
Introduction

Chiefs: Sense of Belonging versus Power and Politics

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Abstract: As a guideline to reading the articles of the thematic section “Chiefs of the Pacific,” this introduction suggests differentiating sacred chiefs and secular chiefs, understanding them respectively as a person receiving respect and supplying blessings in a hierarchical order and as the same person (or another) when the context changes to attribute political and/or economic power to them and put them at the summit of a social stratification. The four articles illustrate how this distinction became particularly useful after colonization.

Keywords: Pacific, chiefs, belonging, Micronesia, Fiji, Solomon Islands

Résumé : Afin d’orienter le lecteur de la section thématique « Chefs du Pacifique », cette introduction propose de différencier le chef sacré du chef séculier et de les concevoir respectivement comme l’individu qui reçoit le respect et dispense des bénédictions au sein d’un ordre hiérarchique et ce même individu (ou tout autre individu) dans un contexte modifié qui lui confère un pouvoir politique et/ou économique et le place au sommet d’une stratification sociale. Les quatre articles montrent que cette distinction est devenue particulièrement utile après la colonisation.

Mots-clés : Pacifique, chefs, appartenance, Micronésie, Fiji, Îles Salomon

The topic of chiefs in Oceania has been treated so exhaustively that further research may seem unnecessary (Hooper 1996; Kawai 1998; Lawson 1996; Petersen 2015; Rutz 1997; Sahlins 1981; Tcherkézoff 2009; White and Lindstrom 1997). However, several questions, taken into account in this special issue, are more than ever on the agenda. Among them are issues of terminology and meaning: What is a chief? Is the word synonymous with “leader,” “politician” or even “entrepreneur”? Should the term “chief,” in Oceania, be reserved for the person who was so called before the contact period? Do we have to consider any form of being a chief after contact as neotraditionalism, not really deserving this term any more because of having undergone influences and changes? How should the latter be reported? Is not there, still today, an unchanged part that then would concern the quintessence of the chiefly function? Or can we still imagine colonization or the building of a nation without the partaking of chiefs and without their being double-hatted, chief and politician, intermediaries between the power and the people, intrinsic, among others, to the system of indirect rule. How should they be differentiated?

Three countries¹ answer these questions: Fiji, the Solomon Islands and the Marshall Islands. Fiji occupies two complementary papers: a small chiefdom and a big chiefdom. A tiny atoll, recently in the media, represents the Marshall Islands. The Solomon Islands benefit from a general enquiry. Nevertheless, this introduction offers an approach applying beyond Oceania, where observers have written about sacred kingdoms or sacred chieftaincies. Numerous anthropologists working in Africa and very interested in political systems (Balandier 1967; Bazin 1988; de Heusch 2002, 2006; Evans-Pritchard 1940; Evans-Pritchard and Fortes [1940] 1970; Lienhardt [1961] 1988; Muller 1980) were interrogating the nature of leadership in African societies and were prompt to call exceptional men “chiefs” and their territory “chiefdoms,” as they were looking for holders of coercive power. However, not denying their political dimension,

they found men with a ritual status empowering them to bring peace, abundance and life to a territory and its people. In most cases these chiefs had a special relationship, described as mystical or sacred, with the land. Very generally, the primary function of chiefly or kingly power in Africa was (is) to ritually control the fecundity of nature and people within the territory. Outside the latter, chiefs lose their ritual power even if they acquire political power on a broader level. We will see that these facts are very familiar to Oceanic societies.

Some of the articles in this volume may disclose new similarities and enrich the comparison, especially because they deal with societies that also have undergone turbulences and transformations with their colonization and, later, their construction of a state administration, peculiar to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Changes in the ritual status of the chiefs were the result. They enhanced their power and authority in some cases and shared them with new forms of leadership in others.

