Hybrid Identities and Indigenous Language Sustainability: Reflections on Language Contact and (Neo-)Colonial Practices on Sakhalin Island

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Abstract: This article discusses hybrid identities and language contact of the Indigenous peoples of Southern Sakhalin, Russia's biggest island located in the Far East. It argues that mobility, advanced techniques of navigation, and a wide range of contacts with the neighbouring populations has facilitated multilingualism on Sakhalin. The international spirit and language super-diversity that were preserved until the beginning of the 20th century were significantly violated by the colonial regimes of Japan and Soviet Russia with their strong focus on ethnic and language classification. However, numerous redistributions of administrative boundaries, mass resettlements, and mixed marriages have paradoxically made the intervening of languages and identities in southern Sakhalin even more complicated. These radical changes further challenge current ethnic and language policies as well as development practices that rested on outdated perspectives on ethnic purity and traditional authenticity. These policies result in the exclusion of many Indigenous people, who fail to fit the dominant discourse on language and identity, which is colonial in nature. A more nuanced account of reality, though, raises a variety of questions ranging from special rights, to Indigenous peoples speaking non-Indigenous languages, to the adequacy of language revitalisation in ethnically mixed communities.

Keywords: Sakhalin, Indigenous people, colonialism, language sustainability, language policy, super-diversity, hybrid identities

Résumé : Cet article traite des identités hybrides et du contact linguistique des peuples autochtones de Sakhaline du sud, la plus grande île située à l'Extrême-Orient de la Russie. Il montre que le mode de vie nomade, les techniques avancées de navigation et un large éventail de contacts avec les populations voisines y ont facilité le multilinguisme. L'esprit international et la superdiversité des langues ont persisté jusqu'au début du XXe siècle et ont été significativement perturbés par les régimes coloniaux du Japon et de la Russie soviétique, qui ont utilisé des approches de classification ethnique et linguistique. Or, les nombreuses redistributions de frontières administratives, les réinstallations massives et les mariages mixtes ont paradoxalement complexifié les entrecroisements de langues et d'identités de la région. Ces changements radicaux remettent en question les politiques ethniques et linguistiques actuelles, ainsi que les pratiques de développement qui reposent sur des idées obsolètes de pureté ethnique et d'authenticité traditionnelle. Ces politiques entraînent l'exclusion de nombreux membres autochtones qui ne correspondent pas au discours dominant sur la langue et l'identité, qui est de nature coloniale. Un compte-rendu plus nuancé de la réalité soulève néanmoins une panoplie de questions, allant des droits particuliers pour les peuples autochtones parlant des langues non-autochtones à une revitalisation linguistique adéquate dans les communautés ethniques mixtes.

Mots-clés : Sakhaline, peuples autochtones, colonialisme, durabilité linguistique, politiques linguistiques, superdiversité, identités hybrides

Introduction

In 2013, I was hired as an anthropologist by one of the oil companies working in Sakhalin, which is one of the biggest Russian islands located in the Far East and administratively related to the Sakhalin region. The island's total population is about 498,000 people (Census 2010). The majority of inhabitants are concentrated in the south of Sakhalin, whereas numerically small Indigenous groups (Nivkh, Uilta, Evenki, and Nanai) mainly inhabit the island's central and northern parts. My duties included proposing a set of recommendations that could help the company to build better relations with the Indigenous peoples and to facilitate language maintenance among them. However, very soon it became clear to me that, at least in some Indigenous communities, especially in the southern part of the island, this task would be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish. Moreover, some of them are unlikely to be identified as "linguistic communities" in the conventional sense of this notion. Although I submitted my report with several conventional recommendations, I remain sceptical of the applicability of standard language revitalisation approaches to such regions as southern Sakhalin, where the local population has long been in contact with linguistically diverse groups. This experience also inspired me to reconsider current development policy as it has been applied by some oil companies and state institutions toward Indigenous peoples, as well as to look critically at empowerment models of interaction with a community with respect to revitalisation issues.

Oil development is the backbone of the island's economy. Both Russian and foreign industrial companies have been operating on the island since the end of the 19th century, and have gradually become one of the main sources of financial aid for Indigenous people. Although such companies usually support a variety of revitalisation initiatives, some of them have established a set of conditions to which Indigenous applicants have to adhere to get funding. For example, Sakhalin Energy requires

the applicants to clearly explain why the project has a "social value," a notion that might be hard to determine and evaluate. Most importantly, development programs reinforce the "performative magic of the power of instituting" (Bourdieu 1986, 248) that makes it possible for Indigenous peoples to defend their rights on behalf of the group but, at the same time, restricts their freedom to choose multiple identities. When it comes to language revitalisation, this kind of development policy may lead to significant misrepresentations of reality by not taking into account complicated ethno-linguistic diversity and by forcing Indigenous members to represent their cultures in a very rigid way (see Ferguson 1990; von Benda-Beckmann 1989). I am going to discuss this argument using the example of the Sakhalin minorities. There are at least two issues that I would particularly like to consider in more detail.

The first issue is associated with the interwoven nature of ethnic identities and languages spoken by the Sakhalin minorities, which has always been complicated due to the island's frontier position and geopolitical location in proximity to China, Japan, and Russia. In different periods, the island was a part of one or another empire. Events such as the Russian invasion (beginning in the middle of the 19th century), the Japanese occupation of the southern part of the island (1905–45), and the establishment of the Soviet regime across the whole island (1945–91) have all made a significant impact on the language landscape there. Ethnic composition has also been affected as a result of the assimilative language and nation building policies, mass resettlement, deportation, and ethnic cleansing. In some parts of the island, this has resulted in a greater mixture of ethnic identities and languages. Therefore, the first problem I encountered can be formulated in the following way: How could we talk about language revitalisation in Indigenous communities whose members are ethnically mixed and multilingual? Should they enjoy language rights if their native languages are non-Indigenous?

In the current situation of rapid language loss, my question may sound provocative, and some language planners and researchers could even contradict it by saying that the goal of Indigenous languages' revitalisation is important on its own, especially considering the fact that all Indigenous languages spoken on Sakhalin are endangered. Nowadays, these languages are used mainly by elderly residents and are not transmitted to children anymore (for a more detailed account, see, for example, de Graaf and Shiraishi 2013; Gruzdeva 2015; Mamontova 2015a; Vakhtin 2001). I should say, in advance, that I do not aim at refuting this argument. I would rather like to show that in some cases adherence to uncritical language/identity links may serve as an obstacle to language revitalisation and even lead to the exclusion of some Indigenous members from language planning (see May 2012). Consequently, whereas Sakhalin languages have long served as objects of research, we know comparatively less about multilingual language practices of the people from mixed families.

