
The “Arab Wave” in World Music after 9/11¹

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Abstract: This paper investigates the paradoxical surge in popularity of Arab music, post 9/11, in the U.S. world music scene. It charts the gradual incursion of Arab popular music into the U.S. from the late 1980s, showing how this was on the one hand, a progressive phenomenon, given U.S. antipathy toward Arabs and Islam, and on the other, that such gains were won through the deployment of anti-fundamentalist and exoticising discourses. In the post-9/11 period, Arab music has entered the U.S. at a time of both increased public hostility and interest toward Arabs and the Middle East. The heightened popularity of Arab music has arguably been a source of pride for Arab-Americans and a means of creating more acceptance for Arab culture in the U.S. Whether the growing marketability of Arab music will have significant progressive consequences, however, will depend on the nature of political mobilization on Middle East issues in the U.S. and how that activity is aligned with cultural practice.

Keywords: Arab popular music, world music, Orientalism, aftermath of 9/11

Résumé : Cet article examine le paradoxe que constitue la croissance de popularité de la musique arabe aux États-Unis depuis les événements du 11 septembre. Retraçant l’incursion graduelle de la musique arabe populaire depuis la fin des années 1980, l’article établit qu’il s’agit, d’une part, d’un phénomène progressiste compte-tenu de l’antipathie américaine envers l’Islam et le monde arabe, et d’autre part, d’un phénomène attribuable au déploiement de discours à caractère exotique et anti-fondamentalisme. Après les événements du 11 septembre, la musique arabe a réalisé une percée aux États-Unis durant une période qui s’est caractérisée par une hostilité accrue envers les Arabes et le Moyen Orient, mais au cours de laquelle un intérêt renouvelé s’est manifesté envers cette culture. Tout en représentant un moyen de créer une zone de tolérance pour la culture arabe aux États-Unis, l’accroissement de popularité de cette musique du monde a sans doute été source de fierté pour les Arabo-américains. Les possibilités de commercialisation de la musique arabe seraient-elles synonymes de progrès? Cela dépendra de la nature de la mobilisation politique américaine sur les questions touchant le Moyen Orient et de l’alignement de ces activités en fonction des pratiques culturelles.

Mots-clés : musique populaire arabe, musique du monde, orientalisme, conséquences du 11 septembre 2001

I happened to travel to New York City on May 30, 2002, the day that ceremonies were held to mark the completion of the clearing of the rubble at the site of the World Trade Center. At a downtown law firm’s expense, I was staying at the Ritz Carleton Battery Park, and could see “Ground Zero” from my hotel room. Walking through the hotel lobby the next day, I noticed to my surprise that Arab instrumental music was playing over the loudspeakers. I didn’t recognize the piece, but it was clearly Arab, set within a distinctively contemporary musical framework, richly produced, and with a subtle dance rhythm. That Arab music would be played in 2002 at an upscale New York City hotel located just a few blocks from the WTC site, I would argue, is not anomalous, but rather a reflection of the remarkable fact that Arab music acquired a certain “hipness” in the U.S., post-9/11. In this article, I chart some of the twisted and contradictory paths Arab music has taken on its way to becoming cool.

Pre-9/11 Inroads

Ever since the mid-1980s, when “world music”—the Western marketing category that encompasses a wide variety of international music—first emerged, popular music from the Arab world has remained a fairly minor player. Aimed in large part at what could be described as a National Public Radio (NPR)-listening “adult” audience, world music has a small share of roughly 2-3% (comparable to classical music and jazz) of total music sales, but its audibility increased during the 1990s.²

It should be underscored at the outset that music from the Arab world faces a particular obstacle on the U.S. scene that is not encountered by musical genres emanating from most other parts of the globe. That impediment is the special antipathy found in the U.S. toward virtually all things Arab and Muslim. This exceptional aversion, as is well known, was discussed and diagnosed intensively by the late Edward Said (see in particular, Said, 1979a; 1979b; 1981). The U.S., as Said argues, not

only participates in the generalized Western discourse of Orientalism, but U.S. Orientalism possesses a particular and often virulent character. This is due, in part, according to Said, to the sheer distance of the U.S. from the Arab world/Middle East, by comparison with Europe, which produces a generalized public ignorance and disinterest when it comes to things Arab and Islamic. Added to this is the strength of sympathy for Israel in the U.S., a force that one finds nowhere else in the Western world. This peculiar U.S. abhorrence toward Arabs and Muslims, plus the relative weakness of U.S. movements in solidarity with Arab causes, makes it quite difficult for any overtly politicized Arab music to gain acceptance via the U.S. world music market.

This is in marked contrast to other genres of world music which have won audiences in the U.S. In his *Dangerous Crossroads*, for instance, music critic George Lipsitz (1994) investigates the work and Western reception of world music artists such as Fela Kuti (Nigeria), Ruben Blades (Panama/U.S.), Yothu Yindi (Australian aborigines), and Thomas Mapfumo (Zimbabwe), all known to be associated with various progressive causes. In the U.S., however, it is much more politically acceptable to be against white racism in southern Africa or in favour of Aboriginal rights than it has been to be identified with the cause of Palestinian national liberation or with the campaign against the UN sanction regime in Iraq. This has meant that one of the main avenues to world music fame in the U.S., which involves a combination of progressive politics and commercial circuits, has been virtually closed to Arab musicians.³

On the other hand, it could be argued that there are fewer obstacles to the penetration of Arab popular music into the U.S. than exist for other genres of Arab culture, such as films or novels. Arab popular music is arguably a more mobile, cheaper, readily consumable and ultimately *accessible* form than are Arab novels or films. In addition, in the U.S. context it could be argued that the gaining of an audience for Arab music constitutes a net progressive gain, since the simple act of making Arabs seem *human* as opposed to “fanatics” or “terrorists” represents a kind of political accomplishment. The peculiar context for the Arab music entry into the U.S. arena, therefore, makes the “politics” of this phenomenon a matter of some complication and ambiguity, as will be elaborated below.

Rai music from Algeria and Algerians in France was the first Arab musical genre to establish a presence in the world music scene, in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Gross, McMurray and Swedenburg, 1996; McMurray and Swedenburg, 1991; Morgan, 1999; Schade-Poulsen,

1999). U.S. and U.K. labels like Mango, Virgin and Shanachie released several recordings by established *rai* stars like Cheb Khaled, Cheb Mami, Chaba Fadela & Cheb Sahraoui, and Chaba Zahouania. But sales were unremarkable, and so after the initial flurry, *rai* releases by U.S. labels slowed to a trickle. Nonetheless, something of a buzz was created, rock critics wrote favorably about *rai*, recordings from the Arab world for the first time became readily accessible—in world music sections at all major record stores—and an audience for Arab music slowly began to build. *Rai*'s early successes, although rather modest, opened the way for other Arab artists to enter the scene during the 1990s.

