there since the original discoveries by du Bois in 1890. Jacob emphasizes the diversity of these remains, naming three species, two of which are put forward as over-lapping in time.

European finds are considered in four papers. Clark Howell addresses general questions regarding the evolutionary sequence in Europe, while Thoma focuses on remains from Eastern Europe, particularly those from the Hungarian site of Vértesszöllös. M. de Lumley also discusses Europe, presenting a case for regional morphological continuity of the hominid populations. Mania and Vlček consider remains from the German site of Bilzingsleben.

Four authors consider African materials. Jaeger reviews Northwest African finds, while Rightmire offers a preliminary report of two fossils from Olduvai Gorge in East Africa (OH 9 and OH 12). Walker considers possible interpretations for East Turkana remains, and Protsch provides an up-dated discussion of Tanzanian finds from Eyasi and Garusi that were discovered in the 1930's.

Finally, although there are no papers about more recent finds from the People's Republic of China, Mann offers new interpretations of the Chokoutien remains that are based on studies of casts, the originals having been lost during the Second World War. Mann also provides an inventory of these casts and their locations.

In general, these regionally focussed papers emphasize biological issues and pay more limited attention to cultural data. One would like to see more attention paid to possible selective pressures that might have brought about diversity - even possible speciation - among these Middle Pleistocene culture bearing hominids. There is, furthermore, little agreement among the various authors regarding nomenclature or over-all evolutionary relationships among the regional populations or with earlier and later forms, although a number of hypotheses are offered. However, as volume co-editor Sigmon notes in her useful introduction to the book, these various perspectives point to the dynamic nature of "populations of hominines spreading throughout the Old World, adapting, and evolving" (p. 11). They also drive home Howells' point that the diversity of *Homo erectus* remains must be carefully considered.

A final paper by volume co-editor Cybulski provides an extremely helpful overview of remains, including a chronological chart, thus presenting a synthesis that was not possible in the more regionally focussed papers.

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Kenelm BURRIDGE, *Someone, No One. An Essay on Individuality.* Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. 1979. xi-270 p.

In 1940, Ogborn and Nimkoff devoted several chapters of their sociology textbook to socialization, "the process whereby the individual is converted into the person." In this process, the assertion to autonomy and self-willedness are pitted against the traditional moralities of a given social order. Anthropologists and sociologists tend to focus on that which to them reveals normalcy and the normative: the person. If becoming a person, in the sociological sense, would be the only avenue open to human beings, we would all become the automated creatures of our

cultures, writes Burridge. Human beings do not always show forth the person, they are not always content with things as they are. Human beings sometimes show forth the individual who posits an alternative set of moral discriminations to the existing set of moralities. The transcendance of given moral discriminations is the generative font of culture. Without some form of alienation from a given order, the creation of new moralities would be impossible. In *Someone, No One* Burridge focuses not on the person, but on the movement between person and individual, on the shift from conformity to innovation. *Someone, No One* is a masterful exploration and discussion of individuality, the movement between person and individual.

Allport advanced the notion that there exists within each human being an energy, which capable of adapting to culture, may also modify it. Burridge finds in this notion the concept around which to organize his description and analysis of the dynamics between person and individual. This energy, the integrating self, moves not always to conformity, to the reproduction in word and deed of the norms of a given traditional order. If the self integrates the given categories of a socio-cultural order into an identity (someone), it is also poised to change these categories through the assertion to autonomy. The self then becomes a non-identity (no-one) attempting to become a new kind of someone.

Burridge notes again and again that the notions of the individual, individuality, metanoia, moral action, free will, lie at the core of our Western civilization. The author makes the case that individuality in fact marks off Western cultures from other cultures in space and time. European or Western society has generalized individuality, making it a desideratum for each member of community. Generalized and institutionalized individuality means that all are called to live the movement between person and individual. Although most are persons most of the time, moving into the individual for a while and returning again to the person, individuality expresses a cultural prescription permeating our civilization. This prescription implies continuing change and restructuring in communities and in their members. Because of generalized individuality, Burridge argues, Westerners experience alienation, anomie and charismatic movements in degree and contexts greater than non-Westerners.

The transcendance of given moralities is the generative font of our beings. Without some form of alienation from a given set of moralities, the creation of a "new heaven and a new earth" would be impossible. To generate and implement a new moral order, no one becomes a new someone. "The question whether one must first change oneself before changing the world or first change the world so that one must be transformed and free can only arise out of and seems to be resolved in the individual as here determined" (p. 115).

Authors have laid generalized individuality at the feet of capitalism, urbanization, industrialization and / or a burgeoning egalitarism. It is Burridge's thesis that generalized individuality is firmly rooted in the first century in the christian experience of the Pentecost. Although the Greeks and the Romans provided the intellectual tradition and the conditions in which actual experience and appreciation of otherness could develop, it is the impact of Christianity that has definitively sealed in the Western world the imbuilt and continuing endeavour to transcend the given prescriptions and categories of a social order and to extend one's love across cultural and political boundaries.

