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Anthropology in an Era of Permanent War

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Abstract: Anthropologists are increasingly called on to work within and for military institutions in the United States. The entanglement of anthropological knowledge and military power should be set in context of the monumental growth and size and the imperial deployment of the U.S. military. There has been a striking absence of work in anthropology around the question of U.S. military power during the six decades of its permanent mobilization. This paper distinguishes between an anthropology of and an anthropology for the military, and proposes research foci that might help our discipline understand militarization, its effects and the routes to its reversal.

Keywords: militarization, U.S. military, anthropological knowledge, Permanent War, U.S. university research funding

Résumé : De plus en plus, on fait appel aux anthropologues pour travailler avec et au sein des institutions militaires aux États-Unis. On devrait considérer l'interpénétration du savoir anthropologique et de la puissance militaire dans le contexte de la croissance et de la dimension monumentale du déploiement impérial des forces américaines. L'absence de recherche en anthopologie autour de la question de la puissance militaire américaine au cours de six décennies de mobilisatrion permanente est frappante. Cette communication établit la distinction entre l'anthropologie du phénomène militaire et l'anthropologie pour les militaires, et propose des domaines de recherche susceptibles d'aider notre discipline à comprendre la militarisation, ses effets et les moyens de la contrer.

Mots-clés : militarisation, puissance militaire américaine, savoir anthropologique, guerre permanente, financement de la recherche universitaire aux États-Unis

Introduction

Anthropologists today have fanned out from the university to ply their craft in locations as diverse as hospitals, human rights organizations, corporate offices and forensic police labs. In increasing numbers, they also work within military institutions. In broadest location, however, the discipline operates inside national and political environments that shape the ideas in which they traffic. The theme for this CASCA conference encourages us to try and make sense of what difference these contexts of work and politics make to our field.[1] I will do so by asking particularly about the giant state just to the south of here, and the more or less visible effects of its quite staggeringly large military on our field and on the universities. I end with some thoughts on what kind of research might help our discipline understand militarization, its effects and the routes to its reversal.

I want to ask about the entanglement of anthropological knowledge and military power during the long Permanent War that began, by some reckonings, in 1947 (Lens 1987; Sherry 1997). I want to point to both the continuities and the ruptures from that year to the present era of the Global War on Terror. With the notable exception of the Vietnam War years, there has been an eerie silence in our field around the question of U.S. military power through most of this 60 year period. But this issue has come under renewed examination today as the U.S. military turns once more to recruit the discipline and its members to its work. This is evident in both the turn to "cultural awareness" as a concept and set of educational and training practices in the military (Brown 2008; Gregory 2008) and its combat deployment in the Human Terrain System (Gonzalez 2009), as well as the Minerva initiative, announced in April 2008, which has focused Department of Defense (DoD) funds on university social sciences, including and especially anthropology.

The Era of Permanent War

In 1987, Sidney Lens (1987) gave the name Permanent War to the era in which peacetime military spending and a permanent war footing were normalized in the U.S. He argues Permanent War began in 1947 with passage of the National Security Act and a variety of executive orders. They produced a *revolutionary* rupture in U.S. state organization, instituting what Lens argued was a second, secret government that was housed in a set of new organizations, including the National Security Agency (NSA), National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). At the head of this second state was a new, more imperial President permitted, or better created by, the National Security Act. From the Act's passage on, military activities fell under heavy mask from public oversight. The U.S. became a "national security state."

Military activities and funding mushroomed. A multimillion person standing army was established (rather than the previous small force to which troops were added on a temporary basis for individual, declared wars). Massive investments in science produced weapons which would be without competitors in lethality, stealth and sophistication. The U.S. military already had the most deadly military by the Second World War, when the "kill ratio" in the case of some planes was 11 Japanese shot down for every American (Donald 1995). During the invasion of Iraq, U.S. and British forces killed 60 Iraqis for every one of their soldiers killed by Iraqis (Conetta 2004).

The scale of the U.S. military begins with its funding: the United States currently has the largest military budget of any contemporary or historical state. A small downturn at the end of the Cold War notwithstanding, that spending continued apace until it grew with abandon after 9/11. A good portion of it is the so-called "black budget," whose funds are kept secret even from Congress. While this invisible accounting practice began as part of the Manhattan Project, under Ronald Reagan, it came to be relied on for an ever larger number of military projects; the DoD portion doubled during the Bush years, reaching US$32 billion a year by the end. Billions more in black funds go to the CIA and NSA, whose budgets are completely classified, disguised as seemingly unrelated line items in the budgets of other government departments, which sometimes even Congress does not realize (Broad 2008; Weiner 1990).

