégories inédites» que deviennent les bénéficiaires, éducateurs, animateurs, ateliers de travail, appartements regroupés ou foyers de groupe.

L'ouvrage se caractérise d'abord par son souci du détail ethnographique et la parole donnée aux déficients et aux éducateurs. Le lecteur se trouve plongé dans une description minutieuse et sensible des rapports des bénéficiaires aux lieux physiques, des rapports sociaux de solidarité mais aussi des conflits de clans, des tensions interindividuelles et des mesquineries mais aussi des élans d'entraide entre déficients, de la déconstruction et la reconstruction des réseaux d'amitié suite aux départs des résidants du 5 445 (nom de la ressource résidentielle étudiée). Le lecteur pourra aussi suivre les déplacements des résidents qui partent chaque matin soit pour aller travailler dans le cadre de stage non rémunérés ou dans des ateliers supervisés, soit pour participer à diverses activités de formation et d'éducation. Nous pouvons les suivre dans l'intimité des rites de solidarité qui balisent leurs loisirs ou les fêtes, dans leur quête de normalité à travers l'idéal d'une vie conjugale, dans leurs rapports quotidiens avec les animateurs à la fois instructeurs et mauvais *boss*, confidents et fouineurs, protecteurs et *mères poules*. Mais surtout la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage nous introduit dans l'intimité de la forme et des contenus des programmes de «rééducation sociale». Desjardins analyse alors avec finesse et sensibilité de quelles façons, mais aussi avec quels résultats mitigés, les locataires du centre d'accueil Les Marronniers s'efforcent d'apprendre à maîtriser les techniques les plus basiques des soins corporels, de la tenue du foyer, des impératifs de ponctualité et de productivité qui règlent le marché du travail, le tout régi par des «plans de soins individualisés». Dans un souci du respect des besoins et des aspirations des bénéficiaires, l'auteur montre les limites de ces efforts de réinsertion et de rééducation sociale : même après plusieurs années de supervision et de stimulation, la grande majorité des locataires des Centre Marronniers n'acquérront pas les habiletés et les compétences permettant de vivre de façon autonome. Plus encore, la majorité d'entre eux, ralentiront plus ou moins consciemment le rythme d'apprentissage, effrayés par la perspective d'affronter une société extérieure dépourvue de la sécurité qu'offre le soutien quotidien des animateurs et le milieu protégé des résidences et des ateliers supervisés. Bien sûr, comme le montre Desjardins, ce milieu de vie n'a rien de «naturel». Ce milieu adapté représente en fait un «monde parallèle», un «simulacre» du monde normal reproduit ici en échelle réduite, «en miniature». Le monde des bénéficiaires «est ainsi une vaste reconstruction esthétique de notre monde [...] cette marge voilée à la fois si semblable et si différente du centre».

Tout en vivant dans une marginalité accueillante, les bénéficiaires ont toutefois l'impression illusoire de vivre dans le

monde naturel. Ce monde miniature du «comme si» représente pour l'auteur «l'un des exemples les plus probants et les plus spectaculaires qu'on puisse trouver de la survivance des métamorphoses rituelles au sein des sociétés industrielles, les bénéficiaires étant transformés symboliquement en Comme-Nous, voire en Nous ou en Tel-Nous» (p. 194-195). Ces séjours de plusieurs années dans ces résidences constituent, pour l'auteur, non pas un rite de passage, mais un rituel de transition permanente. Réalistement, tant pour les animateurs que pour les bénéficiaires, le but n'est pas la réintégration sociale, mais la simple maximisation du développement de leur potentiel. L'expérience de terrain et l'écoute des animateurs et des bénéficiaires mettent clairement en évidence les avantages pour les déficients mentaux légers, de ces structures de rééducation : retrouver la dignité, le prestige, l'égalité, le respect, la fraternité, la solidarité, l'amitié, la capacité à relever des défis, de se dépasser. Cette sensibilité à la réalité du vécu et des limites de cette population conduit l'auteur loin des sentiers battus des théoriciens de la marginalité et des discours utopistes sur la réintégration sociale autant irréaliste que non souhaitée par ceux qui n'y trouveraient que frustrations. Ceci n'empêche pas Michel Desjardins de conclure sur une dénonciation d'une société qui cloître les déficients mentaux dans une «marge voilée» sise au cœur de la ville. Le centre d'accueil «homogénéise la société en masquant le lieu clos à l'intérieur duquel il confine les bénéficiaires» (p. 222) en invitant les bénéficiaires à simuler le mode de vie des autres citadins. Le travail demeure immense pour une véritable inclusion sociale libre de préjugés et de préjudices. Mais cet ouvrage a le mérite d'analyser avec grande finesse les contributions et les limites de ces structures de rééducation sociale tout en illustrant, pour les étudiants et les administrateurs, les contributions du terrain ethnologique en milieu institutionnel urbain.