During the nineties a variety of Arab artists made slow inroads into the U.S. world music market. There is no space here for a comprehensive accounting of the Arab musicians involved in that ingress, but a few important trends can be discerned. These tendencies can be roughly grouped as (1) spiritual; (2) hybrid; (3) *Gnawa*; and (4) *rai*, which has continued to have a presence. Representative examples of the first three categories—which in practice are overlapping—will be discussed here.⁴

Among the most prominent “spiritual” artists are Morocco's Master Musicians of Jahjouka, who first made names for themselves in the U.S. “international” and “folk” markets in the early seventies, but had faded from recognition since then. The world music scene provided the opportunity for a Jahjoukan revival, this time under the sign of “spirituality,” a growing market category with important connections to the New Age scene, and an important world music niche.⁵

The Master Musicians of Jahjouka, from a village near Tangier, owe their renown to a legend first spread by artist and writer Brion Gysin and later by William Burroughs. Gysin claimed that the annual festival at Jahjouka held on the occasion of the Islamic 'Id al-Kabir is a reenactment of the ancient Roman Rites of Pan, and that the festival's central character, Bou Jeloud, is Pan himself. To listen to the Master Musicians therefore is to channel into “primordial” music, “the oldest music on earth,” to hear “a 4 000-year-old rock 'n' roll band.”⁶ Gysin (as well as Burroughs) were well connected to hip Western cultural luminaries, and the Jahjoukans' fame owes to the fact that Gysin and Burroughs were able to convince so many to believe the myth. The most famous of these celebrities was Brian Jones of the Rolling Stones, who visited Jahjouka with Gysin in 1968 and whose recording, *Brian Jones Presents the Pipes of Pan at Jajouka*, was released posthumously (1971). In 1973 Gysin and Burroughs took noted jazz saxophonist Ornette Coleman to Jahjouka, where he recorded with the Master Musicians.⁷ Other

important “scenesters,” inspired by Gysin’s stories, have also hung out and jammed in Jahjouka, such as Chris Stein of Blondie, the Rolling Stones (post Brian Jones), Lee Ranaldo of Sonic Youth and most recently, in 2000, Talvin Singh, the British-Asian dance music maestro.⁸ World music gave the Jahjoukans a new lease on life, and their recordings over a period of thirty plus years make them among the most-recorded musicians on the Arab world music scene.⁹

The second category can be loosely categorized as the hybrid, and among the most interesting figures here is Natacha Atlas. Unlike most “spiritual” Arab music, “hybrid” Arab music is characterized by an aggressively experimentalist and syncretizing aesthetic rather an appeal to primordialism or folk roots.¹⁰ Natacha Atlas, of Egyptian-Moroccan background, first won renown in the early nineties as the vocalist (singing mostly in Arabic) and bellydancer for the England-based “global-trance-dance-fusion” band Transglobal Underground (TGU). As such, Natacha and TGU were part of a large, diffuse, dance music subculture whose aesthetic involved the sampling or incorporation of a variety of non-Western musical styles and instruments.¹¹ In 1995, Natacha released *Diaspora*, her first recording as a solo artist, and since then has put out four more solo albums, all of which manage to combine highly contemporary dance music Western sounds with the resonances of authentic modern Arab pop music (especially that produced in Egypt).¹² Natacha’s music has been so successfully hybrid that it has been difficult to contain it within the world music category; this has been helped by the fact that her guest vocals have popped up in all kinds of surprising places, including, for instance, the anti-death penalty song, “Faye Tucker,” on the album, *Come on Now Social*, recorded by The Indigo Girls, a well-known, left-wing, lesbian folk duo.¹³

The third category is *Gnawa* music, produced in Morocco by members of a religious grouping whose practices and music are partly rooted in West Africa. It is the West African sound of Gnawa, which it shares with much U.S. popular music, that is the source of Gnawa’s appeal on the world music arena. The deep rumblings of the Gnawa *sintir*,¹⁴ a three-stringed instrument that sounds something like an acoustic bass, thrills many listeners, convincing them that they have been magically transported across time and space to the primeval cultural origins of all humanity. Collaborations between prominent Gnawa musicians and respected U.S. African-American jazz artists like saxophonist Pharaoh Sanders and pianist Randy Weston have underlined the presumed inherent affinities between Gnawa and other diasporic African musics. Gnawa singer and sintir player Hassan Hakmoun,

who settled in New York City in 1987, has produced even more interesting and wildly syncretic “fusions,” most notable of which is *Gift of the Gnawa* (1991), on which he collaborates with jazz trumpeter Don Cherry. Hakmoun has also recorded with his own electric funk band, Zahar, singing (and on occasion rapping) in Arabic and playing sintir, as well as putting out more traditional, “unplugged” Gnawa releases.¹⁵ In addition to Gnawa’s appeal as West African “roots” music, it has been marketed as “spiritual” music, since the traditional ritual function of the music is to induce trance and temporary possession by spirits (known as *mulûk* or *asjnûn*) and to produce a state of emotional and spiritual health. Gnawa recordings, therefore, sometimes participated in the “spiritual” trend, sometimes in the “hybrid” trend, as well as possessing their own, distinctive, African diaspora appeal.

Exoticism and Promise

The slow growth of the Arab presence in the world music scene that began in the late eighties was not connected in any organic way with political mobilization in the U.S. around Middle East issues. The entry of *rai* and other Arab music on the U.S. world music scene did overlap with the 1991 Gulf War and the concurrent flurry of interest in (as well as antipathy toward) things Middle Eastern, and Arab music no doubt benefited from that momentary upsurge in attention (which also unexpectedly made Albert Hourani’s *A History of the Arab Peoples* [1991] a U.S. bestseller). On the other hand, there were no significant or overt connections between the growth in Arab music and the two most important areas of progressive U.S. activity pertaining to the Middle East, Palestinian solidarity work (which in any case fell off considerably after the Oslo peace accords) or the movement against Iraqi sanctions. Activists in these movements, however, were certainly constituents of the world music audiences for Middle Eastern music. The growth of the Arab presence in the world music scene did, however, produce some progressive political effects, as well as help reinforce certain negative stereotypes. Regrettably although not surprisingly, world music publicity about “traditional” Arab musicians like the Jahjoukans or Gnawa artists tended to erase their Islamic context and render them artificially exotic. Publicity on Gnawa music generally focussed on its African roots and downplayed the fact that the *lilas*—the healing/trance rituals which are the main occasion for Gnawa music—consistently invoke Allah, the prophet Muhammad, his companions and family, and prominent Muslim saints, as well as the spirits (*mulûk*) of West African origin. In an effort to sell cultural commonalities with which world music fans can identify,

world music discourse has stressed the *African* side of Gnawa culture, and covered over the syncretic character of Gnawa beliefs and practices, which involve the propitiation of both Arab and Berber Muslim saints and West African spirits (Chlyeh, 1998). Gysin's endlessly recycled myth of the Master Musicians, meanwhile, assimilated Jahjoukan rituals on the occasion of 'Id al-Kabir, a major Muslim feast, to the pagan rites of Pan. This assertion similarly slighted Islam and made the music's spirituality more palatable to a Western audience.

