Citizenship and the Social Geography of Deep Neo-liberalization

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Abstract: From the vantage point of the bleak social landscapes of the "divided cities" of Latin America, the meaningfulness of the focus on deepening the rights of citizenship that accompanied the shift to more democratic political regimes is far from obvious, despite some apparently positive developments accompanying the transition to neo-liberalism. This paper examines the reasons for the resilience of neo-liberalism despite the popular protests that neo-liberal economic policies have provoked in many countries, arguing that the logic of neo-liberal rule systems has now permeated even the most "socially progressive" political parties and feeds off the diffuse effects of social transformation.

Keywords: neo-liberalism, citizenship, diffused power, urban space, politics, poverty

Résumé : Du point de vue des sombres réalités sociales qui caractérisent les «villes divisées» d'Amérique latine, l'accent porté sur le renforcement des droits de la citoyenneté qui a accompagné la transition vers des régimes politiques plus démocratiques revêt une signification qui est loin d'être évidente, et ce, malgré certains développements en apparence positifs qui ont accompagné le passage au néo-libéralisme. Cet article examine les causes de la résilience du néo-libéralisme en dépit des protestations populaires que les politiques économiques néo-libérales ont suscitées dans de nombreux pays, et soutient que la logique des systèmes de domination néo-libérale a pénétré jusqu'aux partis politiques les plus «socialement progressistes» et se nourrit des effets diffus de la transformation sociale.

Mots-clés : néolibéralisme, citoyenneté, pouvoir diffus, espace urbain, politique, pauvreté

Introduction: Neo-liberalism and Its Counter-movements

Surveying ways in which social science perspectives on urban Latin America have changed since the 1970s, Bryan Roberts notes that citizenship "has largely replaced class as a means of analyzing the political struggles of the poor" (Roberts 2004: 195). The change clearly relates to the transition from developmentalist to neo-liberal states. Traditional class-based politics depended on the labour force of organized workers with stable jobs. In practice only a minority of Latin American workers ever enjoyed such jobs and received benefits from the state. Nevertheless, even if they were first offered by authoritarian populist regimes to preemptively demobilize challenges from below, workers' rights tended to expand through further political negotiation. Since the 1980s, neo-liberal economic "reforms" have eroded these gains, making it difficult to contest the overall assessment of Petras and Veltmeyer (2002) that the new regime has proved "a catalyst for social regression," even if there are longer-term differences between countries in terms of poverty alleviation that should not be ignored, since they suggest that redistributive policies remain feasible as well as desirable.[1]

During the 1980s and 1990s downward mobility not only of skilled workers but of people who had come to see themselves as at least lower-middle class created a situation in which, as Mexican researchers Boltvinik and Hernández (2000: 14) argue, an increasing mass of "socially anonymous" urban poor did not figure as "subjects of rights" but as receivers of politicized discretionary income supplements, with the implication that: "where citizenship ends, charity and manipulation for electoral purposes begins." Yet electoral manipulation is not the whole story. As Roberts points out, while the social services that neo-liberal governments provide to the poor have been downsized, poor people are now subject to more rather than less intervention, not simply on the part of NGOs but also by local instances of government to which

central state functions and budgets have been delegated in accordance with World Bank and IMF prescriptions (Roberts 2004: 197). All this is done in the name of fostering "the rights and the responsibilities associated with citizenship and participation." For Roberts, far from diminishing with the slimming-down of the state, "governance" has deepened by becoming more efficient and "managerial." The question he poses is whether these interventions can actually "create new spaces of participation and a stronger and more diverse sense of rights among urban populations," or simply lead to "greater control from above and to the fragmentation of collective action below" (ibid.).

This paper seeks to address that question. "Greater control from above" might, however, suggest the kind of "state-centred" account that governmentality theorists such as Nikolas Rose argue is an obsolescent way of analyzing politics and power in the 21st century. Rose (1999: 5) does not argue that the state has become unimportant, but that it needs "relocating" as simply one element "in multiple circuits of power, connecting a diversity of authorities and forces, within a whole variety of complex assemblages." My interest in what Rose terms realist "sociologies of governance" is stronger than my interest in an "analytics of governmentality," which is "empirical" in a different sense to my discussion of urban social geographies in the second half of this paper. Anthropologists can bring to a focus on capillary processes of power and the creation of "regimes of truth" an understanding of how the socially situated reactions of "ordinary" people unintentionally contribute to the conditions that are sustaining neo-liberalism. Yet ethnography also shows that the limits of neo-liberal governmentality lie in the resistance of popular cultures to total colonization by power and continuing organization on the part of such "ordinary people" to effect change in their lives. I do, however, accept the value of the "space for critical thought" that an analytics of governmentality opens up (ibid.: 19). The core argument of this paper is that realistic assessment of the possibilities of "progressive" politics today requires us to abandon all illusions about the depth of the transformation of the political field produced by neo-liberal systems of rule.

Although I will return to Rose's analysis frequently, my starting point is the less Eurocentric framework of Peck and Tickell (2002), who make a distinction between the "roll-back" neo-liberalism of the Reagan-Thatcher-Pinochet eras and a subsequent "roll-out" phase that also accommodates shifts in World Bank discourse such as its invocation of "strengthening civil society" to forge a new partnership between states and NGOs (World Bank 1997). Defining neo-liberalism as a political and cultural rather than simply economic project, Peck and Tickell (2002: 383) emphasize that like globalization, it "should be understood as a process, not an end-state."

The neo-liberalization process is contradictory. It produces counter-tendencies and exists in "historically and geographically contingent forms" (ibid.). Local histories influence paths of neo-liberal transformation. Differences between, say, Blair's Britain and Mexico under Vicente Fox, who in 2004 publicly affirmed his conviction that neo-liberalism represented the only possible route to a more prosperous national future, are neither theoretically nor politically trivial (Gledhill 2001). Nevertheless, Peck and Tickell argue that the diverse forms of neo-liberalization share common underlying logics. The "roll-back" phase involved "the active destruction of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions" but remained "shallow" (ibid.: 384). The "roll-out" phase is "deeper" in multiple senses because it is *constructive* in Foucault's sense.

Like many anthropologists who conducted fieldwork through the years of neo-liberal transition in the 1980s and early 1990s, I initially found it difficult to imagine that the massive social dislocations the new economic model produced could be contained politically. As I show below, there are clear senses in which they are not being contained, but explaining the resilience of neo-liberalism has now become an unavoidable issue. In seeking to address it, Peck and Tickell argue that the "roll-out" phase has created "a more formidable and robust pattern of proactive statecraft and pervasive metaregulation," even if the current "diffuse, dispersed, technocratic institutionalized form of neo-liberalism" has "spawned a free market in social regression" (ibid.: 384-385). What they point to here is that neo-liberalization has created a pervasive system of "diffused power" in the sense of Hardt and Negri (2000) that makes it "qualitatively different from 'competing' regulatory projects":

> It shapes the environments, contexts and frameworks within which political-economic and socio- institutional restructuring takes place. Thus neoliberal rule systems are perplexingly elusive: they operate between as well as within specific sites of incorporation and reproduction, such as national and local states. Consequently they have the capacity to constrain, condition and constitute political change and institutional reform in far-reaching and multi-faceted ways. Even if it may be wrong-headed to characterize neoliberalization as some actor-less force-field of extra-local pressures and disciplines—given what we know about the decisive purposive interventions of think-tanks, policy elites and experts, not to mention the fundamental role of state

> power itself in the (re)production of neoliberalism—as *an ongoing ideological project*, neoliberalism is clearly more than the sum of its (local institutional) parts. (ibid.: 400-401, emphasis in the original)

For Peck and Tickell, the problem posed by neo-liberalism as a system of diffused power is thus that "contemporary politics revolve around axes the very essence of which have been neoliberalized" (ibid.: 400).

In what follows, I explore how and why this system of diffused power seems to have rooted itself so deeply in Latin America, with particular attention to Brazil. Nevertheless, some readers may remain scandalized by the suggestion that neo-liberalism is proving "successful" politically, although I am not alone in asserting this. As Charles Hale has remarked:

> Key premises of the neoliberal doctrine now form part of the common sense of virtually every political party seriously in contention for state power in Latin America, and underlie all but the most peripheral of economic activities in the region. Debates over the consequences of neoliberal policies have been intense, and organized resistance to their consequences may well be on the rise, but these serve only to underline the general ascendancy of the doctrine. (Hale 2002: 487)

Political parties are not, however, the only players in the contemporary political field, and Latin America continues to produce social movements that manifest strong popular opposition to neo-liberalism. In the case of Mexico, they have covered a wide range of social sectors, including middle-class anti-debt movements as well as a variety of lower class urban popular movements and the Zapatista indigenous movement in Chiapas, which triggered a wave of militancy in other areas (Gledhill 2002). Yet the inability of these disparate social forces to coalesce in a coherent movement for change seems symptomatic of wider problems of fragmentation found in many other countries, and as fewer and fewer Mexicans feel it worthwhile to cast their ballots in elections, more and more have decided to vote with their feet by emigrating from Mexico to the United States.[2] Nevertheless, in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, popular mobilizations calling for an alternative to neo-liberalism have actually forced changes of government. This is, however, precisely why I think it essential to explore neo-liberalization as a deeper and more diffuse kind of process. To date, these militant challenges to neo-liberalism have failed to produce the changes that the movements sought, and seem consistent with Peck and Tickell's claim that neo-liberalization can endure despite provoking counter-movements.