A second issue, linked to the first one, stemmed from my expert status. I had already worked in Sakhalin a few years before I arrived there as an expert, and I have to admit that my second experience significantly changed my view of the problems related to language planning and ethnic policy in general. I understood that at least some of my recommendations could be used by policy-makers, and, that therefore, they could affect the local population. Unlike in other regions in Russia, it is a common practice in Sakhalin for the local oil companies to hire specialists in Indigenous issues for either designing development programs or evaluating their impact (see Roon 2008). But, unlike the Indigenous population, companies have a casting vote and the privilege of choosing what kind of expert proposals to accept. This creates an unbalanced situation in terms of power relations (see Coumans 2011), not to mention the fact that an outsider researcher, acting as an expert, may also establish the power over revitalisation issues, for example, by creating a generation of speakers (see discussion in Speas 2011). As I have said, over the past decade, development programs have turned into the main source of support both for researchers and Indigenous people. Therefore, their role in language planning and Indigenous policy in general seems to be growing, although this process is not always visible. One of these development programs, which I am going to consider in more detail, is the Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan (SIMDP), which is run by Sakhalin Energy. This program was established in 2004 following long-standing protests by Indigenous leaders against oil drilling, and it is frequently recognised as representative of the relationships between Indigenous peoples and businesses in Russia (see Wilson and Stammler 2006). My focus will be largely on the development discourse through which I will try to consider a broader problem of power relations between language users and experts regarding language revitalisation.[1]

Methodologically, my analysis of the sociolinguistic situation is based on the theoretical assumptions of superdiversity (see Rampton et al. 2015; Silverstein 2014). Super-diversity is understood as the multi-dimensional fluidity and excess of languages and identities, which the state's institutional apparatuses have been unprepared to countenance and assimilate into official practices

(Silverstein 2014, 2). As I will show, in the 20th century, the multilingual and ethnically mixed population of Sakhalin has challenged ethnic and language policies based on the nation-state ideology of several colonial regimes, each of which tried to limit local ethno-linguistic diversity to several clearly bounded ethnic and linguistic categories. Most of the assumptions continue to be applied and reproduced in modern development programs. Since I show that the development discourse is a part of state policy toward Indigenous minorities, this framework also helps me to point out such problems as the further exclusion and marginalisation of certain Indigenous communities in Sakhalin: those who have failed to fit into the rigid boundaries of these categories and standards of authenticity projected onto them by those in power.

Structurally, the article consists of three sections. In the first section, I briefly describe language and ethnic contacts in Sakhalin before the colonisation period. The second section is devoted to the sociolinguistic situation on the island from the beginning of the 20th century until the present in light of Japanese and Soviet national policies. I use some examples from my interviews with local residents who shared their language biographies. Finally, in the third section, I discuss the representation of Indigenous people in contemporary sustainable development ideology and its impact on language revitalisation initiatives.[2]

Language and Ethnic Contacts on Sakhalin before the Colonisation Period

I would like to begin with a brief description of the ethno-linguistic situation in Sakhalin shortly before the most intense colonisation period, by which I mean the events of the 20th century, namely, the occupation of the island by Japan and Soviet Russia.[3] Of course, this is an incomplete and very fragmented account. The aim of this introduction is to highlight that ethno-linguistic diversity and multilingualism have long been attributes of the Aboriginal population living on the island. The most significant feature of the island's historical past was that its population acquired the experience of navigation much earlier than in other parts of the world and knew how to deal with woodworking tools for making boats – for example, Sakhalin inhabitants used polished adzes for smoothing and carving wood earlier than similar techniques developed in Siberia and Europe (see Vasilevskiy 2007). This fact is very important for understanding the specifics of Sakhalin ethnic groups; people were highly mobile and came into frequent contact with the numerous neighbouring cultures. Of course, the ancient population of Sakhalin cannot be directly identified with its modern one. However, the ability to steer a boat seems to be a significant attribute of the people living on the island from time immemorial, and, among other things, this ability preserved the international spirit of Sakhalin and multilingualism into the beginning of the 20th century (Smolyak 1984, 124, 132). Thus, Mamiya Rinzo, a famous Japanese traveller of the 19th century, noted that the trade fair arranged annually on Sakhalin served as a gathering place for numerous linguistic groups. Not only did the Aboriginal residents and the Japanese newcomers attend, but people from the Amur River region also took part in this event. In turn, members of the Sakhalin Indigenous population travelled to the mainland to trade in Manchuria (see Harrison 1955). Another circle of trading and exchange relations included the Ainu of Hokkaido, Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and probably even Kamchatka (Kikuchi 1999).

However, it is still unclear in which languages those trading operations were conducted. Japanese linguist Yoshiko Yamada in her recent research suggests that there must have been some geographical as well as social differences between the minorities that determined the specifics of language contact on Sakhalin (Yamada 2010). Moreover, cultural and social relations between all ethnic groups on the island were not stable. Yoshiko Yamada came to the conclusion that in the latter part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, there might have been a few linguistic areas on the island. The first area existed in northern Sakhalin. It was characterised by the use of Nivkh as a tool of inter-ethnic communication. However, in southern Sakhalin, the situation was quite different: it was the Nivkh who were obliged to know the neighbouring languages.

Indeed, one of the most cited remarks in this regard was made by Lev Sternberg (1908, viii), who noticed that while the Nivkh had to acquire the knowledge of the neighbouring languages, including the Tungusic ones, the latter were not supposed to speak Nivkh. He alleged this was due to the difficult Nivkh phonetic system. In this respect, Ekaterina Gruzdeva, a specialist in the Nivkh language, points out that Nivkh has had little effect on the other languages of Sakhalin. However, the linguistic influence of Tungusic languages on Nivkh is found even on the level of dialectal differences (Gruzdeva 1998). Linguist Alexander Pevnov also suggests that the Nivkh language has a lot of loan words borrowed from Tungusic languages that can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of some cultural terms borrowed from the Manchu language via the Tungusic languages spoken in Priamurye (Russian Far East). The second group is constituted by terms that were borrowed during

more ancient contact that occurred before the Manchu conquest (Pevnov 1992).

