Anthropologica

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Anthropology of Sport / Anthropologie du Sport

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Open to contributors from Canada and abroad, *Anthropologica* publishes in French and English, articles and reviews in all areas of cultural and social anthropology. All manuscripts are refereed anonymously by two reviewers.

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La revue *Anthropologica* publie en français et en anglais, des articles et comptes rendus produits par des chercheurs canadiens et étrangers oeuvrant dans les divers domaines de l'étude académique de l'anthropologie culturelle et sociale. Chaque manuscrit est soumis pour évaluation à deux lecteurs anonymes.

Canada

Anthropologica

Vol. 46 N° 1, 2004

Anthropology of Sport / Anthropologie du Sport

Book Reviews / Comptes Rendues

Cover/couverture

Kaiser Chiefs soccer fans, Johannesburg. Photo by Shiloh Vanderhoof, at the Johannesburg Stadium, January 2001.

Fans de l'équipe de football Kaiser Chiefs de Johannesburg. Photo par Shiloh Vanderhoof, au stade de Johannesburg, janvier 2001.

Getting into the Game: Anthropological Perspectives on Sport—Introduction

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Conceptual walls that once cloistered scholars from even contemplating that games and sports might be legitimate and significant matters for intellectual inquiry have in recent years been intrepidly scaled. Political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, literary critics, historians, geographers, economists and philosophers have mounted inquiries into sundry aspects of sport participation and spectatorship, past and present. Anthropologists too have been tempted to rethink their disciplinary habit of steering clear of the study of games and sports and to speculate concerning the intellectual challenges that may be embraced within previously forbidden fields of play. Ethnographers who venture into arenas of sport may risk incurring larger or smaller measures of professional indifference or prejudice, but they also tend to return with vivid accounts and intriguing theoretical insights.

Sources of the lingering anthropological reluctance to afford games and sports serious and sustained attention have been probed in various writings (e.g., Archetti, 1998; Bourdieu, 1990; Dyck, 2000b) and are subjected to further critical analysis by King in this issue. What also needs to be noted here is the ethnographic breadth and analytical depth of a nascent and pulsing anthropological literature on sport. In fact, ethnographic fieldworkers have been intermittently reporting the popularity of games and sports of many types since the founding of the discipline in the 19th century. James Mooney published an article on the Cherokee ball game (1890) in the same year that he conducted research into the Ghost Dance religion. Shortly after this came Culin's (1907) comprehensive study of the morphology and religious significance of the games of North American Indians. Additional accounts of the traditional games and athletic contests of the Americas have been issued in the last two decades (Nabokov, 1987; Oxendine, 1988; Scarborough and Wilcox, 1991; Veenum, 1994). At various times eminent anthropologists have matter of factly identified sport practices as salient features of their investigations (i.e., Appadurai, 1995; Firth 1931; Fox 1961; Geertz 1972; Gluckman and Guck-

Keywords: sports, games, play, body, performance, aesthetics

man, 1977; MacAloon, 1981). Paradoxically, although several generations of undergraduate anthropology students were introduced to the filmed intricacies of Trobriand cricket while their teachers puzzled over the implications of the Balinese cock fight, the notion that games and sports might comprise appropriate objects of systematic and comparative anthropological investigation tended to be smothered by a preference for exoticism.

Since the 1980s, however, a set of finely crafted anthropological monographs that explicitly target the study of specific sports in particular settings has appeared. It includes works on masculinity, ideology and wrestling in India (Alter, 1992), sports in the moral order of the Peoples' Republic of China (Brownell, 1995), baseball on the border between Mexico and Texas (Klein, 1997) and of football (i.e., soccer) cultures worldwide (Archetti, 1999; Armstrong and Giulianotti, 1997; Armstrong, 1998). These and other ethnographies have been supplemented by a revised introductory text (Blanchard, 1995) and edited volumes that examine a broad range of fieldwork settings and theoretical concerns pertinent to the anthropology of sport (Dyck, 2000a; MacClancy, 1996; Sands, 1999). In conjunction with these developments a distinctively anthropological literature on children's involvement in sport has materialized (Anderson, 2001, 2003; Beyer Broch, 2003; Dyck, 1995, 2000c, 2000d, 2003; Lithman, 2000; Weiss, 2000). The anthropology of sport now boasts a small but rapidly growing literature that suffices to demonstrate the potential of both what the study of sport has to offer to anthropology and what, in turn, anthropology can reveal about sport as a facet of social life.

What await anthropologists who choose to look into the sporting pastimes so enthusiastically partaken of by people within our fieldwork locales are familiar components of ethnographic inquiry. We can expect to encounter activities, relationships and events ensconced within shared or conflicting purposes, meanings and imaginaries that yield varied types of experiences, outcomes and identities. Clearly, the ethnographic study of sport proceeds in the same manner that anthropologists explore other facets of social life. What is, nonetheless, distinctive about sport ensues from its stunning capacity to generate pleasure, passion and prodigious levels of social investment and personal commitment to given games, athletic competitions and sporting events. Although games and sports are ubiquitous in the contemporary world, they stand categorically and experientially apart from the mundane routines of everyday life. Elements of play that remain pivotal to sport furnish athletes and spectators with numerous and compelling forms of engagement. There is, thus, no end of ethnographic opportunities to scrutinize why and how sport takes such a persuasive grip on its aficionados or to elucidate the ways in which it may be wielded as an instrument for mediating and reshaping social, personal and political arrangements.

Depending upon one's theoretical inclinations, the anthropological study of games and sports can be approached from any number of directions. For instance, Victor Turner's observation that "the way people play perhaps is more revealing of a culture than how they work" (1983: 104) pointed to the dramatic, expressive and anti-structural properties of sport. Turner identified games, sports and festivals as modes of play that are intrinsically reflexive, serving as both their own subject and object (ibid.: 105). Anchoring his speculations within Roger Caillois' general theory of play (1979), Turner too connected childhood play and simple, unregulated forms of racing and wrestling to highly organized sport activities such as boxing, billiards, baseball and the Olympic Games.

Moving beyond *agon*, or the competitive dimension of sport, Turner underscored the significance of *mimicry*, through which "one can become an imaginary character oneself, a subject who makes believe or makes others believe that he/she is someone other than him/herself" (ibid.: 108). Turner agreed with Caillois that while the athletes who compete in a sports contest are dominated by *agon*, members of the audience at a sporting event are under the spell of *mimicry*. He further endorsed Caillois' contention that:

> [a] physical contagion leads them to assume the position of the contestants in order to help them, just as the bowler is known to unconsciously incline his body in the direction that he would like the bowling ball to take at the end of its course. Under these conditions, paralleling the spectacle, a competitive mimicry is born in the public, which doubles the agon of the field or track." (1979: 22)

This configuration, noted Turner, can be readily seen in the crowd at a football or baseball game (1983: 108). We might add that the agonistic and the mimetic intertwine in myriad ways wherever games and sports are played, thereby providing ethnographers with absorbing lines of inquiry to pursue.

Alternatively, one might focus upon embodied dimensions of sport that reprise propositions and concerns enunciated by Marcel Mauss (1973) in his seminal essay on techniques of the body. He portrayed the body as:

> ...man's first and most natural instrument. Or more accurately, not to speak of instruments, man's first

and most natural technical object, and at the same time technical means, is his body. (Mauss, 1973: 75)

Identifying the body as a social as well as a psychological and biological phenomenon, Mauss nominated education (or training) as being dominant among all elements of what he termed the art of using the human body. The training procedures human beings apply to animals, reported Mauss, they voluntarily apply to themselves and their children. Whether imitating the body techniques of those who are admired or who have authority over one, the individual borrows a series of movements or ways of using the body that constitute it from the action executed in front of him/her or with him/her by others (ibid.: 73). Summing up the social dimensions exhibited by different styles of walking, Mauss concluded that there was perhaps no "natural" way for an adult to walk, but only one or another socially mediated and transmitted form of per-ambulation.

Mauss' inclusion of running, swimming and games as appropriate and significant matters for social analysis forsook stances that would sideline these as trivial matters. He also bequeathed to those curious about the social workings and salience of body techniques an analytical scheme within which ethnographic observations about the differing ways in which people use their bodies might be linked analytically to larger social processes and purposes. Regimes of physical training to which child, youth and adult athletes are routinely subjected, either voluntarily or with some degree of coercion, tend to be overlooked or taken for granted. Nevertheless, such programs of instruction and discipline offer ethnographers a promising vantage point from which to survey the ways in which games and sports enlist and entrain bodies for athletic performance as well as other purposes. Acknowledgement of the embodied nature of sport also brings to the fore aesthetic considerations and recognition of how performing bodies may serve to express all manner of attitudes and dispositions.

Other approaches to the study of games and sports might emphasize their potential to observe, redraw or transcend ethnic, class or gender boundaries in everyday life (Dyck, 2000b). The complex relations and meanings that emerge between particular athletic competitors or teams, events and audiences oblige those who study these to take appropriate account of the larger contexts within which games and sports are enacted and consumed (e.g., Springwood, 2000). To grasp how given sport practices speak, or can be made to speak, to larger issues it is necessary to conjoin fine-grained ethnographic observations of action within arenas of play to a politically and eco-

nomically informed appreciation of forces and factors beyond the playing field. The intricate and shifting dynamics between the local and the global, the colonial and the postcolonial can be graphically illustrated through the examination of sport as is evidenced in Klein's (1991) account of baseball in the Dominican Republic and Appadurai's (1995) analysis of the meaning of cricket in contemporary India. Ethnographies of sport can also usefully delve into the organizational capacities and instrumental purposes that underpin the sponsoring of games and sports, be these professional or amateur in nature, formal or informal in constitution (e.g., Alter, 2000; Azoy, 1982; Frankenberg, 1957).

The investigative tools that anthropologists can bring to bear upon these or other approaches to sport reflect the traditional strengths of the discipline. Ethnography, both as a mode of inquiry as well as a means for reporting findings, provides a powerful medium for taking account of both the structural arrangements and personal experiences so central to sport. Moreover, anthropological ways of dealing with ritual, symbolic analysis, social drama and communitas can be employed with considerable effect to capture and explain aspects of embodied and verbal behaviour by athletes and spectators. Similarly, an ethnographically informed appreciation of aesthetics, morality and narrative can help to calibrate the ways in which fans and players seek to understand the nature of given games and sports and of their involvement in these. The abiding anthropological concern to locate and contextualize specific relationships and activities that we examine in terms of larger issues and factors allows ethnographers to draw analytical connections between arenas of play and arenas of power. Finally, the anthropological penchant for courting comparisons between widely separated settings and seemingly disparate or similar activities can produce unexpected insights. For example, the articles by Moore and Anderson in this issue trace the organization and significance of a single sport, football, in two different countries—respectively, Australia and South Africa. When read together they establish just how dissimilar can be the ambience and outcomes of the same sport when it is fused with national political purposes in two such differing settings.

There are further implications for anthropology in taking up the study of sport that need to be specified. Proceeding wholeheartedly into this area of inquiry necessitates the granting of suitable recognition of work conducted by practitioners of other disciplines whose interests in sport may overlap but not exactly correspond with our own (see Moore and Lithman, this issue). We can, indeed, gain much from the approaches established in other dis-

ciplines as well as from interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary discussions now emanating from a broadly defined field of sport studies. As Moore (this issue) notes, this is hardly a new or untested feature of anthropological practice. At the same time, it is incumbent on ethnographers of sport to continue articulating their inquiries and findings to broader theoretical and substantive concerns within anthropology (Brownell, 2000) lest they lose touch with more general developments within the discipline. Yet this obligation must be counterbalanced by an ontological acceptance of the need to see games and sports not simply as epiphenomena or indicators of other social concerns, but as complex and significant activities in their own right (Lithman, this issue).

Another implication of investigating, writing and teaching about sport is the likelihood that these undertakings will attract more diverse audiences and non-anthropological lines of interrogation than we may be used to juggling. Moore (this issue) reports the enthusiasm with which undergraduate and graduate students respond to ethnographic works on sport, wherever these might be located, and the ways in which many students are inspired to compare and contrast their personal experiences of sport involvement with those that they read about. Anthropologists have long claimed that ethnography comprises a penetrating and effective vehicle for reflecting upon one's own experience by reaching out to understand less familiar forms of social and cultural life. In view of the relative accessibility associated with ethnographic writings, we should anticipate a careful reading of our accounts by scholars from other disciplines as well as by more than a few non-academics.

Ideally, this will inspire productive circumstances for transgressing and extending the boundaries of anthropology as well as conventional Western definitions of what is and isn't sport. Some sociological treatments of sport are inextricably linked to conventional assumptions of modernity and structural determination that cannot readily accept either indigenous athletic contests (e.g., Mentore, 2000) or today's "extreme" sports as being commensurable with organized team sports (including cricket, football, rugby, baseball, basketball and hockey) that developed in Europe or North America during the 19th century. The prospects of comparing not only temporally, geographically and culturally diverse athletic pastimes but also, for instance, sport and dance as embodied performance activities (e.g., Archetti, 1999; Dyck and Archetti, 2003) are more likely and welcome within anthropology than in other disciplinary realms. In consequence, anthropological approaches are better suited than others to take account of aesthetic and moral dimensions of sport and to

trace how these considerations enter into the fashioning of selves by individual athletes and sport enthusiasts as well as by collectivities and situational communities convened by sports events.

The articles in this issue ensue from anthropological field research conducted in the United States, Australia, Sweden and South Africa. Based on papers originally prepared for a session held at the 2001 Meetings of the Canadian Anthropology Society and the American Ethnology Society, they comprise a cumulative invitation to venture into the anthropology of sport. King examines the predicaments and possibilities of an anthropology of sport through a discussion of the Native American mascot issue in professional and collegiate sports. While the use of pseudo-Indian symbols in sport has been formally condemned by the American Anthropological Association as well as by Native American organizations, King reports a systematic unwillingness within the anthropological community in the United States to grant intellectual attention to either this particular matter or the study of sport in general. King's identification of the biases and barriers that function to discourage American anthropologists from taking sport seriously raises fundamental questions about not only the policing of the substantive boundaries of the discipline but also the analytical limitations and institutional losses to anthropology occasioned by this prejudice.

Moore's article situates the anthropology of sport within the active and eclectic multidisciplinary field of sport studies. His contention that the potential of ethnographic investigations of sport depends upon the preparedness of anthropologists to articulate their studies with or at least take appropriate account of work conducted elsewhere in the field of sport studies touches upon more fundamental and abiding concerns within current anthropological practice. Moore's brief account of his research on soccer in Western Australia illustrates the ways in which local social and academic conditions shape anthropological work. Finally, he makes an invaluable point in noting that the teaching of the anthropology of sport can provide an attractive, accessible and effective way of introducing students to anthropology.

Lithman conducts a wide-ranging assessment of the premise and value of anthropological contributions to sport gleaned through research conducted "at home." He also specifies several methodological and theoretical refinements that anthropologists might adopt to deal appositely with the social and cultural dynamics of an industrial, urban and Western society such as Sweden. Lithman characterizes anthropology as a discipline well suited to capitalize upon an essential "wonderment" about

how society is constituted. This capacity equips ethnographers with a powerful tool for delineating the ways in which participation in sport becomes a key feature of countless contemporary lives. Anthropology is enabled to maintain this wonderment, argues Lithman, because it is far less implicated than other disciplines in guiding the management of the contemporary world.

Anderson's article on football in the "old" and "new" South Africa highlights the manner in which sport was traditionally employed as an instrument for marking and maintaining the racial and political boundaries of *apartheid*. Her account shows how the previous regime of white rule in South Africa was both celebrated and challenged through participation in international sport. But just as difference and inequality were once constructed through sport, today South Africa is experimenting with football stadiums as sites for producing shared and pleasurable experiences of (and hopefully more lasting forms of commitment to) similarity and equality. The image of a nation playing itself into oneness offers poignant testimony of how sport can be mobilized to provide not merely pleasure but also attainable forms of comfort and connection in a changing world.

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Perspectives anthropologiques sur le sport : Mise en jeu

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Les cloisons conceptuelles dans lesquelles étaient, jadis, confinés les chercheurs, et qui les empêchaient de concevoir les jeux et les sports comme de légitimes, voire importants objets d'étude, ont récemment été courageusement abattues. Les politicologues, tout comme les psychologues, les critiques littéraires, les sociologues, les historiens, les géographes, les économistes et les philosophes, se sont ainsi penchés sur divers aspects historiques et actuels du sport, tant du point de vue des participants que de celui des spectateurs. Les anthropologues se sont eux aussi mis de la partie et ont entamé une réflexion sur leur tendance à se tenir à l'écart de l'étude des jeux et des sports. Ils ont mesuré le calibre du contenu intellectuel à explorer au cœur de ces terrains de jeux autrefois interdits d'accès. Il est vrai que l'ethnographe qui ose se hasarder dans les arènes sportives risque de s'attirer sinon les jugements, du moins l'indifférence de ses pairs. Par contre, il court aussi la chance de revenir vainqueur du terrain avec, en sa possession, des témoignages frappants et de stimulantes idées théoriques.

Les raisons du tangible manque d'enthousiasme à l'égard des jeux et des sports au sein de la discipline anthropologique ont fait l'objet de plusieurs écrits (voir, par exemple, Archetti, 1998; Bourdieu, 1990; Dyck, 2000b). Ce numéro vise à poursuivre l'analyse critique des ces raisons (voir King) tout en faisant état du déploiement ethnographique et de la profondeur analytique de la littérature anthropologique sur le sport. Bien qu'à l'état naissant, elle est pleine de promesses de par l'attention sérieuse et soutenue qu'elle accorde aux jeux et aux sports. Il faut admettre que depuis la naissance de la discipline au 19ième siècle, les ethnographes ont sporadiquement rapporté la popularité de divers jeux et sports. En effet, dès 1890, James Mooney publiait un article sur le jeu de balle de la nation cherokee, alors même qu'il menait une recherche sur la Religion de la danse de l'esprit (*Ghost Dance*). Peu de temps après, l'étude exhaustive de Culin (1907) sur la morphologie et l'importance religieuse des jeux des Indiens d'Amérique du Nord a vu le jour. Sans

compter les autres récits parus au cours des deux dernières décennies et traitant des jeux traditionnels et des compétitions d'athlétisme en Amériques (Nabokov, 1987; Oxendine, 1988; Scarborough et Wilcox, 1991; Veenum, 1994). À plusieurs reprises, d'éminents anthropologues ont prosaïquement désigné les pratiques sportives comme étant des éléments saillants de leurs recherches (voir Appadurai, 1995; Firth, 1931; Fox, 1961; Geertz, 1972; Gluckman et Gluckman, 1977; MacAloon, 1981). Et que dire des générations d'étudiants en anthropologie qui ont abordé, par le biais d'un support vidéo, les complexités du criquet chez les Trobriandais, alors que leurs professeurs s'interrogeaient, perplexes, sur les retentissements des combats de coqs balinais ? Paradoxalement, même si les sports ont toujours fait partie du paysage intellectuel, l'idée qu'ils puissent représenter d'adéquats objets d'étude pour des recherches anthropologiques systématiques et comparatives a souvent été supplantée par une préférence pour l'exotisme.

Depuis les années 80, cependant, une série de monographies anthropologiques habilement réalisées a été consacrée explicitement à l'étude de différents sports dans des contextes donnés. On y retrouve notamment un ouvrage sur la masculinité, les idéologies et la lutte en Inde (Alter, 1992). D'autres encore portent sur le rôle des sports dans l'ordre moral de la République populaire de Chine (Brownell, 1995), sur le baseball à la frontière mexico-texane (Klein, 1997) et sur les cultures du football (ou du soccer) dans le monde entier (Archetti, 1999; Armstrong et Giulianotti, 1997; Armstrong, 1998). À ces ethnographies, pour n'en mentionner que quelques-unes, se sont ajoutés un texte introductif revu et enrichi (Blanchard, 1995) et des ouvrages collectifs comprenant un vaste éventail d'études sur le terrain et des aspects théoriques pertinents à l'anthropologie du sport (Dyck, 2000a; MacClancy, 1996; Sands, 1999). Parallèlement à ces développements, une littérature distinctivement anthropologique a pris corps : celle sur la participation sportive des enfants (Anderson, 2001, 2003; Beyer Broch 2003; Dyck, 1995, 2000c, 2000d, 2003; Lithman, 2000; Weiss, 2000). L'anthropologie du sport marque donc des points. Elle est fière de posséder un ensemble d'œuvres dont le nombre, quoique restreint, augmente rapidement, et qui est à présent suffisant pour illustrer non seulement ce que l'étude du sport peut offrir à l'anthropologie, mais également ce que la discipline peut révéler sur le sport en tant que facette de la vie sociale.

Des composantes familières de l'ethnographie attendent les anthropologues qui choisiront d'explorer les passe-temps sportifs et de focaliser sur les gens qui y prennent part avec tant d'enthousiasme. On peut s'attendre à retrouver des activités, des relations et des événements qui s'inscrivent au sein d'objectifs, de valeurs et d'imaginaires, tantôt partagés, tantôt contradictoires, mais qui engendrent néanmoins une variété d'expériences et d'identités. Les registres d'analyse ethnographique sont donc manifestement les mêmes pour les sports que pour toute autre entreprise anthropologique. Ce qui distingue les sports, cependant, c'est leur capacité renversante à générer allégresse, passion et niveaux prodigieux de mobilisation sociale et d'engagement personnel. Ainsi, même si les jeux et les sports sont omniprésents dans le monde actuel, ils représentent une catégorie à part, tant sur le plan conceptuel que sur le plan expérimental, puisqu'ils ne s'inscrivent pas dans la routine quotidienne. L'aspect ludique, élément central du sport, offre aux athlètes et aux spectateurs des formes d'engagement aussi nombreuses qu'irrésistibles. Par le fait même, d'un point de vue ethnographique, les occasions sont illimitées de tenter d'élucider pourquoi et comment le sport maintient une telle emprise sur ses adeptes, ou de se pencher sur la façon dont le sport peut être manié pour conditionner et refaçonner les configurations personnelles, sociales et politiques.

L'étude anthropologique des jeux et des sports sera abordée de multiples façons selon les penchants théoriques de chacun. À titre d'exemple, rappelons l'observation de Victor Turner, à savoir que «la façon dont les gens jouent est parfois plus révélatrice de la culture que la façon dont ils travaillent» (1983 : 104). Ce constat a mis en évidence les caractéristiques dramatiques, expressives et anti-structurelles du sport. Dès lors, les jeux, les sports et les festivals sont intrinsèquement réflexifs et possèdent la caractéristique d'être à la fois leur propre sujet et leur propre objet (ibid. : 105). En ancrant ses spéculations à même la théorie générale des jeux de Roger Caillois (1979), Turner a lui aussi établi un lien entre les jeux enfantins, les formes simples et sans règle de course et de lutte, et les activités sportives très organisées telles la boxe, le billard, le baseball et les Jeux olympiques.

Au-delà de l'*agôn*, c'est-à-dire de l'esprit de compétition inhérent aux sports, il y a l'importance de la *mimicry*, souligne Turner. Il s'agit du procédé par lequel «un individu devient son propre personnage imaginaire et se fait croire, ou fait croire aux autres, qu'il est quelqu'un d'autre que lui-même» (ibid. : 108). Turner abonde dans le même sens que Caillois en soutenant que les athlètes qui sont en compétition sont dominés par l'*agôn*, alors que le public, lui, est envoûté par la *mimicry*. À propos des spectateurs, il réaffirme l'assertion de Caillois selon laquelle :

[u]ne contagion physique les conduit à esquisser l'at-
titude [des participants], pour les aider, à la manière
dont on sait qu'un joueur de quilles incline son corps
imperceptiblement dans la direction qu'il voudrait
voir prendre la lourde boule à la fin de son parcours.
Dans ces conditions, outre le spectacle, prend nais-
sance, au sein du public, une compétition par mimicry,
qui double l'agôn véritable du terrain ou de la piste.
(1967 : 66)

Cette tendance, remarque Turner, se perçoit aisément
dans la foule lors d'une partie de football ou de baseball
(1983 : 108). Ajoutons que les façons dont l'*agôn* et la
mimicry sont liés, voire entrelacés, sont innombrables
au cours des compétitions sportives, ce qui offre aux eth-
nographes d'intrigantes et prometteuses pistes de
recherche.

On peut aussi privilégier une approche sensible à la
dimension corporelle du sport, ce qui, d'ailleurs, repren-
drait les idées qu'a exprimées Marcel Mauss (1935) dans
son essai riche et original sur les techniques du corps. Il
y décrit le corps comme étant :

...le premier et le plus naturel instrument de l'homme.
Ou plus exactement, sans parler d'instrument, le pre-
mier et le plus naturel objet technique, et en même
temps moyen technique, de l'homme, c'est son corps.
(Mauss 1935 : 278)

En assimilant le corps à un phénomène à la fois social,
psychologique et biologique, Mauss a fait de l'éducation
l'élément clé parmi ceux qui constituent «l'art d'utiliser le
corps humain» (ibid. : 275). En fait, rapporte Mauss, les
règles de dressage que les humains appliquent aux ani-
maux, ils les appliquent volontiers à eux-mêmes ou à leurs
enfants. Qu'ils imitent les techniques du corps de ceux
qu'ils admirent ou de ceux qui ont autorité sur eux, les
adultes comme les enfants empruntent la série de mou-
vements qui compose l'acte exécuté devant eux ou avec
eux par les autres (ibid. : 275-276). Après avoir résumé la
dimension sociale des différentes façons de marcher, Mauss
conclut qu'il n'y a probablement pas de démarche dite nor-
male chez les adultes. Il n'y a, en fait, qu'un type x ou y de
déambulation conditionné et transmis par la société.

En considérant la course, la nage et les jeux comme
des sujets appropriés et significatifs d'analyses sociales,
Mauss a mis en échec les positions qui jugeaient ces sujets
futiles et sans intérêt. Il a légué des fondements analy-
tiques à ceux qui s'intéressent aux fonctionnements
sociaux et à l'importance des techniques du corps, à savoir
l'idée que les observations ethnographiques sur l'utilisa-
tion du corps trouvent leur sens, sur le plan analytique, au

sein des processus et des objectifs sociaux qui les englo-
bent. Les régimes d'entraînement physique auxquels ont
l'habitude de se soumettre, volontairement ou non, les
athlètes (qu'ils soient enfants, jeunes ou adultes), ont ten-
dance à être négligés ou considérés comme allant de soi.
Pourtant, ces programmes instructifs et disciplinaires
offrent aux ethnographes une perspective prometteuse
pour explorer les façons dont les sports et les jeux amè-
nent et les humains à s'enrôler et à s'entraîner, que ce soit
ou non en vue de participer à des performances athlé-
tiques. Le fait de reconnaître l'aspect corporel inhérent au
sport met en évidence des considérations esthétiques.
Dans cette optique, les performances et les prestations
corporelles deviennent l'expression de toutes sortes d'at-
titudes et de tempéraments.

D'autres façons d'aborder l'étude des jeux et des
sports mettront l'accent sur le potentiel de ces derniers à
respecter, à redéfinir ou à transcender les lignes de démar-
cation entre les sexes, les groupes ethniques et les classes
sociales dans la vie de tous les jours (Dyck, 2000b). La
complexité des liens qui se tissent et des valeurs qui émer-
gent entre les athlètes, les équipes, les événements spor-
tifs et les spectateurs obligent les chercheurs à attacher
une importance particulière au contexte général dans
lequel les jeux et les sports prennent place (voir, par
exemple, Springwood, 2000). Les pratiques sportives révè-
lent, ou du moins ont la capacité de révéler, des sujets
dont la portée dépasse les limites du jeu. Pour ce faire, il
importe d'allier, aux observations ethnographiques
détaillées, des appréciations politiques et économiques
des forces et des facteurs en jeu à l'extérieur de l'enceinte
sportive. Les sports sont à même d'illustrer clairement
les dynamiques complexes et changeantes liant les ques-
tions locales et mondiales, coloniales et post-coloniales.
Klein (1991) et Appadurai (1995) l'ont d'ailleurs démontré
dans leurs analyses respectives du baseball en République
Dominicaine et de la valeur contemporaine du criquet en
Inde. Les ethnographies du sport sont aussi en mesure
d'approfondir nos connaissances sur les moyens organi-
sationnels et les objectifs centraux qui sous-tendent les
commandites des jeux et des sports, et ce, qu'il s'agisse de
sports professionnels ou amateurs, officiels ou non (voir,
par exemple, Alter, 2000; Azoy, 1982; Frankenberg, 1957).

Les outils d'analyse à la disposition des anthropo-
logues concernant les diverses façons d'aborder le sport
reflètent les points forts traditionnellement associés à la
discipline. L'ethnographie, tant comme méthode de
recherche que comme façon de rendre compte des résul-
tats, offre un excellent moyen de documenter les struc-
tures organisationnelles et les expériences personnelles
inhérentes au sport. De plus, les techniques d'analyse

propres à l'anthropologie, visant à examiner les rituels, les symboles, les drames sociaux et les *communitas*, ont le potentiel de cerner et d'expliciter des aspects du comportement physique et verbal des athlètes ou des spectateurs. Dans la même veine, les données esthétiques, morales et narratives issues de l'ethnographie sont en mesure de révéler la façon dont les fans et les joueurs perçoivent la nature des jeux et des sports, de même que leur implication dans ceux-ci.

L'éternel souci anthropologique de situer dans un contexte plus large les rapports et les activités examinés offre aux ethnographes l'occasion d'établir des liens analytiques rattachant les arènes de jeux aux cercles de pouvoir. Finalement, le penchant qu'a l'anthropologie pour la comparaison entre des environnements complètement distincts et des activités disparates ou similaires, en apparence, peut produire des résultats inattendus. Les articles de Moore et d'Anderson, dans ce numéro, illustrent d'ailleurs cette entreprise. Ils traitent de l'organisation et de l'importance d'un même sport, le football, dans deux pays, soit l'Australie et l'Afrique du Sud, respectivement. La lecture conjointe de ces deux articles illustrera à quel point l'ambiance et les conséquences créées par un même sport diffèrent selon le contexte et les valeurs nationales et politiques qui s'y rattachent.

Entreprendre l'étude des sports comporte des implications supplémentaires pour l'anthropologie qu'il importe de préciser. Tout d'abord, afin de pouvoir se lancer à fond dans ce domaine d'investigation, il faut reconnaître à sa juste valeur le travail des autres disciplines qui se penchent également sur les sports, même si leurs intérêts ne font que chevaucher les nôtres (voir Moore et Lithman, ce numéro). Les méthodes des autres disciplines et les discussions interdisciplinaires et transdisciplinaires qui émanent du vaste domaine qu'on appelle les Études du sport ont beaucoup à offrir à l'anthropologie. Comme l'indique Moore dans ce numéro, le fait de s'enrichir au contact des autres disciplines ne représente guère une nouvelle stratégie qui doit encore faire ses preuves. Et pour ceux qui craignent de s'écarter des développements généraux en cours en anthropologie, soulignons qu'il incombe aux ethnographes du sport de continuer à articuler leurs recherches et leurs conclusions en fonction des questions pratiques et théoriques générales propres à leur discipline (Browell, 2000). Ce devoir doit cependant être contrebalancé par l'acceptation ontologique que les jeux et les sports ne constituent pas simplement des épiphénomènes ou des indicateurs d'autres manifestations sociales; ils doivent être reconnus comme des activités complexes et significatives à part entière (voir Lithman, ce numéro).

Autre implication, en publiant et en enseignant les résultats de nos recherches sur le sport, il faut s'attendre à attirer un plus vaste public et des questionnements qui s'éloignent des considérations anthropologiques que nous avons l'habitude de soulever. Moore, dans la présente parution, rapporte l'enthousiasme manifesté par les étudiants de tous les cycles face aux études anthropologiques sur les sports d'ici et d'ailleurs. Ces travaux incitent les étudiants à comparer leurs propres expériences sportives avec celles qu'ils lisent. Les anthropologues n'ont-ils pas, de tout temps, affirmé que l'ethnographie représente un moyen pénétrant et efficace de s'interroger sur nos propres expériences en tentant de comprendre d'autres formes de vie socioculturelle? Puisque les écrits ethnographiques sont facilement accessibles, des chercheurs œuvrant dans d'autres disciplines et des individus à l'extérieur des milieux universitaires porteront sûrement une attention particulière à nos ouvrages.

L'idéal serait que l'étude du sport engendre de fécondes découvertes qui favorisent la transgression ou l'élargissement du cadre qui limite tant la discipline que les définitions occidentales de ce que constitue ou non un sport. Certaines des approches sociologiques au sport sont inextricablement liées aux suppositions courantes sur la modernité et sur les déterminismes structurels. Ces postulats soutiennent que les compétitions athlétiques autochtones (voir, par exemple, Mentore, 2000) de même que les sports extrêmes, si populaires de nos jours, ne représentent pas vraiment des entités comparables aux sports d'équipe organisés (tels le criquet, le football, le rugby, le baseball, le basketball et le hockey) qui se sont développés en Europe et en Amérique du Nord au cours du 19ième siècle. Il y a donc davantage d'avenir en anthropologie pour les comparaisons. En effet, aucune autre discipline n'accueillera aussi volontiers les parallèles – temporels, géographiques ou culturels – entre les divers passe-temps athlétiques, ni l'étude des différences entre le sport et la danse en tant que prestations corporelles (voir, par exemple, Archetti, 1999; Dyck et Archetti, 2003). Ainsi, les approches anthropologiques sont les plus à même de rendre compte des dimensions esthétiques et morales du sport et de raccorder ces aspects aux identités qui se créent autour des événements sportifs, qu'il s'agisse de l'identité des athlètes et des spectateurs ou encore de celle des collectivités et des communautés situationnelles.

Les articles rassemblés dans la présente parution sont le résultat d'études anthropologiques menées sur le terrain aux États-Unis, en Australie, en Suède et en Afrique du Sud. Elles sont issues de communications présentées en 2001 lors des rencontres communes de la

Société canadienne d'anthropologie et de la *American Ethnology Society*. Collectivement, ces textes constituent une invitation à se lancer dans l'anthropologie du sport. En abordant la problématique de l'usage de mascottes à l'image des Indiens d'Amérique dans les sports professionnels et étudiants, Richard King illustre les difficultés auxquelles fait face l'anthropologie sportive et le potentiel dont elle est porteuse. La *American Anthropological Association* ainsi que des organisations autochtones américaines ont explicitement condamné l'usage de symboles pseudo-indiens dans les sports. Pourtant, il y a un blocage systématique au sein de la communauté des anthropologues aux États-Unis quand vient le temps d'accorder à cette polémique ou à l'étude du sport en général quelque attention intellectuelle que ce soit. En identifiant les préjugés et les barrières qui freinent les anthropologues et les empêchent de concevoir les sports sérieusement, King soulève des questions fondamentales. En effet, il s'interroge tant sur le maintien rigoureux des contours de la discipline que sur les restrictions analytiques et les pertes institutionnelles qui en découlent.

L'article de Philip Moore vise à situer l'anthropologie du sport au sein du domaine multidisciplinaire ardent et éclectique des Études du sport. Il soutient que le potentiel des travaux ethnographiques sur le sport repose sur la volonté des anthropologues à articuler leurs recherches en fonction des autres études menées au sein de cette discipline, ou du moins, de leur porter l'attention qu'elles méritent. Cette assertion soulève des questions fondamentales relatives à la pratique actuelle de l'anthropologie. Moore présente ensuite brièvement sa recherche sur le soccer en Australie Occidentale afin d'illustrer à quel point le contexte social et académique local façonne le travail anthropologique. Pour finir, il signale un élément essentiel : le fait que l'étude du sport représente une façon attrayante, accessible et efficace d'initier les étudiants à l'anthropologie.

Yngve Georg Lithman, quant à lui, fait un vaste estimé des fondements et de la valeur des contributions anthropologiques à notre compréhension du sport à l'aide de sa recherche menée «at home», c'est-à-dire dans le contexte de sa propre société d'appartenance, la Suède. Il suggère un certain nombre de points méthodologiques et théoriques que les anthropologues auraient avantage à adopter pour rendre adéquatement compte des dynamiques sociales et culturelles en jeu dans une société occidentale, urbaine et industrielle telle la Suède. Il réitère que les ethnographes possèdent d'excellents outils d'analyse pour révéler à quel point la participation à un sport est devenue un élément clé dans la vie de nombre de nos contem-

porains. Aux yeux de l'auteur, l'anthropologie est bien placée pour tirer profit et procéder à l'examen des profondes remises en questions de ce qui constitue la société actuelle, étant donné qu'elle n'a, contrairement à d'autres disciplines, à peu près pas d'intérêt à guider la gestion de la société.

Connie Anderson, pour sa part, examine la pratique du soccer en Afrique du Sud pendant et après l'apartheid. Elle met en évidence la façon dont ce sport a servi à marquer et à maintenir la dichotomie raciale et politique créée par l'apartheid. En outre, elle montre que la participation à des compétitions de soccer internationales a contribué à la fois à glorifier et à contester le régime de domination politique blanche en Afrique du Sud. Si le sport a autrefois favorisé l'édification des différences et des inégalités en Afrique du Sud, les stades sont à présent des lieux d'expérimentation visant à souligner les similarités et l'égalité sous le signe, que l'on souhaite durable, du partage et de l'allégresse. L'image d'une nation qui crée l'unité par le jeu offre un exemple poignant de la façon dont le sport, tout en générant du plaisir, est à même de renouveler les relations et d'apaiser les esprits dans un monde en perpétuelle mutation.

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Anthropologists on Home Turf: How Green is the Grass?

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Abstract: When embarking upon studies of "our own" societies, anthropologists face strong competition from other disciplines. However, the value of the anthropological contribution to the study of sport will derive from cultivating traditional anthropological strengths. Methodologically, the anthropological toolbox will need some re-tooling The anthropological "grass-root" perspective is important, also as a distinguishing disciplinary feature, as will be attention to ritual, bodies and embodiment, and aesthetics. Hereby anthropologists can get at the cultural meaning-creation in sports, and why and how sport is a significant social phenomenon. The anthropological study of sports has a clear potential to let small matters speak loudly to large issues in our societies.

Keywords: sport, aesthetics, ritual, holism, anthropology at home

Résumé : En entreprenant l'étude de notre propre société, les anthropologues font face à une forte compétition des autres disciplines. Cependant, la contribution de l'anthropologie à l'étude du sport sera d'autant plus valable qu'elle s'appuiera sur les points forts de l'anthropologie traditionnelle. Méthodologiquement, la boîte à outils de l'anthropologie aura besoin d'être renouvelée. La perspective «populaire» de l'anthropologie est importante en tant que caractéristique disciplinaire particulière, aussi bien que l'attention aux rituels, aux corps et à leur image autant qu'à l'esthétique. De cette façon, les anthropologues peuvent atteindre la signification culturelle créatrice dans le sport, et montrer comment et pourquoi le sport est un phénomène social significatif. L'étude anthropologique des sports a clairement le potentiel pour permettre à des phénomènes minimes de parler fort sur des questions importantes pour notre société.

Mots-clés : sport, esthétique, rites, holisme, anthropologie chez soi

Introduction

Sport can be seen as a prism through which major social and cultural tendencies in our own societies manifest themselves. Yet through features such as its collectivistic rituals and embodiment practices, it also serves as a field of meaning-creation. Sport, thus, is both reflective of society and a force in society. From such a perspective, sport has similarities with many themes in traditional anthropology, where "small stuff" is made to speak to big issues, and should be able to constitute itself as one important gateway to anthropological studies of "our own" societies.[1]

Notwithstanding a substantially growing interest, especially during the last couple of decades, anthropologists have barely started exploring "our own" societies. As the case of sport shows, the competition we have from other disciplines to explain contemporary issues in what were their 'traditional' fields should be met head on, and anthropologists should make handy use of their specific areas of expertise. Rituals, bodies and embodiment, aesthetics, the creation of meaning—these are some of the classical anthropological concerns, and these provide a crucial orientation that allows a deeper understanding of what sport "is." At the same time, if the pursuit of long-term fieldwork and the study of small-scale societies represent the core of an anthropological identity, inquiries into sport and other general phenomena in our societies, will force some changes. Our fieldwork techniques will continue to bring us close to people, but we will also have to change our ambitions.

An optimistic assessment of the powers of anthropology must be seen in the context of present epistemological and methodological concerns within the discipline. Anthropology, perhaps like many other social sciences, seems to produce an endless series of statements about the crisis of the discipline, or even about its end. In anthropology, a contemporary challenge is the dislodging of the anthropological notion of "culture" as one of or the central concept of the discipline. Attacks both from within and

outside the discipline (i.e., from cultural studies and adherents of post-modernism) seem to suggest that the anthropological use of culture, as a more holistic notion, has to give way to flux, fractured identities, human life as a semiotic bazaar—"railway station studies," to give a label to this kind of anthropology, referring to James (1997) who quite literally deals also with railway stations. Difference is no longer geographically represented, but the Other is juxtaposed with us, and the perspectives from globalization put us on the same arena. Hence, it is argued, the integrative features of culture, tying people together in shared understandings of their societies and the world, can no longer be a basis for our studies. Culture, with this emphasis, loses some of its significance. Anthropology as a discipline has thus become characterized by attempts to redefine its essence. By the same token, the importance of the researcher is aggrandized,—s/he is now the author not just of the order of writer, but supposedly the very authorship is in itself a denial of an external standpoint of judgment/truth. While these observations may reflect the American situation more directly than British/European continental orientations, this distinction should not be exaggerated. Even if American anthropology has a tradition of according issues related to culture (including its dissolution as a fundamental analytical concept) more weight, it appears that anthropology there as a whole is in large measure in a phase of reducing culture with its anthropological connotations as a fundamental analytical tool. In Europe, the influences from cultural studies, media studies, as well as post-modern perspectives more generally, have obviously been important influences in a similar development.

The Holistic Tradition

If, however, we would like to remain in the holistic anthropological tradition, what is the holistic to mean when we do studies in our own societies? The anthropological structuralist and functionalist paradigms (and in spite of all the criticism, who can do without functionalism and structure in an analysis?) which molded together economics, religion, politics, kinship, and whatever the various 'institutions' in society were called, is untenable to take as an unqualified starting point in the study of our own societies. The production and distribution of yams, uncles and nephews, housing patterns, canoe-building—what at first must have appeared as a chaotic mess all hangs wonderfully together once Malinowski in the 1920s had sorted out their relationships in the Trobriand Islands. But how is Malinowski's prescription to be applied to the local suburban youth sports club? To what goes on in the Saddledome ice hockey arena in Calgary? To children's "leisure pursuits?"

The holistic perspective in anthropology is perhaps best understood as a set of questions. This is not to say that anthropologists would ever agree upon exactly which questions to pursue. Nevertheless, the questions that might be asked include how people transcend themselves, how is value produced, and through which processes is the social produced? Such questions, rather than specific paradigms or methodologies, characterizes the disciplinary history. The prime accompanying method, whatever it has been called, has been a focus on actual people's actual doings, when, how, and why. This starting point is also what makes it possible for anthropology to have a radical humanistic stance—the anthropological interest is not directed to how any particular features/institutions in a society function together, how any particular set of ideas have been managed in the scholars' chambers, or how any particular media—films, TV, books—cuts into society. Instead, people are the focus, and in a dual sense. On the one hand, people are seen as cultural beings, as the creators and carriers of notions, meanings, interpretations, and, on the other, simultaneously also as members of the social relations' orchestration of the rhythm and beat of social life.

With the holistic anthropological ambition, what is the anthropological object in our own societies? What is there to study and how can it be suitably explained with recourse to the anthropological tradition? Introductory textbooks in the discipline have indeed come to include any number of illustrations of anthropological reasoning with empirical material from our societies. However, their character of apt illustrations of an anthropological argument or of why anthropology is an important tool in the study of our own societies, make them just that—illustrations. Rarely do they attempt to provide a more systematic argument about what and how anthropology can help us understand general features of our own societies.

A significant impetus to this writer's own reflections over these questions relates to a personal experience. My interest in sports as a cultural phenomenon was aroused by what I met through my oldest son's sports activities. For example, when he was 10 years old, playing ice hockey and participating in competitive gymnastics, I realized that children's sports were no childish matter. He was supposed to be with his hockey team 18 times during the month of February, and 11 times with his gymnastics troupe. Why the emotional engagement, among the children, among coaches, among the parents, during competitions, or even, for that matter, during practices? What made hundreds of thousands of Swedish kids participate in sports, although, of course, relatively few as intensely as described above? What made coaches invest incredible

amounts of time in a children's activity? What made parents organize their holidays around their children's sports camps?

Searching for What Sport "Is"

The logical step in coming to grips with these questions was of course to go to the literature, and see what answers that could be found there. A first issue was to what extent sport is a reasonable analytical tool or just too imprecise a term. Is sport a blanket label, where such a variety of things can get thrown in that the term in fact is of limited utility? There is, at least to this author, a resounding answer to this in a partly wonderfully rich literature. That there is a specific historical development of sports, where sports can be seen as an outgrowth of or a specifically constituted part of industrial/capitalist society, is demonstrated in several arguments.[2] There are somewhat different elaborations of this thesis. Sport, with all its measurements and rankings can be seen as the "rationalization of the romantic," (of the same kind as the Apollo moon landings) where the romantic (another realm than the humdrum of everyday life) is dressed up in the idiom of the scientific world-view (Guttman, 1978). The romantic, "marked by the imaginative or emotional appeal of what is heroic, adventurous, remote, mysterious, or idealized" (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2003), gets measured, ranked, and precisely remembered. To others, the relationship between general features of our societies and sports is that sports expresses the capitalistic ethos more brutally than capitalism itself—sport is the "by capitalism twisted" variety of play (cf. Prokop, 1971). Gruneau's (1983) as well as Hargreave's (1986) more Foucaultian-inspired views also show the intertwining of modern sports and modern society. So, although the argument is presented in several shapes by different authors, it is clear that sport can be sufficiently analytically situated to be useful as a topic of scholarly inquiry.

It is also noteworthy, that the anthropological contributions to the study of sports are fairly limited, and limited in a double sense. On the one hand, there are relatively few anthropologists who have made sports a major topic in their professional activities. These include Joseph Alter, Eduardo Archetti, Susan Brownell, Noel Dyck, and Alan Klein, and it also appears that there is a significantly growing interest in this field.[3] On the other hand, in most anthropological studies of sports, sport "itself" is hardly the major topic, but rather how social or cultural features in a society express themselves through sports. Such studies, whether about sports and masculinity, the social position of women, neo-colonialism or the socialization of children, can of course be highly interesting. However,

sport as a topic per se somehow often seems to get lost. Put differently, is there something in the social science treatment of sport, which thus far to a significant degree is missing? And can anthropology play a role in expanding our understanding of sport as a phenomenon with somewhat specific characteristics? In shorthand, one may perhaps suggest that most social science treatment of sports has not set out to explain "sport," but how sport intersects some particular dimension of society. To give some examples, and these are certainly not exhaustive, political scientists have written about how political ideology expresses itself through sports, sociologists and educators about how sports contribute to the socialization of children and youth, economists about how big-league sports affect local economies, historically oriented social scientists about how sports have contributed to the disciplining (a la Foucault) or "civilizing process" (a la Elias) in society. With such orientations, however, whatever is special about sport, perhaps most clearly evident in the passions it can arouse, is not necessarily at the fore.[4]

Anthropology as a Social Science

The role of anthropology in the social sciences is somewhat peculiar, at least in a historical perspective, and this may help in explaining why it can make a specific contribution to the study of sports. As disciplinary, institutionalized activities, the social sciences were one issue in a twin birth of modernity, where the other delivery was the nation-state.[5] The social sciences were meant to be the creators and repositories of the knowledge needed for the proper and well-functioning nation-states. This gave the social sciences an orientation towards social problem issues, such as the "functioning" of societies, the reduction of conflict, how to achieve well integrated societies. If this was largely the "social location" of the social science disciplines, there was also always another somewhat competing perspective present, a perspective rooted in wonderment over how society is possible. In spite of debates over anthropology as a colonial exercise (and there is no doubt that this was to some extent the case), one may well argue that anthropology was the social science most shaped by a wonderment over how society is possible, and least tangled up in issues of managing states. It was, and is, in large measure liberated from having to be "useful" in a narrow sense. The anthropological focus was on the general human condition in all its variety, how people constructed meaning and the social. From this perspective, anthropology has a vantage point in understanding what sport "is." If something matters to people, it matters to the anthropologist—especially something that is so obviously engaging as sport.

