

Power in Ruanda

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RÉSUMÉ

L'organisation sociale et politique de la société ruandaise d'avant 1959 est ici étudiée en terme de pouvoir, pouvoir étant défini: l'habilité d'un individu à infliger un dommage physique à un autre ou à le déposséder. Cette vie sociale et politique était caractérisée par un monopole du pouvoir exercé par la minorité aristocratique des Tutsi, tandis que la caste des Hutu, formant quatre-vingts pour cent de la population, était opprimée et exploitée, demeurant quand même soumise par nécessité. Ce tableau de la société ruandaise diffère de celui tracé par Maquet. Il s'écarte aussi des vues de Fortes, de Radcliffe-Brown et d'Evans-Pritchard sur le type de système politique au Ruanda.

En 1959 et en 1960, ce pays subit une révolution qui renversa l'ancienne structure de pouvoir. Ce furent l'administration européenne et l'évolution sociale et culturelle qui, directement ou indirectement, amenèrent ce renversement ainsi que la prédominance des Hutu. Les enquêtes sur place, durant cette période, et particulièrement les réponses et commentaires aux questionnaires sont ici utilisés pour expliquer (a) la nature de l'ancienne et de la nouvelle conception du pouvoir, (b) la classification de vues opposées sur le pouvoir, selon l'appartenance aux castes Tutsi, Hutu ou Twa, (c) la présence, dans chacun des groupes mentionnés, d'attitudes traditionnelles et anti-traditionnelles relativement au pouvoir.

L'interprétation de la société ruandaise à partir de la notion de pouvoir semble bien expliquer sa continuité et ses changements, même ses changements révolutionnaires. Ce serait donc une interprétation fonctionnelle.

INTRODUCTION¹

The theme of this African issue of *Anthropologica* is incomparable in its relevance and importance for an understand-

¹ The fieldwork on which this article is based was carried out in 1959 and 1960 with the support of a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship and a Vassar College Faculty Fellowship. In Africa the auspices of IRSAC (l'Institut pour la recherche scientifique en Afrique centrale) were invaluable in furnishing a base of operations and I am in especial debt to Jan Vansina, Marcel d'Hertefeldt and André Coupez, all of IRSAC, for their help and intellectual stimulus. My greatest debt is to my Ruandese assistants: Nelson Rwagasore, Léocadie Mukamuzoni, Gidéon Ntaganzwa, Gérard Ngarambe and Jean Gakwaya.

ing of Ruandese society in the past and in its present turmoil. Dominant-subordinate relations in Ruanda are examined in the present paper as power relationships. This view involves an interpretation that differs from previous interpretations of Ruandese society, best exemplified by the work of J.J. Maquet (1954), and from the views of Fortes, Evans-Pritchard and Radcliffe-Brown on the nature of the general type of African political system to which Ruanda would be assigned. (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1958). However, field data collected during 1959 and 1960, Ruanda's revolutionary year, seem to demand such a reinterpretation of Ruandese social and political structure.

A period of great tension and turbulence in a society has rarely been the setting for anthropological fieldwork, and it was necessary to find or modify field techniques that would avoid or lessen the difficulties and profit by any advantages such a period presented. With thoughts and feelings of sufficient force and clarity to be translated into novel and even violent action it follows that there might also be an outpouring of words and a desire for listeners. Ruanda burst into articulateness. It was possible to get information, life histories, responses to two questionnaires, one of which was projective in character, and thousands of notebook pages written by literate Ruandese, from Ruandese men and women of each of the three castes and of every occupational group, level of schooling and age. Like every anthropologist who has worked in the country I had Tutsi assistants the major part of the time, a consequence of the great disproportion between educated Tutsi and Hutu and of the near monopoly of Europeanized jobs by the Tutsi. However, my chief assistant, Nelson Rwagasore, became interested in every shade and bloc of opinion and influenced the training of the other assistants — I can recall as one of the most reassuring moments of the work the time when with Rwagasore taking the lead we teased a new assistant asking him what kind of brain-washed Hutu he had been talking to in order to come out with such and such a report. Apart from the articulateness of the Ruandese and their desire to be heard they seemed also to like the consideration they received in having everything they said recorded. Excepting one or two early experiments and a per

page payment for notebooks filled in at home no information or time spent in giving it was paid for. Some of the field data gathered will be presented as documentation for the interpretation of Ruandese social and political structure in terms of power.

Following a summary of background information on Ruanda's geography, history and population groupings the topics of the paper will be: the classical interpretation of political and social structure by anthropology; power; vassalage in Ruanda (*ubuhake*); other power relationships in Ruanda; the revolution in Ruanda; field data bearing on power relationships in Ruanda; and conclusions.

THE SETTING²

Ruanda in east central Africa is bordered on the north by Uganda, on the east by Tanganyika, on the south by its twin kingdom of Urundi and on the west by the Congo. In spite of closeness to the equator — from 1° to 3° latitude South — the climate is largely temperate since the altitude of the Nile-Congo crest in the west of Ruanda goes to 3,000 meters and the greater part of the country is not less than 1,500 meters in elevation. With an area of 26,338 square kilometers and a population of 2,452,737 the population density of somewhat over 93 persons per square kilometer is the highest to be found in Africa south of the Sahara and even exceeds that of France.

The pre-history of Ruanda has only been sketchily investigated but the similarity of Ruandese finds to those recovered by scientific archeology elsewhere in Africa makes it probable that Ruanda has been occupied for some half a million years, or since the emergence of Man. Archeological periods from the early Stone Age to the present are represented.

The present population of Ruanda is composed of three groups, the Twa, Hutu and Tutsi. The Twa pygmoid forest dwellers entered Ruanda from that region many centuries ago. The Hutu, Negroid Bantu-speaking agriculturalists were next to settle the country. The Tutsi pastoralists, who are Ethiopoid

² The figures in this section are drawn from the latest official handbook, *Le Ruanda-Urundi* edited by l'Office de l'Information et des Relations Publiques pour le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi, Bruxelles, 1959.

in race, entered Ruanda from the north some time before the 15th century, and established themselves as the ruling group just as Hima groups related to them established themselves throughout Inter-lacustrine Africa.

Occupational specialization, cultural differences and endogamy justify the use of the term "caste" for each of the three groups. The Hutu agriculturalists also did all manner of menial services for the Tutsi; the Tutsi monopolized all administrative positions and were warriors as well as being pastoralists. The Twa were hunters or potters but in addition they performed a number of special services for the Tutsi: royal dancers and choreographers, musicians, torturers and executioners, pimps, commando raiders, messengers and jesters. Marriages between members of the different castes were extremely rare, and, although there has been sufficient intermixture to blur racial lines, the majority of each caste is racially distinct. In stature, for example, the differences are striking: the average stature of the Tutsi is 1 m. 75; the Hutu 1 m. 66; and the Twa 1 m. 55.

A fact of critical importance is the disproportionate size of the caste groups. Today the Hutu are an overwhelming majority of over 83 per cent of the population; the Tutsi 16 per cent and the Twa less than 1 per cent. It seems probable that a similar proportion has held for centuries.

European intrusion into Ruanda was at a late date. It is less than 70 years since Van Götzen entered the country in 1894. The first missions were founded in 1900; and the first seat of German administration was established in 1907. In 1919 Ruanda passed to Belgian administration under a mandate of the League of Nations which was converted in 1945 to a Trusteeship agreement under the United Nations Organization. European contact has had important effects on Ruanda for little more than a generation.

THE CLASSICAL INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE BY ANTHROPOLOGY

The classical interpretation of Ruandese social and political organization is so much in accord with the general point of

view of both American cultural anthropology and British social anthropology that any conflicting interpretation must survive the rigours of exposure of a Spartan child. However, field data gained during a year of turmoil and articulateness in Ruanda seem to force the issue and override reluctance to oppose established views.

In brief the general classical interpretation is that Ruanda, or any society, is a functioning whole continuing in time through its mutually reinforcing structures and institutions and its vast web of reciprocities which benefit and obligate every one of its members. Thus (1) any institution or practice, though seemingly destructive to some or even many members of the society, will be seen to have an overall positive value for the whole society and its whole membership, and (2) inequities in the balance of benefits and obligations are never so great that any group or individual has mostly the one and scarcely any of the other.

This view of society seems to apply satisfactorily to most primitive societies. It has been the framework for interpreting Ruanda and for interpretations of a lengthy list of African societies. It seems so difficult as to be impossible to apply it with success to either all contemporary industrial societies or to their historical forerunners. The reason for this may well be the unmanageable complexity of such societies. It may well be — and this will be the argument of this section of the present study and the basis of the reinterpretation of Ruandese social and political organization — that anthropologists, perhaps out of their feelings of responsibility in speaking for a defenceless group of societies, have not wished to see or acknowledge that any of them could be based upon the monopoly of power by a minority without the consent but with only the resignation or submission of the governed.