Colin Renfrew, April McMahon, and Larry Trask (eds.), *Time Depth in Historical Linguistics 1-2*, Papers in the Prehistory of Language, Cambridge, England: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research; or Oakville, CT, U.S.A.: David Brown Book Company, 2000, 681 pages.

Reviewer: *Paul Proulx*
Heatherton, Nova Scotia

These two volumes are collections of papers by several linguists, several anthropologists and archaeologists, some Orientalists, one specialist in molecular genetics, one Classicist, and several by people whose return address did not reveal their specialties. The linguists fall into three main categories, which for convenience we may call Traditionalists, Experimenters, and Exotic.

Traditionalists contribute several fine papers, replete with anecdote and important detailed refinements to the Comparative Method, an approach which has consistently proven its worth over the last two centuries. A few of these papers merit special mention. Lyle Campbell's paper (I: 3-19) provides a welcome detailed review of most of the traditional topics related to time, amply illustrated.

Bernard Comrie (I: 33-44) tackles some new as well as old but often forgotten insights, notably the idea that rates of linguistic change are more rapid in small societies, and in societies with word taboos. He also discusses the often forgotten fact that it is easier to reconstruct using several daughter languages than it is using only two, something Greenberg's scapegoaters always seem to forget.

Larry Trask (I: 45-58) provides a long and insightful account of Basque as a 2000 year linguistic adstratum to Latin and later Spanish, discussing the types of loans that took place and the extent to which they can be dated. This is required reading for anyone working on languages in contact or the borrowing process.

Kalevi Wiik (II: 463-480) also takes up borrowing over long periods, and the dating of loans, but from the point of view of a substratum language (Uralic) and its effects on the superstratum (Indo European), and how this progresses in time. The model he proposes here suggests the best account I know of the relationship between a pair of language families I work on, Aymara (substratum) and Quechua (superstratum).

Experimenters provide a wealth of exciting new ideas, as well as discussions of possible refinements of much less exciting old ones. Two proposals stand out particularly among the new ones, both exploring the possibility of using language data to go boldly back in time, where linguists have never gone before. Johanna Nichols (II: 643-664) attempts to use language data to help date human entry into the Americas. This is only one of a long series of papers, in which she works on these questions. Dixon does not contribute a paper to the present volumes at all, but is richly present in the discussions.

To my mind, the Nichols paper should be thought of not so much as a research report, but rather as a research proposal. It contains a great number of very preliminary formulations and estimates that are in need of testing and refinement, over a substantial period of time. Only then can the reasoning used be tested in a meaningful way.

Meanwhile, the virulent criticisms to which the paper is subject are premature, as would be any acceptance of its conclusions. One senses a defensiveness on the part of scholars who have made their reputations with traditional approaches to language, and do not want to share the limelight with upstarts. It leaves me with the uneasy feeling that this is academic warfare, and that, as in all warfare, the first casualty is likely to be the truth. These same likely applies to Dixon's theories as well.

Glottochronology has of course been around for a long time, often buried, yet always returning like the "undead." The present volumes are full of criticisms of it, which Matisoff (II: 333) calls "an exercise in necrohippomachy" (beating a dead horse). It also has several defenders and revisionists (mainly mathematicians whose writing I do not understand). They seem not to be reading what linguists have written on the subject in recent decades.

In my view the main contribution of the half century long glottochronology debate has been to focus some attention to fundamental questions of scientific reasoning and the nature of knowledge in linguistics. Critics seldom bother much with this, self-satisfied in their majority opinion. But reviled proponents cannot avoid it, and their introspection is very illuminating, even to those without the slightest interest in glottochronology.