In Oceania, things vary with the country, as the degree of pre-existing unity in the locality and the identity of the colonizer, as well as the introduction of Christianity, played important parts. In most places, chiefs experienced changes such as an increase with their authority or at least in the practice of it, under the influence of the traders first, and then the colonizers. Nevertheless, these alterations did not interfere with the fact that they remained chiefs for the people even if the exercise of their authority came to surpass their function of caring for their people, being responsible for their well-being (Berta this issue; Pauwels this issue). Some chiefs in Oceania became paramount chiefs with the help of the colonizers and their need for unified territories, colonies, protectorates or condominiums. Those chosen by the colonial administration soon considered themselves politicians, often using tradition and rituals to confirm and strengthen their new political powers, partial at the beginning, full at independence. In other words, on the one hand, these chiefs remained chiefs in their territories or chiefdoms, functioning as a “realm of shared values and respect” (Berta this issue) specific to a hierarchical order in which everything has its preordained position. On the other hand, the chiefs entered a system of social stratification in a much wider entity.

What do we understand by “hierarchical order”? Streamlining the work of Louis Dumont ([1966] 1980, 3) and Serge Tcherkézoff (2009), one might say that a group (or a territory) is organized according to a hierarchical order when at least five conditions are fulfilled. First: the limits or the contour of the group are defined and this group with its territory and everything living on it is considered to be a *totality*. Second, *belonging* to this

totality is not a choice but is determined by birth. Third, each member and his or her subgroup has a *place*, a *function* in this hierarchical order. Fourth, one person belonging to the chiefly subgroup, after a ritual installation or collective consent, “embodies” *the divine*. And finally, all the subgroups are interdependent, “but *the movement is hierarchical* because one of the terms is everything to the other – and the converse is never the case” (Tcherkézoff 2009, 305). In many Oceanic societies the relationship between the chief, usually the descendant of an ancestor-god, and the other members of the territory is expressed in terms of “respect” oriented in the opposite direction from *mana*.

The word *mana* deserves a short digression here. Much has been written about it (Hocart 1914, 1952; Keesing 1984; MacClancy 1986; Shore 1989; Tomlinson and Tengan 2016; Tuwere 2002, to mention only a few) and the term is still undergoing changes in its understanding, descriptions and translations, by the people of Oceania as by researchers². Keesing, who insisted on the fact that *mana* was not a noun but a stative verb meaning “be efficacious, be successful, be realised,” defines *mana* as “a condition, not a thing: a state inferred retrospectively from the outcome of events” (Keesing 1984, 137). The idea is that this state of expected efficacy comes through the representatives of the divinities on earth or the divine ancestors (a chief, a carpenter,³ an elder sister⁴ or a *tauvu*, “cross-cousinship of groups”⁵) and shows or even proves that the relationship between the *mana* provider and the recipients of the state of efficacy is harmonious, and thus that the latter behaved in a customary way, for instance, showing due respect to the chief and those he was representing. *Mana* is often linked to the uttering of words that are said to be “words that are effective speech,” very strong speech acts that make their content happen, for instance, during rituals. In some places in Fiji, *mana* is connected to *sau* (*hau* in Tonga), either as a synonym (Lau group and western Viti Levu) or as a secular power or strength, in some chiefdoms held by a secular chief titled *Sau*. In other places, *sau* is said to be sacred power (Nakoroka in Vanua Levu⁶). Where *mana* and *sau* are synonymous, *kaukauwa* is the word used to say that somebody has strength or secular power. In the olden days it was the attribute of successful warriors.⁷ This echoes MacClancy’s analysis (1986) of what could be the equivalent of *mana* in Vanuatu and is termed *paoa* (power) in Bislama, the creole language of Vanuatu and now one of the three official languages of the country. *Paoa*, or equivalent terms in the local languages, is “traditionally conceived as ultimately originating from spirit beings” (1986, 143) and is also often associated with efficacious speech.

