

we would perhaps have liked to know more about the way in which these fragments were generated and allocated in the monograph (were they selected or were they random, as perhaps the author's online "archival degenerator" indicates?).

In any event, these unnumbered and uncaptioned photographs create an unnerving, silent visual rhythm that soon becomes part of a compelling reading experience. What is interesting here is the relation between text and photograph, for the latter are never discussed or explained but stand as nodes of "anti-illustration, an intrusion into the historiographical calm of the text" (xx). Does this technique manage to agitate the reader in the sense planned by the author, or does it rather defamiliarise him or her in the formalist sense of the term? This is a question that, if raised and explored in dialogue with the author's overall "historiographical perspectivism," may allow us to suggest that the risk present in the book's approach lies with the theoretical affinities it seeks to draw. Rather than exploring the idea and debates around agitation in its Marxist context, in an effort to test or tease out the possibility of rendering them anthropologically unsettling, the author resorts to a cultural theory approach. He thus grounds agitation within a discourse of theoretically more familiar notions, such as "troubling" and "queering." While this brings agitation up to date, it could also be argued that it somehow dilutes the critical potential of the otherwise enticing thesis for an agitating use of photography, making the overall argument all too easily assimilable into the current social theoretical doxa. In spite of this theoretical limitation, the monograph is a very important step toward a critical anthropological engagement with archival photographs and their power to unsettle text-centred readings of history and of the state. Most important, it introduces crucial questions regarding the use of photographs in anthropological texts, employing a method that paves the way to an engaged and radical new way of writing visual culture.

Note

- 1 See <http://metafactory.ca/agitimage/index.html>, accessed May 10, 2015.

Corbey, Raymond and Annette Lanjouw, eds, *The Politics of Species: Reshaping Our Relationships with Other Animals*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, xiv + 295 pages.

*Reviewer: Gregory Forth
University of Alberta*

Comprising 20 chapters and an introduction, this multi-disciplinary collection is edited by philosopher and anthropologist Raymond Corbey and Annette Lanjouw, a conservationist and primatologist who is also vice-president for Strategic Initiatives and the Great Ape Program at the Arcus Foundation. As well as supporting the publication, the foundation also sponsored the 2013 conference held in New York from which these papers derive.

Drawing on research in the social sciences, biology, primatology, law, medicine, and philosophy, all chapters critically

discuss the human/(non-human) animal opposition, particularly as it has developed in the West. As the book's title virtually announces, the main focus is speciesism, a moral and political position that sees other natural species as essentially different from humans and accordingly supports their differential treatment. Against this position, contributors explore a variety of issues to advance a philosophical view that questions the existence of any radical difference between humans and animals, thereby challenging notions of human exceptionalism. The concept of speciesism, of course, is modelled on racism and sexism, and, as one would expect, critics advocate a parallel extension of legal rights currently enjoyed only by a single species (*Homo sapiens*) to non-human animals.

At the same time, the authors are not entirely agreed on how far this can or should be taken. One contributor (Joan Dunayer, Chapter 2) argues that human rights should be accorded to all animals possessing any sort of nervous system. (Another suggests a restriction to creatures possessing a central nervous system.) Insofar as these rights might include a right to life, such extension would, of course, seriously restrict the dietary practices of everyone excepting vegans. However, other writers argue for a more modest extension – for example, only to mammals or vertebrates. For the most part, granting rights to non-human animals is argued on the basis of research showing that animals, or particular species, differ less from humans than was previously thought – and sometimes far less. As one might expect, many chapters provide demonstrations of such resemblance concerning non-human primates, elephants, and cetaceans. And the cases are made with reference to issues such as intelligence, possession of a theory of mind, experience of physical pain and mental anguish (including grief and depression), moral agency, and even linguistic ability.

While mammals, and especially large mammals that closely resemble humans in overall structure and facial form and expression, are the main focus of several chapters, the book also includes an intriguing account (Eben Kirksey, Chapter 13) of the capabilities of the ant species *Ectatomma ruidum*, and another chapter (Molly Mullin, Chapter 17) deals with domestic fowl. The extensionist strategy advocated explicitly or implicitly in most of the chapters, moreover, is found wanting, not just by Dunayer but also by philosopher Lori Gruen (Chapter 18), who argues instead for an approach called "entangled empathy," where differences should not make a difference and where one should instead strive to grasp the other animal's own perspective. Somewhat in contrast, in her very personal account of raising chickens, Mullin makes the point that there is no contradiction between caring for animals in a compassionate and ethical way and treating them differently from people, including exploiting them as food and therefore necessarily killing them. In a not entirely different vein, physician Hope Ferdowsian and lawyer Chong Choe (Chapter 19) suggest that ethical practices providing greater protection to non-human animals, particularly in the context of such morally challenging issues as medical and other scientific experimentation, might be modelled on existing policies for the protection of especially vulnerable humans in the same context as, for example, children, the mentally deficient, and people who are economically disadvantaged.