Another related feature of anthropology is that it by and large, for the vast part of its history, confined itself to methods of study where a face-to-face contact with people was the main data collection method. Anthropologists (usually) did not use or even have access to census data, large-scale questionnaires, focus groups, polling, and so on. Instead, they involved themselves in the everyday lives of people. If one should talk today about a shared anthropological perspective, maybe Goffman (1982: ix-x), the social anthropologist turned sociologist, early on had the best formulation:

> "Any group of persons...develops a life of their own which becomes meaningful, reasonable and normal once you get close to it, and...a good way to learn about any of these worlds is to submit oneself in the company of the members to the daily round of petty contingencies to which they are subject."

Maybe most anthropologists would agree that this is the anthropological subject—*homo vivans*. But the anthropological project also has to do with the character of explanation. Simply put, perhaps almost too simply, the anthropological ambition is to explain through contextualization; around that which one wants to explain, the anthropologist seeks to bring to light that which is not immediately seen, that which underpins social and cultural processes, to make evident the logic upon which these rest. And always on the basis of data created in the interaction with actual people.

There is a curious and superficially paradoxical situation here, and one that is certainly important when reflecting upon what anthropology can contribute to our understanding of our own societies. As anthropology is a discipline that programmatically has its foundation in the interaction between the researcher and actual, living people, this also means that what is important for people is also important to the anthropologist. But the ambition is not an individuating, psychologizing approach, quite the contrary. In a sense, the anthropological craft is to show something of the totality of how a society hangs together, to show those patterns, interconnections and processes which constitutes the society in question—the anthropological commitment to a holistic perspective, as it used to be called. So here, then, is the apparent paradox: through an attention to persons, their statements and their activities, as the by far most important sources of data, anthropology has a strong commitment to say something about the principles that structure social and cultural life in society.

Towards New Holisms

While still limited in terms of the total anthropological output, a significant body of anthropological studies of Western societies has emerged over the past few decades. From this, it is obvious that anthropologists have tackled the issue of doing "anthropology at home" in different ways. One has been, in effect, to turn our objects of study into virtual Trobriand Islands. Neighborhood and immigrant studies are often illustrations of this. The object (the neighborhood, the immigrant group) is seen as an entity with a boundary between it and the rest of the world (and across this boundary flow "influences from the surrounding society"). Another approach, frequently combined with "Trobriandization," has been to limit the study to often Goffman-inspired, almost sociological small-group studies. Network studies, often with a pronounced transactional (as opposed to "cultural") analytical bias have their success, perhaps most prominently in the genre of studies of transnational communities. All in all, however, the ambition to provide holistic treatment is fairly reduced, either in terms of scale (small-scale cutouts) or analytically (restricting the scope of the study to some particular feature).

In studies of our own societies, then, anthropologists still have work to do to recalibrate and redefine what will better realize their holistic ambitions. Instead of showing how all institutions in a society hang together, a first step in a new holism can be seen as comprised of a focus on actual people and upon the explanation of thinking and actions. This explanation would be derived from a social and cultural contextualization driven by an attempt to explain not "the whole society" (as in many classical anthropological studies), but, more modestly, with a starting point in what drives people in specific contexts in terms of their participation in these contexts. In such an endeavor, anthropologists would be greatly assisted by their commitment to a focus on people. Here, some of the things that are important to people, but seldom or ever to other social sciences, can be incorporated into the anthropological analysis. What is characteristic of sports—passion, rituals, emotional engagement, aesthetic expression—is certainly outside much social science, but are classical anthropological themes. This is in contrast to the social sciences generally, where with some wonderful exceptions sports have in large measure been relegated to a non-concern, not seen as belonging in the realm of that which is really important in a society. It is noteworthy that much of the current sport literature (and this is not a statement about its quality) derives out of what are basically social order concerns.[6] These have provided the inspiration behind many studies of soccer hooliganism, as well as of the

socialization effects of children's sports. But if we want to know something about sports, it seems that the social order approach is not necessarily the best one to help us along. To people, after all, sport "in itself" may be of overriding importance. If so, why not also treat it as important in its own right?

Due to its non-state-centred approach, its tradition of not focussing on "social problems," and its engagement with and focus on real people, anthropology has a particular advantage for the study of sports; this advantage is expressed and enhanced through its classical focus on what people themselves find important.

Anthropology and Methods

The differences between working in a "traditional" society of the kind in which most anthropological studies have been done, and of doing anthropologically oriented studies in our own societies, will of course force some radical re-tooling. Some of the challenges are fairly easy to observe, while others will emerge as we increasingly pursue such studies.

It is obvious that the analytical relationship between the biography of the individual and the constitution of society is very different "at home" compared to the case in more "traditional societies." If Malinowski had followed an individual Trobriand Islander from cradle to grave, he would in all likelihood have had spectacularly rich material about the social, economic, political, ritual and other conditions in Trobriand society—each member of the society participated in virtually all the significant activities of Trobriand life (gender dimensions aside). Malinowski would however have offered a strange picture of the present author's country of birth, Sweden, if he had just followed him around, and used this as his material to depict all aspects of Swedish social and cultural life.

Another, and related concern, has to do with how an individual in "our" societies is a part of a large number of networks, all with their own characteristics. A teenage hockey player can in the course of a day be in school, at home, with his school mates, with the hockey team, watch a video with his girlfriend, and then go to a disco. To postulate a wholeness, an integration, between these different contexts, over and above what the teenager himself constructs, is problematic, to say the least. A Trobriandization, whether it is called youth culture or something else, may in fact gloss over that the wholeness is not there. That an individual is tied into a plurality of social networks must be at the base of inquiries into our own societies.[7]

However, any anthropologist who is interested in sports knows that the Calgary Saddledome is not a Tro-

briand island, and our sons are unlikely to have uncles to whom they have to carry the bounties of harvests. Nevertheless, it is also true that posters of Lemieux and Gretzky on bedroom doors and the youth ice hockey games on thousands of arenas show that social anchorages, tied to principles of ceremonial exchange, are as present to our sons as they ever were to some kids on coral islands some 90 years ago.

So how to deal with the methodological issues entailed in conducting anthropology "at home," and especially in studying sports? With reference to those studies of sports which anthropologists have presented and also to what seems like exciting and largely unexplored areas of inquiry, it is possible to draw some conclusions and make some suggestions.

Anthropological fieldwork, which has helped so much to distinguish anthropology from the other social sciences, should of course be maintained. Further, there is no doubt that an anthropology of sport has to have a starting focus on the sporting event. Most scholars would probably accept that sport is a meta-commentary on society. However, the anthropological study of sport will show that it is more than that—through its ritual dimensions, expressed in the sporting event, sport is also the creation of meaning. As parts of the ritual, performing bodies, the aesthetics, and the structure of the event, are all perceived through acts of interpretation, and the summation of the event, its significance, its total meaning, is also arrived at through acts of interpretation. Different participants may well interpret differently, and various groups in a society, or the state itself, may want to impress a particular interpretation upon the spectators. All this testifies to the meaning-creation potential of the sports event, and the foundation it lays for the contestation of meaning. Further, as a ritual, the sport event also claims to express transcendent values (and this point will be further touched upon when discussing aesthetics), and this also argues for the fruitfulness of an anthropologically based analysis. Even if not every particular anthropological study of sport has to deal with the sporting event, it may well be argued that an anthropology of sports which is not informed by reference to the main formative occasion in sports, the sporting events, will somehow lack an appreciation of the dynamics and energies that these release by virtue of the fact that they are not defined within the humdrum of everyday life. They are, in an anthropological sense, rituals—they somehow touch on a deeper level of participation in social and cultural life.

An anthropology of sports cannot, however, restrict itself to the sport events and the people involved in it. Sport, it may be argued, has become a major field for vir-

tually all sorts of attempts at symbolic elaboration. The sport event itself can thus in a sense be seen as "empty," and being filled in continuous acts of creation of meaning.[8] Fifty years ago, Swedish soccer was expressive of regional and local identities, and every team had a clear and significant geographical reference. Transcending these distinctions, the national team was a kind of encompassing symbol both for the nation, its regional and local soccer teams, and also for the "seriousness" of soccer. This was after World War II, and the war period had pretty well finished off the battle between workers' clubs and other clubs.[9] Today, Swedish soccer has in large measure lost its regional/local determinants, and players move around in a market without being regarded as traitors if switching clubs. The heroes today are players much more than clubs. (Still, there is for instance a club such as Hammarby that manages to maintain its image of being both working class and also tied to a specific Stockholm suburb.) What this cursory exposé shows is that although the sports event in many ways may look the same over this period, its interpretation has changed dramatically.[10] The openness of interpretation of course makes sports a field of activity both for politics and for the market. The uses of sports for political purposes or in political contexts have been well documented in many presentations and here, in fact, anthropologists have made some very significant contributions, especially when dealing with sports in developing countries (cf., among others, Alter, 2000; Brownell, 1995; Cronin and Mayall, 1998; MacClancy, 1996). The market and its influence on sports is a subject that is largely untouched as far as anthropological treatments are concerned (also other social sciences have not produced much on this). With respect to both politics and to the market, anthropologists will find fascinating topics. These include studies of the Scandinavian "sports high schools," the Marlboro Formula One team off-season exhibitions with any number of chain-smoking young hostesses (overarching message to young men: live dangerously—in pleasant company) and, for that matter, what makes political propagandistic self-glorification possible (for politicians, for places, for states) through the involvement of athletes. Even if these last examples deal with topics rather than methods, they illustrate that the anthropological toolbox may have to be somewhat restocked. Fundamentally, as thematics they are within the realm of what anthropologists deal with—how cultural logic is shaped and expressed. Anthropology is not political science, nor economics, so the anthropological purpose will not be to imitate what is being done in those fields. The creation and management of meaning, however, is a field where anthropologists excel, and this is where their important contri-

bution can be in terms of studies depicting the relationship between sports, politics and economics.

Anthropological studies of our own societies will undoubtedly often contain a stronger biographical orientation that what is usual in anthropological fare. In my fieldnotes about children's elite sports, I have the case of a 10 year old who was prohibited to change his gymnastics club "during the season." He had originally belonged to the club to which he wanted to move back to, but this club had had to cease operations for some time due to a lack of coaches. As this club resumed operations, the child wanted to move back since this club was much closer to his home, but he was denied permission to do so during the season. This case, to an anthropologist, is something that immediately brings to mind issues about the constitution of personhood, the shape of agency in different societies and the cultural construction of childhood. Further, the creation of sports heroes, and the athlete's own role in this, provide other examples of studies where the biographical dimension will be significant. In between these two poles, we have the whole slew of youth and young adults who have a relationship to sports. Much of the sports literature deals with children and youth in a socialization perspective, primarily as issues related to the transmission and internalization of values. This is in fact a problematic approach, and does not necessarily provide a far-reaching understanding of children's sports (cf. Lithman, 2000). Here is also a field where we need anthropological studies with a biographical bent, informed by cross-cultural understandings of the shape of personhood, "life career" perspectives (focussing on the various social personae an individual may or may not assume depending upon context) applied to children and others active within sports.

Anthropological Issues in Sports

Above, a claim was presented to the effect that sports is an activity intimately tied to and part of industrialization and capitalism[11]—that sport is a child of modernity. This is a point which has been made with admirable theoretical distinction (see above), but not necessarily by anthropologists. To see sports only as this, however, is too restricted. If sport is "simply" reflective of some themes in modernity, we deny ourselves the opportunity to understand its passions, its emotional engagement, its rituals, and its fascination. And this is where the anthropological argument becomes important. If others, including sociologists, political scientists, and even anthropologists, have been able to describe the reflective dimension of sports, how features of the society where sports are practiced are expressed in sports, the anthropological study of

sports should have at least additional ambitions manifesting its disciplinary strengths. For one thing, studies of sports which go beyond the reflective character of sports, which are attuned to the creative dimension of the sport event and peoples' engagement with it, have to have a basis in data related to actual experiences of actual people, an anthropological forte. For another, anthropology has a long and rich history of developing ways of analyzing collective events, rituals, emotional displays, passions—all those things which people think are important but which do not really provide the empirical substance to most social science.

The distinctive features of our societies have to be evident in anthropological studies of sport. Which distinctive features will of course be related to the particular inquiry, but some general observations can also be made. It seems hard to imagine that studies of sports, implicitly or explicitly, do not have to have a foundation in what Dumont (1971: 32; 1986) calls "the individualism revolution": that is, how individualism as an ideology shapes and penetrates (Western) thinking. The valorization of the individual is also a denial of the significance of the individual's social anchorages as determining who the individual is. The individual, in this ideology, is a biographical self, writing his or her own story. The individual is not preinscribed and predetermined—so the ideology goes—in his or her social station, the individual life is open to change, and the individual has the ability to change and direct the individual biography.

Given this, there is an immediate relationship between biography and "moral fiber"—the ability to change one's destiny is interpreted as being related to moral qualities, to values, to intelligence, to having "drive." It is amazing, or amusing, to read sports pages, where over and over again supreme sport achievements are attributed to factors such as these. Sport, thus, becomes a clear example of how physical abilities, the bodily achievement and moral (in a wide sense) qualities are fused in contemporary versions of the individualism ideology.

The relationship between on the one hand the human body, body management and bodily rituals, and on the other cultural notions embracing these as well as extending into society at large, is, of course, a classic anthropological theme.[12] This a fine example of how small matters speak to large issues—what the anthropologist observes can be elongated into general propositions about how a society, its social relationships and dominant cultural themes, has constructed itself. This is also what the anthropological study of sports in our own societies should provide. Through the intensive fieldwork based studies of the management of the body in sport, and the ideas which are

linked to it, we should be able to say something significant about general principles upon which our societies are built.

There is an important point to note here. In a large number of works, some also by anthropologists, sport is treated as reflective of society. It is shown that what is in society, such as ethnic strife, class distinctions, notions about personhood, gender constructions and distinctions, and nationalistic fervor, to name but a few, will of course finds their way into sport. It is important to remember, however, that sport is more than reflexive. A ritual, to cut the anthropological argument short, is not just reflective, but also has other qualities. It draws attention to something, it (may) provide an "explanation" for something, it may energize a particular constellation of factors so that their importance is stressed, it (may) provide statements about what is important in life or society, and what is not. What ritual thus deals with is not just reflective of something else—the ritual itself has power to engage, to collectivize an experience, and to mold understandings. And, not to be forgotten, the interpretation of its meaningfulness, the imputation of meaning to it, is open to discussion, to debate, to contestation. As opposed to the stylized form of the sporting event, its at least relative openness in terms of meaning and interpretation makes it an instrument for meaning-creation. The idea that sports, seen as a ritual, is to be understood as "reflective" must certainly be true in some sense—everything in a society will of course be reflective of that society—but this must then not be construed as something passive, as the ritual as a mirror. Instead, sport provides a wonderful mine of opportunities to see a ritualized activity where there is an ongoing struggle over what meanings to impute to this activity. The meanings so constructed will also have the ability to be exported from the sporting event to interpretations of society more generally.

The argument about sport as reflecting or not reflecting what is in the rest of society should in fact be carried even further. In its reflecting sense, giving expression to what is in the rest of society, sport is a kind of virtual representation. However, it is a kind of virtual representation which can be acted upon, its inherent truth-values manifested and confirmed in public rituals. It is something which to the participants (athletes, coaches and spectators) is as authentic and as real as anything else in society. In this sense, sport has its own autonomy. This also means that what takes place in sports may have as formative an impact upon the participants as their participation in any other part of society. The meaning continuously created in sport must therefore be taken as seriously as that created elsewhere, and will reflect back upon the meaning-creation taking place in the rest of society.[13]

Anthropology, with its holistic orientation, has no epistemological or other barriers that prevent the according of serious attention to sport. Much other social science, such as political science or economics, is strongly attached to the governmental, justice or social order aspects of society. With respect to these disciplines, anthropology should be able to show its special contribution. Where the lines become more blurred is with respect to the field of cultural studies and a sociology oriented towards cultural issues. Some of the work in this vein has a pronounced anthropological bent, while others are—to an anthropological reader—less disciplined (in a dual sense). The only reasonable way to deal with the challenges from these disciplines is to do "the anthropological thing," with holistic orientation and a focus on actual people. Nothing else is required.

Sport as Meaning-Creation

Sport has sometimes been one of the foremost arenas for a kind of blatant battle over ideas. Hoberman (1984, 1997) has provided two fascinating texts about this. One concerns how political ideologies have related to sports and another about racism and sports. The first of these texts was very much an attempt to show how political ideologies are reflected in sports. But in the second, about black athletes in the U.S., there is a greater appreciation that sport as a field of inquiry can have specific qualities. This book, *Darwin's Athletes*, created uproar by pointing to a racist conjunction between biologistic thinking, blackness and sports. This is a book that could not have existed if sport was just a reflection of society. Racism in the U.S. did certainly not originate in sports, and its existence in sports is of course reflective of its existence in U.S. society generally. But Hoberman' s argument is much more interesting than that—he shows how sport is an arena where racist presumptions are worked upon, elaborated, given specific interpretations and institutionalizations (such as in sports scholarships), energized, confirmed and acted upon. Even more, sport not only becomes a major vehicle for these racialized notions to develop, but also energizes their way into being generally accepted truths in society. To understand this process requires that sport is seen in its own right, not just as a mirror of society. Hoberman's discussions are lodged in political ideology and the history of ideas, and the value of adding an anthropological contribution to the thematic he brings forth is obvious. A society is not just ideas, but also people in networks of social relationships. If one significant dimension of anthropological work is the simultaneous and integrated treatment of people, relationships and meaning-creation, this is what makes possible a processual analysis, as opposed to an historical or philosophical presentation. The processual, in this instance, means that the dialectic over time between social relationships and the meanings people create in interaction are dealt with simultaneously. The everyday struggles over interpretation, to make sense of what people encounter, their interactional strategies, all come together in depictions of actual people dealing with "the petty contingencies" of everyday life. What would the insights from such an approach add to what scholars such as Hoberman provide? Several things, and important ones. To get at these, one has to give attention to features of sports which are significantly missing in sports literature. The sport event, its ritual and aesthetics should be the starting point.

The Sport Event and Aesthetics

Sport is certainly defined by the sporting event—without it, there are no sports. However, little of the literature, anthropological or otherwise, seem to be amazed at how 60 000 people can participate in a soccer match, or 15 000 in a hockey game. The accidental visitor would probably be surprised at both the number of spectators at a hockey game for 11-year olds (many of whom are parents) and the levels of their emotional commitment. Going to a sports event is not like going to the movies or reading a book. This comparison is not without purpose: given what happens at a sports event, it must have some qualities that set it off from other activities. Fromm (1965) noted something significant when he claimed that "all this fascination with competitive sports, crime and passion, shows the need for breaking through the routine surface." This is what clearly gives sports its peculiar character—it breaks through "the routine surface."

An anthropologist will of course immediately see that the ritual dimension is crucial. The ritual juxtaposes different levels of culturally given understandings, and it brings to expressivity the more formative streaks underpinning these. Concepts such as Ortner's (1973) "key symbols" and Kapferer's (1998) use of the "ontology" concept are relevant in this context. For a moment reverting back to the example of soccer in Sweden during the post-war era, the force of the local identities manifested by the spectators during the games was not the result of a one-dimensional attachment to a specific locality. Instead, the local belonging and identity manifested trans-generational familism, class-based loyalties, and, with only slight exaggeration, in fact the universe of an individual's life. In terms of structuring the individual's life chances, both the options to choose as well as the social ligatures supporting or negating choice, were contained within this universe. The locality was, in a sense, the individual writ

large. Hence, the fate of the soccer team was, for those spectators who invested in this symbolism, emblematic for the "worth" of the spectator. With an analytical perspective such as this—no wonder if there was passion in the stands!

The ritual dimension being discussed here can be seen as "the cultural" on the level below surface expressivity, the creation and manipulation in ritual life of that which ties together on a deeper, mostly non-verbal level of understanding. This also means, that the anthropologist will always have to operate at a level of analysis that "makes sense," that explains rather than proves.

Another important feature of the sporting event that has received fairly scant attention is the aesthetic dimension. Aesthetics is of course the type of issue about which mainstream social science is not very concerned. Nevertheless, in spite of how little attention that has been devoted to this in the sports literature, an appreciation of a sporting event without dealing with aesthetics is impossible.

Aesthetics represents a kind of time-space collapse in sports. Athletic achievements widely separated in space and time are notionally tied together in a common frame of appreciation, where the transcendence is lodged in the perceived beauty in the achievement.[14] The beautiful here represents an ultimate truth—a transcendent statement dissociated from time and place. This kind of issue of course ties closely to anthropological studies of ritual generally. As a kind of micro-example of what this time and space collapse is all about at the level of data, the following incident may suffice. During one hockey game with 12 year olds, one kid (actually on the losing team) did a remarkably beautiful thing. He almost lost the puck, was able to retrieve it through a combination of skate and stick work, and eventually scored a beautiful goal. After the game, the fact that a defenseman on the other team had scored several goals was not what everybody was talking about. Even the coach joined in (which he usually did not) and volunteered: "that's the kind of stuff the Rat used to do." The Rat, Rolf Edberg, was a famous hockey player who as a juvenile had scored 37 goals in one game; he went on to a NHL career, and was then often referred to as "Magic Hands." The defenseman who scored did his job, but the one who let the spectator have a "glimpse of God" was the one with the beautiful moves. It is impossible to understand this without realizing that sports is built on a kind of aesthetic imperative. The supremely beautiful transcends time and place, makes a statement to the fact that the sport act has a "truth" to it that is independent of the specific of time or place. The reference to The Rat wonderfully ties together kids sport and the high-

est elite sport, Sweden and Canada, then and now, and demonstrates that excellence transcends time and place. Sport, through its aesthetics, thus constructs its own particular realities, of which space-time collapse is one. These realities serve as a confirmation that what happens in sport for some is much more real or true than ordinary life. Sport, indeed, breaks through the "routine surface." And its major vehicle in so doing relates to aesthetics. The aesthetic dimension, expressed in ritual, is what gives sports its amazing power to excite.

Concluding Remarks

If the sine qua non in sports is a culturally constructed ritual, with hugely important aesthetic dimensions, it follows that to appreciate sports, one has to become a member of a collective where the qualities of sports are known, discussed, acted upon and internalized. The conscious "interpretation" of a soccer game in Sweden 40 years ago was quite different from what is the case today. To "see" the beautiful requires training and shared assumptions about what the beautiful is. At the same time, sports is also an activity which engages dimensions of the cultural which are best analyzed at the level of the non-conscious and non-verbal, the level where different dimensions of being are brought together. This is the kind of work anthropologists regularly do in their study of "far-away" peoples. In our studies of sport, the performing, expressive body manifests this bringing together. If in sports we only saw bodies, sports would be boring. What we see is embodiment—the body manifesting, testifying, providing a vehicle, an idiom, permeating all dimensions of being, from that which is immediately known to the non-conscious and non-verbal. The sporting body thus actuates us in a manifold way, hence its power.

Here we end with another seeming paradox. Through the focus on "small things," such as sporting events, we will in fact be able to say something significant about "big issues." In sporting events, in their rituals, in the performing bodies, we should see fundamental issues of our existence being dealt with. It may be misleading to suggest that sports is a religion (cf. Novak, 1976), but there is no doubt that sports manifest notions about what a person is, what is important in life and society, how collaboration between people should be constructed, about technology, about passion (Lithman, 2000). The "performing body" (Dyck, 2000) is indeed the vehicle through which all this expresses itself, and aesthetics provide the validation. If so, it seems that anthropological studies of sports will be able to provide a "great coral reef exploration" of our own societies. Only a bit of what is there is above the surface—and there is a lot of that determining

the shape of what is above the surface that is not immediately seen. To explore sports, anthropologists will in large measure have to do what they have always been doing, and to some extent they will have to innovate. But keeping the focus on living people actually doing things, athletically or as spectators, will be the basis of it all.

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Notes

1 "Our own" societies is of course an increasingly dubious term. However, reflecting common usage, it is used here to denote modern, large-scale, industrialized (Western) societies. Also with regard to "anthropologists," a terminological comment is in order. In this article, "anthropologist" is used as a label for those authors arguing in an anthropological vein, regardless of institutional affiliation. In the case of sports, anthropologically informed arguments are presented by persons affiliated to departments of human kinetics, cultural studies, sociology and elsewhere. This dispersion of the anthropological argument over departmental affiliations is probably to be encountered for most themes related to studies in "our own" societies.

2 There are historic-developmental treatments of sports, where sport is seen as a continuous human activity with somewhat changing forms and expressions through history. This perspective negates the proposition that sports should be seen as historically concomitant to modernity, industrialization and capitalism. That there has been ritualized bodily expressivity, some with competitive dimensions, through history, and across cultures, is of course a given, but to subsume all this under the label of sports seems arbitrary.

3 For a discussion of anthropologists' contributions to sport studies, see Dyck, 2000.

4 While hardly a proof of this statement in the strict sense, the Heysel tragedy in 1985, when 43 persons were killed on live TV in advance of a soccer game between an English and an Italian team, will have left no viewer insensitive to the passions that sport can generate.

5 This term is used somewhat loosely—many states to be included here were not really "of one nation"—but this should not lead to any confusion in this context. For a more extended argument about the epistemological roots of the social sciences, see Lithman, 2004.

6 Social order concerns refers to that large body of literature in which sports is treated either as a vehicle for the convergence of social values, or which deals with social problems within sports. Prominent examples of the first kind are to be found in the sport-as-socialization literature, to the second kind belongs many studies of British soccer hooliganism.

7 This should not be construed as an attempt to invalidate youth culture studies. On the contrary, these have many times shown themselves to be very fruitful. The argument is that in studies of our own societies we have to be careful to avoid a "Trobriandization." Nor shall the argument be taken to mean that youth in our societies live in some kind of post-modern anomie—the argument is just that the degree of "cultural" integration is a topic of inquiry.

8 This argument about the changing interpretations is sports is somewhat reminiscent of MacAloon's (1984) discussion, but is meant to be even more general. Contestations about interpretations of sports can be studied in the stand during a sports event as well as over the longer turn, as exemplified in the main text.

9 In several parts of Europe, including Scandinavia, the distinction between workers' and bourgeois sport was of significance for a good part of the 20th century. Different clubs, associations and leagues openly catered to different classes in society, and some sports were more associated with certain classes than others. Sport was openly declared to be one permitted arena for the battle between the classes. Given how remote this reasoning about sport now feels, this is of course an illustrative example of how sport can be given different interpretations during different times and circumstances.

10 This story is not without relevance. A sportscaster told me that he was the youngest member of the sports section in a major Swedish paper a few years after World War II. As such, it was his job to check the Teletype machine. One night the message came that the first Swedish soccer player to turn professional, in Italy, had had tremendous success in his first game, and had scored goals. The journalist stormed up to the editor to show him the great news. The editor shook his head and declared: "We don't write about such people." To turn professional abroad, then, was virtually to be a traitor—today Swedish fans, and not least Swedish politicians, revel in the success of Swedish athletes abroad. They are used as examples of what a good country Sweden is that it can produce such athletes.

11 There is hardly reason to revisit the debate about sports and its relationship to the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. The strong relationship between the "socialist" states of the U.S.S.R. and the D.D.R. and sports has by some been seen to negate the "capitalist" nature of sports. That these self-professed "socialist" states used sports in an effort at achieving international gains for self-glorification, and as a vehicle of internal social control, is hardly a sufficient argument to deny the tie of cultural logic between sports and capitalism.

12 One foundational anthropological text about the metaphorical relationship between notions of the body and notions of society is Douglas (1966). This text uncovers how remarkably close this relationship can be. Lock and Scheper-Hughes (1987) offer another important contribution, noting that the body is "simultaneously a physical and symbolic artifact, both naturally and culturally produced, and securely anchored in a particular historical moment" (1987: 7). Not surprisingly, several scholars with a postmodern orientation are also interested in this relationship (cf. Rail, 1998).

13 This argument is illustrated in Lithman, 2000.

14 In fact, the massive attention to history in sports can also be seen as a confirmation of this point. Everything from television commentators (especially during events such as the Olympics, season-ending cup games, etc.) to huge printed baseball digests provides the sport fan with com-

parative historical material. Briefly, however, the point of this historical referencing is not to show development or distance in time, but the very contrary. This historical referencing is in fact meant to provide simultaneity—to show the timelessness of the aesthetic.

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Preoccupations and Prejudices: Reflections on the Study of Sports Imagery

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Abstract: This essay examines the predicaments and possibilities of the anthropological study of sport, arguing that it offers anthropologists unique opportunities to fashion engaged, critical, and public anthropologies. It focusses on sports mascots and how they epitomize the promise of the anthropological study of sports. It begins with a consideration of the disciplinary biases and barriers that have prevented anthropologists from taking the study of sports seriously. Against this background, it reviews a number of ongoing struggles over racialized imagery in sports, highlighting their relevance for the formulation of engaged anthropologies.

Keywords: anthropology/philosophy, cultural politics, identity, racialization, sports mascots

Résumé : Cet essai examine la situation et les possibilités de l'étude anthropologique du sport; il soutient que cette étude offre aux anthropologues une chance unique d'élaborer des anthropologies engagées, critiques et publiques. Il se concentre sur les mascottes et leur potentiel pour représenter les promesses d'une étude anthropologique des sports. Il commence par une analyse des biais disciplinaires et des barrières qui ont empêché les anthropologues de prendre au sérieux l'étude du sport. Il passe en revue un certain nombre de luttes actuelles au sujet de l'image racialisée du sport, soulignant leur pertinence pour la formulation d'anthropologies engagées.

Mots-clés : anthropologie/philosophie, politiques culturelles, identité, racialisation, mascottes

In November 2002, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) celebrated its centennial at its annual meetings. The massive convention, attended by several thousand students, academics, and practitioners, showcases the discipline, offering a ritualized display of its priorities, preoccupations, and prejudices at the start of the 21st century. While one could attend panels devoted to art worlds, immigration as a divorce strategy, posthuman media, hostess bars in Taiwan and the future of food studies, noticeably absent again was a single session on sport. In contrast, sport not only brought host city New Orleans, Louisiana, to life, but it also framed the meetings as well. The evening of my arrival at the conference, the driver, who took me, along with several colleagues, from the airport to our hotel, raced against the conclusion of a professional basketball game and the subsequent street closing. Throughout my stay, the local media pivoted around athletic events and exploits, devoting more attention to the popularity of the new basketball franchise, the Hornets, and high school football than to pending elections or economics. The meetings themselves were held in the shadows of the Superdome, home to the New Orleans Saints football team and host to the annual Sugar Bowl and regularly to the National Football League Championship game, the Super Bowl. And, in my hotel room, of the roughly 15 cable channels, 2 were dedicated exclusively to sports programming. Sport was literally everywhere but at AAA.

The pronounced presence of sports in the rhythms of everyday life, structures of urban space, and flows of public discourse in New Orleans, North American societies generally, and increasingly in communities and nations throughout the world, when contrasted with their virtual absence from the annual meetings of AAA is simultaneously telling and promising. Indeed, as I argue in what follows, although too often ignored within the field, sporting worlds afford important opportunities to fashion engaged, critical and public anthropologies.

In advancing this position, I build on the works of anthropologists, both the celebrated and the unknown, who have recognized in sports a powerful and privilege occasion to understand local communities, global processes and human conditions (see for instance, Appadurai, 1993; Blanchard, 1995; Dyck, 2000b; Geertz, 1973; Gluckman and Gluckman, 1977; MacClancy, 1996; Sands, 2000). In fact, anthropologists have seized upon sporting worlds. Clifford Geertz (1973) turned to the cockfight to unlock the meanings animating Balinese culture and character. In his attention to the subculture of bodybuilding, Alan Klein (1993) sensitively probes the workings of gender and identity. Similarly, Charles F. Springwood (1996) uses sport to disentangle a powerful ideological knot, namely the intersection of nostalgia and the new right in the Baseball Hall of Fame and the farming community that served as the setting for *Field of Dreams*. In a wonderful ethnography of sport and China, Susan Brownell (1995) discerns the linkages between nation, gender and the body. And, Arjun Appadurai (1993) examines cricket to grasp the significance of global shifts in the wake of decolonization in south Asia. For me, each of these ethnographers and many others underscore the promise of studying sport for anthropology.

I came to the study of sport, specifically racialized representations in athletic spectacles, media coverage, and public debates, quite by accident. I watched sports, but never would have thought to study them. That is, it had not occurred to me until I began to recognize Native American mascots as unnatural, hurtful, powerful, meaningful and racist, precisely as I came of age as an anthropologist at a time when the discipline struggled with the lingering legacies of colonialism, continental philosophy, textuality, reflexivity, the postmodern turn, cultural studies and questions of power. Although by no means conventional, my take on these issues had pushed me to commit myself to doing anthropology at home, to studying up, and more to formulating anthropology as cultural critique (Marcus and Fischer, 1986). My realization that Native American mascots were problematic, my desire to scrutinize mundane features of American culture and my insistence that anthropology address political and ethical as well social and intellectual questions came together at the University of Illinois. The school not only had a rich tradition of using pseudo-Indian imagery in the figure of Chief Illiniwek and more generally in its team, the Fighting Illini, but also shortly after my arrival a vocal opposition to this tradition (see King, 1998; Prochaska, 2001; Spindel, 2000). In this context, I seized upon mascots and other stagings of and struggles over Indianness as a means to find a way to make a difference in and through anthropology.

For the better part of a decade, I have been striving in the words of Richard Fox (1991) to recapture anthropology through the study of sports. And, studying sport has afforded me the opportunity to craft an engaged anthropology. To me, this has meant producing a situated, responsive and anti-racist/anti-colonial anthropology, fostering dynamic exchanges between theory and practice as well as scholarship and pedagogy. On the one hand, it has allowed a presence for anthropology on radio programs, in editorials and as responses to misleading journalism (King and Springwood, 2001; King, Stavrowsky, Baca, Davis and Pewewardy, 2002). On the other hand, it has promoted political activism. For instance, my work on mascots allowed me to lobby the Iowa Civil Rights Commission to pass a resolution against the use of Indian imagery in educational institutions. Finally, sport, I have found, furthers comparative inquiry into the key concerns of American culture, especially racial stratification and ideologies (see King and Springwood, 2001). In essence, I am suggesting that the significance of sport for anthropology is that the study of it fosters critical anthropologies, attentive to race, culture and power, encouraging collaborative reframings of the taken for granted beliefs and behaviours.

In what follows, I want to explore the problematic and promising place of sport studies in anthropology suggested by the paradoxical absence of sport from anthropology in the United States and its implications for the field and its practitioners. I am interested in detailing the structures and sentiments that discourage anthropological engagements with sports and in explaining why anthropologists should be studying them.

To advance my central assertions regarding the importance of studying sport for an engaged and engaging anthropology, I narrow my focus to race and representation in contemporary American sporting worlds. I knit together ongoing controversies over the use of racialized imagery in athletics, specifically the creation and contestation of sports mascots: the embattled Colonel at Nicholls State University in Thibodaux, Louisiana, the long debated Fighting Illini of the University of Illinois, controversial team names at a Muslim flag football tournament in southern California, and the rhetoric at play in national debates. I begin my discussion with an overview of the prejudices and preoccupations that prevent anthropologists from taking sports seriously, before highlighting the significance of studying sporting worlds for the field.

Obstacles

The study of sport remains marginal to anthropology. A number of scholars have wrestled with the inability and

unwillingness of anthropologists to take sport seriously (Archietti, 1998; Dyck, 2000b; Klein, 2002; MacAloon, 1987). Here, I want to account for the neglect of sports and the more general failure to more fully integrate and accept sporting worlds through an examination of a number of overlapping biases and barriers in the field. My discussion begins with general observations, building toward more specific obstacles to the study of racial imagery in athletics.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the study of sport worlds and the uses of race within them remains the anthropological canon. Despite a number of important struggles over interpretation and epistemology, positionality and power, gender and colonialism and writing and representation, a well defined hierarchy of knowledge production persists within the discipline (especially in the United States), legitimating certain ways of knowing, that is particular practices, sites and subjects, while excluding, undermining and silencing others. Sports remain illegitimate, questionable and marginal. Put simply, anthropologists from metropolitan contexts (typically still imagined as white, from Europe or North America) set off to study significant, serious topics elsewhere among people not like themselves, more or less authentic, if not exotic, others who can offer a comparative glimpse of the human condition. Four key structures of conventional anthropology impact the study of sports within the field: place (elsewhere), context (authentic), topic (serious) and people (others).

Although the practice has become more common than it was in the past, anthropology in the United States still frowns on homework. Mentors regularly discourage graduate students and junior scholars from working at home, motivated at least in part by concerns over prospects for employment, publication and prestige. Anthropologists who wish to study the metropolitan center often wait until they have tenure, initiating a second career of sorts after establishing a reputation through their work on the margins; alternately, they may stray or be pushed beyond the discipline, finding themselves in interdisciplinary spaces like women's studies or like myself ethnic studies. Importantly, anthropologists working at home often seem to undertake projects designed to secure legitimacy through their responsiveness, practicality, prestigiousness and seriousness: health care, reproductive rights, public policy, the law, science and poverty. In this context of insecurity or overcompensation, it is difficult to find a place for the study of sports.

Anthropologists who do follow a more conventional path appear to be only a slightly more likely to study sport than their less conventional peers. In part, and per-haps more frequently in the past, this pattern derived from a desire to know the other through their words and deeds. Their institutions and expressive forms attracted anthropological interest over against local uses and reinterpretations of Western commodities and technologies. Consequently, sport, like media and technology, often was overlooked to salvage a snapshot of an uncontaminated other.

More important, here as there, the persistent illegitimacy of sport in anthropology surely has much to do with its perceived frivolity and triviality, contrasted with more supposedly important issues like work, politics, cosmology and well being. Indeed, the fact that anthropologists, in common with a broader public in North America, conceive of sport as entertainment and exercise, a recreational diversion and a mass spectacle, encourages them to dismiss its significance. As if things that were fun had no social, political, moral, or economic import. This reading of sport, which I would argue is terribly common in the field, suggests something deeper about the anthropological canon as well. It has yet to embrace or formulate an approach to or place for pleasure. Anthropologists have developed sophisticated means of analyzing kinship systems and political ideologies, of accounting for medical beliefs and economic transaction, of talking about suffering and arguably even oppression, but they have largely failed to integrate the study of desire and delight as well as the social scenes, cultural practices and human expressions they animate. Sporting worlds clearly hinge on pleasure and longing—the joys of play, dreams of future greatness, the *communitas* of the crowd, the stories passed from one generation to the next, the satisfaction of seeing a perfect catch or watching a winning goal, reliving past glories, the escape in collecting memorabilia or crafting a fantasy baseball team.

Finally, the anthropological canon has great difficulty including the self. Of course, anthropologists have investigated psychological issues and increasingly some stress the importance of postionality and reflexivity. By and large though, and yes there are exceptions to this rule too, anthropologists have not turned the tools of their trade onto themselves as teachers, parents, lovers, consumers, citizens, or fans. They compartmentalize their work and their lives. In their research, they pose questions, deconstruct and analyze. In their everyday lives, they run to the store, raise kids, have sex, watch television, play tennis, participate in an office betting pool and cheer on their favorite team. They work in universities, but do not study them typically, let alone think about how athletics and academics articulate within them as a cultural issue. This disconnect is crucial to understanding why

sport is not a more important part of contemporary anthropology. The hierarchy of anthropological knowledge production discourages what one of my thesis advisors negatively described as navel-gazing. The lingering potency of positivism encourages anthropologists to keep themselves out, to look at others, to turn away from the everyday. Indeed, objectivity, in particular, stressing detachment and neutrality on the one hand, while discouraging public advocacy on the other, seems to have militated against anthropological inquiry into sports. One anthropologist in response to an invitation to present a scholarly paper on the controversy unfolding around the use of pseudo-Indian imagery in sport on her campus remarked to me: "Things are going very badly here right now and I am much too close to the situation to be objective. I don't even want to be objective (which may be an awful thing for an anthropologist to say)" (March 7, 2001). Needless to say, she opted not to participate on the panel. The importance of objectivity to cultural anthropology as both an ideological structure and methodological tool, I would argue, accounts at least in part moreover for the tendency of the field to marginalize sport studies. That is, the centrality of pleasure, emotion and proximity all run counter to what many anthropologists still believe makes for good anthropology. In this context, sports other unsettling pleasures cannot enter into the anthropological imaginary as significant social artifacts.

Core elements of the anthropological canon, then, retard inquiry into sports. Not only do they often turn attention away from crucial dimensions like frivolity and pleasure, but they also rely upon conceptualizations (such as objectivity) that inhibit understanding.

Imperatives

Anthropologists should be studying sports. I have noted that for me a key rationale for studying sport has been a desire to craft a more engaged anthropology. Of course, this is neither the only way to do anthropology in the present nor arguably the best space in which to elaborate transformative anthropologies. Nevertheless, anthropologists should be studying these topics for several reasons.

Sports are not only ubiquitous features of everyday life, but uniquely meaningful and powerful for countless individuals and institutions as well. In fact, judging from television audience, everyday conversation, wagering, talk radio, media coverage, domestic abuse rates and merchandise sales, many Americans know more and care more about the outcome of events from the Super Bowl and Kentucky Derby to March Madness and the World Cup, as well as the success or failures of superstars and

high school players, professional dynasties and even little league teams, than they do about any number (perhaps any other set) of political, economic and social issues. Consequently, if anthropologists wish to craft a public anthropology, that is, an anthropology that addresses a broader public, encouraging it to pause to consider, perhaps even seriously contemplate, social arrangements and cultural practices, I would argue, they must study sports. While they continue to attend to media in Sri Lanka, genocide in Rwanda, globalization in China and environmentalism in Amazonia, because these and many other pressing topics afford profound insights into human conditions, they must increasingly interrogate the signs and spectacles animating sporting worlds precisely because they speak so powerfully to so many people, hailing them where they are at, act and imagine. Studying sports even might allow anthropologists to stop talking only to themselves and other experts in arcane languages about subjects most people know little about and care for even less, ideally opening a space for a proliferation of anthropological voices and perspectives about an array of topics in public culture. If nothing else, sporting worlds offer one of the best contexts in which bridges can be built between anthropologists and the public.

Anthropologists have much to learn by studying the structures and symbols of sport. Indeed, even if one sets asides these aspirations as hopeful, examining sport worlds and the place of racialized imagery within them speaks to concerns central to anthropological inquiry and public debate. To illustrate these contentions, I want to present a series of snapshots from local and national struggles over the use of racialized imagery in association with athletics.

Continuing the Intifada in L.A.

In the late fall of 2003, Sabih Khan began organizing a flag football tournament for Muslim youth in Southern California (see http://www.muslimfootball.com). According to Han, he hoped "to keep them off the streets and to them an opportunity to have fun participating in organized sports" (statement, 2004). While the event posed fascinating questions about immigration, sport and assimilation, more intriguing was the manner in which some teams opted to use the tournament as an occasion to stage identity and comment on global concerns. Initial entrants included teams named Intifada, Soldiers of Allah, and Mujahideen, accompanied by images of masked youth, some hurling rocks, and Arab warriors bearings swords or daggers. Although some may find in such imagery a rather conventional and universal appeal to masculine tropes of power and bravado, a more nuanced and

grounded reading would insist that these symbols speak to local and global concerns, resonating in powerful ways within and beyond the Muslim community in southern California. In the wake of the 9/11 attack and the subsequent state of siege endured by Arab Americans, including intense surveillance, pronounced stigmatization and open hostility, it is not surprising that young men would select warriors and rebels to imagine themselves or would clothe themselves in symbols signifying resistance and defiance. Of course, Intifada and Mujahideen also reference (depending on one's politics) at one extreme (represented by some of the players) illegal occupation, righteous uprising and indigenous resistance and at the other extreme (for instance how the Jewish Defense League understood the situation), terrorism, suicide bombings and inhuman evil. In either case, the team names and their associated images not only assess the conflict in the Middle East, but link the players and likely their predicament with it as well. A seemingly minor sporting event emerges as an important occasion for players to make the popular political, to articulate an empowered identity in an emasculating context of terror and to enunciate what too often remains unspoken or at least inaudible—who they are, what the world is like and what is at stake in the game of life.

Down South in Dixie

Whereas some may want to read the use of imagery by Arab American football teams to be heartening, a resistant moment in which the marginalized speak truth to power; more often than not, racialized symbols and spectacles in sports tend to reinforce conventional formulations of identity and hegemonic articulations of culture and power. Beginning in 1957, Nicholls State University in Thibodaux, Louisiana chose "The Colonel" as its mascot. For nearly a half century, the mascot has led cheers at home games, where until rather recently the marching band played Dixie and after each touchdown scored, cheerleaders would run the Confederate flag the length of the field and back. According to the administration, the school symbol is harmless, originating in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps tradition once at the core of the institution. That such a defense is thinkable unveils the lingering residue of white supremacy in American society.

Nicholls State is named for Francis Tillou Nicholls, a Confederate war hero who later became the first post-Reconstruction governor in Louisiana. What's more, the university is built on a former plantation and white students are known to visit the former slave quarters after dark for a creepy thrill. Finally, the Colonel has more than a passing resemblance to Colonel Reb, the famed mascot

of the University of Mississippi (King and Springwood, 2001a). Together, these elements suggest the sports mascot is a nostalgic appeal to a lost racial order, an effort to reformulate, if not reclaim, a glorified white identity. Only occasionally has it faced questions, first, briefly, in 1973 as the civil rights movement sputtered, and then again in 2003. In both cases, African-American students have voiced concern about the Colonel, asserting that it evokes the Old South and honors the Confederacy and by extension slavery. Then as now, African-American students have found the mascot to be alienating and terrifying. And, likely because of the Colonel and the social relations that it sanctifies have become embattled, African-American student leaders report being harassed by students and alumni, "Hey, nigger, the mascot is not bothering you, so you leave it alone" (Krupa, 2003).

Debating Pseudo-Indian Mascots

As these sketches of local stagings and struggles hint, arguments over the significance of racialized sports imagery turn on profoundly different interpretations of race, culture and history. Indeed, conflicts over mascots are not simply, as some would have it, instances of political correctness gone awry; rather, they invariably are ideological struggles over memory, community and possibility, about what it means to be an American, to be a citizen, to be human.

King (2003) outlined the following schematic patterns from a study of an Internet survey about the appropriateness of pseudo-Indian imagery in athletics. Whereas supporters argue that mascots foster respect, honoring indigenous people, opponents insist that they denigrate Native Americans, perpetuating historical patterns of discrimination and dispossession. These distinct positions point to deeper differences: supporters stress text (honor, intention), while opponents emphasize context (history and racism). Supporters isolate; opponents make connections. Supporters argue for intent; opponents argue for effect. Supporters think of symbols and names as flat and more or less unimportant; opponents think of symbols as powerful cultural forms that reflect social relations and reinforce historical inequalities. Supporters deflect and deny the import of race; opponents highlight the centrality of race.

Through their arguments, supporters and defenders advance competing visions of race. Supporters advocate a largely hegemonic understanding, asserting that "we are all more or less equal," that the ill intentions of prejudiced individuals produce racism, and that discussions of discrimination should be confined to "real" and "important" social domains. In contrast, opponents advance an

interpretation that reads the social relations and cultural categories against the grain, exposing the power and meaning embedded within accepted norms, ideologies and behaviors. They argue that race and racism ground the American experience, that racial hierarchies structure everyday life, and that mascots far from being frivolous are significant measures of race relations. In this light, the ongoing controversy over mascots is as much about conflicting interpretations of race as it is a series of arguments over the appropriateness of Native American images in popular culture.

Anthropological Advocacy

Often hidden beneath the ideologies, images and identities fundamental to racialized sports mascots are the institutional contexts animated by and animating them. Of particular concern for academic anthropologists should be the ways in which such symbols and associated spectacles saturate educational institutions. A letter from the University of Illinois Department of Anthropology faculty to the Board of Trustees illuminates the many and varied ways in which the school's Chief Illiniwek impacts them (Department of Anthropology Faculty, 1998). The use of pseudo-Indian imagery, they contend, has "a number of adverse academic effects on the Department of Anthropology."

> (i) it promotes inaccurate conceptions of the Native peoples of Illinois, past and present; (ii) undermines the effectiveness of our teaching and is deeply problematic for the academic environment both in and outside the classroom; (iii) creates a negative climate in our professional relationships with Native American communities that directly affects our ability to conduct research with and among Native American peoples; and, (iv) adversely affects the recruitment of Native American students and faculty into our university and department.

Racial imagery in athletics then, whether the Colonel at Nicholls State or Chief Illiniwek, works against the ideals of educational institutions. It produces false knowledge, fosters hostility and discomfort and undermines the creation of inclusive, democratic learning communities. For anthropologists, as the faculty at the University of Illinois make clear, racialized sports mascots place them in an impossible position, compromising their roles as scholars and teachers.