During the nineteenth century, the introduction of Christianity and its impact on ideas about spirits and ancestors had variable effects on ideas about *mana*, its origin, its conveyers and its manifestations. Quite often it became a noun (Solomon Islands, Fiji, Tonga, etc.) and later was translated by the word “blessings,” with the underlying idea they ultimately come from God. Nowadays, these shifts in meaning, together with the weakening of chiefly power in Oceanic societies, lead to debates about who, of the chiefs or religious representatives, conveys *mana*, even if, as in Fiji, the capacity of conveying *mana* is still ritually bestowed on chiefs,⁸ showing its efficacy in the vitality on the land, in the sea and with the people in their territory. The last is designated nearly everywhere in Oceania by a cognate of *vanua* (in Fiji and Vanuatu): *fonua* in Tonga, *fenua* in Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia, *fanua* in Samoa, *whenua* by the Maori, *hanua* in some places in Papua New Guinea and in Rotuma, *honua* in Hawaii and so on⁹. Those who occupy the highest rank hold titles such as *Ratu*, *Ali’I*, *Ariki*, *Matai*, *Rangatira*, *Irooi*, *Sau*, *Hau* or *Tui*, which are often translated as “chief” or “king,” which unfortunately impoverishes the meaning of the titles and does not particularly highlight their sacred and/or secular qualities. So, as others have done before, I reserve the term sacred chief to the recipient of respect and the supplier of *mana* or state of efficacy and use “secular chief” or “leader” (Newbury 2008; Walter 1966) to label the same person (or another) when the context changes, and attributes to him/her political and/or economic power and puts him/her on the summit (or adjacent to it) of a social stratification. Notice that generally secularization went together with administrative, military, legal and other remunerated duties. These benefits gave sacred chiefs the means to complete their *mana* with authority; the latter, in turn, allowed colonizers to lean on them to play a crucial role in the management of the colony, through indirect rule, for instance. Observe also that the choice of the colonizers to rely on the sacred chiefs was, among others, based on a misunderstanding that consisted in thinking the latter had all the rights over land and could use the labour force of the members of their territory unreservedly. Things were much more complex, even if certain chiefs tended to share these ideas, and sometimes still do.

Before contact with whites, a sacred chief had, in the totality that was their territory or *vanua*, the responsibility, the function, of ensuring peace and plenty by means of the *mana* he conveyed.¹⁰ To guarantee peace inside and possibly widen the territory, he or she could appeal to warriors, priests and often navigators – subgroups characterized by these functions or places. Others, frequently the first settlers, got places to work

on the land. Still others were boat builders, envoys, fishermen, heralds and so on. That is, the sacred chiefs did not, strictly speaking, have power or authority, but the function of being “responsible,” of being the source, through the divine forces, or the vector of well-being and of life itself. A good chief was the person who gave to each the opportunity to fulfil his or her function, to occupy his or her place, to have his or her identity, his or her purpose, in a fertile and peaceful territory.¹¹ Nowadays the core of this description is still valid in many places. The function of sacred chief is inherited (not without fights between several pretenders), or the candidate is elected, designated by his or her predecessor, or chosen among possible candidates for his or her exceptional skills. Nevertheless, to be selected to become a sacred chief is only one step, as the candidate has also to be ritually installed as chief during a performance led by the members of the territory – in Fiji called *leve ni vanua*, “the content of the *vanua*” – who make him or her a sacred chief by giving him or her access to their divinities and ancestors as a source of spiritual efficacy. It is important to note this dichotomy between sacred chiefs and chief makers, as their relationship is mutually interdependent, even if, as cited earlier, “*the movement is hierarchical* because one of the terms is everything to the other – and the converse is never the case” (Tcherkézoff 2009, 305). This interdependence is exactly the point forgotten by many present chiefs, and sometimes even the nonchiefly members of the territory, because of the blurred distinction between sacred chief and secular chief through the impact of colonization and politics after independence. Or, to put it in a different way, because of the coexistence of two different understandings of “hierarchy,” the one just mentioned and belonging to what Kaplan, for Fiji, calls, in what looks like a narrow approach, “Fijian ritual politics” (Kaplan 1988, 108)¹² and the “British ‘top-down’ hierarchy” (Kaplan 1988, 112). The confusion appeared as soon as colonial administrators distributed new tasks to sacred chiefs or minor holders of any authority. The Fijian case is indeed exemplary. In 1875, one year after the signature of the Deed of Cession, the British Governor decided to gather the chiefs¹³ for the first time in a Native Council, which afterward became the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC). The first question set on the agenda by this council was “Who are the chiefs?” At the end of the debates, the list was long and included persons as disparate as