The money involved overall is astounding, with approximately US$1.2 trillion slated to be spent on military matters in 2009. This includes the formal DoD budget, separate "off-budget" costs for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, military spending buried and often not counted as such in other areas of the budget such as the Department of Energy, NASA and the State Department, debt payments for past and current wars, and Department of Veterans Affairs allocations.But this huge number represents only a fraction of the actual cost of the military, as Bilmes and Stiglitz (2008) show in their study of past and future costs of the Iraq war. They put the price tag very conservatively at US$3 trillion, a total that so far exceeds official budget figures because it includes the macroeconomic effects that follow from both insecurity and higher oil prices, as well as such things as wounded veterans' lifetime disability payments, the opportunity costs of using the civilian labour of the National Guard and Reserve, lost economic productivity of dead troops and health care costs for those with traumatic brain injury, burns, facial destruction and mental illness. The Cold War stage of the Permanent War had similar costs: by one estimate, the U.S. nuclear arsenal cost US$5.5 trillion to create and maintain during those 45 years. The probable cost of cleaning up U.S. nuclear weapons facilities will likely approach the costs of making those weapons in the first place (Schwartz 1998).

What makes the U.S. military stand out in world historical context as well is its imperial structuring and reach is that it is the world's first and only truly global empire (while the British, in the first half of the 20th century, had a financial supremacy unrivalled before and since [Kelly 2006], they did not have military presence in and surveillance of nearly as many places). Officially, there are currently over 190,000 troops and 115,000 civilian employees sited at 909 military facilities in 46 countries and territories (Department of Defense 2007). Those bases are located on 795,000 acres of land that the U.S. military owns or rents, and contain 26,000 buildings and structures valued at US$146 billion. These DoD numbers, however, are quite misleading as to the scale of U.S. overseas military basing: they exclude the massive amount of building and troop movement into Iraq and Afghanistan over the last several years, as well as secret or unacknowledged facilities in such places as Israel, Kuwait and the Philippines (Lutz 2009).

The U.S. military patrols and surveys the globe with fleets of planes, ships and satellites 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The U.S. military rents or owns over 28 million acres of land, and stores extensive amounts of weaponry there, including nuclear bombs and missiles whose presence in any particular country it refuses to acknowledge. This global power projection, as they call it, is legitimated by bilateral and multilateral security agreements, many of which were signed between the U.S.

and its vanquished enemies or with war-battered allies. These unequal relationships of the post-Second World War and now post-Cold War environments became permanently inscribed in international treaty law, something the U.S. has attempted to accomplish in Iraq as well.

The U.S. military spends some of its billions on personnel, with the result that it has become the largest employer in the U.S., with even the largest corporations mere pikers in comparison. The Pentagon pays the wages of 2.3 million soldiers and 700,000 civilians. Having modelled itself after the neoliberal business restructuring of the last several decades, the military now has almost as many temporary employees as permanent: 1.4 million soldiers are permanent employees in the regular branches of the military and 0.9 million in the Reserves and National Guard are called up and fully paid only when they are needed. The Pentagon directly or indirectly writes the paycheque of millions more Americans through weapons and other contracts. When these workers are added to the above, military labour constitutes approximately 5% of the total U.S. workforce. That percentage would be much larger (as it has been for some other highly militarized societies of the past) were it not for the fact that the U.S. mode of warfare displays a preference for more capital-intensive advanced weapons rather than more soldiers.

Most military contracting has provided jobs to industrial, scientific and technical workers designing and producing weapons. In that capacity, one quarter of the scientists and technicians in the U.S. work on military contracts (Korb 1986). Increasingly, work once done only by those in uniform is now subcontracted out to civilian organizations by the DoD.[2] The ballooning of the number of companies selling "private warriors" to the Pentagon occurred alongside the neoliberal restructuring just mentioned. The phenomenon is also the result of successful lobbying by military corporations for budgetary consideration. Companies such as KBR (Kellogg, Brown & Root), Vinnel and Blackwater (now Xe Services), have been doing extensive base construction, providing logistics, training the soldiers of other militaries and providing protection services for military bases and domestic and foreign officials. They have been doing this with many low-level employees from the global south as one route to windfall profits. They have been making such money for years, but many have recently become infamous for their financial and physical abuses in Iraq. By 2007, there were 180,000 civilians on U.S. military contracts in Iraq (21,000 of them Americans, 118,000 Iraqis, and the remaining 43,000 from other countries). In addition, estimates of the number of private armed security guards working for government agencies, nonprofits, and businesses range from 6,000 to 30,000 (Miller 2007).

The U.S. warehouse of weaponry has been called a "Baroque Arsenal" by one analyst (Kaldor 1981). The process by which those weapons have been constructed is a lesson in the relationship between science, technology and profit. It has produced, at the peak of lethality, the still immense number of 6,000 actively deployed nuclear warheads.[3] Many types of missiles, each of great complexity and expense, have been produced. Just one example is the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile, which the Raytheon Systems Company sold to the U.S. government for US$386,000 each. The platforms for launch of such weapons are much more expensive. The Air Force recently bought 91 fighter aircraft (F-22A Raptors) from the Lockheed Martin and Boeing corporations. A total of 183 of the jets will be purchased with the Government Accounting Office estimating that the cost will total US$361 million per individual aircraft. The profits from such military sales go to these and other major contractors whose return on equity is twice that of other manufacturing companies on average—the result of government subsidizing of their research and development costs and infrastructure expenses, and the government's absorption of business risk.

