

The Production of Race, Locality, and State: An Anthropology

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Abstract: This paper is an examination of some of the causes and consequences of state-managed processes that make very large numbers of people useless in their own localities. Examples are drawn from the displacement of African American workers in North Carolina by undocumented Central Americans, and the massive layoffs in Newfoundland—the largest in Canadian history—following the commercial extinction of Newfoundland and Labrador's cod fish and the closure of the fishery in 1992. This essay focusses on both the contradictions of citizenship and on the consequences of exporting people for work elsewhere. New ways of analyzing rupture and chaos are suggested, as are some implications for progressive political strategies.

Keywords: migration, citizenship, displacement, race, Newfoundland, U.S. South

Résumé: Cet article examine certaines causes et conséquences des procédés de gestion étatique qui rendent inutile un nombre très élevé d'individus dans leurs propres localités. Des exemples sont tirés du remplacement des travailleurs afro-américains en Caroline du Nord par des travailleurs sans-papiers provenant d'Amérique Centrale et des mises à pied massives à Terre Neuve – les plus importantes dans l'histoire du Canada – à la suite de l'extinction commerciale de la morue à Terre-Neuve ainsi qu'au Labrador et de la fermeture du secteur de la pêche en 1992. Cet article focalise tant sur les contradictions de la citoyenneté que sur les conséquences de l'exportation des personnes dans le but de les faire travailler ailleurs. Il suggère de nouvelles façons d'analyser la rupture et le chaos ainsi que certaines conséquences découlant des stratégies politiques progressistes.

Mots-clés: migration, citoyenneté, remplacement, race, Terre-Neuve, le Sud des États-Unis

Prologue

This article emerges from a confrontation in North Carolina in 2001. The article, which is about Newfoundland as well as North Carolina, is a partial, necessarily unresolved attempt to come terms with that moment, for both its causes and its consequences seem to have very broad implications for an engaged anthropology.

To tell even a brief story of the incident in 2001 I have to start much earlier. For most of 1967-68 I was doing civil rights organizing in Robeson County, North Carolina—on the swampy interior coastal plain, at the border with South Carolina. Robeson was then a particularly nasty place. It was the second richest rural county in the south, by value of agricultural produce shipped from the county, and at the same time one of the 50 poorest counties in the U.S. by average per capita income. A handful of Whites did very well, a substantial number were moderately well-off, and together they were doing whatever they could to keep it that way, against the interests and well-being of the African American and Native American peoples, who together comprised two-thirds of the county population, and who were, for the most part, desperately poor and hard-pressed.

Part of the struggle we were then fighting was for school cafeterias and subsidized lunches, particularly in the rural Black and Indian schools. You could see kids rummaging around in the schoolyard garbage dumpsters in the afternoon looking for food. We involved a writer-photographer from the *Charlotte Observer*; then the most liberal paper in the state, who came down and took a stunning photograph: a young African American boy, about eight, inside a garbage dumpster, with his head and shoulders showing above the rim, leaning out and passing a clearly half-eaten sandwich to a younger boy, who was standing on his tip-toes, reaching up for the sandwich with an angelic smile on his young face. She published this on the front page of the Sunday edition of the paper, where

folks could see it on their way to or from church. It blew the state legislature wide open; we got a lot of important programs from the ruckus it caused.

Thirty-four years later, in 2001, I am still working on issues in Robeson County, if now only episodically. In the previous five years, 8500 mostly African American and Native American women had been put out of work by the passage of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), and the ensuing closure of all the textile assembly “cut and stitch” mills that moved “offshore.” These mills had been the largest source of employment in the county, from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s. Before the mills were built, agriculture provided most of the work; very quickly after the mills left, poultry and hog packing became the primary employers, but with a completely different labour force. By 2000 county officials were estimating that there were 12 000–14 000 “Mexicans” (as all Spanish-speakers and many other immigrant workers are called) in the county, about three-fourths of them undocumented, and all referred to as “illegal Mexicans” (for a similar instance see Striffler 2005). They were by very far the predominant workforce in the new poultry- and hog-deconstruction plants, and provided almost all of the seasonal agricultural labour. They were hard run both at work and off; most saving money at little more than minimum wage, and doing so by living packed into substandard housing, along with other severe restrictions on consumption expenses.

My current research and engagement in this area focusses on the displacement of African American labour, after they won a modicum of “civil rights,” by undocumented immigrant workers with very few rights. A senior official in the county’s Department of Social Services and a local teacher both took enough interest in my present research to tell me that there were about 70 “Mexicans” living in a former chicken coop, telling me where it was, and suggesting I go. I went to see it and indeed there were. The next day I went to Fayetteville, where I had an introduction to a very progressive reporter-photographer. I told her the story of the dumpster, and what was won from that photo-story, and asked her to come down and take a picture of the chicken coop. She looked at me quietly for a while, and then just said no. I told her the story of the child in the dumpster again, quite slowly, thinking perhaps she did not understand the importance both of the story and of what she could do. This time, after a pause, she said she would do it if I insisted, but that the way she understood how things work, if she published the story on Sunday, by Monday or Tuesday the *migra* (the Immigration and Naturalization Service Police) would come and deport everyone they could catch. By Friday

there would be a new bunch of people in the chicken coop. The folks who are there now need their jobs, she said to me, and stood up to shake my hand to end the discussion.

I left with the realization—still growing, still gnawing at me—that none of the strategies that we used in the 1960s, including demonstrations, disruptions, voting, protests, humiliating power, could be used effectively now in this local context. More: the range of social analyses in which we rooted and refined these strategies for winning a combination of civil, political and employment rights now seem to me too simple to be useful. We could use those analyses then not just because the struggles were different, but because those struggles were situated against a divided elite, and were given their dynamic both by the efforts and hopes of people and by fundamental splits in the organization of domination. With the shift in predominant economic organization from agrarian to industrial capital, it had ceased to make sense to a significant faction of those in power to grind Blacks down so brutally and so directly. In that context a very wide range of strategies would have worked for change, transcending the suffering that a dying agrarian elite was still capable of imposing, and incidentally giving borrowed life to an equally wide range of theories—including an all-too-innocent anthropology—to which the strategies were tied.¹ Now new ways of organizing local and regional processes of domination, rooted in an increasingly direct engagement by the state, along with increasingly trivial or ineffective factional opposition to state policies and practices, is making former political strategies obsolete and our explanatory toolkits increasingly inadequate. Meanwhile appropriation and dispossession once again intensify.

In Robeson County, as elsewhere, when you get ten miles or more away from the interstate highways, African American village neighbourhoods are devastated. The poverty and material decay are worse than in the 1960s, for employment has collapsed. Twenty years or so after African Americans won effective civil rights (in the 1970s in this very out-of-view area) they find out that their civil rights are an obstacle to the kinds of employment that are widely available: as another county official put it, “a coloured person with civil rights is useless—that is not what ‘coloured’ means.” I think of the enormous price people paid to win these rights, in the villages and farms out of the glare of the television cameras, and at that time very far from concerned lawyers, and I think how much more difficult it is to organize not to win rights, but against being replaced because you have rights.

Strategy is changing, necessarily. It is changing because struggle is changing, and more is at stake in these changes than strategy and struggle. Fundamentally new

and different kinds of struggles necessarily shape new kinds of groups, new kinds of differences between groups, and new kinds of vulnerabilities. This crucial point was most forcefully made by Edward Thompson. Writing about the early formation of the working class in the agrarian social turmoil of the late 18th century, he argued that a class does not form and then look around for its "enemies." Rather, people find themselves enmeshed in *unavoidable* struggles, and from these struggles comes their sense of class and, with that, their class relations. In the process of class formation struggle is historically primary (Thompson 1978). Unavoidable collective struggles produce far more than class: his argument has broader implications, although it might not yet be clear what is now emerging. Changing kinds of struggles, we must realize, not only produce new kinds of social difference, but they require us to develop new kinds of theories, new—if temporary—analytical categories or frameworks, and, especially, new kinds of progressive strategies. That is the situation to which this paper speaks.