The central fact of politics is power or physical force, but even when this has been acknowledged by anthropologists power has been put in its place in the larger society, has been bound and controlled by the rules and reciprocities of the functioning whole. It has been denied that any enduring social order could depend on the ruthless use of power by a minority which monopolized it. These views are clearly put in *African Political Sys-*

tems, one of the few specialized works in political anthropology. (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1958) In his preface A.R. Radcliffe-Brown states (xxiii): "The political organization of a society is that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with the control and regulation of physical force," and "In studying political organization we have to deal with the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force." (xiv) Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, the editors of *African Political Systems*, go into more detail and make the position more explicit:

A relatively stable political system in Africa presents a balance between conflicting tendencies and between divergent interests... The forces that maintain the supremacy of the paramount ruler are opposed by the forces that act as a check on his powers.(11)

Looked at from another angle, the government of an African state consists in a balance between power and authority on the one side and obligation and responsibility on the other. Every one who holds political office has responsibilities for the public weal corresponding to his *rights and privileges*. *The distribution of political authority* provides a machinery by which the various agents of government can be held to their responsibilities. A chief or a king has the right to exact tax, tribute, and labour service from his subjects; he has the corresponding obligation to dispense justice to them, to ensure their protection from enemies and to safeguard their general welfare by ritual acts and observances. The structure of an African state implies that kings and chiefs rule by consent. A ruler's subjects are as fully aware of the duties he owes them as they are of the duties they owe to him, and are able to exert pressure to make him discharge these duties. (12)

In our judgment, the most significant characteristic distinguishing the centralized, pyramidal, state-like forms of government of the Ngwato, Bemba, etc., from the segmentary political systems of the Logoli, the Tallensi, and the Nuer is the incidence and function of organized force in the system. In the former group of societies, the principal sanction of a ruler's rights and prerogatives, and of the authority exercised by his subordinates, is the command of organized force. This may enable an African king to rule oppressively for a time, if he is inclined to do so, but a good ruler uses the armed forces under his control in the public interest as an accepted instrument of government — that is, for the defence of the society as a whole or of any section of it, for offence against a common enemy, as a coercive sanction to enforce the law or respect for the constitution. The king and his delegates and advisers use organized force with the consent of their

subjects to keep going a political system which the latter take for granted as the foundation of their social order. (14)

The sanction of force is not an innovation in African forms of government. We have stressed the fact that it is one of the main pillars of the indigenous type of state. But the sanction of force upon which a European administration depends lies outside the native political system. It is not used to maintain the values inherent in that system. ... For as we have seen, in the original native system force is used by a ruler with the consent of his subjects in the interest of the social order.

An African ruler is not to his people merely a person who can force his will on them. He is the axis of their political relations, the symbol of their unity and exclusiveness, and the embodiment of their essential values. ... Into these sacred precincts the European rulers can never enter. They have no mythical or ritual warranty for their authority. (16)

It should be remembered that in these states there is only one theory of government. In the event of rebellion, the aim, and result, is only to change the personnel of office and never to abolish it for some new form of government. (13)

Thus we see that in Fortes' and Evans-Pritchard's view power in primitive societies is yoked submissively to the social order; it is at the service of the governed and with their consent; it can get out of hand only briefly, and infrequently; it is not a separate factor as it is in European states; the principles of its distribution among the members of society are never questioned or opposed. The authors ask a question at the end of their introduction that is astonishing in view of the position they have already taken that power and political organization are subsumed to the social order: "Herein lies a problem of world importance: what is the relation of political structure to the whole social structure?" (23)

POWER

Based on the case of Ruanda the position arrived at in this study is that power can be held and exercised by a minority against the interests and without the consent of the governed; that this state of affairs can last for long periods of time, that power is a factor that can be independent of the social order or capable of shaping a kind of social order that becomes the only

kind known to the people; and lastly, that revolution is a possibility. Such a position is empty of all novelty in relation to historical or contemporary European societies. It should not, given the great body of anthropological findings, prove a novelty if some "primitives" are seen to resemble us on still another score.

Power is used in this account of power in Ruanda with reference to the ability of one individual to inflict physical harm or deprivation on another. (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1958: xxiii) As Radcliffe-Brown says "There is no such thing as the power of the state; there are only, in reality, powers of individuals — kings, prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and voters." Those who possess power can use it or refrain from using it, while those who do not are in no position to take it or leave it. The powerful might exercise their power over or within a range of possibilities from caprice and terrorism to the acceptance of ethical controls of great benevolence; from ferocious frequency and intensity to a seemingly irreducible minimum. The powerless can accept the uses of power in ways ranging from masochistic joy or hopeless or angry submission to approval grounded in a social ethic to which the individual is attuned. Power must always, however, be accepted by the powerless; the only initiative open to them is to act toward the powerful in some way that may influence whether they use their power or how they use it.

There are ways in which power can be maximized by the holders of power: they can maintain superior communications and solidarity as a group and can break down communications and solidarity among the powerless; they can maintain evident and covert cultural distinctiveness through the socialization of their children and this can increase, demonstrate and perpetuate their solidarity; they can use their power with maximum frequency and to maximum intensity; they can multiply positions of power so that the powerless are subject to multiple relations with the powerful; they can pretend that chances of having power or influencing its exercise exist for the powerless when, in fact, such chances are virtually non-existent; they can develop and propagate ideologies, myths, cults and symbols that glorify and support established power.

The methods listed as ways of maximizing power are simply

generalized from those actually used by the Tutsi minority in old time Ruanda. The Hutu man or woman with a hoe had little chance against them.

VASSALAGE - UBUHAKE

Vassalage³ was a pervasive form of power relationship in Ruanda. Only the king or Mwami was vassal to no one, but from him down, the chain of vassalage extended through those who were at one and the same time vassal and overlord to those, making up the bulk of the population, who were only vassals.

In Ruandese the institution of vassalage was called *ubuhake*; the overlord, *shebuya*; and the vassal, *umugaragu*. The institutionalized relationship was begun when a man appeared before a superior and pronounced any one of several formulas: "I ask for milk," "Make me rich," "Think of me always," "Be my father" or "I shall be your child." (Maquet 1954: 151) The overlord could accept or refuse a man as a vassal, although no man, again excepting the Mwami, could avoid vassalage to some overlord. The vassal had to fulfill the commands of the overlord and had to be subservient in manner; over and above that he did well to be as skillfully ingratiating as he could and to bring his overlord presents as often and of as great a value as he could manage. A further proof of his loyalty and worthwhileness as a vassal was his ability and willingness to furnish useful information to his overlord, including information about the conduct of other vassals. In return the overlord granted the possibility of mediating with other powerful personages in his behalf and gave him the care and the milk production of one or more cattle. Either one could in theory terminate the vassalage but this was most often done by the overlord who then took back the cows and any offspring they had engendered; the vassal was seldom in a position to terminate the arrangement, for to do so he would

³ Maquet's usage of "clientèle," "client" and "patron" (1954: 151-52) has not been followed. Maquet frequently speaks of Ruandese society as feudal and terminology drawn from medieval feudalism seems more appropriate than that drawn from Rome in the first and second centuries, B.C. The *clientes* of ancient Rome seem to have been in a freer relationship to their *patroni* than vassals to their overlords.

require the help of another and more powerful overlord. The insubordination or disloyalty of a vassal justified his torture or death and a second and new overlord might thus punish a vassal even when the second had profited by the vassal's betrayal of the first.

In spite of the isomorphic character of *ubuhake* in Ruandese relationships there were really two *ubuhakes*, one for the Tutsi and one for the Hutu majority. The two castes, Tutsi and Hutu, were subjected to different exactions as vassals and had quite different chances to profit from the system or manipulate it in their own interests.

