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Culture, Globalization and the Politics of Place

Edited by Belinda Leach

Fictions of Law

Edited by Eric Worby and Blair Rutherford

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Editor's Note

This volume of *Anthropologica* is the last to be produced by the former owners. The next issue of *Anthropologica* (Vol. XL, New Series), which is now being prepared, will be produced by the Canadian Anthropology Society/Société canadienne d'anthropologie (CASCA) which now owns the journal following its merger with *Culture*. The new Editor-in-Chief will be Jean-Guy Goulet (Université St-Paul, Ottawa); Sally Cole (Concordia) will be Editor (English manuscripts); and the new Managing Editor will be Jean Lapointe (University of Ottawa). I shall continue as a member of the editorial board and Wilfrid Laurier University Press will continue as publishers.

— Andrew Lyons, Editor-in-Chief (1992-97)

Cover

The cover photograph ("This is our neighbourhood, this is our history"), by Lindsay Dubois, shows a mural produced by members of a history workshop in the working-class neighbourhood of José Ingenieros, in the borough of La Matanza, which is situated in the greater Buenos Aires area. It shows the neighbourhood's apartment blocks at four different historical moments, represented by four buildings in a row. An unfinished rainbow runs above the buildings.

Culture, Globalization and the Politics of Place: Introduction

Belinda Leach *University of Guelph*

Among the various theoretical perspectives on processes of globalization, considerable attention has been paid to a "postmodern condition" which characterizes late-20th-century capitalism as newly fragmented and disorganized, exhibiting unprecedented instability and flux. Yet the work of anthropologists like Sidney Mintz (1986), June Nash (1994) and Eric Wolf (1981), and geographers like David Harvey (1989), Allan Pred and Michael Watts (1992), subverts claims that flows of capital, labour, technologies and ideas are new and characteristic of a postmodern era. These analysts show, in contrast, that such shifts are inherent to the logic of capitalism.

The consequences of globalization processes are profound, and it is hardly surprising that analysts are seeking new ways to understand and explain them. Some suggest that people's lifeworlds now expand beyond old borders, allowing them to break free of narrow localism, to aspire to acquire the trappings of capitalist success (and excess), and to choose, if they wish, to relocate themselves across borders, real or imagined. On the other hand, as processes affecting people's daily lives increasingly operate outside their local communities, and decisions taken far away leave them feeling powerless to make change locally, relationships to and within local communities are continually reconstituted and renegotiated.

As anthropologists struggle to find helpful ways to think about such processes, the very concept of "culture" itself is problematized and reconsidered. For example, in an attempt to find a theoretical way to reconcile "globalizing processes and distinctive forms of social life" (Featherstone, 1990: 2), some anthropologists have turned to an idea of global culture, a process of cultural production which transcends borders of all kinds, gathering up in its path migrants, refugees, entrepreneurs and tourists, as well as money, ideas and information (Appadurai, 1991; Hannerz, 1990). Yet while the idea of global culture speaks at some length to ethnic mobility

and the construction of transnational "third cultures," it lacks both gender and class analysis. Paradoxically these may be the very factors which are crucial to our understanding of the connectedness of global and local processes. Who moves and who stays? Why, and to what end? *Whose* global culture?

The global culture idea contrasts dramatically and deliberately with the concept of whole, territorialized cultures which has been dominant in anthropology historically, is increasingly untenable and was always problematic (see, for example, Wilmsen [1989] for a critique of the anthropological reification and circumscription of "the Bushmen"). This older conceptualization, conflating location, culture and identity, is demonstrated by the production of ethnographic maps (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992: 7) and the assumption of a "natural" rootedness of people to particular bounded places. This is not only a powerful idea in classical anthropology, but in social science more broadly, with its focus on territorially discrete nation states. Recent critiques question these ideas, showing among other things, the ways that anthropology itself has demanded a particular idea of place contiguous with culture to pursue its methodology (Olwig and Hastrup, 1997). Being "in the field" and then leaving it, implies travel for the anthropologist, but the subjects of study are expected to remain "in place." Gupta and Ferguson (1992: 14) contend that through this process anthropologists have been active agents in the production of otherness. This led to a situation where the discipline has been far more interested in those who "stay put," and has been relatively blind to those who move with the exception of some, such as nomadic peoples, whose movements are limited and predictable (Olwig and Hastrup, 1997: 4-5). It is only recently that attention has been paid to de Certeau's (1986) idea that practices blur the boundaries of place, through, for example, transnational processes and actions.

Starting from particular and grounded cases from France, Ecuador, Argentina, the Cayman Islands and the Philippines, the articles in this collection all insist upon an approach to place as socially constituted, and investigate the ways in which economic and political processes transform places. Addressing the emerging literature on space and place, the authors examine place and placelessness as sites of experience and locations where hegemonic and counter-hegemonic processes are played out. Together the articles demonstrate the value of joining serious attention to particular histories with a global level of analysis, of bringing together the study of structure, cultural process and human agency (Basch et al., 1994: 11).

Lindsay Dubois' study concerns an urban neighbourhood in Buenos Aires where differences in the lived history of the place have disarticulated people from each other and from the apartment-block community in which they live. Dubois shows people trying to come to terms with how to live with their histories, and, by analyzing a community mural project, she shows how painting their histories helped people to bridge the past and the present, sometimes in unexpected ways.

Kim Clark argues that any sense that place is declining in importance is probably derived from attention to central rather than marginal places. Examining globalization from a marginal perspective, that of rural indigenous Ecuadoreans, she shows how Ecuador's participation in the world economy through the 1980s increasingly disadvantaged marginal peoples economically. On the other hand, she argues, it also opened up space for a revitalized indigenous political movement.

From a quite different marginal location, Charles Menzies examines how restructuring of the social and political landscape connects with local, historically constituted ethnic, gender and class practices to transform the lives of Breton fisherpeople. Again, the crisis has led to a cultural fluorescence and strengthening of Breton identity, yet Menzies argues that the material base of fishing communities is severely threatened and may not be able to sustain them.

Pauline Gardiner Barber critiques some recent theorizing in anthropology and cultural studies which focuses on the "in-between mode" of travelling culture, paying little attention to those whose mobility is not freely chosen and to the "historically specific modes of travelling and the social class dynamics which compel this." She argues that the practices of transnational Filipina, with multiple cultural, social-economic and political ties, call into question spatially simple ideas of home and nation.

Vered Amit-Talai examines national identity and historical consciousness in the Cayman Islands. In this example, transnationalism becomes an issue for local identity. While the Caymans are quite literally a bounded place, identity is confused by the transience of many residents, such as tourists and migrant workers, and by a system where citizenship is conferred by Britain, while legal residence status is determined locally. Amit-Talai shows how the cultural sector has responded to these "anxieties" by constructing history to ensure that access to rights and privileges is granted to a particular segment of the society, the "rightful inheritors of Cayman."

Some of the themes emerging from the articles here include the importance of looking at both staying put and moving, and the significance of considering both the

places where people are, as well as the more remote places where elements of their histories are made, in relation to large-scale economic and political transformations. The articles all indicate that, as Olwig and Hastrup (1997: 10) admonish us to recognize, local culture is never untouched by history, and is often not primarily defined by locals, nor constructed to serve local interests. As Gupta and Ferguson suggest, rather than taking cultural difference as an a priori condition, it is fruitful to take a position which sees it as "a product of a shared historical process that differentiates the world as it connects it" (1992: 16). The places where people live and work, including hegemonically constituted political spaces, continue to be vital locations from which to engage politically, mobilize social memory, construct identity and wage political battles.

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Past, Place and Paint: A Neighbourhood Mural Project in Suburban Buenos Aires[1]

Lindsay DuBois *Dalhousie University*

Abstract: This article discusses the creation of a mural by the neighbourhood history workshop in a working-class district of Buenos Aires. The mural was chosen as a way of giving immediacy and visibility to memories of three distinct intervals in the history of the neighbourhood, the periods before, during and after military rule. In creating the mural, participants were able to re-establish some of the community solidarity lost during the era when community leaders were subject to repression and "disappearance" and give voice to some of the insecurities of the present. The mural portrays some surprising presences and absences in the collective memory of the different phases of the neighbourhood's existence and points to ways in which old and new members of the community can work toward a common future.

Résumé: Cet article discute la création d'une peinture murale effectuée par un atelier d'histoire locale d'un quartier ouvrier de Buenos Aires. Cette peinture murale avait été choisie pour son côté immédiat et visible représentatif de trois périodes distinctes de l'histoire du quartier; c'est-à-dire les périodes avant, pendant et après le régime militaire. En créant cette peinture murale, les participants ont pu rétablir une partie de la solidarité perdue à l'époque où les dirigeants locaux étaient sujets à la répression, aux disparitions; elle permet aussi d'exprimer certaines des insécurités actuelles. La peinture murale représente quelques présences et absences surprenantes de la mèmoire collective des différentes phases de l'existence du quartier. De plus, elle ouvre la porte à un avenir commun par les membres anciens et nouveaux de cette communauté.

How do people make sense of a past fraught with danger and contradiction? For the members of a history workshop in a working-class neighbourhood, one answer was to paint a mural. The mural, like the workshop that produced it, calls our attention to the difficult relationship between community and place in the Greater Buenos Aires neighbourhood called José Ingenieros. Much of the literature on memory sees working on the past as a way of getting at and thinking about collective identity (cf. Boyarin, 1994; Friedman, 1992a, 1992b). Workshop participants also saw the neighbourhood history workshop as a location where community might be remembered and thus somehow reconstituted and positively valued. In the attempt a group of neighbours engaged their past in a process and through images that provide a point of entry for considerations of popular memory on one hand, and the social constitution of place on the other.

The Setting

José Ingenieros is an intriguing location from which to examine working-class memories of Argentina's last 25 years. The neighbourhood where I conducted field work in 1991 and 1992 is comprised of 2 500 apartments in four-storey blocks with a total population of about 15 000. It is located in La Matanza, the most populous of the formerly industrial and working-class boroughs which form a ring around Argentina's cosmopolitan capital. Most residents are domestic labourers, semi-skilled construction workers, pieceworkers, low-income wage earners or self-employed.

An acute housing shortage set the stage for a squatter occupation of these apartments even before they were completed. Squatters were thus part of a moment of almost revolutionary effervescence surrounding the return of Perón at the beginning of the 1973 democratic period. The space they occupied was originally constructed as part of the National Plan for the Eradication

of Shanty Towns, and some of the intended inhabitants were placed in the neighbourhood as well. In the time between the "*toma*," as the takeover is known, and the military coup in March 1976, squatters organized for the completion of the unfinished apartments and infrastructure, and for official recognition. They went beyond these most immediate concerns, however, generating lively community organizations including a health centre and a mothers' child care cooperative.

Things changed after the 1976 coup. There were disappearances: delegates to the neighbourhood council, political activists and doctors from the community clinic were among those kidnapped by plain-clothes military and police. The repression included other less horrific activities as well: there were "censuses" in which military conscripts surrounded the neighbourhood, searched apartments, checked documents and took people in for questioning. From 1979, the neighbourhood even had a military administrator. In general, poorer neighbourhoods were seen by the state as either a refuge for, or a hotbed of subversion. These experiences made manifest the ways in which the neighbourhood itself—unlike middle-class neighbourhoods, I would argue—was a target of suspicion.

After 10 years of democracy, everyday concerns in the neighbourhood are drugs, crime and the physical deterioration of the buildings and infrastructure due to vandalism and neglect. Outsiders, and some residents as well, see José Ingenieros in much the same way that many North Americans see "housing projects." Fears people may have had about the intrusions of the authoritarian state have been supplanted by fears of violence on the street and the violence of the market: crime, hyperinflation and soaring unemployment. The present tempers people's memories of previous eras. Some fault the military for the destruction of neighbourhood organization and solidarity, but most remember orderliness and lack of crime as positive characteristics of the military period, often at the same time as they disapprove of the human rights violations they now know to have existed. The past is difficult for residents of José Ingenieros, and it is usually spoken of only partially and obliquely. The history workshop I instigated and helped organize was a way to watch people work with and make sense of this past.

The Mural

Figure 1 shows the mural in which workshop participants rendered a version of the past for themselves and their neighbours. It shows the neighbourhood's apartment blocks at four different moments represented by four buildings in a row. The first shows the time of the *toma*, when some buildings were not even finished, and when many neighbours lacked access to water, electricity and gas; the second depicts a later period with infrastructure installed; the third is the present, with bars on the windows signifying fear and insecurity in the face of crime; and finally, we see a future when the gardens are green and people feel safe. In front of all this is a series of silhouettes of people working and painting to better the community. Above everything is a rainbow being painted and as yet unfinished, and the title, "This is our neighbourhood, this is our history."

Figure 1

The meaning of the mural is neither transparent nor expected. This depiction of the period from 1973 to 1992 renders preoccupations and tensions that are central to life in the neighbourhood, however. The contrast between the images in the mural and official histories, both dominant and oppositional, is striking and important.

Popular Memory

Recent writing on popular memory (Popular Memory Group, 1982, Swedenburg, 1991) uses Gramsci's notion of common sense to talk about the practical knowledge that subalterns have about their past and present.[2] These authors emphasize the difficulty which popular sectors have in articulating a history that runs counter to the official stories that exclude them. The Popular Memory Group writes: "If this is history, it is history under extreme pressure and privations. Usually this history is held to the measure of private remembrance. It is not only unrecorded it is silenced. It is not offered the occasion to speak" (1982: 210). It was this common-sense history, however, that I set out to discover in my research. I wanted to know how the members of this

particular neighbourhood understood and lived with their particular pasts. I used a number of methodologies, most importantly participant observation and interviews, but the history workshop provided a privileged vantage point because it was precisely about the attempt to articulate the "common-sense history" of José Ingenieros. It was also a specific social context which complemented and stood in contrast to more private and personal accounts.

Argentina's recent past is painful and conflictive. For the people with whom I worked, the 1973 to 1992 period includes memories of the tumultuous return of Peronism, the apparent order and/or repression of dictatorship and the hopes and disappointments of democracy. Further, for many, the lessons of years of military rule are not easily forgotten, although often never even articulated. In this sense a workshop (*taller* in Spanish) on the history of the neighbourhood is a complicated project charged with implications. Why, then, were people interested? Why were they willing to get involved in it?

When we started the *taller*, I saw it as formalizing an existing relationship in a way that would recognize the active role of residents in my project, as well as giving their participation a degree of autonomy. These neighbours were already trying to answer my questions and introducing me to people who they thought had something interesting to say. It soon became clear that few were interested in working on the neighbourhood's history for itself, rather it was seen as a tool to achieve some other more pressing goal.

One of the principal objectives of years of repression had been the fragmentation, even atomization, of all kinds of social networks (Villereal, 1984; Acuña et al., 1995), and in this neighbourhood it had been largely successful. The perceivable result of this recent past is a population that has turned inward. Many people who used to participate in community organization say they are no longer interested. The abrupt and prolonged break in such activities means that not only activists and leaders but also certain practical organizational knowledge has been lost. Thus, one of the principal preoccupations of the *talleristas* was how to recreate or recover a sense of community like that which some remember from the early days of the neighbourhood. Once we sat down to think about the possibilities that a history workshop offered, it soon became clear that few were interested in working on the neighbourhood's history for itself, rather the workshop was seen as a way to address other more pressing concerns. Several months into the first *taller*, four of us went to talk about it on a local FM radio station. After discussion, participants decided that representatives of the group should say the following:

> — We are a group of neighbours who meet on Saturday afternoons to drink *maté* [a distinctively Argentine tea] and talk about the history of the neighbourhood.
> — The workshop is a space for those of us in the neighbourhood who believe that our history matters too.
> — The *taller* allows us to talk about our experiences, the ways in which we have lived different moments. We have become aware that although we are neighbours we haven't all lived the same history in the same way. There are four complexes within the neighbourhood. There are squatters, and people who had been assigned apartments. Because of this, we have different visions of different moments.
> — We express what happened to help us understand the present and make plans for the future.
> — We believe it is important that what we are learning not stay only with us. That's why we feel an obligation to go on the radio, for example. (From the workshop minutes)

People felt the need to articulate, or perhaps recreate, community identity and to look to the past as a source of inspiration and examples. Some felt themselves to be excluded from "History," and wanted to write themselves back in. People hoped a history workshop might awaken concerns for the neighbourhood. If we could "recuperate memory" as they put it, perhaps earlier moments might serve as models for present organization. This was to be a history for the future, as our flyers rather self-importantly proclaimed, "A neighbourhood without history is a neighbourhood without a future."

This view of history, although much theorized by North American academics, was common sense for other participants—in fact it was the main reason people considered the *taller*, or my work for that matter, worth the bother. In explaining this to me, many people quoted the popular Argentine song: "If history is written by the victors, that means there is another history. The true history." They thus agreed with writers like Raymond Williams who call our attention to the counter-hegemonic possibilities of history.[3] Argentines are more likely than many North Americans to recognize the malleability of the past. Rewriting the past, as in official school curricula and history texts, has been normal in the switch back and forth between Peronist and non-Peronist, military and civilian, and more and less nationalist governments over the last 50 years (Shumway, 1991). On one hand, this makes Argentines in general more conscious of the manipulation of the past. On the other, it makes them more sceptical.

In addition to the demobilization engendered by the dictatorship experience, other factors also make community organization difficult, as they did the much more modest efforts of the *taller*. The shared insecurity and neediness caused by the precariousness of the squatters' position in the early years facilitated sharing and co-operation between neighbours. The current relative stability, on the other hand, permits them to take their housing for granted and to concern themselves with their individual, household problems. But stability does not mean economic well-being, and present conditions in Argentina mean that many neighbours lack the time and energy for activities unrelated to their most immediate needs. We occasionally lost workshop participants when they acquired a second job.

The History Workshop

The idea of the history workshop is connected to the movement in social history which focussed on "history from below." The history workshop was seen as another methodology for getting at subaltern histories and silenced voices. The term itself is used as a gloss for the collective thinking through of history, generally by participants in the events or members of the communities in question. Such workshops have employed various methodologies with a variety of groups, around the globe.[4] The most obvious Argentine precedents are the *talleres* run as part of the National Reading Plan under the Alfonsín government (1983-89) (Alvarez, 1989). With the exception of a project on railway workers (Accortini, 1990), these tended to focus on small towns of the interior and worked mostly with local intellectuals: the town librarian, schoolteachers, someone from the mayor's office. That a project of this sort should have been sponsored by the state is striking. In going outside of Buenos Aires and other big cities, it represented an attempt to amplify the field of Argentine history.

The two workshops I was involved in organizing were somewhat different from these *talleres* in that they sought to understand the distinctive historical vision not just from another place, but also from another social class. Here, in the interest of space, I focus, on the second of these *talleres* because it was more successful and responsible for the mural. The principal of the neighbourhood preschool and I organized the workshop collaboratively. The woman I call Alejandra was one of the few outsiders who had developed a good working relationship with neighbours; she was even able to call meetings that people from the community would actually attend. This workshop operated out of the preschool. Participants were mothers and grandmothers of pupils (who could attend since their charges were in school at the time), the principal, some staff, myself and various others. Its membership shifted, although a core group formed. We met 24 times over five months and, according to my sources, it continues to be sporadically active. Attendance ranged from 2 to 25 people, and ages from 21 to 60. One of the productive divides in the *taller* was generational. Younger participants had grown up in the neighbourhood, and were generally trying to reconstruct a history which they vaguely remembered but had yet to understand. Older people tended to focus on their personal experience because the workshop was an environment that accorded this experience significance.

The *Taller de Memoria* Mural

The preschool workshop was called *taller de la memoria del barrio* in contrast to the first which was known as the *taller de la historia del barrio*. It is not clear to me precisely what significance people accorded to the difference, but they were quite insistent about it. Raymond Williams' discussion of tradition is suggestive here (1977: 115ff). By using the idea of tradition in place of history Williams underlines the significance of the past in a daily sense. Traditions are not just about "historical events" however we might understand them, but about "how things have been" in the broadest possible way. Likewise the shift from history to memory as the subject of the *taller* brings it closer to the experience of participants.[5] It is probably less intimidating and more accessible; after all, everyone has memories. The Popular Memory Group argue that these are also less well analyzed by those who hold them. Subaltern histories are "held to the level of private remembrance" (as quoted above).

The previous *taller* in the community centre had demonstrated the need for markers of progress. People had felt frustrated by the lack of tangible advance, even when we had rich and fruitful discussions. It was clearly important that, from quite early in the process, the new *taller* have a clear goal of producing something. The inclination of many participants was a written document since this fits into dominant ideas, and their ideas, of what history should look like. Alejandra and I pushed for a medium that would be both more accessible to other neighbours and more open. Participants considered a mural, a radio program, a photo exhibit, a video, a festival or a neighbourhood clean-up day.

The workshop finally decided that our first project should be a mural painted on some large public wall in

the neighbourhood. When we discussed why we wanted to paint a mural, people gave the following reasons:

— To communicate;
— To make people think, reflect;
— Because it is nice/pretty [*lindo*];
— A mural gets to people more than something written; it calls attention to itself;
— The very fact that there is a group of people working calls attention and communicates a message;
— We can communicate our hopes, the things we want. (Minutes of the *taller de memoria*)

Once we had agreed on the medium, we had to start thinking of the history of José Ingenieros in terms of images rather than verbal storytelling. Although the history workshop technique is frequently classified as part of oral history because it looks beyond written documents it often goes outside the spoken altogether. Photographs, for example, can be a rich source, conveying a sense of the past and helping people remember. It may also be easier to express some things in non-verbal forms, especially if they are emotionally or politically difficult.

Of course the mural has its limitations as an expressive form, but some of these were also advantages: we did not have to understand the whole history of the neighbourhood, we only had to have a few things to say. The fact-finding part of the project could continue as we worked on representation. The sense that we needed to have everything figured out had been a stumbling block in the earlier *taller*, keeping us from thinking seriously about how to express our findings. Also the mural is a very public form requiring little commitment on the part of its audience.

The problem of where to put the mural generated considerable discussion. There were many possible blank walls, but several factors entered into consideration. The first decision was whether the mural should face inward toward other residents or outward toward passers-by and adjoining communities. Because José Ingenieros is located at the intersection of two major arteries there is a lot of passing traffic. One mother argued for an outward-facing mural because she was concerned about the image of José Ingenieros. Her children's friends were not allowed to visit her apartment. She saw this as the product of a long-standing tension between residents of "the complexes" (as the neighbourhood is sometimes known to outsiders) and the supposedly more respectable bungalows of Ciudad Evita which adjoins José Ingenieros to the south. She felt the need to show outsiders that José Ingenieros is not a bad place. Others argued that we had things to say that neighbours themselves needed to hear. The group eventually decided that the first mural should be prominently located within the neighbourhood, with the understanding that an outward-facing mural might soon follow.

Next was a decision about where the mural should be located within José Ingenieros. Everyone knew a place near their apartment that would be ideal and each lobbied for her own. We settled on a spot facing onto one of the few internal streets which was also situated on the pedestrian mall frequented by people from all over José Ingenieros.

Finally, there were the issues of ownership and territoriality. The people who lived behind the wall had to give permission, but we did not expect problems here. More worrisome was the issue of *pintadas*. The painting of political slogans in red, white and black is an important part of Argentine political culture (Chaffee, 1986, 1989). In the neighbourhood the various local political offices had acquired traditional use rights for certain key walls. One participant had, some years earlier, been physically threatened by a rival group when she and her allies tried to paint over a *pintada* on someone else's wall with a human rights slogan. The wall we eventually chose had neither problem. We could find no currently active political group which claimed responsibility for the old *pintadas* on the side of a small building housing electrical equipment.

Unlike most murals discussed in the literature, the choice of medium was almost incidental for the *taller de memoria*. As is evident, none of us were artists, although we did have a draftsman in our group. For technical expertise, we turned to a former preschool teacher who was also a painter, but the whole project was a collective endeavour. She stoically resisted the *talleristas'* attempts to defer to her.

The design was generated in a few of our Wednesday workshop meetings. Many of us also met on Saturday afternoons for the dusty work of scraping down and bleaching the wall. Preparation involved many hours removing years of *pintadas* off the 18-by-12-foot wall in what felt like a form of political archaeology. The entire process took a month. Some of the people from the first workshop participated in these sessions, partly because the meeting time was convenient, but also, I suspect, because of the concreteness of the enterprise. The ideas were generated by participants working in groups of three or four. The final composition was a synthesis of these ideas. We agreed on a design before going out to paint, but it was discussed and altered as we went along.

Although the mural genre might have been expected to obviate any obligation to work chronologically, the mural does contain an explicit linear narrative. The periodization it expresses, however is somewhat unexpected. First is the *toma*, which is not surprising, since this is always cited as the foundational event; then the neighbourhood, once it is well established; third the present, and finally the future. There is a silence in the mural: the notable omission of the dictatorship as a period. The bars on the windows of the third building are intended to reflect a climate of fear of crime *in the present*. The second building cannot be easily dated. Shutters and door are closed, however, and there is paint peeling off the building which represents a time somewhere between 1973 and the present. As noted earlier, this history does not fit neatly with official ones.

Here is one of the most important things the *taller* taught me. Throughout my field work, I kept encountering what seemed to be an obsession with the quality of physical space: sewage, trash, garbage. This fixation appeared again in the context of the *taller*. It finally became clear to me that this was a way of thinking about order and community. Both were complicated ideas, given the history of dictatorship. When people told me "this is not a slum" it was this physical deterioration that they feared might mislead me. This deterioration was tied to poverty, but also to the dissolution of community organizations which resulted from the pressures of the authoritarian state. Who might have organized neighbours to clean or improve the neighbourhood after community activists were targeted for repression?

The themes of order and community, as well as the tension between them, help explain what is probably the mural's most conspicuous design feature: the juxtaposition of the buildings and the silhouettes. The contrast is partly an artifact of the process, two groups' designs were selected and put together. The buildings express a concern with the physical space of the neighbourhood, and especially its present sad state. Only through working on the mural did people become conscious of the fact that the neighbourhood is not, actually, in worse shape than it was at the time of the *toma*. Rather, the neighbourhood in general had seen a rise and fall over time. There is also considerable variation within the neighbourhood.

The silhouettes address more overtly social themes about co-operative community-oriented labour. While the buildings, at least for the artists, express a marked chronology, the silhouettes are more slippery. They were originally seen as both a description of the past and hopes for the future, but they were actually created by tracing our bodies onto paper and then painting them onto the wall, so they are a sort of visual pun—referring to the narrative of the mural and to the mural painting itself—which was strongly felt as we worked (Figure 2). This slipperiness was partly intentional; the silhouettes were meant to represent continuity between the constructive community activity in the past and in the present. They constitute a rather explicit bridge in that the silhouettes can be placed in the times which the mural depicts, or outside them. The woman getting water from a spigot who explicitly belongs to the *toma* is clearly on the same plane as the painters or muralists.

Figure 2

One effect of the mural not to be belittled is that it is cheerful and lively in the grey concrete context. To some, the act of painting was seen as communicative in itself. The fact of our persistent, collective and community oriented effort in a central location within the neighbourhood would convey its own message about the possibility of neighbours working together. Traffic was light since we tended to paint Wednesday afternoons when there was little street life and during the Saturday afternoon siesta. But for those who were around, we presented an unusual sight. Children, in particular, hovered on the edges of our activity and were often handed paintbrushes so they could participate.

Popular Memory, Dimensions of Political Practice

The work of the *taller de memoria* through its activities and especially its mural, calls attention to the complex relation between space, place, history, identity and politics. Geographers have begun to call their fellow social scientists to task for our underdeveloped understandings of space and place. Doreen Massey, for example, criticizes a notion of place, "as bounded, as in various ways a

site of an authenticity, as singular, fixed and unproblematic." She suggests instead that place should be, "thought of in the context of space-time and as formed out of social interaction at all scales, then one view of place is a particular articulation of those relations, a particular moment in those networks of social relations and understandings" (1994: 5). The very history of José Ingenieros militates against the assumptions she criticizes. The construction of José Ingenieros as a space and place is so recent and so obvious a process, and such a difficult one, that one could hardly think of it as authentic or unproblematic. One of the important struggles in José Ingenieros is precisely to develop community in the sense that proposes shared solutions to common problems.

On the other hand, neighbours' and muralists' descriptions of José Ingenieros suggest that essentializing place is not exclusively the academics' vice. Residents of this neighbourhood tend to fall into a similar trap. Part of this has to do with the struggle to form a collective identity and/or sense of community which might underwrite collective action. Despite all the co-ordinators' best efforts, participants still represented the history of the neighbourhood using the convention of depicting the physical space it inhabits. The portion of the design which includes the buildings was produced by a group working with pencil and paper, although our artist guide tried to dissuade them from what she saw as a medium which tends to the over-literal. For some neighbours, José Ingenieros *is* its grey concrete monoblocks (colour, too, was added later). Like the perpetual return to the material conditions of the neighbourhood (garbage and decay) the focus on the buildings equates the community with the space. The crisis of the space *is* the crisis of the community. Thus social problems (lack of community organization, alienation and crime) are read as physical ones (the decay of the neighbourhood).

The two elements of the mural represented in the two superimposed designs—the preoccupation with physical space on one hand, and with community on the other—were recurrent themes in the *taller* itself. They are related to current problems in the neighbourhood, and to distinct visions of the nature and causes of these problems. By superimposing the figures on this representation of the space, the workshop tried to call attention to the social dimension of these problems. These figures, as well as the mural's caption, make an argument about the role community activity has and might play in improving the space, and remaking the place.

Like writers on popular memory, participants in the *talleres* explicitly tie history to identity and politics. Further, work on popular memory is seen as a tool toward reaffirming or forging collective identities. Activists care about this because they believe that fortified collective identities can then be turned into collective endeavours and political action. The Popular Memory Group defines popular memory "first as an *object of study*, but, second, as a *dimension of political practice*" (1982: 205). Throughout the *talleres* we were continually reminded of this connection. As I have noted, many participants were quite explicit about the politics as the reason for doing the history.

This tension became apparent especially when the significance of our activities was called into question explicitly in discussion, or implicitly, by poor attendance. At issue was whether the *taller* mattered. Was it just indulgent intellectualizing, as some argued? Some saw the workshop and its talk of the past as abstract, perhaps interesting but also a luxury in the face of the serious problems the neighbourhood confronted. These critics saw talking and doing as contradictory, and even mutually exclusive, activities. One challenge came when there was a serious problem with contamination of the water in the neighbourhood. People from the community centre targeted this issue; little time was left for meetings of the *taller de memoria*. Alejandra and I found that we agreed with their decision to give priority to the water problem. We also found, however, that our co-operation through the *taller* facilitated the flow of information and helped co-ordinate the activities of the preschool with those of the community centre with respect to the water crisis. The workshop became a location where concerns could be informally discussed and information exchanged.

Another animated debate about the utility of the workshop arose as we discussed possible projects. Neighbours concerned about the lack of green play spaces for children suggested refurbishing one of the unkempt gardens. Some people said that a playground was something the neighbourhood really needed and that our energy should be directed at the needs of the children. Others said that although the idea was good, this was a *taller de memoria*; we should build on what we had learned by staying closer to our theme. Here the presence of outsiders emerged as a concern; by this they meant myself, Alejandra and the teachers. Could we say that this was a neighbourhood workshop when there were often fewer neighbours than non-neighbours? Notably the person who expressed this concern most forcefully was the same one who wanted to get away from history-oriented activities "and really do something concrete." He was also a relative newcomer to José Inge-

nieros and tended to talk about neighbours as if the category did not include himself. Thus activities about the community's history and identity may not have touched him. Contradictorily, he was one of the workshop's most persistent and industrious participants. Other members pointed out that, although the neighbourhood has been in need of fixing up for a long time, groups had not successfully organized around this issue, while people were meeting in the *taller de memoria*. It was worth taking some time to consolidate a base using something that seemed to be working.

The *taller* temporarily petered out after the completion of the mural, which was coupled with the departure of my co-organizer (a promotion moved her to another part of the province), the end of the school year and the fact that I too would soon be leaving. We closed with a showing of photographs of the mural-painting process, displayed at the preschool and in an administration office near the mural.

Lest the reader carry away too rosy an image of the *taller*, I should note that the workshop always seemed on the verge of extinction. Just when it was about to take off in a flurry of activity, something would happen to set the whole thing back several steps. Nonetheless, people did meet to reflect on their history in the workshops. The reasons and the ways they did this point to the place of history and memory in social life. Authors like Passerini (1987) and Portelli (1991) have indicated something of the complexity of popular memory, but the workshop experience begins to point to its role. It is a location where people can begin to produce histories in which they figure—literally, in the case of this mural. The *taller de memoria* I have described indicates something of the slowness and complexity of this process. The double image of the mural in particular stands as a metaphor for how difficult it is for people to fully integrate themselves into the picture.

In the final analysis, what is most important is the significance that neighbours assigned to the workshop. For them historytelling is an important part of history-making. When members of the memory workshop tried to depict the past, they were speaking through their present concerns, and addressing a community that they saw as having moved from activism to apathy. The process of designing and painting the mural was a way of understanding the past, and it was intended to instruct other residents on the virtues of collective community-oriented action—by example and through its images. It is striking that they chose a spatial idiom to represent their community. At least some saw the *taller de memoria* as an experience that could aid in recreating social ties by helping to forge a common, positively valued, identity in the face of the social atomization which is a product both of Argentina's repressive past and of the economic liberalism of its present.

Figure 3



I close the story of the workshop and the mural with a final image (Figure 3). In February 1994, I received a letter from friends in the neighbourhood bringing me up to date on the activities there. A new mural had been painted on the side of the community centre building just before Christmas. Painted in one day because of rumours that the wall of the centre was to become the canvas for a new *pintada*, the new mural shows young people partaking in the activities of the centre: a soccer game, a rock band, neighbours meeting and talking. This wall is on the edge of the neighbourhood directed outward. In the face of dominant discourses marginalizing the community, the struggle to paint an optimistic image of the future continues.

Notes

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2 For Gramsci, "common sense" is the collection of beliefs, prejudices, ideas and principles which each of us encounters and absorbs as we become social beings (1971: 323). It is the "product of history and a part of the historical process" (1971: 326). Common senses are thus specific to particular times, places and social contexts. Further, and more importantly, common sense is inherently "disjointed and episodic" (1971: 324). It thus contrasts both with the relatively coherent dominant ideologies and religions, and with critical thought which takes "common" and "good" sense as its

starting point for the building of coherent philosophies and interpretations of the world (1971: 323-325, 423, 199).

3 "It is significant," writes Williams, "that much of the most accessible and influential work of the counter-hegemony is historical: the recovery of discarded areas, or the redress of selective and reductive interpretations. But this, in turn, has little effect unless the lines to the present, in the actual process of the selective tradition are clearly and selectively traced" (1977: 116). The connections Williams describes here are precisely the sort which Gramsci has in mind when he calls for a movement from "common sense" to critical understandings (see note 2, above).

4 See *History Workshop Journal* in general and especially Selbourne, 1980 and Samuel, 1980; Lindenberger and Wildt, 1992; Johnson et al., 1982; Brecher, 1984. I have the impression that the history workshop is used quite a lot throughout Latin America and Africa, but as I have come across few references this remains an impression (see the special issue of *Radical History Review* on South Africa including Witz, 1990 and especially the fascinating article by Bozzoli, 1990). For Chile, see Paley, 1993.

5 Both *"memoria"* and *"historia"* have even more complex constellations of meaning in Spanish than do their English equivalents. *Memoria* means "memory" in the English senses, and also "memorial" and "memoir." *Historia* includes the various English meanings of "history" and also "story," so does not necessarily have the same connotation of veracity as it does in English.

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Globalization Seen from the Margins: Indigenous Ecuadorians and the Politics of Place

A. Kim Clark *University of Western Ontario*

Abstract: Processes of economic globalization over the last quarter century, associated with increased mobility of capital, goods and labour, suggest that attachments to place are of decreasing importance. However, this may be a result of looking at these processes from the centre, rather than from the margins. This article combines a discussion of how globalization and the debt crisis in Ecuador have restructured the limits of the possible for subaltern groups, with a consideration of some of the unexpected consequences of those processes in the countryside, as broad economic processes intersect with local histories and human agency.

Résumé: Les processus de globalisation économique au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années, associés à une plus grande mobilité de capital, de biens et de travail, semblent indiquer que le fait de s'attacher à un endroit est d'importance décroissante. Cependant, cela résulte peut-être d'une constatation de ces processus observée du centre, plutôt que des marges. Cet article combine une discussion sur la manière dont la globalisation et l'endettement en Equateur ont restructuré les limites du possible pour les groupes subalternes, avec une considération de quelques-unes des conséquences inattendues de ces processus à la campagne, telles que le croisement de ces larges processus économiques avec les traditions locales et le facteur humain.

Processes of economic globalization over the last quarter century have undermined the importance of attachments to specific places, as capital, goods and, to a lesser extent, labour have achieved an unprecedented mobility. These economic processes have had important political implications. For instance, in the context of increasing pressures from the global economy and from international organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund), states have become less responsive to internal pressures from their own populations. In addition, the shift from Fordism to flexible accumulation has undermined the labour movement, as there are fewer situations in which people work side by side in common conditions. In the Third World, the debt crisis has resulted in a great increase in the informal economy, further reducing the importance of the labour movement. A politics of place thus seems increasingly irrelevant in the postmodern world of shift and flux.

This article examines some of the specificities of these processes in Ecuador.[1] On the one hand, Ecuadorian elites have reoriented their production to the international market since the early 1980s, with a precipitous decline in industrial production for the internal market, and a return to the export of primary products. In addition, they have sponsored a rapid process of capital flight. The reaction of many poor and middle-class mestizo Ecuadorians to economic globalization has been to undertake the arduous path of international migrations. Altogether, this suggests the decreasing importance of attachments to place. On the other hand, however, the response of the indigenous population has been very different: they have become increasingly organized and politicized in their commitment to produce in and for Ecuador. In regard to the indigenous movement, this article examines two issues: first, the democratization of local powers in the Ecuadorian highlands and the generation of indigenous intellectuals and leaders at the grassroots level; and secondly, the increasing indigenization of the Andean countryside. The rise of the indigenous

movement in Ecuador can be seen as directly related to processes of globalization: in some cases, their mobilizations are in response to the local effects of economic globalization, while in others, they colonize the terrain left behind by globalization. The aim here is not to provide a detailed ethnographic account but rather to rethink the overall panorama of these processes, by placing elite and subordinate groups side by side as components of a single social field of analysis, and by examining the importance of human agency alongside what might appear to be overwhelming political economic processes.

This article begins with a discussion of some of the general characteristics of recent processes of economic globalization. Then, it moves on to a more specific consideration of the effects of globalization on Ecuador, with special reference to the impact of the debt crisis and the subsequent reorganization of production for the international market. That consideration contributes to a broad understanding of how economic processes have restructured the limits of the possible for subaltern groups in Ecuador. However, despite the reality of those processes, this article argues that in fact, what social actors actually make of that restructuring is not set in stone. The exploration of the indigenous movement thus serves to remind us that human agency must be taken into account in understanding how broad economic processes intersect with local histories: subaltern groups also make history and participate in determining the outcomes of global processes, sometimes in unexpected ways. As Carol Smith suggested about an earlier period in the expansion of capitalism, "one way we can account for the distorted, uneven and unanticipated events resulting from the global expansion of capitalism is to view capitalism as a social and cultural phenomenon as much as an economic one, as a process that can be and is affected by class struggle and human agency all along" (1984: 225).

Globalization and the Declining Importance of Place

In general terms, the world economy has been transformed since 1970, with the shift from Fordism to flexible accumulation (Harvey, 1989). This has been characterized by a new mobility of capital, goods and labour. For instance, there have been changes from fixed capital investments in factories with organized labour forces, to small-batch production, undertaken through subcontracting arrangements, home work and temporary jobs. This has allowed for a greater responsiveness on the part of business owners to changing market conditions, particularly given the possibilities of rapid and inexpensive communications and transport. There has been a change from economies of scale to economies of scope, as well as from the production of goods to the production of services in the developed economies. This has involved the transformation of production processes in both the developed and the "developing" countries, often involving the closure of factories and their re-establishment in regions where cheaper labour is available, for instance, in free trade zones of various kinds. While theoretical statements suggest that both capital and labour have become more mobile, the experience of the last two decades demonstrates that in fact capital moves much more easily than labour. As a result, where economic recovery has been occurring in the developed world, it has often been a "jobless recovery." The effects of these economic processes are wide ranging, including cultural changes in time-space perception and sensations of fragmentation, shift, instability and insecurity: "the condition of postmodernity," as Harvey entitles his book. The changes in forms of capital accumulation have had implications for workers' rights and movements, and have often involved the informalization and/or the feminization of the labour force, as well as the establishment of export processing zones which often prohibit unionization. From a more cultural perspective changes in communications, especially computer technology, produce standardization and the homogenization of identities on the one hand, but, on the other, generate increasing possibilities for the decentralization of power.

Such changes in the world economy also mean that governments are less able to dictate economic policy within their borders. As Held (1991) points out, this situation is intensified by the role of international organizations in reducing state autonomy. That process has taken a specific form in Latin America, where the debt crisis of the 1980s, the continent's "lost decade," has brought national economies under the direct supervision of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Overall, the triad of policies promoted have comprised, "liberalization—open up economies to international trade; privatization—reduce the role of the state; and deregulation—increase the space for foreign capital to operate in the region" (Gereffi and Hempel, 1996: 20). Held suggests that the influence of international organizations has had important political repercussions, making governments less responsive to local pressures, as they are compelled to respond increasingly to international ones. "While the state's ability to define and defend national economic interests is shrinking, the demands placed on it for social programs to handle those who are marginalized or unable to compete in the global

economy will undoubtably grow" (ibid.: 27). Indeed, the adjustment programs of the 1980s in many ways have led to a crisis among the region's poor, with rapidly declining real wages, increasing unemployment and reduced social security in the broadest sense of the term.

Globalization in Ecuador

In Ecuador, processes of economic globalization can perhaps be most clearly seen by examining the debt crisis and its result, the reorientation of the national economy away from an import-substitution industrialization model, and toward a model of primary product exports, focussing on non-traditional products. In this section, an exploration of these issues is undertaken from "above" (examining the state and elite groups) and from the "centre" (in the Ecuadorian case, the cities). Then in the last section of this article, and with these processes in mind, an exploration will be undertaken of how globalization might be seen from the margins, meaning both from "below," and from the rural areas of the country. In that context the response of the indigenous population and the indigenous movement to these processes is analyzed.

Ironically, the causes of the debt crisis are found in a period of unprecedented prosperity in the Ecuadorian economy: the oil boom of the 1970s. This was the third of three boom periods based on export-led growth in Ecuador since the late 19th century. The first was the cocoa boom of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which entered a crisis with the First World War, and was further undermined by the Depression. The second was the banana boom of the 1950s, which ended in the 1960s, when new disease-resistant crops were introduced into United Fruit's Central American plantations, allowing a shift back to production in those areas. The third boom was based on oil exports in the 1970s.

With the failure of banana exports in the 1960s, Ecuador had embarked on a project of industrialization based on import substitution. However, sufficient capital to offer tax incentives and subsidies to national manufacturing did not emerge until the early 1970s, when the exportation of oil began. When Ecuador began to export oil in August of 1972, its price on the international market was $2.50 U.S. a barrel. By 1974 this price had increased by a factor of five to $13.70. This occurred because the beginnings of Ecuadorian oil exports in 1972 coincided with the Arab-Israeli war and the associated Arab oil embargo on many industrialized countries. In the following years, from 1975 to 1978, the international price of oil stabilized within the range of $12 to $13 per barrel. Then, in 1979 this price doubled, and in 1980 it rose further, to $35. The price of oil began to decline precipitously in 1982.

Thus, during the 1970s, the country saw an unprecedented influx of capital. The total value of Ecuadorian exports increased from just below $190 million in 1970 to $2.5 billion in 1981. This period also saw a very important increase in the role of the state in national development. Between 1972 and 1979 Ecuador was governed by the military, who promoted a strong state directly involved in the economy. With the creation of the *Corporación Estatal de Petróleo Ecuatoriano* (CEPE, later *Petroecuador*) and the nationalization of the oil industry in 1972, the state became a direct agent of accumulation. Public expenditures rose from 13 035 million sucres in 1972 to 86 627 million sucres in 1979 (during which time the exchange rate remained stable).

Driven by these processes, during the 1970s Ecuador made the definitive move from a poor country to a middle-income one, in the rating system of the World Bank. Indeed, some of the income from oil production was spent on improving living standards in Ecuador. This increase in social spending was part of a larger project to modernize society, and involved significant expenditures by the military government in health, education and housing. "Between 1960 and 1980 more than ten years were added to Ecuadorian life expectancy, death and infant mortality rates dropped by 40 percent and by 1980 virtually all children attended primary school" (Moser, 1993: 177). In addition, a great quantity of state resources were spent on various kinds of subsidies to the industrial sector. The model of economic development followed during these years included: a reduction in tariffs for the importation of machinery, intermediate goods and prime materials for industry; the concession of large tax exemptions for the realization of industrial projects; the maintenance of low prices for agricultural products and food through subsidies; and the generation of a growing demand that favoured investment and employment, through the construction of large projects of infrastructure, direct state participation in enterprises in the productive sector, commerce and services, and the expansion of the bureaucracy (Samaniego Ponce, 1988: 123).

The model followed by the military of "modernization" and incorporation from above came at a price, however. In the absence of internal savings and investment, the funds to finance these ever-increasing state expenditures could only come from two sources: either a positive balance of trade, bringing in significantly more resources than left the country, or an influx of external capital through loans. Between 1972 and 1974 the former occurred, given the fivefold increase in the price of oil.

However, between 1975 and 1978, the price of oil stabilized, and growing expenditures could only be financed through the contracting of external loans. Although the value of exports stabilized rather than continuing to grow, the amount of money leaving the country through the purchase of imported goods (for consumption and industry) continued to increase exponentially, leading to budget deficits beginning in 1975. The crisis that should have occurred in 1975-76 (with the stabilization of oil prices) was postponed through the contracting of foreign loans, used to maintain high rates of economic growth. In 1978, the deficit in the current account was 9.2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), which would have motivated a severe crisis if it had not been for a new increase in the price of oil in 1979 to $23.11 dollars a barrel, compared with its 1978 price of $12.46. Thus it was in 1976 that the debt began to skyrocket: between 1976 and 1980, the total external debt of the country increased by a spectacular 67 percent annually, ballooning from $693 million dollars to $4 652 millions. Altogether, between 1971 and 1981, the Ecuadorian external debt multiplied by a factor of 22: from $260.8 million to $5 868.1 million (Acosta, 1995).

In 1979, the military turned over power to the first of a series of democratically elected governments, having instituted no economic adjustment policies during the 1970s. In 1982, economic crisis struck, in a context where commercial lending had dried up, oil prices had declined (by 1986 they would reach below $10 a barrel) and real interest rates had risen. Essentially, the adjustment measures that the democratic governments have taken over the last decade and a half have involved the elimination of protective mechanisms and subsidies, a reduction in price controls in the internal market, an opening of the economy to the international market, cuts in public spending, monetary devaluations and increases in rates of interest. The first challenge was to reduce domestic demand through a reduction in real incomes, in order to reduce imports. Indeed, a trade surplus had to be generated quickly, which could be done more rapidly by limiting imports than through generating additional exports. The measures taken were dictated by the International Monetary Fund in order to obtain "standby" agreements for loan payments, which were indispensable in order to renegotiate the debt. Then, by 1984, there began to be significantly more attention to the process of reassigning productive resources to stimulate the economy, with attention to the promotion and diversification of exports. There was thus an explicit recognition that it was necessary to shift resources back into the export sector to promote non-traditional products and thus generate a trade surplus. Since then there has been a massive reduction in trade barriers and subsidies to non-traditional products for export, an aggressive policy of increasing the international monetary reserves in order to renegotiate the debt, and severe reductions in government jobs and services. The subsidies and incentives that were previously offered to industry (oriented toward the internal market) are now offered for the production of non-traditional exports. One of the explicit goals of the adjustment process was to encourage a shift of supply from the home market to the world market in order to generate foreign currency to pay debt servicing. The result was that, by 1990, the share of industry in Ecuador's overall GDP had shrunk to a mere 7.3 percent after a continual decline through the 1980s. This was the lowest share registered for any Latin American country; Panama, at 9 percent, was the only other country in which this figure was below 10 percent (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994: 401).

The effects of adjustment on the Ecuadorian poor have been extreme. While the cost of living increased 21.88 times between 1980 and 1990, salaries were reduced by a factor of 2.38: the minimum monthly salary of 4 647.5 sucres in 1980 had been reduced to 1 945.3 sucres by 1990 (measured in 1980 sucres). However, currency devaluations and rising inflation through the 1980s meant that Ecuadorian products maintained and increased their competitiveness on the world market, while labour costs were driven ever lower through the decline in real wages. By 1992, the poorest 20 percent of Ecuador's population received 2 percent of national income, while the wealthiest 20 percent received 73.5 percent of the total income (Ojeda, 1993: 218). By 1995, 40 percent of Ecuador's population was living below the poverty line.

Given the reduction in local industry, which had been overwhelmingly concentrated in Ecuador's two largest cities (Quito and Guayaquil), there has been a great increase in the informal sector and urban poverty. The closing of factories has also implied a rollback in unionization and workers' movements: since there are fewer places where workers labour together in similar conditions, there are also fewer social bases for a union movement. Indeed, the effects of globalization on the labour force mean that more and more people work individually and informally, and therefore are in situations of competition rather than co-operation with one another. This has intensified the impact of economic crisis on the poor, given that the movements through which their rights have traditionally been promoted are in decline.

One response to this situation, indicative of the desperation felt, has been emigration. While the New York

area had 300 000 legal Ecuadorian residents at the end of the 1980s, it was estimated that the additional illegal immigrants in the area numbered between 300 000 and 600 000, making New York Ecuador's third largest city. The figures for Los Angeles are similar. Ecuador's total population is currently estimated at 12 million.

The debt crisis itself has been declared over for Latin America, but it has left in its wake a fundamental reorganization of production and productive relations. However, globalization does not have a single face in Latin America. On the one hand, within countries, different social groups have been affected very differently: the gains for some have come at a price paid by others. Indeed, in Ecuador, certain elite groups have found new opportunities for profit in the current situation, and part of their profit comes precisely from policies that enforce low wages. On the other hand, the Ecuadorian situation should be comprehended in relation to the range of effects globalization has had on Latin American economies in the 1980s and 1990s. Within this range, Ecuador has seen a decline in manufacturing, and an emphasis on non-traditional fisheries (such as shrimp) and agro-exports (such as roses): in 1993, 93 percent of exports were primary products (Larrea Maldonado, n.d.: 17). Unlike other areas where non-traditional agro-export production has been "multinationalized" (such as Del Monte's domination of fresh pineapple exports in Costa Rica; see Henwood, 1996), in Ecuador the new export products promoted through the adjustment process have remained largely in the hands of national elites. In contrast to the emphasis on non-traditional agro-exports, other Latin American countries have by and large been newly integrated into the global economy through the establishment of manufactures through buyer-led commodity chains. This involves the production of cheap consumer goods to the specifications of transnational companies, such as clothing retailers. The manufacturing is subcontracted out to local firms, rather than being undertaken directly by the transnational corporation. Another possibility, limited principally to Brazil and Mexico, is the development of industry-led commodity chains, with industrial production integrated with distribution by transnational corporations, usually for capital goods such as automobiles, machinery and computers.

Although capital has become more mobile since the 1970s, the lack of direct foreign investment in Ecuador implies that capital has been flowing out of the country rather than in. In addition to the outflow of capital through debt payment, there is also extensive capital flight. By 1985, capital flight reached the point that Ecuadorians had bank accounts in the U.S. totalling $700 million, and an additional $600 million in banks in other countries. This did not take into account investments in foreign companies or real estate, which were presumed to raise this figure of $1.3 billion to $2 billion (Samaniego Ponce, 1988: 152). By 1994, wealthy Ecuadorians had 13 times as much money invested outside of the country as they had in Ecuador.

Despite the enormous social cost of the adjustment policies, these policies have not failed, from the perspective of those Ecuadorian elites who have prospered, and from the perspective of the developed countries. In fact, they have fulfilled one of their central goals, of liberalizing and opening the Ecuadorian economy. While a view from the centre, and from the cities, seems to suggest that globalization is inevitable and its effects are uncontrollable (promoting resignation among the poor), an anthropological perspective suggests that economic processes never have a single meaning nor a uniform effect. Thus we must shift our vision to see how these processes look from the margins.

Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: The Politics of Place

While urban workers have become increasingly disorganized as a result of the transformation of the economy and the workplace, this section examines another subordinate group, indigenous peasants and their political organizations.[2] Here two issues are explored: first, the democratization of local powers in the Ecuadorian highlands and the generation of indigenous intellectuals and leaders at the grass-roots level; and secondly, related to this, the increasing indigenization of the countryside. In many ways this is the flip side of globalization: while others have more often analyzed the effects of globalization on workers directly producing for the global market, here I ask what has happened to the political and economic terrain left behind by the global economy in Ecuador.

With the passage of the two laws of agrarian reform in 1964 and 1973 (see Barsky, 1984), and the agrarian conflicts associated with them (Sylva Charvet, 1986), the large *hacienda* in its traditional form disappeared from the countryside of the Ecuadorian highlands. In 1954, 16.4 percent of the land in the Ecuadorian highlands corresponded to properties measuring less than 20 hectares, 19.2 percent to those measuring 20 to 100 hectares and 64.4 percent to estates larger than 100 hectares. In 1985, 33.5 percent of this land was held in properties less than 20 hectares in size, 30.3 percent in those of 20 to 100 hectares and 36.2 percent in those greater than 100 hectares (Zamosc, 1993: 278). Although the process of land

distribution was uneven, the overall tendency has been the creation of smaller, highly mechanized *haciendas*, often in the more fertile valley floors, and the sale of land in upper altitudes, where it is more difficult to use tractors, there is less access to water, and where land is often subject to erosion. In the northern highlands (with easy access to urban markets for dairy products) the sale of marginal lands allowed larger landowners to capitalize what remained of their properties, rendering these lands fully utilized and thus not subject to further expropriations. In the central and southern highlands, it appears that large landowners sometimes attempted to pre-empt the agrarian reform by selling off some of their lands, and endeavoured to encourage conflicts among and between neighbouring indigenous communities and mestizo townspeople to drive up the price of those lands (Zamosc, 1993).

The disappearance of the traditional agricultural estate implied the undermining of an entire system of ethnic administration through private, local powers, wherein the large landowner dominated indigenous peasants, in alliance with the priest, the local political authority (*teniente político*) and the white-mestizo inhabitants of highland towns (Casagrande and Piper, 1969). These local powers are defined by Guerrero as:

> an hierarchical political configuration, a clustering of heterogeneous institutions and social ties, in whose apex is always the patron. *Hacienda*, church, local state functionaries, municipal governments (the white-mestizo town authorities), domestic ties between townspeople and families from indigenous communities (ritual kinship, unequal reciprocity, share-cropping agreements, ritual representations, etc.), are the elements that integrate local power in the highlands. (1993: 93-94)

The decline of these "private" forms of ethnic domination, in *haciendas*, public markets and the homes and lands of white townspeople created a power vacuum in the rural *parroquias* (civil parishes) of the highlands (Guerrero, 1995). The disappearance of the large estate meant that some of the mestizo social groups in towns who had been intermediaries in the traditional system of ethnic domination lost importance. In addition, in the 1960s the Catholic church, which had been an important part of the system of ethnic domination, as well as itself a large landowner, began to be influenced by liberation theology, becoming involved in various educational projects at the local level (Carrasco, 1993; Ramón et al., 1992).

Since the 1960s, this power vacuum has gradually filled with indigenous grass-roots organizations. This occurred not only with the demographic decline of mestizo towns and the peasantization of the countryside (see below), but also with the formation of indigenous communities, co-operatives and associations, as well as multiple, local village improvement committees, women's groups, students' groups and similar organizations (Carrasco, 1993). The origins of grass-roots organizations differ by region (Ramón et al., 1992). In Chimborazo province, for instance, there seem to have been three basic motivations for the formation of grass-roots organizations: struggles over access to land; ethnic and political confrontations with mestizo groups; and the effort to obtain access to basic services and infrastructure. In Bolívar province, in contrast, there has been more emphasis on creating local savings and loan associations to promote economic autonomy. In any case, the period dating from the first agrarian reform has been characterized by both the legal registration of existing indigenous organizations of all kinds and an increasing density of local organizations in areas that are predominantly indigenous, in comparison with those that are predominantly mestizo.

In the 1970s, with the resources generated by the oil boom and the military government's goal of modernizing the countryside, there was a proliferation of development projects in rural areas.

> Endowed with generous budgets, state organizations specializing in "development" under the auspices of the ministries and the Central Bank, established various agencies in the villages and towns: rural schools, medical dispensaries, training centres, telephone and hydro offices; plans for irrigation, electrification, and potable water systems. They also paved and constructed roads, crossing the rural areas with a network of secondary roads that linked peasants with urban markets for goods and labour. (Guerrero 1995: 101)

This was part of a project to integrate and "civilize" the Indians, through creating direct linkages between state agencies and the emerging, indigenous grass-roots organizations. The social spending by the military government of the 1970s was clearly designed as a form of incorporation from above, inasmuch as the population affected was meant to be the passive recipient of an authoritarian paternalism.

Nonetheless, these processes had unintended consequences. The emergence of grass-roots organizations was often indirectly encouraged by various educational services offered by the state, the church and non-governmental organizations. The state, through its investments in rural education, unwittingly promoted the formation of local indigenous organizations; this was contrary to the long-held assumption that education would lead to *mesti-*

zaje (national incorporation through the erasing of ethnic differences), which was equated with modernization. In some cases, projects directed by non-governmental organizations included important elements of cultural revitalization. In others, the decision to use the Quechua language in educational programs for pragmatic reasons also had the effect of increasing cultural pride (Carrasco 1993; Muratorio, 1980). Another important influence came from development programs that created a demand for local interlocutors who might promote and even administer such projects. The strategy of the progressive church was particularly important in this regard, because it identified the indigenous community itself as the preferred unit of intervention (Carrasco 1993). Altogether these processes have resulted in:

> the generation of leaders on various fronts simultaneously and the consolidation of a new kind of leadership, in which traditional components, such as an emphasis on redistribution ... are combined with modern factors, such as formal education, the capacity to manage relations with external agents, training in administrative areas, etc. (Ramón et al. 1992: 176)

With the economic crisis of the early 1980s, state investment in rural areas was paralyzed, with the result that the incipient indigenous organizations became more autonomous. They also began to mobilize to claim the development promises—especially for basic services—that the state had made in the 1970s. Thus both the formation of these organizations and their subsequent increase in autonomy are directly related to the broader processes occurring in the 1970s and 1980s in Ecuador.

The proliferation of grass-roots organizations since the 1960s was complemented in the 1980s with the emergence of important regional and national indigenous organizations. These organizations together form a network of groups which respond to different issues and are sometimes in competition with each other for resources and constituencies: this is not a hierarchically integrated structure. Nonetheless, the existence of multiple meeting places for the sharing of ideas and problems and the accumulation of local organizing experience is what allowed for the generation of massive and co-ordinated actions in the indigenous uprisings of 1990 and 1994 (Guerrero 1995).

In the 1990s indigenous groups have finally begun to speak for themselves, rather than being represented by other groups, and rather than leaders having to give up indigenous identity in order to participate in public debate. Indeed, the space for indigenous leadership was generated in part through the discourse (and reality) of oppression and the exclusion of the indigenous population from national decision-making. As a result, the maintenance of indigenous identity has now become a necessary political statement for leaders. Moreover, in a discussion of indigenous leadership, Zamosc observes that:

> The characterization of indigenous leadership cannot be limited to the question of the origins of the leaders, since the exercise of leadership is also conditioned by the content of their claims and by traditional indigenous political forms. Within the organizations, this is expressed in a style of leadership that is markedly more democratic than is common in other popular organizations; a style that is based on decision-making by consensus, the rotation of positions, vigilance against bureaucratization, and the subjection of leaders to controls from below. Outwardly, the principal trait is the emphasis on the autonomy of indigenous organizations, expressed in the fact that the leaders have experienced a process of secularization, distancing themselves from external political discourses, and developing their own orientations that increasingly affirm ethnic revindications. (Zamosc, 1993: 294)

Rather than the definitive disappearance of indigenous identity that both the right and the left had expected to come with "modernization" in Ecuador, indigenous identity has been strengthened through these processes. This is seen not only in the increasing importance of indigenous organizations and leadership, but also in the growing indigenization of the countryside itself on which this trend is based, and which it in turn strengthens.

The indigenization of the countryside is particularly interesting from the perspective of a politics of place. Although, at the national level, there has been a net decline in the indigenous population over the last three decades (through processes of assimilation into the mestizo population), as well as a net decline in rural population compared to urban population, in contrast, the rural areas that are predominantly indigenous have grown significantly. That is to say, in a context of widespread rural-urban migrations, the population of indigenous areas of the highlands appears to migrate much less than does the population of white-mestizo areas. It also appears that indigenous persons, who do engage in labour migrations within the country, often do so with the goal of returning to rural areas to purchase land (see especially Carrasco, 1990).

> The conclusion is that, with variations by rural parish, today between 50 and 66 percent of the rural popula-

> tion of the highlands lives in areas classified as "predominantly indigenous" in five of the ten highland provinces (Imbabura, Pichincha, Cotopaxi, Chimborazo and Cañar). In contrast, thirty years ago only two provinces (Chimborazo and Cañar) had more than half of their rural population in predominantly indigenous areas. (Guerrero, 1995: 98)

While the populations of provincial capitals are growing, the populations of cantonal and parish seats are declining. In Chimborazo, for instance, the majority of parish seats declined in population in the period from 1974-90, while the rural population of these areas is increasing (Carrasco 1993). Thus what appears to be occurring is an increased migration of white-mestizo townspeople to larger cities, combined with a growing permanence in and return to the countryside by indigenous peasants. Contrary to all expectations, the data suggest that the countryside of the Ecuadorian highlands is becoming more rather than less indigenous, in a reversal of long-term trends.

Given the processes of formation of indigenous leadership at the grass-roots level and the indigenization of the countryside, it is not surprising that the leadership of resistance to legislative changes undermining the situation of peasants in Ecuador is increasingly undertaken by indigenous organizations rather than mestizo peasant groups. In June of 1990, a massive civic strike erupted in the Ecuadorian highlands, led by indigenous groups. Among the reasons given by the participants, one of the most important motivations was the high cost of living: "more specifically, they mentioned the low prices for the products that peasants sell in the market and the high cost of what they buy, with a great deal of emphasis on food and fertilizers" (Zamosc, 1993: 287). In other words, these processes are directly related to the adjustment policies discussed above. Mestizo peasant groups also joined the movement in some areas, under the leadership of the indigenous umbrella organization, CONAIE (*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador*).

