FROM ETHNIC BOURGEOISIE TO ORGANIC INTELLECTUALS: SPECULATIONS ON NORTH AMERICAN NATIVE LEADERSHIP

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Abstract: A notable feature of native politics in North America in recent decades has been the emergence of Indian associations of varying scales and complexity. These organizations are often led by people whom Rolf Knight has called "ethnic bourgeoisie." This type of leadership is also found at local band and tribal council levels, and appears to have arisen in response to the force of bureaucratic encapsulation. Problematic aspects of this leadership are explored, and the Gramscian notion of "organic intellectuals" is used to speculate on the direction of changes in this leadership to overcome some of its problems.

Résumé: Un élément notable dans les politiques relatives aux autochtones en Amérique du Nord au cours des dernières décades est l'émergence d'associations d'étendues et de complexités variées. Ces organisations sont souvent dirigées par des gens que Rolf Knight dit provenir de la « bourgeoisie ethnique ». Ce type de direction se retrouve aussi aux niveaux des conseils régionaux des bandes et des tribus; il semble être une façon de réagir à l'enfermement bureaucratique. Les aspects problématiques de cette direction sont explorés. En référence à la notion gramscienne d'intellectuel organique, une réflexion à été faite sur l'orientation des changements dans ce leadership afin de surmonter certains de ses problèmes.

The Problem

In the recent literature on the native peoples of North America, there seems to be a consensus regarding the heightened level of political activities by way of "Indian organizations" (Hamelin 1976:38; Elias 1976:36; Cardinal 1977:213). A series of case studies on Indian associations is now available (Sawchuk 1978; Ponting and Gibbins 1980; Weaver 1981, 1985). In an expanded chapter on "native organizations" in the new edition of his book, Frideres writes,"the growth of Native organizations and movements is helping Natives to retain their culture and identity and is reinforcing links among Natives all over Canada" (1983:255). This "organizational" development

among native peoples in Canada is also apparent at the levels of reserves and reservations. A recent Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development survey reports a rapid increase in the number of the band staff (1980:86), partly as a result of the decentralization policy of the federal government.

Frideres also notes that the more successful native organizations are "institutional groups" rather than "issue-oriented groups," the former commanding "(more) extensive financial and human resources to bear on a variety of issues" (1983:255). He points out that these organizations "have found that appeals to MP's [Members of Parliament] and MLA's [Members of Legislative Assemblies] are ineffective. . . . Rather, they have learned to focus on the bureaucratic organizations that most affect them, whether at the federal, provincial or municipal level" (ibid.). These remarks indicate that native organizations are formal, bureaucratic organizations that deal mainly with the government bureaucracies at various levels.

Bureaucratization has been proceeding at the local level as well. A predominance of service occupations, mostly connected with the tribal bureaucracy, was observed among the Navajo Indians in the United States (Kunitz and Levy 1981:386). The previously quoted Canadian Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development survey also notes that "Indians are becoming less involved in labour-oriented activities and more involved in 'white collar' work in the commercial and social service sectors" (1980:61). As more native people become displaced from national wage labour markets, and reserve and reservation lands remain underdeveloped, the ties connecting the native peoples to central governments seem to become more binding and comprehensive. Decentralization and the promotion of "self-government" notwithstanding, dependence upon central governments does not appear to have lessened to any appreciable extent.

Two types of observations about the leaders of these organizations may be cited. Of the first type, Dunning remarks that, "Although the elected officials (chiefs and councillors) are responsible to their electorate for the positions, they are in a much more meaningful position of accountability to bureaucratic officials at all levels of DIAND [the Canadian federal Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development]" (1976:115). McFeat states that in the Malecite band, "[the Indians] fashioned models of the outer side of their own ethnic boundaries which those on the outside already know about" (1979:223). McFeat notes that "Such phrases as 'decision-making process,' 'Catch 22,' 'hidden agenda,' 'zero-sum' . . . flow easily" (ibid.) from the mouths of Malecite band members. One also hears of "apple Indians" (Cardinal 1977:34) and "flying chiefs."