Opportunities

In short, examining racialized imagery in even a truncated fashion underscores the ways in which the study of sporting worlds overlaps and extends the substantive concerns and theoretical preoccupations of anthropology at the start of the 21st century. Quite clearly, it illuminates the signifying practices through which individuals and institutions create and contest identity, clarifying the conditions and terms that make it possible claim place, voice, history and community. Not surprisingly, it grants access to the ways in worlds of rationalized play work to make social hierarchies simultaneously real and invisible. It permits the mapping of the articulations of culture and power, particularly as manifested in appropriation, representation and authenticitation and the entanglements of commodification, symbols and public culture.

Moreover, studying the symbols and spectacles central to contemporary sports has important consequences for knowledge production in anthropology. On the one hand, it encourages cross-disciplinary dialogues and collaborations that foster fuller understandings and more dynamic interpretations. On the other hand, it prompts anthropologists to meet people where they are at; whether, in the context of current controversies over the imagery at play in athletics, the arguments advanced by students, parents, educators and political leaders concerned about mascots, racism and cultural citizenship or those marshaled by sports fans, alumni, parents, players and boosters intent to preserve tradition, celebrate masculine ideals, or sanctify collective memory. Such encounters and dialogues shift anthropology to the center, where it might craft (com)passionate, critical, and responsive accounts of the symbols and structures that so powerfully shape the conditions and possibilities of life as lived in the present.

Conclusions

In this essay, I have sought to further understanding of anthropology's vexed relationship with the study of sport, asserting that taking up sports enables anthropologists to simultaneously reinforce the fundamental concerns of the discipline and extend the field in dynamic new directions. On the one hand, I have highlighted the structures of the field that prevent full engagements both with racialized symbols and the broader sporting worlds which animate them; on the other hand, I have underscored some of the reasons why anthropologists should be studying them. Clearly, the anthropological study of sport and its symbolic contours continues to face challenging obstacles and afford great possibilities.

I have no illusions. I do not believe that the next AAA meetings will have an invited session on sport, nor do I think that a professional organization devoted to the anthropology of sport will materialize in the near future. In fact, given the existing structures of the discipline,

particularly the manner in which it organizes, ranks and legitimates knowledge and, in turn, trains, socializes and rewards practitioners, I doubt that a cohesive, recognizable or accepted subfield will solidify. As unpleasant as such circumstances are, they suggest something fundamental about what individual anthropologists interested in the study of the sport should be doing. Most basically, they must continue to study sport—in creative, unconventional and challenging ways. For if an anthropology of sport is to have significance, it will have to resonate and make a difference within and beyond the field.

For me this has meant embracing aspects of the discipline, abandoning others, and looking elsewhere to learn novel ways to pose questions, find answers and explain beliefs and behaviours. If nothing else, by studying racial imagery in sports, I have come to realize that it is only by multiplying our approaches, objects, audiences, media and networks that an engaged study of sport that is meaningful, relevant and responsive will emerge. Indeed, to my mind this is the only fashion in which an anthropology (of sport) that matters to indigenous peoples, to a broader public and perhaps even to other anthropologists will materialize.

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Scouting an Anthropology of Sport

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Abstract: This paper explores some of the processes that shape the development of an anthropology of sport. It situates the anthropology of sport in relation to a broad and eclectic field of sport studies. It then identifies the anthropology of sport as embedded in the particular sorts of ethnographic projects undertaken and the sites where they are undertaken. Finally, it explores the significance of teaching and researching as activities that contribute to the shaping of an anthropology of sport. The paper argues for a disciplinary commitment to anthropology coupled with an acknowledgement that we should be extending our reach beyond the current boundaries of our discipline. Rather than writing only for a narrowly defined anthropology of sport we should be actively engaging broader and more inclusive audiences interested in sporting activities.

Keywords: anthropology, sport, soccer, institutions, teaching and research

Résumé : Cet article explore certains processus qui façonnent le développement d'une anthropologie du sport. Il situe l'anthropologie du sport par rapport à un champ vaste et éclectique d'études sur le sport. Il identifie, ensuite, l'anthropologue du sport comme lié aux types de projets ethnographiques déjà réalisés et aux lieux où ils ont été entrepris. Finalement, il s'intéresse à l'impact de l'enseignement et de la recherche en tant qu'activités qui contribuent à la constitution d'une anthropologie du sport. L'article plaide en faveur d' un engagement disciplinaire envers l'anthropologie, allié à la conscience que nous devrions nous étendre au-delà des frontières présentes de la discipline. Au lieu de contribuer à une anthropologie du sport définie de façon étroite, nous devrions nous adresser à des auditoires plus larges intéressés aux activités sportives.

Mots-clés : anthropologie, sport, football, institutions, enseignement et recherche

Introduction[1]

In pursuing the development of an anthropology of sport it is important that we are mindful of the connections amongst the sorts of persons, issues, institutions and powers that shape the practices and production of both sport and anthropology. Both sport and anthropology commonly produce understandings and experiences that depend on local communities but whose significances are best understood when we locate them as embedded in much broader and more complex cultural environments. Here I record my intention to write from a local perspective, as a Canadian anthropologist living and working in the antipodes; but in so doing I write to the broader concerns of an anthropology of sport that claims a right to deal with any sport, from anywhere and from any era.

Australia has had an important role in the history and development of anthropology. While perhaps less central to many of the contemporary concerns of the discipline, anthropology in Australia remains connected to the waxing and waning of international trends in the discipline. It is certainly articulated to the larger enterprise of an anthropology of sport. Following the appearance of a few articles in Australian anthropology journals (Mewett, 1999; Palmer, 1998a, 1998b), an issue of the flagship journal of the Australian Anthropological Society, *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* (Palmer, 2002), was devoted to the topic. Yet this issue of the journal was not restricted to sports in Australia; it included papers on a variety of sports connected to diverse places around the world. Notably, it also included papers from a cultural historian and a human geographer. However, to fail to recognize appropriately the particular sorts of local conditions under which it is possible to write and to research sport from Australia is to miss, I think in a fundamental way, the particular local concerns of any more global ethnographic enterprise. We may, in some respects, all be cosmopolitans now but many of us continue to live and to work as ethnographers somewhere on the periphery.

The language of this is telling. Talk of core and periphery not only identifies a recognized set of academic concerns, a set of issues and problems, but also assumes that some places or sports are more core than others, that some analytical issues are more core than others.

With this in mind, I want to make three particular points before drawing them together to say something more general about the development of an anthropology of sport and the ways we might imagine a future for it. First, I explore the presence of what can be identified as a developing and generic "sport studies" focus and suggest that this must be considered in any shaping of the potential of an anthropology of sport. Second, I offer a brief account of certain aspects of one of my current research interests, pertaining to the anthropology of the soccer or the "world game" in Perth, Western Australia, to show how it can illuminate some of the ways that local social and academic conditions shape such an account. Finally, I suggest that teaching the anthropology of sport can provide an accessible and useful way of encouraging entry into anthropology, as a way of interesting some who find the traditional concerns of our discipline almost arcane and anachronistic in relation to their everyday lives.

Overall, these three points come together to shape our anthropological practices in ways worth examining. It is the intersections and interconnections among these aspects of our anthropological practice that will continue to invest our particular contributions to the understanding of sports with a sense of contributing to a larger body of scholarship while retaining something of the particularity of our discipline. So in developing these points, even in the attenuated way possible here, I take seriously the notion of "scouting" the anthropology of sport signalled in my title. In many sports scouting is the activity where interpretations and assessments about the potential and prospects of a (usually) young player are made and shared. Scouting is fundamental to the reproduction of the sport. I have recourse to a body of evidence similar to that available to scouts in sports: runs on the board, the contexts of previous actions and some idea of the way that past actions may be expected to speak to expected future performances. And, like scouts in all sports, I acknowledge scouting as an imperfect activity, more an interpretive art than a predictive science.

Sport Studies

Here I use "sport studies" to name a general focus on sport found across a range of traditional disciplines including psychology, human biology, economics, politics, history, geography and sociology. Sport studies exists now as both an institutional setting for the study of sport and as a broad intellectual frame for understanding sport. Institutionally, it has become common enough to find departments, schools or programs in "sport studies" located in many universities. While there is a tendency for such programs to be identified as interdisciplinary it is clear that there are different degrees of integration among the disciplines that comprise each program. This interdisciplinarity is sometimes given shape in a somewhat muted way—through "joint appointments" rather than alignments or associations solely with sport studies. Often it is under the title of "kinesiology," "human movement," "exercise science" or some other scientific sounding rubric that those interested in sport find work. Here the role of the sociologist or anthropologist (and one could add historian or geographer or practitioner of any of the other disciplines noted above) of sport is often to provide social and cultural context for the "hard" analyses of the physiologist and exercise scientists. As these programs develop and produce their own graduates, it seems likely that the interdisciplinarity that now characterizes such places may soon be lost as the more traditional disciplines recede into the past and their own newly minted specialists take over.

Sometimes these programs bring together concerns about sport in systematic and interesting ways, as in a couple of volumes committed to unifying different perspectives in a Human Movement program in Australia (Abernethy, MacKinnon, Kippers, Neal and Hanrahan, 1996; Kirk, Hanrahan, Macdonald and Jobling, 1996). This presence of sport studies in universities is repeated in the catalogues of publishers, so that sport studies can now be found as a separate category of publications lumped under an overriding concern with sport rather than under the disciplinary perspectives from which the accounts are produced. One aspect that flows from the confluence of these two trends, university programs and publications, is the appearance of accounts that are no longer grounded in any single disciplinary perspective but instead are held together by the substantive focus on sport.

What is particularly important about the general field of sport studies is the way that sport acts as such a powerful focus for the analytical work carried out. Sport studies grew up as an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary way of making sense of a particular sort of activity. And, for me, sport studies have a different feel to it in the various places where it is practiced. The social and cultural traditions along with the organization of both sports and studies of sport in various places makes this so. Australia is not Canada, nor the U.K. and is certainly not the U.S. The development of various sport studies traditions have more in common with the growth of regional studies, that other great interdisciplinary—transdisciplinary, multi-

disciplinary, non-disciplinary—exercise that has moved across the traditional academic disciplines, than with the "blurred genres" (Geertz, 1983) that may characterize some disciplinary practices. And some of the difficulties inherent in regional studies, as well as other synthetic academic creations (here I am thinking of hybrids such as tourism studies, leisure studies, criminology, urban studies and media studies), are clearly present in sport studies. Most notably, there is a tendency for there to be a lack of coherence due to the lack of any strong underlying analytical connections uniting the various perspectives and studies into anything approaching a coherent body of knowledge. Studies multiply but the struggle to grow insights into a body of deeper knowledge as produced in the traditional disciplines remains.

To work in the social or cultural side of sport studies at the moment is typically to come to it from a particular disciplinary background. But it is also to be pushed out to expand the focus of your work to address the myriad of other approaches to the subject. In part this has never overly worried anthropologists. Like most of us I read beyond our discipline and I assume that each of us reads a similar variety of other disciplines regarding the topics of our respective research. But it seems to me that when we poach from other disciplines we return home with our prize and recontextualize it within our own intellectual frameworks. Like the other hybrids noted above, sport studies tends to lack such encompassing frames for its insights. As such, research into sporting activities, when couched as some variant of sport studies, has remained rather weak in terms of analytical frameworks for the studies that constitute it. And while it is true that we can generate as many anthropologies of sport as there are anthropologies, we do have a home to return to with our evidence and usually a sense of what an anthropological account could or should be like and feel like (Rosaldo, 1989). In sport studies, what is strong in focus remains weak in approach and relatively underdeveloped in analytical integration. With a strong topic there is less need for strong boundaries. One field, anthropology, can emphasize (an imagined) strength in theory and approach in order to keep others out and to maintain the need for our contribution to be heard. The other approach, sport studies, can be synthetic and care less for theoretical pretensions and the recognition of disciplinary boundaries and do more to bring the topic to a wider range and larger number of potential readers.

Does, then, working within an anthropology of sport condemn us to talking to merely a few hundred other anthropologists rather than addressing a much wider readership? Are those working in this field in danger of creating an expertise that we produce and that we alone tend to consume? I cringe when I read or hear justifications for the anthropology of sport that are grounded in little more than a need to do so because it has not been done to date. This sort of logic may work as a justification within our discipline, but it is hardly convincing beyond the boundaries of a purely academic anthropology. While I remain suspect of the theoretical grounding of sport studies, there is no suggestion that it is without value; I mean only to suggest that the values demonstrated in sport studies do not necessarily square with our anthropological and ethnographic sensibilities. In any positional understanding of these two broad approaches, it is the potential depth of the one that must be set off against the breadth of vision of the other.

As researchers within anthropology, anthropologists of sport must be mindful of the studies that others carry out. We have to read them and may often find ourselves writing to and about these others. This is nothing new for anthropologists. It has long been the way in our discipline. In writing about other topics in Australia, for example, I have hardly been constrained to read only the writings of professional anthropologists. My research would have been impoverished were it not for the work of demographers, planners and economists. The recent arrival of anthropologists on the sports scene has seen the shaping of an anthropology of sport that is sensitive to a range of pre-existing interests and concerns both within our discipline and within the broader field of sport studies. Much of this could be said for anthropologists' engagement with any number of other academic interests, such as development studies, gender studies, cultural studies and varieties of regional studies. In all of these cases, what social or cultural anthropology brings to such engagements is a firm grounding in and commitment to ethnographic ways of knowing the world. In the anthropology of sport, for example, our detailed and contextualized accounts tend to be constructed and carried out with methods that emphasize long-term and holistic engagements with the sporting practices we study. For social or cultural anthropologists it is a commitment to ethnography, in terms of both fieldwork and representation, that for me most characterizes the anthropological contribution to understanding social life. The more we move away from a commitment to ethnographic ways of making knowledge about sports, the more in danger we are of losing an anthropological identity and of being absorbed as mere contributors in some generic field of sport studies. Anthropologists are not alone in worrying about a disciplinary identity when dealing with such a strong subject as sport. Historians too worry about their

ability to maintain disciplinary integrity while engaging powerful others beyond their discipline (e.g., Nauright, 1999).

Rather than trying to sketch a history, or construct a genealogy, for the academic study of sport let me assume that an anthropology of sport already exists. Its presence is there to be found readily in publications, classes taught and anthropologists defining their research interests. As relative latecomers to sport studies, we have only just begun to make ourselves and our distinctively anthropological and ethnographic contributions felt. Our contributions are becoming clearer with each major publication in the field (Blanchard, 1995; Dyck, 2000; Dyck and Archetti 2003; MacClancy, 1996; Sands, 1999, 2002). And while we may indeed profit from the research in that broader domain of sport studies, the challenge ahead is to have our concerns embraced by those working in that broader domain. Having sketched something of this general trend let me turn to the particular challenges of understanding soccer in Western Australia.

The World Game in Australia

Soccer (football) is one of the most celebrated topics in the academic study of sports. The game has been studied by perhaps more academic researchers than any other game played. Recent works speak to both a range of places and topics that have been studied (Archetti, 1997; Armstrong, 1998; Armstrong and Giulianotti, 1997). This is certainly befitting for a game that can legitimately identify itself as "the world game." But the game does not have the same status everywhere it is played. It is played in a number of places where it does not have the central place in the sporting calendar, and Australia is one such place (Murray, 1995). Indeed, the very fact that the game is known here as soccer rather than football, and that the latter term football has been conscripted for a particularly Australian version of the game, is itself telling about the place of the game down under. Even good academic studies of soccer in Australia have been driven overwhelmingly by notions of ethnicity (see Danforth, 2001; Harrison, 1979), where ethnicity is often used in ways that tend to embrace ethnicity as primordial difference and that jump to such essentialized differences for the explanation of almost all things about the game, often at the expense of considering other possible interpretations (Mosely, 1995; Mosely, Cashman, O'Hara and Weatherburn, 1997).

There is no need to belabour the history of soccer in Australia here, for it has been examined in other accounts (Jones and Moore, 1994; Mosely, 1987; Mosely and Murray, 1994). What does need to be said about the game in Australia is that while it arrived fairly early—by 1880 in

New South Wales is the commonly accepted starting point (Mosely and Murray, 1994)—it has never been central to Australian sporting culture. The game has been played by many, but has been culturally marginalized quite systematically at its highest levels. The national side, the Socceroos, has competed in the World Cup eliminations for some time now. While they have not had much success, and can look at the structure of the qualifying rounds as one reason for that, the game does occasionally break through into popular awareness. However, this is often short-lived. During the World Cup in 2002, the first finals played outside of Europe and the Americas, all the games were broadcast on Australian television. A commercial channel chose the best games, including the semifinals and the finals, but left the SBS, the state-sponsored Special Broadcasting Service, to broadcast the rest. Television coverage of the game has certainly improved over previous years (Moore, 2000), but it remains very much presented as an ethnic concern. In Australian sports media coverage of the last World Cup, held in Japan and South Korea, much attention was devoted to covering the various local ethnic communities' responses as they followed "their" teams. Ethnicity remains the dominant trope for understanding the world game in Australia. While I find certain aspects of it problematic, this focus on ethnicity has, nonetheless, inspired some fine ethnographic accounts. Sociologist John Hughson, in particular, has produced particularly vivid analyses of the meaning of ethnicity among some supporters of a professional soccer team in Sydney (Hughson, 1996, 1997). Hughson's fieldwork was spent with a group of young Croatian men that identified themselves as the "Bad Blue Boys." These young men sought to maintain the Croatian identity of their team and so were in active resistance to the "de-ethnicized" organization of the National Soccer League in Australia in the 1990s.

The professional soccer league in Australia, the National Soccer League, has existed in various forms since the 1970s. It has, throughout its existence, struggled for survival with teams disappearing, going into receivership and changing quite regularly. In 2001 the Carleton team in Melbourne was forced to leave the competition midway through the season. This failure, for a team associated with one of the premier Australian Rules Football teams with the longest of traditions, is truly enormous. The economic precariousness of the game is further reflected in other forms of marginality. A recent volume providing a partial account of the life of the great Australian player and commentator, Johnny Warren, is titled *Sheilas, Wogs and Poofters: An Incomplete Biography of Johnny Warren and Soccer in Australia* (Warren et al., 2002). As the back cover of the volume notes, the title

evokes the days of the 1950s and 1960s when "you were called a 'shiela,' 'wog' or 'poofter' if you played soccer" in Australia. "Sheila" (a girl or woman), "wog" (a migrant, usually considered "not white") and "poofter" (homosexual) were understood then as terms of denigration when applied to a man and marked those so identified as social and cultural outsiders—as being unAustralian. For soccer, identification as a marginalized game has changed through time and has meant different things at different times. As part of a study of the game in Western Australia I have been paying close attention to the ways that these sorts of understandings have gradually emerged. There still remains a strong association between soccer and ethnic social clubs that nurtured the game since the end of World War II. However, we make a mistake if we assume that it therefore follows that everything that happens within the game is understandable, if not reducible in some accounts, to "ethnicity." Such a position is unwarranted and the assumption that it is the case is damaging to our potential understandings of the nuances and subtleties of the organization of the game in Australia. A short while ago I spent an afternoon with a well-known Australian historian, reworking interpretation after interpretation of particular events only to have him return repeatedly to a rather crude primordial ethnic gloss for interpreting all things contentious about the game. Where I was pushing for relational and processual understandings of events in Australian soccer, my colleague was quick, far too quick I think, to reduce any understandings to some assumed inherent characteristics of ethnicity. This easy recourse to primordial ethnicity as *the* essential feature of game misses the subtle and nuanced ways that ethnicity is asserted and used in Australian soccer (Moore, 2000).

Much of the academic research concerning sport in Australia has been undertaken with an unspoken concern for nationalist issues. In what is even now an early account, Brian Stoddart's *Saturday Afternoon Fever: Sport in the Australian Culture* (1986) set the tone for much of this. After dealing with the traditional sports of Australia for much of the volume he introduces near the end a chapter titled "Play an Australian game, mate!" (1986: 158-182). In it he deals with those sports that do not seem to be clearly and distinctly Australian, or those which do not have the stamp of Australian culture on them. These are the games that were brought to (or, at least, that have come to) prominence since the influx of migrants following the World War II. Stoddart's focus on this matter is fundamental in the development of the study of sport in Australia. While new accounts have been produced, such as those by Adair and Vamplew (1997), Cashman (1997),

Booth and Tatz (2000), and Hall (2000), with greater sophistication and a clearer analytical sense of direction, Stoddart's account was key in defining the approach to many of the topics covered since its publication.

The Australia government formally embraced multiculturalism in the early 1970s and did so in a particularly Australian manner. Following a national referendum in 1967 that saw Australians vote overwhelmingly to grant Aboriginal people in Australia citizenship, with all the entitlements that follow, the government jettisoned traditional assimilationist policies that had been applied both to Aboriginals and to large numbers of postwar migrants. No longer were these people to be obliged to assimilate to Australian society, but rather they could chose to retain their cultural ties with their countries of origin. Embracing this newly acknowledged multiculturalism successive governments have allowed that there are many different ways of being Australian. Australian governments since have reinterpreted multiculturalism according to the perceived needs of their own times and economic agendas (Kelly, 1992) but no government has been willing to provide public support for overt multicultural activities in ways which seem to economically privilege ethnic difference. The attitude seems to have been one of allowing migrants, and Aboriginals, to maintain their culture as long as the maintenance did not incur any cost to the government. In this it is the case of Aboriginal Australians that has most vexed successive governments since Aboriginals were granted citizenship. Aboriginal people continue to refuse the label "ethnic" on the grounds that theirs is a prior claim, grounded in different moral facts. The "new Australians," as they came to be known in the 1950s and 1960s were expected to assimilate and integrate, to become just like the rest of the population as quickly as possible.

While governments have, for the most part, embraced some form of multiculturalism since the early 1970s, the particular emphases in policy and practice have varied through time. Multiculturalism in Australia has come under attack from those on both the political left and right. Successive governments have worked to use multiculturalism to their own political and economic ends (Kelly, 1992). My point in this is that multiculturalism in Australia has not been a stable notion; it has been subject to the vagaries of politics and history. Likewise, nor should any interpretation of ethnicity be treated as though it is unproblematic. Indeed, there has long been a politics of culture at the core of Australian multiculturalism, with concerns about what the government can and cannot fund still being decided along ethnic lines. Instead of merely identifying difference, and naming those differences "ethnic," the

analysis needs to become far more subtle and discerning. So while the game may still occasionally be called "wogball" in Australia (Hay, 1994), this stance has slowly been disappearing. In the past few years the ethnic names have gone from the national league teams and from teams in the various state leagues. In Western Australia, for example, no longer can Athena, Benfica, Croatia or Dalmatinac appear as part of a team's name. They have all been anglicized, so that they become Knights, United, City and so on. Until this government-inspired change in the naming of soccer teams, English migrants took part in the game merely as members of one more migrant group in Australia. Now they have once again become associated with the mainstream, with that which is linguistically unmarked and taken for granted as the normative case.

Even though successive Australian governments have embraced multiculturalism, there has been a muted continuity with previous assimilationist policies. In the management of soccer Australian governments at both state and federal levels, have seen the strong ethnic presence in the game as a feature hindering the development of the sport. Through the 1980s and 1990s governments pushed very hard to have the game change in order to present less of an ethnic identity in the community. Governments pushed for teams to change their names, losing their ethnic origins, and often tied large sums of money for the development of the game to such changes. Those in control of the game often refused. Elsewhere I have shown how the offer of a significant support and funding from the Western Australian government in the mid 1980s was turned down (Moore, 2000). This has, in part, been explained as due to the requirement that the teams give away the ethnic names of their teams. However, more important was the fact that any change to the organizational structure of the game would undermine the positions of power and influence already held by a number of individuals. In this I advocate a non-essentialist approach to ethnicity that has been characterized in many different ways over the years. In avoiding any significant sense of accepting ethnicity as founded on primordial ties, I see ethnicity in Australian soccer more as a resource often used by those engaged in organizing the game and equally often used by those trying to change the organization of the game. It is an aspect of the politics of culture. In the ongoing struggles to control the game, ethnicity can be used to either further or undermine claims by individuals and groups. Ethnicity, from this perspective, is understood as situational and transactional (see Barth, 1969) and, as the Comaroffs (1992) have argued for a different ethnographic context, but about ethnicity more generally, embedded in the local history of the game.

Changes in the meanings and significance of ethnicity, then, should be seen as one aspect of the history of soccer in Australia; and in acknowledging the presence of ethnicity we should not there end our investigations. To this day the federal government continues to push for reforms in the management of the game in Australia that seem to many to be aimed at reducing ethnic control over the sport. In April 2003 the Crawford Report was tabled, providing a direction for the future development of the game in Australia with particular reference to the "the existing governance, management and structure of soccer in Australia" (Crawford, 2003: 2). As such, Crawford is disinterested in any ethnic involvement in the game.[2]

Over the previous couple of decades the study of soccer in Australia has attracted a small number of anthropologists. At times this anthropological engagement has involved a degree of writing against the entrenched interests of those with the most prominent voices. By far the strongest academic lobby in the field of soccer research, and of sport studies more generally, in Australia has been that of historians. The Australian Society for Sports History (ASSH) publishes *Sporting Traditions*, the premier journal for all of us in Australia interested in the study of (particularly) Australian sports, along with a newsletter and an important monograph series. The ASSH organizes an annual conference that brings together a diverse range of academics and others from around the country, and across the Tasman Sea. New Zealanders have taken quite a prominent role in the society. However, while the editorial policy for the journal is remarkably open, it is in the end still "history" that is identified in the title and that claims disciplinary prominence. Anthropologists do indeed publish there—Wedgwood (1996) and Mewett (2000) are two excellent examples—but it is not "our game." And, perhaps what is almost equally interesting is that neither Wedgwood nor Mewett was identified as being anthropologists anywhere in the journal. Wedgwood's account grew out of an honours thesis in anthropology. Peter Mewett began his professional life as an anthropologist but has subsequently been reinvented as a sociologist.[3] The point is that in working closely with this important group of scholars (and I hope nothing I have said indicates anything other than great respect for them) entails writing to their editorial standards, disciplinary judgments and sometimes even disciplinary objectives, and not always to our own. I believe that this dominance, which is by no means absolute control, nonetheless has an effect on the sort of anthropology of sport that has thus far been produced in Australia. We do not have the numbers to establish an organization as vibrant as the ASSH and therefore we do not have the sort of flagship journal that

a large membership makes possible. For those of us who continue to write ethnographically about local sporting activities we are left with peers in a fairly distant international field and those with a mildly disinterested local sport studies focus.

Anthropology, Sport and the Academy

There is yet another powerful reason for continuing to push ahead with the development of an anthropology of sport, both in Australia and elsewhere. Teaching an undergraduate class in the anthropology of sport for the past 15 years or so has helped me understand several things that we can provide for our students and what they can, return, provide for us.

In my experience, a focus on sport can provide powerful encouragement to bring students into anthropology. Not only is the topic intrinsically interesting to many students (and most of them have at least a passing personal experience with or understanding of some aspects of sports), but it allows them to begin using this knowledge in class. It may at times be difficult to encourage students to make the shift from talking sport to talking an anthropology of sport, but the pursuit of this goal allows them to make this transition while still retaining a sense of the value of their own knowledge. There is great satisfaction in watching students wrestle with the complexities of turning their own knowledge and expertise in the complex field of sport into the subject for anthropological and ethnographic writing. For many of my students, the class in the anthropology of sport is the first occasion when they have had the opportunity of making anthropological knowledge rather than merely consuming it. For students, doing the anthropology of sport has become a hallmark of this class.

Over the years my position in teaching the anthropology of sport has moved from one of using literature about sports gleaned from a variety of disciplines due to a lack of suitable materials within anthropology to one where I could now teach it entirely with materials produced by anthropologists. Yet I choose to retain a broader reading list in order to push students into an engagement with the broader concerns of sport studies. The anthropological literature dealing with sports is certainly far more sophisticated now than it was 15 years ago, but there are still so many other ideas and insights out there that can open intellectual doors for students.

The research projects that undergraduate students have developed and undertaken for this class are diverse. They are encouraged to conduct small, local ethnographic projects that build on their prior knowledge and involvement in sports. Not only has this proven to be an excellent way of developing their ethnographic skills and capabili-

ties, but the results have also been a boon for me. These projects have produced insights into sporting activities in and around Perth, Western Australia, much faster and in far greater detail than I could ever have done as an outsider working on my own. It does not seem too much of a stretch to note that often students have explored domains of social and cultural life to which I would have found access much more difficult to negotiate. In some respects it has been like having so many research assistants heading out to locate and report on sporting activities in the local community. Over the years, students' work on these projects has fed back into the class and helped contribute to the local content in more ways than I could have achieved as a lone ethnographer.

There is also a flow on from undergraduate classes into honours and postgraduate research degrees. I have had students develop theses dealing with such topics as the political economy of the expanding Australian Football League (AFL), negotiating gender relations in squash, the difficulties of fundraising in women's sport, the significance of Australian rules football for the Aboriginal people in the southwest of Western Australia, the globalization of surfing, the making of local heroes in the AFL, and the making of community through the Gaelic Athletic Association in Western Australia. Each of these topics has in some way helped to connect research students to a local community, and each has given a research student the possibility of coming to an ethnographic project with a background knowledge that allows them to move quickly into an anthropological research project. Some of these projects have now begun to produce publications (Lanagan, 2002; McCarthy 2003; Wedgwood, 1996).

In approaching sport this way students are empowered to make knowledge from early in their studies. An intellectual facility with the complexities of theory and the details of local ethnography require considerable time to develop. In focussing on sport, students are brought into the practice of anthropology very quickly and develop their skills while working on projects—while doing anthropology rather than just reading what professional anthropologists have written. There is a general lesson here. In approaching the learning of the discipline in this way, we are able to offer classes that may attract a wider range of students. It is now hard for me to whip up great excitement about the intricacies of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage systems much less to inspire my students with such topics. I do not deny the importance of kinship studies, or other particularly anthropological specialisms, for our discipline; I merely wish to report that there is, nowadays, far more to anthropology than the traditional topics of an earlier iteration of our discipline.

For an Anthropology of Sport

Practitioners in established academic disciplines tend to emphasize their disciplinary particularity, often evoking strong boundaries to maintain differences from other disciplines and to confirm their own identities. As a developing field of activity, the anthropology of sport is still working to establish itself and, thus, has relatively weak boundaries. Rather than being clearly set off, and hopefully not set aside, from other subfields within a more general anthropology our study of sport seems to be at its best when it builds from existing theoretical and ethnographic strengths to produce the sorts of knowledge we have come to expect in good ethnographic accounts. While social and cultural anthropology has gone down the path of specialization—and the many different interest groups and publications of the American Anthropological Association are a good measure of this—a concern that grows from this fracturing of the core of the discipline is that practitioners of the different specialties do not always develop ways of talking across their differences.[4]

I am not opposed to an anthropology of sport taking its place beside these other interest groups. The powerful analytical focus that can come from an ethnographic commitment seems to me to provide ample reason for continuing on within an anthropology of sport. Such an approach ties us to the strength of a large disciplinary organization while still allowing us the space and place to let us work through our own empirical investigations in a coherent and systematic manner. Our analyses should share in the general development of anthropology rather than being sealed off into some separate subdisciplinary domain, irrespective of whether it is a path-breaking one or a quiet backwater. Yet in doing this we must always be on guard against making this disciplinary context our sole or main focus. To do this is potentially to render our studies of particular sporting practices of little interest to anyone but our anthropological colleagues, no matter how large the professional association. In a small place like Australia, the anthropology of sport may indeed wither if we try to maintain a dialogue only amongst anthropologists. And if we move too quickly to embrace a broader and more general anthropology there is always the danger of losing the local touch, of writing to problems found in the literature rather than in our ethnographic experiences.

In looking at the broader field, sport studies will likely be with us for the foreseeable future. This sort of interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, transdiciplinary or non-disciplinary work has certainly found favour in many places. So while it may at times be useful for us to dance with sport studies, it does seem to me that we need to take due care on such occasions. We need to work off of these other accounts, be mindful of other ways of making sense of sporting practices, but in the end we would be wise to make sure that we find an anthropological way of speaking to this broader audience.

The overriding concern in this paper has been to situate the productive intersections of a personal anthropological practice and a developing anthropology of sport. In order to understand what happens locally, we need to understand the sorts of division of labour that appear in the various social, cultural and intellectual fields in which we work. A sporting field is only one of the contexts that shapes what we, as anthropologists, produce.[4] I suspect many of us may well feel a bit isolated at times in so far as we are apt to find ourselves working in places where there are more sport studies scholars than anthropologists of sports and more anthropologists interested in topics other than the anthropology of sport. Here is precisely the site where the integration of our teaching and researching practices with the research of our students becomes particularly important. I do think that we can better understand our own practices by locating the contextual features that shape our work in terms of the sorts of problems we write to and the sorts of audiences that read our works closely. And while we may continue to write for our colleagues in anthropology, we also face the necessity of recognizing that we must push for our work to be embedded in the relevant sport studies literature. In Australia, there has been no way of avoiding the literature that emphasizes that in this country soccer *is* an ethnic game. I admit to contributing to this literature even as I find its essentializing tendencies uncomfortable.

Finally, looking beyond all this, the message from all of this should be quite clear: as anthropologists of sport, wherever we may practice, we can only gain by making our accounts of sporting practices engage with the accounts of others. It matters little whether the others we engage be those working in what I have identified here as sport studies, those working on the same sports as ourselves but from another disciplinary perspective, or even our students. As a focus of interest, sport has the capacity to bring us together with others interested in sport so that our differences can work in complementary ways to produce understandings of sport that are more illuminating. In this anthropology has an opportunity to bring the insights of our discipline to a much broader audience.

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Notes

1. This paper was originally presented at the joint CASCA/AES conference held in Montreal in May 2001. As I was unable to be present, due to the tyranny of distance, Vered Amit kindly read the paper for me. I owe her an enormous debt. I also thank Noel Dyck for the opportunity to develop the paper and for his kind advice over such a long period of time. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments of the two referees for the journal. I alone remain responsible for all shortcomings.

2. The Independent Soccer Inquiry of 2002 was funded by the federal government as a review of the governance, management and structure of soccer in Australia. Mr. David Crawford, the chair of the inquiry, is a recently retired business person. Mr. Crawford came to this task with no prior involvement in soccer. He has been the national chairman of KPMG, a business advisory firm, and remains a director of several large companies. He chaired a successful review of the Australian Football League about 10 years earlier.

3. The movement of individuals from anthropology to sociology is a well-recognized one in the Australian academy. Just as anthropology departments tended to dominate the development of sociology in England in the first half of the 20th century, so too in Australia. In Australia anthropology has continued to provide academic staff into sociology programs.

4. This intellectual concern, of course, has to be set beside the political and career importance of such things as having many more positions as heads of sections and the like that allow for a demonstration of leadership within a discipline and significance to a broader academic community.

5. I have previously made a similar point regarding working as an anthropological consultant in Australia (Moore, 1999). The work, and words, of consultant anthropologists are shaped very much by the industry in which they work, and particularly by the expertise relevant to that industry.

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One Country, One Sport, Endless Knowledge:
The Anthropological Study of Sports in South Africa

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Abstract: Sport was one of the most important venues for the construction of difference and inequality in apartheid South Africa. The construction of the body and the boundaries maintaining difference between the defined groups in South Africa are described in this paper, as well as the use of sports talk to define and seek national unity and to construct national character. Soccer was set aside as the sport most suited to non-Whites, thus becoming available as one of the most important venues for statements of Black identity, organizational competence, pride and excellence. Despite the exaggeration of difference and segmentation of the population into ostensibly independent geographic regions in the past, despite continuing attempts to maintain the boundaries of White ethnicity, despite tremendous, racialized differences in wealth, the discourse of sport in South Africa supports the new nation, from the President to the poorest fan watching games through holes in the fence.

Keywords: sport, South Africa, reconciliation

Résumé : Le sport a été un des lieux les plus important pour la construction des différences et de inégalités dans l'apartheid sud-africaine. La construction du corps et de la différence qui maintient les frontières entre les groupes en présence en Afrique du Sud sont décrits dans cet article, aussi bien que l'utilisation du langage sportif pour définir et atteindre l'unité nationale et construire le caractère national. Le football a été choisi comme le sport le mieux adapté aux non-blancs, devenant ainsi accessible comme le lieu le plus important pour l'affirmation de l'identité, de la compétence organisationnelle, de la fierté et de l'excellence des «Noirs». En dépit de l'exagération de la différence et de la segmentation de la population entre régions géographiques visiblement indépendantes dans le passé, en dépit des tentatives continuelles pour maintenir les frontières de l'identité blanche, en dépit d'immenses différences à teinte raciale quant aux richesses, le discours sportif en Afrique du Sud supporte la nouvelle nation, à partir du Président jusqu'aux plus pauvres amateurs qui suivent les parties à travers les trous dans la clôture.

Mots-clés : sport, Afrique du Sud, réconciliation

Introduction

This paper describes some of the many ways that sport allows anthropologists to experience and to analyze South African society. Throughout the decades of apartheid, sports served both to define and to defy White superiority. Sport continues to serve as one of the most accessible avenues for the conscious refashioning of South African society. While focussing on soccer, the paper includes cricket and rugby, the other two sports that have been most important in reflecting and determining White identity, and in celebrating the nation. We aim to demonstrate both the many ways in which sport has reflected the most important issues of South African history, and the ways in which the performance of sport changes that history.

When men familiar with South Africa find out that we study sports there, they invariably respond with some variation on "You know, sport is a religion in South Africa." Several scholars, too, have observed that "South Africa is the most sports-mad country in the world" (e.g., Farred, 1997; Nauright, 1997). Why (or if) this is unique to South Africa is beyond the scope of the present paper, or whether this belief is the result or the cause of the way sports have been used to state and debate the most important issues in South African society. White rule was celebrated through international sport, particularly through rugby, which has been conceptualized as the defining demonstration of White Afrikaner strength and determination. When South African rugby teams won at the international level, their victory was quite consciously hailed as a justification of White rule: "Countries that allow mixing of races can never field a strong enough team to beat an all-White team from a White-run country."

Many fine anthropological ethnographies and analyses of sport have appeared in the last decade. Three areas of concern to anthropology in general have been brilliantly

discussed as aspects of sporting practice in one or more countries: the generation of bodily meaning, the construction, maintenance, destruction and reconstruction of identity processes, and the celebration of groups and ideologies.

Bodily practice has been analyzed among poor boxers in the U.S. by Wacquant (1995a, 1995b), who described their use of their bodies as a resource as an honourable way to achieve money and success, in contrast to criminal or semi-criminal activity. Archetti (e.g., 1996) studied the meanings given to different styles of play in Argentinian soccer, as Leite Lopes (1997) has done in Brazil, demonstrating the ways in which ideals thought to constitute less-valorized social classes can be read into and then derived from bodily performance. The role of the referee as director or conductor of action has been described by Dyck (2000) in his review of studies of body performance in sports.

Perhaps more anthropologists have been concerned to describe identity and boundary generation, maintenance and redefinition in sport than any other area of recent interest in the discipline. Notable among these are studies of struggles in British soccer (there and elsewhere also called "football") to define a particular team or style of play as characteristic of one race, social class, ethnicity, or even religion in contrast to others (e.g., Armstrong, 1998; Giulianotti and Armstrong, 1997). In Africa, conflict that centered on whether soccer should represent European or African values, traditional or modern practices, local or global discourse has been described by Stuart (1996), by Anderson (e.g., Anderson, Clarke and Perzigan, 2001), and by Farred (2000); Nauright (1997) has described the way in which rugby has been used to assert Afrikaner identity in South Africa.

The celebration of state or subcultural values, of hegemony and resistance, the generation and affirmation of alternative societies and relations through sport is the third area of concern to anthropologists of sport for which we will provide data from current practice in South Africa. As the Olympic Games were created to try to establish a system for uniting nations worldwide through shared values and practice (MacAloon, 1981), nations extolling the extent to which they have been re-made anew, as in "The New South Africa," attempt to demonstrate and promote national unity through sport. Often concurrently with the nationalizing mission come local or subordinate alternatives that are proclaimed through the medium of particular players, styles and events (e.g., Anderson, Clarke and Perzigan, 1999). New values are read into old games, as fans and players use "new" nations to talk about sport, and politicians use sport to talk about the nation that they wish to renew.

The Racialization of South African Sport

From early in the 19th century, White residents of South Africa identified themselves as either "English" or "Afrikaner," based on language, religion, location, racial ideology, and preferred sport. Self-designated Afrikaners are a very diverse amalgam of Dutch, French, German, Portuguese and other European settlers, indigenous Khoisan- and Bantu-speaking peoples, and Malaysian, Indonesian and Madagascarene slaves (Le May, 1995). This genealogical diversity makes the cultural signifiers of Afrikaner identity as important as skin color in categorizing individuals. "Afrikaner" identifies individuals who speak Afrikaans, a Creole of Dutch; who identify with the mythic history of the Dutch and Huguenot settlers; and who believe that winning at rugby, a vastly superior sport to either soccer or cricket, is one of the most important of life's endeavors (van der Merwe, 1990).

"The English" in South African parlance are Whites who do not self-identify as Afrikaner and whose home language is English, no matter how long ago their ancestors immigrated to South Africa. Most Afrikaners reject cricket as an effete symbol of English imperialism, so that in the past most cricket players have been categorized as "English" regardless of surname. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, however, some Afrikaners, including the late Hansie Cronje, have been rather reluctantly admired for their success in cricket, at least as long as the national cricket team achieved international success.

"Indian" in South Africa is applied to persons who appear to have originated in the Indian subcontinent, regardless of religion. "Coloured" means a person of mixed race, but especially of Dutch and Indonesian or Khoisan origins. Both categories were often included with indigenous Bantu-speaking "Africans" under the label "Black."

Each of the three most important South African sports has been conceptualized as the cultural property of one of its three most influential populations. An Afrikaner follows the fortunes of local and especially national rugby sides with the kind of passion usually aroused by charismatic religious movements (Anderson, Clarke and Perzigian, 1999). Although "the English" play all three sports, cricket is especially associated with them; and soccer has always been characterized as a Black sport, so much so that apparently White individuals who play soccer are said by many Whites to be coloured.

The processes that first maintained and now blur the boundaries between White and non-White have been particularly transparent in the embodied practice of South African sport.

Soccer began to be played by Black, White, Indian and coloured in South Africa in the 1870s, when it was introduced to Africans because of its association with the lowest classes in Britain (Holt, 1986). Only the few Westernized, affluent Black Africans played cricket or rugby, but soccer was played by all Black Africans, both rural and urban, of all language groups, as well as by English-speaking working-class Whites, by recent European immigrants, by mixed race "Coloureds," and by Indians. In race, class, ethnicity and religion, soccer players, and therefore the game itself, belonged to the least valorized categories recognized by dominant Afrikaners. To Afrikaners, the fact that a few recent immigrants from Britain were willing to join racially mixed teams in order to play soccer (Couzens, 1981) defined both soccer and lower-class English-speakers as inferior. Their acceptance of Black teammates soon led to the designation of soccer as "the Black sport." Few White South Africans even today can conceive of Afrikaner soccer players or teams, so strong is this association. We have often been told that soccer players with Dutch surnames are "known" to be "really" mixed race Coloureds. Among class-conscious non-Whites today, this identification is strong enough for many to abandon soccer in favour of rugby or cricket.

After an Afrikaner government came to power in 1948 on a platform of apartheid, a barrage of laws completely separated all recognized racial and ethnic groups (Archer and Bouillon, 1982). The government deemed it necessary to overdetermine separate racial identities to maintain the boundaries separating Afrikaner "Whites," virtually all of whom had some African and/or Indonesian ancestry, from "non-Whites," and to complete and maintain the subjugation of all non-Whites by dividing the non-White population into dozens of separate categories, each with its own set of privileges, to prevent them from uniting against the White minority. All social spaces in which multiracial performances had ever occurred were to become the exclusive property of one race only, including sports arenas, playing fields and spectators' seats alike.

The Black, Coloured, and Indian soccer associations opposed this new legislation by federating in 1950, but the government forced them to split into three separate organizations again by 1960 (Booth, 1997). Any association or team that resisted race apartheid was banned from using, and even watching play on, all public playing fields (Archer, 1987). When South Africa left the British Commonwealth in 1960, the government imposed even more restrictive laws that soon resulted in the removal of South African teams from international competition.

FIFA (Federation of International Football Associations), the international soccer body, suspended the Whites-only national soccer team immediately, finally expelling them in 1976. The International Rugby Board and the International Cricket Council, both dominated by English Commonwealth countries, were reluctant to take similar action until some 15 years of blatantly unsportsmanlike behaviour shamed them into following suit. As only one example, South Africa was banned from the Olympic Games in 1964 for the following events: in accordance with its policy of recognizing the citizenship of Whites alone, the South African government insisted that only Whites could represent the nation. Any non-White South Africans who participated had to travel to the Games in a separate airplane from the White sportsmen, had to stay at a separate hotel, had to wear a different uniform, and could not enter any event that a White South African had entered (Guelke, 1986). South Africa was not readmitted to international sport until after Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990, when he asked the international boards of rugby, cricket and soccer to confirm South Africa's re-entry even though the new laws governing sport in South Africa had not yet been written (Booth, 1996, 1997).

Although the apartheid government recognized that integration in sports would contradict the total system of apartheid, sports were so important that Afrikaner politicians were willing to compromise in order to broadcast their message of the superiority of White-run nations internationally (Farred, 1997: 16). By the mid-1960s, White players and administrators, desperate to play internationally, begged the government to abandon apartheid in sport. Concessions to international principles were made, but in every sport except soccer these consisted of trivial window-dressing. The fact that some White soccer players were allowed to play on Black teams in the 1970s made that sport available as a symbol of non-racialism.

South African public figures frequently propose to increase racial respect and co-operation through sport. If the experience of playing on mixed-race teams changes players' evaluation of other races and cultures in a positive way, schools and other organizations have a simple, easily-accessed tool of great power: to manipulate team membership in order to decrease racism. Although playing on multiracial teams amounted to a renuciation of racism in the past, White players who joined multiracial teams throughout the apartheid decades, at considerable risk to themselves, state that they were motivated primarily by the desire to win. Many of those we interviewed were recent immigrants who rejected practices that they thought characterized Afrikaners, including racially segregated sports, as a way of increasing their own status. Many lower-class English-speaking Whites sought to

escape both ethnic prejudice (directed at them by Afrikaners) and class prejudice (by middle- and upper-class cricket players; Anderson, Clarke and Perzigian, 2001) by playing an "English" sport on a team composed of Black players who never appeared to raise the question of their relative rank. In this paper we concentrate on the first decade following Nelson Mandela's release from prison, which has been a transitional period from apartheid to an unseen future. We cannot claim that our findings will characterize South African sport into this future.

The Anthropology of South African Soccer

Can sports unify a country? The claim is often made by representatives of various sporting bodies, and it was also made by virtually all leaders of newly independent African states. In most cases, subsequent research has indicated that sports are as likely to divide as to unify a country. In the particular circumstances that obtained in this particular country from 1990, however, we believe that we have found that the particular sport of soccer did serve to help unify certain segments of the population. Whether this will continue into the future, much less spread to the rest of the population, remains doubtful; but during the decade following Nelson Mandela's release from prison, soccer allowed for reconciliation between Black South Africans and those Whites who sought to use it in this way.

The heavy weight of White cultural oppression paradoxically created sites of freedom in those areas assigned to Africans, especially in sport. Both English and Afrikaner Whites agreed that rugby was the ideal game for the demonstration of White superiority (Nauright, 1997; Van der Merwe, 1990). The playing fields were ideal sites for the maintenance of boundaries between Black and White, and between Afrikaner and English. The authorities were concerned to maintain the boundary and not concerned with the internal content of the "Black sports" so categorized; dismissed by Whites as beneath their notice (Farred, 2000: 104), the soccer field, as a result, was free to be an arena for the creation, performance and celebration of African identity. The remainder of this paper presents some of the exciting ways in which the study of sports can help in the attempt to understand and to effect change in South Africa.

Soccer uniquely allowed Africans to assert, even celebrate, equality with Whites, locally if not internationally, in at least one area of endeavour *that was of importance to Whites*. White South Africans were willing to concede Black superiority in soccer during apartheid, since that sport hardly mattered to the ruling Afrikaners. Ironically, this is being contested today, more than a decade after the release of Mandela, as more and more Whites play soccer and follow the activities of the racially-mixed national team. Playing soccer no longer requires that White players set aside any racist beliefs they might have held. For example, one informant, mother of a White player, insisted that although Black players appeared to be faster and more agile on average than White players, this was not due to innate qualities of speed, strength or agility, but to the constant practice by Black boys who did nothing else but play while the White boys were spending most of their time toiling away in school or at jobs.