Sheila Embleton (I: 143-166) gives a detailed history of the work done on glottochronology (and lexicostatistics) over the years, and gives a very cogent account of the non-rational factors that go into decisions by linguists to accept or not some particular methodology. It gives one pause to recognize how little of the linguistic scholarly thought process seems to be rational, when carefully examined. Presumably, we are most irrational when we deal with matters we do not want to waste time on, but manage to do better in the few matters we are willing and able to devote adequate time to. Perhaps this should teach us humility, and tolerance for ambiguity.

Baxter and Ramer (I: 167-188) simply, yet elegantly, illustrate the value of statistical reasoning in linguistics. Using a computer to compare a short English and Hindi word list, they run a simple program designed to spot signs of phonetic similarity, comparing words with similar meanings. It finds nine matchings out of 33 items (where to my eye, only about three look like possible cognates). Then, they let the computer run 1000 comparisons of random matchings of the same words, to see if the nine where meanings match can be attributed to random chance or not. It turns out that only 11/1000 runs produce nine or more matchings, a statistically insignificant number. On that basis, they conclude that English and Hindi show statistically significant signs of being related. I'm impressed. Still, I wish they had tried the same thing with an additional pair, say French and Russian.

Of the non-linguistic papers, three especially stood out as especially worth reading for a linguist. McMahon and McMahon (I: 59-74) summarize new developments in biological estimations of time, comparing and contrasting recent chronological work in linguistics. Peter Bellwood (I: 109-142) compared archaeological and linguistic accounts of the Austronesian expansion out of Taiwan and across the Pacific, and more briefly of other parts of the world where he thinks agriculture was a factor in the formation of language families.

Finally, Clackson (II: 441-454) makes us aware of how we may confuse non-linguists by using a term like Proto-Indo-European in multiple contextually defined meanings. Lacking a good grasp of the (unstated) technical concepts that distinguish these multiple meanings so clearly in our own minds, he concludes that "one of the key ways in which reconstructed languages differ from actual spoken languages is that they are achronic, that is, they combine data from a wide range of different chronological layers...The method cannot distinguish between what is a late, or even post-, Indo-European feature and what is early or pre-Indo-European." This should warn us to use our terms clearly, explicitly distinguishing Proto-X, pre-Proto-X, Proto-X dialects, early daughters of Proto-X, and the like. And, when writing for non-linguists, we should probably explicitly state how we know which of these is which.

Each of the remaining authors writes on a slightly different topic, or from a different point of view. They are covering broad subjects in very little space, and as a result several papers are essentially reviews of some section of the literature, accompanied by the author's views.

There is no way a short review can even begin to point out all the errors in reasoning, out of date ideas, and crucial omissions found in many of the papers. Caveat lector! In general, authors in need of firm editorial guidance didn't get it (or resisted it). This is particularly serious in the matter of several papers evidently translated from foreign languages, where the English is unreadable without an unabridged dictionary. Readers are busy people, and are not likely to bother to decode these. That translated papers out of Eastern Europe can be clear and readable is proven by Starostin (I: 223-266), and the same clarity should be required of others. Several other papers are obviously written with only specialists in some exotic topic in mind, scholars who are intimately familiar with an enormous amount of background. These papers would have required quite a lot of introduction in order to become meaningful to a general audience.

The two volumes are printed on glossy paper, and by direct artificial light (a reading lamp) there is a serious problem with glare. Finally, the binding in one of the volumes broke almost as soon as I opened it, and the pages are not very securely bound. I presume libraries will have to have these volumes rebound almost right away, and for this there is only 2.5 cm of margin. For 50 pounds sterling, one might have expected better.

Paul Atkinson, Amanda Coffey, Sara Delamont, John Lofland and Lyn Lofland (eds.), *The Handbook of Ethnography,* London: Sage, 2002, xviii + 507 pages.