In Ecuador, the activism of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) over the 1990s represented a real challenge to the existing political class and its institutions, culminating in two mass uprisings in 1999. Yet the six months during which the indigenous movement actually participated in the administration that its militancy finally brought to power, headed by Lucio Gutiérrez (a military officer who supported the protestors in the short-lived coup that overthrew President Mahuad in 2000), proved sharply divisive as the grassroots logic of the movement, based on indigenous communal institutions, conflicted with the logic of Gutiérrez's embrace of neo-liberalism. Withdrawal from government reduced CONAIE's official political influence, but proved the only way of avoiding its decomposition (Zibechi 2004: 3). In the case of Argentina, President Kirchner's "unorthodox" policy of focusing on boosting internal demand and employment while telling the nation's creditors, including the IMF, to wait until the country is able to pay has produced some economic recovery and reduced the proportion of Argentine citizens living below the poverty line from over 50% to 44% in two years (Rohter 2004). Yet Kirchner and his wife, Senator Cristina Fernández, built their power base in the tiny but oil rich state of Santa Cruz by running an efficient patronage machine based on the translation of oil revenues into public employment. His application of the same skills to national job creation programs has entangled many segments of the Movement of the Unemployed (the *piqueteros*) in relationships with the state, as administrators of funds and distributors of work, that have again had divisive consequences (Zibechi ibid.: 4). Although Kirchner talks the language of the anti-globalization movement, his economic "unorthodoxy" has little to do with alternatives to capitalism (though it has quite a lot to do with lack of immediate need for foreign investment) or with forms of statecraft antagonistic to those employed by self-avowedly neo-liberal regimes.

It is interesting to compare Argentina with Venezuela, arguably the most radical threat to the status quo in the region. Hugo Chávez's democratically elected government has fought off a series of challenges in which multiple forms of covert U.S. intervention have been implicated, along with personal connections between the Bush family and the Venezuelan transnational capitalists who financed the 2002 coup attempt (Aharonian 2002; Talbot 2002). Chávez's "Bolivarian Revolution," again born of the popular effervescence of the 1989 *Caracazo*, has revealed the potential of an anti-oligarchic movement that exploits the racial fractures of a country in which part of the military apparatus is willing to defend the consti-

tution and support alternative social projects. The overwhelming endorsement that Chávez secured in the 2004 recall referendum reflected the conjunctural benefits of rising world oil prices, since he could use revenues from the state oil company PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.) to fund social development projects. Yet the fact that the old PDVSA management had joined forces with the corrupt and despotic trade union leaderships nurtured by previous regimes to support his political opponents made it easier for Chávez to bring about shifts in power relations that are materially and symbolically significant for poorer Venezuelans. The redirection of PDVSA's revenues to improve their lives—rather than to subsidize other branches of Venezuelan capitalism or provide rents for a political class and union bosses—is another example of what can still be done through the national state in the era of globalization. With land reform also underway, only time will tell whether Venezuela can continue to advance on a distinct course, but *how* distinct that course will be remains an open question.

Since the Venezuelan economy is critically dependent on oil exports, the country has suffered from the multiple contradictions endemic to "petro-states," which have poor track records on mass impoverishment (Karl 1997). The capacity of a hostile United States to do harm remains a major preoccupation, not least because of its influence in neighbouring Colombia. Chávez has sought to reassure foreign investors and thus has limited scope for pushing confrontation with the national economic elite beyond the level that can be justified by their anti-democratic activities. PDVSA is run on commercial lines, and Chávez's anti-imperialist rhetoric disguises a willingness to leave the articulation of the economy, including "alternative enterprises," to market relations. The extent to which developments in Venezuela represent a decisive break with neo-liberalism should not, therefore, be exaggerated. They reflect another attempt to use the residual room for manoeuvre of the national state to make market economies less socially destructive, bolstered by the dream (also being promoted in Brazil) of forging regional ties that would offer a counterweight to U.S. hegemony.

Bolivia also saw "regime change" via popular insurrection in October 2003, when Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who had been returned to power in the previous year despite the unpopularity of the "structural reforms" forced through by the government he headed from 1993 to 1997, was forced into exile. As vividly charted in the multi-sited ethnography of Lesley Gill (2000), the consequences of neo-liberalism for the social fabric of Bolivia have been profound, producing a myriad of dislocations, even within families. Yet there have been regular confrontations between the state and popular coalitions that have crossed class and ethnic boundaries to challenge major neo-liberal economic projects, notably the attempt to privatize the water system of the Cochabamba region and place it in the hands of the Bechtel Corporation. The problem is once again that of holding coalitions together. The new government of Carlos Mesa has continued the plan to export gas that triggered the latest uprising by exploiting divisions between the coca growers' movement led by Evo Morales, the Bolivian Workers' Central, the landless movement and the neighbourhood assemblies of the El Alto "peripheral city."

While Morales has adopted an institutional strategy focused on his personal presidential ambitions, the Aymara organizations led by Felipe Quispe are now pursuing an increasingly separatist path, abandoning the idea of further participation in the state and aiming to build a new Bolivia from the bottom up, composed of self-governing communities substituting communal for capitalist economic principles (Zibechi 2004: 4). This project may have further radical (if risky) consequences, but it is important to note that it is still competing with others. As Sian Lazar has shown, the people of El Alto are subject to intense campaigns on the part of NGOs and donor agencies to implant a neo-liberal governmentality project based on the creation of "active" citizens (Rose 1999: 164-165) "who will take responsibility for their own and their families' welfare, and who are prepared for the market rather than the state to provide for them" (Lazar 2004: 302).

The women who participate in micro-credit schemes in El Alto behave in a manner that reflects embedded economic rationalities that differ radically from those envisaged by the planners of these schemes, with ironic results, such as the dependence of loan repayments on kinship relations and the (highly stressful) collective group sanctions that operated within older (high-interest) local lending arrangements (ibid.: 308). Many women fail to use the loans for their intended purpose or to internalize the messages that the capacity-building sessions organized by NGO facilitators seek to inculcate (ibid.: 315). Nevertheless, as Lazar notes, the point here is not simply that neo-liberal governmentality projects are failing to operate in the manner envisaged by their architects, which is a relatively common occurrence, but that they are displaying the adaptability typical of the roll-out phase of neo-liberalism. As the focus shifts from "the individual" to collective "social capital" and "community," intervention continues to extend into the intimate spaces of social life and is being modified in ways that threaten to draw upon "deeply rooted collective traditions of organization, com-

munity and kinship" to strengthen a process of "privatization of citizenship" (ibid.: 316).

This brings us back, then, to the way in which citizenship lies at the heart of neo-liberal governmentality projects. In the next two sections I review how the neo-liberal concept of citizenship differs from older, classically liberal and social democratic models, as a prelude to considering the limits of the "participation" and "empowerment" that are possible under conditions of deep neo-liberalization.

A Brief History of Citizenship, North and South

Citizenship has a special significance for the British, still "subjects" of a monarch languishing without a written constitution or citizens' bill of rights despite our precocious struggles against the "Old Corruption" of the Absolutist State. There are people in my country who continue to fret about that situation. They are, however, probably less numerous than those for whom the question of citizenship is principally a matter of excluding unwelcome "others" from the benefits of life in a former imperial metropolis much given to xenophobic and racist post-imperial nostalgia.

There we have the paradox of the form of citizenship that people fought and died for in early modern Europe. The politics of citizenship was about rights in the positive sense that people struggled to have more and new rights in ways that extended and deepened a basic "right to have rights" (even amongst subjects). Yet the construction of European citizens was also part of the process of construction of nation-states and state-nations of a historically novel kind. One aspect of this novelty lay in the way that the task of governing became tied to a conception of particular territorial space, the "national economy" and a population whose unity was defined in terms of shared language and culture, giving rise, from the 18th century onwards, to the "modern" conception of the government of "conduct" that inspired Foucault's original notion of "governmentality" (Rose 1999: 8-9). Yet these were also imperial nations, and as Stoler (1995) suggests in seeking to rectify Foucault's Eurocentrism, the capitalist disciplining of the Western European masses on the basis of the construction of racialized class differences had much in common with systems developed in the older colonial world of the 16th to 18th centuries. The same logic was then deployed to exclude colonials from the new citizenship rights being extended in Europe, so that the mirror of liberal society based on "free and equal" citizens was constant recourse to naturalized notions of "difference" to qualify capacities to enjoy rights, in what was an interdependent history of transformations in North and South.