Calling Anthropology into Question

The life-trajectory of the small community and the distinct people, as we have more or less known them, has come to an end, even though the world is still full of small communities that are becoming more, rather than less, distinctive. The point here is not that we are running out of small communities, or that anything like "globalization" is homogenizing their distinctiveness, nor the trivial issue that anthropology is losing its classical subject (but only to the extent that it relies on its classical concepts). Rather, the processes that have produced and transformed their continuity are changing, as always, but now in fundamental ways. Widespread and intensifying crises of social reproduction are transforming communities beyond analytical recognition. Small, distinct, and seemingly directly observable localities are now very widely organized, reproduced, and fractured—split apart by an unfamiliar logic; a social and historical logic—in ways that our theories can not quite grasp.²

Let us start with the symptoms. I find myself continually surprised by widespread and very basic social changes that we have been witnessing: the collapse of the Soviet Union and its client states; the rise to decisive political power and cultural prominence of a wide variety of religious fundamentalisms; the widespread and largely unprotested collapse of recently won civil rights and civil liberties in the U.S. Well beyond these dramatic turns are extraordinary shifts in the rootedness of daily life—factory closings that devastate whole communities, epidemics of AIDS so intense they devastate village farming across

wide regions of Africa, and all the butchering, inconclusive wars against civilians in the name of oil, diamonds, land-appropriation, "security," ethnic and religious purity and, just beneath the socially visible surface (save for the victims who can not avoid seeing it), all the international trade and lending agreements that make daily life increasingly unliveable for vast numbers of people. However well we can *describe* the ensuing changes brought about by these events, and it is often quite well, we have been less successful in understanding how and why their consequences unfold the ways they do.³

Across a broad range of perspectives, from classical anthropology to Marxism to textual or discourse analysis, to Foucauldian fantasies of power, the theories we use are more than inadequate: they have lost their capacity to surprise us. The worlds we live both in and against may continue to surprise us, but our theories now rarely do—they scarcely suggest any new ways of grasping hold of our world, or new ways to struggle for change. I want to open a discussion that leads toward new ways of understanding and confronting current processes of transformation. We can do this by putting a few current changes in village Newfoundland and village North Carolina under the magnifying glass, in order to help root the theories suggested here both in and against what is actually happening. Anthropology and cultural critique, over the past three decades, turned to textual analysis without seriously addressing how this coincided with the contemporaneous intensifying turn to text by religious fundamentalists. Our theories, per contra, must do more than parallel real-world changes: they must *also* confront these changes.

The Reproduction of Surplus People

Across very wide regions of the world small communities are experiencing a massively destructive encounter with both economic and state-orchestrated pressures. The destructiveness itself is not new. Mike Davis' *Late Victorian Holocausts* (2001) describes the havoc wreaked upon large portions of India, Africa, Asia, and Latin America by a deadly combination of *El Niño* droughts and intensifying colonialism in the late 19th century. He provides an important framework for understanding how the 20th century was founded upon a holocaust of destruction that spread across much of the colonized world. But the destructiveness at the outset of the twentieth century was very different from recent processes. One difference is particularly relevant: a century ago destructiveness was deeply embedded in successful attempts to *use* vast numbers of peoples dispersed across a wide variety of hinterlands as cheap labour, and in the labour-intensive pro-

duction of cheap raw materials and foods. Colonial and imperial expansion was founded upon the production of new kinds of inequalities, and the transformation of prior ones, and simultaneously upon the attempt to *order*—in both senses of that term—and to stabilize these inequalities so that they might continue to be harnessed for as long as they were needed.

Now a different destructiveness is becoming widespread. It is based on dispensing with people who are no longer needed—displacing people for whom there is very little, if any, use in their present locales—especially not at a cost that would come close to reproducing them in anything resembling even their present difficult circumstances. Many of the victims of this process of becoming useless manage to flee their countryside or their country, or fail to manage and die. Their deaths are attributed, superficially, to untreated diseases or famine or war or failed migration or forced dispersion or murder by border guards and vigilantes—all socially constructed and all rooted in the fact that the victims have usually disappeared from public or political view, except as a “problem,” even before their deaths. Many more survive or manage than fail or die; that is the calculus of success these days. We are concentrating, however, on the calculus of suffering and hope in the minds of the victims and of their state-sponsored managers. Underlying the calculus of suffering and hope are the processes that make people useless.

Two brief examples will introduce these underlying processes:

1. On the Mexican side of the U.S. border, by 1999, there were approximately 1.5 million workers in *maquiladoras*—export commodity producing factories owned by companies that had relocated to Mexico to take advantage of local conditions. These workers earned about \$3 000 a year in US dollar equivalence. Between 1999 and 2003, one-half million—a third—of these jobs were lost as these factories relocated to even lower wage places, such as China or Vietnam, where labour could be bought for under \$1 000 a year. These figures are all approximations, but are sufficient to lead us to ask: what sorts of consequences have followed, and are likely still to follow, this massive loss of jobs?⁴ Amidst the increased misery, drug-dealing, prostitution, general deterioration of health and well-being, and the rising dangers of daily life, two general aspects of this situation are immediately apparent. First, there is little chance that any significant number of people can go back to what they were doing, or not doing, before they began working at these factories. Second, the Mexican government’s responses to this “race to the bottom” of the wage scale will inescapably make

Mexico more, rather than less different from the United States; will make rural areas in Mexico more, rather than less different from urban areas in Mexico; and in large numbers of cases, will even make rural areas increasingly different from one another.

The attempt to stem the migration of industry will, as usual, necessarily entail even less attention to social health issues both on and off the job (pollution, job safety), through lowering taxes and corporate costs, with all the consequences for public well-being. Of special significance, there will be a very substantial further deterioration of, and differentiation in, rural well-being far beyond the maquiladora zone, as rural areas are squeezed to supply the everyday consumption needs of urban people with markedly declining real incomes. This sort of squeeze seeks to pump an increased volume of very low-priced goods and labour out of rural areas and often, also—as in wide areas of Mexico—to break staple and subsistence production almost completely, and import food, which provides new revenues to unstably rooted local and regional elites. Either strategy characteristically intensifies locality-specific inequalities, producing both new wealth and widespread destitution. In such situations, localities often turn in on themselves, the poor for relations of sustenance, the local elite as part of consolidating their domination and exploitation against a larger field of forces with somewhat different agendas.⁵ This combination of strategies by the poor and by the privileged characteristically intensifies differentiation both within and between localities. Globalization differentiates; it does not homogenize.

2. Michael Wines wrote a full-page article in the *New York Times* (2002) on the social collapse of large rural regions of central Asia in the former Soviet Union. He described a situation with surprising analogies to rural Newfoundland, considering that his focus is communities in the midst of an arid savannah, and Newfoundland’s rural economy is ocean-based. The source of this social collapse of the central Asian savannah was an ecological disaster precipitated by the overuse of the water supply to sustain an irrigation agriculture that was immensely profitable for two decades or so, until an almost completely unrestrained overuse (wasting more water than was used), and an utter failure to understand and plan for long-term sustainability, brought the whole system, and the rural communities that depended upon this system, crashing down. Wines ends by quoting the geographer Sarah O’Hara, who summed up and generalized the problem: “We talk about the developing world and the developed world. This is the deteriorating world” (2002:A14).

Similarly, rural Newfoundland has been devastated by the commercial extinction of cod fish in the late 1980s

following two decades of very profitable and very destructive overfishing, with by-catch wastage levels exceeding what was kept.⁶ Cod had been the economic foundation of rural Newfoundland since its first colonization by Europeans. This resource-destroying overfishing, which continues now with crab and shrimp, is driven by far more than mindless greed combined with increasingly efficient technology. Nor is any “tragedy of the commons” model analytically useful (Sider 2003a). Underlying this destructiveness in many such instances are the *contradictions of citizenship* in modern capitalist (and socialist) states.

