Merdeka in West Papua: Peace, Justice and Political Independence

Camellia Webb-Gannon *University of Western Sydney*

Abstract: The vision for "Papua *merdeka*," or a "peaceful, just and necessarily politically independent Papua" is perhaps the most powerful force of unity among West Papua's indigenous peoples. This article explores the origins of this supra-uniting vision and provides examples of how merdeka is envisaged by West Papuans as the best outcome of their struggle for peace with justice. It critiques the contested meanings of the term but demonstrates that there is considerable unity among West Papuan leaders regarding its components, and in the belief that merdeka cannot prevail in Papua without political independence from Indonesia.

Keywords: West Papua, peace, justice, independence, *merdeka*, unity

Résumé : La vision de la « merdeka papoue », ou d'une « Papouasie pacifique, juste et nécessairement politiquement indépendante » est peut-être la force unificatrice la plus puissante parmi les peuples indigènes de la Papouasie occidentale. Cet article explore les origines de cette vision super-unificatrice et montre comment la merdeka est envisagée par les Papous occidentaux comme le meilleur résultat de leur lutte pour la paix dans la justice. Il critique les significations contestées du terme mais démontre qu'il existe un sentiment d'unité remarquable parmi les chefs papous à l'égard de ses composantes et de la croyance que la merdeka ne peut s'imposer en Papouasie sans l'indépendance politique de l'Indonésie.

Mots-clés : Papouasie occidentale, paix, justice, indépendance, merdeka, unité

Introduction

"Papua!" calls a man dressed in *koteka* (traditional penis gourd), standing on a misty mountaintop in West Papua's highlands. "*Merdeka!*" is the enthusiastic unison shout of the group of variously aged Papuan freedom fighters standing around him. The repeated call and response of "Papua ... *merdeka*" builds in a rousing rhythmic chant. This powerful scene of West Papuan solidarity and determination of spirit concludes UK filmmaker Dominic Brown's *Forgotten Bird of Paradise*, a documentary on the independence movement in West Papua,[1] filmed undercover in 2009. The Papuan resistance group he had been brought on a dangerous trek to meet, resplendent in outfits of traditional body paint and decoration, army camouflage and accessories such as mirrored sunglasses, had been forced to flee their villages by Indonesian armed forces. In hiding, they worked on strategies for achieving independence, practised combat drills and recited with passion their allegiance to a hoped-for independent West Papuan state (Brown 2009).

Several hundred kilometres from this scene, in June the following year in Jayapura, West Papua's largest city, footage bearing witness to thousands of urban West Papuans taking to the streets was anonymously recorded and later uploaded to YouTube (Westpapuambaham 2011). The leader of the protest continuously booms, "Papua!" through a distorting megaphone; the charging crowds—painted in the red, white and blue of the nationalist West Papuan Morning Star flag, dressed in feathers and traditional jewellery or in West Papuan design-inspired batik—yell back, "Merdeka!" (Westpapuambaham 2011). This demonstration marked the lead-up to the biggest popular protests in West Papua's history, calling for West Papua's provincial governments to "return" to Jakarta its much resented and unsuccessful 2001 Special Autonomy Law and for a referendum on West Papua's political status. Since the 1962–63 Indonesian takeover of their land, West Papuans have been

campaigning for independence through diplomatic, civil resistance and military means. The 2001 Special Autonomy Law was the Indonesian government's post-Suharto attempt to appease the international community and West Papuans by responding to West Papuans' calls for independence with a compromise promising greater autonomy for the province. On paper, it included significant concessions to the Papuans, such as committing more profits to flow back into West Papua from its lucrative U.S.-owned Freeport McMoRan gold and copper mines, permitting freedom of cultural expression, including the right to fly their Morning Star national flag, "straightening" the different Papuan and Indonesian understandings of West Papuan history and promising improvement of education and health facilities (Widjojo et al. 2008). In practice, however, few of these promises came to fruition and, in less than a decade, most Papuans already considered the implementation of the law a failure.

"Papua merdeka"—that is, an independent, peaceful and justly governed Papua—is a vision West Papuans share, whether they live in cities, remote rural locations or the diaspora. It is a vision that unites by way of an "imagined community" (Anderson 2006). "Papua merdeka" is also the catch-cry of the independence movement in West Papua and its diaspora. This article sets out an overview of the various meanings of the term that have been advanced by various scholars as they have attempted to define its significance and application. Some of the critics whose arguments I critique here deny that merdeka must include political independence. However, in so doing, I contend,[2] they also deny the integrity of the movement. In contrast, I use conflict transformation theory to further explore the meanings of merdeka from the perspectives of West Papuan leaders I interviewed in West Papua, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.[3] I demonstrate that, in fact, there is considerable unity among West Papuan leaders about what merdeka entails and in the belief that merdeka cannot be achieved in West Papua until its baseline—political independence—has been attained. To more clearly understand West Papuans' insistence that independence must accompany their ultimate goal of peace with justice (merdeka) in West Papua, a brief overview of the West Papua's colonial history is useful.

The Dutch had proclaimed sovereignty over the western half of the island of New Guinea, from the 141st meridian east of Greenwich, since 1848, having previously asserted control over portions of western New Guinea based on an agreement signed with the Sultan of Tidore in 1660 (Elmslie 2002). When the Dutch were ousted from what was then the Dutch East Indies, in anticipation of Indonesian independence, they determined to prepare West Papuans for self-determination in the form of an independent state. This was negotiated under the 1962 New York Agreement with the United States, and it was decided that a referendum in 1969, supervised by the United Nations, would be held to allow West Papuans to choose whether they wanted their own independent state or to be formally integrated with Indonesia. However, from 1962 until 1969, not only the Indonesian government but also, in the context of Cold War geopolitics, the American, Dutch and Australian governments, which were ultimately concerned with curtailing Indonesia's communist leanings, worked against the actualization of self-determination in West Papua. The result was that, in the 1969 Act of Free Choice referendum in which Papuans were to freely choose their political fate, only 1,025 people—less than 1 per cent of the Papuan population—were handpicked and coerced with threats of violence to vote in favour of integration with Indonesia. The process and outcome of this plebiscite, now widely acknowledged as a sham by U.S., Papuan, Australian, Dutch and United Nations sources (Fernandes 2006; Osborne 1985; Saltford 2003), violated the West Papuan people's right to self-determination enshrined in international treaty and customary law.[4]

The Indonesian state has also deprived Papuans of all manner of civil, political, economic, cultural and social rights in the 50 years of its administration of the West Papuan territory. In short, these include: "the expropriation of land and resources, forced relocation of indigenous communities, racial and ethnic discrimination ... physical assault and torture, sexual violence and extrajudicial killings" (Kirsch 2002:53). This weighty list of abuses has led to calls to end the violence and to sustained concern on the part of many Papuans.[5] Wing and King (2005) and Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (2013) of the University of Sydney and Brundige et al. (2004) of Yale Law School argue that the Indonesian government is responsible for genocide against the Papuan population. This fear is further fuelled by decades of transmigration, both spontaneous and as part of Indonesian state policy, of people from other Indonesian islands to West Papua so that, in 2010, West Papuans ultimately became a minority in their homeland (i.e., numbering just under half of the approximate population of three million) (Elmslie 2010). Thus, many West Papuans believe that despite their repeated attempts at peacemaking over the past 50 years of Indonesian occupation, peace with justice or, merdeka, is unlikely to become a reality without the removal of the Indonesian state and the installation of West Papuan sovereignty within West Papuan territory.