Rolf Knight makes a second type of observation about native leaders. He characterizes the emergence of the native élite he calls an "ethnic bour-

geoisie" as a "substantial Indian administrative middle-class," many of whom are working as "consultants, conventioneers, administrators, program directors, social articulators and professionals of various sorts" (1978:20). According to Knight, the ideology of these native élite is:

> some form of ethnic nationalism ... [which] holds that no classes of different interests exist among Indian people ... that conflicts are exclusively inter-ethnic conflicts ... that there is some mysterious racial-cultural spirit ... in the Indians' condition which only other Indians (i.e., themselves) could probably understand or cope with. (ibid.)

This "spirit" is sometimes referred to as a "collective ethic" (Jorgensen 1978:69), or the belief in "Mother Earth" (Trottier 1981).

Joining the above two types of observations produces an image of native élites speaking in two communication codes: the codes of bureaucrats, and those of the Indian "spirit." This image fits Paine's (1976) model of the "broker," who uses E(laborate) codes to engage in a T(ransaction) mode of exchange with the outside, while at the same time using a R(estricted) code for the I(ncorporation) mode of exchange with the inside. Current native leadership appears to embody universal technocratic norms and particular cultural idioms. One wonders who actually speaks with a "forked tongue."

Paine's model is applicable to the leadership of any politically "encap-sulated" system; thus the situation is by no means unique to native organiza-tions. However, bearing in mind Frideres' claim that these organizations help retain native culture and identity, one may question whether the organization leadership — whether an association or band council — accomplishes this objective. More concretely, we may ask how effectively this leadership, qualified by bureaucratic expertise and particularistic cultural knowledge, manages the cultural boundary, and what cultural identity is preserved by this type of leadership. I shall tackle these questions by first looking at the Hopi Indians of Arizona in the United States, and their structure of leadership.

Hopi Indians and the Discontinuity of Leadership

In the United States, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 exercised an enduring influence on the lives of American Indians. This act encouraged American Indians to organize their own forms of governance and a frame-work within which to develop their own cultural and political consciousness. By eliminating various assimilation regulations, the act aimed at the preser-vation and dynamic functioning of Indian cultural practices. However, the two aims of the act — the promotion of self-government and the protection of traditional cultures — turned out to be not only contradictory, but also disrup-tive for the Hopi.

The reasons for the difficulties that the Hopi experienced with the Indian

Reorganization Act are complex. First, Hopi society was acephalous. Each of the several Hopi village communities more or less governed themselves by a complicated, hereditary system of politico-religious or "theocratic" leadership. The Indian Reorganization Act changed this by instituting a society-wide form of government and a tribal council, whose chairman was to be elected from among the councillors. By way of compromise, councillors consist of elected delegates and hereditary village chiefs. As it turned out, most Hopi villages with hereditary chieftainships refused to take part in tribal council activities. In the case of First Mesa, the chief of Walpi acted as a certifier of elected councillors.

The constitution of the Hopi Tribal Council was drafted by such anthropologists as Oliver LaFarge. For the first 10 years of its existence, the council was practically moribund. It was revived only in the 1950s, when a land claim case was filed with the help of a tribal lawyer. During this early period, the council was run mostly by the people of First Mesa, particularly the Tewa (a "guest" group of the Hopi), and by the people of New Oraibi and Upper Moenkopi, all villages that have been described as "progressive" and without hereditary chieftainships. Many tribal councillors and chairmen had some experience in working for the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs agency (Kluckhohn's "Agency Indians"), and some had been in contact with Christians, Mormons, and Mennonites (Clemmer 1978:64, 66). After World War II, veterans began to take part in council affairs. These "outside" experiences continue to be important for leadership positions in the council.