The *Roko* [the chiefs of the new Provinces defined by the colonial power], the magistrates, the *Bullies*¹⁴ [district chiefs], all chiefs owning land, and people

called *Turaga Taukei* or *Turaga ni matagali*, and chiefs of towns. The position of all these chiefs is clear and definite, and each holding his chiefly position in his own Province.¹⁵

The confusion between sacred chiefs and secular chiefs (leaders) was clearly institutionalized. The only common denominator in the enumeration is that all these “chiefs” were people who received greater or lesser allowances from the colonial administration, fees they produced themselves by collecting taxes from the population. Back in their territory, those who were also sacred chiefs performed both roles.

Interestingly, during the same Council, the chiefs wondered how to treat the representative of Queen Victoria, the Governor. In their agenda, they inquired, “Should we offer him the *isevu* or should we cancel it?” *Isevu* is the name of an annual gift offered to the sacred chief of a territory, often translated as “first fruits,” and made up of yams that the chief, his ancestors, and today, the God of the Bible have to consume prior to the community in order to desacralize the harvest. The idea is that the harvest is meant for divinities and their representatives, while the humans eat remnants. Thanks to the question above, we understand three things: during the first year under colonial power the *isevu* had been offered to the Governor; some people had realized the incoherence of this act with the fact that the man was not a sacred chief; and finally, Fiji had not become a holistic totality but an assembly of territories in which most of them continued to inhabit the role of the sacred chief. At the end of the discussion, they decided to maintain the offering of the *isevu* to the Governor “because it pleases the donor and the donee”!

In most countries in Oceania, the sacred chiefs increased their secularization, being involved in land management (selling and leasing), sale of wealth and even nonredistribution of customary gifts. The last was then deciphered as a commodification, proper to the secular sphere.

At independence, these chiefs, representatives of the colonial power, frequently took over and became the leaders of the states or nations in the making. Among them, those who were also sacred chiefs often occupied the highest positions, precisely thanks to strategic games that played on the ambiguity between secular and sacred chief. Nonetheless, at the same time, this equivocality generates, till today, unease among the members of a *vanua* when their sacred chief exposes himself to the disrespect suitable in the political world. Every article of this issue shows, each in its own way, that the sacred chiefs provide a sense of community, a sense of

belonging, in other words, an identity. They do not offer this at the level of the nation but at that of the *vanua* or territory, the holistic totality, a fact that paradoxically explains the electoral success of a sacred chief in his realm. Nevertheless, Tucker (this issue) claims that the Solomon Islands, for various reasons, seem to undergo a different development.

All the articles are based on current first-hand observations and an essentially historical approach. They discuss the distinction between sacred chiefs, secular chiefs, leaders and entrepreneurs. The authors observe that the absence of the first, because not yet designated, or because monopolized by his or her functions at the national level, entails recourse to other persons or instances found at a national or local level: leaders, decision-makers, assistants, developers, entrepreneurs or even policemen. But these interventions are either temporary or complementary; nowhere has the function of sacred chief been abolished so far as to remove the identity of the members of a territory and prevent them from connecting with others, having a function too, but different. Fijians define this with the very strong words “I’m born to be ...” (a warrior, navigator, envoy, herald, farmer, priest, fisherman, sacred chief, etc.).

At the national level the Fijian chiefs within the GCC, with the consent of the colonial administrators, developed an “ideology of traditionalism” (Lawson and Hagan Lawson 2015) and built their authority on it. At the foundation of the colony, this ideology was meant to protect the indigenous Fijians and their culture, but as uniformity, simplification and rationality became the goals of the political administration, the chiefs caught in this process became two-headed, secular and sacred, but nevertheless (ab)used their being sacred chiefs in the political exercise of their being secular chiefs. This fact has often been characterized as neotraditionalism or reification (Lawson 1996, Lawson and Hagan Lawson 2015, Rutz 1995, Newbury 2008, etc.), but one should always be aware that this labelling is only acceptable if it is kept in mind that at a local level, the holistic totalities have continued to exist and allowed people “to belong,” as shown in this issue. Mostly everywhere the first words exchanged by two strangers are “I am so and so, from ‘name of territory.’” This does not prevent the totalities from having undergone changes in their turn, the most remarkable being the replacement of the divine entities by the God of the Bible as the ultimate source of chiefly *mana*.