Political democracy was not part of the original 17th-century package that enunciated the virtues of a liberal market society based on possessive individualism. Even a 19th-century "progressive" such as John Stuart Mill not only regarded "barbarous" segments of humanity as unworthy subjects of liberal freedoms, given the underdevelopment of their capacities to enjoy them, but continued to regard illiteracy and dependence on parish relief as valid reasons for excluding some members of the "labouring classes" from the right to vote (Gledhill 1997: 83-84). The achievement of a more extensive political citizenship was therefore the product of intense struggles punctuated by defeats by populist, authoritarian, fascist and totalitarian alternatives in some countries. Even after the class basis of the electoral franchise was widened, further battles remained to be fought over exclusions related to gender and race (which remain all too salient for "immigrants" today).

Nor should we lose sight of the history of internal colonialism that accompanied the formation of an imperial entity such as the "United Kingdom." In both Ireland and Scotland, an enormous wave of violence was unleashed against a rural population considered by English elites to be an "impediment to progress," forcing millions to emigrate to the Americas, though not without a considerable amount of resistance to dispossession in the name of "traditional rights" and just treatment (Logue 1979), a reminder that the history of rights-based politics in Europe is not coterminous with the development of liberalism.

Modern liberal doctrines themselves have reflected a variety of positions, ranging from the extreme represented by "libertarians" such as Hayek, who became an obligatory points of reference for "roll back" neo-liberals thanks to his insistence that any redistributive principle of justice is incompatible with liberty (Lukes 1991: 53), to strong advocates of redistributive policies such as John Rawls, for whom the ability of citizens to "fruitfully exercise" their rights and liberties depends on their "basic needs" being met (Rawls 1993: 6-7). At the heart of debates within liberalism lies the problem of balancing individual autonomy and freedoms with substantive equality of rights for all. In the now classic formulation of T.H. Marshall (1950), citizenship was defined in terms of political, civil and social rights. Political and civil rights constitute defences against the abuse of power by the state, whereas social rights are those that require the active intervention of the state to equalize citizens' opportunities to enjoy the political and civil rights to which all are equally entitled. Civil rights include rights to freedom of expression and religious creed alongside the rights to

peaceful enjoyment of property and legal guarantees for contracts seen as essential to the functioning of a market economy. They remained in potential tension with social rights in Marshall's formulation, opening the door to the neo-liberal counter-offensive centered on the disadvantages of state intervention for the formation of properly "autonomous" and "capable" citizens, including the alleged undermining of a sense of personal responsibility provoked by the Welfare State.

Classical Euroamerican liberal notions of citizenship privilege a narrative of modernity focused on the relationship between "the State" and "Civil Society." The archetype of the state is the Absolutist Monarchy, whose arbitrary power cannot be tamed by the individual alone, but requires individuals to form the (free) associations that constitute "civil society" as an intermediate level of organization between state and individual in order to advance their freedoms. This model (hardly appropriate for understanding the development of "modern" government in a country such as Germany) places the "rising bourgeoisie" in the role of hero, leading "society's" conquest of the state and the separation of "public and private" on which individual rights and freedoms depend. It is reworked today under the rubric of "strengthening civil society" so as to invoke a wider range of collective actors as participants in the construction of less arbitrary and corrupt state orders. Yet the notion that "civil society" is of necessity opposed to the state is a problematic extension of the term from its original historical context, and we should also remember that movements that are "emancipatory" at one historical moment may cease to be so once structures of social power have been transformed (Brown 1995: 98).

Criticizing the way civil society is opposed to the state in debate about achieving "good governance" in Africa, Chabal and Daloz (1999: 19) note that it can be defined as "the creation of social networks distinct from the state and capable of transcending primordial family, kin or even communal ties." This definition might, however, also embrace mafias, and if we included only "recognized bodies," such as trade unions and professional or business associations, we would have to include some that had especially privileged access to and influence upon the state (ibid.: 20). Chabal and Daloz argue that African countries are likely to continue to pursue a distinct course, based, for the moment at least, on the political "instrumentalization" of apparent "disorder," but they also invite us to question whether deviation from Western paths of modernization is always catastrophic.

Making similar points about the problems of all-inclusive definitions of civil society, while striving to avoid the "Afro-pessimism" that ignores cases such as Botswana (Werbner 2004), Monga (1996: 4) argues for a more restrictive definition that includes "only those groups, organizations, and personalities that pursue freedom, justice and the rights of citizenship against authoritarian states." His "civil society" constitutes "new spaces for communication and discussion over which the state has no control." Yet although Monga offers fascinating insights into how an alternative kind of "civic culture" can propagate through informal rural-urban networks beyond the gaze of the state, in addition to being forged by dissident artists and intellectuals, the fact that he also reveals how dissidence is so frequently co-opted by the holders of state power makes the notion of a completely uncontaminated civil sphere beyond the reach of the state problematic. Furthermore, much of what "civil society" is called upon to do in pressing for substantiation of citizenship rights entails engagement with the state: in the case of demands for indigenous rights, for example, absolute refusal of relations (of the kind now practiced by the Zapatistas in Chiapas) remains the exception rather than the rule since the goal is generally legislative change that must still be enacted through whatever kind of regime enjoys national power.

Yet even if we conclude that "civil society" is more an ideological construct than a coherent analytical concept, the progressive story embedded in the foundation myth of liberal citizenship as birth of "civil society" seemed to offer the currently excluded—whether colonials or lower class Europeans—the hope of future inclusion through education in the civic virtues assumed alien to their original dispositions. The coupling of political citizenship to the nation complicates the issue, depending on whether ties of blood are deemed constitutive of national belonging, or the nation is built in politico-territorial terms that base membership on commitment from people of diverse origins. Yet an obvious anomaly is that the United States as a paradigmatic "nation of immigrants" has reproduced inequalities based on notions of "fitness" and "model minority" models that racialize cultural distinctions (di Leonardo 1998: 126). The way in which such qualifications affected formally liberal notions of citizenship is equally apparent in the case of "Latin" America.

Jorge Klor de Alva (1995) may be technically correct to argue that only the region's pre-Columbian aboriginal inhabitants were and remain a truly "colonized" population, given that *criollos* and *mestizos* became "natives" of nations in formation. Nevertheless, the post-imperial history of Spanish and Portuguese America was marked not only by a redefinition of "the Indian problem" that owed much to the importation of 19th-century European ideas

about race, state- and nation-building (Larson 1999), but also by spectacular episodes of violence on the part of the "civilizing" forces of the nation-state against dissident regional movements of ethnically mixed people which seemed to reflect the threat posed by "fanaticism" and rejection of "civilized virtues" to modernist state projects, a particularly chilling example of which was the Canudos massacre in the Bahian backlands of Brazil in 1897, immortalized by Euclides da Cunha's book *Os Sertões*. A renaissance humanist such as Mexico's Bishop Vasco de Quiroga saw Indians as "pliable clay" fit to be moulded into practitioners of the civic virtues of the European polis through the benign imposition of the utopian community of Thomas More (Verástique 2000: 121). Yet by the 19th century a strong body of elite opinion argued that worthy modern citizens could only be created by either "whitening out" the indigenous population through miscegenation or its displacement by European immigrants.

The adoption of liberal constitutions by newly independent Latin American nations brought in its wake a series of efforts to achieve "modernity" by measures of social engineering such as hygiene campaigns, the privatization of corporate landholdings, and, eventually, the extension of public education, but the anomalies continued. While the law served mainly as a weapon of privilege, everyday structural inequalities were rationalized in terms of the innate differences of a spiritual or racial kind between subalterns and elites, and men and women (DaMatta 1991).

Yet Latin American history abounds with struggles to make constitutional promises of fuller rights of "citizenship" real, even by what seemed the "weakest" elements of what is often dubbed a weak "civil society" on the grounds that a "progressive" capitalist bourgeoisie did not take the leading role (Díaz Polanco 1996: 25). To take simply one example, Sieder (2000) has shown how, under the patriarchal rule of the dictator Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, men and women living on the plantations of Alta Verapaz sought to exploit the cleavage between the local exploiting class and judges representing a state with centralizing pretensions. Men demanded payment of the wages specified by the law, while women demanded the right to leave husbands who abused them and compensation for violence. The fact that the supplicant was an Indian meant that the administration of justice continued to be affected by class and racial bias, a situation that continues to be salient today. Yet the fact that subalterns are active agents exploring concrete options for improving their situations made an unlikely "articulation of discourses" possible.