In the last decade and a half, Hopi Tribal Council activities have expanded to an unprecedented degree, mainly through the infusion of assorted federal grants, loans, and transfer payments from such sources as the United States federal Department of Commerce, the federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Hopi Tribal Council is currently housed in an imposing structure in the village of New Oraibi. Some villages boast new and comfortable office buildings that contrast strikingly with ordinary Hopi homes. Almost every issue of the privately-published tribal newspaper carries advertisements for such council and agency positions as "community developer," "staff resource person," "adult probation officer," and numerous grades of "secretaries."

During the same decade and a half, the Hopi Tribal Council embarked on the exploitation of reservation resources and "economic development" in the form of site-leasing arrangements. At least two short-lived experiments in locating industries both on and near the reservation were attempted, and these actions certainly helped council finances. Richard Clemmer, who chronicled these developments, characterizes the 1970 act of the United States Congress, empowering the council to create and manage a "Hopi Industrial Park," as

an attempt to turn "the 'Hopi Tribe' into a business corporation" (1978:68-69).

As the life of Hopi Indians increasingly revolved around their tribal council, council leadership began to require corresponding managerial skills and a knowledge of government bureaucracies. Much of the chairman's time is now taken up with the administration of programs that come down to the council, and in negotiations with government bureaucrats, for which the tribe also retains lawyers and consultants. Council chairmen and councillors are elected by constitutionally-defined electorates. Partly due to an increased demand for knowledge of bureaucracies, those who stand for election and eventually become elected tend to have had salaried or appointed experience in agency or council work. As mentioned previously, there is a close connection between elected political positions and appointed administrative roles. In contrast to some Canadian Indian reserves, differentiation between these two spheres of public service is still incipient among the Hopi. Thus, the Hopi tribal bureaucracy provides an important training ground for political leadership in the tribal council.

Under these circumstances, the roles of village chiefs and priests as traditional leaders appears to have been pushed aside, and seldom influence the current conduct of the tribal council. Hopi chiefs are now marginalized in their management of current tribal affairs.

The role of traditional Hopi leadership can be characterized as religious, economic, and political, all fused into one. Of these three dimensions, the political has lost its importance since the implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Until then, chiefs were taken seriously by the people themselves, by the government, and by non-Indian missionaries and traders. As new villages appeared on Third Mesa and the settlement of valley floors proceeded in other mesas, the ability of chiefs to speak for their people diminished. After the Hopi Tribal Council was established, the authority of Hopi chiefs was further eroded by the government's refusal to deal with them.

In the past, the economic leadership of Hopi chiefs derived mostly from their role in Hopi rituals, which were in turn closely interwoven with Hopi subsistence activities. By coordinating agricultural work, these rituals formed an integral part of subsistence technology. Now that cash is the staple instead of corn, Hopi acreage planted in corn has decreased almost annually.

Rituals in Hopi villages are still being performed, albeit in attenuated forms. However, deaths of priests and a lack of successors have caused the number of rituals produced in the "major" villages to decrease. Many ceremonial societies have ceased to function. The end of the famous Hopi snake dance may be near. On the other hand, villages that used to join the "major" villages in religious performances have now instituted their own versions of

Hopi rituals. However, the variety of these rituals is rather limited, and most of the esoteric rituals are not part of their repertoire. At present, continuation of the *kachina* cult, which occurs in most Hopi villages, seems to be of major importance for Hopi religion. The *kachina* cult may now be the common denominator of contemporary Hopi religious practice, and initiation into the cult appears to be a contemporary symbol of Hopi identity. Thus, even in the field of religion, traditional leadership no longer claims an exclusive monopoly. Hopi religion is changing from an all-inclusive cultural commitment to a type of "political religion" (see Apter 1963) that expresses tribal identity. Unlike the early missionary period, when Hopi religion and Christianity were seen as mutually exclusive, many Hopi Christians now participate in *kachina* cult initiations and dances.

Traditional Hopi leadership has somehow missed the opportunity to transform itself to meet the challenge of changed conditions. In the process, it has been marginalized and displaced from the political centre stage of tribal life.