Within the U.S. "spirituality" market, furthermore, the tendency has been to present music like that of the Master Musicians or the Gnawa as expressions of a mystical Sufism that is universalistic and virtually devoid of any Islamic basis.¹⁶ In this rendering, Sufism acquires a warm and fuzzy New Age image and the sweet odour of incense and patchouli, and becomes roughly equivalent to Buddhism, guruistic Hinduism, or Native American shamanism. The other chief representation is of a Sufism that is firmly Islamic, but pacifistic and gentle, in contradistinction to the "bad" Islam of the fundamentalists and the fanatics.¹⁷

The publicity in the U.S. surrounding rai music has functioned in similar ways. In particular, Algerian rai artists have been depicted as anti-fundamentalist and anti-puritanical, the vanguards of a youth movement against the forces of repressive tradition. By stressing the opposition between rai musicians and the Algerian Islamists, in particular the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), world music discourse has virtually obscured the fact that rai musicians (and fans) are Muslims themselves (Schade-Poulsen, 1999). In addition, by stressing the purported rai-fundamentalism antagonism in Algeria, the fact that many major rai musicians are now located in France, and are important actors in the cultural and antiracist struggles of French Arabs (known as Beurs), is also conveniently overlooked (Gross et al., 1996).

World music discourse on the Arab music entering the U.S., therefore, forged connections between audiences and Arab musicians, in part, through a *dis*-identification with mainstream Islam and Muslims and/or, sometimes, an identification with a partially imaginary mystical Islam. World music discourse also traded on exotic images, enticing listeners with the notion that the Master Musicians of Jahjoukans or Gnawa artists would magically transport them to primordial and authentic time-spaces. In the case of rai, artists like Khaled were depicted as the Algerian analogue of the Sex Pistols or Jim Morrison, fighters against conservative repression, but rarely as cultural actors contesting white racism in France.

On the other hand, the slow penetration of Arab music via world music did at least serve to humanize Arabs, for part of the U.S. public—something that should not be scoffed at as insignificant, given the rampant Orientalism of U.S. public culture. The sounds of Arabic music began to seem less forbiddingly alien to many in the U.S. The music of "hybrid" artists like Natacha Atlas, meanwhile, who managed to insert Arabic music into locations and spaces beyond that of the world music arena, probably did even more to increase the awareness and receptivity to Arab culture. Natacha, moreover, was quite upfront about her admiration for Islam, making this clear both in her interviews and in her recordings (for instance, on "Dub Yalil," which features the Islamic call to prayer, from *Diaspora*, and on "The Righteous Path" from *Gedida* [1999], an assertion of devotion to God).¹⁸

The Arab Wave

Although Arab music made inroads in the nineties, it never boomed in the U.S. the way Cuban, Celtic or Brazilian music did. Records were sold and modest U.S. tours undertaken, but there were no real hits. But by the summer of 2001 it seemed as though Arab music was finally on the verge of breaking through. A number of articles appeared in the music press that summer, suggesting that what they called the "Arab wave" was about to enjoy unprecedented success.¹⁹ And after September 11, this is in fact happened—both despite, and because, of the 9/11 events.

Arab music is an important element in the complex picture of September 11's after-effects in the U.S., one that includes racist attacks on Muslims and Middle Easterners, racial profiling and assaults on civil liberties that especially affect Arab and Muslim Americans, as well as heightened interest in Middle Eastern culture and Islam, increased sales of books dealing with Arab and Islamic topics and a new ethnic visibility for Americans of Middle Eastern origin. As during the 1991 war against Iraq, 9/11 caused both a spike in antagonism toward the Middle East and a boom in consumption of Middle Eastern commodities of all sorts.²⁰ Some U.S. cultural entrepreneurs reacted by abandoning the promotion of Middle Eastern culture, or by camouflaging its origins, while others have worked to take advantage of the new interest in things Middle Eastern in a more overt way.²¹ To what extent the increased circulation of Arab musical culture will truly matter politically, however, remains to be seen. Greater public familiarity with Arab culture can contribute to a "humanizing" of the Arabs, as I have already suggested, but it is not clear that this humanization has yet had any real effects on public opinion regarding the erosion of civil

liberties or U.S. Middle East policy toward Iraq or Palestine. Increased public awareness of Arab music and the possibilities for corporate profit, nonetheless, do offer certain opportunities, as well as pitfalls, for political activism.

Run-up to 9/11

Natacha Atlas was one of the major artists pushing Arab music toward what critics were to call breakthrough time by the summer of 2001. Her May 2001 release, *Ayeshteni*, was inventive, eminently danceable, and brilliantly produced. It was critically well-received, and did well on college radio.²²

But it was the stable of Arab musicians assembled by Miles Copeland III, president of Ark 21 Records and its world music subsidiary label, *Mondo Melodia*, that played the major role in bringing on the Arab wave. Son of prominent CIA man Miles Copeland, Jr., the record executive grew up in his father's posts of Damascus, Cairo and Beirut during the fifties and sixties.²³ After earning an MA in economics from the American University of Beirut in 1969, Miles Copeland III entered the rock music business in London, managing successful U.K. acts like Wishbone Ash and Joan Armatrading. In 1977, he became an important business actor in the British punk scene, most famously as manager of *The Police* (which featured his brother Stewart Copeland on drums) and as owner of IRS Records. From 1984 until 2000, Copeland managed Sting's solo career. More recently, he has devoted much of his energy to promoting Middle Eastern pop music.