This kind of struggle did not, however, necessarily entail the embrace of a "modern" concept of citizenship based on the autonomy of the individual (Harvey 1998: 24). While the "rights" enshrined in classical liberal doctrines are rights assigned to, and constitutive of, individuals, as are those of modern international human rights law (Overmyer Velázquez 2003), contemporary indigenous rights politics orientated around mutual respect for "difference" within a multicultural nation threaten to reassert the collective rights and legal personalities expunged by liberal "reformers" in the 19th century. That such demands are more feasible today is related to the differences between classical liberal and neo-liberal rule systems, as I show in the next section. Change is equally manifest in the way that the once irredeemably "fanatic" culture of the Bahian backlands is now seen as a rich "folkloric" patrimony worthy of state promotion for religious tourists (Pessar 2004). Nevertheless, today as in the past, the more certain means of getting one's rights as a citizen attended to in Latin America is to resort to the levers of personal patronage or negotiation of bureaucratic favours, a framework from which deeply sedimented practices of discrimination are not easily erased.

Classical liberalism's claims to universalism, based on the creation of a society of citizens "free and equal under the law," were therefore frequently subverted, in the North as much as the South, while Marshall's model of social citizenship now seems like a half-forgotten dream in a North Atlantic world in which welfare has given way to workfare. There are, however, significant variations in terms of global paths to "modernity" that I have not touched upon so far.

In East Asia we have examples of politically "illiberal" states such as Singapore that built legitimacy and tranquilized social and ethnic tensions on the basis of generous attention to social rights (Castells 2000: 261). Public housing provision was central to the social engineering projects of both Singapore and Hong Kong, in the latter case offering de facto citizenship even to immigrant workers. Starting their economic development processes from the basis of a radical dominance of the state over "civil society" that in South Korea and Taiwan led to the elimination of the existing landowning oligarchies, the larger "Asian Tiger" states practiced redistributive policies that had impressive effects in terms of the reduction of social inequalities between nationals and produced affluent middle classes. These social changes eventually brought more middle-class engagement with liberal politics, along with social movements that became more questioning on issues such as gender and the environment. If, as Castells (ibid.: 377) argues, fundamental structural changes in the global economy are producing "a crisis of the nation-state as a sovereign entity, and related crisis of political democ-

racy," these tendencies are becoming equally relevant to the new "active citizens" of East Asia.

Liberal versus Neo-liberal Citizenship

If, following Roberts, we place citizenship at the centre of analysis of the political struggles of the poor, neo-liberalism has displayed the paradoxical quality of both expanding the ways in which citizenship can be defined and "hollowing out" its substance. At first sight, "hollowing out" is the result of the socially polarizing effects of changes within global capitalism, even if measures of social and personal welfare based simply on cash incomes fail to tell the whole story.[3] As Kruijt, Sojo and Grynspan (2002) document for Latin America, the symptoms of regression include growth of economic "informalization" and increases in violence, both organized (on the part of paramilitary and private security units as well as official security forces and organized crime) and everyday (robbery, assault and domestic violence). This leads them to describe the urban poor as enjoying a second-class, "informal" kind of citizenship, despite the enhancement of political rights produced by transitions from military rule to democracy. Yet as Sassen (1998: 154) has shown, the growth of economic "informalization" in New York City cannot be seen as a result of "Third World" immigration but is integral to the logic of U.S. "advanced capitalism," underscoring the need to avoid seeing changes in the South in isolation. Neo-liberalism has increased insecurity for citizens even further up the social scale, and again not simply in the countries of the South (Gledhill 2001: 135-138).

Nevertheless, the transition from what Hardt and Negri (2000: 70) define as a Eurocentric "modern sovereignty" to neo-liberal rule systems also appears to have extended rights through an apparent revaluation of "difference." We now have "ethnic" citizenship. In the case of Latin America, assimilationist projects have given way to programs that offer material support for the reproduction of distinct cultural identities: both indigenous and Black groups have become beneficiaries of schemes to reconstitute communal landholdings and administratively autonomous territories, even in war-torn countries such as Colombia.[4] Such concessions now enjoy the active support of the World Bank, which is increasingly insistent that recalcitrant states accept the need for them as NGOs and advocacy groups fortified by the catastrophic results of earlier Bank-sponsored mega-projects have made headway in forcing change by finding allies within the institution, in what Fox and Brown (1998: 489) describe as a mutually reinforcing process of external pressure and internal division.

It is easy, and perhaps necessary, to be cynical about these developments. There is frequently a vast gap between the rights recognized by revised constitutions and the lived daily realities of the mass of these new "subjects of rights." Where rights to control real resources are handed over, they tend not to be strategic from the point of view of contemporary capitalism, which often takes particularly predatory forms in the tropical regions in which many indigenous people live—one of the factors, along with more positive changes in the political climate produced by democratization, that has fostered increasing indigenous activism. While NGOs and transnational advocacy groups may have had tangible impacts on World Bank policies, their practical results are limited by procedural and bureaucratic strategies that limit the substance of changes (Fox and Brown 1998: 531). Where powerful private interests operate in close alliance with local states with the backing of a military superpower, prospects for mounting a successful defence remain limited.

Even where such interests are not central, grants of land to indigenous people still provoke conflict when poor people who cannot successfully play the "identity card" feel themselves unfairly discriminated against (Gledhill 1997: 95-96), and stir up backlashes from more privileged groups such as the middle-class *ladinos* that Hale (2002) discusses in the case of Guatemala. Ethnic categories are not transparent but are rather the historical legacy of processes of nation-building and elite projects of socio-economic transformation, made yet more problematic by "neoliberal multiculturalism's investment in neatly bounded categories of cultural difference" (Hale 2002: 324). Hale suggests the need for a new kind of politics to deconstruct such difference-making. Yet as the Zapatistas' efforts to foster a reworking of mestizo identities from below in Mexico demonstrate, advancing this counter-hegemonic form of cultural politics remains difficult in practice (Gledhill 2002: 246-247).

From the perspective of indigenous people themselves, even if they are appreciated in their own terms, "cultural rights" alone may not have a substantial impact on everyday problems of economic survival. The principal beneficiaries of such concessions may be community leaders, spokespersons or intermediaries who become increasingly socially distanced from those that they represent as they move into the urban worlds of NGO funding and government and multilateral agencies (Gledhill 2004: 338-339). Yet the irony here is that these new rights and definitions of citizenship have not been won without struggle, and often the kind of struggle that provokes suffering and loss of life. They are the product of rooted demands for recognition. Yet they may have become concessions

that can be more easily made as new global regimes of accumulation call for new modes of "governmentality."

Free markets and deregulation are not sufficient to define what is "new" in neo-liberalism. What would shock Adam Smith about neo-liberalism is its extension of the concept of "market society" to embrace the production of personhood, identity and social life itself. The injunction on individuals to take responsibility for their futures within a "knowledge-based economy" by learning how to "market themselves" acquires the force of an ethical imperative that is equally integral to the "softer" brand of neo-liberalism associated with "Third Way" politics (Gledhill 2004: 340). Failure to accept the opportunities presented by labour markets (however poorly remunerated and socially degrading) or to exercise prudence in providing for one's own future security becomes an individual moral failure. As Rose puts it:

> As the twentieth century draws to a close, political reason from all quarters no longer phrases itself in the language of obligation and social citizenship. It now justifies itself by arguing over the political forms that are adequate to the existence of persons as essentially, naturally, creatures striving to actualize themselves in their everyday, secular lives. Within such rationalities, it appears that individuals can best fulfil their political obligations in relation to the wealth, health and happiness of the nation not when they are bound into relations of dependency and obligation, but when they seek to *fulfil themselves* as free individuals. (Rose 1999: 166, emphasis in the original)

For Rose, as I noted earlier, "advanced liberal" forms of government rest on the promotion of "active citizenship." As a consumer of "services" the citizen becomes "an active agent in the regulation of professional expertise," while "the citizen as prudent is to become an active agent in the provision of security" (ibid.). Other central characteristics of neo-liberalism, such as the insistence that the public sector adopts "internal markets" to maximize "efficiency" and a pervasive bureaucratic culture of audit, follow from this broadening of the concept of market society (Gledhill 2004: 340-341).

Yet neo-liberalism does not invoke the individual as the isolated atom of a free market society in which the greatest good of the greatest number is to be achieved by everyone pursuing their purely personal interests. U.S. neo-conservatives and Blairite social democrats alike became alarmed at the apparent decline in "civic virtues" that accompanied the socio-economic transformations of the 1970s and 1980s, so that rising individualism and autonomy could not been seen as a wholly positive good. Despite their differences, communitarians from the North American Right, Third Wayers and advocates of the rebuilding of "social capital" such as Robert Putnam (1995) agree that, in Rose's words—reworking Bentham's description of the benefits of the panopticon—"the Gordian knot of State versus individual" can be "not cut but untied" by "a simple idea in politics: community" (Rose 1999: 186).