Soccer has been a vehicle for assimilating European culture. Even more so, it has eased the entry of migrants from rural hinterlands into the White-dominated urban areas. Young men who had been forced off the land and into the vast mining compounds of the Witwatersrand by taxation and seizures of land and livestock were deliberately selected by the mining recruiters to be as unfamiliar with urban conditions as possible, as it was believed that they would be easier to control politically if they were totally lost in their new surroundings. But new arrivals on the urban scene already had some knowledge of urban Black culture: the Johannesburg soccer teams, which neighbors who had been to the Rand and returned described at length, and whose games themselves could be heard on transistor radios in the remotest areas. Their knowledge of the Johannesburg soccer teams provided them with an entrée on arrival, into conversations among sophisticated long-time urban residents, among South Africans from different areas who spoke different languages, and from migrants from foreign countries. As Dyck (2000: 30) indicates, such knowledge provides "supporters, regardless of discrepancies of class, ethnicity, citizenship, age and even gender that might otherwise serve as barriers to conversation" with cultural capital to buy themselves into urban life. New immigrants (constantly generated by apartheid until 1994 and by continuing systems of economic dominance since then) were able to join huge supporters' clubs that provided them with instant communities and networks through which they gained information and support of many kinds (Couzens, 81; Stuart, 96).

These clubs have local branches in the smallest neighbourhoods and sponsor many purely social activities; they pass on information about available jobs and housing, and many other services of importance to rural migrants. At every game, banners are hung along the fences declaring the presence of supporters' clubs from the smallest and most distant parts of the country. Anyone who has worn a replica jersey of a local team to a public place in South Africa has discovered that other fans, regardless of colour,

language, gender or ethnicity, will greet another supporter on sight as a long-lost friend; most will approach and talk with their fellow-supporter, and offer various kinds of useful information. When we have carelessly forgotten and worn such a jersey although we were in a rush, we regretted it bitterly, as everything takes two or three times as long to complete when one is constantly being greeted by passers-by, security guards, tellers, vendors and the like and forced to stop for a brief conversation about the team with each one of them.

The emotional arousal, release of tension, and bonding with thousands of other fans temporarily released from the gaze of White supervision made Black labourers' fragmented, dangerous and degraded ordinary lives whole and their individual lives valued (Anderson, Bielert and Jones, 2001). "Re-creation" occurs quite literally in sport, as fans recreate themselves in their idols' image (e.g., Hendricks, 1989: 9). As Bernard Magubane said, at the height of apartheid, soccer was an escape from the White world and its drudgery and repression; soccer made life worth living:

> Momentarily their emotional life which is often subdued and repressed during the week…is allowed to break through…. The drudgery which their life imposes on them is temporarily forgotten…. This pre-occupation with football matches makes life worth living despite its frustrations. (1963: 53)

Forty years later, we hear similar statements, always uttered with the greatest sincerity: "Soccer, this beautiful game that is our life," "Soccer is life," "Soccer gives us our life."

Pan-South African identity was constructed, maintained and transformed in the soccer stadium by both fans and players. By 1930, soccer had become *the* Black urban sport. Rural and urban Africans from all backgrounds and regions, speaking dozens of different languages, come together at soccer matches and perform and produce urban Black popular culture. African dress, songs, dances, ornaments and other material and behavioral productions of African culture are overwhelmingly in evidence at soccer games. Individual freedom of expression is allowed and rewarded, yet subsumed in a glorious group production, a celebration of both individuality and unity (Anderson, Clarke and Perzigian, 2001).

This infinite elaboration on a few common themes can become a path to fame, even greatness, for fans as well as for players. Some fans become nationally known, featured in the media, and sponsors have sent a few of them to the World Cup in France and in Korea/Japan. Similarly, men and women of wealth are expected to demonstrate their importance by supporting soccer teams. These avenues of influence were especially important under apartheid, when no opportunities for investment existed outside of the circumscribed Black townships.

Soccer was a highly valued, relatively safe arena to demonstrate Black resistance to apartheid, partly because at least a few White players have always resisted the regulations prohibiting mixed teams, mixed matches, and mixed spectators (Archer and Bouillon; 1982, Blades, 1998). Resistance to local White cultural domination continues still, as fans embrace and ridicule those institutions which have most intruded on their lives. Choir robes in the team colours, inscribed with team slogans and players' names, acknowledge while ridiculing and, especially, Africanizing Christianity, proclaiming traditional African beliefs in ancestral influence and the efficacy of spirit mediums at the same time as they insult the European administration of Christianity. A mind-boggling and eye-dazzling array of African-transformed hard hats, overalls, protective goggles, lunch buckets, spades, and other labourers' paraphernalia appear at all soccer games. The hard-hats blend with 19th-century Zulu warriors' headdresses in visionary spectacles that bring to mind the "transformed shamans" of Bushman rock paintings, in an analogous depiction of images of power. "Cheerleaders" with giant sunglasses and underwear in the team colours exhort the crowd. Fans construct and enact resistance to European attempts to control or eliminate African spiritual and secular life, ridiculing technology, industrialization and capitalism.

Soccer is available to those Whites who seek such a voice as an ideal medium for demonstrating acceptance of Africans and repentance for apartheid. Africans literally embrace White fans with open arms. At the match itself, Whites are invariably greeted with handshakes, hugs, praise, and great quantities of helpful advice to young players. Anywhere else, a White person wearing the jersey of one of the local teams will be repeatedly engaged in friendly, enthusiastic conversation by Black and mixed-race passersby eager to discuss their favorite teams, proud of soccer's 40-year record of striving for interracial cooperation on the field. Juggling a ball in public brings fervent invitations to join local, mostly Black teams, as well as to socialize at local restaurants and bars. Lost on foot after midnight in one of the Black townships internationally famed for murder, rape and robbery, White Hartwick College students who interviewed fans and players accidentally discovered that they had nothing to fear if they were identified with soccer. While in ordinary clothes they were ignored, when they wore soccer jer-

seys, especially those of South African teams, they were repeatedly stopped and given help and advice by passers-by, including rides out of the township to their lodgings, for which payment was refused.

The "nation playing itself into oneness" (Farred, 2000) was initiated publicly by then-President Mandela at the 1995 Rugby World Cup final when he urged the entire nation to support "our children" on the national team, and appeared at the championship game itself in the Springboks' jersey and cap (Booth, 1996: 70). When Black sportsmen and women win, White South Africans claim their successes as their own (though this probably continues to reflect White assumption that Blacks can only succeed with White guidance) (Anderson, Heffernan, Lewis and Nicolarsen, 1999).

As difference and inequality were constructed through sport, similarity and equality are intentionally being constructed at soccer stadiums today. As one of us was told at a Kaizer Chiefs game in January 2002, "color doesn't matter, we're all Chiefs here." A similar quote came from the journal of one of our American students in 2001: "I threw on the Chiefs jersey and I was no longer seen as a White American, but as a Chiefs fan, just like everyone else…. We shared liquor and cigarettes with everyone around us and for those two hours we were truly brothers with our fellow man." The discourse of celebration of national unity and reconciliation through sport exceeds the exhortations of church and political leaders. Soccer thus provides Whites with a unique entrée into Black urban life. Good relations with White fans and players are a significant source of identity and pride for Black fans and players—one of the ways in which Black South Africans now construct difference between themselves and Whites: Blacks see themselves as more generous, forgiving and accepting than most Whites.

At the club level, a majority of the current teams for teenagers are either all-Black or all-White, but with a significant number of mixed teams as well. Even the emphasis on boundary maintenance that continually occurs in this situation produces unity as much as disunity, because White members of mixed teams support Black teammates who are taunted by members of all-White teams. During the instances we observed on which such taunting was reported, the White teammates rallied around the Black players in opposition to the Whites on the other team, continuing to complain about their opponents' boorishness for the following week or two. White players on mixed teams are also often asked by members of all-White teams why they play with Blacks, but the usual answer, "because I want to *win*," is accepted by the all-White teams without further comment.

Future Problems, Future Research Opportunities

We do not claim that the racial reconciliation that we observed at soccer games during the decade of transition will continue to characterize South African soccer. Indeed, there are many indications, some of which we have presented here, of increasing racial conflict in soccer as White attendance and White diversity increase. If White presence in soccer becomes naturalized, soccer will no longer be a venue whereby Whites can demonstrate acceptance of equality with Blacks or their (urban) culture. This is a question to be addressed as the "New" South Africa becomes just South Africa.

A second question to be pursued, using the avenue of sports to investigate ethnicity, is the extent of African difference and assimilation. Although teams at all levels are composed of all colours and ethnic groups, and fans and players claim to be unaware of any ethnic biases in soccer, some fans do claim that, for instance, Zulu referees are "bad" because they are "the most biased." What can this mean, when neither team has a preponderance of Zulu players? Black fans have also "explained," "you'll never see an Indian player" because Indians are "too afraid, too small, too weak; an Indian would walk out and break his leg before the first half." In most countries, the sports field is an appropriate stage on which to literally play out ethnic rivalries. While the appearance of unity in South Africa is unanimously celebrated on the field itself, perhaps it is an error, or a temporary manifestation of Black unity following the demise of apartheid, given the expression of such differences and the obvious values that are attached to them. We do not mean to minimize the importance of the expression of unity and equality in sport, however; we too believe that "saying is doing" (Archetti, 1998), that "discourse is what is" (MacAloon, 1987), and that the nation can thus "play itself into oneness" (Farred, 2000) in the imagination of the fans and the bodies of the teams. Within soccer itself, boundaries between Black and White are being eroded by the gold-and-black choir robes, by the hard hats with horns worn over gorilla masks, by all the other hybridities of Black and White, "primitive" and modern culture that fans fashion to display at and en route to the games.

What images will come to define the new nation? In South Africa as in Cameroon (Nkwi and Vidacs, 1997: 138), "When people talk about football, they're talking about their own lives." Rural populations identify with urban Premier League stars as though they play out their own lives. The source of this identification may be investigated by questioning rural fans about the sport, partic-

ularly among those who have never seen a professional game, even on television. At the national level, questions concerning how participation in the international community will change the way the game, particular styles of play, and individual star players are regarded in South Africa are important. The rural/urban, European/African dichotomies are experienced through soccer as continua rather than clearly-bounded opposites, fortifying the impression of a discourse of unity and reconciliation. Similarly, the embodiment of soccer is that of the mixed-race coloureds, as the percentage of coloured players is much higher than their percentage in the national population.

Much of the construction of the current meanings of Black, White, coloured and Indian in South Africa today continues to be through sports. "White," for example, is constructed slightly differently in each sport. It means strength, tactics, and relatively slow speed, in South African soccer (for a complete list of characteristics attributed to Black and White soccer players, see Anderson, Clarke and Perzigian, 2001). In rugby, however, White stands, above all, for strength, size and resolute control (Nauright, 1997). White soccer players emulate the style of play characteristic of England, Black players that characteristic of Brazil, a style increasingly thought to characterize play by Africans from any country (e.g., Kuper, 1994; Motloung, 1997). When the mostly Black national soccer team loses, the White public condemns African soccer in general for its disorganization and lack of control. Most White South Africans with whom we have spoken believe that no African team will ever be able to overcome the "discipline and concentration" of a European team, and that Cameroon in 1990 was a "fluke"—as was Nigeria's victory over Spain in 1998, and Senegal's over France, the world champions, in 2002. When the almost all-White rugby team loses, the White public likewise condemns supposed African interference in player selection in order to integrate the sport (by the African National Congress party, though it includes many White members, that holds a majority of parliamentary seats). Any researcher seeking to understand the attributes of the different populations today, self- and other-ascribed, will find them readily at hand on the sports fields, in the stands, and in the media coverage and advertisement of the different sports.

Future research must consider the ongoing re-construction of gender in the New South Africa. White definitions of "Black patriarchy" are giving way to renegotiations of relationships between men and women in all areas of society. There is a national women's soccer team, with members of all races; there is no national women's rugby or cricket team. This may occur in soccer because of its long history of inclusiveness, but it may be due, as well, to White and upper-class Black labelling of soccer as less masculine than rugby or cricket. Which is the true demonstration of masculinity, soccer or rugby, and why? Whereas Bernard Magubane (1963: 12) said "real men, fit and strong," played soccer, Steve Tshwete, minister of sports at the time (1996-99), often claimed that soccer was for "sissies," as "real" men play rugby (Nauright, 1997: 57).

Conclusion

These few examples show that reconciliation continues to be seen as a successful mission in at least one arena of South African society, perhaps despite all evidence to the contrary, and that that arena is still described as one of the most important areas of South African existence. The discourse of the united, multiracial, New South Africa of equals continues to be celebrated on the field even as resistance to a single dominant culture continues to be celebrated through outlandish caricatures of once White, now upper-class Black culture. The nation is talking about its new search for unity through soccer, while also expressing *and accepting* disunity and divergence.

We wish to stress that it is a *nation* that is being constructed and celebrated, not a fragmentable entity with parts capable of secession. However much Whites complain of imagined Black preferences, corruption or inefficiency, however much Blacks complain of White hegemony, wealth and racism, whether or not Zulu referees or White cricket captains are corruptible or Indians are weak and cowardly, not one member of the spectator base or players claimed that the country should be divided or even significantly re-fashioned. Different fans celebrate different constructions of the nation to promote different constituencies, but all those we met fully accepted the concept of the South African nation, at least on the field and in discussions with fellow devotees.

The *meaning* of the South African nation is constructed and contested among fans and administrators of sports. Long-established soccer nations like Brazil, England and Germany view their style of play as a demonstration of national character (MacClancy, 1996). One can read the different imagined forms of nationhood from the dress, flags and songs of fans at soccer, rugby and cricket matches more easily than in any other context. In every African country, sports have been touted as a road to national unity and pride. Steve Tshwete again, in a 1999 interview (Jayiya, 1999), claimed the following achievements for the national soccer team: national unity, nation-building, reconciliation, national pride and international recognition; national health and fitness; and reduction in juvenile crime. Politicians in virtually all the newly-independent African countries believed, with Kuper (1994:

110), "Football is the one chance Africa has to beat the world." Although South Africa's team failed to reach the second round of the 2002 World Cup, the team was praised by Black politicians, White reporters, schoolchildren and crowds in the street for having "represented the nation with honor." The "unity" of the team was repeatedly cited, as well as their courage, perseverance, and creativity. Of these attributions, only creativity has traditionally been granted Africans in the past, and that rarely. The other praiseworthy qualities are those characteristically associated with Whites, almost exclusively so.

Our work shows that the ethnographic study of South African sport can be fruitful for identifying statements of reconciliation and of difference, for maintaining, destroying and substituting boundaries, in order to judge the state of the nation along some continuum of co-operation and resentment, resistance and release.

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The Saint, the Sea Monster, and an Invitation to a *Dîner-Dansant*: Ethnographic Reflections on the Edgy Passage—and the Double Edge—of Modernity, Mayotte 1975–2001

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Abstract: This depiction of social change in the Western Indian Ocean emphasizes consciousness, agency, and temporal experience as Malagasy speakers are poised between grasping the future and completing—but also regretting—the past.

Keywords: modernity, temporal experience, the *unheimlich*, Mayotte

Résumé : Cette description de changement social dans une île de l'océan Indien fait ressortir la conscientisation, la prise en charge et l'engagement dans le présent chez les malgachophones qui sont à un point d'équilibre entre la conquête du futur et l'achèvement—mais aussi le regret—du passé.

Mots-clés : modernité, expérience historique, *unheimlich*, Mayotte

This paper addresses the theme of the 2003 conference of the Canadian Anthropology Society (CASCA), "On Edge: Anthropology in Troubling Times" at which it was delivered.[1] The times are indeed troubled, but it is important not to allow our own edginess to overwhelm or displace our reporting on the concerns of others nor to mistake our anxieties for theirs. We should remember that times have often been troubling, the future uncertain, people on edge. We call this condition history.

Insofar as edginess is the opposite of complacency, it is not necessarily a bad thing. We can be on edge in the way that a coin is, not concealing what lies beneath us, and ready to roll. I take edginess to be a sign, albeit ironic, of some kind of historical consciousness, or self-consciousness, where what comes without saying does *not* go without saying. I am not making large claims for this consciousness, not imputing revolutionary agency to it. But from the point of view of practice theorists who criticize the excessive weight that others have placed on abstract rational thought, consciousness may be an index of a certain loss of knowledge, of no longer being able to perform our social roles with the ease of intuition that is born of extended cultivation and habit (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Edginess implies having to think twice. Still, it may be a little more hopeful than the sort of consciousness of which those who know their history know that they are condemned to repeat it. It is a consciousness comprised of brief glimpses, flashes of insight, sporadic attempts to make a difference. Edginess is a mode of intention poised between ethics and anxiety and ready to slide in either direction.

The edginess experienced by anthropologists no doubt has many sources. One that stems from changing conceptions of our profession has been anticipated in the observation by literary critic Erich Auerbach that, "The

scholar who does not consistently limit himself to a narrow field of specialization and to a world of concepts held in common with a small circle of like-minded colleagues, lives in the midst of a tumult of impressions and claims on him; for the scholar to do justice to these is almost impossible" (1969, as cited by Said 1975: 36). That is a good reason to hunker down in ethnographic specificity. Indeed, this essay explores two sites at which the edginess of rapid social change has flashed into consciousness among villagers in the western Indian Ocean island of Mayotte whose lives I have tracked since 1975. In other words, I propose to offer fragments of the history of a community that is in part a history of its own historical consciousness.... It is long-term fieldwork that enables this particular kind of conjunction of history and anthropology. This is an articulation characterized precisely by the refusal of "ethnographic refusal" (Ortner, 1995) evident in the invisible standpoint of the genealogist or the abstractions of the pure deconstructionist.

Modernity: The Video

Imagine yourself set down behind a video camera in a tropical island of the Comoro Archipelago in the Mozambique Channel, panning from the verdant slopes of the interior to the bustle of the new port, then following the weekly delivery truck from the Coca-Cola bottling plant along the paved road to the community that was once a remote village. Perhaps every anthropologist who has returned to a field site over as long a period as I have thinks they have been privy to documenting radical social transformation.[2] The closer one is to a set of phenomena, the larger the changes look. In my case, the changes I have observed have indeed been decisive. My sketch of this transformation here is of course limited, images along a single transection through a complex historical process. At the outset I find myself in the classic Weberian position of ambivalence: wanting to tell the story without undue moralizing and realizing how impossible this is on both epistemological and personal grounds. At least I will try to acknowledge where the moralizing and the theorizing are mutually implicated. Nowhere, perhaps, is this more problematic than in the concept of modernity.

If the transformation to modernity has arguably been the force behind the work of the great founders of social science, "modernity" has undoubtedly been also one of the key terms to precipitate from their arguments, especially perhaps within the discipline of sociology. Recently it has colonized anthropology as well. Instead of describing and comparing societies or social formations, anthropologists now speak routinely of alternate or multiple modernities. In part this is a solution to the reification

implied by distinct or bounded cultures; in part it is a recognition of capitalist permeation, societal interdependence, and so forth, in sum, of the global spread of modernity itself. But all this is surely insufficient. The concept of modernity has its roots in a temporal distinction rather than a spatial unification. To be useful, "modernity" must depict neither a global oil slick nor a universal phase (and certainly not the triumphalist narrative of modernization), but an historical experience or set of experiences compounded of eagerness, restlessness and rupture. To speak of modernity is to acknowledge incessant production, but also destruction; of straining forward, but also of looking back.

I am characterizing modernity by a certain temporality or historicity and one that makes claims to its own novelty with respect to what preceeded it. What preceeded it, and from which modernity differentiates itself ambivalently, that is, grandly and self-assuredly, but not without a certain nostalgia, regret, or guilt, is too readily—and, by anthropologists, too anxiously—summarized in the concept of tradition. One way to describe postmodernity would be modernity without that sense of connection and loss, a kind of history without memory; a modernity uncoupled from an ancestral Other through which to identify itself.

Some argue for the globalization of the term "modernity"—everyone has been modern for as long as "we" have—on what appear to be ethical rather than empirical grounds, drawing their lesson from Fabian's discussion of coevalness and its denial in *Time and the Other* (1983). That extrapolation seems to me unfortunate insofar as it suppresses the distinctiveness of local histories, specific transformations that are as radical at the present moment in their consequences for local experience and perhaps even more sudden in their actuality than the disruptions that inspired Marx, Weber, Baudelaire and others to grasp their historical condition in arguments and depictions that can be variously summarized under the rubric of the modern.

I could attribute "modernity" to the people of Mayotte on several grounds, of which I will mention only three. First, taking the coeval argument, I could say they are "modern" simply on the basis of the fact that I am referring to the last quarter of the 20th century. This not only trivializes the concept of modernity but it actually presupposes what it means to argue insofar as it applies a quintessentially modern, "empty" time frame and assumes its universality.

Second, and in a much stronger sense, I could import to the Indian Ocean from the Caribbean the line of argument developed by Sidney Mintz (1989, cf. Vaughan in

press) and suggest that Mayotte has been "modern" ever since the disruptions of the slave trade and especially since French appropriation of the island in 1841 and the establishment of sugar plantations and factories. This is indeed compelling, especially insofar as enslavement and dislocation transformed the lifeworlds of the plantation workers and linked them to the transformations taking place in Europe. However, in Mayotte, and unlike much of the Caribbean, these workers formed only a portion of the 19th-century African population. They lived alongside indigenous Shimaore-speaking inhabitants who had long exploited labour themselves and who adapted quite adroitly to the colonial context, and alongside various immigrants from Madagascar who saw themselves as reasonably autonomous subjects seeking a more peaceful life apart from the conflicts that wracked Madagascar at the time. Moreover, the factory system collapsed early on and the plantations rapidly declined, leaving space for the development of local communities on the margins of a marginal colony. The inhabitants practised subsistence cultivation and fishing supplemented by occasional periods of wage labour and cash cropping. They also participated in an intense and compelling social life of intra- and intervillage festivity focussed on Muslim and life-cycle celebrations.[3] Mayotte has never been quite *A Small Place* of Jamaica Kincaid's visceral evocation (1988).

Third, and here leaving aside all the other ways modernity has been and could be described, written from the shores of an even smaller colonized island is Marshall Berman's depiction of capitalist modernity's intensity and restlessness, of unceasing need for and feeding upon change (1988). Seen from this perspective, the experience of life in Mayotte has shifted decisively towards modernity in the last decades of the 20th century, at least relative to what preceded it. Again, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to depict the earlier period by the term generally given to modernity's "other"—namely, tradition. Those who like using the term modernity are often much edgier about applying tradition. This illustrates how problematic is the entire classificatory exercise that looms behind the application of a single label. I think there are plenty of interesting things to say about tradition or ways to apply the concept, especially understood as longstanding conversations and bodies of practice that may continue into—or even begin with—modernity, such as anthropology itself. However, this is not the place to do so. Let me simply be clear that I am wary of any ostensibly objective or stable application of a contrast between modernity and tradition and restrict their deployment here to a dialectical process of change and a recursive discourse. One could even say that modernity exists only

insofar as it is able to conceptualize and differentiate itself from tradition; hence that tradition itself only comes into being, in a certain sense, along with modernity and hence, along with its own demise (cf. Handler, 1988; Ivy, 1995).[4]

In any case, for the first three-quarters of the 20th century Mayotte changed slowly; far too slowly for the local critics who developed in the post World War II surge of African independence. As the Comoros moved, again more slowly than most of their neighbours, toward that goal, the inhabitants of Mayotte (one of four islands in the Comoro Archipelago) felt that they were not receiving a share of new infrastructure, in the shape of roads, buildings, education, white collar employment and so forth. But at the same time that there emerged an acute political consciousness and an active political movement, life in the villages had consolidated in highly integrative ways that countered any immediate displacement toward more individualistic conceptions of persons and practice.

It is the developments from this period that interest me, with respect to people's historical consciousness; to their increased awareness of the global context in which they find themselves; to their class-inflected assurance in taking up opportunities and inviting or discovering new ones—for example, the female village shopkeepers who now fly to Dubai and Bangkok for merchandise; and to their critical apprehension of the changes that transpire. Here the meaning of modernity is close to that of global citizenship and of facing in a direction that is outward and forward rather than inward or backward (using these directional indicators in a non-evaluative sense). Nevertheless, I will suggest, it does not occur without a remainder.

A Quarter Century of Change

When I first arrived in Mayotte in 1975, political sentiments were running high.[5] A vote had been taken in the Comoro Islands concerning independence from France. Tabulated globally, the large majority of the population were in favour of independence, but counted island by island, it was apparent that the majority of people in Mayotte were opposed (Lambek, 1995). The Mouvement Populaire Mahorais urged France to disaggregate the results and maintain its presence on Mayotte. The movement expected unanimity in each village in which it expressed the majority opinion. I, of course, disagreed, and argued the evils of colonial exploitation until I was invited to either keep my opinions to myself or find another community in which to live. In brief, most people were more worried about exploitation from the stratified societies on the more densely populated and wealthier islands next door than they were about France, which they pictured as

a relatively disinterested step-parent. Indeed, they hoped to manipulate the French into providing them with the economic infrastructure that was obviously lacking. When the pro-French forces won the agreement of the government to hold a second referendum, the women—who had been the main mobilizers and enthusiasts of the movement, who had spent a week surrounding a bulldozer in order to prevent its removal to another island—singing odes to the Prophet all the while—and who had even supplied the movement's only martyr—celebrated in an impromptu fashion. I have slides of village women doing an energetic dance (the *wadaha*) that involves passing a heavy wooden pestle from hand to hand so that it creates a steady rhythm as it is pounded into the mortar by one dancer and retrieved by the next. The performance beautifully indexes both collective interdependence and unalienated labour (cf. White, n.d.). The women dance in the dusty red earth plaza to a backdrop of palm trees and wattle- and-daub thatch-roofed houses. A large French flag hoisted on a makeshift pole flutters incongruously, much brighter than the women's faded work clothing. In one picture an elderly man approaches to pay his respects to the women for their political efforts.

Twenty-five years later the fruits, both sweet and bitter, of this strategy have been achieved. Some liken these fruits of progress specifically to the papaya; they depict a "papaya world," *dunia papay*, in which, as the fruit hang on a papaya tree, the young rest above their elders (Lambek, 2002a). That is to say, in the course of rapid transition, during the specific historical period of the 1990s, younger siblings moved far ahead of older siblings, and children ahead of their parents, in wealth and privilege, and partly in respect and authority, producing a world turned upside-down.

More broadly, Mayotte shifted from sleepy backwater to economic hub of the region. The French really did invest. A network of paved roads was established along with new forms of housing, water supply, electricity and greatly improved education, health care and personal benefits. The cultivation of dry rice, which had been the main preoccupation of villagers in 1975, was abandoned, and eventually most cash cropping as well. The rigorous daily labour of husking rice with mortar and pestle is gone, along with the locally constructed wooden versions of these implements, and along with the taste, nutrition and availability of non-commodified field rice (*vary shombu*). Houses of brick or cement facing, with tin roofs and electric lights that are left on all night push up the hillsides; the newest constructions are accompanied by compulsory latrines.

People of my age cohort have lived their adult working lives since the mid-1980s engaged in menial and man-

ual labour—road work, construction, janitors and guards—combined with some independent activities such as fishing or livestock, or else they have moved, increasingly since the mid-1990s and ostensibly temporarily, to La Réunion or metropolitan France for better unemployment benefits. But many of their children and younger siblings have now been through an entire cycle of decent French schooling.[6] The successful ones earn professional degrees overseas or continue to live in the village while commuting each morning, in their private cars and through traffic jams, to white collar jobs across the island. In brief, a vast and rapid expansion of infrastructure, commoditization, internal class and age differentiation, migration, unemployment and opportunity. Indeed, a papaya world.

This is not, then, just another local version of the same old story of the desultory or violent aftermath of colonialism, at least not in the short term.[7] Mayotte has become what I have described as a "postmodern colony" or a postcolony, in which the emphasis rests on the second morpheme not the first. The economy is entirely transformed and, insofar as it is based on continued French subsidy, entirely artificial. Politics are oriented toward fuller integration with France and therefore toward the same level of benefits that are available to all citizens of the Republic. In June, 2001 Mayotte shifted in status from a *Collectivité Territoriale* (initiated in December 1976) to a *Collectivité Départmentale*, in the process of what is referred to as an *évolution statuaire* (to be re-evaluated in 10 years) en route to full integration in the French state. The French have made huge inroads in governmentality, transforming public and private life and changing the boundaries between them, working now on family law. The currency is the Euro and the most enterprising young people know how to apply to the European Community for local development grants. The village contains a modern *foyer des jeunes* (youth centre) with a decent library. Moreover, despite initial surprise, disconcertion and dislocation at many of the changes, people are generally satisfied by the direction things have gone and feel somewhat empowered by their role in instigating the process. It is certainly different from the immiseration and political turmoil of the neighbouring islands of the independent Federal Islamic Republic of the Comores—since 2002 re-formed as L'Union des Comores—many of whose inhabitants make dangerous and illegal nocturnal maritime crossings to Mayotte in search of livelihood. What people in Mayotte say they regret is not the speed, but the slowness of change, and the unfairness in the distribution of its effects, notably the way it has left some people relatively impoverished and marginalized.

Because of this particular history, "modernity" is not objectified and is neither an imaginary object of desire nor an unrealized source of violence. Indeed, most people in the villages I have studied would not describe their trajectory by means of abstractions like tradition and modernity. Instead, they identify the immediacies of change by the sort of concrete representations and practice I will describe shortly. To the degree that they use a dual classification, it is between the marked category of *vazaha*—French people or Europeans—and themselves, sometimes identified as *silamo*, Muslims or as *ulu mainting*, Black people, or *ulu maskin*, the poor. These categories are not essentialized and do not imply a hierarchy of progression. They are not understood as mutually exclusive and their boundaries are traversible in both directions.

However "French" they become, most people remain devout Muslims and ostensibly committed to the intense sociality of village life. The dry southern winter is a time of festivity. In 1975 this was the post-harvest season; it is now more accurate to call it the period of school vacation, when even those employed in France or Réunion are able to take their *vacances* (vacations) and, in some years, return home. As in the past, performances of all kinds succeed each other: weddings, spirit possession ceremonies, mortuary ceremonies, circumcisions, *maulidas* and other Sufi-inspired Muslim dances. Each of these includes the preparation, distribution, and consumption of large amounts of food and other expenditures of time, money and energy. I have long thought of the village communities of Mayotte as existing and reproducing through the almost continuous production of such feasts (as well as funerals and other Muslim celebrations that are not seasonally linked).[8] It is to facets of this collective sociality that I wish to turn in order to indicate both decisive changes in practice and their collective acknowledgment and representation.

Intensive festivities continue but their social significance has altered. Not only have individual communities become less autonomous and less central to the functioning and reproduction of society as a whole, but their internal constitution has also changed, in ways that festive performance often indexes. In particular, villages are shifting from social wholes constituted through the totality and density of the interrelationships among their inhabitants to administrative units comprised of individuated parts—households, families and individuals.[9]

The festivities of the 1970s were of roughly four social orders. First, were ceremonies conducted for, by, and on behalf of the villages as whole communities. These included an annual new year festival in July, the date varying slightly from village to village and year to year depend-

ing on how local officials kept track. There was also a triennial sacrifice at the tomb of a saint, about which more later. Second, were rituals held on behalf of families but conducted by the entire village, notably funerals and those life cycle rituals that were performed as *shungus*, a term I will explicate shortly. Third, were rituals conducted for and by families to which kin, friends, and neighbours were selectively invited. Finally, were spirit possession ceremonies held on behalf of individuals but at which all adepts participated. This picture is vastly oversimplified in several ways, one being that a given event might have components that would engage people through various of these forms of connection. In any case, each festivity had a complex and quite specific way in which labour was organized and raw materials collected; and in which food was distributed and consumed.

Of these four rough types, some, but not all, of the events of the first, village-based, order had virtually disappeared by 2001, while possession ceremonies have continued apace. Those of the second, that articulated families to the whole community had mostly transformed into the third, more individual and optative kind.

I turn briefly to weddings.[10] In Mayotte the celebration of virgin marriages continues to be a central feature of social life and subject to a great deal of expense and interest, but its value has been rather different from the functions and meanings highlighted by either old or new kinship theory (cf. Lambek, 1983). The main theme of weddings has been social reproduction and the celebration and transformation of young women, as well as of their husbands and their parents. Marriage has been a critical moment in the moral life narrative in Mayotte, understood as the event that gets you started on an adult career and on what were the most important tasks of adulthood, namely circumcizing boys and marrying off girls of the next generation and holding memorials for deceased parents—that is, further acts and ceremonies of social reproduction. While biological parenthood was much desired by people of both sexes it was less critical for adult status than sponsoring life cycle rituals like weddings. Thus a man or woman who was childless would sponsor a nephew's circumcision and a niece's wedding.[11] These sponsorships marked people as full social adults.

During the 1970s and earlier, the major public life cycle rituals—virgin marriages, circumcision of boys, and memorials for deceased kin—were the occasions for the enactment of a unique and elaborate system of reciprocity known as *shungu*. *Shungu* was intricately beautiful in its structure and effects, providing a means and measure for articulating and substantiating personhood, citizenship and the temporal experience of the life cycle

(Lambek, 1990). In brief, the *shungu* demanded precisely equivalent prestations from each member of the community in turn. Not only were the quantities of food regulated and measured, but the obligations of giving and receiving were such that over the course of their lives each person ate at precisely the same number and kinds of feasts as the number of guests who had eaten at theirs (the places of people who were absent or deceased being taken on their behalf by close kin). Around the time of marriage one began eating at the *shungu* feasts of other community members, moving from increasing indebtedness to one's own series of payments, to the last feast at which one was a guest of those who had eaten at ones own feasts. Not only did fulfilment of the *shungu* establish the civic status that Gregory (1982: 65) has captured in the felicitous phrase "mutual superiority," but each person's life could be measured according to the balance of invitations they had yet to offer and to receive. This produced, in the end, the mutual embeddedness of all members of the community as part of one another through the logic of the gift.

By 1985 the *shungu* system had been closed down insofar as no more young people continued to enter it. However *shungu* feasts still occured from time to time as the system could not end until the last participant had completed their obligations. The decision to close the system was taken for several reasons, including the collapse of subsistence production and the increasing discrepancies between the ideally equivalent prestations of the gift economy and rising prices in the commodity sphere. The temporal interval between receipt and return thus engendered an irresolvable contradiction in the balancing of acts of exchange. Moreover, people felt increasingly anxious about their individual ability to fulfil their obligations and decided to remove the burden entirely from young people. The fact that the *shungu* was not simply abandoned in mid-cycle but has wound down slowly and systematically, feast by feast, until everyone meets every obligation of giving and receiving, is a remarkable testament to cultural integrity. The irony is that what has replaced the obligatory *shungu* is a more inflationary and unregulated sequence of competitive feasting that discriminates readily between the relatively wealthy and the poor, invites and excludes participants on an individual basis, and no longer distributes social prestige even-handedly. Rites of passage are no longer the business of the whole community (*tanana*)—whose members in witnessing each other's events helped produce them and became part of them and of each other.[12]

At weddings *shungu* feasts have been replaced by the aptly named *invitations*. Consider two weddings that took place in 2001. In both, as in the past, the couple stayed in the bride's new house for at least a week after the consummation, receiving congratulations and entertaining visitors, mostly young people, including boys who dance at night to the CD player. In one house, actually belonging to the bride's sister, since no new house had yet been built, the bride was only 15, a fact for which her mother, Zaikia, was much criticized in the village. Zaikia had wanted to ensure her daughter was still a virgin. The groom was an unemployed man from the Grande Comore, much older than his bride. The wedding was modest; a small festivity at which traditional cakes were served had taken place.

Across the road, the bride was 22, left school after completing *3ième*, and was looking for work.[13] Her husband was 36, a cross-cousin and a school teacher. The house was new and well equipped and the fesitivities elaborate. The class difference expressed in the two weddings derived less from the parents of the respective brides and grooms than from the young people themselves, their education, employment opportunities and outlook.[14]

In the second wedding house the couple and close friends were excitedly folding invitations. I was delighted to receive one. They had two computer-printed versions, each with interesting layout and including images of distinctly white couples in romantic poses. In one, bride and groom were kissing on the lips, something that was never seen or practised in the past. On the cover was written *Monsieur Saïd Abdourahim et Mademoiselle Kaisati Aboudou vous invitent à leur marriage*.[15] Inside, the parents of groom and bride were listed and *ont l'honneur et le plaisir de faire part du marriage de leurs enfants... et vous prient de bien vouloir honorer de votre présence*. As they stuffed the envelopes, one person remarked—in French rather than Malagasy, *il faut garder la tradition*. The printed program listed a Friday evening *dîner-dansant*, followed on Saturday morning by a *walima*, a *cortège* at noon, a *sirop d'honneur* at 3 p.m., and on Wednesday noon by an *mbiwi avec Viking*.[16]

The *walima* is a meal traditionally offered by the bride's family to the entire village and requiring a large cow. The *cortège* is a procession by motor vehicle through the village and its neighbours. The *cortège* displays the groom's *valise*, a "suitcase" that includes not only some 1-3 000 Euros of gold jewelery and clothing but nowadays a TV, freezer, and frequently a VCR, microwave and washing machine. *Mbiwi* is the Shimaore word for what Malagasy speakers call the clacking of sticks. It is a dance performed and much loved by women in which they sexily sway their buttocks while clacking together pieces of bamboo. The women dress elegantly and come in large numbers to celebrate the transformation of a "daughter"

into a sexual woman as well as the munificence of male spending on new wives.[17] Nowadays *mbiwi* is performed to a live, amplified band; *Vingkingy*—the Vikings—are prefered, if expensive at around 400 Euros, a cost sometimes shared between the bride and groom's kin. The *dîner-dansant* and the *sirop d'honneur*, practices begun only a decade or so ago, are primarily for young people. Their expense is the groom's responsibility although the bride's family helps with the labour. The *invitations* are not intrinsic to a wedding; the number of discrete events depends in part on what people can afford. A friend remembered his *dîner-dansant* from 1995 costing 3 700 FF. Total costs for an elaborate wedding can reach as high as 12 000 euros or 15 000 Canadian dollars on the groom's side alone.[18]

I would have liked to describe the *dîner-dansant* in detail, but suffice it to say that people arrived dressed in elegant European clothing—I was chastised for not wearing a tie—and gave each other *bises* (kisses on the cheek, a French style of greeting) and handshakes. A master of ceremonies took the microphone and asked everyone to acknowledge the entry of the new couple. The bride wore a white wedding dress. They stood and blushed as photos were taken, speeches were made, and people clapped. Everyone sat at tables, like European couples, self-consciously making small talk. They drank soft drinks and ate popcorn and samosas followed by grated *crudités* (raw vegetables) with a mustard vinaigrette, platters of rice with chicken or beef, and finally a multitiered cake made with a nut and egg batter topped with cherries. Couples danced under strobe lights to slow love songs played by a DJ and soon replaced by the loud, amplified generic Western (or world) popular music known as a *boum*.

All this suggests a kind of naive and pretentious appropriation of Western forms, images, and values. But when I mentioned to the young man on whose wedding video I first saw an *invitation* that people seemed to be acting like *vazaha*—Europeans—he replied that that was precisely the point. He explained that indeed they were acting—imitating (*mikeding*), or playing at being European. It was done knowingly, in the spirit of pleasure or play, not out of some unmediated acceptance of Western comportment and consumption. But, he added, they were also preparing one day to *be* European.

The *dîner-dansant* is thus a matter of seeing and being seen as European. The mimesis is in large part—and in sharp contrast to some compulsive and unrationalized Platonic conception—a deliberate reflexive process, seeing oneself as another, catching oneself in the future, maintaining the distance of the spectator even as one is acting the part. As another young man put it, "We imitate Euro-

peans, want to become Europeans, indeed are already practicing as European" (*Mikeding vazaha; famila vazaha; famañanu kamwe*). "But," he emphasized, "acting like Europeans doesn't hurt Islam; it is play (*soma*)."[19]

In his compelling thesis on the way in which weddings in contemporary Lithuania address the relationship of participants to conceptions of modernity and the West, Gediminas Lankauskas (2003) draws on Victor Turner's (1985) discussion of the subjunctive "as if." Such subjunctivity is no doubt characteristic of wedding performances in many places across time and place and goes back to their function in articulating the beginnings of responsible adulthood and thereby projecting hopes for a future that can be only partially known and articulated. Such performances must also contain an "edge of irony" (Hutcheon, 1994).[20]

In Mayotte, the *invitation* was at once a performance of Frenchness and a rehearsal for it, with all the entailments each of these terms implies. It is half wish, half realization; half serious, half gentle mockery.[21] The confidence of youth is in contrast to the older generation, who hold themselves back and sit awkwardly in European clothes, leave the *dîner* early if they attend at all, and who are certainly not seen on *this* dance floor. If people are imitating French culture at these events, the point is that they know this full well and are doing so deliberately. The performance is creative, not yet congealed into artifice or dead metaphor, into a ritual carried out for reasons its enactors have long since forgotten. If the *invitation* entails implicitly a very different sociality, temporality and personhood from the *shungu*, it nevertheless expresses quite explicitly a certain kind of historical consciousness.

The Saint and the Sea Monster

At the time these weddings took place, many of the villagers a generation or so older than the primary celebrants were preoccupied with a troubling issue. A young man from an inland village had drowned on the local beach, swept off his feet while fishing at receding high tide. The previous year a boy from a neighbouring village had drowned while swimming. The coincidence of these events made people recollect that some years earlier a young girl from the village had fallen out of a canoe and drowned. What all these deaths had in common, apart from the unusual fact of drowning itself, was that in each case the bodies were recovered, washed up on shore. They had not been eaten by sharks. The anxiety caused by the most recent death was heightened by the fact that people had just learned about the introduction of autopsies by the French judicial system and were highly disturbed by and opposed to the idea.

People began to talk. They linked the deaths to the saint whose stone tomb lies in the bush adjacent to the beach. The tomb dates to a period long before the founding of the village and had been the site of community sacrifices held every three years until in recent years the sacrifices had stopped. Moreover, the beach on which the tomb sat had seen the construction of a soccer field, basketball court, and tourist facilities and the tomb itself had been polluted by visitors seeking a place to relieve themselves. In the past people had come from afar to the sacred and powerful spot (*ziara*) in order to utter personal prayers, bathing first and bringing incense, perfume and rosewater; now they just held *piqueniques* and danced *boums* there.

This saint was the same person who some years earlier had preoccupied a woman I called Nuriaty and indeed continued to do so. In another essay (Lambek, 2002a), I have described how she dreamed that the saint had been rescued from the tomb. Nuriaty was adamant that he was gone; along with the other ancestors who had once looked after Mayotte, he had seen that people no longer cared for him and so had retreated to Madagascar on a golden palanquin; she had seen him.[22] But other people now suggested that the saint had turned himself into a sea monster and that it was this creature who was responsible for the drowning deaths. Angered at the loss of his sacrifice, his state of neglect, and the abuse of his tomb, the saint was lashing out. He had risen in a woman in a neighbouring village to announce the fact. Women began organizing a collection in order to buy a sacrifical beast to satisfy him, or rather, to pray to God to make him lie back down (*mampahandry*) and render the beach safe again. Shortly after I left this took place, officiated by the leading Muslim scholar and the elders of the community.[23]

The next year Nuriaty told me that although the sacrifice had been correctly performed, the community had slaughtered only a goat rather than a cow. The saint wouldn't return, she was sure; the remains of the food were simply eaten by rats and lizards. There had not been another drowning in the interim, but she knew the saint remained angry. Nuriaty, a poor, self-employed healer and former subsistence cultivator, continued to leave small offerings of perfume at the tomb, while the young man who served as the M.C. at the *dîner-dansant*, a *lycée* graduate, owner of a car repair business—and son of the senior Muslim scholar—felt that the tomb should be protected as a *monument historique* (historical monument).

I see the emergence of the saint's story as another kind of response to the rapidity of change, this time not a self-confident grasping of the future but a regretful or anxious glance backward at what has been left behind. If people begin to ignore sacred historical figures, they too can begin to abandon, and even turn on, their successors. The people most concerned were indeed those who had experienced most acutely the distortions of the papaya world in which their own juniors forged ahead of them. But their concern is primarily ethical. Weber was correct when he challenged Nietzsche's argument that religion is forged in resentment (Weber, 1946: 270). Unspoken, but looming behind the local drownings, was the regular loss of lives sustained by Comorians from the neighbouring islands who crossed over to Mayotte in small craft in the dead of night in search of livelihood and whose presence in the village, as well as the suffering back home that pushed them to take such risks, was a source of moral anxiety. The saint himself may have originated in the next island.

The great psychoanalyst Hans Loewald once wrote that, "ghosts...long to be released from their ghost life and led to rest as ancestors. As ancestors they live forth in the present generation, while as ghosts they are compelled to haunt the present generation with their shadow life" (1980: 249). Loewald was drawing a metaphorical contrast between psychic repression and identification and internalization, but the idea has broader social relevance. If Loewald says one must transmute angry ghosts into benevolent ancestors, what the villagers experienced was a formerly benevolent ancestor transmuted into an angry ghost. This ghost stands for what has been abandoned, unassimilated, unrecognized, uncompensated; the remainder in the narrative of progress; modernity's double edge. It is not without irony that the boy who drowned had been attempting to swim by clinging to a piece of foam packing that had been discarded from someone's new refrigerator.

The Historical *Unheimlich*

Social change isn't something that simply "happens" or that happens "to" you. Rather, people have complex, multifaceted relationships in processes of change, relationships at once active and passive, characterized by action and reaction. People are caught up in change—are themselves changed—but, at the same time, they can pry moments and spaces of distance through which to construct prototheoretical appreciation and appropriation of what is transpiring.

Moments of self-recognition, of seeing "oneself as another," (Ricoeur, 1992) contain a twinge of the *unheimlich*, which may be experienced as a frisson of pleasure or a shudder of unease.[24] I have shown that such disruption of the habitus, whether intentionally or unintentionally produced, is temporally inflected, past- and future-oriented. Moreover, historical insight is necessarily cultur-

ally mediated, drawing on older cultural idioms and productive of new ones.

I venture that up to now I have had most of you with me—thinking, perhaps, a nicely circumstantial account, if not very novel or sufficiently material. So let me move for a moment onto edgier theoretical terrain and risk a bit of *unheimlich* disruption before drawing back to my conclusion.

Perhaps there is no special historical insight or consciousness, no glimpse of the truth behind appearances. Perhaps this is not possible, either for "them" or for "us," because truth is not out there waiting to be discovered but something humanly constructed. In such a pragmatist view—Richard Rorty's—"human history [is] the history of successive metaphors" (1989: 20) or, as he might have said, one damn metaphor after another. However, our understanding of what is metaphorical versus literal is entirely relative to what precedes or succeeds it, to playing one language game or inventing a new one. Rorty follows Davidson to say, interestingly, that live metaphors are sentences that do not have fixed places in language games and hence are neither true nor false. At the *invitation* people were predicating Frenchness lively metaphorically, making a statement "which one cannot confirm or disconfirm, argue for or against. One can only savor it or spit it out" (ibid.: 18).

We might view the *dîner-dansant* as banal, another instance of shallow globalization, but that would simply indicate our jaded view. The *invitation* is "modern" not because of what is represented—the music, food, comportment and so on—nor because of what is understood, or because of who is excluded, but because of the audacious re-description and triumphant Nietzschean self-fashioning it exhibits, albeit the self-fashioning not of a single individual so much as of a generational cohort.

From the perspective of the participants the *invitation* is metaphorical. Conversely, the sea monster is no metaphor, whether of guilt or of greedy capitalism, but understood quite literally. The saint and the sea monster intervene and interpellate their subjects. People died, after all, and their bodies risked the degradation of autopsy rather than Muslim burial. Here, too, is a matter of discovery not invention, of causality and continuity over contingency. The critics are engaged in a last ditch play—albeit a highly creative one—in an old language game in which the metaphors have long since congealed to literalness; people did debate the veracity of the statement about the saint and the cause of the drownings.