Newfoundland villagers, in this context, are the miners’ canary—a particularly fragile and visible manifestation of a very much more widespread and potentially explosive situation, which we can introduce as the problem of citizenship for states that have substantial sectors of their populace becoming useless. Citizenship, in this perspective, is an aspect of social reproduction. Citizenship provides rights and benefits that help people get to tomorrow. When they have no tomorrow, at least in their current locales, when their tomorrows will be, for most, well below even current standards and beneath expectations, the rights and benefits of citizenship come into contradiction with today, and even more with tomorrow.

We can begin to discuss the contradictions of citizenship with a brief delineation of issues of social reproduction. The intensifying demographic, economic and social collapse of rural Newfoundland is a crisis of social reproduction, an intensifying inability of communities simply to continue. Social reproduction is never exact; the point here is not that communities are changing but that the sorts of changes we are witnessing are fundamentally different, and much more disruptive, than those that have occurred in the recent history of these communities. Further, the widespread deterioration in rural well-being that we are witnessing has much deeper causes than the poverty that has increasingly developed following the 1992 closure of the cod fishery. In substantial part this deterioration in well-being is associated with the consequences of outmigration, made all the more intense by new restrictions on access to unemployment insurance. These restrictions were introduced in 1997 and made it extremely difficult for young people—the “new entrants”—and former fishers and fish plant workers to enter or re-enter the labour force without leaving Newfoundland. The exodus of people from Newfoundland (and Mexico, and Central Asia, and...) has consequences that go well beyond all the problems caused by a simple decline in population.

Even though substantial population decline in and of itself ordinarily causes major problems including, in North America, closure or constriction of schools, closure of

stores, banks and churches, increasing burdens on those who remain for care of the elderly and infirm, et cetera; the expanding exodus of people who leave the hinterlands to work elsewhere brings significant additional problems, and especially also often a crisis in local social reproduction. It is the need to understand this broad range of problems that emerge when local social reproduction becomes increasingly non-viable for much of the populace that leads us to seek new theoretical tools, more capable of grasping the ruptures, disjunctions, and chaos domination creates and that people must, unavoidably, address.

Displacement and the Citizens of Remnant Places

One crucial cause of current local crises, in Newfoundland and elsewhere, is the shift from exporting locally produced commodities to exporting, as the primary export commodity, human beings in their capacity as workers. The most immediate and most visible problem for small communities when a large proportion of the young adults leave is often a marked decline in the number of children in the community, who are its social and economic future. These consequences are more than obvious; they are unavoidable. Other aspects of the process are not as obvious, and there is much at stake, politically, in avoiding discussion of them. They begin with the economics of the process of exporting people, and there are some substantial surprises as we work our way through the problem. Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack (1973) still provide the best introduction to the issue. I quote them:

Migration involves the transfer of a valuable economic resource—human labour—from the poor to the rich countries. The workers who migrate may have been unemployed in the country of origin, but this does not alter the fact that the community has invested considerable sums in their upbringing....“If the emigrants were slaves, and raised for the purpose, it would be appropriate to calculate whether it was worthwhile for a poor country to raise slaves for export....The answer would doubtless be “no.” But babies are born and youth are raised and educated without regard to [the economic] return on the process...” [Noting that some of the costs are borne by the families and some by the community] whatever the proportions...the total cost of raising a child is a charge on the country’s national income. [1973:409, citing Kindleberger 1967:98]

It may not be many peoples’ intent to raise children for export, but it is a widespread fact. Children are a labour-intensive product, and most of this labour is provided by families and communities. Grown children, as export goods, are thus the products of what Marxists and

many economists call “petty commodity production.” This concept has been used, under one name or another, in a wide range of analyses of rural hinterlands under the assault of “globalized” capital and the state, including apologists for inequality-producing micro loans, World Bank “modernizers,” and Marxists still hoping and struggling for social justice.⁷ Yet the whole notion of petty commodity production, under any of its names, remains both relatively undeveloped and crucial to understanding the changing dynamics of localities that increasingly specialize in producing young adults for export.

Marxists have two nearly equivalent phrases, “petty commodity production” and “domestic commodity production,” that are used to name and describe the production of commodities by local labour, primarily mobilized along lines of kin, household, and locality and using locally available, small-scale tools in the process of production. In the usual analysis of this form of production, it has scarcely any internal dynamics—few, if any, internal contradictions, tensions, or disjunctions that would impel change, movement, or transformation. Change, for places where this is the predominant form of production, ordinarily seems to have external origins. A different and far more volatile view of the internal historical dynamics of petty commodity production emerges, surprisingly, from the one feature of such places that seems an enduring, unchanging feature: the poverty and hardship that characterizes so many lives in these communities so much of the time.

The widespread intense poverty of many, or most, rural producers is so characteristic it is often taken as if it were a fact of nature. But we no longer treat gender or race as if they were formed by essential or “natural” characteristics. Let us see if we can do the same for the people we used to call “peasants” or “semi-proletarians,” the rural, small-scale, domestic commodity producers: interrogate their characteristic poverty and immiseration to find its dynamics.⁸

To do this we will be working toward understanding what I will call the contradictions of citizenship. These contradictions appear first, and most intensely, in two contexts: in locales characterized by a substantial export of people to work elsewhere, and in contexts where the production of those kinds of differences that come to be called race is particularly intense. We will look a bit more closely at the logic of exporting people, and here only introduce issues in the production of race.⁹

Rural domestic commodity producers characteristically are forced to sell their commodities below the full social costs of producing these commodities.¹⁰ In very many places the terms of trade have decisively worsened

for large numbers of rural producers just since the early 1970s. People whose living comes substantially from selling coffee, cocoa, ground nuts, grains, beans, et cetera are now frequently in serious trouble. With some commodities the problem is the resource—not nearly enough—or a price-breaking market glut; with other commodities it is declining markets or unfavourable changes, particularly for small producers, in the ratio of production cost to selling price. The problem does not stem simply from the small amounts produced in rural small-scale production: if even more hoe-grown Mexican *milpa* corn were sold at the same price as subsidized machine-grown U.S. corn more hoe farmers would die (as they are now dying) from severe impoverishment, or they would be (as they are now being) driven out in even vaster numbers. There are two, often sequential, consequences that follow these deteriorating terms of trade in addition to the usual destruction of the livelihoods of many small-scale producers.

First is a decline in local well-being, which comes from an increasing spread between the social (and not just the direct monetary) costs of producing the goods and the selling price of their commodities.¹¹ The second consequence, which ordinarily either follows or intensifies after a period of the worsening of the terms of trade, a collapse of the resource, or a collapse in the conditions of production, is to begin exporting people, partly for the remittances they will send or bring back and partly because it ceases to be possible to sustain all the local people with locally available resources for what is loosely called “subsistence” production.¹²

The production of humans for export in some basic ways is not logically different from the production of any other commodity; when you sell a commodity below the cost of production your own continuity is undermined. But humans are so costly to produce, and the gap between costs and returns often so great, that when humans become raised for export the problem of social continuity is dramatically intensified. This intensification is further magnified by the major logical difference between exporting people and exporting other kinds of goods: when people leave the community their departure (depending upon who goes and for how long) often removes the people who make the goods upon which the future of the community depends. In this case, it removes the people who create the next generation of people.¹³

What this entails, I suggest, is that the export of people from a community—despite the remittances sent back, and the enrichment, or stabilization, of a portion of the community through these remittances—means that the community as a whole necessarily becomes increasingly dependent upon the state for its social reproduction. Rural

producers, and the villages or localities in which they live, nowadays usually do not simply reproduce themselves through their own efforts, social relations, income and resources; they are ordinarily necessarily assisted and subsidized (and simultaneously also, of course, undermined) by governments. This brings us, finally, to one of the central issues in the developing involvement of governments with social reproduction: differential citizenship.

Differential Citizenship and the Production of Race

Differential citizenship is a particularly complex phenomenon. The complexities are partly due to the changing way citizenship has been combined with race, both in the United States and Canada, in the history of the 20th century.¹⁴ A brief illustration from my work in rural coastal North Carolina will highlight some relevant dimensions of this issue.