The Hutu, the great majority of the people, were mere vassals and almost never overlords. Cases in which a Hutu was ennobled by the Tutsi and taken into their ranks were so rare as to be almost non-existent. As vassals Hutu were given heavy, menial and despised work: agricultural labour, repairing the lord's house and courtyard fence, and a host of menial tasks like carrying the lord in a litter, being his nightwatchman, or cutting wood and carrying water for his household. A man's vassalage could also include that of his daughter or unmarried sister who were demanded as concubines by the overlord or as houseservants by his wife. He could be dismissed because poor health decreased his usefulness as a vassal, because of incompetence or alleged incompetence, on grounds of suspect loyalty, or for no reason at all, and he could be severely punished or killed. He was bound to the soil and was immediately suspect if he appeared any distance from his proper district. He had one chance to escape the worst that might happen to him, and that chance came through the constant power struggle among overlords. His overlord might be brought low, despoiled and replaced by another less exigent one. An appeal to the chief of his army or a more powerful overlord might be successful depending upon their enmity to his overlord or their assessment of his power. The more powerful a man's overlord the more protected he was against the exigences of other, mostly governmental authorities, that impinged on him, but the more he was completely under his power. The Ruandese proverb is explicit, "You fear a dog's master, not his fangs." (Kagame 1954: 271)

Not all Tutsi were overlords and some, especially in regions in which the Tutsi proportion of the population was very high, might be like Hutu in many of their life circumstances, but, in general, even a poor Tutsi had an opportunity to profit through his kinship with some Tutsi overlord. In *ubuhake* a Tutsi of the meanest condition would have honorable cattle herding and dairy tasks. A young Tutsi with any connections would be given the task of carrying his master's pipe and tobacco, a task that gave him valuable education in the ways of Tutsi society and politics. Vassalage for many, however, meant only a social, and especially, a political alliance and political services one of the most important of which was gaining information and transmitting it to the overlord. Instead of the one cow a simple Hutu was most likely to have received from the overlord a Tutsi might receive, depending on his power connections, from several to a whole herd. He could then become an overlord in his turn. The struggle for power within the Tutsi caste was severe and unremitting, but it could lead to great rewards. The power of the Tutsi in *ubuhake* was supported and reinforced by the administrative and military structure of the society. These structures will be described later. Here it is sufficient to point out that the Tutsi monopolized political and military office as they did overlordships in *ubuhake*, and that the holders of such offices were always greater or lesser overlords. Vassalage guaranteed the Tutsi the status, occupations and affluence of a leisure class. They cultivated the arts, especially the art of witty and elegant conversation, and, save for engaging in activities pertaining to war, they exerted themselves physically only in sex where their exploits were formidable. The Hutu found a simple explanation for Tutsi sexual prowess — "They are not tired from working in the fields." (Maquet 1954: 97)

The comparison of the Tutsi with European feudal aristocracy is so close in many respects that it has not gone unnoticed by some Tutsi themselves. One day while driving past a tile-works with a Tutsi assistant, I idly wondered aloud in my ignorance about what *une tuilerie* had to do with *Les Tuileries*. My assistant said with both a laugh and a shudder that he did not want to think about anything having to do with the French Revolution.

The Twa who constituted an extremely small minority of the population were a special sort of vassal and were rather apart from *ubuhake*. They were considered the Mwami's vassals, though they were often attached to one of the high nobility (Kagame 1954: 283), and they performed a number of specialized tasks: choreographers and trainers of dancers, musicians, buffoons — and, on the darker side — assassins, torturers and executioners and searchers out of girls that might interest their lord. They received gifts for their services, particularly animals to butcher and eat. Probably as many Twa were ennobled as Hutu, although the latter outnumbered them by more than eighty to one. Thus, although some of the Twa hunted periodically for their own consumption needs and some made pots which they exchanged for foodstuffs, the Twa also gained from the exploitation of the Hutu by the Tutsi in *ubuhake*.

The place of cattle in the system of *ubuhake* is of interest. Certainly a Hutu vassal received something of economic value when he was assigned a milkcow, although, considering the very small production of Ruandese cows, he would not have received anything like adequate compensation for having in effect paid out much of his entire surplus in foodstuffs, labour and gifts to his Tutsi overlord — the rest of the surplus going to various Tutsi governmental authorities. According to the writing on Ruanda, cows were not valued according to their milk production or for any other economic reason, but rather for such aesthetic features as the grandeur and grace of their horns. My data indicate, however, that while such a view was typical of the Tutsi the Hutu were far more utilitarian. Expressing the Tutsi point of view the abbé Kagame said on looking over a European herd in their stalls, "Elles ne sont pas les vaches, elles sont les bêtes qui donnent du lait." The Hutu would be less contemptuous of high milk production since they stressed again and again that one of the major inequities of *ubuhake* was the small economic compensation received for much labour and many dues and gifts of produce. As part of the cattle culture the Tutsi brought with them into Ruanda there must have been a body of values and attitudes about cattle, but, while it is tempting to consider how these values were imposed and modified by the conquest of the Hutu, no such reconstruction is necessary to

see them functioning in power terms. Cattle were the symbol and currency of power. It is no wonder, then, that the Tutsi should have glorified them so greatly and for so many non-economic reasons that their sheer economic importance was diminished. The Tutsi composed and recited panegyrics to cattle, the ceremonial parade and glorification of cattle was a feature of court life, cattle were the basis for most of the figures of speech of dynastic poetry and of elegant speech — both Tutsi arts, Tutsi standards of feminine beauty, standards no Hutu woman could ever measure up to, were analogized from the form and carriage of cows. The development of the most elaborately detailed descriptive vocabulary for every possible bovine physical feature both enriched Tutsi literary art and performed the useful function of helping them keep track of their most priceless possession. The Tutsi did nothing to increase the economic worth of cows to the Hutu since Tutsi pasture rights guaranteed a superior nourishment to cows in Tutsi hands. That the Hutu shared attitudes magnifying the importance of the cow is undeniable but just as they were left out of the cultivated literary appreciation of cattle — their version of the language was considered uncouth — they could not feel the same exultant identification with the symbol and currency of power as those who possessed and controlled it.

OTHER POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN RUANDA

A series of power relationships other than *ubuhake* show such similar features as monopoly of power by the Tutsi, great inequity in power in relationships between Tutsi and Hutu, and ruthless use of power by those who held it. In going through the list of power relationships, many of which are between Tutsis in various relative positions of power, it can be said that the Tutsi lived and died not only by the power they exerted over the Hutu but also by the power they struggled for among themselves. In fact the use of power among the Tutsi was frequently of such ferocity that it should have served to further intimidate the Hutu, if they required anything more of the kind. A remarkable feature of Tutsi government was the multiplication of positions of power and the consequent over-lapping of jurisdictions. This both built Tutsi power struggles into the system and multi-

plied the authorities to whom the Hutu were subject, guaranteeing maximum surveillance of the Hutu and the fullest possible removal of their agricultural surplus. Without the Tutsi power struggle the system might have had far less viability, for a man in an unchallenged position of power might become casual in its use. This hypothetical danger did not, however, even exist for the Mwami.

The Mwami was the absolute power in Ruanda. He headed the administrative, military and feudal structures and his power was exerted to the advantage or disadvantage of every Ruandese. Only the Queen Mother or Mwamikazi could be said to be secure because of her close identification to him during his lifetime; otherwise no chief or councillor was safe from possible deposition, despoilation, torture or death. Even the *abitu* or guardians of dynastic traditions and holders of the secret of the Mwami's choice of his successor could be removed from office by him if he doubted their loyalty. Usually the Mwami had a favourite or succession of favourites among the greatest chiefs and the burden of blame for fearful and arbitrary punishments and the constant replacement of individuals in office often fell on him rather than on the Mwami himself. While the clan of the Abanyiginya monopolized the kingship the death of a mwami was frequently the occasion for an intra-clan or fraternal power struggle and coup d'état, and the opening of a reign was insecure even for the Mwami. A remarkable feature of system was the formal alternation of peaceful and warlike reigns. During the latter the expansion of the boundaries of Ruanda was sought. During the peaceful reigns the aim was the consolidation of the internal power structure of the country. Mwamis bearing the names Mutara (or Cyiirima) and Yuhi in the cycle, Mutara, Kigeri, Mibaambwe, Yuhi, were proscribed from crossing the Nyabarongo river which had a course surrounding the central provinces of Ruanda (d'Hertefeldt 1959: 47). Ruanda was divided into about eighty administrative districts and in all of them in the center of the country the Mwami maintained a residence which was placed in charge of a wife or a concubine during his absence. Her chief task was to receive all taxes and dues and to turn them over to the court. The dynastic history preserved by the Tutsi themselves documents vicious and constant

intrigue among the Tutsi at the court and ferocious and equally constant use of his power on the part of the Mwami against fellow Tutsi. Such histories are little concerned with the physical violence the Mwami might even personally direct against Hutu but European reports of the reign of Musinga, the last king whose reign included any period free of European interference, document horror in unbelievable measure. The royal symbol was Karinga, a drum decorated with many bundles containing the genitals of conquered Hutu kinglets and regional chiefs and black caked with beef blood applied in recurrent ceremonies. It was an appropriate symbol.

Next in power to the Mwami were the great district chiefs, the chiefs of the army, and the direct vassals to the Mwami drawn from the Tutsi nobility. A wife of the Mwami in charge of his district residence was at about the same level of power. All were interested in gaining and holding the favour of the Mwami by the size of the gifts they made him and, excepting his noble vassals who did not at the moment hold administrative or military positions, by the size of the taxes they turned over to him chiefly in the form of milk, cattle or agricultural produce. They were in competition with one another; from the point of view of the Mwami they counteracted one another so that it was made difficult for any one of them to gain too much power and become unmanageable; from the Hutu point of view it was subjection to multiple claims on their labour and its fruits. The survival of this group of administrators in their position of power, and sometimes their very survival, depended upon their unremitting use of power and their ability in intrigue.