But, between the truth of the wedding and the truth of the sea monster—of that we cannot debate. They are merely successive metaphors in the non-teleological

movement of history, the one fading out of literalism as the other is destined to enter it. For Rorty, the idea that there is some prelinguistic consciousness or pan-human intuition is "simply the disposition to use the language of our ancestors, to worship the corpses of their metaphors" (ibid.: 21).[25]

In concluding, let me draw back from this particular edge to a more comfortable zone that gives greater credit to human insight and commitment. Put another way, let me step back from the radical modernity of Wittgenstein and Nietzsche to the temperate traditionalism of Aristotle.

My recent book *The Weight of the Past: Living with History in Mahajanga* (Lambek, 2002b) describes in much greater depth an elaborate and full blown set of culturally constituted vehicles for historical consciousness and historical conscience found in a neighbouring region of Madagascar with much cultural affinity to Mayotte. In the book I draw on two categories from Aristotle. Poiesis refers to creative production in a sense that embraces both meaningful work and art. Phronesis refers to the exercise of ethical judgment or practical wisdom. Both are relevant to what I have just described for Mayotte. People do not passively become Europeans or inadvertent poor copies; they reasonably self-consciously fashion themselves in their image. And people do not simply forget their ancestors; they witness and intervene in their passing. These acts and performances are suitably framed, timed, inserted and circumscribed.

The present is intense in Mayotte. People have acquired a strong sense of personal and collective agency; everyone is engaged in planning and building the future and they have achieved a good deal. Yet some people must find their dignity elsewhere. For them the past cannot and does not simply vanish without trace; nor is it yet discarded on the trash heap to which the gaze of Walter Benjamin's angel of history is mournfully turned (1969). Rather, its surpassing leaves an insistent remainder that demands to be acknowledged, marked, addressed.

The point of the saint's story is not that one should return to the past. No one either explicitly wants this or considers it possible. The point is rather that moving forward should be handled judiciously, ethically. For the people who spoke about the saint or participated in the sacrifice, the past is not objectified. In other words, people ought to continue to be in some active relation to the past, a past that cannot therefore be relinquished unthinkingly but must be remembered, as an old friend is. Historical figures like the saint may continue to give their blessing, but only on condition that they are not humiliated, abandoned in the rush forward. Between the wedding and the saint we see people looking both forwards and back, poised

between the "no longer" and the "not yet." Moral practice entails establishing a balance (Lambek, 1996).

There is also critique here, admission of failure. The moral call of the past slips in uneasily, edgily, in monsterly mutation. The saint suggests that possessive individualism and the pleasures of consumption are not yet the full order of the day, that collective responsibility retains some weight, that people possess their past less than they are possessed by it. Yet he does so after the fact, as a monster. Much as older ways are threatened, so they have come to threaten. The threat can only be reduced by the very historical consciousness that grasps it. Much as the *shungu* is wound down in orderly, deliberate fashion, so the saint is witnessed receding on his golden palanquin.

The author now feels under strong obligation to recede himself. In concluding he offers the usual qualifications of the academic. It has not been my intention, he says, either to provide a definitive distinction between tradition and modernity or a definitive depiction of the transition from one to the other. It would, indeed, be ludicrous to think of modernity as a phenomenon of all or nothing. Rather, he has tried to show that modernity and tradition may engage in mutual interpellation and to evoke that edgy self-consciousness, sometimes playful and celebratory, sometimes anxious and ethically concerned, that subsists on the margins of history.

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Acknowledgments

Notes

1   This paper was originally presented as the Hawthorne Lecture at the annual meeting of the Canadian Anthropology Society (CASCA) on May 9, 2003 at Dalhousie University, Halifax.

2   I spent 14 months in Mayotte during 1975-76 and re-visited for various lengths of time in 1980, 1985, 1992, 1995, 2000 and 2001. The research has been generously supported throughout by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, with additional help from the NSF in 1975-76 and the National Geographic Foundation in 1985.

3   See, for example, Lambek (1987, 1990, 2000).

4   Africanists will observe that I have been alluding quite indirectly to heated debates over the ascription of "modernity" with respect to such matters as witchcraft. For a useful recent discussion that cites much of the literature, see Shaw (2002). Shaw, interestingly, explores the roots of many "traditional" Temne practices in Sierra Leone in the "modernity" of the slave trade. There are several good ethnographies based on long-term research that similarly try to analyze changes with respect to a dialectic of tradition and modernity; an exemplary study from Europe is Collier (1997: 10-14) who offers an especially lucid discussion of her use of the terms.

5   I went, in part, on the advice of French scholar Pierre Vérin who prophesied, correctly, that the place was on the verge of a major transformation that I would be poised to witness.

6   The first primary school in Lombeni was set up in 1982. Prior to that a few intrepid children walked to schools in neighbouring villages. In 2000 there were some five *lycées* (high schools) on the island which then had a population around 135 000—triple that of 1975. In 2000, 545 students took the *bac* (high school leaving exam) with a pass rate of 56%, though only five students got the mention of *"très bien"* (very good).

7   Of course, this is a gross oversimplification of the multiple trajectories of colonial and postcolonial states. On Africa, see inter alia, Bayart (1993), Cooper (1994, 2000), Mbembe (2001), and Young (1994).

8   This impression of communities constituted through ceremonial activity at arm's length from the market I owe in part to Jackie Solway.

9   These differences may correspond in some respects to the types of peasant communities famously discerned by Wolf (1957).

10 In what follows I deal only with certain aspects of the festive, public, and commensal side of weddings, not with their core transformative functions or with the events in their totality. Hence this is not the place to address the profound question of the historicity of ritual form (e.g., Bloch, 1986).

11 Sometimes these were children whom they had fostered for a shorter or longer period. Parents would sponsor the life cycle rituals of all children who had not been taken over by relatives, but their public responsibilities were met by the first circumcision (often of several closely related boys at once) and first virgin wedding they sponsored. This meant that the weddings of sisters were often not identical in scope and elaboration. On the significance of virginity, see Lam-

bek (1983) where I argue that in Mayotte on balance virgin marriage actually contributed to women's dignity and sexual autonomy rather than detracting from them.

12 On the other hand, people still need each other for their life cycle ceremonies and participate when invited so that they can expect assistance in return.

13 *Troisième* in the French school system is four years prior to completion of the *bac* (high school diploma, a higher level than the North American equivalent*).*

14 The latter groom had three children from a former wife (who herself had been previously married) and told me he would have another three children in this marriage. His new wife demurred and said she planned to have only two; she would use the pill. The groom affirmed he wouldn't practice polygamy, that men were starting to reject it. His own father had three wives simultaneously and the groom said he didn't know the exact number of his own siblings, which are certainly close to 20. At the same time, the young people's positions are partly realized as the result of decisions taken in past generations, notably successive cross-cousin marriages in the more prosperous case.

15 The names are pseudonyms.

16 A translation of the second half of this paragraph: On the cover was written "Mr. Saïd Abdourahim and Miss Kaisati Aboudou invite you to their wedding." Inside, the parents of groom and bride were listed and "have the honour and pleasure to invite you to the marriage of their children...and request the honour of your presence." As they stuffed the envelopes, one person remarked—in French rather than Malagasy, "one should maintain tradition." The printed program listed a Friday evening dinner with dancing, followed on Saturday morning by a *walima*, a procession at noon, a drinks reception at 3 p.m., and on Wednesday noon by an *mbiwi with Viking.*

17 This event only takes place if the bride was a virgin. During the 1970s the women's dance celebrating sexuality was held spontaneously immediately following the consummation, whereas the arrival of the groom's gifts, a week later, was accompanied by a men's dance. By the 1990s marriages were often enacted and consummated a year or two before the groom brought the *valise* and the wedding was celebrated with public feasting and dancing at the latter event (Solway and Lambek, in prep.).

18 During the relevant period the value of the French franc oscillated between approximately 4 and 5 to the Canadian dollar. On July 1, 2001, 1FF equaled .15245 Euros that equaled CAN$ .1966.

19 It is also, as another successful groom admitted, a form of conceit or showing off *(mpwary).*

20 They may also present claims of entitlement, a point for which I thank Victor Li.

21 Some wedding guests were of course more "European"— i.e., performing as Europeans less self-consciously and in more domains of their lives—than others.

22 She referred to his means of transport sometimes as a golden *fauteuil* (arm chair), sometimes as a *vedette* (motorized boat).

23 There is always more than one version to story. Another version had it that a powerful man was displeased that the community had forbidden the land-owner to sell him a plot by the tomb from which to sell liquor. Even angrier when his side lost the latest political referendum, he buried medicine to raise the monster *(kaka).* Seven people would have to die before anyone would do anything about it. Yet another account emphasized that people had stopped participating in the community sacrifice when one group, the very (large, extended) family whose children had first started going to school and were the holders of many of the *invitations,* had started claiming the saint as their personal ancestor.

24 *Unheimlich* is a term that appears in Freud and that is usually translated as "uncanny" but might also work as "uneasy," "disturbing," or "edgy"—that which makes us feel no longer "at home."

25 This, of course, suggests an interesting reading of Nietzsche's famous aphorism concerning the state of God's health.

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The Self in Northern Canadian Hunting Societies: "Cannibals" and other "Monsters" as Agents of Healing

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Abstract: This paper presents a theory of the Self in northern Canadian hunting societies. Ethnographic arguments are drawn from the Athapaskan-speaking Sekani of northern British Columbia and the Algonquoian-speaking Cree of northern Quebec and Ontario. We describe the three dimensions of the Native "composite" Self in order to discuss Native mechanisms of social and individual inequilibrium and healing. We also attempt to re-analyse the so-called windigo psychosis among the Cree. Like others before us though for very different reasons, we argue that the label "psychosis" misrepresents this phenomenon. The assemblage of beliefs describing the windigo cannibal monster is an important clue for the dynamics by which composite Selves are constructed.

Keywords: Self, nomadic hunters, Cree, Sekani, windigo psychosis

Résumé: Cet article décrit une théorie du Soi tel qu'il est conçu par les chasseurs nomadiques du Canada septentrional. Les données sont tirées des Sekani, un peuple athapascan de la Colombie-Britannique, et des Cris du Québec et de l'Ontario. Nous décrivons les trois dimensions du Soi 'composé' afin de décrire les mécanismes autochtones de la guérison et de l'équilibre, soit de l'individu soit de la société. Nous présentons une réanalyse de la dite "psychose windigo" parmi les Cris. Nous affirmons que l'étiquette "psychose" n'est qu'une projection occidentale qui ne tient pas compte des faits. La description détaillée du monstre windigo fournit un indice important pour mieux comprendre la construction du Soi composé.

Mots-clés : le soi, chasseurs nomades, Cri, Sekani, psychose windigo

In this paper we propose a theory of the Self in northern Canadian hunting societies. In particular, we draw on material from two, the Athapaskan-speaking Sekani of northern British Columbia and the Algonquoian-speaking Cree of northern Quebec and Ontario, because we have noted strong similarities in their respective views of the Self after comparing the results of our independently conducted research. We argue that the Native[1] Self can best be described by the word "composite." We discuss Native mechanisms of social and individual inequilibrium and healing in terms of this composite Self. Although our arguments are based on extensive field contacts in various communities, Native views of the composite Self are not easily accessible in ordinary discourse for reasons that we will briefly describe below. We also attempt to incorporate some of the older ethnographic literature, especially as it concerns the so-called windigo psychosis among the Cree, with the aim of applying our view of the composite Self to "pre-modern" ethnographic contexts, roughly the period between contact and the early 1950s. Like others before us though for very different reasons and with different implications, we shall argue that windigo psychosis is misnamed. The assemblage of beliefs and legends surrounding the windigo cannibal monster is instead an important clue for the dynamics by which composite Selves are constructed.

Our descriptions of Native notions of the Self do not use contemporary Native accounts as such for a variety of reasons. One argument we advance is the persistence of the composite Self through different economic and political regimes imposed by Euro-Canadians, so we must interpret older descriptions of social life in support of our views. Most older ethnographic accounts, however, rarely make mention of the Native sense of Self as such, especially as it is pertinent to our hypothesis. Second, complex

biographical narrations obtained in field research situations are not often explicit, since Natives usually see explicit descriptions of activities as bragging. Third, one component (or "dimension") of Sekani and Cree selves, the relationship to the world of animal power, is not only unmarked in discourse, it is surrounded by explicit rules that prohibit talking about that aspect of the Self (which, we argue, is the basis for imagining the community). This, coupled to the traditional Native belief that all knowledge is keyed to individual agency, makes it difficult to obtain general descriptions that are sufficiently decontextualized from individual experience. In other words, on some issues—and the construction of the Self is one—Native people often seem to speak in parables and metaphors, when they speak at all about certain issues.[2] Finally, Ferrara's data based on interviews with over a thousand Native patients over the years is strongly suggestive that their emphatically stated need for "harmony" is based on a view of illness resulting from the disequilibrium of the elements of the composite Self.[3]

Far from apologizing, we are attempting to frame the discussion that follows. We argue that the process of healing depends very much on ideas of *what* is being healed and how this ontological object came to be sick. In other words, wellness depends very much on local definitions of illness and on the specific triggers that cause imbalance. For example, we will argue that windigo beliefs, which have often been described in the literature as symptomatic of "illness," also represent "wellness" or healing if Native definitions of the Self are taken into account.

Nomadic Selves in Context

Our aim in this section is to describe the composite Self, which we will argue has three dimensions. Although we issued a warning in the introduction that parts of our descriptions are not supported by explicit Native discourse, we have noted in our respective first hand contacts that there are many suggestive metaphoric expressions that describe the workings of the composite Self.

We will describe briefly how the Sekani of north-central British Columbia construct the Self. We are convinced that the dynamics of the Self described in this section are also relevant for the Algonquian speakers that we describe below. In particular, Ferrara's conclusions based on her long-term participation in healing practices are similar to Lanoue's, which are based on extended fieldwork contact in "modern" and "traditional" contexts.[4] Besides contemporary Sekani descriptions of illness and the Self, their traditional stories[5] mention cannibals and monstrous beings, which, we argue, symbolize threats to mental harmony. Like the Sekani, we do not treat cannibal and monster stories as descriptions of empirical truth but as metaphors for equilibrium. In this sense, they are useful guides to Sekani ideas of the Self.

Before presenting our arguments, we would like to mention two caveats. First, it is not only Native ideas of the Self that differ from Western notions. The composite Self is framed in a social space that is imagined in a completely different manner than the social of tribes and nations. Nomads' ideas of the link between territoriality and the polity are unique in band societies for two reasons. First, society as an entity is believed to emerge from individual contact with a hidden transcendental dimension. Second, social solidarity is strongest when people are dispersed over the homeland and weakest when they aggregate in a community, which goes against popular and analytical Western notions that a high degree of social solidarity is achieved by the abnegation of the Self. The reasons for these qualities are too complex to examine in detail here (see Lanoue, 1992) but will become clearer when we examine the social Self.

Our second caveat concerns the quality of the evidence we present. We suspect that Athapaskan descriptions of threats to equilibrium are less elaborate and less ritualized than comparable Algonkian beliefs because Athapaskan contact histories with Europeans and Canadians have been less dramatic. For example, windigo beliefs of cannibalistic monsters are associated more with Algonkian-speakers than with Athapaskan, although Ridington's description (1990) of Beaver wechuge beliefs offers a close parallel.[6] If our hypothesis is correct—beliefs in "monsters" are a guide to the psychological repair of Selves as well as the more traditionally-described threats to equilibrium—then one would expect richer stories in circumstances in which various dimensions of the Self have been weakened, eroded or artificially augmented beyond traditional limits by market forces (more in the early and middle periods of contact) and by contemporary politics and Euro-Canadian social engineering. The relatively isolated Athapaskans may have fewer cannibal tales because the conditions that allow for full development of normal Selves have remained relatively untouched for a longer period of time, whereas many Algonkian-speaking peoples have suffered more as a result of contact with Europeans and with Euro-Canadians. They may have had to reinforce their stories and beliefs to deal with greater threats from the outside. Although we do not explore this here, we believe that windigo tales are post-contact precisely because they are ritualized responses to the more explicit threats by Euro-Canadians many eastern Algonquian peoples faced in their early contact histories.

"True" Selves

While the word "composite" that we use here is a new usage, at least for specialists of northern Canadian First Nations, the thinking behind it is not. For example, when describing a "medicine fight" between two Chipewyan (Dene) men who were squaring off in terms of their respective "power" (*inkoze* for these people; the concept of power is discussed below in more detail), Sharp describes (2001: 135) reasons for the eventual loser's weakness. It was not so much that he was not known as a man who had cultivated his power (in contrast to his opponent, known as a man with strong power) as it was that the outcome of the struggle was partly determined by the context in which each opponent's individuality was expressed. In other words, the social (in this case, public opinion that the man was a bit of a buffoon) was not a mere backdrop to the drama but was a part of the loser's sense of self that may have contributed to his loss: "That context, these symbols, values and emotions were not just internalized within [the man], they *were* [the man]" (ibid.: 135; emphasis in original). The term "composite selves," then, is merely an attempt to recognize that the production of the self among northern nomadic societies is different than comparable Western dynamics, not because the people of these societies are especially sensitive to gossip and informal social controls, but because their notions of society and self are unique. In other words, Euro-Canadian Selves may be just as mouldable by interaction with others (a view Sharp espouses) but this sensitivity to the social is framed very differently because Euro-Canadians often assert that the two, the individual and society, are unique and somewhat autonomous entities that are often at odds. Not so among northern First Nations, who, we will argue, define the social as an intrinsic part of the individual.

What we are arguing is not complex. Like the various contributors to Allen's collection of non-Western conceptions of the Self (1997), we are only seeking an adequate language to describe the influence of two dimensions of existence that are sometimes overlooked in classical (Western) definitions of the "true" Self as an autonomous entity at odds with the social and political currents that shape the public persona: while the first, "society" (more precisely, the interaction between individual's representations of the social and the degree to which the individual sees these as influencing him or her), is often believed to play a role in shaping the public Self, the extent of that role and especially the mechanisms with which individuals mediate a position between the "true" and "social" self are generally not well-defined. The second aspect of the composite Self, the transcendental dimension, is less well understood and so has generally been left to the province of esoteric or marginal religious theories at worst (again, see Allen 1997, whose contributors can only find parallels to nomadic composite Selves in Eastern religions and philosophies), or metaphysics at best. In neither case are links between the empirically unknowable and the "true" Self generally given much importance. We argue that one reason for defining a composite self with three dimensions is precisely to define more clearly the role of what is conceived of as the transcendental in the Self.

In some ways, the problem of the Self has been a thorny one for anthropologists, used as we are to thinking in Durkheimian terms that were strongly influenced by the 19th and 20th century affirmation that an alienated Self was the norm in modern industrial societies, which of course led to an endless round of speculative attempts to identify what the Self was alienated from. The problem, however, is deeper than one of the mere inertia of a particular intellectual paradigm more or less contaminated by Western ideologies that sanctioned economic individualism and political domination by means of complex semiotic engagements that led to individual complicity. Cartesian subjectivism deeply polarized subsequent Western thinking about the Self. Descartes' arguments seemed to propose that the essential defining quality that made us human was an innate capacity to transcend history and culture by the power of pure reasoning. This position was later interpreted as dangerously close to an apology for capitalist individualism and positivist instrumentality.

When Western states consolidated their hold on power by the late 19th century, both ideologues and critics of the state's newly-defined social space set off a new round of debates about the Self that defined much of 20th century approaches. By arguing in favour of the explanatory power of the social fact, Durkheim provided a means of thinking around the problem of the autonomy of the Cartesian subject, whose logical implication was that society could not exist except as a voluntary agglomeration of rational, independent Selves. By deriving the Self from the social, the Durkheimian approach was in some respects a throwback to a pre-Cartesian position, although this was hidden by the new rhetorics of social functionalism at the time. Indeed, Durkheimian epistemology could be seen as a modern manifestation of the Aristotelian concern with the empirical sensorium, weighed against Descartes' espousal of Platonic logical dialectics. In either case, Self and society remained problematical terms.

No matter how seductive contemporary critiques of the inviolate (Cartesian) Self may appeal to a Durkheimian-derived (and Aristotelian) cultural relativism that sanctions the primacy of local conditions in defining the Self, it

is our contention that the nature of the individual agency of the Self is far from resolved by being simply redefined by the modernist (paradoxical) position that alleges co-determination, albeit unequal and hegemonic, between Self and society. Even later attempts, notably by Foucault, fail to discern the outlines of what an unalienated Self might look like. For Foucault, modern Selves are even more fragmented than the alienated individuals described by the Marxist theory of overt political oppression and hidden economic domination. Despite Foucault's insights into the mechanisms (normalization of alienation through discipline) governing individual complicity with structures of domination, the Foucauldian Self is even weaker and more victimized by history and culture than the Marxist Self, whose autonomy is crippled by historical and cultural circumstances but redeemable by its potential creative capabilities when engaged in productive activity. It remains a moot point whether or not Foucault's attempt to trace the possible outlines of a fragmented Self reconstituted by individual (and subversive) appropriation of the technologies of domination would have led him to develop a vision of unalienated, "true" Selves, since his theoretical explorations were cut short by his untimely death.

What we are attempting here is to describe a model of Self under unalienated conditions, or at least a Self in which a kind of alienation—a movement from the individual Self to the Transcendental Self—is voluntary. Our model of the nomadic composite Self might serve as a limited guide for situating postmodern attempts to recover and reinvent otherwise fragmented Selves.

The Three Dimensions of the Nomadic Self

Sekani Selves comprise three dimensions: the ego-Self, consisting of individual desires, ideas, and remembered experiences and actions; the social Self, consisting of each individual's field of shared values and expectations framing the social environment; the transcendental Self, consisting of the powers acquired from the invisible dimension through dreams and vision quests, especially as these powers are channelled through animals. We shall briefly describe each dimension of the Self, keeping in mind that no one dimension is more important than the other two in defining a person's experience of the Self.

The Sekani, like the Cree, explicitly believe that an individual sense of harmony and balance of the various dimensions of the Self are desirable goals. Balance must be achieved because human naturally tend towards selfishness, which is a sign of imbalance, especially of the ego-Self. Because this "diagnosis" is something the Sekani have long recognized, they have developed "traditional" means of dealing with the tendencies for self-serving self-ishness, which is kept in constant check by specific rules aimed at inculcating generosity and sharing. These practices are so well documented among nomadic hunters that we will not examine the Sekani versions here except to say that people feel a very strong obligation to share meat from game animals, sometimes travelling long distances between camps to make sure that less fortunate hunters get a share (although meat from trapped animals such as beaver, which is occasionally eaten, is exempt).

The Sekani have a very strongly developed sense of the ego-Self, which seems natural in an environment in which individual skills are the key to well-being. People collaborate while hunting (hunting groups consist of two partners; most commonly, two unrelated men; husband and wife; father and son; brothers—though each partner generally hunts alone during the hunting expedition). The basis of collaboration is mutual respect of each partners' individual hunting skills such that a complementary relationship emerges. There are usually some differences in skill levels between partners, as men will usually rotate through a series of hunting partners in their lifetimes and expect to learn from more skilled partners while young and to impart some of their wisdom to junior partners in their old age.[7] However, these status differences are relatively minor and are believed to be more due to the qualities of the transcendental Self than the result of empirical learning retained and used by the ego-Self. In other words, collaboration between "selfish" individuals is possible because the ego is always framed by its interaction with the social and transcendental Selves, which shifts agency from the purely selfish and individual to much more complex realms inhabited—in the case of the transcendental—by superior entities. Because of the traditional importance of hunting and the Western view that northern environments are extremely dangerous, we think many researchers have underestimated these other aspects of the Self in order to reinforce a Western-derived notion of the centrality of economics in hunting societies (cf. the influential papers in Lee and Devore, 1968 or in Lee and Daly, 1999). Some researchers, in other words, try to frame the selfishness of the ego-Self by attributing collaboration to a Western-style economic rationale for sharing risks.

There is another, more complex reason why the importance of the ego-Self was recognized long before the forces of market-driven colonialism destabilized Native communities in the contemporary era. Sekani hunting groups are always potentially hiving off to pursue their own economic interests. However, this economic selfishness (which is of course encouraged, within limits, because it favours survival) may lead to serious political consequences for the

collective, since it is only by constant circulation of these small groups over sometimes economically uninviting parts of the homeland that the Sekani were able to demonstrate ownership of the entire homeland to their neighbours and potential enemies. Means must be found to balance individual interests manifested as local hunting group autonomy against the necessity of "patrolling" less-favoured or less well-known ranges within the homeland. The Sekani therefore had strong moral injunctions not only favouring generosity—which cancels the short-term economic advantages of selfishly sticking to a richer range by moving "wealth" from the "rich" to the "poor" and moral authority from the ego-Self to the transcendental—but that also respected the moral authority of good hunters. In other words, the "luckier" a hunter, the more it was thought that his luck came from greater power derived from an enhanced contact with the transcendental realm inhabited by the atavistic "monstrous" form of animals left over from pre-Transformation times (the Sekani believe, like many other northern nomads, that animals are superior to humans and can only be hunted if the animal is willing to sacrifice itself). The respect shown to this moral leader and to his exhortations to visit relatively unoccupied ranges suggests that the Sekani sought to balance a potentially dominant ego-Self by linking its main manifestation—hunting prowess—to an increase in the power of the transcendental Self, with obvious implications for a stronger social-Self as well. A person in disequilibrium not only suffers individually but also causes the community to suffer as well, since others' social Selves have partially incorporated him and his augmented ego-Self (conversely, one person's wellness benefits others by the same logic). The Sekani believe that a selfish person also causes the "animal-masters," the pre-Transformation transcendental forms of animals, to abandon humans. In brief, any imbalance in the Self has potentially disastrous consequences for individual and community survival.

The social Self is more difficult to describe. It is certainly arguable that all human beings have a social Self, which in fact is often described as the persona. Originally defined in the modern context by Jungian psychology as a kind of mask of how individuals wish to represent themselves to the social world (although the word is of course much older and traceable to theatrical masks used by ancient Greek and Roman actors) and by philosopher George Herbert Mead (cf. Mead, 2001) as a way of objectifying the immediacy of the sense of "I," anthropologists have sometimes been loathe to use the word in order to avoid its volitional connotation, as if people are in complete control of what they project to others and what others

see in them, and as if social life were nothing more than a series of strategic and instrumental negotiations that uses culture as a supermarket-repository of symbols to be mobilised in the search for individual advantage. The social Self is usually seen in more Durkheimian terms, as the outcome of continual negotiations between a (usually autonomous and Cartesian) Self and the reified (Cartesian) Other, an aspect of the physical body on which "society" inscribes its principle values, something that T. Turner calls (1979) the "social skin," although Turner is arguing that the body is not only a superficial Durkheimian representation of the collective but also refers to the process of socializing the psycho-biological individual.

These negotiations can be empirically real and therefore come close to the idea of a mask "hiding" the "true" Self, or they may engage individuals' notions of their place in an Andersonian imagined ("cultural") community (Anderson, 1986). Some, notably Herzfeld (1998), have refined this idea into very complex views of how individuals in modern nation-states negotiate status and access to resources not under their control by appropriating and using the state's own ideological capital (pace Bourdieu) to their own ends as they navigate the maze-like corridors of state-instituted political practices and therefore modify state technologies of social control (and, theoretically, lift culture from the level of a symbolic storage bin to an active protagonist in all negotiations). The persona, in other words, can be both a true mask of the "real" ego and a temporary and "public" ego-Self that is a "true" representation of the ego-Self insofar as the individual, to negotiate successfully for social resources, must deploy symbols of the ego-Self that are recognized as legitimate by others. Obviously, these remarks are too brief to paint a complex picture of how the Sekani see the social Self, but this latter observation at least gets to the heart of Sekani ideas.

There is another dimension to the Sekani social Self, however. Not only does the Sekani social Self consist of individual negotiation vis-à-vis the rules of social life that engage others (there are few explicit rules as such), it also incorporates an ongoing process of constructing the social through the transcendental Self. This is a crucial difference with Western notions of the social Self, since the Sekani and the Cree are explicit that the outcome of all negotiations in the social sphere engages the transcendental Self, and that the goal of such engagement is not limited to cementing partnerships or establishing a representation of the Self for public consumption. People in these hunting societies are acutely aware that each moment of negotiation brings part of the Self into contact

with the transcendental, with important repercussions for bringing the community into being. Briefly, and taking into account our description above of the potential for selfishness, the collective is seen as weak and must be continually created and reinforced by augmenting the transcendental Self through contact with the realm of "monstrous" animals. Although we cannot describe this process in detail here, individuals present themselves to others as partial manifestations of an invisible dimension that contains "real" power. The transcendental realm becomes a vehicle for defining the collective because it allows for the possibility of a strong ego-Self whose potential selfishness is lessened by shifting agency to the transcendental.

The third component, the transcendental self, is more or less absent in Western notions. For the Sekani and the Cree, it consists of "power," the special and indescribable qualities that are acquired through contact with the transcendental dimension of animals.[8] Sekani, like all Athapaskan and Algonkian speakers, are ambiguous about the creation of the world but clear about the Transformation, an epoch in which a Trickster-like creature (a beaver for the Sekani, a raven for the Southern Tutchone [cf. Legros, 1999]) appears and, through the usually-inadvertent consequences of his actions, gives the world the form it has now. In the past, animals were larger ("monstrous" or "giant," according to most accounts), spoke, and sometimes married and hunted humans. For their part, humans are often represented as weak and unable to defend themselves from the depredations of various monsters, including those of the monstrous animals. In other words, animals were superior to humans, a belief that many Sekani still profess, since animals live in the same environment as the Sekani yet survive without weapons, society and language.

The Transformer imposed on each species a smaller, limited and weaker biological form that reduced the monstrous or giant animal's ability to express its powers—it could no longer talk, marry or hunt humans. However, the Transformer did not alter in any way the innate capacities of animals, just as he did not significantly alter human physical abilities by making them stronger or better-armed, as in many classic culture-hero tales from other parts of the world. Significantly, the Transformer gave humans several rules to live by; notably, respect for transcendental power and for blood as a powerful sign of life. "Rules," whatever their content, become signposts of the social, whose arbitrary qualities are unique to humans. In brief, the Transformer separates the two as humans become less animal-like (because they acquire culture through rule-driven behaviour) and animals become less

human-like (because they are unable to express some of their natural attributes while occupying the physical bodies they now possess).

To come into contact with this now-hidden dimension of animals, hunters transform themselves into symbolic prey, calling into being the pre-Transformer dimension of animals: hunters can dream this contact, but the more usual way is what has been sometimes called a vision quest, which among the Sekani and many other northern nomadic hunters is not so ritualized as versions found among the semi-tribalized peoples of the Plateau or the Plains. Immobile, without food or weapons, and alone, the hunter creates a ritual space[9] by these inversions of normal experiential reality; he becomes symbolic prey for animals and hence evokes the pre-Transformer epoch. Because an animal's biological nature would normally urge it to flee humans, any animal that approaches the hunter in this temporary ritual space is assumed to be under the sway of its transcendental, non-biological nature. Because the human has become animal-like prey and the animal has become less like an animal, a channel of communication is then opened between the hunter and the animal. In fact, the favourite metaphor used to describe this is a "conversation" or "talking with the animal doctors" (the widespread Native English name for the act of engaging the invisible dimension of animals).

Just as the Transformer did not alter the essences of humans or giant animals, people who come in contact with the transcendental are not necessarily transformed in any fundamental way. They have access to the transcendental and its pre-Transformation powers, and these acquired powers usually cause men to become more successful in the hunt.[10] While it may be tempting to some to think of enhanced abilities as a result of contact with some spiritual force, in reality people become more "efficient" because they are more graceful and composed. They simply feel better because they are attuned to themselves and to the people and natural environment around them. Again, while it is true that these beliefs enable the Sekani to shift agency from individual abilities to a wider and invisible dimension, it is also important that people who are said to have received power have achieved a balance between the ego, social and transcendental Selves. In other words, "power," hunting "luck" and the Transformer's actions are perfect metonyms of balance and harmony: in each case, potential polarities (contemporary humans versus the transcendental; contemporary humans versus contemporary animals; early humans versus early monstrous animals) are attenuated by bringing the two poles closer to one another (contemporary humans obtain transcendental power; contemporary humans eat animal

flesh if the animal wishes to sacrifice itself; early humans move closer to animal perfection and early animals move closer to human imperfection). The ideal is always integration that does not sacrifice or eradicate the elements that define the opposition. This is neatly encapsulated in local Transformer myths, as we mentioned above, that describe the distancing of humans and animals in the past, which, in the present, are used to justify the bringing together in the vision quest the hunter temporarily transformed into prey and "normal" animals temporarily transformed into monstrous animals. In other words, Sekani notions of integration favour placing elements in a relation of complementarity rather than in a hierarchical ladder. Excessive attention to status differences and talents (in other words, hierarchy) is a sign of failing to achieve the partial blending of oppositions, the failure to exchange without compromising the fundamental identities of each partner. What is true in terms of this reading of Transformer is equally true for the social and the Self: each domain must exist in a delicate harmony with the others without altering the fundamental qualities of each component's signifieds, whether this be the Self or society.

All men are expected to be able to achieve contact with the transcendental. Woman cannot because they already possess an essential quality of the transcendental, the blood of reproduction and of survival, the same blood that superior animals willingly sacrifice to ensure the survival of inferior humans. In one sense, women are symbolic animals and are more perfect than men just as animals are more perfect than humans. Men are the semiotically marked category that is subjected to the ritual transformation of the Self by means of the vision quest; women are unmarked because they are "naturally" transcendental. Furthermore, female superiority is tacitly acknowledged by the absence of male strategies for controlling female sexuality. Unlike other societies in which men limit, regulate or even partially eliminate sexual contacts because female sexuality is seen as polluting or dangerous (for example, by long-lasting postpartum sexual taboos, by elaborate rituals of precoital protection and post coital purification, by a period of ritualized homosexuality, or even by the simple ritualization of coitus designed to limit the expression of pleasure to implicitly deny female inequality and explicitly reaffirm male control of female sexuality), the Sekani, like all northern nomadic hunters we are aware of, do not mark sexuality as a vehicle of domination (women and men are viewed as equal; each is responsible for their respective sexual pleasure and for initiating sexual contact).[11]

Some men never initiate a conversation with the transcendental. This is not viewed as failure as such, since animals initiate such contact; men merely invite animals to visit by ritually transforming themselves into pre-Transformer prey. However, men with no contacts are viewed as "ordinary" and will not enjoy luck while hunting. They will have to depend purely on skill. Occasionally, they are viewed as weak because without an augmented transcendental Self, the social Self may inhibit the ego-Self (for example, Sharp's example of the "weak" sociable buffoon that we cited earlier). On the other hand, because contact with the transcendental is the ultimate source of "luck" that keeps the ego in harmony with the social, men who only possess skill may develop a tendency to egoism. Both extremes, weakness and excessive egoism, are disdained.

Other men have a variety of contacts. These, anthropologists sometimes call shamans, although it is significant that the Sekani do not acknowledge a special status by placing them in an explicitly defined category ("shaman"), though we have occasionally heard the word in English, along with "medicine-man." Such people are merely more successful or luckier at initiating contact and obtaining power. They are potentially dangerous because they suffer from an augmented transcendental Self. It is noteworthy that almost all anthropological descriptions of shamanism (not curers as such) often describe such individuals as "unbalanced," "dangerous" and even "psychotic." Well they might be, since they are suffering from a form of imbalance of the Self brought about by an excess of the transcendental.

In brief, too little or excessive contact with the transcendental are potentially dangerous situations. If there is no or little contact, a man is considered potentially unbalanced, prone to expressing excessively the other components of the Self, ego-Self or the social self. He can be ungenerous, mean and aggressive (i.e., denying the social self because the ego fills the void left by the absent transcendental). However, too much contact can be equally dangerous, since ego and society become submerged to the transcendental. "Spirit" power[12] invades the individual; the "conversation" with power is too intense. People in this condition start acting like their "spirit helpers" and lessen or even temporarily lose their humanity. Ridington, the major ethnographer of the neighbouring Dunne-Za (Beaver) gives (1980: 175) some examples: a man infected by frog power can begin jumping up in imitation of giant frogs; another with wolf power began sharpening a nail to a sharp point in imitation of the "silver teeth like knives" that are said to have been characteristic of giant wolf. In all cases, they are potentially dangerous because they are no longer "conversing" with the social Self. Similar forms of disequilibrium among the

Sekani, though in the contemporary colonial context, have been described in Lanoue (2002).

Although some of these dimensions, especially the dimensions of ego and the social, have been discussed in terms of Western notions of Self by anthropologists, philosophers and psychologists (among others), the fact remains that many people still apparently take for granted that a large part of their public personae is a direct expression, sometimes contradictory, of a strongly-integrated ego not differentiated into various components. Even therapists and researchers more familiar with Native views essentialize Native references to the third, non-experiential (in Western thought) transcendental component by treating it as a "metaphor" for a desire to root the present in the past; in other words, as essentialized "tradition" that expresses a desire to bolster a fragilized contemporary political identity by a nostalgic appeal to the utopian, pre-contact past. As Geertz noted (1983: 75), anthropology often projects Western essentialisms onto "primitives," who are reduced to culturally modified versions of the major Western European ideological categories: totemism is "really" religion in another guise, cargo cults are "really" ideology, the kula "really" evidence of economic and political calculation, and so on. For some, the transcendental Self in "conversation" with animals is "really" a Native form of Western-style ideologically-sanctioned history. We argue, however, that the transcendental Self as embedded in the world of animal power is not a metaphor for the past but a very real component of the present.

In the West, individuals often see the social as a somewhat reified "imagined community," an immobile, atemporal and hegemonic entity that forms a backdrop framing individual attempts to work their way through cultural and institutionalized pathways. In other words, individuals tend to see the social as a place of institutionalized hegemony, whatever the actual power relations governing the local pond in which they are swimming, because of ideologically fed processes of the normalization (cf. Foucault) and of naturalization of power (cf. Yanagisako and Delaney, 1995). For the Sekani, the absence of institutionalized spaces imbued with (disguised) political power means that the community is a direct manifestation of the continual displacement of individual agency from one component of the individual Self to the other two. Such displacement creates a "multi-sited" (with apologies to George Marcus) idea of agency that acts very much like Naskapi scapulimancy, which transfers individual responsibility for important decisions from an individual to the group and ultimately to the invisible dimension of the transcendental (see Moore, 1965), or like indirection in

Native speech described by Irvine (1979) and commented on by Brenneis (1988), which avoids direct confrontation when individuals negotiate pathways in the social.

Windigo and the Self

We have argued that the composite Self is a deeply embedded notion in contemporary Native northern nomadic hunting societies, although we have only been able to trace its contours from its manifestations rather than from explicit Native discourses as such. Here, we will examine one of the premier ethnographic examples of a traditional Native "illness" to argue that it is possible to see the workings of the composite Self in a post-contact but pre-colonial situation. We propose that windigo psychosis has been misnamed and misunderstood as an illness.

We argue that these beliefs, whether or not they are anthropomorphized as windigo, can be interpreted as a map describing both dangers to the composite Self and conditions that bring the unbalanced Self into equilibrium. We suggest that it is the disequilibrium of the Self's components that leads to the negative valence assigned to the windigo condition. In other words, traditional cannibal beliefs (and especially cannibal stories) are a richly detailed and polysemic reference guide dealing with imbalance, whatever particular element—ego, society and the transcendental—that may happen to be in disequilibrium, either through relative absence or relative surfeit. Windigo, spirit quests and other healing practices are evidence of attempts to deal with psychological disequilibrium by the metaphors of possession, transformation and cannibalism, in a traditional reading of the phenomenon, to which list we would add metaphors of representing mobility and emotional isolation. In this contemporary context, windigo is more of a representation of the cause, effect and cure of the disequilibrium that can affect individuals with a hyper- or weakly developed sense of individual components of the Self.

Over the years, anthropological enquiries have clustered around the notion that windigo possession is a sickness, a psychosis, a manifestation of isolation and of the stresses of the nomadic lifestyle of northern hunters and trappers trying to wrest a living from the harsh northern Canadian environment. In general, the descriptions of windigo-induced cannibalism among northern nomads has been interpreted in the literature either as a real possibility or as a symbolic representation of what can go wrong during the periods of isolation that characterized people's winter and spring hunts. During these episodes, the summer aggregate band would separate into sub-units (the hunting groups, usually two hunters and their

spouses and children) that established base camps in local ("family") hunting and trapping areas. The extreme cold and snow made it seem a real possibility that people would not be able to find food and might starve, especially as the weather got warmer towards spring: although still covered by ice, rivers are too dangerous for sleds and snowmobiles, and the frozen ground does not absorb the runoff from the melting snow. Travel is difficult and sometimes impossible for several weeks. Cannibalism might be a real or potential outcome of forced immobility leading to starvation (see Vecsey, 1983).

Naturally, many debates centred whether there was any factual basis for reports of starvation among the Cree, Ojibwa and various other northern nomadic hunters that might have led to the development of a widespread fear of environmentally induced cannibalism. The absence of "real" (documented) episodes of cannibalism led some to reject the semiotic underpinnings of windigo beliefs (see, for example, Marano's 1982 controversial paper in which he argues forcefully that windigo psychosis is an anthropological misinterpretation or even projection). We are not concerned with the alleged facts surrounding stories of cannibalism as such but with indigenous notions of the Self that give weight to polysemic representations of cannibalism, monstrosity, isolation and transformation; in other words, as signs of the composite Self. While we certainly do not subscribe to the notion that the term "psychosis" has any relevancy today (especially since it was first used in this context in 1930s by a non-specialist), the pertinent literature, our own observations and contemporary Native accounts tell us that there is still a widespread feeling in many Indian communities that windigo is *something* negative.

There are many fragmentary accounts of windigos and of windigo psychosis. For example, there are several references in the *Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 6, The Subarctic* that mention, almost in passing, that windigos are feared by Algonkian-speaking peoples from the East coast to the Rocky Mountains. A slightly richer account, a few lines, is mentioned in the article on the Saulteaux of Lake Winnipeg (Steinbring 1981: 253):

> Most describe the windigo as a giant, human male who appears dramatically and devours the people he happens upon. windigo is, however, quite separate from "becoming (or being) windigo." This latter denotes an identifiable craving for human flesh. One may contract the ailment by confrontation with a windigo, or one may be sorcerized by a shaman into "becoming windigo." In the event of the latter, copious doses of hot grease (including bear fat, melted deer tallow, and sturgeon oil) are said to bring about a quick cure. Those

who have the windigo psychosis can be identified in the bush at night by bright, sparkling lights that surround and follow them.

Another synthetic account is contained in the *Dictionary of North American Mythology* (Gill and Sullivan, 1992: 345), also worth quoting at length:

> Witiko—Fearsome anthropomorphic cannibal beings. During famine, humans can become witiko and compulsively seek human flesh. Human witiko differ from the nonhuman northern witiko giants and the malignant transformations of the spirits Ice and North. The nonhuman witiko are depicted as giants who use treetops as snowshoes and cover vast distances with every step. Their most common characteristics are a heart of ice, filthiness, a mean appearance, and the ability to transform humans into cannibals. They become witiko after being mortally wounded and subsequently eaten by the human families with whom they lived. Their power can be overcome be conjuring, and human excreta blind and confuse them.... Sometimes humans become possessed of witiko by dreaming of the malevolent spirits North and Ice.... Witiko stories express the danger and isolation of living in the subarctic wilderness as well as taboos against cannibalism.

Today, documented accounts of windigo sightings seem to be less frequent, though many legendary accounts survive as tales for children.[13] Windigo beliefs are treated as allegories that illustrate a moral injunction against selfishness rather than as a narrative encapsulation of the dangers of a hunting lifestyle. However, cannibal beliefs are still extant among contemporary Algonkians and Athapaskans, and there are enough reports to suggest that belief in windigos has not disappeared (cf. 1993 Brightman's analysis of the semiotic links between cannibalism, cardinal directions, temperature and hunting and "religious" beliefs among the Rock Cree).

Although isolation, immobility, sickness and cannibalism are the major traits underlined by an older anthropological reading of the phenomenon, there are other dimensions to windigos that we believe are just as important. In fact, these overlooked dimensions are strongly suggestive that windigo is a guide for balancing the various dimensions of the composite Self. First, windigos can appear in summer; a case of windigo panic affecting "over 1 000 people" one summer was reported by Teicher (1960, cited in Vecsey 1983: 82), which belies the winter starvation scenario. Second, windigos are only one of many powerful spirits, though they are the only ones that can *possess* people (Vecsey 1983: 106). Third, if windigo psy-

chosis is the result of the isolation of hunting groups, why is only one individual and not the entire group transformed? Finally, why are windigos hypermobile when the condition is believed to be caused by immobility? Windigos are always alone and always highly mobile.

There are several elements that run through these accounts (and others we have not cited): isolation (the condition is often associated with too long a separation from the community; though non-human witikos travel fast and far);[14] famine and food (though witikos eat their own lips and human flesh even when normal food is available, and human excreta confuse them); ambiguous causality (some accounts, notably Brightman [1993: 140],[15] suggest that humans are transformed into witikos as a result of famine-induced cannibalism, while most accounts suggest transformation by possession leads to cannibalism); size (non-human witikos are giants; transformed humans become bigger); temperature (human and non-human witikos have hearts of ice that must be "melted" to kill or cure the witiko); identification and appearance (witikos are unkempt and ill-dressed; human witikos can be detected by their violent behaviour and by other signs such as lights hovering around them); duration (the phenomenon can be temporary and is curable if the infected person does not die or is not killed by non-infected persons); volition (the condition is involuntary though contaminated people are at first conscious that they have been infected and may warn others of the impending danger); "mythic" status (no accounts of "real" cannibalism are documented, though many Native second-hand accounts exist; people have "heard of" or "seen the tracks" of witikos; these accounts are usually situated in a distant past or in a geographically remote part of the band territory; non-human witikos can arrive in dreams to possess hunters); and, finally, witikos are usually (though not always) male. In brief, some traits seem to support the standard view that witikos are an expression of the dangers of becoming too isolated, too immobile, too cold, too hungry—all the risks that northern nomads face as a matter of course during their winter hunts.

Quite apart from questions regarding the quality of the evidence that allegedly supports the isolation hypothesis, other traits do not seem to fit this model: windigos can be cured by animal fat or grease[16] (ingesting animal fat balances the excess of human "meat," which becomes a powerful metaphor not only for balance but also for contact with the transcendental, the ultimate source of meat and fat) and confused by non- or anti-food (excreta, which is neither fat nor meat; significantly, windigos are neither cured nor harmed by excreta; it is outside the significant category, in Mary Douglas' sense). Standard views also

take for granted that witikos are male, though this is apparently more the result of the old view of hunting as an exclusively male activity. Furthermore, we believe that anthropologists have persistently misinterpreted the main symbol associated with witikos—their hearts of ice—as a reference to winter, when starvation is admittedly more likely, instead of being a symbol of social and emotional isolation (more or less as it would be interpreted in a Euro-Canadian context), which some traditional accounts and contemporary Native interpretations support.

The main objection to the standard model, however, is that if windigo represents the fear of the disastrous consequences of isolation, immobility and eventual starvation, then stories should somehow stress the resumption of mobility (ideally, moving towards human company) or the ingestion of "normal" animal meat as cures. On the whole, they do not. In fact, human and non-human witikos are often considered even more dangerous because they travel far and wide *after* they are transformed into witikos. When they begin to roam, the transformation is complete and there is generally no hope of being cured. They must be killed, usually by a combination of ruse and heroic action (often by a culture hero such as Nanabohzo or by a person with marginal social status such as an orphan).

Sometimes, however, the transformation can be halted by members of the community coming to the isolated victim. In effect, this displacement of community members negates the potential windigo's hypermobility and induces immobility, which is exactly the cause of the problem in the first place, according to the standard model. In other words, while it might seem that the cure involves mobility, it is really about the community being symbolically reconstituted, which is symbolized by its voluntarily moving to another locale. The community as social category refers to the summer aggregate band, which is highly marked in terms of immobility, and not to the hunting groups, which are highly marked in terms of mobility. In other words, if one of the standard cures is a form of immobility, then immobility can hardly have been the root cause of the transformation.

Other views see witiko as a metaphor for structural tensions within northern band formations. Turner argues (1978) that witiko myths are expressions of an incorporative logic that produces hunting-group solidarity under normal conditions. Briefly, selective cannibalism is a metaphorized fear of the potential hiving off of the component parts of Cree society, the local or seasonal hunting bands. What we have called the potential "selfishness" of local hunting bands is in effect the potential realization of autonomy of the only major social category between the individual and the band.