Nevertheless, chiefs and their supporters have not totally withdrawn from the political arena. They continue to pursue rather ill-defined goals, which Clemmer characterizes as a mixture of revitalization and messianic movements (1982:46). These people proclaim themselves to be "traditional" and refuse to recognize the tribal council as the legitimate Hopi government. Their politics are mainly oppositional, and although their actions tend to be negative and to occur outside of the institutionalized area of the council, they occasionally succeed in frustrating council leadership. Their recent agitation to remove a Hopi Bureau of Indian Affairs superintendent succeeded, even if briefly (*Qua' Töqti* June 29, 1984, September 13, 1984). Clemmer describes the traditional chief of the village of Walpi exercising his veto in certifying elected First Mesa delegates to the Hopi Tribal Council (1982:31). The role of traditional Hopi chiefs in the Hopi-Navajo land dispute has also been important. Navajo leaders have adroitly exploited "traditional" Hopi opposition to the Hopi Tribal Council to their own advantage.

In short, the strengthening of instrumentality by the Hopi Tribal Council encouraged the development of leadership based on bureaucratic competence. At the same time, this marginalized traditional leadership by removing it from the day-to-day concerns of the Hopi. For all its rhetoric on the promotion and preservation of Hopi culture, the tribal council is, after all, a major conduit for dispensing approved government benefits. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the tribal council is derived from the effectiveness and efficiency of the distribution of public goods and services. On the other hand, as Clemmer seems to argue, current traditional leaders — chiefs of the villages of Oraibi and Shongopavy — appear to form a protest "movement," or even a sect committed to the "remembered" tradition of the "Life Plan" (*diingavi*).

Thus, there is polarization and discontinuity between modern and traditional leadership, which results in factionalism.

Bureaucracy, Culture and Leadership

As mentioned above, bureaucratization is among the forces that have helped to mold the new leadership quality among the Hopi. This has emanated from the United States federal government since the mid-1960s, when various funds began to be transferred to the Hopi Tribal Council for its own management. These funds are not always outright grants, and are often designated for specific programs. Specialists and trained personnel are needed to manage the programs being funded, and federal government departments call for appropriate accounting of expenditures. This accounting must follow standardized formulae and accepted government procedures. In most cases, congressional legislation is needed to provide such funds. The Hopi seldom take part in this process.

In an analysis of centre-periphery relations, Sydney Tarrow presents three models: (a) diffusion/isolation; (b) dependency/marginality; and (c) bureaucratic integration (1977:32). The last of these models (c) best describes the relationship of the contemporary Hopi Tribal Council to the central government. The dominant link from the tribal council to the centre government is administrative, and the state of Arizona's relation to the Hopi Tribal Council consists mainly of the "distribution of public goods." Insofar as the fiction of self-government is accepted, the importance of community politics is high, though mostly ineffectual in shaping the relationship. This whole complex can be termed "administrative determinism"(Carstens 1971:130).

Bureaucratization is also encouraged by programs of economic development on Indian reservations. These mostly take the form of resource exploitation by external capital. With little Indian participation in the direct production process, the role of Indian tribes in development is mainly that of negotiating and administering leasing and royalty contracts. These activities are governed by the impersonal legal norms of industrial capitalism, in which lawyers and administrators are prominent.

For the past two decades in Canada, native people have been developing regional organizations that include a number of bands within their respective regions. The Déné of the Northwest Territories and the Cree of James Bay are well-known examples. Previous to these attempts to develop regional organizations, pan-Indian movements gave rise to nation-wide organizations in both Canada and the United States. Beyond the national framework, indigenous peoples of the world are now forming a common front through such organizations as the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), using the ideology of a Fourth World.

    The objectives of these native organizations are as diverse as their scale. Nevertheless, two features are common to all of them: (a) the protection and promotion of special status; and (b) rights over certain territories. Native organizations differ from those of other ethnic minorities in that native or indigenous organizations demand recognition, constitutional or otherwise, for special status and land (Dyck 1985:238). They seek to be Hawthorn's "citizens plus" (1966:13).