The civil administration stemmed from the great district chief in a hierarchy of power descending first to a Chief of the Land and a Chief of Cattle of about equivalent power to Chiefs of the Hill — Ruanda's thousands of hills made natural geographical divisions for administration. Under them were the Chiefs of Neighborhoods, then the Lineage Chiefs, the Family Chiefs and lastly the individual male adult members of the family. (Maquet 1954: 163)

Under the Chiefs of the Army were two groups at again an approximately equal level of power, the Warriors and Chiefs

of the Lineage and the Pastoralists and Chiefs of the Lineage. As in the civil administration the next levels down were the family chiefs and individuals.

Each functionary in the system had the right to retain a third of the taxes he collected from those below him in the hierarchy.

Although it was a very rare occurrence, a Hutu could be a Chief of the Land, with somewhat less rarity a Chief of the Hill or the Neighborhood. It was, however, the fate of almost all Hutu to be powerless, to be, as the abbé Kagame called them "contribuables ordinaires." The opportunities of the Twa were even further circumscribed. A Twa could only be a Chief of the Hill; very rarely a Twa might be ennobled and taken into the Tutsi caste. (Maquet 1954: 127)

This account of Ruandese power structure has been based on Maquet (1954). He considers that the system was a functioning one made possible for the Hutu by a series of compensating features: (1) The Hutu had the protection of his overlord in *ubuhake*, and his overlord could help him in his relations with administrative authorities. (2) Often the overlord was at the same time a governmental authority in which case his gifts, dues, and services would probably not be doubled. (3) The duplication of civil and military authorities, each with judiciary functions made it possible for a man to get the aid of one, especially the military authority, in dealing with the other. On the other side, however, Maquet notes that: (1) The command of organized physical force was exclusively Tutsi. Only Tutsi were trained as warriors; the Hutu had service and mob tasks in warfare. (145) (2) The governing Tutsi group was enabled by long experience to judge exactly the degree to which exploitation could go and still be supported, but that in the case of individuals the limits might well be exceeded by those in power. (127) (3) From the point of view of power

La caste Tutsi pouvait, en tant que groupe, infliger un grave dommage aux groupes Hutu ou Twa, et n'importe quel individu Tutsi pouvait exercer une forte pression sur n'importe quel Hutu ou Twa, quelles qu'aient été par ailleurs leur qualités personnelles ou leurs possessions individuelles (158).

The major part of Maquet's conclusions should be reproduced at this point. The conflict evident in his statements seems to justify a "power" interpretation of Ruandese social structure as much as it does a "functional" one.

Dans les chapitres précédents, les différentes structures politiques ont été analysées d'un point de vue fonctionnel... Ce qui était "immobilisé" par l'organisation politique était le contrôle de pouvoir qui appartenait presque exclusivement à la caste et aux gouvernants Tutsi. Ils l'utilisaient pour l'exploitation, par quoi nous entendons ici la satisfaction de besoins par pression et non par une production économique. ... Il serait évidemment complètement faux d'affirmer que l'organisation politique rouandaise avait pour seule fonction la préservation de l'exploitation des Tutsi. Par la structure politique, comme nous l'avons montré, les castes inférieures jouissaient de sécurité. Collectivement les paysans étaient protégés contre les expéditions de pillage des voisins et contre une exploitation illimitée et trop arbitraire. Individuellement, dans toutes les circonstances difficiles ou dangereuses de la vie, un Hutu pouvait s'appuyer sur la protection de son seigneur, de son chef d'armée et de ses chefs administratifs, s'il ne pouvait ou ne voulait pas demander l'aide de son lignage.

Devrions-nous alors parler de contrepartie et interpréter les privilèges des Tutsi comme une rétribution pour le soin qu'ils prenaient du bien commun et de l'ordre public? Nous ne le pensons pas. L'organisation politique au Ruanda remplissait plusieurs fonctions. On ne peut pas dire que l'une est la contrepartie de l'autre simplement parce qu'elles profitaient à différents groupes. Il se faisait que deux fonctions différentes étaient remplies par le même ensemble d'institutions. En conséquence, nous ne pensons pas que la notion de contrepartie doit être incluse dans la description de la fonction de l'organisation politique rouandaise.

En résumé, ce système politique était un moyen de maintenir un certain ordre social dans lequel le groupe des gouvernants et leur caste s'appropriaient la consommation d'une partie considérable des biens du pays sans avoir à intégrer leur travail dans les processus de production. (1954: 181-183)

The conclusions reached by Reisdorff seem more clearly in accord with the data and are particularly to the point in discussing the compensatory features of the system to which Maquet attaches such importance. Reisdorff reaches his conclusions after examining a series of legal cases involving land rights in Ruanda. They are in agreement with the conclusions reached in a later section of this paper which are based on the

responses of a sample of Ruandese population that includes as many Hutus as Tutsi.

L'intérêt de la présente enquête réside dans ce qu'elle met en relief l'époque de fer que connut le Ruanda avant l'arrivée des Européens. Le droit ne s'appliquait qu'aux grands et à ceux qui avaient su se ménager un protecteur. Les petits étaient infailliblement la proie des puissants. Il était pratiquement impossible à un muhutu sans protecteur de se faire rendre justice lorsque la partie qui l'avait lésé était un mututsi.

Le chef guerrier défendait ses gens mais il n'intervenait que pour ceux qui avait sa faveur — quand ce n'était pas lui-même ou un de ses apparentés qui était l'auteur de la spoliation.

Le recours du suzerain vacher (shebuya) était possible à condition qu'il s'intéresse au sort de son umugaragu et que l'adversaire de celui-ci ne soit pas de ses amis ... ou un personnage trop influent pour être mis en accusation.

De toute manière un procès durait plusieurs années. Il fallait donc disposer de moyens de subsistance importants (vivres, lait) pour poursuivre une action devant son suzerain ou son chef guerrier.

Encore la partie perdante refusait-elle souvent d'exécuter les décisions prises par les autorités — celles-ci pouvaient alors envoyer un mandataire (UMUHESHA) chargé de faire exécuter la sentence — mais celui-ci pouvait encore être acheté par la partie récalcitrante.

En résumé, le Ruanda vivait sous le signe de la force. C'est elle qui créait le droit, dont les principes n'étaient d'application que pour celui qui était en mesure de se faire justice à lui-même. (1952: 148)

THE REVOLUTION IN RUANDA⁴

The revolution in Ruanda that began in November 1959 and that is continuing up to this moment according to a September 3rd issue of the *New York Times* (1961: 14) is too complex a series of events to be analyzed for some time. International partisanship with Russia and the pro-Russian nations favouring the Tutsi has done nothing to diminish the complications. But in spite of these difficulties some statements can be made.

⁴ The reader is referred to the United Nations Trusteeship Council publication of the Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960. Report on Ruanda-Urundi (see bibliography) for an excellent and detailed account of the events of the revolution and their background.

First, Ruanda has been undergoing a genuine social and political revolution. Not only has the old order that has been described been overthrown but also Tutsi domination will not continue in any qualified or modernized form in which, for example, a Tutsi monopoly of educational opportunities would lead to a monopoly of economic and political opportunities in a Europeanized Ruanda. There have been irreversible shifts for both the Tutsi and the Hutu in fundamental attitudes, in social relationships and in access to economic benefits and to political power.

Second, it is a Ruandese revolution. While a host of factors connected with the presence of Europeans in Ruanda during the past six decades enabled the revolution to take place, the revolution was neither inspired, created nor engineered by outside forces, Belgian, United Nations, African, or any other. Various measures enacted by the Belgians had a direct effect on Ruandese social and political structure — although it might be years from the date of the measure to the instance of any effective or general enforcement of it. For instance, a 1917 ordinance required a Tutsi who deprived a Hutu of his property to make double restitution; in 1923 domestic slavery was abolished and traditional dues in labour and service to an overlord was lessened; in 1954 *ubuhake* was to be abolished in a series of progressive stages. Various other European measures had an indirect and, perhaps, in many cases inadvertent effect: for instance a network of roads had political and economic implications in breaking down Hutu isolation, in increasing their economic opportunities, and in enabling escape from difficult situations with their overlords or local administrators. Perhaps the Belgians would prefer the Russian or the Tutsi charge that they were guilty of engineering the revolution to my exoneration of them on the grounds that they did not foresee anything that occurred or have any accurate notion of timing, form, location or extent of participation of the population in any revolutionary development, at least from July 1959 to June 1960 during my stay in Ruanda.