Over the last five years Copeland has, through Mondo Melodia and *Ark 21*, released a number of important albums by top artists from the Middle East, as well as by Middle Easterners residing in the U.S. and Europe. It was Copeland who put rai star Cheb Mami together with Sting to produce Sting's 1999 global hit "Desert Rose" (which reached the Top 10 in the U.S.). Sting's record company had wanted to eliminate Mami's stunning guest vocals from the cut, but Sting and Copeland insisted on keeping them. Many claim that it was "Desert Rose"—and the Jaguar used in the filming of the music video—that thrust contemporary Arabic music into mass U.S. public awareness. After watching the footage of the music video, Copeland called up the Jaguar Corporation to offer it to Jaguar for a television auto advertisement, on condition that the company make their advertisement look like a record commercial. Jaguar produced a high-profile advertisement which displayed Sting and Cheb Mami singing together and carried a banner promoting *Brand New Day*, the album which includes "Desert Rose." This huge free cross-branding campaign, according to Copeland,

doubled Sting's ticket sales (his tour in support of *Brand New Day*, with Cheb Mami in tow, earned \$70 million) and album sales (which hit eight million worldwide). Jaguar meanwhile saw its purchasing demographic get dramatically younger (previously the Jag was viewed as a car for older people) (Anonymous, n.d.; Lippert, 2000). As an unintended consequence of this spectacularly successful and fabled exercise in corporate synergy, Arab music took a big leap forward in the U.S.

Copeland and Mondo Melodia's vice president at the time, Arab-American Dawn Elder,²⁴ were quite public about their aims in promoting the five recording artists and concert performers who rode at the crest of the Arab wave. All the artists in question already had substantial track records. Cheb Mami shot to the top of the rai scene in Algeria in 1982, at the age of fourteen, and moved to France in 1985, where his reputation has grown steadily and he is now an established star. Cheb Mami, known as the Prince of Rai, has been consistently overshadowed by the King of Rai, Cheb Khaled, who also started his career quite young, releasing his first Algerian hit in 1975, at age 15. Cheb Khaled too had relocated in France by the late 1980s, and in 1992 his song, "Didi" (released under the name Khaled) was the first global rai hit, to be followed in 1996 with the huge international hit, "Aicha." By 1999, with the release of *Kenza*, Khaled was a transnational superstar—except in the U.S. Rachid Taha was born in Algeria but moved to France at the age of 10, where he grew up in working class immigrant environs and experienced the hard face of French racism. In 1981 Taha formed the Arab rock group *Carte de Séjour*, which courageously addressed the pressing issues facing young Arabs in France. In 1989, Taha launched a solo career, and gradually became a major star in France, with a stunning series of eclectic recordings that were variously techno, Algerian *sha'abi*,²⁵ and—most brilliantly—Arab punk-rock. Hakim, for his part, burst onto the Egyptian scene in 1991 and over the decade developed into one of Egypt's top *sha'abi* singers, selling millions of cassettes. Egyptian *sha'abi* is the music of the working and popular classes; Hakim's brand is known as "pop" *sha'abi*, and is more more romantic and heavily produced than regular, raw *sha'abi*. Simon Shaheen, a New York-based Palestinian from Israel and a virtuoso on *'ud* (Arab lute) and violin, rounded out the Mondo Melodia roster. Shaheen was the only one of the five who is not a big star in his country of residence (in his case, the U.S.), but Shaheen has a very respectable résumé, including releases of classical Middle Eastern instrumentals (most notably on *Turath*, 1992) and wildly hybrid funk (the best examples are on Material's *Seven Souls*, 1989). Except for Hakim, all the artists in the Mondo Melodia stable already had

considerable experience performing before Western audiences prior to 2000.

In the wake of the success of "Desert Rose," Cheb Mami toured extensively with Sting in 1999 and 2000, including a performance before 20 000 in New York's Central Park, sponsored by Best Buy. The rai star also appeared on the "Tonight Show," performed "Desert Rose" with Sting at the 2000 Grammy awards (backed by an Arab orchestra that included Simon Shaheen) and belted out a rai-inflected version of The Police's hit "Roxanne" with Sting at the 2001 Super Bowl. In July 2001, Mami released *Dellali*, featuring Sting and Ziggy Marley on backing vocals, the late Chet Atkins on guitar, and production from Niles Rodgers (of Chic fame). *Dellali* hit the CMJ New World Top 20 and is Mondo Melodia's biggest seller to date.²⁶ Rachid Taha went on a critically acclaimed U.S. tour in summer 2001 in support of his brilliant album *Made in Medina*, recorded in New Orleans and released in February 2001 on Mondo Melodia. It too made the CMJ world music Top 10. Writing in *Rolling Stone*, veteran rock critic Robert Christgau (2002) opined that "no track released anywhere in 2001 rocks as hard as the opening of 'Barra Barra,'" a cut from *Made in Medina*.²⁷ Simon Shaheen opened several dates for Sting, performed extensively with his Arab/jazz fusion band Qantara and released (with Qantara) the album *Blue Flame* in June 2001.²⁸ Egyptian star Hakim toured the U.S. in summer 2001 and released, on Mondo Melodia, *Yaho* (2000) and *The Lion Roars: Live in America* (October 2001), recorded during his first U.S. tour. Khaled meanwhile made several trips to the U.S. to perform during the nineties. He also put out the brilliantly eclectic album *Kenza*, some cuts of which were recorded with the acid-jazz collective, Brooklyn Funk Essentials, on Mondo Melodia in April 2000.

Sold-Out Houses

On September 11, 2001, the Mondo Melodia Vice-President Dawn Elder was in Egypt, preparing to put Hakim and his musicians on a plane bound for the U.S., to tour with Khaled and Simon Shaheen, in the hopes of building on Arab music's considerable momentum. The tour, which was almost sold out, was abruptly cancelled. Simon Shaheen for his part kept on performing and touring—he was even invited to play at an interfaith service in New York City's Riverside Church five days after September 11, and he appeared on the late-night television show "Politically Incorrect," as did Miles Copeland. Shaheen claims that, since 9/11, people in the U.S. "seem much more interested and open" when it comes to the Middle East and are trying to unlearn stereotypes²⁹ (Armstrong,

2002). Finally, the Hakim-Khaled tour, cancelled in September, was relaunched in February 2002, with Simon Shaheen serving as a backup musician. The tour was extremely successful, drawing full houses in most cities, very enthusiastic crowds and tremendous press coverage. The tour also engendered further CD sales, which in turn were helped as well by Mondo Melodia's publicity campaign that promoted its Middle Eastern artists with posters saying "Banned by the Taliban," prominently featured at many record stores.³⁰

The effects of this increased Arab cultural visibility in the U.S. have been contradictory. On the one hand, it is clear from numerous other examples that global capitalism has become very adept at marketing the exotic to sell products, while at the same time managing to mostly avoid troubling political or economic issues associated with "exotic" peoples and cultures. Many capitalist firms have successfully promoted the sensibility that consumption can be a form of progressive political practice: to wit, buy a chocolate bar and strike a blow for endangered rain forests (Hutnyk, 2000; Klein, 2002).³¹ On the other hand, the increased circulation of Arab music has offered certain opportunities for community and progressive activists.