    As R.W. Dunning pointed out (1964), however, the recognition of Indian legal status does not entail the recognition of the cultural diversity of the native peoples. To impose a universal classificatory scheme upon diversity (e.g., Handelman 1976:229), the administrative apparatus of the state demands some uniformity. Furthermore, Indian identity is defined as a legal concept. This identity does not emerge from the practice of the tribal life, but is imposed by the application of rational-legal criteria such as blood quanta, enfranchisement, and the "double mother" clause (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Annual Report 80/81; see note 1). As LaRusic and Bouchard noted:

> the price of the special relationship with the government [by means of special status] is to permit its bureaucracy to define, through a necessary process of reduction and narrowing, . . . that which it seeks to protect. That is the unescapable [sic] reverse Midas touch of a bureaucracy. It is not mere whimsy nor cynicism to state the reality: the power to define the "We" can never be relinquished to the "Other." And therein lies the contradiction of a bureaucracy which pretends to speak of reinforcing the cultural identity of its charge. For it can only incorporate them as part of the bureaucratic "We." (1981:61)

Grass-roots organizations, such as band and tribal councils, follow the same bureaucratic path of simplifying, narrowing, reducing, and thereby destroying the people's own concrete and vibrant (if somewhat messy) life experiences. Recently, the Hopi Tribal Council proposed to eliminate intertribal adoption and marriage as a qualification for tribal membership, and to rationalize membership by blood quanta alone (*Qua' Töqti* June 15, 1984).

    Contemporary pan-Indianism in the United States supposedly rejects the abstraction of Indian cultural diversity and insists on the recognition of particularistic tribes (Trottier 1981:288). However, this "tribalism," a major political consequence of the Indian Reorganization Act (Taylor 1980), entails a cultural dimension only passively. It emphasizes retention rather than development. The antinomy of bureaucracy and culture may also be present in the structure of the Fourth World, of which Dyck states:

> On one level they [indigenous peoples] must constantly demonstrate fundamental cultural differences between themselves and members of the majority population; on another they must transcend the cultural plane in order to nego-

tiate and assert a complementarity of status between themselves and govern-ments. (1985:238)

What types of leadership are possible under these conditions? Leadership has two major functions: (a) mediation; and (b) direction. Mediation tends to be a prominent aspect of the leadership of encapsulated cultural groups like native peoples, primarily because the norms governing the groups and their sur-roundings are different. Thus, some kind of brokerage characterizes the lead-ers of cultural groups. They may become entrepreneurs or managers of inter-cultural relations, and as such are vulnerable to the conflict between self-interest as a leader and the collective interest they represent (see below). Mediation is a defining feature of the leadership in Knight's "ethnic bour-geoisie."

On occasion, some ethno-cultural groups have produced leaders charac-terized by strong direction. Some of these leaders are millenarian movement leaders and "prophets" with visions of a new future for their peoples. Thus, ethnic entrepreneurs and messianic "prophets" may represent the two polar types of minority leadership. Further commentary on these minority leaders will now follow.

From Ethnic Bourgeoisie to Organic Intellectuals: A Conclusion

Dyck notes that the Fourth World must satisfy two legitimacies: (a) that of the people it represents; and (b) that of the dominant society with which it deals (1985:239). Although this is characteristic of the leadership of any encapsulated group, the relative importance of the two legitimacies influences the type of leadership that emerges.

In a classic work on social conflict, Kurt Lewin spoke of "leadership from the periphery" as typical of minority group leaders assimilating to the majority (1948). This type of leadership tends to be recruited from the periphery of the group value distribution, where majority values exercise the strongest influence. Since the group is anxious to conform to majority values, it chooses as its leader a member who embodies the values and the interests of the group, as well as the values of the majority. Lewin points out that such a leader may act against the group's goal of assimilation, for once the goal is achieved, the leader is no longer needed. Hence, the leader from the periph-ery will try to discourage the minority's assimilation, if only to hold onto the leadership position. Knight speaks of "some mysterious racial-cultural spirit" embodied in the distance that his ethnic bourgeoisie tries to preserve.