Arms sales and grants to other countries provide a large additional portion of profit to such military corporations. The U.S. is the largest arms dealer in the world, with exports totaling US$124 billion in the years 1999-. 2006. Many of those sales have the effect of provoking local arms races and are deeply destabilizing. Raytheon's AMRAAM missile, for example, is now in operation in dozens of countries allied to the U.S., including Taiwan which was sold 218 missiles in a large package of weaponry valued at approximately US$421 million in 2007 alone.

Some U.S. weapons are relatively normalized in the context of global militarization. Others have been controversial, including weapons considered to fall under the category of banned use, such as white phosphorus bombs, which the U.S. has used in Iraq.[4] Also highly problematized have been U.S. cluster bombs which explode and spill out hundreds of "bomblets" across large expanses of territory. They have a high "dud" rate which means thousands of unexploded submunitions can be scattered for civilians to accidently come across. The Dublin Convention on Cluster Munitions was endorsed in 2008 and is the beginning of a ban on their use; the U.S. is not expected to sign.The U.S. is among the minority of countries which have yet to ratify the Ottawa Treaty, the international treaty banning landmines, which have killed or maimed

millions (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2008).

Anthropology in the Era of Permanent War

It is widely acknowledged that anthropological work took place in a colonial context. Less often recognized is the fact that it has taken place in the context of war and militarization. This has shaped where anthropologists have gone, what they have said and who has been allowed to say it (Lutz 1999). Examples extend from the work of American anthropologists on the essentially war refugee populations of Native America to Malinowski's First World War sojourn in the Trobriands—lengthened by his status as an enemy alien in Britain to which he could then not return. It includes the battalions of anthropologists working for the War Department in the Second World War, estimated by Ross to be near 95% of all U.S. anthropologists working in the early 1940s (Wax 2008:89-90). They produced the ethnographies-at-a-distance of the Japanese and later the Soviets meant for use in besting U.S. enemies and they put together cultural compendia of areas targetted for influence or acquisition. There later followed the backlash and new interest in power and knowledge that emerged in anthropology in the context of the Vietnam War. And we now find ourselves awash in the effects of the War on Terror and its new crop of anthropologist employees of the Pentagon.

During this whole era of Permanent War since 1947, anthropologists have quite sensibly avoided field sites where they might be shot, and they have avoided sites which might lead to questions about their national loyalty. These included areas of heavy U.S. military and military proxy violence, as well as "enemy territory" (i.e., the Soviet Union and its bloc and China during the Cold War). War and war preparation, on the other hand, sometimes made field sites a kind of war booty, as for English anthropologists in Africa and Japanese and then U.S. anthropologists in Micronesia.

The growth of U.S. universities, and with them teachers and students of anthropology, was, in important measure, the result of the bargain the U.S. state struck with its Second World War veterans in the form of the GI Bill. The affluence that put a generation of men in college with the privilege of learning of the world and all that is in it emerged from having escaped war at home. It was also the result of the trade advantages of that postwar world, and the network of military bases and power that helped ensure market access and cheap oil.

David Price (2008) has written comprehensive histories of the relationship between anthropology and the security apparatus in the U.S. through the Second World War and the Cold War. In them, he details both this kind of anthropological assistance in identifying and figuring out how to respond to and best represent "the enemy," as well as the red-baiting and repression that resulted in firings of leftists and pushed the field away from the hot topics of militarization and from studying up. As Wax sums it up, the militarized climate of that era "snuffed out all meaningful opposition to the official version of the Cold War" (2008:32).

Structural functionalism, moreover, treated modern war as an *event* around which anthropologists had to peer in order to see the stable *patterns* that were considered to be the real sociocultural thing. In the early years of Permanent War, anthropologists' ownership of the Savage Slot helped produce the discipline's focus on "primitive war." These wars were decidedly *not* events; they were the patterns of the people without history. The proliferation of this work is evident in Ferguson and Farragher's bibliography (1988) which identifies hundreds of articles on the subject through the 1950s and 1960s. These studies tended to be ahistoric and depoliticized, a safer analytic strategy in the McCarthy era, to be sure. This all left civilized war as the unmarked category. Modern wars, like those the U.S. participated in and prepared for, were seen as the very engine of history, a result of the strategic rather than cultural reasoning of states or of political economic imperatives. So they remained invisible to anthropology.

In the 1980s, however, the field began to investigate the victims of modern war in Central America and elsewhere (Green 1994; Nordstrom 1997; Tambiah 1986). But the armies that were studied or referenced were rarely those of the U.S. or Europe or other democratic states, but instead were those of repressive governments such as Guatemala or were paramilitaries (Feldman 1991; Schirmer 1998; Sluka 1989, 2000).