By the mid-1970s, with both court cases and federal pressure, the civil rights victories of the 1960s were finally being institutionalized in the rural South: in employment, including job safety in industry and agriculture and minimum wage protection for farm labourers; in daily life, including housing, municipal services (especially water and sewerage), access to medical care; and in schools that were less segregated and thus (until class and locality replaced colour) more equally funded, staffed and serviced. The issue here, for employers and especially local and state governments, is not just wages, but the rising costs of using workers. An increased attention to health and safety issues drives up labour costs; increased rights to housing, schooling and municipal services drive up the costs of government, particularly of local governments. And they do so at a time when local governments, in their increasing desperation to attract and hold “industry,” provide not only a variety of tax breaks but a large variety of rather costly inducements, from infrastructure development (water, sewerage, roads, workforce training) to management inducements (golf courses, cultural centers, high-tech medical facilities, etc.).

In the 1990s, 20 years after civil rights gains became widespread, following the passage of NAFTA, and especially following the 1999 severe decline in the number of maquiladora factories in northern Mexico, there has been a massive influx of Central American workers to Robeson County, as elsewhere in the United States, driven as much, I suggest, by the desire to replace the increasingly costly African Americans as by the increased availability of non-citizen workers.

Several county officials told me, in 2001-2002, that their estimate was that about three-quarters of the “Mex-

icans” in Robeson County during the summer were undocumented; that is, about 9 000 to 11 000 so-called “illegal Mexicans” (many from Guatemala, Honduras, and Columbia) are working, increasingly for a full year, in just this one county. The point is not simply that they can be worked very hard for little more than the minimum wage, but that they have no protection on the job against, for instance, the increasingly intense use of agricultural chemicals, including insecticides and herbicides that are used with scarcely any safeguards for the workers, or against the likelihood of eventual injury or repetitive stress problems in the chicken and hog-packing industry. The belt in a chicken factory then usually ran about 93 birds an hour; one chicken to cut or clean every 38 seconds. These plants have the highest injury rate of any occupation in the U.S. More: undocumented workers have very low demands on tax-revenue-supported services, being largely denied access to hospital or clinic-based medical care, save for life-threatening situations, and they have diminished access to education, to housing that meets standards, municipal services, et cetera. As a bonus for using undocumented workers, employers can pocket a portion of the social security deductions from their pay and the federal government can pocket the rest, for undocumented workers have, by definition, fake social security numbers.

Agriculture and meat and poultry packing are now the two largest sources of employment in the region, and in both of these occupations African Americans have been almost entirely displaced by largely undocumented Mexicans and Central Americans, produced in vast numbers through a combination of policy-imposed impoverishment in Mexico and Central America and a range of increasingly murderous “border patrol” theatrics: the focussed reality and the more generalized spectacles of rape, death by desert-route dehydration,¹⁵ physical abuse, official and vigilante murder, and so forth, which do not stop people from coming but create thousands of vulnerable, abusable, and highly exploitable “illegal aliens” each month, who as a “bonus” to citizen taxpayers have comparatively low social cost. It is a two stage process: labour migrants, who come to work, are first made illegal and then quickly made vulnerable to totalizing abuse. Government policies and practices, including the impunity granted to local vigilantes, employers, police and landlords produces vast numbers of people who are disposable not just from their jobs but *in* their jobs and daily life.¹⁶ So-called “primitive” or initial accumulation has shifted its main taproot from dispossession to disposability.

The situation in Robeson County is almost—but ultimately not—describable as a transition from “race” to citizenship as the locus of what I would call “harnessable

vulnerability.” To a very large extent what we called “race” *was* differential citizenship, and in that sense the transition from one to the other is illusory.

“Race”—and gender as well—was produced by a deep collusion between the state and popular culture. President Roosevelt, for example, was asked several times in the 1930s and 1940s to introduce and support congressional legislation suppressing lynching. He said that he could not, because he had to defer to “southern culture.” Southern culture included what have rightly been called “festivals of lynching” (Tolnay and Beck 1995) complete with large crowds of party participants, speeches by local dignitaries and ministers, and victims who were tortured, mutilated, and murdered, all without any punishment of the perpetrators whatsoever. This southern culture, which was so crucial in the production of race and races, was being mediated by southern senators and representatives, who dominated most of the key congressional committees. With one-party politics in the South, and seniority in congress decisive for chairing committees, Roosevelt needed to pay attention to southern demands. The point here is made by his phrasing of that reality, which points to a still-to-be-understood constitutive role of the state in the production of local and regional culture.

With lynching, to continue this example of the production of race, the state’s grant of impunity for major crimes committed against African Americans—kidnap, torture, rape, murder, none of which was punished—put the state in partnership with specific elements of popular culture to produce categories of people who, while legally citizens, in fact had almost none of the protections, and very few of the rights, although most of the obligations, of citizenship.

In this perspective, the apparent transition from race to citizenship as the primary way of producing usable difference and inequality is more usefully understood as the state increasingly and directly assuming almost full control over the production of useful vulnerabilities, without having any need to involve, or acknowledge, or produce “culture,” and delivering these vulnerabilities as a subsidy to capital. With 9 000 to 11 000 “illegal aliens” in one North Carolina county, and county officials telling me where they worked, where they lived, what churches they attended, et cetera, the adjective “illegal” far more defines what can be done to them than the ordinary definition of the word: criminal actions by people who should be apprehended. We must understand the whole policing of the actual and the interior “borders” to have the production of non-citizen workers as one of its core features.¹⁷ Insofar as many of the same policies and practices of the state intensify the consequences and the vulnerabilities of gen-

der, altogether this implies that the historical moment of culture—the central concept of anthropology—is passing into secondary causal significance, for reasons that are scarcely related to the growing realization among anthropologists that the concept conceals more than it reveals.¹⁸

Citizenship, like culture, is explicitly both homogeneous (all citizens belong equally within) and simultaneously differentiating. Unlike “culture,” and more like the former “custom,” it has the force of law and the power of the state behind it.

Differential Citizenship and the Production of Locality

Newfoundlanders, within Newfoundland, are clearly citizens and as citizens have a wide range of very costly entitlements: education, health, unemployment benefits, welfare, mail service, road maintenance and more—with regional tax revenues scarcely meeting these costs. Forcing people out of Newfoundland ruptures these entitlements. Are these entitlements simply replaced elsewhere in Canada? Is it simply a matter of transferring the costs of these entitlements to another province? In some instances the answer is yes, but in general it seems not, or not completely. Many Newfoundlanders go to live in the inexpensive parts of working-class neighbourhoods in far more densely settled places, such as Toronto or Calgary, where economies of scale and particularly of class-differentiated service, especially in education, municipal services, and perhaps also health care, can be substantial. Many others go to places such as the “company towns” of northern construction camps, where there are few services and where the corporation often subsidizes the costs of housing, municipal services, and even sports teams. Suffering from the effects of long-term unemployment or underemployment in Newfoundland, they are often grateful for employment elsewhere, even in difficult jobs in harsh environments, and in places with few municipal services or attractions. A Nova Scotia fish-plant manager said that if he could not get Newfoundlanders he would have to import Mexicans.

More to the point, mainland Canada receives workers that it has not paid the costs of “producing” as healthy, educated adults. The productivity, the profits, and the taxes from their work are materialized and realized outside of Newfoundland; the costs of producing them as workers are largely paid in Newfoundland. Citizenship, only in some respects an either/or categorization, in fundamental ways also positions people within ranges of very significantly differentiated (partially) state-financed and (partially) state-sponsored entitlements. The whole state-sponsored and financed production of differentiated

neighbourhoods in cities, between cities and suburbs, and between regions of provinces or states exemplifies the way class and ethnicity become remapped onto citizenship as differential entitlements. These differential entitlements (particularly to basic “services” such as education and health) are organized in ways that give the state a significant role in both social reproduction and reshaping of difference and inequality. Ethnic and class differences often tend toward clustering in specific localities, for reasons that have to do with a range of factors, from zoning, housing codes, segregation, differential rents and costs based on differential services, access to work, to choice, which facilitates state engagement in the production—and with the increasingly widespread collapse of the welfare state, usually the enhanced reproduction—of unequal difference.