Reviewer: *Elvi Whittaker*
University of British Columbia

Rather surprisingly *The Handbook of Ethnography,* edited by three British and two American sociologists, arrives hot on the heels of another sociological *Handbook* devoted to ethnography. This earlier one edited by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln is in its second edition (1994, 2000) and in the preparation stages for its third. Both handbook efforts are encyclopedic in their scope mainly featuring writings by sociologists and anthropologists, while the Atkinson *et al* volume also adds assorted other disciplines. While the earlier *Handbook* relies mainly on American scholars, the more recent volume claims that "international excellence was our primary criterion" (p. 1) for the selection of authors. The cast includes 21 British, 20 American and 2 each of Dutch, Finnish and Australian aca-

demics, comprising 31 sociologists, 9 anthropologists, 4 education scholars and one each from folklore, women's studies and the philosophy of science. Seemingly aware that the comparison between the two handbooks would be unavoidable, the editors offer a critique of the earlier volume(s), indicating that their own intention is to distance themselves from "the five (six) moments model of Lincoln and Denzin" ...[which] "can do violence to the complexities of research and its historical development"...[such] a chronological, and linear view of development...is in danger of doing a disservice to earlier generations of ethnographers" (pp. 2-3). While these differences do not appear thunderous at first glance, reading all of the chapters leaves one with a clear sense of the strong support offered for the classic ethnography, not through proclaiming its familiar canons, but rather through displaying its multifaceted progeny, deep diversities, multiplicity of methods and broad applicability. Intriguing as the question of differences between the two parallel volumes may be, the Atkinson *et al* volume stands on its own as a worthy addition to the gargantuan growth in the discourses on ethnography.

The editors hope to present a "*tour d'horizon* of ethnographic methods and ethnographic research in the social sciences" (p. 1) in an undertaking that they readily agree is diffuse and beyond the ambitions of any single volume. To accomplish this they organize thirty-three diffuse chapters into three sections. The first section explores the origins of ethnography, various "intellectual and substantive contexts," differences in disciplinary and national orientations and seminal conceptual theoretical strands involved in ethnographic thinking. To meet these ends there are rich offerings on the Chicago school of ethnography (Mary Jo Deegan), the ethnographic roots of symbolic interactionism (Paul Rock), an overview of the ethnographic commitments of British social anthropology (Sharon Macdonald) and American cultural anthropology (James Faubion). To these are added the ethnography-centred works in community studies of various kinds (Lodewijk Brunt) and the less-well known fieldwork methods of the Mass-Observation studies of Britain (Liz Stanley). The section is rounded out by those theoretical and analytic propositions and assumptions that have come to be associated with ethnographic work—the Orientalism problematic, so much in the very fibre of anthropological thought (Julie Marcus), the basic contributions of phenomenology (Ilja Maso), ethnomethodology (Melvin Pollner and Robert Emerson), semiotics and semantics (Peter Manning) and grounded theory (Kathy Charmaz and Richard G. Mitchell).

The second section is devoted to "distinctive domains of ethnographic research," those locales where ethnographic work has contributed definitive knowledge or shaped the academic portrait of the cultures involved. These are the ethnographies of health and medicine (Michael Bloor), educational settings (Tuula Gordon, Janet Holland and Elina Lahelma), deviance (Dick Hobbs), science and technology (David Hess), childhood (Allison James), material culture (Christopher Tilley), cultural studies (Joost Van Loon), communication (Elizabeth Keating), work (Vicki Smith) and photography and film (Mike Ball and Greg Smith). This is a well-documented state of the art perspective on topics that, like the titles of courses in a curriculum, are familiar to all social scientists.

The third explores "key aspects of data collection, analysis and representation," key domains and debates. Some of the necessities for any handbook are addressed here: career socialization (Christopher Wellin and Gary Allan Fine), ethics (Elizabeth Murphy and Robert Dingwall), participant observation and field notes (Robert Emerson, Rachel Fretz and Linda Shaw), interviewing (Barbara Heyl), narrative analysis (Martin Cortazzi), life stories (Ken Plummer), autoethnography (Deborah Reed-Danahay), feminist ethnography (Beverley Skeggs), ethnography after postmodernism (Jonathan Spencer), computer applications (Nigel Fielding), ethnodrama (Jim Mienczakowski) and finally postmodern, poststructural and postcritical ethnography (Patti Lather). The differences between sections two and three are not entirely self-explanatory, for example as to why photography and film reside in a section devoted to distinctive domains rather than to aspects of data collection and representation. Yet the chapters in themselves, as individual attempts, support the editors' intention of presenting the "presents and futures" of the enterprise, the nature of "ethnographic labour" and the reflexivity involved in the art and practice of ethnography (p. 322-323).