Co-optation of Cool

As in the case of Western pop music in general, promoters could co-opt the Mondo Melodia artists' work for purposes that were not necessarily intended by the artists or the company. Media coverage of rai music (Khaled and Cheb Mami) continued to repeat old myths and partial stories, representing rai as Algeria's version of rock n' roll, an agent in the struggle of the modern against the traditional, of youth against the elders, of enlightened bohemianism against fundamentalism. The notion of rai as an enemy of Islamic fundamentalism gained greater resonance after September 11, and Khaled and Mami themselves actively promoted this view to show that Islamic societies are not homogeneous. But this model of rai also ignores the ways Algeria's repressive regime has used rai in its very bloody and dirty struggle with the country's Islamists, and it erases rai's very important role in Arab struggles against racism in France (Swedenburg, 2001b).

Meanwhile, Cheb Mami's half-time performance with Sting at the February 2001 Super Bowl was preceded by the pre-game appearance of Desert Storm commander Norman Schwarzkopf and flag-hoisting soldiers for the singing of the national anthem, which placed Arab culture safely within Western rock 'n' roll and a celebration of U.S. military might. To underscore the point, a Stealth bomber roared overhead at the anthem's crescendo. During their U.S. tour in February 2002, Khaled, Hakim and

Simon Shaheen appeared at the World Economic Forum in New York City, the annual gathering of top corporations and political leaders, while global justice movement activists were meanwhile mobilizing on NYC streets and 60 000 were meeting at the alternative World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil. At the World Economic Forum, Egypt's Hakim performed a duet with Puerto Rico's queen of merengue, Olga Tañón, while Khaled sang John Lennon's song "Imagine" in a duet with Israeli singer Noa, backed by Palestinian Simon Shaheen on 'ud.³² Here hybridized Middle Eastern music, safely and profitably contained within the elite circles of global capitalism, was put to the cause of "world peace."

Another example of such containment is the use of Rachid Taha's song "Barra Barra" in the soundtrack to Ridley Scott's film, *Black Hawk Down*, released in January 2001. *Black Hawk Down* is the highly sanitized portrayal of a botched operation by U.S. Special Forces in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993, in which some 1 000 Somalis, many of them women, children and old people, as well as eighteen Rangers and Delta Force members, were killed. "Barra Barra" serves to humanize U.S. Special Forces and to make them appear sympathetic and even somewhat hip, as they prepare for their mission to seize Somali warlord Mohammed Aided. Taha did in fact give Ridley Scott permission to use his song based on the director's prior work, especially *Blade Runner*, but he was reportedly not happy with his decision, as he considered the film to be "propaganda" (Emerick, 2002).

***Kufiya* on the Stage**

On the other hand, Arab music's newfound public recognition has been a source of pride and mobilization for Arab-Americans. Delighted that Cheb Mami's performance would be the first time Arabic singing was heard at the Grammys, Arab-American political organizations launched an e-mail campaign, urging their members and friends to watch the 2000 awards. The Khaled-Hakim tour with Simon Shaheen in early 2002 was an occasion for Arab community celebration, a sort of reemergence party in the intimidating atmosphere after September 11, and Arabs were a raucous component of the packed houses in New York City and Chicago.³³ In New York, a concertgoer tossed a black-and-white *kufiya* (the Palestinian scarf) on the stage while Khaled was performing, and the Algerian star wore it over his shoulders for the remainder of the show (Pareles, 2002). In February, Simon Shaheen with members of Qantara played two benefit concerts, in New York and Ann Arbor, for Palestinian medical relief.³⁴ The Hakim-Khaled-Shaheen concerts and Arab audiences' spirited participation are also linked to the mobilization of

an estimated 75 000 people in a rally for global justice in Washington DC on April 20, 2002 that was transformed, due to massive Arab and Muslim participation, into the largest-ever demonstration in support of Palestinian rights in the U.S. No doubt there was a great deal of crossover in personnel between concerts and demonstration.

Khaled's pro-Palestine gesture at the New York show was noteworthy because over the years he has repeatedly stressed that he is not a "political" artist. His songs, he says, are about wine and fun, and he wants to make audiences laugh. "Make love not war," Khaled intones, "that's my politics" (Dunlevy, 2002). Khaled has consistently underscored his sharp differences with Islamic fundamentalists, at the same time asserting that he is a Muslim and that Islam is a religion of peace. In a February 2002 interview with Afropop Worldwide's Sean Barlow, however, Khaled was uncharacteristically blunt about his political views. Speaking of the September 11 attacks and Islamist political violence, Khaled said, "at the base of this whole thing" is the question of Palestine. "To end [terrorism]," he went on, "we need to fix the problem, the source of the big problem." Khaled also drew attention to the fact that he, a Muslim, has performed and recorded "Imagine" with Israeli singer Noa (who is known in Israel as Achinoam Nini) (Barlow, 2002).³⁵ Of Yemeni origin, Noa grew up in New York and is openly affiliated with the Israeli peace camp.

Khaled's claim that he is not a "political" musician in fact provides him with a cover for staking out certain political positions. Although Western media repeatedly depict Khaled simply as an anti-fundamentalist Muslim, Khaled in fact is able to find some room for manoeuvre within this imposed framework. Perhaps even Khaled's duet with Noa at the World Economic Forum is not inherently antithetical to the struggle for Palestine. As Joel Beinin (1998) has argued, the vision of the overwhelmingly middle- and upper middle-class peace forces in Israel and their Palestinian interlocutors within the Palestinian Authority is one of "peace with privatization"—the integration of a technologically advanced Israel into a globalized regional economy as the dominant player, with the Palestinian state as Israel's junior partner.³⁶

Pitfalls and Possibility

What have been the political consequences of the Arab wave?³⁷ Mondo Melodia's Dawn Elder called the Khaled-Hakim tour in early 2002 an opportunity "to share the true values of millions of people from the Middle East who want to live in peace" (Anonymous, 2002). It is difficult to measure to what extent the artists' and promoters' goals has indeed had such political effects, but it does at

least appear that the audience for Arab music has now expanded beyond the stereotypical “world music” demographic. When Khaled, Hakim and Shaheen played in Los Angeles in June 2002, for instance, a large portion of the audience was Hispanic.³⁸

Meanwhile, the tour, in bringing together Arab artists from three different countries in the Arab diaspora, had an unprecedented and important pan-Arab dimension, parallel to the reemergence of pan-Arab sentiment forged in large part by the coverage of the Palestinian uprising by global Arabic satellite networks, especially al-Jazeera. But this pan-Arab solidarity was not seamless. When Khaled, Hakim and Shaheen played concerts in Lebanon and Jordan in July 2002, Jordan’s professional unions called for a boycott of Khaled on the grounds that his appearance with Noa was furthering “normalization with Israel.” Despite the uproar, Khaled’s performances in both countries were for the most part well received.³⁹ Such pressures, however, now serve as a disincentive for Arab artists to record duets with Israeli or Jewish artists.