Hence, if individuals act "selfishly" and refuse to participate in the circle of collaborative and sporadic displacement over the homeland (for example, if they happen to be in a particularly well-favoured zone as a result of normal variations in animal populations), the structural underpinnings of co-occupation and co-ownership of the entire homeland can be weakened. Windigo, therefore, is a not a simple warning of the physical danger of isolation as such, and cannibalism in this view is not merely "a primary Algonkian symbol of exploitation, domination and evil" (Brightman, 1990: 113).[17] In Turner's view, windigo cannibalism is about the evils of self-incorporation, the evils of denying one's political affiliation to other hunting groups.

This argument avoids the psychological and ecological reductionism of materialist views and acknowledges the political complexity of band societies. On the other hand, it ignores the facts regarding cures (ingesting fats; social support). It also fails to address the questions of windigo hypermobility and solitude (windigos never travel together), an especially important consideration since mobility of the dispersed hunting groups is positively marked as an affirmation of band ownership of land. Hence, the same objections to the standard model seem to apply: if isolation and immobility are the causes, then mobility and sociability should be the cures. Furthermore, if physical isolation during winter hunts is represented as a metaphoric trigger for witiko psychosis, then other instances of isolation—in particular, heightened individualism as a result of post-contact pressures towards personal economic relationships negotiated with the aim of aggrandizing individual interest at the expense of collaborative ties—should have produced more witiko stories as expressions of this problem. These, however, are usually absent in the literature.

We have other objections to the standard winter-isolation-starvation view and to Turner's model of potential political breakdown. First, windigo is a form of *gradual* possession. The transformation is not instantaneous but signalled by a period of strange emotions and behaviours that are usually explicitly signalled by the possessed person through a series of warnings to others (among the Athapaskans, a man may not be aware he is "becoming" a monstrous animal, though others will speak of it). Second, isolation and famine are not usually causes of possession. Native stories dealing with people under threats of extreme environmental stress do not normally describe possession by spirits as an outcome but visitations by monstrous beings who threaten but do not possess humans. In fact, possession is a trait associated with supernatural vision beyond the normal ken of physiological sight that is sometimes described as a form of spirit travel.

Possession, in other words, is the flip side to shamanic "vision," and it is not surprising that in many societies shamans are often possessed by tutelary spirits so they can "see" the normally invisible.

We believe that the windigo's hypermobility is linked to the symbolism of hunting group displacement in the political dimension, in which extreme tendencies, too little or too much movement, lead to imbalance: too little invites invasion of ranges left empty as people stay in the home community,[18] and too much (for example, the hunting group not returning to the summer site of summer aggregation, the village) leads to selfish individualism in which the fragile idea of the collective becomes even more ephemeral. Both threaten the social, and because the social is constructed through the transcendental, windigo possession or transformation is a complex metaphor for the Self in society through the intermediary agency of the transcendental.

While eating others may be a metaphor for the destructive incorporation of society, as Turner cogently argued (1978), cannibalism is not *only* a warning tale of the political dangers of people becoming too individualistic. It is an attempt to set things right, to urge people to augment the ego-Self (by one's selfish action of not respecting others) and the social Self (by incorporating them) that have been temporarily submerged by a surfeit of the transcendental or by the absence of the social. In cases of disequilibrium, the only real option is to augment the social Self (windigos eat humans), the ego-Self (windigos eat their own lips), or the transcendental (transform oneself). The windigos' extreme mobility may be a powerful metaphor for the disequilibrium of the invisible and immaterial transcendental component of the composite Self, but it is cannibalism that in a sense "heals": the sick windigo "eats" (reduces or eliminates) its own ego-Self and the social but is cured when people come to it (which augments the social) or feed it fat (another powerful symbol of collaborative hunting).

Full-blown windigo "possession," when the transcendental is no longer in harmony with the ego and the social Selves, is indeed a dangerous condition because it signals a loss of control. Given that the social is constructed by ego-Selves coming into contact with the transcendental, a person without control is subject to the buffetings of the primordial power of monstrous beings and, more importantly, becomes incapable of affirming his membership in the fragile collective. In our reading of the available facts in light of our hypothesis, the heightened mobility of witikos could be interpreted as an affirmation of the ego-Self attempting to flee excessive contact with the animal-spirits of the transcendental. Contact with

monstrous animals can lead to full transformation, which must be immediately countered by curing the individual if possible, either by giving him fat, the "best" or essential part of the biological animal, according to all Athapaskans (natural "essence" is semiotically linked to the animal's transcendental dimension), by being "compassionate" (augmenting the social Self by approaching the sick individual and reminding him he is not alone) or by killing him (killing his heart of ice, a perfect metaphoric allusion to the emotions surrounding a weak social Self and selfish ego-Self). In brief, while "going windigo" may be a metaphor for the disequilibrium of the Self, windigo stories are also guides to healing. In this sense, Marano (1982) may be right when he affirms that anthropologists have projected Western values when they describe windigo psychosis only in negative terms.

While there are many contradictory details in the rich panoply of windigo stories, the essence seems to stress the same theme: unbalanced people—solitary, grieving, selfish—must seek harmony. Windigo stories map out the cures while warning of the dangers of attempting to augment the transcendental Self and, implicitly, attempting to augment the social through such contact. Possessed people can lose their humanity if the illness or the cure are too severe because they are alienated from the community. If others do not intervene by interrupting the imitative actions that would eventually transform them into the giant animal or into a windigo, then the person completes the transformation (empowering the transcendental Self) and consumes himself (windigos eat their own lips, a metaphor for excessive ego-Self) or others (a metaphor for the social Self dominating the other two aspects).[19]

There is no automatic cure for the disequilibrium of the Self, since contact with the transcendental that precedes windigo psychosis can dangerously over-augment the transcendental Self and weaken the ego- and social Selves, which are subsequently augmented through endo- or exo-cannibalism. Exactly what elements are in disequilibrium and what therefore must be augmented or countered must be the result of individual circumstances and contingencies. In this limited sense, some of the case histories cited in Marano (1982) to support his view that windigo describes a sense of loss of humanity, which may be especially acute among people who are grieving for the death of a loved one, is consonant with our position: the social is in disequilibrium and must be harmonized with the other components of the Self.[20]

Conclusion

To render the windigo phenomenon as a culture-specific psychiatric syndrome is an ideologically derived Euro-

centric tautology that evacuates the link between Native definitions of the individual and of the social. As Ridington notes (1990: 179), "the assumption that windigo belief and behaviour are psychotic has gained a kind of tacit acceptance because of our own culture's willingness to reify the labels we have become accustomed to using to describe a phenomenon we do not otherwise understand." We propose that windigo is an indigenous belief—in this case, Algonkian—in which the individual is in intimate contact with the intangible powers of the transcendental in order to achieve equilibrium within the Self embedded in the social. Rather than being a "culturally patterned form of psychosis" (ibid.:179), windigo is more of an attempt to describe the dangers of disequilibrium and the steps that help heal the fragmented and disassociated composite Self. This powerful sign is still relevant today as people try to balance the components of the Self that are brought into disequilibrium by Euro-Canadian political agendas.

We suggest that although the semantics of the discursive field called "tradition" have changed drastically since windigo psychosis was first described as a "typical" feature of northern Algonkians, Indigenous beliefs in the composite Self and in the importance of balancing its dimensions have changed little, such that various alleged cures for windigo possession that seem to be based on very different postulates and aimed at very different conditions are merely particular manifestations of the same underlying beliefs in the composite nature of the Self. In other words, belief (or disbelief) in the immanence of the transcendental mediated through contact with animal-spirits ("tradition") or contemporary belief (or disbelief) in the efficacy of forced vision quests among contemporary people who feel oppressed by enforced marginalization at the hands of Euro-Canadian colonialism is irrelevant as a guide to selecting the most efficacious path to healing damaged Selves. As long as these Algonkian and Athapaskan-speaking peoples still believe that the Self is composed of several dimensions that can become seriously unbalanced, cures will involve bringing unbalanced dimensions into a harmonious relationship—in the "traditional" case, possibly leading to windigo possession manifested by "cannibalistic" desires; in the contemporary case, by enforced vision quests that augment the presence of the transcendental and of the social in the Self. People do not have to believe in witikos or in modern psychotherapy to be healed (although many do believe in both of these domains and do not see a contradiction between them, precisely because they both aim at inducing balance), nor must they be possessed of a complete semiotic map of "tradition" or of "contemporary politics" for the windigo

sign to be a meaningful guide to illness and healing the composite Self. They must merely believe that the Self is composed of several interdependent dimensions each of which is embedded in and sensitive to the other. They must above all believe in harmony and in its implicit opposite, the potential disequilibrium of the Self.

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Acknowledgments

Notes

1 We will use this word as a shorthand way of designating the hunting societies to which we specifically refer. We make no all-encompassing claims.

2 Native accounts of the Self are also oblique because—at least for Athapaskan speakers—all discourses touching the Self are negatively marked as a means of reducing or at least imposing limits on the expression of the ego-Self. See Lanoue (2001) on multiple naming systems and attempts to weaken the ego-Self.

3 Because of their very intimate nature, none of these data will be cited or referenced here.

4 The Sekani have been described elsewhere (Desgent and Lanoue, 2003; Lanoue, 1992) on the basis of nearly two years of fieldwork in 1978 and 1979.

5 Here, we use "traditional," in two senses: the commonly accepted anthropological meaning that refers to early contact and relatively undisturbed culture, and the Indigenous meaning that is invoked when Native people present material they say no longer describes a contemporary situation.

6 An anonymous reviewer of this paper suggested that Ridington's description is suspiciously too congruent with windigo legends. In fact, Ridington's is the only attested description of a windigo-like complex of which we are aware, and Lanoue found no analogies among the neighbouring Sekani (Beaver and Sekani are in fact now reclassified as a single language, Sekani-Beaver), although cannibal themes (without windigo-like transformation) are present in Sekani legends.

7 Typically, a male hunter passes through several stages as his skills and status improve. He starts as a junior partner to an older member of his family of origin or with someone closely linked to this family of origin (e.g., sister's husband). As a young adult (a status recognized in discourse as distinct from older adult), he is a junior partner to wife's brother. Finally, he is a senior partner to younger sister's husband or to a younger member of his family of origin. "Senior" and "junior" refer to decision-making regarding hunting and the division of the spoils, usually 60-40 in favour of the senior partner when trapping. Game animals are usually the property of the senior partner who "gives" his junior partner a substantial share. The more senior a hunter, the more he is expected to be generous. Game is also "given" to the hunter's wife when back in camp, and she has the right to serve the game as she wants. There are, however, no significant wealth differences as such between senior and junior partners; any individual can "borrow" (without repayment) all the necessary equipment for hunting and trapping. Neither age nor wealth alone produce status differences. For example, some men never come to be considered as potential senior partners because they do not sufficiently develop their hunting skills and "luck" (power), despite their growing into "older adult" status. Productive ability is a sign but not the cause of high ("senior") status. The true measures of status are a person's transcendental power and generosity. Age-grades are slightly different for women, who pass directly from "adult" to "grandma" (the male equivalent is "grandpa," sometimes called an "elder" in front of Whites) after menopause. Since they cannot acquire transcendental power, they cannot become "older adult" women.

8 Among Athapaskan-speaking peoples, this power is called by several names: *nadetche* by the Sekani (Jenness, 1937: 68; although the Sekani in 1978-1979 never used this word); *zhaak* ("grace", Legros, 1999) among the Northern Tutchone; *in'kon* (Helm, 1994) among the Dogrib; *nitsit* (R. McDonnell, personal communication) among the Kaska. See also Sharp (1987, 1988) for a discussion of the same concept among the Chipewyan and Ridington (1988) for the Beaver.

9 By "ritual space" we do not refer only to the ceremonial aspects of the transformation of hunters into symbolic prey but to the fact that there are a limited number of signs in this space, leading to an increase in polysemy. The result is powerful metonymic displacements that establish metaphoric links between animals and humans (cf. Desgent and Lanoue, 2003).

10 This has often been described in the literature as men "acquiring" power (and so it is, in one limited sense, although a much more accurate, non-economic metaphor is that they have entered a ritual field suffused with power).

11 Athapaskan menstrual taboos and beliefs that female genitalia can ruin male hunting power have nothing to do with the alleged inferior status of women. Women's genitals and especially their menstrual blood are not considered dangerous because of the risk of inadvertently blending distinct social categories that are functionally necessary to reinforce fixed hierarchies (à la Douglas). Menstrual blood, like animal blood, is a sign of the transcendental, and male contact with menstrual blood ruins a man's hunting power because it displaces the locus of the "conversation" from relatively-perfect animals, who assure human survival, to relatively-inferior humans, who do not. Another way of seeing this is that already-powerful men would risk disequilibrium by close contact with this metaphoric pathway to the transcendental.

12 Here we are using a common anthropological expression, though the Sekani do not conceive of the transcendental in terms of spirits.

13 For example, see www.kayas.ca/Stories/witiko4/witiko4. html; http://www.dinojoe.8m.com/crypto/windigo.html. We are unconcerned with the "New Age" uses to which windigo has been put in the last 20 years. "Tradition" and "modern" are simple temporal reference points that, for us, do not raise issues of authenticity.

14 Significantly, Swampy Cree stories collected in the 1970s refer to windigos as *Upayokwitigo*, "He who lives alone" (Norman, 1982: 4).

15 Brightman argues (1993: 144) that windigo or *atuush* relates to a loss of cultural identity; individuals are sometimes paralysed by the fear this possible loss elicits. He suggests that beliefs in cannibal monsters are related to Cree views on food, spirits and becoming human, a view also suggested by Vecsey (1983: 77).

16 Although this is not clear for Athapaskans. Some Sekani stories collected in the 1920s suggest cannibals crave human fat and not meat, and that the "normal" human body has little or no fat, which of course pushes people to crave fat even under normal conditions (in one story, a captured woman is fattened for eventual consumption but escapes and washes away the accumulated fat until she regains her "normal shape"; cf. Desgent and Lanoue, 2003). The Sekani and, as far as we know, other Athapaskans, then and now, consider fat to be the best and strongest food. The Cree studied by Brightman (1993: 146) seem to fit the witiko trope more closely; he argues (1993: 155) that eating fat is akin to being human because it is the result of a highly "cultural" (in the Lévi-Straussian sense of opposed to "natural") process, boiling, and that hot grease cures witikos because the heat melts their hearts of ice.

17 This latter argument merely uproots windigo from any reference to experiential reality and transforms it into a sign of generalized evil, much like the devil in many Christian interpretations by people who do not believe in the literalness of symbols.

18 This is a real possibility that has been described for one case in Lanoue (1992). The Sekani live in a homeland bounded by two mountain ranges, which at several points in their documented history channelled game in such a way that the northern Sekani ceased moving over the homeland, in one case for a 20-year period. The result was a loss of autonomy as non-Sekani began using the abandoned zones of the Sekani homeland.

19 A contemporary windigo tale told by a Quebec Algonkian to Bernard Assiniwi (1998: 48) makes the point more succinctly: after an episode of inadvertent selfishness by the narrator's grandfather in the late 1800s (he forgot to turn over a beaver he had caught on a neighbour's trapline or to replace it at a later date), he was visited by a windigo who warned him to replace the beaver he had consumed. The narrator's grandfather answered the windigo's questions truthfully and was left alone. "That's how I [the narrator] became aware that the windigo monster only eats people from the *inside*." (our emphasis).

20 Marano argues that windigo describes the death (usually by execution) of an individual who is no longer considered human. For Marano, windigos are essentially scapegoats. However, a loss of humanity can be caused by "normal" stresses such as grief. He cites case histories to that effect,

although he points to environmental conditions as the source of stress.

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Property, Kinship and Cultural Capital: The Ethics of Modelling Kinship in Sustainable Resource Management

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Abstract: This paper originated in the theoretical, methodological and ethical issues raised by the possibility of formally mapping kin-based rights in resources using new developments in GIS and data management software. While acknowledging that there are valuable applications for such mapping exercises in Native land claims or other battles over local rights in natural resources, we argue that the proliferation of such formal mapping methods raise a number of pressing concerns. One concern is the resurgence of simplistic functionalist arguments as with the concept of cultural capital, utilized in some publications on adaptive management and in community based natural resource conservation. Another concern is the implicit reliance on overstructuralist modelling of non-Western kinship systems. Salient ethical questions concern the possible dangers of "making legible" to the state legal systems such highly formalized and thus static kinship models.

Keywords: kinship, law, social capital, resource management

Résumé : Cet article s'intéresse aux questions théoriques, méthodologiques et éthiques posées par la possibilité de transcrire formellement les droits héréditaires au moyen de logiciels GIS et de traitement de données. Tout en reconnaissant qu'il y a des applications valables pour de tels traitements formels dans le domaine des revendications territoriales et celui d'autres luttes pour l'accès à des ressources naturelles, nous soutenons que ces méthodes de présentation formelle des données soulèvent un certain nombre de questions urgentes. Une préoccupation est le retour d'arguments fonctionnalistes simplistes comme, par exemple, l'utilisation du concept de capital culturel dans des publications sur la gestion adaptée et sur la conservation des ressources naturelles par la communauté. Une autre préoccupation est la confiance implicite accordée à des modèles sur-structuralistes de systèmes de parenté non-occidentaux. Des questions éthiques évidentes proviennent des dangers de «rendre lisibles» pour les systèmes légaux de l'État de tels systèmes de parenté hautement formalisés et donc ainsi rendus statiques.

Mots-clés: parenté, droit, capital social, gestion des ressources

Introduction[1]

Painstaking and prolonged fieldwork provides many anthropologists with an understanding of both the centrality of and the flexibility in kinship rules for distributing rights in and for managing use of resources. However, conceptualizing and communicating that importance across disciplinary boundaries is often very difficult. The specialized language of kinship, taken together with the myriad and highly complex, non-Western tenure arrangements, often makes for a difficult process of translating what we know into language that is understandable to those without anthropological background. And yet, translation of that specialized knowledge takes on increasing urgency in a world where resource sustainability has become the elusive Holy Grail. Some recent publications that explore the role of cultural capital in ecological resilience without adequate cognizance of the basic building blocks of social life are but one outcome of that translation difficulty.[2] When kinship systems *are* considered in relation to rights in resources, simple, ahistorical, linear arguments and functionalist assumptions are common (Aswani, 1999: 418).[3]

The dangers in this type of thinking are exacerbated when new technical methods of modelling relations between the human and physical landscapes are brought to bear. Kinship software (Widlock, 2000), GIS mapping (Aldenderfer and Maschner, 1996), and recent three-dimensional "cone tree" software (Card, MacKinlay and Shneiderman, 1999) offer significant opportunities to translate and make more visible non-Western social organization, especially when used in combination.[4]

The mutual compatibility of these developments is apparent. Any anthropologist who views the fisheye cone trees in the Card *et alii* volume will be immediately reminded of what McKinnon (2000: 43) calls the "elegantly abstract skeleton" of kinship diagrams. What concerns us here

are the many questions about the relationship between such abstractions and the actual on-the-ground kin-based behavior and resource management. This paper began with an exploration of such developments. We quickly realized, however, that the possibilities inherent in such software raise salient theoretical and ethical questions about kinship theory, about the adaptive functions of various kinship forms, and about the dangers of the increased "legibility" of such local adaptations (Scott, 1998). The original and quite simple question we asked was can we make complex, kin-based rights structures and their impact on resource use more visible? But this simple question rapidly generated a host of more complex questions, and at the head of the list was the question: should we?

There seemed several compelling reasons to pursue increased visibility for kinship and its possible connection to resource management and use. First, we were interested in the possibility of exploring the role of kinship in cultural capital, as the term is used by Berkes (1996), Berkes and Folke (1998), Hanna, Folke and Mäler (1996) and other scholars exploring traditional ecological knowledge and its possible role in livelihood resilience and sustainable ecological adaptations. Capital is defined by Berkes (1996: 91) as a "stock resource with a value embedded in its ability to produce a flow of benefits" (see also Ostrom and Schlager, 1996: 129). The sustainability literature defines three types including natural capital (assets from the ecosystem), cultural capital (assets from cultural organization and values)[5] and human-made capital (assets created through use of human technology). These three types of capital are said to be interconnected such that the characteristics of the group and the technology they utilize are the key to understanding their relationship with the ecosystem, as are the property rights that organize the interface with natural resources (Berkes and Folke, 1998: 16-17).

It is clear that this scholarship largely developed without reference to the wealth of anthropological literature on kinship and property, or indeed without reference to longstanding notions of capital. As Harvey (1996: 62-65) notes, this model has intellectual roots in Marxist dialectical notions of capital, but has travelled far from those roots and lost much of its strength in the process. Harvey argues that for Marx: "Capital is directly conceptualized...as a *process* or as a *relation* rather than as a 'thing'" (ibid.: 63; see also Li, 1997: 128). Harvey goes on to add:

> This process definition differs radically from that typically incorporated into neoclassical economics where capital is treated as an unproblematic (i.e., noncontradictory) stock of assets (of things) with

certain qualitative and quantitative attributes which, when set in motion by human agency, embody causative powers. (ibid.: 63)

In this light, a clear and highly visual representation of non-Western kinship processes and their importance in resource utilization seemed valuable.

Second, there is a growing body of literature that links together ecological economics, common property, policy analysis and other scholarship interested in the role of specific property types in economic growth and in ecological sustainability, again, mostly without reference to anthropology (Dobell, 2001). Given the critical voices raised over the influence of this literature on the World Bank and other international organizations involved in social and legal reform (Harriss, 2002; Li, 2001a; Randeria, 2003), it seems particularly important to make more highly visible the complex relationship between kinship and local normative systems of resource rights. In many nation states of the world, these local normative orders are in conflict with state-generated normative orders, a situation which is called legal pluralism. There is a prolific anthropological literature on legal pluralism,[6] much of which focusses on important interconnections between property systems, political power, ecological impacts, religion and ethnicity (Franz von Benda-Beckmann, 2000, 2001; Wiber, 2001). It seemed useful to be able to clearly demonstrate these complexities to the non-anthropological audience.

Finally, we were interested in revisiting some enduring anthropological questions about the tremendous variability in kinship organizational forms and the potential reasons for such variability. Formal analysis in kinship theory has a long history of generating systemic models with associated functional explanations (Faubion, 1996: 67), many of them uncritically focussed on supposed natural differences between the genders and on associated notions of the evolution of power and governance under conditions of increasing stress on resources. In this context, our view was that a careful mapping of actual resource access rights and use patterns could provide for an ethnographically rich, critical perspective on anthropological kinship theory. But the more that we discussed our project, and thought about recent scholarship in legal pluralism, governance, marginality and state power, the more that fundamental questions about the anthropological endeavor became central to our considerations. In this paper we provide a discussion of some of those questions.

Of Systems, Functions and Social Structures: What is Kinship Good For?

There would be little point in mapping kinship structures onto the landscape if there were no evidence to support the argument that kinship is an important structural and processual component of both social organization and of making landscapes.[7] Even a cursory review of the literature demonstrates a great deal of evidence that local practice often relies heavily on kinship as a mechanism for matching people to resources.[8] There is also evidence that these arrangements are often sustainable over the long run. Our two sets of research data from the Philippines and from Vanuatu, although cases drawn from very different kinds of kinship systems, are a case in point (see Lovell, 1980; Wiber, 1993), and will provide the context to discuss the several issues considered in this article. We also draw on some of the literature on the complex relationship between kinship, rules of access, property rights and resource use to demonstrate that anthropology has never satisfactorily answered the basic questions of why a society employs one kinship system over another, or whether there is any importance to the myriad variations on a single kinship type. We will not revisit all of the debates, but instead select specific areas that have relevance to our concerns as outlined above.

Within anthropology, there have been many attacks over the years on what Parkin (1997: 374) has referred to as "a sort of geneological *doxa* among anthropologists." In particular, these attacks focussed on the formal structural models and associated functionalist explanations common during the heyday of kinship research. Nevertheless, most anthropologists of today would agree that kinship systems are not randomly generated, nor are they in a random relationship with other aspects of social organization. The so-called death of kinship as a central anthropological concern has been recently challenged (Colloredo-Mansfield, 2002; Faubion, 1996; Franklin and McKinnon, 2000), and it is clear that functionalist arguments in particular have a continuing popularity (Goody, 1990).

One example is the assumption that where population density increases over time and competition for resources intensifies, corporate kin groups emerge. Classic corporate theory largely focussed on unilineal descent systems and on their advantages in situations of resource competition. It saw corporate groups as clearly demarcated and strongly hierarchical with particular advantages in managing property access and use, a point to which we return below. The mechanisms that facilitated such control were debated for several decades within anthropology, particu-

larly as additional lineage-based societies were found to vary dramatically from the African exemplars.[9] Other research focussed on the difference between corporate groups and communal organization, arguing that the advantage of corporate property is that it is held in severalty (Appell, 1976). Thus, in communal groups, appropriators can make demands equal to other appropriators whereas in corporate groups, shares in the property are variable and often proportionate to status in the group, limiting problems of exclusion and over-exploitation. Other ethnographic research demonstrated that corporate organization was not unique to unilineal descent groups. In a bilateral society of the northern Philippines, for example, cognatic descent groups performed many of the same corporate functions (Wiber, 1991, 1993).

Thus, despite challenges to classical structural-functionalism, kinship studies continued to focus on the functional characteristics of kin groups and to posit important property holding advantages such that natural resources were managed in a sustainable way. However, there is a significant difference between current studies and classical studies, and that is that any assumed benefits in kinship structure and process must be contextualized through a focussed understanding of their empirical operation in any one place and at any one time. One of the first scholars to articulate this clearly with respect to kinship and rules of access was Sally Falk Moore (1969, reprinted in 1997). We revisit a number of the points raised by Moore as we address the functional arguments made about kin organization and natural resource use.

If we focus on the functional attributes of kin groups with respect to sustainable resource use, there are both structural and processual arguments made. In terms of structural attributes, the most relevant characteristic for our purposes is the rules for membership in the kin group. Here, Moore (ibid.: 379-380) cautions against seeing these rules of membership in a rigid way, either in defining members or in any simple causal relationship between membership and resource access. A key characteristic of kinship appears to be its mutability—a characteristic that frustrates anthropological attempts to plug empirical examples into a typology of pure structural types. But perhaps that mutability should be better understood as an important value. The abstract rules of kinship facilitate *claim-making* based on genealogical connections. The recognition of that claim is not automatic, and often depends on circumstances (ecological, personal, political and religious). Thus, bilateral and unilineal systems both demonstrate a "bargaining" approach to rights, something which is important to keep in mind when theorizing about the role of kinship in ecological sustainability.

Second, kin organization ideally supports a hierarchical structure, although clearly some formal types are more hierarchically organized than are others at the operational level. This in turn offers a number of processual advantages, which we will discuss shortly. This ideal structure is extremely flexible, and globally there are innumerable variations that may or may not have important functions. Third, there are built-in alliance mechanisms—especially through marriage. Fourth, the segmentary building blocks of kin groups allows for units to be organized at larger or smaller scales, depending on any number of circumstances.[10] And fifth, kin groups often have what has been called "assumed perpetuity," or a legal identity that persists over time despite the changeover of component members—this gives them a temporal stability useful in property control and managment (F. von Benda-Beckmann, 1979).

These five structural attributes of kin groups are all theoretically linked—some in more than one way—to processual features, seven of which we identify here. The first relates to hierarchy, which provides for clear rules of leadership and of devolution of authority, usually on the basis of age and gender differentiation, but also on the type and distance of relationship. The second feature is the resulting flow pathways that facilitate information exchange and a command structure. These information pathways are rooted in the rules of leadership and authority. Third, basic kinship units, whether nuclear family, extended family or kin compound provide built-in contexts for the transfer of knowledge across generations within the family, lineage and clan structures. Fourth, members of the group participate in the creation, modification and enforcement of rules with respect to access, within the context of age and status, with dispute resolution similarly facilitated. Fifth, there are clear rules for and demarcation of membership shares in the joint estate, both within a single generation and across generations. This provides for an important temporal difference with non-kin based property groups, which less often are focussed on the long view.[11] Sixth, descent structure allows for natural points for fission/fusion of the group, for ultimate flexibility in the scale of property holding group and for political affiliation across geographical space (Moore, 1997: 383). And finally, these same structures facilitate mechanisms for cross-linkages through alliance networks.

We are not breaking any new ground here. However, while it has long been recognized that kin concepts can be quite flexible in terms of their implementation at any one point in time (Scheffler, 1965), the potential ecological benefits of this have not been thoroughly pursued. For example, in any one context, many notions of blood and

affinity can act as *potential* pools of alternative structures in times of flux or perturbations, and as forms for re-assemblage after a dislocation. The same flexibility that puzzled many kinship theorists may in fact be the main strength of kin organization, facilitating what Moore (1997: 387) describes as "adjusting genealogy to convenience." Nor should we downplay the spatial and temporal cyclical operation of kin groups. Among the Ibaloi in the Philippine uplands, all of the descendents of a single founding pair have rights to the resources in which that pair invested labour (Wiber, 1993). Depending on the degree of labour invested, those rights are transferred in different ways to descendents. Some are devolved as a form of private rights held by a single descendent (as in irrigated rice terraces), while others are rights in severalty devolved to the group as a corporate group (pasture lands, fruit trees, irrigation systems). However, as successive generations swell the number of descendents over time, more and more members of the village can trace genealogical connection to it, and many of the resources become more or less communal in nature. Also, each person in the village is a member of many cognatic descent groups at any one time, including those of their parents, of their grandparents on both sides and so on. Each of these descent groups will be at a different stage of this cyclical development, and at a different level of property rights organization. Subsequently, where an individual chooses to operationalize access rights can be a matter of delicate negotiation. The general effect of kinship negotiations within the community, and even across community boundaries, is to allocate and reallocate people over the village resource base across both time and space, not automatically as a result of blood connections, but selectively *in response to specific circumstances*. We argue it would be fruitful for those interested in ecological sustainability to pay more attention to this aspect of anthropological work on human kinship organization.

In short, kinship "systems" do seem to be systemic to the extent that they organize people's thoughts and provide some basis for behaviour, but not to the extent that the behavioural response is automatic.[12] As Geertz (1983) has pointed out, what members of a culture think is not so important as the concepts with which they think, and kinship is a key idiom for thinking and talking about property, and thus for organizing claims to, and subsequent behaviour towards natural resources. Since this idiom is a flexible one, the uses to which it can be put are many. And since the idiom is so deeply ingrained, local groups often resist external attempts to transform it.

While Lovell was doing fieldwork in Longana, on the island of Ambae in Vanuatu, he observed a dispute over

land that illustrates this point. A young man, who we will call Isaac, shocked the district by planting coconuts, taro and other food crops on land which his father and father's brothers had donated to a cultural centre and for which they had received compensation by the community. The young man and his father were against the donation, arguing that the compensation was not nearly enough; but, in Longana, land is administered by sibling sets, and Isaac's father had been overruled by his brothers on the grounds that it would help the community. A portion of that land would have been part of Isaac's patrimony. Isaac and his father continued to complain about the arrangement, long after the land had been alienated, even after Isaac had become the most important Longana employee of the cultural centre itself. He was second in line only to the Australian who had been hired to develop the centre, and was therefore scheduled to take it over when the expatriate left. But Isaac, a self-assured and headstrong man, was always at odds with his Australian boss over a wide range of issues, and, because of his perceived arrogance, managed to annoy many in the community who were associated with the centre. His constant bickering with, and hostility to, his boss finally got him fired.

It was shortly after his dismissal that Isaac planted crops on the playing field of the centre, on the land in which he and his father had historic rights. He also blocked access to this land with logs. These actions made visible again Isaac's (and his father's) kin-based property rights, since you only plant crops on land in which you have rights or for which you have the permission of the rightful owners. Given the earlier kin group decision to transfer the lands to the community, it could be argued that Isaac had neither rights nor permission, and the resulting land dispute created strong feelings in the community.

For months people discussed the case. The chiefs felt particularly strongly about any attempt by Isaac and his father to reclaim their land after all this time. Eventually, a public hearing was called at the centre. People from all over the district showed up to watch Isaac receive the dressing down and the fine that it was widely felt that he deserved. One of the chiefs presented a general introduction to the case, emphasizing Isaac's legitimate interests and former rights in the land. Isaac stood to speak. The crowd hushed. He spoke very softly, and with all the respect due to the crowd, the elders, the political leaders and the centre personnel. He admitted to planting the fields, but he declared that he was not interested in the land. It turned out that all he wanted was his job back!

He went on to explain that the community had been so biased against him that he had never received the pub-

lic hearing which was his due (the centre being a community project), and that planting the field had been a trick to force such a hearing of his case. So now that everyone was assembled, they might as well listen to what he had to say concerning the unfair conditions of his employment, the mismanagement of the project, and his summary dismissal. He was rehired at the conclusion of this meeting—much to the disappointment and anger of the Australian in charge of the cultural centre. Given the way that Isaac had manipulated the idiom of kinship, most Longana agreed with the assessment of one of their most important political leaders—that if Isaac would only learn to control his temper (and his arrogance), he had great potential for becoming a traditional leader himself one day.

Thus, it is important to know how kinship systems connect people with resources, and in what ways kinship is a model for elaborating rights (Moore, 1997: 391). Such knowledge is essential to understand the rights which Isaac and his father once had and that formed the basis for an important community dispute over the development of some of its land. But it is just as important to realize that kinship is more than just a template—its concepts and principles are useful to think *with*—and this is why kinship systems have the potential for being so flexible and adaptive in the face of change.

Systemic Plurality: Property Rights and Legal Pluralism

We have been arguing that when people model their behaviour with respect to resources around deeply ingrained kinship idioms, the outcome *can* be long-term ecological stability. Again, this is not a new observation in anthropology. Others have certainly taken this position (Piddocke, 1965; Rappaport, 1968). Even among some of the earlier studies, however, many analysts noted that functions and systems can operate at many different levels, and these diverse operations may not all be mutually compatible.

For example, F. von Benda-Beckmann (2001) notes that the two "functions" of property systems that have received the most attention from economists and from resource managers, are the ability to promote first economic wealth, and second ecological sustainability. These two may not be mutually compatible given what he calls "concretized" property relations—that is, the way a "right-relationship is established between actual persons or groups and an actual resource" (ibid.: 299). As he points out, this can be quite different than the "categorical rights" which exist as typified legal concepts that may or may not structure real relationships. In their functional analy-

sis of property rights, Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1999: 22) speak of the four levels in which property becomes manifest: in the ideological, in the concrete normative, in social relations and in actual social practices. These layers need not be well synchronized, and indeed are often not, which in turn is a source for change and reorganization.[13] Since many property theorists focus on the ideal categorical rights at the ideological level rather than on their actual expression in real relationships, it is not surprising that expected behaviour rarely matches reality.[14] Indeed, F von Benda-Beckmann (2001) has made an argument about property systems that is very similar to the point we raise about kin systems, which is that *categorical* status in kin systems tells us very little about the social, economic or ecological significance of actual *concretized* relationships and real behavioral patterns. We will return to this point below.

Once we have accepted that in however a flexible way, kinship rules do organize the way people are spread over resources, we can then go on to ask if these local maps are *more* adaptive (resilient, responsive, finely tuned?) than the ideological maps being introduced by development agencies and international power brokers such as the World Bank.[15] Even a superficial level of analysis, which is all we have space for here, shows significant differences. The introduced maps are usually focussed on individual freehold tenure, male-led nuclear family households, and involvement in mono-crop commercial/market production, with the entire assemblage backed up with an introduced normative order, or "legal reform." Is this assemblage more sustainable? The consensus in anthropology seems largely to be that it is not, primarily because it usually has a very poor fit with local patterns of production and of reproduction. There is also concern that these introductions can, in a very short time, be enormously destructive of long-established patterns of resource use and management.

But can we argue for the reverse, which is to say that we uncritically trust the local ways of doing things (or *metis*, as Scott, 1998 refers to it, after the Greek term for practice-based, situational knowledge)? Is this *metis* automatically beneficial, ecologically or socially, all the time and in all circumstances? The short answer for most anthropologists, is not necessarily, but perhaps. And that qualified answer depends very much on whether we have accurately reflected real behaviour patterns in our descriptions of other cultures, and have adequately understood their impact on the environment (F. von Benda-Beckmann, 2001: 294)

It is an irony that anthropologists are more loath these days to make firm causal connections between kin-

ship and property-style rights to territory or resources at the same time that various state courts are beginning to recognize the foundation of Native title in genealogical relationships over time (see Povinelli, 2002). Perhaps the two phenomena are related, as several points regarding state recognition of local kin organization have raised concerns among anthropologists. Povinelli, for example, notes that state recognition of Aboriginal rights in Australia has been based on a spiritual tie binding genealogically-related persons to territorially delimited spaces. However, any such genealogical system and its associated normative system must first be made intelligible to outsiders so that the cultural basis of any claim can be clearly tested by the courts.[16] Povinelli's analysis here echoes Scott, in that the legibility of cultural practices relies on a level of abstraction that *cannot* adequately represent reality, or more disturbingly, thoughtlessly creates a new reality through the application of formal technology (see Escobar, 1994). In the case of kinship, the "diagram" appears to exist prior to and independent of the social behaviours (including real life negotiations and conflicts about "proper" social identities, roles, and relations) which it tries to explicate. Povinelli's data brings to mind the anthropological debate about the use of an *a priori*, supposedly neutral genealogical diagram or grid as a tool to analyze and understand a system of kinship and its associated rights to land and to other property. Schneider (1984), for example, argued cogently that this grid is solely a Western phenomenon. If this is true, applying the grid uncritically to explicate the organization of other cultures could smuggle into the analysis our assumptions of what kinship, descent, and gender are all about. Although Schneider has been challenged (see especially Scheffler, 1973), even his harshest critics acknowledge that anthropologists have proceeded to use the genealogical grid to analyze kin relationships and related rights and duties without first establishing that it is appropriate to do so. To return to Povinelli, the abstraction resulting from this sort of analysis then gets injected into state legislation and absorbed into state forms of property. The important point for our discussion is the very real possibility that this state-recognized abstraction has been stripped of the very dynamic, fluid and flexible character that may have made it a key feature of non-Western ecological resilience.

We can further elucidate one of the concerns that Povinelli raises. The use of formal models for any analysis of social process may superimpose a hierarchy on the material that is not inherent in the social behaviour (Haraway, 2000). Our intent in mapping kinship-based rights onto landscapes was not to fetishize any kinship system. These systems are always "ongoing events" difficult to

capture in static concrete representation (ibid.: 119). To abstract from a dynamic social fabric, so that people are locked into particular relationships through the codified law of property rights may be exactly the type of "reverent literalness" that Haraway condemns (ibid.: 115).

Any sustainability that arises from kin organization is very situational, time-sensitive and context-specific, as has been demonstrated by recent work in the African Sahel. Han van Dijk (1996: 40) found an "amazing variety" of land tenure arrangements among Fulbe agro-pastoralists, all loosely based on lineage ideology but also particular not only to place, but also to time, in a region where ecological instability is a constant in the environment (see also Aswani, 1999). What worked in the 1950s and 1960s when the rains were abundant, would emphatically *not* work in the drought conditions of the late 1990s. The Fulbe patterns of rights and responsibilities are thus a negotiated order. Moreover, van Dijk credits "the exercise of power" as fundamental in the adjustments required to meet new environmental exigencies. Before the colonial period, this power was embodied in the local chief given his authority over land and pasture, a power that was highly context-specific and circumscribed by checks and balances within the kin system. Unfortunately, the rise of the Mali State has muddied the waters, particularly with introduced notions of rights in water and with state bureaucracy replacing local chiefs. Thus powers no longer so close to the situation are involved in resolving conflicts and awarding rights in ecological contexts they do not really understand, nor take the time to study.

"Cultural Capital" or Historical Product of Relations of Power?

Thus, a related problem in understanding the temporal dimension of kinship organization and ecological sustainability is the historically-contingent source of present-day kinship arrangements and the continuing role of power in their formation. What then are the ethical implications of an anthropological exercise to make such formations more visible? Given the emerging global importance of "cultural rights" (Brown, 1998; Cowan, Dembour and Wilson, 2001), this is a highly political issue. We can only touch on some of the parameters of the problem, and specifically on the tendency, both within anthropology and without, to naturalize historically contingent processes (Aswani, 1999). This in turn brings us to the question of inequality—built in or introduced—and to the difficulty of dealing with this question in anthropological model building.

In a recent article that addresses the rise of inegalitarian societies, Polly Wiessner (2002) provides an example of some of the pitfalls of naturalizing historic processes. She takes the stance that egalitarian societies do not represent a "slate of simplicity" on which status and power seeking individuals eventually leave their mark, but rather are formed of "complex institutions and ideologies created and maintain by cultural means which empower a coalition of the weaker to curb the strong" (ibid.: 235). However, she then goes on to argue that in the long run, such societies are not "maximally efficient" since they constrain competition and overemphasize redistribution (ibid.). Thus, "the seeds of inequality can take root only when the population stands to gain real benefits from stronger leadership" (ibid.: 234). Implicit in her analysis of the last 250 years of upland Enga cultural change is the driver of a "volatile social and natural environment" including rampant population growth and competition for resources (ibid.: 249n25). Thus, her work fits within a long anthropological tradition that views aggressively expansionist societies as somehow better adapted and thus more progressive.

In contrast, McKinnon (2000) challenges standard anthropological "theoretical domaining apparatus" to question our basic ability to recognize, much less analyze, egalitarian or hierarchical structures.[17] Tania Murray Li (2001b) also takes an explicitly historical approach to argue that power is often deployed in "boundary work"— or the process of constructing a separation between communities and what lies beyond—a process that anthropology gets caught up in (re)producing, and one that obscures the tight interconnections between the state and the non-state spaces within state territory, including minority ethnic communities. Conservationists, "green" developmentalists and human rights activists often turn to communities "because there is a hope and/or an assumption that they are (to varying degrees) different in their practices, motivations, or aspirations from the world beyond" (ibid: 163). One supposed difference is that their property systems focus attention on the longer—often multigenerational—time horizon (F. von Benda-Beckmann, 1979, 1999, 2001). However, when one turns to questions of power, Li (2001b: 163) asserts, it becomes difficult to ignore the ways in which "states and communities are not only mutually implicated, but in some respects (and for some purposes), inseparable" (see also Laura Nader, 1997). During the colonial period, state-local interaction often created the very local configurations that then became templates for anthropological notions of difference (Li, 2001b: 165). Further, anthropology often misread the way that the power relationships between state and local agents became a component of the power relationships *within* the local configuration.

The "matrilineal triangle" and other arguments about male power within matrilineal descent systems may exemplify this misreading process.[18] The traditional authority of women among the matrilineal Iroquois, for example, was approached as a "puzzle" (Randle, 1951), perhaps because of the wider symbolic field in which anthropology fitted "a preestablished compartment" as a discipline concerned with "the savage" (Trouillot, 1991). Thus, the "savage slot" formed a major component of the symbolic organization of the discipline. The role of matrilineal descent within evolutionary discourse is part of this "savage slot" and it can be argued that the entire "problem of matrilineality" came from this positioning. It was undoubtedly true that the problematic nature of matriliny was less apparent to those living within such systems until their behaviour had been disciplined within the colonial exercise. Masculine power in matrilineal systems may have emerged to facilitate the colonial state's business, and then became naturalized through subsequent anthropological models of matrilineality.

In redressing this problem in ethnographies that predated her work, Weiner argued that the actual status of Trobriand women derived from the perceived power they have to regenerate the matrilineage and to prevent lineage property from being lost through the exchanges of women's wealth at funeral ceremonies. She noted that whereas men's political control and power were perceived to relate to historical time, women were perceived to control immortality. Only they could reconstitute the lineage through conception, and recover its garden lands through the exchange of women's wealth. But is this reading of Trobriand kin and gender conceptions any "deeper" than the ones that went before?

Can we trust anthropological data on how specific kin systems work? In creating state property regimes, state bureaucrats have tended to award property rights to the most visible claimant rather than to the those who are deserving (Carol M. Rose, 1998). Kinship studies, whether resisting or enabling the deployment of colonial state power, were likely often captured by a similar process whereby state bureaucrats (re)inscribed kin group rights as if they were the rights of a single, highly visible individual, usually male (see also Wiber, 1991: 478). On the other hand, some level of inequality *is* clearly intrinsic to the modern-day functioning of many kinship systems. What is its role? How does it affect sustainability? Rousseau (2001) has suggested that inequality provides room to maneuver so that power can be exercised in pursuit of group goals through political leadership. Are the ecological and the political then directly connected in the way in which Rappaport (1968) so long ago proposed?

More specifically, if one of the functions of leadership is the stewardship of resources, what role does situational power with its foundations within a kin group, play in guiding resource use?

We argue that if they are left to resolve their own problems, local people will probably find ways to match people to resources sustainably, and ways of restricting the abuse of power within a hedge of kin obligations and duties (Ames, 1981; Moore, 1997: 390). Further, these solutions might be more resilient in the long run than the cookie-cutter solutions of Western developers. However, this kin-based inequality may come at some cost to our notions of individual human rights and equality.[19] Particularly when women's rights are concerned, this may be a politically untenable approach, and the result may be the generation of more heat than light from those focussed on social justice (Hernandez, 2002). The potential trade-off is difficult to examine objectively not only because of this political sensitivity, but also because history has left insufficient evidence to provide a definitive answer on the origin of inequality. We cannot know how a kinship system, unsullied by colonial power relations, may have husbanded ecological resources differently, and with what loss of equality in gender rights, or in the rights of different age categories.

Conclusions: Ethics, Legibility and the Exercise of State Power

Anthropologists have long debated how to deal with the situation whenever anthropological methods and materials can make local people more vulnerable to external agents (Pels, 1999; D'Andrade, 1995). The increasing numbers of applied anthropologists, often working for corporate, state, and international or development-aid agencies, have contributed to the controversy (Brosius, 1999; Kirsch, 2002). This brings us back to the question of whether or not we should map kinship systems and make more legible their possible role in resource management, even if such maps appear on the surface to support arguments for resilient cultural capital, or more concrete and mundane arguments of land claims and political rights. Several ethical difficulties plague the exercise.

First, if the state needs legibility as part of its exercise of power as Scott (1998) argues, making the highly context-specific and mutable local arrangements more visible may only increase state power, which will probably not be used for local benefit. We can be optimistic or pessimistic here. Scott argues that high modernism and the state need for legibility only become a problem when paired with a weak civil society and a government that tends towards authoritarianism; in the right hands, the state legibility exercise

allows us to more successfully control new diseases, environmental risks and perhaps mass transportation. On the other hand, fishermen that Wiber has been working with on the eastern coast of Canada are often pessimistic. Many of them reject the digital mapping of their local knowledge about fish nurseries and stock migration patterns. They argue the resulting heightened visibility will only harm their interests by making them more vulnerable to state control and competing sectors of the fishing industry.[20] Scott also notes that the state not only simplifies in order to make legible, but also charts future behaviour based on its simplifications, thus making so what it only theorized at the outset, a pattern of which fishermen are well aware. Fishermen know that increased knowledge about the resource base contributes to government agendas to privatize the right to fish, making the rights embedded in the private property more valuable through quantification. Povinelli notes that this state-sponsored simplification is usually followed by a process of normalization; that process, in turn, "draws up the ladder" and leaves us trying to live in an abstraction.[21]

A related problem involves the role of scientist as objective observer and recorder. As one reviewer of Scott observed:

> If the main problem with high-modernist ideology is that it is bad science or abstract, laboratory science, might one not call for better science, more engaged science, more informed planners? (Yoffee, 2001: 768)

If anthropology had failed to provide richly detailed ethnographic research on non-Western kinship, property systems, and local adaptations one might be swayed by this argument. However, we suspect that a lot of good science simply gets ignored as being too complex to deal with. As Scott notes, bureaucrats require simplifying models for very specific reasons having to do with the exercise of power and control of behavior. Knowledge which is richly detailed, and that demands attention to context specific ethnographic description will simply not fit such needs.

A more complex set of ethical questions is also posed by the possibility of anthropological mapping of kinship systems. As Rowlands (2001: 9) notes, recent trends to legalize the heretofore-moral right to cultural survival have some very negative implications, such that: "If culture is increasingly a form of capital to substantiate rights claims, then disputes over the authorization and legitimization of cultural rights are inevitable."

Rowlands is concerned with how cultural rights discourse enters into and changes the legal definition of ownership and of property. Anthropologists have long

recognized another closely-related concern. For example, what *is* culture, and more importantly, who will *authenticate* it? Anthropologists may be accused at one and the same time of both undercutting the cultural authority of indigenous peoples by speaking about "invented tradition," and of endorsing a static and unchanging cultural package that keeps a people from experiencing "development."