The end of the Cold War ushered in an era in which a few anthropologists began to work on the U.S. military. This was primarily an anthropology *of* rather than *for* the military. It includes work by Lesley Gill on the School of the Americas (2004), Hugh Gusterson on nuclear weapons designers (1998, 2004), Joseph Masco on U.S. national security culture (1999) and post-Cold War nuclear communities (2006), and my own work on U.S. military bases' impact on surrounding communities (2001, 2009). Anthropologists looked at resistance to U.S. military bombardment of Vieques, Puerto Rico (McCaffrey 2002) and anti-nuclear protests in upstate New York (Krasniewicz 1992). They have examined the military practices at issue in Abu-Ghraib (Bennett et al. 2006), U.S. soldier memoirs of Iraq and Afghanistan (Brown and Lutz 2007), and U.S.

dissident veterans (Gutmann and Lutz in press). An emerging cohort of scholars are examining cultural knowledge production in the military (Brown 2008), the military industry in southern California (Pandya 2008), and multiple sites of the war on terror including military hospitals (Wool 2007). David Vine has researched the social movements that emerged among the people evicted from their homes on Diego Garcia for a U.S. base as well as the history of U.S. and British strategic moves made to acquire the island in the 1960s (Vine 2009). Studies have also been conducted on allied democratic militaries including those of Israel (Ben-Ari 1998), Germany (Bickford 2003), Japan (Fruhstuck 2007), Turkey (Altinay 2004) and Canada (Irwin 2008; Winslow 1997).[5]

The post-9/11 period ushered in an era in which asking what anthropology could do for the state and the military had renewed legitimacy. This legitimacy has been developed over the years in the culture at large, whose respect for the military surpassed that of virtually all other institutions in the U.S. including Congress and religious institutions. This was perhaps also true in the discipline itself, increasingly distanced from Vietnam era discussions of the dangers of this work.

There are today numbers of anthropologists (uniformed and civilian) with military paycheques, and they are all, by definition, doing an anthropology for the institution and swimming in the same cultural seas. Anthropologists are now regular teaching faculty at the service academies, and they work in national weapons labs or with the DoD itself. They have studied Homeland Security (Fosher 2005), organizational culture in the CIA (Johnston 2005), Special Forces units (Simons 1997) and problems of job dissatisfaction among officers posted in Germany (Hawkins 2001).[6]

Montgomery McFate is the most well known among them, even perhaps the most famous anthropologist in the U.S. today. She regularly appears on TV, radio and newspapers, and was featured in the April 2008 issue of *Elle* magazine. She has been the chief promoter of anthropology for the military (McFate 2005), and argues its value, as in one recent article, this way: "If you understand how to frustrate or satisfy the population's interests to get them to support your side in a counterinsurgency, you don't need to kill as many of them," "And you certainly will create fewer enemies" (Stannard 2007). She and other military anthropologists see themselves as critical of some aspects of military operations. Some will say they opposed the invasion of Iraq. Many even see themselves as members of an "insurgency" within the military (Brown 2008). They generally would acknowledge, however, that the mission they operate within is given by the

Commander in Chief, and that their work is to effect *how* that mission is accomplished.

Anthropologists (as well as regional and language experts) are now being recruited for the Human Terrain System (HTS), to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. There they are uniformed and sometimes armed and advise brigade commanders on the "cultural terrain" with attention both to enemy culture and that of the populace more generally. The HTS's US$60 million allocation makes it a budgetary sneeze in the context of the military's annual trillion dollars, but it is nonetheless one of the largest social science projects ever mounted (Gonzalez 2009). Numerous news stories which began appearing in 2007 in the mainstream U.S. press—many initiated or massaged with the help of a Pentagon public relations campaign—quote officers giving high praise to the anthropologists and the teams for raising cultural awareness and helping reconstruction. These officers, providing no evidence, also claim that the teams have reduced kinetic operations by 60%.

But while the PR campaign relentlessly focuses on the much more seductive idea of HTS as a peacemaking campaign, its own proponents note that such cultural information already has, as one Lieutenant Colonel noted, "help[ed] me sort through who was the enemy and who was not and from that understanding [that his HTS advisor contributed to] I was able to target and sometimes kill the enemy" (Gonzalez 2008a). The ethnographic information they provide is specifically meant to be integrated with regular military intelligence gathering. Moreover, as Gonzalez notes, the five private companies contracted to hire anthropologists (with salaries which can be as high as US$300,000 a year with entrance into the civil service ranks at the equivalent of a full Colonel), "hired unqualified instructors, didn't discuss ethics, and recruited social scientists ignorant of Middle East languages and societies...[in] a pattern of waste and war profiteering characteristic of a privatized Pentagon" (2008b:8). Three HTS members have already been killed on duty.

Those who recruit for and support the program maintain that the question of the legitimacy of the U.S. project in Iraq and Afghanistan is an irrelevance given the principle of civilian control of the military. They argue that it is ultimately we, as civilians, who sent the troops to their war zones through our elected representatives, and therefore it is our responsibility to help those troops complete their mission successfully, or at least safely. Setting aside the historical inaccuracy of that rendition of how the U.S. had the Commander in Chief it had from 2001 to 2008, their argument mirrors the militarization of cultural discourses in the U.S. In this argument, civilians are modelled as aides

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to the state, rather than its sources of revenue, ideological targets of opportunity or critics. The civilian advisors on HTS teams are in fact put in uniform despite their civilian status. The shift in conceptions of citizenship could not be more fundamental and is ultimately deeply connected to decades of Permanent War.