Each chapter inevitably invites a critique but, given the tradition of such book reviews, I can evade the onerous task of applauding the sparks of imagination or occasionally enumerating the banalities in each, and instead direct attention to those facets of the work that might provoke the interest, or alternately, the ire of anthropologists. For many years I have heard sociologists deride the offensive assumption of anthropologists who claim ethnography as the sole domain of their own discipline. Two chapters in particular are destined to challenge that discipline-centred ignorance. May Jo Deegan traces the "continuing tapestry" of the Chicago school of ethnography, the history of that institution between 1892 and 1942, its active and activist descendants and, most importantly, the classic urban ethnographies published by the University of Chicago Press. Listed among these are such enduring contributions to social science, to urban studies and to the ethnographic record of North America as W.I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant in Poland and America* (1918-1920), Nels Anderson's *The Hobo* (1923), Louis Wirth's *The Ghetto* (1928), Harvey Zorbaugh's *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (1929), Clifford Shaw's *The Jack Roller* (1930), Paul Cressey's *The Taxi-Dance Hall* (1932) and William F. Whyte's continuing example of what ethnographic excellence looks like—*Street Corner Society* (1943). Much of this "hands on" method was promoted by Robert E. Park, a leading figure in Chicago sociology, who, interestingly, was connected to the anthropologist Robert Redfield by marriage and by collegial interests in social science. This sociology and its promotion of ethnography had a towering presence over the discipline from 1892 well through the last century to the present. Reputedly

by the 1930s the University of Chicago had trained half of the sociologists in the world (p. 11).

The University of Chicago sociology is also the focus of Paul Rock's chapter. He traces the beginnings of the theoretical-methodological approach of symbolic interactionism and its ethnographic imperatives. In doing so he connects the work of such recognizable figures as George Herbert Mead, the philosopher, with Erving Goffman, Herbert Blumer and others to the practice of participant observation, the focus on the everyday and the production of ethnographic writing. Despite their potential contributions to ethnographic work in anthropology, to participant observation, to the ethnography of speaking and other interests entertained by anthropologists, symbolic interactionist propositions have not penetrated the anthropological ethos, apart from the work of a few practitioners like Gerald Berreman.

Of further interest are two sociologically inspired chapters. One of these by Lodewijk Brunt organizes ethnography under the rubric of communities and community studies, thereby giving credence to sociological as well as anthropological work and bringing together tribes, clans, bands, villages, cities, towns, neighbourhoods, immigrants, families, social classes and "imagined" communities of many kinds into some kind of common symbolic entity. Undoubtedly adjusting to the direction set for the volume, the author does not push his analysis into some intriguing spaces signalled by his particular choice of topic such as questions about the borders and limits of ethnography, of macro demands for knowledge beyond communities and other epistemological factors. The other chapter by Liz Stanley introduces North American social scientists to observational fieldwork carried out in Britain between 1937 and 1939 and again immediately after WWII. Intended to capture "the historical moment," the Mass-Observation's fieldwork was portrayed as "a new form of social science, an anthropology at home, a synthetic sociology, and as an alternative to the very different form that the university-based social sciences of the day had taken (p. 93)." Arising in response to the royal abdication crisis of 1936, the fieldwork project was committed to linking "ordinary people" to science by having them observe each other within a variety of social occurrences and on a variety of debatable social issues. As these "subjective cameras" and the demands of the "new science" were at odds with each other, the author implies that the interests of ethnography were set back for some time to come, defeated by "high positivism." The emotional and ethical appeals of this type of fieldwork would be congenial to the ethnographic cultures of today.

Although obviously ethnographic fieldwork is always hard work, the chapter by Christopher Wellin and Gary Fine offers a fresh perspective on the enterprise. It places what is usually seen as "methodology" into the arena in which careers and labour is usually situated. The approach puts a different complexion on the complaints echoed by generations of anthropologists—the difficulties of entrée into the field, the continual presence of ethical issues, the impact of the research, the retention of disciplinary rules, the translation into favoured theoretical bundles, the mundane pressures of everyday fieldworking lives and a myriad of other dilemmas. They become part of the "dirty work of making a living," the problems of dealing with bosses and superiors, labour-intensive but not capital-intensive and indeed heir to all of the exigencies and demands recognized by all occupations and bureaucracies. The chapter is both provocative and entertaining. Yet anthropologists will inevitably bristle at being informed that they are "less subject to critical reflection" than are sociologists. The *Writing Culture* efforts are dismissed as "broad, political and literary critiques of ethnography and its linkages to colonial power" rather than reflection (p. 325), thereby giving no acknowledgment that those very efforts were only possible because of extensive earlier reflection. Parenthetically, those who are tiring of the continual genuflection to *Writing Culture* and to Geertz, will find some solace as well as some amusement in Jonathan Spencer's playfully iconoclastic chapter on postmodern ethnographies. For him the mavericks who broke the mould, like Bateson, did so well before the volume in question and Clifford Geertz is a "literary dandy" (p. 445).