The duality of Church and State provided the necessary framework for ensuring and conserving generalized institutionalized individuality. Political coercion led to conformities countered in the Church's critique. Thus individual and person corresponded with Church and State. This social ambience was to become the bedrock of generalized individuality. "European and Western democratic forms, we may remind ourselves", writes Burridge, "are not derived from Athens, which depended on forms of slavery, but from the modes developed by the Church and its religious orders" (p. 108).

Generalized individuality, Burridge holds, started with Christianity and has spread with it. Peter's change of heart, Paul's reversal on the road to Damascus, the Pentecostal experience, are the events providing exemplars of metanoia. Metanoia and free will sum up the ideas that order and moralize the assertion to autonomy, central to western cultures. In Christianity metanoia represents the institutionalizing of the putative capacity in each human being to change his or her mind about the nature of the world and the truth of things. Metanoia and the ideas associated with it play a vital role in the development of the human race, for they have fostered, over and over again, moral variation and innovation. These, Burridge insists, "are as essential to human survival as genetic variation. And the instrument of this variation and innovation is some kind of individuality" (p. 140).

Burridge goes on to explore how far different kinds of social orders (hunting-gathering, subsistence-cultivation, complex economies, pastoral nomadism, peasant cultivation, city and town) produce situations which allow, encourage, or inhibit the moments of individuality. Death, dream, visionary experiences, trance, possession, orgiastic dance, the use of money in exchange, are all events compelling those who have lived through them, to dismiss censors, to forget structures and to invoke communitas. These events and occasions, regularly encountered, tend to bring about a critique and rethinking of principles of governance.

In cross-cultural perspective Burridge finds that non-Western cultures do prescribe individuality or its semblance, but then it is always reserved to selected and identifiable positions within the social order. Outside the Western ambience we find restricted individuality, not generalized individuality. The shaman of the hunters and gatherers, the Leopard-skin chief of the Nuer, the Melanesian Manager and/or sorcerer of New Guinea, the Australian Man of High Degree, the Hindu Sanyasi, are all instances of non-Western individuality or of its semblance. The shaman in an arctic community, and the sanyasi in India can initiate and present new ideas because they are insulated from the larger society and the moralities that inform it. Their experience of ordering their lives in terms of non-conformist ideas, is not propagated to their fellow-citizens. The Leopard-skin chief presides over situations that can be briefly defined by the oppositions life/death, animal/moral, moral/non moral, moral/spiritual. The Leopard-skin chief thus regularly encounters fellow-citizens in events which, regularly encountered, tend to bring about a questioning of principles of governance. In Nuer society, the Leopard-skin chief is called to mediate between fellow human beings who in situations of moral and/or legal breech are in need of being reintegrated into the community. "Whatever his discoveries about the self, and however he himself realizes the self, he is restricted in communicating his discoveries and realizations" (p. 124). In his capacity of mediator the Leopard-skin chief is barred

from going beyond current moralities in order to initiate new moralities. He is bound to his office. Hence individuality is contained, the social order, perhaps renewed, is not changed.

In prescribing individuality or its parts to selected positions, the needs of change and moral innovation are controlled, the traditional structure is maintained, sometimes renewed, but not changed. In contradistinction, Western cultures direct each member of community to integrate the assertion to autonomy with the participatory values and the given moralities so as to produce moral innovation. The implication of this generalized individuality is continual restructuring and change.

The most obvious exponent of individuality is the Christian missionary. It is no surprise that with missionary activity alienation from traditional moralities spreads, anomie correspondingly so, and charismatic activities multiply. For the most part, millenarianisms, pietistic movements, and reformative movements occurred in ambiences either determined by Christian missionaries or in which Christian missionaries have been active. Why this is so, is that statistically at least, charismatic authority yielding new moralities characterize the European and Western ambience. What once the single missionary tried to do has become differentiated into a host of professional specialisms - teacher, technical instructor, doctor, anthropologist, etc., - "each of which, carrying the instruction to learn, instruct, inform and improve, is derived from and informed with the missionary purpose" (p. 237). Correspondingly, bringing the material gifts of western civilization to other peoples in other cultures "without also communicating the moments of individuality betrays a blind faith in the former to renew and transform: ...without some kind of (albeit secularized) mutual metanoia, the impulse to engage in a process of developing awareness is lacking" (p. 238).

Someone, No one bridges a vast expanse of human experience, from the core of our life histories, our socialization and transformations, through historical and cross-cultural discussions of the development of individuality, to the contemporary scene of Christian mission, national and international development. Whereas most studies of individuality begin with psychodynamics, Burridge is concerned with the socio-cultural processes and contexts that foster or hinder, promote or inhibit the movement from person to individual. Although much have been written about the individual and individuality, the author is successful in taking anew the core issues surrounding socialization and moral innovation and to leave on them a distinctive mark in the light of new interpretations. The result is a masterful essay focused on the primary questions that have characterized socio and/or cultural anthropology from its inception on: What is man?, What are his conditions of life?, How should he live?

Someone, No one is rewarding reading to all anthropologists who having engaged in fieldwork seek to place this experience and their findings in the broader context of the human experience everywhere: that of becoming someone, that of becoming no one to become a new someone. The moral philosopher and theologian, the missionary alike, will also find in these pages stimulating insights into their unique positions in the quest for individuality, metanoia and moral innonvation.

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