The increasing popularity of Rachid Taha may offer the best potential for raising awareness of anti-Arab sentiment in Western countries. Taha is well known in France for his scruffy-punk image and his vocal opposition to French anti-Arab racism, and Mondo Melodia’s press release about *Made in Medina* emphasizes his experiences confronting anti-immigrant prejudice. Coverage of Taha’s U.S. tour in summer 2002, in support of his most recent Mondo Melodia release, *Rachid Taha Live*, played up the antiracist aspect of his persona, in contrast to the press treatment accorded rai stars like Khaled and Cheb Mami. Taha’s increasing circulation and visibility could possibly lead U.S. audiences to make connections between the experiences of French-Arabs and Arab-Americans. Of all the artists discussed here, Taha is the most politicized.⁴⁰

In May 2001, Sting was awarded a Kahlil Gibran “Spirit of Humanity” by the Arab-American Institute, in recognition of his work to save the rain forests, to promote the rights of indigenous people and to further cross-cultural exchanges. The Dearborn, Michigan-based Arab-American non-profit agency ACCESS (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services) was also honoured at the event. But the political causes of cultural icons can always be rendered apolitical or worse. Speakers included Queen Noor of Jordan (King Hussein’s widow) and Secretary of State Colin Powell, who praised Sting and discussed the Bush administration’s positive “engagement” in the Middle East peace process.

The run-up to the U.S. war with Iraq, launched in March 2003, witnessed both massive and quickly organized U.S. street mobilizations in favour of peace. At the

same time, Mondo Melodia and other labels continued to offer up even greater numbers of offerings of Arab (and other Middle Eastern) music to U.S. consumers. But there is not much evidence of any direct connection between the two phenomena. Antiwar rallies, depending upon the locale of course, frequently included performances of Arab music by local artists,⁴¹ but I know of no major recording artists who participated in such rallies (of course, most of them live abroad). The only clear connection between the anti-war mobilization and major Arab artists was the release of a single by the African-American rocker Lenny Kravitz called “We Want Peace.” The anthem featured vocals from Kazem al-Saher, an Iraqi singer and the Arab world’s biggest-selling artist who has been based in Cairo and Canada since the early 1990s. Al-Saher’s album *Impossible Love* was released by Copeland’s Ark 21 in 2000.⁴² Kravitz put his single out on the Web site of *Rock the Vote*, an organization that promotes free expression and has registered over three million young people to vote over the last decade.⁴³

Since the invasion, significant Arab releases have continued to appear. Most important perhaps is Natacha Atlas’s fifth CD, *Something Dangerous*, released in May 2003. *Something Dangerous*—whose title some commentators say refers to the U.S. intervention in Iraq—enjoyed the best first-week sales of any of her albums,⁴⁴ and quickly shot up to the number one spot on the CMJ charts. Atlas also did a brief but successful tour of the U.S. in July 2003. I managed to attend the Detroit date, which was co-sponsored in part by ACCESS (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services) in Dearborn, a Detroit suburb. The crowd at Atlas’s show, while not filling the arena, was appreciative and multiethnic, reflecting Detroit’s diverse (and important Arab) population. In Detroit, at any rate, the audience was not the stereotypical “NPR” audience.

As for Mondo Melodia, it continued to release Middle Eastern music during the run-up to the Iraq war, including collections like *One Thousand and One Nights* (February 2003) and *Bodega Lounge* (January 2003).⁴⁵ But most significant of these was *Bellydance Superstars* (November 2002), the label’s fastest-selling album as of September 2003.⁴⁶ Miles Copeland and Mondo Melodia first began to move into the bellydance scene as a means of promoting their release of Oojami’s *Bellydancing Breakbeats* (February 2002), a bellydance/dance music hybrid produced by a Turkish DJ based in London. A bellydance contest sponsored by Mondo Melodia garnered a phenomenal response, and so the label organized a troupe called Bellydance Superstars. The Superstars did performances at two LA clubs in November 2002, and both

shows were sold out and enthusiastically received. The renowned William Morris Agency then booked the Mondo Melodia-sponsored Bellydance Superstars and Desert Roses troupe into the prestigious indie-rock tour, Lollapalooza for summer 2003. The Superstars performed for 200 to 300 persons a day at Lollapalooza's second tent, and before an average of 12 000 a night on the main stage, right before "supergroup" Audioslave. Although the Superstar bellydancers are not Arabs, the music they perform to is mostly by Arab artists, and audiences are most enthusiastic when the Superstars dance to numbers by Egyptian *sha'abi* star Hakim. Audience response to the Superstars, according to Copeland, has been extremely positive, and he now sees bellydance as the key vehicle for delivering Middle Eastern music to a mass American audience.⁴⁷ Copeland and his firm have now refocussed their efforts on releasing bellydance videos, organizing tours of the Superstars troupe, and producing a documentary about bellydancing. The downside of this activity, however, is that Mondo Melodia's promotion of Middle Eastern music has virtually halted, and only five new releases, mostly belly dance music, have appeared since early 2003.

The current growth—now slowed due to Miles Copeland's new priorities—of Arab music on the U.S. scene therefore offers up potential pitfalls as well as opportunities. It is in the nature of capitalist producers to be relentlessly on the lookout for new products to market to consumers who are seeking out the exotic and hip, consumers for whom the purchase of a Khaled CD to "appreciate" Middle Eastern culture can substitute for grappling with serious political issues. Yet it would be a mistake to think of the current main actors involved in marketing Arab music as merely opportunistic, for they are, for the most part, interested in both making money *and* in fostering the appreciation of Arab culture (and thereby, forestalling conflict). Moreover, as Arab music has become a hotter commodity, artists, audiences, political movements and even business entrepreneurs have faced new possibilities for action. Thus far, it seems that the most important political effect of the Arab wave has been a boosting of community building and of feelings of empowerment among Arab-Americans. But it would also be possible for broader political forces to make use of these newly important Arab cultural vehicles. Rachid Taha for one would no doubt be delighted if "Barra Barra" were to be deployed as the theme song for a U.S. movement against the U.S. occupation of Iraq or the Israeli occupation of Palestine, rather than simply as the soundtrack for a paean to the Pentagon.