Anthropologists working for the military take a variety of stances on their assistance, some seeing themselves as helping the government become more competent, others seeing themselves as assisting the troops themselves rather than the elites who sent them there (their work primarily with officers and the power of the Pentagon leadership to shape U.S. military choices, however, might throw that into question). Yet others take the view that they are engaged in humanitarian work directed at the people in those war zones or potential war zones: their work, they hope, will protect the civilians there from the culturally ignorant blundering or habitual turn to violence of the U.S. military.

It remains, unfortunately, a powerful argument for a U.S. audience to claim that we abandon troops with cultural ignorance if we do not join the war effort. The level of incompetence of the cultural training some soldiers receive cannot be overstated, but the ultimate question is what the overall military project and intentions are. The fact is that this interest in the details of adversary or local populations' cultures is malleable: McFate's letter to the editor of a critical *Newsweek* article in 2008 stated that it does not matter if HTS personnel are not area experts since their major contribution is to bring methodological skills to the work, although cultural specificities were precisely what she initially sold the program as providing.[7]

In any case, the long history of other disciplines working with the military shows that the intention to reform or help a military seen as benighted have often run horribly aground. The most notorious example is that of the physicists who worked on the atom bomb project during the Second World War, beginning with the prompt of countering what was thought to be a German A-bomb project. Not only was their research not ended when it became clear that the Germans could not develop a nuclear weapon, but their bombs were used to kill several hundred thousand people from another country which was on the verge of collapse (Gusterson 2009; see also Finkbeiner 2006 and Price 2008).

But for all the horror of putting anthropology in uniform—expressed in the AAA condemnation of participation in HTS—this program can be seen as sideshow to the larger problem of the militarization of the university and of departments of anthropology, to which I now turn.

Hearts and Minds and Money: Anthropology and Military Funding at the University

Scholars have looked at the many ways knowledge produced in the U.S. across a range of disciplines has been shaped by military funding, a militarized ethos and imperial patterns of thought that militarism has helped create. U.S. universities are often portrayed as hotbeds of anti-military and anti-nationalist sentiment, but in fact the majority of what goes on day-to-day runs orthogonal to or in concert with at least liberal nationalist projects. The university accommodates and more generally supports or rewards research in service to the national security state (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; Giroux 2007; Lutz 1997; Nader 1997; Price 2004; Simpson 1998).

The Pentagon relationship with U.S. universities, and especially the sciences, has been intensive since the Second World War and deeply structuring of those disciplines in which it has taken an interest. The military currently provides 41% of all federal engineering research dollars in the universities and 45% of all federally funded support to computer science graduate students. While this research is often termed "basic," with the notion that it will contribute to the larger public good, that same public good would have been more efficiently and quickly produced through direct civilian agency funding. Moreover, the point of military funding is sometimes simply to keep individual researchers and universities on retainer as much as it is to produce immediately useable knowledge. Given the tremendous size of the Pentagon research and development budget—US$85 billion in 2009—it represents an industrial, educational and science policy in disguise, shaping scholarly (and corporate) research directions and directing students who work on professors' military contracts into career war work.

This is especially true in the hard sciences, which receive the overwhelming bulk of military funding. Historians of science have shown how physics, engineering and applied math, among others, were remade to focus on issues of utility to warmaking through decades of funding. Whole fields of study hypertrophied and others shrank or are never developed as researchers were drawn from one field into other, Pentagon-funded ones. To take just one example: many physics departments were reshaped in order to provide Ph.D.s to the weapons labs, while urban transit disappeared altogether from engineering. Professors today who would like to train students for work on rail transportation would have to translate suitable textbooks from French, German or Japanese: "In the United States, the traditional depositories of

knowledge for these subjects have been wiped out" (Melman 2003; see also Giroux 2007).

This is true in the social sciences as well, even with relatively slim Pentagon funding. In the securitized environment of the Cold War and post-Cold War university, much political science has come to offer "little more than weakly theorized, putatively scientific, repetitive rationalizations for U.S. military policies" (Gusterson 2007). While anthropologists have tended to see themselves as the antidote to this discipline in particular, the nationalism that guides the attention processes of U.S. anthropology has lately come under scrutiny. There are emerging attempts to develop a less imperial U.S. and European anthropology via South–South linkages and pluralizing efforts in the World Anthropologies Network (Restrepo and Escobar 2005; Ribeiro 2005). It is this U.S.-centrism or Eurocentrism that provides some explanation for why a critical anthropology of the military has been so long in coming.

Let me give the example of my own university, Brown. With Mary Wallace, I have been looking at its military funding which has varied from 13-20% of all external research funding over recent years. The figure that the university gets from this in overhead has hovered around US$20 million a year. Brown is a small university. Others, like MIT, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and several of the California schools are even more dependent. In 2000, the University of California system received over US$147 million in DoD research contracts. Like most other U.S. universities, the California universities are now so dependent on Pentagon grant overhead charges for a part of their operating budget that they have begun to lobby Congress in favour of more military spending for research. While some of that research sounds innocuous to the untrained ear, representing "retainer research" or work that is exploratory of basic processes the Pentagon would like to understand, other work is more explicitly in service to destruction. Fifteen universities, for example, have received funds since 1993 from the Air Force and Navy to investigate how to be able to affect atmospheric processes in ways that will allow knowledge or destruction of the communications of those who become enemies.