Territorial identity is what governs everyday life, whereas politics and the State and its government are authorities from which people expect something else and that they make use of in a relatively opportunistic way

without establishing a real relation, in part because it is not considered to be long-lasting, as it is dependent on recurring elections. The distance between the national level and the local level is similar to that between a democracy (often existing only in universal suffrage) and a hierarchical order in which each element has its appointed and inherited place. This is what the Fijian villagers mean when they state that their identity is weak-end because they no longer have sacred and installed chiefs because they cannot perform their duty, the same as that was fulfilled by their ancestors before first contact and during colonization. Without a sacred chief the “well-living together,” the “loving each other” (Brisson 2007) proven by an increasing population, gardens and reefs full of food and, today, plenty of development projects is undermined because the *mana* cannot flow; there is nobody to serve, and most important, to respect.

Repeatedly confusion arose when the colonizer, for administrative purposes, united different territories into one, often appointing a paramount chief at its summit. In spite of this, to be a “sacred chief in his own right,” to be chief regardless of any higher body, still refers to the territory from which the sacred chief, or his title, occupies the superior function. This brings us to Lin’s paper, on Fiji, which establishes the same ideas by demonstrating that so-called “sacred petty chiefs” do not exist in Fiji even if “secular petty chiefs,” very low in the stratification induced by the colonial administration, do occur. The argument is that sacred chiefly titles, “even without actual holders are an important symbolic resource that is able to connect communities to past prominence and hold them together despite the numerous transformations they had gone through in the local histories.” They are particularly meaningful to local *vanua* “that are trying to anchor themselves in the ever-changing contemporary world.” Very early colonial officials cited by Lin (and Scarr) noticed that what they considered to be very small sacred chiefs could renounce the authority of their superiors. This is consistent with the idea we have already developed that every *vanua* or hierarchical order is a totality, which as such cannot be encompassed. Even when such a *vanua* was what we would call “conquered,” the land was not surrendered but only “the fruit of the soil, not the soil itself” (Fison 1881, 344)¹⁶ because

No man, whether chief or commoner, is the absolute owner of the soil. He has no more than a life interest in it. He may dispose of that interest if he please, but he can do no more. Nor is the whole tribe the absolute owner. Each generation does but hold in trust for the next, and the tribe is under obligation to hand down the tribal estate undiminished for ever. Land with the Fijian is not a chattel to be bought and sold. “*The*

earth does not lie in our hands,”¹⁷ he [the Fijian] says. (Fison 1881 : 351)

In other words, the people lie in the hands of the *vanua*, they are only the content of the *vanua*, and the *vanua* is so to say indestructible and symbolized by its inalienable title, carried by the sacred chief, as shown by Lin. He notes that “even before Western contact there were paramount chiefdoms that had sophisticated tributary networks and wide spheres of influence,” but these networks were nevertheless constituted of a myriad of smaller *vanua*, each with its title and its sacred chief in his own right, even if, as Lin explains, the GCC ended up being considered, especially by the chiefs themselves, but regularly also by the observers, as the only traditional form of the “chiefly system,” be it reinvented or not. Lin, in his article, shows how an offering of kava roots that is customary for every visitor of a *vanua* is not done to deify the chief himself, as seen in the installation ceremonies, but to acknowledge the community by showing respect, especially to the sacred chiefly title of the community, thereby empowering its very existence. Historically, after having nearly disappeared through warfare and disease, the *vanua* he studies never lost its sense of stability and wholeness, achieving it through continuously recognizing the significance of its chiefly title *Tui Nasau* as a way of renewing ties to the past and strengthening the contemporary community. Indeed, for this there is no need to be a politician or a member of the GCC.