The further hardening of the position of the Right in the "culture wars" of the United States following Bush's re-election demonstrates that a project of rebuilding community by no means necessarily endorses respect for the culture differences embodied in the smaller communities to which diverse ethnic groups hold allegiance within larger national political communities. Disciplinary and normalizing tendencies are evident in all the projects that I have just mentioned (Gledhill 2001: 137; Rose ibid.: 194). Nevertheless, as Hale notes, once primary responsibility for the restoration of the civic virtues that the individual has lost is placed in the hands of non-state entities that include not simply churches and NGOs but "communities" with historically shared ties of culture, from the standpoint of governmentality the logic of the new relationship between community, identity and political subjectivity gravitates towards multiculturalism. Through this kind of multiculturalist strategy "the state does not merely 'recognize' community, civil society, indigenous culture and the like, but actively reconstitutes them in its own image, sheering them of radical excesses, inciting them to do the work of subject-formation that would otherwise fall to the state itself" (Hale 2002: 496). In this case, the professionalized NGO becomes the neo-liberal substitute for the panopticon (ibid.).

Theories devised for North America and Western Europe clearly require qualification when transposed to a region such as Latin America (ibid.: 497). Hale suggests that "it seems likely that the neo-liberal model in Latin America confronts considerably more autonomy, variability, and volatility in the civil society groups that purportedly serve as agents for individual subject formation" (ibid.). I exemplified this problem earlier with Lazar's discussion of the implementation of micro-credit schemes in Bolivia. Nevertheless, as Hale emphasizes, there is no straightforward tension between neo-liberalism as a set of political and economic policies and state-endorsed multiculturalist policies in the field of indigenous rights. The tensions lie in the way that the cultural project of neo-liberalism pro-actively endorses some kinds of cultural rights while drawing a clear line between such concessions and demands that are classified as "too radical," a distinction again readily illustrated by the vicissi-

tudes of the Zapatista campaign in Chiapas. Yet the dilemmas this construction provokes for indigenous activists and movements themselves are evident. There are political costs in complete refusal of the embrace of the state and NGOs conforming to a neo-liberal agenda, as exemplified by the Zapatista strategy. Yet there are also costs in occupying the spaces opened up by neo-liberal multiculturalism, in the form of regular tendencies to become "articulated with the dominant bloc" (Hale 2002: 522).

Multiculturalism helps neo-liberal states to "govern at a distance" (Rose 1999: 49-50) by offering once excluded actors the opportunity to participate in a way that is in constant danger of containing and redirecting mobilization, even if it is strongly grounded in an historically-rooted sense of injustice and identity. The "democratizing" force of neo-liberalism's offers of "participation" and "empowerment" create mechanisms for manufacturing "civil society," managing chronic social crisis, and bringing conflictive sectors into government and NGO-mediated processes of intermediation. We might conclude that this simply implies that we are dealing with a simulation that masks underlying structural power inequalities. So, in a sense, it is, but it is not *simply* a simulation. There are real spaces for negotiation, up to a point, and this is also where, from a theoretical point of view, Foucault's account of power in terms of governmentality fails to capture the agency of subaltern groups. That neo-liberal governmentality projects face continuing challenge is not simply because of the negative socio-economic consequences of the new order, nor even because of resistances to the neo-liberal cultural project arising from the realities of the everyday life-worlds, cultural strategies and internal conflicts within politically recognized "communities." Many of the actors are self-reflexively conscious of the limits of what is on offer and the political costs of co-optation, even if it is difficult in practice to avoid the risks of engagement routinely produced, for example, by the election of social movement leaders to office in local government.

In thinking about the positive possibilities opened up by the new era, there is a strong body of opinion that focuses on the implications of the "progressive" consequences of globalization, stressing the way that the growth of reticular, transnational coalitions and networks leads to the empowerment of "resistant" subaltern groups (such as the Chiapas Zapatistas) that were unable to make an impact on a less "connected" world. For example, the Mexican political theorist Benjamin Arditi has argued that "the spectre of socialism, or better, the imaginary driven by the socialist tradition, is re-entering the public scene in the form of a new and informal internationalism that looks to counter the weight of its conservative counterpart by emphasizing the themes of equality and solidarity on a global scale" (Arditi 2002: 476). Following Derrida, he suggests that the virtue of this new international solidarity is that no state, political party, labour union or civic organization can control or institutionalize it, while it generates multiclass pluralistic convergences capable of transcending social and cultural differences.

There is clearly some justification for arguing that local "progressive" projects are better able to prosper with the support of transnational networks that can increase pressures on nation-states that violate the rights of their citizens and can confront supranational powers in a more effective way than any local movement could. Ten years after the Zapatista rebellion, it requires a dose of optimism to see global neo-liberalism being significantly challenged from the rebels' last redoubt in the Selva Lacandona, however inventive their politics remains. Yet I doubt that the Zapatista movement would still be developing its innovations in autonomous government were it not for the fact that it enjoys an unusual degree of external funding through its international solidarity network. Nevertheless, to join the proponents of the bright side of globalization in celebration of the decentred subject of resistance without pondering the countervailing weight of decentred neo-liberal techniques of rule means risking an optimism of the spirit often inconsistent with ethnographic evidence.

Most of humanity does not live in places like the Selva Lacandona. Even when they have not left for the cities or adopted the life of a worker crossing international borders, indigenous people today frequently face serious problems making a livelihood in rural spaces, thanks to generalized agricultural crisis and environmental degradation. So I now turn to examples from other kinds of spaces to explore the force of deep neo-liberalization in a more concrete way that illustrates some mutually reinforcing relationships between neo-liberalization and social change.

Redeveloping the "Divided Cities" of Brazil

The victory with more than 60% of the vote of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Worker's Party (PT) in the 2002 Brazilian Presidential elections represented an overwhelming defeat for Fernando Henrique Cardoso's Partido da Social Democracia Brasileiro (PSDB), and an explicit expression of public desire for an alternative to neo-liberalism. Given the profusion of political parties, Lula can only govern Brazil in coalition with other parties which range ideologically from Liberals to Communists.[5] Some of his allies on the Right are now gravitating towards new alliances following the PT's dismal per-

formance in the local government elections of 2004, when it lost most of the cities it controlled in the South of the country. Yet the PT has long advocated political positions that focus on the achievement of greater social justice through the "empowerment" of poorer citizens via their inclusion in public decision-making rather than simply the electoral arena. This makes analysis of its performance in power particularly pertinent to an analysis of deep neo-liberalization.

The immediate causes of Lula's problems are clear enough. Brazil, like Mexico, faces the problem not only of generating enough new jobs to satisfy a growing labour force, but of ending a pattern in which even reductions in unemployment are accompanied by a continuing decline of real wages. With 2.3 million people officially unemployed in the six largest metropolitan areas, a fall in October of 1.2% in real earnings, concentrated in low pay sectors such as construction (*Folha de São Paulo,* 26th November 2004), did not make for optimistic conclusions about the prospects for reducing chronic poverty.

The metropolitan city itself is something rather special in Brazil. Clinging crab-like to coastal mega-cities whose separation from a still under-populated interior underpins a sharp cultural-ideological divide between town and countryside, Brazilians themselves seem as fascinated as outsiders by the forms of social exclusion that their urbanization process has created, as witnessed by the huge domestic success of the mini-series *Cidade dos Homens* (City of Men) that TV Globo spun-off from the internationally acclaimed movie *Cidade de Deus* (City of God). It might be too cynical to suggest that this reflects a strategy of "if you can't eliminate the slums, then why not aestheticize and exploit them commercially," since the authors of these media creations clearly intend them to humanize the people of the slums (*favelas*). Yet they are also in danger of flattening our sociological understanding of the Brazilian city, not to mention making us forget about the many smaller rural towns whose economies have been hollowed out during the neo-liberal decades, to lend further impetus to the growth of the shanties.

Not all working-class Brazilians live in *favelas,* and there are a great many Brazilians in between the wealthy inhabitants of gated condominiums and the segment of the middle class that shares the elite obsession with privatizing security and keeping away from public spaces. In fact, the term "lower middle class" is quite a strongly marked category. Occupationally speaking, it contains, for example, teachers, minor functionaries, secretaries and clerks, office workers and some shop keepers and self-employed people. As Teresa Caldeira has shown, lower-middle-class people and the working-class people who live in neighbourhoods (*bairros*) not stigmatized as *favelas* differ from the elite and upper-middle classes in their attitudes to sociality. Although they too are fearful of crime and insecurity, they still value interaction with neighbours in public space, and prefer family homes to condominiums, even if they have been obliged to add fences, walls and bars on the windows to make them more secure (Caldeira 2000: 289-296). Ironically, for the upper classes to accept condominium living has involved abandonment of previous associations of collective living with the old working-class tenements called *cortiços* found alongside the mansions of the rich in the centre of São Paulo before the dictator Getúlio Vargas shipped the working classes off to the urban periphery in the 1930s and 1940s (ibid.: 219-220). Caldeira's studies have shown that, locked inside their "fortified enclaves," the rich are remarkably unsociable, even with each other. So the direct and indirect effects of neo-liberalism, in particular the decline in personal security experienced by all social classes, have produced strong, though still contested, tendencies towards privatization and fragmentation in the fabric of Brazilian society (ibid.: 258-259).