And now we have the Minerva Project, the Defense Department's 2008 initiative to fund research in the social sciences. Christening the project as a "classic" (i.e., timeless, noble) one, Secretary of Defense Gates noted that the nation is "facing challenges from multiple sources: a new, more malignant form of terrorism inspired by jihadist extremism, ethnic strife, disease, poverty, climate change, failed and failing states, resurgent powers, and so on." But of these challenges, he specifically gave four examples

of the kinds of research the Pentagon feels is needed from the social sciences. They include: (1) studies of "Chinese military and technology"; (2) mining documents the U.S. military has captured in Iraq for "The Iraqi and Terrorist Perspectives Projects"; and (3) research on the relationship between terrorism and religion, especially Islam. And Gates specifically called out anthropology, along with history and evolutionary psychology, as disciplines which could be as important to them as game theory and Kremlinology were during the Cold War.

How should we begin to understand the problems with this initiative? Historians, sociologists and anthropologists of science have demonstrated how the funders of research affect not only the topics of interest but the findings themselves. University research funded by Big Pharma has more often found drugs safe than research funded by the National Institutes of Health; academic research in chemistry departments funded by the chemical industry tends to see safety where National Science Foundation research does not (Krimsky 2003). Research funded by the Pentagon will be no different, intensely framed as it is by a set of institutional imperatives that include profit for contractors and ideological commitments to the use or threat of force as the first need of the state. As Big Pharma research generally helps create the commodities it needs, so military research will create what *that* institution needs—marketable threats, recruitable youth and hygienic self-images of itself as an institution of the best and brightest.

University Presidents will not object, however. In a free market model of knowledge production, they will mostly call for their faculty to be allowed to "make their own choices" about what to research and happily rake the grant overhead into their coffers. We should use the anthropological work that has been done on market ideologies, not just to deconstruct this way of thinking but to reconstruct a better one. Without it, the University becomes an instrument rather than a critic of war-making, and spaces for critical discussion of militarism within the university shrink.

Secretary Gates told the university presidents "too many mistakes have been made over the years because our government and military did not understand—or even seek to understand—the countries or cultures we were dealing with." As several scholars (Brown 2008; Gonzalez 2008a; Price 2008) have pointed out, this is a fundamental misrepresentation of what has gone wrong in Iraq (the insurgency is the result of occupation, not of failure to treat Iraqi women with cultural correctness or understand the meanings locally read in hand signals or the soles of feet, or even the distinction between Sunni and

Shia). It is also a misrepresentation of what the leadership of the U.S. military in fact sees itself as doing, which is using cultural knowledge as a tool or weapon whose use is focused on the mission. In any case, many within the military would see the image of a soldier hugging a local on the HTS website as an embarrassing and at best necessary gloss on the larger, more masculine and warrior-like project.

An anthropology of the military must simultaneously question not just a militarized common sense in the consumers of our research, but question and agitate around the conditions of knowledge production at our university homes. Understanding the university's current institutional imperatives is an important research task if we are to be able to successfully develop research programs that question militarization more generally. The seductions of the military for anthropology and social science more generally will need to be understood, for example, in that context where National Research Council rankings hold such sway, rankings which prominently include grant dollars received, and where internal university competition for power can make DoD funding—particularly when other funding is difficult to come by—so attractive.

An Anthropology for and an Anthropology of the Military

There is an important distinction to be made between an anthropology for the military and an anthropology of the military. A story from the island of Guam in the western Pacific can illustrate the difference it makes when anthropology is on a military mission, and when it is on another one. I have been to Guam a number of times in the last few years in connection with research on U.S. military bases in the Asia-Pacific region and the social movements that have risen in protest to them. There I met Felix Mansapit, an indigenous Chamorro veteran of the Vietnam War in his 50s who continues to suffer from and receive treatment for a variety of mental and social effects of his years in the military.

The story of how he ended up in a war zone in Vietnam in a U.S. military uniform begins in 1598, when Guam's violent colonization by the Spanish got underway. It became more likely in 1898, when the U.S., intent on becoming an imperial power, received the island along with several other Crown territories as loot from the Spanish American War. It became yet more probable in 1941 when the Japanese captured Guam and began an abusive occupation which the U.S. interrupted with reconquest in 1944. The Navy proceeded to fence off a large proportion of the island for military purposes, including its main water supplies. These land takings were given a fig leaf of legitimation by declaring Guam's residents U.S. citizens.

This citizenship is partial (they cannot vote for the President) and sits alongside the fact that Guam has been a colony in the true sense of the word. Local workers have received lower wage rates than U.S. mainlanders, had their harbours irradiated by the washdown of U.S. warships freshly back from standing watch over above-ground nuclear weapons tests in the nearby Marshall Islands, and lived alongside other military toxins and trash bulldozed off cliffs near the shoreline, buried throughout the island or burned in open fires. Nonetheless, gratitude was the normative political affect of the decades that followed (Liberation Day is celebrated with large parades and speeches every July 21). Despite this, the patriotism of the Chamorro people remained suspect and Felix was one of thousands of young men of the island who joined the military to demonstrate their loyalty.