If Lin’s article is about a rather small *vanua*, Pauwels’s article is an opposite case, as it considers manipulations of titles, and thus *vanua*, on a much wider scale that concerns a whole present province. The approach is first historical and establishes how chiefly titles were used and abused in the colonial and postcolonial construction of a province/chiefdom: Lau. Titles were created, revived and transformed to increase local and national power. Locally this was possible because those who exercised power were pursuing two aspects, being sacred chiefs in order to be able to intrude in land issues and being sacred chiefs in order to become political secular chiefs at a national level. Recent data show how, nevertheless, decades of nonsacred chiefly behaviour – some would say “chiefly re-invention of tradition” – could not destroy the sense of belonging and the need for respect to organize the *vanua*. Today, after the removal of the GCC, several *vanua* members expect to see their sacred chiefs come back to the villages in order to provide them with the wealth and the knowledge accumulated during their political and/or economic experience. The accumulation of the sacred title of a *vanua* and the experience attested by a high position in the social stratification are

the mandatory conditions to awaken the respect that befits a sacred chief. Educated and qualified retired city dwellers who return to their villages are invited to occupy functions in local government bodies such as provincial or district councils or enterprises, but they will never be termed “chief” – at most “leader” or “businessman.” However successful, a man who is not of chiefly descent will not be able to convey *mana* toward the *vanua* or have the kind of authority that accompanies respect.

Several authors (Fraenkel 2007; Fraenkel, Firth and Lal 2009; Lal 2006; Lawson and Hagan Lawson 2015) described how in Fiji different coups and rewritten constitutions led to the last coup of 2006, the abolishment of the GCC and the end of the established difference between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, all labelled as Fijians since 2010, and wondered if this was the termination of the chiefs in Fiji. I am tempted to say that the prime minister, Frank Bainimarama, discontinued the ambiguity between secular chiefs and sacred chiefs in Fiji. In this way he was pulling the former massively away from the political scene but not the latter from the *vanua*. Did he enhance the sentiment of Fijian citizenship above the sense of belonging to the *vanua*? A difficult question to answer.

Berta’s article shows how the inhabitants of an atoll worked out various issues through hierarchy, authority and leadership in a small community in the southern periphery of the Marshall Islands in eastern Micronesia. Here too an entrepreneur is subject to gossip and scorn because he is believed not to share values. Here too hierarchal status is linked to respect and expressed in terms of responsibility; here too landownership with the sacred chiefs is challenged by recent observers; and here too the interest of the colonizers in the sacred chiefs was linked to the incorrect assumption that they were the primary landowners. And here too colonizers and sacred chiefs altered land tenure and affected the chiefly role, and the sacred chiefs became autocratic and authoritative secular chiefs. Today, the inhabitants consider the presence of one sacred chief on the atoll as a benefit, as it allows young people to learn proper respect. Of course, policy-making is the concern of local government representatives, as well as some church representatives gaining high social status.

Berta nicely outlines a case where neither the chiefly hierarchy, age-determined status positions, nor modern-day political power was enough to handle a dispute. One day José “Ivan” Salvador Alvarenga drifted ashore on Tile, a tiny islet on the Epoon Atoll, after 14 months of drifting on the open ocean. Berta’s observation of what happened then shows that power and authority come in many varieties and that they play out differently in different contexts.

Tucker’s article displays how the constitution of the Solomon Islands at independence also acknowledged the importance of customary practices and traditional leaders. However, non-Western forms of leadership have actually been incorporated only marginally into the modern political structure, and the country has adopted a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. Not surprisingly, the most formalized positions of chiefs within the governmental system relate to land tenure and use. After colonization, the Solomon Islands, made up of 60 inhabited islands and roughly 80 different ethnolinguistic groups, hardly constituted anything more than an artificially bounded country, let alone a state. Postcolonial conflicts only ended in 2003 with the intervention of RAMSI (the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands).¹⁸ But years of overcoming the damage done, reconciliation and clearing a path forward were needed. These aims were not only the work of government, foreign NGOs and RAMSI but also of religious institutions and women’s organizations as well as customary peacemaking practices planned by local chiefs and traditional chiefs.¹⁹ For the latter, this opened the way to the role they play in today’s modern Solomon Islands state.