The fact that the most frequent victims of crime are poorer, working-class people has additional important consequences, since the same people are also the victims of a policing and justice system that persecutes them as "usual suspects" while shamelessly favouring the upper classes by granting them and their children impunity (ibid.: 277). Ordinary Brazilians have learned to exercise their political rights in an electoral regime in which voting is compulsory. Yet working class Brazilians are generally antagonistic towards campaigns to enhance human and civil rights. Notwithstanding their frequent experiences of humiliation by both public and private security forces, they continue to view retributive justice and police who kill as a better option than "giving privileges to criminals" in the name of human rights (Caldeira 2002: 251-252). Brazil's power structures therefore configure a spontaneous convergence between elite projects and popular reactions to situations of economic stress and physical insecurity that facilitates containment of the poorest sectors of the urban population, defence of extreme social inequality and perpetuation of social indifference to the fate of slum dwellers.

This example of the capillary effects of the pervasive violence promoted by economic inequality illustrates the importance of taking a more decentred view of power relations and considering the more diffuse way in which their effects shape contradictory subjectivities throughout society. A different type of example is the evolution of the social movements that have attracted the interest of

so many analysts as possible catalysts of radical change in Brazil. Much of the reputation of the PT rests on the idea that it represented an alternative to the old parties, born out of social movement activism in the period when the military suspended normal political life.

One important way of looking at the impacts of neoliberalism on social movements is to emphasize the effects of sustained economic hardship and the "disappearance of work." In the words of González de la Rocha (2004: 194), the bonds of inter-household reciprocity and solidarity that were once one of the "resources of poverty" that households could draw on to adapt to hard times have become increasingly eroded by the absolute "poverty of resources" produced by a sustained decline in real income. Social movements have not disappeared, but as the state has reduced public service provision, they have been weakened and fragmented by the way NGOs and political patronage networks may foster clientelism and individualized solutions to problems (Auyero 2000: 110). Yet this is not the whole story, since there is also a problem with seeing social movements as purely spontaneous responses "from below."

In an analysis of Recife, one of the showcases for what the PT can achieve in city government, Willem Assies (1999) has challenged the idea that Brazil's "new politics" was founded in the purely spontaneous development of grassroots social movements under military rule, noting that the role of the Catholic Church and other "institutional" actors should not be underestimated, while middle-class professionals played a significant role in building the movements. Politicized under the peculiar circumstances of the military regime, with the consolidation of democratic governance these professionals have now found themselves in a changed relationship with their popular "base." Assies argues that under present conditions, what were once "radical" demands for "participation" and "empowerment" "blend into a strategy of neoliberal reform" by acquiring "connotations of self-advancement and self-reliance to participate as economic subjects" (Assies 1999: 222-223).

This gives us some windows onto the inter-locking forces that have entangled the political project of the PT in the process of "deep neoliberalization." To take the discussion further, I will go back to the end of the 1980s, when the party first took control of the city government of São Paulo.

Despite the PT's previous criticisms of the program of the Jânio Quadros administration to clear *favelas* from an area to the south-east of the city that was to be redeveloped to enable São Paulo to becomes a "global city" with a World Trade Centre, once in office the party accepted the principle that municipal governments in fiscal crisis should attempt to solve social problems through public-private financial partnerships (Fix 2001: 74). This meant accepting Quadros's plan to finance slum clearance and the resettlement of the *favelados* with funds provided by the very property speculators who had been behind the scheme to revalorize an urban landscape colonized by the poor through the construction of high-rise office blocks, shopping malls, and "first world" quality apartment blocks located in "ecologically rehabilitated" parklands.

The full realization of this scheme had to await the Prefecture of Paulo Maluf, of the right-wing Progressive Party, whose political career began under the patronage of the military, took him to the state governorship, and entered a period of crisis in 2001 as charges of graft and money laundering prompted investigation of his offshore bank accounts. Nevertheless, by 2004 Maluf's level of unpopularity with electors was not much worse than that of the next PT Prefect of São Paulo, Marta Suplicy, whose ratings dropped alarmingly as floods destroying precariously built homes added to the miseries produced by rising rates of unemployment. Suplicy, born into a *paulista* elite family, made a major political mistake by visiting the people who had lost their homes wearing a particularly up-market trouser suit, retreating in confusion as they hurled mud at her fashionable person. This may well have contributed to the failure of her campaign for re-election later in the year, when she was defeated by José Serra, Lula's vanquished PSDB opponent in the presidential elections.

There were, however, deeper reasons for this popular anger. Despite a massive political marketing exercise for new style public housing projects whose social engineering pretensions were marked by the choice of the name "Cingapuras," very few of the families expelled from their homes by Maluf's policies were satisfactorily relocated. The money raised by the consortium of capitalist developers was only sufficient to cover the needs of around 12% of the families of the principal *favela* to be bulldozed, Jardím Edith (Fix 2001: 94). The minority of families that did obtain some compensation needed to invest in a great deal of militant action and devote time to outmanoeuvring community leaders constantly being offered sizable sums to "sell out" their followers. At the end of their struggles, they found the alternative housing offered far beneath the promised standard, located at unattractive distances from places of employment, and it still had to be paid for.

The result was very Brazilian. What remained of the *favelas* in this new enclave of global corporations and

consumerism was discreetly shielded from the gaze of motorists passing on the new urban freeways by fences, while the evicted majority either moved to other established *favelas* or built new ones in a previously uncolonized zone, which happened to be a water conservation area (ibid.: 99). The overall environmental effects of this development made nonsense of the idea that private-public partnerships save taxpayers money. Not only has the state been burdened with further future costs in terms of transport and other infrastructure, but there was a complete failure to predict the costs of the development for that scarcest of urban resources, clean drinking water.

The poor thus lost land and homes for at best a pittance, whilst the speculators reaped spectacular capital gains as the land they colonized was re-valued by entering the "First World." The *favelados* were not, however, the only group to be affected by São Paulo's ascent to "global city" status. As Fix shows, middle class people living in family homes and low-rise apartments along leafy suburban streets were also caught up in the redevelopment process because of the need to improve road communications with the old urban centre and allow residents of the global city fast transit into transnational hyperspace through a heliport. Although their leaders, who included an architect and a functionary of the municipal urban planning department, suffered some harassment from the Prefecture, their "citizenship" counted enough in political terms for plans to be modified and a modicum of "preservation" to be introduced into the restructuring of their part of urban space. So it is not that "citizens" had no voice at all in these contestations around the social functions of cities and the social responsibilities of their governments. It was a question of whose voice counted, which made the existence of "second class" citizens patently obvious.

The Limits of Neo-liberal Empowerment of "Civil Society"

As Caldeira and Holston (2004) demonstrate, the language of modernist rule in the days of the Brazilian developmentalist state focused on rational state planning to overcome "underdevelopment." Although "development" was conceived as a means of reducing social inequality, the masses were imagined as "non-modern," to be incorporated into the plans as a labour force but marginalized as citizens on grounds of incapacity (ibid.: 401). Yet although they were consigned to living in irregular settlements, by building their own homes, often after buying land in good faith from swindlers, and by paying their taxes, the politically excluded increasing came to understand that they could claim "rights to the city" (ibid.: 402). By organizing themselves, again often with the help of the Catholic Church, neighbourhood movements from the urban periphery not only contributed importantly to the return of democracy but greeted it with demands for inclusion, not merely demanding that the state meet their social needs materially by providing services and infrastructure, but that it should accept their right to participate in planning decisions.

The fruits of this struggle were manifest in the 1988 Constitution and the incorporation of new ideas about the "social function" of cities and "urban self-management" involving popular participation into new municipal codes and master plans for urban development in cities such as São Paulo, Recife, Porto Alegre and Curitiba (ibid.: 405). The neo-liberal 1990s thus brought a deepening of political democracy and a new concept of the inclusion of the poor as citizens, who, even if they lacked resources and had their rights disrespected, were no longer seen as "incapable of making good decisions" (ibid.: 407). Yet since this more pluralistic vision emerged in an era of debt crisis and deepening fiscal austerity addressed through public-private partnerships that put market interests before social justice, under city administrations that "disregarded the practices of participatory democracy," this period saw the deepening erosion of public space and intensified urban segregation that I have just described (ibid.: 411). Nevertheless, the PT repeatedly sought modifications to municipal statutes that would enable city governments to do more for poor residents not only in terms of land regularization but in terms of taxing real estate profits and regulating building activity to address broader social and environmental goals (ibid.: 408). Although the Suplicy administration in São Paulo was unable to get all its proposals approved, it did enact a new Master Strategic Plan in 2002, and took the question of "participation" more seriously (ibid.). Suplicy also apparently managed to limit the backstage power of the property developers relative to the days of Maluf. Yet this was not enough to secure her re-election.