While the Canadian government, through various financial “equalization” schemes, transfer payments, and direct subsidies sends a lot of money to Newfoundland, it is unclear what is the relation between the scale of these subsidies and the scale of the wealth that Newfoundland produces for mainland Canada through oil production on the seas adjacent to the province, through the “sale” of massive quantities of hydro-electricity from Labrador to Quebec at or below the cost of production (which Quebec Hydro then turns around and sells to New York at a very hefty markup), and especially through providing mainland Canada with very large quantities of workers with comparatively quite low social and wage costs. For all the resentful and contemptuous media and parliamentary talk about the many subsidies sent to Newfoundland and the lazy fishers who only work part of the year, Newfoundland remains the poorest province in Canada, and despite so-called “equalization” transfer payments, there is an increasing disparity in income and in well-being between Newfoundland and mainland Canada. It seems far more likely that Newfoundland is actually subsidizing mainland Canada, just as all the “illegal Mexicans” working in the United States represent a subsidy to the United States paid by some of the very poorest regions of Mexico.

The contradictions of citizenship in modern “democratic” states go far beyond shifting or saving the costs of producing adult workers. Capitalist states face two contradictory tasks. On the one hand, states produce and manage a wide range of inequalities, including especially race, gender, and locality, which capital uses intensely in the unequal organization of production, distribution, and consumption. Capital makes class. It intensifies, but it cannot produce, race, gender and locality—and especially the differential citizenship entitlements associated with each. The state-orchestrated production of these unequal-

ities is the state’s subsidization of capital, and of that portion of the citizenry who benefit from these practices.

On the other hand, modern “democratic” states are based in a range of citizenship entitlements which make such differentiation difficult to produce—particularly within the entitlement to equal treatment under law. Law is absolutely fundamental to modern “democracies” and to capital, and equally fundamental is the *partially* realistic assumption and practice that both law and regulation will be applied equally to all. Beyond this, there are a range of increasingly costly services and supports, from education to health care to municipal services, where differential access, against the grain of equal protection, is probably the primary cost saving. There is thus a fundamental contradiction between the state’s full-scale engagement in the production of inequalities and the state’s commitment to the so-called “rule of law.” This contradiction is partly concealed, primarily from its beneficiaries, by the pretense of naturalized inequalities—race, gender—and by a fragmentation of state engagements into a multiplicity of supposedly separate strands—education, health, municipal services, subsidies, et cetera. The production of locality will serve to illustrate how fragmentation turns into the kinds of concealment that enable states to produce and reproduce fundamental inequalities amongst its legally equal citizenry.

The production of locality as a powerful form of inequality, with far-reaching and very substantial consequences (Carbonella 2005), has scarcely been given the attention it deserves. Differential social services, differential zoning, differential environmental and medical-care health issues, and differential schooling—each of which gets separate attention—come together to make far more than the obvious. The concept of “ghetto,” or more politely “inner city,” puts the blame on race, class, geography and, with the predominance of woman-headed households, gender, for what is primarily a product of state. Financing schools substantially through local property taxes, as is almost universally done in the U.S. as a matter of state policy, alone makes the point: if all public schools in a state are financed by local property taxes (above a minimal per-pupil equal state grant), then one law or practice applied to all guarantees a citizenry very significantly differentiated in well-being.

This points to a core contradiction of contemporary states: to have and to fracture its citizenry. This contradiction seems to be increasingly resolved, or only concealed, by subtle and fluid forms of “legally” delineated differential citizenship, with much of the fluidity realized through major variation in enforcement. There now seem to be fewer forms of social differentiation as bipolar and as rigid

as race, and more fluid and shifting state-managed statuses and situations such as we find in large urban neighbourhoods of “illegal aliens,” many of whom are permitted to live as citizens, many of whom have more tentative and vulnerable situations, and many who are somewhere in between. A similar fluidity and shifting state-managed range of situations has recently been developing in the former cod-fishing outports of rural Newfoundland.

Spreading Local Ruptures

Until the development of chemical sensors, miners often took caged canaries with them, particularly into the deep shafts. Canaries would die in the presence of odorless, explosive methane gas, just before the gas became explosive. When the canary dies you run. At the outset of this essay I suggested that Newfoundland villagers were the canaries of Canada—and even more broadly, of capitalist so-called democracies. To develop this point we need to look a bit more closely at the social death of Newfoundland fishing villages. There are two major components to this death, one forcing many people to leave, the other creating new and intense inequalities among those who stay.¹⁹

The cod biomass collapse became undeniable by early 1992, and Canada closed almost all the commercial cod fishery around the coasts of Newfoundland, precipitating the largest mass layoffs in Canadian economic history. As there was little other primary economic activity in most villages, and as it was widely expected that the cod would soon regenerate, Canada developed income replacement schemes that essentially paid fishers and fish plant workers a modest annual salary to sit still and wait for the cod to come back.

The income replacement program that Canada introduced in 1994 was called TAGS (The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy). The government said that TAGS would last for five years, until 1999. It was designed both to pay an income to people who still could not fish, or process fish in factories, and simultaneously to transfer as many people as possible out of the fishery. This was done by seeking to buy up fishing licences—buying people out of the fishery—and by job retraining schemes. Neither was very effective. Between 1994 and 1996, of the 40 000 people receiving TAGS support in Atlantic Canada, 732 were placed in jobs outside the fishery, and 1 492 retired from, or were bought out of, the fishery.

In 1997, when the cod biomass showed no sign of rebuilding, Canada announced it would end the TAGS program a year early, in 1998, and it began to withdraw substantial numbers of entitlements. At the same time (1997), the Unemployment Insurance program was

changed in major ways, to force people to go where the jobs were. It did this primarily by drastically increasing the minimum number of weeks, different in each region, to *initially* qualify for unemployment insurance: that is, for those who were just entering the full-time work force. In Newfoundland this was raised from 14 to 26 weeks, far longer than any available employment in the remaining, intensely seasonal, shrimp and crab fishery. If you just finished your education, and were a new entrant into the labour force, you had to leave rural Newfoundland for your first job, or else try to live on episodes of work combined with Social Assistance (welfare) for a substantial part of the year. Unemployment insurance paid fully entitled workers about \$15 000 a year; welfare maxed out, for families with several children, at about \$8 000—not a liveable income, even in rural Newfoundland.

The most powerful pressure to leave Newfoundland was the organization of “job training” under the new post-1997 Employment Insurance program. If you no longer got TAGS payments and did not qualify for employment insurance, you could avoid the unlivable welfare payments by signing up for job retraining, which paid the same as TAGS for the year or so of training. You did not just volunteer; you had to be accepted by the local “Job Counsellor.” Every single job counsellor in rural Newfoundland with whom I spoke said that they would not accept a person for job retraining unless they “signed a paper” saying they would relocate anywhere in Canada that a job was offered. They told me that this was the only way they could make their very costly retraining programs look successful, as there were few jobs in Newfoundland. This forced relocation was denied by every single senior government official in Newfoundland with whom I spoke—one said that it was illegal; another that it was unconstitutional. The job counsellors in the villages said that none of the trainees challenged the enforceability of this requirement. They signed, and they went. One retrainee told his job counsellor that he would leave at three in the morning, because he did not want to see his children sob. That quiet statement about the heartlessness of the process was about as deep and as confrontational as protest was, or was thinkable, by all parties involved.²⁰

Beginning in 1998, there was an explosive expansion of the distant-water shrimp and crab fishery. For those few individuals who have a shrimp and crab license, and a boat that now costs upwards of \$800 000, it is possible to earn \$80 000 to \$100 000 a year, and the four or five crew members can earn \$30 000 or more each—much more money than almost all cod-fishers ever saw. But the fish plant in the north-eastern village of Catalina, which

had hired about 1 250 people for fifty weeks a year when it processed cod, closed with the moratorium on cod fishing in 1992. When it reopened in 1998 as a shrimp plant, it hired 135 workers back and ran barely 15 weeks a year—some years not making the 14 weeks necessary for the workers to qualify for full unemployment insurance benefits.²¹

More: the 135 former cod plant workers hired back in 1998 all had to have at least 20 years seniority in 1991, when the cod plant closed, to be offered a job in the reopened plant. This means that they were hired in 1971 or before. If they were 17 years old in 1971 (the minimum hiring age), they were born in, or for most of them at least several years before, 1954. In 1998, when the plant started processing shrimp, the youngest worker in the plant was 44, and there were almost no working-class jobs locally available for anyone younger, anyone of child-bearing age, outside of a few minimum wage jobs in nursing homes or retail sales. Most of the people with young children had to leave rural Newfoundland to find work. While village populations declined about 25% from the closure of the cod fishery in 1992 to the 2001 census, in very many places well over half the people of child-bearing age are gone. Schools, churches, grocery stores and banks are closing. Children have few playmates; elderly have little family support and care. Some communities are having trouble collecting enough taxes to keep their street lights on.

