# CASCA Annual Meeting 2021: Keynote Lecture

## Black Bones Matter: Notes Toward a Radical Humanism in Anthropology

Kamari Maxine Clarke
*University of Toronto*

### The Banality of Bones

In 1985, teenage sisters Delisha and Tree Africa lived in West Philadelphia, in a communal housing settlement founded by a revolutionary organisation known as MOVE. Originally called the "Christian Movement for Life" and renamed MOVE in the early 1970s, the group combined philosophies of Black nationalism and a lifestyle of raw foods, urban farming and opposition to modern science and capitalism. Founded by Vincent Leaphart (1931–85), later known as John Africa, MOVE was one of a range of Black consciousness groups advocating for communal living and green politics. However, on May 13, 1985, this community formation came to an end.

Neighbors had filed complaints about the number of animals on the property, the garbage piled up around the home, the use of a bullhorn to transmit community lectures based on John Africa's teachings and the group's refusal to pay its water and electric bills. Thus, the city issued a search warrant and the police were sent to the MOVE compound. When MOVE members remained unresponsive to the warrant, police escalated with military-grade weapons, even though they knew there were children present. The settlement was flushed with firehoses and blasted with tear gas, and holes were blown in the walls. This led to a shootout, with some members remaining trapped in the houses. Conflicting reports indicate that group members who did try

to leave were fired on by police. Shortly thereafter, a helicopter dropped C4 explosives on the houses. This started a fire that spread rapidly. At the end of the onslaught, six adults and five children were dead, including sisters Delisha, Tree and Netta Africa.[1]

The state surveillance apparatus, combined with police militarisation that killed eleven members of the MOVE family, is part of the broader history of surveillance of Black empowerment organisations by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 60s. But these apparatuses have gathered force from the past four hundred years of anti-Black racism. From histories of slavery and degradation to convict labour, lynching, segregation and mass incarceration, anti-Black violence is longstanding. It has been upheld not only by federal, state and municipal laws but also through social and political processes of surveillance, scrutiny and evidence-making that devalue Black and Brown lives, as scholars Simone Browne (2015), Christina Sharpe (2016) and others have shown.

Following the bombing of 1985, the remains of most of the eleven deceased were returned to MOVE family members for burial. However, Tree and Delisha's remains were held in the city morgue for more than six months. Commissioned by the City of Philadelphia, forensic pathologist Ali Hameli confirmed that the bodies pulled from the rubble belonged to six adults and five children. The analysis of bones and teeth led him to conclude that some were from Delisha Africa, a child of around twelve years of age, and others were from Katricia "Tree" Africa, whom he estimated to be fourteen. Yet, Ali Hameli was unable to identify some of the pelvic and femur bones because they were burned beyond recognition. City officials therefore turned to Professor Alan Mann, a forensic anthropologist at the University of Pennsylvania, to assist with the analysis. But in the end, Mann was not able to ascertain to which girl the bones belonged.[2]

By December 1985, the Africa family members thought that they had buried Tree and her sibling Netta. They assumed that Delisha had been buried by the state in September 1986. But some of the girls' bones were kept at the Penn Museum until 2001, when Alan Mann took a job at Princeton and brought the remains with him. Unbeknownst to the Africa family, Professor Janet Monge, Mann's former student, took custody of the remains in 2016 following his retirement. She moved the bones back to the Penn Museum, and between 2016 and 2019 she continued trying to determine age at death. During this period, Monge shuttled between Princeton and Penn, teaching biological anthropology classes in which she performed case studies that consisted in evaluating the age

of the bones to identify the girl to which they belonged. On July 2, 2021, Tree and Delisha's remains were finally returned to the MOVE family after news of their ongoing use in university classrooms attracted media attention.[3]

Just one month prior, Professor Monge had posted a video in which she is seen using Delisha and Tree Africa's bones for a Princeton class. She appears in the video with an undergraduate student, Jane Weiss, whom she describes as "the person who's looked at [the bones] most carefully." In her undergraduate senior thesis, Weiss took on the unresolved question of the age of the remains. As the two women prod the bones, they discuss with scientific detachment the ages of the people to whom they once belonged. "Fourteen or sixteen, right?" says Weiss.

"More, you know, in the eighteen-plus kind of a category," Monge suggests.[4]

In response to the circulated video, Mike Africa, the surviving brother of Tree and Delisha,[5] issued this statement to the press: "Nobody said you can do that, holding up their bones for the camera. That's not how we process our dead. This is beyond words. The anthropology professor is holding the bones of a fourteen-year-old girl whose mother is still alive and grieving."

Museums around the world hold collections of human remains awaiting repatriation. Crania of Indigenous and Black people abound in these collections. Still today, thousands of enslaved African Americans remain housed in the problematic Samuel Morton collection (Mitchell 2021) at the Penn Museum.[6] The process of return is complicated. It involves the recognition of peoples' lives and of the contexts in which their remains were taken, and it allows the deceased to rest in the cultural dignity of ritual and burial. It seldom happens.

My discussion today starts with a story about the performative labour that renders subjects as objects and the evisceration required to ontologically rearrange people as bones. Bones, of course, are not the only means through which the subject is disarticulated from the object of science. There is a well-documented history of scandals concerning the multifarious forms of experimentation that have been carried out on Black people in the name of medicine (Doucet-Battle 2016; Washington 2006).[7] But in Biological Anthropology, such histories are primarily traceable through skeletal remains. Bones, and the bodies that contain them, are polyvalent; they are "the matter" used by the anthropological sciences to understand the past and the future via predictive methods. But bones also index human attachments and the relations that supersede life and death. They constitute community in that they are the

cultural proof of descent and therefore of kin and historical continuity. When loved ones die, we mourn them. We remember their contribution to our lives, our community, our personhood (Derrida 2001). Mourning is also an act of bringing dead persons close. But for Professor Monge, whose deep allegiance seemed to be to her discipline her discipline and not necessarily to her deceased subjects, there is no connection to history or relationship to mourn. Delisha and Tree's bones are just bones, objects for scientific problem-solving. The knowledge she is tasked with passing on is not one that bounds emotions and traditions. Monge is in a classroom and her concern is expert knowledge. How do you date a bone to differentiate it from another bone?