The Malay word *merdeka*, "freedom," comes from a Dutch derivation of the Portuguese version of the Sanskrit word *maharddhika*, meaning "wealth, wisdom or competence" (Junker 1999:126). The Sanskrit term was already being used in Javanese texts from the tenth century (Reid 1998:143). Another derivative term of the Sanskrit word, *mardijker*, had acquired the meaning "freed slave." It referred to former Spanish or Portuguese slaves from India, brought by the Dutch to live in the Malay archipelago (Serving History 2010). It is from *mardijker* that the term *merdeka* acquired its association with freedom. The word *merdeka* has a considerable history of political usage in terms of being a uniting goal of nationalisms within the Malay archipelago, particularly within Singaporean, Malaysian, Indonesian and Acehnese nationalisms (Reid 1998). In pivotal moments in each of these nationalisms, *merdeka* superseded its earlier, broader brushstroke connotations of freedom and assumed the weighted and particular meaning of political independence.

Following the betrayal of the Papuans by the Dutch and the United States during the 1962 New York Agreement that effectively signed West Papua over to Indonesia (West Papuans were completely excluded from the agreement negotiations), the formation of the Free Papua Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*—OPM) in Manokwari in 1965 (Osborne 1985:35) became the first concerted attempt by West Papuan constituents to achieve political freedom from their Indonesian oppressors. Following the failure of the staged and unrepresentative 1969 Act of Free Choice to reflect West Papuans' political aspirations, the OPM grew in strength and numbers, particularly when Seth Rumkorem, formerly an officer in the Indonesian army, defected to join West Papuan law student-turned-guerrilla Jacob Prai's OPM post in the jungle and to train his troops. The highlight of the two men's collaboration was the July 1, 1971, *Proklamasi Kemerdekaan* (Independence Proclamation), issued from their headquarters at Markus Victoria (West Papua), in which they declared the land and people of West Papua "free and independent." Unfortunately for the West Papuan independence movement, the proclamation was not acknowledged by the Indonesians or by the international community at large, and the OPM splintered into factions based on ideological and personal differences between Prai and Rumkorem shortly thereafter.

That the yearning for merdeka with its inherent implications for political independence still lives within the hearts of many West Papuans was made abundantly clear to me during my time in West Papua, during November–December 2008. From the very elderly man who touched my elbow outside of the police station in Jayapura and whispered, eyes tearing and clouded by cataracts, "Papua merdeka"; to another man, who, stopping for a conversation as he strolled past my accommodation one beautiful evening in Merauke, finished by expressing his desire for "Papua merdeka"; to a woman I worked alongside who, despite her fear, wanted to set up an appointment for her friend to meet and brief me secretly on the West Papuan desire for independence; to a Papuan resistance soldier with an imposing build, long dreadlocks and Rasta colours, who approached me at a pig-killing festival in Wamena and, looking pointedly into my eyes, whispered, "Today it rains but tomorrow the sun will shine"—throughout West Papua, the desire for merdeka was palpable.

Merdeka: Peace, Justice and Contested Meanings

Historian Richard Chauvel writes, "Some have argued that Merdeka, the slogan of the nationalist movement [in West Papua], means not just political independence but freedom, and freedom has been defined variously as freedom from poverty, ignorance, political repression and abuse of human rights" (2005:4). He questions whether "the freedoms to which Papuans aspire could perhaps be achieved within the Indonesian state ... whether these freedoms would be realized even if Papuans succeeded in establishing an independent nation state" (4). Upon reading almost any account of West Papua's treatment under Indonesian occupation, however, it is clear that the "freedom from poverty, ignorance, political repression and abuse of human rights" to which Chauvel refers has not been the common experience of West Papuans, despite attempts to work collaboratively with the Indonesian state—for example, by proposing, albeit a very different version than what it eventually became, the Special Autonomy Law of 2001—or to resist state oppression—for example, by forming the OPM. Chauvel opens up the discussion of compromise as a possible path to effective self-determination; however, in an interview, Oridek Ap, the son of assassinated West Papuan anthropologist and activist Arnold Ap, presented a response to this position when I interviewed him on September 10, 2008, in the Hague, the Netherlands. He contends that the West Papuan desire that independence be the result of an act of self-determination and that West Papuans have the freedom to make mistakes should not be underestimated.

Chauvel poses a second question in regard to merdeka—that is, whether "these freedoms would be realized" even should Papuans attain a sovereign state. I argue that such questions are beside the point in universal human rights discourse. West Papuans have

been denied their right to self-determination, a denial they have been fighting and lobbying to reverse, since 1962 (Drooglever 2009; Ondawame 2010). Hence, the first step to rectifying the abuse of West Papuans' human rights—and such rectification is one of the components of merdeka that Chauvel has outlined earlier—would be, according to the West Papuans whose views I draw on for this article, to grant them this right. Chauvel's question, which is echoed by others, implies that West Papuans may do a *worse* job of pursuing peace, human rights and justice in their homeland than the Indonesians have done over the past five decades. Regardless of the slender possibility of the fulfilment of such paternalistic musings, given the grimness of Indonesia's occupation thus far, the question skirts the issue of the human right at stake—namely, the right of West Papuans to self-determination, regardless of the outcome.

As previously stated, this right is spelled out in the United Nations General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples Resolution 1514; it is also enshrined in treaty law, through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations 1966a) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations 1966b). It seems, however, that in academic arguments, such as the example just cited, realpolitik concerns, such as amicable diplomatic, security or trade relationships with the Indonesian state (rather than with groups that currently make up Indonesia's body politic, such as West Papuans), take precedence over human rights concerns (King 2004:141). Regardless of what arguments against a merdeka inclusive of political independence that analysts of the West Papuan merdeka movement put forward, what is clearly evident from my research in West Papuan communities is that the majority of West Papuans are in favour of independence,[6] to the point that the word *independence* is often used interchangeably with *merdeka*. That political independence cannot be separated from the goal of merdeka is one of the strongest views currently uniting West Papuans.[7]

Using insights from conflict transformation theorists, I offer an alternative interpretation of merdeka (to the realpolitik one addressed earlier) based on concepts of positive peace and peace with justice that resonate with West Papuan ideations of merdeka. Such concepts of peace are similar to that referred to by Kuehling (2014) in her discussion of *siwalowa*—the Dobuan word for peace meaning "deep calm sea." The process of enabling peace with justice, known as conflict transformation, is, according to conflict transformation theorist John Paul Lederach, committed to facilitating peace through providing advocacy for those harmed or for those with less power, adhering to justice ("making things right") and openly addressing wrongs that have been committed (1995:20), to enable people to live fully and with dignity. The founder of contemporary peace studies, Johan Galtung (1996:26), differentiates between negative peace or the absence of direct violence and positive peace, which refers not only to the absence of direct violence but also to an absence of structural and cultural violence—in other words, "peace with justice." Peace with justice does not mean that conflict does not exist in a peaceful society but, rather, that it is transformed via peaceful, just and creative processes, so that all parties to a conflict benefit from processes and outcomes (Galtung 1996:vii).