Even among those fisher families who are doing extremely well financially there are profound ruptures in the midst of their prosperity—ruptures that go well beyond the devastation of their communities, which their wealth permits many to partially ignore. The really profitable shrimp and crab fisheries are about 200 miles offshore, and many of the boats used are not built to fish that far out in the north Atlantic. They could neither outrun a very fast-rising major storm nor ride it out. The fishery, I was told, was a disaster waiting to happen. Several fishermen, descendants of fishers, told me they were never so afraid in all their lives; their wives, usually the daughters and granddaughters of fishers, said the same. When I asked each if they talked to their spouse about their fears they all said no, never. Down at the base of what and why, there is nothing to say.

The fundamental concepts of anthropology—culture, social structure, social organization, kinship system, et cetera—all presume a continuity and a processual stability in everyday life that is simply not there for a great many people in the world today. These concepts all depend upon today being more or less like both yesterday and tomorrow. We do not yet have an anthropology that is adequate to speak to, or with, lives defined by ruptures.²² Feminists

have argued that narrativity—stories with beginnings, middles and ends, and with a simple linear progression from beginning to end—profoundly misrepresents many women's lives. The problem is broader and even deeper. When fishermen do not talk to their wives about their fears that their boats are potential death-traps, and wives do not talk to their husbands about their same fears, in part because there is now nothing much in the way of viable alternatives to taking these boats that far out to sea, not if you want to stay “home” in village Newfoundland, then in this silence we are witnessing the spreading death of coherence—both the solidity and the speakability of social life. Unspeakable actual and potential ruptures now shape the lives of vast numbers of people.

The ruptures get even deeper, particularly for those who seem to be stuck going nowhere, having almost nothing. At the bottom end of the village income scale, I remember the sight of a gaunt woman in her late 40s or early 50s, on the northern end of the Bonavista Peninsula, far out in the North Atlantic, on a truly cold and windy late October morning in 2000, two years after TAGS ended and there was nothing left but welfare, in an utterly threadbare coat and summer-weight slipper-shoes, spending \$30 on Lotto tickets in a small convenience store at the end of a rutted village street. Shortly after this I saw the following advertisement for the state-run lottery (reproduced in Davis 2002):

If you play *Lotto 6/49*, *Lotto Super 7*, or *Pick 4*, increase your chances...“TAG IT.” TAG IT is Atlantic Canada's \$100,000 add-on game [note, only Atlantic Canada, where almost all the TAGS payments went]. It's drawn every Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday, and it costs only \$1 [more] to play.

The point here is not to ask what sort of people would design a gamble of such poor odds and then write an advertisement in those terms—from a moral height perhaps slightly above green pond slime—and more, would give supervisory approval for it, with everyone involved knowing that lotteries are a tax on the poor for having some hope left within them.²³ The point at the end is to understand how, in the face of such governmental contempt and destructive manipulation of its own citizenry, people may still move forward, and how we might provide some small help for this struggle.

To begin with, what we see in this woman's intense participation in the lottery is that within and against her suffering she has to be crafting a sense of tomorrow—a better tomorrow. We can not know what she desires the money for, should she win. What we can know is that it would have to be spent on material goods and, most likely,

on enhancing her social relations: in sum on joining society more on her own terms, and on triumphing over it—at least temporarily.

This form of gambling is near, or at, the bottom end of non-professional gambling. Unlike the video lottery terminals in bars, or the bingo games in church halls, each of which is embedded in a well-crafted sociability among the participants, lottery tickets are far more isolated, a far more lonely endeavour. Yet even here we can find an attempt to construct, against the pressures and ruptures of impoverishment, a coherent and viable social life. That this attempt leads her to cooperate with the forces that even further rob her of that possibility is only one of the characteristic, multiple contradictions of her situation. It is precisely in these contradictions that we can situate our attempts to intervene—to share our understandings and give our hand to this gaunt woman, and to use our understandings to get our hands on the people who continually put her where she is.

Conclusion: Confrontational Anthropology

The substantial decline of these small communities is neither steady nor “processual,” capable of being usefully described as an on-going, continuing process. While this decline has some process-like features, for the people who live in the midst of the problems it is experienced as a series of fundamental ruptures: the fishery ended, fish-plant employment gone, the village grocery store closed, your car up on blocks for the winter, your telephone given up. Social life in much of Newfoundland is now increasingly shaped by profound ruptures between yesterday and today, between today and tomorrow, and most of all by the ruptures one lives with all day, every day.

The ruptures between yesterday and today are not simply definable by the end of the cod fishery, or the closing of schools, stores, and banks, as crucial as are all these events. Out of the social relations of yesterday came changing values about ways of relating to one another, changing ideas about needs and wants, and changing hopes: in sum, came the process that anthropologists, myself included, once called “culture.”²⁴ As income, ways of working, and community collapse, and kin and friends and neighbours leave, people are increasingly unable to meet the demands of their own culture. They find themselves necessarily in a partly antagonistic relationship to their own past or to a romanticized idealization of it, which amounts to the same thing, a distancing from a part of their own identity.²⁵

Most subtly of all, and perhaps most powerfully, we can sense the complexities of an impending rupture

between hopes and doom with the impoverished woman spending \$30 on Lotto tickets: the growing rupture between her hope and her impending, intensifying, doom. This is a particularly revealing rupture, for here we are unavoidably drawn to go beyond the chaotic separations of yesterday from today, today from tomorrow. The space between this woman’s hope and her impending doom is a rupture she must live every day, every moment of her life, not something that can be positioned on a time-line. So also, when we think about it, is working on a boat that must fish much too far out to be safe, or having a husband and a son or two on that boat, with the silence within the family naming the sense of an unavoidable, impending, potential rupture. To say that here or there was, is, or will be the break would be to trivialize what is happening, to misunderstand the circumstances within and against which so very many lives are lived.

What can we do? In the face of such crises of local social reproduction what constitutes, or reconstitutes, a partisan anthropology?

I think we have to give up the notion that the core of anthropology—of ethnographic field research—is the immediately observable. We still must look and listen intensely. But I want to problematize, in a different way than usual, what it is that we are looking and listening to and for. We must first put aside, as important but ultimately shallow and simplistic, the self-centred realization that we need to pay more attention to how our own particularity as specific kinds of observers shapes what we see and hear. Of course it does, but if we keep looking for, or listening to, the sorts of things that caught our attention for the past 50 years we will not get very far by adding ourselves and our own peculiarities to the mix.

In recent years I have increasingly emphasized the need to listen for the silences and the incoherence of social life, and to look for the growing ruptures and the rents in the social fabric, with rents implying both tears and appropriation. In these tasks of listening to the silences and looking for the fractures, I have found that classical anthropology is particularly useful—not to describe or explain reality but to describe and explain the organizing illusions of domination.

Anthropology, using concepts such as social organization, social structure, culture, et cetera, (or worse: *a* social structure, *a* culture, etc.) to make field research seem doable, unwittingly incorporated the fantasies of ordered and controlled inequalities embedded in the concepts. So when I am in the field I constantly wonder how and why what I see and hear differs from the classical anthropological models of *a* social structure, expressed in ordinary everyday life and sequential processes, and with people

having, in some unproblematic way, their culture. Fieldwork for me now depends on wondering what classical anthropology would have said about what I am seeing, and how and why what I am seeing and hearing, and not seeing and not hearing, differs from that.