This contradictory demand placed on the traditional leadership of the encapsulated group is centred in the group value field (*Gestalt*). For this rea-son, it often causes traditional leaders to withdraw from active leadership when the group gets encapsulated by a dominant group. Oliver noted that tra-

ditional Melanesian "big men" often refused to take up the leadership posi-
tion imposed by the Australian administration, leaving junior men to fill this
role of "hat man" (1955). Feit reports that among the James Bay Cree,
respected men in the community sometimes refused to accept the position of
elected leader (1985:36). The withdrawal of the traditional Hopi leadership
from the council was partly due to the same circumstances.

Because of their preoccupation with the encapsulating agent, group
leaders may also endanger the legitimacy of the people they lead. This is
how LaRusic and Bouchard (1979) interpreted Cree leadership in the James
Bay negotiations in Canada. In their opinion, these negotiations became dom-
inated by consultants and lawyers (cf. also Feit 1985:28-29). Usher also
points to this possibility when he says "the devolution of administrative
responsibility (if not political power) to the reserve level has thrust
significant financial resources into the hands of those with the most educa-
tional and employment experience, and disrupted traditional structures of
power and authority" (1982:9-10).

These two legitimacies may be handled in still another way. That is, two
types of leadership may operate so that a traditional leader acts from back-
stage, as *éminence grise*, giving advice to a new leader. With this support, the
new leader may then indirectly secure the legitimacy of the people. Feit
(1985) describes how band chiefs involved in the James Bay negotiations
acted with the support of "elders." The position of "elders" has been
important in various native organizations, including the National Indian
Brotherhood of Canada (now called the Assembly of First Nations). Kathryn
Molohon (personal communication) reports that Swampy Cree residents of
the village of Attawapiskat maintain a two-chief structure, involving a tradi-
tional chief and an elected, relatively acculturated chief, who acts as a broker
in relations with outsiders.

While the "diarchic" arrangement for leadership may avoid the contra-
diction of leadership from the periphery, it is at best a compromise to meet
the exigencies of encapsulation. It does not bring people out of encapsulation,
and although its leadership is adaptive, it is not "directive." Though conflict
between the two legitimacies of the group being led and the dominant society
is muted, the dominant society's demand to satisfy its own legitimacy falls
unchanged upon the encapsulated group leaders.

How can this contradiction be transcended, so that the group's legiti-
macy, rather than the dominant society's legitimacy, becomes the necessary
and sufficient condition for native leadership? This problem is so complex
that the following discussion is onlytentative.

Previously, I described millenarian and messianic cult leaders as
direction-oriented. They led North American native people (briefly) along the
path to a New Jerusalem. This type of leadership is by no means unique to the

leaders of religious movements, and is seen in secular charismatic politicians as well. Antonio Gramsci's ''organic intellectuals'' come close to my meaning of direction-oriented leaders.

Although much has been written about Gramsci's theory of ''intellectuals,'' the following is relevant to this discussion. Gramsci derived his theory from a criticism ''of the 'cosmopolitan' tradition in Italian culture'' (Merrington 1968:163):

> In Italy, he [Gramsci] noted, the term ''national'' had a restricted sense, not coinciding with that of ''popular,'' since ... the intellectuals are removed from the people, that is from the ''nation'' and are on the contrary linked to a tradition of caste ... the tradition is ''bookish'' and abstract ... and the typical intellectual feels more linked to Hannibal Caro or Hippolitus ... than to the peasant of Apulia or Sicily. (ibid.)