If conflict transformation were to be pursued in West Papua, for instance, through dialogue between West Papuans and the Indonesian central government, then it would be important for external observers and analysts to avoid influencing potential dialogue agendas in the direction of realpolitik interpretations of what the Indonesian central government is currently expected to tolerate. This would include, for example, avoiding the dilution of definitions of merdeka so that those deemed palatable for Indonesia have been thinned to the point of excluding national political rights, obfuscating the issues of contention. Instead, observers, scholars and policy-makers could contribute to rectifying the balance of power between the parties to any such dialogue by clarifying through careful consultation with West Papuans, as the less powerful party, the concrete goals they are pursuing. This would contribute to a dialogue agenda that reflected the goals, values and fears of each party, instead of favouring those of the most powerful party, and could create a space for *just* politics, not solely for what some prejudicially assume to be realistic politics.

Various scholars besides Chauvel have reflected on the meanings of merdeka, many drawing on its roots in West Papuan "millenarian" or "utopian" discourses, such as Koreri (a West Papuan spiritual and nationalist movement analyzed at length by Danilyn Rutherford [2003:24–30]). Anthropologist Eben Kirksey and J. A. D. Roemajauw, former member of the West Papuan performance group *Mambesak*, draw on correspondence with the late Viktor Kaisiepo, a West Papuan who lived in the Netherlands, when they define merdeka as "variously a desire for divine salvation, equitable development, environmental sustainability and political independence" (2002:191). Anthropologist Brigham Golden's definition differs slightly but critically from that of Kirksey and

Roemajauw, however, when he contends that merdeka is "supra-political in Papua ... whose meaning fundamentally *transcends* the political concept of 'independence'" and is more closely linked with "a liberation theology, an ideology of moral salvation in which a Christian desire for a world of human dignity and divine justice is finally manifest in Papua" (2000:33, emphasis added).

Anthropologist Jaap Timmer argues that merdeka is located within Papuan "ontological ideas about sovereignty and dignity (*harga diri*)" and is "a response to decades-long denial of the people's competence in learning and performing in modern colonial and postcolonial contexts" (2005:4). Yet he concludes that "the idea of having one's own state, right now and for all times, is seldom on the minds of most Papuans, as it is a construct far from the more intrusive largely individual and communal concern with sovereignty and *harga diri*" (2005:4). Timmer's data supporting this point appear, however, to be drawn largely from his research with one people in West Papua—the Imyan (Timmer 2005:3–4)—although his contention does highlight that the definitional limitations of merdeka are far from clear-cut and that ideas of statehood and its importance may vary according to tribe and location. Nevertheless, political independence is still a widespread, popularly held goal across West Papua and its diaspora, as conceded by the findings of the usually conservative International Crisis Group, which, based on geographically comprehensive research, concludes that there is "widespread, straightforward and uncompromising support for independence at the village and provincial town level of Papuan society" (2001:14). Papuans in both towns and villages have experienced the brutal oppression of Indonesian security forces and policies, including the burning of houses and gardens from which they are forced to flee, and thus are able to yearn for a life not dominated by the security apparatus of the Indonesian state.

Merdeka has also been invoked by Golden as a concept that should be harnessed by the central government in Jakarta to appease Papuans, writing that "both the apparent contradictions of independence without merdeka and merdeka without independence are possible" and that "Jakarta's goal should be the latter," a possibility only if Jakarta addresses the "*moral* concerns of Papua merdeka" (2000:33, emphasis added). However, given that human rights are both acutely moral *and* political and for West Papuans include their moral human right to political self-determination, the contradiction to which Golden refers—that is, merdeka without an act of self-determination with an option of independence—remains unresolvable.

By contrast, merdeka, as alluded to within the narratives I collected through fieldwork, expresses metaphysical qualities that are inseparable from its physical, tangible and political manifestations. In other words, merdeka is a concept evoking unity, referring both to transcendental freedom and to physical and political freedom on earth, without the dualism suggested in Timmer's and Golden's analyses. Anthropologist Stuart Kirsch even argues that "the Christian association of merdeka with independence draws on the prevailing assumption that both self-determination and territorialized nations are manifestations of divine will" (2010:14). However, merdeka is not just a Christian-influenced ideal, as evidenced by the political support lent to it by Muslim Papuan leaders, including the Muslim secretary general of the pro-independence Papuan Presidium Council, Thaha Al Hamid. In a declaration, which he read aloud at the December 1, 2008, independence demonstration in Sentani, West Papua, Al Hamid called upon the international community and their governments to support merdeka in West Papua by recognizing "the existence of the West Papuan state and its sovereignty declared [by a Dutch-coached West New Guinea Council] on December 1, 1961" (Beanal and Yaboisembut 2008).

Merdeka, as the amalgamation of what has been set out here by Kirksey, Roemajauw and Kirsch, as well as Timmer, Golden and Chauvel, in its fullness, is in fact very similar to peace scholars' iterations of peace with justice—the absence of both direct and structural violence; an emphasis on justice; respect for the natural environment; pursuit of inner and spiritual peace; and respect for human rights (Jeong 1990; Nhat Hanh 2000; Reardon 1990). To reiterate, however, a fundamental human right that has not been upheld for Papuans is that of self-determination, with the option of independence. Therefore, until West Papuans' right to self-determination has been fulfilled, peace with justice, or merdeka, is emptied of meaning for West Papuans. This argument will now be explored by drawing on my field interviews and observations to analyze what it is that merdeka means to contemporary West Papuan leaders in West Papua, Papua New Guinea, Australia, Vanuatu, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Merdeka: West Papuan Aspirations

Meanings of merdeka communicated to me by West Papuans resonate with many of the human needs defined in John Burton's "human needs theory" as "obvious biological needs of food and shelter [and] ... basic human needs that relate to growth and development" (1990:36).

Burton writes that "human needs in individuals and identity groups who are engaged in ethnic and identity struggles are of this fundamental character ... and will be pursued by all means available" (1990:36). Further, he argues that

> needs [similar in this case to the components of merdeka] ... are inherent drives for survival and development, including identity and recognition. It is not within the free decision making of the individual to trade them. [Burton 1990:39–40]

Burton defends his theory, writing,

> The issue whether behaviour is determined genetically, environmentally or both, is not a profitable one for us to engage in at this state of knowledge. The fact that there are behaviours that cannot be controlled to fit requirements of particular societies [e.g., West Papuans' relentless struggle for self-determination, despite Indonesia's insistence on its current territorial integrity] is our concern, rather than the evolutionary explanation of this phenomenon. [Burton 1990:37]

In the West Papuan context, these needs range from minimum human needs and basic rights, such as employment, health care, education, equity of access to other such services and peace (security/freedom from violence and fear); to protection and respect of the natural environment and resources and religious and spiritual freedom; to the more abstract yet equally important need of West Papuans to exercise power and control over their lives through political and social planning and to keep their human dignity intact; and finally to justice—an end to impunity for those meting out violence—and a "'straightening' of history" (King 2004:85) to recognize West Papuans' as yet unfulfilled right to self-determination. Brief biographical details of interviewees quoted in the following sections, explaining their importance within the West Papuan independence movement and their political affiliations, are provided in Appendix 1.

Basic Human Needs (Security and Basic Welfare)

At the most basic level, then, merdeka is used by West Papuans, at home and abroad, to refer to negative peace (in terms of security) and to having access to the fundamentals of "the good" society. Ironically, though, Papuans in West Papua feel a lack of security to the extent that, according to a customary leader of the Marind tribe in Merauke who spoke to me in November 2008, people in Merauke are "scared to even talk about *merdeka*" because of the repercussions should the wrong person overhear.