In July 1994, indigenous leadership regarding these issues was even more powerfully represented in the image of indigenous leaders entering into direct and prolonged negotiations with the national government over proposed changes to the Agrarian Law, which would have turned back the clock on many aspects of the agrarian reform. One of the principal concerns of the peasant movement in the highlands was access to water, which is an essential resource for the production of non-traditional agro-exports such as flowers. Again, then, it was partly in response to some of the local effects of globalization that peasants mobilized in new ways. Indigenous leaders, in indigenous dress, negotiated with representatives of the national government—including President Sixto Durán Ballén—on behalf of both indigenous organizations and other peasant groups. Indigenous leaders were in fact involved in a dual negotiation during those weeks. During the day, they met with the national government and large agriculturalists to debate the agrarian law, while at night they met with an umbrella organization of peasant groups in order to present a truly representative position. For sociologist Andrés Guerrero, the changing shape of paternalistic attitudes toward Indians throughout the 19th and 20th centuries was finally ruptured during the 1994 negotiations over the Agrarian Law.

> The dialogue became a great public and political debate. Before the eyes of the public glued to television screens, and their ears tuned to radio reports, the indigenous representatives expressed a global analysis of Ecuador's problems: a national vision of society and the state. (Guerrero, 1995: 118)

Indigenous organizations in Ecuador have been strengthened through the various, externally generated development projects since the 1960s. Quite clearly, however, the strength of the indigenous movement must be sought in local processes in the Ecuadorian countryside, rather than in external forms of support. Indeed, CONAIE called the 1990 mobilization in response to pressure from local and regional organizations, who should be seen as the real initiators of these actions. Although indigenous organizations may be able to take advantage of international pressures and support groups, their most important strength is in their ongoing interest in and commitment to living in, producing for, and transforming Ecuador.

Given these developments, was the 1980s a lost decade for indigenous peoples in Ecuador? Ramón et al. (1992), quoting Dr. Luis Macas, president of the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador and, as of 1996, member of the national Congress, say no. The vision of increasing flows of capital and labour out of Ecuador presented earlier in this article, then, should be complemented by a vision of the economic and political space, which is vacated as a consequence of such changes, being gradually colonized by indigenous producers and indigenous organizations.

Conclusions

Today, it appears that if anyone has a national project in Ecuador, it may be the indigenous movement, rather than elite groups. The processes of globalization have left behind the space that allows for this, in some sense shifting the locus of subordinate organizing and political engagement out of the cities and into the countryside. In some cases, the globalization of the Ecuadorian economy is directly implicated in the reasons for indigenous mobilizing. On the one hand, adjustment measures themselves generate protest in rural areas. On the other hand, the penetration of rural areas by new forms of production, such as flower plantations, brings the indigenous peasant population into conflict with elite groups and the neoliberal agenda, for instance over access to water. In other cases, the indigenous population may be colonizing a political and physical space left behind by globalization, as many other social groups look abroad for work or investment opportunities. This does not, however, mean that indigenous organizing can be seen as anti-modern. The new forms of indigenous organizing are not "traditional": in scope, form, and content, they are very modern indeed.

Processes of economic globalization involve profound political changes, given that there is "pressure from the transnationalized economy for a more permeable and flexible state that is less centralized, less homogeneous, less authoritarian, and thus more open to corporate penetration" (Varese, 1991: 17). Casting globalization in these terms allows us also to see that it may present opportunities for subaltern groups to press for changes from below and from within, taking advantage of the spaces opened up due to the pressures coming from "above" and from "without." The kinds of political-economic changes associated with globalization may have unexpected results and create unforeseen possibilities for democratization, whose actualization may depend in part on an ability to conceptualize alternatives. Hence the importance of placing people as historical agents at the centre of our analyses, rather than granting that agency to economic processes. As the Zapatista rebels of Chiapas responded, when they were asked if they were against globalization, "our struggle is not against the future, but about who shapes that future and who benefits from it" (cited in NACLA, 1996: 10). Despite the overwhelming processes of economic globalization occurring in the 1990s, history may not have ended yet.

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Notes

1 This article is based on a range of sources and experiences. Much of the information itself is drawn from secondary sources, cited throughout the article. The overall analysis, however, draws on a total of five years of research and residence in Ecuador between 1986 and 1997, which provided the opportunity to observe some of the effects of globalization. Most of that time was spent doing archival research on the contradictions of national incorporation, the intersection of local and global processes, and the relation between elite and subaltern projects, in the period from 1895 to 1950. Insights developed from my historical research have greatly influenced how I understand the more current processes discussed in this article.

2 For additional information about the recent history of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, see the articles collected in CEDIME (1993) and Cornejo (1991), as well as Field (1991), Guerrero (1995), León Trujillo (1994), Pacari (1996), Ramón (1993), Ramón et al. (1992) and Zamosc (1993, 1994, 1995).

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Class and Identity on the Margins of Industrial Society: A Breton Illustration

Charles R. Menzies *University of British Columbia*

Abstract: In this article the author draws upon his field work in Le Guilvinec, France during a period of crisis in the local fishery to explore the creation and reproduction of a local Bigouden identity. This identity emerged, replete with costume, rituals and festivals, out of an encounter between a metropolitan-driven industrial capitalism and a local, essentially non-capitalist, social formation. Here two aspects of how the "local" is integrated into and/or articulated with the "larger" are important: (1) the historical positioning of the Bigoudennie within Brittany, an internal hinterland of France supplying labour and raw resources; (2) the ways in which the emerging neoliberal processes of globalization structures, shapes and hinders the ability of local communities to wield any real control over local processes.

Résumé: Dans cet article, l'auteur s'est inspiré de ses recherches sur le terrain, à Le Guilvinec (France), lors d'une période de crise dans les pêcheries, afin d'explorer la création et la reproduction d'une identité bigoudenne. Cette identité, avec ses costumes, ses rituels et ses festivals, est née de la rencontre d'un capitalisme industriel venu de la métropole et d'une structure sociale locale fondamentalement non capitaliste. On dénote deux points importants: comment l'aspect «local» est intégré dans le plus grand et/ou comment il est articulé par rapport à celui là. Le premier traite de la situation historique de la Bigoudennie au sein de la Bretagne, un arrière-pays français qui procure main-d'oeuvre et matières premières à la France. Le deuxième point traite la façon dont le processus néolibéral de globalisation structure, façonne et empêche les communautés locales d'exercer un véritable contrôle sur les processus locaux.

To write about class and identity is simultaneously to come to terms with both the structures of power and appropriation and the manner by which such structures are interpreted and translated into daily life (Sider, 1986: 7). Class is here used in its most fundamental and basic sense, defined as an objective relationship to the means of production. Identity, while a profoundly more ephemeral and elusive quality, is rarely constructed so as to entirely repudiate its material moorings in class. As expressed in racial or ethnic terms, identity is often essentialized as being immutable and, once created, is always there until the homogenizing force of state power erases its uniqueness. In practice, the expansion and consolidation of state power and the processes of capital accumulation both destroy and create variation (Sider, 1993).

The constant restructuring of the social and political landscape reminds us that "capitalism does not so much come to the countryside. The backcountry is itself a site of historical transformations, generating social [race/gender/class] relations,... market forces pivotal in the transition to capitalism" (Palmer, 1994: 15). In this illustration of one particular transition to capitalism, drawn from the Bigouden region of France, I focus on: (1) the historical set of social relations out of which emerged a local identity; and (2) how this identity is intimately linked to the formation of social class in coastal Brittany. My underlying point of concern is with the mundane daily necessity to feed, clothe and shelter one's family, and how this is connected to, shaped by and is often in opposition to an economic formation driven by profit and greed.

The People and the Place

I first visited the Bigoudennie in the fall of 1992. As I toured the coast, rumblings of the coming crisis could be heard on every dock. Fishers complained of poor fish prices, declining catches and non-European Union fish

imports. A major fishing co-operative was forced to reorganize and consolidate its operation (in the process nearly 100 workers lost their jobs). Fishing skippers were beginning to have difficulty in making their boat loan payments. Though the problems were widespread, it was in the fishing ports of the Bigoudennie (the primary artisanal fishing district in France, fourth in rank in overall production after the industrial ports of Boulogne, Lorient and Concarneau) that the situation seemed the most acute.

Upon my return to the Bigoudennie in 1994, local fishers were in the midst of the second year of free-falling fish prices. Overall landed value had fallen by more than 20 percent (Chatain, 1994) and the prices continued to fall well into 1995. The brutal realities of fishing for a living drove fishers to fish longer, travel farther and spend less on essential maintenance just to remain "on an even keel." Despite their increased effort, more than one quarter of the Bigouden fleet had difficulty meeting their debt service requirements.

The Bigouden region is located at the extreme western tip of Brittany, in the department of Finistère—"land's end"—on a box-like peninsula that juts out into the open Atlantic. The coast consists of open sand beaches broken occasionally by rocky outcroppings. The land is not particularly well suited to large-scale agriculture nor to the new farming techniques which rolled over north Finistère with such remarkable results in the 1960s and 1970s. Before the advent of the sardine fishery, generation upon generation had eked out a living on the coastal strip, alternating between land and sea. The birth of the fishing industry in the Bigoudennie was accompanied by a profound social transformation whose corollary was the near-total disappearance of agriculture in the southern coastal zone.

The four Bigouden fishports, Le Guilvinec, St. Guénole, Loctudy and Lesconil are incorporated in one maritime administrative district, "Le Guilvinec" which includes the southern half of the Bigouden region. This is a region characterized by intense cultural particularities (cf. Burguière, 1975; Hélias, 1978; Segalen, 1991) that became important political markers in the Bigouden fishers' mid-1990s fight against the new fishing regulations and in their struggle to survive the ecological and economic crisis in their fishery. The fishing industry and its shore-based support industries are one of the most important aspects of the economy in the Bigoudennie today. Of the approximately 33 000 people living in the south Bigouden, about 2 000 are directly employed as commercial fishers.

Agriculture, once predominant in this region, has been in decline for most of the century, but the period from 1960 to 1980 witnessed its virtual death. Between the years 1970 and 1980 almost one third of the farms in the south Bigoudennie disappeared, while the average age of those working them rose (Segalen, 1991: 250). From the late 1800s up to the early 1970s fishing had been able to absorb some of the region's surplus labour. By the 1990s this was no longer the case.

The third axis of the local economy is tourism. The local tourist industry is based on a short summer that does very little in terms of providing for long-term stability. Most of the summer tourist trade consists of summer cottagers who come down from Paris, Germany or across the channel from Britain. Though a boon to some of the local merchants, the tourist trade adds little in the way of a stable economic base for the local economy.

From Peasant to Worker

Though it is convenient (and not uncommon) to separate and privilege either the social relations or the forces of production from one another, both must be taken together and understood as being intimately intertwined processes. The dialectical entanglement of technological innovation with customary practices and social relations does not always necessarily lead to a transition to new forms of social relations. Additionally, the development of new technologies and techniques of work sometimes emerges out of social relations of production in an attempt to sway the balance of class forces (Albury and Schwartz, 1982). The transition in the Bigoudennie from peasant agriculture to industrial capitalist fishing demonstrates the complexities, interconnectedness and, ultimately, the necessity of considering social relations of production and the development of the forces of production not in causal terms, but rather as interconnected elements in the transition to capitalism.

The pre-1880s peasant agriculture in the Bigoudennie had stagnated under the pressure of social relations tied to a peasant system of production, which was locked into "tenant farming and an egalitarian system of transmitting goods" at the point of generational succession (Segalen, 1984: 130; see also Segalen, 1991). By the late 1800s, growing population increased the pressure on the local peasant economy to such an extent that outmigration was, for many their only alternative. However, the development of a commercial fishing industry completely transformed the social and economic structure of the Bigoudennie. According to Segalen: "The crisis in agriculture ought to have resulted in a mass exodus from the countryside at the end of the nineteenth and the

beginning of the twentieth centuries. However, this was deferred for thirty years by the growth of the fishing and related activities" (Segalen, 1991: 234; see also, Vauclare, 1985: 15).

Surplus labour, as Jose Nun reminds us, "is necessarily a 'relative' concept, and a surplus only exists in relation to a given type of production system" (Worsley, 1984: 188). Prior to the arrival of the sardine canneries one cannot truly talk of a reserve army of labour in the Bigoudennie waiting to be called into service. We can note that the form of agricultural production relied on human (not machine) labour and that little progress was made toward agricultural intensification. According to Segalen, "demographic pressure militated against any kind of technological innovation" (1991: 224). The introduction of machinery at the end of the 19th century occurred in the context of the development of the sardine industry. The possibility of replacing agricultural workers with machinery and thereby creating "surplus labour" emerged out of the transition to industrial capitalism within the *locality*.

The primary limiting factor for the development of the fishing industry was the lack of adequate and accessible rail linkages between the Bigoudennie and Paris. Investment in transportation infrastructure by the state and private enterprise and in sardine factories by private capital rapidly transformed the local economy.[1] In the space of less than 10 years Le Guilvinec jumped in population from a small hamlet to over 6 000 people working in the canneries and on the fish-boats.

During the "episode" of industrialization (1880-1950) the face of coastal Bigoudennie was fundamentally altered. Involvement in the industrial waged-economy was crucial for the more than half of the 30 000 people living within the southern portion of the Bigoudennie. In a report to the Prefecture dated 1913 a "typical" household of six (husband, wife and four children) is documented as having earnings as follows:

Category of Worker	Income
2 fishers	1 000 FF
3 women (needlepoint)	750 FF
1 cannery worker	100 FF
Total	1 850 FF

While one may speculate that some forms of subsistence practice were used to supplement the household budget the report unambiguously argues that the people living in the newly urbanized coastal strip no longer engaged in any form of agriculture.

The primary impetus toward economic development came in the form of the investment of industrial capital based in metropolitan France. Railroads created an opportunity for capital investment to gain access to the resident labour pool and, in the process, remade the local population into a Bigouden working class. The first step was the extension of joint state-private funded rail links into the Bigoudennie. Quimper, the regional capital was linked with the markets of Paris by rail in 1863. A regional spur line linked the Bigoudennie with Quimper (and thus with Paris) in 1884. While it is tempting to see the railway as being the causal factor in the phenomenal growth of the sardine fishery in the Bigoudennie (within two years of the establishment of a railhead in Quimper five sardine canneries were established, and by 1901 20 canneries were operating), the development of the railway should not be seen in isolation from the metropolitan-based food industry nor from the local level political leadership's economic aspirations. The expansion of the rail links into the region was prosecuted as a development strategy and, as such, is a product of the wider processes of industrial development in France at that time.

The expansion of the sardine fishery in the south Bigoudennie was part of a larger expansion of the sardine fishery that followed the introduction of the canning process in 1840 in Nantes, several hundred kilometres to the south of the Bigoudennie. This new technique for preserving fish revolutionized the fishing industry and, when combined with assembly style production procedures swept the coast, and also spread around the world. Regions like the Bigoudennie in which there were high levels of surplus labour and rural poverty were targeted by the canning firms.

The rapid transformation of the economy gave birth to a working class unfamiliar with the disciplined form of control capital expected of its workers. The resulting militancy severely hindered capital's desire to unfettered accumulation. While labour power may exist in the raw form it must be made into a labour force. This requires coercing workers as well as workers' own accommodation and desire to adapt.

The canners encountered two basic obstacles to their seemingly unstoppable expansion: (1) an irregular supply of fish due to the seasonal nature of the fishery; and (2) a militant and politically radicalized workforce (Adam, 1987; Chatain, 1994: 40-43; Lachèvre, 1994; Lebel, 1981; Le Coz, 1985; Martin, 1994; Vauclare, 1985, 1987). The supply of fish alternated between oversupply and scarcity. Because of the supply problem and the power of the organized workforce ongoing profitability proved difficult to achieve. The canners responded to the militant labour movement by: (1) requesting government mandated control of supply; (2) introducing labour-saving

technology to take over control of the work process; and (3) investing in Portugal, Spain, Algeria and Morocco.

Attempts were made to diversify into other fisheries (trap, longline and tuna). However, the development of these fisheries was limited. Their targeted species were not sufficiently profitable for the fish processors to encourage more than an occasionally foray in new directions (though the tuna fishery did, to a certain extent, supply the canneries in times of undersupply or strike). Overall, however, the artisanal fishery was unable to supply the processing sector on a regular enough basis. Some canneries attempted to counteract the problem of irregular supply by switching to vegetables in the off-season, which in turn led to the development of back-breaking pea farming in the Penmarc'h peninsula. The canneries that survived into the 1960s were those which had turned away from fish processing and focussed more generally on processing agricultural products.

In the 1950s the dominance of the sardine fishery began to wane under the pressure of competition from lower wage areas in the French colonial possessions (notably Algeria and Morocco) and Spain and Portugal. Without strong protective tariffs and/or greater rationalization the local food-canning industry was not competitive. Rationalization was not an option due to the strength of organized labour. Thus, by the early 1960s, most of the canneries had been shut down. In 1997, the two canneries remaining in the region primarily process imported fish.

The Rise of the Trawl Fishery

During the period between 1906 and 1945 the Bigouden fleet was completely transformed. The primary transformation was the change from sail to motor power and a gradual enlargement of the vessels themselves (partly to accommodate the added weight of the motors, partly to take advantage of their newly extended fishing range and catching capacity). The first five motorized vessels were put into service in 1924. By 1934 the number of motorized vessels had jumped to 634. The financing of the fleet's motorization was underwritten by the state-funded Crédit Maritime.

The Crédit Maritime was established by the French state in 1906, in part as a reaction to a crisis of undersupply in the sardine fishery and partly to assist artisanal fishers in purchasing and outfitting their own fishing vessels. Initially this worked to the interests of both canners and fishers. The canneries did not have to finance or own the fishing vessels, thus shifting the burden of economic risk. For the fishers, access to capital allowed them a modicum of independence from the canners which was consistent with a peasant mode of subsistence. It is important to point out that while the state assisted fishers in becoming "little capitalists" it was significantly less supportive of other avenues of economic improvement, such as the formation of trade unions.

The state-funded program of motorization figured prominently in the collapse of the sardine canners. The switch from sail to motor opened up the door to the successful prosecution of fisheries other than sardines and mackerel (the dominant fish species caught prior to World War II). In the postwar period ground fish quickly became the most important commercial species. This change in primary target species was linked to the adoption of trawl gear that had been made possible with the introduction of motorized vessels and hydraulics. By 1950 trawling was incontestably the primary focus of activity in the fishery. Whereas sardines were linked with industrial canning plants in the region, the newly developed trawl fishery was oriented toward a fresh fish market, based first on a regional network of small retailers and secondly on the large corporate distribution system which extended from dockside fish auctions to supermarkets.

Thus, the introduction of trawl technology and the motorization of the fishing fleet cleared the way for a relatively independent artisanal fishery to develop in the Bigoudennie. In the post-World War II period, trawling made it possible for the fishers to circumvent price and market controls by the canneries and to enter the rapidly growing fresh fish market. The fresh fish market was better suited toward maintaining higher ex-vessel fish prices. Initially, fishers and fish buyers used the existing rail links to transport fish to market. Very quickly after the end of World War II, road and highway modernization programs made truck transport more attractive due to its lower costs and greater flexibility.

The infrastructural support for the development of the sardine fishery was laid down by the railroad and the canning process. The postwar fishery developed in conjunction with the techniques of refrigeration and an expanding highway system that made it possible to ship fish by truck. The new reliance on truck transport (the major local trucking firm was established in Le Guilvinec in 1954) allowed a greater flexibility in marketing for fish-boat owners. In the place of the departing canneries a system of government-run fish auctions emerged.

The shift away from an industrial cannery fishery to a fresh market artisanal fishery had a major impact on the structure of employment in the region. While the employment of men on the fish-boats remained relatively

stable into the 1960s, employment prospects for women disappeared as the canneries and subsidiary factories closed their doors and moved away. Thus, the Bigoudennie entered a period of de-industrialization at the very moment when the rest of rural Brittany was "modernizing."

In hindsight, the introduction of motors and trawl gear foreshadowed the death of the local canning industry and made possible the survival of a family-based artisanal fishing industry that has lasted well into the 20th century and (one hopes) beyond.

On to Crisis

The contemporary malaise faced by Breton fisherfolk has been growing sporadically since the end of World War II. The threefold increase in the volume of fish landed by the French fishing fleet under postwar modernization plans (Chaussade and Corlay, 1988: 31, 51) led to a reduction of employment and, potentially, to ecological collapse. With increases in catching capacity and improved fishing technology, job opportunities disappeared. In Brittany alone, the number of jobs plummeted from 25 000 in 1950 to 8 000 in 1992. In the 1990s, Brittany's highly capitalized and efficient fishing fleet's catching capacity greatly exceeds the reproductive capacity of the fish stocks (Gwiazda, 1993; Salz, 1991).

French government attempts to control the fisheries in the immediate postwar period focussed on access to fishing grounds and the development of catching and processing capacity (Meuriot, 1986). The first Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU), adopted on October 20, 1970, encompassed two fundamental points: (1) equal access to the basic resource by all member states; and (2) a common market organization for fish similar to the common market for key agricultural products (Leigh, 1983). This agreement still left much of the actual control of fisheries in the hands of individual member states and emphasized economic development, fleet modernization and rationalization ahead of issues of conservation. The EU was not able to come to an agreement on a CFP that effectively dealt with both economic and conservation factors until January 1983 (Farnell and Elles, 1984; Leigh, 1983; Wise, 1984). The 1983 CFP gave the European Commission powers to set fishing quotas for member states, to limit access to fishing grounds and to restrict fishing effort.

French fishers have been strong supporters of EU and national policies that have expanded and/or guaranteed their access to fishing grounds, funded modernization of new vessels and/or ensured strong minimum prices for key species. The triumph of neo-conservative economics and the advancing globalization of the economy has had a direct impact on EU fishery policy. Under the guise of conservation (undeniably needed, but in no way effectively implemented)[2] EU fishers have been confronted by mandated fleet reductions and declining quotas. Simultaneously, new EU trade regulations opened the door to cheaper American and Third World fish imports, prompting EU officials to lower the guaranteed minimum prices for key species. In addition, the devaluation of the Spanish and Italian currencies resulted in a concurrent devaluation of fish prices owing to the important role of these two Mediterranean nations in buying French fish. Working in concert these various factors were at the root of the crisis that shook the French artisanal fishery in the early 1990s.

During the heyday of the fishing boom the retail sector in the regional commercial centre, Pont-l'Abbé, grew at a remarkable rate during a time in which many other rural communities in France were losing their small commercial centres. At the peak of the boom, this small town of 8 000 (servicing an area population of between 30 000 and 35 000 residents) supported more than 200 commercial businesses. A local building boom propelled by rising fishing incomes swept the region as fishers replaced old housing stock with larger, modern homes in the interior of the region. The new homes were more reminiscent of the cannery owners' homes of an earlier era than of the small, cramped homes of their parents.

The 1980s had been exceptionally good to artisanal fishers. Fish prices climbed, newer, better boats had been built, and the years of hard times appeared to be moving into the haze of memory. Constantly rising fish prices masked an acute drop in catch per unit effort (typically measured in terms of how much fish is caught by a finite unit of gear in a specified unit of time). This decrease manifested itself in sporadic, but significant, drops in overall production, beginning in the early 1980s, which should have signalled the impending crash in the local fishing economy.

Following four to five generations of hard times it seemed to the fishers like the good times had finally arrived. Little luxuries that had been denied their parents and grandparents became a normal aspect of everyday life. Growth and expansion seemed unending. The drop in overall production that had begun in the mid-1980s was more than offset by steadily rising prices. When the crisis arrived, it hit many as a complete shock.

Fish prices in the south Bigouden fluctuate depending upon the time of year. Toussaint (November 1) heralds the beginning of the lucrative holiday season. Fish

prices climb to the annual high point as French consumers flock to their local fish counters in preparation for the expansive meals which mark the Christmas and New Year holiday season. The relative scarcity of fish at this time of year works in concert with heightened demand to drive up prices. Consumer demand falls off dramatically in January and the fish move back onto the fishing grounds, driving prices down to what is normally the annual low in the cycle. The situation is made more difficult for fishers as the weather in January and February is the worst of the year. The bad weather keeps most of the under-24-metre vessels tied up to the dock. In the 12-18-metre class of vessels, ships' logs indicate that an average of 50 percent of the available fishing days are lost during January and February due to poor weather. With the milder spring weather fish prices start to slowly climb back. Prices peak during the summer langoustine fishery. Prices drop off a bit in early fall just until the holiday season rush begins again, propelling prices skyward.

In the south Bigouden the crisis of the early 1990s brought the boom of the preceding decade to an abrupt halt. Early warnings of crisis were clearly apparent during 1992. Falling catches combined with declining prices to make 1992 a poor year for the majority of the ports in south Finistère. Overall production fell 7.2 percent (72 123 metric tonnes versus 77 728 in 1991). The registered value of the catch dropped by 5.7 percent (1.3 million French Francs against 1.4 million in 1991). In the Bigoudennie 1992 had a variable effect. Declines in overall production ranged between a loss of 8 percent and 11 percent. The aggregate price per kilo of fish dropped by 23 percent in January of 1993. While the magnitude of the drop was unusual it was not unexpected to experience a drop in prices during the first few sales of the new year. However, prices continued dropping throughout 1993. Prices continued their free fall until spring/summer 1995 when they stabilized at a rate still more than 15 percent less than the 1991 pre-crisis price. The impact on the local economy was devastating.

The Impact of Crisis in the Everyday

Under capitalism, conservation and resource management practices are almost always aimed at maintaining the best rate of profit over the medium to short term. These plans are designed from outside the community of fishers and are oriented toward fulfilling needs and objectives that have very little to do with the local community (Rogers, 1995; Stump and Batker, 1996). For their part, the local community is pulled inexorably into a vortex of increasing capacity and diminishing returns until the fishery collapses completely. Local people are then forced to switch to a new fishery or else they are pushed irrevocably out of fishing altogether.

In the Bigoudennie the direct impact of the crisis on the fishing fleet was reflected in the day to day operations of the fishing boat in three very specific fashions: (1) reductions in crew size; (2) reductions in expenditures on maintenance of vessels; and (3) increasing fishing time. In combination these responses to crisis resulted in a worsening of shipboard safety.

For example, since 1989 the crew size on a fleet of 24-metre boats belonging to one local fishing company declined from six to five at sea. During the same period many of the coastal draggers went from four to three men at sea. Whereas technological changes (such as the switch from side trawling to stern trawling) were at the root of downsizing of crews in the past, in the mid-1990s the explanations are directly economic. Fewer men in the crew translates directly into bigger crew shares.

Many boat owners also cut back as much as possible on maintenance expenditures. Boats were taken up on the slipway less frequently than was previously the practice. Gear was made to last longer than usual and the replacement of old equipment was deferred, often beyond the point of safety. In the short run this may improve the productivity of the vessels and thus increase the boat owners' revenue and (perhaps) maintain or at least slow down declining incomes. However, over the long term these measures led to a deterioration of conditions of work and a worsening of shipboard safety.

The crisis also had a social and economic impact on the fishers' families. Most obviously, declining incomes forced changes in the management of the household budget. In confronting "the perennial problem of the peasantry" (Wolf, 1966), fishing families in the Bigoudennie had little recourse but to increase production (that is to fish longer and harder) and to restrict their consumption on the fish-boat and in the household. Changes in patterns of household spending had a serious impact on the economy. However, it was the hidden ways of economizing and their impact on the fishers families that underlay much of the widespread anger and spurred the Bigoudennie to protest.

Danielle[3] is a mother of two (ages five and two) who had, until the crisis in 1993, concentrated on working in the home raising her children, managing the family accounts and maintaining her house. "My husband," she remarked, "is away from home 15 days at a time on a dragger in the Irish Sea. His feet barely touch the ground before he's back out fishing. . . ." Since the crisis he has brought home a salary of between 800 and 2 500 Francs

(200-625 $Can.), typically about 1 000 Francs. Until the debut of the crisis Danielle had worked at home. When the crisis hit she unsuccessfully tried to find employment in the region's service economy, and when the crisis deepened she joined the local Fishermen's Wives Association.

"You think about it," continued Nicole, a mother of three children, "with a sum like that one can't make the house payments or pay the various bills that arrive. I can't properly care for my children anymore, in particular the youngest who is 18 months and has severe bronchitis."

"What's more, our men love their *métier* and, it's not a question of doing something else," said Françoise. "They are worried and on edge because of these financial difficulties and the crisis about which one can see very little to do. Their anxiety affects us and our children. We are worried when we watch them head out to sea, but not as much as when they leave to join the demonstrations. It is a desperate time and we worry when we hear news of men being arrested and beaten by the police," said Françoise.

"On what do we live?" asked Nicole. "That's the real question. You can ask us—why don't you get a job?— But there is no work in this region. Each time we get a bill we have to go to the bank and negotiate. You know, that is not normal. Our husbands spend 18 hours working each day at sea and make next to nothing. Do you think they'll go begging, cap in hand?"

Due to the nature of the regional economy and high levels of unemployment it was difficult for fishing families to supplement their losses from fishing with income generated by other family members not already working. The distribution and allocation of paid employment in the Bigoudennie reflects a common Western pattern of gendered employment opportunities with women disproportionately represented in the service (retail/clerical) sector and men employed in managerial occupations, trades and fisheries.

A careful consideration of the structure of employment reveals that, while fishing is by far the most important sector of the productive economy (in the sense of the creation of value) and employs more than 2 000 people directly and nearly half again as many in support services, it is in the service sector (both private and public) that most jobs are found. Irrespective of the very clear linkage between the fishery and the region's overall economic health, without government employment the region would be less economically stable than it currently is.

For example, the single largest employer is the hospital in Pont-l'Abbé, followed closely by the educational system, municipal services and the postal service. These government agencies together employ as many (if not more) individuals than are working in the fishery. In addition, fully 65 percent of those employed in the service sector are women. Understandably the national government's attacks on the structure of the welfare state will create greater uncertainty and potentially more damage to the local economy than change in the fishery. This is not to deny the crucial role played by the fishery in generating wealth, but merely to illuminate the extent to which the focal point of both wealth creation and political struggle have been displaced from the local through the rise (and decline?) of the welfare state.

Night of Fire

On the night of February 22, 1993, between 800 and 1 000 Breton fishers and their supporters stormed the Rungis wholesale fish auction, just south of Paris. In the ensuing mêlée 800 tonnes of fish valued at more than $4 million dollars was destroyed. The fishers and their supporters engaged in a running battle with the CRS, the specially trained and armed French riot police. Armed only with sticks and the brute determination of a people fighting for their livelihood, they held off the police until well into the early hours of the morning. Many of the demonstrators came from the Breton fishing ports of Le Guilvinec, Douarnenez and Concarneau where earlier in the day more than 9 000 people had participated in demonstrations against changes in the European Union's common fisheries policy. The new policies cut quotas, forced a reduction in the size of the French fishing fleet and liberalized regulations governing the importation of non-EU fish products. The anger and strength of this and subsequent demonstrations underlines the extent of the crisis which shook the French artisanal fisheries in the early 1990s. The crisis that local fishing communities are facing in France is part of a global fishing crisis (McGoodwin, 1990). The amount of fish taken from the world's oceans peaked in the 1980s and has been declining ever since. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organizations have determined that of 17 world fisheries four are in a state of commercial depletion and nine more are in serious decline. Under the pressure of the market economy fishing effort continues to increase in search of ever increasing profits. Local coastal communities struggle to make sense of the rapid changes and to find effective ways to resist and persist.

In a desire to minimize social disruption among fisherfolk while simultaneously attempting to conserve fish stocks, government agencies have introduced a variety

of restrictive policies that range from limiting access to fishing grounds, restricting types and sizes of fishing gear, limiting vessel size and power to the establishment of regional and species quotas. These measures, however, have only compounded the problems of those who fish. Breton fishers face the likelihood of further fleet size reductions, rapidly declining fish stocks and ultimately the collapse of their way of life.

During the holiday season of 1992 prices did not climb nearly as high as was expected, and when the January price drop arrived it hit with the force of the famed French high-speed train. Gentle pre-Christmas warnings by the president of the local fishers' committee in the committee's bulletin were quickly transformed into a general protest movement of fishers that at its peak stretched along most of the France's Atlantic coastline. The movement had its roots in the government mandated local committees of fishers,[4] but as the nature of the protest changed from lobbying to direct actions informal "survival" committees sprung up and soon displaced the official committee structure as the effective political voice.[5] Unhampered by the government bureaucracy and arising out of local networks of co-operation and kinship, the survival committees were able to mobilize large numbers of fishers, family, and community members in a relatively short period of time.

Four thousand demonstrators marched through the streets of Le Guilvinec, February 22, 1993, the day before Breton fishers stormed the Rungis fish market. The newspaper *Ouest-France* (hereafter referred to as O-F) declared: "De mémoire de Bigouden, on n'avait pas vu tant de monde manifester au Guilvinec depuis mai 68." Survival Committee organizers declared the demonstration to be: "Un bel élan de solidarité. Ici, tout le monde a compris que si la pêche crève, tout le monde crève avec elle" (O-F, February 23, 1993). The exasperation and anger of the demonstrators was reflected in the slogans on their placards: *Briezh*[6] fish d'abord; American fish dehors; Bruxelles garde les choux et laisse nous le poisson; Poissons invendus, marins foutus; US Go Home."

The speakers stood upon a makeshift platform draped in the black and white of the Breton flag and the orange and yellow of the Bigouden flag. In a manner evocative of an English-Canadian unity rally or a St. Jean Baptiste Day celebration in Québec these visible signs of the Bigouden and the Breton swayed through the demonstration and in the words of the speakers. While simultaneously recognizing, even supporting the need for an effective pan-European fishing policy, speaker after speaker referred to the community base of the fishery and the importance of the fishing industry in economic and cultural terms.

Demonstration followed demonstration emanating outward from the Bigoudennie, the epicentre of protest. A careful plotting of direct actions and demonstrations against the landscape of France's Atlantic coast dramatically illustrates the central role of the Bigoudennie in the groundswell of social protest that swept through the French fishing industry (Couliou, 1994: 11-12). Roving bands of fishers entered grocery stores and cold storage facilities and destroyed thousands of kilos of imported fish. Trucks loaded with imported fish were held-up on local highways and their contents dumped out. The national government tried to put out the flames of protest with the promise of a 225 million French Franc "emergency plan" and an offer to review government fisheries policy (*Le Télégramme*, February 24, 1993). The protests continued unabated.

As spring weather gradually replaced the meanness of winter storms the daily necessity of earning a living slowly displaced social protest. Sporadic direct actions occurred well into June but modest price increases over the summer and during the 1993 holiday season kept fishers at sea. Government largesse also allayed the concerns of some boat owners, especially those most in difficulty who had been promised financial assistance. The basic problem, however, remained in place and in January 1994 social protest erupted again.

In 1993, the skippers had been at the forefront of the struggle. In 1994, crew members were at the vanguard of the movement and they pushed their demands on working conditions and pay into the limelight. A general strike was called and most of France's Atlantic fishery shut down for the better part of February. As in 1993, the fishers organized roving bands of "commandos" whose task it was to destroy imported fish wherever it was found. Other units went into the local markets to hand out copies of the prices fishers received at the dock. Local town councils worked with the survival committees to organize "dead city" days in which all the merchants of the town closed their shutters in support of the fishers (and incidentally thus avoided attacks by units of "commandos").

The national government acted quickly in an attempt to forestall an escalation of the protest. A meeting was called by the government between then prime minister Édouard Balladur and representatives of the striking fishers in Rennes, the capital of Brittany. On the day of the meeting several thousand fishers, their families and supporters demonstrated in the streets. While the minister talked, the riot police chased demonstrators through

the streets of the city using tear gas, rubber bullets and clubs. The fishers fought back with distress flares, one of which landed on the roof of the historic former parliament building of Brittany.

Early the next morning demonstrators returned home to pictures of the burning building and bloody-faced fishers on the local newspapers. The burning of the parliament building in Rennes seemed to dampen community support a little. Yet, despite this momentary setback and the beginnings of vocal criticism at home in the Bigoudennie, fishers continued their protests until the government promised more subsidies to help boat owners in difficulty. Crew members, however, received little attention. Social cleavages at the local level between skipper and crew started to widen and made subsequent solidarity more difficult.

The Local—Within and Against the Global

The unrelenting movement toward liberalized trade and the globalization of the market is making it increasingly difficult for local communities to have any real control over local development. In the Bigoudennie a "traditional" peasant culture arose out of the encounter between a metropolitan-driven industrial capitalism and a local, essentially non-capitalist social formation. Prior to the extension of capitalist relations of production into the local fishery, the Bigoudennie existed on the fringes of the Breton hinterland which supplied metropolitan France with labour and raw resources. The arrival of rail and the establishment of an industrial sardine fishery in the late 19th century pushed the region out of its socio-economic isolation[7] and, in so doing, created the *Bigoudennie* and the *Bigouden*. In point of fact, the label Bigouden did not come to be generally applied to either the people or the geographic space until well into the early 20th century. Contemporary Bigoudennie roughly corresponds to the boundaries of the pre-revolutionary Barony of Pont-l'Abbé.

Mapped onto the topography of the material conditions of daily life, a culture emerged which was rooted in the local, yet angled against the continuous incursions from "outside." In the early period the outside was represented physically by French-speaking cannery managers and owners who brought their money and machinery into the Bigoudennie. Even though they lived among the Bigouden their lifestyle, dress and language were ever present indicators of both their social and ethnic differences. The early social movement that emerged in opposition to this new class of owner was articulated within the language of class and class struggle. It was symbolized by the red flag and the singing of the Internationale. Though its struggles were rooted in the local, in that the arena of protest was local (the physical sites of struggle were the canneries and the streets of the local towns), it was universal in terms of its use of the language of the international working class.

In the aftermath of de-industrialization the contemporary movements of social protest have turned to a localized idiom while simultaneously operating in a delocalized arena of struggle. The social movement that arose in the context of the current fisheries crisis in the Bigoudennie employs a different set of symbolic markers than its predecessors in the early part of this century. In the 1990s the rhetoric and symbolism of struggle was local even though the arena of struggle was delocalized. The symbols of the 1990s included the traditional peasant costume and flag, though today's flag is no longer the red flag, but a flag created by the tourist authority to represent the Bigoudennie for marketing purposes. The new sites of conflict are the provincial, national and European capitals. The new targets are multinational corporations and foreign fish importers.

In both contexts local markers of identity have been important (for example, the use of the Breton language or the traditional costume worn by the women). However, the creation of a clearly defined local identity followed the imposition of the industrial fishery and has taken on a greater importance than ever before in the context of the globalization of the market for fish. What is for me most intriguing in this illustration is how, at the point of engagement between an imposed industrialization and the struggle by a local population to maintain some sense of dignity in their loss, a local neo-ethnic identity emerged.

Conclusion

One of capitalism's defining features is its inherent capacity for change, destruction and reconstruction. This constant process of pulling down and building back up has important consequences for racial, ethnic and local identities. In the borderlands of Europe's internal colonies and along the margins of our settler society, capitalism has been engaged in a spatial and cultural restructuring that has critical consequences in terms of racial, ethnic and local identities. During the period of capitalist transformation in the Bigoudennie, local resistance was expressed as class struggle, represented symbolically in the red flag and the singing of the Internationale. Following the collapse of the sardine fishery, a local identity, *Bigouden*, took precedence over that of being a *worker*.

The particular and local manifestations of the new sets of identities which emerged out of the encounter between the larger (that is to say the world capitalist system) and the local (be it "tribal or peasant") is dependent on the nature of the overarching state formation and that of the pre-existing social formation. At its moment of encapsulation the Bigoudennie was an economically stagnant agricultural region in which the rural peasantry were barely eking out a living.

Capitalism arrived in the back country of Brittany in much the same manner as it was implanted in Europe's overseas colonies, carried by "foreign" capitalists who expropriated local labour and resources and undermined local forms of production. The particular form of struggle which emerged in the Bigoudennie reflects this almost colonial context. This is not to say that local struggles which emerged were explicitly or necessarily nationalist in nature. In truth, nationalist sentiment seems to have never moved far beyond the simple resentments expressed by most hinterland peoples toward the urban centre. Rather, local expressions of class solidarity were more easily cultivated when the cannery owners and managers were French-speaking and the working class were Breton-speaking. This, in combination with the transition from peasant to industrial conditions of work, created the conditions for strong collective action and militant trade unionism.

As opposed to more clearly nationalist "Breton" movements described by McDonald (1989), contemporary Bigouden militants see their struggle as one based in maintaining the viability of their "community," not as part of a struggle for autonomy or independence. Here, idioms of locality and "community" are used as a medium to articulate specific class demands and viewpoints within a context in which physical representations of class formations have become despatialized.

Gavin Smith, in examining the twinned issues of livelihood and resistance, describes how cultures of opposition, based in the local or in expressions of "community," can be seen to sow "the seeds for a more broadly based oppositional class consciousness" (Smith, 1989: 236). Smith follows Sabean who defines community "not [as a set of] shared values or common understanding, so much as the fact that members of a community are engaged in the same argument, the same *raisonnement*, the same *rede*, the same discourse, in which alternative strategies, misunderstandings, conflicting goals and values are threshed out. . . . What makes community is the discourse" (Sabean, 1984: 29-30). In the Breton case, it is most interesting to note that identities based in the local or the "community" have (re)emerged as the primary expression of class interests, whereas Smith was documenting a case in which he saw the local culture of opposition as forming a basis upon which a more generalized class consciousness might emerge.

The more abstract notion of being "Breton" appeals to a cultural "quest for authentic identity" (Badone, 1992: 808) in which pan-Celtic celebrations of traditional costumes, dance and music play an important part. Yet on the national plain, the majority of the Bigouden fishers support "French" political parties, as opposed to regional-based groupings advocating autonomy or independence. At the very least, this points to the complexity and divergence of social identities in which a fisher may well be "Bigouden" at the demonstration, "Breton" at the *Kermesse* and "French" on election day.

The early struggles united, in an industrial setting, people who had primarily thought of themselves as villagers, as opposed to assuming a rather more abstract identity as either French or Breton. In their struggles against the "bosses," their own collective identity emerged, and in the late 1800s and early 20th century manifested itself in a class idiom. Though not evident at the time, this early proletarian identity contained within it the potential of transmutation into an ethnic or "local" identity. Subsequent changes in the local political economy—primarily the collapse of the industrial canning industry—stripped away the unambiguous class basis of their collective identity and opened the path for the emergence of a *bigoudenne* identity.

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Notes

1 For an interesting discussion of railways and (1) their importance in the development of "second phase" industrial capitalism see Hobsbawm (1969: 109-33); (2) their role in turning "peasants into Frenchmen" see Weber (1976: 195-220); and (3) a comparison of British, American and French approaches to the construction of railways, see Dobbin, 1994.

2 See Coffey, 1995.

3 All names are pseudonyms with the exception of those of prominent members of the fishing community, government officials, or elected politicians, quoted by name from published sources. I met Danielle, Nicole and Françoise at a local food bank run by one of the local Fishermen's Wives Associations. During my stay in the Bigoudennie I spent a great many hours listening to the women talk about the difficulties of running a household and, for the skippers wives, the boat budget during the period of crisis.

4 The local committees, established in 1945, are part of a well-integrated and centralized management system that brings together all sectors of the French fishing industry under one umbrella organization, the Comité Central des Pêches Maritimes (CCPM). Although they have a certain degree of autonomy, they are ultimately responsible for the "execution of decisions taken at a higher level" (Salz, 1991: 137; see LiPuma and Meltzoff, 1994, for a discussion of an analogous management system in Spain).

5 It is important to point out that in spite of the new structure and separate organization many of the CLPM personal were also involved in the organization and leadership of the survival committees. In many instances the survival committees were run out of the CLPM offices and were funded by the official organization.

6 *Briezh* is the Breton word for Brittany.

7 A word of caution is in order here: isolation is intimately intertwined with integration. We might more precisely remark that, at the moment of the arrival of rail transport, the Bigoudennie was poorly articulated in terms of physical communication links with central France. However, it should be pointed out that the "isolation" of this region has fluctuated over the centuries and for a period of nearly two centuries it was firmly incorporated into the coastal trading network which linked Bordeaux with England (see Duigou, 1991; 1994).

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Transnationalism and the Politics of "Home" for Philippine Domestic Workers

Pauline Gardiner Barber *Dalhousie University, Halifax*

Abstract: Gendered labour migration and transnationalism have become part of the ideological fabric of Filipino culture and nationhood. Local livelihoods and the meanings of "home" are being socially, politically and spatially recast through the unprecedented scale of women's migration. This article explores the cultural politics of Philippine labour migration and offers a critique of victimizing representations of Filipina. Homogenizing cultural idioms portray Filipina as dutiful daughters in families and of the nation, yet migrants' narratives reveal their agency and indicate their differences. Questions are also raised about whether the idea of a travelling culture accommodates the contradictory experiences of migrants. From their perspective, political aspects of travel, culture and economy are elided through a discourse of travelling, flux and the fetishization of the in-between mode.

Résumé: La migration de genre des travailleurs et le transnationalisme sont devenus un élément de la matière idéologique de la culture Philippine et du statut national. Les gagnes-pain locaux et les significations de «foyer» sont socialement, politiquement et spatialement reconsidérés tenant compte de l'étendue sans précédent de la migration des femmes. Cet article explore les politiques culturelles de la migration des travailleurs Philippins, et offre une critique des représentations des Philippines comme étant des victimes. Les idiomes culturels homogénéisants décrivent les Philippines comme des filles dévouées aux familles et à la nation, pourtant les récits des émigrants révèlent leur agence et indiquent leurs différences. Des questions sont également soulevées pour savoir si la notion de culture itinérante contient les expériences contradictoires des émigrants. De leur point de vue, les aspects politiques du voyage, de la culture et de l'économie, sont élidés tout au long d'un discours de voyage, de changement continuel et du caractère fétichiste de cette situation «d'entre-deux cultures».

Introduction

Dependence upon Philippine labour migration is sufficiently important to the Canadian economy and imprinted on middle-class urban Canadian consciousness that a recent column in *The Globe and Mail* (September 18, 1997) included having a Filipina nanny, along with the gas-guzzling four-wheel-drive, as one of the status symbols associated with the "thirtysomethings of the world." In the Philippines there is also an emergent taken-for-grantedness that women—young and old, poor and middle class—might, could and even should seek work overseas. In this work I discuss some of the processes which underlie the scale and form of what is best viewed as the exporting of Philippine gendered labour from the Philippines, how labour migration is constituted in the Philippine development policy and the gender and cultural politics that sustain migration. My main concern is to examine some of the implications of the globalization of "home" for Filipinos, or what can be called Philippine "ethnoscapes" in Appardurai's sense.

This article has four main parts. First, I discuss ethnoscapes and transnationalism which comprise part of my theoretical argument for how labour migration is transforming gendered cultural politics in Phillipine society and, indeed Philippine transnationalism. Next, I discuss the contours of Philippine labour migration and its gendered qualities. Then, I provide examples of the negotiation of gendered femininity in Philippine social spaces and most importantly, how labour migration narratives reflect agency and the changing politics of place in migrants' homes. In conclusion, I draw from the circumstances of Filipina cultural politics of travel and place to direct some critical questions to the literature on travelling.

My research in the Philippines to date spans five years and has been based in the Visayas. Most important was my initial research on gender and livelihood in Bais, a coastal community outside of Dumaguete, the capital

city of Negros Oriental in the central Visayas. There, I first encountered remittances from overseas labour migration as one aspect of household livelihood.[1] Subsequently I have commenced preliminary research (in 1996) on gendered identities and the cultural politics of Philippine transnationalism building upon my research in Bais and by conducting interviews on university campuses and in communities near the city of Iloilo, Panay in the western Visayas.[2] I also draw upon several interviews conducted in Canada with Filipina from the Visayas who are working in Nova Scotia.

Transnationalism as Theory and Practice

I use a transnational perspective to analyze how gendered Philippine labour migration is shaped through the forces of global capitalism, the gendered cultural and class processes negotiated by migrants both within the Philippines and in the countries of destination, and through the "social fields" created by migration flows. Anthropologist Roger Rouse (1995) argues that transnational capital formation has transformed cultural and class identities in the U.S. to predispose people towards evermore individualized subjectivities and modes of consumption. Arjun Appardurai (1991), with less attention to capital formation and more interest in deterritorialized, travelling culture, offers the concept of ethnoscape to refer to new configurations of identity made possible by the forces and flows of late capitalism. Both of these models apply to Philippine labour migration.

Transnational anthropology, Appadurai proposes, can reveal how migrants and other displaced groups frame their identities in terms of common historically and politically situated perspectives, even as they also experience socio-spatial-cultural dislocation, deterritorialization and perhaps, disjunction. This means that for migrants we cannot read off their identities in simplifying bipolar, hyphenated terms (for example, as Filipino-Canadians). Instead, Appardurai envisions migrants' identities as composed of several deeply meaningful, fluid attachments, akin to landscapes. Within these multistranded "scapes," each distinguished by a primary organizing principle—such as the trope "ethno" which connotes shared ethnic identity—people negotiate their social experiences mindful of their culturally diverse and complex social, political, economic and, most importantly, spatially transposed affinities. Thus, shared ethnoscapes can be seen to constitute larger social formations, regardless of the actual location of the places called "home." Ethnoscapes, but one of a series of scapes, become the "building blocks" of "imagined worlds"—in Anderson's (1983) sense—spreading around the globe. Moreover, ethnoscapes can have an unprecedented effect upon the politics of (and between) nations, as is certainly true for the Philippines. In his model of globalizing spatially reconfigured local cultures, Appardurai also allows for the possibility of historically more stable human communities and experiences. However, again relevant to contemporary Philippine society: "the warp of . . . stabilities is everywhere shot through with the woof of human motion, as more persons and groups deal with the realities of having to move, or the fantasies of wanting to move" (1990: 297).

In one sense, my paper is about the contrarieties of the particular kind of mobility which Appardurai (1990) casts as "tragedies of displacement," in this case for the migrant Filipina who become domestic workers overseas. But I also suggest that women's agency is a crucial aspect of their displacement. Because of this, tragic may be too harsh as a term for their circumstances. Politically, I emphasize the role of the Philippine state in encouraging migration and remittances even as it smooths over the negative implications of the transnational positioning of so many of its citizens. Theoretically, I question tendencies in the burgeoning recent cultural studies literature on travelling which invoke a generalized alterity (or "othering") and appeal to the seductiveness of travel. This is all part of postmodernism's widely orchestrated celebration of late, fast capitalism's hypermobility, globalization and subject fragmentation, as described by Harvey and others (Harvey, 1989: Massey, 1994; Pred and Watts, 1992; Urry, 1995). In addition to the important questions about culture, gender and class politics that arise from their circumstances, I address whether current theories of mobile culture and cultural displacement adequately accommodate the experiences of Filipina whose travels follow a particular model of gendered labour and familial obligation.

Transnationalism addresses cultural and social processes which span nation-states and in fact deterritorialize emergent forms of nationalism (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994). Two decades of escalating Philippine gender labour migration have transformed Philippine ethnoscapes, the ways in which people in various Philippine communities imagine their personal futures in different social and geographic locations. Emergent Philippine ethnoscapes do in fact disarticulate the tidy fit of culture, space and place so prominent in earlier models of migration. As Tyner (1994) and others have demonstrated, conventions in the mainstream academic literature on migration are more inclined to see migration in terms of structural forces, like push and pull

factors and/or experiential ruptures, and their statistical representation. Tyner goes on to note that outside of policy and advocacy discussions, the gendered labour migration of Asian overseas contract workers, particularly Filipinas, remains undertheorized. Moreover, I suggest, the cultural politics and agency of labour migrants are also overlooked.

Within national contexts, the complexity of transnational cultural politics in immigrant experience is sometimes sociologically recast in reductive nationally specific discourses, as in Canada where Philippine labour migrants become a category of workers (domestic service workers), a type of immigrant—immigrant woman in feminist writing—or members of an "ethnic" community. The promise of transnational anthropology is to forge a course through reifying structural explanations, tendencies towards cultural essentialism, and/or unfettered postmodern subjectivities. The challenge is to explore the complexities of lived experience where culture is neither conflated with place nor rendered static, coherent and outside of time and the workings of capitalism; to reveal how culture is articulated through the lived experience of political economy. For Filipina labour migrants, transnationalism allows for discussion of how historically produced, gender and class identities and subjectivities collide and sometimes collude with state policies.

It is precisely this intersection that I trace next in my review of the Philippine state's promotion of gendered labour migration through the direct manipulation of historically resonant, gendered cultural idioms in Philippine culture—dutiful daughters, migrant mothers—women who are cast and recast alternatively as heroines and victims. Shifts in the meanings accorded migrant Filipina reveal political struggles over the reliance of the state upon the economic contributions of overseas workers and other migrants, and the social complexities of emergent practices of gender and class identities in Philippine society. Furthermore, Philippine labour migration, as orchestrated by the Philippine state and on occasion challenged by social activists and, sometimes, individual women, is becoming normalized within the culture of daily life in the many historically, culturally and socially distinct localities which make up Philippine society.

My argument is that the cultural meanings accorded contemporary Philippine labour migration and the emergent Philippine transnationalism it inspires are transforming gender and class practices within the Philippines. Hence gendered labour migration resounds in the cultural politics of place. Politically this situation is paradoxical and contributes new spatial dimensions to Philippine nationalism (Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc, 1995), predicated as it is on migratory transnationalism. Despite and because of political interventions and discourses which alternatively "heroine-ize" or victimize the lives of women labour migrants, the labour flows continue. As I will show later in the article, women who migrate reject both of these characterizations about contemporary Filipina identity. Instead, migrants embrace experiential contradictions. They give and accept multiple readings of their experiences. They may well be dutiful daughters, and many of them are migrant mothers performing surrogate "motherwork" in other people's families; nonetheless, the public discourses about Filipina victims and heroines actually flatten migrants' experiences in politically expedient ways.

The Contours of Labour Migration

The export of Filipino workers overseas was initiated under Marcos's government during the 1970s, aided by a World Bank-sponsored telecommunications infrastructure which facilitated the subsequent increased scale of migration (Sussman, 1995). In the post-Marcos period, labour migration has escalated and changed both in terms of the composition of the migrant labour force and in terms of the destination countries to the point where it has become central to the state's debt management strategies (Chant and McIlwaine, 1995). The number of Filipinos working abroad, legally and illegally, is staggeringly high. In 1995, the Philippine Overseas Workers' Welfare Administration estimated there were 4.2 million migrants. Feminization of Philippine international contract labour migration is relatively recent. During 1992, approximately half of the officially recorded first-time contract workers were women; by 1994, women made up 60 percent of neophyte migrants (Go, 1997).

Asian regional labour markets have increased the scale of their deployment of Philippine contract workers. Hong Kong exemplifies this trend. In late 1995, of the 150 000 foreign women workers resident in Hong Kong—one of the primary regional labour markets for Filipina—120 000 were domestic workers from the Philippines. This situation compares with the total number of 38 000 foreign domestic workers reported in 1987, up from several hundred in the early 1970s (Constable, 1997). Other prime destinations for migrant Filipina contract domestic service workers—euphemistically termed "overseas contract workers" by the Philippine state and known as "OCWs" or "DHs" (domestic helpers) in Philippine communities—are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait in the Middle East and Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and Malaysia in Asia (Go, 1997). Canada

and the United States provide a different case because of immigration policies which can lead to permanent migration. In labour-receiving countries that provide employment for large numbers of foreign domestic workers with limited work contracts, Filipina comprise the most prominent Southeast Asian labour force, followed by Indonesian and Sri Lankan women. Middle Eastern states have seen the greatest recent increase in officially executed export visas for Filipina (Heyzer, Lycklama and Weerakoon, 1994).

Philippine contract labour migration is subject to rapid changes arising out of the peculiarities of Philippine political economy which Sussman (1995) describes as dependent-integrated. Philippine foreign policy machinations and regional instabilities affecting destination countries also produce sudden changes. For example, the Gulf War saw the repatriation of many thousands of foreign workers (Heyzer, Lycklama and Weerakoon, 1994). As with many groups of foreign workers, large numbers of Filipinos work illegally, a situation which renders them particularly vulnerable to abuse from their employers and makes all official statistics subject to qualification. The Philippine Overseas Workers Welfare Administration estimates that in 1995, of the total labour migrant population (4.2 million), 42.7 percent went undocumented (Go, 1997). Various commentaries also concur that over half a million relatively well-educated women leave the Philippines each year to take up employment (or rather, under-employment) in foreign labour markets (Arao, 1991; Beltran and De Dios, 1992; CIIR, 1987; Eviota, 1992; Heyzer, 1986; Heyzer, Lycklama and Weerakoon, 1994; Tacoli, 1995). One recent analysis of the international labour market dynamics which cheapen Filipina's labour both within the Philippines and overseas, characterizes Filipina as "Women of a Lesser Cost" (Chant and McIlwaine, 1995). Gendered ideologies about domestic labour, care-giving, mother work and Philippine aptitudes, within the Philippines and in countries where Filipina are sought after as domestic service workers, sustain this migration flow and belie its economic origins (Bakan, 1995; Bakan and Stasiulus, 1997; Beltran and de Dios, 1992; Macklin, 1994; Pineda-Ofreneo, 1991; Silvera, 1983; 1993).

In keeping with the scale of gendered labour migration, Philippine foreign investment and foreign policy are negotiated with a view to the country's economic dependence upon remittances from overseas workers and other migrants (Sussman, 1995; Hernandez and Tigno, 1995). The displacement of Filipino women has become politically contentious globally, as international media carry stories on the plight of individual migrants, the most well-known being Flor Contemplacion and Sara Balabagan. Since the execution of Flor Contemplacion in Singapore in March 1995, Filipinos have become quite militant in calling for government officials to be more assertive about the welfare of Philippine overseas workers,[3] but particularly domestic workers. For example, in May 1997, the Philippine ambassador in Singapore acted quickly when a Filipina domestic worker resident in Singapore was arrested on a murder charge. Government officials called for people to remain calm and were quick to communicate that the woman had confessed to the murder. Clearly, these actions were contrived to prevent any public perception that yet another travesty of Singapore injustice to a Filipina was about to unfold.

At other times, however, when the Philippine state has been more proactive on gendered migration, protests about the curtailment of Filipina's rights have flared up. This happened in 1988 when President Aquino's administration restricted exit visas for select destinations with the expressed intention of forcing labour-receiving countries to implement certain basic labour policies for contract domestic workers.[4] A cartoon in the *Far East Economic Review* on March 17, 1988, captured the social conflict by representing President Aquino reversing the Cinderella metaphor. The president, as the fairy godmother, waved her wand over a tearful Filipina domestic worker down on her knees clutching a scrubbing brush. The caption read: "No. You Can't Go (to) the Ball!" The contradictions manifest in this struggle over the conditions for the exporting of labour versus workers' rights to sell their labour, are underscored by the state's dependence on migrant Filipinos and the transnationalism this spawns. Over the last five years there has been an escalation in Philippine public discussion about the experiences, both positive and negative, of women overseas workers. To counteract protests, articles in Philippine newspapers routinely also draw attention to the sacrifices of Philippine overseas workers, and Filipinas working overseas are particularly lauded for their contributions to the national economy.

My research reveals that migrants have different reasons for leaving the Philippines and that they draw upon sources of knowledge and social networks that are quite varied. Nevertheless, there is now a certain "taken for grantedness" about the possibilities and pitfalls of labour migration expressed by people of quite different social backgrounds in the Visayan communities I visit. For example, people are not at all surprised that Philippine transnationalism would be the subject of my research, nor that I would expect them to have direct knowledge from friends and relatives, if not firsthand

experience, about women leaving the Philippines to work overseas. Likewise the return of Filipinos from overseas destinations punctuates the routines of daily life in many Philippine communities. In these ways migration and transnationalism have become part of the ideological fabric of Filipino culture and nationhood. In what follows, I suggest some of the ways in which the escalation in scale, the gendered character of Philippine labour migration and the public discourses surrounding this exodus of women are transforming local culture in Philippine communities. Again, my argument is that politically this situation is paradoxical in that gendered labour migration is constitutive of a new form of nationalism, but one which is predicated on migratory transnationalism; such are the cultural politics of place in contemporary Philippine society.

Constituting Gendered Femininity

In February 1996, in commemoration of the 1986 "EDSA revolution" which ousted Marcos from the Philippines, President Ramos acknowledged the significance of Filipino migrant workers by praising what he called their "exemplary acts of heroism." Citing the case of one women who had rescued the children she cared for from a house fire, he offered commentary on the great courage shown by all Philippine overseas workers whose labours contributed to the well-being of their families and the nation as a whole. I characterize such women as dutiful daughters, who are often, themselves, also migrant mothers engaged in maternal sacrifice for the well-being of their families and nation.

The cultural potency of such exalting—and homogenizing—claims about the bravery of domestic service workers was emphasized for me during my most recent stay in the Philippines in May 1997. During a one-month period of residency on an Iloilo university campus, I encountered a different strand of Philippine gendered culture, one positioned within the Philippine middle class. The gendered representations and practices of the women and men in Bais coastal households who first introduced me to the realities of their less urbanized cultural economies and gendered labour migration were less consistent—and insistent—about gender proprieties. Bais women migrate but they do so for different reasons. In Bais, gendered labour practices and ideologies accorded privileges to males but they also afforded space for women's negotiated autonomy (Barber, 1995; 1996). This may be less true for more middle-class urban women in Iloilo, where normative gender boundaries and familial expectations seem more restrictive. And in fact, the literature reveals quite clearly that issues of familial control and "escape" figures prominently in how the decision to leave the Philippines gets constituted in migrant narratives about leaving (Parrenas, 1997).

In an intensive intersession university course for approximately 20 women teachers and development practitioners, ranging in age from 22 years old to "50-plus," I and the two Philippine colleagues with whom I collaborated posed an exercise to encourage reflection on the acquisition of gendered knowledge in Philippine culture. In response to our request for completion of the sentence "As a Filipina I must...," all the course participants positioned themselves exclusively within their familial relations without mention of wage work, careers or the extensive community service performed by most middle-class women, often in the context of their churches. They described their culturally based understandings that as women they felt they were expected to get married and devote themselves to serving their husbands and other members of their families whilst maintaining a neat, peaceful, well-run household. Self was to be realized through meeting the needs of others, if not sublimated.

The group had had limited exposure to feminist critiques of gendered inequities in Philippine society, hence their attendance in the course. Striking to me was the number of women who spoke openly about their interpretations of the dictates in Philippine gendered ideology for women to submit themselves to familial male authority and to maintain expressions of femininity in accord with male desire and pleasure. This ideology dictates that Philippine women should, as one woman put it: "be slim, sexy, faithful, do the household chores, be beautiful, wait for a male companion, have a baby, and be taken care of by her husband; she must be a martyr."

Not surprisingly, our further discussions clarified that the women were demonstrating their understandings of the anthropological distinction between normative and actual cultural expectations. Subsequent discussions exposed numerous contradictions and complexities in this starkly sketched, somewhat stereotypical pastiche of "martyred" Philippine femininity. This is not how these women actually live their lives but, importantly, that they believe that other women do follow more closely the norms prescribed by Philippine culture. Several women were also forthcoming about the creative avenues through which they, and other women they knew, circumvented and at times subverted these cultural ideals. Ironically, for the younger women of the group, overseas work remained one possible means of retreat from the more onerous aspects of gendered submission within Philippine middle-class families. This

shift spatially transposes the familial (patriarchal) control into a new location—that of commodified domestic labour in a different familial, national and cultural context. The nexus of control over women and their labour process is transacted in globalized labour markets which are mediated through the kinds of state-to-state relations discussed previously. The Philippine state oversees this migrant labour contract; indeed it facilitates it. Dutiful daughters in the family context become dutiful daughters in the wider social field, the new—to them—spaces and places of international domestic labour markets.