Under magnification, one might focus on what's brought closest to view—the individual culpability of Professor Monge. But to focus simply on her actions is to blame one individual for a larger disciplinary issue that begs attention. In reality there are at least four levels of scholarly distancing at play here that render a child into a bare bone.

First, there is a disciplinary distancing at work: the scientific labour that detaches a person's bones from their life and that forms the basis of estrangement, in this case from the two Africa children whose biographies Monge is not responsible for knowing. This distancing is central to the subject-object relation that we have inherited from Descartes (de la Cova 2019; DiGangi and Bethard 2021).

Second, Monge, whom I came to know when I taught at the University of Pennsylvania, is an untenured faculty member. Alienated from the conditions of her labour, she is a product of the ongoing precarisation of the disipline. Therefore, the forms of distancing and detachment at play are not unrelated to her institutional marginality (Lacy and Rome 2017). Over the past twenty-plus years, Monge has been cobbling together part-time positions across two states to make a living.[8]

Third, there is a distancing from the modalities of racial and state violence that have not only shaped the conditions of the death of the MOVE members and Africa children, but that are also tied to a long history of dehumanisation of Black, Indigenous and People of Colour's (BIPOC) bodies and to forms of white supremacy that have produced exclusions and rendered some bodies subject to bare life and bare death (Blakey 1999; Jackson 2020; Mignolo 2015). The conditions of detachment are related to Monge's position as a middle-class white Philadelphian liberal, for whom such histories of surveillance and targeting do not constitute everyday realities.

Fourth, there is a disciplinary distancing and detachment connected to the history of positivism and to the anthropological imperative to produce truth and data and fulfill the conditions of objectivity. In the institutional logics by which science is expected to produce *truth,* we see attempts to teach not only the techniques for ascertaining the truth, but also the distancing methods that lead to the normalisation of bones as objects for scientific pedagogy (Wynter 2001, 2005).

These four dimensions of estrangement are related and require interdependent analysis. To understand the *mattering* of black remains in the field and the banality of bones as objective matter, we need to hold all four dimensions in tension in such a way as to elucidate the logics through which distancing and alienation unfold. As the body enters a new field of inquiry, it enters a new field of power; as such, the practices that produce truth are interconnected. The links between these practices and the processes of alienation and detachment speak to the way that some remains are buried and granted humanity while others are desecrated and rendered objects of science. While this alienation is indeed about individuals, subject-object relations and state and racial violence, it is also deeply entangled with the history of racial science and the disposability of BIPOC lives in our discipline and in our world.

While holding these four forms of estrangement in tension, this talk will focus on the fourth: the positivist detachment required for disciplinary reproduction. We will see that the disciplinary detachment that has normalised such practices is deeply connected to the rise of positivism and, by extension, of four-field anthropology (Blakey 1999, 2020; Harrison 2011). Estrangement and detachment through the subject-object distinction are core components of particular approaches to the scientific method that involve inductive and deductive reasoning. In light of open-ended methods, which challenge the idea that there is only one true explanation of the world while foregrounding the person embodied in bodily remains, how can one tell the story of the human side of subordination and loss in relation to the broader entanglements that contribute to lives lost? In the context of the narratives used to articulate these entanglements, what is the relational nature of a story's telling—the story of loss, the story of violence, the story of joy? And how does it become inseparable from the coproduction of human relations?[9]

Part of the story is that science is more than just knowing by analysis. It is a process of learning to know the nature of everything in the material world. Its essence is to doubt without adequate proof (Rothchild 2006). In this

lecture, I explore the conditions by which the forms of estrangement produce disciplinary objects, thereby removing subjects from their racial contexts. In so doing, I propose a new analytical direction that involves a radically humanist orientation to the practice of cultural anthropology and that helps us move beyond positivist detachment and toward an *anthropology of connection based on an ethics and politics of attachment.* This direction rests on a range of principles, one of which is tied to a specific methodological approach called abduction. To understand this approach, it is necessary to explore alternative ethnographic genealogies that take us back to Franz Boas but depart in a direction that has been largely overlooked in anthropology's canon – that of Boasian-trained anthropologists and novelists Zora Neale Hurston and Ella Cara Deloria. Examining the story of the field through the life worlds of Hurston and Deloria—scholars who served as intermediaries for a field in formation—opens a new way of reading the discipline through its exclusion of them and through the methodological failures of its positivist foundations.

I will now move to considering the rise of positivism and the role it played in the elaboration of anthropological methodologies with the goal of detailing how to tell a different story about positivism's fraught subject-object relation.

## 1. Positivism and the Consolidation of the Discipline

Methodologically, when we examine the story of the field through the life worlds of Black and Brown people, who were traditionally the objects of anthropological inquiry, we see that positivist orientations became articulated in two primary ways within anthropological fieldwork (Roscoe 1995). The first is methodological scientism, or the belief that only the scientific method produces truth. The second is a reduction of epistemology (that is, of the modes of knowledge production) that has reinforced the methodologies through which certain practical and actionable components of fieldwork are routinised and made replicable, leading to the equation of "science" with "positivism."