A U.S.-based representative of the self-described West Papuan provisional government (the West Papua National Authority), Herman Wainggai, emphasized to me in an interview on November 4, 2009, in Melbourne, Australia, that West Papuans yearn for merdeka but stressed that it should be obtained peacefully and democratically, to counter the current lack of peace and security in West Papua. The thwarted ability to feel safe—a fundamental aspect of merdeka—has unsurprisingly fuelled the desire for independence. This was expressed to me by priest and West Papuan intellectual Neles Tebay in Jayapura, West Papua, on December 6, 2008. Although not himself an outspoken advocate of political independence, he said,

> I think the human rights violations committed by Indonesian security apparatus against indigenous Papuans have been one of the reasons [Papuans have] ... been strengthening their demand for independence ... Perhaps only one or two people are really committed to separation [through] independence, but when many people are treated badly, we have reason to join them, just to escape from this.

When I interviewed Otto Ondawame in Sydney, Australia, on July 11, 2009, he analyzed Indonesia's version of "peace" in West Papua—that is, the Special Autonomy Law—as a false peace that has further limited indigenous people's welfare. He views merdeka, by contrast, as being the catalyst for change that *will* provide basic welfare for West Papuans. President of the West Papua New Guinea National Congress, Michael Kareth, who lives in self-exile in Boekel, the Netherlands, elaborated on this connection when I interviewed him there on September 24, 2008, arguing,

> The meaning of independence [is to] protect these people, this nation, from the destruction, [and] killing [by] Indonesia ... The main thing is the social welfare [of the] people.

Benny Wenda, a West Papuan refugee and activist currently living in Oxford, England, also spoke of his hopes for merdeka, describing it in terms of West Papuans enjoying the basic freedoms of everyday living, when I interviewed him there on August 27, 2008:

> When [will my people] be free like other people? ... Free to go to hunting or gardening, [to] enjoy these [activities] with their family, and grow their own vegetables? ... I want to see them dancing with no military surrounding them ... One day I want to see my people go free, smiling, dancing.

On a similar note, Rev. Benny Giay of the Kingmi (indigenous) church of West Papua endorsed West Papuans' right to political self-determination in the hope that it will lead to welfare as a part of merdeka, when I spoke with him on December 5, 2008, in Jayapura, West Papua.

> We are strongly support[ing] it in our church ... Freedom is from God and, once you deny one's freedom then you are in trouble. God is not happy ... God is being hurt when Papuans are not being given the right to ... have access to education, to health, nutrition, culture and God is angry at ... [the] church when we sit here silent.

Cultural, Spiritual and Environmental Freedom

Besides the freedoms identified earlier, merdeka also refers to cultural and spiritual freedoms. A significant part of each of these freedoms has to do with West Papuans' connection to their land and the resources it yields, as can be gleaned from many of the explanations of merdeka that follow. When referring to the cultural aspects of merdeka, such as culturally appropriate development, including enjoyment of the West Papuan natural environment, it was evident that visions of merdeka fit definitions of a just peace but were stymied in their realization. Forkorus Yaboisembut, head of the *Dewan Adat Papua* (DAP) or National Customary Council, contended when I spoke to him in Jayapura on December 2, 2008, that

> there is a future for the Papuans if they don't disappear. Their culture, land and resources must be preserved. Government must be maintained and it must issue policies on land that must not be sold. Mining must be controlled and schools established for cultural education and democratic structures. But the Indonesian government regards all these as separatist activities ... My hope is that West Papua must be independent first so we can have a better future. We are not able to do that under the Indonesian system. We have tried but it is impossible.

Many descriptions of merdeka have a spiritual element to them, too, in that the West Papuans pursuing merdeka believe that it is a God-given right and that God will eventually facilitate its arrival. One ordained church leader in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, a West Papuan refugee and former member of the West Papuan guerrilla army, who wished to remain anonymous when he spoke to me there on August 30, 2009, explained his decision to fight for merdeka, saying,

> I thought, well, it's better for me to join my people for the struggle for independence ... freedom to me is [as] important as [it is] to any other West Papuan. Good to be free on your own land. That is the birthright. And we West Papuans feel that it is our right. Like any other nation, we are Melanesians, we have [a] different entity, we have [a] different identity ... West Papua has been given by God and West Papuans have sole right on that soil.

Political Freedom and Justice

The most popular meaning of merdeka, as political freedom, was frequently expressed throughout my field research as political independence or sovereign statehood, and was often linked to the concept of justice—for righting past political wrongs, such as overlooking West Papua's right to self-determination. When the desire for independence was articulated explicitly, as was often the case, it was frequently spoken of as nonnegotiable. For example, Jacob Prai, a founding fighter in the OPM, now exiled in Malmö, Sweden, told me when I interviewed him there on September 15, 2008, of the time he was jailed in PNG and was faced with the choice of either amnesty in Sweden or repatriation to West Papua, on the condition that he would give up the struggle for independence. Prai responded to the choice by saying, "It's better for me to die, than go back and ... [not] struggle." Oridek Ap explained *merdeka* when we spoke in the Hague on September 10, 2008:

> When I talk about merdeka, when most Papuans talk about merdeka, they mean independence. Merdeka is a word, an Indonesian word, but what we mean by merdeka is independence ... We want to have the opportunity to solve our own problems ... that is what we want—merdeka.

Benny Wenda likewise denies assertions that the freedom Papuans ask for is primarily metaphysical or spiritual as some have interpreted merdeka (see Golden 2000:33). In so doing, he refers to the Indonesian struggle for merdeka during the Dutch East Indies' decolonization process. When I interviewed him in Oxford on August 27, 2008, he stated, "This is always my question ... if [Indonesians just] wanted freedom spiritually, why [did] they fight against the Dutch?" Zachi Sawor, a West Papuan refugee living in Wageningen, the Netherlands, similarly proclaimed during our interview on September 25, 2008, that "to me ... merdeka is independence ... Independence is to raise everything yourself, like Australia and the Netherlands ... And, until now, Indonesia [is] the boss of the country, so the Papuans do nothing ... there is no independence at all." Hence,

merdeka is envisaged by many West Papuans as a sum of, or even greater than, its parts, rather than as a composite of a random selection of its parts chosen to fulfil a realpolitik agenda.

The right to self-determination is inherently important to West Papuans, not just because it is a first step in enabling the other benefits of merdeka to be implemented, but also because it represents West Papuan dignity and identity. This is echoed in the words of Andy Ayamiseba, former member of the West Papuan rock band the Black Brothers, who is a Papuan refugee living in Port Vila, Vanuatu. Speaking to me on July 20, 2009, in Port Vila, he stressed the importance of independence to Papuan identity and dignity. Regardless of any initial difficulties an independent West Papua might encounter, Ayamiseba explained,

> The issue here is that [of] identification of ourselves, our identity is—we are not Indonesian. Maybe when we become independent, the situation may be [that] our economy is not as good as [it was] under Indonesia, we have to crawl out, but you know we want to be ourselves ... I am a Papuan ... So, in all due respect to the Indonesians ... we are two different people: we are not Indonesians, they are not Papuans.