One of the reasons that some Tungusic languages were so attractive was that its speakers possessed the advanced and mobile technology of reindeer breeding. In contrast to other Siberian minorities, they used reindeer as a pack and riding animal. As such, Tungusic languages, mainly Evenki, were able to spread quickly across all of Siberia where it served as a lingua franca (Tugolukov 1982, 168). Even some of the Nivkh adopted Tungus reindeer to travel long distances (Roon 1996, 83). Thanks to the nomadic way of life, the Evenki had greater contact with many other cultures and, consequently, acquired some useful skills and possessions that they later distributed among the Sakhalin minorities (186). But the main reason for Nivkh multilingualism was, to my mind, that they had long served as mediators in trade deals between the populations of Sakhalin, Japan, and the lower Amur. The Nivkh were involved in, and adapted themselves to, the commodity-money relations flourishing in the Amur area in the 1860s. Trade was a prevalent occupation in this location due to the influx of Russian traders involved in the Russian-American Company. The trading and exchange contacts of the Amur Nivkh covered the entire island, and the local Nivkh actively participated in these operations (see Smolyak 1975, 171). They had to know many languages to communicate with different actors, mainly those who spoke Tungusic, within a huge area. Finally, the Nivkh had a very flexible social structure that allowed them to accept new members whatever their ethnic origin. The latter quality significantly contributed to the Nivkh language and culture (see Smolyak 1967).

As for language contact between the two representatives of the Tungusic group, it seems that the majority of the Evenki who migrated to the island in the middle of the 19th century were able to speak Uilta and vice versa. This can be explained by the fact that these two groups have always shared almost the same economic complex based on the Evenki style of reindeer herding, which established close social contact and kinship relations (see Kosarev 2009; Missonova 2009). Yet, according to the field materials collected in different periods and places, "linguistic equality" between these languages has not been stable (see Funk, Zenko, and Sillanpää 2000; Novikova and Savelyeva 1953, 90–91; Patkanov 1906, 139).

In addition to language contact within the island, Indigenous peoples interacted with representatives of the Manchus, Koreans, Chinese, Japanese, and later Russians and Yakuts. Most of those contacts, as I have already mentioned, took place within the framework of trade relations. Concerning hierarchical relations between local and foreign languages, I reiterate that since the ethnic history of this region has not been studied fully, mainly because of the lack of written sources, we do not know for certain who, with whom, and in which language particular conversations were likely to have occurred. However, it seems that the Japanese language had already become actively used in the 19th century (Asahi 2009a; Novombergskiy 1903). Some indirect evidence also makes it appear that trading between the Japanese and Nivkh occurred mainly in Japanese (Nivkhi Sakhalina 2008, 149). In the late 19th century, Japanese goods became so widespread on the island that they almost replaced Manchurian ones. On the other hand, there is some evidence that the Ainu language might also have been used for these purposes. Thus, it was employed by the Nivkh living on southern Sakhalin as well as by the Japanese fishermen who were engaging in trade with the Ainu. Later, this language was used by the Karafuto government as a means of communicating with the Indigenous population (Gruzdeva 1996, 1008). It was also the Ainu who were the first subjects of direct Japanese colonisation during the Karafuto period.

Sakhalin in the 20th Century: Japanese and Soviet Sovereignty over Sakhalin

In the 19th century, Sakhalin became a disputed territory between Japan and Russia. In 1855, the Treaty of Simoda was signed between the two countries. This date also marked the beginning of Russia's colonisation of the island with the establishment of its biggest penal colony for criminals and political exiles. However, it was the events of the 20th century that had the most significant impact on the sociolinguistic situation on Sakhalin. One of these events involved the Japanese presence in the southern part of the island, which resulted in the creation of the Karafuto province, and another one was the establishment of the Soviet regime. Sakhalin was a very attractive region for colonisers due to its valuable resources in timber, gas, and oil. Locals were brought under routine administration to provide a supply of labour, which allowed the dominant culture to establish its authority. The impact of the two regimes, however, has resulted in a rather peculiar and paradoxical situation. On the one hand, it has largely contributed to the process of marginalisation of the Sakhalin Aboriginal population based on an ethnic policy informed by an evolutionary paradigm. On the other hand, it has facilitated the increase of ethno-linguistic diversity in some parts of the island.

Japanese Language and Ethnic Policy in Karafuto

In 1905, Russia lost the Russian-Japanese war, and the southern part of the island was ceded to Japan (see Figure 1). It is usually stressed that under Japanese governance, the local population, especially the Ainu, experienced cultural and linguistic assimilation. Indeed, the Ainu were used by the Japanese authorities as early as the end of the 19th century in the geopolitical dispute with Russia. Thus, Japan argued that the Ainu had always been under Japanese protection and, thereby, these territories belonged to Japan. In turn, Russia immediately acknowledged the presence of the Nivkh. Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1999, 70) notes that these processes were crucial to the Indigenous populations of Hokkaido and Sakhalin since their representatives were "reassigned from the role of exotic foreigners to that of national subjects, whose links to the land no longer empowered themselves, but instead empowered the territorial claims of the colonizing nation-state." A little bit earlier, Russia had also recognised the Evenki. Russian authorities were arguing that the Tungus had to pay tribute to the tsar no matter where they were located and that, therefore, they belonged to Russia wherever they were. With their presence on Sakhalin, Russia claimed rights over the land as well (Evans 1999, 82).[4] Michel Foucault (1970) would call this an example of biopower over bodies: the human species, namely, the Tungus, became subjects of a political strategy and imperial sovereignty without even knowing it. For these reasons, the active acknowledgement of these three Indigenous groups can be said to be the result of colonial governance. For the Ainu, this was a rather negative turning point.

In the early 20th century, assimilating policies were imposed on the Ainu; education and cultural assimilation programs began to be implemented by a Japanese ethnic policy which was based on an evolutionary paradigm of social development (see Siddle 1996). But their population was relatively large, and this factor was considered by Japan to be a threat to the integrative national policy; therefore, the Ainu were forcibly relocated to the village of Otasu (currently known as Poronaysk). They were excluded from the full rights of Japanese citizenship until 1932 (Bukh 2010; Morris-Suzuki 2004, 264). Among other things, the assimilation policy toward the Ainu may be viewed as one of the reasons why they have lost their language so rapidly. As early as 1946, Dmitriy Kriukov (2001, 41), once head of the Soviet Civil Administration, reported on the situation of the Ainu on southern Sakhalin, noting that they had already abandoned their language. However, this was contradicted by the research



Figure 1: A Japanese map of Karafuto Province, 1945 (created by Alexey Bambizo, reprinted with permission from http://www.karafuto.bambizo.ru)

conducted in Sakhalin in the 1950s, when scholars were still making records in the Ainu language (Novikova and Savelyeva 1953).