As a lineage of thought, positivism is often thought to have originated in early modern Europe. In reality, it did not appear under this name until the work of Auguste Comte in the mid-nineteenth century. Following Comte, the positivist orientation to the world spread to the social sciences—including through the works of Spencer, Durkheim and Mauss—and later to Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown and to virtually all the representatives of modernist anthropology, in particular cultural materialists and comparative anthropologists. These anthropologists were influenced by Darwin's theory of

evolution, which maintained that biological diversity results from a gradual response to environmental pressures. It is no surprise that the thrust of the Darwinian evolutionary approach in anthropology was philological and that it reflected an attempt to reconstruct what Candea describes as "historical sequences, branching associations and progressions by comparing the state of affairs in a number of distinct contemporary cases" (2018, 23). The critique of such thinking and its broad implications for anthropology's conception of itself has been, of course, substantial in the modern anthropological literature (Wolf 1982; Fabian 1983).

In "The Methods of Ethnology," Boas (1920) argued against two other theories of culture that were predominant at the time: evolutionism, with its phylogenic conception of cultural progress, and World Diffusionism, which posited that cultural development rests on the diffusion of traits from a central locale. According to Boas, these theories made unproven assumptions about human culture, using evidence selectively. Instead, he advocated working inductively from data to theory while being careful not to let biases come in the way. He argued that theory was important, but only once the correct data had been collected. This empirical and inductive model of analysis has been foundational in anthropology. However, the inductive method articulates with a methodological scientism that asserts a particular notion of truth and depends on an epistemology founded on the subject-object relation. While Boas showed a proclivity for the exactitude of science in his early physics studies (see Goldenweiser 1933; Kroeber 1943; Radin 1933; Spier 1943), his increasing emphasis on observable empirical facts indicates that geography became his primary epistemological guide over time (White 1963). For the physicist, Boas wrote, "single facts become less important… as he lays stress on the general law alone. On the other hand, the facts are the object which is of importance and interest to the historian.… Cosmography… considers every phenomenon as worthy of being studied for its own sake" (1887, 138). The physicist decentres the singular facts that make us human, sublimating them into the larger order that naturalists invoke to organise the world. As Boas argued, "the cosmographer, on the other hand, holds to the phenomenon which is the object of his study and lovingly tries to penetrate into its secrets until every feature is plain and clear" (1887, 140). Here we see how the desire to understand the "truth" framed Boas's method. His approach attests to his inductive commitments: He always spoke of "discovering" and "finding" laws rather than formulating them. Yet, in assuming that his inductive commitments made such "discoveries" possible, he refrained

from reflecting on the fact that the latter were always already conditioned by his own formulations and limitations (White 1963, 64).

As a fieldworker, Boas developed a method whereby ethnographic recordings of Indigenous traditions were performed not only in Indigenous languages, but by Indigenous people themselves (White 1963, 22). This method, he felt, allowed him to "present the culture as it appears to the Indian himself" (Boas 1909, 309). His more general ethnographic contributions focused on classical topics in anthropology—marriage, social organisation, belief systems, kinship, etc. However, his principal ethnological publications conveyed myths and folktales from the Northwest Coast, many of which concerned the Kwakiutl people.

As we know, Boas's Kwakiutl research, along with his students' popular publications that drew upon it (e.g., Benedict 2005 [1934]), were extremely influential in the development of anthropology. In his fieldwork, Boas focused on the empiricist demand for the particular rather than on the general, which drove his extended commitment to the idea of a representable reality. This commitment led him to advance the task of observation, to reconstruct cultural history and finally to search for the laws of cultural development. Concerning these laws, he wrote: "The frequent occurrence of similar phenomena in cultural areas that have no historical contacts suggests that important results may be derived from their study, for it shows that the human mind develops everywhere according to the same laws. The discovery of these is the greatest aim of our science" ([1888] 1940, 637). For Boas believed in the accuracy and scientific validity of his historical method—a testament to his ultra-empiricist, ultra-inductive commitments, which were based on assumptions and hypotheses rather than on evidence (White 1963, 62). As he insisted:

> The material of anthropology is such that it needs must be historical science, one of the sciences the interest of which centers in the attempt to understand the individual phenomena rather than in the establishment of general laws which, on account of the complexity of the material, will be necessarily vague and, we might almost say, so self-evident that they are of little help to real understanding (1932, 612).

Seeing that non-Indigenous scholars struggled with interpretation, Boas encouraged his students to learn their informants' language. Yet, he himself did not become fluent in any Indigenous language of the Northwest Coast (Cannizzo 1983, 47). And while he acknowledged the need to intensively study a single people, he usually visited the field only briefly. He travelled from one fieldsite

to another and stayed in boarding houses or hotels, rarely "participating" in the lives of his interlocutors (Cannizzo 1983, 48). As a result, he became dependent on "native fieldworkers" like George Hunt (1886–1933), Ella Cara Deloria (1927–1942) and Zora Neale Hurston (from 1926 through the mid-1930s), whose data collection skills he particularly valued (Berman 1996). As Berman (1996, 226) points out, what these fieldworkers shared was "labor in service of Boas's quest for the most authentic ethnographic materials." The perception of authenticity was, however, something Boas himself sought to manufacture.

Boas' contemporaries rejected the evolutionary paradigm. Overall, public concerns then focused on the acculturation of "Indians," immigrants and Blacks. At the same time, there was intensified hostility and discrimination against First Nations and American Indigenous people, immigrants (anti-Semitism and anti-Catholic sentiment), African-Americans and women. Echoes of evolutionary thinking persisted in the approach to race and in the liberal conceptions of time and death—which oriented toward a future free from uncertainty—that were predominant in anthropology and other disciplines. As we know, the reasons behind the division of anthropology into four fields are varied. But they included the emergence of anthropology as a discipline unto its own, after it had been taught as a part of biology (Hicks 2013). The North American and English efforts to facilitate this division had in common a concern with producing knowledge in the form of museum collections. These collections did not only document people's lifeways, but also had the effect of classifying and objectifying personhood. While operating under the premise of positivist truth, which led to the disaggregation of the "human" into various fields of knowledge, the four-field discipline is closely bound to the idea of anthropology as a domain of organisation, classification and display. With Bronislaw Malinowski, the method of long-term participant observation that culminates in a monograph-length publication came to structure disciplinary understandings of objects of study (Stocking 1992). Immersive fieldwork and lab methods enabled observations that made it possible to describe a holistic totality. However, the very spirit of positivism remained outside the purview of critique. In the search for greater meaning, the processes of knowledge production led to the production of persons and things as objects of inquiry. It is through the inculcation of this worldview that positivist precepts became linked to science. As such, the forms of (white) hegemonic power could not envision alternate modes of being. For positivism is not just a question of reasoning and methods; it is also a project of purposeful exclusion of those who do not