However, independence is not necessarily envisaged as the end point of merdeka, but rather as an imperative step toward its realization, the fulfilment of holistic emancipation-focused hopes for future peace. In our interview on September 24, 2008, in Boekel, the Netherlands, Michael Kareth contended that the "importance of independence is the first thing—we need to be free from any type of colonialist system." West Papuan student activist Markus Haluk, when I interviewed him in Jayapura on December 1, 2009, identified three fundamental issues. "First, politics. Our independence on first of December 1961 was destroyed by Sukarno. Second, human rights issues. And third, development: delivering services in education, health and infrastructure" to Papuan people. Hence, merdeka includes, rather than solely consists of, political independence. Viktor Kaisiepo reflected critically and at length during our interview on September 11, 2008, in Amersfoort, the Netherlands, on the importance of independence for merdeka, in effect blaming Indonesia for preventing West Papua from reaping the benefits of globalization while it is simultaneously exploited by the same:

> Of course I'm fighting for independence. [However,] when I was younger I believed independence [was] the [only] solution. But in a globalized world I don't think independence is the [whole] solution, because we have entered into a world that we call interdependence. I can't live without them and they can't live without me. Both of us cannot live without the resources ... I don't believe in West Papuan independence if it's not open to outer influences, because [it has] already been globalized. That's why I'm fighting Indonesia, Indonesia's trying to keep Indonesia together but that's not going to help, it's going to fall apart, it's like I'm raising a family and I say all kids should stay at home until mom and dad die at the age of 90, you should not marry you should not go, get out; no, that's stupid.

While the majority of West Papuans support political independence (this was emphasized by Paul Barber and Liem Soei Liong from TAPOL [a human rights organization that monitors Indonesia], whom I interviewed on September 3, 2008, in Surrey, England), it is the case that not all West Papuans are unified in pursuing independence as a goal of merdeka. Various West Papuan refugees, particularly in Port Moresby, when I spoke to them there on September 2, 2009, told me that the majority of West Papuans desired "full independence" but that "some leaders [are] you know, influenced by [the] Indonesian government." Their reference may have been to West Papuan Franzalbert Joku's Independent Group Supporting the Autonomous Region of Papua within the Republic of Indonesia (IGSSARPRI), which receives funds from the Indonesian government and advocates special autonomy and the repatriation of West Papuan refugees in PNG to West Papua (Vatsikopoulos 2007). At a 2007 conference hosted by advocacy group Indonesian Solidarity and the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney, Franzalbert Joku presented his views concerning West Papua's likely future opportunities:

> Special Autonomy Law and Papua's status as an autonomous region is a *fait accompli* and, having searched the globe in search of answers, the independence campaign has come to a dead end road. Those still searching for it, we have gone to the UN, to the PIF [Pacific Islands Forum], to other countries and each time we plea for help we are told to go back to Jakarta and sort your problems out. That's why I say the international system does not support the struggle for an independent nation state of Papua. [Joku 2007]

Joku's language, however, seems to be that of defeatist pragmatics,[8] an exhaustion of ideas, rather than an embracing of what special autonomy has to offer. While he argues that special autonomy is a "bottom up process ... as opposed to perceptions among Papuans abroad and ... supporters that it is something shoved down the throat of Papuans by politicians in Jakarta," and contends that it is "a golden political opportunity for Papuans to manage their own affairs, while enabling the central government

in Jakarta to preserve their country's sovereignty and national unity"; yet he does not go so far as to claim that special autonomy achieves what West Papuan people want it to—that is, merdeka—or even what the Special Autonomy Law itself purports to do. He goes so far as to mention what the law does not allow—that is, a wide-ranging list of limitations to self-rule that prohibits self-governance in political and security affairs; diplomatic and foreign relations with other countries in the pursuit of trade, investment, cultural and educational objectives; judicial and justice administration; education; and fiscal and monetary policies (Joku 2007). Yet, despite this, he entreats,

> Papuans should have every reason to now, I believe, firmly embrace the Special Autonomy Law, however diluted, imperfect or incomplete and I underline those words, "however diluted," imperfect or incomplete, [it] may be in [its] present form. Politics is the art of compromise and political compromise through regional autonomy is an important cornerstone in conflict management and resolution. I do not see any other option on the table [and] although there are various aspirations expressed ... realistically there is no other option on the table right now that we can legitimately discuss and pursue as an achievable goal. [Joku 2007]

In an appeal for Papuans and the international community to accept special autonomy, rather than pursue an act of self-determination, using a similar discourse of pragmatics, former West Papuan activist Nicholas Messet, now deputy chairperson of IGSSARPRI, provided a testimony in September 2010 to the U.S. Congress:

> After many years of struggle and hardship, I realized that I can only cry for so long. No amount of tears can bring back the past ... The Special Autonomy is the solution that is endorsed by the world community. This is the solution that is the most practical, good for Jakarta, good for the Papuans. [Federal News Service 2010]

Further, Messet calls upon those outside West Papua "not to make tensions worse because when things get worse in West Papua, you stay [home] in your comfort and we suffer" (Federal News Service 2010). This is a valid point that certainly needs to be considered by advocates for West Papuan rights but one that carries with it a veiled threat—that is, standing up for human rights will serve only to entrench abuses against West Papuans by the prevailing power, Indonesia. Perhaps unintentionally, it therefore reinforces the legitimacy of calls for independence and the claims of many other West Papuans and observers that a climate of human rights violations and impunity is ubiquitous in West Papua.[9] That threats of reprisals against West Papuans for rejecting special autonomy and calling for a referendum, coercion or corruption might be behind Messet's statements is supported by Burton's human needs theory, mentioned earlier, which posits that "it is not within the *free* decision making of the individual to trade [needs]," including the need for self-determination or, in Burton's words, for identity and development (Burton 1990:39–40). Further, that Messet's ideas about what will meet Papuans' needs have been influenced by Indonesian cultural and political hegemonic discourses is evident from his justification of special autonomy's shortcomings: "We are given millions of pounds to establish [special autonomy] ... but we are lazy. We are [too] lazy to do that" (Federal News Service 2010). This is internalized racism exemplified, which, in Camara Jones's terms,

> is defined as acceptance by members of the stigmatized races of negative messages about their own abilities and intrinsic worth. It is characterized by their not believing in others who look like them and not believing in themselves. It involves accepting limitations to one's own full humanity, including one's spectrum of dreams, one's right to self-determination and one's range of allowable self-expression. [2000:1213]

It appears, however, that the views represented by Joku and Messet—that is, special autonomy is perhaps an enabler of merdeka—are those of a minority of West Papuan leaders, particularly when seen in the light of recent events in West Papua, such as the mass rallies for a referendum mentioned at the beginning of this article, organized in June and July 2010 and throughout 2011, 2012 and 2013, by a broad representation of Papuan leaders who reject special autonomy. However, although I have demonstrated that West Papuans are largely united in their vision of what *merdeka* involves, throughout the five decades of their struggle for peace with justice, including independence, Papuans have employed various strategies for achieving their vision, while disagreeing over the efficacy of this or that approach. Nevertheless, this, as I shall argue, has not necessarily been to the detriment of the movement.

Merdeka-Seeking Efforts

"Power relations change ... as a result of the intentional exercise of power by specific, historically-situated individuals and groups ... The ability of individuals to create change—no matter how insignificant—is power" (Heller 1996:83). Counterintuitively, one of the most powerful agents of change in West Papuan politics has been factional and generational conflict. Competing ideas and networks, different resource pools and milieux of educa-

tion have spurred on various generations and factions of West Papuan political groups to more ambitious strategies and tactics in the pursuit of merdeka. Four major strategies for achieving merdeka through independence, each with diverse strengths and spheres of influence, are discernable as having operated, at times simultaneously, throughout West Papua's liberation struggle, building unity when necessary, branching out in different directions when possible, but always heading toward the same goal. These are: guerilla warfare, international diplomacy, acceptance of special autonomy as a stepping stone to building independence and campaigns for an independence referendum. Otto Ondawame reflects that it was the original split in the OPM between Jacob Prai and Seth Rumkorem in 1976 that "had the positive effect of opening up alternatives in approach and increased areas of control and mass participation" (2010:123).