There might be another explanation for "language loss." After the establishment of the Soviet regime in 1945, some Ainu were not willing to leave the island along with the Japanese. According to the legend I heard, they hid themselves in the woods to escape the deportation to Japan. Later, they preferred to refer to themselves as Nivkh, keeping their ethnic origin a secret (compare de Graaf and Shiraishi 2013, 56). This legend might be at least partly true. Otherwise, the rapid disappearance of the Ainu from official statistics is difficult to explain. During the time of the Soviets,

they were struck off the list of ethnic groups, and to this day the Ainu are an unrecognised minority in Russia. My informants recalled that some of their relatives, either a grandfather or a grandmother, rarely both of them, were Ainu; however, they tried not to reveal this fact in public (Funk 2013). What made this group distinct from other Indigenous groups was that some Ainu from the elder generation had a good command of the Russian language. Nowadays, their descendants identify themselves mainly as Nivkh. For the majority of Nivkh who can remember their Ainu background, Russian is the main language of communication. Some of them also know Japanese.

As for the rapid spread of the Japanese language, it became possible first of all due to the wider system of public schools. This approach involved crafting a common identification based on a shared "national" language (see Hobsbawm 1990). For the next several years, the government of the newly established province set up numerous schools in almost every settlement. The Japanese language was used as a language of instruction in the majority of these settlements. However, there were also a few schools in which some Aboriginal languages, such as Uilta, were used (Asahi 2009b, 28). Children of Indigenous origin started attending Japanese classes, and, therefore, the Japanese language became dominant. By the 1930s, it had already replaced the local languages and was spoken not only in official domains but also at home. The latter happened also due to the high rate of mixed marriages between the Japanese and local residents. In these marriages, the man was usually Japanese, and his wife was a representative of one of the Aboriginal groups, mainly Nivkh or Ainu. However, according to my field data, in some cases, full linguistic assimilation did not occur as the children acquired their mother tongue along with Japanese. Thus, some elderly residents of Poronaysk still passively know Japanese and are able to speak, or at least understand, Nivkh. But it seems that Japanese strictly served as a language of communication between spouses (Funk 2013).

Korean Migration to Sakhalin and the Ethno-Linguistic Situation after 1945

The Karafuto period is also characterised by the migration of Koreans to the island. Although the first record of the presence of Koreans on Sakhalin falls in the 19th century, it was only during the Karafuto period that their population became sizeable. In 1929, the number of Koreans reached 513, and, since that time, the number of Koreans gradually rose, up until the collapse of the Soviet Union (Din 2013, 35). On the whole, it is believed that the Japanese government brought to Sakhalin between 60,000 and 80,000 people of Korean ethnic background, the majority of whom were natives of South Korea (Son 1992, 8). The most intensive relocation took place during the Second World War when the Koreans were used by the Japanese as forced labourers. Statistics indicate the rapid decline of the Japanese population after the war, but, at the same time, it shows that the total number of Koreans remained stable. Thus, as of 1 July 1946, there were 305,800 people with Japanese citizenship, including 27,088 Koreans (Podpechnikov 2003, 257). The significant reduction of the Japanese population after the war is explained by their repatriation to Japan. However, the Koreans were not included in the repatriation program and had to stay on Sakhalin (Son 1992). Moreover, Russia refused to grant Koreans citizenship. The former residents of Karafuto were considered to be "Japanese" by the Russian authorities, therefore their status on Sakhalin was uncertain; they could not enjoy any civil rights and were not allowed to leave the island.

The state of Indigenous peoples in southern Sakhalin after 1945 was even more complicated. It is well known that the Soviet government, in close collaboration with linguists and ethnographers under the "affirmative" nationality policy, ended up classifying its citizens according to ethnicity, which was a rather controversial category used with respect to the pre-revolutionary Aboriginal groups of Siberia and the Far East (see Hirsch 2005). Like the Japanese authorities, the Soviet authorities regarded the Aboriginal population as rather culturally stable groups whose members' ethnic origins could be easily traced and determined. Therefore, already during the 1926 census, policy-makers divided the Native population of the lower Amur into a certain number of ethnic categories, which were later imposed on the ethnically related population of northern Sakhalin (Smolyak 1975, 93). Each group was supposed to have only one "mother tongue," which ideally corresponded to its prescribed ethnic name. In this way, Soviet authorities attempted to identify and group Indigenous populations into a defined number of future nations. At the same time, only an ethnic group whose dialect occupied both a linguistically and geographically central position was treated by them as a nation. This approach has had an enormous effect on some Indigenous groups whose languages were classified as dialects of the "larger" languages. For example, one of these unrecognised groups was the Uilta, whose language was defined as a Nanai dialect. They did not gain their language rights until the 1990s.

The population of southern Sakhalin, with its mixture of ethnic groups and languages, undoubtedly had a rather uncertain and undetermined status and appeared to be a real challenge for the Soviet authorities. They even discussed the possibility of establishing a Japanese national

Figure 2: A senior citizen of Poronaysk showing her mother's kitchen utensils of the Karafuto period (photograph courtesy of N. Mamontova; Poronaysk 2016)

region, once all of the population spoke Japanese there. However, this idea was not implemented, and the Soviet categorisation schemes were soon applied to the former Japanese residents. In 1945 onwards, everything associated with being Japanese was banned and finally dismissed from everyday life (Funk 2013). My informants from the Japanese-Indigenous families I interviewed in Poronaysk admitted that the most difficult thing for them was to get used to Russian food and the Russian way of life (see Figure 2). In part, this problem was solved by using traditional Korean ingredients and cultivating some plants needed for Japanese cuisine. The Russian language served as another obstacle. The Japanese language continued to be used at home. The following is part of my interview with a woman who identifies herself as Nivkh:

Informant: I have never lived among the Nivkh, only among the Koreans. Then I came here [to Poronaysk]. I have been living here since the 1960s.

Researcher: Do you communicate with Koreans?

Informant: Yes, I do. I have not seen them for a long time. They speak Korean to me. I understand a simple language. But I have not long seen them. Although now Koreans speak mainly Russian.

Researcher: Do you understand Japanese?

Informant: Of course I do! When I was in Japan in 1992, I went and bought everything from the store on my own. Because in my childhood, in the 1950s, my brother bought us a radio. I listened to the radio, and I knew all Japanese singers, I understood everything. But when I moved here, I stopped speaking Japanese.

Researcher: Where did you learn Japanese?