Third, the revolution is the attempt on the part of the majority to achieve a political and social order based on their consent. While the Hutu have been guilty, as have the Tutsi, of cruel acts of violence, their most typical revolutionary act

has been to fire the houses of the Tutsis in their neighborhood, usually after due warning so the occupants could leave in advance, and usually without pillage, or any act of violence against persons. The United Nations Visiting Mission Report (1960: 84) lists 22,000 Tutsi refugees by April 1960. Most of those had been chased from their homes in the way described. Burnings have continued intermittently and the recent *New York Times* article (Sept. 3rd, 1961: 14) speaks of twice that number of refugees. The same United Nations Visiting Mission Report (1960: 82) states that there must have been many more fatalities than the total of 200 reported by the Belgians, but the highest number of deaths I have seen quoted — in the same *Times* article — does not exceed 1,000 and that figure includes some 300 deaths in July and August, 1961. Many Hutu are included among the dead; perhaps the largest number killed at any one time was a group of sixty Hutu who were murdered when an irresponsible and ignorant Belgian officer arrested them for house-burning and left them under armed Tutsi guards. In other words, in proportion to a population of two and a half million the amount of violence done does not suggest that the Hutu desire vengeance or a guillotine period of excess. Belgian patrols reduced the amount of violence done in 1959 and 1960, but it is doubtful whether they have done or could do much about it even with the helicopters they are now using in Ruanda's difficult terrain, if the spirit or the objectives of the Hutu were different. The Hutu wish to end Tutsi domination and to govern Ruanda. Many Tutsi are understandably irredentist, but recent personal communication indicates that many feel that even the institution of the Mwami will never again be accepted by the Hutu majority of the population.

These remarks on Ruanda's revolution will prove sound or worthless as time will give perspective for analysis as well as the opportunity to correct the garbled and incomplete reportage of current events.

SOME FIELD DATA BEARING ON POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN RUANDA

The field data presented here are but a sample of the total collected. Since these data are a sample in harmony with the

whole and since they are systematic, they are useful in documenting many of the points that have been made and in illuminating how social and political change, even of a revolutionary order, exists not only in the minds and in the shifts in thoughts and feelings of the generality of the members of a society but also in the range, consistency and weight of opinion to be found within each of the important groups making up the society.

The data under discussion are the responses of 356 Ruandese to three questions, only one of which bears directly on the matter of Tutsi dominance and Tutsi-Hutu power relations. The forty-question questionnaire was individually administered in at least an hour's time and most took longer than an hour with a few running to three hours or over. Some questionnaires were administered in French, but the overwhelming majority were done in Kinyarwanda which even most "évolué" Ruandese found a more congenial tongue in which to give their opinions and commentaries. Kinyarwanda also contains a formal affirmative and negative nuancing that is happily made to order for opinion questionnaires: *cyane* [cani] = emphatically yes; *yee* [ye] = yes; *oya* [oya] = no; and *ashwi* [asgwi] = emphatically no. Commentary, usually giving the reason for the response to a particular question, was freely offered. Most questionnaires have at least a page or two of accompanying commentary, and, while few individuals commented on every one of the forty questions, as many as twenty-five pages of commentary accompany some questionnaires. The comments proved invaluable in the control of the questionnaire and in illuminating the meaning of the affirmative and negative responses. Most of the questionnaires (323) were done after November 1959, which means after the outbreak of the revolution and after the results of various tests of strength were no longer merely a matter of hopeful or despairing speculation. Nineteen per cent of the individuals who did the questionnaire came and requested to do it on their own initiative, because they heard about it or because they saw it being given.

Facts on the caste, sex, age, occupation and schooling of the individuals who answered the questionnaire can best be presented in tabular form. [See Table I] It should be pointed out

TABLE I.

Ruanda Questionnaire I.
Respondents by Caste, Sex, Age and Type of Occupation¹

CASTE	OCCUPATION		AGE			
	Traditional	Evolué	15-29	30-44	44-	
TUTSI						
Men	111	40	71	52	36	21
Women	55	24	32	42	7	6
	167					
HUTU						
Men	142	68	74	60	59	22
Women	34	30	3	18	10	5
	176					
TWA						
Men	9	9	-	2	2	5
Women	4	4	-	2	1	1
	13					
TOTAL	356	176	180	176	115	60

¹ Ninety-two per cent of the questionnaires were done after the beginning of Ruanda's revolution. Almost a third of the respondents are cultivators. Men are 64% of the sample and women 36%. Totals for occupational and age categories do not reach 356, since data are lacking in a few cases. On the accompanying charts four age-breaks are used rather than three in order to gain detail.

that there are more Hutu than Tutsi in the sample and that women are represented, Tutsi women making up over 15 per cent of the total and Hutu women just under 10 per cent. The Twa are poorly represented with but nine men and four women. However, their commentaries are useful. In the questionnaire used by Maquet women were not represented, but, of far more vital importance for his topic, he had too few Hutu or Twa to allow the use of their responses in his results.⁵ I believe, however, that until 1959 when there was a visible reversal in Tutsi-

⁵ "Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, les personnes les plus compétentes sur l'organisation politique furent les Tutsi et, en fait, plus de 90% de nos informateurs furent des Tutsi. Comme le nombre de Hutu et de Twa était trop restreint pour avoir aucune signification (il n'y avait en fait qu'un seul Twa), leurs interrogatoires ne furent pas pris en considération dans le calcul des résultats... En fin de compte, le nombre des interrogatoires utilisés fut réduit à 300." (MAQUET 1954: 15)

Hutu power relationships, it would have been almost impossible to obtain candid Hutu statements on many subjects. If the data presented are biased, it would be largely because my Tutsi assistants might be expected to know some Hutu who were friendly or obligated to them, or they might have edited some of the Hutu responses in ways my limited knowledge of Kinyarwanda could not catch. Considering the possibility of bias in this pro-Tutsi direction the predominance of anti-Tutsi responses made by the Hutu must be given full weight. The nature of the commentaries is, however, sufficient evidence that my Tutsi assistants were seeking the truth with me in spite of the fact that what we learned made harsh demands on them while it only fulfilled my demand for data.

The forty questions of the questionnaire were designed to elicit opinions having to do with cultural and social change. While they were not arranged by subject in the questionnaire, they fall into categories concerning attitudes about: the past and the future; innovations and change; European and Ruandese medicine; the place of women in education, politics and trade; cows and husbandry; towns; outsiders such as Hindus; Congolese and Europeans; and Tutsi-Hutu relations. While perhaps half of the questions would yield numerical results or commentaries related to the subject of this paper, only three will be presented and discussed. One was chosen because of its direct bearing on dominant-subordinate or power relationships: "Tutsi and Hutu are racially different; the Tutsi will always be the dominating race and the Hutu the dominated race." The other two questions were chosen because they contribute indirectly to an understanding of power relations; the questions, themselves, do not determine that power relations be considered. The two questions are overlapping and very similar: "A hundred years ago the Banyarwanda were more honest and nicer to one another," and "Before the Europeans came the Banyarwanda had fewer problems and found life happier."

Question number 22, "Tutsi and Hutu are racially different; the Tutsi will always be the dominating race and the Hutu the dominated race," is in effect, a brief statement of the central fact of Ruandese culture as it has been described by writer after writer. The most important analysis of Ruandese culture

has been done by Maquet, and he makes "la prémisses d'inégalité" (1954: 184) the principle from which other facts of Ruandese culture can be deduced in a way that corresponds to the important role in analysis played by such concepts as "configuration," "sanction" or "theme" in the work of other anthropologists. The form of the premise of inequality in Ruandese culture as Maquet described it is that birth into the Tutsi, Hutu or Twa caste predetermines physical and psychological qualities and subordinate or superordinate social and political position. Thus race in Ruandese thinking gives the Tutsi their intelligence, refinement, courage, cruelty and ability to rule. It gives the Hutu the qualities that make them both useful to their Tutsi overlords and in need of their commands, the qualities of vassals: physical strength, mediocre intelligence, lack of guile, coarseness, and the capacity to work hard and to be obedient. (Maquet 1954: 188-189) The responses, then, to question 22 are responses to what was alleged to be the Ruandese rationale of Ruandese society up to recent times. As this paper has already claimed, the true "premise" of Ruandese culture seems to have been the possession of power by the Tutsi. That a racist rationale of power was also developed is incontrovertible. The responses to question 22 are clarifying. They demonstrate, first, that the *fact* of the possession of power as the critical reality in social relations is recognized by all but a few of the Tutsi (8%) and Hutu (7%) with only most of the Twa of the opinion that the Tutsi would always rule and the Hutu never. Chart I shows the numerical results in percentages, and it shows the overthrow of the "premise of inequality" supposed to have been the basis of Ruandese society. Neither age, general type of occupation (traditional or évolué, by which is meant a job with some European features), or membership in the Tutsi or Hutu caste makes for any significant differences in the results. The commentaries show why the proposition thought to have been the very premise of the society was denied by every group in the society excepting the Twa. It was because power was seen as no longer being in Tutsi hands after the revolution. The commentaries that follow represent every characteristic in the sample including that of years of schooling which is not included on the charts because the sorting and tabulation of the IBM cards is not yet completed. It seems best at this point to present the commentaries to question

22 and the charts and commentaries for the two other questions.