accept its logics (McKittrick 2021). Positivism finds and establishes the truth and implements its projects in the mode of detachment, rendering precarious those who are located outside of its knowledge network. If we consider Western rationality as a modality by which closure and finality can be plotted along a linear narrative, we can see that such modes of rationality grant those who adopt its tools the authority to make things knowable. This method is tied to a broader ideology of knowing, which conceals its work by hiding its deep connections to exclusion and epistemological constraints (Wynter 2003).

In the social sciences, World War I did not result in a project of repair or rectification. Instead it led to the promotion of problem-oriented, interdisciplinary research and to that of the study of racial groups and race mixture, especially in the United States (Anderson 2019). At the same time, there was a move in anthropology toward "salvage ethnography": that is, the study of Indigenous languages considered close to extinction. For Boas, anthropology was a science whose mission was to study the particular history of each society in order to understand its development, and not to explain cultural differences based on evolutionary principles. It should be recalled that Boas was appointed to a combination of museum and university posts—including to the post of curator at the American Museum of Natural History. This coalescing of anthropology with the museum and the laboratory was consistent with the vision of a four-field discipline. The 1904 exposition, at which Boas spoke, is infamous as one of "the most extensive, but also the last, major public celebration by anthropologists of nineteenth-century unilineal, cultural evolution and anthropometry." In the years that followed, "cultural anthropology moved in a new direction," largely through the agency of Boas (Hicks 2013, 760).

Boas saw himself as advancing a twentieth-century humanism. He believed that anthropology should have an activist dimension, and his studies challenged white supremacy. His interventions into immigration in New York's Lower East Side, his efforts to recover Indigenous knowledge, his consolidation of four-field methodologies and his anti-racism invigorated his commitments. Yet, many have argued that his anti-racism work was limited by the language of discrimination and the emphasis on miscegenation, both the result of his embrace of liberalism (Baker 1998, 2010; Anderson 2019). As much as Boasian anthropology was oriented toward condemning racism, it left the "coloniality" of white supremacy intact (Anderson 2019; Baker 1998; 2004; see also Smedley 1993; 1998; Williams 1996; Teslow 2014). Indeed, Boas's work was shaped by his

own positivist quest to document, retain and preserve the certainty of cultural and linguistic practices, which led to the containment of such knowledge. This containment was not without consequences. Boas's method also depended on the refusal of approaches that did not follow the same positivist formulas. Such refusal contributed to the maintenance of white supremacy through the gatekeeping of knowledge reproduction in educational spaces, the withholding of publishing endorsements and the presence of obstacles to the career success of minoritized researchers. The result was the widespread adoption of the practice of positivist documentation in all fields of anthropology. These moments led to the consolidation of the discipline (Clifford 1983; Sondheim 1970; Stocking 1992; Urry 1972).

Twentieth-century anthropology also produced a form of disaggregation between beings and objects (things) that led not only to persons and their life worlds being displayed in museums alongside non-human entities, but also to the concretisation of relations of study through their objectification. This disaggregation was the result of the kind of positivism that also gave rise to forms of dispossession that became widespread in the discipline. The omnipresence of these forms of dispossession indicates that the opening case of MOVE and biological anthropology is far from atypical: On the contrary, the practices of the scientists who dealt with the remains of the Africa children are consistent with the history of the anthropological production of some humans as objects, humans who to this day continue to occupy what Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2003) refers to as anthropology's "savage slot."

Early anthropological practices and processes underwent significant revisions in the mid-twentieth century, without this ultimately disturbing the foundational relation of coloniality that structured the production and interpretation of "Others." In the 1970s, critics from within anthropology began to link the anthropological tradition to colonial rule, thus attempting to lay bare the discipline's problematic origins (Asad 1973; Fabian 1983; Willis 1972; Wolf 1982). Indeed, early Euro-American anthropological approaches had not only maintained the "savage slot" (2003), they had also given rise to timeless subjects through assumptions about the "Other" that ensured the preservation of whiteness as the structure of production and interpretation of "Otherness" (Baker 2004; Anderson 2019). By paying renewed attention to the "decolonizing generation" described by Allen and Jobson (2016), we can trace a path beyond these elisions (Harrison 1995; Harrison and Harrison 1999; Harrison and Nonini 1992; Mikell 1999). In the context of seemingly intransigent questions

regarding anthropological subjectivity, objectives, methods and techniques of representation, the approaches developed by this generation of anthropologists allowed to reconsider and rearticulate the type of positivism that had produced the search for the knowable subject. They also helped to make sense of the workings of white supremacy in the application of anthropological positivism. Lastly, they showed how anthropologists framed their research through the positivist concretisation of knowable liberal subjects, thereby reproducing unequal power dynamics in knowledge production. In view of these dynamics, we must inquire into the ethnographic tools and practices that are capable of representing and safeguarding multiplicity. What new conceptual tools are necessary to appreciate these multiplicities? In what ways might we move from singular knowledge forms and take seriously the fragmented and unfinished forms that actually exist in people's worlds (see Omura et al. 2018)? How do we maintain a relational approach to understanding and being in co-existent worlds—especially in a context where the principles that continue to underpin anthropology's various methodologies are those of a science whose effects are inevitably harmful?