Felix was initially posted as a guard at the U.S. Navy weapons depot on the island where bombs destined for Vietnam were stored. Falsely accused of theft by a white officer, he remains stung by the humiliation today, protesting that he nonetheless continued, as he said, to "serve my country." He was sent to Vietnam and returned after his tour, when many others did not—the Chamorro had the highest combat death rate of any ethnic group in the U.S. military.

He did not come back the same man, however. As he tells it, he drank himself stupid, slept with guns under his pillow, shot them off randomly among his terrified and disgusted neighbours, and became a regular burden to the local police. Thirty-five years later, and with shame-stinging tears, this story of return was punchlined and punctured by the words of his mother who finally said to him, "the army took my son and sent me back a monster."

This man might be the subject of an anthropology for or an anthropology of the military. How do these two approaches differ?

An anthropology *for* the military would find Felix's psychological problems of relatively minor interest compared with other issues of more pressing concern for its mission. Among personnel issues, the military is concerned with recruitment, retention and unit cohesion. Operationally, it foregrounds enemy culture. An anthropology for the military trying to understand people like Felix will operate in an institutional context in which 3,750 soldiers a year have been discharged from the military with pre-existing mental health conditions since 2002. This compares with just 67 soldiers a year in the late 1990s, a rate 55 times lower than today's. An anthropology for the military would be deeply dissuaded or prevented from studying why those rates are so different and from taking on the discharged soldiers no longer eligible for veterans bene-

fits and no longer counted as cases. An anthropology for the military will be asked to examine Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a psychological state set in a social context rather than a sociomoral discourse set in a frail body and mind and an institution motivated to exclude the politics of the war from the diagnosis. An anthropology for the military might try to understand what mental health screening the U.S. Army can provide to war zone-exiting veterans to prevent damage to family, community and Army on return. In a context of intense media and civilian pressure on the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and military facilities for failures to properly care for injured veterans, understanding how the VA might do better would become a higher priority, particularly as it is relevant to morale and future recruitment.

In an anthropology *of* the military, on the other hand, we might ask about how his illness emerged from the mission he was given, and particularly the contradiction between what he was taught about the laws of warfare or about the social or Biblical injunction not to kill and what he was told or encouraged to do in the war. An anthropology of the military would focus on the complex mix of desire, politics, friendship, money, career advancement and idealisms that makes up the motivational context of military action. It would ask how Felix's life chances after he separated from the service are structured by Guam's military-dependent economic life, and ask how his identity as a man and as a Chamorro might be different were he never to have enlisted or gone to war. It might ask how a whole society, in a sense, might have the disease of militarism that Felix is asked to carry as a psychological diagnosis of PTSD (Gutmann and Lutz 2009). It would explore how the creation of PTSD as a diagnosis tells us as much about the institutions that treat it as about the people who putatively have it (Young 1995). It would ask how the social order might be cured of the disease that was slowly killing Felix as an individual. Anthropology *of* the military would decentre battle and foreground homefront militarization and recruitment, and contextualize it in the historical experience of Guam's colonization and the political economy of semi-citizenship and peacetime military spending and the retail wages it produces. To focus just on this soldier and his war in Vietnam's jungle (and his sons' wars in the Middle East desert) is a bit like focusing only on Hiroshima and not on the emerging nuclear weapons system that produced it and shaped post-war consciousness and economies. To examine only the use of this weapon of mass destruction—the U.S. military—without looking at the much larger and more complex facts of its existence and day-to-day re-creation lulls us into a false strategy for ending this war and preventing the next.

An anthropology of the military would also focus on the recent U.S. Navy and Air Force build-up on Guam, which the Pentagon calls "the tip of America's spear" and its "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for its valuable existing facilities. It would analyze the impact of the Marines being moved there after massive decades long protests at their original location on Okinawa. Together with dependents and contractors, 40,000 people will be added to Guam's current population of 170,000. How the U.S. is able politically to invade Guam in this way and the exact nature of the social dislocations to come and the profits and where they flow would be eminently anthropological projects. Right now, the military has contracted out a social impact assessment whose superficial methodology focuses on elite interviews and is structured to allow Pentagon planners to do what they originally intended.

Finally, a reflexive anthropology of the military would ask why Guam has received so little disciplinary attention over the decades of U.S. colonization in comparison with the islands elsewhere in Micronesia. Two answers initially suggest themselves, including more intense DoD interest in the islands newly acquired from Japan through the government funded Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology and the notion, raised in the 1980s disciplinary critiques, that anthropology had been avoiding places like Guam which appeared *too* embedded in the flow of violent colonial histories.