From the point of view of middle-class Filipina labour migrants (the majority of the legally registered migrants), the important point to be made here is that this move can be construed as a form of resistance to restrictive cultural and familial controls. While research indicates that to view such a shift as liberating is problematic because of the severe exploitation of Filipina migrant labour (by employers and states), some women see it this way nonetheless. The search for personal autonomy through wage labour overseas remains one paradoxical aspect associated with the agency of young middle-class women. There are others. Little research on Filipina overseas workers leaves space for what we might construe as "agency"; that is, seriously addresses their modes of dignity and resistance, without discounting exploitation and abuse. However, one study of women working in Japanese entertainment-sector labour markets reports a somewhat controversial finding, perhaps politically efficacious to state agendas: "There is little doubt that the female workers had derived significant benefits from their labor migration" (Osteria, 1994: 55). Moreover, while this study and others suggest familial duty is part of the motivation to seek overseas employment, the young women in Japan also expose the contradiction that working overseas frees them from the constraints of familial control. Working in restaurants and night clubs in Japan clearly provides some Filipina with well-paid overseas jobs, even if such jobs are filled by a relatively small minority of Filipina labour migrants. Such examples provide some insights into the migrants' agency and move beyond the polarized discourses of victims and heroines promoted by the Philippine state. For the women who are successful in establishing themselves in well paid (and personally "secure") contracts, and who do not feel compelled into desperate measures to retain their jobs, work is construed as both helpful to their families and, potentially, as a vehicle for greater personal freedom.

Other research, most of it also survey based, for example on domestic workers in Hong Kong, places greater conditionality on women migrants' experiences. One study links women's "job satisfaction" with their overseas employment to factors, ranked by degree of statistical significance, such as salary, the nature of their personal accommodation, the nationality of the employer and the number of relatives in Hong Kong (French and Lam, 1988). Another, later survey challenges any use of the discourse of "job satisfaction" as descriptive of the disadvantages faced by Hong Kong-based Filipina, who serve the financial needs of their families and the labour needs of the industrializing Hong Kong economy (Lane, 1992), and I would add, the needs of the Philippine economy. All this literature points to familial relations and ideologies—what I here embrace with the ideologically suggestive trope of "dutiful daughters"—as key to the complexities of how gendered migration is sustained in the politics of place in local communities and as part of transformative, transnationalized national culture.

Thus, the simple profile of normative gender ideologies, as described in the seminar class, affirming as it did some core values about femininity in middle-class Philippine culture, also confirmed that official Philippine policies and discourse on migrant Filipina domestic service workers strike a cultural chord which resonates deeply. Indeed, such discourse has transnational repercussions when it collides with ideologies about Philippine gendered culture in receiving countries. For example, in Canada, Filipina are considered to be particularly patient care-givers and childminders (cf. Bakan, 1995). It is striking that they also share this view of themselves. Further, as one Filipina working in Halifax suggested: "it is natural for Filipinos, especially women, to know housework" because of the relatively low level of technological support in Philippine families, where people of her generation typically were members of large families.

In terms of entertainment sector workers, the market for Filipina is also partly sustained through misplaced assumptions about the docility and sexual submissiveness of women from the Philippines. This image was fostered through the period when Philippine communities and Philippine women provided a focus for the recreational designs of a succession of occupations by colonizing agents and their military forces (Illo, 1996). Most important, in current Philippine dialogues on this topic, were the Japanese who captured "comfort women" for their sexual purposes during World War II. Americans, who have only recently vacated U.S. bases in the Philippines, perpetuated similar images of Filipina (Constable, 1997; Illo, 1996). Now, in the period following the base closures, the Philippine tourist industry, including ecotourism, struggles against yet also sustains and is sus-

tained by images of compliant Filipina, some of whom are available for the paid sexual servicing of tourists (Barber, 1998).

While overseas migration was not presented as central to culturally bound stereotypes of contemporary Philippine femininity in our seminar, our conversations about gendered understandings and practices soon turned to overseas workers. In this subsequent discussion about actual cultural processes and practices, migration was evidently part of the seminar participants' immediate experiences. They confirmed how it is becoming entrenched in the ideological fabric of gendered Filipino culture, a "fact of life" which is manipulated by the state and supported through the cultural and religious idioms surrounding gendered selfhood, family, community and nation. State initiatives such as President Ramos's EDSA address and the setting up of various enquiries into the circumstances of well-known cases of abuse,[5] serve both to normalize labour migration and the transnationalism it spawns and to secure the loyalty of all types of migrants and their kin to the nation. To leave and return has become typically Filipino, a means to self and cultural realization. For many Filipinos compelled by economic circumstance and these more invidious cultural incentives, being here, or there, or in-between is an ever-present possibility; spatial, social, economic and emotional ties are indeed fragmented, if not dislocated as postmodern perspectives would suggest. But why, how and to what end? And, how do the contemporary modes of labour migration differ from earlier forms? To ask such questions is to reveal historical trajectories which link so-called postmodern experiences with the social consequences of political-economy and the imposition of capitalistic modernity, in this case in Philippine society.

For women from the central and western Visayas, employment contracts as domestic workers in Hong Kong remain—even with the uncertainties of the 1997 shift in governance—a more desirable work location than Middle Eastern countries, where personal freedoms appear to be quite restricted because of the dictates of religion, custom and repressive state attitudes. For example, Eva, from the summer course, met some younger women students while visiting an Iloilo bank. Conversation turned to the purpose for visiting the bank, where Eva learned her friends were in the throes of negotiating employment contracts in Hong Kong. She asked: "Look what happened to Flor Contemplacion and Sara Balabagan, aren't you afraid?" Their answer was a resounding "No." They said that they doubted Hong Kong would change quickly and, significantly, whatever happened: "It would be their fate!" These young women and indeed many other Filipina contemplating labour migration appeal to the Filipino cultural idiom of "*Bahala na*," which communicates not only a sense of fatalism but also that: "It's in God's hands." Still, fate is negotiated with agency.

Christina's Agency

Working with the social knowledge that circulated amongst her circle of friends, about the constraints associated with various foreign labour markets, a woman I call Christina negotiated an employment contract to work in a hotel in Dubai. Thirty years old, and herself the daughter of an Iloilo-based domestic "helper," she made the decision to apply for the Dubai contract after a period of underemployment in Manila. In selecting employment with a five-star Dubai hotel, which she described as hosting a more Westernized clientele, she calculated that she would be less subjected to some of the more exploitative and degrading employment scenarios she had heard about in Middle Eastern countries; for example the utilization of hotel staff to provide sexual services to hotel guests—an ever-present possibility in her view—in lesser-ranked hotels.

Christina uncritically accepted violations of her personal privacy and her body as routine aspects of overseas employment. Discussions with friends and state-sponsored seminars for overseas workers prepared her to accept that she would be subjected to routine pregnancy and stool tests and could be arrested if she were suspected of consorting with men. In fact, she told me that one Filipina who had worked in her hotel had developed a relationship with a male Filipino also working in the hotel. Rumour had it that this woman had become pregnant and had been jailed for the duration of the pregnancy. Christina believed stories that the woman's child would be taken from her at birth and the woman would be deported upon her release from prison. However, Christina's greatest sympathies were reserved for illegal Russian immigrants who were forced to sell their bodies and were extremely vulnerable to excessive male violence, even death, in Dubai society. With such comparisons at hand, Christina considered herself extremely fortunate in her employment and did not acknowledge having any regrets about the restrictions on her sociability in Dubai. When I met her she was happy to be home in Iloilo for a visit lasting several months and she was delighted to bring luxury gifts home to relatives, such as gold jewelry and leather goods.

After graduating from university with a Bachelor of Science, Christina had relied upon Manila-based social contacts to help her secure employment as a secretary.

Her salary of 4 000 Pesos barely covered the expenses necessary to maintain herself in the Manila economy. Frustrated with her situation precisely because "she was working for herself and not her family," Christina accepted the advice of two friends of hers who were knowledgeable about jobs in Dubai and initiated negotiations with a job recruitment agency for an employment contract. The employment contract cost nearly three months in wages with payments spread over several months. In addition to the cultural risks of Middle Eastern employment, Christina took a calculated economic risk that she would recoup these costs, be able to return money borrowed from kin and would have some left over to share with her family. Christina is the seventh "dutiful" daughter in a family of 12 children. She is not the only overseas worker in her family. Her 37-year-old sister is completing her first two-year contract in Malaysia with apparently benevolent employers, while her brother works in the boiler room of a Norwegian-owned ship under employment conditions and wages that are satisfactory to him. All the siblings plan on renewing their contracts with their current overseas employers, yet they remain committed culturally and economically to place and kin in the Philippines. The remittances Christina and her family send home are used by their parents to educate their younger siblings and the children of yet other siblings. They also provide emergency funds for kin when called upon. While Christina's Dubai wages are only 1 000 Pesos more than in Manila, her employer provides her meals, accommodation and a work uniform. Like many other Filipina migrant workers, her dream is to start a business, in her case a piggery.

Cultural Politics and Capital: Beyond Agency and Bahala Na

I did not tell Christina that the literature on Filipina return migrants reports that aspirations to start businesses with the capital acquired from wages earned overseas are typically not realized (Cruz and Paganoni, 1989; Lane, 1992; Osteria, 1994). Instead, return migrants are more likely to use up any capital they have acquired through repayment of debts arising out of employment and recruitment related costs and debts they feel obliged to pay on behalf of kin. Capital is also sometimes exhausted in meeting the increased consumption aspirations of the kin the overseas workers felt compelled to support in the first place. I see this as one further aspect of the "dutiful daughter" familial ideology that is fuelled by gift-giving conventions in Philippine culture. It is also a form of social capital that becomes more deeply commodified through the increased exposure to foreign consumption styles in travelling. Televisions, one material indicator of the receipt of remittances in Philippine households, also feed aspirations for increased levels of material goods. Educating kin, as a means to self-reliance for that relative but also as a form of social capital for oneself, appears to hold a top priority in the allocation of remittances to the families of migrant Filipina. This is true both for the temporary overseas contract workers like Christina and for more permanent immigrants like Ima Tiangco and Portia, described below.

I will now provide further examples of how culture travels, and people are not really where they want to be in these here, there and in-between modes. The women whose travels I represent in short vignettes below are deliberately selected to capture the variability of the mobile cultural politics which comprise contemporary Philippine ethnoscapes, in each of the three modes, beginning with the Canadian "here." I will then offer some concluding remarks about the theoretical implications of the gendered political consequences of Filipino travelling.

How Culture Travels

Eufracia (Ima) Tiangco's obituary appeared in August 1995, in one of Halifax's daily newspapers. Ima was born in Tarlac province in the Philippines 81 years ago. She died in a large provincial hospital in the Philippines. Her obituary does not describe the circumstances surrounding her migration to Canada, nor her departure from Canada and her homecoming. As is the case with many Filipina who migrate to Canada, Ima was employed on the housekeeping staff of a large public hospital, in her case in Halifax. One of Ima's surviving seven children resides in Halifax, the other six live in the Philippines, no doubt under improved material conditions because of her overseas work and residence. The life sketched in the obituary spans two countries and cultures. Filipinos in Nova Scotia knew her as a member of their organization, suggesting that her desire was to maintain contact with transposed Filipinos like herself, as part of her Canadian cultural environment. But her family in the Philippines, the cultural environment of "home" and the place where she died and was buried, also clearly retained a powerful emotional draw in her life.

Portia is in her late 40s and has lived in Halifax for just over 10 years now. Portia lives in Canada but her cultural affinities and social orientation remain firmly tied to the Philippines and Filipino travelling culture. Like Ima Tiangco and many respondents in overseas contract

workers' surveys (Cruz and Paganoni, 1989), she muses about returning to the Philippines when she becomes elderly. She also visited the Philippines two years ago and plans to go again in the next few years. For now, she considers her job difficult, mostly because she provides care to an elderly person for whom she is solely responsible on a day-to-day basis, but she also considers herself fortunate to trust and have the trust of her employer. As she reconstructs her motivations for leaving the Philippines to live and work in Halifax, initially on temporary labour contracts, she casts her desire for travel and her curiosity about the world, the broadening of her ethnoscape in Appardurai's terms, as one of the main factors underlying her decision to leave:

> I was a wide reader. I read pocket books and magazines when I was in the family store. These pocket books are sometimes very descriptive . . . and I said to myself when I was still a kid, I want to go to places. But when my friend asked me if I wanted to come here to work, I said I don't know what to do. I know I can do the work and I have friends there so that will help . . . I had doubts, yes, but my employer kept my job open for me in the Philippines.

Family obligations and economic necessity played a lesser role in Portia's decision to migrate from her home community in the Visayas, in part because she felt secure in having a steady, if relatively poorly paid retail job to return to. As it turned out, Portia did not feel the need to return to her old job in the Philippines. Instead she renewed her employment contract and completed educational "upgrading" courses to facilitate her transition to Canadian landed-immigrant status. In Halifax, Portia has developed a circle of friends and built a sense of community for herself through friendships with other Filipinos living and working in Halifax, including the childhood friend who recommended her to her current employer and her niece, now working as a nanny in Halifax. While Portia's account of her life indicates her pragmatism and personal resilience, ambivalence marks her discussions about her earlier life in the Philippines and her loss of the deep, personal church-based friendships there. She contrasts these past affinities with her present circumstances where her social nexus remains planted firmly in a transposed form of Philippine culture; a constructed transnational place, an "over there but set up here." When Portia is homesick she telephones friends and family in the Philippines, and when she sees unfamiliar Filipinos on the streets of Halifax, she approaches them to assess their interest in identifying with herself and other "displaced" Filipinos, perhaps by joining them for one of their regular monthly outings. As she puts it: "I have two lives now . . . I can choose if I go there or here." It is the institutionalization of the elderly in Canada that compels her to see her future as being located in the Philippines, an imagined repositioning of herself into the familial context where she will be socially and spatially located within generations of her kin. Constructing a familial ambience for herself in Halifax has been possible up to a point, but she is constrained in this by the demands of her job and by the geographic dispersal of her North American friends and relatives, some of whom reside as far away as Florida.

Returning from the Philippines on a flight from Manila to Hong Kong, I recently met Ruth, a Filipino woman in her late 60s. I was curious about Ruth because she seemed older than many of the Filipina who become my fellow travellers to Manila. Actually, Ruth represents another face of mobile Philippine culture. She was sitting over the aisle from me carefully balancing a rather large, obviously very precious and lavishly dressed replica of El Santo Niño. We struck up a conversation in which I learned we were both to travel on the same flight from Hong Kong to Toronto. I helped with her bags as we negotiated the departure formalities at Hong Kong before boarding our Toronto-bound plane. The figurine in Ruth's care was approximately three feet tall and stood with arms outstretched, palms turned outward. Ruth was transporting the replica of El Santo Niño as a gift for her daughter, who had immigrated to Canada through the domestic worker's programme some 10 years ago. Ruth was to visit with her daughter in Toronto for three months. The daughter had not been feeling well, and Ruth hoped the presence of the holy icon, combined with her own skilful healing therapies, religiously inspired, would settle her daughter's ailments. Ruth also hoped to contribute to the costs associated with her stay in Toronto by extending her therapeutic services to needy Filipinos living in Toronto, members of her daughter's church congregation. As Nagata (1987) has shown, Christian churches provide one main institutional framework supporting the integration of Filipino immigrants living in Toronto. Ruth's affiliation with her daughter's church-based social networks eased Ruth's accommodation to Toronto while sustaining her daughter's (gendered) Filipina cultural sensibilities.

Where Ruth calls the Philippines home, even in travelling, Sarah lives in a more in-between mode, in an expensive condominium complex in Hong Kong's Discovery Bay. Sarah, also a Filipino domestic worker, considers herself fortunate to have part-time work as a nanny with several foreign families. She is paid what she feels is a

good hourly wage and has control over her time. She is also pleased not to be living with her employers because she is able to economize on her accommodation costs through sharing a modest apartment with other Filipino domestic workers. When Sarah's Canadian employers recently took a trip to Canada to introduce their baby to his grandparents, her employers encouraged her move into their condominium unit during their absence. They also assisted her in making arrangements to have her 10-year-old daughter visit with her from the Philippines at this time. The daughter in the Philippines remained in the care of Sarah's parents during her absence. Sarah accepted her employer's offer because her own living space is so cramped. This situation of being emotionally inside her employer's "family" yet spatially and culturally separate is not without tension for her, as she said: "They want to visit my place which makes me ashamed. They say we are all friends and I shouldn't worry, but I do. They cannot really understand my life."

Again, I learned of Sarah's circumstances through a conversation which began casually between myself and a fellow traveller in the Hong Kong airport. My research to date places Hong Kong as a key labour market for women from the Philippines who seek contact with foreign employers, themselves temporarily resident in Hong Kong. Filipina who make contact with actual or potential foreign employers often use those contacts to facilitate their entry into more distant, comparatively better-waged labour markets, such as those in Canada. Maria Perez, now a citizen of Canada living in Ottawa, whom I first met in Bais during one of her several trips home, represented this trajectory known as "cross-countrying" in her life history narrative.

In 1996, when I last visited the coastal community in Bais Bay, Negros Oriental, where I have been doing research since 1992, Maria Perez's son was preparing for his imminent departure to Canada to join his mother and aunt. Approximately 10 years ago, Maria moved to Canada in the employ of Canadians she first met in Hong Kong. When she became eligible to apply for Canadian landed-immigrant status, Maria resigned from her job as a domestic worker and sought employment as a community nurse with a private-sector agency. This career move provided Maria with a better hourly wage and some flexibility in her hours of work. She devoted her spare time to upgrading her educational qualifications through a course of study at an Ontario community college. Maria's previous employers, with her assistance, subsequently contracted her sister to take care of their children.

With the anticipated arrival of her son, Maria is about to accomplish one of her primary goals in coming to Canada, that of providing her son with greater economic opportunities then he would have in the Philippines. The son, now a young man in his 20s, has been raised by his maternal grandparents during his mother's absence. He has been a constant worry for his mother, in part because she feels that her material support for him and her natal household has led him to become rather self-indulgent. As she put it "he lacks a work ethic and is only interested in having a good time." Because he had ready access to cash through the remittances she sends home, Maria also feared that her son was a desirable suitor in the eyes of his female companion's parents. She feared an accidental pregnancy would produce pressure for the son to marry at a young age. In her view, these pressures upon her son will dissipate in the Canadian environment once he settles in and embarks upon some kind of educational training programme. Maria, then, is intent upon establishing a broader representation of family on the Canadian side of the places she calls "home."

These examples should really be balanced by an example of daily life which is not fractured by the comings and goings of migrant travellers. Susan and Luciano Lopez provide one such example (see Barber, 1995). Their livelihood practices include fishing on Luciano's part, as well as Susan's enterprise in a range of activities including vending, sewing and raising livestock. Although not wealthy by any means, Luciano is one of the more "successful" fishermen in the barangay, and the Lopez family is relatively better off than many other Bais fishing households. But even here, on my most recent visit to the family in April 1996, I learned that May, the eldest daughter in the family, a graduate from a community nursing programme, is working in Manila in a small shop owned by her uncle. Such a move was not projected during my previous visit with the family some four months earlier. Wages from this job, for which she is overqualified, are preferable to those for domestic workers in Manila. Luciano asked me about his daughter's employment prospects in Canada as a domestic worker, revealing that even in this previously stable household, consideration is being accorded to labour migration.

The desire for greater economic security for three younger children in the family motivates the Lopez discussion about Canada. While May Lopez would probably migrate to Canada if she could, in fulfilment of her duties to the family (and through this, in Ramos's own words, "duty" to the nation), she is also drawn by the promise of opportunities for herself in Canadian society. The experiences of her "neighbour" Maria Perez, who now lives in Canada, are well known locally in the Philippines. Maria's modest Canadian wages as a nursing assistant

appear high in comparison with Philippine wages. Thus, the Lopez family have now planted Canada firmly in their shared ethnoscape; the imagined and longed for, local and globalized configuration of home(s).

The Cultural Politics of Travelling

Do theories of mobile culture and cultural displacement accommodate the experiences of this group of women travellers? For example, the concept of "travelling culture" has been posed by Clifford, Appardurai and others as a vantage point for consideration of displacement and migration, mobility and hybridity, globalization and rootedness. "Travel" in such arguments, is said to invite reflection about historical, material and spatial processes and practices. It is also claimed in this literature that travel subverts the conflation of culture with locality, what Appadurai calls "ethnographic essentialism" (1991). As noted earlier, there is questionable lack of attention in this literature to historically specific modes of travelling and the social class dynamics which compel this. But in addition, my research questions the persistent reductionism implied in tropes like travelling. Can the idea of travelling culture, which is deliberately contrived to avoid binarisms, adequately accommodate the paradox for Filipina (Christina, Ima and her kin; Portia, Ruth, Sarah and Maria Perez), whose lives are marked by the contrast between the "home" they have left but still support economically and the "home" where they work and live. Also, in the example of the Lopez family, there are the "homes" they wish to constitute for their children in Bais, and for May in Canada. Along with such multiple locations of "home" go numerous imperatives to travel back and forth.

Many further examples of the multiple cultural, social, economic and political ties in migrant's lives suggest to me that this form of divided attention, experiential and material, temporal and spatial, has become one significant feature of contemporary Filipino culture. Filipino local loyalties are expressed through the idea of returning, often in a transient mode. Thus it is not without significance that many Filipino home comers, *balikbayans*, choose their originating *barangay* fiesta month for their routine yet symbolically charged homecomings; in such moments we see the symbolic inversion of the Lopez's current dilemma. For the Lopezes the hope for a future better life is associated with Canada. For the homecoming *balikbayans*, "home and the local" are associated with the better life, a paradox that I am proposing must be theoretically accounted for. From the perspective of Filipina, important questions about the political aspects of travelling cultures are subsumed within notions of travelling and flux, getting there rather than being there, what we might term the fetishization of the in-between mode. Certainly Filipinos travel, but since culture, all culture, is constituted through material and symbolic practices, culture retains connections to distinctive locales even as experiences, ideas and practices from globalized exchanges transform culture. The Philippine state's approach to Filipino mobility acknowledges as much.

In conclusion, I would suggest that there are very real political and social consequences associated with the exodus of gendered migrant labour from the Philippines. My argument is that migrant Filipina incorporate local and global experiences into their cultural politics; a doubleness pervades their experience as they straddle borders and draw upon comparisons from more than one cultural and class location. The meaning of the local, key in which is the idea of "home," shifts with new more globalized experiences. In our rush to prioritize the complexity of experience and valorize individual subjectivities and identities, fragments and fluxus, novelty and mobility—all important principles in what has come to be called postmodern theorizing (see Knauft, 1994)—we should not overlook the commonality in experiences shaped by historical political economy and gendered class and racialized relations. Nor should we allow formal theoretical discourse to stand devoid of content. To do this is to valorize travelling without specific travellers, which is a tendency in some of the recent interdisciplinary travel writing (for example, Chambers, 1994).

In his well-known essay on travelling culture Clifford begins his discussion of travel encounters with a commentary on writings about hotels, surely one site of Western gendered (male) class privilege and a prime example of the treatment of travel as generic. In the locating of travel experience in hotel rooms and in the absence of a more full-blown discussion of the social relations of travel, travel as a trope becomes pure form minus content. Later in the essay, the locus for reflecting the travelling culture problematic shifts more towards cultural power and politics, but perhaps this is too little too late. He asks, in what could well be a research agenda for the Philippines:

> How are national, ethnic, community "insides" and "outsides" maintained, policed, subverted, crossed—by distinct historical subjects, for their own ends, with different degrees of power and freedom? (Riding, at times on the same planes . . .). (Clifford, 1992: 108)

Travel and writing about travel can indeed provide a lens into how Western hegemony is constituted and reconstituted in a globalized mode (Nash, 1994). On one side of the frame sit those elite travellers who luxuriate in being away from home, whether temporarily as tourists, anthropologists and other writers, or as temporary residents, in the case of members of the management strata in business, development and state bureaucratic agencies (Hannerz, 1990). Displaced persons such as labour migrants and refugees take up the remainder of the space. That one group regards the other as part of the novelty of their experience is a curious feature of contemporary travelling dialectics, which much of the literature on travel writing fails to grapple with adequately. As in Clifford's case, migrants and displaced persons are positioned on the periphery of the discussion. They are read off or added on in much the same way gender and race used to be appended to class in earlier, pre-feminist and proto-feminist sociological discussions (Moore, 1988; di Leonardo, 1991).

In later work on diasporas Clifford (1994) more directly acknowledges the class and cultural layering of travelling. How could he not, given that displacement is central to diasporic lives? But much cultural studies writing on travel continues to valorize the experiences of the wilful, self-indulgent, curious traveller, more often than not as an unclassed, ungendered, ethnically unspecified traveller, more so than the displaced and migrating; the tourist, the cosmopolitan and the expatriate, rather than the overseas worker or refugee. The travel literature also indulges the Western audience for these narratives. In this, postmodern treatments of travel—either as experience or encounter—paradoxically obscure the still-potent structural foundations of their theorizing. The very modernity that so-called postmodern theorizing seeks to transcend persists unscathed, if not implicitly bolstered. Along with this goes the denial of the political economy of all forms of travel, past and present, imperial and imperious, and the historical continuities people such as the migrant Filipina described here must contend with and contest as they reconstitute their means of livelihood through familiar (Illo and Polo, 1990) and novel social and spatial fields (Barber, 1995).

There is nothing particularly new about labour migration from rural to urban settings in Western and non-Western countries (Smith, 1989), or internationally as revealed in the history of North American migration (Wolf, 1982). However, the current scale of Philippine migration, its gendered character, and the structural dependency of the Philippine state on the economic nexus generated through migration is relatively recent and quite dramatic. Also different is the pace of contemporary travel and the nature of contemporary transnationalism which are facilitated through and facilitating of the technologies of late 20th-century capitalism. All these features may well be novel, but historical precedents and preconditions in Philippine and other modes of travelling should not be overlooked.

As Appardurai correctly projects, the legacies of Philippine colonial history combine with current capital flows and their political and ideological trappings to inspire seemingly novel cultural accommodations and politics. Filipinos(a), and other moving groups, must weave their fantasies and define their needs against this backdrop of political economy and the constantly shifting terrain of policies regarding emigration and immigration; they "can never afford to let their imaginations rest too long, even if they wished to" (1990: 297). For them travel is never merely experiential. It is always strategic and inevitably political. Travellers have histories and are the bearers of class, ethnic and gendered relations as they constitute the politics of places. Just how truly politically contentious gendered labour migration can be was revealed by the official responses to the well-publicized brutalization of Sara Balabagan in the United Arab Emirates and the death sentence against Flor Contemplacion in Singapore in 1995. In the Philippines, the public debate and social protest over these tragic events provides part of the explanation for the current political discourse of heroic overseas workers and the cultural ideology of travelling.

Notes

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2 To date I have travelled to Iloilo as a member of the Dalhousie University Steering Committee of the CIDA funded curriculum development project of ISLE (Island Sustainability, Livelihood and Equity). In Iloilo I am particularly indebted to the members of the Women's Desk, the new Gender Studies programme and the ISLE Steering Committee at the University of the Philippines. Most particularly I wish to thank Rosario Asong, Luz Lopez-Rodriguez, Ma Luisa Mabunay and Ida Siason for their various ongoing col-

laborations, research expertise and friendships without which my research would not be possible.

3 Over one year after the death of Flor Contemplacion publicized the difficult circumstances of migrant Filipina domestic workers in headlines all over the world, an article in the *Philippines Free Press*, June 15, 1996, reporting on a Manila-based United Nations conference on violence against women migrant workers bore the title "Sweet and Damned." The article is flagged with the subheading: "Pushing for a World Conference on Violence against Women Migrant Workers Has Yielded No Results."

4 President Aquino's initiative was partly in response to the policy deliberations of an international conference in Quezon City in 1987 on women's migration. This conference was organized by the Asia and Pacific Development Centre's Gender and Development Programme (Heyzer, Lycklama and Weerakoon, 1994).

5 For example, the fact-finding commission investigating the conduct of Alice Ramos, the Philippine ambassador to Singapore at the time of Flor Contemplacion's death (Saspa, 1995), and the rumoured diplomatic controversies associated with the delay in releasing the movie, "The Sarah Balabagan Story" (Ramos, 1997). In the case of the former, the suspensions initially accorded to senior diplomatic officials from the Philippine embassy in Singapore were lifted within five months of the death of Contemplacion, too soon for some critics. In the latter instance, Ramos (1997), writing for the *Philippine Press*, speculated on the possibility that the United Arab Emirates had applied diplomatic pressure to the Philippine government to prevent the release of a film potentially critical of its labour relations. The plight of other Philippine workers resident in the United Arab Emirates and accused of unlawful conduct rendered this process of negotiation fraught with ambiguities for Philippine officials, at pains to appease Philippine critics and foreign states.

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In Pursuit of Authenticity: Globalization and Nation Building in the Cayman Islands[1]

Vered Amit-Talai *Concordia University*

Abstract: Over the last decade, a number of publicly funded institutions have emerged in the Cayman Islands charged with the discovery, exploration and promotion of a Caymanian national identity and historical consciousness. They have emerged in the midst of a period of dramatic and very rapid economic transformation in which Cayman moved from a labour-exporting, small-scale maritime economy to become a major offshore financial as well as tourist centre, with increasing dependence on the inflow of foreign capital and imported skilled and professional contract labour. That dependence has produced both affluence and anxiety among many Caymanians about their ability to maintain a primary share of the opportunities arising in these new economic industries. The work of the cultural sector, while limited in popular appeal, has responded to these widespread anxieties by seeking to establish and reaffirm the status of one category of residents as rightful inheritors of Cayman and as such legitimately accorded special residential, electoral and employment entitlements. But it too has been dependent on the expertise, ideas and support of expatriate personnel and enthusiasts. In an important sense, Cayman has contracted out its nation building.

Résumé: Dans les îles Caymans, depuis les dix dernières années, un certain nombre d'institutions subventionnées publiquement ont vu le jour. Elles sont chargées de la découverte, de l'exploration et de la promotion de l'identité nationale ainsi que de la conscience historique caymanienne. Elles ont vu le jour au coeur d'une période de transformation économique rapide et dramatique dans laquelle les îles Caymans passent d'une économie maritime à petite échelle exportatrice de main-d'oeuvre à un important céntre financier et touristique hors-lieu, dépendant de plus en plus de l'influx de capitaux étranger ainsi que d'une main-d'oeuvre importée, qualifiée, professionnelle et contractuelle. Cette dépendance a apporté une certaine richesse mais aussi de l'anxiété aux Caymaniens en ce qui concerne leur capacité d'avoir un rôle important à jouer dans les occasions provenant des nouvelles industries. Le secteur culturel, bien que limité au niveau de l'intérêt populaire a essayé d'adresser le problème des anxiétés en cherchant à établir et à redonner le statut d'héritiers de Caymans à une catégorie de résidents; en cela, ils leur ont accordé de façon légitime des droits spéciaux en matière de résidence, de vote et d'emploi. Mais, il aussi a dépendu de l'expertise, des idées et de l'appui du personnel expatrié et des fervents. Dans un sens important, les îles Caymans ont sous-traité leur bâtiment de nation.

This article is dedicated to the memory of Michelle Fitzgerald, whose keen intellect, insight, wit and friendship is sorely missed by many who knew her both in the Cayman Islands and in Canada.

Introduction

In the three tiny Cayman Islands, there is no local manufacturing to speak of. A small and, until recently, declining agricultural sector provides only a fraction of required foodstuffs. Most of Cayman's consumption needs are therefore met through foreign imports. The economy relies almost entirely on the inflow of foreign capital generated by the tourist and offshore financial sectors. Nearly 40 percent of the 32 000 residents are contract foreign workers and their dependents. It would therefore be quite easy to conclude that over the last 25 years, the Cayman Islands have been wholly assimilated within the global economy. This article however concerns itself with the converse trend of nation building. In less than a decade a number of institutions have been established to preserve, promote and interpret Caymanian "heritage" and "identity." I will argue that, far from being an independent development, the growth of this cultural industry has been a direct outcome of Cayman's incorporation into the world economy. The Caymanian case provides an important illustration of the way in which the opportunities afforded by international flows of capital and investment become associated with access to particular places. How these places and its citizenry are characterized can therefore take on critical political and economic implications.

A Little Background

The Cayman Islands are situated in the Northwest Caribbean. They are one of six territories in this region which still retain their jurisdictional status as British colonies.[2] Between 1863 and 1959, the Cayman Islands

operated as a dependency of Jamaica (Yearbook 95, 1995: 433-434). However, when Jamaica moved to sever its ties with Britain first as a member of the West Indian Federation and then as an independent state, Cayman opted instead to remain a British colony. Colonial status then, and even more so now, has been viewed by many Caymanians as an important international icon of stability in a region which has experienced its fair share of political turbulence. The symbolic utility of colonial affiliation is commonly cited as a key element in foreign investor confidence and hence of Cayman's successful transformation over the last 25 years from a maritime economy to a financial and tourist centre.

Dependence on external economic markets, beyond colonial links, is however by no means new. In contrast to many other Caribbean islands, the history of Cayman was dominated not by a plantation system but by a nautical tradition. Throughout much of the islands' history, a major focus of maritime activity consisted of the exploitation and export of giant turtles. By the end of the 18th century, local turtle resources were exhausted and Caymanian ships began to venture further and further afield in pursuit of new stocks, first off the south coast of Cuba and then the Central American coast (Doran, 1953). During the 20th century, the economy of the islands became increasingly dependent on remittances from Caymanian men serving in foreign merchant marines. In 1943, of the 654 persons involved in maritime work, approximately 500 were employed on foreign-owned ships (ibid.: 335). However, the prior experience of Caymanian seamen, who continued to apprentice in local turtling fleets, appears to have served them well, contributing to their international reputation as superior seamen and the high proportion—10 percent in 1943—who achieved officer status (ibid.).

The foreign maritime experience of Caymanian men contrasted with the continued isolation and obscurity of the islands themselves. In the 1940s and 1950s, there were still few scheduled transportation links in and out of Cayman. The road system of the islands was poorly developed and there were few automobiles, making internal communication and movement very difficult and contributing to the isolation of outlying districts. Mike, who now works in the fire department, recalled spending 10 months in a Jamaican hospital when he was only nine years old and being the "brunt of jokes" from nurses when his nationality was discovered. It was an experience, he said, that stayed with him all his life. According to Mike:

> There was a time when Cayman was isolated and some people didn't even want to identify themselves as Caymanian. People would say "oh, that's the poor turtling island." Being Caymanian today is a hell of a lot different than being Caymanian 30 years ago.

Mike didn't even visit the North Side district of Grand Cayman until he was 15 years old,[3] but only two years later he went off to sea and over the course of the next three years he visited such countries as Brazil, Kuwait and South Africa.

In the 1960s, the introduction of new banking legislation and the alleviation of the mosquito problem catalyzed the development of the financial and tourist sectors. Today, nearly a million tourists visit every year and the Cayman Islands are ranked as the world's fifth-largest financial centre. Some of the Caymanians who had earlier emigrated to seek better economic opportunities elsewhere in the Caribbean and in the United States have returned. But the growth of Cayman's contemporary economy has also necessitated an increasing dependence on foreign workers. Thus, whereas once capital came to Cayman through the export of workers, today Cayman imports workers to service the inflow of foreign capital. By 1995, Mike's concerns about Cayman's relationship with the outside world had substantially shifted. He had become anxious about the degree to which Cayman was being transformed by external influences: the Americanization of the islands through television and quick access to Florida and the effects of the large tourist and expatriate influx.

The Expatriate Labour Force

The foreign labour force in Cayman is substantial. Expatriates not only fill jobs in virtually every sector of the Caymanian economy; in 1994 they comprised an estimated 40.4 percent of the total labour force.[4] The majority of these workers originates in Jamaica, Honduras, North America, Britain and Ireland. In spite of its conspicuous magnitude—the most comparable cases would be found in the Gulf States—the expatriate labour force in Cayman reflects two important general trends in contemporary international migration. The first is the marked post-World War II preference in receiving countries for temporary migrants as opposed to the settler migration which characterized the 19th and early 20th centuries (Papademetriou and Martin, 1991:x). Foreign workers are allowed into Cayman on temporary contracts usually from one to three years in duration. As emigration to Cayman has increased, interpretations of Cay-

man's immigration regulations have become increasingly restrictive. Work permits are often renewed, but sooner or later foreign workers are expected to leave the country, an expectation which is usually enforced by the Immigration Board. There is little provision made for or encouragement of permanent immigration, and even people with significant ties to Cayman have experienced substantial difficulties in attempts to regularize their residential status.

Secondly, as the international division of labour shifts with the globalization of transnational corporations and the growth of producer service industries, the migration of highly skilled and professional workers, while still proportionately small, has increased in both volume and significance (Salt, 1992; Beaverstock, 1994). In line with that trend, the expatriate labour force in Cayman is, in the majority, skilled. Skilled workers and professionals accounted for 42 and 17.4 percent respectively of all foreign work permit holders in 1994 (Yearbook 95, 1995: 510-511) and their presence has been used by the Caymanian government as a selling point in literature advertising the financial services available in Grand Cayman.

If Caymanian labour relations reflect general international trends in migration and shifts in the global division of labour, they also acutely highlight some of the attendant dilemmas. As Roger Rouse has noted, the distinction between immigration and migration is far from being as self-evident as usage of the terms would imply (1995: 375). Migrant workers who were expected to go home after a short stay have maintained an enduring presence in many receiving countries (Papademetriou and Martin, 1991:ix). Guestworker policies have given way to recruitment bans and integration policies in northwestern European countries such as Germany (Gitmez, 1991). The Arab Gulf states have reoriented the sources of their recruitment strategies from the Middle East to South and East Asia with an increasing reliance on highly regimented collective contract migration (Seccombe, 1988).

Neither of these strategies offers much of a solution for Cayman. Given the size of the indigenous population, both the maintenance and future growth of the Caymanian economy, relying as it does on producer and tourist services, will continue to be dependent on the labour and skills of foreign workers. By the same token, collective contract migration may be effective for finite construction projects, but it is not equally suitable for long-term service positions. Anxieties about Cayman's reliance on an expatriate labour force have tended therefore to centre on the relative growth of the tourist versus the financial sector.

Development and Status

Tourist development, some Caymanians argue, places heavy demands on the islands' infrastructure, damages the environment and is labour intensive. The personnel demands in this sector tend to favour semi-skilled and unskilled labour and offer job conditions that have not been especially attractive to Caymanians. In contrast, the financial sector entails fewer infrastructural and environmental stresses, is less labour intensive and offers more possibilities for training and professional advancement. According to this line of reasoning, a focus on the growth of the financial sector has a better chance of slowing down the expansion of the expatriate labour force and of producing a highly skilled and well educated Caymanian work force that can assume a greater proportion of managerial and professional positions.

There are, however, a number of problems with this prescription for future development. First, as even members of the islands' burgeoning environmental movement readily acknowledge, the nature of the Cayman Islands' taxation system ensures government dependence on a growing hospitality industry. There are no direct personal, business or sales taxes in Cayman, a crucial component in its role as a tax haven. Government revenues are therefore reliant on the only two forms of taxes that are levied: an import as well as a tourist tax on both visitor entries and hotel/condominium daily rentals. The ability of the government to continue to maintain a large civil service at the annual wage increases to which they have become accustomed, to mount capital works programs critical to infrastructural development, to further develop public services is therefore dependent on the continued growth of the tourist industry which provides most of its revenue. If the government changes the taxation base in order to reduce this dependence, it risks undermining the financial sector which has heavily relied on Cayman's tax free status for attracting foreign investment.

Secondly, residents with Caymanian status are still far short of being able to supply the full range of people and skills required for the financial industry at its present size. Additional expansion of this sector is likely to augment even further the number of expatriate professionals and managers in Cayman, a category that along with foreign entrepreneurs seems most likely to raise the spectre of Caymanians becoming economically "second class" in their own country. According to a local magazine article which was dramatically entitled "Caymanians: Cayman's Second-Class Citizens":

> In the course of a range of articles on "the development question" in Cayman for this issue of *Newstar*, a significant number of Caymanians have expressed the sentiment that one of the consequences of the rising foreign presence, needed for the economy, is that Caymanians are "second rate" in their own country. (*Newstar*, January 1995: 21)

But that very same sense of vulnerability and encroachment has ensured little support for a policy of expatriate integration because it threatens the one major asset which native Caymanians command in an economy driven by foreign capital and labour: their privileged access to residential and work entitlements.

Over the last 25 years, a foreign economy has been artificially parachuted into Cayman. Apart from the appeal of its coral reefs and central beach, Cayman's integration into the global circulation of capital had little to do with its indigenous human and natural resources. What Cayman offered most was an accommodating regulatory environment and a reputation for political stability via colonization. The standard of living, levels of education and incomes of most Caymanians have risen dramatically with the growth of the tourist and offshore financial sectors. But the income thereby generated has not been used, as in the Gulf states, to diversify the economy. The foreign workers that were imported were not used to construct an infrastructure that could make Cayman more self sufficient in the future. Instead, for the most part, they have been used to sustain a service economy. In a sense therefore, Cayman and many Caymanians were and still remain extraneous to their own national economy.

What political and economic leverage Caymanians do exercise, largely accrues to them as holders of particular legal statuses. As in the British Virgin Islands (Maurer, 1996), there are a number of different statuses available to residents in Cayman which establish entitlements respectively to work, conduct business, to vote or stand for public office. The most crucial of these is Caymanian *Status*,[5] a standing created by local legislation which confers the largest and most sought-after package of entitlements, particularly for permanent residence and work. According to Caymanian immigration law, qualified holders of Caymanian status must be given preference in employment. Employers wishing to hire foreign workers must first show that they have made reasonable efforts to hire Status holders. They are required to advertise in the local papers. If they do hire foreign workers, they are expected to establish training programs for Caymanians.

Status is not, however, citizenship per se. Given colonial association, the latter is still conferred by Britain in the form of the general category of British Dependent Territories Citizenship as well as a specific category of citizenship for each territory in turn (ibid.: 158). Not all holders of Caymanian status are likewise British Dependent Territories Citizens, but, under the terms of a 1987 Constitutional Amendment, both criteria became prerequisites for eligibility to vote, along with long-term residence and/or descent.

The skills and numbers of foreign workers are crucial to the Caymanian economy, but as individuals they come and go. The expatriate work force may be on the whole more highly skilled and better educated than their Caymanian counterparts, but by law the latter take precedence in employment. Cayman is utterly dependent on foreign capital, but only residents with long-standing ties to Cayman are enfranchised to vote and run for office. Over the years and with successive constitutional amendments, the Cayman Islands have achieved considerable autonomy from Britain. Nonetheless, the British Governor and Parliament retain final authority over this territory, at the insistence of the local legislature. In short, Caymanians derive an important measure of power and advantage from carefully husbanded legal statuses but these are precariously positioned within a system of political and economic dependence on external interests. It is therefore not difficult to understand why attitudes towards foreign expatriates so often combine a sense of threat with necessity or why status holders are not eager to share their circumscribed privileges with relative newcomers. And it is this volatile mixture of vulnerability and legal privilege that provides the context for the development, over the last decade, of a set of national institutions mandated to interpret and promote Caymanian identity and history.

Trust to Archives

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a handful of residents began to respond to what Margaret, an early activist, described as the "influx of new immigrants into the island. Caymanians were feeling a bit threatened, being overrun by outside influences from North America. We needed to hold on to or try to establish what is Caymanian." One of the earliest ventures was the effort to establish a new theatre group, undertaken by a quartet of local residents including Margaret, then a high school teacher, as well as a painter, playwright and a theatre director. Mark, another founder, had been studying in England and then the United States before returning to Grand Cayman in 1977. Shortly after his return, he met up with the others who were then trying to set up a

small, avant-garde, Brechtian theatre. "We decided," explained Mark, "that we had to do more down to earth theatre." The quartet of friends founded the Inn Theatre which later became the National Theatre Company.

> [Margaret] and I persuaded the manager [of the Royal Palms nightclub] to give us his nightclub for three nights a week to run this play.... It was a whole group of people who started a 'Renaissance.' There had been a drama group, but they weren't dedicated to bringing in Caymanians which was what we wanted to do.

These first relatively casual arrangements gave way in 1984 to a more formal infrastructure with the establishment of the *Harquail Theatre* and the *National Cultural Foundation.* While the foundation has concentrated on theatre productions, it has also offered art workshops, occasional lectures, exhibitions, as well as a recent publication on the work of Miss Lassie, a local artist. The relative cultural orientation of this work has, however, occasioned some disagreement among past and present supporters of the foundation along lines that incorporate the expatriate/native Caymanian distinction in an ironic reversal. According to David, a Guyanese expatriate who, in 1993, had been working with the Cultural Foundation for a number of years:

> Cayman hasn't made a decision about where it wants to go. Are you Caribbean?...A lot of Caymanians would prefer not to be associated with the Caribbean and then there are quite a few people who would. The reason they don't want to be associated with the Caribbean—and it is a fallacy—is that for them, the Caribbean is synonymous with poverty.... What do you pass onto young people? Do you also bring in Caribbean influences? We are trying to show people that you don't always have to go far to find excellence, that you can find it in the region.

Joanne, an American expatriate businesswomen living in Cayman, had helped organize a major exhibition of Caribbean art held at the Harquail Theatre. In her speech at a launch of an adjunct exhibit at the museum, she noted that the Carib art exhibit reminded people that, "we are part of a very special region and that region is not Miami, it's not Britain, it's the Caribbean." In contrast, Mark worried that the influence of several key figures in the Cultural Foundation had resulted in an overly marked and potentially distorting Eastern Caribbean influence.

> This island is not shaped by Eastern Caribbean thinking. It is shaped by the Northwest Caribbean. Its roots are in the Northwest Caribbean. It's wrong [the emphasis on Eastern Caribbean] and we don't need it. Our roots are in Cuba, Honduras and the Southern United States and Jamaica to a certain extent.

Mark's concerns were echoed in a 1995 address to the Caymanian Legislative Assembly by the Education Minister. The minister criticized the Harquail Theatre for putting on too many "Eastern Caribbean plays" and for featuring too prominently the patois of other countries in these plays. In his view, this was not Caymanian culture. If the object was exposure to other cultural influences, then there should be exposure to North American and European plays also. He had seen the Carib art exhibit and found it very interesting, but thought that the Caribbean angle had been overdone.

The position, both self- and other-appointed, of expatriates, often themselves North American or European, as defenders of Cayman's identity and natural resources from rapacious overdevelopment and Americanization is also echoed in the establishment of the *National Trust* which closely followed on the establishment of the Cultural Foundation. Throughout the short history of the Trust, expatriates have figured prominently as founders, staff and members. The Trust, a conservationist movement, was originally expected—as was the National Cultural Foundation—to serve as an umbrella organization for a wide variety of environmental and heritage pursuits.

Among these was the *Memory Bank* (otherwise known as the *Oral History Bank*), a project which, inspired by its earlier Jamaican counterpart, was initiated in 1984 by Margaret, then newly appointed as Museum Officer. The Memory Bank was supposed to record the recollections of elderly Caymanians, and was expected originally to rely on the efforts of volunteers in each of the National Trust district chapters. But the volunteer corps proved less than systematic and many potential respondents died before they could be interviewed. This emphasis on Caymanian elders as mnemonic repositories of authentic "Caymanianness" extended well beyond the work of the Memory Bank, and was frequently echoed throughout my research. I was repeatedly advised by Caymanians as well as expatriates that I should concentrate on interviewing the former to get a truly "authentic" view of Cayman and it was often assumed that, like the Memory Bank, I would focus my attentions on elders who could give me a description of the "true" Caymanian culture which had preceded the transformations of the last 25 years. In contrast, however, to the respondents sought by the Memory Bank, the full-time interviewer who was eventually hired by this project was not a native

Caymanian but a resident with acquired Status, who was born and raised in Canada.

The "Bank" shifted its affiliation from the National Trust to the *National Archives* which opened its doors to the public in 1992, but was formally established in 1991 along with the *Museum* and Public Library. While original plans called for a purpose-built building, the Museum has instead been housed in Georgetown's renovated Old Courts Building, and opened to the public in November of 1990. The Museum's official promotional literature identifies its mandate as the "preservation, research and dissemination of all aspects of the Caymanian heritage for present and future generations." In practice, this mandate is interpreted in two small permanent exhibitions, one on the "natural history" of Cayman which focusses on the islands' undersea habitats and formations, while the other focusses on "how Caymanians survived in the early days with little outside world contact," specifically turtling, rope making and shipbuilding.

Meanwhile, the National Trust pared down the original broad expectations of its supporters towards a dual focus on preserving and protecting natural and architectural sites of important environmental and historic importance. The Archives' mandate, on the other hand, is to manage the organization and storage of government records, as well as to identify, and where possible also acquire and preserve archival material relevant to the Cayman Islands from around the world.

There are two important trends to note about this institutional proliferation. First, while the progressive formalization of these organizations has involved their separation and even occasional jurisdictional tensions, their development was from the start closely intertwined, and this remains the case. Thus the founders of the Oral History Bank included a small group of high school teachers who were in turn also involved in the Theatre Group, the National Trust, the National Archives and the Museum. The former high school teachers are each now working as senior managers for one of these institutions. Helen Harquail,[6] who donated the land and the building for her namesake, the Harquail Theatre, is also a founding member of the National Trust. What was a relatively small network of people interested in the development of this sector has certainly grown. The National Trust currently has around 1 000 adult and 700 juvenile members (Yearbook 95, 1995: 460-461). But the core of active members, supporters and staff of these institutions still remains small and their relationships and activities often crosscut. As I noted above, the Carib art exhibition mounted at the Harquail Theatre included an adjunct exhibit at the Museum. Museum staff provided logistical and practical support to the Cultural Foundation in setting up and dismantling the exhibit. The Museum mounted its own exposition of the historic "Ten Sail" wreck, dominated by archival materials which were later ceremoniously deposited in the National Archives. Representatives from the National Archives, the Museum and the National Trust all serve on the Government Historic Sites Committee which is overseeing the restoration of St. James Castle at Pedro.

Secondly, the development of these organizations shifted very rapidly from volunteer, ad hoc arrangements to formal, government sponsored and regulated institutions. All of these institutions have been officially established through the passage of special government legislation, specifically the Cayman National Cultural Foundation Law of 1984 which set up the Foundation which runs the Harquail Theatre; the 1987 legislation establishing the National Trust; and the Institute of Caymanian Heritage Law which was passed in 1991 and called for the formation of a National Archive, a National Museum and a National Library. The staff of these latter three institutions are in fact civil servants and are directly employed and paid by the government. The National Trust and National Cultural Foundation are more autonomous, but are nonetheless financially dependent on government grants. This level of government intervention and sponsorship is noteworthy in a country which still has no public-transportation system, government-funded national health or social security system.

Icons of Authenticity

These are not, therefore, populist organizations. Given their artistic, literary and ecological foci, it is not surprising that they have tended to appeal to a professional, middle-class elite and they have all experienced some difficulty in enlisting more general participation in their activities. Mike complained about the sparse attendance at a series of information/consultation meetings sponsored by the National Trust to discuss a proposed revision to the government development plan. While he, himself, is a long-standing National Trust supporter, he has found it hard to interest even his wife and children in these issues. "People are just concerned with paying the bills." The Museum and Cultural Foundation would like to increase local participation in their respective activities. Nonetheless, these public institutions do represent an attempt to respond to and manage more popular concerns.

If, as Mike and a number of other conservation enthusiasts claimed, it is often difficult to activate appre-

hension about the pace and physical/social impact of development, anxieties about the presence of expatriates are common and far from being the preserve of a professional elite. And that anxiety has generated a broader search for an iconic and ideological repertoire which can express and underscore the claims for continuing primacy of one class of residents. As Margaret explained: "We're the first settlers. With this whole Caymanian versus Paper Caymanian thing,[7] people are proud to trace their roots." By the same token, the cultural sector is enjoined to trace collective "roots." The mandates conferred on the cultural industry by government legislative decree are replete with references to Heritage and preservation: calls to "preserve" and develop Caymanian culture; "arouse public interest in Caymanian Heritage ... increase knowledge and appreciation of, and respect for Caymanian Heritage," preserve the architectural and natural heritage of Cayman, preserve historical documents and so on (Yearbook 95 1995: 454-458). The novelty of this passion for heritage and preservation is well exemplified by the severe paucity of history textbooks for most of Cayman's period of settlement as compared to the flurry of historical chronicles emanating from the cultural sector over the last few years.[8]

In both written and oral accounts, this construction of Caymanian "heritage" features certain common themes. First, there are the chronicles of relative poverty and hardship. Children, it is recounted, had numerous chores and often had long walks to reach their one-room schoolhouses. Most families had few possessions. Traditional wattle and daub houses were small and furnishings basic. And making a livelihood through the sea was difficult and dangerous. "Turtling was a hard life, my boy, as we had to brave all sorts of weather and discomforts. Many good men were lost in hurricanes" (Cayman Islands Education Department, 1989: 138).

A corollary theme emphasizes the independence, dedication and resilience inspired by this way of life. *The Cayman Islands Who's Who and Business Guide* (1992) describes a Caymanian "tradition of hardiness and independence." The primary social studies text produced by the Education Department lauds the dedication and devotion of previous generations of men and women who worked under difficult conditions "to build the nation" (1989: 168-169). According to a *Human History of Long Ago Cayman* offered by S. O. Bertie Ebanks, and published by the Cayman National Bank and Trust Company in 1983, "The salt of the sea flowing through their [Caymanians] veins made them the tough and hardy men they became in later years, and today they are reckoned among the bravest and most skillful of sailors, taking to the sea and everything nautical as ducks to a pond" (20). Philip, a native Caymanian who worked for the Ministry overseeing the cultural sector, emphasized the autonomy and suspicion of authority engendered by this earlier way of life:

> People here have historically seen themselves as independent. It may have to do with the whole emergence from slave society or the physical isolation of the islands' enforced self-sufficiency. They try to avoid the direction of external parties. One tries to run one's own life. One is not subject to the direction of others. This has probably influenced people's view of life, death and religious beliefs.

While the foreign maritime adventures of earlier generations of Caymanian men are accorded central significance in this narrative of a hardy, seafaring people, the arrival and contributions of thousands of migrants over the last 25 years are almost always excluded. The Memory Bank includes interviews with Caymanian emigrants who have settled elsewhere but come back to the islands for regular visits, or with Caymanians who have spent their working lives elsewhere but returned to Cayman when they retired. In 1993, the Memory Bank interviewer was hoping eventually to visit Honduras, Nicaragua and Cuba to interview Caymanian emigrants living there. More locally, she was also planning to interview younger Caymanians about their recollections of more recent events. But these plans do not appear to include interviews with expatriates living in Cayman. The Museum, in spite of its focus on the recent history of the islands, provides no indication of the presence of expatriate workers or their impact on the development of Cayman. In spite of the recent flurry of efforts to chronicle Cayman's past, I could not find any history texts focusing on the experiences and contributions of expatriate workers. The representations produced by the cultural heritage programs, for the most part, disregard the contemporary Cayman with its foreign banks, cable television and video imports, supermarkets, chain restaurants and hotels, tourists and foreign workers. The claims to authenticity of the national identity being constructed, so laboriously and self-consciously, by these institutions derive from largely abandoned lifestyles that predate the economic development of the last 25 years. These practices are likely to be as unfamiliar to most Caymanians under the age of 35 as they are to recent migrants to the islands, but cultural ownership is still credited to the former by virtue of descent and explicitly denied the latter. According to Margaret:

> Some people think that once people get Status, they should be considered just as Caymanians. Some people that have Status, they feel that they've been here 15 or 20 years and that they're more Caymanian or know more about Cayman than that young Caymanian that's only known the Cayman of 10 or 15 years. Say they came here when they were 30 and the young person who was born in a Caymanian family has always been here. Who is more Caymanian?

For Margaret, in such a comparison, it is the young Caymanian who should still be judged as more authentically Caymanian, because s/he has not been previously shaped by the experiences of a childhood and adulthood elsewhere. S/he knows nothing but Cayman. This reasoning, however, disregards the contradiction between the denigration of expatriates' previous experiences outside Cayman and the celebration of Caymanian seafaring and voyaging in the construction of national identity to which Margaret has contributed. But her point is clear. She is building a cultural corpus for one category of contemporary residents of the Cayman Islands, not for everyone. This is a heritage and identity being claimed only for people who either themselves lived in Cayman long before its recent transformations or whose ancestors did. Others can learn from it and even be encouraged to do so, but they cannot derive their national identity from this knowledge.

Nation Building and Globalization

Most of what has been so far described resonates with well-known practices of nation building: the search for distinctiveness, the arbitrariness of the cultural symbols chosen, the social boundaries thereby being defined and the effort to legitimate particular hierarchies of power.

> From recent studies of nationalism, finally, we have learnt that the relationship between cultural practices and reified culture is not a simple one, and that ideologists always select and reinterpret aspects of culture and history which fit into the legitimation of a particular power constellation. (Eriksen, 1993: 118)

So what is the power constellation that is being legitimated here? The objective is not greater political autonomy for Cayman. Indeed some of the most passionate Caymanian nationalists and critics of unfettered development are also critical of Britain for not intervening more actively in local affairs.

> The British administration should be perceiving that they are going to get into an internationally embarrassing position. They will perceive that they should take over this country and start to take responsibility for this country. They haven't allowed us the benefit of their superior knowledge and skill. If the British administration remains one of sleeping colonialism or sleeping imperialism then people will eventually want to know who is really managing their affairs. British crown colony will become more unpopular.

Neither is the objective greater economic autonomy. None of the cultural workers I spoke to argued that it would be possible for the country to loosen its dependence on foreign capital or even significantly overcome its reliance on an expatriate labour force. Rather the boundaries and powers being defined refer to the internal composition of Cayman's resident population. The aim, it would seem, is to provide a cultural and ideological underpinning for Caymanian citizenship vis-à-vis the nearly 40 percent of the residential population who do not share this package of statuses. Hence comes the insistence that what is authentically Caymanian predates the economy and lifestyles in which both status holders and expatriates participate.

Caymanian nation building is not a rejection of globalization. On the contrary, it is an attempt to ensure a particular population's preferential access to local instances of a global economy on which they utterly depend but in which they are very minor players. As George, a local Caymanian businessman explained: "Caymanians realize that Cayman is just a speck. Because of the Maritime tradition, Caymanians realize that Cayman is part of the world." The "tradition" being constructed thus combines a distinctiveness defined in opposition to newcomers with an equal emphasis on the continuity of Caymanian openness to foreign influences. It becomes easier, therefore, to understand why a government, notoriously reluctant to curb the pace of development and foreign investment, or to provide publicly funded social programs, would have so quickly moved to appropriate a role as the sponsor and regulator of the cultural sector. This is, after all, a government elected through a system that enfranchises only one segment of adult residents. The cultural sector's definition of that segment and their offspring as the only "true" Caymanians legitimates the government and entrenches the political class from which it is drawn. It provides an ideological and historical rationale for another area in which government regulation has been very visible: immigration and labour policy, while "explaining" Cayman's dependence on foreign invest-

ment as one chapter in an ongoing national embrace of internationalism.

Ironies in the Manufacture of Authenticity

The symbiosis between the cultural sector and the progress of economic development is well illustrated by the importance of tourism in both. The National Trust's largest project is the development of the Botanic Park as a tourist site. Indeed, the project won an ecotourism award in 1993 (Yearbook 95, 1995: 459). Most visitors to the Museum, located just beside the main Georgetown cruise-ship landing site, are tourists. Perhaps the most ambitious historical restoration project is that of St. James Castle in Pedro (usually referred to as Pedro Castle). In spite of its name, this is not a castle but it is one of Grand Cayman's earliest and largest buildings. One of its major claims to historical significance is the fact that it served as the meeting place for the first Legislative Assembly of Cayman. The development of this site is being sponsored by the Caymanian government, overseen by a committee with representatives from the cultural institutions and is meant to eventually serve as a major tourist site, complete with a sound and light show. In short, much of the clientele of the cultural sector's effort to preserve and promote Caymanian identity and heritage consists in fact of foreign visitors.

Furthermore, most of the staff that work in Cayman's institutions are foreigners. The restoration of Pedro Castle is being carried out by a Canadian firm. The majority of the professionals who work in the Museum, National Trust, National Archives and Cultural Foundation are expatriates working on short-term contracts. A few more are what Margaret referred to as "paper Caymanians," i.e., former expatriates who have been granted Status rather than acquiring it automatically through birth and descent. Obviously, this substantial expatriate presence reflects the rapid expansion of the cultural sector and its consequent needs for very particular qualifications and expertise. There are some training schemes for Caymanians in place, although at least one staff person expressed some consternation at the reluctance of the government to fully fund these programs. But the involvement of expatriates is also striking among supporters and volunteers of the cultural institutions.

When the National Trust holds its district meetings, the presence of expatriates in the audience is strikingly evident. The National Trust was indeed founded largely as the initiative of a visiting American. Expatriates have featured prominently as sponsors and facilitators for the Harquail Theatre. The Carib art exhibition was mounted principally through the efforts of foreign residents, both as volunteers and staff. Expatriates are active on the boards of most of these institutions.

Occasionally this support simply reflects pragmatic self-interest. For example, some investors and managers in the tourism, and especially the watersports industries, worry that environmental degradation could adversely affect the long-term health of their industry by making Cayman less attractive to visitors. They, therefore, supported the National Trust in its concerns over proposed amendments to the government development plan in 1995. There is also no doubt that many North American and European expatriates have been influenced by the widespread interest commanded by the environmental and conservation movements in their countries of origin. Some of the foreign residents involved in this sector have long-standing interests in the Arts for which there are few outlets in Cayman, save the activities sponsored by the cultural institutions. As noted earlier, other expatriates, initially attracted by what they viewed as Cayman's exotic or Caribbean character, have been dismayed by its visible Americanization and have therefore supported efforts to invigorate a sense of local distinctiveness. But there are also many foreign workers who, given their appointments and occupations, have a vested professional interest in the development of a cultural sector dedicated to the discovery and protection of a Caymanian heritage and environmental resources.

Whatever the personal motivations of foreign residents involved in these institutions, it is doubtful that the cultural sector could have evolved as rapidly or as extensively without the presence of the expatriate and tourist populations. Their numbers have significantly contributed to the development of a critical population mass, large enough to support this number and range of institutions. They have contributed models and expectations drawn from similar kinds of institutions and movements in their countries of origin which have helped shape the blueprints for Caymanian counterparts. In short, as activists, staff and consumers, non-Caymanians have provided crucial impetuses for the emerging cultural industry.

By the same token, the infrastructure for this industry would not have been possible without the influx of foreign capital, generated by the transformation of Cayman from a small-scale maritime economy to an international financial and tourist centre. It is this economic growth that has made possible the government, and to a lesser degree corporate financing, necessary to provide office spaces, equipment, salaries for professional and support staff and educational and training programs both within Cayman and in universities abroad.