In the perspective of articulating a new genealogy, I will now consider how to tell a different story about the subject-object relation on the basis of neglected works that refused this distinction. I will ask what the positivist history of anthropology would look like if it were told in light of the journey of the dispossessed or the lives of those who have been racialised as "Other." From the continued wanderings of First Nations dispossessed of their lands and cultural institutions to the "journey of the enslaved from the barracoon to the hold of the slave ship to the plantation" (Li 2021, 1686) and to the exodus of Blacks to Chatham and Africville in the early 1800s, what would anthropology look like if we told its story through the theory-building proverbs and the unpublished writings of persons otherwise objectified, abducted, or lost? What we would tell is a different story. One about the nonlinearity of personhood, the pain of loss and the refusal of renditions of the all-knowable liberal subject. This story would look very different from canonical ethnographies, for it would defy the will to separate the objects of inquiry from their narrative context.

Clifford Geertz's interpretive model and method of "thick description" (1973) famously conceived culture as a text to be interpreted by the anthropologist. Geertz recommended producing detailed accounts of the context and environment of cultural practices to help the reader grasp the meaning given to

these practices by those who took part in them. Departing from Malinowskian interpretivism, which favored "getting into the head" of "the native," Geertz framed his method as looking over the shoulder of one's informants in order to decipher their own cultural texts (Ortner 1984). However, in most oral traditions of Indigenous, African and Black Atlantic cultural worlds, narratives are not detached from the context of their telling. Oral stories are meant to be born of a connection within the world and are thus recounted relationally depending on the situation and context of the telling (Kovach 2021). Such relational methods resonate with Saidiya Hartman's (2019) practice of critical fabulation. Critical fabulation is tied to a form of abduction through which one can tell an impossible story based on partial accounts, scattered facts and biographical snippets in ways that render enslaved or emancipated Black lives intelligible and valid within the context of narration. Such narratives do not produce the type of certainty that emerged from anthropology's longstanding association with positivism. Contrary to Geertzian interpretivism, Hartman's method does not involve "pulling apart the context in which the story is told into bits of abstractable data" (2019). The focus on "fabulated" relations, whose constitutive elements are fabrication and complexity, offers instead a way of decolonising positivism by discarding the assumption that narratives are composed of discrete and discoverable units that together produce cultural meaning. In other words, it allows us to tell a different story about the constraints of positivism. In this regard, this talk seeks to rethink the methods of anthropology by moving them from the tradition of distancing in the service of certainty to a relational space beyond detachment. This point of departure for the elaboration of a radically humanist anthropology can bring about a new pedagogy for teaching historical objects and processes and, thereby, the genealogies we map in our attempts to reproduce the insights of anthropological inquiry.

However, envisioning a radical humanism for Black bones is no easy task. We have behind us centuries of epistemologies, unwritten letters, stolen biographies and itinerant lives. I will now turn from positivist projects that ground scientific inquiry in distancing and detachment to critical abduction understood as a method of reasoning that moves beyond the estrangement of objects, bones and cultural and more than human practices that I described in the opening section. In short, I will turn from positivist methods based on induction and deduction to abductive methods through which one can "formulate a general prediction without positive assurance that it will succeed" (Peirce 1998, 299).

## 2. Abduction as a Methodological Proposal

Historically, *induction* and *deduction* have been deployed as methodological logic formulations to solve problems. Inductive reasoning, the most commonly used method in cultural anthropology, consists of identifying a general characteristic from a set of observable phenomena in order to predict outcomes. In conventional positivist approaches, deduction moves in the opposite direction: from general knowledge to particular applications. As a scholarly practice, it serves to test existing theories that are already structured in particular domains of logic. These approaches to positivist thinking have been formative, if not foundational, for the anthropological pursuit of knowledge. They are the basis through which categorical knowledge about others has been considered to reflect something "true" about the world taken as an empirical totality.

Abduction as a predictive practice goes from a specific observation to a broad generalisation, which allows to draw a conclusion based on the relational context (which can vary from time to time) rather than on evidence produced according to a given premise (Reichertz 2004). This approach is anti-empirical in that it rests explicitly on overlapping fragments nstead of on an observable totality. Thus, abductive arguments are not meant to be deductively valid or measurable by the standards of verifiable objectivity. They do not consider certainty to be a way of achieving truth. They are the most common type of logical reasoning in daily life. Since their function is relational and social rather than scientific, they start neither from objective particulars nor from abstract generalities. They are based on possibilities whose potential orientation to one another is the subject of reasoning, without recourse to truth, objectivity, or science ever factoring in. This implies a reasoning that is embodied and quotidian, inseparable from daily precarities and affects.

Abduction as an alternate approach to reasoning allows us to resist positivist logics, which can desecrate commitments to human relations via processes of estrangement that produce detachment and distance. As such abduction behooves us to take seriously what an *ethics and politics of attachment* could mean for the way we *do* anthropology. It helps to rethink anthropological persons, work and history through entanglements that make the intersubjective connections of our lives *visible and viable*. By emphasising connectivity rather than detachment, it opens the way for a mode of ethical engagement that amplifies people's own theoretical frameworks.

To advance this goal, I will close with a reflection on the rebel methods and lives of Ella Cara Deloria and Zora Neale Hurston, whose biographies reveal—and trouble—the role of positivism in the development of anthropology. Like forensic science, cultural anthropology has deep roots in deductive and inductive reasoning. Thus, the logics that disqualified Deloria and Hurston's subaltern style of ethnographic research and writing are looped into those that put Tree and Delisha's bones in academic custody.