Anthropological attention will also be piqued by other outsider views of the anthropological enterprise. Beverley Skeggs maps the topography of feminist ethnography in ways that would find a sympathetic audience among anthropologists. That is until she declares point blank "a number of anthropologists used ethnography to spy for the US government" (p. 427). Every anthropologist who lived through the problems of the Vietnamese war, the academic responses to it and the actions and activisms of the time, and who has read the numerous accounts that have emerged in the writings within the discipline since then, will affirm the complexities of the issues, the diffuse views of those inevitably drawn into the debates and the impenetrable fuzziness of the accounts provided about the uses to which ethnographies were actually directed. That such multifaceted happenstances become translated into single sentence confident summaries is, I suppose, an expected part of the academic as well as every other textualizing effort.

In all, the collection proposes to celebrate "a certain unity in diversity" (p. 6). As satisfying as the collection of chapters has shown itself to be, it leaves the reader with a hunger for the next stages in the ethnographic drama. Do these well-executed foundations lead to some kind of epistemic introspections? What will interdisciplinarity enable in the ethnographic scenario? What kind of powerful knowledge-producing vehicle is the ethnographic narration? What is the nature of the description discourse itself? How do we come to know? Surely we do ethnography every day of our lives and a non-ethnographed life is hardly possible? Can these familiar assumptions of everyday knowledge be teased out for ethnographic reflection? What kinds of interlocutors will herald the next stage? Where and how will the boundaries of ethnography be stretched?

Film Review / Revue de Film

Footbinding: Search for the Three Inch Golden Lotus. Directed and produced by Yue-Qing Yang. 47: 45 minutes. 2004. ©East-West Film Enterprise. Moving Images Distribution, 402 West Pender Street, Ste 606, Vancouver, BC V6B 1T6, telephone: (604) 684-3014 or (800) 684-3014, url: www.movingimages.ca

Reviewer: *Laurel Bossen*
McGill University

Footbinding was practised in China for centuries until it was finally discontinued in the first half of the 20th century. In China today there still survive dwindling numbers of elderly women who had their feet bound. This permanent bodily transformation, a physical compression and containment of the feet of small girls, fascinates people for different reasons. Some marvel at the artistry of the tiny foot and the extreme efforts to achieve this particular beauty ideal, while others struggle to understand how and why a society could permanently hobble girls' and women's ability to stand on firm feet, to walk briskly, to run or to jump. Born and raised in China, Canadian filmmaker, Yue-Qing Yang returns to China to understand both the how and the why of footbinding. She finds this is a subject that few in China want to discuss.

Yang draws upon her own family resources and in so doing reveals some of the dynamics of Chinese families. She has two mothers because, when she was born in China, her birth mother wanted to have another child, a boy. She thus gave Yang to her sister to raise as a daughter. Only later did Yang discover that the mother who raised her was biologically her aunt. Both Yang's mothers and her sister are a tremendous help to her in making the film. They are loyal and supportive, but also dubious that Yang's desire to make a film about footbound women and to show the naked foot unbound is a good thing politically or culturally. Conflicted by their desire to help her—which they certainly do, their ambivalence is very moving. We see incredible tenderness and warmth in these relations, giving us a sense of the strong but unspoken love that ties these women together. This film reveals various sides of Chinese family relationships linking women: mother, aunt, and sisters. Surely footbinding is a subject that requires women's participation and voices.

The story takes the form of a personal quest to learn what it meant to Chinese women to have bound feet and why they did it. Yang is troubled by the thought that she might have been bound as a child if she had been born a generation earlier. She wants to understand what the women of her family, her mother and aunt, and Chinese women more generally, went through as children to make their feet small, and why binding was deemed necessary. She looks far and wide to find and interview surviving elderly women who had feet that were close to the ideal small foot, called the "three-inch golden lotus." Yang's narration throughout this journey is soft-spoken, calm, understated and emotionally compelling.