The revolutionary urge instigated by the guerrilla-fighters who were the first generation of independence leaders has come full circle to the current (third) generation, albeit this time with an insistence on peaceful means. Despite the instances of intergenerational differences of opinion, this strengthens Garry Trompf's (1979) theory that important ideas, especially those so intimately linked with liberation, will be revisited repeatedly, even if the particular strategies associated with their epochs have become passé. The four main strategies employed by the three generations of West Papuan freedom fighters since Indonesian occupation are highly contingent upon the political and social milieu of the leaders of each of the strategies. Thus, once they realized that they had been abandoned by the Dutch, leaders of the first generation who remained in West Papua tended to engage in guerrilla warfare as a significant complement to the overseas lobby work that others were undertaking at the time, given its strategic prevalence during the decolonization era as well as its revolutionary philosophical underpinnings. As times changed and the international backing for decolonization fell away, the leaders of the second generation of independence fighters searched for other means to secure international support for West Papuan freedom. Some pragmatists chose to accommodate Jakarta's offer of special autonomy, as has been discussed, believing that an increasingly democratizing Indonesia should be given a chance to display its new colours. Others have decided to pursue peaceful dialogue with the hope that independence might eventually be put on the dialogue agenda. In recent years, however, a revolutionary appeal to the international community to sponsor a fair referendum for West Papua was instigated by third-generation independence leaders, Victor Yeimo told me in an interview via Skype on June 1, 2010. This has been taken up since 2010 by leaders from the first and second generations too, and appears to be the strategy that currently enjoys the most traction (Webb-Gannon 2011).

My research reveals that factional membership loosely follows generational lines and, to a degree, dictates strategy preference (Webb-Gannon 2011:198–254). (A table of the different factions of the West Papuan independence movement and their chronological emergence is included as Appendix 2.) Hence, factions of the OPM and its armed wing are proud of their guerrilla backgrounds, even if various members have renounced guerrilla strategies and have joined new factions. Few have given up OPM allegiance, preferring instead to join other groups as well, including the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation, the umbrella group of West Papuan liberation organizations based in Port Vila, Vanuatu; the West Papua New Guinea National Congress, an interim government based in PNG and the Netherlands; and West Papua National Authority (WPNA) instigated Federal Republic of West Papua (FRWP), a powerful, on-the-ground, parallel government. A prominent member of the Papuan Customary Council (DAP), the late Viktor Kaisiepo, supported special autonomy as the best strategy for West Papuan independence until his death in 2010, believing that, as it had the support of world powers, it probably represented West Papua's best chance of attaining respect for indigenous rights with global backing. He was in the minority within the DAP, however, which has become increasingly referendum-oriented over the past four years (Webb-Gannon 2011:237–239). The WPNCL is primarily made up of second-generation independence activists, with some first-generation supporters as well, and favours strategic, peaceful dialogue with Indonesia. WPNGNC and the WPNA/FRWP are made up mainly of second- and some first-generation leaders. WPNGNC rejects dialogue altogether and seeks international recognition of West Papua's independence, while the WPNA/FRWP does not reject dialogue outright but has little faith in its feasibility. Third-generation youth and student groups, the most prominent of which currently is the West Papua National Committee (KNPB), also reject dialogue and seek an internationally monitored referendum for West Papua. To draw international attention, which is part of their strategy, this generation operates tactically within a similar sort of "subaltern counterpublic" as that referred to by Na'puti (2014), when she writes about the resistance movement among certain Chamoru of Guam, who use blogs, their own press and distinctive rhetorical strategies to build community.

Of course, cultural background and diasporic location play a role in factional and strategic choice as well. My conversations with anonymous West Papuan leaders in Sydney, Australia, on June 1, 2010, showed that conflict between generations exists to a degree, with some resentment among young leaders that various older leaders are outstaying their welcome and among older leaders that the younger ones have too little strategic discretion. However, for the most part, each generation has built and continues to build on the strategic strengths and ideas of the others. This pertains to factions as well. While interpersonal feuds between leaders of different factions are at times destructive and waste energy, they are by no means uncommon in any political conflict situation anywhere in the world. Instead, strategic inter-factional conflict has also been able to play a constructive role in West Papuan politics, an aim of conflict transformation (Galtung 1996:96), with each faction promoting their own strategies and chasing strategic achievements with perhaps more fervor than they would have had there been no competition. A larger-picture unity of spirit and of ambition, as West Papuans build for themselves an enhanced international profile, is thus emerging (see Webb-Gannon 2011 for an in-depth analysis of the various West Papuan independence factions and their strategies).

Conclusion

West Papua's struggle for decolonization, I have argued, understands merdeka as peace with justice, indivisibly practical and spiritual. Moreover, peace with justice, which has so far eluded West Papua during its recent colonial history, includes the political right to exercise self-determination with the option of founding an independent state. Syllogistically speaking then, the opportunity to choose an independent state is a necessary step toward the actualization of merdeka. However, just as "negative peace is a necessary but not sufficient condition for positive peace" (Barash 2000:2), so independence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for merdeka.

Regardless of whether sovereign state status is recognized in West Papua, Papuans still face a maze of challenges to a just peace and to achieving the many other dimensions of merdeka, Andy Ayamiseba told me on July 20, 2009, in Port Vila, Vanuatu. These may include intertribal and ethnic tensions, elite exploitation, endemic violence against women, difficult development and resource management decisions and tensions between diaspora and in-country leaders (see Webb-Gannon 2011:144–195 for further details regarding how West Papuans envisage dealing with these and other issues they may face if independence is achieved). However, as Oridek Ap pointed out, when I interviewed him in the Hague on September 10, 2008, in the event of attaining independence, these would be West Papuan problems and it would be the right and responsibility of the West Papuan people—united as a polity, with a democratically agreed governance system—to decide how to address these in line with shared West Papuan understandings of merdeka.

Camellia Webb-Gannon, Justice Research Group, University of Western Sydney, Bankstown Campus, Room 21.G.19, Locked Bag 1797, Penrith South DC, NSW 2751, Australia. E-mail: c.webb-gannon@uws.edu.au.

Notes

1 The territory located on the western half of the island of New Guinea has experienced frequent name changes corresponding with its colonial occupiers and their political plans. Given the proliferation of name changes, in this article I use the term *West Papua*, in solidarity with West Papuans who chose this name in 1961, to denote the entire territory of what has now been divided into Papua and Papua Barat provinces. (For more on the history of the territory's names, including West New Guinea, West Irian and Irian Jaya, see King 2004:19–20.)

2 Western scholars might propose less controversial definitions of *merdeka* (i.e., those that do not include independence) for a number of reasons, including an acceptance of or belief in the Indonesian ideology of NKRI (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* or the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, which includes "Sabang to Merauke"), concerns about retaining research visa access to Indonesia, efforts not to upset Indonesian/Australian academic exchange partnerships and efforts to avoid controversy for scholars' own (especially Australian government-funded) institutions, such as public universities, or a defeatist view of the likelihood of West Papuan aspirations coming to fruition, which might lead to the support of the "second-best" option of special autonomy.

3 The data for this article were collected as part of my Ph.D. research, now written up in my 2011 dissertation *Birds of a Feather: Conflict and Unity within West Papua's Independence Movement.* I used semi-structured interviews and participant observation as methods of data collection in West Papua (Indonesia), Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and the United Kingdom. I interviewed West Papuan political, religious, customary and women leaders, as well as non-Papuan experts on the independence movement. The majority of my fieldwork was carried out between August 2008 and September 2009, although I continued to collect data throughout the course of my candidature, which was finalized in June 2011. Interviews and other data drawn on for the dissertation and for this article were limited to the English and Indonesian languages.