Informant: Well, my step father was a Korean, my mother was a Nivkh. Their common language was Japanese. They spoke Russian very badly. But Nivkh I know just a little. (Funk 2013)

The lack of an employable population as a result of mass deportations led to some unexpected consequences for the Soviets' nationality policy. One of them was the resettlement of Koreans from Central Asia and another was the appearance on the island of a new Tungusic-speaking group, the Nanai. In 1947, the Russian government forced the Koreans living in Central Asia and Kazakhstan to return to the island as voluntary workers.[5] The Soviet Census of 1959 registered 42,337 Koreans on Sakhalin, which appeared to have doubled since 1946 (Census 1959). On the whole, the number of Koreans remained almost the same up until the era of perestroika. It is worth mentioning that Koreans from Central Asia spoke a different dialect, and, unlike the local Koreans, they did not know Japanese.

In regard to the sociolinguistic situation and interethnic contacts after the establishment of the Soviet regime in former Karafuto, my respondents indicated that there were numerous marriages between Koreans and the Indigenous population, and their rate even grew as some women got married for the second time after the Japanese had to abandon the island, leaving behind their wives with children. Either Japanese or Korean, and sometimes both, were used as the languages of communication between spouses. Moreover, despite the fact that Koreans had no civil rights, they were allowed to develop their own radio broadcasts and newspapers, and there were a few schools in Poronaysk functioning partly in Korean, which were only closed down in 1962.[6] For example,

Informant: My mother got married to a Korean. There was no one to get married. Well, a Korean took her as a wife. And I started attending Korean school.

Researcher: So, your brother went to a Japanese school, and you to a Korean one?

Informant: Yes, he went to a Japanese school. After the war, I attended Korean school. I was given a Korean surname and name. Well, when I got the passport, I took my father's [Japanese] surname. My Korean name was Pak Sudya. Yes, I had been Korean for four years. Well, all of us have tragic fates here. (Funk 2013)

In 1992, when Russia officially allowed Koreans to return to South Korea, about 1,500 people of Korean ethnic background decided to come back home. At that time, the South Korean government launched a program in which Koreans who had been born before 1945 could receive Korean citizenship within a short time. It is

important to stress that among them there were many people from mixed Korean-Indigenous families. Some immigrants, after having spent a few years in Korea, returned to Sakhalin (Funk 2013). As anthropologist Lyudmila Missonova (2009, 95–96) reports, Indigenous members from mixed families identify themselves as Indigenous within Sakhalin and Korean when outside. The reason is that Indigenous identity helps people to obtain such privileges as fishing limits. I partly agree with this observation. However, even within the island, some Indigenous residents still use their Korean names in official documents and household registers. It is unknown how many Indigenous members consider Korean to be their mother tongue. For some Indigenous residents, Korean was not a first language; they learned it later, either in childhood or during a long stay in South Korea. But for the people from mixed Korean-Indigenous families, Korean may be one of their native languages. Of course, not all are fluent in Korean. Their language repertoire varies from the very basic to a moderate level of knowledge. However, when there is the choice between three or more identities, which seems to be a quite common phenomenon in southern Sakhalin, it sometimes becomes difficult to understand the intertwining of ethnic identities – why in one situation an individual prefers an Indigenous identity but in another they chose in favour of either a Korean or Japanese one (for more examples, see Funk and Terekhina 2015). It again reminds us of the fact that identity is a fluid category and that links between identity and language are not constant. Here is one part of my interview with a Nanai respondent from Poronaysk which is illustrative:

Informant: There is one Evenki [woman]. Her children are Orochens, though her husband is Japanese. First he was Uilta, but then he decided to become Japanese [*potom vzyal japontsa*] … She was 16, when she went to get a passport. I do not know what she said there, but she was recorded as Tungus. Later she changed her passport and became Evenki. That is it.

Researcher: Why did her husband decide to become Japanese?

Informant: Because they are such strange people.

Later I returned to my question:

Researcher: Well, why did he become Japanese then?

Informant: Because his mother used to be Uilta, then for some reason her blood surged up within her [*ee krov' vzygrala*] and she became Japanese. Her children are half Koreans. She has a lot of children from different husbands: half Koreans, half … So, she has a girl, she gave birth to a girl from Orochen. So, they have one Uilta girl. (Funk 2013)[7]

As for the Russian language, it acquired its dominant status only in the second part of the 20th century when it became the foremost means of communication on Sakhalin and in every other region of Russia. Soviet authorities started recruiting pupils from Indigenous groups to send them to so-called national boarding schools. In some of these schools, Indigenous languages were used as a means of instruction. But, normally, they served only as a tool for colonising the Aboriginal population and not recognising their languages as valuable in and of themselves (see Slezkine 1994). However, and most importantly, the Soviet transformations that dramatically changed the everyday life of Sakhalin Indigenous groups can also be compared with the Karafuto reforms. The Aboriginal population was forcibly resettled into several small towns and villages of mixed populations that led to the withdrawal of the most employable segment of this population from traditional activities (in southern Sakhalin, this was happening for the second time) (see Grant 1993; Roon 2002). In southern Sakhalin, people had to change not only their native languages and "inappropriate" ethnic identities but also their personal names if they were of Japanese origin. This short story, which was told to me by a lady of Nivkh-Japanese origin, whom I have already cited above, is typical and, to my mind, illustrates well people's attitude to cultural change. After having been Korean for a few years, she had to adapt herself to the Russian language. This change was marked with the acceptance of a new name. Much later, she managed to return to her Japanese name. Now she identifies herself in public as Nivkh, has Russian and Japanese names, speaks Russian, and knows Korean, Japanese, and, to a lesser extent, Nivkh:

> They gave me a name "Valya." I did not like it. Then I was called Sveta for a while. Then I heard "Tamara." Such a beautiful name! I wanted to be Tamara. Then I went to the Korean school. There was a Russian teacher, "Do you have a Russian name?" "No, I do not." "Do you want to be L'usya?" "Yes, I do!" Since that time I have been called L'usya. (Funk 2013)

As in the Soviet era, compulsory ethnic registration now makes it impossible for people with multiple identities to claim recognition of their self-determination and to choose two or more languages as their mother tongues. In Sakhalin, this has resulted in a few cases where people have had to prove, or even officially change, their ethnic identity in favour of an Indigenous one to

enjoy priority access to marine resources allocated for the Indigenous peoples of the north. As I have tried to show in this section, the choice of minority identity does not indicate that other options are less important to people but, rather, that they may have no instrumentalist value. In the final section, I am going to discuss this problem in more detail in light of current development discourse.