The twenty-first century is bursting with abductive engagements. In some cases, the process of unearthing and re-examining older, less canonical ethnographic work is proving fruitful (Allen and Jobson 2016) for clarifying the potential of abductive methods and Hartman's critical fabulation. However, such an approach requires a different genealogy to tell a different story about the discipline and to thus open a new path for anthropological work. By departing from the anthropometric approach to existence and by untangling the self-contained "one-world world" view of being (Law 2015), I will reconnect what was disconnected through the estrangement mechanisms outlined in the opening section. I will explore how particular entanglements can offer renewed pedagogical tools to interrogate, to unpack and even at times to provincialise the histories of intellectual violence.

Thus, I wish to advance a call for a radical humanism in anthropology by exploring early twentieth-century attempts to radically rethink the positivist tradition. Hurston and Deloria struggled to recentre humanity by pushing against positivist tensions via a contrary set of methods that privileged a politics of attachment combining pedagogy and renewed attention to state and racial violence and subject-object relations. I will briefly review their contributions from the last century to consider the value of abduction for a radically humanist anthropology. We will see that while positivism has favoured the use of inductive methods in cultural anthropology, abduction can be deployed as an ethics and politics of attachment to tell the story of the field from the human side of knowledge production.

## 3. The Ethics and Politics of Attachment: New Genealogies

*Zora Neale Hurston*

Zora Neale Hurston's *Barracoon: The Story of the Last Black Cargo*, published posthumously in 2018, reflects such abductive commitments. Over a three-month period in 1927, Hurston interviewed Cudjo Lewis, who, in 1859, had been

the last person captured in West Africa and sold into slavery in the United States. Departing from the disaggregation between researcher and interlocutor, Hurston used a unique narrative form to document Lewis's life and to convey the complexities and pain that marked their interactions and conversations in his hometown Plateau, in Alabama.

Referring to Lewis not by his *slave* name but by his African name, Kossula, the opening story recounts his coming of age in Takkoi, his home village in West Africa. Over many weeks, with many stops and starts, Kossula recounts the violence that culminated in the raiding of his village by the neighboring Dahomey tribe. He talks about how they took him from his family and detained him in a "barracoon," a holding place on the West African coast, where he was sold to an American slaver. He describes the insufferable pain he endured as he journeyed across the Atlantic on the last slave ship to the United States, and he details the five and a half years he spent in Alabama, where he was enslaved by his "owner." He continues with a range of events, tragic and otherwise, including his emancipation in 1865 and the death of his wife and six children. The narrative of his memories is marked by temporal disjunctions and by various signposts that accent his experiences without necessarily aligning with what Hurston understands to be official renditions of the same periods. Despite this dissonance, Hurston listens and allows Kossula's experiences to shape the contours of his stories. As he recounts one dramatic event after another, Hurston and him share food, laughter and sorrow, all the while building their friendship (2018, 94).

Hurston's method was directed to ends that differed from those of her contemporaries. These ends were not scientific, nor did they presume the knowability of her subjects. Hurston grounded her literary craft in the traditions of Black expressivity, deploying a flexible discursive strategy to confront the racial and gender dimensions of Blacks' oppression (Meisenhelder 2001).

In *Mules and Men*, Hurston shows that Black humour is multifaceted and can serve several purposes at once: "The brother in black puts a laugh in every vacant place in his mind. His laugh has a hundred meanings. It may mean amusement, anger, grief, bewilderment, chagrin, curiosity, simple pleasure or any other of the known or undefined emotions" ([1935] 1978, 67–68). These multiple simultaneous purposes do not confound conventional means of ascertaining the meaning of phenomena. They reflect what de la Cadena (2010, 352) describes as the partiality of our connections in circumstances where the formula "more than one and less than many" most aptly summarises the

character of our encounters. In this regard, Hurston uses figures from folklore, including Br'er Rabbit and the trickster High John the Conqueror, whose double register reflects Black people's historic forms of resistance. Slaves, she suggests, could tell these stories in the presence of whites because they could be confident that these would miss the point. As she mentions, "It is no accident that High John de Conquer has evaded the ears of white people. They were not supposed to know. You can't know what folks won't tell you. If they, the white people, heard some scraps, they could not understand because they had nothing to hear things like that with. They were not looking for any hope in those days, and it was not much of a strain for them to find something to laugh over. Old John would have been out of place for them" ([1943] 2019, 3).

In *High John de Conquer* we see examples of resistance brimming with humour, in which Hurston foregrounds what she sees as an essential component of the African American folk tradition. The characters resist racial oppression through subversion of the categories with which their oppressors make sense of them—namely the categories of knowability and classificatory knowledge of early anthropology. Likewise, in her article "Characteristics of Negro Expression" ([1934] 2020), Hurston uses humour as a strategy that enables her to participate in a system rigged against her. Through humour, she simultaneously plays into white expectations of a Black woman and undermines those expectations with rhetorical means ("winks," sarcasm, exaggerations, etc.), which allows her to level a deeper critique of oppression and to paint a more nuanced picture of resistance to it. Hurston's use of masking, coding and humour to convey multiple messages at once in her work reflects what she calls "feather-bed" tactics ([1935] 1978). These tactics constitute a form of resistance that takes the shape of lovable characters in humorous stories. For example, in *Mules and Men* she writes:

> the Negro, in spite of his open-faced laughter, his seeming acquiescence, is particularly evasive. You see we are a polite people and we do not say to our questioner, 'Get out of here!' We smile and tell him or her something that satisfies the white person because, knowing so little about us, he doesn't know what he is missing. The Indian resists curiosity by a stony silence. The Negro offers a feather-bed resistance. That is, we let the probe enter, but it never comes out. It gets smothered under a lot of laughter and pleasantries. ([1935] 1978, 2–3).