Yang's quest takes her back "home" to China where the state and the culture both exert pressures to deny this "shameful" past. People are reluctant to talk about a custom that once embarrassed China before other cultures, even though the custom was firmly opposed and suppressed by the Communist government, as well as the Nationalist government before it. This denial is, then, more a question of national pride, and a concern with the "face" of traditional Chinese culture. It reflects a fear that foreigners might ridicule traditional Chinese culture. The Communist state taught people to see foreigners as colonialists or antagonists looking for ways to deride Chinese culture. This makes it difficult for Yang and her crew to film this sensitive topic, particularly when she leaves her circle of kinswomen. Yang shows several women turn away and refuse to be filmed or interviewed in the presence of a foreign film crew (despite the fact that Yang is Chinese). It would have been interesting to have a glimpse of her camera crew to see what it was that made people nervous. In such situations, long-term anthropological research methods might have opened more doors, but of course they would have required much more time in remote locations.

Yang's search for the three-inch ideal takes her beyond her immediate family and friends in Jiangsu and Shandong provinces in eastern China to distance places in the west such as Shaanxi province, the city of Datong in northwest Shanxi, and Yunnan province in the southwest. She seeks out places where women's small feet were famous, or where footbinding persisted to a relatively late date. We see Yang carrying her gear, travelling by train, trekking up hillsides, and finally, suffering the pain and irony of being hobbled herself after breaking her ankle. She carries on, with cast and crutches, perhaps more motivated than ever to understand the history of Chinese women's disabled feet.

Woven into this story of women's pain and beauty are interesting but uncommented scenes and dialogues that give us a glimpse of women's work in the past. Her elderly mother and aunt, who both had their feet bound, sit together upon the bed to show her how they used to sew the beautiful cotton shoes. The women deftly cut, paste, and sew, working with cloth, scissors, needle and thread. Without Yang mentioning their mastery of traditional techniques, the observant viewer can see that they have been working with cloth most of their lives. One of them recalls how they used to make all the clothes and shoes for the family, and that she once made seventeen pairs of shoes consecutively.

In other scenes, elderly women show precisely how they bound and cared for their own feet, dealing with infected feet as the flesh rotted, soaking them, rebinding them. They demonstrate these techniques upon the tender feet of a small Chinese girl about five or six years old, a haunting, shadowy child in black-and-white, who represents the past, the girl that Yang might have been. This technique allows us to imagine how parents would bind the feet of a girl child, how she would resist, how she would try to walk leaning against a wall. Yang juxtaposes this small unsteady girl trying to walk, leaning

against the wall, with a scene of a boy who was told to study hard for the imperial exams. An even more memorable contrast is a contemporary scene, in colour, of a boy leaping and dancing in the street, expressing with his flying feet the innocent joy and energy of unfettered youth, denied to millions of foot-bound girls.

In painstaking detail, old women describe how they began the binding, how they wound the cloth to fold the toes under the foot, anchored the cloth at the heel, and gradually broke the arch. They showed the differences following the unbinding of feet. One sister simply stopped wearing the bindings and her foot remained deformed although unbound. The other tied small strings to each toe to pull them back out from under her feet and thus achieved more normal looking feet, although she was still unable to walk on the balls of her feet. Yang slowly demonstrates that although most women had bound feet, few mothers had the expertise to create a foot of the desired form. There were different degrees of skill in this process. Much as if teeth straightening were performed by each mother rather than by an orthodontist, footbinding produced a great range of effects, some far from the ideal. Yang reveals the unfortunate experience of one bitter woman whose feet were improperly bound. Because they did not take the ideal shape she had the handicap of deformity yet none of the advantages associated with small-footed beauty.

Seeking explanations, Yang interviewed Columbia University historian Dorothy Ko (2001), curator of an exhibit of bound-foot shoes at the Bata Shoe Museum in Toronto in 2000. Ko emphasizes the pride and beauty that women felt about their feet and their shoes, and believes that enduring the pain was somewhat like a rite of passage to womanhood.