And there is the related problem of the complex audience waiting to use anthropological constructs. Li (1999, 2001) suggests that much of the work of anthropology feeds into constructions of the other that are manipulated by many agents (local, state and international) in the power struggle over resources. For example, she notes that both environmentalists and state forestry officials in Indonesia picture the upland swiddeners in much the same way; they simply put different values on the construct. Some green activists see the ultimate environmental solution as the total removal of humans from the landscape, an objective that some state officials in Indonesia would endorse provided that state resource extraction was thus facilitated. If you think about Scott's arguments regarding the ideology of "high modernism" (faith in the power of science to logically transform and socially engineer society), then green environmentalism begins to appear—along with neo-liberal modernization— as just another form of high modernism. As a transformative map for the future, both are untenable.

How then do we strike a balance between sensitivity to local arrangements and sustainable resource management without threatening both? While a number of scholars (Berkes and Folke, 1998; Berkes, Colding and Folke, 2003) have recently suggested an exploration and an exploitation of the cultural capital of local groups, we have reservations. We have identified a number of difficulties and pitfalls, including naturalizing history, re-elevating the concept of the neutral, scientific observer and downplaying local complexity. However, our concerns about the concept of cultural capital do not automatically suggest any concrete solutions. Adding kinship to the concept, for example, and substantiating its significance through formal modelling, seems on the surface to be useful—but a deeper analysis raises many methodological and ethical questions. While it is clearly possible to provide formal mapping of the way kinship systems theoretically distribute their members across available resources, the exercise may not capture real flexibility, and indeed, may undermine it. And further, it will involve complex ethical issues that should not be lightly dismissed.

We conclude then that there are several contributions that anthropology can make to the concept of cultural

capital. One is that so long as kinship is not part of the calculation, important components of local arrangements will be entirely missed. Another is that anthropologists have much to contribute to an awareness of the pitfalls and deep ethical waters involved in developing and in applying the concept of cultural capital. While we might be tempted to promote the value of our highly specialized knowledge on the kinship and property systems of other cultures, we must be careful at the same time to convey the deep ethical dilemmas that plague making use of such knowledge.

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Notes

1 This paper was originally presented at the International Congress of the Commission on Legal Pluralism and Folk Law, Chiang Mai, Thailand, April 2002. We would like to thank the members of that congress for their helpful comments.

2 Few of the contributions in Berkes and Folke (1998), for example, make more than passing reference to kinship in order to elucidate important human/environment interactions in the non-Western setting. More importantly, such work employs what has been called a universalizing "big four" property model that assigns all non-Western property arrangements to one of the following impoverished categories: state, individual, commons or open access (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1992).

3 These flaws also appear in many publications on ethnoecological classification, where political history and especially intertribal conflict is usually absent from the explanations for toponyms (but compare Johnson, 2000 with Cruikshank, 1998).

4 GIS "is a sophisticated database management system designed for the acquisition, manipulation, visualization, management and display of spatially referenced (or geographic) data" (Aldenderfer, 1996: 4). Cone tree software allows for the on-screen manipulation of heirarchical data sets (including kinship diagrams) in a three dimensional way, so that the operator can sequentially focus on both specific detail (nuclear family) and wider context (lineage). Combining GIS and cone tree software could allow for the computerized mapping of kin-based rights in resources onto a geographic image of the landscape, thereby linking specific units of a kin group (nuclear family) with specific resource sites (a fishing weir).

5 This is a separate concept from Robert Putnam's social capital, but there are similar problems in both concepts (see Putzel, 1997).

6 For overviews see Merry, 1988 and Griffiths, 2002.

7 Following Hirsch and O'Hanlan (1995), we view space and place as important concepts linking anthropological analysis to other disciplines interested in how space is defined, constructed, utilized and theorized by various human populations. Several of the contributions in that book focus on kinship.

8 Most of us are familiar with classic studies such as Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Fortes, 1949; Rappaport, 1968; Weiner, 1976. For more recent studies see the working paper series of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, especially those produced by the property unit under the directorship of Chris Hann, which is largely focussing on postsocialist states (available at http://www.eth.mpg.de). See also Ziker (2003).

9 McKinnon (2000) revisits African unilineal descent among the Nuer and offers both a reevaluation of Evans-Pritchard's analysis of patrilineality, and of Nuer egalitarian political organization.

10 Spatial and temporal issues are important variables to keep in mind in this connection. See Wiber (2001). This is discussed in more detail later in the paper.

11 See J. Libby Jr. and D. Bradley (2000) for an example of how difficult perpetuity is to structure into a non-kin property-holding group under current U.S. property law. Their discussion focusses on housing and ecological "land trusts" in Vermont and on the difficulties of bundling private property rights in a way that allows for a balance of individual and group interests.

12 Despite ongoing criticism of systems theory in anthropology, and of functionalism in more general terms, it is useful to outline our view, which relies on Gouldner (1967: 151) and Sally Falk Moore (1978). Both posit a concept of functional autonomy and asymmetrical reciprocity between part and system, and therefore creative tension-producing relationships (see also Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, 2002). The level of autonomy of any part is a matter of empirical research, as is the adaptive function of either the parts or the whole. A great deal of recent ecological scholarship, on the other hand, is retrograde since it relies rather uncritically on universalizing notions of environmental and economic needs that the functional traits of selected traditional systems have supposedly addressed more successfully (see Wiber, 2001).

13 Other layers can be distinguished, as in Alexander (2001) where she speaks of the nested nature of property systems and their dependence on other systemic features of social organization.

14 As Elliston (2000: 185-86) notes, the relationship between kin group and land tenure in the Pacific focussed exactly on this point—and the resulting confusion occupied two decades of work on Pacific kin systems, "working through the inability of African models to account for the practices of kinship in Polynesian societies." What the models were unable to account for was flexibility in membership status, behaviour as an index of kinship, and propinquity or proximity as central to authorizing genealogies, thus instantiating kinship and activating land claims (ibid.).

15 Shanafelt (2002: 18) notes that one anthropological standard for evaluating beliefs and practices pertains to function, as when a practice "can be shown to be an important component of a functioning cultural system." On the other hand: "something may be evaluated in the negative if it can be shown to be maladaptive or obsolete." Shanafelt's posi-

tion illuminates how the functionalist stance implicitly accepts the political ramifications of *the power to decide*.

16 Cruikshank (1998: 21), for example, refers to the way that Yukon land selection forced Natives to enroll in only one First Nation, despite the fact that they could legitimately claim membership in several communities—an arbitrary and ultimately stagnant notion of cultural rights was thus fixed not only in genealogy, but onto geographic space.

17 It is interesting to note that neither Wiessner nor McKinnon question the fundamental relationship between kin organization and access to resources.

18 See Scheffler (1991) on the wider issues.

19 Scott (1998) asserts that individual rights and notions of political equality were concepts developed purely to further the state agenda of creating equally *visible* subjects for purposes of state control. Thus, for example, the strong sense of individual identity, the foundation of international human rights, is backed up with birth certificates, identity cards and state mapping apparatus of all types.

20 There is good reason to be cautious. Cruickshank (1998: 66) describes how similar mapping projects for trappers in the Canadian north were later interpreted as the firm boundaries separating groups. As she notes, such exercises can promote hierarchy and inequality, set communities in competition over scarce resources, and fix patterns of land use.

21 Such abstractions are especially problematic when genealogical criteria for claims are complex, nuanced and contestable (Cruikshank, 1998: 145, 154). In such cases, bureaucratic inability to deal with complexity may mean that some people may not be easily "mapped into" state apparatus, leaving them abandoned outside the land claim or political redress process.

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Book Reviews / Comptes rendus

Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius et Werner Rothengatter, *Megaprojects and Risk. An Anatomy of Ambition,* Cambridge University Press, 2003, 207 pages.

Recenseur : *Paul Charest*
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Le sujet de ce livre n'a probablement pas grand intérêt pour la majorité des anthropologues, même pour ceux qui comme moi travaillent en anthropologie appliquée dans le domaine de l'analyse des impacts sociaux des projets de développement de différentes natures. Il concerne principalement les gestionnaires de projets, les administrateurs et preneurs de décision dans des organismes publics, les économistes et les politologues. Il n'y est pas véritablement question d'impacts sociaux et culturels dans un sens large, même si la thématique pourrait s'y prêter. Sous le terme de risques ce sont les questions de coûts et de prises de décision politique et administratives qui intéressent essentiellement les auteurs. L'abondante bibliographie d'une vingtaine de pages laisse d'ailleurs peu de place à des ouvrages de sociologues ou anthropologues (v.g. Boothroyd, Giddens) et, même si j'y suis cité, c'est uniquement parce que le titre d'un de mes textes comporte le mot *megaprojects* (Charest, 1995). Des auteur majeurs dans le domaine de l'évaluation des impacts sociaux comme Kurt Finstersbush ou Michael Cernea sont ignorés, de même que l'ouvrage clé de Mary Douglas sur la question du risque environnemental.

En fait, il s'agit d'un livre très technique qui s'adresse à un nombre assez restreint de spécialistes des grands projets de développement essentiellement dans le secteur des transports : autoroutes, chemins de fer, tunnels, ponts. Malheureusement, il y est très peu question d'autres types de mégaprojets, tels les développement hydroélectriques auxquels je m'intéresse plus particulièrement, même s'il est explicitement mentionné dans l'introduction que différents projets autres que des projets de transport seront aussi abordés. De façon plus pointue encore, seuls trois grands projets de transport—uniquement européens—sont au centre de la plupart des analyses détaillées présentées en une dizaine de courts chapitres de 10 à 15 pages abondamment illustrés de tableaux et de figures : le tunnel sous la manche, la Grande Ceinture

(Great Belt) entre le Danemark et l'Allemagne et le lien Oresund entre la Suède et le Danemark. Le fait que les auteurs soient respectivement danois, suédois et allemand explique sûrement ces choix. D'autres mégaprojets réalisés dans d'autres pays non européens (v.g. États-Unis, Japon, Mexique) sont mentionnés dans certains tableaux (vg. tableaux 2 et 4) et de façon succincte dans le texte à titre comparatif, mais il s'agit presque toujours de projets de transport.

Comme l'indique le titre, la notion de *risque* est au centre des préoccupations des auteurs, mais celle-ci n'est pas véritablement définie dans le texte et on ne trouve pas non plus d'entrée à *risk definition* dans l'index. Dans le premier chapitre, il est toutefois affirmé en référence à deux sociologues (Anthony Giddens et Ulrich Beck) que la société moderne est devenue une «société de risques» occasionnant de plus en plus de débats (p. 6). Et le paradoxe des grands projets, selon les auteurs, est qu'ils se multiplient malgré les piètres résultats de nombre d'entre eux. Les principales causes de cette situation seraient des débats inadéquats sur leur niveau de risque et le manque d'imputabilité dans le processus de prise de décision. C'est pour cette raison que deux autres concepts analytiques majeurs sont associés à celui du risque: soit ceux de *démocratie* et de *pouvoir* (p. 6-7). Ainsi, la plupart des mégaprojets sont le résultat d'une association entre politiciens et autres preneurs de décision et de gens d'affaires qui recherchent plutôt leurs intérêts propres que ceux des citoyens, bien qu'ils soient présentés officiellement comme les premiers bénéficiaires. Pour parvenir à leur fins ces décideurs essaient d'écarter le plus possible les citoyens de la prise de décision tout en surestimant les retombées positives et en minimisant les coûts et retombées négatives. Il y a donc souvent une manipulation de la prise de décision par les promoteurs politiques et économique des grands projets.

La nouvelle démarche décisionnelle proposée par les auteurs consiste, au contraire, à réaliser des analyses en profondeur des différents types de risques (financier, environnemental, sécuritaire) associés au grands projets à travers un processus comportant une vingtaine d'étapes successives (p. 126-127). Selon les auteurs, les remèdes pour rendre le processus décisionnel plus équilibré au profit de l'ensemble des citoyens sont au nombre de quatre :

1. Mettre le risque et l'imputabilité au centre de la prise de décision;
2. Réorganiser le partage des responsabilités entre le public et le privé;
3. Assurer l'imputabilité par les mesures suivantes : (a) la transparence dans l'information; (b) la spécification de la performance en fonction d'objectifs; (c) la formulation explicite d'un mécanisme de contrôle; (d) la participation du privé au capital de risque.
4. L'utilisation de deux modèles différents d'imputabilité selon le type de gestion de projet : propriété de l'état; (b) construit et opéré par le privé, puis transféré à l'état (p. 138-140).

L'application de ces principes devrait assurer une prise de décision impliquant l'ensemble de la société civile concernée et assurant que les différentes catégories de risques et l'imputabilité à la fois des promoteurs économiques et politiques soient incorporées dans celle-ci. Les auteurs n'expliquent pas de façon générale comment et par qui ces principes—auxquels on ne peut que souscrire on nom d'une meilleure démocratie—pourraient être mis en place et observés. Cependant, un exemple donné en appendice concernant un projet de lien routier entre le Danemark et l'Allemagne (Fehrmarn Belt) à travers la mer Baltique et dans lequel les auteurs ont été directement impliqués démontre qu'il est possible de les mettre concrètement en application dans un cas ponctuel.

Référence

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Molly Lee and Gregory A. Reinhardt with a Foreword by Andrew Tooyak, Jr., *Eskimo Architecture: Dwelling and Structure in the Early Historic Period,* Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2003, xii + 200 pages.

Reviewer: *Peter C. Dawson*
University of Calgary

In "Eskimo Architecture," Lee and Reinhardt present us with what may be the first real synthesis of Inuit/Eskimo architecture across the circumpolar world, from the time of Frobisher (1577) to the modern era. Although primarily descriptive in nature, this wonderful book systematically examines Inuit and Eskimo house forms from Greenland, the Central Arctic, Northwest Alaska and Bering Strait, Southwest Alaska, Siberia, and the Pacific Eskimo Zone. Within each of these culture areas, the house forms built and used by various groups are categorized and discussed according to seasonal and/or ritual usage. Lee and Reinhardt do an admirable job mining the ethnographic and ethnohistoric literature for detailed information on construction materials, design principles, and the spatial organization of domestic activities and people. Indeed, their thoroughness makes this book an invaluable source for Arctic archaeologists interested in the evolution of circumpolar architecture.

What immediately becomes apparent as one reads "Eskimo Architecture" is the incredible diversity of house types found across the Arctic. From the stilt houses of King Island in the Bering Straight region to the unique domed tents of the Nunamiut of interior Alaska, Lee and Reinhardt successfully challenge the idea that the architectural ingenuity of circumpolar peoples was restricted to the snow house. While the authors explain that the objective of their book is to describe rather than theorize about Inuit/Eskimo architecture, all regional sections include a discussion of the spatial organization and patterns of housekeeping practised by various groups, as well as the rituals and beliefs associated with each dwelling type. Out of this emerges some interesting information about the social dimensions and cultural meanings affixed to these house forms. For example, Lee and Reinhardt cite Boas' (1904) observation that although various types of houses appear prominently in Central Inuit string games, there is a notable absence of character myths that account for their origins. This distinguishes them from other Native American cultures such as the Navajo, where the origins of the hogan (traditional Navajo house form) are explained in the Navajo house blessing ceremony. One might speculate that the reasons for this lie partially in the impermanent nature of Central Inuit house forms like the snow house.

One of the most intriguing sections of the book deals with special purpose structures used by many Inuit/Eskimo groups for female seclusion during menstruation and childbirth. In reading the descriptions of these unique dwellings, one wonders how many of these structures have been encountered by archaeologists and misinterpreted as childrens' playhouses. Lee and Reinhardt also discuss the use of death huts among some groups to house individuals who were sick and/or terminally ill. Citing accounts by Parry (1812) and Lyon (1824), the authors suggest that the practice of placing a sick individual inside a sealed snow house lit by a single lamp may have been used to impart a quick and human end through carbon monoxide poisoning.

In addition to descriptions of raw materials and construction materials, Lee and Reinhardt touch upon issues relating to energy efficiency, air quality, and lighting. Unfortunately, most of this information is restricted to early European descriptions of the interiors of these dwellings that inevitably rely heavily on such adjectives as "filthy," and "evil-smelling." What does come across, however, is the importance of the lamp as a source of light, heat, and gender identity throughout the circumpolar world.

All through the book, Lee and Reinhardt make excellent use of historic photographs and drawings of the various houses they discuss. They are well captioned, and add substantially to

the textual descriptions provided. In the concluding section, the authors provide a useful comparative synthesis of the architectural features shared by dwellings across the Arctic. This synthesis, coupled with the detailed summaries of houses provided throughout the book, should provide an excellent point of departure for Arctic researchers interested in further exploring the structural and social dimensions of circumpolar architecture. For the lay reader, Lee and Reinhardt have produced a highly informative and enjoyable book that illustrates the important link between house form and culture.

Alison Wylie, *Thinking from Things: Essays in the Philosophy of Archaeology*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002, 357 pages.

Reviewer: *Erika Evasdottir*
Columbia University

One of the most enduring—and endearing—consequences of the New Archaeology is that it continues to make people think long and hard about the nature of archaeology, the questions it can and cannot answer, and the goals it ought to have in a changing world. Alison Wylie has produced a marvelous catalogue of all the ways in which New Archaeology has made her think over the years. She thereby exemplifies the possibilities engendered by the combination of theory and practice and shows throughout the value of inquiry to the discipline. Students of anthropology as well as archaeology would do well to read this book not so much for the substance, but as an example of how to be a curious, well rounded, and—above all—a thinking archaeologist.

Wylie begins her tale in 1973, in the summer after her first year of undergraduate studies, at the excavations at Fort Walsh, Saskatchewan. Archaeology was then a discipline deep in the throes of the revolutions begun in the late 1960s by the New Archaeologists. In reading her account it struck me how funny, almost quaint, the rhetoric of New Archaeology seems today, more than 30 years on, and how deeply misplaced the urgency of its posturing. Yet nevertheless, Wylie manages also to convey—and to remind those of us who have forgotten—the excitement of feeling like one was truly participating in a revolution. It was a time that made thinking acceptable, fun, and productive. The process of thinking itself became a site of competition and struggle. Archaeology had till then never been (or seen itself as) an oasis for the practical, taciturn, rugged outdoorsy type; perhaps we first needed a 1950s male-oriented "science" of archaeology in order to break down the contempt felt for the effete armchair thinker before we could move on to find creativity, diversity, and even room for the traditional male ego in more complex theories. For being the true proximate cause of the flowering of the many schools of archaeology that followed, Wylie reminds us to feel ungrudging gratitude for even the most acerbic of the New Archaeologists.

To anyone who prefers the polemical statement, Wylie's writing can be frustrating because it is, and has always been, marked by a calm, even tone that refuses the rhetorics of extremist posturing or the grandiose statement. She refuses to ally herself with any school in particular. She is fundamentally confident in the persistent resistance of the archaeological record to the play of theory, but she is no processualist. Her basic certainty does not stop her from reading newer and more complex theories and reaching to the feminists, the interpretivists, and the critical theorists, but she is certainly no postprocessualist. Wylie's school is the middle road: the work of archaeologists may be more complex than heretofore expected, but it is both possible and worth doing and, most importantly, new knowledge about the past can indeed be accumulated. In Wylie's mind, everyone and every theory has something important to contribute to archaeology's common task. While each idea spurs her to consider the situation from a different angle, she never loses her own sense of where she stands on the basic issues.

That sense of certainty combined with the ability to see something important in every theory is a rare and laudable trait. She is therefore the ideal narrator to walk us through the rise and fall of New Archaeology since it is a tale marked by immoderate statements ranging from grand unified theory to the end of the possibility of knowledge itself. Wylie refrains from making fun of words that strike us now as simply silly, but rather shows the truly interesting issues and problems with which the speaker was grappling and explains how the answers are far more complex than their odd vocabulary may suggest. It is as if she is translating a 16th-century English play full of words that mislead because they seem familiar but whose context must be supplied before they can be understood.

Although the first main chapter does set the scene from a chronological standpoint, the book is not a slave to the order of things (pun intended). Wylie breaks the book into topics and weaves in older, already published essays with new commentaries or essays to show the range of issues and answers each topic brings up. Within each topic, the chronology and context of what was going on at any given time is provided and the topics themselves are wholly well researched. What is perhaps the most useful part of the book for a student is that Wylie provides an encyclopedic list of all the major names and actors in each topic and debate. As for a more established archaeologist, to teach "Intro to Archaeological theory" using this book would be a breeze—Wylie not only provides all the relevant citations but gives a short and easily digested version of each person's position. For that alone, we must be grateful, and the fact that Wylie's writing is clear, her précis apposite, and her compilation complete is merely an added benefit.

The problems with the book are not Wylie's; on the whole, I was unimpressed by how ugly the book is and the font choice was frankly annoying and confusing. I found myself searching to figure out which essays were written when (their dates are cleverly disguised) and which was written solely for this book. Are these criticisms too picky? I would say not, since I found

my first glance through the book difficult and off-putting and students, as we know quite well, are far too easily off-put. Since I think this book's chief contribution to be the opening up of history to students, and since the book is clearly a compilation of Wylie's own intellectual history, I find it frustrating that the book is difficult to use and appears almost deliberately to hide the most important building blocks of history (time, dates, context).

For older archaeologists who can remember when, it is indeed a particular delight to see the earlier essays again. Yet it is also true that seeing them in this context rather changes their meaning. When they were new, and written in reaction to events happening at the time, they were further evidence of a thriving discipline in an exciting era; now, they are themselves symbols of accreted time and an indication that Wylie herself has reached doyenne status (and all the more power to her). In comparison with the tales told in this book, archaeology now appears quiescent; it seems that the exciting times are truly over. Wylie's characteristic lack of passion in her writing does fail in one regard, then, which is to fail to incite students today to jump into the fray and generate something as interesting as New Archaeology compelled us to do all those years ago.

Jeannine Koubi : *Histoires d'enfants exposés. Pays toradja, Sulawesi, Indonésie.* Paris : Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003, Collection Asie, 428 pages.

Recenseure : *Marie-Pier Girard*
Université Laval

La mise en graphe de la littérature orale constitue un défi considérable car il s'agit de rendre compte du style direct de la parole, de capter sur papier le rythme cadencé du verbe. Dans son ouvrage *Histoires d'enfants exposés*, Jeannine Koubi relève ce défi en présentant une anthologie de mythes et de contes tirés de la littérature orale des Toradja de l'île de Sulawesi en Indonésie. Ces récits, minutieusement transcrits et traduits, traitent de l'exposition enfantine, un thème qui n'est pas sans rappeler les péripéties du petit Poucet, d'Oedipe et de ses émules, ainsi que les aventures de Hansel et Gretel. En fait, nombreux sont les enfants exposés, qui, comme ceux rencontrés en traversant l'univers imaginaire toradja, font figure de héros dans des contes et récits mythiques.

Cette traversée du monde toradja débute par un survol historique et ethnographique du contexte de production des narrations présentées. Quoique brève, cette section introductive permet d'explorer certaines dimensions fondamentales à la compréhension des contes, dont les multiples célébrations rituelles, la vision de l'enfance et la littérature de «[...] cette civilisation de l'oralité [où] la parole conserve toute sa puissance et [où] on préfère se taire plutôt que de mal dire» (p. 31). En plus de montrer comment cette sacralité de la parole est actua-lisée dans les narrations, l'auteure décrit le caractère haute-ment stratifié de la société toradja, la complexité de son système rituel, ainsi que la place privilégiée qu'y occupent les enfants.

Ensuite, le périple entrepris nous amène à faire successi-vement la connaissance de l'enfant qui devait mourir (Datu Ruang), de la petite fille enceinte, de l'enfant qui n'a pas connu son père (Panggalo'-galo'), de la fille à la dentition singulière (Sangbidang), de l'enfant à la paume velue (Bulu Pala'), de la fille qui crachait de l'or (Timbura'Bulawan), des enfants au gilet de fibres (Babu'Solong), de la fille qui adorait tisser (Tula-didi'/Tulangdidi'), des benjamins (Labokko/Labongkona), et enfin, des orphelins. Dans tous les cas, les héros enfantins se voient exposés au sens mythique du terme, c'est-à-dire placés dans une situation périlleuse en raison de leur différence, de leur a-normalité, telle la possession d'une dentition singulière ou le fait de parler en crachant de l'or. L'enfant particulier, souvent perçu comme une menace potentielle pour son village d'origine, est alors condamné à mort par son père ou par les puissances surnaturelles et abandonné dans un lieu lointain renfermant d'innombrables et d'insondables dangers. Cette exposition constitue dans la plupart des contes toradja le point de départ des aventures des enfants qui, le plus souvent seuls, devront affronter ogres, ogresses et animaux féroces que renferment les denses forêts indonésiennes, endroit de prédilec-tion du bannissement et de l'errance dans l'imaginaire toradja.

En fait, comme le mentionne Jeannine Koubi, l'enfant exposé, invariablement victime de parents indignes ou d'aînés jaloux, est l'être fragile par excellence, infiniment démuni et vulnérable face au danger (p. 239). Mais si l'enfant se retrouve indubitablement en danger de mort, il est également cru mort par ses proches qui effectuent les rites de deuil appropriés, et surtout par sa mère, qui le pleure inlassablement, complète-ment affligée par le départ prématuré et provoqué de son enfant chéri. Expulsé du cadre familial et rejeté du monde des humains, l'enfant exposé expérimente certes la mort sociale, mais trouvera aussi dans certains cas la mort physique. L'in-fanticide est donc accompli, mais il ne sera que temporairement maintenu car celui-ci se révèle foncièrement instrumental per-mettant une transition vers une nouvelle existence, source de richesse, d'épanouissement et de bonheur pour l'enfant exposé. Cependant, il n'en est pas de même pour le village natal de l'en-fant qui voit s'abattre sur lui les pires calamités qu'on avait pourtant cru écarter par l'exposition de l'enfant. Ainsi, c'est l'éloignement de l'enfant de son village par son exposition, et non pas sa présence parmi les siens, qui se convertit en la cause même du fléau si redouté. Donc, qu'il soit ramené à la vie ou qu'il échappe à la mort, le héros enfantin des contes toradja, soit «celui qui porte malheur» (p. 246), devient, grâce et suite à son exposition, non seulement une personne influente et puissance, mais aussi un être bienfaiteur, bref celui qui porte chance.

Un tel revirement témoigne de la dimension positive confé-rée à l'exposition enfantine, les narrations proposées permet-tant de réaffirmer à l'ensemble de la civilisation toradja que

l'enfant constitue un don précieux et que même s'il possédait une dentition singulière ou s'il parlait en crachant de l'or, sa différence devrait être acceptée et représenterait un signe de grande fortune. À ce titre, dans l'épilogue où une fine analyse de la structure, du contenu et des significations des récits est élaborée par l'auteure, celle-ci signale : «Ainsi par le truchement d'histoires agréables à conter et à écouter, la société tente-t-elle de gérer les différences entre les individus, les inégalités sociales et économiques» (p. 249).

Si, comme le spécifie Jeannine Koubi, ces histoires sont agréables à conter et à écouter, elles se révèlent également fort agréables à lire. La double traduction, c'est-à-dire de la parole à l'écriture puis de la langue toradja au français, est méticuleusement effectuée et nous permet de nous laisser transporter sans difficulté dans cet autre univers, de se retrouver dans la situation de l'auditoire toradja afin d'y reconnaître la performance des différents conteurs. L'auteure fait d'ailleurs preuve d'un grand respect face aux voix multiples de ceux-ci, présentant dans la plupart des cas plusieurs versions d'une même histoire, exprimées par des conteurs de tous âges et offrant en annexe, en hommage aux conteurs disparus, leurs récits en langue vernaculaire. Si la thématique de l'enfant exposé renvoie à une pluralité de paroles et de narrations, elle s'avère également, comme le spécifie Koubi, susceptible de plusieurs lectures et de multiples interprétations, une diversité que l'auteure réussit à appréhender tant dans la présentation des récits que dans l'analyse qui y est proposée.

En fait, Jeannine Koubi nous présente dans son ouvrage un florilège de récits anciens qui pourraient éventuellement permettre d'entreprendre une étude comparative, mais qui, pour l'instant, permettent surtout d'apprécier, en silence bien sûr comme il se doit dans la tradition toradja, la richesse des histoires d'enfants exposés qui sont racontées au crépuscule lors de veillées à l'île de Sulawesi.

Marcel Detienne (dir.) *Qui veut prendre la parole ?* (*Le Genre humain*, no. 40-41), Paris, Seuil, 2003, 433 pages.

Recenseur: *Éric Gagnon*
Université Laval

De l'antique royaume mésopotamien de Mari à la France révolutionnaire, des communautés monastiques du Japon médiéval aux assemblées secrètes des Sénoufo de la Côte d'Ivoire, depuis longtemps et en de multiples endroits, des pratiques d'assemblée ont été imaginées. «Lieux d'égalité», où les hommes délibèrent des affaires communes (commerce, diplomatie, guerre), ces assemblées ont semblé à l'historien et helléniste Marcel Detienne un excellent objet de comparaison pour comprendre la nature du *politique*. Une vingtaine d'anthropologues, d'historiens et de politologues ont ainsi été réunis, chacun appelé à décrire une pratique d'assemblée particulière.

La collection d'études qui en résulte est d'un grand intérêt. On y découvre une diversité des modes d'assemblée, considérés sous différents angles : le principe de représentation des membres, le type d'accord recherché (généralement l'unanimité), l'ordre selon lequel est distribuée la parole, ou encore la manière dont le lieux et la forme de l'assemblée (cercle, hémicycle ou Maison commune) impose des contraintes de significations (égalité de la parole, recherche de l'intérêt général, discussion argumentée ou modération des passions). La première conclusion à laquelle conduit cet ensemble est le renoncement à une vision selon laquelle il y aurait une seule origine de l'assemblée démocratique (la Grèce), et que celle-ci s'est développée de façon linéaire, suivant une ligne d'évolution. Les lieux de débats dans un espace ouvert, où l'on discute des questions communes, souvent en cherchant à faire abstraction des solidarités lignagères, de l'origine sociale et des intérêts privés des participants, ont existé à des époques très éloignées les unes des autres et dans des sociétés très diverses, parfois sur de longues périodes, parfois brièvement avant d'être abolis par un pouvoir royal ou la conquête.

Qu'ont en commun le mouvement communal en Italie entre les XIe et XIIIe siècles, les maisons d'assemblée des îles formant aujourd'hui la république de Kiribati dans le Pacifique, et le droit de réunion dans la nouvelle Afrique du Sud? Detienne parle d'«expériences de commencement», d'expériences du politique «à la fois moins complexes et plus ouverts que des états institutionnels développés» (p. 15). Le mot «commencement» est ambiguë, plus intuitif que descriptif. Certaines des assemblées décrites ont eu une longue vie. Si l'on veut parler d'émergence du politique comme activité distincte, l'assemblée témoigne autant de son institutionnalisation, que de son essor, le commencement ne pouvant être confondu avec les origines. Plusieurs formes d'assemblée coïncident avec une rupture importante de l'ordre social (la Révolution française ou la formation d'une société nouvelle par les serfs du Caucase fuyant l'esclavage seigneurial), mais c'est loin de toujours être le cas. Le point commun semble plutôt celui de la souveraineté du groupe. L'intuition de Detienne me semble proche de l'hypothèse de Pierre Clastres : ces assemblées ont pour effet, sinon pour fonction, d'empêcher l'accaparement du pouvoir par un seul ou par un groupe (une famille ou une classe). La manière, par exemple, dont les cosaques signifient au chef, au moment de son élection, qu'il est le serviteur de la communauté et non l'inverse, ou la manière dont les Ochollo, par des rites et dans les pratiques d'assemblée, rappellent aux dignitaires leur subordination à la collectivité, renforcent cette hypothèse. *A contrario*, la manière dont les pouvoirs centraux cherchent à limiter ou abolir ces réunions est également significatif. Le peuple n'est jamais docile pour le Prince, surtout lorsque réunit en assemblée. Mais toutes les expériences décrites ne témoignent pas, loin s'en faut, de la même liberté et égalité des participants, ni du même pouvoir de l'assemblée.

Dans ces lieux d'égalité, émerge une certaine individualité. Celui qui parle se distingue souvent par sa maîtrise de parole,

il se singularise, et acquiert une certaine autonomie par rapport au groupe. Longtemps l'«individu» a pu ainsi émerger, mais à certains moments et dans certains lieux, dont ces assemblées, où curieusement la discussion portait sur les questions communes! Mais ce n'est bien sûr pas la citoyenneté abstraite du sujet occidental, le sujet appelé à se défaire de toutes ses appartenances, et à juger selon la Raison et sa conscience personnelle. Ces assemblées, on ne s'en surprendra pas, ont toutes pour fonction première de «faire» la communauté, de maintenir l'identité et l'unité du groupe, de surmonter les divisions. L'assemblée «suppose une véritable maîtrise de la coordination sans hiérarchie», écrit Yves Schemeil (p. 273) : il faut faire se parler et s'accorder des parties différentes et divergentes. L'assemblée est d'abord une *ré-union*, l'exposé des questions d'intérêt commun, et c'est ce qui signifie en tout premier lieu l'égalité dans la parole : elle efface provisoirement les divisions : les inégalités de richesses, de prestige ou de statut, et les solidarités familiales ou claniques. Il y a rarement calcul des voix, on recherche le consensus et l'unanimité, quitte à prolonger l'assemblée des jours et des mois durant; vis-à-vis de l'extérieur il faut aussi se montrer unanime. C'est sans doute une particularité récente de la démocratie occidentale d'accepter et de reconnaître la division et le conflit, comme l'a bien vu Claude Lefort, de penser la société comme divisée, et d'organiser l'assemblée et la parole autour de cette division, plutôt que de la refouler.

Le comparatiste exigeant sera peut-être déçu : on ne saurait parvenir ici à des résultats équivalents et aussi précis que ceux qui permettent la comparaison des systèmes de parenté ou de classification. La comparaison ici tentée repose sur une mise en parallèle de plusieurs cas de figure, en prenant le plus possible en compte l'histoire ou l'organisation sociale du groupe. On ne s'en tient pas à une région ou une aire culturelle, et il manque encore aux chercheurs un langage commun ou des schémas précis de comparaison. De plus, la documentation est loin d'être homogène et d'égale qualité ; on ne dispose que de quelques récits décrivant les assemblées de guerriers cosaques, alors que les archives des assemblées de la Révolution française sont nombreuses. Si l'intention comparative va de soi, puisqu'il qu'il n'y a pas de sciences sociales sans elle, l'objet n'est cependant pas évident. Il s'agit, écrit Detienne, de comparer des «microconfigurations» en vue d'éclairer le *politique*, sur la base d'une catégorie «ni trop fortement classificatoire, ni de portée trop faible» (p. 419), le «s'assemblé». La comparaison n'est donc pas aisée, l'entreprise est audacieuse, peut-être même déraisonnable, certainement inachevée.

Mais déterminé à *comparer l'incomparable*, et d'ouvrir les frontières disciplinaires, Detienne ne se laisse pas pour autant arrêter. Il n'en est pas à sa première tentative et il a déjà publié plusieurs ouvrages collectifs comparatistes tout aussi suggestifs et intéressants que celui-ci (dont celui portant sur la «langue des dieux», prenant d'ailleurs la forme d'un dialogue entre cinq chercheurs travaillant sur des époques et des aires géographiques éloignées (Detienne et Hamonic, 1995). Il ne s'agit pas, précise-t-il, de dégager des lois générales, mais

d'«expérimenter et construire des comparables (...) aller et venir entre les sociétés observées en ce volume et d'autres qui viendront affiner le questionnement, modifier des perspectives, découvrir de nouvelles articulations entre les éléments composant des configurations, ou d'autres composants qui enrichiront la lecture comparative de ce premier cercle.» (p. 428). En somme, faire de la science sociale—ou ce qu'elle devrait être. Entreprise incertaine certes, mais stimulante.

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Recenseure : *Arlette Gautier*
Université de Provence 151

Ce livre reprend les textes d'un colloque intitulé «La transformation des systèmes de santé et de services sociaux et le mouvement pour la santé des femmes : enjeux contemporains, résistances et pratiques novatrices», qui s'est tenu à Québec en 2002. Composé de trois parties et douze chapitres, il conclut par un texte de Lamoureux. Chacune des trois parties est introduite par Manon Boulianne alors que l'ensemble l'est par Francine Saillant. Ces précisions pour souligner le travail d'édition et de synthèse réalisé par les deux éditrices.

La première partie sur «La mondialisation et la marchandisation de la santé : des tendances fortes qui débordent les cadres nationaux» indique que les réformes de la santé touchent aussi bien le Québec et les autres pays développés que les pays dits en développement. Trois aspects sont particulièrement notables. (1) On parle beaucoup de déconcentrer les systèmes sanitaires. Néanmoins, des sommes énormes sont investies dans des systèmes de santé hyper spécialisés, comme les méga hôpitaux, alors que les communautés ne reçoivent que des montants modestes. (2) La déinstitutionnalisation a des conséquences plus fortes pour les femmes que pour les hommes, du fait que l'identité relationnelle de celles-ci. (3) Le mouvement pour la santé des femmes avait fortement critiqué le modèle bio-médical, critique qui a disparu face à l'urgence de la défense contre le néo-libéralisme. Pourtant, le nouveau système met en avant un idéal de mode opérationnel-décisionnel dont l'efficacité est tournée vers le système et non vers l'individu.

Selon Marie France Labrecque, les réformes au Sud ont d'ailleurs servi de laboratoire de notre futur. L'État international, c'est-à-dire un ensemble hégémonique formé d'agences déterritorialisées, intervient maintenant dans les anciens domaines réservés des États, ce qui se traduit par une dimi-

nution des droits humains, notamment dans le domaine de la santé, comme le montre le cas mexicain. On peut dire que cet État est également genré car il institutionnalise la domination masculine. Ainsi les politiques publiques d'équité de genre produisent des sujets féminins bureaucratisés, dépendants et disciplinés, capables de travailler dans les *maquiladoras*, où les femmes courent des risques sanitaires sans régulation adéquate.

D'après Foley, alors que le Sénégal dépensait 9,3% de son PNB pour son système de santé en 1967, ce pourcentage est tombé à 5,8% en 1980. La restructuration du système public de santé, fondée sur la décentralisation, la privatisation et l'implantation de structure de gestion participative s'est faite au nom d'une meilleure efficacité, mais elle s'est traduite par une diminution de l'accès à la santé des plus pauvres alors que celui des plus riches s'améliorait et que les Conseils de santé accumulaient des bénéfices. Désormais : «pas d'argent, pas de soins». Une enquête à Pikine, dans la banlieue de Dakar, souligne que la décentralisation a accru le pouvoir des notables, généralement des vieux hommes, dans un contexte où les femmes sont exclues du pouvoir, y compris municipal. Toutefois, l'article termine avec l'idée que les femmes ont accès à de nombreux services de santé reproductive, ce qui induit une certaine confusion, liée notamment à l'absence de toutes données chiffrées sur l'accès aux soins.

Selon Tavares Soares, le Brésil était le seul pays d'Amérique latine à avoir institué un système universel d'accès à la santé, mais là aussi un discours séduisant a accompagné le désengagement de l'état fédéral. Pire, celui-ci appuie désormais proportionnellement plus les assurances privées des plus riches que le système public, cela dans un contexte de très grandes inégalités de revenus, notamment au détriment des femmes, qui dirigent pourtant 25% des ménages. A cela s'ajoute la fréquence des stérilisations, même sur des femmes très jeunes, alors qu'au Brésil cette opération augmente significativement la mortalité maternelle.

Pour Courtois et Beaulieu, la communauté montagnaise de Mashteuiatsh n'était pas préparée au virage ambulatoire qu'a pris abruptement l'État québécois et le centre de santé, chargé de la prévention, se trouve aujourd'hui débordé par des demandes de soins curatifs. De plus, les femmes non autochtones n'y ont pas droit, même si elles sont épouses et mères de Montagnais.

La seconde partie porte sur les conséquences pour les femmes de ce virage ambulatoire au Québec. Thivierge et Tremblay montrent, dans le cas du Saguenay, que le virage ambulatoire, dont on parle toujours de façon sexuellement neutre, a des conséquences beaucoup plus lourdes pour les femmes, qui constituent 66% des aidantes et des soignantes en général et même 72% auprès des personnes âgées. Les aidantes notamment se retrouvent obligées par la force du lien affectif mais parfois aussi par les demandes des aidés, à prendre en charge des actes spécialisés et complexes et même à acheter des équipement coûteux. Cette aide présente donc des coûts importants, en termes de santé physique et psy-

chologique ou de coûts financiers et professionnels. Dandurand et Saillant s'interrogent sur la solidarité des réseaux familiaux dans les soins aux proches dépendants. En fait, les soins sont le plus souvent assumés par une seule personne. L'aide est d'autant plus importante que la taille des réseaux l'est, ce qui fait s'interroger sur le futur alors que le nombre d'enfant s'est fortement réduit. En France également, selon Cresson, les soins aux jeunes enfants ou aux personnes âgées se réalise de plus en plus au sein d'une famille et non par une institution, sans que les besoins propres des femmes soient pris en compte.

Pour revenir au Québec, d'après Cognet, alors que les Centre Locaux de Santé Communautaire sous-traitent 60% des soins et services de programmes de maintien à domicile, les salaires des salariées, souvent immigrantes, des entreprises privées sont la moitié de ceux des CLSC. En revanche, Descarries et Corbeil évaluent positivement l'action des entreprises d'économie solidaires en aide domestiques, qui jouent un rôle important dans la réintégration de l'emploi, malgré des salaires insuffisants. Les femmes détiennent 70% des postes de direction.

Trois articles s'interrogent ensuite sur l'action des mouvements pour la santé des femmes. Leur rapport avec l'État a été ambigu, complexe et paradoxal selon Andrew. Pour certains, l'État l'a plus ou moins créé pour avoir un interlocuteur en la matière, alors que pour d'autres il l'a marginalisé dans sa définition de l'expertise en matière de santé. Paumier et Richardson analysent ensuite le mouvement pour la reconnaissance des sages-femmes en France et au Québec. En France, les sages-femmes sont reconnues mais intégrées au système médical classique, sauf une cinquantaine, alors que le Québec dispose de maisons de naissance où elles peuvent officier mais n'admet pas la pratique à domicile. Pour Saillant, les femmes ont développé des savoirs locaux qui ne sont pas perçus comme universels, mais que la politique et la culture universalisent en les naturalisant. Le mouvement pour la santé des femmes a d'abord été une utopie puis il a cherché pragmatiquement à développer des alliances avant de s'internationaliser en revendiquant la citoyenneté. Il a présenté les problèmes de santé de la reproduction comme liés à la pauvreté. Je ne suis pas tout à fait d'accord avec cette perception, qui est peut-être plutôt celle du mouvement québecois que celle du mouvement international pour la santé des femmes. Celui-ci a plutôt critiqué le sexisme des institutions médicales et a avancé la notion de droits humains des femmes, et particulièrement des droits reproductifs pour y faire face (Sen, Germain et Chen, 1994). Quant aux alliances alors passées avec certaines institutions internationales, elles sont désormais critiquées pour leur inefficacité (Petchesky, 2003).

Selon Lamoureux, il ne sert à rien de regretter l'ancien État providence, il faut reconnaître les caractéristiques du nouvel ordre social : la centralité du marché en tant que régulateur, le caractère potentiellement mondial de ce nouvel ordre, la transformation du rôle de l'État suite à son implosion. Ce nouvel ordre a des conséquences néfastes pour la santé

publique, du fait notamment de l'aggravation des conditions de travail des femmes dans le secteur de la santé et de l'accroissement de la charge physique et mentale du travail domestique. Il faut faire reconnaître l'importance du travail de soin et revenir à une logique de droits. On voit mal cependant comment atteindre à cette reconnaissance dans le contexte actuel.

Ce recueil apporte donc des analyses variées et des résultats d'enquêtes sur un sujet largement occulté malgré son importance pour tous et pour toutes.

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Susan Mann and Yu-Yin Cheng (eds.), *Under Confucian Eyes: Writings on Gender in Chinese History,* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001, xiii + 310 pages (paper).

Reviewer: *Lorne Holyoak*
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The tendency to gloss Han culture as Chinese culture and furthermore to essentialize Han culture as identical throughout time and space is an ongoing issue in the Western representation of cultural Others. This is further manifested in the instance of Chinese cultures by the unsubtle gender critiques applied to China that can only be characterized as monolithic. Yet, as demonstrated in these two volumes, gender roles and relations in China need to be understood in terms of interdependency and complementarity, rather than division or separation (Farrer, 2002).

There can be little doubt that the popular imagination in the West is dominated by images of Chinese women with bound feet, of forced marriages and of female infanticide. The historic imagining ignores the majority of the female population, including the peasantry, minority women and the members of the ruling elite (Manchu women were forbidden to bind their feet). Similarly, popular conceptions of contemporary China tend to neglect the conditions of educated, urban women, especially female professionals, and the prominence of rural women in local leadership and entrepreneurship. And as Charles Stafford has demonstrated, women are indispensable to the process of creating social relationships among the Han (Stafford, 2000).

Shanshan Du examines gender relations among the Lahu, a Tibeto-Burman speaking people who live in the highland border regions of China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. She is specifically concerned with the Lahu of Yunnan province, in China. However, before describing the Lahu way of life and of constructing gender, Du begins by asking whether there are any gender-egalitarian societies on earth. Her answer is a solid critique of the biases of Western dominated feminist thought, and feminist anthropology in particular. After pointing out that descriptions of gender-egalitarian societies are always qualified as "relative" or "possible," while patriarchy, though necessarily always limited in its implementation, is not described in such an equivocating fashion, Du writes that "according to the academic double standard, inequality and hierarchy can be of any degree, but equality must be perfect" (p. 6). She proceeds in this book to document a society in which male and female members are equally valued, regardless of the role they play—unqualified gender equality. Yet at the same time Du is careful to avoid the essentialising trap that is so common to sinology by acknowledging the complexities and regional variations in Lahu culture.

What renders Du's characterization of the Lahu so compelling is her grounding of gender equality within a dyadic worldview that emphasises the need for balance and complementarity in all things. This is clearly expressed symbolically in Lahu mythology and ritual, and throughout the life cycle. This is best expressed in terms of male-female blending:

> By defining and evaluating personhood according to one's standing in the husband-wife dyad, Lahu classification and symbolism of the life cycle fully elaborate the cosmological ideal of male-female unity.... Specifically, Lahu ideals for men and women tend to blend femininity and masculinity in their religious definitions of human nature and ultimate morality, as well as in personality, social traits, and standards of beauty. (p. 71)

Part of what makes Du's analysis convincing is the attention that is paid to the nuanced reality of gender equality. While a strict sexual division of labour is not practiced by the Lahu, the desire to optimize the contribution of both spouses to the family's task schedule does not mean that differences do not exist. Work requiring intense strength is typically carried out by men, while women in turn carry out tasks that are also demanding (such as weaving), but less intensively so. As Du notes, the symbolic conception of gender unity ignores sexual division of labour, and most importantly, "none of the tasks marked by sex division was accorded differential value, and many of them were not even gender-exclusive in every day life" (for example, men typically assist with cloth weaving in various ways) (p. 104-105).

Finally, Du examines the tensions between the Lahu ideal of gender-unity and the reality of social practice. Noteworthy is the discussion of kinship relations based upon the foundation of the spousal dyad (or "dyadic ego"). Du ably demonstrates the functional aspect of unitary ideals through the

symmetrical interhousehold reciprocity made possible by an egalitarian bilateral kinship structure. However, a detailed discussion of the threats to the ideal gender dyad is also provided. Notably, much of this involves ideals about personality, specifically the consequences of marrying someone who is lazy or fails to exhibit tenderness, care and humility. Arranged marriages, divorce, elopement and suicide pacts are all a part of the Lahu's social reality, as are attempts by the Lahu to minimize these deviations from the norm.

Du succeeds in accomplishing three important tasks in this book. It is an important corrective to the tendency to essentialize the Chinese. It moves us away from the habit of interpreting gender relations in all cultures within a Western paradigm predicated on conflict. Finally, we are given an insightful and detailed ethnography of the Lahu themselves. In the end, her analysis makes a remarkable case for the existence of gender-equality in a traditional society, and focusses our attention on its quotidian manifestations in marriage, kinship, politics, ritual and economics. Du's book is important and well-written, but also contains clearly expressed ideas that make it suitable for undergraduates.

