he wasn't really tall and muscular at all if we are looking at him from our contemporary North American perspective.

Yik-Man soon leaves to join his father working in a Chinese restaurant in Vancouver, and troubles begin for Sau-ping. Bandits, rumours, the constant worry about money coming from her husband, war, famine, illness and finally the communist revolution all beset Sau-ping, who gives birth to daughter Fei-yin and adopts son Kin-Pong. When the PRC is established and a former lowly day worker given a prominent role in ferreting out anti-revolutionaries, Sau-ping finds her house, property and family in danger. Furthermore, the remittances are no longer allowed to enter China, and those with overseas connections become suspect. Taking her daughter and adopted son, she flees to Hongkong. The colony, however, is flooded with refugees like herself, and Sau-ping can barely support herself selling vegetables on the street.

Eventually Sau-ping gets the opportunity to join her husband in Canada, although her daughter must be left behind (Kin-pong already has left for Canada). She has learned that her husband sold Fei-yin's birthright, an act she finds hard to forgive. In the end, however, family loyalty wins out and she finds herself working hard in a restaurant with living quarters above it—a far cry from her beautiful house in China.

The family almost loses the restaurant to Leung Kin-tsoi, the unscrupulous grandson of the lineage chief. Kin-tsoi has been the beneficiary of Fei-yin's sold birthright, a fact which angers Sau-ping continually. With the help of Mr. Chau, their lawyer, however, the restaurant is found to belong to Yik-man and his family. Fei-yin eventually makes her way to Canada and the group is reunited. Yik-man dies and Sau-ping moves into a facility for the elderly. While my retelling may be bland, the story proceeds with lively conflict.

One of Woon's goals is to take the actual lived reality of Chinese families in the diaspora and show how it was and is formed by legislation, by common attitudes in both China and Canada, and by the peculiarities of cross-cultural living. Issues of the "paper son," explaining the complex rules of kinship and relations to foreign authorities, manipulating what is a prejudicial and unfair system to reach common goals such as letting families live in peace together—all of these things are represented. Evil characters appear within the Chinese ranks, showing that Woon is consciously avoiding romanticization. She understands a great deal about how the grass widows lived and felt, and she translates this into the mind of Sau-ping.

Rather than thinking of this book as pure fiction, it should be regarded as a hybrid form, a mixture of history, fiction, imagination, and ideas that is backed by years of research. As I mentioned, a feminist sensibility underlies the character of Sau-ping, yet the overall impression I get is that this is a story of families, not of women or even individuals. In this regard, Woon has accurately injected a worldview almost totally determined by lineage into the story, creating an experience for the reader that would be difficult to come by in scholarly work.

Paul Antze and Michael Lambek (eds.), *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory,* New York and London: Routledge, 1996.

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The last several years have seen the rise of a new Canada-centred cross-disciplinary discussion of memory and trauma. Key players include the philosopher Ian Hacking and the anthropologists Paul Antze and Michael Lambek, their students and collaborators, all based in Toronto, and some scholars from other places. This multidisciplinary volume is the first to give an idea of the importance and scope of the reflections of this strongly anchored and loosely bounded group. The book represents a milestone in studies of memory in giving a much-needed cross-cultural perspective on the field, in a way at the same time is sensitive to psychological and historical approaches.

The book begins with a wide-ranging and sometimes inspired introduction by the two editors. The remainder is divided into three parts. The first contains papers on memory and trauma in the lives of individuals; the last papers on collective memory and the handling of collective trauma. Between these the editors have appropriately put papers on explicit expert theories of memory and trauma, reflecting the recent increase of scholarly interest in experts" discourses. In more classical anthropological terms, it's as if Griaule had put data on individual Dogon in a first section, Ogotemmêli's version of Dogon cosmology in a second, Griaule's own reconstruction of the collective Dogon world in a third.

The first section of the book contains three papers on cases of traumatic memory and how individuals deal with them. Paul Antze draws implications for our assumptions about identity from his participation in a self-help group for people defined as having multiple personality disorder resulting from repressed early trauma. Donna Young and Glynis George each presents women's histories of trouble and their efforts to conceptualize and deal with them, both from Atlantic Canada. These two papers show the link between individual trauma and social conditions, as well as the sometimes vast implications of turning private trauma into public disclosure.

The second part, "The Medicalization of Memory," takes critical views of what are often unquestioned professional readings of memory. Here the guiding spirit (or sprite) is Michel Foucault, whose work on medicine, psychiatry, and the penal system created a field of critical scholarly discourse about scholarly discourse, particularly as it is used to justify the existence of institutions of treatment and constraint. The first chapter in this section, "Memory Sciences, Memory Politics" by Ian Hacking, is a memory manifesto which to some degree anchors the whole book. Hacking's purpose, following Foucault, is to identify unspoken assumptions ("depth knowledge") behind expert discourses ("surface knowledge"). Depth knowledge, the "knowledge" that there is something to know in a given domain, differs from period to period and among societies. Its source is more likely to lie in general social con-

ditions than the explicit rules of the sciences that it makes thinkable. This relatively relativistic position is presumably what Hacking means by insisting on "politics" in relation to "sciences." He holds that "memory" as a scientific category was historically and politically constituted through modernity, illustrating this history with short treatments of key figures: Freud, the psychologists of shellshock, Locke, Ribot.