4 See the United Nations General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-

tries and Peoples Resolution 1514, which states, "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the United Nations Charter, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation, and that steps should be taken to transfer, unconditionally, all powers to the trust and non-self-governing territories so that they might enjoy complete freedom and independence" (United Nations 1960). Additionally, the right to self-determination is enshrined in treaty law through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (United Nations 1966a) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (United Nations 1966b), both of which declare in Article 1 that "all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they may freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."

5 This suspicion of genocide was expressed on the banner displayed on the outrigger canoe, taken by the 43 West Papuan refugees who arrived in Australia in January 2006, which read, "Save West Papua people soul from genocide, intimidation and terrorist, from military government of Indonesia. Also we West Papuan need freedom, peace, love and justice in our homeland" [sic] (Australia Council of Trade Unions 2006).

6 International human rights lawyer Jennifer Robinson notes that even at the time of the UN sanctioning of the Act of Free Choice, prior to the concept of West Papuan independence being thoroughly "socialized" by independence advocates in West Papua, "UN officials admitted in private that 95 per cent of Papuans supported independence" and that the "process of consultation did not allow a genuinely free choice to be made" (Robinson 2010:173).

7 Other factors uniting many West Papuans include: a steadfast belief that God will deliver independence to them; an emphasis on a pan–West Papuan, Melanesian identity; ideas about a future democratic "federation of tribes"–type government (which, given the vastly varying sizes of Papuan tribes, and the significant migrant population, would struggle to operate democratically); and a strategic, Christian and Melanesian valuing of unity within the independence movement (see Webb-Gannon 2011 for a more comprehensive exploration of these unifying factors).

8 As mentioned previously, many West Papuan leaders whom I interviewed believe that genocide will be the horrific alternative fate of the West Papuan people if special autonomy, rather than independence, remains the foundation of West Papua's future governance. Most West Papuan leaders whom I have interviewed are convinced, partly because of the horrific nature of what they believe to be the alternative to independence, partly because they believe it is their God-given human right and partly because there is international precedent (e.g., East Timor, Kosovo and South Sudan), that they will achieve independence and, therefore, do not agree with Messet and Joku's realpolitik stance (Webb-Gannon 2011).

9 See, for example, comments by Sophie Richardson from Human Rights Watch and Salamon Yumame from FORDEM (Forem Demokrasi) (Federal News Service 2010).

References

Anderson, Benedict
2006 Imagined Communities. Rev. edition. London: Verso.

Australia Council of Trade Unions
2006 ACTU Supports Rights of West Papuan Asylum Seekers. Scoop World Independent News. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0601/S00291.htm, accessed April 5, 2010.

Barash, David
2000 Approaches to Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beanal, Tom and Forkorus Yaboisembut
2008 2008 Deklarasi Bangsa Papua Barat Pada Tanggal, December 1. Jayapura, printed flyer.

Brown, Dominic
2009 Forgotten Bird of Paradise. London: Dancing Turtle Media, 27 min.

Brundige, Elizabeth, Winter King, Prineyha Vahali, Stephen Vladeck and Xian Yuan
2004 Indonesian Human Rights Abuse in West Papua: An Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of Indonesian Control. New Haven: Allan J. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, Yale University.

Burton, John
1990 Conflict: Resolution and Provention. New York: St Martin's Press.

Chauvel, Richard
2005 Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation, Policy Studies. Washington, DC: East-West Center, Washington.

Drooglever, Pieter
2009 An Act of Free Choice: Decolonization and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua. Oxford: One World.

Elmslie, Jim
2002 Irian Jaya under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus West Papuan Nationalism. Adelaide: Crawford House.

2010 West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 Indonesian Census: "Slow Motion Genocide" Or Not? Papua Papers. Sydney: West Papua Project, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies.

Elmslie, Jim and Camellia Webb-Gannon
2013 A Slow Motion Genocide: Indonesian Rule in West Papua. Griffith Journal of Law and Human Dignity 1(2):142–166.

Federal News Service
2010 Preliminary Transcript of September 22, 2010 Congressional Hearing on West Papua. Convened by the Asia, Pacific and Global Environment Subcommittee of the House of Foreign Affairs Committee. http://www.etan.org/news/2010/09wpapuahearing.htm, accessed March 17, 2011.

Fernandes, Clinton
2006 Reluctant Indonesians: Australia, Indonesia and the Future of West Papua. Melbourne: Scribe Short Books.

Galtung, Johan
1996 Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilisation. London: SAGE.
Golden, Brigham
2000 Letter to the Editor. Van Zorge Report 2(20):33–34.
Heller, Kevin J.
1996 Subjectification and Resistance in Foucault. SubStance 25(1.79):78–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3685230.
International Crisis Group
2001 Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya, ICG Asia Report. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
Jeong, H.-W.
1990 Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Joku, Franzalbert
2007 Problems and Prospects of the Special Autonomy Law. Paper presented at the West Papua: Paths to Justice and Prosperity Conference, Indonesian Solidarity and the West Papua Project, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, Sydney. August 9–10.
Jones, Camara
2000 Levels of Racism: A Theoretic Framework and a Gardener's Tale. American Journal of Public Health 90(8):1212–1215. http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.90.8.1212.
Junker, Laura Lee
1999 Raiding, Trading, and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
King, Peter
2004 West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos? Sydney: UNSW Press.
Kirksey, S. Eben and J. A. D. Roemajauw
2002 The Wild Terrorist Gang: The Semantics of Violence and Self-Determination in West Papua. Oxford Development Studies 30(2):189–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600810220138294.
Kirsch, Stuart
2002 Rumour and Other Narratives of Political Violence in West Papua. Critique of Anthropology 22(1):53–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0308275X020220010301.
2010 Ethnographic Representations and the Politics of Violence in West Papua. Critique of Anthropology 30(1):3–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0308275X09363213.
Kuehling, Susanne
2014 The Converted War Canoe: Cannibal Raiders, Missionaries and *Pax Britannica* on Dobu Island, Papua New Guinea. Anthropologica 56(2):269–283.
Lederach, John Paul
1995 Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Na'puti, Tiara R.
2014 On Speaking the Language of Peace: Chamoru Resistance and Rhetoric in Guåhan's Self-Determination Movement. Anthropologica 56(2):301–313.
Nhat Hanh, T.
2000 Being Peace. *In* Approaches to Peace. D. Barash, ed. Pp. 204–208. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ondawame, Otto
2010 One People, One Soul: West Papuan Nationalism and the Organisasi Papua Merdeka. Adelaide: Crawford House.
Osborne, Robin
1985 Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Reardon, Betty
1990 Feminist Concepts of Peace and Security. *In* A Reader in Peace Studies. P. Smoker, R. Davies and B. Munske, eds. Pp. 136–143. London: Pergamon Press.
Reid, Anthony
1998 Merdeka: The Concept of Freedom in Indonesia. *In* Asian Freedoms: The Idea of Freedom in East and Southeast Asia. D. Kelly and A. Reid, eds. Pp. 141–160. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Robinson, Jennifer
2010 Self Determination and the Limits of Justice: West Papua and East Timor. *In* Future Justice. H. Sykes, ed. Pp. 168–187. Sydney: Future Leaders.
Rutherford, Danilyn
2003 Raiding the Land of the Foreigners: The Limits of the Nation on an Indonesian Frontier. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Saltford, John
2003 The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal. London: Routledge Curzon. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203221877.
Serving History
2010 Mardijker People: Origins. http://www.servinghistory.com/topics/Mardijker_people:sub:Origins, accessed September 28, 2010.
Timmer, Jaap
2005 Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua. State, Society and Governance in Melanesia. Australian National University Discussion Paper Series, 2005/6.
Trompf, Garry
1979 The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought. Berkeley: University of California.
United Nations
1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples—Resolution 1514 (XV).
1966a International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – General Assembly Resolution 2200A. XXI.
1966b International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – General Assembly Resolution 2200A. XXI.
Vatsikopoulos, Helen
2007 Papua's Special Autonomy: Interview with Papuan Autonomy Advocate Franz Albert Joku. Australian Network—Asia Pacific Focus (Australian Broadcasting Commission). http://australianetwork.com/focus/s2003388.htmQ1, accessed March 17, 2011.