Mann and Cheng's *Under Confucian Eyes* is a very different sort of work. The stated intention of this work is to assist in rethinking "Confucianism in East Asia by using gender as a category of analysis (p. xiii). Primarily focussed on the Han (with a few exceptions), this is an edited volume consisting of translated materials from a wide variety of sources, dating from the 8th century A.D. to the mid-19th. These consist mainly of complete works, although in a few cases excerpted passages are provided. Translated works include ghost stories, poetry, biographies and autobiographies, essays and admonitory compositions, letters and descriptions of non-Han customs. In six cases the materials that have been selected were written by women, nine of the extracts have male authors, and in three instances the authorship is mixed or unknown. In all cases the selections were made based not on the sex of the authors but rather on content—on what we can learn from these passages about women's lives, their roles in Chinese society and the historical construction of the female gender. Each selection includes a brief translator's preface, followed by an introduction penned by the translators, who also indicate recommended readings in the list of references. The editor's have also included a guide for students and teachers.

The editors' introduction to the text helps the reader to place women's writings within a nuanced social context by pointing out that the distinction between the public and private spheres in China is not the same as our understanding in the West. Furthermore, Western scholarship displays a bias towards emphasizing the public sphere when examining the historical record. Mann and Cheng are quite correct in insisting that throughout Chinese history "the 'inner' realm is never reduced in importance relative to the 'outer' realm: it merely occupies less visible textual space at certain times" (p. 4).

The editors also attempt to ground the readers understanding of the selections with respect to style, ideology, gender and values (p. 5-8). However, this section is somewhat brief and thus of limited use to the average reader, while more sophisticated scholars will be aware of the issues touched upon. The implications of the translated works will be most evident to readers who are very familiar with Confucian ideals and expectations. For readers who are not familiar with Confucian discourse, the full implication of the material presented will not be readily apparent. That being said, this work still provides a useful starting point for understanding the Confucian construction of gender. This is the case partly because of the introductions provided to each work by the translators. In most instances, these introductions contribute to the readers' understanding by clarifying the social and historical context, and providing important information about the personal context and life histories of the original authors. For instance, Beverly Bossler's discussion of the "Funerary Writings of Chen Liang" (chap. 4) nicely weaves together a description of the "precariousness of ... life itself in Song times" (p. 73) with the personal crises experienced by Chen Liang and his family. Thus the translated texts can be understood in terms of the affinal relations created through women and their implications for the fortunes of the family and for everyday life.

Fictional writings are also included in this volume. One example is Judith Zeitlin's translation of two ghost stories from "Liaozhai's Record of the Strange" (chap. 13). These stories are of interest for what they tell us about the construction of sexuality within and beyond Confucian boundaries. They are also well-constructed and enjoyable tales that benefit from an adroit and fluid translation. Zeitlin's introduction is however quite brief and does little to place the stories within a context beyond the strictly literary. This is something of a problem with the volume as a whole. Most of the introductions could further explore the background and the implications of the texts.

As primary sources in translation, each chapter without exception is excellent. Patricia Ebrey's "The *Book of Filial Piety for Women* Attributed to a Woman Née Zheng" is of particular interest for two reasons. First, the original work is an expansion upon traditional Confucian works for men. Therefore it has value as a window on the expectations placed upon women in traditional Han Chinese society, and contributes to our understanding of the historical construction of gender. Second, Ebrey has chosen to juxtapose the equivalent text from "the Book of Filial Piety" (essentially for men) on the same page parallel to the text from Zheng's work. This allows for a very instructive direct comparison, and illustrates clearly the ideological basis for gender relations in China. Ebrey's approach provides an excellent opportunity for students to engage in a textual or structural analysis of the materials.

For anthropologists Mann and Cheng's volume is of somewhat limited utility, and it would be of greater interest to scholars of East Asian history or religious studies. However, anthropologists interested in the construction of ethnic identity or gender roles will find useful materials here. For those concerned with the nature of inter-ethnic relations in China, especially in terms of the construction of the ethnic Other as

female, there are two chapters of value: Jacqueline Armijo-Hussein's translation of Li Jing's "The Customs of Various Barbarians" (chap. 5) and Emma Teng's translation of "A Brief Record of the Eastern Ocean" by Ding Shaoyi (chap. 17). The former provides descriptions of indigenous peoples in Yunnan from the 13th century, including Bai, Yi, Dai, Mosuo, Zhuang and Hani. These are brief and very general descriptions that do not deal specifically with gender to any meaningful extent. The latter chapter includes ethnographic materials related to aboriginal Taiwanese of the 19th century. It is a selection from the much larger original work. Teng's preface and introduction are both highly informative, but the translated passage is somewhat brief, though rather more pointedly dealing with gender issues.

Overall, both of these volumes make a useful contribution to the field of gender studies. Du's work is of greater interest to anthropologists, and also is more daring in its critique of the assumptions Western scholars are prone to in this field of endeavour. Du's work is recommended for teaching in anthropology, Indigenous studies or gender studies at the junior or senior level, while Mann and Cheng's book is more suited to Asian studies at the senior or possibly graduate level.

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Richard G. Fox and Barbara J. King (eds.), *Anthropology beyond Culture*, Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002, 256 pages.

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This edited collection about the various ways the organizing concept of culture can be defined and applied moves beyond the question "what is culture?" to demonstrate how "culture" is characterized and used by a range of researchers. Silverman's foreword proposes that a key theme of the contributions is "culture worry," in that many contributors to the Wenner-Gren international symposium in September 2000, which launched the collection, were defensive about perceived threats to culture as a core anthropological concept. The symposium gathered 18 international scholars, who were invited from varied disciplines so that cultural anthropologists could engage with researchers of nonhuman primate culture and sociality, and were chosen "to maximize diversity" (p. 11). Sadly, to this southern hemisphere reader, while excellent scholars, the group maintained the north/south geopolitical and intellectual divide.

Despite this oversight the collection shows how there are multiple overlapping definitions of culture. Some authors adopt an ideational heritage characterization, some perceive culture to reside in the mind or to be located in the individual in contrast to group life, others analyze the integration of people into culture, and yet others pluralize culture(s) in order to encompass the diversity of human groupings through the time/space continuum. The chapters discuss culture as the "conceptual kernel" of anthropology and its ongoing usefulness (or not), particularly as a unifying thread among similar yet different sister disciplines. Overall, they remind the reader that culture is an evolving notion through which facile assumptions can be challenged and analytic uses embraced.

Fox and King introduce the 12 papers, which are divided into four parts. They detail how the traditional definition of culture presumed a homogeneity and continuity that shabbily failed to examine social inequality and active human agency. Fox and King demonstrate how culture has entered popular realms as a vapid, essentialist, but nonetheless vigorously politicized, concept. They argue for an acknowledgement of the failures and value of culture and to "just do" anthropology.

The first three chapters examine the diverse definitions and uses of culture. Fredrik Barth's chapter suggests anthropology should study the processes underlying social action in order to create generative models. He argues against a conceptualization of culture that does not theorize variation and against the trivialization of particularity by deeming it irrelevant. He proposes that research data is impoverished when verbal data that obtain ideas about notions ordered into "conceptual domains" are collected, but the ways that ideas are made manifest through daily lived experience are not portrayed. He proposes that ideas are manifest in conjunction with social action that, in an ongoing process, provide "new materials for internal reflection" (p. 35).

Trouillot, in the second chapter, creates a central distinction between concept and word, considers the site of deployment and modes of engagement that mediate between both, and suggests the kernel of "culture" be conserved while replacing it with words that more accurately describe the specificities being studied. He further distinguishes culture in academe as a "political move in theory," from broader society where it operates as a "theoretical move from politics," thereby silencing its own conditions of possibility (p. 39). He tracks the use of culture in North Atlantic philosophies and through time to show how the notion has moved from being an evocative conceptual tool to an increasingly rigid and reified explanatory concept. He analyses how anthropology's credentialization process of writing monographs inscribes and limits anthropological theories and methodologies, an assertion that links neatly with Ota's claim in the third chapter that the ways that anthropology is enmeshed in power relations and inequality should be clarified. Ota's declaration is impelled by insights from those on the discipline's margins. It is anchored in a critique of authenticity from the perspective of the anthropologist as coterminously subject and object of investigation, and is substantiated by field research in Guatemala and the Ryukyu Islands.

Three chapters then examine notions of emergent sociality. King begins the collection's second part with a proposal that great ape infants can teach anthropologists much about the negotiation of social worlds and, as a consequence, how to escape from the potentially pernicious closure of culture as a concept. Returning to human ways of being, Torn examines children's modes of communication to recognize and appreciate in greater detail how people live in and transform their world(s), and simultaneously themselves, via intersubjective relations with others. In contrast, Shanker suggests disposing of culture in order to avoid being caught within essentialist/reductionist disputes and to better understand the ontogeny of language.

Part 3 heralds a range of archaeological perspectives via Wright's argument, anchored in feminist archeologists' concerns, that culture emerges directly from the patterns of material objects created by individuals' and social groups' definitions and redefinitions of themselves. Her chapter is followed by Brown's, which contends that it is in public, shared representations such as those of the Mexican Mayan Indians with whom she has conducted research, that elements of the culture concept may be conserved, although reconfigured and refined. This proposal permeates the papers in this section, particularly the last by Durham, who presents a sophisticated argument from population theory for an ecumenical definition of culture as cultural variants changing through time. He considers the dynamic iterative nature of the social transmission of culture, the processual temporal nature of transmission, and the consequent need to acknowledge cultural variation and complexity.

Wilson signals the differing contentions of part four with his argument that culture should be discarded in order to better analyze its contemporary geopolitical uses. He focusses on South Africa's inability to negotiate the complex nexus of race, politics and culture inherited from its apartheid regime. A similarly politicized chapter is that of Andrade, who demonstrates how the hypermasculinity of Ecuador's political élite is lampooned in cartoons as a mode of political dissent and a calculated subversion of their legitimacy. The final chapter by Hann concludes the collection with a critical reading of the most problematic aspects of the current usages of culture, particularly their links with totalitarianism within German-American traditions.

Taken as a whole, the collection offers a wealth of fascinating proposals about culture as a key concept in anthropology. Part of the authors' collective goal in creating the book seems to be to strengthen anthropology as a discipline by exploring the heterogeneity of culture as a concept while engaging in spirited contestation with enduring attempts to define it. This is a goal that can only be applauded.

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Recenseur : *Vincent Mirza*
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Ce livre accompagne une exposition remarquable au musée ethnographique de Neuchâtel qui porte sur les pratiques sexuelles et, en particulier, les représentations et les interdits qui les entourent. À cette occasion, Gonseth, Hainard et Kaehr (GHK) ont réuni une série de textes de différents horizons pour continuer cette réflexion. À cet effet, on retrouve dans cet ouvrage une quinzaine de textes écrits par des ethnologues, sociologues, des écrivains, des journalistes qui participent chacun dans leurs styles aux questions abordées dans ce collectif. D'ailleurs, c'est l'un des points intéressant de cet ouvrage qui nous montre la pluralité des discours ainsi que la complexité des questions abordées. Cette diversité qui fait la qualité de l'ouvrage, le rend néanmoins difficile à résumer si l'on veut rendre justice à tous les textes qui nous sont présentés. Nous nous concentrerons donc sur quelques points importants.

Comme le soulignent GHK l'ouvrage peut se découper en trois grands ensembles. La première partie traite directement de la pornographie. D'abord, comme une esthétique du capitalisme où la pornographie est recyclée passant de la contestation à l'économie de marché. Dans cette «mise en marché», on retrouve ce que Deleu appelle le nouveau *pornographisme* qui s'inscrit dans le processus de consommation entre autre à travers la publicité. Mais la réflexion sur la pornographie s'inscrit aussi dans un processus historique. Ce survol de l'histoire de la pornographie met en évidence comment la pornographie est passée d'un élément relativement marginal à une intégration, une récupération par la société qui en fait un outil de consommation comme un autre. Néanmoins, plusieurs auteurs soulignent que cette normalisation de la pornographie est toujours sujette à un retour de la morale et du puritanisme. Il y a donc une tension permanente entre une normalisation du porno et sa dénonciation. Toujours dans cette logique, le texte de Venanzi est particulièrement intéressant puisqu'il met en évidence comment les mesures législatives codifient le porno afin d'en contenir les débordements et ce faisant en appauvrissent le genre jusqu'à l'absurde et au sordide.

La deuxième partie de cet ouvrage est composée de textes qui portent sur l'évolution des normes sociales en ce qui a trait à la sexualité. Autour de ce thème, on trouve ainsi des textes tel que celui de Mossuz-Lavau qui traite des transformations de la sexualité en France depuis les années 1950. Elle y fait un bilan de plusieurs acquis, notamment pour les femmes et les homosexuels. Elle met aussi en valeur différents facteurs qui ont contribué à ces transformations (la pilule contraceptive, le HIV ou encore les médias). On retrouve aussi des témoignages dans ce deuxième ensemble de textes. Nous pensons, par exemple, au texte de Calame qui engage le dialogue avec sa fille.

Dans ce dialogue, elle évoque les souffrances et les acquis d'une révolution sexuelle toujours en progrès.

Enfin, la dernière partie de l'ouvrage est constituée de textes qui traitent de sujets variés mais qui s'articulent toujours autour des trois mots clés qui servent de fil rouge aux auteurs de ce collectif : l'«imaginaire», la «spéculation» et les «interdits». À titre d'exemple, il faut noter le texte remarquable de Yazgi sur les sorcières en Inde, plus précisément dans la région de Jaunpur–Jaunsar. L'auteur nous explique d'une part comment la sorcière dans le jeu des rapports fait partie intégrale du fondement de la domination masculine et d'autre part, comment ce rapport définit la sexualité. Enfin, on notera aussi le texte de Wastiau qui nous parle des photos prises au Congo au plus fort du colonialisme et qui met en rapport le nu ethnographique et le nu artistique. Cette mise en rapport nous rappelle l'inscription de l'imaginaire européen et colonial dans la mise scène des corps nus.

Enfin, qu'il s'agisse de l'inscription de la pornographie ou encore de l'évolution des normes et la mise en place des interdits, ce qui ressort de la lecture c'est la façon dont la sexualité s'inscrit et se transforme à travers les logiques marchandes, les modifications du cadre législatif ou encore l'influence des médias. À ce titre, l'expérience individuelle s'inscrit dans ces dynamiques. Mais bien sûr, la négociation des interdits se fait de façon différente que ce soit dans le temps (la transformation des mentalités) ou dans l'espace, et cette négociation prend souvent la forme «d'injonctions paradoxales» entre différents champs (l'intime, la sexualité, les normes en place, etc.).

Pour terminer, on peut dire qu'il s'agit d'un ouvrage intéressant dont la diversité des textes alimente une réflexion sur des sujets qui sont généralement peu traités.

Michael Billig, *Barons, Brokers, and Buyers: The Institutions and Cultures of Philippine Sugar*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003, 320 pages.
Sally Ann Ness, *Where Asia Smiles: An Ethnography of Philippine Tourism*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003, xvii + 301 pages.

Reviewer: *Lisa M. Mitchell*
University of Victoria

There is considerable anthropological interest at the moment in the transnational flows of capital, humans, and goods and in the consequences of these forces for local groups. The two books considered in this review—Ness's analysis of tourism in Davao City, Mindanao and Billig's study of sugar production on the nearby island of Negros—are significant contributions to this area of study. That the setting for both books is the Philippines is significant, continuing a renewed anthropological interest in this country.

Barons, Brokers, and Buyers: The Institutions and Cultures of Philippine Sugar is an analysis of elites, power and bureaucracy on the island of Negros, the region of the Philippines known as "Sugarlandia." Author and economic anthropologist, Michael Billig, sets out to explain why sugar is no longer the powerhouse of the Negros economy and to argue that economic and political domination on that island has shifted from a rural agrarian elite to an urban, commercial, industrial and financial group based in the Makati district of Manila. What stands out in this fine book is the extent to which both the decline and the shift are deeply shaped by a colonial past and current international processes of production and exchange, as well as, by local organizations, ideas and players.

Acknowledging his "neo-Weberian predilection" (p. 11), Billig investigates this area of economic activity through meanings, morals, and values, institutional forms and conflicts. In his first chapter, he also outlines the stance of "relative objectivity" (p. 12) or neutrality he adopts as the best way to understand how conflict, oppression and inequality operate in sugar production. Chapter two is an excellent overview of sugar's history in the Philippines, from the Spanish colonial period, through the American years and Marcos' "kleptocracy," up to Billig's own fieldwork in the 1990s. Billig then richly details the many factors contributing to the decline in the sugar industry (chapter three) before focussing his analysis on the anachronistic *quedan* (coupon) system of ownership rights in the sugar as it moves from planter to miller to trader (chap. 4). Discussion follows about conflicts between the old agrarian elite and the new urban industrial, financial, commercial elite over importing foreign sugar (chap. 5) and "rationalizing" the sugar industry (chap. 6).

Overall, Billig's work succeeds more in analysing the decline of agrarian based power than it does in persuading this reader that power now resides in the "younger, wealthier, more often Chinese, urban industrial, financial and commercial elites" (p. 30). A chapter extending his meaning- and institution-oriented ethnographic lens to this emerging elite in Negros or in Makati is needed. Nor was I persuaded by Billig's justification for his stance of "neutrality" and "objectivity." Certainly, his position of "neutrality" was born out the very real social conflict and violence in the sugar industry in the early 1990s and the very lines of power and influence Billig studied, ultimately forced him to leave Negros Island abruptly and for good. However, his claims that "advocacy" or "action" anthropology, which he sees as the only alternative, lead to "simplistic and facile accounts and solutions [of social problems]" analysis are themselves simplistic. So, too, is his assumption that "advocacy" is equivalent to "moral condemnation." Some sections of the book are slow going, largely because of the complexity of the story and the countless organizational acronyms which characterize politics and economics in the Philippines. His concluding argument that economies must be studied empirically, with attention to multiple and competing meanings will be familiar to anthropologists and appear to be directed primarily at formalist economists.

Nonetheless, Billig's book is a formidable model of the value of ethnography for economic analyses. His descriptions

of conflict among elites are compelling accounts of the ways in which national policies are the outcome of forceful personalities, individual agendas and backroom dealing. I think his analysis is strongest in demonstrating that particular organizational forms, relationships and policies of sugar production emerged to solve particular historical problems or to ensure American control over this industry, are now both entrenched and unproductive. His discussion about the relationship between this "institutional stasis" and groupism, personalism, patron-client relations, and attitudes toward the Chinese in the Philippines are instructive and thought-provoking. While the book focusses on the sugar industry in one region of the Philippines, Billig's approach should serve as a model and standard for the analysis of other industries in other post-colonial settings.

On the neighbouring island of Mindano, Sally Ann Ness turns a similar interest in the details, personalities and meanings of local and transnational processes into an engaging analysis of contemporary tourism in Davao City. Ness' scholarship in the anthropology of dance is evident early in *Where Asia Smiles* in her assertion that "tourism is an essentially performative, imaginative phenomenon" (p. xvii). Tourism is further delineated by Ness as "a complex, unruly, all-too-human living matrix ... dedicated to the production of ... hyper-consumable landscapes" (p. 10). A central goal of Ness' analysis is to understand how touristic utopic spaces are created and how their material and symbolic existence "deforms ... homes, homeland and natural citizens." (p. 13)

The book chapters are organized into three major sections. The first section situates Ness as an anthropologist studying tourism from a particular theoretical place and as a traveller narrating her arrival at the Davao airport, riding through the city in a taxi, and emerging at the inn where she usually stays. Once there, as Ness puts it, she finds herself "both inside and outside the tourism matrix" (p. 36), adopting an ambivalent "halfie" stance which she also traces to her early exposure to and employment in the tourism industry in the United States. Part two, Global Enterprises, discusses "utopic spaces"—a luxury resort and a planned theme park tourism estate—oriented to the international "high end" traveller and controlled by nonlocal forces. Part three, Local Amusements, focusses on aspects of the tourism matrix aimed principally at the accommodation and amusement of Filipinos and more locally controlled.

Ness' analysis is complex and elegant, and she skilfully applies both anthropological concepts and notions of "quality" and "consumer" generated from within the tourism matrix. Her descriptions of and comparative analysis of the resorts, inns, beaches and other touristic places are particularly good. Ness has an eye for detail, the easily overlooked, but oh-so-important details which create and sustain the core illusions of touristic utopias—exotica, glamour, leisure, and home away from home. The raised eyebrow of a porter, a road bump at the driveway of her hotel, a pause in a speaker's key note address, the colour, texture and width of a sash on a dress, and so on

provide the concrete details which anchor Ness and her reader in the complex touristic hyperspaces she analyzes.

She coaxes a lot out of her observations and interviews; only occasionally do her conclusions feel overextended. At several points in her analysis, Ness suggests that tourism represents a continuity of development processes and transnational influences in Mindanao but that continuity is never fleshed out. Ness also says she wants to attend to "the entire spectrum of persons...engaged in the cultivation of touristic landscapes" (p. 11), so this is a book about the "tourate"—tourism service providers and locals (p. xi). Yet, the perspectives of those who are debilitated by or excluded from the tourism matrix, and those who create utopic spaces by their back breaking work as maids, cooks, gardeners, drivers, construction workers and so on do not figure prominently in her book. Ness' primary contacts appear to have been the movers and shakers of Davao tourism—managers, developers, owners, old money and new money, and the group she suggests are "on the brink of corporate life" (p. 180).

Read together, Billig's and Ness' books exemplify current ethnography as thick, but necessarily partial, accounts of the everyday priorities and concerns in people's lives, the connections between local events and global processes, and the importance of keeping history and transnational forces at the heart of analyses. They offer very different but fruitful approaches to understanding economic activity—Ness' performative acts and spaces and Billig's search for causal factors—and different takes on the place of the ethnographer—Ness' ambivalence and Billig's objectivity. Both books contribute to understanding struggles over resource control and meaning, and the lived negotiations of shifting economic priorities among elites and an emerging middle class. The books work nicely as a pair since they describe co-existing aspects of contemporary economic development in the Philippines and elsewhere—the waning of colonial initiated cash cropping and the waxing of tourism with its promise of profits from selling a fantasy when all other resources have been drained.

While the works of Renato Rosaldo, the late Michelle Rosaldo, Jean Paul Dumont, Pauline Gardiner Barber, and Vincente Rafael will be known to many readers, anthropological writing about the Philippines is not abundant. This is surprising perhaps given the historical and enduring presence of the United States in the Philippines. Billig and Ness have worked in the Philippines for many years and their books are important and insightful contributions to the small but growing area of Philippines studies.

Both books will be of use to scholars and students interested in the contours and consequences of transnational economies, identities, and as well as those with specific interest in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Billig's book will be of particular value in graduate or upper-level undergraduate courses on political and economic anthropology and Ness' book in courses at the same level on tourism and identity.

Wolfart, H.C. (ed.), *Papers of the Thirty-Fourth Algonquian Conference*, Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 2003, x + 399 pages.

Reviewer: *John O'Meara*
Lakehead University

The 34th Algonquian Conference was held at Queen's University in October 2002. The proceedings contains 22 of the 57 papers given at the conference. Since its inception the conference has been interdisciplinary in nature. It typically features papers on linguistic topics and a variety of anthropological areas, with papers on ethnohistorical topics and a wide range of subjects within cultural anthropology, archaeology, and physical anthropology.

Aubin "The Algonquin-French Manuscript ASSM 104 (1661): Miscellanea" (p. 1-18) discusses a late 17th century missionary word list, containing some 5 000 words from the Algonquin dialect of Ojibwe and their French equivalents. Missionary works are a valuable source of information on earlier forms of Algonquian languages, and often contain words that have fallen into disuse, as well as examples of grammatical constructions that no longer occur in the modern languages.

Conathan and Wood "Repetitive Reduplication in Yurok and Karuk: Semantic Effects of Contact" (p. 19-34) discuss the morphological phenomenon of reduplication in Yurok, a language of California distantly related to the Algonquian languages, comparing it to a similar phenomenon in Karuk, an unrelated Californian language, as well as in the Algonquian language Meskwaki (also known as Fox).

Cook "A Semantic Classification of Menominee Preverbs" (p. 35-56) analyzes preverbs in Menominee; preverbs are word-like elements that appear in construction with verbs to form complex forms that resemble compound words.

Corbiere "Exploring Historical Literacy in Manitoulin Island Ojibwe" (p. 57-80) presents a valuable analysis of literacy in Ojibwe during the period 1823-1910, showing that Ojibwe speakers on Manitoulin Island made extensive use of written forms of their language during this period. Corbiere's archival research reveals many examples of documents written in Ojibwe, including letters, petitions, testimonials, minutes of meetings and others.

Dahlstrom "Owls and Cannibals Revisited: Traces of Windigo Features in Meskwaki Texts" (p. 81-114) discusses a puzzle reflected in a traditional Meskwaki (Fox) story, in which the word for "owl" is clearly cognate with the Cree and Ojibwe word conventionally written windigo, which has the meaning "cannibal monster." Dahlstrom sketches an account of how the differences in meaning might be accounted for.

Darnell "Algonquian Perspectives on Social Cohesion in Canadian Society" (p. 115-128) contains the author's reflections on the significance of indigenous peoples' contributions to Canadian identity.

Fidelholtz "Contraction in Mi'kmaq Verbs and its Orthographical Implications" (p. 129-146) discusses patterns of vowel deletion in Mi'kmaq that are part of the complex phonological patterns that occur in Mi'kmag, and proposes an analysis and representation that would be most useful for a Mi'kmaq practical orthography.

Genee "An Indo-Europeanist on the Prairies: C.C. Uhlenbeck's Work on Algonquian and Indo-European" (p. 147-164) reviews the scholarship of Dutch linguist C.C. Uhlenbeck, noting the significance of his early 20th fieldwork on Blackfoot, which led to publications that are still valuable today.

Goddard "Heckewelder's 1792 Vocabulary from Ohio: A Possible Attestation of Mascouten" (p. 165-192) discusses a putative manuscript vocabulary source for Mascouten, a dialect closely related to the Fox-Sauk-Kickapoo dialect complex. Mascouten is mentioned in early sources, but no examples of linguistic material are known to have been recorded. Goddard proposes that a manuscript vocabulary of some four pages found in the papers of Moravian missionary John Heckewelder can be attributed to Mascouten.

Inglis "The Deferential Evidential in Mi'kmaq" (p. 193-200) discusses details of the evidential system of Mi'kmaq, a form of modality that is found in varying forms in other Algonquian languages. Mi'kmaq appears to make a three-way distinction between: (a) statements based upon the speaker's direct knowledge; (b) statements in which the speaker does not have direct knowledge of the event under discussion; and (c) statements in which the speaker's assertion reflects others' knowledge of the event under discussion.

Junker and MacKenzie "Demonstratives in East Cree" (p. 201-216) discusses demonstrative words in East Cree, a variety of the Cree-Montagnais dialect complex spoken along the east coast of James and Hudson Bay. Algonquian languages frequently have complex sets of demonstratives. East Cree has a full range of such forms, including comparatively rare absentative forms, which indicate a referent that is missing, gone, or deceased.

Macaulay "Negation, Dubitatives and Mirativity in Menominee" (p. 217-240) describes data in Menominee in which a complex interaction of negation and modality leads to subtle interpretations of sentences containing these combinations. Macaulay notes the evidential nature of these data, also prominent in the Mi'kmaq data discussed by Inglis in the present volume, and makes connections to analogous data in Cree-Montagnais.

McDougall and Valentine "Treaty 29: Why Moore Became Less" (p. 241-260) discuss the demise of a small parcel of land reserved for members of the Chippewa Nation as part of Treaty 29, signed in 1827. The treaty surrendered a large tract of land south and east of Lake Huron. In 1843 this reserve was itself surrendered in another treaty. The authors discuss the context for both surrenders, detailing the political dynamics in both Upper Canada and neighbouring areas of the United States.

Oberholtzer "The Dorothy Grant Collection: Granting an Insight into Cree Material Culture" (p. 261-286) discusses the history of two collections of Cree items of material culture

dating from the 19th century. Oberholtzer argues that the items in the collections were likely produced by two Cree women involved in "country" marriages to Hudson Bay Company employees, and provides a review of what is known of the families involved, as well as an analysis of features of the items, which includes beaded clothing, bags, moccasins and snowshoes.

Pentland "The Missinipi Dialect of Cree" (p. 287-302) discusses the evidence for a now disappeared dialect of Cree spoken on the western shore of James Bay and Hudson Bay. The sole source of information is a vocabulary collected by Hudson Bay Company factor James Isham, probably obtained at York Factory between 1737 and 1744. Isham's list contains vocabulary from several distinct Cree dialects, and Pentland undertakes the philological work necessary to determine the Cree words reflected in Isham's English-based renditions of the Cree words he recorded.

Poliandri "Mi'kmaq People and Tradition: Indian Brook Lobster Fishing in St. Mary"s Bay, Nova Scotia" (p. 303-310) discusses Mi'kmaq lobster fishing within the context of their traditional economic activities, as well as patterns of fishing and ecological knowledge and their transmission. Also discussed is the significance of Mi'kmaq use of modern fisheries management plans and research techniques as an adaptation to changing circumstances in the lobster fishery.

Preston "Crees and Algonquins at 'The Front': More on 20th-Century Transformations" (p. 311-320) discusses the impact of changes induced in northeastern Ontario and adjacent areas of Québec among Cree and Algonquin Ojibwe peoples following the opening up of the area to southern influence; particularly significant is the construction of railways lines in this area. He presents a trio of biographies of Cree and Algonquin individuals who lived during this period of change during the early part of the 20th century.

Schreyer "Travel Routes of the Chapleau Cree: An Ethnohistorical Study" (p. 321-332) uses archival data to document the close connections between Cree at Moose Factory on James Bay and in the community of Chapleau, originally a Hudson Bay Company trading post established around 1885 near the eastern end of Lake Superior. Schreyer documents extensive travel along inland water routes that helped maintain connections between Cree families in the two communities, despite the considerable distance.

Smith "Creating New Relations to Improve Relations: Strangers as Wabanaki Chiefs" (p. 333-340) reviews a longstanding pattern of incorporation of non-native individuals into positions of leadership among the Algonquian groups of the northeast. Smith discusses cases of individuals who either voluntarily joined or were taken as captives and were prominent either politically or in a military role, and notes the persistence of this pattern over a period of 300 years.

Swierzbin "Stress in Border Lakes Ojibwe" (p. 341-370) presents a detailed analysis of word-level accent in the variety of Ojibwe spoken in the Lake of the Woods area of Ontario. She proposes that word-level stress correlates strongly with vowel length, i.e., long vowels always bear some measure of stress.

Valentine and McDougall "The Discourse of British and U.S. Treaties in the Old Northwest, 1790-1843" (p. 371-392) discusses similiarities and differences between early British and U.S. treaties, arguing that British treaties were primarily deeds of sale focussed upon orderly conveyance of land, while U.S. treaties were generally broader in nature. The authors indicate that British agreements were made in the context of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which provided the framework for official dealings with First Nations groups.

Walker "George Soctomah's Hat" (p. 393-399) discusses traditions for the installation of chiefs among eastern tribes including the Maliseet, Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot. He notes the gradual atrophy over the past 200 years of the relatively elaborate procedures recorded in the early 19th century.

Virginia Kerns, *Scenes from the High Desert: The Life and Theory of Julian Steward,* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003, xiv + 414 pages.

Reviewer: *Marc Pinkoski*
University of Victoria

A very strong argument could be made that Julian Steward was one of the most influential anthropologists of the 20th century. Virginia Kern's recent biography, *Scenes from the High Desert: The Life and Theory of Julian Steward,* goes a tremendous distance to demonstrate this assertion. In a thoroughly researched, accessibly written, and lyrically enjoyable text, Kerns has well documented the life, both academic and personal, of Julian Steward.

Her study follows the life of Steward, as a boy from the east coast of the United States to the desert of California; from Berkeley to Utah to Washington, D.C.; and then on to New York, to Columbia University, and finally to the midwest (with stops along the way). Centring on one of Steward's key concepts, the "patrilineal band," Kerns prepares a descriptive analysis of Steward's life and by association the seminal people in the formation of American materialist anthropology. Her analysis serves to explore the workings of this particularly anthropological concept, as it applies to the life history of its originator. Her success is that she creates an analysis that not only documents the life of someone worthy of a biography, but it also documents much of the focus, structure, and psychological workings in American anthropology, and particularly, the incredible prejudice experienced by women, within the academy mid-last century. Through the focus on Steward's life and career, Kerns has produced an effective biography that manages to situate the subject within his historic-academic context. The analysis is more than a simple biography; it is, in fact, an ethnohistory of American anthropology through an examination Steward's life.

Steward's materialist arguments are often remembered or imagined as the introduction of Marxist analyses to anthropology. This effect, as Kerns' recognizes, places Steward in a key role in the history of American anthropology. She describes his approach as having "...a propensity for the concrete" and that "[h]e used an impressive array of ethnographic and archaeological evidence to support a range of creative, generalizing conclusions about how, in his own words, 'similar subsistence activities had produced similar social structures'" (p. 3). This approach led him to develop the sub-field of cultural ecology, and to train several key materialist anthropologists in the process. For these reasons, it is fascinating to understand the details of Steward's life, and to come to a fuller appreciation of the lives that Steward was influenced by and in turn influenced.

Beginning with Steward's formative years, Kerns argues that he was heavily influenced by problems inherent in the daily life of arid environments and the labour that it takes to organize irrigation work to solve them. Following this focus was Steward's initial academic and then professional material on the American Great Basin. Kerns demonstrates that the focus on the organization of subsistence labour and its relationship to the physical environment remained a central component in Steward's *oeuvre* on development and change. Detailing fully Steward's early ethnographic and archaeological work and demonstrating the full mix of personal responsibilities and professional desires for the ambitious young scholar, Kerns relates the stories of his development from both his first and second wives. These perspectives from both women well compliment the public and professional history of Steward's academic career. A particular example of this dynamic was his move from the University of Utah. This was due to the break-up of his first marriage and overlapped with his second marriage. Leaving the security of his first marriage and his position at the University of Utah forced Steward to look for work during the difficult economic times of the Great Depression. His responsibilities as the head of a household to provide influenced his theorization of the formation of social relationships and societies. Insights from his first and second wives and his searching correspondence with Alfred Kroeber permit Kerns to triangulate various factors, thoughts, and demands that affected Steward at that time in his career. This serves to present Steward, who often is not a sympathetic character, in the most human of terms.

Steward's unwavering focus, and his work with many of the GI's returning to university after the war and the burgeoning field of academic anthropology, spawned numerous influential studies about the nature of Indigenous societies, and materialist analyses about the development and change these societies experienced. His cross-cultural analysis, generating a nomothetic explanation of cultural development, differentiated his approach so thoroughly from the dominant Boasian tradition as to develop an entire new area of study. As a method of analysis of multilinear evolution, cultural ecology helped re-codify evolutionary theory within a scientific rhet-

oric. Detailing Steward's professional development and personal relationships from Berkeley to Washington, D.C. and continuing the root metaphor of the patrilineal band offers a fascinating insight into the motivations and concerns that anthropologists were facing during the Great Depression and after the Second World War. This is the context that must begin to be appreciated if we are to understand the generation of foundational pieces in anthropological theory, particularly those who adhere to a "scientific" position within the field. Kern's text provides this context; and it systematically undermines Steward's claim to an objective, scientific method for his conceptual basis for the root of society. The patrilineal band was merely a reflection of his own social habits projected into his theoretical paradigm. The model ensconced a male-centred approach to anthropological method and was replicated and promoted in his theory and practice.

Although the text addresses Steward's failure, like many in his time, to appreciate the role of women in his analyses, and the contribution of the women surrounding him, it does not soundly question the basic assumptions that he makes about Aboriginal societies as a whole. To this point, a further discussion of Steward's role in the Indian Claims Commission proceedings and the relationship of his theory to colonial legal ideology would be fruitful. Exposing the gender bias is but one crucially important component of Steward's approach. Of equal significance is the oppositional relationship between Steward's position and that of John Collier, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs who led the Indian Reorganization Act (1934), and how Steward's approach helped to facilitate the U.S. government's stance in claims cases against the Indians. This is a deeper context within which to understand the relationship of the patrilineal band and anthropological theory to a greater number of real social relationships.

Notwithstanding my claim about the omission of the Indian Claims Commission period in Steward's life, this text is a tremendous addition to several of the recent biographical and historical works in American anthropology. Kerns' contribution well documents Steward's academic history, and augments this chronicle with the personal insights of those close to him. This is a useful and interesting book for the history of American anthropology, the theorization of hunter-gatherer societies, and gender studies within the academy.

Blair A. Rudes and David J. Costa (eds.), *Essays in Algonquian, Catawban, and Siouan Linguistics in Memory of Frank T. Siebert, Jr.,* Algonquian and Iroquoian Linguistics Memoir 16, Winnipeg: Algonquian and Iroquoian Linguistics, 2003, ix + 296 pages.

Reviewer: *Paul Proulx*

As a specialist in Algonquian, I will limit my comments to the Algonquian papers. Three are written by scholars generally

found lunching together at Algonquian conferences: Ives Goddard, the group's leader; Richard Rhodes, his disciple; David Costa, a student of Rhodes and the Algonquianist co-editor of the volume. The signs of intellectual inbreeding are everywhere, and Goddard clearly suffered from too gentle an editorial hand.

Group isolation and status within it can be estimated from the volume bibliography, which indexes frequency of citation. I count 31 separate Goddard publications cited, versus only seven for Bloomfield. Rhodes has 10 and Costa six, while Peter Denny, a psychologist (these days converted into an amateur archaeologist) who hangs out with them, and the remaining linguist, Philip LeSourd, are tied at four.

Goddard's contribution is of monograph length (65 pages). Its merit lies in assembling a huge amount of data on Algonquian demonstratives. However, rather than comparing all the Algonquian languages, as the comparative method calls for, Goddard bases his reconstruction of the Proto Algonquian (PA hereafter) demonstratives only on his two fieldwork languages (and some neighbouring ones he regards as closely related to them).

These he reconstructs internally, producing something like a 1960s underlying structure. This may resemble an earlier stage of a language, or may not. In any event, it is a synchronic representation, that hypothesizes in simplified and abstract terms about the daughter language studied, and how to get from there to its more complex concrete (surface) structure.

Goddard then reconstructs PA comparing the two underlying systems, and argues away all the rest of the data in the second half of the paper. Once this choice of language sample and method are made, nothing like a genuine PA reconstruction is possible. He has discarded far too much information.

For example, Goddard claims that demonstratives "may undergo phonetic reduction beyond what can be accounted for by the general sound laws of a language" (p. 80). He proposes the ad hoc deletion of whole demonstrative roots (VC-) in some languages. In Ojibwa, "PA *4eyo(:)- (set A) was reduced to CO *4o-, and PA *4en- (set B) was lost completely" (p. 63); in Cree-Montagnais, "word-initially PA *4ey- was lost" (p. 69); in Menominee, "the initial sequences PA *4eyo:- and PA *4eni- were reduced to M *4a-" (p. 76); and in Miami, "initial I 4iy- is lost in set A, and initial I 4n- is lost in set B" (p. 78).

I submit that this is not just wrong, it's utter nonsense. Even if one believes in ad hoc sound change, wherever Goddard claims that reduction has totally deleted a root, he has no evidence that the root was ever there in the first place. Arguably, it is simply a convenient fiction, to avoid recognizing that the following element is itself a root, and thus the existence of additional stems. (For those who believe in the regularity of sound change, where his ad hoc reduction has totally deleted a root, although regular sound change would not have done so, he has *proven* that it was never there.)

Many of his other claims also go against linguistic intuition and common sense. For example, he says that Fox 4i:niya "that

(animate, inaccessible)" and Eastern Cree 4(a)niya: "that (animate, inaccessible)" do not attest a stem PA *4eniy- as suggested by Pentland, but rather are separate parallel compoundings of his roots *4en- and *4ey- (p. 38, 71, 91).

However, notice that the attested stems are not Fox *4i:n i:ya nor Eastern Cree *4(a)n-aya:, as a word-initial position for the second syllable would have produced by his own rules. The compounding, if such it was, clearly came early, and one wonders by what criteria he refuses to reconstruct it for his "Western dialect" of PA (in which initial *4e > *4i). His hypothetical compounding can be seen as another convenient fiction to artificially reduce the number of PA stems.

Nor do I believe that Blackfoot 4anno- "this," Mahican 4no: "this (inanimate)", and Menominee 4enoh, 4enom "that (animate)" are chance similarities (p. 89). This merely gets rid of a PA stem *4eno:-.

These are not incidental details. They show Goddard's PA reconstruction to be invalid in its basic methodology, producing multiple omissions. Goddard may feel that the quest for simplicity justifies extreme methods, but he should remember the words of Albert Einstein: "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler."

Charles Hockett also had a dictum: "who explains everything, explains nothing." He illustrated this along the following lines. If someone uses "God wills it" as an explanation, we learn nothing we did not already know. It is too powerful an explanation and so, in the scientific sense, it explains nothing. Goddard's methods are too powerful as well. He is not discovering his conclusions, he is creating them.

Goddard's paper is somewhat tedious and dry reading in the multiplicity of its argumentative details, until near the end (p. 86-93), when he begins an attack on Pentland (1979, 1991, 2001a, 2001b), and Proulx (1988). He makes no reference to Proulx (2001), which addresses many of his objections.

Rhodes and Costa's paper (p. 181-216) is well organized, easy to read or consult. It reconstructs the PA numerals from one to ten, clearly presenting the full data. The reconstructions are not new, but a full presentation of the data is most welcome. I wish they had organized the Eastern data into the four genetic units it is composed of, but that's a detail.

Besides the simple numerals, the authors present a number of compound ones (p. 193-196), and describe what seems to have happened to them in the daughter languages. They are unable to explain these developments, and sometimes speak of "the phonological reduction characteristic of numbers" which "cannot be explained as a normal sound change." This is the Goddardian idea that laws of sound change do not hold, except when convenient. It leaves a number of things described but unexplained.

Nevertheless, they have made an important discovery about these compounds, that they postdate PA and are found in all the non-Eastern languages. They argue further that "the construction is recent" (p. 194). This implies that until recently the non-Eastern languages were able to innovate jointly (albeit clearly across dialectal boundaries), which strengthens my

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view that these languages descend from a Proto Central Algonquian (PCA) much more recent than PA. They also provide a plausible if somewhat speculative account of the influence on Cree vs. Ojibwa relations of the rise and fall of Missippian societies just to the south of them. However, some other ethnographic reconstructions are too specific for the very small amount of data considered, and do not convince.

The paper by Denny (p. 15-36) is evidently an overview of the account he has developed in recent years, on the archaeology of times and places he suspects of having harboured Algonquians. The framework for this is more art than science, and it almost never convinces me. The main problem is that the linguistic evidence he is working with is much too tenuous, and will not really sustain a detailed account of any kind. Costa's paper (p. 1-14) consists of notes on Shawnee.

The paper by Philip LeSourd (p. 141-164) is easily readable, a fine introduction to Malicite-Passamaquoddy for the Algonquianist unfamiliar with it. After introductory remarks on the phonology and grammar of this language, the topic is the noun substitute, best known throughout Algonquian for its use when one has forgotten a word ("whatyoumaycallit"). However, LeSourd discovers unsuspected uses for it: to announce a clarification, including a switch in gender of a referent, and as a generalizing modifier meaning "of some kind." He explores its historical phonology, inflection, and syntax. Rich with examples taken from texts, it inspires confidence. He also discusses its relation to the suffix -4èy "pertaining to, consisting of," also found in Micmac, that forms modifiers (adjectives) indifferent to gender. These are unique within Algonquian, as far as I know, and thus of special interest.

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Barker, John and Douglas Cole (eds.), *At Home with the Bella Coola Indians: T.F. McIlwraith's Field Letters, 1922-4.* Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003, 224 pages.

Reviewer: *Brian Thom*
McGill University

This publication of T.F. McIlwraith's field letters chronicles an important point in the life of an historically significant figure in Canadian anthropology, and provides an important window into the personal and professional relationships that inform the writing of ethnography.

Before McIlwraith became one of the first Canadian anthropologists to be established in a Canadian university (University of Toronto), he was employed by Edward Sapir to engage in fieldwork in the Nuxalk (Bella Coola) community of coastal British Columbia. The enthusiastic, 23-year old Cambridge graduate who had studied under A.C. Haddon and W.H.R. Rivers, set out to comprehensively document Nuxalk traditional culture from kinship systems to the potlatch to shamanism and religion. Out of his two field seasons of work in 1922-24, McIlwraith produced a seminal 2-volume ethnography (*The Bella Coola Indians*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948) that is a distinctive Northwest Coast ethnography from this time in his departure from the general Boasian research agenda of focussing on native texts. The current volume completes the publication of his writings on Nuxalk culture, providing his home-bound family and professional letters from his time in the field, along with the three other short pieces which were obscure or previously unpublished.

The preface by Barker and Cole describing the impetus for the work is followed by an introduction that supplies background information on McIlwraith, the Nuxalk and the texts that follow. The letters read as freshly and lively as if they were written last winter. The letters and papers are richly annotated with endnotes and bibliographic citations that give enough detail to prevent the reader getting lost in the particularities of language, personal relationships or historical events that were current in the 1920s. The book is significant for the new contributions to early 20th Nuxalk ethnography, and perhaps more widely significant for the insight and point of self-reflection it provides for the practice of ethnographic fieldwork.

As Barker and Cole assert in the introduction, the book has been highly interesting to contemporary Nuxalk people. Through these writings, they gain a rare glimpse into the lives of their ancestors and some close descriptions of aspects of their culture as it was practised during the years that McIlwraith was in the community that were not included in his larger study of "traditional culture." Indeed, the letters provide an interesting contrast with *The Bella Coola Indians*. They are concerned with the immediacy and presentness of events and relationships in the community, whereas the ethnography is primarily concerned with the memory culture of pre-contact issues.

The letters show how the Nuxalk community influenced McIlwraith's fieldwork through their insistence on discussing and working on matters of importance to them. During his first season, they wanted him to understand "Indian Laws" and the details of legendary ancestral history before they would engage him in discussions of other cultural issues. From the close relationships McIlwraith developed with individuals in the Nuxalk community during his first year, he became heir to a number of ceremonial prerogatives that he was obliged to exercise during the next winter ceremonial season.

While his field letters detail his extensive participation in the Nuxalk winter ceremonial of 1923-24, they also reveal that he felt the time-consuming experience was "getting in the way" of interviews and other fieldwork that was more relevant to a study of "traditional" or historic Nuxalk cultural practices. In spite of his understated enthusiasm for the process in the letters, this was clearly a time when McIlwraith came to know and more deeply understand the Nuxalk people, their language and the ways in which cultural practices became meaningful for them. Though the material manifestation of these practices were, in McIlwraith's view, somewhat "spoiled" by elements of European assimilation, the ceremonies were an embodiment of what it was to be Nuxalk.

McIlwaith discusses the tensions between his growing pride in his Nuxalk identity and the embarrassment he felt towards his very public participation in Nuxalk ceremonial life. McIlwraith reflects on these feelings in his letters to his family and his professional mentors, to whom he recounts his indignant feelings towards the smells, tastes and aesthetics of Nuxalk life, at times employing words like "filth" and "stench," and referring to the Nuxalk as being "barely intelligible" and "all I can stand." Such frank personal notes may not sit well with some readers, but are more revealing when seen along side his expressions of deep respect for the veracity and potency of Nuxalk culture that other non-Natives living in the Bella Coola valley did not share. Living in the non-Native community and working in the Nuxalk villages, McIlwraith became quite aware of his insider/outsider status in both of them. That status produced an emotional response that is well revealed in the letters to his family and professional colleagues.

This emotional tension culminates in a letter to his father following a Christmas pageant held towards the end of his field studies. At the pageant, he performed Nuxalk song, dance and speech for a mixed audience of Nuxalk and non-Native community members from the neighbouring village where he had his lodging. He writes of feeling intensely loyal to the Nuxalk, but not being able to look his non-Native friends and acquaintances in the eye while performing for fear of breaking down in laughter and not completing the complicated dance he had learned out of respect for his Nuxalk consultants. The mix of pride, humility and embarrassment expressed by McIlwraith reveal the tensions the anthropologist feels while engaged in between two cultural worlds and provides a frank and vivid point from which others engaged in the insider/outsider dialectic of ethnographic fieldwork can reflect on their own experiences.

The book is well conceived and edited, with the usual high production values of the University of British Columbia Press. The notes and references are, however, set in a very tiny typeface that may be a challenge to older eyes. The book, which is not a large volume at just over 220 pages, would have filled out nicely if as much of the existing inward correspondence (particularly that from other anthropologists) to McIlwraith was also included. The only instance of this is found in a single footnote that contains a humorous comment from Edward Sapir regarding the very high-ranking name that had been bestowed upon him for having sent McIlwraith into the field. Regardless of these few weaknesses, *At Home with the Bella Coola Indians* documents an imporant chapter in the history of Canadian anthropology and is well worth the time to read.

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