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Notes

- 1 An earlier version of this article appeared in *Middle East Report* 224 (Fall 2002).
- 2 Any effort to delineate with any precision the "world music audience" would be very difficult. It is certainly the case that National Public Radio listeners (usually represented as typically white, middle class, professional) are an important target audience, and that NPR is an important vehicle for promotion of world music, both through the attention devoted to it on news programs like *All Things Considered* and on specialty shows like *Afropop Worldwide*. The other key media vehicle for world music is college radio, discussed further below. The world music network also includes nightclubs which feature live world music and DJs spinning world music; specialty magazines (like *Global Rhythm*, *Dirty Linen*, *The Beat*) and online publications (like rootsworld.com); music critics for major publications who often cover world music (Robert Christgau in the *Village Voice* and John Pareles in the *New York Times*); specialty music shops and world music sections of outlets like Tower Records or Barnes & Noble, and so on. In addition there are significant world music subdivisions, like Brazilian or Cuban or African or "world-dance-fusion," and each have heterogeneous, ethnically mixed, and fluctuating audiences.
- 3 Progressive world music artists who have followed such trajectories have been the focus of a great deal of attention from world music critics, among them Lipsitz (1994) and Timothy D. Taylor (1997).
- 4 It should be stressed that these are not the only trends, but are among the most important.
- 5 Nubian 'ud (Arab lute) player and vocalist Hamza El Din enjoyed a similar revival with the emergence of world music. Hamza El Din was a fixture on the U.S. folk circuit in the 1960s, performed at Woodstock in 1969, and can be heard on the soundtrack to the Peter Sellers 1968 comedy, *I Love You, Alice B. Toklas*. Today he is frequently marketed under the Sufi rubric, although this was not an important feature of his image during the 1960s and 1970s. For an excellent in-depth investigation of how the category of the "sacred" (what I call here "spiritual") gets played out in the world music scene with Syrian "Sufi" music from Aleppo, see Shannon, 2003.
- 6 The formulation "4 000 year-old rock band" is Timothy Leary's (Fuson, 1996). The phrase is repeated by William Burroughs (1992) in his liner notes to *Apocalypse Across the Sky* by the Master Musicians of Jajouka featuring Bachir Attar.
- 7 Samples of Ornette Coleman's collaborations with the Jahjoukans can be heard on the soundtrack to the film *Naked Lunch* (1992)—based on Burroughs' novel of the same name—and on Coleman's release, *Dancing in Your Head* (1977).
- 8 See Philip Schuyler's witty critique (2000) of the Master Musicians' allure among what he calls the U.S. "glitterati."
- 9 Notable (albeit uneven in quality) releases include *Apocalypse Across the Sky* (1992); *One Night @ the 1001* (1998), recently discovered recordings made by Gysin in the 1950s; and *The Master Musicians of Jajouka featuring Bachir Attar*, recorded with Talvin Singh (2000) and referred to above. It should be noted that the Master Musicians of Jajouka are little known in Morocco; their international

- reputation is for the most part the creation of Gysin and his hip offspring.
- 10 Some spiritual and Gnawa recordings are quite syncretic, but nonetheless are still rooted in a bedrock that is figured as "authentic."
 - 11 Nation Records, based in London, represents the left wing of that movement; see Hesmondhalgh, 1995; Hutnyk, 2000: 50-83; Swedenburg, 2001a.
 - 12 Much of contemporary Egyptian pop is just as syncretistic in its attitude as Natacha's music.
 - 13 I found Natacha's second album *Halim* (1997) for sale in the rock section of Tower Records in Tulsa, Oklahoma in summer 1997.
 - 14 Also known in Morocco as a *hajhouj* or *gimbri*.
 - 15 With Zohar, most notably *Trance* (1993), and in the traditional style, *Fire Within* (1995).
 - 16 See Kinney (1994) for a description of how Sufism entered the U.S. as a universalistic religion that was not tied specifically to Islam. This is a theme that continues in current representations of Sufism, particularly those with a New Age tinge.
 - 17 This representation of Sufism as an alternative to militant political Islamism gained added force after the attacks of 9/11.
 - 18 On Natacha's public advocacy of Islam, see Swedenburg 2001a. The fact that Islam was not erased from the discourse surrounding Natacha Atlas had much to do with the fact that she asserted some control over the discourse, in particular by asserting the importance of her religious views when interviewed by the music media.
 - 19 See, for instance, Bessman, 2001. For the term "Arab wave," see Nickson 2001.
 - 20 Public opinion surveys reveal great hostility towards Arabs in the U.S., particularly at times of crisis. A 1991 ABC News poll found that 59% of Americans saw Arabs as "terrorists," 58% as "violent," and 56% as "religious fanatics." A 1993 Gallup poll revealed that two-thirds of Americans believed there were "too many" Arab immigrants in the country. A poll conducted by *Newsweek* right after 9/11 found that 32% agreed with putting Arabs under special surveillance like that imposed on Japanese-Americans during the Second World War (Levitas, 2003). On the new ethnic visibility of Arab-Americans, see Cainkar, 2002.
 - 21 For instance, the Aladdin Casino in Las Vegas abandoned its Middle East motifs and stopped featuring belly dancers; Rio Hondo Community College in Whittier, California cancelled its sponsorship of Cairo Carnival, an annual belly dance festival, after 9/11, forcing the festival to move to the Glendale Civic Center (interview with Miles Copeland III, September 26, 2003; Pierce, n.d.).
 - 22 According to Fred Navarrete of Beggars Banquet, sales of *Ayeshteri* totalled around 15 000 as of March 2003, a number that the company was quite pleased with (personal communication, March 18, 2003).
 - 23 Miles Jr. describes his undercover role in the successful 1949 coup of Husni al-Zaim in Syria in his books *The Game of Nations* (1970) and *The Game Player: Confessions of the CIA's Original Operative* (1989). On loan from the CIA in 1953-1954, Copeland helped Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser to organize his intelligence service.
 - 24 Elder left Mondo Melodia in 2002, but she still represents Simon Shaheen. A representative statement from Elder: "The more people are able to see and touch and hear these cultures, the better understanding they'll have of that ethnic group, and the more peaceful coexistence we'll have" (Farber, 2001).
 - 25 Algerian *sha'abi* ("popular") is the brand of popular music prevalent in Algeria prior to the coming into vogue of *rai*. It is characterized by large orchestras playing traditional Arab instruments. Major *sha'abi* artists include Dahman El Harrachi and Mohammad El Anka. Algerian *sha'abi* bears no relation to Egyptian *sha'abi*, discussed below.
 - 26 CMJ (*College Music Journal*) tracks college radio airplay, and plays a crucial role in the promotion of world music, since there are very few other radio outlets for world music other than college radio. As of September 2003, *Delalli's* sales were 50 to 60 000, according to Miles Copeland III (September 26). Unfortunately, *Dellali* is one of Mami's less interesting recordings, and its success is due mainly to the fact that it was released in the wake of the grand success of "Desert Rose." Better examples of Mami's work are *Meli Meli* (1999) and *Saida* (1995).
 - 27 Total U.S. sales of *Made in Medina* are about 10 to 15 000 (Miles Copeland, September 26, 2003).
 - 28 Released on Mondo Melodia, it was nominated for a number of Grammys in 2001, mostly in the adult contemporary category.
 - 29 *Desert Roses and Arabian Rhythms* is Mondo Melodia's second biggest seller (36 000 as of September 2003, according to Miles Copeland, September 26). Copeland attributes its success, like that of Cheb Mami's *Dellali*, to the Sting/Mami hit "Desert Rose."
 - 30 The logic of the "Banned by Taliban" campaign was that one could support the struggle against fundamentalism by purchasing CDs by artists whose work was banned by forces like the Taliban (Miles Copeland, September 26, 2003). Copeland considered the Khaled/Hakim tour a great success in terms of publicity, but he lost \$100 000 on the venture (September 26, 2003).
 - 31 Among the many options in rainforest-saving chocolate is Absolute Chocolate's Chocolate Candy Rainforest Bar (<http://www.chocolate-candy-endangered-species.com/chocolate-candy-rainforest.html?mgIDtoken=0C15B7C83347922CA3>).
 - 32 Miles Copeland was asked to set these events up (September 26, 2003).
 - 33 Arab participation in the concerts in Detroit and Los Angeles was less prominent, due to the heterogeneous nature of the U.S. "Arab community." There are substantial Algerian and Egyptian communities in New York City, whereas Detroit's community is mostly Syrian/Lebanese and Yemeni, and these are less likely to be avid fans of Khaled and Hakim than the Algerians and Egyptians (Miles Copeland, September 26, 2003).
 - 34 More remarkably, when Sting performed in Jordan with Cheb Mami in April 2001, at a benefit concert for the Promise Welfare Society attended by several members of Jordan's royal family, the proceeds went, in part, to Palestinian victims of the violence inflicted by the Israeli occupation.
 - 35 The duet with Noa appears on the version of Khaled's *Kenza* that was released in France (1999), but it does not appear