Webb-Gannon, Camellia
2011 Birds of a Feather: Conflict and Unity within West Papua's Independence Movement. Ph.D. dissertation, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney.
Westpapuambaham
2011 Pengembailan Otonomi Khusus oleh MRP dan masyarakat asli Papua. www.youtube.com/watch?v=eRes3cXmQpg, accessed March 25, 2011.
Widjojo, Muridan, Adriana Elisabeth, Cahyo Pamungkas Amiruddin and Rosita Dewi
2008 Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future. Jakarta: Indonesian Institute of Sciences.
Wing, John and Peter King.
2005 Genocide in West Papua: The Role of the Indonesian State Apparatus and a Current Needs Assessment of the Papuan People. Sydney: Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney.

Appendix 1 – West Papuans Interviewed

Ayamiseba, Andy: July 20, 2009, Port Vila, Vanuatu. Ajamiseba is a West Papuan refugee based in Port Vila, Vanuatu. He managed the West Papuan band the Black Brothers, and is a spokesperson for the West Papuan National Coalition for Liberation.

Ap, Oridek: Interview with the author, September 10, 2008, the Hague, the Netherlands. Ap is son of assassinated West Papuan musician and anthropologist Arnold Ap. He is an activist for West Papua in the Hague, the Netherlands, with his family.

Giay, Benny: December 5, 2008, Jayapura, West Papua. Giay is the head of the indigenous Kingmi Church of West Papua and a human rights advocate.

Haluk, Markus: Interview translated by Rex Rumakiek, December 1, 2008, Jayapura, West Papua. Haluk is a student leader with pro-independence student organization AMPTPI.

Kareth, Michael: September 24, 2008, Boekel, the Netherlands. Kareth is the president of the West Papua New Guinea National Congress.

Kaisiepo, Viktor: September 11, 2008, Amersfoort, the Netherlands. Kasiepo, now deceased, was the founder of PaVo and an indigenous rights advocate and refugee in the Netherlands.

Ondawame, Otto: July 11, 2009, Sydney, Australia. Ondawame is the vice-chairperson for the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation, based in Port Vila, Vanuatu.

Prai, Jacob: September 15, 2008, Malmö, Sweden. Prai is one of the founders of the OPM. He and his son Joseph operate the OPM office in Malmö, Sweden.

Rumakiek, Rex: January 21, 2010, Sydney, Australia. Rumakiek is the secretary general of the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation.

Sawor, Zachi: September 25, 2008, Ede-Wageningen, the Netherlands. Sawor was one of the first West Papuans under the Dutch New Guinea administration to be educated in the Netherlands, where he still resides.

Tebay, Neles: December 6, 2008, Jayapura, West Papua. Tebay is a Catholic priest and intellectual, preparing West Papuans for (a hoped-for) dialogue with Indonesia.

Wainggai, Herman: November 4, 2009, Melbourne, Australia. Wainggai organized the voyage of the 43 refugees from West Papua to Australia in January 2006. He is a student leader and activist, and a member of the West Papua National Authority,

Wenda, Benny: August 27, 2008, Oxford, UK. Wenda and his family are refugees and musicians living in Oxford. He is a founding member of the International Parliamentarians for West Papua.

Yeimo, Victor: June 1, 2010, via Skype from Sydney, Australia (author) to Jayapura, West Papua (Yeimo). Yeimo is a student leader and former political prisoner. He is a key figure in the KNPB resistance organization.

Yaboisembut, Forkorus: December 2, 2008, Jayapura, West Papua. Yaboisembut is the head of the Dewan Adat Papua (Papuan Customary Council). He lives in Jayapura.

Appendix 2 – Factions within West Papua's Independence Movement

Faction/Affiliation	Strategy	(Main) Generational Membership	Position on Independence	Countries of Operation	Description
OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka)	Dialogue	All generations	Pro-independence	West Papua, PNG, Australia, Vanuatu, the Netherlands, Sweden	Est. 1965, Manokwari, to resist Indonesian occupation
TPN (Tentara Pembebsan Nasional)—armed group of the OPM	Mixed: peaceful dialogue, referendum, armed resistance	Gen 1: 1933–1948	Pro-independence	West Papua, PNG, Sweden	Est. 1970, border region of West Papua, to prepare for "radical action" before the AoFC
WPNGNC (West Papua New Guinea National Congress)	International intervention and recognition of independence	Gen 2: 1950–65 (with some Gen 1 and 3)	Pro-independence	West Papua, PNG, the Netherlands	Est. 1994, PoM, PNG, as "caretaker government" for WP
PDP (Presidium Dewan Papua)	Referendum; dialogue	Gen 2: 1950–65	Pro-independence	West Papua, Vanuatu	Mandated in 2000 to work peacefully for West Papuan independence
DAP (Dewan Adat Papua)	Referendum	Gen 2: 1950–65	Mixed, but increasingly pro-independence	West Papua	Est. 2002 to protect WP indigenous rights
WPNA (West Papua National Authority)	Referendum; dialogue	Gen 2: 1950–65 (and some Gen 3)	Pro-independence	West Papua, Australia, Vanuatu	Est. 2004 in West Papua as a "provisional" or "transitional" govt. for WP
IGSSARPRI (Independent Group Supporting the Special Autonomous Region of Papua within the Republic of Indonesia)	Special autonomy	Gen 2: 1950–65	Pro–special autonomy	West Papua, Indonesia, PNG	Est. 2006 to assist the Indonesian/PNG governments in repatriating West Papuan refugees to WP
WPNCL (West Papua National Coalition for Liberation)	Dialogue	Gen 2: 1950–65	Pro-independence	West Papua, PNG, Australia, Vanuatu	Est. 2008, Port Vila, Vanuatu, as umbrella body for WP independence groups
KNPB (Komite Nasional Papua Barat)	Referendum	Gen 3: 1971–87	Pro-independence	West Papua, Indonesia	Est. 2008 to support the International Parliamentarians for West Papua launch in London, and as a media clearing house for West Papuan resistance news
FORDEM (Forum Demokrasi)	Referendum	Gen 2: 1950–65 and Gen 3: 1971–87	Pro-independence	West Papua	Est. 2009 in Jayapura, West Papua, to protest against special autonomy
FRWP (Federal Republic of West Papua)	Referendum	All generations	Pro-independence	West Papua, USA, Australia	Est. 2011 in Jayapura, West Papua, to govern a newly declared (but not internationally recognized) independent West Papua