Conclusion

There is a tendency to contrast nation building and globalization as two contradictory trends in the late 20th century. The former orientation, it is assumed, wanes as the latter waxes (Hannerz, 1996). The Caymanian case suggests the possibility of a rather different relationship between these trends.

Over the last decade, a number of publicly funded institutions have emerged in the Cayman Islands charged with the discovery, exploration and promotion of a Caymanian national identity and historical consciousness. They have emerged at a time in which increasing dependence on foreign capital and imported labour has generated both affluence and anxiety among many Caymanians about their ability to maintain a primary share of the opportunities arising in offshore finance and tourism, the linchpins of the contemporary Caymanian economy. The work of the cultural sector, while limited in popular appeal, has responded to these widespread anxieties by seeking to establish and reaffirm the status of one category of residents as rightful inheritors of Cayman and as such legitimately accorded special residential, electoral and employment entitlements.

The evolution of the cultural sector thus interlaces with a local competition for the benefits of globalization being waged through a selective definition of the relationship between place and population. The capital fueling the Caymanian economy may originate and financial control may continue to reside outside the country, but access to the opportunities this capital is generating is being defined in terms of access to Cayman, with work permits and temporary residence for some and Status/citizenship with permanent residence and preferential employment for others. But the emerging cultural institutions are not only a *response* to globalization through the affirmation of national distinctions. They are also, inescapably, the *product* of that globalization. Their development has borrowed heavily from the examples of similar institutions elsewhere, and the influence of the training and education of Caymanian managers in other countries. Their proliferation and expansion has relied on public funds generated by the growth of the financial and tourist sectors which serve an international clientele. Expatriates and tourists have been a conspicuous and vital segment of the audience and volunteer supporters for these institutions. And finally, the elaboration and growing professionalization of these organizations have been dependent on the expertise of expatriate personnel.

The irony of the incorporation of Cayman into global capital and labour markets is that it has generated anxiety about which category of residents will benefit but enough wealth to "contract out" the enterprise of nation building.

Notes

1 This study was made possible by a grant from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. Field work was conducted between 1993-96. For confidentiality purposes, aliases have been used in place of the real names of the individuals interviewed for this study.

2 Apart from the Cayman Islands, these include the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Montserrat, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Anguilla.

3 Grand Cayman is only 22 miles long and is only 7 miles wide at its widest point.

4 This ratio is drawn from a Labour Force Survey conducted by the Government Economics and Statistics Office.

5 Caymanians usually reserve the term "Status-holder" only for immigrants who have applied for and were granted Status by the Immigration Board. People who were born in Cayman, of Caymanian parents are generally referred to simply as Caymanians. The Immigration Law and Policy Directives or the Caymanian Protection Law, as it was known before 1992, does not, however, employ this terminological distinction.

6 I have not employed an alias for this person since her bequest and relationship to the National Trust are public knowledge, nor was she one of my "informants."

7 Paper Caymanian is a term sometimes used to refer to former expatriates who have been granted Status.

8 The Cayman Islands Archive and Oral History Bank published four books in a period of only three years. These include two publications which made use of the Oral History Bank interviews: Heather R. McLaughlin, *Cayman Yesterdays: An Album of Childhood Memories*, Georgetown: Cayman Islands National Archive, 1991; Heather R. McLaughlin, *The '32 Storm*, Cayman Islands National Archive, 1994. An additional two publications made use of archival material and these include: *Our Islands' Past*, Vol. 1: *1802 Census-Corbett's Report*, a joint publication of the Cayman Islands National Archive and Cayman Free Press, 1992; *Our Islands' Past*, Vol. 2: *Wreck of the Ten Sail*, a joint publication of the Cayman Islands National Archive and Cayman Free Press, 1994.

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Law's Fictions, State-Society Relations and the Anthropological Imagination—Pathways Out of Africa: Introduction

Eric Worby *Yale University*
Blair Rutherford *University of Regina*

The long 20th century has embraced both the epoch of high colonial domination as well as its aftermath—the generalization of the nation-state model and its multiplication around an increasingly interconnected globe (Anderson, 1991 [1983]). The transition from colonial subjugation to independence in Africa, Asia and the Pacific has been strung out over a period of nearly five decades following World War II. But no matter the timing, for the colonized peoples of the world crossing the political frontier into independence has been marked by a formal shift in jural status from "colonial subject" to "national citizen" (Mamdani, 1996). What difference, if any, has this made in the way in which people experience and attribute significance to the power of the state? What kinds of identities and what arenas of action has "the law"—in both its colonial and postcolonial manifestations—made it possible for subjects and citizens to imagine? How, from our unique vantage point at colonialism's end, might we rethink the figure of "the law" in the encounter between society and polity?

In the spring of 1995, we convened a group of junior Canadian anthropologists to address some of these questions.[1] The results of our individual presentations and common discussions are, with some amendments, presented here.[2] In different ways, each contribution explores how the social identities that the law creates, invokes and animates are reinterpreted in practices of everyday life and in situations of social conflict.

Our cases are drawn from Eastern and Southern Africa. They thus extend, albeit in a critical vein, the classical focus on matters of "law and order"—and perhaps on "rebellion" as well—that once constituted the special, if controversial, contribution to the discipline as a whole made by anthropologists working out of British colonial Africa.[3] Yet the concerns our articles express, as much as the way in which we address them, might serve as a gauge for something more general—as a barometer, perhaps, of our own anthropological age set's sensibilities and preoccupations. Specifically, we hold in common

a desire to discover meaningful ways for anthropology to contribute to the comparative and historically grounded study of law and violence, and to the understanding of the increasingly volatile relations between state and civil society that have come to characterize the postcolonial world.

From "Invention" to "Imagination": Identity under the Law

On reflection, it seems apparent that a broad set of assumptions underlies our efforts; indeed these assumptions might seem so self-evident to anthropologists working in Africa, or anywhere else in the 1990s as to be almost unworthy of explicit articulation. All of us, for example, were trained to treat as deeply suspect the colonial generation's cultural "facts." Our collective inclination was to see "traditions" as imported or home-grown inventions (Ranger, 1983), "ethnic" or "tribal" identities as historically recent fabrications (Vail, 1989) and "customary law" as a useful fiction that provides the occasion, the instrumentation or merely the legally sanctioned space for the exercise of a limited and unequally distributed local power (Chanock, 1985, 1991; Mamdani, 1996; Moore, 1986).

These sentiments can be traced back at least to the early 1980s, to a time when Foucault began to supplement, if not entirely displace, Marx as the dominant theoretical muse whispering in many a young, left-leaning, North American ethnologist's ear. From Foucault we learned to ask how identity categories—the familiar trio of ethnicity, race and gender, for example—were produced as part of the apparatus of modern disciplinary power brought to bear on colonial subjects. And yet the deeply ingrained scepticism toward "customary" practices and identities that this view implied was tempered by two qualifications: first, a concern with how people might experience these same identities and customs as existential, if sometimes contestable, facts, and hence as the basis for political action in the domestic, local and national spheres; and secondly, a concern to explore how colonial and postcolonial subjects continuously carve out a self-sovereign, undisciplined, or otherly disciplined, moral space for themselves, whether it be by means of, or in spite of, the legal machinery of the modern state.

Much of the discussion centres on the legacy of "customary law." The establishment of a separate domain of "customary law," in which appointed chiefs combined administrative and judicial functions under the watchful eye of the local colonial administrator, was the pre-eminent technique for native governance under colonial rule in Africa. The question of what it allowed in terms of freedom of manoeuvre for those subjected to it remains sharply debated. Mamdani (1996) is perhaps least sanguine, suggesting that the racialized colonial division between an urban, European "civil" legal regime and a rural, tribalized "customary" legal sphere was the vehicle for implementing what he calls "decentralized despotism," an enduring model that has plagued the democratization project across the continent long after independence. Moore (1986) and Ranger (1993), on the other hand, take the view that the sphere of customary law in some instances permitted and protected a realm of relative freedom in which novel identity categories could be imagined, contested and made operational.[4]

In a magisterial review of the literature on "invented traditions" in Africa, a literature that was largely spawned by his own work (see Ranger, 1983), Terence Ranger has charted the course that we have broadly followed here:

> It is clear, then, that as with ethnicity so with customary law we need to trace a constant process of imagining and re-imagining, and the ways in which Africans exploited "inventions" useful to the colonial rulers so as to preserve areas of autonomy in which unexpected and disconcerting changes might take place. (Ranger, 1993: 105)

The word "exploited" here may well imply a level of intentionality and freedom beyond what we, or indeed Ranger himself, would fully support. Yet the thrust of his argument encourages us to move away from an emphasis on the self-conscious, manipulative inventions of rulers, and to focus instead on how communities creatively imagine a moral space, one that is enabled, but not wholly determined, by the kinds of ethnic ascriptions and inscribed cultural practices to which colonial "customary law" gave such enduring weight.[5]

Complicating "Civil Society"

Between the discursive practices, jural identities and institutional arrangements which form "the state" (Mitchell, 1991) and the varied uses and reinterpretations of these fictions of law by citizens and subjects (Mamdani, 1996), there is, then, a gap that our works seek to explicate. One might imagine that the resurgent concept of "civil society," now fashionable in academic and development literature, would capture the location of this contested terrain. Yet Africa offers its own challenges to this notion for reasons that we now explore.

With the meltdown of the Cold War, the (forced) adoption of structural adjustment policies throughout the

Third World, the dismantling of the welfare state, the increasing number of social movements struggling for "democracy" over the past decade, the restoration or establishment of civil society has (re-)emerged in research agendas, policy-making circles and activists' demands, sometimes as a midwife to economic growth (Cohen and Arato, 1992; Hadenius and Uggla, 1996; Macdonald, 1994; World Bank, 1995). This trend is reflected in both the shape of recent studies and in development policies directed towards Africa (e.g., Harbeson, 1994; Robinson, 1995; Whaites, 1996); other analyses of the space between state and society on the continent, however, have challenged both the focus and assumptions embedded in this literature: its unanalyzed grounding in the teleology of modernization; its overprivileging of a select few organizational forms (non-governmental organizations, trade unions, churches, political parties), and the sharp contrast or opposition it posits between "civil society" and "the state" (Hutchful, 1995; Lemarchand, 1992; Monga 1995; Simone and Pieterse, 1993). Indeed, one can challenge the heuristic, policy and political utility of "civil society," as it is normatively understood, on strictly empirical grounds. From Senegal to South Africa, Niger to Namibia, the neat division between state and society, the legal and the illegal and the morally legitimate and the morally outrageous, certainly blurs from the point of view of ordinary citizens, when

> [s]treet gangs become block associations, clans become crime families and then turn into legitimate business syndicates, fashion movements become healing practices, religions become devil worship, devil worship becomes entertainment, and history, ethnicity and identity are continually being invented. The problem is differentiating the philosophers from the fools, the witches from the Jehovah's Witnesses, the police from the thieves. Everyone learns and takes something from each other, borrows an expression or look. (Hecht and Simone, 1994: 19-20)

In the articles that follow, we extend this critical trend emerging out of Africa. Our authors eschew the explanation of the hybrid forms and processes that have emerged from state-society relations through a static, formulaic narrative about the iterative interaction between "tradition" and "modernity." Rather, they investigate how administrative structures, national identities and legal property divisions establish rules, interests and power relations that are always in tension with, and reconfigured by, the projects of citizens and subjects—projects that are always partially fuelled agendas of their own making.

In the suggestive ethnographic story from Gokwe in northwestern Zimbabwe offered by Eric Worby, a set of male collaterals created a corporate structure shortly after Independence in 1980, one loosely based on the constitutional form of farmer groups set up by the colonial agricultural extension service. Their intention was to use this organ of "invented tradition" as a vehicle for asserting male moral authority in the public sphere of their peasant community. Although the official judiciary in the rearranged postcolonial legal system ultimately asserted its superiority over this novel and, from the state's perspective, illegitimate representative of civil society, Worby's argument persuasively cautions against assuming the Zimbabwean state will be able to wash away all alternative sources of power and moral authority.

In her article, Teresa Holmes also pays attention to the submerged dialogues on the margins of state-society interactions (Tsing, 1993). In her analysis of disputes over land ownership in western Kenya in the 1930s, Holmes goes beyond the "invention of tradition" literature and its set of questions which focus, narrowly, on how the colonized manipulate, negotiate or appropriate the collective identities manufactured for them by the colonial state. She argues that assertions of ownership by a Luo clan association crosscut the model of agency and legitimacy imposed by the British on African identities. In provocative detail, Holmes builds a case, so to speak, that the community identity forwarded by the Luo clan association was situated in a cultural register quite different from the image of patrilineal clans making claims about original occupancy.

But how can one question, and perhaps destabilize, the resonance of state-authorized identities and practices in Rwanda, where the outgoing regime sponsored a genocide in 1994 that left over a half million dead, ostensibly, according to international media reports, because of their ethnicity? As Villia Jefremovas contends in her richly illuminating article, it is by taking history seriously. Jefremovas shows how careful historical research can explain how state fictions of ethnicity in the Great Lakes region, notably the division between Tutsi and Hutu, have rested on competing and shifting sources of authority and legitimacy over the last several centuries, including, in this century, the resource of "history" itself. Although these ethnic identities have structured administrative, political and economic relations in Rwanda during this century, they did not necessarily provide the main motivational ground for the genocide. In a chilling account, Jefremovas discusses how the violence and the killings were strongly shaped by political rivalry, socio-

economic class antagonisms and regional histories. In doing so she shows us that, contrary to the caricature of the violence presented in international media, state fictions do not necessarily dominate and determine the actions of citizens, even in the exercise of state-sponsored genocide.

The international media, a typical foil for academics, are not the only source of commentary which posits a simple relationship between state and society in Africa. In his article, Blair Rutherford offers a sympathetic critique of an important stream of feminist literature on "gender and the law" in Southern Africa. Through an ethnographic discussion of the contested valuations of gender, marriage and the "laws of the farm" on a commercial farm in Zimbabwe, Rutherford exposes analytical and political difficulties that follow from reducing state laws and practices to a unitary gender, class and/or racial interest that purportedly underlies them, as many proponents of the "gender and the law" literature do. In contrast, he suggests that it is heuristically, and potentially politically, useful to concentrate on how gendered interests are shaped by jural identities that have emerged within the interaction of state and society in spatially significant locations.

In the final contribution to this collection, John Galaty astutely captures and exemplifies a set of analytical and methodological implications borne implicitly by all the articles. He attends to the specificity of the meanings of actions deduced from ethnographic or archival sources, showing their resonance with state practices and international forces while, at the same time, not making them derivative from these wider spheres. Building on his own wealth of experience and knowledge of Maasai histories, politics and cultural practices in the Rift Valley of Kenya, Galaty situates a specific conflict over land, resonant with undertones of violence, within the imbricated levels of Kenyan land law, international pressure for democratization, national and local political manoeuvrings based on rigid ethnic blocks, (post)colonial administrative boundaries and internal Maasai conflicts between segments, classes and age sets. Galaty's narrative thus illustrates perfectly our larger goal in this collection: to show that within the shifting grounds of locality, state and globalism there lie enactments of power, realizations of law's fictions and innovative ways for anthropologists to represent them.

Notes

1 These papers were presented at two successive conference venues: the first at the Canadian Association of African Studies (CAAS) meetings in Peterborough, Ontario on May 13, 1995; the second at the Canadian Anthropology Society (CASCA) meetings in Montreal on May 27, 1995. We would like to give special thanks to David Howes for his encouragement and advice in the development of this project. We are very grateful as well to Andy Lyons who, together with an anonymous reviewer, provided exceptionally helpful suggestions in revising these papers for publication and for framing this introduction. Finally, we dedicate the collection to the one (not very elderly!) elder among us. As doctoral supervisor, friend and mentor to us both, John Galaty has been of inestimable importance in giving shape to the substance and spirit of our ideas over many years. We hope this will stand as merely one expression of our deep appreciation and affection.

2 Eric Worby and Villia Jeffremovas have submitted different works from those presented at the conferences. Although we were unable to include a further paper presented by Michael O'Flaherty, we gratefully acknowledge here his contribution to the discussion and to the project as a whole.

3 One thinks of the focus on dispute settlement and the more general problem of political order in classic ethnographies by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Gluckman (1955a, 1955b) and Turner (1957) as well as the more specialized treatments of customary law by Meek (1937), Rattray (1929) and Schapera (1938). A vast and diverse Africanist literature followed in the 1960s and 1970s. See Chanock (1985: chap. 2) and Mann and Roberts (1991: chap. 1) for useful reviews.

4 The debate parallels and intertwines, of course, with that which attempts to sort out "hegemony" and "resistance" in relation to autonomy and agency (see Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991; Hirsch and Lazarus-Black, 1994; Scott, 1990). For an exemplary exploration of these processes elsewhere in the world, see Keesing (1992).

5 Ranger's shift from "invention" to "imagination" draws of course upon Benedict Anderson's path-breaking rereading of nationalism, *Imagined Communities* (1991 [1983]). Other key resources in the recent Africanist literature that Ranger relies upon include Berman and Lonsdale (1992), Chanock (1991) and Moore (1986).

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Eleven Guilty Men from Goredema: Parallel Justice and the Moralities of Local Administration in Northwestern Zimbabwe[1]

Eric Worby *Yale University*

Abstract: In the late 1980s, at a time when the newly independent Zimbabwean state was still struggling to fortify local organs of legal and development administration, a group of male collaterals in the northwestern district of Gokwe was inventing a parallel corporate structure for purposes of limited self-governance. This article narrates the dramatic events consequent upon a case of rape and incest, using it as a point of departure to explore how spheres of local jurisdiction may be carved out and tested, and the morality of state intervention ultimately contested, by a newly imagined, if deeply patriarchal, form of civil society.

Résumé: Dans les années quatre-vingt, à l'époque où le nouvel état indépendant du Zimbabwe luttait pour renforcer les organes locaux de l'administration en matière de droit et de développement, un groupe d'hommes collatéraux du district nord-ouest de Gokwe inventait une structure institutionnelle parallèle dans un but d'auto gouvernement. Cet article raconte les événements dramatiques qui ont suivi un cas de viol et d'inceste; l'auteur s'est servi de ce cas comme point de départ pour explorer la façon dont les milieux de juridiction locale peuvent être d'une part construits et testés et d'autre part comment la moralité de l'état peut-être contestée en fin de compte par une forme de société civile, nouvellement conçue mais encore profondément patriarcale.

> A society composed of an infinite number of unorganized individuals, that a hypertrophied State is forced to oppress and contain, constitutes a veritable sociological monstrosity. For collective activity is always too complex to be able to be expressed through the single and unique organ of the State. Moreover, the State is too remote from individuals; its relations with them too external and intermittent to penetrate deeply into individual consciences and socialize them within.
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> — Emile Durkheim, 1964 [1902]: 28

The state in postcolonial Africa routinely fails to provide the kind of moral authority it pretends to command, as the lengthening literature on corruption, terror and arbitrary or personal rule well attests (see Davidson, 1992). Still, communities must somehow make their way within the state's shadow, constantly testing or negotiating the limits of autonomy under circumstances that are often as hard to fathom as they are to predict (Bayart, 1993). Some limits are more easily, or more urgently contested than others, of course, so that asserting the right to raise a local militia may be less worthwhile or important than adroitly avoiding the payment of crop levies. In any case, the pathways through and around the web of laws that authorize state power are not easily classified as instances of "resistance to" or "compliance with" the state (see Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991; Lazarus-Black and Hirsch, 1994). So much, I hope, will become clear from the story I will shortly present, the story of an effort to constitute a limited form of patriarchal self-governance lying parallel to the official state.

The now-independent nation of Zimbabwe was claimed as a colony for the British by Cecil Rhodes and the Pioneer Column in 1893. The same year, we might note, marked the publication of *De la division de travail social*, Durkheim's famous essay on the changing relation of moral order to social form under conditions of industrial and political modernity. At the time, the problem of

state-making in western Europe had, at least for the time being, been effectively resolved. Neither the formal sovereignty of the state, nor its moral hegemony over ordinary citizens were any longer seriously in question (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985). It was the excessive, rather than the exiguous, permeation of social life by the state that Durkheim seems to have found worrisome. By comparison, the nature, degree and terms of hegemonic domination enjoyed by the postcolonial states of Latin America at the same moment were all at that time still very much being worked out (Joseph and Nugent, 1994; Mallon, 1995).

African societies, in contrast, had only just begun to find themselves compressed into the straitjacket of colonial boundaries and the regimes of colonial discipline, the results of which are still today openly contested in many African states, three or four decades after achieving independence. At the 19th century's end, the multi-imperial project famously initiated on paper at the Berlin Conference in 1884-85 had largely been realized in the form of colonies on African soil, just as the British defeat of Boer independence heralded the unification of the modern South African state. These events have been meticulously documented, of course, but the experiential meaning or moral assessment of the colonial state for Africans newly subjected to it is rather less well described (see Mamdani, 1996, Vincent, 1994).

The experience of Zimbabweans both under colonialism and after was somewhat unique. The pre-World War II pattern of land alienation and racial domination in what was then the semi-autonomous colony of Southern Rhodesia (see Palmer, 1977) was followed by a post-World War preoccupation with "Native Development"— at times mirroring and at times departing from the South African pattern. In 1965, the ruling White settlers skirted the anticipated transition to majority rule, and, with Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), assumed instead the international status of a pariah state.

The UDI government was notable for its efforts to revive—many would say "re-contrive"—the judicial and moral authority of rural chiefs, marking out apartheid-style Tribal Trust Lands to be governed under "customary" law (Holleman, 1969; Seidman, 1982; Weinrich, 1971). This strategy proved to be as ineffective at establishing a renewed hegemony over the African majority (Ranger, 1982) as it was at gaining credibility for the Smith regime abroad. By the time of its collapse in the face of a widespread guerrilla insurgency, the renegade Rhodesian state had received almost universal censure—not only for the disregard with which it held international law, but specifically for the draconian, racially motivated treatment meted out to those it called "Natives" in the face of their refusal to comply with the happy vision of cultural pluralism that Smith proposed as a substitute for majority rule (Ranger, 1985). The dual system of judicial administration that had a network of appointed administrative chiefs dispense justice in "customary" cases between native Africans, subject to the overriding discretion of White Native Commissioners, rapidly collapsed. Chiefs were shot by guerrillas as collaborators; village courts were set up by guerrilla cadres to fill the void left by a vanquished colonial state.

The Lancaster House agreement of 1979, and the election of Mugabe's ZANU-PF party to power the following year, brought the anomalous state of Rhodesia to an ignominious end. In its reincarnation as the postcolonial state of Zimbabwe, however, the reputation of the state has fared little better. In the eyes of many scholars of the post-independence era, Mugabe's government seemed determined to harden the administrative state inherited from Smith into the hypertrophied "sociological monstrosity" of Durkheim's nightmares. According to these assessments, even where direct oppression by the Zimbabwean state cannot be clearly demonstrated,[2] a kind of "governmentality" (Foucault, 1991) can be—one in which the vulnerability of citizens to centralized bureaucratic power seems discernible at every join and weld between policy discourse and governmental practice (Astrow, 1983; Drinkwater, 1991; Raftapoulos, 1992; Munro, 1995). From this perspective there seems to be little space for civil society of any kind that the state (including the national army and the effectively unique governing party) has not somehow managed to penetrate or sought to bring under its control.[3]

The extent to which the postcolonial state in Zimbabwe has in fact managed to permeate and control everyday social relations can perhaps best be estimated from the implementation of law in the domestic realm, an arena that, as I have already suggested, was relegated by the colonial government to appointed administrative headmen and chiefs, working beneath the paternalistic gaze of White Native Commissioners.[4] The revamping of the local judicial system, in fact, was one of the first areas to be addressed by legislators in the effort to transform and extend postcolonial forms of governance. Sensing the need to fill the void in judicial authority that the revolutionary transition provided, the Customary Law and Primary Courts Bill in 1981 provided one of the means by which the state sought to bring into alignment two discrete objectives: first, to institutionalize its rejection of the racialized colonial order in the adjudication of citi-

zen's rights, and second, to assert sovereignty over a countryside that had essentially become self-governing during the last stages of the war. The Bill specified that from the village level on up, the judiciary would, for the first time, be separated from the administrative organs of state. Chiefs and Native Commissioners in particular would lose their authority to independently appoint Community and District Courts, although the realm of "customary law" was preserved to adjudicate several areas of law, including family and land disputes in the erstwhile Tribal Trust Lands in which most Africans lived.

A Parallel State? Repossessing Local Governance in Goredema

In the late 1980s, while conducting research in the remote northwestern district of Gokwe, my wife and I made a surprising discovery, one that called the hegemony of the state into question in a variety of ways. What we found was something like a parallel state-within-the-state. Unlike much of the rest of the country, Gokwe had been the staging ground for all the contesting factions during the war, but was exclusively captured by none. The party-operated "kangaroo courts" that administered justice in the years just before and after independence seem to have had little enduring presence in the ward of Goredema where we lived. Thus in 1982, taking advantage of the hiatus between revolutionary chaos and the re-encroachment of state authority, a group of 45 men, linked largely by ties of clanship, agnation and generation had formalized a corporate structure that served as a circumscribed form of self-governance through the application of locally derived conceptions of law.

This was not a return to remembered tradition: the corporation of brothers had written a constitution, elected officers and passed by-laws regulating procedure and jurisdiction for their actions. Its basis for recruitment—effectively an age-set of junior married men—had no counterpart in precolonial or colonial social life, and its system of offices was designed to mirror a division of functions and a set of procedural rules adopted from the farmers' groups created by the colonial agricultural extension service. Yet to call this corporation simply a hybrid of traditional and modern elements would be to miss the ingenuity that made it unique. These male collaterals sought precisely to modernize male authority over private relations by shifting them out of the colonial category of customary law and into a reconstituted public sphere, one in which their judgements, and not those of the state, held sovereign sway. In this sense, one might go so far as to say that these men had created a surrogate state, one that in its jural functions and moral presumptions ran parallel to those of the state officially holding sovereign power.

We learned of the existence of these parallel institutions of governance only by observing a dramatic series of events in which they were put to work, and it is the story of this drama that I present below. More than simply a story of how a system of parallel governance operates, it is a story of how various fragments of the official state's authority—or what might be thought of as the dispersed qualities of the state's presence and power in the lives of its rural subjects—are actually realized. It is a story about how the state's official sense of temporality interacts with a contrasting village temporal sensibility. And finally, it is about the way in which these men forged a novel form of agnation itself, making of it the public sphere in which male moral authority, exercised unreflectively in the name of the community as a whole, was to be both asserted and assessed.

Katsuro's Crime

On a hot evening early in October of 1988, three weeks before the first rains would break, a beer party was held at an isolated homestead cut in the *mopane* forest of eastern Goredema. The second son of Takoshiwa, headman of the village of that name, was in attendance. A tall, wire-thin man, his name was Katsuro. After getting quite drunk, and having been urged to go home early in the company of relatives, Katsuro was caught, quite literally, with his shoes off and his pants down in the hut of the host's junior wife. The kin of the offended husband immediately bound and beat him, one of them going so far as to bite off the lobe of one of his ears, before allowing him to be carried by his brothers to the clinic some 10 kilometres away for treatment.

This episode was relayed to us with great mirth by the women of the household in which we lived that year; Katsuro was a half-cousin of their common husband, and one whom they held in low esteem for his slovenly appearance, his beer-drinking habits and his adulterous ways. The general amusement deriving from this incident had hardly subsided, however, when Katsuro's immoral behaviour took a far more serious turn. On October 15th, he embarked on a libidinous rampage, first attempting to enter the huts of several of his agnates' wives before finally accosting and molesting his own brother's daughter, a girl only six or seven years old. Whether because she screamed or because someone entered the hut, we do not know, but Katsuro was once again caught *in flagrante delicto*, and the girl's immediate

relatives were quick to seek a punishment in accord with the gravity of the crime.

That very evening, a meeting was held of all the adult men in the village. It was, however, the corporation of (mostly married) brothers, of whom Katsuro was one, who took control of the adjudication process. They agreed that he should not be sent to the police, since an extended jail sentence would only punish his wives and children. In fact, the burden of their upkeep would be passed on to the very relatives whom he had offended. They decided instead (apparently with his father, the headman, uniquely in dissent) on a course of summary punishment: Katsuro's possessions were to be removed from the several huts that accommodated his wives and children, and his granary emptied. The huts were to be set alight, and he and his family were to be driven from the village, and told never to return.

In the event, Katsuro's own wives were beaten trying to interfere with the execution of this judgement, and it was reported that our own host, a man named Kamba, broke the arm of one of them with the stick that he wielded against her. Katsuro himself, although scrawny, listless and less an earlobe, proved to be a more wily opponent than his kinsmen had anticipated. Instead of fleeing into exile, he went straight to the government authorities, reporting his version of the events to the police post at Nembudziya. A day later, the brothers received a summons to respond to charges that Katsuro had laid against them—collectively for destruction of property, and against Kamba in particular for assault. Hobbled by the sticky mud left by an early rain, the fraternity of accused men walked the 20 kilometres to the police post and the 20 kilometres back, losing an entire day's labour during the critical time of field preparation for planting. In Nembudziya, they were told that on November 30th, they would have to appear in the Magistrate's Court in the district headquarters at Gokwe, 55 kilometres away. Kamba would have to make an earlier appearance to answer for the broken arm.

On the night of November 29th the rains broke again over the Goredema lowlands, this time in earnest. We were awakened at 3:00 a.m. to hear Kamba's younger brother pounding on the hut of the elder wife, where Kamba was sleeping. Others shouted greetings in the misty night, and eventually the 11 men charged in the case set out in the dark and rain through the *mopani* forest, on up the steep escarpment of the Mafungabusi plateau. A two-hour hike would take them to the top where they would intercept the night bus coming from the Kuwirirana crossroads at the north end of the plateau. The bus would take them into Gokwe town, where they would await their hearing with the magistrate. Late that evening, the weary men returned, laden with store-bought sugar and flour, and stories of what they'd seen in court.

"Can you believe it, Rukomboreri has three summonses waiting for him there!" Kamba told us, referring to the local big operator—a trader, transporter and moneylender—who controlled the local black market in cotton. One summons was for shooting a boy in the leg in one of his shops, another was for cashing a cheque without authorization and the last was for transport fraud. Nothing ever came of these complaints, as far as we could learn; Rukomboreri's awesome commercial reach throughout the district seemed to be complemented by a kind of unofficial immunity to successful prosecution, an alloy of the fear he inspired with his own arrogance and greed.

Kamba was recalled to Gokwe again in January to await the hearing of his case, and then again in February, when he was convicted and fined 200 Zimbabwe dollars (about a tenth of his annual crop value) or one month in prison. His younger brother collected the money from the others to pay the fine (each of the 10 contributing 20 dollars) and went to pay it the next day. Meanwhile the case against the group as a whole wore on without resolution; once a month they ascended the plateau before dawn, only to wait in futility for the case to come up on the docket, and each time they returned with a greater sense of anger and resolve.

On March 22, 1989, the men set out for the fourth or fifth time. "Bye, bye," one of them jested to the entourage of women and children gathered in their wake. "We might not ever see you again."

"Don't worry," teased the women. "We'll see you in Gokwe when we go to buy our cooking oil and sugar with money we've earned from selling your cotton. We'll take the bus from Maware, then change at Kuwirirana, and do our shopping at Gokwe. We'll be eating fat-cook daily!"[5]

The night before, I sat chatting in the moonlight with Kamba:

> "We have decided we will spend even two years in jail if that is what is wanted [he said angrily]. But that guy Katsuro has been very lucky so far. We could have easily killed him. There are people we know who are easily able to do so. You know, he goes to the *doro* [beer party] and then is not seen again. Now, for such a guy who is doing many wrong kinds of things among his own people—to be trying to sleep with his sisters and his daughters, just like me taking my daughter for my wife!—for such a guy to be making *us* go to court, and to pay what, two hundred dollars each, times eleven, makes what?"

"Over $2 000," I helped.

"That's right, over $2 000. Do you think he will live after that? We have played Chimurenga [a reference to the anti-colonial guerrilla wars of 1896-97 and 1966-79]. To kill such a man is not hard for us. Yes, we have played that game. And also his father is very wrong for opposing us. He is just supporting Katsuro because he is his son, for no other reason. He says we should have gone to the police. But for what? So that we could look after his family for some years while he is in jail? No, better to chase him from this place. If he wants to do such works in Chinoyi or Kadoma or Njelele [towns to the south and east], it is alright with us. He can join the police or the roads department and travel around doing what he likes. But not here among our family."

In the event, we met half of the lot of them returning through the forest the next afternoon. "June 14th," they sang, still disbelieving. "We are to return June 14th, with all of our witnesses and the village leaders—Takoshiwa and Taneta and also Chamuka, perhaps because he's an elder who's not involved."

June 14th came and the men stood inside the courthouse; I couldn't stay to hear the proceedings, which in any case seemed as likely as ever to be cancelled again. But this time the men did not return to the village. The magistrate heard the case and ruled against them. The sentence he meted out was far worse than anyone could have guessed: two months hard labour in the district jail for all 11 men. It was the same jail, ironically, in which suspected guerrillas had been kept during the second Chimurenga war by the colonial government.

I sensed no rancour toward the state, abstractly conceived, at this judgment. What had been affirmed was the effectiveness of the corporation of patrilaterals in asserting the right to govern moral relations among themselves, regardless of the capacity of the state to eventually override their actions. The sovereign state was not conceived in political terms in this sense, it mattering little which party was in charge, or in whose name such governance was carried out. The brothers of Kamba had, in their view, merely taken advantage of a *de facto* hiatus in power, one in which the Rhodesian state was weakening along with the elders whom it had successfully co-opted, and in which the new postrevolutionary state had not yet developed the institutional means to intervene in domestic relations. The form of self-governance that the brothers developed was uniquely tailored to revolutionary times.

We might read the import of this narrative in two ways. We might see it as instancing the ultimate triumph of a hypertrophied state, establishing its unquestioned suzerainty through the force of the police and judiciary, as well as through its capacity, ultimately, to enjoin the community to consent to its naturalized authority. Then again, rather than interpreting the story as illustrating the means by which the state has extended its hegemonic project, we might understand it to be indicative of the means by which the subjects of that project creatively put elements of the modernizing project to work toward ends that, while not precisely subverting state power, nevertheless appropriate it.

The corporation of Kamba brothers asserted, indeed assumed, that it is men who are the active subjects of civil society; this was reinforced by the conviction that it is women, and in particular, contested access to women's sexuality, that give rise to disputes among them. Indeed, this was the explicit *raison d'être* we were given for the formation of the corporation: that in the course of the disorder caused by the war and its aftermath, cases of adultery among classificatory brothers had grown rife. With the discrediting of chiefs and the collapse of their legal authority to adjudicate cases, it was felt that men would have to institute a modern, if patriarchal, form of judicial authority, to take charge of their own affairs. When asked why men ought to represent the interests of women when the latter's rights had been violated, the brothers easily asserted, without sensing any contradiction, that this was their "tradition" (see Selim, 1991); indeed this view was enshrined in the rules of the colonial customary courts and adhered to in the Customary Law and Primary Courts Bill passed after Independence (Seidman, 1982).[6] Whether women are subjected to forms of private violence and banishment, or merely rendered passive victims by state institutions, they have not been included as legitimate, legally empowered guardians of the moral order in Zimbabwe by either the formal or the parallel state.

What happens if, when asking about the century-long history of local encounters with modern administrative power in northwestern Zimbabwe, we dispense with our organic vision of the state; if, instead of picturing an amoeba or octopus, we see instead a dispersed residue of specific and very different sites of power—tidal pools in which micro-environments of power are iteratively nurtured, but never irreocably submerged, by the sea? Within these pools, local configurations of power, made of local histories, obtain. In Goredema, as elsewhere, these have always been multiple and cross-cutting; the temporary retreat of the state, far from creating the conditions for anarchy, enabled the mobilization of novel political identities (the corporation of classificatory brothers), and the selective use of "modern" models of governance (the

constitution) to enforce moral codes that were nevertheless predicated upon a naturalized "tradition" (the subjugation of women and their exclusion from the adjudication process). The reassertion of state sovereignty over the domestic realm has done little to undo the sense that its reach is in principle negotiable, and its future unpredictable.

Notes

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2 Nonetheless, the recent report of the Zimbabwean Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace on systematic and violent repression in Matabeleland in 1983-84 leaves little room for doubt. The report has not been released by the Government of Zimbabwe, but the text is circulating on the Internet. See also Werbner, 1995 and Worby, 1998.

3 See Ciekawy 1997 for a comparable attempt to demonstrate the penetration and surveillance of civil society by the state in Kenya.

4 This was the case in the Communal Areas (formerly Tribal Trust Lands). Relations among Black farm workers in the commercial farm sector were subjected to the paternalistic governance of the farm owners. See Rutherford, 1997.

5 "Fat-cook" consists of a wheat flour batter dropped into boiling vegetable oil; since the ingredients are costly and must be purchased at the shops, eating fat-cook signifies extraordinary cash liquidity and conspicuous consumption.

6 The brothers were astonished to read, in a literacy magazine that we had brought from town, that it was in fact illegal to beat one's wife and that criminal charges could legitimately be brought against a man for doing so. This issue of the magazine easily enjoyed the widest circulation, and the most lively discussion, of any such material that we brought. (I am grateful to Gul Rukh Selim for recalling this episode to my attention.)

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Contested Kinship and the Dispute of Customary Law in Colonial Kenya

J. Teresa Holmes *York University*

Abstract: In the 1930s, individuals claiming membership in the dispersed Luo Ugenya Kager clan and the local officials of the British colonial administration were actively disputing Native rights to land and authority in a region of the central Nzoia River valley of western Kenya. In this article I argue that this dispute was part of a larger discursive process in which both colonizer and colonized participated. This process is seen as one in which colonizing agents invented clan-based tribal forms that privileged agnatic principles of customary law, while "Kager" peoples utilized alternative notions of kin-based rights to land and authority in an attempt to construct meaningful forms of community identity.

Résumé: Dans les années trente, les individus revendiquant l'adhésion au clan dispersé Luo Ugenya Kager, et les fonctionnaires locaux de l'administration coloniale britannique, se disputaient activement les droits naturels à la terre et à l'autorité dans la région de la vallée centrale Nzoia River au Kenya occidental. Dans cet article, j'expose que cette dispute faisait partie du plus important processus discursif auquel ont participé, à la fois, les colons et les colonisés. Ce processus est considéré comme étant un de ceux pendant lequel les agents colonisateurs ont inventé les formes tribales, basées sur le principe de clan, qui privilégiaient les principes agnatiques de droit coutumier, tandis que les peuples «Kager» utilisaient des notions alternatives de droit à la terre et à l'autorité, basées sur la parenté, pour essayer de construire des formes positives d'identité de la communauté.

On August 15, 1932, the Ugenya Kager Luo Clan Association of Nyanza Province (UKLCA) in western Kenya, sent a petition to the British Governor of Kenya Colony in which they claimed their rights to land in the Musanda Region of the central Nzoia River valley.[1] This was not the first, nor the last, time that individuals representing the Kager clan would assert their rights to the territory frequently referred to as the Musanda valley.[2] Archival records document numerous Kager attempts to reclaim land and authority in this region between 1913 and 1919, and again beginning in 1930. The most common Kager demands on these occasions were an investigation of land tenure and administrative boundaries and the replacement of all native administrative officials with Kager elders. These demands were most often supported by assertions of Kager status as *wuon gweng'* ("owner of the land") in the Musanda valley.[3]

The British colonial administration responded to the UKLCA petition of August 1932 in a fashion consistent with their own assumptions about the customary basis of land rights and political authority in this region. They saw Kager demands in the Musanda valley as emblematic of long-standing disputes between what they believed to be the two major tribal divisions in western Kenya: the Nilotic-speaking Luo and the loosely connected association of Bantu-speaking clans that would later be known as the Abaluyia.[4] In fact, administrative officials had long recognized the Musanda valley as a central focus of disputes between representatives of these so-called tribal units: on the one hand, the Ugenya Kager clan (Luo) and, on the other hand, the Wanga clan (Abaluyia) and other smaller Bantu-speaking clans. Archival documents demonstrate very clearly that most British colonial officials believed the Bantu-speaking clans, especially the Wanga, had ancestral, and thus legitimate, rights as landlords to much of the Musanda valley, while the Kager had more recently, and illegitimately, expanded into the area by force. British intervention had supposedly settled these conflicts, as

part of the work of colonial administrators was to determine and administer ancestral, customary clan rights over land and political authority. Thus, these same administrators interpreted the contradictory land claims of the Kager, and their assertion of *wuon gweng'* status in the Musanda valley, as an attempt by disenfranchised and dispersed tenant groups to gain control over land to which they had no customary clan-based claim.[5]

This dispute in the early 1930s between British administrators and representatives of the Kager clan reveals just a small portion of what I contend was the contested terrain of customary law created by the interpenetration of law and culture in colonial western Kenya. My approach to the analysis of this kind of local-level dispute within colonial society departs somewhat from other studies of customary law in colonial contexts. Since the early 1970s studies that investigate aspects of customary law have looked at how the transformation (Colson, 1971; MacGaffey, 1970; Moore, 1986, 1989; Vincent 1989) or invention (Iliffe, 1979; Ranger, 1983) of indigenous political and legal traditions served to establish the ideological dominance of colonial authority. Within these contexts, scholars have considered indigenous disputative responses primarily as the manipulation, negotiation or appropriation of these traditions, rather than exploring the possibility that these responses might represent an alternative understanding of the ways in which community identity and thus rights to land and authority are constituted.

More recent works have taken a slightly different perspective and considered how the process of describing, ordering and administering colonized peoples led to the construction of supposedly indigenous political and legal traditions (Cohen, 1987; Dirks, 1992; Mitchell, 1991; Thomas, 1994). While these works have brought welcome attention to the role of customary law and other colonial institutions in the creation of relations of power and political and legal identity, they have not, for the most part, explored the response of the colonized as an alternative part of this discursive process itself. Timothy Mitchell, for example, notes that the new forms of power introduced into Egypt through the British colonial method provided, "spaces for manoeuvre and resistance, and [could] be turned to counter-hegemonic purposes" (1991:xi), but he also insists that "colonial subjects and their modes of resistance are formed within the organisational terrain of the colonial state" (ibid.). Thus, he leaves no space for the possible production of alternative forms of local meaning as an integral part of the ongoing process by which customary law is contested and negotiated (cf. Pels, 1996).[6]

In this article, I examine the discursive production of a political and legal order in western Kenya. I suggest that British policies of locating tribes and defining tribal modes of social organization artificially designated certain indigenous means of acquiring rights to land and authority as custom. I also contend, however, that, at the same time, this administrative practice obscured or silenced conflicting voices of the colonized and their use of other old and new avenues to the acquisition of these rights in response to the restrictive dictates of customary law. Kager claims to *wuon gweng'* status, I suggest, can be seen as an example of such a conflicting voice, as they utilized an alternative avenue to the construction of a community identity conferring rights to land and authority.[7] In this context, then, customary law, and colonial administrative policy in general, can be seen as a highly contested arena in which dominant and subordinate voices continually negotiated the meaning and substance of local community identity.

Mapping Tribes and Administering Kavirondo

In 1895 the British Foreign Office sent First Class Assistant C.W. Hobley to Kavirondo territory, the region on the northeastern shores of Lake Victoria that would later be called Nyanza Province. In Hobley's words, he was sent there to establish an administration over "various sections of the turbulent collection of tribes" about whom "nothing much was known" (Hobley, 1970: 80). This is a telling comment, since it is evident from the records Hobley left behind that the task he undertook, aside from that of pacification, was to make this "turbulent collection" of peoples "known" within the imagined landscape of colonial society. Hobley's records, and those of the colonial administrators who followed him, demonstrate that, in the context of the British empire, the peoples of Kavirondo were to be "known" solely as members of clan-based, tribal populations.

Timothy Mitchell's recent examination of the colonial method in Egypt suggests that local indigenous populations became "known" or were made visible through the "reordering of material space," or more particularly, the establishment of "new kinds of spatial frameworks and the means of coordinating and controlling those who move within them" (1991: 93). In Kavirondo territory in the late 19th and early 20th century, colonial officials like Hobley carried out this particular administrative practice primarily through the identification, topographic location, and, I would argue, invention of local tribal and subtribal units. The invention of tribes in colonial Africa has been

well documented by Africanist scholars (Crehan, 1997; Iliffe, 1979; Jackson and Maddox, 1993; Pels, 1994, 1996; Ranger, 1983; Vail, 1989; Worby, 1994). In various studies they have identified those administrative practices that, in many colonies, created tribes and thus invented the "closed corporate consensual system which came to be accepted as part of 'traditional' Africa" (Ranger, 1983: 248). Much of their work also suggests that this invented tribal system differed significantly from a situation in pre-colonial Africa in which "far from there being a single tribal identity, most Africans moved in and out of multiple identities" (ibid.). Thus, analyses such as these have shown that, in the context of colonial society, the creation of tribal units was the primary means by which the social spaces of indigenous communities were materially reordered as more rigid and more familiar frameworks of social control were established. They suggest, implicitly if not explicitly, that the practice of representing local populations as tribes was a tactic that gave these populations a recognizable form and identified them as "objects" that could be "govern[ed] effectively in a rational and conscious manner" (Foucault, 1991: 100). I contend, however, that we need to consider not only how administrative practices such as these created fixed units of tribal identity, but also how they gave substance to European assumptions about the essential, kin-based nature of those social relations that defined and delimited the tribal unit. By constructing the tribal unit as kin-based, I argue, these practices determined the rights and obligations that were supposedly inherent in customary social practice.

With respect to the invention of tribes in Kavirondo territory, the records and memoirs of administrators like Hobley indicate that there were a number of techniques used to make local populations visible, or to give a seemingly natural order to what, to European eyes, must have been a confusing mix of peoples and communities. One of the most effective techniques was the locating, mapping and classifying of tribal populations as localized clan units. By the early 1900s Hobley had identified what he believed to be the ancestral territories of tribal populations in Kavirondo (Hobley, 1898, 1902, 1903). He designated the two primary tribal groupings as the Bantu Kavirondo (most of whom were later known as the Abaluyia), occupying the highland regions in the east and centre of the region, and the Nilotic Kavirondo (later known as the Luo) in the lowland areas to the west and along the shores of Lake Victoria (Hobley, 1898: 364). He also, however, located specific tribes on an accompanying map of this region on which they were inscribed as if they occurred in, and were thus part of, nature. In the way they were placed, the names of these tribes signified the presence of the human population in the natural landscape in much the same way that the descriptive notes "Grass Country" or "Euphorbia Scrub Country" would denote the terrain to be found in that landscape.[8] It is important to note that although Hobley recorded the presence of Nilotic-speaking, or Luo peoples, in what would eventually be recognized as the Musanda region of the central Nzoia River valley, this area was designated as part of the (seemingly naturally occurring) tribal territory of the Bantu-speaking Kisesa, or Wanga, clan.[9]

What is significant about this early mapping of Kavirondo, however, is not just the allocation of tribal identities to localized populations, but also what this map (and others like it) might have conveyed about the basic relationship between the people and the land they occupied. Adam Kuper has noted that, by the late 19th century, British scholars had generally concluded that "extended ties of kinship," defined by ties of blood, were the basis of primitive, or tribal, societies (1982: 73). I would argue, then, that this map not only represents local communities as naturally occurring tribal populations, but, by extension, also naturalizes consanguinity and related ties of descent and kinship. Thus, an important aspect of the "knowledge" about Kavirondo represented by this map is the natural connection between blood and the organization of peoples within a tribal territory. Perhaps the clearest demonstration of this presumed connection can be seen in the numerous colonial documents that record, in even the smallest passages, the ethnographic data on descent-based custom collected by colonial officials working in this region. I suggest, however, that what we find in these documents is not so much the recording of ethnographic fact, but rather, evidence of the conceptual reordering of social space in this region through the description of traditions and customs supposedly associated with descent-based tribal populations.

Agnatic Privilege and "Customary Law"

While serving the purpose of making "known" the peoples of Kavirondo territory, Hobley's cartographic exercise also would have transformed the human chaos of local communities into an objective, "comfortingly familiar and yet 'scientific'" (Crehan, 1997: 206), tribal framework that would certainly have simplified the administration of this region. In fact, in 1908 district and locational boundaries were established on the basis of these perceived tribal and subtribal divisions. Colonial officials fixed the boundaries of administrative districts based on their understanding of the natural, tribal divisions in the

Kavirondo region. Thus, they designated what was believed to be the tribal territories of the Bantu Kavirondo as Elgon District (later North Kavirondo and then North Nyanza) and the territories of the Nilotic Kavirondo as Kisumu District (later Central Kavirondo and then Central Nyanza). Within these districts, officials identified administrative locations that corresponded to the perceived territories of specific tribes or, as they were also recognized, localized clans. Notably, this served to formalize the designation of large areas of the Musanda valley as Wanga tribal, or clan, territory.[10]

Thus, through the creation of this naturalized order of tribal divisions, Hobley, in effect, produced those governable objects required by a British colonial administration. However, more was required for an effective administration than just the identification of the objects of rule. In 1909, John Ainsworth, the new commissioner of what was now Nyanza Province, sent a memorandum to the Governor of Kenya, Sir Percy Girouard, strongly suggesting that the principle of Indirect Rule should be more formally implemented in the colony. This required, he argued, that "African laws and customs" must be followed in political and judicial matters (Maxon, 1980: 183-184). Ainsworth's views on the importance of tribal traditions are not surprising. As several recent studies have demonstrated (Crehan, 1997; Pels, 1994, 1996; Worby, 1994), colonial officials who adopted the policy of Indirect Rule in Eastern and Southern Africa believed that adherence to tribal traditions was extremely important because these customary forms would act as legitimate channels for the implementation and regulation of administrative policy.

By 1909, then, administrative policy in Nyanza Province required not only a knowledge of tribal identity, but also a working knowledge of tribal custom. Quite a bit of ethnographic data had already been collected by Hobley during his time as administrator (see Hobley, 1902, 1903) and this was soon added to by other administrators working under Ainsworth (see especially Dundas, 1910). Officials used this data to determine and specify what they believed to be tribal customs relating to such things as marriage, land tenure and political succession in Nyanza Province. It was on the basis of this so-called tribal custom, in fact, that in later years administrators justified their predecessor's earlier decision to grant the region of the Musanda valley to the Wanga and repeatedly denied Kager claims of *wuon gweng'* status.

Ranger argues that so-called customary forms—"customary law, customary land-rights, customary political structure and so on"—"were in fact all invented by colonial codification" (1983: 250). He points out that "once the 'traditions' relating to community identity and land rights were written down in court records and exposed to the criteria of the invented customary model, a new and unchanging body of tradition had been created" (ibid.: 251). Obviously, a process such as this would have enormous consequences for colonized communities. For example, studies of this process demonstrate that as a result of this invention of tradition, some indigenous individuals and groups were able to enhance their own positions in colonial society through the manipulation of certain ethnographic information that would be taken down by administrators as tribal custom (Pels, 1996; Worby, 1994). I believe, however, that there was a more far-reaching and fundamental consequence of the invention of tribal custom, at least in Nyanza Province.

A close reading of the archived information on tribal custom from the early 1900s, taken together with reports on day-to-day conditions in local communities from this same period, suggests that administrative officials in Nyanza Province selectively used certain native customary forms as iconic representations of larger tribal populations, especially those customs associated with principles of agnatic descent. For example, Hobley (1903: 326-331) provides three examples of Luo origin myths: two of these indicate that one way ancestral Luo groups established rights to new territory was by creating ties through women to occupying groups; the other makes no mention of links through women, and instead emphasizes the importance of descent through men. While Hobley presents all three versions to the reader, he insists that the latter version is more authentic. According to Hobley it is the "ancient genealogy, brought down from the Nile valley by the people when they migrated to the south" (ibid.: 331).

As administrative officials, like Hobley, engaged in this process of privileging agnatic custom, they also considerably underplayed the significance of those customs deriving from other forms of relationship, such as uterine links, affinal relations and non-kinship ties such as friendship. Customs associated with these latter forms of relationship are certainly described in reports and appear to have had some local and regional significance. Nevertheless, those customs associated with agnation are privileged and thus held to be representative of the larger social whole. As a result this particular colonial practice of associating custom with agnation conceptually reordered the social space of local communities, producing models of these communities as descent-based groups with fixed systems of agnatically defined tribal custom. What is most significant in the context of this article is the way in which this practice extended the implied

connections between blood and tribal territory by creating certain patrilineal clan groups as authentic inhabitants with natural rights of possession over and against other groups that might be in occupation of specific areas.

One of the common strategies by which colonial administrators imagined certain localized groups as authentic, and thus determined their rights to land, was by reference to clan histories. This was especially true for those peoples living in regions in which there was some ongoing conflict over community rights and identity. For the Musanda region, district officers began writing the histories of the Luo and Wanga peoples into the colonial record as early as 1911.[11] This practice became more frequent in the 1930s as the Kager Luo began actively pressing their claims of rights as *wuon gweng'* in this region.[12] What is striking about these histories is how administrators wrote the pre-colonial past of Wanga and Luo clans into provincial and district records in such a way as to emphasize the natural, kin-based rights of Wanga to land in this area. For example, Wanga peoples are usually referred to as "original" occupants whose ancestors found the land uninhabited or empty upon their arrival in the Musanda region. Luo groups in this area, on the other hand, are consistently described as invaders. The ancestral, or natural, rights of the Wanga are also emphasized in these histories through frequent reference to the strength of the genealogical, or agnatic, connections of localized groups. Conversely, these administrative clan histories fail to mention such genealogical connections among the Luo, emphasizing instead the dispersed character of their clan population.

There were other strategies used by colonial officials working in the Musanda region that further designated Luo groups as temporary occupants with no rightful claim to own the land. Summaries of census data, for example, while almost always verifying the presence of a significant population of Luo in this region, often reported this information in such a way as to suggest the illegitimacy of their presence.[13] Indeed, it seems clear that colonial officials saw the presence of groups without agnatic connections to those imagined as original occupants as problematic and unnatural, creating what one District Commissioner referred to as a "mixed population."[14] In fact, by the early 1930s, administrative officials had adopted the Luo term *wuon gweng'* (always glossed as "owner of the land") and had designated certain Bantu-speaking clans, usually the Wanga, as owners of the land with legal possession of this territory as "landlords." At the same time, all Luo groups, including the Kager, were labelled "tenants" occupying land only at the "will" of those with these customary rights of possession.[15]

This would certainly have been highly problematic for those Luo peoples (and Bantu-speaking peoples not members of the recognized landlord clan) now designated as tenants. Generally, archival documents from this period suggest that there were large numbers of Luo living in the Musanda valley who were well integrated into local communities and claimed residence for several generations back.[16] It is also apparent from these records that these Luo were connected to Wanga peoples through long-term, uterine, affinal or other non-kinship ties. Nevertheless, official ethnographic practice and the gradual codification of customary laws establishing rights of landlord and tenant groups had now made these ties structurally meaningless. Furthermore, Luo groups in this region had no recourse to a claim of any administratively significant, agnatic identity. In other words, as tenants they were unable to claim a status that would allow them to effectively utilize established customary laws in regard to such things as land tenure and access to political authority.

It is not surprising, then, that by the 1930s Luo individuals and groups in the Musanda valley were consistently attempting to claim an identity for themselves as *wuon gweng'*. What is interesting, however, is that archival records of their written and spoken claims of *wuon gweng'* status as well as their activities in this region suggests that they had a rather different understanding of what it meant to be, and how one becomes, *wuon gweng'* than that now codified in customary law. As we will see, Kager discourse relating to their claims to "own the land" constructed a much more encompassing and fluid understanding of this concept, one that asserted their rights to become *wuon gweng'* contrary to their defined administrative status as "tenants."

Becoming *Wuon Gweng'*

According to archival records, Luo peoples living in the Musanda region of Nyanza Province began trying to redefine their administrative status even before the official gazetting of district and locational boundaries in 1908.[17] It was not until the early 1930s, however, that these efforts were organized under the authority of the Ugenya Kager Luo Clan Association (UKLCA). Throughout the 1930s this organization provided a strong Kager voice in the Musanda region.[18] During this period members of the UKLCA made claims of *wuon gweng'* status in petitions to the colonial government, in local council meetings and in private meetings with administrative

officials. Records of their formal statements, testimony and conversations show that the Kager used a number of different discursive strategies to fashion an identity as *wuon gweng'* in colonial society. And, as was true for the administrative project of constructing tribal or clan identity and defining customary law, one of the most common strategies was the telling of their clan history. However, a consistent theme in this often-repeated clan history was not the status of ancestral Kager as original inhabitants of the Musanda region, nor even as invaders or interlopers. Instead, these Kager were more concerned with the circumstances of conquest and occupation in their recent past and with their position within a larger and heterogeneous indigenous community.[19]

This idea that the Kager were part of an historically interconnected community of diverse populations is a central image in their discourse on their own past in the Musanda region. In fact, their claim of conquest generally leads to statements alluding to the establishment of extended community relations through the process of occupation. For example, colonial records document Kager statements concerning the presence of trade between themselves and the Wanga prior to colonial intervention, as well as to their political alliances with other Bantu-speaking groups in this area.[20] I argue that by making these and other claims concerning the significance of intergroup relations, Kager representatives portrayed pre-colonial Musanda as a region in which one came to "own the land" through the process of negotiating relations with others, rather than as part of a predetermined agnatic birthright.

Perhaps the most telling example of the Kager understanding of what it meant to "own the land" in Musanda region can be found in allusions in speeches and petitions to the importance of ties through women in the pre-colonial community. The most frequently occurring instance of this was in the retelling of the Kager conquest of the forces of the Wanga leader, Shiundu, not too long before the arrival of the British. In December of 1931, one elder stood before a council meeting in the village of Musanda and claimed Kager rights to "own the land" in this region. As part of his statement, he told a brief version of the story of the establishment of relations between Kager and Wanga in this region, stating that "there was a time when we defeated the Wanga under Shiundu. We had him pinned in his *boma*. Then he gave us a girl, and we helped him in his war against the Kitosh."[21] Taken at face value, this statement would appear to contradict Kager claims to be *wuon gweng'* in this region. After all, it implies that shortly before the arrival of the British the Kager became affines and allies of the Wanga, rather than replacing them as *wuon gweng'* through conquest. Yet, this story appears in other records of Kager accounts of their clan history and is always cited by the Kager as proof of their rights to "own the land."[22]

Given this, it would seem that we need to take this story seriously, as part of a larger Kager strategy to become *wuon gweng'* and gain rights to land and authority in the Musanda region. To get some idea of the significance of this story, I will briefly discuss one exchange between the British administration and the Kager recorded in the archives. In March of 1931, Provincial Commissioner Thompson of Nyanza Province held a meeting with several Kager elders who had come to see him about their claims in the Musanda region. Mr. Thompson's official report of this meeting notes that when these elders were reminded of their historical status as tenants in this region, they told him that "in the past we were never tenants, we were *jodak*."[23] I suggest that if we examine this fragment of dialogue, and consider the possible meaning of *jodak* for these Kager elders, we might get a better understanding of how Kager peoples in the 1930s were trying to fashion a meaningful identity and in the process remake the terms of clan identity as assigned to them by customary law. Colonial records show that, generally, Luo peoples used the term *jodak* ("people who stay") to designate those individuals or groups living in a community who had actual or potential ties through women (uterine, affinal) to established *wuon gweng'* groups, or to those peoples that the British had designated landlords. In other words, those people that the British designated tenants—those people without agnatic ties to *wuon gweng'*—the Luo referred to as *jodak*. I contend that by denying their status as tenants, but admitting their earlier status as *jodak*, the Kager elders who visited P.C. Thompson in 1931 were in effect asserting an understanding of the significance of ties through women in the indigenous community that was rather different than that of British administrators. I believe that this understanding is one that contained the possibility of becoming *wuon gweng'* through the creation of links between various landed populations based on ties through women; a possibility that would be denied the Kager under the provisions of customary law.

But how is it that the Kager could admit being *jodak* in the Musanda region in the late 1800s and yet assert their rights as *wuon gweng'* in this area in the 1930s, especially since customary law defined these rights solely on the basis of ancestral, agnatic links to landlord groups? I have already pointed out that the Kager back

up their claims to "own the land" by telling of the historical establishment of trade relations and the forging of political alliances with other localized groups. It would also seem likely that historical ties through women with Wanga groups would both have reinforced these links and, initially, would have also strengthened the status of those Wanga previously in occupation of the region. Nevertheless, if the Kager understanding of becoming *wuon gweng'* is based on the creation and negotiation of significant regional relations and alliances, it is equally possible for them to presume that, while their parents and grandparents entered this relationship as *jodak*, they in turn have transformed their status to that of wuon gweng' by creating their own *jodak* relationships. Thus, it is highly significant that by the 1930s Kager living in the Musanda region were frequently reprimanded by colonial and native authorities for "bringing" Luo from other locations to live as *jodak* on that land which the Kager officially occupied as tenants.[24] This, along with the previously mentioned archival evidence, indicates that Kager peoples perceived rights to land and authority, and thus the status of *wuon gweng'*, as partial, negotiable and based on a network of significant regional and community ties. This is quite different from the rigid, bounded, inflexible and linear definition of those rights in customary law and constitutes an alternative construction of a meaningful community identity, and hence rights to land and authority.

Contesting Customary Law

I will end by returning to the larger issue of the relationship between customary law and culture and the investigation of indigenous disputative response, or what some people might describe as indigenous resistance. Much of the anthropological work that has been done in this area looks at customary law as an historical construct that has been "forged in struggles between colonial power and colonized groups" (Merry, 1991: 897). This focus on history and power has done much to enhance our understanding of the role of customary law in the perpetuation of the power of the state and in the construction of an arena for indigenous response. But, I suggest that it is not enough to identify the ways in which colonized peoples have disputed or resisted the imposition of colonial institutions such as customary law. Instead we must also consider the possibility that the very act of disputing this colonial power constituted an attempt to put forward an alternative form of local meaning that might have served to contest and renegotiate what were now the fixed terms of customary law.

The Kager claiming *wuon gweng'* status in the Musanda valley in the 1930s were not just challenging institutionalized structures of power in an attempt to change its terms. They were, instead, attempting to remake the terms of that power and thus the terms of their own identity. British notions of customary law reduced the concept of *wuon gweng'* to a category of land tenure fixed by what were imagined to be the natural, ancestral and restricted rights of bounded, agnatically defined clan units. Kager discourse, on the other hand, relied on an understanding of becoming *wuon gweng'* that was more inclusive and that would have encompassed many of those peoples who had been dispossessed because of their invented status as tenants under the terms of customary law. In this context, then, Kager claims to "own the land" can be seen as an attempt to remake a community identity that is more viable and meaningful than the identity assigned to them within the dominant administrative discourse of customary law. Thus, in considering the role of colonized peoples in disputing, resisting or even contributing to customary law, what must be more fully addressed is how these actions might be connected to struggles over the imposition of meaning, especially as this meaning relates to the issue of identity. As Peter Just has noted, "disputing is not just about my rights and your obligations, it is about who I am and what we are" (Just, 1992: 409).

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Notes

1 Kenya National Archives (KNA) DC/NN10/1/1, Petition from Ugenya Kager Luo Clan Association to Governor of Kenya Colony, August 15, 1932.