Yang also interviewed Beverly Jackson, Asian art collector and expert on footbinding (1997), about the theory that footbinding was invented by men to control women. Jackson notes that it was not simply men who imposed and perpetuated the custom; women as mothers and grandmothers actually carried out the binding and inflicted it on small girls, telling them it would help them get a husband. No one ever mentions men binding women's feet.

Elderly men expressed their admiration of the small, bound foot and how the size of bride's feet was evaluated: small was beautiful, big was ugly. Boys were told to obey or they would get a big-footed wife. Girls were taught they couldn't get married unless their feet were small. Older rural men fondly recall the peculiar way that women swayed from side to side when they walked on their heels as attractive, but they did not mention sexual fantasies about the feet.

Yang interviewed Doctor Chi-Sheng Ko, surgeon at a hospital in Taiwan. Dr. Ko is an avid "lotus shoe" collector and foot fetishist who makes some rather remarkable claims about the sexual properties of the bound foot. His ardent admiration for tiny shoes and tiny feet are a testimony to the human's ability to create sexual fantasies and sexual theories about any part of the body, as well as the tendency of society's gender norms to infuse the symbols of the opposite sex with sexual desire.

Dr. Ko's belief that the main motivation for the spread of this custom across China was male sexual fantasy, inspired, according to legend, by an early imperial concubine, is not very credible despite the evidence that some male writers and artists portrayed the bound foot as sex symbol. Yue-Qing Yang skillfully juxtaposes his views with those of her mother. When she asked her mother whether any sexual purpose was associated with the bound foot, her mother said, "No," and then turned the question around, noting that today women don't have bound feet, yet people still have sex. As a good reporter, Yang notes that most elderly Chinese women do not feel comfortable talking about sex at all.

Yang explores each of these theories about beauty, eroticism, marriage, but does not seem fully satisfied with any at the end of her quest. The aesthetic and erotic explanations both fall short, leaving a gap between expressed ideals and the realities of women's lives. In one of the most powerful scenes in the film, following Dorothy Ko's claim that women with bound feet could walk with few problems, despite popular perceptions, Yang inserts documentary footage of a woman crawling on her hands and knees while everyone else is running to escape the Japanese invasion of China. The woman had lost her shoes, and she could not walk upon her feet without the support of the shoe. Elderly women also explain how they went hungry in times of famine because they could not walk very far to find food. One tearfully recalled how with bound feet she could not get enough food and so her baby girl died in her arms. Another related that her own grandmother burnt to death at the stove when some loose straw ignited and she could not get up on her feet quickly enough to get away. It may be that in the normal course of everyday slow-paced and sedentary life, footbinding did not completely immobilize women as people often believe. But Yang's images speak more than words when she shows us an elderly woman, wobbling, unstable, holding her cane, and having great difficulty taking a step. This image recalled for me my interviews with several footbound women near Datong in May 2004. One old woman with bound feet had lent her cane to her friend, and thus she herself could barely walk unaided across the courtyard. Even with a cane, these women were unable to walk very much and seemed most comfortable seated on the *kang*, a heated bed.

Much as I love this film, there are questions about footbinding that Yang does not explore. Specifically what kinds of work did footbound women do? For some reason, it has been common for the focus on bound feet and beauty to push out of sight all other aspects of women's lives, such as their daily work. The research by Hill Gates (1997, 2001) on footbinding in Fujian (2001), and my own research in Yunnan (2002) suggest that footbinding was not as divorced from economic interests as usually believed. Girls and women with bound feet worked with their hands, as illustrated by many of the women Yang interviewed.

This film is an extremely useful introduction to the subject of footbinding and its significance in contemporary China where elderly women with bound feet have been kept in the

background. Footbinding was not just as a curious cultural custom. It was a widespread social practice and an everyday technology that still needs to be investigated as an integral part of Chinese social and economic history. Witnessing Yang's travels across a visually stunning landscape, we are reminded how far and widely this practice had traveled across China. Still, Yang's dialogues with women and her exploration of the current theories regarding beauty, eroticism, or male dominance as explanations for the practice leaves many questions yet to be asked and answered. The film concludes with images of contemporary women wearing high, spike-heeled shoes and points to cross-cultural parallels in the quest for female beauty. This is a wonderful film for introducing audiences to the history of Chinese women, and for courses in anthropology, women's studies, gender, China, or East Asian studies.

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



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