In allowing poor citizens a voice in the public sphere through their organizations and representatives, the neoliberalized Brazilian political field projects the possibility of a plural society in which the interests of all should be balanced, even at the price of accepting a degree of social inequality that would have been unthinkable for Left projects in the past. This gives local politics a depoliticized tone, even when the different groups shout at each other in City Hall. In the shouting, everyone appears equal, and it becomes difficult to distinguish one type of association of "active citizens" from another. Yet they remain structurally differentiated in terms of class and power, and

with regard to access to the broader public sphere through mass media. The "communities" recognized and constructed by neo-liberal "government at a distance" proliferate in often quite virtual forms, as comparatively tiny NGOs may gain a voice as interlocutors. Even activists who articulate a "voice" on behalf of a substantial popular constituency may become increasingly socially distanced from their putative "communities" (or co-opted). Neo-liberalism continues to disarticulate the bonds of "community" through the hardships inflicted on families. NGOs, development agencies and party political machines fail to operate in a manner that would foster their reconstruction when they manage scarce social development resources in ways that promote socially divisive competition for their patronage. Although grassroots efforts to build community organization in the slums (and to counter stereotyping) have not been extinguished in countries such as Mexico and Brazil, and by no means all of the NGOs, churches and charitable foundations that support social activism should be portrayed in this negative way, these processes often make neo-liberal rhetoric of "helping the poor help themselves" via the "thickening of social capital" ring hollow (Molyneux 2002).

The privatization of the public sphere has also opened up spaces for other kinds of actors. In case of the *favelas*, the armed bands of *traficantes* have come to be seen, thanks to the movies, as the quintessential sources of casual economic aid, rough justice, and a modicum of protection for the powerless against the systematic violence and abuse of police. To the very limited extent to which this image corresponds to reality, it is an unhappy and far from desired kind of dependence as far as most *favelados* are concerned. Furthermore, these are not simply phenomena of the social margins. Early in 2004 in Salvador, Bahia, one of the leading *traficantes*, not only mysteriously escaped capture in a theatrical police action that did apprehend several policeman caught *em flagrante*, but subsequently roamed around the city trying to get his patrons in the state congress to honour their promises of protection and was sighted several times in the company of state deputies. In Mexico, the understanding that the rise and fall of the *narcos* is a political question is widely diffused. Mexico is also one of the countries that best illustrates the affinity between neo-liberalism and the regeneration and modernization of boss rule or *caciquismo*, a reflection of the way Mexican neo-liberalism is underpinned by "shadow state" power that implicates members of political parties that compete in the electoral arena in a deeper web of elite complicities that are strongly inconsistent with a healthy democratic life and the personal security of those who seek greater social justice (Gledhill 2002).

"Right" versus "Left" after Neo-liberalization

Whilst Marta Suplicy's efforts to combat corruption in São Paulo must be applauded, there is sobering food for thought in Bahia, where the outgoing Party of the Liberal Front (PFL) Prefect of Salvador, Antônio Imbassahy, received the highest approval ratings in the country in 2003. Imbassahy's urban policy focused on beautifying his city for tourism and promoting the conservative brand of multicultural politics pioneered by the chief of his party, the great Bahian *cacique* Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM), whose political machine has dominated the state for decades.

Once again a protégé of the military, ACM achieved notable popularity in key sectors of Bahia's majority Black community by fostering pan-Africanism and subsidizing Black culture in a way that produced both political and commercial benefits. Although the popular imaginary of ACM as an epitome of the corrupt and violent exercise of power indicates that few citizens are deluded about the nature of his project, we can learn much about Brazilian politics from his ability to survive demands for his expulsion from the Senate after a wire-tapping scandal and public disengagement from his person by Imbassahy and other allies. While ACM still controlled most of the jobs, his dark reputation, far from being an impediment, was part of the magic of his rather uncharismatic charisma.

Nevertheless, in Brazil's volatile political climate, even the likes of ACM may need to reinvent themselves. Although the PFL scored some important victories in the 2004 city government elections, with Rio's controversial Prefect César Maia securing re-election, ACM's candidate in Salvador, César Borges, was roundly defeated in the second round of the elections by João Henrique of the Partido Democrático Trabalhista. The PDT embodies the legacy of the "labourist" Left that was the more progressive outcome of Getúlio Vargas's populism. Formal ideological positions are, however, less important than the longer-term failure of ACM's efforts to boost employment in Bahia through the creation of a petrochemical complex and attraction of a Ford plant. As the children of workers who once enjoyed stable jobs look forward at best to casual work in the increasingly impoverished areas that Salvador dubs *suburbios*, the PFL's traditional means of buying votes in the city have lost their effectiveness, although the PDT's overwhelming victory may also have reflected ACM's failure to build the alliances that would have prevented all the other political parties from uniting against Borges in the second round.

Yet nationally the PFL is now seeking an alliance with the PSDB, a far from unlikely scenario despite apparent ideological differences between these parties of the Right and the Centre-Left. Although the PT's performance under Lula has prompted PDT calls for a regrouping of the "genuine" Left around a reworked "national project," and economic nationalist ideas are not yet extinct in Brazil's technocracy,[6] it is difficult to envisage a return to the developmentalist state. Yet the PT's problems also suggest that "socially progressive politics" are unlikely to make headway while parties of the Left and Centre-Left offer themselves to the electorate on the basis that they can manage capitalism better than the Right.

Recent corruption scandals afflicting Mexico's equivalent of the PT, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), also illustrate the possibility of all political spaces becoming contaminated by shadow networks of power that cross apparent ideological boundaries in an age in which "realism" has tended to evacuate party political differences of real substance. The PRD administration of Mexico City under Andrés Manuel López Obrador has made a difference in some areas, such as concern for the elderly, but not produced a sea change in urban development strategy. Its promotion of the addition of a "second tier" to one of the city's major traffic arteries has scandalized environmentalists. The remodelling of the city's historic centre, which involved an intense police campaign against street traders, was led by the transnational telecoms entrepreneur Carlos Slim, while the peripheral "global city" of Santa Fe, located on the edge of a national park, has worsened the already precarious lives of the shanty dwellers perched precariously along the gullies and hills surrounding the new utopia of concrete, steel, glass and First World apartment prices around the Jesuit Universidad Iberoamericana.

Polls show, however, that, despite the scandals within his party, López Obrador himself is still widely considered one of the few honest politicians in the country and stands a good chance of election to the presidency in 2006, a situation that prompted the old ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party and Fox's National Action Party to join together in an extraordinary legal manoeuvre based on a technical act of maladministration to try to debar the Mayor from standing again for public office. The hand of former PRI President Carlos Salinas, the architect of Mexican neo-liberalism who has now beem rehabilitated following temporary disgrace in the second half of the 1990s, thanks to backstage agreements with the Fox government, is clearly visible in the seamier side of recent political life. The defence of the neo-liberalism can therefore involve far from transparent political processes, orientated towards thwarting any popular democratic will, even if comparison between Mexico and Brazil suggests that there are differences in the quality of the democracy achieved in different Latin American countries.

Diffuse Power, Invisible Walls and Class Violence

I have argued that neo-liberalism is proving resilient because it is a system of diffuse power on multiple levels, and I see no inconsistency between this contention and the fact that states still regularly deploy repressive power both domestically and in relation to imperialist projects involving far from invisible interest groups. As I noted earlier, another of neo-liberalism's key dimensions is its fostering of the production of social life through the capitalist market.

One episode of *Cidade dos Homens* focuses on the symbolic impact of the latest style in air-cushioned trainers across the social divide that separates the two black kids who are the chief protagonists from the *favela* from two white middle-class boys who look out over the slum from bedrooms whose windows are best kept shuttered in case a bullet strays. The urban and rural landscapes of austerity of neo-liberalism are ever more landscapes populated by people striving to participate in the market as consumers in an important kind of way. Where the horizontal social relations of kinship and neighbourliness that once fortified a sense of "personhood" are increasingly fractured, and elites are increasingly indifferent to the fate of what now seems an inexhaustible reserve of exploitable bodies, maintaining a sense of cheerfulness through the cultivation of the self makes increasing sense.

Yet this is not the only way in which the self can be cultivated. Another important way in which individuals seek new anchors for their lives in Brazil is through the non-Catholic churches that continue to proliferate not simply in big cities but in smaller, rural towns and villages, offering an increasing range of alternatives to (seldom exclusive) Catholic and Afro-Brazilian religious practices. The profusion of "choice" visible in so many streets as one passes churches of the Seventh Day Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses interspersed with a variety of Evangelical and Pentecostalist churches indicates that the market for religious services is as broad as that for trainers. Some of the wealthier churches, especially the controversial *Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus*, founded in Rio de Janeiro but now also well established in the United States and Europe, offering healing and blessings to the faithful in return for cash donations, display a clear capitalist ethos in their own operations. There is no simple

relationship between "choice" and "social message," since the meaningfulness of their religious practice for the different congregations is also related to the distinct embodied spiritual experiences on offer, but what perhaps can be argued is that there are few strong contradictions between the growth of non-Catholic religious identities and the ethical imperatives of neo-liberal market society.