Over the past several decades there has been some excellent work done that puts classical anthropology aside, and focuses on the discordances, ruptures, the chaos in daily life caused by domination and inequality. All I am suggesting here is a different route to understanding, one that takes the basic concepts of mid-20th-century anthropology again more seriously, not as tools to discover what social life is like, and certainly not how it “works” or “functions,” but as a guide to power’s goals and simultaneously its lies. Classical anthropology, in this perspective, remains at least initially useful in field research to delineate how those who dominate different factions of the state, capital, and local social relations seek to have, or to assume and thus partly create, an ordered framework for governance, control, administration.

The deeply incomplete and uncompletable social ordering that anthropology, like power, assumed was there for all but the “deviants” became the basis for the hegemony of power; in the older sense of the word, which was as much about *must* as about belief, and thus treated “going along” with power as a mixture of unwitting and unwilling compliance. Power, much of the time, was largely indifferent to this distinction in the reasons for compliance, sometimes even openly mocking or further abusing those who willingly complied with its demands or its hints. That is one of the crucial lessons of the “Sambo” myths and of pornography: people are rather more likely to be mocked and humiliated than to be appreciated for complying with the demands of power.

To understand how such power seeks to organize itself and others, from its perspectives and with its methods, I find classical anthropology, with its vision of an ordered and orderly inequality, moving routinely from one day to the next, exceptionally useful for delineating the present and the necessary in people’s lives and, as I have sought to show here, *simultaneously the unliveable*.²⁶

In the chaos that power routinely causes, in the fractures in people’s lives that inequality characteristically imposes, in the social production of the vulnerabilities of race, gender, differential citizenship and class—in all the social order and ordering that makes the world that classical anthropology sought to describe both unliveable and usually unavoidable—we can find the terrain of our new anthropology and our partisanship. The anthropology of “shared culture” was not wrong, and can not be put aside: more to the point it was a deeply unavoidable and, for

many, a necessarily and inescapably opposable presence in daily life—as the words “nigger” and “newfie” were both given their force by, and at the same time destroyed, the idea of “shared culture.”

It is this from unavoidable opposition that we can begin. Perhaps in it we can find a different sense of struggle, not based on a direct confrontation with power and domination, for such confrontations primarily serve to dignify the enemy, but struggle rooted in a radical, confrontational engagement with the production of fractures in our and each other’s daily life. Producing these fractures turns out to be crucial to the continual reproduction of power and inequality. Power necessarily produces inequalities; inequalities necessarily produce chaos. Organizing among and with each other against the production of chaos in our daily lives may shape new and hopefully more effective confrontations with states.

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Notes

- 1 On the innocence of American cultural anthropology see, for instance, Adam Kuper (1999); in particular his discussion of how post World War II concepts of diverse cultures, then a characteristic of U.S. schools of anthropology, would be heard in apartheid-dominated South Africa.
- 2 Crises of social reproduction are notoriously difficult to understand—hence the “transition debates” on the transition from feudalism to capitalism that compelled so much attention from medieval and early modern historians in the last half of the twentieth century. Transitions nowadays are often regarded as rather less epochal. Discussions centre either on industrial organization and strategies of accumulation, such as the rise and decline of fordism and flexible production, or on undefinables and supposed novelties, such as postmodernism and globalization. In the perspective developed here, crises of social reproduction are more rooted than is usually done in the direct involvement of, and contradictions within, states, and thus take on an analytically unfamiliar dynamic.
- 3 Note, for future development in my current research both on race and on child suicide among native peoples, that the phrase I use here is “daily life,” not “everyday life.” Daily life is just that—yesterday, today and tomorrow, perhaps with significant continuities, perhaps not. Everyday life presumes the centrality of continuity within which fluctuations are viewed as part of the order, or the ordering, of the everyday. The chaos, fractures and discontinuities poverty and domination characteristically impose on ordinary people makes the concept of a continuous everyday life a way of separating our understandings from their realities.
This is simply to introduce an issue. It is not a critique of the *Alltagsgeschichte* (usually translated as everyday life) school of history that has developed in Germany, which has had some important influence in North America. *Alltagsgeschichte* is framed in different terms (which also call out for close consideration). The French perspective on daily life history, once it passed out of the hands of its masters (Braudel, LeRoy Ladurie, Carlo Ginzburg) mostly became the framework for coffee-table books and dinner-table chatter.
- 4 I owe this overview of the situation in the maquiladoras to Sra. Marta Ojeda, Executive Director of the Tri-National Coalition for Justice, who presented these figures in a talk given in the University of Arizona Symposium “Resistance on the Border: Globalization, Militarization, Immigration” on December 7, 2002 (with thanks to Professor Linda Green, who provided her notes on this symposium). The *New York Times*, on December 10, 2002, had a long article on the large

number of women who have been “ritually” murdered in Juárez, the urban maquiladora zone just across the border from El Paso, in the past three years (see Thompson 2002). Mexican government officials seem to have paid very little attention to this: they were only working women.

- 5 The literature that both exemplifies and deepens this glancing overview is broad and crucial. To name just a few items that I have found particularly useful, see John Iliffe, *African Poor* (1987); Mahmood Mamdani (1996)—but necessary to use with much caution; Gavin Smith, (1999); George A. Collier with Elizabeth Quaratiello (1999[1994]); Maria L. Lagos (1994); Charles R. Hale (1994); Jeffrey L. Gould (1990, 1998); Steve Striffler (2005) and with special force and clarity, Francisco Scarrano (1996). There is an excellent review of the literature on the production of locality, along with perceptive theoretical insights, in Carbonella 2005. On the relation between the production of locality and local inequality see Sider 1997. Biolsi 2005 has a very fine, brief introduction to sovereignty and differential citizenship, and Brooke Larson (2004) provides a model analysis for the interweaving of citizenship and race in the special circumstances forming Andean liberal democratic states.
- 6 The best overview of the destruction of the fishery is Michael Harris, *Lament for an Ocean: The Collapse of the Atlantic Cod Fishery*.
- 7 Professor Don Kalb of Utrecht University and Central European University, Budapest, in a close and perceptive reading of an early draft of the manuscript, noted [and I quote from his remarks in a personal communication, September 26, 2003]:
“The process...is even much larger and more widespread than you infer. The whole of provincial Eastern Europe, in particular spaces in eastern Poland, eastern Slovakia, eastern Hungary, the whole of Romania and Bulgaria except the capital cities and some additional islands of stability, large tracts in the Ukraine and Russia, not to speak of Central Asia and Siberia, suffer from precisely the same process of a radical decline of citizenship, turning locales from commodity producers into the producers of human exports. It is only not understood as such because they never had active democratic citizenship and because the socialist heritage spoils critique and puts a premium on exit. Post-socialism as cultural process is primarily about this dispossession, about the illusions of migration and Westernization, about struggling with your own traditions and the false promises of transition. The process is comparable to what you discover in North Carolina and Newfoundland, to the extent that these people also have had the experience of social rights, which have now been taken from them.”
- 8 A key part of this task entails a critique of the concept of “subsistence production”—along with the way this concept was developed by Chayanov and Meillassoux. That critique was presented in Sider 1989.
- 9 The preface in Sider 2003b begins the discussion of the production of race, which is my current research project, to be further examined in a forthcoming volume of collected essays.
- 10 The concept of the social cost of commodities, and the political inequalities tied to the production of these social costs,