- on the U.S. Mondo Melodia release (2000). Miles Copeland states that he did not include the song on the Mondo Melodia release because he was advised that Arab audiences in the U.S. would not buy *Kenza* if it included a duet with an Israeli, and secondly because it is the weakest song on the album (September 26, 2003). I must concur with the second point. Note that although Copeland deleted "Imagine" from the U.S. version of *Kenza*, he did organize Khaled's appearance with Noa at the World Economic Forum.
- 36 See Shafir and Peled (2002: 231-259) on the role of Israeli business and economic liberalization in the peace process.
- 37 Useful surveys of this phenomenon are Motavalli, 2002 and Ali, 2002.
- 38 The Hispanic audience may have been attracted, in part, because of Hakim's collaboration with Olga Tañón (see above). The Venezuelan star Shakira, of Lebanese origin, has also played a role in making Arab-Hispanic crossover popular in the U.S. and Latin America. Shakira sings in Arabic on the hit, "Ojos así," from *Dónde Están Los Ladrones?* (1998) and—as all MTV viewers are now aware—is a decent bellydancer. Rachid Taha's *sha'abi* hit "Ya Rayah" (from *Diwan*, 1998) charted throughout Latin America.
- 39 Khaled responded to his critics by noting that Palestinian singer Nabil Khouri also performed at the concert, which was attended by Yasser Arafat's advisor, Mohammed Rashid and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and by affirming his support for the Palestinian cause (Awadat, 2002).
- 40 This emerges clearly in published interviews with Taha. Steve Hillage, Taha's producer and lead guitarist, who I met in London in July 2003, is very sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, and spoke with fondness of performing with Taha in concert in P.A.-controlled Bethlehem in 2000.
- 41 Thanks to Tim Fuson, Joan Mandell, George Bisharat, Lisa Hajjar, and John Iskander for this information. In Oakland, on March 22, 2003, The Cosmik Casbah put on Beats NOT Bombs: The Bay Area Anti-War Dance. The event featured, among others, noted DJ and Six Degrees recording artist DJ Cheb i Sabbah. Cheb i Sabbah is best known for his releases of Indian classical-trance fusion, but has also been spinning Middle Eastern music for years once a week at Nickie's in the Haight, and has produced many Bay Area shows featuring Middle Eastern musicians.
- 42 Al-Safer received substantial media coverage after the outbreak of the Iraq war, and he guest vocals on "The War is Over," a cut from eclectic classical-pop artist Sarah Brightman's new album *Harem* (June, 2003). Simon Shaheen is also heard playing on Kravitz's "We Want Peace." According to Copeland, Kazem al-Safer's music, because of the nature of its sound, is not likely to "cross over" into the U.S. market (September 26, 2003); I agree with his judgment.
- 43 The single got good media coverage from such outlets as MTV News.
- 44 Personal communication, Fred Navarrete, Beggars Banquet, June 10, 2003.
- 45 Copeland has also expressed his skepticism about the U.S. military intervention in Iraq, saying "I'm suspicious of the outcome of the war," at a press conference in Singapore in May (Wee, 2003); also in my interview with him, September 26, 2003.
- 46 Total sales as of September were near 20 000 (Copeland, September 26, 2003).
- 47 Copeland, September 26, 2003. David Lindquist wrote—in a classic Orientalist formulation—in *Rolling Stone* (2003) that the Bellydance Superstars were the "must-see" at the festival's Second Stage—because they were "[like] a troupe of NBA cheerleaders doing a routine in Arabian garb." Photos of the Superstars are available at www.bellyqueen.com/lollapalooza/index.html.

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