Though embedded in stereotypes, the figure of the trickster in African American folk culture is important here. It is frequently through humour that

the trickster achieves its goals, and it is frequently the goal of the trickster to undermine or take advantage of those that dominate others. Thus, in exaggeration tactics, participants take turns trying to top one another with ridiculous stories about how mean their boss is (among other examples) as a way of lampooning white authority figures. We see the importance to Hurston's method of the concealment and layering of the life worlds of her interlocutors as mechanisms of visibility and invisibility. These approaches to the documentation of the life worlds of Black people are not just intersubjective, they are also experiential. In *Barracoon*, Hurston's encounters with Kossula are not always verbal and dynamic. They are sometimes marked by silence rather than storytelling, such as when Hurston drives Kossula into town or when she sits quietly and watches as he repairs his fence. These moments reveal Hurston's role not as a neutral observer but as an engaged participant in Kossula's acts of refusal. Ultimately, the approach underpinning Hurston's method involves a patchwork of engagements that are at once disjointed, difficult and pleasant.

Hurston does not romanticise Kossula's reflections as self-awareness or the transcendence of a suffering subject. She does not interpret his comments. Rather than inserting herself into the narrative as a learned and probing author, she engages in deep listening (Hill 1993). This acceptance of the multiple ways that people articulate their stories is an important part of abduction. What we see is not only the forms of attachment that allow Hurston to listen, but also the creation of a text that dismisses the goal of narrative certainty. In *Barracoon*, Hurston accepts Kossula's sense of his experiences as his true story. She lets disruptions, refusals, contradictions and friendship guide the construction of ethnographic *truth*. This approach rests on the recognition that no person is fully knowable and that conferring on individuals the authority to articulate their life story forms the principle and ethics of engagement. Through this approach, the principles of a self-knowing subject that can be interpreted or translated are disavowed. Like other social scientists of the time, Hurston's mentor, Franz Boas, posited instead a knowable *Other* whose life worlds ought to be documented and its peoples salvaged. Grounded in interpretive approaches to social analysis, Boasian relativism conceived culture as an integrated whole that forms a coherent totality for the individuals living within it (Anderson 2019, Candea 2018, Darnell 2001). This conception is at work in Boas's preface to *Mules and Men*, in which he praises Hurston's ability "to penetrate through that affected demeanor by which the Negro excludes the White observer effectively from participating in his true inner life," thereby adding significantly to "our knowledge of the true

inner life of the Negro" ([1935] 1978, xiii). Here Boas assumes that the human subject is knowable and that Hurston will be the one to pierce through the "feather-bed" tactics and to reveal the coherent truth of Black social life. This is not the case, however. While Hurston offers enough details to satisfy lay readers, giving them a sense of the "inner life" of her subjects, her interpolations and voicings of folktales confer on her books a quality of subversion and resistance, in this case to a white-dominated academic, literati and popular audience (see Kalos-Kaplan 2016). We see this at the beginning of *Mules and Men*, where she argues that the "theory behind our tactics" is to "set something outside the door of [the] mind" to satisfy the white man's desire to "always… know into somebody else's business" ([1935] 1978, 3). Tellingly, she reiterates her point in terms of writing: "He can read my writing but he sho' can't read my mind" (3).

Hurston does not present these multi-layered complexities of reality as subversive. Nor does she make mention of her interlocutor's psychological and spiritual resistance. Rather, she adopts a relational method that does not involve analysing the tales she recounts, which explains why different audiences are able to draw different meanings from her work. Contrary to Boas, for whom ethnographic data could faithfully represent reality and speak for themselves, Hurston understands that their meaning is always relational. By deliberately suppressing her own analysis and point of view, she foregrounds her interlocutors' stories on their own terms. In doing so, she masks her criticism under a cloak of humour and good will, as many observers have noted. Interestingly, in his preface to *Mules and Men*, Boas ([1935] 1978, ix–x) interprets this humour in light of what he calls her "charm and loveable personality," not as a reflection of the complexities of building relationships in ethnographic fieldwork but as the means to penetrate the "true inner life of the Negro."

In communicating Kossula's life in *Barracoon*, Hurston shares the exact transcription of his language as it sounds rather than translating it into standard English. She transcribes Kossula's story using his vernacular diction, spelling his words as she hears them pronounced. Sentences follow his syntactical rhythms while maintaining his idiomatic expressions and repetitive phrases. Hurston's methods respect Kossula's storytelling sensibility, a sensibility rooted in his life experiences as a West African man, in his social, linguistic and affective relation to that homeland and in his efforts to survive in his American destination. In the end, the text she has written preserves the braided form of the spoken word.

Yet, it is precisely this form that publishers wanted to remove. In 1931, after Hurston submitted *Barracoon* to different publishers, she was asked by Viking

Press to write the manuscript in standard English rather than in Kossula's dialect, a compromise she refused. Indeed, Hurston's commitment to straddling the role of storyteller and scientific documenter of other people's stories came with publication difficulties. Publishers wanted her to dramatise her storytelling in order to make people's stories more appealing to non-academic audiences (Kalos-Kapan 2016, 49–53). But she preferred to retain the "juices" of these stories, transposing the oral tale-telling atmosphere to a written one to better convey their humour. Through the shaping of the stories she participated in the folk-telling tradition and showed that folklore was not a "stagnant thing to be collected but rather a living, thriving tradition that adapted to the modern context" (Kalos-Kaplan 2016, 49). Rather, it involved a dynamic dance of play, suggestion, and – at times - fabrication. During her lifetime *Barracoon* found no takers among publishers. This reality is a reflection of positivist logics that have centred Western styles of reasoning and contributed to the assertion of anthropology as a project of detachment.