QUESTIONNAIRE COMMENTARIES

Key to the identification of each commentator:

T = Tutsi	M = Male	Numbers = years of age	S followed by a numeral or numerals = years of schooling	E or T	(1) = YES!
H = Hutu	F = Female			T = traditional occupation	(2) = yes (0) = no res- ponse
Twa = Twa				E = European- ized occupation	(3) = no (4) = NO!

Thus the first commentary (T M 30 SO E (1)) was given by a Tutsi man of thirty who had had no schooling, was in a Europeanized — if only somewhat Europeanized — occupation, and who agreed emphatically with the statement of question 22 that "Tutsi and Hutu are racially different: the Tutsi will always be the dominating race and the Hutu the dominated race." In some cases the occupation is named.

REPRESENTATIVE COMMENTS — QUESTION 22:
Tutsi and Hutu are racially different; the Tutsi will always be the dominating race and the Hutu the dominated race.

T M 30 S0 E (1) No, they are not two different races; but it is necessary that the Tutsi dominate at any price. Even within the family the father chooses one to be the chief over the others. It is thus for the Hutu and the Tutsi.


T M 52est. S0 T (3) The father being the same, all the children must love one another — Gahutu, Gatutsi, Gatwa.

T M 21 S? E (3) Tutsi and Hutu are not different races — they are brothers because we know from our ancestors that Gathutu and Gatutsi are descended from the same father. The Hutu were never enslaved by the Tutsi. Formerly Hutu even exercised authority and lived in a very fine entente with the Tutsi.

T M 20 S6 E (3) That depends on the ability and the intelligence of the dominant and of the subordinate race. One will choose those who are capable and able to exercise the power given to them whatever their race.

T M 18 S0 (3) Because of evolution the once dominated class has begun

FIGURE 1. RESPONSES TO QUESTION 22 : TUTSI AND HUTU ARE DIFFERENT RACES ; THE TUTSI WILL ALWAYS BE THE DOMINATING RACE AND THE HUTU THE DOMINATED RACE



to see things clearly and to insist on their rights; that is to say that there will be Hutu chiefs in the administration of the country.

T M 19 S6 ? (3) Because with democracy the wish is that everyone has a say and participates in power the moment they are capable of doing so.

T M 20 S6 T Cultivator (3) It is heartbreaking! At this time the Tutsi have no longer a monopoly in ruling. How many Hutu chiefs and subchiefs have been set up by the [Belgian] administration contrary to custom in order to put down the Tutsi? How many more will be imposed to the detriment of the Tutsis?

T M 28 S6 E (3) Kanyarwanda, the father of Gatutsi, Gahutu and Gatwa... Whichever one is capable and wants to do so will dominate.

T M 42 S0 T Cultivator (3) There will be more chiefs from the Hutu side than from the Tutsi. It has begun already. The Tutsi once dominated and that put into the thinking of the Hutu the fact of being dominated. For instance, if a Hutu had some accident and he saw no matter which Tutsi, he would explain it to him and want him to judge it. All that is going to finish after all this long time as I see it.

T M 23 S9 E (3) That is already begun and a year from now the Tutsi will be dominated.

T M 50 S6 TE (3) Tutsi and Hutu are not different races but different names. For a long time the most intelligent of the Batwa, Batutsi and Bahutu dominated.

T M 43 S0 T Cultivator (3) The rich will dominate whether they are Tutsi or Hutu.

T M 36 S3 T Cultivator (3) Only because the force of the European government is behind the Hutu; otherwise the Hutu could expect to have no power on their own. The Tutsi alone are able to rule — only the Tutsi.

T M 26 S3 T Cultivator (3) Actually it is the Hutu who now dominate. The Tutsi dominated the Hutu when they had many cows and when a Hutu asked for a cow and had to pay court to them for it. And then, the Tutsi were more favoured by the whites than the Hutu. It was the Tutsi alone who formerly went to school and because of that they dominated with their intelligence.

T M 24 S4 T Cultivator (3) The two races will both rule after the elections. This is not to say that the Tutsi will be dominated as the Hutu once were rather the greater number dominant will still be Tutsis.

T M 42 S6 T (3) Why ask this question any more. Now it is the Hutu who dominate.

T M 30 S3 E (3) Because the Hutu knew he was the inferior of the Tutsi and the Tutsi knew just as well that he was the superior of the Hutu, there was no race question that obliged them to hate one another.

T M 21 S9 E (4) Tutsi and Hutu are not of different races; they are both Ruandese. Furthermore the Tutsi will not stay in the dominant position, because civilization is not something just for them, it is for everyone in Ruanda, Tutsi, Hutu, and also Twa.

T M 18 S6 E (4) In the future the Tutsi alone ought not to exercise authority, because the country does not belong to them alone. If there are capable Hutu, surely power will be exercised by them and not by Tutsi — that is Hutu are really capable and conscious of their duty.

T F 19 S8 E Monitrice (2) The Tutsi ought always to be the dominant race because they have given proof for centuries of their ability to rule the country.

T F 23 S0 T (3) The present troubles in Ruanda are that the dominant class has been put in prison and the dominated class has seized the occasion to take over souschefferies and even chefferies. That shows that the dominant class has become the dominated class and the other way round.

T F 26 S0 T (3) Evolution has turned everything upside down, and the voice of the Hutu claiming the right to participate in power rings in the air. Logically and practically they demand something they have never had or known, while the spirit of organization is something born into the Tutsi.

T F 25 S? (3) The Tutsi no longer dominate the Hutu, but the Hutu will never dominate them. No one will dominate someone more intelligent than he is.

T F 25 S5 T (3) In all justice all Banyarwanda of the two races should govern together, but the Hutu do not know how to command.

T F 21 S5 (3) But all that is caused entirely by the whites. Many chiefs and subchiefs have been dismissed because of hate and not because of incapacity; so that means that the Hutu would never refuse to be the subjects of the Tutsi.

T F 55 S0 T (4) There is the flaw. Always before the Banyarwanda were brothers under the Mwami who alone was able to advance or degrade anyone. Now all that is changed and we are divided.

H M 65 S0 T Cultivator (2) The Tutsi were good to many people. To keep them from having power when they once had it without question would be to commit a crime.

H M 40 S? T Cultivator (2) Because there are those who have run Ruanda for years and years. They know how to do it because they are used to it.

H M 70 est. S0 T Cultivator (2) The Tutsi always surpassed the Hutu. They really knew how to do well by their servants. The Hutu ought to be dominated. The one who is strongest and most intelligent dominates.

H M 48 S? T Cultivator (2) It would be good for the government to always be in Tutsi hands.

H M 26 S? T Cowherd (2) As long as the Tutsi are rich they will rule. Now rich Hutu will also rule.

H M 24 S0 E (3) The country is developing. The Hutu also go to school. Therefore capable Hutu will also direct the country.

H M 23 S4 E (3) In the future everyone will be on the same equal footing. Besides that is already begun since the Hutu are exerting their rights and there are quite a few Hutu who have recently been named as chiefs and subchiefs.

H M 25 S: T Cultivator (3) Before the Hutu could not get into the schools which were reserved for the Tutsi. Now everyone Hutu and Tutsi goes to the same schools. I think that it is thanks to schooling that capable and intelligent Hutu will share in the running of the country.

H M 45 S0 T Cultivator (3) The whites have separated us. We shall no longer be dominated by the Tutsi but, rather, we wish to be independent with only the Mwami having power over us. Thus the Tutsi will not dominate us any more but we shall get along together.

H M 46 S0 T Cultivator (3) The Tutsi dominated us as long as they possessed the great benefice of cows. Now none of them have very many and we Hutu have some. The way it is can be understood — Bahutu-Batutsi.

H M 34 S13 E (3) With evolution and education the Hutu and the Tutsi will find positions according to their ability without regard to race, and the uneducated Hutu and Tutsi will be dominated by the educated Hutu and Tutsi.

H M 38 S0 T Cultivator (3) They will get along together. Those who did not go to the Mwami were dominated. Now both the Hutu and the Tutsi go to Mwami.

H M 50 S4 E (3) Because the Hutu no longer respect the Tutsi as they once did. We only respect chiefs and subchiefs.

H M 20 S8 E (3) In justice the Tutsi ought not to have priority over the Hutu nor the Tutu over them. It would be better for both to be on the same level.

H M 40 S13 E (4) Different — yes — but as for saying that the Tutsi will remain the dominant race and the Hutu the subject race — no. All are men; no race is destined to dominate another.