Current Sustainability Discourse and Language Revitalisation

In the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when there was great demand for political and economic changes, most of the Indigenous leaders and some researchers started to advocate for returning to a traditional way of life, which they considered to be one possible way to revitalise their language and culture. The turn toward Indigenous-oriented policy was facilitated by the state. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the government passed a few important and progressive laws aimed at protecting Indigenous land use rights and values. For the first time, Indigenous minorities in Russia received the status of nationalities and were entitled to some special rights and privileges (see Sillanpää 2008). At the same time, many legal provisions had no mechanism for their implementation and were largely based on the same approaches that had been applied to minorities during the Soviet era since state bodies still paternalistically represented Indigenous people as being incapable of making decisions on their own (Slezkine 1994). As a result, a lot of thorny issues concerning Indigenous self-government and recognition remained unsolved. Moreover, as we have witnessed over the past decade, the state has even reinforced its control over Indigenous peoples by making some crucial amendments to legislation that further restricts minority rights. Numerous programs and strategies designed for Indigenous people are not only unable to solve these problems but also cause them to go round in circles. One of the main features of these programs is the re-establishment of development discourse, which has turned into a new ideological project.

In 2009, the government of the Russian Federation officially recognised and adopted the Concept of Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East as a state policy applied against Indigenous minorities. This concept may serve as a good example of an outlandish combination of Soviet paternalistic policy merging with western development practices. Shortly after its adoption, the ideology of sustainable development became an integral part of most state and regional programs. The administration of the Sakhalin region has also adopted a few programs devoted to the sustainable development of local Indigenous groups. Some of them I have already considered in my previous papers with respect to Indigenous economic development (Mamontova 2012, 2015b). These programs are represented by state authorities as mechanisms aimed at helping Indigenous minorities to become an integrated part of modern life and, at the same time, to preserve their traditions. Many of them are quite eclectic; they combine ideas of the conservation of untouched "primitive societies" with capitalist economic development strategies.

The key proponent of sustainable development on the island is Sakhalin Energy, the biggest oil consortium, with the state-controlled Gazprom company as its main shareholder. As I noted in the introduction to this article, Sakhalin Energy launched the SIMDP in 2006 as a response to the opposition of Indigenous leaders to further gas and oil exploitation, a protest action that resonated not only across Russia but also other countries (see Wilson and Stammler 2006). It is important to repeat that my critique of the SIMDP does not target one particular company. Rather, I see it as a suitable point of departure that brings together the issues raised by current ethnic policies applied to Indigenous minorities and development practices. However, I should admit that the SIMDP is not just a program among many others. First of all, Sakhalin Energy is one of the richest and most powerful companies in Russia, having access to gas and oil fields located in proximity to Indigenous fishing camps and reindeer pastures. The SIMDP is part of the state apparatus since it operates only on a national basis and uses the federal government's policy instruments. Moreover, it cannot be separated from the state as the SIMDP comprises a tripartite agreement that allows local authorities to participate equally in the program's implementation. Finally, this development program is not only about aid for Indigenous groups; its numerous program's subdivisions penetrate into all vital spheres of society (the economy, education, culture, social support, and health), making it difficult for people to reject some company decisions that are potentially harmful because there is always the threat of losing financial support if one is too critical. All of this turns the SIMDP, as well as similar development programs, into effective instruments of power (see Ferguson 1990).

As its foremost goal, the SIMDP seeks to promote the sustainable development of Indigenous communities, designing programs suitable to their "cultural characteristics," according to what is written in the booklets

introducing the strategy. However, according to one of the company's reports, "Indigenous people have to make efforts to understand the meaning of sustainable development" (Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan 2007, 22). Therefore, the company's experts need to formulate the key aspects of this notion to "teach" [sic] the Indigenous population how to develop themselves in accordance with sustainable principles. The call for sustainability requires an Indigenous project to be carried out with the company's financial support that is traditional, addresses important social issues, and, at the same time, includes the potential for development to bring benefits to the next generation.

The company may reject applications on the grounds that they fail to meet sustainable principles. Some project descriptions I looked through, which people had submitted to Sakhalin Energy, were marked as "unsustainable" by the company's experts. Moreover, Indigenous members and the company's experts had contrasting opinions on what a sustainable model is (see Stammler and Wilson 2006, 18). In addition, the experts were often dissatisfied with how the applications are composed. They explained this problem in the following way: "Coming from cultures more at ease with verbal as opposed to written communications, Indigenous Peoples have had difficulties fulfilling the Plan requirements for keeping records, filing reports, filling in application forms, etc." (Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan 2010, 27). Characteristically, they chose not to discuss the annoying bureaucratic side of this problem but, rather, the difference between the competence of the company's experts and the allegedly illiterate Indigenous members or those caught between "the West and the Rest," as Stuart Hall (1995) suggests. All of this, however, does not correspond to the reality and can be easily refuted with numerous examples.

The SIMDP's focus is precisely on the inclusion of Indigenous communities into the market, which is viewed as the backbone of sustainability and progress. A project is regarded as being sustainable as long as it may bring some benefit. This kind of development discourse leaves little room for language revitalisation since, according to this approach, a minority language can hardly be seen as a sustainable practice since its maintenance requires financial support and long-term language planning programs will not benefit investors. In this regard, some people have mentioned, for example, the edition of the *Uilta ABC Book*, which was financed by Sakhalin Energy. In the present situation of rapid language shifts and the lack of adequate language planning, it remains a colourful ornament on a shelf in the local administration and makes for a good souvenir for tourists, but it is rarely used by the native speakers for teaching language as there are no other books nor language lessons in secondary schools. The same problem appears when it comes to state programs – almost all of the proposed measures are rather symbolic, short-term, and ineffective.

