America. Coverage, then, is narrow in regard to child abuse (Korbin) and "intergenerational conflict" (roughly synonymous to "abuse of the elderly") (Zimmer); but is wide in relation to "spousal violence" (Nero, Lewis, Counts) and spousal violence placed in a wider context of other forms of "domestic violence" (Aucoin, Lateef, Carucci, McDowell, Scaglion).

As a whole the volume is strong. Without exception the individual pieces are well and clearly written and typographically clean, and the format is attractive. As to content, if one is looking for comparative statistics, this book will be a disappointment as there are few references in it that are other than qualitative and relative, e.g., discussions of rates of occurrence of various forms of interpersonal violence in terms such as "few," "disproportionate" or "uncommon." On the other hand, if one is interested in sound ethnographic descriptions and generalizations illustrated with specific cases, events and incidents, this volume makes for very interesting and sometimes surprising reading.

Most of the authors do not seriously attempt cross-cultural comparison or provide sophisticated theoretical discussions of their materials. Among those who do, however, the most notable are Nero on Palauan wife-beating, Mitchell on the lack of violence among the Wape, and Counts on wives' suicide in Kaliai, West New Britain.

In her "Conclusion" Counts gives a succinct, but complete, review of the articles and furnishes a very helpful outline of four recurrent approaches applied in explanations of the presence and/or absence of domestic violence in different parts of Oceania (pp. 235-244). It is here that the fourth theme identified for the collection—why there is so much and such extreme domestic violence in some societies and so little in others in the same region—is addressed in the most direct and detailed way.

For a new field of anthropological analysis, *Domestic Violence in Oceania* provides a solid starting point. I would recommend it to those who want to get a sense of non-Western variation in the form and extent of domestic violence, and to those teaching the ethnography of Oceania or courses such as comparative gender relations. If used as a text, however, one ought to read Counts' conclusion first and perhaps again after completing reading the individual articles. This would allow one to realize the volume's considerable potential for working through historical and comparative ethnographic questions regarding domestic violence in Oceania and elsewhere.

Ethno-Logic: The Anthropology of Human Reasoning
James F. Hamill
Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1990. xii + 124 pp. $22.95 (cloth)

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Most of us in the human sciences are uncomfortably aware that our research is liable to be distorted by our political beliefs, but try to discount these as the regrettable temptations of subjectivity. Professor Hamill is unusual, therefore, in unashamedly making his political convictions the cornerstone of an academic treatise on non-Western logic. The desire to build world peace led him into anthropology and cultural relativism, but while relativism showed him that all cultures are equal and that ethnocentrism, racism, imperialism and colonialism are therefore unjustified, it cannot explain

the many universals of culture. He therefore needed a model of culture that was not only egalitarian but universalistic, and thinks he has found it in Chomsky's generative grammar.

He argues that since everyone has the innate ability to learn language we therefore have an innate knowledge of culture as well as language, because all culture involves thinking: "People are equipped at birth, or before birth, with all the knowledge that they need to acquire culture" (p.11), and "every feature of culture is derived from this innate base" (pp. 46-47). Furthermore, just as there are no primitive languages, "there are no simple or primitive cultures; all cultures are equally complex and equally modern" (p. 106), and every culture contains the same amount of information to be learned. Therefore the syllogism, for example, is a universal mode of reasoning and anyone who doubts this is a "colonialist."

This theory of culture and thought seems to me to have about as much intellectual credibility as the Tooth Fairy. Chomsky has explicitly repudiated the idea that there are significant resemblances between grammar and any other known systems of mental functioning, while the evidence that no culture is more complex than any other is about equal to the evidence that the earth is flat.

Although his book is intended to show that "there is a worldwide distribution of syllogistic reasoning" (p. 103), it is an indication of the level of Hamill's scholarship that he does not refer at all to India and China, where systems of formal logic emerged independently from Greece. In these complex civilizations logic was developed by professional thinkers in the context of philosophical and theological debate, and it was in the same social circumstances that Greek logic was employed by Muslim and Medieval philosophers. The development of formal logic was a very difficult process, and it would therefore be most surprising if such forms of reasoning occurred in simpler societies. Luria's researches among the Uzbeks and Cole's among the Kpelle showed, predictably, that syllogistic reasoning is not understood by non-literates in tribal societies without formal schooling. It is also well known that it is not properly understood by members of our own society before they reach the stage of formal operations at about 12. Hamill attempts unsuccessfully to refute Luria and Cole, and claims that there are "large quantities of syllogistic data" in the literature which also refute them (p. 40). He quotes not a word of this, however, and does not even provide a single reference to any of these alleged studies.

To show that members of all cultures reason syllogistically he conducted linguistic studies in Milwaukee with two Mende speakers and two Ojibwa speakers, and a five-year-old English speaker. The Mende speakers were gaduate students, and the Ojibwa each had several years of schooling and were residents of Milwaukee. Further research was carried out among the Navaho with 19 informants, having an average of six years of schooling. None of these subjects can be compared with those studied by Cole and Luria in educational background and social experience; we are told almost nothing about the conditions in which the tests were administered; most seriously, not a single interview is published; and we are given no data on individual performances. By the standards of cross-cultural psychology this is extremely poor research, and contributes nothing to our understanding of syllogistic reasoning in non-Western society.