H M 53 S0 E (4) No, the Tutsi cannot stay in power for they have governed badly. They gave people tasks and did not pay them for what they did. They did all kinds of bad things. If that came back the country would fall into misery.

H M 31 S0 T Cultivator (4) In dominating us the Tutsi did us great harm.

H M 42 S0 T Cultivator (4) All that has changed. Rather they will live as equals and with more fraternity.

H M 40 S0 T Cultivator (4) You can see it for yourself. The Tutsi are no longer in their high position.

H M 39 S3 T Cultivator (4) Their kingdom is destroyed; they will no longer dominate. That finished with the year 1960.

H F 50 S0 T Cultivator (2) The Tutsi knows how to govern but the Hutu does not deserve to govern.

H F 36 S0 T Cultivator (2) It is the Tutsi who have the manner of ruling.

H F 21 S7 E Monitrice (3) What would you want — the Tutsi to stay the dominant race? Now they are taking away their power. That proves that the roles are going to be reversed and the once dominant race will become the dominated one.

H F 20 S0 T Cultivator (3) For many years the Tutsi exploited the country, now the Hutu must rule the country in their turn.

H F 38 S0 T (3) Hutu are as capable of ruling as Tutsi, but the Tutsi don't let the Hutu do it.

H F 26 S3 T Cultivator (4) I think this is a fable or a legend. I can't see events differently, and you know about them as well or better than I do. You see rather that the Tutsi have become servants.

H F 40 S0 T Cultivator (4) You ask me about what you yourself can see — the Tutsi no longer rule.

Twa M 60 S0 T (1) Because the spirit of organization is an hereditary Tutsi trait that the Hutu cannot acquire.

Twa M 60 S0 T Potter (2) But they will all be equal.

Twa M 80 S0 T (2) The Tutsi ought to rule but now the Europeans have given our country to the Hutu... But it is inconceivable that the Hutu could possibly run the country.

Twa M 28 S0 T (3) Those who are capable whether they be Tutsi or Hutu will take part in the running of the country.

Twa M S0 T Potter (3) We want there to be Hutu, Tutsi and Twa capable of ruling.

Twa M 40 S0 T Potter (3) No, that is all changed. The Europeans have turned everything upside down — . But in spite of it the Tutsi will always be nobles.

Twa F 60 T (2) If everything goes well it will be that way because it is the Tutsi who have made them rich. It is thanks to the Tutsi that the Hutu are even human.

REPRESENTATIVE COMMENTS — QUESTION 14:
A hundred years ago the Banyarwanda were more honest and nicer to one another.

T M 30 S3 E (1) The Hutu were not happy, but there were not the sort of troubles we are having today.

T M 25 S5 E Moniteur (1) Really you meet a Tutsi or a Hutu and he says "Ah that one is an Aprasoma or a l'Unarist...". As the history of Ruanda is not unknown to me, I know truly that formerly there were no jealousies or other things contrary to Christian humanity.

T M 30 S6 E (1) They were nice to one another, the great ones and the ordinary people...

T M 30 S0 E (1) They are separated because of the evil administration. The authorities want those who were great to become little and those who were little people to become great and that is the source of the trouble.

T M 50 S? T (1) Ruanda never knew insubordinate Hutu to revolt against the power of the Mwami, to be chiefs of a chefferie or even chiefs of a family! Now extraordinary permission has been granted to them to attack the properly constituted authority. Formerly Ruanda was better governed and directed.

T M 33 S0 E (2) I don't want to say that everyone was happy and contented, but Ruanda was independent. I know the Hutu suffered a lot but it was because they were poor. Even in Europe, I believe, not everyone is content; some want to be richer than they are and there are also the poor.

T M 23 S6 ? (2) These are the old principles which are giving way as they encounter democracy.

T M 26 S3 T Cultivator (2) Formerly they got along better than they do now because a Hutu who was the servant of a Tutsi was respectful and completely polite, while now the Europeans have allowed the Hutu to do everything they can against the Tutsi and have prevented the Tutsi from defending themselves. But what would you expect, they only have Hutu support.

T M 20 S6 E (3) There were too many abuses and injustices on the part of the rulers and against the subordinates. From that comes the hatred between the races.

T F 17 S5 ? (2) I was not yet born but I have heard that they got along together very well. You could order a fellow to do something without paying him for it.

T F 49 S0 T (2) They were nicer and more honest because anyone who did not respect his superior was ruthlessly punished.

H M 40 S0 T Cultivator (1) A child is honest and nice to his superiors.

The superior is honest and good towards the child. The development of being impolite did not exist before. This development is to say that I can go accuse you before the tribunal even if you are my superior.

H M 70 est. S0 T (2) They were honest and nice to one another, more than today. Today a Tutsi says "No one is going to order me around" and the Hutu says the same thing. Isn't our kingdom in which people respected one another in danger of being destroyed?

H M 30 S0 T Cultivator (3) But they were not all happy, only some of them were, the Tutsi and some Hutu who paid court to them.

H M 30 S5 E (3) Actually they were evil to one another, now they no longer hide what is in their hearts.

H M 30 S10 E (3) How so, it was only the Tutsi who enjoyed life; the Hutu worked as if they were machines.

H M 26 S0 T Cultivator (4) The stronger oppressed the weaker. Now people in the same condition of life whatever their race can drink together when before it was impossible to do so.

H M 40 S0 T Cultivator (4) In the old times it was terrible. When one of the great Tutsi met to drink with another he would ask him the loan of a Hutu to kill saying he would return another Hutu in his place. Since the Europeans arrived everything has been better but in olden times the Tutsi did terrible things.

H F 49 S0 T Cultivator (3) Most of the Hutu were treated like savage beasts and they were unable to defend themselves as they do today.

H F 40 S0 T Cultivator (3) I think that the ones who are complaining now are not the ones who trembled in times past. I think that one hundred years ago there were those who were not contented with their lot just as there are some like that today.

Twa M 54 S0 T (1) The Banyarwanda had more trust and honesty in them. They saw only that they had a single ruler who ruled them and contributed to their prosperity. Now there are too many authorities, too much division of power, and that causes the trouble and mistrust among the inhabitants of the country.

Twa M 40 S0 T Potter (1) But certainly, because they had a Mwami who was master of all.

REPRESENTATIVE COMMENTS — QUESTION 27:
Before the Europeans came the Banyarwanda had fewer problems and found life happier.

T M 24 S4 T Cultivator (2) Because before the coming of the Europeans

all the Banyarwanda loved one another more than they do today. I have never heard about Ruanda's being divided into political parties as it is now. They were all in their proper places.

T M 24 S8 E (3) Before the Europeans horrible sicknesses devastated the population; there were periodic famines that ravaged the land; there were wars and terrible injustices suffered by the masses of the people because of the caprice of the monarch.

T M 18 S8 (3) Injustice reigned and it was committed by the Tutsi chiefs.

H M 30 S8 E Monitor (1) Some were chased from their property and despoiled of their cows because they were despised by those greater than them.

H M 25 S4 E (3) The Europeans have delivered us from the yoke of the Tutsi. What abuses, injustices and murders we suffered before the arrival of the Europeans!

H M 25 S3 T Cultivator (3) The Tutsi did not treat the Hutu as if they were reasoning human beings, so, although the Tutsi were content, the Hutu were not.

H M 38 S2 T Cultivator (3) Life was not happy for us since the Tutsi used us as slaves.

H M 30 S0 E (3) How could you say life was happy when the masses had no say about what they wanted.

H M 58 S0 T Cultivator (3) There was no equality among all the Banyarwanda.

H M 50 S4 E (4) The Ruandese lived in misery. The powerful killed the little people. You yourself know about the sword of Nyiragui.

H M 30 S10 E (4) But the Tutsi used the Hutu as if they were animals. European civilization has gradually advanced Ruanda.

H M 27 S8 (4) Before their arrival there was nothing but injustice night and day.

H F 26 S3 T Cultivator (4) No! Instead, if the Europeans had not come, we should still be in misery; but thanks to the Europeans we Hutu are in the same rank as other Banyarwanda.

Twa 70 est. S0 T Potter (1) There was nothing but brotherhood. All this liberty, this pride did not exist. Everyone was subject to the Mwami and that was that.