The next chapter in this section is by Allan Young, an anthropologist who some years ago turned his ethnographic gaze on medicine and has more recently considered the psychiatric profession and its development of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Young traces the passage of the notion of trauma from bodily to psychic damage and shows how current psychological and psychiatric uses of the concept represent extensions of its source in the body. Finally Ruth Leys, an historian of ideas, goes over some of the same material from a different angle, giving a compelling history of the idea of trauma among psychologists and psychoanalysts from World War 1 to now.

The last section of the book, "Culture as Memorial Practice," looks at how collectivities deal with a traumatic past and conceptualize time and memory. In his chapter, Michael Kenny compares assumptions about memory and the past that underlie psychiatric diagnoses of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Borderline Personality with assumptions behind "diagnoses" made in other societies: Zande witchcraft, Latin American *susto*, and West African Bad Destiny. In all these cases, today's misfortune is categorized as something to be explained by the past. The differences seem less between "true" scientific and "false" folk models than between hopeful and hopeless diagnoses that may share assumptions across traditions. In the next chapter, the psychiatrist Laurence Kirmayer uses the landscape metaphor to explicate popular models of memory, what are often presented as the unrememberable horrors of childhood abuse, and narratives of unforgettable horrors of the Holocaust. Then Jack Kugelmass recounts his changing views of the status of the "memory tourism" of North American Jews to Poland, the land of their ancestors, who either fled or were wiped out.

In the penultimate chapter in the volume, Maurice Bloch performs a *tour de force* comparison of presumptions about the nature of time and change in three societies, showing how such presumptions can be understood in terms of specific social patterns and conceptions of kinship and the person. Here Bloch criticizes cognitive scientists for their neglect of the variability of presuppositions about fundamental aspects of experience across cultures; elsewhere he has vigorously criticized anthropologists for neglecting the contributions of cognitive science. Bloch's chapter provides a welcome cross-societal context for the rest of the volume.

In the last chapter, Michael Lambek moves back and forth between popular and expert conceptualizations of memory in the West and an account of the role of memory and forgetting in spirit possession on the island of Mayotte. In both cases, Lambek argues, what one does and does not remember defines and is defined by the kind of person one is and wants to be: in his words, it is a moral practice.

It is evidently impossible to do justice to a book of this complexity and richness in a short review. I will make two small points, drawing particularly on Lambek and Antze's introduction to the volume. Many of the chapters contrast two views of memory. In one, often characterized as the "naïve" or "commonsense" view, memory is a record of things that really happened in the past. This view has been adopted in a particularly literalist form by the repressed memory and multiple personality movements: if you remember something, even something you had forgotten for a long time, even something that emerges only under hypnosis or as a result of prolonged therapy, the content of that memory must be a fact that really happened and that may require dealing with in the present—maybe in the courts. Against this view is one that stresses the constructed nature of memory, arguing that what we remember is at least as dependent on our current circumstances and needs as on what happened in the past. This is the view adopted wholesale by cognitive psychologists, whose experiments show the extreme lability of memory and the suggestibility of rememberers: in this view, memory is or might as well be a fabrication. Since the central point of the introduction and of some of the chapters here is that memory is a kind of narrative, or moral practice, or personal and social construction, we must assume that on the whole the authors concur with this second view.

And this raises two issues. First of all, it is surely too simple to define memory as either a true record of the past or a mere construction of the present. What we mean by the word memory in ordinary language seems somewhat more complex: what we call a memory is experienced not as an "assertion and performance" (cf. p. xxv), but as a witnessing, a constatation. It imposes itself—yet not with the force of immediate perception, but as part of a lived past. This sense of real lived experience, but at a remove, is simply not captured by either/or formulations of memory as record or memory as narrative performance. I, at least, had the sense that in their haste to avoid naïve literalist interpretations of memory as simply the record of the past, many of the chapters in the volume veered to the obvious alternative of memory as simply a story in the present.

At the same time (issue two), the authors of this volume do not fall into the obsession with the literal truth or falsehood of memory that marks most of the discussion today. While they do adopt an essentially presentist and constructionist view, they do not see this as invalidating memory—unlike many cognitive psychologists or the proponents of False Memory Syndrome. This volume takes the very sane position that something that may or may not be literally, or juridically, true can still be very important. One great virtue of the book is thus to challenge what the editors (p. xxviii) aptly call the "assault on fantasy" that is rampant in our society today.