As we all know, there are problems with any dualism such as this one between the *of* and the *for*. Anthropologists' published work, for example, can be used for the military no matter the writers' intention. Moreover, this dualism is challenged by militarization itself which has eroded the distinction between civilian and soldier so significantly that one can argue that no corner of our anthropological practice or cultural context, in the U.S. at least, is not in some way implicated in the prosecution of war and preparation for war. Certainly I remain a paymaster of the U.S. military, for example, through the withholding tax paid out of each of my monthly paycheques.

What Kind of Research Is Needed?

Over the last several years, I have argued that anthropologists should be paying much more research attention—direct rather than indirect—to "the topography of U.S. power—its exercise, effects, negotiation, protest, and limits" (Lutz 2006:593). Central to this task is understanding U.S. military power and its effects at home and abroad. Ethnographies of the institutions and effects of permanent war would look overseas at U.S. military bases, soldiers in joint exercises with and training other militaries, and the sex-industry and other sites those soldiers

visit. They would examine relations between USAID and military operations in places like Mindanao (Docena 2007), and study the U.S. role in international peacekeeping and how U.S. personnel negotiate policy and roles within it (Rubinstein 2008). Ethnography could look at weapons manufacturing (Pandya 2008) and the performances and wealth flows involved in homeland security (Fosher 2005). We can negotiate access to military sites including bases, armouries, recruitment storefronts and military family housing offices. We can examine domestic violence programs in communities around military bases (Chivens and Lutz 2000) and other aspects of the shaping of masculinity by militarization (Enloe 2000, 2007). We can also examine the military funding and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs on some of our own campuses. We can look at basic training in more complex ways than has been done heretofore, and at the veterans groups whose diverse experiences, politics, and memberships have signal importance for U.S. national politics and community life in many places. We can examine the public debates about soldiers, the war, women in combat, the military contractors whose work and workers set the tone and political economy for many communities, and the weapons commodity chains that begin there.

We can examine children's emerging understandings of war and soldiering, and we can research how anti-war or weapons abolitionist movements have had their effects. We need to know how Americans view the military and its power, how they imagine what combat is like and the economic effects of military spending, and how racism and gender play into views of particular wars. We have relatively little empirical notion of how people across a range of positions in the U.S. see their nation's military and understand its functioning, power and activities in the world. How do they imagine the tax system and where funds for the military come from and where they go? How do they select and filter and talk back to media who report particular versions of the Permanent War?[8]

This research is crucial for an anthropology that will speak with any kind of efficacy in the public sphere. It is necessary to speak to a U.S. public that knows little of what the purposes, effects and vulnerabilities of its military are. It will hopefully be of use for social movements trying to accomplish almost any kind of progressive social change in the U.S.: it is obviously of use to the counter-recruitment movement and the antiwar and anti-imperial movements, but it is also of use to the movement for public transit or universal health care, movements whose budgetary requests are crowded out by the Pentagon and the claims for national security motives and outcomes to such spending.

We need to do an anthropology of the cultural supports for militarization if we are going to be able to understand the cultural assumptions that prevent us from asking the right questions or being heard when we do. Those include the idea that war is the health of the nation and that more bombs equal more security.

Anthropologists were crucial organizers in the early anti-Vietnam war teach-ins at U.S. universities. As Marshall Sahlins (Network of Concerned Anthropologists 2007) has reminded us, these efforts were based on the assumption that our job is not to try to influence policymakers from the inside because our knowledge is not what will sway those who choose the missions. Instead, it is by holding civilian and military leadership accountable through educating the public—not advising policy makers—that anthropology will have whatever effect we individually and together want it to have.

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Notes

1 This paper was originally given as the keynote address for the CASCA conference on 9 May 2008. I would like to thank the members of that audience for their challenging and helpful questions and discussion of its themes.

2 Between 1994 and 2002, the Pentagon entered into contracts worth over US$300 billion with dozens of private military companies (Singer 2003).

3 Along with these 6,000 ready to launch weapons, the U.S. had another 4,000 readily deployable warheads in 2008 (see http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction=325& projectId=7).

4 The U.S. used white phosphorus in Fallujah in 2004, at first denying and then admitting it. A military spokesperson claimed its use was not illegal, maintaining that "white phosphorus is an incendiary weapon, not a chemical weapon." The U.S. signed a treaty banning chemical weapons use, but not an international agreement restricting the use of white phosphorus against civilians (BBC 2005).

5 More culturally oriented political scientists like Carol Cohn and Katherine Ferguson are writing in what can be easy dialogue with anthropologists.

6 Some of this work was Ph.D. dissertation work rather than work done as a government employee.

7 She was roundly critiqued for the bait and switch by Derek Gregory: "What McFate resurrects is a shop-worn distinction between understanding the particular and analyzing the universal: she once insisted on social science supplying the former (knowledge of 'adversary cultures') and now, obliged to concede that most of the social scientists recruited by the Pentagon understand neither the area in which they are deployed nor the language in which they are immersed, claims that it supplies the latter" (posted to Weinberger 2008).

8   These media show war hygienically, U.S. soldiers hero-
    ically—often as victims—and portray U.S. military activity
    as exporting democracy, transferring U.S. wealth outward,
    promoting economic development and liberating women.

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