The responses to questions 14 and 27 show that while neither age nor occupational category accounts for any significant differences in the responses, caste is everything. Almost 85 per

FIGURE 2. RESPONSES TO QUESTION 14 : 100 YEARS AGO THE BANYARWANDA WERE MORE HONEST AND NICER TO ONE ANOTHER





FIGURE 3. RESPONSES TO QUESTION 27 : BEFORE THE EUROPEANS CAME THE BANYARWANDA HAD FEWER PROBLEMS AND FOUND LIFE HAPPIER



cent of the Tutsi men and 87 per cent of the Tutsi women felt that "a hundred years ago the Banyarwanda were more honest and nicer to one another." Of these 42 per cent of the Tutsi men and 46 per cent of Tutsi women agreed emphatically. They were loyally supported by the Twa; only one of the thirteen Twa in the sample said "No" to the proposition. However, the Hutu, both men and women, denied the proposition over half the time. As was the case with question 22, a matter of fact is involved. The events of the revolution gave evidence enough that the Banyarwanda were not at the moment being "honest or nice to one another." But even with the evidences of vicious rumourmongering, hostility and brutality, the Hutu often had a second thought, and, as the comments show, took a broader view that included what they had known or heard about the past. The comments also show how much the thinking of Hutu and Tutsi is alike in power terms.

The responses to question 27: "Before the Europeans came the Banyarwanda had fewer problems and found life happier" show a similar pattern, as would be expected when the questions themselves are so similar. Of the Tutsi 52 per cent of the men and 73 per cent of the women affirm the statement. While among the Hutu 73 per cent of the men and 79 per cent of the women deny it; 25 per cent of the Hutu men and 30 per cent of the women deny it vehemently. Again the Twa response is special, three of the nine Twa men deny it, but all the others affirm it with all four Twa women affirming it with vehemence. The list of commentaries is limited for reasons of space but it seemed especially interesting to show how this question elicited Hutu ideas on power and politics.

The questionnaire responses show not only the results but also some of the causes of Ruanda's revolution. Many questions, like Question 22, "Tutsi and Hutu are racially different: the Tutsi will always be the dominating race and the Hutu the dominated race," stated propositions of traditional Ruandese culture and society. To disagree with Maquet's view that the racist premise of inequality was the true basis of Ruandese society is not to deny that a racist rationale for social, economic and political inequality was a feature of traditional Ruandese culture. A more detailed examination of the responses and commentaries

to Question 22 shows how a traditional view may be overthrown. The processes, though complex, seem to be those that contemporary social science would force us to hypothecate: (1) that no proposition, however important in any society, would be held by all adult members of that society in the same way, for the same reasons or with the same interest and intensity; (2) that variations would exist not only because of the inevitable variety of individual human experience but also because of the individual's membership in one or another of the social groups into which the society was divided. A review of the commentaries to Question 22 does not show why one young Tutsi man or woman expresses the old traditional racist view and another an essentially democratic and anti-traditional view; or why one elderly Hutu cultivator is in accord with tradition and another set against it. It does not show how it came about that even two of the Twa express anti-traditional notions. What can be seen is (1) the ordering of conflicting views in Ruandese society according to the caste social grouping of the society; (2) the continuity of traditional views in each of the three caste social groups; and (3) the presence of new, anti-traditional views. The view predominant in the society, and the view the anthropologist will use in describing the society, is the view, *in force*, that is, the view held by those in power in that society. If some 90 per cent of the Tutsi and Hutu alike now deny the traditional proposition that the Tutsi will always dominate the Hutu, it is because the Tutsi are no longer in power, and are no longer in a position to assert their rationale for holding power. The Tutsi are quite correct in blaming the Belgians for the reversal of power that has occurred, but not in their charge that the Belgians engineered the revolution to overthrow them. The commentaries of some of the Tutsi show Tutsi ranks to have been infected to some degree with a European rationale of power-holding and with equally anti-traditional ideas of social justice. When along with some Tutsi and many Hutu even two of the Twa speak of equality and the need for everyone, Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa, to participate in government, this means that either European ideas have had a profound and widespread influence or there has been some point to giving open expression to views that were formerly suppressed. The present analysis

cannot go beyond the fact that the questionnaires were given after the revolution of 1959, but it does not seem incautious to say the equalitarian views held by various individuals were probably not formed after the revolution. Otherwise there should not have been a revolution. True, after the revolution there was confirmation of the fact that the Tutsi no longer dominated the Hutu, and this fact was certainly damaging to the rationale of Tutsi dominance, but it is equally credible that long before the revolution the Hutu and the Tutsi saw Tutsi dominance and its rationale in different ways. Evidence, especially from the life histories, will be brought to bear on this point at a later date and it seems likely that the problem can be worked out historically in terms of Tutsi and Hutu ideas and feelings, the influence of European ideas and the influence of actual changes in living conditions brought about through the European occupation of the country.

CONCLUSIONS

The data and arguments presented seem to support a power interpretation of Ruandese social and political organization. By power is meant the ability of one individual to inflict harm or deprivation on another. Power relations seem to have been the basis of Ruandese social and political structure and the outstanding feature of Ruandese society was the monopoly of power by the Tutsi minority. Constant power struggles among the Tutsi did not break their monopoly of power as a group or diminish its effectiveness. Thus Ruandese society is not seen as a network of reciprocities in which power carried obligations and lack of power had its real compensations, or as a society in which the common weal was of paramount importance and everyone of its members believed in and consented freely to the systems that supported it. Rather than this Panglossian state of affairs the more powerful oppressed the less powerful or the powerless, power was used to the hilt by those who possessed it, and fear and insecurity perpetuated the system.

A question that must be raised at this point is whether a power interpretation of any society can be a functional inter-

pretation. Can a society based on power work? Can it be viable and perpetuate itself? One answer to this question has already been indicated. We know of historical and contemporary societies that existed or exist on a power basis with power in the hands of a minority which is neither chosen nor controlled by the majority. Are all "primitive" societies, some of which, like Ruanda, form organized populations larger than those of European states known to us at present or in the past, to be considered in a different category? As is well known the organizational development and political sophistication of many African states invite comparison with non-African states while inviting contrast with all the societies of native North America, excepting Inca, Maya and Aztec, or with "primitive" societies elsewhere. It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, for one African society, in any case, to have been based on power.

Ruanda seems to have *functioned* on a power basis and there seems no problem about a power interpretation of Ruandese society. It seems to be as "functional" as the "functional" interpretations of Maquet, Fortes, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard that have been reviewed. Their interpretations have involved an assumption that "The sanction of force upon which a European administration depends lies outside the native political system. It is not used to maintain the values inherent in that system... For as we have seen, in the original native system force is used by a ruler with the consent of his subjects and in the interest of the social order." (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1958: 16) This assumption has caused Maquet evident difficulties as has been shown. His summarizing interpretation contains conflicting points and his search for the compensatory features of the Ruandese system for the Hutu seems hardly fruitful when such few and unconvincing ones could be turned up. For example, his presentation of the compensatory advantage to a Hutu of having a Tutsi overlord in order to give him protection from the exactions and oppressions of other Tutsi is such as to deserve a description in more forthright terms. "Protection" in such a sense deserves the quote marks it is usually given in describing U.S. gansterism in the 1920's. Ruanda seems much better explained functionally without making any assumptions about power that prevent seeing it in anything but positive and pleasant

terms. How the system could work for the powerless is all too clear. The Hutu were oppressed and terrorized and accepted what they had to accept as they did what they had to do. How the Tutsi maintained their dominance needs some further discussion, since the power struggle they were engaged in among themselves seems on the face of it difficult to explain functionally when it appears to be against their interests in maintaining their power monopoly in relation to the Hutu. The Tutsi power struggle seems, however, completely functional in maintaining Tutsi dominance and the old order, and, of especial interest, the lessening of the intra-Tutsi struggle seems to have contributed its measure to the loss of Tutsi power in recent years. The fears and insecurities of the Tutsi in the old regime make it understandable why many of them were able to apply whatever power they held with unremitting ferocity and with consequent success as far as the submission of the Hutu was concerned. Had the Tutsi been merely a comfortable and secure aristocracy they might well have developed slack and easy-going ways, but the brutal and relentless struggle for power among them kept them harsh and undistracted in their use of power, and thereby maximized the power they held as a group. Depositions from many Tutsi, including one of the overseers of the Mwami's cattle — a noble traditional office — are criticisms of the ancient system for its lack of security. A Tutsi lived in constant anxiety lest he be demoted from whatever position of power he held and suffer deprivation of property, status, or even life itself. It had been the ambition of the informant mentioned to have at least thirty children so he could rebuild his once great lineage which had nearly been wiped out by other Tutsi at the level of baronial machinations, denunciations to the Mwami, and assassinations. The revolution loosened Tutsi as well as Hutu tongues and in stating their position Tutsi after Tutsi, however intransigent in general about the evils of some of the changes that had occurred in Ruanda, said that an evil feature of the old system was its insecurity for them and gave illustrations from some of the dark incidents in their own family histories. Again the analysis of the data is incomplete, but it seems probable that they were not adverse to European policing of their power struggle and the softening of its consequences for the loser. The interactions that

such a change would set in motion could then prove to be a Tutsi contribution to Ruanda's revolution and the tracing of these interactions could contribute to the understanding of the revolution in functional terms.

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