For the majority of chiefs, their role is local, but when they act as chiefs (or sacred chiefs?) in village conflicts, trying to maintain peace, they do not seem to place themselves at the top of a hierarchical order, but defer to the idea of the state as a central locus of power and operate as mediators. Elsewhere, in the absence of traditional chiefs, so-called community chiefs are designated to provide order, social services or coherence. It is remarkable that these qualities, again, are seen as assuring recognition in a larger set of relations, such as the region or the state. Or, as Tucker formulates it, “chiefs are fulfilling the promise of the state that people have come to expect since colonial incorporation”; they do not replace the state but they effectively have become a part of the state, even if the latter does not recognize them as such. She analyzes the reasons in terms of the opposition between the state’s elites and politicians and the cultural icons as impediments to “progress.” She also considers state-building as an ongoing process in which local political structures and leadership models have acculturated aspects of the Western state to pragmatically serve the needs of the people on the ground. It would nevertheless be interesting to substantiate that, locally, there is no hierarchical order hidden behind these features. After all, this is a challenging project for this myriad of ethnolinguistic groups.

This collection of articles shows that chieftainship is definitely a never-ending subject, as it is an important sphere of human creativity. It challenges new forms of leadership in a postcolonial context of nation building

even as it participates in this process. Chiefs give people a sense of belonging and identity, while the nation or the state, for various reasons, is not (yet) the entity within which this can be achieved.

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Notes

- 1 The authors of this special thematic section met twice, in 2015 and 2016, during the annual meetings of ASAO (Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania).
- 2 For an update on current analyses of *mana* see Tomlinson and Tengan 2016.
- 3 Tomlinson and Bigitibau 2016, 246, citing Rokowaqa 1926, 54.
- 4 Pauwels 2015, 150.
- 5 Hocart 1952, 110.
- 6 Buell Quain 1948, 200, n. 30.
- 7 Parke calls it “secular power based on the warclub,” referring to Western Fiji in olden days (Parke 2014, 28).
- 8 In French Futuna, after their installation, they were said to be the tabernacle of *mana* (personal observation).
- 9 Ross, Pawley and Osmond (2003, 40): “POc **panua* (i) ‘inhabited area or territory’; (ii) ‘community together with its land and things on it’; (iii) ‘land, not sea’; (iv) ‘(with reference to weather and the day/night cycle) the visible world, land and sky.’”
- 10 Many Fijians say that this is still the case, and a conflict in the community is always explained as being the sign of a lack of *mana* (used as a noun) from the sacred chief. A cyclone threatening the crop can also be credited to the same cause.
- 11 These territories were of course not shielded from civil wars for the succession on the status ladder, among other problems.
- 12 Considering the importance of *mana* and *vanua* in Oceania, this expression does not take into account that for the people “*vanua* is what holds life together and gives it meaning” (Tuwere 2002, 36).
- 13 There is no opportunity here to show that certain chiefs were not invited and that others should not have attended, even if this would also have illustrated our purpose.
- 14 As Jolly (1992, 349) remarks, “Roko and Buli were perceived by Fijians quite rightly as novel positions.”
- 15 Notes of the Proceedings of a Native Council, Draiba on the Island of Ovalau in the month of September 1875. Third day meeting, September 18. Suva, National Archives of Fiji. P.21.
- 16 Lorimer Fison was an Australian Methodist minister in Fiji. He wrote the essay cited here at the request of the Governor a little after the beginning of the colonisation. It is a treatise on the native system of land tenure, which became a classic of its kind and was reprinted by the government printer in Fiji more than 20 years later.
- 17 My italics.
- 18 RAMSI was created in 2003 in response to a request for international aid from the Governor-General of the Solomon Islands.
- 19 Tucker does not use the term “sacred” but “traditional.”

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