To Gramsci, this ''constituted the primordial weakness of Italian society,... [which prevented it from] developing its own internal dynamics'' (ibid.). To overcome this weakness, Gramsci devised a theory of intellectuals who are ''organically linked to the people themselves'' (ibid.) and dedicated ''for the expansion of its own class from a subordinate to a directing capacity'' (ibid.:165). Gramsci's ''intellectuals'' emphasize direction rather than mediation. An ''organic intellectual'' is ''actively involved in practical life.'' (S)he is also a ''leader'' who is both a specialist and a politician (ibid.).

How can native leaders be ''organic'' while refusing to be co-opted by the dominant society? I have already discussed such forces as bureaucratization, which extends to ''culture'' in the form of multiculturalism. Since this ''culture'' is abstract and bureaucratized, resources supporting it will not have a significant impact upon the material condition of native people. On the contrary, as Usher has so cogently pointed out (1982:10), this vague notion of ''culture'' may promote complicity between native leaders, non-native politicians, and government bureaucrats; its vagueness and the impossibility of accounting for expenditure on its behalf may encourage pork-barreling.

Meanwhile, the material condition of native people is caught in the clutches of welfare bureaucracy. The ideological nature of this bureaucracy was most starkly expressed in Canada's 1969 White Paper (Weaver 1981). It was criticized as a variant of termination, ''melting-pot,'' or assimilation policy (see note 2).

The web of bureaucratic encapsulation appears to be as comprehensive and seamless as the forces of co-optation. Is the reality of all of this hopeless? In speaking of the ''emergent'' culture, Raymond Williams observed that ''there are always sources of actual human practices which it (the dominant mode) neglects or excludes (from incorporation)'' (1980:43). Do these practices exist in the lives of contemporary native people?

I would respond to the second question in the affirmative. I see a curi-
ous, yet decisive disjunction between the two forces of bureaucratic
encapsulation — "culture" and "welfare." It is as if the dominant Canadian
society seems unable to resolve the dialectic of nationality/culture and
class/welfare and has decided to use two separate forces to deal with native
people. As a result, multiculturalist ideology abstracts "culture" and disre-
gards such things as the commercialization of traditional crafts. At the same
time, welfare ideology ignores such things as the importance of home care in
medical treatment in native communities. Leaders of encapsulated groups
must identify these excluded, emergent, and non-"residual" (as in multicul-
turalism) practices (see Williams 1980:40-41). These leaders must also seize
upon such practices, synthesize them, and bring them out as an authentic
"culture" of the people. This task requires leaders who are deeply rooted in
the communities they direct and represent. As Gramsci emphasized, this task
must be based on the "educative relationship" between leaders and their
people. As Fowler (1978) noted of the Wind River Arapaho, people acquire a
new self-image and create new sources of legitimacy for their leadership. In
other words, the strategy is not so much to hone the skills needed for dealing
with the bureaucracy of government in order to "*retain* their [native] culture
and identity" (Frideres 1983:255, italics added), as to build a new culture
and identity that will impinge on the consciousness of the encapsulating soci-
ety.

    Admittedly, these observations are speculative. The cultures and identi-
ties of native people on this continent have never been stationary. Further-
more, there have always been many native people, like Handsome Lake and
Joseph Brant, whose definitions of themselves and their people enabled them
to meet the challenge of history.

Notes

1. In fact, the scheme is far from being simple and becomes extremely complex in the
   course of its application — so much so that Harold Cardinal called it "legal hocus-
   pocus" (1969:20).
2. The antinomy of pluralism and the melting pot has a long history of debate. For a
   recent example, see the Manners-Collier debate of the 1960s (Walker 1972:124-144).
   Likewise, the minority policy of socialist states has not escaped this debate. For
   example, Mao Tse-Tung maintained that the nationalities problem is essentially a prob-
   lem of class (Dreyer 1976:261). Meanwhile, Stalin noted that nationality characteristics
   were more persistent among the masses than among the bourgeoisie (ibid.:60), and that
   the demand for nationality culture becomes a proletarian demand for the dictatorship of
   the proletariat (ibid.:52). Stalin thus coined the slogan, "national in form, socialist in
   content" (ibid.:60).

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