2 The specific boundaries of the territory being claimed by the UKLCA in 1932 are difficult to determine because they

made reference only to specific community locations, some of which are no longer extant, and because the precise locations they claimed changed over time. They claimed rights to land, and a number of villages, found in the administrative locations of Wanga, Buholo and South Marama. The claimed territory lay on what were then the borders of North Kavirondo and Central Kavirondo and roughly covered the southern tip of Wanga, much of Buholo, and the northwestern region of South Marama. This area did not correspond with any specific territorial unit of colonial administration, therefore it was generally referred to as the Musanda valley after the village of Musanda in southern Wanga.

3 Most accounts of council meeting speeches made by Luo elders, as well as memoranda and petitions submitted by members of the Ugenya Kager Luo Clan Association and others, were translated into English in the archives. Nevertheless, indigenous terms were occasionally retained and from this evidence it appears that, at least in the early 1930s, the most common identity marker used by Luo people to refer to their status with respect to the Musanda valley is the phrase *wuon gweng'* (pl. *weg gweng'*). In these documents this phrase is glossed as "owner(s) of the soil" or "owner(s) of the land" and there is no direct translation given. It is most likely that the term *wuon* could be literally translated during this period as "father of," since British administrators, and after them anthropologists, consistently glossed the Luo term for "father of" as "owner." The appropriate translation for the term *gweng'* is not quite as apparent. Various administrative documents detailing Luo custom with regard to land tenure suggest that the term *gweng'* refers to a specific, bounded locality associated with an agnatic clan unit (see KNA, "Rough Outline of History of the Luo in Central Kavirondo," memorandum submitted by Major B.W. Bond, District Commissioner, North Kavirondo, 1932, Kenya Land Commission Evidence Vol. 3; KNA PC/NZA3/14/27, memo from District Commissioner [Central Kavirondo] to Provincial Commissioner [Nyanza] on Luo land tenure, March 30, 1937; KNA DC/CN3/3/1, "Report on Luo Law and Custom Regarding Land," G.M. Wilson, 1953). However, there is nothing in Luo reported speech or in written documents submitted by Luo individuals and groups from this period that indicates that those "Kager" people claiming to have the status of *wuon gweng'* in Musanda valley were defined only by their connections to a bounded and, at one time, territorially defined Kager clan through agnatic ties alone. Instead, in these archival documents the term *wuon gweng'* seems to be used in a more indeterminate fashion to refer to a loosely connected set of individuals who claim rights over a region that has fluid and inexact boundaries and that incorporates an ever-changing number of villages and homesteads. Given the difficulty of rendering this meaning into a specific translation, I will be using the administrative gloss, "owner(s) of the land."

4 In the early years of colonial administration, this loosely knit association of semi-autonomous Bantu-speaking clan groups was united to a certain extent under the leadership of the administrative chief Mumia, the individual believed, by the British, to be the hereditary ruler of the Wanga. In the 1920s these clans joined together to form the Bantu Kavirondo Taxpayer's Association. In 1940 this became the Abaluyia Welfare Association. According to Gunther Wagner (1949: 69), the term *luyia* can be translated as "one clan." By the mid-1960s the Abaluyia were recognized as a distinct tribal, or ethnic population (see Osogo, 1966; Were, 1967).

5 Similarly, historians and anthropologists who have discussed these kinds of claims and counterclaims to "own the land" tend to treat them as expressions of pre-colonial conflicts over land that occurred between historically distinct clan units (see Evans-Pritchard, 1949; Ochieng', 1973; Ogot, 1971).

6 In his review of several recently published texts dealing with the anthropology of law, Peter Just suggests that we need to consider both local meaning and historical processes of power in the analysis of dispute and conflict (1992: 376; see also Merry, 1991). This combined focus on meaning and power is evident in a number of recent studies that approach the law as a realm in which symbols, narratives and performance can be deployed and manipulated (see, for example, Lazarus-Black, 1994; Lazarus-Black and Hirsch, 1994; Yngvesson, 1993). These studies examine the productive power of the law and its role in the "formation of discourses—both dominant and subjugated—which set the parameters of what can be said, thought, challenged, struggled over, and achieved in a given historical moment" (Hirsch and Lazarus-Black, 1994: 3). However, they also approach the law as "simultaneously a maker of hegemony and a means of resistance" (ibid.: 9). Thus, as with other works concerned more specifically with customary law, they offer a rather circumscribed understanding of the local meaning that might inform those actions commonly labelled as resistance.

7 For other recent studies that have demonstrated the significance of such alternative voices in the construction of community identity and community rights see Worby (1994) and Pels (1994, 1996).

8 There is a difference in the type used for descriptions of the landscape (e.g., "Euphorbia Country") and tribal names, but there is no indication of what this indicates. In fact, one is left with the impression that the difference in type could indicate either a different category of naturally occurring features, or that one feature has greater importance than the other.

9 Although in his 1898 publication on Kavirondo territory Hobley identifies the people of this region as belonging to the Kisesa tribe, he later classifies this as Wanga tribal, or clan, territory (Hobley, 1902, 1903). He and later administrators were somewhat imprecise in their use of terms such as tribe, subtribe and clan. So, for example, the Wanga may be referred to as a tribe in one publication or memorandum and as a subtribe or clan in another. As I will demonstrate, I believe that this is due to administrative (and generally European) assumptions about the segmentary and clan-based nature of tribes, rather than administrative sloppiness.

10 KNA PC/NZA1/14, Provincial Commissioner Ainsworth, Annual Report, Chart of Native Populations. See also Ogot (1971: 96) and Were (1967: 175).

11 KNA DC/CN3/5, Political Records, Book 2, Central Nyanza, April 14, 1911. There is no indication in archival records where, or from whom, administrators collected this and

other clan histories. It is evident, however, that in every case the administrator is rewriting this history in the sense that he is choosing what information to include in his summary. For this reason, I am treating these clan histories as a form of administrative discourse, although as told to local officials by native informants they originally stood as a form of indigenous discourse.

12 See especially KNA DC/NN3/1/17, "Early History of Wanga Chiefs," 1931; KNA, "Historical Survey, North Kavirondo," memorandum submitted to Kenya Land Commission by District Commissioner (North Kavirondo) C.B. Thompson, September 1932, Kenya Land Commission Evidence, Vol. 3; KNA, "Rough Outline of the History of the Luo in Central Kavirondo," memorandum submitted to Kenya Land Commission by Major B.W. Bond, September 1932, Kenya Land Commission Evidence, Vol. 3; and KNA CO 533/447/12, Governor Byrne to Secretary of State for the Colonies, March 31, 1934.

13 See, for example, KNA DC/NN3/3/6, Safari Report, Assistant District Commissioner (North Nyanza) W.H. McGeach on March 9, 1929. In this report McGeach provides a list of all of the clans belonging to the resident Bantu-speaking subtribe in the southern region of the Musanda valley, the total number of villages belonging to these clans and then the number of Luo huts to be found in each village. The latter stands out in this report as the marked, or the problematic, category. This impression is strengthened by the accompanying record, presumably collected by McGeach in the field, of the history of these local clan groups.

14 Central Nyanza District Archives, District Commissioner S.H. Fazan in Political Records, Book 2, Kisumu, March 25, 1913. It should be noted that colonial officials also assumed that it was the Luo who were guilty of creating these unnaturally "mixed" populations. For example, while giving evidence before the Kenya Land Commission in September of 1932, the Reverend Monsignor Brandsma stated that "I do not think that there is much likelihood of the majority of Bantu clans mixing with others. They are very clannish, especially in regard to intermarrying. The Luo do marry Bantu women, but the Bantu do not marry Luo women.... There is a good deal of Luo marrying Bantu wives, but few Bantu marrying Luo wives" (KNA, Kenya Land Commission Evidence, Vol. 3).

15 See, for example, KNA DC/NN10/1/1, memos between Provincial Commissioner Montgomery (Nyanza Province) and the District Commissioner of North Nyanza, February through April 1932.

16 See, for example, KNA DC/NN3/3/6, Safari Report, Assistant District Commissioner (North Nyanza) W.H. McGeach, March 9, 1929; KNA DC/NN10/1/1, Evison (Lawyer for Kager Luo) to Chief Native Commissioner, April 19, 1932; and KNA DC/NN10/1/1, Petition from UKLCA, August 15, 1932.

17 See KNA DC/NN3/3, Political Records, North Kavirondo, 1916. Here there is a reference to the unauthorized assumption of headmanship by a Luo resident in the southern region of the Musanda valley. Further Luo claims of political authority, as well as rights to land, in this area are noted sporadically in colonial records up until the late 1920s. It was not until the early 1930s, however, that these records consistently refer to Kager agitation in this region (see KNA DC/NN3/1). Before 1913, administrative records designated all Luo peoples of this region as Wa-Nife and listed Gero as a local leader and one of those resisting colonial incursions (significantly, the Kager translates as "the place of Ger"). By 1913 these records identified all contentious Luo in this region as Wagenya. Aside from one or two references to the "Kageri" in the Political Record Book of North Kavirondo in 1916, this was the most common name given to these peoples until 1931, when all Luo claims to "own the land" in the Musanda region of the central Nzoia River valley were recognized as Kager claims. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Ugenya Kager Luo Clan Association was established in this same year (Ogot, 1971: 100).

18 By 1933, however, there were other representatives of a Kager voice in the Musanda region besides the UKLCA. In late 1932, one of the major figures in the Kager movement, the Reverend Alufayo Mango, broke all ties with the local arm of the Christian Missionary Society (CMS) and established a new religious sect called *Jo-Roho* ("People of the Spirit"). The headquarters of this sect were at Mango's homestead in the village of Musanda. From then, until his death in 1934 at the hands of a Wanga raiding party, Mango continued to act in ways that, at least symbolically, asserted his claimed *wuon gweng'* status. Archival records show that his actions were denounced not only by local Wanga peoples, but also by those Kager in the area who remained loyal to the CMS and the UKLCA (see KNA DC/NN10/1/1, Ugenya Kager Luo Clan Association Petition of September 25, 1933; KNA DC/NN10/1/1, District Officer F.D. Hislop's report on the Musanda Massacre, February 9, 1934; see Ogot, 1971: 104).

19 At the same time, when referring to their dispersal from this region in 1897, shortly after the establishment of a British administration, Kager representatives made repeated references to the role of colonial officials in this defeat. As one Kager elder noted in front of a council meeting in December of 1931, "Our trouble is that the Wanga did not drive us out, Hobley did. Others who were beaten by the Europeans are in their *bomas* now, why aren't we?" It is perhaps also significant that this type of assertion commonly drew a counter-assertion from Wanga peoples that they acted alone in their defeat of the Kager. So, for example, in the same council meeting, the Paramount Chief of the Wanga, who was also a leader of the Wanga at the time of British intervention in the 1880s, stated that, "I asked Jackson [Hobley's assistant] to help me with my wars. He refused. So I bought guns and defeated you. Hobley did not fight you at all. He fought in North Ugenya certainly near the Boma of Gem. He also fought the Kitosh, but did we take their villages?" (KNA DC/NN3/2/18, Record of Council Meeting, Matungu, South Wanga, December 13, 1931).

20 See KNA DC/NN3/2/18, Record of Council Meeting, Matungu, South Wanga, December 13, 1931; KNA DC/NN10/1/1, UKLCA Petition, August 15, 1932; Public Records Office, Kew Gardens, CO/533/442/12, UKLCA Petition, January 22, 1934; KNA DC/NN10/1/1, UKLCA Petition, June 12, 1935; KNA DC/NN10/1/1, Shadrack Awelo Omolo, Secretary of the UKLCA, to the Provincial Commissioner, June 12, 1935; and KNA PC/NZA2/2/27, Oyama Omoro, Secretary Ugenya Community Development, to the Chief Native Commissioner for Native Affairs, August 20, 1951.

21 KNA DC/NN3/2/18, Record of Council Meeting, Matungu, South Wanga, December 13, 1931.

22 See KNA DC/NN10/1/1, Record of Council Meeting, Musanda, South Wanga, May 5, 1932, KNA DC/NN3/3/6, Safari Report, Assistant District Commissioner (North Nyanza) W.H. McGeach, March 9, 1929; and references to Kager and Wanga clan histories in Ogot (1967) and Were (1967).

23 KNA DC/NN3/2/18, Provincial Commissioner Thompson (Nyanza Province) to District Commissioner Anderson (North Nyanza).

24 See, for example, KNA DC/NN10/1/1, UKLCA Petition, September 25, 1933; KNA PC/NZA4/5/2, Intelligence Report, North Nyanza, October 24, 1938; and KNA DC/KMG1/1/33, Secretary of the UKLCA to Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza Province, May 14, 1946.

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Contested Identities: Power and the Fictions of Ethnicity, Ethnography and History in Rwanda

Villia Jefremovas *Carleton University*

Abstract: This article examines the process through which different interpretations of ethnicity and statehood in Rwanda have been used to create and justify policies of exclusion, inclusion and claims to legitimacy, from the colonial period to the present day. Arguing that the roots of such politics can be found in the politics of the precolonial state, it considers how they have been transformed, not created, by colonial and postcolonial governments. Viewing the representation of ethnicity and statehood over time as fictions of ethnicity, ethnography and history, this article illustrates the process of creation and recreation of these fictions and their impact on Rwandan lives.

Résumé: Cet article étudie le processus dans lequel les différentes interprétations de l'ethnicité et du statut étatique au Rwanda ont l'habitude de créer et justifier des politiques d'exclusion et d'inclusion, ainsi que de prétendre à la légitimité, de la période coloniale à nos jours. Considérant que les bases de ces politiques peuvent être trouvées dans les politiques de l'état précolonial, on réfléchit à la façon dont elles ont été transformées, et non créées, par les gouvernements coloniaux ou postcoloniaux. Considérant la représentation de l'ethnicité et du statut étatique au cours du temps, comme étant l'ethnicité, l'ethnographie et l'histoire, cet article illustre le processus de création de ces fictions et leur impact sur les vies rwandaises.

In the fall of 1994, during a private conversation, an officer of a large donor organization expressed her amazement to me that two different ministers of the Rwandan Patriotic Front government which had just been installed in Kigali placed the rewriting of history books as a first priority of the government. Given the general devastation found in the country, this seemed an incomprehensible priority to her. She asked me why this aspect of Rwandan culture was so overwhelmingly important to the current government. Any observer of Rwanda quickly becomes aware of the powerful hold that the interpretation of history and the nature of ethnicity has on any discussion of Rwanda. The origin and meaning of ethnicity in Rwanda, and the nature of the precolonial state have been topics of debate since the first German set foot in the region. For Western observers, these debates have been largely academic, but for the people living in the region these controversies have had serious consequences. Different interpretations of ethnicity and statehood have been used to create and justify policies of exclusion, inclusion and claims to legitimacy, from the colonial period to the present day.

Most recently the whole issue of ethnicity and the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial state in Rwanda has been reopened by the events of 1959-94. In different ways the Rwandans who fled Rwanda in 1959, the Rwandans who remained in Rwanda after 1959, the three successive governments since 1959, the extremists, the opposition and the propagandists of the various political parties in the region, and politicians in the neighbouring countries have interpreted and reinterpreted the "history" of the precolonial and colonial state to justify various policies and actions.

Viewed through the lens of serious research this whole debate can be seen as a series of fictions: fictions of ethnicity, ethnography and history in Rwanda. Rwanda is a particularly fascinating case, because the manipulation of these fictions has been so transparent, and because it has affected the lives of all the people living in

the Great Lakes region of the country. This article will illustrate these characterizations of ethnicity, history and the state in Rwanda and will present an alternative perspective on them, showing how various concepts of ethnicity and "history" have been manipulated by successive governments. It will then consider the genocide in the light of this review.

Fictions of History

Many discussions of Rwandan precolonial history, and of the construction of the precolonial state continue to be highly reductionist (for recent examples see African Rights, 1994; Braeckman, 1994; Destexhe, 1994; Mamdani, 1996). This is due, in part, to the complexity of the subject and the need to make it easily comprehensible, but it is also the result of manipulation for political ends by various groups. Beginning in the precolonial period, intensifying and transmuting under the Belgian colonial period, undergoing further transformation under the first and second Republic and altering again under the current government, the rewriting of history has been a major academic and political project in Rwanda. Central to this project has been the characterization of the nature of precolonial rule, and the role played by various ethnic groups in the precolonial state.

There is no shortage of writings on the precolonial state, both within and outside Rwanda, but there is little agreement about the nature of that state. Authors such as the Abbé Kagame (1972), Gravel (1965, 1968a, 1968b), Maquet (1961a, 1961b, 1967, 1969), Mair (1961) and even Vansina (1963) see the Rwandan state as an equitable albeit somewhat hierarchical state, contending that the clientage system, while unequal, was based on reciprocity and offered strong benefits to the clients. On the basis of this material Basil Davidson tells us:

> Ruanda . . . was the post-colonial descendant of an old kingship in these pleasant uplands along the southern reach of the East African Rift. The general nineteenth-century move toward more emphatic forms of centralised power had developed the dominance of a minority group, the Tutsi, over a Hutu majority. But the manner of this nineteenth-century dominance was mild, and was regulated by "lord and vassal" relationships which had some resemblance to the simpler forms of European feudalism. "The rich man in his castle and the poor man at his gate" appear to have been the outward and visible forms of a mutually acceptable relationship between Tutsi and Hutu; at least in principle these forms represented an agreed sharing of rights and duties. Colonial enclosure changed all that. (Davidson, 1992: 249)

On the other hand, some powerful proponents in the Rwandan scholarly community, most notably Nahimana (1987), emphasized the exploitative nature of the precolonial state, the role of the Tutsi in this state and the Tutsi's status as an "outsider" group. Starting from the premise that the Tutsi are invaders and the Hutu the "natural inhabitants" of the land, this work seeks to discredit the right of Tutsi either to rule or even to inhabit Rwanda. This rewriting of the "Hamitic hypothesis," the idea that the Tutsi are a separate racial group coming from Ethiopia who invaded Rwanda, has formed a basis for the appalling propaganda of the "Hutu Power" extremists of the last regime. This perspective has been well documented by Chrétien and the Reporters sans frontières (1995).

Meta-Conflict and History

However, these diametrically opposed views overlook the work done by both Rwandan and Western scholars from the 1960s until the present day, which shows the complex and changing nature of the precolonial state and precolonial Rwandan history (Des Forges, 1972; Lemarchand, 1994; Meschy, 1974; C. Newbury, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1988; D.S. Newbury, 1980, 1981, 1987, 1995; Rwabukumba and Mudandagizi, 1974; Vidal, 1969, 1974, 1984, 1985, 1991). The debate over whether the precolonial state was equitable or exploitative can be considered to form the elements of a "meta-conflict," that is to say, a conflict about the nature of the conflict. Lemarchand has coined this phrase to describe the nature of the equivalent debate in Burundi. He tells us that:

> It is one thing for a reasonably dispassionate observer to try and assess the roots of the Hutu-Tutsi problem; but how members of each community perceive their predicament, what each attempts to suppress as well as invent, is an altogether different matter. (Lemarchand, 1994: 17)

Instead the political actors involved in the conflict in Burundi each connect:

> past and present through divergent paths. No attempt to demystify the Burundi situation can fail to appreciate the chasm that separates the reality of ethnic conflict from the manner in which it is perceived, explained and mythologized by the participants. Reduced to its essentials, the conflict about the Hutu-Tutsi conflict revolves around three basic disagreements: the significance of ethnicity as a source of tension; the nature of cultural differentiation between Hutu and Tutsi; and the role of history in shaping ethnic antagonisms. (Ibid.)

The same is true for Rwanda: although Rwanda and Burundi approach the current problems they face through different historical paths, their intertwined current histories mean that the "meta-conflict," the conflict about the nature of the conflict, has ended up being phrased in similar terms. This article will focus on the final point that Lemarchand raises, the debate about the history of Rwanda and the nature of precolonial structures in the debate over the role of history in shaping ethnic antagonisms. One of the ironies of Rwanda is that ethnicity is hard to define in Rwanda, because people have the same culture, language, religion, share a common history, live together and intermarry. Despite this, these labels are recognized by people and have power, and that provides a minimum definition of ethnicity. Ethnicity is a very malleable category, and the history of ethnicity in Rwanda shows this clearly, as this work will clearly demonstrate.

Interpretations of History and "Being Rwandan"

Fundamentally, the debate about the role of history in shaping ethnic antagonisms centres on what it means to be Rwandan. Although, as we shall see, this debate was transformed by the colonial characterization of the Batutsi and Bahutu. David Newbury points out that competing visions of Rwandan identity and the meaning of ethnicity are not new. Rather, Newbury argues, they arise out of competing criteria for "defining Rwanda" in the precolonial state:

> ... the ambiguity of defining Rwanda was not only a product of differing views between the power holders and the powerless, it was also an ambiguity apparent within the ruling class, as the state sought both to expand territorially and to consolidate its power internally. At times the court defined being Rwandan in terms of upper-class court values.... At others the court defined Rwandan culture by language alone.... Similarly with political issues: official perceptions treated power in class terms, as defined by effective state penetration.... At other times, they defined the political unit to include all Kinyarwanda-speakers, whether or not they accepted the exercise of central court power. (D.S. Newbury, 1995: 12)

Therefore, Newbury argues that the competing characterizations of the nature of "being Rwandan" wavered between conceptualizations which excluded the large majority of the population from power, and the vision of a single political unit based on criteria of inclusion in the state (ibid.). He contends that, by building on different aspects of this identity, political leaders of both ethnic groups have "reinvented" Rwanda for their own purposes.

An Alternate View of the Precolonial State

When we turn to the recent historical, political, geographical and anthropological work done on precolonial Rwanda, we find a "history" far more complex than the competing characterizations of the Rwandan state would have us believe. The image of "mild dominance" is shattered by the turbulent transformation in land, labour and power relations. Similarly, Davidson's bland "move towards more emphatic forms of centralised power" (Davidson, 1992: 249), becomes a longer and more violent process through which land and power are centralized into the hands of a tiny aristocratic elite.

The image of the brutal "Hamitic" invader is challenged by evidence that the Nyaginya dynasty moved from the area which is now eastern Rwanda into the preexisting agriculturalist and pastoralist kingdoms to the west, north, southwest and northwest, by the long history of coexistence, and by the process of assimilation of disparate groups into the state. Jan Vansina (1962), David Newbury (1987), Alison Des Forges (1972) and J.K. Rennie (1972) all speculate that the original Tutsi kingdom was modelled on these agricultural states, in which kings (*baami,* or *bahinzi*) had a sacred function and only minimal political or economic control. The core of the current Rwandan state appears to have been established in the 14th or 15th century[1] by Ndahiro Ruyange. This kingship was closely tied to the larger Gesera kingdom, and continued to be associated with that kingdom until the 16th century. The position of the Rwandan king (*mwami*) appears to have been as the "first among equals" with the kingship exercising very little power over the population and none over the means of production. Judging from oral history accounts and material from the peripheries of the Rwandan state, the most important political units were lineages and neighbourhood groups and the main powers were vested in the hands of the lineage heads.

Amongst the agricultural groups, these heads distributed land within the lineage and granted land to individuals who came and demanded it. These clients of the lineage (*abagerwa*) had an obligation to provide gifts of food or beer to the lineage in return for the *use* of land. The land continued to belong to the lineage and could be withdrawn by the lineage. Clients could marry into the lineage and so become members (Des Forges, 1972: 2;

Rennie, 1972: 16; Vansina, 1962: 60-62). The frontiers of this kingdom appear to have been expanded by settlement in already pioneered land and by conquest (Rennie, 1972: 16). However this state differed from its neighbours in that it established "a continuing, strongly centralized political organisation with institutions which incorporated both pastoralists and agriculturalists" (ibid.: 25).

In the 16th century, Kigeri Mukobanya enlarged the ceremonial and real powers of the king (*mwami*) and established a permanent military organization. He formed the *ntore*, small armies, and organized them into *ngabo*, larger armies, founded on the basis of lineages. Power was based on control of men and not control of land. The leaders of these *ngabo* exacted tribute (*ikoro*) from the region they controlled, and although they sent a share of this tribute to the central court, they were relatively independent of it. This organization was initially implemented out of military necessity because of the threat posed by the powerful kingdoms which bordered the state. However, it soon became a mechanism for assimilating populations, exacting services and goods and punishing those that did not comply with these demands (D.S. Newbury, 1987: 170).

Umuheto, a form of clientage between less powerful and more powerful lineages, grew in importance at this time. Under this form of clientage less powerful cattle-owning lineages gave a cow or cows to the more powerful lineage in return for protection of their herds (Des Forges, 1972: 5-6; Vansina, 1962: 65). During the 16th and 17th centuries the war chiefs, the leaders (*umutware*) of the *ngabo*, became increasingly powerful. They started to take over the functions of the lineage heads, settling disputes and appropriating the right to distribute vacant lands. This began to erode the power of the lineage heads and reduce the size of the effective functioning unit of the lineage (Des Forges, 1972; Vansina, 1962).

The process of erosion of lineage power was accelerated in the 18th century. To pre-empt the control of the war chiefs, the *baami* asserted their exclusive right to control land by enlarging the powers of the *abanyabutaka*, "men of the land." These men, who had been responsible for provisioning the Court when it resided in a region and for provisioning the household of the *mwami*'s wife who lived in the region, became responsible for collecting an annual tribute (in kind) from the agriculturalists. Hutu, who received land from these chiefs, owed labour service, also called *uburetwa*, in which they worked two out of every five days for the land chief. This new institution began to redirect the focus of power from the lineage to chiefs appointed from above (Des Forges, 1972: 7; Rwabukumba and Mudandagizi, 1974: 7, 10-11; Vansina, 1962: 68-70). The process of centralization of power and land in Rwanda intensified differentiation at the lineage level. Rwabukumba and Mudandagizi have shown that the clientage relationships, like *umuheto*—though based on lineages—linked the fortunes of different lineage segments to those of their particular patrons rather than to the fortunes of the larger lineage group (Rwabukumba and Mudandagizi 1974: 18-19).

Over time the land chiefs and the war chiefs lay claims to common lands, which they appropriated and distributed to clients. The large majority of these lands were common pasture lands. In response to this development, Yuhi Gahindiro established a new set of officials, *abanyamukenke* (men of the grass) to assert Court control over pasture land and collect prestations for its use. To break up the territories controlled by the powerful chiefs, he also created small personal holdings called *ibikingi* which he distributed to his favourites. These people controlled all rights over that land, could take on clients and exact tribute, and were not responsible to the local chiefs, only to the *mwami*.

Associated with these changes was the development of a form of personal clientage called *ubuhake*, and of land clientage, *isambu*. In the former the relationship was marked by the transfer of the usufruct of a cow from the patron to the client. In the latter a form of heritable tenure over land was given in return for payments in kind. Both of these could be revoked at the whim of the patron. During this time *uburetwa*, land clientage linked to labour service, continued to grow in importance. As these forms of clientage became more widespread, the *mwami* used these institutions to his own advantage, asserting a hierarchy of clientage in which the king was the supreme patron. The effective lineage unit became progressively smaller, as members of the same lineages were drawn into different relationships based on clientage and locality (Des Forges, 1972: 7-8; Rwabukumba and Mudandagizi, 1974: 13-15; Vansina, 1962: 68-70; Vidal, 1969: 396).

Although the process of centralization intensified in the mid-17th century, it was the *Mwami* Rwabugiri (1865-1895), who thoroughly consolidated the system of clientage, smashed the power of the lineages and centralized the powers of the chiefs. Rwabugiri's expansion of his kingdom through conquest, was accompanied by the wholesale extermination or incorporation of a previously independent lineage-based elite and the systematic appropriation of lineage, community and fallow lands (Rwabukumba and Mudandagizi, 1974: 19). Des Forges

tells us that Rwabugiri "brought the notables to heel" through " ruthless terror and astute manipulation of rivalries" (1972: 13). By the beginning of the 20th century, the majority of the population was part of a dependent peasantry.

Expansion and Assimilation under the Precolonial State

The expansion of the Rwandan state was not a smooth and relentless conquest of the neighbouring kingdoms and regions. Rather, it grew and contracted under different reigns, until the mid-18th century to the end of the 19th century when there was a systematic push into the peripheries (Vansina, 1962: 97). Tutsi colonialism, especially after the 17th century, followed a distinct pattern. The newly incorporated areas were first placed under the rule of different lineage-based war chiefs and armies. Although these chiefs ruled the region, the king (*mwami*) also established a residence controlled by a wife or by a favourite.

A process of assimilation took place under the armies and through Tutsi settlers. Local cattle-holding lineages came to be considered Tutsi, while local agriculturalists were considered "non-Tutsi," and over time were classed as "Hutu." This history of warfare, conquest and assimilation happened more often with states we would consider to be "Tutsi" than "Hutu. As the state expanded from the 14th century on groups were incorporated as Hutu if they were predominantly farmers, or as Tutsi if they were predominantly herders, and aristocrats of both "groups" were assimilated and intermarried with the old aristocracy. Over time this state became a highly effective colonial state. It was also a state in which the nature of power changed over time, and these changes had political, social, economic and cultural implications. As the power of the Tutsi grew in the region, the state began to extend other aspects of central administration into these regions, until they were fully incorporated into the central state (Des Forges, 1972, 1986; C. Newbury, 1988; D.S. Newbury, 1987: 169-170; Vansina, 1962).

Under Rwabugiri, the administrative system was extended into the peripheries of the kingdom and the system of clientage and land tenure was spread even further downward affecting all levels of society (C. Newbury, 1978: 19). Despite the unprecedented power of this organization, at the time of colonialism, the Tutsi kingdom only had tenuous control in much of the north and had only just integrated a good part of the east (Freedman, 1984: 95, Vansina 1962: 96). In the areas under control of the court, Rwabugiri systematically crushed the power of the local chiefs and lords. Through manipulation of rivalries and through assassination and terror, he was able to replace the independent, hereditary chiefs with men who were dependent on him for their positions. To extend their control, these chiefs, in turn, instituted clientage relationships with the local population. The appropriation of land, the destruction of the lineage system and increasing population density made these ties increasingly necessary for peasant survival (Des Forges, 1972: 14-15; Meschy, 1974: 39-51; C. Newbury, 1974: 26-38; C. Newbury, 1978: 17-29; Rwabukumba and Mudandagizi, 1974: 6-25; Vansina, 1962: 60, 71-72, 90; Vidal, 1969: 384-401; Vidal, 1974: 52-74). Where control was more recent, such as in the southwest and in the northwest, many forms of tenure and leadership coexisted (Des Forges, 1986; Fairhead, 1990; Freedman, 1984: 93-98; C. Newbury 1988; Vansina, 1962). Therefore we can see that the precolonial state was never one single coherent unit with two tribes, but rather a state created by conquest and assimilation of a disparate group of peoples.

In 1895, Kigeri Rwabugiri died and Mibambwe Rutarindwa who had been ruling as co-regnant for 10 years was enthroned. The Queen-mother, Kanjogera, with her brothers, began a civil war to establish her own son, Musinga, on the throne. During this civil war, control over the north was lost and control over the west became less secure. Musinga, a minor, was established on the throne in 1896. However, the independent reign of Musinga was short-lived. German colonial rule was established in 1898 (Des Forges, 1972, 1986).

Changing Ethnic Relations in the Precolonial State

The period from the mid-17th century until the European rule saw dramatic changes in the Rwandan state. The power of kin groups which had formed the centre of political and economic life up to the early 19th century was destroyed, and in its place a system of one to one (patron-client) ties between hierarchically ordered individuals gave people access to land and power. However, it was the king Rwabugiri, in the 50 years before colonialism, who finally smashed the power of the lineages by exterminating or incorporating a previously independent lineage-based elite and taking central control over lineage, community and fallow lands. This period also saw the transformation of "ethnic" categories and their meaning in Rwanda (Meschi, 1974; C. Newbury, 1988; Rwabukumba and Mudandagizi 1974; Vidal, 1974).

By the beginning of the 20th century, the majority of the population in the central regions of Rwanda was part of a dependent peasantry. The best possible option for these peasants was to establish a one-to-one tie with a lord. In return for land, the peasant owed the lord two days labour, 50 percent of his harvest and a series of taxes and other services. The worst situation was one in which the whole family worked as hired labourers in return for pay in food, and still owed obligations and taxes to the lords. Claudine Vidal argues that as much as 50 percent of peasants worked as wage labourers on a regular basis at the beginning of this century, even if they had some land (Vidal, 1974: 58-64). During this time, the relationship between lords and peasants was beginning to take on a distinctly ethnic flavour. Under Rwabugiri, Central Rwanda saw the beginnings of an important distinction between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa which determined access to various resources, which cross-cut classes and which provided differential obligations.

The elite, who by 1898 were mostly Tutsi, saw themselves as distinctly superior to both poor Hutu and poor Tutsi. In addition, some rich Hutu, who gained favour in the court married Tutsi women and their children became Tutsi. Still, the vast majority of the Tutsi were commoners who had more in common with the Hutu peasants than with the Tutsi lords, while the Hutu lords, who formed a minority in the elite, had little in common with the Hutu peasants whom they exploited (Chrétien, 1985: 150; C. Newbury, 1978: 21, and 1988: 13; Vidal, 1969: 399).

European Colonial State: Fictions of History

Ethnic categories were becoming increasingly important at the end of the precolonial period, but ethnic-based "castes" only crystallized during the Belgian period, which began in 1912. There was always an uneasy relationship between the elite and the Belgians, but with the need to make a profit out of the colony, and the need to rule through the elite, a power struggle developed between the court and the colonial administration. Despite their dissatisfaction with certain members of the aristocracy, the Belgians saw the Tutsi as the "natural" rulers of Rwanda (Vidal, 1973: 37). The Belgians began a campaign to remove the king and the recalcitrant aristocrats by supporting one faction within the elite against another, trying to further the careers of those Tutsi they saw as favourable to their policies. To do this they embarked on a frankly racist set of policies. It was no longer membership in an elite family which gave the lords a right to rule, but membership in a superior race, "the Tutsi." Under this formulation, the Tutsi were characterised as "Hamitic" invaders who ruled the inferior "Bantu" populations which they had conquered (see Prunier, 1995: 5-9 for an overview of the worst of this literature, Maquet, 1961a: 11-12 for a moderate, colonial period view of "racial" differences).

Using this ideology, the Belgians were able to place their hand-picked recruits in power, and to overthrow the king and put one of his mission-educated sons on the throne. To justify their racist vision of Rwanda they were obliged to purge the government of a few thousand Hutu lords.[2] Other racist policies were put into place. For example, the schools, which were designated for training future administrators, were deliberately restricted to Tutsi students alone (Des Forges, 1972: 198; Lemarchand, 1970: 73; Vidal, 1973: 35) and a height regulation was put into place to judge the degree of "Tutsiness." The ideology of the period promoted the idea that the Tutsi were born to rule, which reflected European social/racial theories of the day. This was the 1920s and 1930s, the period of eugenics in the U.S. and Europe and Nazism in Germany.

At the same time, the Europeans began a policy of encouraging the chiefs to undertake large-scale cash cropping, especially coffee and vegetables, with the use of corvée labour. In addition, there was an expansion of European public works projects. European enterprises, such as plantations, industries and mines, also demanded that the government provide labour. This labour was often recruited by ordering the chiefs to produce a set number of workers for a given day. Chiefs, who were not able to do so, lost their positions, those who complied became wealthy (Chrétien, 1978; C. Newbury, 1988: 165-176).

The development of new institutions, like the introduction of "native tribunals" in 1936, only increased the power of the Tutsi elite. These were headed only by Tutsi chiefs and were used to expand Tutsi power and legitimize abuses (Lemarchand 1970: 75-76.) Earlier the Belgians had banned dissatisfied subjects or clients from seeking new patrons. These "reforms" effectively destroyed the sole means which had enabled the peasantry to escape an oppressive lord. It is not surprising that Belgian reforms after the World War II did nothing to change the situation of the peasantry. Between 1949 and 1954, various reforms were made "on paper" but the reality did not change: peasants were only able to get land by making ties with lords, and lords still needed the labour and were still responsible to the state for labour and taxes.

However it must also be stressed that the Tutsi ruling elite played a role in this process. The king, Rudahigwa, crystallized the "Tutsi ideology" through research and publications on his dynastic history (especially the writings of the Abbé Kagame), through sports, arts, clothing and through the choice of court members and members of foreign delegations (Chrétien, 1985: 146-147). "Traditional" Rwanda was essentially reconstructed during this period (Chrétien, 1985: 146).

The Colonial State: Fictions of Ethnography

Research during the colonial period by both Tutsi and Europeans promoted "the vision . . . of a timeless feudal state" (Chrétien 1985: 147, my translation). One of the most blatant cases of this is the study by Maquet. In discussing his ethnography on the precolonial system of government, he states that he did not interview any Hutu because "the more competent people on political organisation were the Tutsi" (Maquet, 1961: 3). He justifies this by arguing that his "aim was not to assess the opinions and knowledge of the whole of the Ruanda population on their past political organisation, but to discover *as accurately as possible* what that organisation was" (ibid., my emphasis). This new vision of ethnicity in Rwanda was filled with contradictions and anomalies, not the least of which was that all three "ethnicities" or "castes" were represented in every clan. However, at the same time that Maquet was working on this study, the Belgian colonial policies were changing, through pressure from the UN and from the new Belgian clergy and administrators who were of "relatively humble social origins" and so "were more generally disposed to identify with the plight of the Hutu masses" (Lemarchand, 1970: 134, 138).

By the late 1940s and 1950s, the Belgians faced strong pressure from the United Nations to reform the administrative system. However, the reforms had little effect. The revolutionary political events of the 1950s and 1960s grew out of this situation. The reforms forced the Belgians to educate some Hutu, but they still excluded these educated Hutu from power, both political and economic. This educated cadre formed a whole series of political parties, which eventually coalesced into a Hutu extremist party, the Parmehutu, who rewrote history to reflect their claim that racially the Hutu held the right to rule Rwanda (C. Newbury, 1980, 1988).

The Postcolonial State and Fictions of Ethnicity and History

The anti-Tutsi rhetoric grew in intensity and the Belgians championed the new "natural" rulers of Rwanda, the Hutu. The years 1959-61 saw considerable turbulence and bloodshed. Initially, anti-Tutsi sentiments took the form of land invasions and the harassment of the Tutsi who were powerful, affluent or well connected, however this soon escalated into bloodshed (Codere, 1973). In 1962, when the Parmehutu party was elected to power with Gregoire Kayibanda as President, the reconstruction of the "Hamitic Hypothesis" intensified. The first and only elected Rwandan government drew its strength from a pro-Hutu, racist ideology. This government became increasingly corrupt, and by the late 1960s and early 1970s it had concentrated access to resources, opportunities and power into the hands of a tiny elite.

In 1973, faced with opposition from northern factions who began to be openly critical of the regime, and the growing discontent of the poor, who began to attack the rich, Kayibanda incited ethnic violence in the schools and university. However, Kayibanda lost control of this process and the Parmehutu party fell to a northern coup d'état on July 5, 1973 (C. Newbury, 1992: 197-198; Reyntjens, 1994: 29). This was a very popular coup, because it reduced both the ethnic violence and the level of government corruption in Rwanda (Reyntjens, 1994: 29). Reyntjens explains:

> Today, it is forgotten that President Habyarimana was particularly popular with Tutsi in the country, and that he was accused of favouring this group by some Hutu groups. (Reyntjens, 1994: 35-36; my translation)

Background to the Genocide

By 1989, Habyarimana was facing a crisis. There was growing discontent with his regime and at the same time the country was required to undergo serious economic restructuring. The invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, in 1990, the majority of whom were Tutsi, provided a propaganda opportunity which deflected criticism of the military regime. Interclass conflicts arose out of the policies of the Habyarimana regime in this period, during which the disparity between rich and poor grew enormously throughout the country and the political and social distance between elites and the predominantly rural poor grew as well (Newbury, 1992: 203; Reyntjens, 1994: 32 n.47, 33).

Economic recession and economic restructuring played a critical role in the growth of this disparity and of

extremism in Rwanda. The fall of coffee prices by 50 percent in 1989 meant that hundreds of thousands of households lost 50 percent of their cash incomes because most of the coffee was grown by small holders. The economic restructuring, which followed, made food prices soar, salaries fall, public services collapse and led to a 40 percent devaluation of the Rwandan Franc (Chossudovsky, 1995a; Newbury and Newbury, 1994: 1; Olson, 1994: 4). In the early 1990s several areas of the country suffered a drought and for the first time since independence people could not afford to buy food, emergency stocks had been reduced and people died of hunger (Newbury, 1992; Newbury and Newbury, 1994). During this period the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded and arms flooded the country (Chossudovsky 1995b; Newbury and Newbury, 1994: 1-2; Reyntjens, 1994: 151-154; Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994).

At the same time, the population bomb exploded. There was little land for the new group of youth reaching the age of majority, in an economy which remained based on agriculture and in which few non-farm options existed or had been created. From the 1940s to the mid-1980s, new lands were opened up and this helped deal with the population pressure, but by the 1980s, "these options were virtually exhausted" (Olson, 1994: 4). There was no new land to be opened up and farm sizes shrank to an average of 0.7 hectares. These young men had nothing to inherit and had few non-farm options. Until the economic restructuring, Habyarimana's regime had provided rural-based projects to absorb some of these youth, but all of these efforts disappeared with restructuring. Peasants also lost access to health care, to schooling and to other services which had been subsidized by the state.

The Civil War and the Fictions of History and Ethnicity

Ironically, amidst this economic and political crisis the rich became much richer. Prominent among the richest of the rich were the military, government officials and the supporters of Habyarimana, most of whom were drawn from the north of Rwanda (Reyntjens, 1994: 33-34). Every region saw the growth of an elite which had fewer and fewer connections with the peasantry (Newbury, 1992). There was little will to deal with this crisis and few resources under economic restructuring to do so. One informant summed up this transformation succinctly when he said: "We, the elites, were so comfortable in those last years, running after the new things we could have for the first time, that we forgot about the problems of the poor" (M.K., February 1995).

The push for "democratization" took place in this context of economic crisis and of war. Like many a political demagogue before him, Habyarimana and factions of the elite used this crisis to foster extremism. They dealt with the unemployment crisis by arming this mass of disaffected youth. Each political party had its militias, especially in the urban areas, and the political arena was the new source of even more economic and social spoils. Multipartism was also linked to a very real push for democratic structures in Rwanda, but for too much of the elite multipartism became a struggle for spoils. This led to a greater pillaging of the economy, a growing debt and more disparity while the war helped fuel the "ethnic" rhetoric of the extremist parties. The growth of these parties under international pressure and scrutiny also gave the opposition a false sense of security in an atmosphere of economic crisis and extremism. An informant commented bitterly: "All that multipartism did was write the death lists" (I.B., December 1994). As discontent with the Hayarimana regime grew, so did the government propaganda, which stressed that the Tutsi were the enemy and the ancient oppressors of Rwanda.

Interclass and Intraclass Violence and the Crisis

When Habyarimana's airplane went down on April 6, 1994, three things happened or did not happen: (1) most of the military stayed in its barracks waiting for the RPF; (2) the Presidential Guard and the *Interahamwe* (the MRND/CDR militias) went out to kill the opposition (the majority of whom were Hutu), the critics of the government (the majority of whom were Hutu) and Tutsi leaders; and, (3) other landless youth and the urban poor went rampaging through the rich neighbourhoods. The media coverage showed gangs roaming through the elite neighbourhoods, going door to door—looting, terrorizing, humiliating, killing—drunk on expensive liquor and carrying expensive goods. This makes little sense if they were only killing Tutsi, because most residents of those neighbourhoods were Hutu.

Discussing the events of the first three days with a number of Tutsi and Hutu who escaped from Kigali, it is striking how often both were threatened. As one man put it, "there was many a Hutu elite man on his knees in front of his Hutu gardener pleading for his life." This same man ran into the chauffeur from his department who told him proudly: "I'm rich now, boss, I've looted lots of houses!" (I.B., December 1994). Another Hutu family speaks of cowering in an interior corridor for three days because the mobs were running through the

neighbourhood. They left after the first three days because they decided that they "would rather die in the streets than like rats in the house." There is no doubt there was a difference in how Hutu and Tutsi were treated (non-political Hutu were terrorised while non-political Tutsi were killed) but, as Reyntjens argues, the socioeconomic aspects of the killings also should not be ignored (Reyntjens, 1994: 299).

The Presidential Guard and the *Interahamwe* killed as many of the enemies on their lists as they could find, and effectively neutralised the UN Peacekeeping Troops by torturing and killing the 10 Belgian peacekeepers guarding Agathe Uwilingiyimama, the southern Hutu Prime Minister. Two thousand plus peacekeepers were withdrawn from Rwanda. This gave the extremists a *carte blanche* to hunt down and kill opposition members and Tutsi in Kigali. However, after these first days, we also see an intensification of the call for the extermination of the Tutsi. I would argue that, as in the case of Kirinda, this renewed call was mounted to deflect and redirect the violence of the poor and young against the Tutsi and away from the rich Hutu elite. It was also used to mask the killing of the opposition.

There was also a pattern of using coercion to make others join in the killings or at least join in the gangs which targeted Tutsi for death (African Rights, 1994: 568-596; Mujawamariya, 1994: 8-9). As the killings gained momentum, the violence became more complex and less linked to purely political ends. There was outright robbery (African Rights, 1994: 577-583). Personal vendettas were settled. Property under dispute could be appropriated by one claimant from another on the basis of accusations (Reyntjens, 1994: 299). People who had excited the jealousy of their neighbours by being marginally more affluent were attacked. Moreover, as the crisis progressed, the killings became an end in themselves. And there is no question that genocide took place in Rwanda.

The reasons why this anti-Tutsi sentiment could be manipulated so successfully is based on both the precolonial and colonial history of Rwanda, and also the make up of the Rwandan Patriotic Front which was predominantly Tutsi, some drawn from the descendants of the aristocrats who fled Rwanda in 1959-63. The regime fostered by the Belgians was very rapacious and very corrupt and most of the peasantry was terrified by the prospect of its return. However, it is important to note that the vast majority of the Tutsi in Rwanda have been and remain poor peasants living in equivalent circumstances to their neighbours. Nonetheless, throughout this period, there was a deliberate use of ethnic violence for political ends, the killings were ordered from above and the majority carried out by the militias (African Rights, 1994; Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994: 2-7; Mujawamariya, 1994: 36-52; Reyntjens, 1994: 298-299).

It should be stressed that, until 1990, the regime of Habyarimana did not use ethnic violence as a political tool. However, after the invasion of the RPF in 1990 this changed. There was a systematic use of ethnic violence between 1990 and 1993 which was escalated in April 1994 (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994; Reyntjens, 1994: 183-192). As in 1973, this process has been linked with the consolidation of power by a small elite and with regional politics (Reyntjens, 1994: 27-29).

Regional Differences in the Genocide

If we consider the development of the genocide throughout the country (in the 1991-93 period and in 1994) we will see that the violence was neither spontaneous nor the result of "ancient hatreds." The killings did not erupt throughout the whole country, instead, many regions stayed calm through weeks of bloodshed. The killings, where they took place, were orchestrated by various elites and targeted different groups with different degrees of success throughout the country. Each region and areas within each region either resisted or became involved for different reasons.

Looking at the pattern of killings in the period between 1991-93, it can be seen that the major ethnic/political massacres and attacks were concentrated in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Kibuye (Figure 1). During the attacks of 1994 we see a similar pattern. The killings in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Cyangugu began almost simultaneously with the killings in Kigali. Soon after, Kibuye began the massacres. Kibungo was the scene of some of the most horrific killings during the genocide. The Bugesera region in Kigali Prefecture also had major massacres. Cyangugu (which had minor attacks between 1991-93) was the site of terrible attacks on Tutsi immediately after the airplane of the president was shot down. Butare and Giterama were effectively left alone between 1991-93 and resisted the call for genocide the longest (African Rights, 1994: 583-590; Mujawamariya, 1994: 6-9, 25-26, 43-44, 51; Pottier and Wilding, 1994: 23; Reyntjens, 1994: 183-192, 295-297). If we consider the social, historical and political context of this crisis, region by region, we can see that ethnic hatred is not the major factor.

Figure 1
Rwanda: Principal Ethnic/Political Massacres or Attacks (1991-93)



Source: Reyntjens, 1994: 186.

The North: Fictions of Tradition

By the 1980s the main positions in Habyarimana's regime, as well as access to resources such as scholarships, were concentrated in the hands of elites from the prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi (Reyntjens 1994: 33-34). By April 1994 power was concentrated even further into the hands of certain members of Mme Habyarimana's family and certain members of the northern elite, the infamous "Akazu" (ibid.: 189). At the same time, this area had the highest population density in Rwanda, the greatest disparity in land holdings and a growing landless group. The land clientage which was at the root of this disparity was always justified as a "Hutu institution" predating Tutsi and colonial rule (Pottier, 1992: 3, 6-7). This area also had the lowest proportion of Tutsi in the country, because it had been only incorporated into the precolonial state during the last years of the 19th century

(Des Forges, 1986; C. Newbury, 1988; Vansina, 1962). The problem of landlessness and the growing gap between rich and poor potentially made this area the most explosive for the Habyarimana regime. The core of the extremists came from this area, and this extremism favoured the interests of the political elite. As the map shows, there was a pattern of "ethnic" massacres through this area during the 1990s. In April of 1994, this area provided the manpower to help hunt down and kill Tutsi in other regions of the country (African Rights, 1994; Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994: 4; Mujawamariya, 1994).

The East: The Frontier

The regions of Kibungo and Bugesera (in Kigali Prefecture) also saw some of the worst killing before and during the genocide. These areas were not as populated as either the Northern prefectures or the prefectures of Butare and Gitarama; however, they were a major area of in-migration and the site of much of the unsettled land in Rwanda before the 1990s (African Rights, 1994; Olson, 1994: 4; Reyntjens, 1994: 184). Many of the Tutsi who fled the persecutions of 1959-62, 1963 and 1973, settled into this area. During the 1980s and 1990s, many of the landless and jobless youth from the north moved into these areas looking for land. By the 1980s most of the unsettled land was occupied and this region could no longer absorb surplus population. During the 1990s the old established Tutsi and the in-migrant Hutu groups clashed for access to land and for power. Given this situation, the government targeted this area for extremist propaganda, for its campaign of killings in the 1990s and found fertile ground amongst the landless youth from the north for the militias (Mujawamariya, 1994: 43-44, 51-52; Reyntjens, 1994: 184-187).

The Southwest: Cyangugu and Gikongoro

Cyangugu in the southwest of Rwanda also was the site of killings in 1991-93. There were also attempts to incite violence in 1991-92 in Gikongoro, but these were less successful. However, after October 1993 when Melchior Ndadaye was killed in Burundi, this changed and there were massacres in this prefecture (Reyntjens, 1994: 186-187). The *Préfet* (Governor) of Cyangugu, Emmanuel Bagambiki, had been implicated in massacres of Tutsi in Bugesera in 1992 and 1993 and had been involved in the killings of both Tutsi and Hutu opposition members in Cyangugu during 1993. As soon as Habyarimana's airplane was shot down, the killings began in both prefectures (African Rights, 1994: 227-231). The west of Cyangugu, near the Zaïrian border, was the worst area for killing outside of Kigali. As in the rest of the country, the witnesses interviewed in both prefectures dwelt on the role of extremist politicians, government functionaries, militias, soldiers and police in leading the killings (African Rights, 1994: 227-231, 289-292).

The "ancient hatreds" argument holds little water in this region, as C. Newbury documents, it was an area where the old Tutsi state had not consolidated power (C. Newbury, 1988). Pottier has suggested that the government fostered extremist politics and appointed an extremist *préfet* because of the strategic location of Cyangugu. It sits on a major route out of the country (Pottier, 1995).

The Centre and South: Butare and Gitarama

If the "ethnic violence" and "ancient hatreds" arguments are to be borne out, then the centre of the old kingdom, the prefectures of Butare and Gitarama should have shown the greatest degree of violence. However, this was the area that most strongly resisted the orders to kill. It took until April 18 for the killings to start and, in the end, the *Interahamwe* and presidential guards had to be brought in from Kigali and the north to force people to kill. Butare and Gitarama were the centre of opposition to the northern dominated government, and the local government was dominated by opposition members, with the notable exception of certain communes (African Rights, 1994: 583-590, 231-232, 248; Mujawamariya, 1994). There was also less disparity in land distribution, more intermarriage between Tutsi and Hutu and much more contact between ethnic groups. Survivors spoke of the solidarity between Hutu and Tutsi, which needed to be destroyed in order that the killings could be effected (African Rights, 1994: 583-584; Mujawamariya, 1994). This solidarity, coupled with opposition to the killings by the *préfet*, meant that even extremist politicians and *Interahamwe* in the communes were not able to act on the orders to kill. It is only when the *préfet* was killed by the army that the killings began. Again, the political opposition, the people who refused to give the orders, or those who helped Tutsi escape were hunted down and killed along with the Tutsi (African Rights, 1994: 583-590, 231-258, 607-610; Mujawamariya, 1994).

Violence and Political Manipulation

The orchestrated nature of the killings is shown graphically in the statements collected by African Rights. These statements also show how various Hutu functionaries tried to stop the killings only to be overridden and often killed (African Rights, 1994: 231-253, 607-617). More than anything, this ethnic violence represented a struggle between elites, as Josephine Mukandori, a survivor, tells us:

> In our sector [Kareba, Butare] and... in Ntyazo [Butare], Tutsis and Hutus fought together.... The Hutus who really fought on our side were the ordinary people, not the educated ones.... These ones who understood the politics of the attacks explained to the ordinary Hutus what was taking place and they began to desert us. (African Rights, 1994: 248)

She argues that the local population was able to hold out against the *Interahamwe* because the militias were only armed with machetes and clubs. The *Interahamwe* were only able to start killing once the soldiers arrived.

Throughout the country the so-called "spontaneous violence" can be shown to have been systematic and cold-blooded. It did not arise out of ancient hatreds, but through overt political manipulation, ruthlessly orchestrated by a morally bankrupt elite. Factors such as the growing landlessness, disparities between rich and poor, the ambitions of an increasingly ruthless elite losing their grip on power, regional politics and regional dynamics played a central role in the genocide and political slaughter. As Josephine Mukandori tells us "in the end the population lost" (ibid.: 248).

The Rwandan Patriotic Front and Fictions of History and Ethnicity

The new government in Rwanda, formed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, has concerns of establishing legitimacy which are similar to those of all the previous regimes. Where Habyarimana and Kayibanda wished to lay claims to having a "natural majority," and the Belgians lay claims to having access to "natural rulers," the crisis of identity facing the Rwandan Patriotic Front concerns membership and inclusiveness. This is a complex process. The extreme end of this process argues that there is no ethnic difference whatsoever, rather it is a misunderstood class term. As Johan Pottier points out, this leads to claims such as those put forward by an RPF captain that "If you have more than 10 cows you can become a Tutsi.... Hutu simply means 'servant' in our language. Somebody with lots of cows has the right to have servants. Tutsi just means rich" (Mudenge, interview, *The Guardian*, March 5, 1994, quoted in Pottier, 1994: 9). This is a claim I have also heard on many occasions. Mamdani notes the same process (1996: 6). The RPF claim that they wish to eradicate the use of these terms, however many Hutu to whom I speak remain sceptical, that scepticism being based on events in Burundi. As Lemarchand points out for Burundi, the lack of reference to the terms does not mean that they do not continue to have power and mean real discrimination in everyday life (1994: 10), nor has the lack of the terms stopped the army from massacring Hutu.

More commonly, the argument is put forward that the precolonial state was equitable and balanced and the exploitative elements entered it only under colonialism (Pottier, 1994). However, as I have shown, this argument is also far too simplistic. Rather the research on the history of precolonial Rwanda done in recent years shows an evolving complex state, in which there was a radical transformation in social relations and the meaning of ethnicity over a 350-year period. Further transformations took place under the Germans and the Belgians, and again under the "Hutu" republics, and this process continues under the RPF government.

Power and the Fictions of Ethnicity, History and Ethnography

Clearly the spurious racial theories of the Belgian colonial period need to be thrown into the dustbin of history where they belong, but the debate surrounding the precolonial state and the ways in which it has been presented still needs to be understood in context. David Newbury delineates the conflicting views of "being Rwandan" which existed in the precolonial state. He shows the roots of these conflicting views in a discourse amongst the Central Court which "both sought to expand territorially and to consolidate its power internally" (D.S. Newbury, 1995: 12). Accordingly, the Court rhetoric encompassed both a conception in which a ritually sanctioned and seperate elite held power in a clearly defined hierarchy, with distinct customs and rituals, and a vision of a single Rwandan identity which included all Kinyarwanda speakers. The various fictions of history and ethnicity which this article has considered incorporate alternative and competing views of what it constitutes to "be Rwandan."

The history of Rwanda is far more complex than the various fictions that have been explored would lead us to believe. It is a history of a state which changed over time

and was in the process of rapid transition at the advent of European colonialism. Both reciprocity and exploitation characterized a wide variety of relations in this complex state. Ethnicity was not invented by the Belgians, but a racial ideology was imposed on these categories. Most of the simplistic formulations and debates which characterize the state as benign hierarchy or viciously exploitative deny the complex and evolving nature of power, state and ethnicity in the 500 years preceding colonialism in Rwanda. This work has shown how, beginning in the precolonial period for the purposes of empire building, intensifying and transmuting under the Belgian colonial period to legitimate the structures of colonial rule, to validate the racial theories of that regime and to increase the power of the local aristocracy, undergoing further transformation under the first and second republic in order to justification of the exclusion and persecution of certain groups and altering again under the current government to legitimate new structures of power, the rewriting of history has been a major academic and political project in Rwanda.

Notes

1 See D.S. Newbury, 1994, for a comprehensive look at the various proposed Rwandan dynastic chronologies.

2 The Tutsi central state practised indirect rule, so that many of the chiefs who held power were Hutu, especially in the Northwest (Des Forges, 1972).

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The Power Plays of Identities on Commercial Farms in Zimbabwe: "Law and Gender" in Southern Africa Revisited[1]

Blair Rutherford *University of Regina*

Abstract: This article raises questions about the heuristic and political effects of "normalizing" sociological identities, the state and space through discussing gendered identities on commercial farms in Hurungwe District, Zimbabwe. It discusses how the various "interests" of men and women farm workers cannot be "read" off their gender but must be situated within the jural identities that have emerged within the specific legal space of commercial farms. Through approaching farm workers this way, it is suggested that academic studies and political interventions can better understand the jural identities and power relations involved on the commercial farms and in our own representations.

Résumé: Cet exposé traite de questions concernant les effets heuristiques et politiques des identités sociologiques «normalisantes», de l'état et de l'espace à travers les identités de genre portant à discussion dans les fermes commerciales du Hurungwe District au Zimbabwe. Il traite de la manière dont les divers «intérêts» des ouvriers agricoles hommes ou femmes ne peuvent être dans l'annonce de leur genre mais doivent être représentés dans les identités légales qui ont émergées à l'intérieur de l'espace spécifique des fermes commerciales requis par la loi. Par cette approche des ouvriers agricoles, on suggère que les études académiques et les interventions politiques puissent être plus compréhensives à l'égard des identités légales et des relations de pouvoir inhérentes des fermes commerciales et de nos propres représentations.

Introduction

Under the rubric of the "postcolonial," social scientists and cultural theorists are trying to go "beyond" the inherited heuristic approaches, ontologies and epistemologies that have characterized their disciplines in order to more strategically challenge hierarchical social orderings. In anthropology, such critical attention has helped to destabilize the field of knowledge built around "culture" (Abu-Lughod, 1991, 1993; D. Scott, 1992; Thomas, 1994), while in feminist studies a similar disordering has been carried out on "women," "sex" and "gender" (Butler, 1990; Haraway, 1989; Mohanty, 1983; J. Scott, 1992; Yanagisako and Delaney, 1995). The hope is that by de-hitching analyses from the presumed certainties guaranteed by the disciplinary foundations (e.g., everyone belongs to a unified "culture" or "gender"), the analyst can deploy criticisms strategically rather than embedding them within grand theories, teleological histories or programmatic politics (Faris, 1992, 1996).

I try to follow this current trend in this article by building on the important academic work that has investigated the role of gender in the construction of state laws and regulations in Southern Africa. I do so by going beyond problematic tendencies in this literature of "normalizing" sociological identities, the state and space. Most of these works presume constant (ahistorical and prediscursive) interests for the sociological categories of gender, race and class, and characterize "the state" and its laws as a somewhat transparent carrier of these interests. Such analyses indeed assume pregiven interests for men and women and use them as a norm to explain and criticize state regulations and the social responses they evoke. Moreover, this form of analysis tends to portray the implementation of laws and regulations as a geographically uniform process, assuming the "nation" (or "colony") at large as its normative scale of analysis; a portrayal which glosses over how different sites become

distinctive legal spaces in (inter)national and local regulatory practices. Following the work of some current feminist and anthropological theorists (e.g., Butler and Scott, 1992; Hirsch and Lazarus-Black, 1994; Manicom, 1992), I aim to move beyond these tendencies to a necessary consideration of the ways in which gendered, racial, class and spatial identities produced in state and non-state laws and practices—the power plays of jural identities—have shaped the relations and interests of groups.

After sketching out a critical overview of this literature, I discuss commercial farms in Zimbabwe as a distinct jural space which I call "domestic government." In so doing, I indicate how the jural identities of this site make it difficult to presume that there are unified "interests" amongst African women farm workers. To introduce some attributes of this "domestic government," I provide an ethnographic depiction of a trial for adultery that occurred on a farm in Hurungwe District in northwestern Zimbabwe. I give a historical outline of this legal space which, in turn, brings me to briefly examine how the current arrangement of domestic government contributes to different "interests" for married women than for "single" women. I conclude with brief comments on the problem of uncritically casting sociological categories such as gender into normative political identities.

Gender and Law in Southern Africa

Since the 1980s, scholars increasingly began to point out how the interests of colonial officials dovetailed with those of African male elders in legislation and judicial opinions which discriminated against African women (e.g., Chanock, 1982; Folbre, 1988; Schmidt, 1991, 1992). Coinciding with the "invention of tradition" literature (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), these academics have critically examined the creation of "customary law" as a process that benefited particular class and gender interests of the colonizers as well as the colonized.

Elizabeth Schmidt has been the most prolific commentator on the subject in colonial Zimbabwe. In her rich work, one of her main theses is that colonial ordinances and legislation concerning African women in the first half of the 20th century reflect the convergence of the fears of African male elders and the concerns of colonial officials. The influx of European settlers and missionaries and the growth of towns and mining and farming compounds after the colony was established in 1890 provided avenues of escape for (particularly young) African men and women from the control of their elders.

The loss of control over African women particularly incensed African male elders since their own wealth and power strongly depended on controlling women for bridewealth transactions and for their labour needs on their own farms. Some chiefs raised these complaints to colonial officials and pointed out that many men were hesitant to work outside the Reserves in case their wives abandoned them. For their part, Schmidt argues, colonial officials wanted to ensure that life functioned smoothly on the Reserves to maintain the interest of European capitalism through subsidizing the reproduction of labour—a system of indirect rule which rested on those very African authorities who were complaining:

> With its own authority at stake, the colonial state sought to mollify male discontent by helping the men regain control. For unless patriarchal authority was in some measure restored, the growing disenchantment of older men and their female charges could throw into jeopardy the whole colonial enterprise. (Schmidt, 1991: 756)

One of the main instruments used for shoring up African patriarchy and abetting colonial capitalism was customary law: "the state, fearing the consequences of female emancipation, increasingly sought to legitimate 'customs' that would justify continued female subordination" (Schmidt, 1992: 107).