The most severely disadvantaged Brazilians also retain a pleasurable awareness that racialized understandings of difference lead their social superiors to think (probably correctly!) that they have more fun, but the music and tourism industries have managed to build extremely effectively even on that. So while the everyday lives of the socially segregated denizens of the city become matters of increasingly tense encounters, in the hollowed out ethico-political spaces of neo-liberalism, the dreams of all converge in the illusions of consumption.

They are not the only dreams that the poor dream, and they are not pure illusions. Self-built houses can become comfortable homes and those who live in self-built houses sometimes get more dignifying jobs. As Janice Perlman's latest research in Rio's *favelas* has shown, thirty years on from her classic critique of "The Myth of Marginality" (Perlman 1976), *favelados* remain as racially, socially, culturally and economically heterogeneous today as they were in 1968 (Perlman 2004: 191). What has changed is that middle class people are being forced to take jobs once destined for more disadvantaged citizens, and they are using less paid domestic help, while jobs that once only required completed primary education now demand much higher qualifications. Access to public education has had a significant impact on the lives of the urban poor since the 1970s. In this respect, they have not been so much "marginal" or completely socially excluded as included in an unjust social system in a differentiated way (Roberts 2004: 196). Yet the potential gains have been seriously eroded, especially for black Brazilians in a city such as Salvador, now that a university diploma is required to gain entry into the lower-middle class through a job in a bank or public service (Sansone 2004: 53). Lula's government has adopted affirmative action policies to try to increase the number of black university students. Yet a politics of compromise with elites that have every reason to wish to defend and deepen the neo-liberal model does not seem likely to reverse the negative tendencies.

Social mobility is difficult in societies in which some citizens remain subjects of spatial segregation that make better-off people comfortable with the persistence of chronic poverty. Rio de Janeiro has seen a decade of programs designed to transform *favelas* into "neighbourhoods" integrated with surrounding districts, through the construction of central public spaces and amenities, well-lit streets and walkways, canalization of rivers, and relocation housing projects of low-rise apartment blocks of the same kind as São Paulo's *Cingapuras*. Although, as noted earlier, such homes are not attractive to all working class people, Perlman shows that there has been movement of families from *favelas* to housing projects and to neighbourhoods not socially stigmatized as *favelas* , even where they are difficult to distinguish in terms of the quality of their built environments. The move from *favela* to *bairro* does constitute social mobility. Perlman therefore argues that Rio cannot be understood in terms of Wacquant's bleak conception, derived from U.S. experience, of consignment of the poor to "bounded territories of urban relegation" (Perlman 2004: 192).

Yet it is important to recognize that the "city of walls" is not constructed simply from the physical barriers which protect the fortified enclaves of the rich. There are also intangible walls between less privileged social groups in these divided cities. The divide between *favela* and *bairro* is structured by fear, loathing and enthusiasm for violent retributive justice. We saw earlier that these sentiments were another capillary effect of the way that elite strategies of substituting private for public order subject the poor to "new forms of surveillance, control, disrespect and humiliation" without solving their basic problem of being the chief victims of both criminality and police abuse (Caldeira 2002: 247). It will be difficult to break such vicious circles of causality in cities of visible and invisible walls in which the incomes of the lower-middle and working classes continue to deteriorate.

In an analysis of police death squads, Martha Huggins argues that these were a by-product, along with vigilantism, of a "functional symbiosis" between at first sight contradictory tendencies towards "re-centring of state control over internal security" and decentring of social control (Huggins 2002: 223). The secret arm of the police system operated in a liminal space perpetuated by the inevitable failure of regular policing to "win" a war against crime that transforms itself into a war against the poor. Yet winning is ultimately not what this war is really about. In April 2004, Luiz Paulo Conde, Vice-Governor of Rio state, suggested the construction of a concrete wall around the huge Rocinha *favela* in Rio de Janeiro. Prefect César Maia rejected Conde's proposal as "governmental autism."[7] Instead he decreed a "state of defence" and called for deployment of federal troops in Rocinha to put an end to the violent disorder created by its drug wars. Yet Rocinha offers "safe" *favela* tours on the Internet, thanks to its community associations, and it also where *Cidade dos Homens* is filmed. Thus, while the media try to

humanize the persons within the *favelas*, some sections of the elite still dream of walls that will hide the Third World from the First, reproducing the power of capital while maintaining forms of social stigmatization that simply conceding "voice" and fuller recognition of political citizenship cannot erase. Others seek to intensify the militarization of "containment" of social problems in an environment in which extra-judicial execution can be applauded by poorer citizens.

That is why space and the enjoyment of full citizenship are so intimately related. Radical rethinking of the urban built environment must be a crucial component of any truly alternative model for development, along with a more radical approach to the problems posed by the rights enjoyed by the rich. Once one questions the city as a container for social life that reproduces profound forms of inequality, then the future of the rural also comes up for discussion, particularly now that so many rural places sustain themselves from migrant remissions. It is time for Latin Americans to consider proposals for a radical spatial reorganization of modern life that would end the era of the mega-city confronting an increasingly impoverished and demographically emptying countryside, such as the "agropolitan" modular cities proposed by John Friedmann (1996).

Every now and again popular movements also question the rationality of contemporary urban development, as did the peasant farmers of Atenco by rising up with machetes and the symbols of an apparently long defeated revolution to challenge the construction of Mexico's City's new airport in Texcoco, thwarting the plans of some of the most politically powerful economic interests in the country. Yet until such uprisings find a broader echo in political projects that give substance to promises of empowerment, participation and plurality by underpinning them with more radical redistribution of power and assets, they will remain dreams that unexpectedly come true for a moment before the darkness of contemporary life returns to engulf the future for so many of the new citizens of the 21st century.

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Notes

1 Chile has produced a less dismal statistical picture over the longer term than Mexico, for example. Although the number of Chilean households living in poverty doubled during the first decade of Pinochet's precocious neo-liberal experiment, and even an annual average growth rate of 7.4% in the 1980s failed to reverse further deterioration that brought 44.7% of households below the poverty line by 1987, democratic governments adopted "equity-enhancing reforms" that included progressive direct taxation of the upper-middle class and corporate profits to fund social programs, restoring some rights and benefits that the Pinochet government removed from labour (Sharma 1998). By 1998, the proportion of families living in poverty and extreme poverty stood at less than half their levels a decade earlier, at 17% and 4% respectively, although one in five young people was unemployed, whereas in Mexico only a third of the population remained above the poverty line (Boltvinik and Hernández 2000: 192-193; World Bank 2001).

2 In 2004, migrant remissions overtook oil revenues as a source of overseas earnings, contributing 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (*La Jornada*, 11th November, 2004).

3 Although the World Bank summarized its 2004 World Development Indicators as showing that "the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (less than US$1 a day) in developing countries dropped by almost half between 1981 and 2001, from 40 to 21 percent of global population," the aggregate result principally reflects dramatic economic growth in China and India. The surprise victory of the Congress party in the 2004 Indian elections reflected the degree to which the neo-liberal model was judged unsatisfactory by poorer citizens, but the fact that the communist government of West Bengal was quick to assure Congress that it would not insist on reversing "economic reform" as the price of support for the formation of a new government and had already made considerable efforts to attract private investment into its state, is highly consistent with the argument of this paper. The percentage of Latin Americans living below the poverty line failed to show significant improvement through the 1990s using World Bank measures (http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/index.htm).

4 For comparative reviews of different countries, see Assies, van der Haar and Hoekema (eds.) 2000, and Sieder (ed.) 2002.

5 The plethora of political parties reflects the extent to which political power still resides in regions. Individual politicians quite frequently switch allegiances in the games of patronage politics and power plays that accompany coalition-building.

6 Although, as major players in world agro-export markets, Brazil's powerful agrarian capitalist interests have some reasons to challenge the policies of the United States and European Community, their main preoccupation is with the militant efforts of the Movement of the Landless to transform Brazil's agrarian structure, a cause that has advanced

little under Lula. The state oil company Petrobras is now, thanks to Cardoso's dismantling of Vargas's legacy, a public corporation with shareholders and aspirations to grow as a global energy company, while the big winners from neoliberalism are also interests linked to globalization, such as the media industries, financial service sector and property developers.

7 Maia promoted the *favela*-neighborhood urban transformation programs during his first term as Prefect in the 1990s, and was once a political ally of Conde, who succeeded him in the Prefecture in 1997.

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