- is delineated in the preface to Sider 2003b. In brief, and much simplified, the social cost of the commodities produced in a locality includes the cost of socially reproducing the producers—those who make the commodities. Price/cost negotiations thus necessarily include the standard of living the producers can successfully claim, or can be forced to accept. In many rural hinterlands a substantial portion of the population, and particularly women, are far too vulnerable to routine forms of domination to negotiate effectively on their own behalf. Amartya Sen (1981) has conclusively shown that most major famines take their mortal toll from large numbers of people losing the ability to purchase or acquire food, rather than from a large decline in the availability of food. Lagos 1994 has a useful description, more broadly relevant than her Bolivian example, of the vulnerability of rural producers to price manipulations very much against their interests.
- 11 While it is exceptionally difficult to measure the actual social costs of, and returns to, domestic commodity production, there are useful ways of approximating the situation. We can see if communities are meeting at least their national (or, better, regional) average standards of life expectancy, infant mortality, maternal mortality, and severe maternal birth injury, as well as national standards for child growth curves, education and literacy. If they are significantly below standard, or if they are comparatively declining, it is likely that the full social costs of producing commodities are not being met. It is possible to argue that there are a very large number of additional factors shaping these outcomes—such as the presence or absence of doctors, clean water, cultural or social marginalization, et cetera (Rodgers, Gore and Figueiredo 1995). All this is true, but a lifetime of working with the rural poor, and on the kinds of differentiation that occur among the rural poor, has led me to think that these additional factors are secondary to, and derivative from, structural impoverishment and of relatively small importance compared to processes that continually impoverish villages and villagers. One of the major obstacles to grasping deteriorating situations in rural hinterlands is the appallingly ignorant, but very widespread, practice of measuring rural well being by per-capita income. Rising incomes then supposedly indicate increased well being. They may just as likely indicate increasing commodification of the necessities of daily life, widely associated with increasing deterioration in well-being. The only criteria that make sense are the ones mentioned above, or similar actual measures of life-quality.
 - 12 There is a whole literature, primarily from France, which addresses this issue in ways that muddle the real-world situation of the people in such circumstances. Meillassoux (1981), for example, argues that villagers can sell their labour and their goods so cheaply because they are also subsisting themselves. Partly correct, this perspective fails to closely examine the whole notion of subsistence, which contains the double meaning of self-provisioning and just barely getting by, with a wide and often changing range of meanings to “just barely.” As a UN study of rural poverty put it decades ago, if a people’s needs are not quite being met, they don’t simply die on the spot, but childhood mortality increases, as does susceptibility to disease, and life-expectancy declines. Yet while they die from malnutrition, we could still think that they are “subsisting themselves” from their small and picturesque patches of corn, beans, and squash.
 - 13 Jeffrey Gould (1998) provides an excellent comparative example, particularly in the way he shows how indigenous communities in highland Nicaragua became dependent upon lawyer politicians who were simultaneously defending them from more direct brutality and plundering their lands and resources for personal and state gain.
 - 14 And also, with particular virulence, in Central and South America, where *indio* and *mestizo* combine, in locally specific ways, both false biology and pervasive, life-shaping citizenship entitlements. Innu and Inuit in Canada have suffered very greatly from their lack of rights and protections, neither of which are excusable by the modicum of “sovereignty” they are permitted. Many of the worst outrages imposed upon them have their origin in the ways they are included in, and simultaneously excluded from, the Canadian nation-state. See, for instance, Frank Tester and Peter Kulchyski 1994.
 - 15 The majority of border-crossers are forced to use a route that goes through a stretch of truly difficult land—barren, very dry, usually very hot—appropriately named for a right-wing senator and presidential candidate of an earlier generation: Barry Goldwater Park.
 - 16 This is intended to imply a historical development from the concept and the reality of a “reserve army of labour.” The main point now seems to be not to have masses of people that one can more or less temporarily set aside, but people one can more or less get rid of.
 - 17 On the concept of “interior borders” see Davis 2000, chapter 7. He uses the terms “second border” for the searches of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and “third border” for the range of extralegal pressures upon both documented and undocumented migrants.
 - 18 Gavin Smith (University of Toronto) insightfully points out that the evidence for the declining significance of culture in the production of inequalities is more suggestive than conclusive. I concur; but emphasize the increasingly direct—unmediated—engagement of states in processes that make, harness and marginalize inequalities. Of special interest in this issue, as he pointed out, is the increasingly widespread use of the term “culture” among academics and the people themselves, at the same time as administratively delineated citizenship becomes increasingly determinative.
 - 19 This is an extremely complex issue, which calls for a historical paper focusing directly on the topic. In brief the issue is this. First, we do not want to romanticize early forms of village social life, saying that the new, more intense inequalities have “spoiled” or destroyed community. There may be some truth to this perspective, but it is beside the point here. The point is that in vast regions of the world a hard-pressed poverty once still left people minimally able to reproduce themselves in their communities, albeit at horrendous cost. Now, however, in vast areas of the world, social reproduction of very substantial numbers of rural people/communities is no longer possible at any cost people are able to pay. Structural adjustment, development, neoliberalism, rapidly shifting processes of accumulation and deeply

subsidized state brutality (a proper part of contemporary imperialism and neocolonialism) have made much countryside unlivable for the poor. That is the new inequality: many can't even stay there to die, but must "urbanize." The out-migration from Europe to the Americas, particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was only partly similar.

- 20 The job counsellor wanted me to know that they too knew their program was heartless.
- 21 The amount of your unemployment cheque is determined, at first, by your income. But if the plant ran only 11 weeks, your unemployment cheque was only 11/14ths of this amount.
- 22 Kirk Dombrowski (2001) is excellent on this issue, and on ways of addressing situations where the assumption that there is an ordinary daily life is more misleading than helpful.
- 23 It is important to remember here that when Pandora—who was "first woman" in Greek mythology, equivalent to Eve—opened her box, letting out all the evils but one, (keep quiet, Freud, there is other work to do) she slammed the lid shut just in time "to keep one evil among men," as the myth goes. That evil, which keeps "men" struggling, was Hope. Graeco-Roman–Judaic so-called "civilization" is founded not just upon intense labour, as per Eve, but upon the critique and the exploitation of hope. Indeed, that is what surplus extraction, the political-economic foundation of all "civilization," entails.

For those who find this language inappropriately strong (Canada being well known, and almost rightly praised for its gentle politesse), I can offer two comments: first that social analysis is, or should be, partisan; second, that if you prefer the illusion of objectivity you can go back to your daily newspaper. I am no longer willing to help maintain the pretenses that have provided both the cloak and the dagger for much so-called "social science."

- 24 The concluding chapter to Dombrowski 2001 has an exceptionally productive discussion of the ways that the concept of culture spread through the social sciences in the early 20th century, and how this continually reshaped the ways anthropology conceptualized its subjects.
- 25 The situations Hermann Rebel (1989) refers to in his interesting (if rather too individualist) proposal of "divided selves" in rural Newfoundland is probably more usefully conceptualized along the lines of historically specific ruptures, including pumping people out of communities during the inshore fishery, as discussed in Sider 2003a and the ruptures described here. These ruptures put people in specific antagonistic or romanticized relationships to their own past and their own culture, as opposed to the more generalized and abstract schisms he finds. Dombrowski (2001) provides the most developed study of the complex and changing relationship of people to their own culture. Of special importance is the way he shows how and why there are different kinds of relations to one's own past and one's own culture in the same small community. Carbonella (1992) develops an analysis of how community itself is shaped by people's confrontations with their own past. Both Green (1999) and Bornstein (2002) carry the analysis into state-imposed ruptures that, while forcing a profound break

between people and their own history and culture, allow the formation of different kinds of illusions among the people so treated. Smith (1999, esp. Part Two) shows differentiation formed in ruptures as part of resistance to further domination.

- 26 Foucault took Weberian ideas about the internal coherence of power and expanded them into an analysis of governmentality that depended upon the ability of power to largely create its subjects. A hasty reading might suggest that the issues here are being pressed into a Foucauldian mold. A better fitting mold had been earlier and much more subtly carved by the playwright Jean Genet. Genet understood, better than Foucault, how people must, and do, accept power's dreams for them, and moreover, incorporate these dreams and act within them more or less willingly, and how this is, at the same time, impossible, so that lives and power are shaped simultaneously by desires and their impossibilities. For this more subtle analysis see, for instance, Genet's *The Maids and Deathwatch* (1954, originally *Les Bonnes et Haute Surveillance*), and from the top down, literally, *The Balcony* (1966).

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