Schmidt, like others in this literature, offers a tidy functional explanation of the creation and maintenance of a sphere of colonial legislation, namely, that it served the interests of older African men and colonial capitalism and went against the interests of African women. As she succinctly puts it, "[r]ather than destroying African male authority *in toto*, the colonial state intended to harness it to its own ends" (1991: 121).

I want to briefly point out three problematic assumptions common to these works (see also Rutherford, 1996: 371ff.). First, "interests" are assumed to inhere in sociological categories like "gender," "class" and "race." This presupposition neglects the historical, contested and changing shape of the "experience" of people living these categories (see, e.g., J. Scott, 1992). Nancy Folbre takes this assumption of prediscursive, ahistorical "interests" to the extreme by suggesting in her analysis of patriarchy in Zimbabwe that (patriarchal) culture mystified African women, alienating them from their authentic selves. She argues that the "intensity of female socialization . . . no doubt impeded female rebellion" (Folbre, 1988: 66). Second, laws and state practices are assumed to simply reinforce these underlying economic and gender relations. They are not seen to be discursive practices themselves which have constitutive cultural and political effects (Hirsch and Lazarus-Black, 1994) but are rather empty vessels of class and patriarchal interests.

Third, the legal space is treated as an undifferentiated whole. Typically the laws of the colonial state are taken to have the same effects throughout its territory. This assumption neglects how various legal orders take on different meaning and power in discrete geographical locations and historical periods. In turn, these legal orders have distinctive rules and procedures which can intersect, reinforce and compete with each other (Santos, 1987).

Rather than beginning with normative assumptions about interests of sociological categories, the state and space to understand the intersection of gender and law on Zimbabwean commercial farms, I find it more fruitful to examine the intersection of different legal orders with actions taken by historically and geographically situated groups and individuals who produce and negotiate the jural identities of particular legal spaces.[2]

The Case against the Foreman (and Wives)

One Thursday evening in September 1992, the beer hall on Chidhadhadha farm was packed. Chidhadhadha is my name for a 1 300-hectare tobacco farm in Hurungwe District in northwestern Zimbabwe where I conducted research in 1992-93.[3] Usually, weekday evenings brought only a few male farm workers into this compound structure, given that money was tight for most of the 230 permanent workers, and even more so for the 200 or so contract workers on the farm. But this night, there were over a hundred people squeezed into the beer hall—men sitting on the benches along the walls, women kneeling on the floor—and almost as many crowding outside the doorways and open windows. Only a few people were buying beer that night. Rather, the crowd was gathered to witness and participate in a *dare*, a court, called to investigate the allegations that Akimu (all names are pseudonyms), a junior foreman, was having sex with another worker's wife.

Ezia, in his position as Chairman of the Village Committee, was responsible for dealing with minor civil disputes in the farm compound. Ezia usually held the *dare* at his own hut in the compound involving only the parties of the case. But lately there had been a lot of disputes on Chidhadhadha over adultery, domestic violence, and hut-burning. Akimu, the accused foreman, had a reputation for being a womanizer. As a way to clear the air of his own alleged adultery and the general problems in the compound, Akimu suggested his case be heard in a public *dare* in the beer hall.

Ezia stepped into the cleared space in the front part of the beer hall and, after giving the ritual salutes to ZANU (PF), the ruling party in Zimbabwe, began the *dare*. Akimu replaced Ezia in the cleared space and declared, in a slightly angry tone, that there were rumours of him fooling around (*kupinda-pinda*) with a married woman and they had to be put to the test tonight. He then sat down and Ezia called into the cleared space Tambu, the woman who was accused of sleeping with Akimu.

After giving a few salutes, Tambu sat with her legs beneath her on the floor and quickly recounted over fifteen minutes the various rumours she had heard about other married women fooling around and how she was told by a few friends that there was a story about her having sex with Akimu. She finished by declaring that she would want to hear someone say that she actually saw her and Akimu having sex.

Ezia next called one of the women said to have spread the story. While kneeling on the floor, she said she only heard the rumour from another woman. Several other women were asked to confirm the story. A few, including the wife of another foreman, declined to speak. Only two others went into the space to declare that they too only heard rumours and did not see anything. Ezia finally called the three women who had declared they passed the rumours, all of whom were married to permanent workers, to enter the floor together.

By this time, young men along the edges began to heckle the women, calling them whores and liars. A few older men entered the cleared space to berate the women close-up for spreading rumours. These three women themselves occasionally stood up and accused each other of being a "whore" with other men, an action that usually enraged the accused woman's husband. During the next hour, these accusations against the loyalty of wives continued. There also was explicit tension between Akimu and Ezia. Akimu even declared that if Ezia dared to find him guilty without any evidence, he would have the farm operators take the position of Village Chairman away from him—to which Ezia angrily responded that he would resign rather than accept this intimidation from a foreman.

Although Ezia did not resign, it was Akimu who eventually closed the *dare* by declaring that he would either go to the magistrate's court or to the "barns" with these women and their husbands to settle things. By this time the space between the women sitting on the floor and the audience had narrowed considerably and passions were running very strongly.

On its face, this case appears to be just a story about a man clearing his name against unsubstantiated rumours. However, there was much more going on. This

transformation of a case of adultery against a foreman into a venting of anger against adulterous wives strongly illustrates the attributes of power relations on Hurungwe commercial farms. Almost every worker and foreman I talked with afterwards assumed Akimu was guilty. Moreover, they believed that the three women witnesses refused to provide any evidence for his guilt because they were afraid that if they testified against him, all the foremen would give their husbands harder tasks at work and might even prevent the women themselves from getting any more seasonal jobs on Chidhadhadha. This fear of the power of the foremen also helps to explain why only a few of the women called as witnesses agreed to enter the cleared space at all and why, moreover, Akimu was brash enough to threaten Ezia, the Village Chairman.

But this event in the beer hall is not simply about the power of men—or, particularly, foremen and, by extension, the predominantly male farm operators on Zimbabwe's commercial farms. Rather to understand these dynamics—why women were afraid of retributions on their husbands at work for their actions, why women were seasonal workers, why there is a Village Chairman and why his authority was undermined by a junior foreman, why civil cases were being heard on commercial farms at all, and why this labelling of married women as "whores" by men—leads to a discussion of the wider forms of laws, regulations and jural identities on the site of commercial farms as well as changes to them since Independence; a discussion which centres on the figure of the European farmer.

"Domestic Government" in (Colonial) Zimbabwe

The vast majority of the approximately 4 500 commercial farmers in Zimbabwe today are "White"[4] men. Just before Independence in 1980, only people officially classified as "Europeans" could own and operate these farms located in the best agricultural regions of the country. In the colonial period, those classified as "indigenous Natives" were required to farm on much smaller plots in what were usually overcrowded Native Reserves, located predominantly in the worst agricultural areas of the colony. Until 1979, the labour legislation covering farm workers was the *Masters and Servants Act*, a piece of legislation with roots extending to medieval England. After 1959, this act covered principally farm workers and domestic servants. Although this act certainly played a role in ensuring a cheap and docile labour force for European farmers, a politically important constituency of the colonial government, the importance of the *Masters and Servants Act* for me here was less its service to some White (male) class "interests" and more the fact that it gave the jural identity of "European farmer" administrative authority over *his* (for the farmer's identity was always male) African farm workers; an administrative authority that after World War II combined concerns of "control" with worries about the edification of "Natives" (Rutherford, 1997).

Unlike farm workers, Africans living in the Native Reserves and those living and working in towns were the targets of a growing post-World War II administrative machinery linked to the emerging North-South "development" industry: Africans living in Reserves and in urban centres were seen respectively as "subsistence cultivators" who needed to improve themselves to become "peasants" and as "detribalized Natives" who needed to improve themselves to become "urban proletarians" (Worby, 1994). These rural and urban Africans were put under the combined authority of government officials (i.e., the Native Affairs Department), state-sanctioned and somewhat representative organizations such as African Councils and trade unions, and "traditional" leaders such as chiefs and headmen (who were also in the civil service). By contrast, farm workers officially fell under the sole administrative authority of European farmers. Let me examine a feature of this official ("customary") authority on commercial farms in regards to gender.

Part of the assumptions in national and international expert literature at the time was, first, that African workers should be men and that, second, to increase labour productivity these workers should be "stabilized" partly through the encouragement of having their wives and children live with them. In colonial Africa, officials and "labour experts" promoted this view to all European capitalists as a way to manage their work force (F. Cooper, 1996). In regards to European farmers, this gendered assumption respecting the labour force was modified by the suggestion that the wives and children of workers could assist as seasonal workers in the farm operations. Moreover, this emphasis on ensuring the proper "family" makeup of farm workers dovetailed with the state-sanctioned empowerment of the authority of the European farmer and his family as the means of administering farm workers to form what I call the "domestic government" of commercial farms: "domestic" in the double sense of officially promoting the "private" over "public" domain and of administratively valuing proper, paternalistic family and family-like relations of workers and between workers and farmers. This "domestic government"

empowered the jural identity of a "European (male) Farmer" as the primary administrative authority of farm workers—an identity produced in the interactions of (inter)national experts, the state and white farmers and their organizations; not an identity reflecting some essential attribute of the European male capitalist.

This "domestic government" was initially challenged by changes introduced with Independence in 1980. The former liberation group, now the ruling party, ZANU (PF) brought farm workers under the same legislation as other workers in Zimbabwe and, more importantly, set up party cells called Village Committees on commercial farms. These party organizations were established to adjudicate minor civil disputes of the compound and to encourage workers to organize and join unions to challenge the paternalistic authority of the farmer and his foremen (Ladley and Lan, 1985).

Farmers fought back through illegal mass retrenchments and by petitioning the government to "stabilize" labour relations. By the mid-1980s, eventually the importance of "stability" for the economic backbone of Zimbabwe (flue-cured tobacco, almost exclusively grown on commercial farms, is Zimbabwe's number one export), coupled perhaps with the fact that many of the several hundred Black commercial farmers are connected to the upper echelons of ZANU (PF) (Thornycroft, 1991), led to decreased party support for Village Committees on farms. Official plans to legislate minimum standards for compounds and other government policies directed towards farm workers fell by the wayside. Today there do not seem to be many significant changes from the colonial concatenation of power relations for the site of commercial farms aside from the representation of farm workers by a relatively underfinanced and disorganized union (which negotiates national collective bargaining agreements with a well-financed and organized employers' organization) and also the ability of farm workers to vote in national, but *not* local, elections (Loewenson, 1992).

Superficially, this notion that colonial forms of control reign unchallenged on commercial farms today seems to be confirmed in the case involving Akimu. Although the case was heard by the Village Chairman rather than the senior foreman as in the colonial period, authority was still vested more in Akimu than Ezia. The women witnesses were reticent to speak against Akimu since their status on the farm still depended largely on their husbands' standing with the foremen. However, on Chidhadhadha and neighbouring commercial farms, the regulations of domestic government have been challenged by changes since 1980; these changes also signal the dissonance between the jural identity of African women living under the forms of domestic government on commercial farms and the representation embraced by some academics of unified interests supporting the sociological category of "gender."

One of the changes which have contributed the most to the challenging of domestic government on commercial farms in Hurungwe District has been the growing number of "single," female farm workers on some farms. By being "single"—meaning unattached to a permanent worker as a wife, daughter or other female relative—these women have not fit into the proper domestic arrangements presumed by the jural identities within the government of commercial farms. Consequently, many disputes involving them cannot be accommodated by the normal procedures of administering "cases" on the farm. This has helped to forge for single women workers a transgressive identity, one that challenges the dominant identities which shape the power relations of domestic government.[5]

Although single African women (and men) have gone to European farms to escape their former life situations since the early colonial years, changes brought on by Independence have increased this process. Although women still tend to be only hired as seasonal rather than as permanent workers, they now get the same wages as men for doing the same jobs. This equivalence in wages combined with a new set of national laws that theoretically grant women many of the same rights as men has led, farm workers told me, to more single women living and working on commercial farms. As one older married woman farm worker remarked, "Divorce started to be too much [after 1980] as women were saying [to their husbands] 'even if you divorce me, I will work for myself because the money which you are receiving and which I am receiving is just the same.'"

Although there were more single women seeking work on the farms, it was not always easy for them to get work or to receive treatment similar to other workers, given that they did not fit within the jural identities on commercial farms. In Hurungwe, some farmers refused to hire single women, since they only hired the wives and children of their own permanent male workers as seasonal employees (though often single women were working on these farm under the pretext of being attached to a worker). On the other hand, on farms such as Chidhadhadha which openly hired single-women workers, most of whom were divorcees or widows with children, the rules marginalized single women in terms of access to resources such as decent housing, cheap maize meal and credit. On these farms, this transgres-

siveness and marginalization of single women is best exemplified in disputes over sexual relationships.

If a single woman and a married man were having consensual sex, then most farm workers (and many Zimbabweans) would not see this as "adultery." They would not necessarily condone the relationship but they would not condemn it either. Since African men could have several wives, a man and a single woman having an affair could be seen to be "exploring" a future marriage arrangement. Thus, these actions could not lead to a "case" to be brought before a *dare*. Yet, given their vulnerable position within the farms, single-women workers were at the centre of many disputes on Chidhadhadha when I was there. For instance, single-women workers often tried to become "attached" to a male permanent worker as a girlfriend or, perhaps, a wife to improve the housing situation and credit access for them and their children, which led to conflict with any existing wife the man may have. Furthermore, in the few cases of rape on the farm when I was there, single women, not married women, were the victims.

There were at least two consequences of this marginalization of single, female workers from the jural identities recognized in the commercial farms. First, there was the constant tension between married women and single women. Married women tended to call all single women *mahuri*, "whores." Since there was no legal recourse to a farm *dare* for "adultery" cases involving single women, if a married woman suspected her husband was fooling around with a single woman and wanted to stop it, she would often fight the woman or set fire to her sleeping quarters. It was perhaps because of the annoyance of husbands with their wives for disrupting their trysts with single women that there was such anger unleashed against married women at Akimu's *dare*. Men were trying to equate married women with single women, casting all women as "whores." Yet single women were in a very different jural position than married women, problematizing such an equation, as seen in the following, and second, consequence.

When single women perceived themselves to be wronged, their own lack of attachment to the domestic government often led them to take their cases outside the jural space of commercial farms to the police, more so than other categories of farm workers. Such actions infuriated the farmers, especially if it was a case against their foremen, for it brought wider forms of government onto their own domestic space. Such actions, like single women themselves, transgressed the identities vital to the operation of "domestic government": they showed that commercial farms fall under wider spheres of authority and laws. Since single women were unattached to a permanent worker, farm operators and foremen did not have the implied threat of giving their husbands harder work tasks to enforce the sanctity of the farm's rules. Instead, the only recourse they had was to fire them, to remove them from the legal space itself.[6]

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I want to reflect on the importance of understanding the jural identities of a site in terms of its historical genealogy as way of critically understanding the forms of power regulating social interactions. Such identities do not reflect the "interests" of one sociological group over those of another. They are not serving the functions of some underlying economic and/or gender system. They are not identical throughout the territory of the state. Rather, these jural identities help to shape not only the formation of some of the "interests" of social groups but also the outlines of the groups and the site itself.

If I had followed the dominant tendencies in the literature on gender and the law in Southern Africa and treated gender as a normative sociological category with inherent interests, I would miss the important jural dimension of marriage within the power relations of the legal space of commercial farms. Although women farm workers, as a "group," suffer discrimination because they are given only non-permanent jobs, the criterion of marriage to a permanent worker determines whether or not one is "attached" to the rules of the farm: it not only has a strong bearing on which farm resources a woman farm worker has access to but also the procedures of enforcement and dispute resolution which are available to her. Such a criterion of marriage contributes to creating a mainly antagonistic division between married and single women on Chidhadhadha; a division which would be glossed over by assuming that African women share common "interests" as "women" and which would be feebly explained by invoking the label "mystification" to construe divergence from these so-called "interests."

To challenge the marginalization of women farm workers generally, and single, female farm workers in particular, requires working with farm workers and, especially, their organizations (trade unions, women's clubs) to devise strategies that could dismantle the ability to gain access to certain resources such as particular jobs and housing based on the criteria of gender and marriage status. Such a challenge, in my opinion, needs to be cognizant of the various jural identities within the concatenation of power relations which I call domestic

government in order to be potentially effective. By not taking such a strategy and assuming, say, that all female workers should unite together on the basis of their shared interests as "women" would neglect the serious division of "interests" between married and single women workers, and thus would likely be a less effective approach.

Finally, my article reiterates a larger question posed by others about the politics of setting agendas for the edification of those who are disempowered (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1993; Mohanty, 1983). In our attempts as academics to politically challenge disempowered groups, such as women farm workers in Zimbabwe, it is important to understand not only the jural identities which shape the power relations and the differentiated "interests" of and within these groups and their jural sites, but also to understand those jural identities which structure our own interventions and productions. It is vital to challenge discriminatory laws, but not in a way which employs other normative standards that subsume the possibilities to listen to and mobilize with those for whom the struggle is waged.

Notes

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2 Hirsch and Lazarus-Black offer a useful synopsis of such an analysis: "We ask how legal identities like wife, slave, undocumented alien, delinquent, and colonial subject—categories imbued with 'naturalized' notions about race, gender, class, and citizenship—structure the practice and consciousness of those who embody and encounter them. We do not assume that subordinated people come to courts only as victims or supplicants; we focus instead on how power and law are transformed by their words and actions" (1994: 13).

3 I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada as well as the Social Sciences Grants Sub-Committee and the Centre for Society, Technology and Development of McGill University which provided support for my 16 months of field and archival research in Zimbabwe.

4 The adjectives "White" and "Black" are commonly used in Africa to denote people whose ancestry lies in Europe or sub-Saharan Africa respectively. There is a tendency in academic literature to treat these labels as more "natural" indices of human differences (i.e., of phenotypical variation) than, say, biological "races" and thus somehow not culturally constructed (Wade, 1993). Although I will not place quotations around these terms in the remainder of the text, I want to stress that this does not mean that they are somehow outside of culture any more than the terms "European" and "African."

5 For other examinations of the various divisions amongst African women based on various moral discourses, see B. Cooper, 1995; Jefremovas, 1991; Ogden, 1996; and White, 1990.

6 During my research, there were several examples of such actions. For example, a senior foreman hit a single woman while she was working in the coffee fields. She eventually reported the incident to the police who arrived at the farm to charge the foreman. The farm owners were irate and paid a fine on behalf of the foreman. Shortly thereafter the woman was "let go" (see Rutherford, 1996, for further details).

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Grounds for Appeal: Maasai Customary Claims and Conflicts

John G. Galaty *McGill University*

Abstract: In a 1994 episode, Maasai herders from Ewuaso were prevented from watering livestock at wells along the border between two group ranches, but, before strife escalated, the police established control. After such events, talk puts a "local construction" on the event, framing, highlighting, justifying and reinterpreting it to certain aims and purposes. This article discusses the backdrop to conflict in Ewuaso: the subdivision and privatization of group lands, competition for land by political factions and age-sets, claims by the locally powerful and the high Kenyan politics of grabbing land and forging electoral alliances, as global forces appear as local faces.

Résumé: En 1994, des gardiens de troupeau maasai de Ewuaso n'ont pas pu faire abréuver leur bétail à des puits situés à la frontière de deux ranchs collectifs; mais avant que la situation ne se dégrade la police avait rétabli leur contrôle. Après de tels événements, le quand dira-t-on ajoute une petite note locale à l'événement, l'élaborant, le soulignant, le justifiant et le reinterprétant en fonction de certains objectifs.

Cet article discute la toile de fond du conflit de Ewuaso : la sous-division et privatisation des terres collectives, la compétition pour la terre entre les factions politiques, et les conflits ancestraux de la classe dirigeante locale. Il examine aussi la politique d'appropriation de terre appliquée par l'état kenyan qui forge des alliances électorales lorsque les forces globales semblent être des personnages locaux.

Word blew like dust through the market of the small rift-valley town of Ewuaso oon Kedong', "the river-of-beehives." Ewuaso herders had been accosted by a group of armed men—*young* men, or, rather, older boys, from an age-grade of later teenagers often glossed, not inappropriately, as "warriors." These *Il-murran* from Mosiro, the group ranch immediately to the south of the Ewuaso ranch, sought to prevent the herders from watering livestock at the wells along the border between the two localities. In the market town, a comparable set of young men from Ewuaso quickly gathered, readying themselves for a counterattack to defend what they saw as their group's rights. But before they could move to the site, news came that the police had established control, so, with a mixture of relief and regret, the would-be champions of the locality drifted home. A wind rises, becomes a swirling sand devil, then subsides. The state prevails.

Local Maasai politics always seem to involve a ready mix of talk and violence, often talk, then violence, but just as often violence, then talk. After the deed, talk puts a sort of "local construction" on the event, framing, highlighting, justifying and reinterpreting it to certain aims and purposes. Never simply acts of force, violent deeds are practices which have force not despite but because they signify. For the young men—older boys—from Mosiro, their attack on a herd that belonged to the Senior Government Chief of Keekonyokie location—of which both Ewuaso and Mosiro form a part—was defensive, for the ingress of his herd into Mosiro locality in early June 1994, was a concrete sign of his claim to land in the area. To have allowed his herd access to the wells, given ongoing conflicts, would have been to concede his right not only to water but to land.

Named after its terrain (*osero*, a place of dry bushes, a sort of "wilderness"), Mosiro benefits from the flow of the *Ewuaso Ng'iro* down from the slopes of the rocky *Osoit le Mosiro*, but its lowland plains have served as wet-season pasture for several Maasai groups.[1] Throughout the colonial period, and into the decade of Kenya's

Independence, Maasai districts represented crown land, held in trust for the entire community. Governance occurred through a hierarchy of administrative levels; answerable to district commissioners and their subordinate district officers, government chiefs and subchiefs were responsible for locations and sublocations, generally demarcated in terms of Maasai customary territorial sections (*Il-oshon*) and subsections (*In-kutot*). Beginning in the late 1960s, the two Maasai districts of Kajiado and Narok were gradually transformed from trust to freehold. In areas of varying sizes, representing divisions of traditional "sections," group ranches were formed, the titles of which were held by formally constituted "group representatives," composed of adult males with recognized claims to local residence who were registered as members (Galaty, 1980a; Lawrence, 1966).

Group ranches represented a social compromise between common and private property, or, to be more exact, between legally undifferentiated (nonetheless administratively and politically differentiated) crown land, in which communities held rights of residence and use, and legally differentiated and enclosed land, in which only individuals held private titl (Galaty, 1980a). As legal means for entitling pastoral communities, group ranches were thought an especially appropriate form of landholding where arid ecology made herd and household movements within a relatively large domain of pasture the most viable form of land use. In drier regions, very large group ranches like Ewuaso were over 150 000 acres (or 600 km^2), while in less arid areas medium-sized ranches averaged 100 000 acres (or 400 km^2) and in more humid areas small group ranches were formed of less than 20 000 acres (or under 80 km^2) (Galaty, 1988). Of course, larger ranches had much greater populations than did small ranches, so meeting and managing were politically more complex processes and consensus harder to achieve. This has become increasingly the case as pressure to subdivide groups into individualized holdings has risen. Should wealthier members receive larger portions of land, or should the land be divided equally among members? Should new members, young men coming of age, be allowed to register, or should the registry be frozen pending subdivision? And should subdivision occur at all? But if it doesn't, will members seeking individual portions be able legally to carve their shares out of the whole? It is perhaps not surprising that larger ranches, especially, became locales of acrimony, dispute and conflict (Galaty, 1994b).

For these reasons and more, Ewuaso locality became a site of uniquely bitter contestation. The construction of artificial wells, boreholes and dams has furthered the ongoing process of establishing land claims throughout the ostensibly vast expanses of Maasailand, so areas such as Mosiro have gradually become sites of semi-permanent habitation. Accordingly, at the historical moment of vulnerability when Mosiro group ranch is undergoing subdivision, legally registered members and outsiders alike position themselves to make claims on parcels of its land. Land law hovers over the region like an unavoidable cloud, but it meets a second, irrepressible mist rising from the land, that of customary claims. In the confusion of claims, the force of law seems often pitted against the perceived legitimacy of local rights. In neighbouring Lodariak (another locality in Keekonyokie division), hundreds of absentee title claimants technically own land that they have been forcibly prevented from occupying, or even visiting, since their claims are viewed as illegitimate (not to mention illegal) by local Maasai who are the actual residents of the region (Galaty, 1994a). Law, legitimacy and justice do not always flow into the same stream.[2]

The Group Representatives Act stipulates that, in the case of subdivision, group lands were to be divided equitably among registered members. But in fact vast discretionary powers have been vested in the land committee of each ranch, or were deemed to have been so by officers in the Ministry of Lands who have overseen, and often benefited from, the adjudication process.[3] Prior to the events of June 1994 a major scandal erupted when it was discovered that Mosiro was in the process of being given away from under the feet of its members, due to collusion between Ministry officials and the secretary of the land committee in allocating Mosiro land to outsiders. I received the following account of the affair:

> As the surveyors were busy helping the committee, they got close to the Secretary for their own convenience. They introduced rich non-Maasai men, as well as their own relatives, to the committee members. This was aimed at efforts to acquire "Maasai" land in the area on the part of the ranch beneficiaries. Most of these people were Kikuyu.
>
> The committee members were heavily bribed, and the rich men managed to acquire pieces of land. They then started pressuring the committee to quickly organise plans for getting title deeds to the land illegally. The presence of politicians in the area made [caused] all these events to be undertaken secretly.
>
> When the Ministry of Lands helped the members process the title deeds, it was discovered that the names on the list were a mixture of Maasai as well as non-Maasai names. With the adjudication of Mosiro still incomplete, the Ministry began giving out the title deeds, which was basically illegal. Complaints from

knowledgeable people who were from other parts of Ngong confirmed these illegal transactions. Eventually, the District Commissioner looked over the matter and stopped the whole exercise.

I have described elsewhere (ibid.) how the adjudication was annulled by the district commissioner in the presence of the Vice President of Kenya, who is the member of parliament for the Kenyan constituency where the localities in question lie.[4] But local Maasai were left shaken by the threat of being dispossessed by outsiders and locally powerful individuals, through machinations beyond their control and comprehension. A year later, in June 1994, violence threatened to erupt that would pit one Maasai group against another rather than insiders against outsiders.

Lending drama to the episode, the district officer ordered the subchief of Mosiro arrested for allegedly having incited the young men to act against the senior chief's herd. The subchief knew that the senior chief and other prominent Keekonyokie Maasai (who were not, however, from the Mosiro locality) had staked out large individual ranches in the area, for which they anticipated receiving title deeds and over which they were now beginning to assert rights.[5] The ox's horn always precedes the ox; in this spirit the presence of the Chief's herd marked his claim.

With anthropology's centre of gravity lying somewhat lower to the ground than that of the state, its narratives tend to be woven out of episodes of actual experience, ideally conveying something of the texture and pattern of the socially real in cultural practice. But today we are convinced that the path of the local, although tangential to the long gravel-and-earth road proverbially built only yesterday, also transects global space. Do we then envision the people we know as "local characters," acting out bit parts in dramas written elsewhere, about transnationalism, dependency and postcolonialism? How do we accommodate both aspects of our twofold cognizance, that people everywhere participate in a single world of global force and import but pursue projects of local scale, designed with homegrown definition, value and shape? To make manageable this conundrum in anthropological identity and method, I would try to refashion it by first working upward and then downward to join the strands of cultural locality to those of state and globality without endowing either priority over the other.

Throughout history, peasant wars have been fought in the context of such erosions of land rights as this episode reveals. And the significance of this momentary eruption of aggression, and the emotion behind it, gains added contrast against a backdrop of two simultaneous events. The first is the widespread experience throughout Keekonyokie Division of corruption in land allocations, and a longer history of drastic land loss by Maasai. The second is an eruption of ethnic clashes across the Rift Valley region, borne out of a backlash against long-term rural migration to Maasai and Kalenjiin territories from Kenya's Central Province, which, in the context of incipient multiparty elections and democratization-from-above, was seen as a crucial factor in the national struggles during the 1992 Kenyan General Elections.[6] International pressure and the implementation of a structural adjustment program in Kenya have helped accelerate the subdivision of group holdings, initiating the sort of local opportunism that invariably accompanies enclosure. Given that it is an enclosure of a collectivity, the subdivision process may seem to outsiders to resemble privatization of a socialist cooperative but, since group ranches were in fact domains under private title, the process in fact represents a dissolving of the assets of an agrarian freehold corporation, which are then allocated among the diversity of its owners. Moreover, international pressure for democratization has also strengthened national ethnic blocs, thus lending a sense of high drama to the usual local squabbles over land.[7]

"Global forces," yes, but with local faces. The assumption held by a congeries of chiefs, subchiefs, councillors, mayors, local businessmen and politicians from Kajiado District, in which Keekonyokie division lies, that *they* above all deserve the fruits of "development," is surely what class formation is all about. It is unlikely, however, that the progressive appropriation of land wealth in Maasailand could be accomplished without the sort of factional strife that is rife there. In the recent past, a subtle alliance between Kikuyu and more wealthy Maasai supported the rise of the incumbent Vice President of Kenya from national to local prominence (an interesting reversal of the more conventional political career, which stemmed from his being a nominated MP and an appointed Minister of Finance, who subsequently sought office), and this alliance was cemented through the distribution of illegal allocations of land carved out of pastoral group holdings and through officially sanctioned purchases.

Politicians from the two major Maasai Districts (Kajiado and Narok) have often been at odds with one another, and most recently a powerful minister from Narok has quietly garnered support in Kajiado from those who oppose the Vice President's faction. The former has also become the public advocate of preserving the integrity of Maasai land, while the latter has been increasingly associated with the erosion of indigenous land rights. One reason for the quick arrest of the Mosiro

subchief was that he was seen as acting on behalf of the Narok parliamentarian, by inciting local protest against appropriation of land by members of the Vice President's faction. It has been thought that the Narok parliamentarian was biding his time, accumulating embarrassing evidence that might ultimately be used to topple his prominent opponent. But his hand would be strengthened if protest broke out against irregular land allocations in the Vice President's own constituency. Thus local strife was generally construed as an act of high politics, perhaps the initiation of a wider mobilization against a sitting Vice President.

But events have subsequently shown that a few weeks can be a lifetime in politics. In late 1996, shifting political strategy, President Moi demoted the MP from Narok in a shuffle of ministerial posts, clearly signalling his support for the Vice President. One reason was another outbreak of violence between Keekonyokie and Purko, which occurred in a dispute over a boundary between the two group ranches. Although both ranches had largely been subdivided among their members, a spring along the side of the escarpment had been left undivided, due to the fact that everyone in the area—including herders from both ranches—depended on it for water. For years, both Keekonyokie and Purko herders had shared use of the spring. But recently the Purko had begun to move in, claiming the area, saying that the Keekonyokie would just seize the land, get a title deed and sell it, like they had sold much of the rest of their land. It was said that the Purko came to settle in the area only after the Keekonyokie had been subdividing their own land. The Keekonyokie then told them to go to their own side, back to Mosiro, ending the shared use of the resource that had previously obtained. But when Keekonyokie tried to move into the area, there was an armed clash, resulting in several Keekonyokie being killed. Then government forces came in to stop the violence.

The minister from Narok District, a Purko, was publicly blamed for the outbreak of violence, since the area concerned was technically in Keekonyokie. Not only was it seen from the outside as another case of Purko expansionism, but also as illustrative of the politician's "tribalistic" chauvinism, here splitting two groups of Maasai. However, it was suspected by some observers that the Vice President, an MP from Kajiado, may have quietly instigated the affair, by encouraging the Keekonyokie to move into the area in order to embarrass his political opponent. The episode was in fact immediately followed by the demotion of the Narok politician, and this may lead to a weakening of those who oppose allocating Maasai land to outsiders and those who seek reversal of illicit allocations through the courts or through legislation.

But even these specific manifestations of national and international factions and forces rest on a locally defined structure of relations and interpretations. For instance, why should Keekonyokie officials try so blatantly to appropriate land in Mosiro, and why should they be so resented when they do so? A bit of administrative history may shed some light on this question. When the boundary between Kajiado and Narok was established, efforts were made to contain most Purko Maasai in Narok; Kajiado was primarily occupied by the Osilalei Maasai, but the land of the Keekonyokie, long allies of the Purko, straddled the boundary between the two districts, one of its localities (Oike) lying in Narok District along the western Rift Valley escarpment. And while the Mosiro locality in Keekonyokie, which adjoins a part of Mosiro in Narok, is administratively part of Keekonyokie, it was, and is, in fact occupied by "ethnically" Purko Maasai. As I was told:

> The Purko who inhabited the area (of Mosiro) originated from Oldorko le Losokon in Narok. Their migration into this area was instigated by a drought that occurred in Narok. When they got to Mosiro, they found the area sparsely populated and decided to settle permanently. They were also encouraged to settle down by constant showers in the area. Clashes arose among the Loodokilani and Purko people which were finally quashed by the government.[8] The Purko stayed on even after this instability. . . . By this time, Mosiro was a group ranch belonging to the North Keekonyokie, and it seemed to have swallowed up the Purko as from the beginning.

The people of Mosiro might publicly proclaim that they were Keekonyokie, which administratively they are, but they also are known in fact to be Purko, a reality they view more with pride than denial. Here, in the microcosm of a sub-ethnic administrative locality, we can see the more global implications of joining nation and state. Ethnic distributions never quite match the political and administrative structures they define, but rather generate around identities a complex set of social anomalies and paradoxes of ethnic affinity and residence, namely, non-resident nationals (who live elsewhere) and non-national residents (seen, justifiably or not, as having come from elsewhere). In Mosiro, land rights that clearly rested with its local and indigenous inhabitants were seen as flawed by Keekonyokie, who could assert that its Purko residents should "return to Narok." Though traditionally allied in relation to other Maasai groups, Keekonyokie and Purko are nonetheless opposed segments of the highland Maasai. Throughout the 20th century, in particular during the post-independence period,

this latent opposition has been reinforced by its congruence with district boundaries and distinct political interests, in particular over land. The local premise that Purko residence in Keekonyokie section is illegitimate is strengthened by the fact that Mosiro leaders not only ignored but abetted the corrupt process of land allocation, which would have left the ordinary Mosiro Maasai landless. From the point of view of Keekonyokie leaders, if Mosiro leaders wish to give up their land, who else should benefit from it but they, who represent the location as a whole?

If the rough structure of Maasai sectional relations bears on this local clash, so does the processual nature of the Maasai age system. Today, the politicians in power are largely from the *I-Seuri* age-set, who have just completed the long ritual task of inaugurating and socializing the age-set that in a pattern of dual-stream alternations lies two behind them[9]. Relations between sponsoring and sponsored age-sets are usually marked by ambivalence; in particular, with the maturation and growing independence of the younger group, deference and respect come to be mixed with episodes of revolt. During the last five years, the widespread and probably accurate perception by young men of the *Il-Manjeshi* age, that the Seuri were accumulating land at the expense of the younger men, led in several regions to outright conflict between groups between which solidary relations of sponsorship and authority theoretically should obtain. Today, the new set of initiates bears even less respect for this senior group because their sponsors, the *Il-Kitoip*, are from the opposite stream. Thus the attack on the Chief's herders by *Il-murran* of Mosiro carried weight as a statement of age-set antagonism: he, a Seuri, was being attacked not only by younger men, but by members of a group sponsored by the *Il-Kitoip*, the age-set immediately junior to his, who were thus from the opposing stream. The clash was thus underpinned by two distinct dimensions of age-set antagonism, which divided the chief from the young men both by seniority and by structural alternation.

At a time in anthropology when "violence" is attributed to the implicit constraints exercised by nouns, pronouns and verbs, to attributions and predicates, the exercise of real force, when one group of young men cracks the heads of another with clubs and threatens them with spears, seems palpable (though of course greatly restrained, both by the closeness of the groups and the absence of firearms in local hands). When "resistance" is elicited from the symbolism of poetry, moods and evangelism, it is almost a relief when local folk actually take direct action to defend lives or land. And when the postcolonial characterizes sense and sensibility in the cultural contrasts and differences between the globally North and South, there is a satisfying concreteness to episodes of struggle that are in fact artifacts of *real* colonial borders and *actual* postcolonial interventions (which the World Bank's structural adjustment policies, no matter how benign, represent) in national and local policy and practice.

The crack of clubs and the wielding of spears, though limited assertions, are overtly violent acts of resistance, not only to local land grabbers wielding micro-ethnic justification, but, in a more global framework, to the consolidation of a landed class and to the realization of global liberalism in a postcolonial world. These concrete practices, whether representing moves on a larger chessboard of political and ethnic struggle or mere responses to local provocation, are not more real simply because they embody physical force, for being pragmatic acts they rely on illocutionary force both as assertions of resistance and as claims to land. To understand the locally real today calls for unravelling the strands of an increasingly pervasive system of world relations and of the cultural premises by which motives and interests are defined and action constrained. Then in our own narratives the strands must be rewoven to produce convincing accounts of the complex grounds for the sorts of claims and conflicts that make up what is important to local lives today.

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Notes

1 Ironically, "wet" season pasture is usually dry, but after the rains it bursts forth with sweet annual grasses which, if not quickly consumed by livestock or wildlife, die, dry and shrivel, the land reverting to parched aridity throughout the dry season, when the joint community of people and their animals retreat to perennial pastures and permanent water.

2 For elaboration of the Mosiro and Lodariak cases see Galaty (1994a, 1996) and Simel (1995).

3 Like their neighbours on Ewuaso and Lodariak group ranches, in the early 1970s, adult Maasai males in Mosiro locality were constituted as a legal "group" and granted a

single, undifferentiated freehold title. By the late 1980s, encouraged by global liberalization and pressured by the government, group ranches were moving inexorably towards subdivision. Land committees, often the same committees that oversaw the original registration of group members, were charged in the event of subdivision with allocating land among the group members and given the authority to receive and act on requests.

4 However, outside claimants did not passively accept his nullification but argued in court that their holding of "first title" should lead to the nullification being set aside. The court found in their favour. Shifting strategy, those opposing the unjust allocation of land to outsiders—and with the moral and financial assistance of Survival International in London—have sought to have a bill brought before the Kenyan Parliament, which would create a legislative solution to both the Lodariak and Mosiro cases. But in the current pre-election period (1997), it is unclear that the bill will in fact be brought forward. At the same time, prominent figures from Mosiro—a region with a high rate of non-literacy— who might have been expected to lead the community in opposing the allocation, have been bribed and threatened not to pursue the case; one was reportedly given a Land Rover, while another was said to have been called to the Vice President's office where he was accused of being an "anti-government tribalist," before being offered money and a position as a district councillor. So, despite both national and international attention given to the case, and the rapid (though provisional) nullification of the illegal allocations, it is far from clear that in the end justice will be done.

5 For discussion of the disastrous land sales that followed the allocation of individual ranches during the 1970s, see Galaty (1992).

6 In the 1992 election, the ruling party, KANU, faced a split opposition, the two largest opposition parties being dominated by Kikuyu (Ford-Asili) and Luo (Ford-Kenya). President Moi's ruling party held together an alliance of smaller groups, most importantly pastoral groups such as the Maasai and his own Kalenjiin, and attracted a reasonable proportion of votes from other communities, such as Baluyia, Kamba and the coastal groups. The President himself, faced with numerous opponents, was returned with a plurality but not a majority of the presidential vote. Ethnic conflict in the Rift Valley preceding the election represented a strategy used by the ruling party to establish "KANU zones" by chasing away or intimidating those most likely to vote for opposition parties. Conflict between Maasai and Kikuyu in Narok District had a similar inspiration, as it represented an attempt to reduce the threat of a strong opposition vote in Narok based on a community that had largely—but not entirely—migrated there during the last 30 years.

7 Discussion of factors leading to the dissolution of group ranches can be found in Galaty (1994b).

8 I have elsewhere described some underlying causes and the structure of clashes between Loodokilani and Purko Maasai (Galaty, 1980b).

9 The Seuri, a mature age-set composed of one right and one left-hand division, is sponsor to the the right-hand *Il-Kipali* and the left-hand *Il-Manjeshi* groups, which in time will be consolidated into a single, named age-set. Immediately succeeding *I-Seuri* (and preceding the age-set the Seuri sponsor) are *Il-Kitoip*, a set which includes the right-hand *I-Rampau* and the left-hand *I-Rrang'irrang'* groups. *Il-Kitoip* in turn are sponsors for the new right-hand set now in the process of formation and first recruitment (in some Maasai sections provisionally called *Il-Memiri*). Thus one full set, encompassing both a right and a left-hand group active as Il-murran over a 14-15 year period, separates a sponsoring and a sponsored group. The age-set "ladder," senior to junior, runs from the Seuri, to Kitoip, to Kipali-Manjeshi, to Memiri; linked in the opposed alternations are: (a) Seuri and Kipali-Manjeshi, and (b) Kitoip and Memiri. For a structural account of the "ladder" versus the "opposing stream" principles, combined in the Maasai system, see Spencer (1976).

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Discourses on Downsizing: Structure and Sentiment in an Organizational Dispute

Constance DeRoche *University College of Cape Breton*

Abstract: Downsizing, sometimes accompanied by staff amalgamation, has become a grim but pervasive cost-cutting device in Western societies of the 1990s. This article focusses on two hospital-based nursing schools, in an economically marginal Maritime community, that faced merger and the loss of a number of much-prized teaching jobs in the early 1990s. Although both staffs approved, in principle, of raising educational standards for nursing employment, they held distinctly different positions on how educational qualifications should figure in the layoff formula. Downsizing provoked a discourse that unveiled the significance of interpersonal loyalties and work-group identities

Résumé: Réduire le nombre des employés et parfois fusionner le personnel sont de dures mais fort répandues mesures de réduction des coûts dans les sociétés occidentales des années quatre-vingt-dix. Cet article se concentre sur deux écoles d'infirmières affiliées à des hôpitaux dans une communauté dans les Maritimes à faible rendement économique. Ces deux écoles ont dû faire face à une fusion ainsi qu'à la perte d'emplois fort prisés dans le domaine de l'enseignement au début des années quatre-vingt-dix. Bien que les employés des deux écoles aient approuvé, en principe, la hausse des standards pédagogiques de la profession d'infirmiers(ères), leurs opinions divergeaient en ce qui concerne la place des qualifications pédagogiques dans la formule de licenciement. La réduction du nombre des employés a provoqué une réaction qui a révélé la pertinence des loyautés interpersonnelles et l'identité des groupes de travail.

The case presented here concerns cultural activity played out in a formal-organizational setting. Concretely, the study compares the way nursing instructors in two hospital-based training programs (in "Stelton," a small Maritime city) differentially and creatively interpreted job qualifications in a situation of competition for continued employment. The conditions that provoked competition—program amalgamation and staff downsizing—were ultimately rooted in forces of political economy and mediated by formal-organizational factors. The study is thus set against a sketch of that backdrop. But these contextual features are not determinative. Rather, I focus on how the instructors acted as human agents, responding in terms of their grounded (i.e., localized, day-to-day, direct) experience. With respect to layoff criteria, each staff generated its own position, which reflected interpersonal loyalties and in-group identities. These polarized positions will be analyzed as a discourse, generated in terms of interpersonal dynamics and personal meanings that played themselves out in the narrative context of everyday work life, one in which extra-organizational roles figured.

The case analysis arises from a prior critique of the popular notion of "organizational culture."[1] Specifically, organizational culture (OC) is a misnomer disguising cultural variation within bureaucracies. Secondly, as a reification, it glosses over cultural process and, thirdly, it creates artificial boundaries between intra- and extra-organizational statuses that are relevant to the way cultured actors interpret structural principles (values, norms and institutions). That critique highlights important methodological issues and creates an alternative framework that is used here for the analysis of organizational behaviour.

Cultural Complexity in Organizations

Anthropologists have noted that the burgeoning OC literature from management studies mishandles intraorgani-

zational cultural complexity (e.g., Gregory 1983). It does so largely by conflating the *organization's culture* with the business ideology of senior management. It is, in brief, "managementcentric," and has been rigorously taken to task for it (Alvesson and Berg, 1992; Baba, 1989; Davis, 1985; deRoche, 1997 and 1994; Gamst, 1989; Hochwald, 1990; Kunda, 1992). The critique does not suggest that subordinates reject all bureaucratic authority. The nursing instructors I studied do not contest the hospital administration's right to make budgetary decisions that effect layoffs. This does not mean, however, that they agree with officially sanctioned decisions about layoff criteria. Nor does it mean that each staff's perception of these decisions is uniform. On the question of educational qualifications, in fact, the women employed at each of the schools ("St. Martha's" and "Stelton General," respectively) differed dramatically.

The OC literature gives some limited attention to professional subcultures within organizations (see, among others, Deal and Kennedy, 1982: 150 ff.; Kilmann, 1985: 352; Kilmann, Saxton and Serpa, 1985: 11-12; Schein, 1989: 7). It does not, however, examine intraprofessional differences in the workplace. It also recognizes that subcultural variations arise through mergers, which bring together separate organizations and thus "cultures." But these treatments suffer from the same analytical difficulties that plague the literature as a whole: cultural variants are generally seen as "deviant" or "countercultural" manifestations of organizational culture. According to OC writers, these variants can and must be subordinated to a broader cultural consensus that flows down from management. By analyzing the perspectives of two groups of nursing instructors, this article presents a very different model of organizational and occupational culture. It is one that acknowledges culture, even in hierarchical organizations, as the natural precipitate of group interaction among human agents (deRoche, 1997 and 1994). As Hamada puts it: "Organizational goals are never accepted or appreciated uniformly by individual members. . . . [The] study of organizational culture is in a way *an inquiry into the political processes of social relationships*" (1989: 6; emphasis added).

In *Occupational Subcultures in the Workplace*, Harrison Trice (1993) does not fall prey to the "managementcentric" oversimplification of culture that is common in the OC literature. Using Mary Douglas's grid/group dichotomy, he tries to identify the circumstances under which occupational groups can resist the firm's management subculture. In doing so he provides an analysis of occupational structure and culture. Occupations, he explains, vary in the degree to which they emphasize hierarchical authority and reward structures, as well as normative formalization (the grid dimension), on the one hand, and communal self-interest (the group dimension), on the other (Trice, 1993: 42-43). These dimensions vary independently, so that an occupation can be characterized by any one of four combinations. The strong grid/strong group occupation, for example, is internally hierarchical but seeks the interests of the collective (as a whole) vis-à-vis occupational outsiders within the organization. (1993: 43-44). The provincial Registered Nurses Association (RNA), to which the Stelton nurses belong, falls into this category. It is attempting to serve the interests of its constituency by legislating a higher minimal educational standard that, it believes, will raise the status of nurses in the eyes of the public, as well as of doctors to whom nurses feel unjustly subordinated. The instructors to whom I spoke agreed with this policy in principle. The two staffs differed, though, in their beliefs about how that policy would best be put into practice.

Trice's training in anthropology and the title of his book promise an in-depth analysis of employees' experiences. But his treatment does not adequately acknowledge the ways bureaucratic structures impinge on the lived experience of workers. Official positions taken by professional associations do not fully represent the complex and diverse perspectives of their memberships. Local understandings may deviate from those formally espoused by authorities. Ultimately, understanding the experience of work in bureaucratized settings requires an analysis of how localized groups deal with policies of both professional associations and employers, as well as other formal structures such as unions. In contending with super-local and superordinate forces, social actors are governed, at least in part, by informal, collective interests that operate at the microlevel, within small coworker units. The dynamics of localized solidarities and collective self-images affect responses to bureaucratic pressures. These factors are crucial to understanding how nursing instructors in Stelton responded to downsizing and the role of educational qualifications in layoff decisions.

Social scientists fundamentally recognize that the quality of interpersonal relations must be understood socioculturally. The capacity of women to bond (to identify and co-operate) is not in question here. The women's movement (Cassell, 1989; Miles and Finn, 1982), as well as the literature to which it gave rise, has put the lie to writings (such as Tiger, 1969) that elevated (or reduced) Western gender stereotypes about organizing and bonding to the level of natural fact. Women, no less than men, are subject to both large- and small-scale pressures, and

they experience these positionally, in terms of the statuses they occupy. When women enter paid employment, they are drawn into an arena which is a "male sphere" dominated by certain values—sometimes labelled patriarchal—that are generally associated with modern formal organizations: instrumentality, universalism, achievement, competition and the like. At the macrolevel, professional associational hierarchies (irrespective of gender composition) are prone to accept these larger-scale values, in their efforts to achieve collective goals within a wider arena of status competition. These may be accepted or contested by their rank-and-file members. But it behooves us to query the complex processes by which ideological systems become reproduced, reconstructed or resisted in concrete circumstances. It is important to ask not only "Whose ideology?" but also "What is the relationship between ideology and lived experience?"

Formal organizations are socially differentiated, and status distinctions mark out stakeholder groups. Various factors can differentiate rank-and-file groups. Stakeholders may be aligned by occupation (Bartunek and Moch, 1991; Kunda, 1992), work assignment (Van Maanen, 1991) or in terms of security of tenure (Kunda, 1992). Stakeholder populations, within the rank-and-file, develop understandings of how they place vis-à-vis one another, and their claims can be conflicting (see, for example, the altercasting between full-time and casual garment workers discussed by Young, 1991). Note, though, that the case at hand involves two groups of women who share a profession (nursing) and a job classification (instruction). Most share the status of permanent employee. Before the process of amalgamating began, their nursing schools were structurally similar and functionally equivalent, as were the hospitals of which they were departments. Each staff was small (composed of fewer than a dozen women), and working relationships within them were close; the women developed a sense of loyalty to one another and to their respective institutions. These factors amplified the magnitude of small differences in the educational backgrounds of instructors at each school. Thus, in the competition into which they were thrust, each staff functioned as a stakeholder group that developed its own strategic symbolic construction of layoff policy. Their competing constructions were formulated as part of a micropolitical process. This observation returns us to the question of process and agency.

Human Agency

Anthropological critics of popular OC literature reference important issues in the theory of culture when they argue against cultural reification and determinism. The contrast between OC authors and their critics parallels what Carrithers (1992: 18) defines as a transition from an earlier model of culture as a causative and conservative *thing* (metaphorically, Benedict's "cups" or Radcliffe-Brown's "sea shells"). The light of theoretical critique has now been refracted to create an image of culture as a precipitate of social events in which culture is itself implicated. Here, culture loses its externality, objectivity and independence; instead, it becomes conceptualized as intersubjective and interdependent, a system of meanings that is open to the implications of its own use as a social instrument (Bailey, 1969; Carrithers, 1992; Giddens, 1984; Murphy, 1971; Sahlins, 1981). The cultural dupes of more traditional (and more recent structural) theory are replaced by inventive social actors who "construct, reconstruct, and dismantle cultural materials" (Wolf in Carrithers, 1992: 27) and thus "make history" (i.e., both cultural reproduction and change). Significantly, a human-agency perspective sees culturally driven thought and action as indeterminate (or underdetermined), since cultural signs are polysemic, and all societies are at least minimally differentiated and thus constituted of varying stakeholder groups. Even if widely accepted, ideals cannot explain the multiplicity of concrete interpretations, much less their relationship to social action. The production of "real" culture is not random, of course, given the limiting effects of received categories and of power.

In other words, people use cultural resources, but do not do so passively. Their active involvement may be more or less creative. Anthony Giddens helps us illuminate this point. As a corrective to "objectivist" views, he offers structuration theory, a conceptual toolkit from which we can borrow the distinction between "practical" and "discursive" consciousness. The former is not to be understood as a-cultural, "practical" reason, but rather as cultural reason. It comprises "all of the things which actors know tacitly" (Giddens, 1984: xxiii) and act upon. Humans, as reflexive beings, use this knowledge in a continuous monitoring of others' actions and expectations. Giddens is therefore arguing that social life is routinely interpretive. Actors need not explicitly articulate their understandings, carry on a discourse about it, or enter a discourse with it. Practical consciousness does not always become discursive, but there is "no bar" between the two (ibid.: 7).

Carrithers (1992), like Giddens, argues that the same capacities that allow routinization also permit mutability: inference, higher-order intentionality, abstract thought. But he does not illuminate the conditions under

which these alternate, cultural-life courses occur. Sahlins also understands that social events are at once both conservative and innovative. He argues that cultural transformation is most clearly identifiable in conditions of culture contact, where there are clashing "cultural understandings and interests," but also that these motors of change exist within societies, "so long as actors with partially distinct concepts and projects relate their actions to each other" (Sahlins, 1981: 68). It seems reasonable to argue that practical consciousness becomes discursive, when routine breaks down and threatens "ontological security"—that is, trust in the way the world works (Giddens, 1984: xxiii; see also Bailey, 1977). Under these conditions, discursive consciousness is likely to be creative. Creative interpretation is most likely where claims for resources compete, since the contest requires that claims be legitimated. That is precisely the type of circumstance in which the Stelton nursing instructors were operating when amalgamation and downsizing occurred. The nurses created a discourse, though they did not challenge authority or try to change the system.

The process of creative discourse must be distinguished from the related questions of cultural and social change. Murphy (1971) argues that the dialectic between the mind and supra-individual ideals can serve to preserve those ideals. This may be effected by polite fiction, by convenient memory gaps, or by ideologically congruent reclassifications. Ideology "misapprehends" the operation of more complex and contradictory principles resident in overt and covert action, and in so doing may permit their continuance. Human creativity, further, occurs in the context of power. Microcultural reworkings of polysemic, received categories may neither convince nor even challenge those with power. Power involves control of resources to which subordinates need access, and it is, after all, often protected by authority, which is itself grounded in intersubjectivity.

Creative discourse need not be revolutionary, but it can serve important intragroup and personal functions. The latter, for example, are amply demonstrated by Kunda's (1992: 160ff.) description of the "continuing dialogue" between workers' understandings of themselves and the roles defined for them by management. In examining the ways that high-tech employees both identified with prescriptions and distanced themselves from them, Kunda sought to illustrate how they interpreted and made "meaningful their situation . . . within socially imposed constraints" (ibid.: 161). As will be shown, the Stelton instructors did likewise: while providing no challenge to authorities, they interpreted official policy in terms of their own *Gemeinschaft* interests. Their interpretations preserved their sense of interpersonal loyalty, small-group solidarity and group superiority, while protecting the principle of profession-wide status-seeking through educational upgrading.

Finally, we can draw a highly useful methodological note from Carrithers' notion that "narrative thought" is crucial to understanding how people experience and manage their social lives. Narrative thought rests on the "capacity to cognize . . . many-sided human interactions carried out over a considerable period . . . [to understand] complex deeds and attitudes" (Carrithers, 1992: 82). He points out that social agents act not only in terms of structural principles, but also in terms of real ongoing relationships with particular people. Carrithers argues for grounded micro-analyses of sociocultural process, and he suggests that abstract principles, even when complex, do not predict process.

Case Parameters

Micropolitical process is at the heart of the case events described in this article. This process is played out within a larger sphere of external conditions and pressures, about which a few words are in order. The context for the case study presented here involves the fiscal crisis (O'Connor, 1973) that has been experienced of late by industrial nations and that has led to budgetary pressures on publicly funded institutions, including hospitals. Two small hospitals in "Stelton"—a pseudonym for a de-industrialized city of approximately 30 000, in an economically marginal Canadian province—have undertaken an amalgamation to achieve, among other things, staffing efficiencies.[2] To cut costs further, the administration of the amalgamating hospitals also decided to decrease enrollment in their new, joint, nurses training program from 70 to 50 students, virtually 30 percent, over two years. According to the standard 8-to-1 student-teacher ratio set by the provincial RNA and accepted locally, this would legitimize 12 teaching positions, down from the 17 that were occupied, in the 1990-91 academic year, by 19 women (because of job-sharing schemes). The teaching staff was expected to decline by two positions during the initial year and three more the next.

The question of criteria for layoff led to conflict between the instructional staffs of the two hospitals, in which the role of educational credentials versus job seniority became a serious bone of contention. Notably, attitudes to education were complicated by events arising from the provincial RNA, which sets standards for education, certification, practice and access to ranked job

statuses. That association has accredited hospital-based training programs that prepare nurses for the provincial certification exams. According to that body, the basic qualification for teaching is an undergraduate degree. The local nursing-school administrations have conformed to that standard, though not as a rigid prescription, but rather with a modicum of flexibility due to local contingencies. Historical practice has, in effect, created conditions that challenge the application of present ideals by laying bare the contradiction between credentials and performance (see below).

Professional-association policy had affected the local scene in another respect. In an effort to raise its professional profile, a "group" strategy, the RNA bureaucracy is modifying its professional grid by making a university degree the standard for "entry to practice" (i.e., the minimal requirement for entry into the profession) as of 2001. It is fostering educational inflation. Instructors at both schools accept the professional association's "group" efforts in this respect. They value increased educational credentials in the abstract, despite the implications for their own employment and educational futures. The new standard will erode the status distinction between themselves and floor-duty nurses. It, furthermore, sounds the death knell of their institutions, and pressures them to safeguard their instructional status by attaining graduate degrees, which will be possible only at significant personal and domestic expense. Some refused to believe in the proximate demise of their programs; others coped with a threatening future by believing that clinical-instructional positions would be made available for them, as bachelors graduates, in a new, local, degree program.[3] More importantly, at the historical moment under investigation, the new entry-level standard carried implications for those making claims to continued employment in the short term. In other words, the degree devaluation implied by the emergent policy increased the importance of the degree as an absolute minimum for instructional positions. Simply, the fact that their "inferiors"—practising nurses—were soon to have degrees suggested a decreased tolerance for anything less.

Perceiving the Stakes

In short, downsizing was hierarchically mandated in response to conditions beyond local control. Contesting that executive decision was hardly a realistic possibility for the instructors, who accepted the inevitability of job losses. Management devised a process whereby instructors would be ranked for rifting. Neither its right to do so nor the process it designed was challenged. The instructors were, however, directly and immediately concerned with how that process worked and with its outcome. Alternate forms of discursive consciousness, informed by professional-associational ideology, emerged in reaction to the ranking formula, and engaged each other dialogically. Before investigating that response, however, we should examine the instructors' evaluation of the jobs under threat.

Among the concerns voiced in 14 semistructured interviews undertaken (in spring 1991) a few months before the first joint academic year, job insecurities loomed large. Virtually every respondent noted fear of layoffs, if not with reference to herself (since some were secure in their positions), then as a group concern. No one, except the one single parent of two children, was especially fearful of her own unemployment per se. All felt the need to contribute economically to their households. Though virtually all were married to men with middle-class jobs, and while the degree of their families' dependence on their incomes varied, they wanted to maintain their families' living standard. However, the probability of alternate employment had been assured, since, as union members, laid-off instructors would have the right to claim the jobs of less senior practising nurses, and incumbent income losses were not judged significant. Job *changes* were seen as worrisome, however. Instructors noted, for example, that securing an appropriate post is complicated in a field of differentiated practice, where recent experience is so important a determinant of competency and self-confidence.

The instructors were more concerned still about changes in working conditions. They favoured their relative independence and control over concrete labour. Their real distress, however, can be understood only with reference to the standards against which they evaluate their jobs, and these norms bear the mark of extra-organizational, non-professional statuses. In other words, while a bureaucratic role *per se* is unitary, each incumbent holds many roles at the same time. Grounded analyses of work roles must take into account the demands of extra-organizational ones. As noted, the OC literature gives little attention to how extra-organizational statuses affect the development of work-group orientations. Its goal is rather to suggest means for controlling extra-organizational role demands (e.g., Pascale, 1984). While this may be desirable from a management perspective, it is unrealistic and analytically misleading to argue that these demands can be written off.

The instructors pointed out that not only is floor-duty nursing very hard work (cf. Greiner, 1991; Growe, 1991), but it is difficult to integrate with family life, and

only one (a quite secure) instructor was beyond her childrearing years. It was this scheduling advantage of their current jobs that the instructors overwhelmingly favoured. They worked regular hours and no overnight shifts, though some did periodic evening shifts. They were not required to work on public holidays, and, though arrangements at the nursing schools differed somewhat, they tended to have free time during public-school holidays.

Accordingly, teaching jobs were premium ones. Reassignment represented real loss. Instructors accepted the inevitability of some job losses at each school. Very little competition occurred within either staff, but the schools aligned themselves against one another. Finally, it is important to note, at least in passing, that the competitive attitudes surrounding downsizing took place in, and were perceived in terms of, the context of amalgamation. Amalgamation raised issues of managerial change and consequent changes in policies governing the concrete labour process, issues that would affect those who survived the downsizing. A detailed exposition of these issues is impossible here—they have been the focus of a separate analysis (deRoche, 1994)—though I can briefly remark on how they formed part of the narrative context that provoked interstaff conflict: while most instructors tried to present a perspective on change that balanced fears with hopes, those on both staffs were acutely aware of problems of distributive justice. As it became increasingly clear that the director of one of the schools ("St. Martha's") would head the amalgamated unit, both groups concluded that her subordinates would face less disruptive change than would their counterpart group (at "Stelton General"). This fed a sense of grievance that was emerging over the issue of job loss, the issue which is our prime concern in the discussion that follows.

Contests and Discourses

The case analysis examines how real-life players cope with institutional pressures and in so doing actively construct, or reconstruct, collective representations. In the conceptual terms introduced above, two groups of instructors ("Stelton General's" and "St. Martha's," respectively) generated alternate forms of discursive consciousness centring on the meaning of "job qualification." Each interpretation reflected its creators' communal interests, which they sought to validate ideologically. The layoff policy was devised by a union committee, empowered by the organizational hierarchy of the amalgamating hospitals. In accepting bureaucratic authority, as well as traditional domestic roles, the instructors engaged in social and cultural reproduction. That is to say, practical consciousness was also at play. Both discursive forms also instantiated a cultural valuation of primary relationships (though not necessarily its prioritization over impersonal standards in the matter of job allocation), and both nourished small-group solidarity. Both ideological models reaffirmed "ontological security," by reinforcing trust in the microcommunity of coworkers and by legitimating its collective self-image. In this sense, and because in so doing it offered a microlevel defence against a perceived injustice, the "deviant" (non-authorized) discourse is not to be dismissed. Rather it functioned as a form of collective disengagement from the oppression of power, like the disengagement on the individual level discussed by Bailey (1993), or, in other terms, as "a weapon of the weak" (Alverson, 1978).

The substantive content of the analysis involves conflict between principles and persons. In actuality, the case is constituted of different but related levels of "conflict": one at the level of ideology and the other on the plane of interpersonal experience. At the former level, there is contradiction between credentialism and role performance. Credentials are meant to testify to performance capacity, but incumbency in their absence reveals their political nature. This places a wedge between ideals and actuality, providing an opening for contestation. This wedge is driven by loyalty. Instructors are faced with a potential contradiction between interpersonal loyalties, on the one hand, and professional-educational ideology, on the other. As noted, abstract ideological principles are expressed by the instructors' professional association and prescribed by its hierarchy. But prescriptions aimed to benefit the collectivity are not necessarily unadulterated goods. Benefits do not accrue to all alike, and they carry costs.