In my opinion, this is happening not because policy-makers do not know how to create suitable programs for language teaching or new textbooks without Soviet illustrations. The problem is rooted in a particular image of Indigenous peoples that is systematically promoted by different state institutions, and the SIMDP simply projects this image onto the local Indigenous population, thereby reinforcing it. According to this image, Indigenous peoples' languages are endangered and their cultural values are being violated because they are experiencing the process of transition from the traditional or pre-industrial state of development to a market economy. This kind of explanation can be found in abundance in the program's reports. The colonial approach shows itself in the fact that the Indigenous population is still represented as a "people without history," who cannot grow, change, and develop in their own way. It is believed that they need someone who can help them to become a part of modernity. This is very typical and recognisable as development discourse, which is uncritically applied to "traditional" societies all over the world (see Ferguson 1990, 71–73). In turn, some Indigenous residents, who are involved in language revitalisation, believe that the lack of access to necessary resources, not only financial ones, make it hard for them to carry out projects that they consider to be more suitable:

> When I discussed it with the authorities, they answered me, "What is your problem? Write! Submit your application, write, compose a program! Everything depends on you!" I think these grants, all of this, they hurt their [Nivkh] pride. Whether it is because of our pride or a national peculiarity, but they [the Nivkh] do not want to be dependent on somebody or something. (Funk 2013)

As a result, policy-makers tend to reduce most issues facing Indigenous peoples to the simplistic "civilisation/tradition" dichotomy through which all problems are explained. Within this discourse, "traditions" are viewed, on the one hand, as obstacles to rational progress and convenient "scapegoats" that explain the failure of development programming (see von Benda-Beckmann 1989). On the other hand, Indigenous communities are perceived as bounded by cultural authenticity that is at risk in the modern age and which must be preserved as valuable heritage (Bell 2014). Indigenous languages are seen as a part of Indigenous authenticity and as an

attribute for the maintenance of "traditional lifestyles," whereas economic development is treated as a means to becoming modern. This artificially created opposition lies at the heart of the development discourse and is colonial by its nature.

Authenticity is typically performed during public festivals, meetings, and holidays, and Indigenous languages are also used publicly in such performances. This form of legitimacy of Indigenous languages, which are sometimes even supported by Indigenous intelligentsia, restricts their use in other domains. One of the results of such an attitude is that Indigenous members themselves are gradually getting used to the idea that they cannot speak their languages outside of such symbolic representations of their cultures (see Mamontova 2014). This opinion shapes language ideology, according to which Indigenous languages are appropriate only in particular contexts associated with traditionality and ethnic purity. As soon as Indigenous people become urban or stop engaging with traditional activities, they are expected to speak the dominant language (see May 2014). Hence, it is assumed that Indigenous languages, along with other "traditional curiosities," can exist in modernity only as relics of the past (compare Patrick and Budach 2014). This is also the reason why the problem of language revitalisation occupies a marginal place in grant applications and is typically mentioned along with the development of arts and crafts, traditional economy, and festival activities.[8]

In this regard, anthropologist Mario Blaser (2004, 31; 2013) argues that the development issue makes Indigenous peoples "authorize their life projects in a very modern fashion as 'authentically Indigenous'." He believes that it might be one of the strategies Indigenous peoples use to bring their ideas to those in power. Indeed, this strategy might be useful for Indigenous members as it allows them to get funding and to access some of the benefits allocated to Indigenous minorities more efficiently. But it also leads to the problem of "indigenisation" when some real needs and concerns of Indigenous people are replaced by what my respondents call "dancing and singing" – the form of cooperation with ethnic minorities that was established during the Soviet era. According to this policy, they had to produce "cultural products," whose content had already been determined by the local authorities (see Martin 2001). There is no need to say that this kind of stage-production interpretation of Indigenous lifestyles is too far removed from reality. Let me give an example. During my final fieldwork on Sakhalin, I participated in a ceremony of "Feeding the Master of the Sea," which is annually arranged in the city of Poronaysk with the financial support of Exxon. One of my informants noticed that after the colourful public performance of the ritual, people would go home to "conduct this ritual in the right way." Therefore, I largely agree with Avril Bell (2014, 26), who writes that "authenticity is not a property of Indigenous cultures, but a value attributed to them out of the concerns of European modernity." Although authentic Indigeneity can work effectively as a post-colonial critique, as, for example, it did in the era of perestroika, it fails Indigenous political projects (20). This understanding of an Indigenous identity as performing rather than ontological has become a convenient model for relationships with Indigenous minorities, which have the tendency for being reproduced over and over again, making some Indigenous residents feel frustrated:

> I have come to the conclusion that my people are like that tree, it is similar to the tree that has been uprooted. First it was uprooted and then driven into the alien ground. It is just occasionally watered, so that it will not dry out. I mean these grants of foreign companies. They support mainly traditional economy … They spend their [financial] aid only on the holidays and demonstrations. Like, you know, if one day a monkey, which has been kept under the lock for a long time, is suddenly dressed in a [traditional] robe – it is here, look, take a picture of it! That is the way we are living, in a beautiful one, dancing and singing. But what is happening out there, in the people's souls, and that the people are dying spiritually … physically it is not so important. (Funk 2013)

Finally, the problem of authenticity overlaps with that of hybrid identities. For the policy-makers of the previous century, the ideal picture of traditional societies was challenged by the complicated history of relationships between local Aboriginal populations and newcomers. As I have discussed above, already in the early 20th century, quite a number of Indigenous members were from mixed multilingual families; they rarely identified themselves with any particular ethnic group. This was, and still is, recognised as a problem of ethnic policy implementation. As in the Soviet era, this policy rests on the assumption there is such a thing as ethnic purity, which makes it difficult for mixed communities to demand recognition as Indigenous (the same issue occurs in regard to Indigenous peoples of Australia, Canada, the United States, and other countries, as discussed in Harris, Nakata, and Carlson 2013). The SIMDP's experts, other policy-makers, and even some researchers tend to repeat the same mistake by representing the local Indigenous population as though they do not live in the 20th century. One of the instruments that puts Indigenous people out of time is the promotion of the

"lost authenticity" rhetoric (Fabian 1983). Representing Indigenous peoples as unchangeable and static produced a population that is "available" for "governance," development projects and revitalisation initiatives all imposed on them from above. In this sense, behind all of the "support" granted for such programming is the repeated denial of Indigenous people's complex identities, mixed economies, and multilingual practices in favour of the representation of pure authenticity and "tradition."

Conclusion

In this article, I have tried to show that one of the most outstanding features of the Indigenous population of Sakhalin is their highly mobile style of life and multilingualism. This international spirit was preserved until at least the end of the 19th century and was significantly violated during the colonial rule of Japan and the Soviet Union with their forceful assimilation policies against Aboriginal peoples. On the one hand, these policies resulted in the marginalisation of Native languages and their speakers. The two regimes represented Native peoples as a homogeneous, undeveloped, and illiterate population that should be integrated into a dominant society through education and cultural policies. On the other hand, numerous redistributions of administrative boundaries, mixed marriages, and mass resettlements have unexpectedly led to an increase in the number of ethnically mixed Indigenous members.