There is much in this book that should interest anthropologists. One might ask how it could be otherwise, given that

arguments claiming there is no substantial difference between human and non-human animals present something of a challenge to a discipline that defines itself by way of just such a distinction and that continues to represent culture as its exclusive topical preserve. But, whatever position individual anthropologists might take on the implications of human/non-human animal similarities, most would probably agree that there is still enough to be learned about the species *Homo sapiens* (or the genus *Homo* or subfamily Homininae) to justify the maintenance of a separate discipline. And if things discovered about human animals can be connected with an expanding knowledge of non-human animals – if, for example, we find that things previously considered arbitrary and inessential artifacts of culture (or specific cultures) are instead found to be rooted in cognitive or behavioural tendencies of other biological species – then all the better.

How humans should treat non-humans, however, is another matter – a moral question ultimately unrelated to empirical knowledge of how much we share with other creatures and equally related to ethnographic findings concerning how animals are treated outside of the West. In this last respect, anthropologists may be disappointed by how few chapters consider treatment of non-human animals in non-Western societies. In fact, there are just two – Chapter 12 by Jet Bakels and Chapter 15 by Erin Riley – and both concern ethno-linguistically defined local populations of Indonesia. From my reading of ethnography and from my own research conducted over a period of 40 years in eastern Indonesia, my impression is that members of a good many small-scale societies draw about the same line between human and animal as would Westerners (or at least those who have received little in the way of a modern biological education). In addition, they appear to base the distinction on the same criteria – notably, lack of language, clothing, fire, apparent tool manufacture, and so on. This is not to claim that hunter-gatherers and subsistence agriculturalists engage in practices as cruel as battery farming or many kinds of animal experimentation. Yet even while so-called animists may grant “souls” or something like human intelligence to non-human animals, this certainly does not prevent them from killing and eating them – sometimes doing so in ways that would seem cruel to Westerners, as the editors acknowledge in the last paragraph of their introduction.

Rather than moral (or cultural) differences explaining cross-cultural variation in the ethical treatment of animals, this more likely reflects the very technological success of modern societies, which has greatly expanded the uses to which humans, for their own benefit, can make of animals. Add global capitalism to the mix and inhumane practices involving animals that might appear distinctive to the West – most of which are connected with a commodification of other species – may be sufficiently accounted for. Also pertaining to rights and mistreatment, one final reflection on the volume may be in order. While there is much to be said for treating non-human animals with greater compassion and even extending to them certain human rights, I searched in vain for any discussion of whether or how far newly empowered animals should be held to the same moral and legal standards as humans. For example, if they attack or kill humans, members of their own species, or members of other non-human species (chimpanzees seem to do all three), should they not be tried and, if found guilty, punished accordingly? One is, of course, reminded of European animal trials (see Evans 1987 [1906]),

and I look forward to an “anti-speciesist” answer to this question.

References

- Evans, E. P.
1987 [1906]
The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals. London: Faber and Faber.

Haugerud, Angelique, *No Billionaire Left Behind: Satirical Activism in America*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013, 278 pages.

Reviewer: Pamela Stern
Simon Fraser University

In the 1990s, a small group of social justice advocates in Massachusetts came together to protest the neo-liberal assault on the Keynesian state and on the poor, whose safety nets were being dismantled. Choosing satirical street theatre as their mode of protest, the activists managed to infiltrate and upend some anti-tax theatre organised by right-wing politicians. By the end of the decade, the core of the organisation had shifted to New York City, becoming the Billionaires, first for wealthy presidential aspirant Steve Forbes, and then, as Democrats and Republicans settled on their 2000 presidential nominees, the Billionaires for Bush (or Gore). They adopted humorous “Billionaire” pseudonyms such as Iona Bigga Yacht, Phil T. Rich, and Merchant F. Arms and donned thrift store furs and other evening attire meant to evoke the glamour (and the economic disparity) of the Gilded Age. The Billionaires staged protests meant to draw attention to, and political action against, the corrupting influence of money on American democracy.

In *No Billionaire Left Behind*, Angelique Haugerud provides an ethnography of the Billionaires and their interjection as tricksters or court jesters into American political discourse during the first dozen years of the 21st century. Haugerud’s study of the Billionaires invites us to consider whether the anti-structure of the joke destabilises systems built by and for the powerful or serves as a safety valve allowing the elite to remain in control. Initially, as the name Billionaires for Bush (or Gore) suggests, the group targeted both political parties, sometimes asserting: “We’re buy-partisan. We buy Democrats and we buy Republicans.” The Billionaires also staged mock protests against collective bargaining: “What’s Outrageous? Union Wages”; health care reform: “Widen the Healthcare Gap”; and public education: “Education is not for Everyone.” On tax days (April 15), the Billionaires would dress in their finery and visit post offices, telling last minute filers: “Thank you for paying our taxes.”

By the 2004 US presidential election, with some dissension, the group had adopted the position that unseating George W. Bush was crucial and should take precedence over the organisation’s broader message about the intertwining of money and political influence. This may have been politically wise; the number of Billionaires chapters had grown from 55 during the 2000 presidential election to nearly 100 in 2004.

Haugerud began her ethnographic study of the group in 2004 and, thus, had to rely on the oral history accounts of a