At the level of lived experience, each of the two small groups has interpreted their common profession's educational ideology in a way that seeks to erase the conflict between it and the demands of intragroup loyalty. That loyalty does not represent simple altruism, an identification of the self with the concerns of valued others. Indeed, altruistic acts are not direct expressions of human nature or personality dispositions, but rather are complex, socially constructed acts. Claims of legitimacy are implicated in loyalty here, and legitimation of the group entails personal justification. Organizations demand loyalty, not just overt compliance. This is, in fact, the managerial goal underlying organizational-culture building (deRoche, 1997). The "dignity of the firm" (Bailey, 1993: 24), its capacity to inspire reverence or commitment, entails the dignity of the work group,

though the two can conflict (Roy, 1954). Each set of instructors takes pride in its school (hospital department) by taking approving notice of its collective effort. Each individual can take pride in herself as part of that collective. Group dignity, its claims on its own behalf, also implies conflict, that is, claims against the other (Bailey, 1993: 40ff.). In its alternative interpretations of qualification, each group makes claims for itself and contests the other's. It is the collectivities of coworkers that are opposed, and it is intragroup loyalty and need for legitimacy that fire the opposition. Finally, recall that role-conflict enters the contested terrain in another way. All instructors are women who well understood the countervailing demands of market- and domestic-sphere duties. As noted, the jobs for which they competed were valuable as a means for controlling conflict, between work and familial roles, that formed part of their practical consciousness. But these extra-organizational role considerations do more than explain the stakes; they also form part of the ideological backdrop for assessing claims and evaluating the outcome of the ranking process.

The instructors' discourse on ranking encompassed a commentary on action that took place in a structured organizational context. Ranking criteria were set in terms of an authorized division of labour in which unions figured centrally. Given its minimal attention to productive workers and its lack of class consciousness, the OC literature ignores the role of unions in sub-cultural processes, and even Trice's remarks are peripheral. In Stelton, nurses at each hospital were organized into a separate union representing both floor-duty nurses and instructors. The task of ranking instructors' claims to continued employment fell under union jurisdiction, and the hospital authorities thus delegated it to a joint committee of the two unions. Instructors were in a minority in both unions, and they were not directly represented on the committee. In other words, the committee comprised representatives of a different stakeholder group than that for which it was deciding policy. In this locale, floor-duty nurses are typically not university trained. The group dimension of the committee's mandate was further complicated: the committee could not represent the interests of the instructor constituency as a whole, but rather had to devise a grid that would differentiate claimants. The focus of the current analysis, however, involves less an unweaving of the grid/group dimensions of union-committee deliberations, and more an assessment of stakeholders' interpretations of those deliberations. This committee's calculations—most especially regarding the factor of education—had practical, micropolitical and symbolic consequences for the instructors. In operationalizing criteria and establishing a formula by which instructors would be ranked for layoff, the committee originally set out to consider three factors: experience (including both staff and instructional nursing), seniority (in the respective hospitals) and education. The first two are complicated, at least in part, by society's double standard of work responsibilities. Some instructors had resigned previously held positions for domestic reasons, while others had taken maternity leaves, allowing prior experience to count for seniority. The typical instructor did not have on hand the amount of detailed data required to assess the strategic value of alternate positions on this issue. The question of education became the most controversial one, polarizing the two staffs and crystallizing seniority issues.

Late in its deliberations, the committee decided to discount educational credentials in its ranking scheme. It did so by identifying a cultural contradiction alluded to above. The point of institutionalizing educational standards is to ensure job capacity. However, the committee argued that anyone who had been successfully filling a position must, by definition, be sufficiently qualified to do the job. The decision provoked a discourse within and between groups in which two forms of discursive consciousness emerged to confront one another.

Despite their common acceptance of the value of increased education, the local groups diverged on the question of qualification at the concrete and immediate level. They differentially interpreted the relationship between job experience and credentials. For the Stelton General instructors, credentials should be the basis for the first cut in the current layoff scheme, the gateway to claims based on seniority. And their definition of the credential supports their own competitive claims making. In contrast, the St. Martha's instructors disputed the primacy of the degree credential, arguing instead for the committee position that job performance proves qualification, and thus that seniority should be the only consideration in the current situation. That is to say, they and the committee discovered, at the level of grounded experience, the debate about credentialism argued theoretically by Marxist educational critics such as Bowles and Gintis (1988 and 1976) and other "conflict theorists" such as Collins (1979). In brief, ideological consensus on educational inflation does not translate into agreement about how to proceed with grounded activity.

Microlevel factors were implicated in the two staffs' respective ideological analyses. The educational profiles of the two staffs illuminate the way microlevel forces informed the discourse. Though a Bachelor's degree had become the basic requirement for teaching by the time

that current instructors were hired (in or after 1976), three instructors were without nursing degrees. Two were at Stelton General and one was at St. Martha's. At first glance, group image and *Gemeinschaft* factors seem to predict that the General's staff would be more favourable to the layoff formula that was generated. But it was the General staff that disparaged it. Instructors there firmly argued that a university degree should be a basic criterion for continued employment, while the St. Martha's instructors generally opposed that stance. Yet, as the situation was perceived from the ground, it was indeed group self-image and primary relationships that predicted attitudes. In terms of local-group status claims and primary loyalties, the General's staff had more to gain and less to lose by espousing the value of education; St. Martha's had nothing to gain and something to lose by the same posture. These reactions make sense so long as one understands the alternate interpretive frames generated for the evaluation of credentials.

Credentialism as a Tool

Among Stelton General instructors, education was said to be paramount. It was synonymous with qualification. One instructor summed up her colleagues' attitudes on the issue of instructor ranking: "At our school, qualifications [credentials] is [*sic*] number one and seniority" is second. Her summary is accurate; there were no dissenters in this group. For them incumbency and performance were insufficient measures of qualification. They typically objected to the argument that educational achievement is made irrelevant by role performance, i.e., that occupancy of a position is *de facto* qualification, since it indicates the ability to do the job. This respondent noted that educational qualifications were supposed to rank higher than seniority in the unions' formula, but by redefining qualification in terms of incumbency, "seniority was the only thing left to go on."

The formulation of this position was made possible by the way the Stelton General staff capitalized on an ambiguity in the degree policy of its professional association. They defined it as referring to any degree, not just one in nursing *per se*. Two of its instructors lacked degrees in nursing, but both were university graduates. Each, in fact, held both Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Education degrees (the latter of which are awarded, in the province, to degree-holders after another year or two of specialized training). Both were also registered nurses, with diplomas from hospital training programs. These women, in other words, each held three credentials. By interpreting the degree requirement broadly, the General's staff could claim credentialist superiority over its competition.

Indeed, some of the Stelton General staff claimed the superiority of the B.Ed. for the job of teaching. Notably, however, the two women in question were also low on seniority. No one suggested placing them above holders of a baccalaureate in nursing, a move that would create intragroup contests and seniority grievances. Sacrificing one of these women to the immediate rifting process was relatively painless, since she had been hired with the understanding that her job was temporary. (All other instructors held permanent positions.) The other woman, having resigned earlier for traditional domestic reasons, had been on staff for only a couple of years. These two would go, irrespective of degree status. To defend them symbolized group dignity, but it was materially and micropolitically cost free for the group as a whole. However, one of the staffs would eventually lose a third position; thus sacrificial imbalance was built into downsizing. In this context, the union position meant that the General would not only lose university-trained staff but also more staff members than the other, and the system would protect a St. Martha's instructor who held only a diploma.

One staffer at the General noted how the union position unfairly discredited her colleagues. In effect, it meant that:

> People with Master's degrees in adult education are bumped to the bottom, and those with no degree, but working on them, is [*sic*—clearly, the speaker had the one case in mind] put high on the list. . . . The difference between a Bachelor's in nursing and a B.Ed., to me she's ***much*** more qualified than someone who doesn't have any one. . . . I don't know what could be done to be fair, but I really feel an education is important in an educational institution. That's our specialty [after all].

This woman spoke for herself with some bitterness, noting that she has been given no rewards or recognition for a Master's degree in Education. (In fact, a Master's in Nursing raises one's annual salary by only $300, and until recently was not rewarded, on the assumption that it was not necessary and thus not utilized on the job). But for her and her colleagues the most contentious issue was the bachelor's degree versus diploma-plus-experience. She went on to rationalize credentialism in terms of culturally rooted values: "What bothers me most is that [there's] no respect for what a person does to help improve herself or the place she's working for."

This argument does more than voice a personal complaint. It asserts the superiority of the speaker's staff and

that group's sense of injustice. It raises the stakes in the educational competition. No one in the rank-and-file of the other staff can claim graduate training. More fundamentally, by underscoring the relevancy of degrees held by her school's two lowest-ranking instructors, this view sets the whole General group above a woman, from St. Martha's, who ranks second in the committee's list of job claimants. In arguing for the displacement of this high-ranking individual, the commentary also addresses a sense of grievance, felt by the General staff, concerning seniority, for which that woman was an especially clear symbol. That instructor's role as target—or scapegoat in the minds, though not words, of her own colleagues—can only be understood narratively, in the way life was experienced and interpreted by the agents of each discursive stance. This instructor had been working at St. Martha's continuously since graduating from that school itself in 1974. She was a part-time floor-duty nurse at the hospital, for seven years while her children were young, until she was invited to teach part-time in its training program. On becoming a full-time instructor, two years prior to the conflict, she had enrolled in an external degree program on a part-time basis, thus studying without resigning her position. In brief, the seniority system rewarded her for not having a degree, for not sacrificing the additional two to three years required to upgrade her diploma to a higher credential. Measuring her seniority by "date of hire," without differentiating full- and part-time status, she came to outrank all Stelton General instructors. Even if her part-time work (until 1981) had been discounted, she would still place rather high on the joint seniority scale, as rival instructors were well aware. (That method of calculation, to add insult to injury, was the standard in the General's union.) However, it is not surprising that the issue of part-time status remained beyond contention. Well-established instructors in both groups would be disadvantaged by any discount on part-time work, and it would create internal rivalries. The education issue more decisively polarized the two staffs and served the collective interests of each.

According to the established layoff formula, the General's third-least secure instructor would lose her job in the second year of amalgamation. She held a Bachelor of Nursing degree but had relatively few years of continuous service, because she had left work when her last child was born. Her colleagues' concern centred on her status as the only single parent in either group. In fact, they were acutely aware of her unusually great fear of unemployment *per se* and that, under the stress of financial vulnerability, she had begun a search for alternate employment. She was also a member of the team of second-year teachers at Stelton General, a group of women who were relatively status-conscious and especially cohesive.

Perhaps the most interesting and ironically corroborating remark comes from a woman who had worked on the provincial association's "entry to practice" committee, the body that recommended the new standard for entry into the profession. As she said:

> I was one of the people that felt education is a definite requirement. It's not fair that someone who didn't even have a degree would be placed higher. It's *not personal.* I know the person, she's really nice. It's *the principle* of the thing. . . . You have to be at least one degree higher than the people you're going to teach. (Emphasis added)

Her denial of particularistic (*Gemeinschaft*) motives and collective self-interest is revealing. Her judgment is not personal in the conventional sense. She was not arguing that a universal and instrumental standard should be abrogated for reasons of taste. Her remarks assert that personality preferences are irrelevant and extraneous. Principle is prioritized; the General's stance appears objective or disinterested. By implication, the other staff violates principle by advocating favouritism. But the ability of General staffers to put principle first reflects the absence of personal loyalties. Their relationship to the woman at issue is indeed *not* personal. In actuality, that group's interpretation of the educational criterion favours those with whom these staffers have personal ties. In the case of each of the two staffs, differentially constructed principles served personal relationships.

Performance as Proof

For St. Martha's staff, the case of the absent degree was very personal, but they did not construe their position as unprincipled. The instructor who lacked a degree had a larger-than-average family (four children). Her husband had returned to work only a month previously, having endured eight months' unemployment after a layoff from a job he had held for only four years. In accepting the unions' argument, her colleagues came to her defence. They questioned the university degree criterion as a valid indicator of ability to do the job. Thus, they critiqued "credentialism" in a way that is reminiscent of theoretized offerings (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Collins, 1979), by arguing that formal credentials are essentially an artificial device for legitimating claims under conditions of oversupply of qualified labour. They emphasized that incumbency proved qualification. One St. Martha's

colleague (who ranks in the middle of the seniority scale) indicated an ambivalence that is inherent in her group's position. She began by noting that she values education, that "a university education is important for anybody." When pressed to judge its universal applicability in the real situation at hand, she waffled:

> My original thought was that a degree was a basic requirement. I'd have to say I still think that [but] ... these people [*sic*] were hired, given these jobs, [they're] very experienced. I don't see how they can go back on their decisions to hire ... and [you] can't say they're [those lacking degrees] not as good to teach. *I couldn't pick them out if I didn't know.* (Emphasis added)

Notably, she made the dangerous argument that the nursing degree provides little in the way of teacher training. Her analysis does not champion formal education but rather on-the-job training. It is reasonable to suggest that under less contradictory microsocial circumstances, this woman would not have so reworked her original credentialist position. Her school colleague, the most senior of all the instructors, was less equivocal. When asked about the seniority system, she had no difficulty aligning herself as an anti-credentialist: "I agree with years of experience. Everybody is basically equal. If you've not got the qualifications, you shouldn't be teaching here." Thus, she brings to the battle the legitimacy of past, authoritative decisions. To question the ranking would question the judgment and authority of the director (who, most believed, would head the joint school). Then she added, more frankly than most, a comment about the microsocial motivation underlying this interpretation: "You have to have that because it gives protection to people in your hospital."

Rule-Proving Exceptions

The St. Martha's staff members further displayed their motivation by differentiating between applying the standard to new applicants (i.e., those who have no place in the personal-historical narrative) as opposed to incumbents. As this same instructor articulated it: "Maybe that's all [who] should be hired [those with degrees], but people who don't have their degrees, we should look after them." Her colleagues also pointed out that the controversial woman is working on her degree. Their opponents at the Stelton General thus appear to be splitting hairs. In general, protectionist and anti-credentialist opinions were echoed by virtually all others at St. Martha's, including its lowest-ranking instructor (who is young and childless). It is worth reiterating that the women quoted—like all other respondents, in both schools—favoured the RNA policy on educational upgrading.

Notably, the Stelton General staff did not entirely deny their target's capabilities. They conceded that it is possible to do the job without the credentials. "She probably does a lovely job," one of them admits, "but you have to have some sort of basis. Someone with a degree shouldn't be displaced." For them, the issue was, as noted, one of distributive justice, which they conceived as rewards for investment and effort. St. Martha's staff could accept credentialism, but only if it were applied to strangers. *Gemeinschaft* pressures displace the application of that principle into the future, to as yet unestablished loyalties. Lacking such mediating ties, the General was unfettered in its immediate application. Accordingly, one could say that in like circumstances the two groups might well react similarly; but their circumstances differed.

To the General instructors, forgiving the degree credential permitted what amounts to a double-dipping (i.e., benefiting twice-over from the same condition). In their commentaries, some of them directly confronted that issue. One instructor specifically suggested a limit on the value of experience. She pointed out that "Over five years, you've developed your teaching skills," though she qualified this by noting that improvement does continue after the basic development takes place. Another went further. After she objected to someone's being essentially credited with a degree by being judged the equal of degree-bearers, she was asked where a non-holder should be placed on the seniority list. She suggested that "maybe they should trade three years as equivalent to one year of the degree," a formula that significantly demotes such an individual, since it normally takes three years of study beyond a nursing diploma to get a nursing degree. A third instructor alluded to the issue, though her plan for crediting experience in lieu of education was less specific.

Generally, each group presented an internal consensus. Only one instructor, from St. Martha's, admitted to a position that deviated from her group's, and her case is instructive. Her admission came in the privacy of the interview in which she, significantly, reported that she had refrained from voicing opposition to her primary group's stance. She is deviant in another important respect, one that reveals the dynamic of loyalty and self-interest. As the last of her staff to have lost seniority by resigning rather than taking maternity leave, a decision her director had assured her would have no material fallout, she felt cheated and betrayed. Three members of

her staff, who would otherwise be her juniors, outrank her. If her formal grievance is successful, she will save her job, though at the expense of one of her own colleagues (but not the one who lacks a degree). While the seniority issue has thrust her into personal competition with individuals in her own group, she managed also to use it as a device for deflecting self-prioritization, as well as for expressing loyalty through outgroup critique. She championed her colleagues, in an otherwise spurious and invidious criticism of the greediness of the General's staff for retaining their positions despite their age and their advantage in having passed their childbearing years. In point of fact, the oldest member of that staff was about 52, and, ironically, she had earlier withdrawn, for a time, from the workforce to become a full-time homemaker. This cost her 11 years of on-the-job experience.

Conclusions

As the last example indicates, seniority concerns *per se* created the potential for complex divisions within each group. Partly because it was simple and partly because of the concrete intergroup differences it marked, the degree criterion had power to divert conflict to the outsider group. The competing positions, on the degree credential, addressed issues of social justice rooted in concrete relational loyalties and self-images. Alternate grid ideologies were generated in terms of local primary-group pressures and identities that took into account extra-occupational and extra-organizational roles, but also judged historical life situations of whole persons rather than abstract role assemblages. The situation of induced competition raised some aspects of practical consciousness to the discursive level. St. Martha's availed itself of the opportunity to bend the meaning of, rather than to reject, the educational ideology of the professional association. By examining the substantive intent of credentialism, it legitimated the practice of "grandmothering" and thus promoted its own brand of narrative justice. It thus defended itself from allegations of inferiority or regressive attitudes. The competing interpretation allowed the General group to bolster its self-image by rationalizing its superiority over the other.

Under conditions of economic insecurity, the instructors accepted the material and symbolic resources of power. While one individual did contest her ranking, no one challenged the authority of the administration to constitute the committee as it did, nor did anyone challenge the authority of the committee to make the decision it did. The discourse produced by the General's staff did not save it from perceived material injustice but allowed the group to perceive that injustice. In this way, it functioned as a defensive weapon against the implied assault on its superiority, and thus it minimized loss by insulating collective self-esteem from the process. Each form of discursive consciousness involved an intragroup discourse and an intergroup one. Each developed in relation to the other. Each juggled ideological and social contradictions by upholding common ideals but contesting the manner of their proper realization.

This case study of cultured experience points toward a general paradigm of values and norms. Both groups accepted bureaucratic authority along with a gender-biased, but non-traditional, division of labour. Group members need not, however, be seen as dupes acting out cultural directives. Given the high costs involved in challenging these principles, which protect the vested interests of others who share them, acceptance indicates practical consciousness. Instructor agency is pragmatic and reasonable. Notably, however, the case demonstrates that formal or manifest consensus at the institutional level cannot predict grounded discourse. Implicit in the patterns enacted in grounded and less formal (more "private") discursive practice are norms of loyalty and desire for legitimacy. These patterns of real culture operate both as blinds and strategic resources, as is incisively witnessed by the groups' differing uses of credential versus ability or "principle" versus "personality." Ethnographically revealed discourse makes *real* culture more visible. Real culture does not belie agency. Rather, agency is expressed in it. These lived patterns become more predictable as microconditions are examined and thus unveiled. More importantly, such patterns make sense, become understood as indicators of cultured rationality, as they are analyzed narratively.

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Notes

1 I refer here to the literature from management studies, which ranges along a spectrum represented, at one end, by more academic writing generated by business professors for one another and their students and, at the other, by more journalistic pieces speaking to managers and the general public. Alvesson and Berg (1992: 25) differentiate three categories of authors: "purists" (gloss as "pure" researchers), "pragmatists" (consultants and popular writers) and "academic pragmatists" (essentially, "applied" academics), though they acknowledge the difficulty of clearly bounding the categories. The anthropological critique applies to the last two. The purist literature from the field of management—which is relatively recent and is exemplified by Alvesson and Berg's volume itself—engages in a similar critique that offers confirmation of the claims made in the current article.

2 This was an effort to eliminate the institutional duplication that followed religious-sectarian lines and that was the norm in Maritime Canada until recently. The amalgamation of two local general hospitals (along with a psychiatric centre) was meant to realize efficiencies which would permit purchase of more advanced technology, thus providing better service to a population that has had to travel some 600 kilometres for various kinds of specialty care. Gradual amalgamation began with the routing of all maternity cases to one hospital in the late 1970s. Emergency and outpatient services in one of the hospitals closed in the summer of 1991 and, at about the same time, the two administrations became integrated and the nursing schools prepared to offer a joint program to incoming students.

3 Hospital training programs are being phased out earlier than the original deadline set for the year 2001. The last local class of students was admitted to the joint (two-year) program in the fall of 1994. Thus, sad to say, the Stelton instructors lost their positions earlier than expected, and the local nursing-degree program has not, to date, materialized.

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Fatal Errors: Ruth Landes and the Creation of the "Atomistic Ojibwa"[1]

Joan A. Lovisek *Unionville, Ontario*
Tim E. Holzkamm *North Dakota State University*
Leo G. Waisberg *Kenora, Ontario*

Abstract: This article examines several aspects of Ruth Landes' depiction of the Boundary Waters Ojibwa. Based on field work in the 1930s, the "Emo" Ojibwa were characterized ahistorically by Landes as atomistic individuals living in small bands having no indigenous political organization, driven by need to disperse widely in a meagre country. Research into Landes' published and unpublished materials, in conjunction with ethnohistorical research and Elder testimony, reveal major problems with Landes' field work and her analysis of the Ojibwa. Although Landes' work represents many of the biases and preconceptions of colonial anthropology, regrettably, she compromised her ethnographic portrayal by fabrications, by serious errors of fact and omission and by questionable methodology. These weaknesses limit Landes' work as a reliable source on the Ojibwa.

Résumé: Cet article examine certains aspects de la représentation des Ojibwas de Boundary Waters par Ruth Landes. Fondée sur ses recherches sur le terrain des années trente, Landes avait dépeint les Ojibwas «Emo» comme des individus atomistes vivant en petits groupes sans organisation politique indigène, obligés de se disperser sur un immense territoire pauvre. Une recherche effectuée sur les travaux publiés et inédits de Landes, ainsi qu'une recherche ethnohistorique et des témoignages des anciens ont mis en évidence de nombreux problèmes relatifs aux expériences sur le terrain de Landes et à son analyse des Ojibwas. Bien que les travaux de Landes représentent le parti-pris et les opinions préconçues de l'anthropologie coloniale, cette dernière a compromis son portrait éthnographique en forgeant des données, en faisant de sérieuses erreurs sur les faits ainsi que des omissions et en utilisant une méthodologie discutable. Tous ces éléments limitent la portée des travaux de Landes en tant que source fiable sur les Ojibwas.

Ruth Landes' work on the Anishinaabeg (Ojibwa) has long been considered an example of "classic ethnography." Her interpretations arose from field work among Rainy River Ojibwa on Manitou Rapids Reserve, near the town of Emo in northwestern Ontario. In several publications during the 1930s, the "Emo" Ojibwa were characterized as atomistic individuals living in small, mutually hostile bands having no indigenous political organization, driven by need to disperse in a poor country. Landes further portrayed Ojibwa women as culturally dispossessed and underprivileged. Her ethnographies from Manitou Rapids became a focus of the theory of particularity or atomism among the Ojibwa in the early 1950s and 1960s. Landes' interpretations of extreme individualism also engaged ethnohistorians, who sought to determine the origin of such "late" features of Ojibwa culture, in order to reconcile them with historical evidence for earlier collective institutions.

Historical research and Elder testimony from Rainy River First Nations[2] demonstrate how Landes compromised her interpretation by a number of fatal errors, including mistakes of fact, omissions and use of questionable ethnographic methods. These errors severely limit Landes' work as a reliable source on Ojibwa culture and society on Rainy River and in the Boundary Waters.

Ruth Landes and the Origin of Atomism

Ruth Landes died in 1991. She was a student of Franz Boas, a contemporary of Margaret Mead and a student and friend to Ruth Benedict. Landes' ethnographies of Ojibwa materials have been praised for systematically studying the culture from a woman's point of view (Hallowell, 1938; Cole, 1995a, 1995b). Her Ojibwa work was a principal reason for Landes' success as an anthropologist; she ended her career as Professor Emerita at McMaster University. Although it has been suggested that the body of Landes' work has been ignored and

marginalized (Cole, 1995b: 168, 177), there is little evidence that Landes' Ojibwa work was ignored.

Landes studied under Boas at Columbia University at a time when his analysis had moved inward into the relationship between the individual psyche and culture. Landes' background included a master's degree in social work and a strong interest in psychology and Afro-American Jews. The "Boasian paradigm" which examined the individual under the stress of culture (Boas, 1938: 269) was taken up by another of Landes' teachers, Ruth Benedict. Her focus on culture as "stress," or entrapment, magnified psychological components by focussing on neuroses, psychoses and general abnormality. Abnormality among the Ojibwa proved an important component to Landes' development of atomism and her understanding of gender, particularly male roles (1938: 24).[3]

The essentials of Landes' portrayal were published in 1937 as "The Ojibwa of Canada" (1966) in a comparative study edited by Margaret Mead, *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples. Ojibwa Sociology* was released in the same year, followed thereafter in 1938 by *The Ojibwa Woman* (1971). Collateral articles were published in the journals *Character and Personality* (1937) and *Abnormal and Social Psychology* (1938). For Landes' work to have received such attention was unusual for this time (Frantz, 1985: 85, 86; Ebihara, 1985: 103) and reflected the powerful influence of Benedict and Mead.

Landes (1966: 102) depicted Ojibwa social life as different "orders of hostility." The Ojibwa personality structure was typified by severe anxiety neuroses caused by a shortage of food which manifested as "melancholia, violence and obsessive cannibalism," culturally represented by the Windigo (Landes, 1938: 24-26, 30). She linked the Windigo to an Ojibwa male ethos and a game-scarce environment in which the Ojibwa, extremely individualistic and protective of private property, existed in small, isolated and hostile households (Landes, 1971: 2, 9). Landes characterized the Ojibwa as hunters of big game and fur animals which were "scarce," forcing complete isolation of family households during the winter season (November-March). So isolated were the Ojibwa, they were "dizzied" by the excitement of social orientation after having been "imprisoned by the deep snows and cold" (Landes, 1937: 51-52). Landes (1966: 87) argued that such winter isolation resulted in individualistic male behaviour, while the behaviour of women was described as "spontaneous and confused" (1971:v).

According to Landes (1966: 102) "politically and economically the Ojibwa are an atomistic society . . . the individual person is the unit." The Ojibwa were described as placing a high value on "ruthless individualism" (1969: 87). She concluded that "the Canadian Ojibwa have only a feeble development of the characteristic American forms of hospitality and gift exchanges: there are no such obligations even between parents and children" (ibid.: 141). Ojibwa were relegated to the farthest outpost of the southern Sioux-Central Algonquian cultural complex: "the Canadian Ojibwa gens shows none of the religious and political developments so characteristic of the Central Algonkian and the Southern Sioux" (ibid.: 37, 52).

Landes characterized the Ojibwa as an "atomistic society" (1966: 102). No term has been more often attached to the Ojibwa. Landes published in psychiatric journals in which the Ojibwa ethos was described as "saturated with anxiety" caused by recurring starvation. The "neuroses and psychoses which flourish in such soil . . . manifest themselves in melancholia, violence and obsessive cannibalism," for all of which "the Ojibwa have one term: *windigo*." For the Ojibwa, "insanity is recognized and [a] comparatively common . . . characteristic and carefully described by the people." Individualism was manifested in the killing of trespassers, characterized by Landes as "ego assertion." War leaders, to Landes, were engaged in "ego-maximation," while co-operation was "personal defeat" (Landes, 1938: 24; 1937: 56-58).

None of these manifestations, such as Windigo psychosis, killing of trespassers, starvation and war parties, or indeed even life on the trapline, were observed directly by Landes. Her interpretation arose from the raw material of stories purchased from her informant, Maggie Wilson and others. The Ojibwa were portrayed as savage dissidents who could be made human and familiar through Western psychology (Landes, 1971: 178-226).[4] Her letters contain degrading terminology in which the Ojibwa were "atomistic megalomaniac paranoids," the Potawatomi, "bitches and sneak thieves" and the Dakota "cretins" (RBP, September 2, 1935; January 30, 1933). Developing these impressions through Western psychology and its penchant for deviance and pathology, Landes (1971: 196, 204-206, 212) described male Ojibwa shamans as megalomaniacs, paranoids and exhibitionists who suffered from persecution reactions during their youth.

The Diffusion of Atomism

Atomism oriented research toward a particular set of phenomena, notably the idea of small dispersed family bands, and ignored evidence of collective activity. Used indiscriminately, atomism continues to be applied as both a description and explanation of Ojibwa culture and per-

sonality. The subject became a central issue in the debate on the "theory of particularity" in *Current Anthropology* (Hickerson, 1967a). Participants did not question the validity of the ethnographic data regarding "atomism." The term survives in studies of acculturation and fur trade dependency (Parades, 1980: 399-401; Bishop, 1978: 221-222).

Hickerson was not the only author to consider atomism. Atomism became the subject of a series of ethnographic papers in 1968 contained in *Human Organization*. In several case studies the phenomenon of atomism, if not the term, social atomism, was applied cross-culturally to societies then categorized as peasant, tribal and band level. The papers were assessed by John J. Honigmann (1968: 220, 227) who had applied the concept of social atomism in his published work in 1946 and 1949 among the Fort Nelson Slave Indians and Kaska. Honigmann attributed the origins of atomism not to Landes but to Ruth Benedict, and accredited A. Irving Hallowell for revealing atomism among Ojibwa. Honigmann's assessment of the case studies indicates that social atomism was generally used to explain a multiplicity of associations such as: absence of political structure; hostility in interpersonal relations; absence of large-scale organization and co-operation; fragmented communication networks; and anxiety, anomie, alienation and irrational behaviour.

As part of the focus upon individual personality and culture in North American anthropology, there was intense interest in psychological testing. Hallowell emphasized the individualistic pattern of Ojibwa society, differing from Landes on the nature of societal hostility. The Berens River Ojibwa were "chiefless, courtless, jailless" and "atomistic" (Hallowell, 1955: 345-357, 422). Using Rorschach tests, Barnouw and Ernestine Friedl concluded that the Wisconsin Ojibwa had "limited maternal care with often shifting parental surrogates [which] conditioned a dependent, emotionally repressed personality with minimal expectations from the outer world." Beliefs in the Windigo were linked to "oral frustrations" and may have been related to seasonal scarcity and inadequate parental affection. Victor Barnouw reported that Ojibwa libidinal regression was conditioned by "sexually repressed and ambivalent gender relations" which derived from "the traditionally atomistic social organization" (Manson, 1988: 89, 91, 92). Atomism was central to Barnouw's 1950 study of the "atomistic constitution" of the Wisconsin Ojibwa (Pelto, 1980: 302) and to Paula Brown's view of the Red Lake Ojibwa (1952).

Criticism of Landes' Ojibwa work has been largely indirect. Margaret Mead expressed some reservations about the quasi-environmental rationale for extreme individualism, but did not challenge the characterization: "it still remains a problem why the habits of the winter months should so completely dominate their whole outlook, rather than the habits of summer months when they collect in villages" (Mead, 1966: 464). Soviet ethnologist J. P. Averkieva questioned whether assumptions underlying the theory of atomism did not originate outside empirical ethnography. Averkieva (1962) criticized the psychological portrait of the Ojibwa associated with the atomistic theory as "fabrications of ethnologists who are racists," for it ascribed to them negative personality traits such as sullenness, hostility and suspicion (Hickerson, 1967a: 318, 321).

Not all ethnographers have replicated Landes' characterization of the Ojibwa as a collection of atomistic individuals living in small, discrete, hostile households, having no communal or political organization. Dunning, for example (1959: 76, 108), attempted to explain striking differences in the rules of exogamy at Pekangekum and those described at Manitou Rapids as the result of the latter being exposed to missionaries and to a modern economy. Sister Inez Hilger (1992: ix), who studied Ojibwa child development and family structure in several neighbouring communities in Minnesota at about the same time as Landes, specifically noted considerably different findings. Similar discrepancies appear in the ethnographies of Frances Densmore (1928; 1979), who conducted field work at Manitou Rapids in 1919 and at Minnesota Ojibwa reservations. However, Landes' work on the whole remained unchallenged.

Ethnohistorians Harold Hickerson (1967a; 1967b) and Charles Bishop (1970; 1974) argued that the development of atomistic social organization could be explained by historical and ecological factors stemming from European contact, particularly the fur trade. In a 1967 publication Hickerson specifically considered Landes' work at Manitou Rapids. He did not criticize its ethnographic validity but questioned its applicability to Aboriginal conditions (Hickerson, 1962: 9-11; 1967b: 61). For others, atomism represented a culture of poverty representative of reservation situations (James, 1970; Lieberman, 1973) and became the subject of sociological investigations.

James G. E. Smith (1973: 11) attempted to reconcile the disparate interpretations of Ojibwa society by suggesting a more elastic framework. Smith argued that the complexity of historical and modern forces affecting the Ojibwa during the 19th century promoted both atomistic and collective action, and that this balance constituted the very core of the Ojibwa social dynamic. Smith cited

the extensive historical literature for northern Minnesota Ojibwa, noting that "atomistic" behaviour was present during the very era when bands formed large confederations and engaged in diverse communal activities. According to Smith, the dilemma facing Ojibwa was to balance the welfare of the individual or small co-operative kin group with the needs of the larger groups of the band, the village, the reserve or the nation. Viewed from this perspective, Landes' portrayal appeared to illuminate only one aspect of a more complex whole. Edward S. Rogers (1974: 2) questioned how the term came to be applied to all Ojibwa: "there was no reason why the nuclear families could not have grouped into larger structural units." Unfortunately, further direct critical inquiry into the bases and errors of Ojibwa "atomism" died with Rogers and Smith. Subsequently there has been little critical assessment of the basis for Landes' development of atomism.

Landes' Field-Work Methodology and the "Emo" Ojibwa

The Ojibwa were not Landes' choice for research. Manitou Rapids was selected as one possible location by Benedict and John M. Cooper. Her initial information about the Ojibwa came from Cooper (1936: 3, 4, 26) who conducted a 36-hour research visit to Rainy Lake in 1928 in which he identified a rank system within the Midewiwin or Ojibwa Grand Medicine Society. He also concluded paradoxically that the Ojibwa had no chiefs outside of those created by the Hudson's Bay Company, and no political organization. Cooper's assessment was echoed by Landes.

While Landes acknowledged earlier studies by Densmore and Ojibwa historian, William Warren, she dismissed the relevance of their findings and disparaged "a nun," Sister Hilger, for attempting to study the Ojibwa from a perspective of cultural change. Landes had little tolerance for studies of change and dismissed Hilger as "thoroughly ignorant of American or any other ethnology... material or method" (RBP, July 25, 1933; September 2, 1935). Landes' rejection of work by women scholars may be tied to self-perception: Landes insisted on portraying herself as "the first woman in the field" (Landes, 1976: 349).

Although pleased to have found a "pagan" reserve at Manitou Rapids, her principal informant, Maggie Wilson, was a recent convert to Christianity who identified herself as a Cree. Because her research informants were essentially limited to Wilson (RBP, July 10, 1932), Landes soon established an interest in women in her field relationships. Landes chose Manitou Rapids over another reserve in Rainy Lake because she could live with a White family, that of the Farm Instructor, William Hayes (RBP, July 10 1932). Her correspondence at the time makes no mention of being prevented from "going native" by government authorities, as she later claimed (Landes, 1970: 121).

Landes conducted field work for two summers, 1932 and 1933, and the fall and early winter of 1935 (Landes, 1937: 51).[4] Her correspondence provides some specific information on her schedule. During 1932, she arrived at Manitou Rapids and commenced summer field work on July 9. During 1933, she visited Red Lake, Cass Lake and Leech Lake reservations in Minnesota. Her field letters to Benedict originated from Ponemah. This was her primary base during 1933. Except for a brief visit to Manitou Rapids to arrange a trip for Mrs. Wilson to Red Lake, Landes was elsewhere (RBP, July 10 and 24, 1932, August 3 and 5, 1932, June 29, 1933, July 15 and 25, 1933, August 15, 1933). The lack of a complete genealogy for the Wilson family or of such basics as a village plan for Manitou Rapids may relate to the little time spent with the Rainy River Ojibwa.[5]

Compensation for the small amount of field time took an unusual form. Landes' primary research method was a form of "armchair anthropology." She paid Maggie Wilson $1.00 per 15 pages of stories, translated by Wilson's daughter and forwarded by mail to Benedict. Benedict read the letters and sent payments (RBP, June 11, 1933). Wilson, an experienced informant who had worked for Cooper, Hallowell and Densmore was instructed by Landes and Benedict as to what to write about: "She gets the real point of what we want. She will henceforth send a greater variety (as well as lustier!) of material both Cree and Ojibwa" (RBP, August 15, 1933; October 12, 1933).

Landes ignored the effects and significance of the 1915 forced relocation of seven neighbouring communities, including Little Forks, onto Manitou Rapids (RBP, August 3, 1932). Landes had been repeatedly told by Wilson of the relocation.[6] Landes much preferred working on the American side of the border where government offices were "almost country clubs" and the "sociological set up lovely." Here she found reservations composed of one people, much intermarried, who were neatly divided into pagan and Christian settlements (RBP, June 14, 1933).

Landes freely admitted that she was not taught specific field-work techniques, but had been instructed instead to "conjecture, to experiment, to use every tool we commanded, to venture." Landes frequently referred

to herself as a New Yorker compared to the poor Ojibwa and admitted that objectivity was impossible between persons "as disparate as they and I." She also stated that she was perceived by the Ojibwa as "vicious, exploiting informants to sell a million-dollar book" and that she conducted her research in a "chronically shocked state" with "the chronic hysteria of Indian villagers" (Landes, 1970: 120, 121, 127; Landes, 1982: 401).

Landes did not maintain the confidentiality of those denigrated in Maggie Wilson's stories, despite being cautioned by Benedict to change the names (RBP, February 4, 1935). In her published work, Landes (1971: *passim*) identified by name Ojibwa who, she alleged, had committed incest, child abuse and infanticide, were illegitimate, deserted by spouses or adulterous. She seemingly did not appreciate that unverified allegations, in addition to being defamatory, might have had severe consequences under the criminal law or the *Indian Act* (see Fluehr-Lobban, 1994).[7]

After determining the Red Lake Ojibwa were not in pristine Aboriginal condition, Landes used the term "cultural leprosy"(RBP, June 29, 1933) to describe their loss of traditional culture. She characterized her field work as "aboriginal ethnology" and described useful informants as "freaks of nature." Finding what she viewed as an impoverished Aboriginal culture, she chose to concentrate on what she considered was still Aboriginal—personality (RBP, June 29, 1933, July 25, 1933, September 2, 1935).

Landes developed her interpretations of Ojibwa personality by dabbling in dream analysis and word association tests, based on her reading of Carl Jung. Through a single recorded episode reported by Wilson, Landes was able to deduce that sexual desire among Ojibwa women revealed "distorted homosexuality" (RBP, March 20, 1935; August 16, 1935).

Landes' field methodology also raises an important question of how representative Maggie Wilson was of the Ojibwa. Maggie Wilson's father was said to have been a Cree who spoke Ojibwa, while Maggie was married to an Ojibwa chief's son (Landes, 1971:v). For many years after her work at Manitou Rapids, Landes was still troubled that Wilson identified herself as a Cree. In 1984 she attempted to resolve this issue by seeking historical information from Grand Council Treaty #3 and archival sources (RLP, November 4, 1984, Box 2).

According to annuity pay lists which provide genealogical data based on male descendants of band members, Wilson's maiden name was Spence. The Spence family first appeared on Rainy River at Little Forks reserve in 1875. Peter Spence, an Anglican Native catechist from Fort Alexander on Lake Winnipeg, was appointed to manage the mission church at Little Forks. His instruction of the younger members in the gospel aroused antagonism from their parents who were, according to Spence's superior, Rev. Robert Phair, "strongly opposed to the truth," and under the influence of the "medicine men" (National Archives of Canada [NAC], 1875, 1879). In 1878, Spence and his son, Benjamin, who was Maggie Wilson's father, were placed on the band annuity list for Little Forks (NAC, 1875-1915).[8] Landes chose to ignore possible implications of Wilson's self-identification as Cree. In doing so she portrayed Wilson as representative of the Manitou Rapids Ojibwa, a society into which her father's family had emigrated as Anglican catechists.[9]

Landes' approach to Wilson's stories and to anthropology is perhaps best expressed in her own words: "I prefer the great imaginative literature to anthropological interpretations of field studies, where the writing is leaden.... I find statistics and projective tests elusive... and often misleading, but amusing, like astrology" (RLP, September 4, 1984, Box 2). Landes planned to develop Maggie Wilson dramatically as a fictional personality, retreating from the field into textual analysis. In 1976, aided by a text entitled "How to Write a Story and Sell It," she subjected Maggie Wilson's stories to various literary themes, including Joan of Arc ("Shaw's Joan"). Her cryptic notes are revealing: "never allow oneself 2 tell a story exactly as happened. It won't come off... move from facts 2 fiction" (RLP, n.d., Box 36). The fatal errors in Landes' work can be traced directly to inadequacies in her fieldwork and the failure to consult the ethnohistorical evidence, much of it readily available at that time in printed government reports.[10]

Criticism of field methodology, or of conclusions arising from deficient field research, has been levelled at both Benedict (see Geertz, 1988: 20, 110) and Mead. In *Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth*, Derek Freeman claimed in 1983 that Mead seriously misrepresented the character and culture of Samoa as depicted in her 1928 *Coming of Age in Samoa*. The Samoan controversy ignited unprecedented debate concerning key aspects of field work, methodology and the history of anthropology.[11]

Ethnohistorical Evidence

Landes' portrayal of the Ojibwa ethic of atomism, its associated attributes of hostility, intense interpersonal anxiety, and lack of village or political organization, are not reflected in the historical evidence for the Boundary Waters and Rainy River area of northwestern Ontario.

Political developments in the 18th and 19th century were related to sustained warfare with the Dakota Sioux, increasing populations and clustered village sites, increased fur trading in a competitive environment, missionary encounters and interventions by the Canadian government. These developments required a greater integration of leadership among the different bands. The Midewiwin also achieved a prominent role integrating the larger assemblages to repudiate Christianity and provide a vehicle for charismatic leadership through the ritual consumption and redistribution of trade goods (Lovisek, 1993).

The Boundary Waters Ojibwa figure prominently in 19th-century historical documents. Before the treaty with Canada in 1873, the Ojibwa economy was diversified through the use of a wide variety of resources: fish, wild rice, berries, garden produce, maple sugar and large and small game. Products such as canoes, pitch, bark and native twines were used in the household and sold to traders. Foods, such as corn, rice, sugar, dried and fresh fish and meats, were also important items of trade. The trade in natural foods, furs and fish products provided the basis for fur company operations (Densmore, 1928; Holzkamm, 1986; Holzkamm, Lytwyn and Waisberg, 1988; Waisberg and Holzkamm, 1993). The fur trade in the district remained profitable throughout the 19th century, despite intense competition from other traders (Waisberg and Holzkamm, 1994; Holzkamm, Waisberg and Lovisek, 1995).

Strategies of seasonal resource use varied each year in response to environmental changes. Although a wide variety of resources was available, their relative abundance in any given year was subject to fluctuation. A balanced seasonal round involved "switching" among a wide range of resources (Vennum, 1988: 4). Economic diversity was a major aspect of the Ojibwa subsistence dynamic throughout the 19th century, during which the regional population expanded greatly (Bishop, 1978: 225). From 455 in 1822, by 1875 the total Ojibwa population of the Hudson's Bay Company's Lac la Pluie (Rainy Lake) District rose to 1 790, a 393 percent increase over 53 years. To offset this increase, the Ojibwa intensified the agricultural sector and developed the considerable potential of garden islands by increased planting of potatoes and corn (Waisberg and Holzkamm, 1993: 178). They also sowed wild rice in new locations (Moodie, 1991: 71-79).

Economic activities promoted seasonal gatherings of Ojibwa families into large groups at maple groves, fishing stations, berry patches, garden sites and rice fields (Archives of Ontario, 1868; Densmore, 1928; Hind, 1972; Holzkamm, 1986; Holzkamm, Lytwyn and Waisberg, 1988; NAC, 1870; Waisberg and Holzkamm, 1993). Large seasonal groups based upon abundant resources were the foundation for tribal government and Ojibwa military power. A Canadian official advised in 1868 that "they have a sort of government . . . [and] are sufficiently organized, numerous and warlike, to be dangerous if disposed to hostility," a condition resulting from an "abundance of food" afforded by rice, corn and sturgeon (CSP [Canada Sessional Papers], 1869: 20, 27).

Specific work was typically associated with one sex, but both women and men were providers and producers. Gender domains frequently overlapped within the same activity; men and women had complementary roles in canoe building, gardening, wild rice harvesting and hunting and fishing. Management and direction of tasks devolved to experts in their field, women as well as men, and women had an important voice in the distribution or sale of the various harvests. Women exercised leadership roles in economic and medicine areas, and "held positions as medicine women, seers, chiefs, warriors and mediators." Their function as herbalists was particularly significant within the ranked Midewiwin (Buffalohead, 1983, 1989; Densmore, 1928: 119-123).

On Rainy River, as recorded by male colonial officials, Ojibwa government was predominantly of a "patriarchal" cast (NAC, 1870). During the 18th and 19th centuries, Ojibwa bands organized through a tribal Grand Council asserted sovereignty over their territory. A wide range of ranked male leaders are noted in the historical documents, including Grand Chief, first- and second-rank civil chiefs, first- and second-rank soldiers, war chiefs, pipe bearers and messengers (CSP, 1873: 133- 135; Lovisek, 1993; Smith, 1973). An abundance of sturgeon and wild rice made the Ojibwa "saucy and independent of the Hudson's Bay Company" (Dawson, 1859). Despite the efforts of the company to support missionaries, the Grand Council, under the influence of Midewiwin practitioners, proscribed Christianity in 1849, and continued to assert its dominance in the region (Lovisek, 1993). Colonial officials were obliged to respect rules for travel imposed by the Grand Council, which forbade, among other things, the taking of scientific samples or the making of celestial observations (Waisberg and Holzkamm, 1994). After 1867, agreements were made for passage of federal officials for the First Riel expedition, while the Grand Council considered more permanent arrangements with the newly founded Dominion of Canada. Treaty negotiations which would involve some cession of land commenced in 1869, but were not concluded until 1873 (Morris, 1971; NAC, 1873).

Government Control and Displacement of the Ojibwa

The Ojibwa on Rainy River in 1873 were part of an organized tribal society in control of their resources and government. Within three decades after the treaty much changed. Government administration of the region favoured resource extraction and Eurocanadian settlement over Native development. Legislatively, women were excluded from any formal role in band government under Canada's *Indian Act*, and were ignored in federal policy initiatives. Significant changes occurred to the Ojibwa economy, population, land base and political structure.

Development of the existing village sites on the Rainy River had been an important inducement to signing the treaty. By 1875, 49 712 acres of arable lands had been chosen as reserves by the seven bands of Ojibwa on Rainy River only to find that the Ontario provincial government, representing settlers, refused to recognize their reserves. In a series of court challenges during the 1880s Ontario secured constitutional title over Crown lands along Rainy River by 1888, and refused to confirm Ojibwa reserves surveyed under federal authority. Because of provincial ownership, Canada denied the Ojibwa permission to clear timber on the reserves, and then used this to support policy that uncleared reserve lands were an impediment to Eurocanadian farming settlement. As a condition for transferring Crown title to Canada in 1913, Ontario insisted that Canada secure surrenders of all reserves along Rainy River except for Manitou Rapids. By coercion and a threat of removal without compensation, Canada secured such surrenders by 1915. The Ojibwa were obliged to abandon their other villages to relocate to Manitou Rapids. By this process, 89 percent of the Ojibwa land base along Rainy River was taken for Eurocanadian settlement, leaving just 5 736 acres at Manitou Rapids for seven bands (NAC, 1913a, 1913b, 1914a, 1914b; Waisberg and Holzkamm, 1993: 195, 210 [n.106-107]). Pressure was also placed on the resources of the Manitou Rapids reserve as its local population increased through the relocation process. As noted earlier, Landes was told about the relocation, but she chose to ignore it.

The first decade after 1873 saw substantial growth of agricultural infrastructure on the reserves. Customers for produce included the numerous lumbering and construction crews in the region. Development ceased after 1882, however. The federal government, by an amendment to the 1881 *Indian Act*, asserted control over Indian commercial agriculture by prohibiting sales to non-Indian consumers without a license. Cultivated lands temporarily declined in extent, and small subsistence and medicine gardens replaced earlier efforts. Increased reliance was placed upon hunting, trapping and wage labour (Waisberg and Holzkamm, 1993). After 1915 farming on Manitou Rapids Reserve was managed by a government farming instructor (NAC, 1916-1936).

Decline of agriculture in the 1880s was followed by devastation of a major fishery. The immense sturgeon resource of Rainy River and Lake of the Woods, a mainstay of the pre-treaty economy, was quickly depleted following the abandonment of federal efforts in 1892 to reserve the fishery to the Ojibwa. During the 1880s harvest levels on the American side of the boundary waters began to rise. As Canadian fishermen began operations, harvests increased dramatically through pound nets placed at the mouth of Rainy River. Annual harvest of dressed sturgeon between 1895 and 1899 averaged over one million pounds, with significant amounts of caviar. Thereafter yields dropped precipitously as sturgeon were overfished. By 1920, a decade before Landes' arrival at Manitou Rapids, the harvest was at its lowest point in a century. While Ojibwa switched to other fish resources the virtual destruction of sturgeon constituted a severe subsistence and commercial loss for the Ojibwa (Holzkamm, Lytwyn and Waisberg, 1988; Van West, 1990).

Difficulties faced in fishing and farming were aggravated by navigation and power dams built by Eurocanadian settlers, and by industrial plants using the power. A dam built in 1887 at the outlet of Lake of the Woods backed up the waters of Rainy River and flooded gardens, hay and wild rice fields in 1888; many of the gardens were "submerged . . . several feet under water so that boats could sail over them." Despite protests and petitions nothing was done to relieve the situation. In 1905, a power dam and paper mill was built at Fort Frances, at the head of Rainy River, upstream from Manitou Rapids Reserve. The dam damaged gardens, hay and rice fields, cemeteries and houses on Ojibwa villages on Rainy Lake. Downstream, effluent from the mill degraded Rainy River (NAC, 1909; NAC, 1913a, 1913b; Waisberg and Holzkamm, 1993: 191-193, 208-209 [n.90-94]).

After 1900, provincial wardens began to enforce off-reserve game and fish laws, despite clear assurances given in Treaty #3. Market hunting for White settlers, an important source of revenue after the decline of reserve agriculture in the 1880s, was terminated, despite the Indian agent's finding that this constituted a "great hardship, and detriment to their means of living." Trapping grounds were appropriated, and Indians driven off. Many commercial fishing grounds were allocated to Eurocanadians, despite their proximity to reserves and demon-

strated Indian need (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1909; NAC, 1937, 1939; Tough, 1991).

Records maintained by the Department of Indian Affairs document many instances of protests and petitions by Ojibwa chiefs after 1880. The unwillingness of Canada to adhere to the terms of the treaty or provide protection for important Ojibwa economic resources led to bitter disputes between bureaucrats and band officials who "indulge in denunciations of the Government's treatment of them in order to influence the prejudices of the Indians against the Department and thus secure the necessary number of votes for their election" (NAC, 1895).[12] As in many other regions in Canada, officers of the Department of Indian Affairs relied increasingly upon the *Indian Act* to achieve federal goals of "civilization" and Christianization.

Canada targeted tribal cohesion. Treaty annuities were paid on reserve rather than at tribal conventions. The *Indian Act* imposed political restrictions upon the traditional male ranks, and disenfranchised all women; typically the names of women do not appear on tribal lists. Soldiers and messengers, traditional ranks, were done away with (NAC, 1895), while councillors and chiefs were threatened with deposition under the *Indian Act* for "incompetency" in not heeding "advice" from their agents. Vacancies in band political offices were not filled (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1909), while the deaths of notable medicine chiefs were celebrated in the annual reports (CSP, 1891: 200). *Indian Act* legislation after 1895 made any traditional religious celebration involving the exchange of "money, goods or articles of any sort" an indictable offence punishable by two to six months in prison (SC, 1895, 1906).[13] Chiefs who participated openly in the Midewiwin in 1911 on Lake of the Woods were arrested by the agent and lodged in jail, and the Inspector of Indian Agencies, Rev. John Semmens, was advised to enforce the Act and its later amendment forbidding dance participation by Indians in Aboriginal costume outside of their own reserves. At Manitou Rapids during the 1920s, the farming instructor operated as an informant in alerting the police to forbid Indian dances, requesting that the Fort Frances Detachment "send [a] mounty" (CSP, 1914; NAC, 1905; 1911; 1914b). While most such convictions resulted in suspended sentences, the direction of federal law was clear and constituted a direct assault on traditional Ojibwa religion. The annual Midewiwin festivals, celebrated openly before 1900 as an occasion for a tribal gathering, declined in significance. Replaced by secret observances in violation of federal law, the open connection of the Midewiwin to a political structure of civil chiefs in a Grand Council was ended.

Population of the seven Rainy River Ojibwa bands declined by over 50 percent from 504 to 244 between 1875 and 1915 (NAC, 1875-1915). Outbreaks of smallpox, syphilis, measles, whooping cough, tuberculosis, influenza and other infectious diseases played a role in the decline. Increased rates of disease occurred simultaneously with dietary changes resulting from the damage to resources such as sturgeon and rice (CSP, 1883: 41, 125; 1884: xli, 66-67, 129; 1886: 128; 1888: 67-68, 165; 1891: 36; 1895: 190; 1909: xxiv, 83; 1910: 87, 270; 1912: 85; 1913: 88). These historical data add a different interpretation to that proposed by Landes who viewed the Ojibwa preoccupation with sickness as a curious phenomenon and termed it "obsessive," with everyone "ridden with anxiety about his[/her] health . . . a rather hypochondriacal self-preoccupation" (1971: 178). According to T. Kue Young (1988: 40, 142 [n. 12, 13]) crude death rates at Fort Frances and Kenora agencies in some years reached 50 per 1 000, "exceedingly high . . . compared to Canadian national rates." Canada assisted the process of depopulation by removing many Ojibwa from band lists on the basis of "foreign residence" (CSP, 1884: 131). By 1915, the seven Rainy River Ojibwa bands had lost 52 percent of their 1875 population as well as 89 percent of their land base. The remainder were crowded into Manitou Rapids, surrounded by Eurocanadian settlers (Waisberg, Lovisek and Holzkamm, 1996). Access to off-reserve resources became increasingly circumscribed after 1915. Traditional trapping and hunting areas in Rainy River valley were either occupied by settlers or appropriated by non-Indian trappers.

Thus, by the time Ruth Landes appeared at Manitou Rapids Reserve, the economic situation was much changed from 1873. Attempts had been made to suppress Ojibwa tribal organization and religion, Ojibwa were prohibited from areas formerly affording them subsistence, and were reduced to 11 percent of their former reserve land base. Ojibwa representing 15 totems, formerly inhabiting seven reserves, had been removed to the one remaining reserve, Manitou Rapids.

Landes' portrayal of pretreaty Ojibwa life and personality, based on material culled from Wilson's stories, does not reflect the totality of Aboriginal society and culture before the colonial period. The abundant evidence for communal co-operation, tribal integration and the importance of women prior to the post-1873 period brings into question the success of Landes' venture into Aboriginal ethnology. Additionally, her omission of political developments occurring during the colonial period of the

1930s is further cause for criticism. Resistance to the suppression of tribal organization among the Treaty #3 Ojibwa is abundantly documented during the period after 1918. While annual tribal Grand Councils had been suppressed, band chiefs and councils from throughout the Treaty #3 region continued to meet, sometimes in secret, to form multiband political organizations, despite the efforts of Indian Agents. Manitou Rapids Ojibwa men took a leading role in organizing collective tribal political resistance during the 1930s under the stewardship of Chiefs John McGinnis and Jim Horton of the "Union Council," the "Organization of Amalgamated Indians" and the "League of Indians, Treaty No. 3." Their petitions dealt overwhelmingly with the violation of Treaty #3 promises or Canada's breach of its treaty commitments (NAC, 1939). Failure by Landes to note a regional protest movement based at Manitou Rapids in the 1930s calls into question her portrayal of Ojibwa society as lacking integrative institutions. It may also provide a cautionary example about reliance on one informant, very inadequate ethnographic techniques and limited field exposure.

Conclusion

Ojibwa society at Manitou Rapids, both before and after 1873, did not lack communal ideals or organization. From a cultural perspective Landes' invention of atomism has distorted the record of Ojibwa lives. Numerous aspects of Landes's portrayal of the Ojibwa are not supported by historical evidence. Landes presented her interpretation without specific consideration of such historical data. Her view suffered from the inadequacies of an ahistorical type of anthropology and the methodology she employed. Landes' legacy should be assessed on this basis.

The most revealing criticisms of Landes' work are yet to emerge—those from the Ojibwa. The writings of Ruth Landes became known to Manitou Rapids Ojibwa in the early 1970s after Landes provided her work to P.C. Clarkin, Indian Affairs School Superintendent, for use in Native curricula in exchange for information about Ojibwa mental health (RLP, April 10, 1969, Box 4). Not unexpectedly, members were distressed at how their parents, grandparents and relatives had been portrayed. Although comprehensive investigations of the response to Landes' depiction have not been attempted, Elders have rejected Landes' work. One Elder states that Landes based her findings on "kitchen gossip" while another reported that those who had read *The Ojibwa Woman* did not like the book. This included Maggie Wilson's daughter and Landes' interpreter (personal communication, 1994, 1995). A female descendant of Maggie Wilson offers a slightly different interpretation. She suggests that Wilson was confused when she related her stories to Landes as she was in the process of conversion to Christianity and was rejecting Native values (personal communication, Elder Y, 1993). Landes typed such situations involving the renouncing of Native ways as "unsystematized prosecutory ideas, and delusions of grandeur" (Landes, 1971: 213), but found in the narratives the sorts of raw material she was after.[14]

Further clarification of the many issues raised by Landes may eventually be drawn from history and ethnography, from the Indian Affairs files buried in archives and from the living memory of Ojibwa. Our concern, as anthropologists, has been to demonstrate the manner in which the atomistic "Emo Ojibwa" were a construct compounded almost equally of fatal ethnographic and historical errors.

The authors espouse an ethnohistorical approach to Ojibwa studies. This approach redresses the absence of historical perspective in studies which have relied upon the ethnographic present. The methodology involves research of published and archival records, including the field notes and unpublished writings of anthropologists.[15] Ethnohistory provides a powerful means of assessing the validity and origins of ethnographic models.

Ruth Landes, as this article demonstrates, erred through her failure to use historical evidence and by failing to apply rigorous research and field-work standards. For these reasons, Landes' interpretations of Ojibwa culture are not classic ethnography but are instead the product of fatal errors, a relic of an earlier ahistorical paradigm in anthropology.

Notes

1 Earlier versions of this article were presented in 1994 at the Canadian Anthropological Society Conference in "Fact and Fancy in the Ojibwa Ethnographic Voice of Ruth Landes: A Critique of Landes' Contribution to Canadian Anthropology" and in 1995 at the 27th Algonquian Conference as "'Cultural Leprosy:' The 'Aboriginal Ethnology' of Ruth Landes."

2 We wish to thank James G. E. Smith, Edward Rogers and the many Elders of Manitou Rapids as well as many others who shared their views on Landes with us. We also wish to thank Ms. Nancy McKechnie, special manuscript collections of Vassar College for her generous assistance with Landes' unpublished papers and Dr. James Harwood for providing access to the Landes papers at the Anthropological Archives of the Smithsonian Institution. We also wish to thank Dr. Mary Catherine Bateson for providing permission to publish from the Ruth Benedict papers at Vassar College

which contains Landes' correspondence. Opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors, and are *without prejudice* to Rainy River First Nations.

3 Landes recorded primarily "stories" which read more like "true confessions" describing incidents of desertion, incest and abuse. These were the major themes which Landes wanted from Wilson's stories: "woman deserted, mistreated, rewarded, shamed, combatted over, etc. The theme is damned familiar to us now" (RBP [Ruth Benedict Papers], March 20, 1935). Subjects were identified by name and there is no evidence that Landes verified the stories or acquired consent from the persons named in text.

4 Landes' actual field notes have not been found despite contacting all sources mentioned in her extant papers. Special thanks to Drs. N. Lurie and Keewaydinoquay Peschel for responding to our inquiries.

5 Correspondence in possession of authors, Landes/Waisberg, February 27, 1984: "I want to locate the records of birth for Ben Spence, the father of my great Maggie Wilson.... I want to reconstruct the genealogy. All I know of Ben Spence is what Maggie told me in the 1930s—that he was a Cree interpreter for the English."

6 In her letter to Leo Waisberg on November 19, 1984, Landes noted that: "Maggie mentioned the amalgamated 7 [communities] several times but we did not discuss it."

7 The question of Landes' use of potentially libellous data was also raised by Dr. Park regarding her material on Negro Jews. The publisher stated that Landes' work was hearsay, not science and that her use of actual names would expose the publisher to libel (RBP, January 18, 1938).

8 See note 5.

9 According to one of her descendants, for a long time following relocation of several communities to Manitou Rapids, Maggie resided alone in a cabin outside the reserve boundaries until she married Namaypock, who changed his name to Wilson (personal communication, 1996).

10 Correspondence in possession of authors, Landes/Waisberg, November 19, 1984. Landes also claimed in this letter that "the Manitou and Red Lake of Minnesota Ojibwa accepted all her versions ... of Ojibwa life as authentic." If Landes' field notes are ever recovered, one might well assess the extent to which Landes employed verification procedures in interviews with other informants. Her field correspondence does not support these assertions, nor do Elders at Manitou Rapids.

11 For a summary of the Samoa controversy from various perspectives see *The Samoa Reader: Anthropologists Take Stock* (Caton [ed.]: 1990).

12 At this time Canada's field officers made a recommendation "to do away with the Chiefs and Headmen altogether ... as the Department is quite convinced from past experience that the Indians will get along much better without them" (NAC, 1895).

13 Section 149 of the 1906 *Indian Act* states: "Every Indian or other person who engages in, or assists in celebrating or encourages either directly of indirectly another to celebrate any Indian festival, dance or other ceremony of which the giving away or paying or giving back of money, goods or articles of any sort forms a part, or is a feature, whether such gift of money, goods or articles takes place before, at, or after the celebration of the same, or who engages or assists in any celebration or dance of which the wounding or mutilation of the dead or living body of any human being or animal forms a part or is a feature, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months and not less than two months: Provided that nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the holding of any agricultural show or exhibition or the giving of prizes for exhibits thereof." Government policy restricting the Midewiwin had also banned the Potlatch and the Sundance (Pettipas, 1994: 93, 97).

14 Responses to Landes' interpretations have not been limited to Rainy River. The humiliation experienced by Native artist, Leland Bell from Manitoulin Island because of Landes' portrayal of the Midewiwin has been recorded by Theresa Smith (1995: 38). Bell, however, suggests that Landes' descriptions were wrong, "either that or Ruth Landes was lying."