This statement is especially relevant to the population of southern Sakhalin. In the first part of the 20th century, this territory, known as Karafuto, administratively belonged to Japan. The Karafuto period has significantly affected the Indigenous population of southern Sakhalin. There is no doubt that people's experiences of living "under the Japanese," as they put it, still plays an important role in their self-identity, and this memory is stored along with their old photos and memorable objects. Some people are not willing to discuss much about this period, partly because it is primarily associated with repressions and deportations in 1945. Although Soviet authorities have attempted to control local ethno-linguistic diversity by establishing ethnic and linguistic categories, in their private lives people continue to use a variety of languages, including Japanese, which was officially banned after 1945. Many of them spoke Japanese and/or Korean at home and Russian outside. In some families, Indigenous languages were also in use. Nowadays, some of these residents try to recall their knowledge of Japanese or Korean to travel abroad, conduct business, or find relatives and old friends who were deported to Japan after the war. Their hybrid identities and multilingualism, however, have never been deeply analysed, even by scholars, who tend to consider them mostly a local peculiarity and a colonial heritage, an assumption that, in my opinion, should be reconsidered.

What I especially wanted to highlight in this article is that the complicated history of Sakhalin may help to refute current nationalities policies, language planning, and development practices based on the outdated premise that each Indigenous group inevitably has only one ethnicity and one mother tongue, either Indigenous or dominant. These categorisations lose their analytical significance, considering the huge impact of the events of the previous century on the local population. In southern Sakhalin, some Indigenous residents have been more emotionally attached to, and fluent in, Japanese and Korean. For others, Indigenous languages are as important as Japanese and Russian. Finally, some of them did not manage to preserve their languages, speaking nowadays only in Russian. This fact, however, does not make them less Indigenous.

The assumption that some groups may be multilingual and multi-ethnic is easily applied to non-Indigenous societies and collectives. However, this is an issue that is hard to discuss in relation to Indigenous and ethnic minorities not only in Russia but elsewhere (see Bell 2014). In this regard, some authors point out that "neoliberal multiculturalism" may intensify inequality and racism and that "hybridity can be exploited for the benefit of the dominant in various ways to create and legitimate hierarchies" (Kubota 2014). But the history of many Indigenous societies, including the Sakhalin ones, demonstrates that dominant cultures have always attempted to do something opposite, namely, to turn the local linguistic diversity and ethnic hybridity into a simplified homogeneity, whereas Indigenous people did not care much about "proper" relationships between their Native identities and languages.

Compulsory ethnic registration is one of the consequences of colonial domination. Indigenous members with multiple identities have to stick to one of the ethnic categories approved by the state just to gain the right to live in the territories of Native residence and engage with traditional activities. The same problem of generalisation exists when it comes to language policy and planning. Indigenous languages are perceived as primordially bounded in ethnic communities. Although sociolinguists have long tried to refute this kind of policy as ideological and simplified, it still unintentionally affects our understanding of sociolinguistic reality (see Blommaert and Rampton 2011; Silverstein 2014). The pressure against, and even the anxiety of, mixed communities is rarely

discussed in relation to the Indigenous people in Russia. Instead of accepting the fact that many Indigenous members have multiple or hybrid identities, policy-makers usually speak about cultural trauma and define such people as being in between the dominant and Indigenous societies. Linguists express the same idea using the concept of a semi-speaker, a person who fails to develop a level of comprehensive knowledge in either of his languages. Development projects intensify this opposition by creating an artificial contradiction between the necessity of "reviving cultural authenticity" and "bringing Indigenous peoples into the modern world."

As a consequence, Indigenous individuals speaking non-Indigenous languages rarely get the opportunity to study or revive their "native" languages as long as they do not correspond to their preferred ethnicity (compare with Chinese-speaking Tungusic minorities in Primorye in the Russian Far East, in Perekhvalskaya 2010). This problem is also relevant to those non-Indigenous residents who wish to study Indigenous languages and who are constantly rejected on the grounds of their "alien" ethnicity. Finally, Indigenous members speaking Indigenous languages are limited to using their languages only in certain domains – for example, during public festivals and other performances. As a result, all of them are being marginalised in one way or another. This situation leads to the legitimisation of ethnic and linguistic hierarchies. Therefore, I believe that recognising linguistic and ethnic complexity as part of ethnic policy and language planning could help to avoid obsolete generalisations and would be beneficial for all parties.

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Notes

1 Besides Sakhalin Energy, there are some other oil companies and state agencies that are involved in the development programs and language revitalisation. For example, Exxon has started to support a "language nests" project that is initiated by the researchers from the University of Helsinki. The government of the Sakhalin region sponsors such short-term initiatives as seminars and conferences devoted to the teaching of the minority languages. However, there are not many projects and initiatives that have been launched and implemented by Indigenous people themselves. I suggest this is largely due to a lack of resources (financial, human, legal) and institutionalised boundaries that prevent people from acting more independently.

2 The research for this article was conducted on Sakhalin Island in 2009 and 2013 under the projects Land Use and Ethnicity in the Circumpolar Region, financed by the National Science Foundation (project leader H. Beach) and Current State of the Indigenous Peoples of Sakhalin, commissioned by Exxon Neftegaz (project leader D. Funk). The article is completed within the framework of the project The Resource Curse in the Circumpolar Areas: Russian and International Experience in the Field of Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts over Non-Renewable Resources in Areas Traditionally Inhabited by Indigenous Ethnic Groups (Rare Species Conservatory Foundation, Grant no. 15-18-00112, project leader D. Funk).

3 Before that time, Sakhalin was not independent. Until the 16th century, the island belonged to the Ming dynasty, and after that it became a part of the Manchu empire (for a good account of local history, see Janhunen 1996).

4 According to pre-revolutionary ethnic classification, Tungus, Lamut, and Orochen constituted a group called "Tungus proper." Only in the 1930s, along with the creation of standard languages, were the ethnic names of Evenk (Tungus) and Even (Lamut) finally introduced into scientific discourse and adopted by the representatives of these groups.

5 In 1937, all Koreans of northern Sakhalin were deported to Central Asia (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) (Din 2014, 64).

6 The State Historical Archive of the Sakhalin Region, Fund 1198, Inventory List 1, Archival Unit 105.

7 Uil'ta are formerly called Orochen or Orok. Nowadays, all of these ethnic names are usually used synonymously.

8 Although during the time I was working on this article, Indigenous residents proposed the Sakhalin Indigenous Minorities Development Plan's committee include a separate Indigenous languages sub-component in the program.

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