15 The late Edward S. Rogers (1986: 210) observed that ethnohistorians needed to not only look at the roles of fur traders, missionaries and government agents but also to include that of anthropologists who imparted and promoted a particular view of the Ojibwa.

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The Cystic Fibrosis Heterozygote Advantage: A Synthesis of Ideas

Kristen M. Beckett *McMaster University*

Abstract: It has been proposed that the high frequency of Cystic Fibrosis (CF) is due to a selective advantage in the heterozygous state. This research supports this proposition and attempts a holistic perspective in reviewing the various models proposed. The pathophysiology, molecular and population genetics and the epidemiology are all demonstrated to be key components when evaluating the carrier advantage of CF.

Various hypotheses are reviewed and critically evaluated. The most recent explanation proposed—that CF affords protection against cholera—is a main focus of this research. While this theory has been supported by molecular *in vivo* experiments, the historical epidemiology of both CF and cholera argue against the acceptance of this model. The conclusion is drawn that while the cholera hypothesis is attractive, further research will be necessary before it can either be accepted or rejected as the explanation for high frequencies of CF.

Résumé: Il a été envisagé que la haute fréquence de mucoviscidose est due à un avantage sélectif au niveau de l'état hétérozygote. Cette recherche appuie cette assertion et tente de donner une perspective holistique en faisant l'état des divers modèles proposés. Il a été démontré que la pathophysiologie, la génétique moléculaire et démographique ainsi que l'épidémiologie sont tous des éléments essentiels lorsqu'on évalue l'avantage qu'a le porteur de la mucoviscidose.

Diverses hypothèses ont eté passées en revue et évaluées de façon critique. L'explication la plus récente qui ait été proposée—la mucoviscidose offrant une protection contre le choléra—constitue le point central de cette recherche. Alors que cette théorie a été corroborée par des expériences moleculaires *in vivo*, l'épidémiologie historique de la mucoviscidose et celle du choléra argumentent contre l'acceptation de ce modèle. Il a été conclu que, bien que l'hypothèse du choléra soit séduisante, des recherches supplémentaires s'imposent avant de pouvoir la rejeter ou l'accepter comme explication de la haute fréquence de la mucoviscidose.

Introduction

Cystic Fibrosis is the most common autosomal recessive trait among Caucasians. The term "Caucasian" will be used in reference to those individuals of European descent. In Caucasian populations approximately 4 to 5 percent of individuals are heterozygous for CF, i.e., they carry a mutated copy of the cystic fibrosis gene. This results in approximately one in every 2 000 to 2 500 live births being homozygous for CF, i.e., expressing the disorder in full (Gabriel et al., 1994: 107). The frequency of a genetic disorder due to random mutation never exceeds 1 percent. The cystic fibrosis (CF) mutation in the homozygous state is lethal before reproduction. Because homozygous CF individuals have rarely survived to reproduce, the mutations they carry have not been passed on to the next generation. The deleterious nature of the disease should therefore maintain the mutation at a low frequency in the population. However, CF is being maintained at very high frequencies in Caucasian populations. This has led to speculation about a heterozygote (carrier) advantage for the cystic fibrosis mutation. If an additional pressure were selecting for the mutation then the disease would be maintained as a balanced polymorphism, which we may define as a state of equilibrium in which gene frequencies are maintained by a balance between mutation and selection (Saunders, 1994).

The prototype for a genetic disease with a heterozygote advantage is, of course, sickle cell anemia. Twenty percent of the population in malarial areas carry the sickle cell allele with up to 40 percent carrying it in some African populations. The explanation for the high frequency is that people who are heterozygous for sickle cell anemia are able to survive and reproduce in areas where malaria is endemic. This is a result of the sickle cell trait in the heterozygous state affording protection against the malaria parasite which matures in the red blood cells (Allison, 1954: 291).This is also the explana-

tion given for the high frequencies of G-6-PD and thalassemia in these areas.

The high frequency of CF coupled with the discovery of the location of the gene which causes the disease in 1989 (Rommens et al., 1989), has generated a great deal of interest in this disease among researchers, as well as in the popular press (Glausiusz, 1995: 30-31). The research presented in this paper attempts a holistic synthesis and review of the many disciplines which study this disease. When trying to discover what might be a possible heterozygote advantage for cystic fibrosis, a broad understanding of the disorder is necessary. Researchers must consider how the disease manifests itself clinically, how it works on a molecular level, the historical epidemiology of it and how it is distributed in populations around the world today. Understanding these aspects of the disease provides a strong basis from which inferences may be drawn.

Researchers seeking the heterozygote advantage of CF have come up with different hypotheses. These hypotheses include: the theory that CF provides protection against tuberculosis (Meindl, 1987); the idea that carriers of CF have increased fertility (Knudson and Wayne, 1967); and the theory that CF affords protection from cholera and *E.coli* (Chao et al., 1993; Hansson, 1988). If one reviews these hypotheses with all aspects of the disease in mind, it becomes apparent that there is more than one factor influencing selection for this gene. It is argued here that while the molecular data, which support the hypothesis that the CF gene may be selected for partly because it offers protection against cholera and/or *E. coli* bacteria, seem compelling, they are not enough on their own to support this theory. Before this or any other hypotheses can be accepted as an explanation for the high frequency of CF, the historical epidemiology of infectious disease in Europe must be calculated. In addition, the epidemiology of both CF and cholera must be understood and accounted for in both modern and historic times.

Pathophysiology of Cystic Fibrosis

General

The basic defect in CF has been associated with decreased chloride ion conductance across the apical membrane of the epithelial cells (Riordan et al., 1989: 106). This defect in the CFTR gene results in an increased viscosity of mucus gland secretion which causes many internal obstructions. Instead of forming a thin, freely flowing secretion, the mucus gland produces a thickened mucoprotein that accumulates in and dilates the glands. The small passages in organs, such as the pancreas and bronchioles, become obstructed as the secretions coagulate to form concretions in the glands and ducts. (Whalley, 1991: 1470)

Life expectancy for those who suffer from CF today is much longer then it has been. Due to advancing medical treatment life expectancy for those with CF has increased from one year in 1940, to 5.5 years in 1960, to 24 years in 1990 (Phillips, 1991: 937-939).

Respiratory Tract

In the normal respiratory tract, mucus production by goblet cells lubricates airways and entraps foreign particles (ibid.: 937). Owing to the increase of bronchial mucus and its thickness among individuals with CF, there is a greater resistance to ciliary action, a slower flow of mucus and an inability to cough up the mucus, all of which contribute to the formation of an obstruction (Whalley, 1991: 1470). The mucus obstruction reduces oxygen and carbon dioxide exchange causing varying degrees of hypoxia (a reduction of oxygen to tissue below physiological levels), hypercapnia (excess carbon dioxide in the blood) and acidosis (accumulation of acid, or depletion of alkaline residue in the blood and body tissue). Most importantly, the retained mucus serves as an excellent medium for bacterial growth. After repeated infections the bacteria develop resistance to multiple drugs and become impossible to eradicate. Eventually, bacterial infection leads to the destruction of the lung tissue (ibid.). Progressive lung involvement leads to compression of pulmonary blood vessels, and progressive lung dysfunction frequently leads to pulmonary hypertension, cor pulmonale, respiratory failure and death (ibid.).

Gastrointestinal Tract

In the pancreas of CF sufferers, the thick secretions block the ducts which leads to cystic dilation of the acici (the small lobes of the gland), which undergo degeneration and progressive diffuse fibrosis. This process prevents essential pancreatic enzymes from reaching the duodenum (the first portion of the small intestine). This causes significant difficulty in the digestion and absorption of nutrients, especially fats, proteins and to a lesser degree carbohydrates (Collins, 1992: 774). The incidence of diabetes mellitus is greater in CF children which is probably related to these changes in pancreatic architecture (Whalley, 1992: 1471).

Reproductive System

Both male and female reproductive systems are affected when an individual is homozygous for CF. Females have reduced fertility due to a thickening of cervical mucus which presents a barrier for sperm penetration. Males are sterile with few exceptions. Virtually all males are azoospermic (lack of spermatozoa in the semen). This is due to atrophy or obstruction of the epididymis, vas deferens and seminal vesicles (Tizzano et al., 1994: 906). The heterozygote may also have reduced fertility. Researchers in fertility clinics seem to have found evidence that the male heterozygote and compound heterozygote have similar symptoms to those afflicted with CF (Liu et al., 1994: 1859-1860).

Integumentary Systems

Individuals with CF display abnormally high sodium chloride concentrations in their sweat. They often taste salty to kiss (Whalley, 1991: 1472). In fact, the distinctive salty taste of children with CF was initially used in diagnosing this disease.

The defective chloride channels in sweat glands prevent reabsorption of sodium and chloride. This leaves the individual at risk for abnormal salt loss, dehydration and hypochloremic and hyponatremic alkalosis (decreased chloride and sodium in the blood) during hyperthermic conditions (ibid.). This would be extremely dangerous to CF individuals living in tropical areas. A study of CF children living in northern Spain showed that during the summer and early autumn CF children of all ages had acute attacks of hypochloraemia and metabolic alkalosis (a disturbance in which the acid-base status of the body shifts toward the alkaline side [Saunders, 1994]). Only the infants developed chronic cases of the same, and failed to thrive (Sojo et al., 1994: 825-826).

Genetic Methods of Study

The year 1989 was a breakthrough year in CF research. Researchers were able to locate the gene responsible for CF and investigate its function. Molecular cloning experiments and chromosome walking and jumping experiments permitted the isolation of a large contiguous segment of DNA spanning at least four transcribed sequences from a region thought to contain the CF locus (Riordan et al., 1989: 1066). Through genetic analysis and DNA sequencing, one of the four candidates was shown to correspond to the position of the CF gene locus (Tsui et al., 1991b: 11).

After finding the location at which the mutation occurred, Riordan et al. (1989) next pursued the detection of the mutation. Comparison between DNA sequences derived from CF and unaffected individuals was next conducted. The most striking difference found was a 3 base pair (bp) deletion which resulted in the loss of a phenylalanine residue, position 508 in the prediscided CF polypeptide. This mutation was observed in 68 percent of the chromosomes studied by this group. Direct sequencing of genomic DNA amplified by polymerase chain reactions revealed many additional mutant alleles (ibid.). These different mutations were found to mostly manifest themselves internally in an identical fashion to the major mutation, ΔF508; however, some missense mutations produced different clinical manifestations (see molecular genetics section).

Most of these laboratory methods continue to be used by those studying the molecular genetics of CF and by those who are trying to isolate additional mutations.

Mouse Models

Following the identification of the CF gene, researchers have continued experimenting in the hope that they may achieve a superior understanding the function of the gene and how it results in the various clinical manifestations. The use of mouse models has become a popular method to study the CF gene. Tsui et al. (1991b) describe two methods of study using mouse models. The first is a gene knock out experiment where a biochemically selectable marker is introduced into the coding region of the mouse gene via homologous recombination. The second method is creating a mouse model with the identical deletion to the major human mutation, ΔF508 (ibid.: 15).

Some claim success with these mouse models (Dori et al., 1992: 212); others believe that the typical 30-40 day survival rate of the mice is not sufficient time for symptoms to extend into the reproductive, pancreatic, hepatobiliary and respiratory systems (Collins and Wilson, 1992: 708).

Population Genetics and Epidemiology as a Method of Study

Certain researchers see value in examining the population distributions of CF (Beaudet et al., 1991: 53; Devoto, 1991: 63; Serre, 1991: 55). The geographic distribution of the ΔF508 and non-ΔF508 mutations and their associations with haplotypes are all being examined (see Serre et al., 1990 and Serre, 1991 for discussion).

This method of study is helping to trace the origins of the disease, discovering what populations are most affected, and trying to discover why it may be being selected for from a historical and geographical perspective.

Molecular Genetics of the Cystic Fibrosis Gene

Cystic fibrosis is caused by a single defective gene on chromosome 7 that codes for a 1480 amino acid protein named cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator or CFTR (Wine et al., 1991: 253). CFTR is a regulated, low-conductance chloride channel (Riordan, 1993: 615), the defect is the absence of the CFTR chloride channel from the apical membrane (ibid.: 622).

The major mutation which causes the defect is a 3bp (base pair) deletion in exon 10 which results in the loss of a phenylalanine residue, position 508, at the centre of the first putative ATP-binding site (Tsui et al., 1991b: 10). This deletion is known as ΔF508. Research has shown that up to 75 percent of CF chromosomes carry this mutation (Klinger et al., 1991: 39), and thus it has come to be considered the major mutation. Over 400 additional mutations have been identified since the discovery of the ΔF508 deletion in 1989 (Morral et al., 1994: 890). These additional mutations include various point mutations which can result in either severe or mild clinical manifestations (Kristidis et al., 1992: 1182). All of the additional mutations appear to be rare and generally associated with specific populations.

Functions of the CF Gene

In its most basic sense the function of the CF gene is to regulate chloride channels. A mutation to the gene results in defective chloride channels. CFTR is a chloride channel which is regulated by cyclic AMP—dependent phosphorylation and by intracellular ATP (Collins, 1992: 776). Mutations in CFTR cause CF, partly through the loss of cyclic AMP (cAMP) regulated chloride permeability from the plasma membrane or affected epithelia (Denning et al., 1992: 761). Generally speaking, CFTR controls chloride secretions in the epithelia of the pulmonary tract, gastrointestinal tract and reproductive organs. Studies in biosynthesis and localization of CFTR ΔF508 indicate that the mutant protein is not processed correctly and is not delivered to the plasma membrane (ibid.). CFTR must reach the cell surface to function. Normal CFTR assembles in the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) then travels via the golgi complex to the cell surface, faulty CFTR gets trapped in the ER (Armstrong, 1992: 709). On this basis some argue that the problem lies not so much in what the mutant protein cannot do as with where it ends up in the cell (ibid.).

Population Genetics and History of CF

Cystic fibrosis is believed to have spread throughout Europe with the migration of Neolithic farmers. This migration began from the Middle East and progressed towards the north and northwest of Europe (Devoto, 1991: 70). This hypothesis has recently been supported by archaeological data and biochemical typing (ibid.).

Since the presumed introduction of this disease to Europe it has spread from the continent to European colonies, including the Americas (see Table 1). The highest known estimates for the frequencies of CF today are in England and France. From these two locations CF frequencies decline in all geographic directions in Europe. However, CF frequencies still remain very high throughout Europe. Among Caucasians living in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand CF frequencies are also high. It is estimated that between 1 in 2 500 to 3 000 births in these areas are homozygous for CF (De Braekleer and Daigneault, 1992: 167-168).

Table 1
Estimated CF Gene Carrier Frequencies in Various Populations Using the Hardy-Weinberg Formula

Geographic Location	Estimated Carrier Frequency
Brittany	1:9.7
Ohio (U.S. Amish)	1:12.5
South West Africa (Dutch)	1:13
United States	1:23
Australia	1:23
England	1:25
Czechoslovakia	1:26
France	1:22
Germany	1:29
Pakistani (in England)	1:50
African-Americans	1:82
Oriental (in Hawaii)	1:150

Source: Rodman and Zamudio, 1991: 255.

CF Mutations

The ΔF508 mutation accounts for 70-80 percent of the CF mutations in western Europe (British Isles, France, Belgium, West Germany and Netherlands). The ΔF508 mutation varies between populations and regions. It reaches a maximum of 87 percent in Danish populations (ibid.: 170), while it accounts for only 30 percent of CF mutations in Ashkenazi Jews (Beaudet et al., 1991: 53; Cutting et al., 1992). Its frequency is highest in northern Europe with lower frequencies in southern Europe (Serre, 1991: 55). The mutation is thought to have arisen

on a B haplotype around 5 000 years ago (Serre et al., 1990). By the Middle Ages the mutation is thought to have been well established in European populations (Rodman and Zamudio, 1991: 254).

Over 400 additional mutations have been observed since the discovery of the major mutation in 1989 (Morral et al., 1994: 890). The frequencies of these mutations vary between populations, and some appear to be unique to specific populations (see Table 2).

Table 2
Mutations Shared by Populations and Mutations Unique to Specific Populations

United States Caucasians	African Americans	Northern Irish	Israeli
ΔF508	ΔF508	ΔF508	ΔF508
G542X	G542X	G542X	G542X
6551D	—	6551D	—
W1282X[a]	—	—	—
N1303K	—		
N1303K	N1303K		
A455E	—	—	—
V520F	—	—	—
Y563N	—	—	—
E1371X	—	—	—
—	—	R560T	—
—	—	G3849⇒A	—
—	1342⇒1G⇒C	—	—
—	S539N	—	—
—	RS53X	—	—
—	AS59T	—	—
—	S1255X	—	—
—	W1316X	—	—

a Only observed in individuals of Ashkenazi origins
Source: Modified from Cutting et al., 1992: 1185-1189.

The W1282X mutation seems to be only present in those of Ashkenazi origins, and in this group it is responsible for over 50 percent of CF mutations (Cutting et al., 1992: 1199). This could be due to founder effect. Further investigation by Sereth et al. (1993) found that 96 percent of CF chromosomes in Ashkenazi Jews are due to only six mutations; W1282X, ΔF508, C542X, N1303K, 1717⇒G⇒A and 3849 + 10KbC⇒T (Sereth et al., 1993: 294).

In examining Table 2, it is evident that the distribution of mutations clearly differed between the African American populations and the three groups of Caucasian origins. Two thirds of the mutations found in the African American populations appear to be unique to that group (Cutting et al., 1992: 1190). This then means that gene flow alone does not account for the occurrence of CF in African American populations (ibid.).

French Canadians living in Quebec have also been found to have high frequencies of non-ΔF508 mutations, especially 621 + IG–T, A455E and 711 + IG–T (ibid.: 1192). Founder effect or genetic drift are assumed to be responsible for this. Researchers are not surprised by the ethnic variations they have found. A number of other autosomal recessive disorders such as Beta-thalassemia, Ornithine aminotransference deficiency and Tay-Sachs have all shown the same pattern (ibid.).

The type of mutation present in an individual seems to play a role in the clinical manifestations of the disease (Dean et al., 1991: 47). The ΔF508 mutation (a deletion mutation) is associated with a severe form of the disease including pancreatic insufficiency (PI) and an early age of presentation. It is interesting that most mutations which cause severe forms of CF occur at frequencies greater than 1 percent, while other mutations including all of those which result in mild clinical cases, occur at frequencies less than 1 percent (Kristidis et al., 1992: 1182; Morral et al., 1994: 890). This could mean that the latter are random mutations and irrelevant to the investigation of a possible heterozygote advantage.

Investigating the Carrier Advantage of CF

Fertility Hypothesis

The fertility hypothesis proposes that the reason for the high frequency of CF is not because of a heterozygote advantage, but because male carriers have increased fertility and produce more progeny (Knudson and Wayne, 1967). This hypothesis is based on the researchers' observation that CF children seem to have more siblings than non-CF children in the same population. However, recent research using the Utah Genealogical data base presents evidence that CF heterozygotes have normal fertility. The principle flaw in the previous analysis by Knudson and Wayne appears to be "ascertainment bias," which means that larger families are more likely to provide the index cases for recessive diseases irrespective of fertility (Jorde and Lathrop, 1988: 808).

Recent studies on infertility in men may shed light on the reproductive phenotype of CF heterozygotes. It has been shown that men with congenital bilateral absence of the vas deferens (CBAVD) have a higher than normal frequency of the ΔF508 mutation. This seems to confirm a link between CF and CBAVD. Further studies concluded that CBAVD is a genital form of CF in otherwise normal healthy men with no other manifestations of CF. In this study these men were compound heterozygotes or homozygotes for CF (Liu et al., 1994: 1858). In another study of only two men the researchers found they only carried the ΔF508 mutation, but still had

CBAVD. However, it is possible they were compound heterozygotes for a less common mutation which was undetected (ibid.: 1859-1860).

The theory of increased fertility for the CF heterozygote holds little credibility today. It has been demonstrated that in the intestinal tract CF heterozygotes express partial manifestations of the disease (Gabriel et al., 1994: 109). If this can be demonstrated to be true for the reproductive tract, then heterozygotes should have decreased fertility since CF homozygotes are most often infertile. New studies being conducted by fertility clinics should help expand our understanding of this. If it is found that heterozygotes do not have any symptoms in the reproductive tract then other factors remain to be considered. Religious orientation and attitudes towards contraception must be considered in order to understand beliefs regarding desired family size. Additionally, an interview process with the families may reveal that the parents of children with CF have more children in hopes of having a child that does not have CF. It can be concluded that the theory that CF in the heterozygote state increases fertility needs much more data to support its claims.

Tuberculosis Hypothesis

In 1987, Richard S. Meindl published his hypothesis stating that the selective advantage for the CF heterozygote may be resistance to tuberculosis (TB). Meindl's hypothesis was concerned with TB of the lungs, or pulmonary TB, caused by *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*. The symptoms of pulmonary TB are weight loss, lassitude and fatigue, night sweats and wasting with purulent sputum, hemoptysis and chest pain (Saunders, 1994).

Meindl's research focused on the epidemiology of CF, the historical distribution of TB, pathophysiology and relations to excess mucopolysacchride (MPS) secretion (Meindl, 1987: 40). The historical distribution of TB and the epidemiology of CF certainly seem to coincide, but there is a dearth of published, experimental data to sustain the molecular side of his argument. His hypothesis can be simplified as follows: when an individual is exposed to TB the tissues inflame and MPS is synthesized as a response. In a normal individual the MPS becomes thick and creates a blockage. The TB would presumably thrive in the mucus buildup. In the CF individual, and heterozygote, Meindl believes MPS production is at least doubled, which at first thought would seem to be a disadvantage. However, when the accumulation of fluids swells to 30-50 percent the MPS breaks up and free-fluid spaces appear. This, Meindl believes, would allow the CF heterozygote resistance to pulmonary TB.

The hypothesis lacks substance for some of its claims, and further research on other assertions is warranted. The idea that CF individuals have increased MPS seems to be based on a 1968 study conducted on only four CF children by Matalon and Dorfman. Moreover, there is no reference suggesting how Meindl determined the phenotype of the heterozygotes. Contradictory research suggests that CF patients have an impaired antibody response that may predispose them to persistent endobronchial infection (Moss et al., 1987: 708). The most compelling evidence Meindl offers is the historical data of the distribution of TB and the epidemiological studies on CF, but this too is a weak ecological correlation. He notes that TB was the leading cause of death in adults at the turn of this century, and "was a major factor in child deaths" (Meindl, 1987: 40). Clearly, TB was not the only disease which could have influenced selection and there were others, perhaps those affecting primarily children, that could also be contenders for the selective advantage. With these caveats, it would be premature to disregard the TB hypothesis entirely (see Discussion).

Cholera Hypothesis

It has recently been proposed that wild-type CFTR (normal CFTR) controls chloride secretions in the small intestine (Chao et al., 1994). The CFTR controlling these secretions is activated by guanylin and cyclic GMP which in turn are activated by a common subtype of a small molecular weight, heat stable enterotoxin produced by *Escherichia coli* (*E. coli*) bacteria, which causes diarrhea and vomiting. This enterotoxin is referred to as STa. When a person is infected with *E. coli* they stimulate the above described repose in that individual and cause severe diarrhea and vomiting which leads to dehydration and in many cases death. It has been demonstrated *in vivo* that there is failure to secrete chloride in response to these agents in the CF intestine, following exposure to heat-stable *E. coli* (Goldstein et al., 1991: 260).

These agents, STa, guanylin and cyclic GMP (cGMP), induce secretion only in cells expressing wild-type CFTR, since mutated CFTR results in defective chloride channels. Chloride secretion is decreased when less wild-type CFTR is expressed by the cells and more ΔF508 is expressed (Chao et al., 1994: 1068). Therefore, it may be that individuals exposed to enterotoxins who only have wild-type CFTR will secrete chloride in response to intestinal bacteria, where individuals with some or all mutated CFTR will not secrete chloride as a response to exposure to certain bacteria. Therefore with fluid secretion decreased in those individuals heterozygous and homozygous for a major CF mutation, it is pos-

sible that these individuals would not suffer as much dehydration as a result of the enterotoxin. This would have been a notable advantage for those living in Europe for at least the last 200 years (when cholera was endemic there), especially infants who are exceptionally susceptible to death from diarrhea.

In addition to the cGMP activated STa induced chloride secretion, it has been reported that chloride secretion in the small intestine can also be activated by cyclic AMP (cAMP) in response to other toxins such as *E. coli LT* (a large molecular weight, heat labile enterotoxin produced by *E. coli*), and cholera toxin (Baxter et al., 1988; Bijman and DeJonge, 1988; Field and Semrad, 1993: 633; Hansson, 1988; Rodman and Zamudio, 1991). Studies in this area concluded that since the pathophysiology of CF is that of defective cAMP-dependent chloride secretion across the apical membrane of secretory epithelial cells, then, secretory diarrheas mediated by toxins such as *E. coli LT* and cholera toxin, which increase cellular cAMP, meet the criteria for a selective advantage for the CF mutation (Chao et al., 1994: 1071). This research was further confirmed through the use of CF mice. In 1994, Gabriel et al. used CF mice to demonstrate that fluid and chloride secretion in response to cholera toxin varies directly with the number of CFTR alleles in each mouse. Thus, in the heterozygote with only 50 percent active CFTR alleles, the chloride secretions in response to cholera toxin were reduced by half (Gabriel et al., 1994: 109).

Cholera is caused by a potent enterotoxin elaborated by *V. cholera* in the small intestine where it acts on epithelial cells to cause secretions of large quantities of isotonic fluid from the mucosal surface. It is marked by severe, painless watery diarrhea resulting in massive gastrointestinal fluid loss and saline depletion, vomiting and cramps. It is spread by feces and contaminated water and food (Saunders, 1994). The CF heterozygote would have less intestinal chloride secretions due to a smaller number of susceptible chloride channels, which would result in less diarrhea and presumably lower death rates from cholera (Rodman and Zamudio, 1991: 255).

Today cholera can be treated with oral rehydration therapy and/or antibiotics and is usually curable. However, cholera is known to have reached epidemic proportions in Europe and North America in the recent past and could result in death in hours. The largest obstacle to the acceptance of the cholera hypothesis is that cholera is believed to have first appeared in Europe only as recently as 1817 (Greenwood, 1977: 165). However, while this appears to be the case for "Indian Cholera" or Asiatic Cholera, it is possible that other strains of cholera or cholera-like illnesses infected Europe much earlier. Cholera is a crowd disease associated with poor sewage disposal in villages, towns and cities. Based on the nature and habitat of the bacteria, one could argue that it has been infecting humans as long as people have lived in city centres. Cases of "deadly" cholera were described in the Hippocratic collection as occurring in Alkmar in 1548, Nimes in 1645, London in 1669 and 1676 and in Vienna in 1786 (ibid.). However, it would be a very difficult task to firmly establish cholera in Europe prior to the 1800s (see Discussion).

Cholera was endemic in Europe and the Americas as recently as the last century (Bilson, 1980: 1). In England and Wales in 1831, there was a 26.3 per 1 000 morbidity rate due to cholera, and there was a 33.8 per 1 000 rate in Scotland (Durey, 1979: 39). In Canada, between June 9 and July 21, 1832, 1 615 people died in Lower Canada from cholera (ibid.: 179). In the same year 5 432 deaths caused by cholera were reported in England and 800 in Belgium (Molnar, 1992: 326). In France, cholera was even more serious. Some 18 000 deaths in Paris in 1832 were attributed to cholera (Delaporte, 1986: 5). In 1834, 258 deaths in Lower Canada and 555 deaths in Upper Canada were caused by cholera (Bilson, 1980: 181). After 1834, there were two more major outbreaks in Canada in 1849 and 1854, two minor outbreaks in 1851 and 1852, with local incidents common from 1866-1871. In 1866, 50 000 died from cholera in the United States of America (Molnar, 1992: 326) and in 1873 there was another major epidemic (Bilson, 1980: 114).

It is important to note that these outbreaks occurred only within the last 121-162 years. As only four to five generations have passed since cholera was endemic, frequencies of CF would not have had time to decline. The incidence of CF could very well be on the decline now, since cholera can be treated. However, not enough time has passed to significantly lower the frequencies. Also, because we have no records of the frequencies of CF until recently, it cannot be known if CF frequencies were significantly higher between 121 and 162 years ago.

Discussion

The frequency at which the ΔF508 mutation is occurring among Caucasians is much too high to be ascribed to any genetic process other than selection. Any mutations occurring at a frequency above 1 percent in a population must be seriously considered for a possible selective advantage. With CF the situation is complex. The clinical manifestations are extremely variable. There seems to be no consistent pattern even among those homozygous

for the major and more serious mutation, ΔF508. Some patients have pancreatic problems, some have respiratory problems, and some have a combination of both in varying degrees. The additional mutations further complicate the search for the heterozygote advantage, because added to the variation of clinical manifestations within the major mutation is a variation of clinical symptoms between mutations. This complicates the search for a heterozygote advantage because the advantage may lie in any of the clinically affected areas. Alternatively, it may be selected for because there is a selective advantage that falls in the same section of chromosome as the CF gene.

In reviewing the hypotheses put forward to explain the high frequency of CF in Caucasians, it is apparent that more investigations and research are necessary. The fertility hypothesis and TB hypothesis have both been criticized here on the basis of insufficient evidence. Likewise, while the cholera hypothesis is supported by more laboratory experiments than the other theories, it too warrants further investigations—-especially in the realm of epidemiology.

The cholera hypothesis is supported mainly by laboratory studies. *In vivo* studies in mice have demonstrated that individuals heterozygous for CF would presumably suffer less and have reduced mortality from exposure to cholera and *E. coli,* due to a decrease in the amount of active chloride channels in the individual (Gabriel et al., 1994). However, this evidence alone is insufficient.

Before this hypothesis can be accepted two major concerns must be addressed. First and foremost is the proposal that cholera was endemic in Europe prior to the 1800s. This proposal must be withdrawn until there is sufficient evidence to support it. In order to suggest that cholera was present in northern Europe prior to the 1800s in proportions great enough to induce a selective advantage, an intensive study of reconstituted families from parish records, and other sources of information on fertility and cause of death, would have to be undertaken. Even if this could be accomplished, and if data on families with and without deaths from cholera could be compiled through generations, it is unlikely that medical diagnosis prior to this century was accurate. The best one could hope to establish would be the presence of cholera-like illness.

If it cannot be demonstrated that cholera was present in Europe before the 1800s, the hypothesis that cholera is the selective advantage for CF weakens. In order for a disease to increase the frequency of a genetic trait, when no other pressures are present, several generations of selection are required. However, since the molecular data supports the notion that CF affords protection against cholera, other possibilities should be considered. One possibility is the idea of pre-adaptation. Pre-adaptation can be defined as a characteristic useful for conditions in which the organism does not yet live (Poirier, 1993: 335). If the idea of pre-adaptation is accepted then two possibilities concerning the cholera hypothesis emerge. First, CF was already established in Europe prior to the first cholera epidemic, maintained by a different and unknown source. The mutation acted as a pre-adaptation during the cholera epidemics, consequently further increasing the frequency of CF rapidly.

Alternatively, the CF gene may lie on a highly mutable region of the chromosome which would allow for speedy selection once cholera was introduced. In the second case, the high mutability would be the pre-adaptation. The second scenario seems to be supported by the fact that while over 400 mutations have been found to cause CF, certain populations seem to have one mutation which occurs at greater frequencies. In northern Europeans it is the ΔF508; in French-Canadian Quebecois it is 621 + IG–T, A455E and 711 + IG–T; and in those of Ashkenazi origins it is W1282X (Cutting et al., 1992: 1192). However, if CF does lie on a highly mutable region of the chromosome, high frequencies of this mutation should be found in all populations around the world.

The second problem with the cholera hypothesis which needs to be addressed is the population genetics of CF with regards to the epidemiology of cholera. CF is believed to have its origins in the Middle East, and to have been brought with the Neolithic farmers through southern Europe, north and northwest into northern Europe where it would become more prevalent (Devoto, 1991: 70). Cholera has been or is presently endemic in all of these areas. In the last century cholera was endemic throughout Europe, and today it is endemic in the Middle East and parts of southern Europe. The cholera hypothesis does not explain why CF is only polymorphic in Caucasian populations and not in Asians and Africans who have both suffered a history of greater exposure to cholera than other populations. Likewise, it fails to explain why CF is more prevalent in northern Europe as opposed to southern Europe where cholera remains a present-day threat.

Climate may be the key to understanding the epidemiology of CF. The southern areas of the world exhibit much lower frequencies of CF than areas in the northern hemisphere. It may be that the southern climates exhibit lower frequencies of CF because individuals with the disease would be at some disadvantage in a hot climate. It is likely that CF would be selected against in the southern

climates because the defective chloride channels in the sweat glands prevent reabsorption of sodium and chloride. In hyperthermic conditions this would leave the individual with CF at a greater risk than a person without CF for decreased sodium and chloride in the blood and dehydration. More simply, if an individual with CF were to be placed in an environment that increased sweating they would lose more salt then the average individual, and, in the absence of modern medical intervention, such salt was not easily replaced. It must be noted that CF heterozygotes as well as homozygotes suffer an increased risk of dehydration when exposed to excessive heat. Behm et al. (1987) found that, when CF hetrozygotes were artificially stimulated to sweat, their sweat secretions were reduced by 65 percent compared with individuals who did not carry a copy of any CF mutation (cited in Rodman and Zamudio, 1991: 257). Furthermore, Smith et al. (1995: 579-580) report the case of an individual heterozygous for both ΔF508 and R117H who succumbed to heat exhaustion when increased sweating was induced. This type of chloride imbalance that affects the individual's cooling system would greatly outweigh any advantage the CF heterozygote may have. In areas such as Australia and New Zealand the Caucasians represent a recent migration from northern climates, so frequencies could be expected to be on the decline. While this explanation may explain the low frequencies of CF in cholera endemic areas in the present day, further research will be necessary to test the idea.

In northern climates CF heterozygotes would not have this disadvantage. It is also possible that they may have an additional selective advantage. As Meindl hypothesized, tuberculosis, which is prevalent in northern climates, may have acted as an additional selective pressure. As CF alters the molecular architecture of the respiratory tract, perhaps it also causes some changes in the local endobronchial environment which are unfavourable for the growth of tuberculosis (Rodman and Zamudio, 1991: 254).

Because cholera and other diarrheal diseases can now be medically treated, it is possible that CF frequencies are on the decline, although this cannot be known for certain. Historical diagnosis is one of the obstacles to gaining a true understanding of the prevalence of specific diseases such as cholera, *E. coli* and CF. Cystic fibrosis was not diagnosed until about 60 years ago (Lloyd-Still, 1983: 1). Prior to that time, CF deaths would have occurred before the age of one and would not be recognized as a genetic disorder. Similarly, for the diarrheal diseases in early records, cause of death would often be no more descriptive than "diarrhea." Infections with *E. coli* bacteria or cholera toxin produces symptoms which closely parallel each other as well as most other diarrheal disease. As a result they were likely diagnosed simply as diarrhea by earlier doctors. This serious impairs our ability to truly understand the historical epidemiology of CF, cholera and *E. coli* in Europe prior to the second half of the 20th century.

Conclusion

The study of cystic fibrosis is becoming increasingly more complex. This research has attempted to compile data from the different fields of study in order to understand what force may be maintaining this deleterious gene at such a high frequency. This holistic approach has incorporated evidence from biochemistry, population and molecular genetics, epidemiology, bacteriology, archaeology and medical anthropology. From this broad-based research it can be concluded that it is likely that no single force is maintaining CF at a carrier frequency of 5 percent in the Caucasian population. The conclusion of molecular data, that CF provides protection against cholera and *E. coli* in the heterozygous state, is not enough on its own to explain the population distribution of the disease. Further study of the population genetics and the pathophysiology of CF are necessary to explain why the disease would be selected against in the tropics where cholera is the greatest threat today.

The various explanations provided for the heterozygote advantage of CF are all speculative and none have been confirmed with the certainty that the sickle cell-malaria scenario has been. In fact, many investigations into selective advantage for genetic disorders have yet to yield results as conclusive as the sickle-cell model. The trouble rests in the nature of the historical data on infectious disease—we do not know enough about epidemiological patterns in Europe prior to this century.

The high frequency of CF supports the contention that there may be a carrier advantage for this disease, but so far no single hypothesis has been accepted. This being said, the cholera/*E. coli* hypothesis, with its caveats, does provide one of the better-researched and documented theories. However, further testing of the theory is necessary. In particular, the historical and modern epidemiology of cholera should be consistent with the epidemiology of CF; if it is not consistent, a rigorously tested explanation must be provided to explain the anomaly.

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Book Reviews / Comptes rendus

Thomas J. Csordas, *Language, Charisma and Creativity: The Ritual Life of a Religious Movement,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, xxii + 320 pages, $40.00 (cloth).

Reviewer: *Paul Antze*
York University

In his first book, *The Sacred Self* (University of California Press, 1994), Thomas Csordas offered a detailed phenomenological analysis of healing practices among members of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal in the United States. In the present work he takes up a larger and more vexing set of questions about the Charismatic movement as a whole. How are we to understand a "movement" that is both acephalous and authoritarian, that makes equal virtues of spontaneity and control, that preaches "retreat from the world" while its members lead relatively conventional lives? How can its strict rules of conduct be reconciled with ecstatic practices like speaking in tongues? How does "charisma" operate in the absence of a charismatic leader? For Csordas such questions are of more than local interest. Taken seriously, in fact, they serve to challenge some fundamental anthropological assumptions—about social movements, postmodernity, charisma, religious innovation, performativity and the creative possibilities of ritual, to name just a few. Because Csordas takes them very seriously indeed, his book is an ethnography, but it is also something more—a series of critical but very fruitful conversations with theorists ranging from Max Weber and Irving Hallowell to Pierre Bourdieu, Johannes Fabian, Maurice Bloch and Stanley Tambiah.

The book falls into three parts, moving from basic questions about the Charismatic movement and the evolution of its practices to a subtler array of problems involving language, performance and creativity. The first part examines the movement's history and its place in contemporary culture. Here Csordas notes important affinities between Catholic Pentecostalism and other emerging "religions of the self" in India, Japan and Africa. In this and other respects, he argues, the movement vividly reflects the "breakdown of boundaries between symbolic forms" and the "montage of transposable spriritualities" that have become hallmarks of postmodern culture.

In the second part, Csordas examines the process driving the steadily growing intensity and complexity of life in Charismatic communities since the late 1960s, a process that has yielded both a high degree of commitment and an enormous diversity of visions within the movement. He argues that the dynamic behind this transformation can be understood discursively as one of "rhetorical involution"—a complex interplay between what Bourdieu called ritualization of practice and a second process that Csordas calls "radicalization of charisma."

This discussion then sets the stage for a fascinating theoretical chapter on the anthropology of charisma. Here Csordas makes a persuasive case for rejecting the personalistic theory bequeathed by Weber in favour of the discursive approach pioneered by Johannes Fabian. From this standpoint, as Csordas puts it, "charisma is rhetoric," and the task of understanding specific cases becomes a matter of seeing just how they are enacted, both discursively and practically.

Csordas takes up this challenge in the final and most original part of the book, which examines the ritual performance of charisma among Catholic Pentecostals with special attention to the weightiest of ritual genres, "prophetic utterance." In a dense and extremely rich discussion, Csordas examines the ways in which the Charismatic vocabulary of motives and the illocutionary force of prophetic speech serve to construct a "sacred self" while providing strong incitements to radicalization.

This is an important book. While perhaps too difficult for most undergraduates, it would be an excellent choice for graduate courses dealing with ritual, social movements rhetoric or the anthropology of religion.

Desley Deacon, *Elsie Clews Parsons: Inventing Modern Life,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997, xvi + 520 pages, $29.95 (cloth).

Reviewer: *Sally Cole*
Concordia University

Born in 1874 into elite New York circles to summer at Newport and follow a rigorous round of "calling" when in New York, Elsie Clews Parsons died in 1941, the first woman to be elected President of the American Anthropological Association. It was the discovery of anthropology, Elsie wrote, that

had saved her from despair and cynicism. In *Elsie Clews Parsons: Inventing Modern Life*, Desley Deacon, Associate Professor of American Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, describes Elsie's migration from a life of enforced leisure in "a civilization that had played itself out" to a life of social commitment and scholarship in anthropology.

Elsie early understood that her disentanglement from her own family and caste was symptomatic of a wider "rebellion of the daughters" against the patriarchal conventions and patterns of privilege of the 19th century. As a student at Barnard College soon after it opened in 1889, she was introduced to another New York, one that was the site of radical branches of the women's movement and the heartland of an industrializing, urbanizing, diversifying America. Parsons studied sociology and became involved in the closely linked, settlement house social-reform movement, working among immigrants on the Lower East Side. Intellectually, she was inspired by French sociologist Gabriel Tarde's theory of "social imitation." In contrast to the organic determinism of 19th-century thinkers like Herbert Spencer, Tarde emphasized individual freedom and creativity in the "invention of the future," thus offering Parsons "the sturdy intellectual rationale she needed to insist on living life her own way" (p. 35) and the hope that a truly "modern" society could be created in the new century. The possibility—and the responsibility—of inventing a new way of life through the example of her own was the guiding principle in every subsequent decision she made. After completing her doctoral dissertation in 1900 and following six years of courtship and three years of "intimate friendship," she agreed to marry the politically active young lawyer (and later congressman) Herbert Parsons with the understood goal of experimenting with and modernizing the institutions of marriage and motherhood. Desley Deacon's intimate portrait of the travails of this marriage is detailed and touching and is in itself a major contribution to the ethnography of the family in 20th-century America.

After visiting the American southwest in 1910, Parsons met Pliny Goddard, then director of the American Museum of Natural History, and through him she met the young men who were revolutionizing the new science of anthropology: Alexander Goldenweiser, Robert Lowie, Paul Radin, Alfred Kroeber and Edward Sapir, all of whom had been students of Franz Boas at Columbia and, with the exception of Kroeber, were of Jewish immigrant families. Rejecting 19th-century classification, generalization, evolutionism and metaphysical speculation, the new science they were charting was positivist and empiricist, emphasized experience as the source of knowledge, and documented diversity rather than uniformity in culture, a project Parsons found close to her own.

The build-up to American participation in World War I solidified Parson's commitment to anthropology. A pacifist, she viewed with horror the ease with which "preexisting patterns in American life lent themselves to this leap into militarism" (p. 183) and the increasing anti-immigrant sentiment and concern for "racial purity" and Americanization so opposed to her own philosophy of tolerance. She turned to anthropological field work as a practical guide to social action. Parsons spent a total of 27 years doing field work in the southwest producing dozens of articles and the massive two-volume work, *Pueblo Indian Religion* (1939). She studied African-American culture in diverse Caribbean and American contexts, and continued this commitment through her funding for research in this field, notably the work of Melville Herskovits. In Oaxaca, Mexico she became one of the first to study the complexity of Indian-Spanish cultural interaction, publishing her findings in 1936 in *Mitla: Town of Souls*, a book Deacon describes as "a modernist tour de force" and, in the last years of her life, was continuing her comparative work in Ecuador, published posthumously as *Peguche: A Study of Andean Indians*.

Desley Deacon provides an ethnography of the dynamics of gender, class and ethnicity in early 20th-century anthropology. Parsons had been slowly accepted by the masculine group in part due to the protective roles played by Goddard and Kroeber, both of whom fancied themselves in love with her for a time, and in part to her increasingly prominent role as a public intellectual in Greenwich Village circles that included her friends in the settlement house movement. Deacon links Parsons with the mavericks in anthropology through her construction of them as "secure outsiders": Elsie who was "secure by virtue of her wealth and social position, an outsider by virtue of her gender and subversive ideas" (p. 107); and the male Boasians "as immigrants with backgrounds in the European professional classes" (p. 103). As the discipline became more field work-based, a move strongly supported by Elsie, she worked against protest from her male colleagues to ensure that women were included in field parties and endeavoured, through her own example, to model how men and women might work together as colleagues and not as potential or actual sexual partners—a utopian dynamic that continues to elude the discipline at the end of the century. Although Elsie, through funding, helped women like Esther Goldfrank and Ruth Bunzel move from secretarial positions in Boas's office into field work and professional anthropology, she was, finally, not able to help them (or other women) to overcome, as Deacon documents, the "sexual innuendo, assumptions about women's place, and the old boy networks, ethnicity, and individual personality that kept talented women out of permanent academic positions" (p. 268). Throughout her life, however, Parsons remained a sensitive mentor to young anthropologists, both male and female, and financially supported the field work of uncounted anthropologists. Interestingly, Ruth Benedict was one of the few who, forced to accept her patronage, resisted a relationship with Parsons, resenting both her own lack of job (and financial) security in the discipline and Parsons' relative privilege to design her own career.

Elsie Clews Parsons is clearly a labour of love, and author Desley Deacon compassionately and carefully draws the figure of Parsons by placing the intimate details of her life against the backdrop of modernist social movements of early

20th-century American society. The Parsons Deacon constructs is a woman who followed Robert Louis Stevenson's prescription that "[t]o live out of doors with the [man] a [woman] loves is of all lives the most complete and free," a woman who found a new and simpler life on canoe trips and southwestern treks with Grant LaFarge and during anthropological fieldwork in some of the most beautiful (and instructive) places on earth. She is a loving mother and her four children emerge as important figures in Deacon's story, guiding Elsie's seasonal round and returning her love. Above all, she is a determined individualist who maintained high standards of honesty and integrity in human relationships, and who lived her life as a committed advocate and practitioner of socially responsible social science. Deacon's narrative reminds us that the social science we practise is intimately rooted in the people we are as individuals: in the quality of the relationships we nurture and in the values we hold sacred in our personal lives. The book is a must for scholars and students of the history of anthropology, women's history, American history and life writing but will have a wide appeal far beyond such disciplinary boundaries.

Richard Feinberg and Karen Ann Watson-Gegeo (eds.), *Leadership and Change in the Western Pacific,* London School of Economics, Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 66, London: Athlone Press, 1996, xvi + 416 pages, $90.00 (cloth).

Reviewer: *Mike Evans*
University of Northern British Columbia

Leadership has long been one of the key areas of concern for scholars of the Western Pacific, and a great deal of the attention paid to the study of leadership in the Pacific has been comparative. This volume offers a collection of diverse accounts of leadership among both Austronesian and non-Austronesian peoples of Melanesia, and among some of the Polynesian peoples of the Western and Central Pacific. Like many collections produced on the Pacific, the volume is constructed to support comparative thinking, albeit from an ethnographic rather than overtly theoretical basis.

The notion that theory need grow from ethnography rather than the reverse is one with deep roots in the anthropological literature on the Pacific, and it is an approach which is well represented in the work of Raymond Firth (to whom these essays were presented in celebration of his 90th birthday). The work of Firth, together with the seminal ethnological articles on leadership in the Pacific by Marshall Sahlins ("Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 5 [1963]: 285-303) and George Marcus ("Chieftainship," in *Developments in Polynesian Ethnology*, Alan Howard and Robert Borofsky, eds., University of Hawaii Press, 1989), form the axes around which the articles turn.

Individually, many of the articles in the volume stand as valuable contributions to the literature in and of themselves. But, in spite of the exhaustive review of the issues and problems of anthropological approaches to leadership offered by the editors of the volume by way of introduction, the articles do not work particularly well together. Neither Sahlins' "Big man vs. Chief," nor Marcus' "Kingly vs. Populist Chief" dichotomies are robust enough to provide anything more than foils for the appearance of comparison. Indeed many of the articles challenge the assumptions of these earlier ethnological frameworks. The volume retains value because of the concern of the various authors for ethnographic quality (à la Firth), rather than its ethnological contribution.

One possible route towards a greater comparative frame, that is a focus on political economy and the significance of exchange processes for the reproduction and transformation of leadership structures, is sadly neglected. With a couple of exceptions, detailed consideration of economic processes is strangely absent in the articles. This absence is all the more disturbing, given that the volume is concerned with change. There is a tendency to view changes in leadership as simply political, while the impact of changing relations of production and exchange, growing from the integration of Pacific polities with the world system, remains curiously underanalyzed.

In the end, the volume exhibits both the strengths and weaknesses of the anthropological tradition. The authors provide ethnographically rooted and finely grained analyses respectful of indigenous constructions, actions and intentions, which can continue to inform the work of others. Nonetheless, the collection of these articles together in one volume should not be understood to suggest any theoretical coherence. While readers may find essays that will be valuable for comparative purposes (and there are some in this volume I found quite useful), the work of developing frameworks or narratives, capable of supporting comparative thinking, remains undone.

Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, *Why I Can't Read Wallace Stegner and Other Essays: A Tribal Voice,* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996, xiv + 158 pages, $45.00 (cloth), $12.95 (paper).

Reviewer: *Winona Stevenson*
Saskatchewan Indian Federated College

Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, a Crow Creek Sioux Tribal member and Professor Emeritus of English and Native American Studies at Eastern Washington University, is well-known in academic and Native American circles as a forthright literary critic and proactive political commentator. *Why I Can't Read Wallace Stegner* is an anthology of her more provocative and insightful critical essays from the past three decades.

Cook-Lynn's essays address a range of Native American Studies concerns—from Indigenous philosophies, historical and contemporary realities, to literature, theory, criticism and appropriation. In addition to challenging Western paradigms and constructs of Native American experiences, she challenges Indigenous scholars to push beyond existing academic

confines. Native American Studies reaches its 30th anniversary in 1998, and Cook-Lynn's work provides an overview of the criticisms, pitfalls and challenges facing it. Most importantly, she forcefully distinguishes Native American Studies from conventional disciplines by reminding us why it emerged 29 years ago—why our subjects, objectives, methods and theoretical developments make us different.

One essential and distinct element in Native American Studies derived from Indigenous intellectual knowledge is "the reality of race memory" connection to the land (p. 82). Since the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the land is inherently spiritual, it is imperative that Native American scholars maintain spiritual and ideological groundings in their own intellectual traditions. Further, since Indigenous intellectual traditions inform discourse, Native American scholars are most valuable and inspirational when proactively engaged in "partisan struggles" (p. 39).

These essential criteria, often called grass-roots intellectualism, are evident in each essay. Cook-Lynn intimately places herself in her texts and grounds her work in the best of both worlds—her tribal *tiospaye* and her transdisciplinary academic background which is predominantly informed by the postcolonial critical thinking of Said, Deloria Jr., Medicine, D'Souza, Momaday, Otriz and others. Politics also informs the core of her work, a point criticized by mainstream scholars who perceive it as a lack of objectivity. Native American scholars agree that Eurocentric standards of "objectivity" serve as rationales which often undermine, minimize and negate our scholarship.

Cook-Lynn's field is Native American literatures and she challenges Native American writers to engage their own and each others' work more critically. She encourages an "ethical relationship between tribal nationhood and the imagination" (p. xiii) and is concerned about authorial intent. For example, she claims that Louise Erdrich denies nationalist and spiritual connections to her tribal homeland and by doing so does not write from tribal place. She asks, "how can one be a tribal nationalist and 'set the pace' if one claims no connection to the land either in one's personal life or in one's fiction" (p. 82). The political ramifications of cosmopolitan, as opposed to nationalist literature, undermine and negate tribal sovereignty and First Nations status. This in turn directly opposes historical realities and the current work of tribal governments, activists, politicians and grassroots intellectuals.

Critical essays provoke debate because they are inherently interpretive in nature. Since Cook-Lynn's work exemplifies that principle on a range of Native American studies issues, it will be a valuable university text. One aspect students will immediately note is its strong Dakota bias. How this plays out in her analysis of the historical role of Métis, for example, deserves mention and caution. In her title article Cook-Lynn counters Wallace Stegner's representation of the Métis as cultural buffers with the assertion that the Métis were active enforcers of "assimilation and oppression of native populations by the American and Canadian governments" (p. 35). She asserts that the Métis were responsible for much "hatred and violence within tribal groups" (ibid.) and were a society "produced through unsanctioned marriage and reproductive activities" (p. 36). To view them as buffers, she claims, "is to look at it from a purely European point of view, not from the vantage point of the *tiospaye* value system" (ibid.). Clearly this revisionist assault is weak, narrow and dated in the wake of more recent Métis scholarship. It strongly reflects ancient Dakota/Lakota hostilities towards a traditional enemy and demonstrates a failure to recognize the uniqueness of the Canadian Métis' experience.

While Cook-Lynn's sometimes caustic tone and turgid, convoluted writing style add to the challenge of reading this work, her essays are urgent, stimulating and vital. Her dedication "To the indigenous writer in the modern world" speaks directly to those of us who follow in her stead and she need not fear—what Native American Studies has gained in the last three decades will not be consumed by the growing conservative wave.

Thomas Biolsi and Larry J. Zimmerman (eds.), *Indians and Anthropologists: Vine Deloria, Jr. and the Critique of Anthropology,* Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997, x + 226 pages, $45.00 (cloth), $19.95 (paper).

Reviewer: *James B. Waldram*
University of Saskatchewan

The legacy of Vine Deloria, Jr.'s *Custer Died for Your Sins* continues to plague anthropology in complex and amusing ways. A single chapter in his 1969 book, devoted to "Anthropologists and Other Friends," presented a satirical, biting and hilarious send-up of the discipline from the perspective of a Native American scholar. Certainly there was some truth to Deloria's claim that anthropology was little more than a fancy form of colonialism, and anthropologists intellectual vultures. What puzzles, however, is not so much that Deloria was hardly the first to make these accusations, but that, for American anthropologists in particular, his words had such a dramatic impact. Following his publication, the American Anthropological Association convened what might be seen as crisis meetings designed to defend anthropology and respond to the critique. What followed was a major shift in the direction of the discipline, giving an impetus to the emerging field of applied anthropology, as practitioners attempted to reconfigure their work so that Native Americans benefitted.

This volume consists of 10 chapters by various contributors, plus an introduction by the editors and, not surprisingly, a final comment from Deloria himself. The papers vary in style and tone, but all address in one way or another the question: what has the impact of Deloria's critique been on anthropology and Native American studies? Most papers have been written specifically for this volume, and the addition of one previously published paper (by Peter Whitely) strengthens an uneven text. The papers range from intellec-

tual ruminations about Deloria and the state of the discipline, to case studies, personal reflections and largely irrelevant polemical statements. While the editors appear to establish a postmodern/postcolonial tone in their excellent introduction, there is no uniform theoretical orientation to the volume. This is unfortunate, as it seems that the postmodern critique appears to offer the best insight into the issues raised by Deloria.

It is not possible here to discuss each chapter in the volume. From my view, the most interesting chapters include the introduction and several papers contained in the section titled "Ethnography and Colonialism." Thomas Biolsi, for instance, employs the framework of primitivist discourse to critique the work of early-20th-century ethnographer Haviland Scudder Mekeel and its role in redefining Lakota culture and governance. Gail Landsman discusses the conflict between Iroquoian scholars and the Iroquois themselves over the fundamental issue of whose view of history is accurate (i.e., "objective") and whose is fancifully inaccurate (i.e., "subjective"). Whitely's discussion of the relationship between anthropology and the Hopi is one of the best in the volume, and presents a clarion call in support of applied anthropology and the need to produce knowledge of direct use to Native Americans.

Deloria's concluding comment is vintage Deloria. The reader is invariably frustrated by his continuing tendency to issue blanket statements without substantiation (e.g., "Anthropology departments still cling fiercely to the belief that it is more valid and scholarly to have an Anglo study an Indian tribe than to have a member of that tribe trained in anthropology" [p. 211]). This polemic is tempered by occasionally astute observations (e.g., "In America we have an entrenched state religion, and it is called science" [ibid.]) which challenge and provoke. Deloria does not appear to want to eliminate the discipline, for in it he sees many things of value for Native Americans. However, he continues to argue for a shifting of anthropological paradigms and methodological strategies.

In the end, the volume is more about anthropology and less about Deloria. There have been some solid critiques of Vine Deloria's views, his apparent looseness with "facts" and lack of comprehensive knowledge of many of the disciplines and approaches he criticizes—see, for instance, his new book, *Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientific Fact* (Scribner, 1995). That anthropology as a discipline still feels compelled to respond to him is intriguing, especially in light of the much more informed views of Native American anthropologists such as Bea Medicine and the late Alfonso Ortiz. Canadian scholars will find some merit in the American perspectives offered here, but many, like me, may finish the book feeling that the situation in Canada is quite different. Recent books published here, such as Robert Paine (ed.), *Advocacy and Anthropology* (Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1985), Noel Dyck and James B. Waldram (eds.), *Anthropology, Public Policy and Native Peoples of Canada* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993) and Edward Hedican, *Applied Anthropology in Canada: Understanding Aboriginal Issues* (University of Toronto Press, 1995), together provide a Canadian perspective on the issues raised by Deloria and discussed in *Indians and Anthropologists.*

Contributors / Collaborateurs

Vered Amit-Talai

Vered Amit-Talai is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Concordia University, where she has been a faculty member since 1988. She received her PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Manchester in 1984. She is the author of *Armenians in London: The Management of Social Boundaries* (Manchester University Press) and the co-editor of *Urban Lives: Fragmentation and Resistance* (McClelland and Stewart), *Youth Culture: A Cross-Cultural Perspective* (Routledge) and *Resituating Identities: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Culture* (Broadview Press).

Pauline Gardiner Barber

Pauline Gardiner Barber is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Dalhousie University, where she teaches courses on work, gender, culture and political economy. She also holds cross-appointments in International Development Studies and Women's Studies. Currently her research investigates questions associated with gendered livelihoods, development and cultural politics in the Philippines and Cape Breton.

Kristen Beckett

Kristen Beckett is a doctoral candidate in anthropology at McMaster University.

Kim Clark

Kim Clark received her PhD from the New School for Social Research in 1993, and since 1995 has been Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Western Ontario. Her research has focussed primarily on an anthropology of the Ecuadorian nation, examining the contradictions of national incorporation for different social groups over the last century, and exploring the relations between racial ideologies, gender ideologies and national ideologies. She is the author of *"The Redemptive Work": Railway and Nation in Ecuador, 1895-1930* (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1997).

Constance deRoche

Constance deRoche, an Associate Professor at the University College of Cape Breton, received her PhD in Anthropology from Washington University (St. Louis). Her interest in how people cope with supralocal forces and superordinate structures has patterned her work on regional economic disparities, voluntary associational activity and organizational culture. Besides work on organizational culture, her publications include: *A Rock in the Stream: Living with the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Cape Breton*, Research and Policy Papers, 7, edited with John E. deRoche (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1987); and "Social Ecology as Political Economy: A Case Study in the Anthropology of Complexity," *City and Society*, 1: 122-147.

Lindsay DuBois

Lindsay DuBois is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Dalhousie University. She received her PhD in 1997 from the New School for Social Research for a dissertation entitled "The Politics of the Past in an Argentine Working Class Neighborhood (1972-1992)." DuBois conducted field work in a working-class neighbourhood in the suburbs of Buenos Aires. Her primary research interests are the relationship between culture, politics and history and working-class culture, especially in Latin America.

John Galaty

John Galaty is an Associate Professor of Anthropology and Director of the Centre for Society, Technology and Development at McGill University. He has pursued research on pastoral societies in East Africa, currently collaborates with the ALARM network in Eastern Africa in pursuing regional research on rangeland tenure and coordinates a research team at McGill concerned with agrarian land tenure and development. He is the author and/or editor of a number of books, monographs and articles dealing with nomadic pastoralism and issues in development, including *Herders, Warriors, and Traders—Pastoralism in Africa* (edited with Pierre Bonte), Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

Teresa Holmes

Teresa Holmes teaches in the Anthropology Department at York University. Her doctoral research on colonial societies in East Africa focusses on issues of identity and representation and the anthropological construction of kinship.

Tim E. Holzkamm

Tim E. Holzkamm has consulted as an ethnohistorian since 1980. He currently teaches anthropology at North Dakota State University and resides on the White Earth Indian Reservation. He also does land claims analysis and advisement for several First Nations and organizations, and is an author on such topics as Dakota and Anishinaabeg history, fisheries, flooding, forestry, mineral use and agriculture. He has served as an expert in court, and for administrative tribunals, on treaty and resource rights.

Villia Jefremovas

Villia Jefremovas is an anthropologist with a PhD from the University of Toronto. Currently she is a consultant working in International Development on social and health issues. She has also provided political briefings and analysis on the Great Lakes region of Africa for the UN, CBC, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Privy Council, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and various international NGOs. She teaches as a sessional lecturer at Carleton University in Geography and at the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs. Her best-known publication is "Loose Women, Virtuous Wives and Timid Virgins: Gender and the Control of Resources in Rwanda" *Canadian Journal of African Studies,* 25(3), 1991.

Belinda Leach

Belinda Leach is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Guelph. She received her PhD from the University of Toronto. Her research interests are focussed around the following topics: economic restructuring; formal, informal and domestic work; gender; development; culture and class; industrial homework. Her recent publications include: "Neoconservatism and the Politics of Work and Family in Hamilton, Ontario," *Atlantis*, 1997; "Behind Closed Doors: Homework Policy and Lost Possibilities for Change," *Rethinking Restructuring: Gender and State Responses to Restructuring in Canada*, Isabella Baker (ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996; "Bringing 'Globalisation' Down to Earth: Restructuring and Labour in Rural Communities, *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 32(3), 1995, with A. Winson; and "'Working at Home is Easy for Her': Homework in Contemporary Ontario," *Ethnographic Feminism(s): Essays in Anthropology*, L. Phillips and S. Cole (eds.), Ottawa, ON: Carleton University Press, 1995.

Joan A. Lovisek

Joan A. Lovisek holds a PhD in Anthropology from McMaster University and specializes in Ojibwa ethnohistory. She has conducted field research among Ojibwa/Saulteaux in Ontario and Saskatchewan. She is author of numerous papers on Ojibwa land use and political organization and has a forthcoming contribution to the *Encyclopedia of Canada's Peoples*. Since 1979, she has provided research consultation on various aspects of Ojibwa ethnohistory to First Nations and government. She is currently engaged in research into the historical and political aspects of the Midewiwin.

Charles R. Menzies

Charles R. Menzies is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the University of British Columbia. He received his PhD in Anthropology from the City University of New York. His work encompasses ethnographic research on the northwest coast of North America and coastal Brittany in which themes of identity and social class have been an underlying point of concern.

Blair Rutherford

Blair Rutherford is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Regina. He received his doctorate from McGill University in 1996, carrying out research on the politics of resource access for commercial farm workers in Zimbabwe. He recently was a consultant at the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa, carrying out research on the role of civil society organizations in social development.

Leo G. Waisberg

Leo G. Waisberg has consulted as an ethnohistorian in northwestern Ontario since May 1975, when, he reports, Manitou Rapids Anishinaabeg first made complaints to him about Ruth Landes and cultural anthropology. He is a land claims analyst for several First Nations and their research organizations, an advisor on claims settlement negotiations and an author on such topics as sturgeon fisheries, flooding impacts, forestry and agriculture. He has functioned as an expert in court, and with administrative tribunals, on Ojibwa history, claims, treaty and fishing rights.

Eric Worby

Eric Worby's research has focussed on agrarian commoditization, property relations, ethnicity and the state and development discourse and practice in southern Africa and south Asia. He has been a researcher with the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Zimbabwe in 1988-89, a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow with the Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management in Dhaka, Bangladesh, from 1992-94 and a member of the Department of Anthropology at McGill University from 1994-96. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Anthropology and a member of the African Studies Council at Yale University.

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

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

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