In her other ethnographies, Hurston coded her messages and writing by inserting folktales in the social contexts of their telling. In doing so, she highlighted the function of Black folklore rather than analysing it. Moreover, her attachment to her interlocutors led her to use humour to circumvent the filters of unsympathetic white readers and mentors. Hurston experienced difficulties in critiquing white oppressors—difficulties that were compounded by her precarious financial and professional circumstances. She knew that the novelistic frame of her tales could present a problem for Boas, whose enthusiasm for "scientific rigor" she was well familiar with. Her benefactor, Mrs Mason, insisted that she focus solely on the "primitivism" of black culture (Meisenhelder 2001, 9). As for her publishers, they asked her to write readable books aimed at the general public. Faced with such demands, Hurston was extremely careful to describe the conversations and incidents that punctuated the story telling. Boas's stamp of approval was especially important to her, as shown in a letter in which she pleads with him to write an introduction to her book *Mules and Men*: "I am full of terrors, lest you decide that you do not want to write the introduction to my 'Mules and Men.' I want you to do it so very much" (1934). Hurston downplays in her letter the novelistic elements of her work as a product of pressure from the publishing house. She ends with an ingratiating flourish: "So please consider all this and do not refuse Mr. Lippincott's request to write the introduction to Mules and Men. And then in addition, I feel that the persons who have the most information on a subject should teach the public. Who knows more about folk-lore than you and Dr. Benedict?" (Hurston 1934).

Despite this deference, Hurston mobilised strategies that were as central to the making of twentieth-century anthropology as those elaborated by Boas. In reality, these strategies reflect a position of exteriority vis-à-vis the field that is far from unique: A range of Black and Indigenous scholars whose work was central to the making of American anthropology were relegated to the margins of the mainstream story we tell of the field. In this regard, Ella Cara Deloria's relation to anthropology is also instructive. Like Hurston, Deloria combined her cultural knowledge and lived experience into an expressive form of ethnographic communication that involved a new way of approaching and creating anthropological knowledge.

*Ella Cara Deloria*

Ella Cara Deloria was an anthropologist of Métis, Dakota, English, French and German roots and a student of Franz Boas and Ruth Benedict. Boas had trained her in 1927 in his self-devised method of phonetic transcription after having hired her as a part-time research assistant to transcribe Dakota texts (Cotera 2008, 46–47). In February of 1928, she travelled to New York to receive her first and only training in Boasian ethnology. While anthropology was considered the "welcoming science" at the time, it nevertheless fostered a highly racialised and gendered hierarchy. At Columbia, for example, Deloria was labelled "an Indian girl," even though she was more than forty years old (Bonnie and Krook 2018, 288). It is not so much that Deloria's work was directly challenged as that it was largely ignored so as to maintain the status quo. By and large, where there were disagreements, the interpretations of earlier, European American anthropologists ruled the day.

Deloria undertook five fieldwork trips for Boas and Benedict and two more through grants from the American Philosophical Society, dedicating a significant amount of her paid time to positivist documentation and to translation of their Indigenous collection. Boas had modeled his version of anthropology on a certain vision of the scientific method which he had injected with emotional detachment. By contrast, Deloria's approach aimed to dismantle the barrier between herself, the researcher, and her people, the "studied" (Cotera 2008, 52–53). In her associations with her interlocutors, Deloria used her status as an insider and the intimacies that followed from it. Her "kinship ethnography… transformed the objectifying relations of the ethnographic encounter by foregrounding reciprocity, relatedness, and dialogue" (2008, 52).

Although Deloria was recognised as an expert on Dakota in the Boasian milieu, she was overlooked when it came to government jobs because she was considered too educated to be *authentic*. Indeed, she occupied an "in-between" position. Her social obligations to the Dakota, about whom she was reluctant to say too much, compounded the contradictions of her identity as an insider scholar. Her relationship with Boas was also complicated by her "unconventional" fieldwork methodologies and marginal professional status, which had implications for her authority in the field. Both Boas and Benedict had lingering doubts as to her objectivity (Cotera 2008, 48).[10] Yet, Deloria was a precursor to what Finn has called "anthro-performance," namely the pedagogical power of communicating lived experiences through fiction, drama and performance (1993, 346). And nowhere did this commitment manifest itself more than through her laments and challenges in writing *Waterlily*, a novel that illustrates the application of critical abduction in anthropological work.

Written between 1928 and 1935 but published only in 1988, *Waterlily* is a story about Dakota lifeways before settler colonialism. The novel maps the experiences of two generations of women with the goal of demonstrating the centrality of kinship. Set in the Great Plains, a large part of the story concerns nomadic life and what was called the Sioux camp circle at the time. Deloria used the camp circle as a metaphor for the relationships, conflicts and social change in women's lives. Rather than following a chronological path as she was instructed to by Benedict and Boas, she presented female struggles and joys in the form of a collaborative story told from the perspective of differently positioned women.

Deloria struggled to write the stories of the community women because their lives did not fit the narrative expectations of western anthropology. Reframing *Waterlily* as a work of fiction was, in the end, what freed her from the representational constraints of the time. This allowed her to discuss the lives of women without feeling as if she had betrayed their trust. By resorting to the genre of "conversational anthropology," she was able to pull apart and together the lives she chronicled, thereby defying the linear positivist conventions of the mid-twentieth century (Gardner 2009, 21). However, due to her positioning, Deloria received little financial support and wrote *Waterlily* under precarious circumstances. She was seen as a "tribeswoman in academe: transitory, marginalised, ill-paid and yet irreplaceable to the scholarship and reputations of [Franz Boas] and the various linguists and cultural anthropologists for whom she worked" (Gardner 2009, 19).

Deloria developed a relationship with Boas that was a source of frustration for her: As a research assistant, she provided data on Indian kinship, folklore, language and ways of life, but she struggled to make her views of this world intelligible within the frameworks of scientific understanding established by Boas and her other mentors. This led to a paradoxical relationship wherein she felt simultaneously supported and distorted (Finn 1993, 340). The feeling of support was clear in her references to Boas as "Father Franz," a formula that underscored a kinship obligation in her relationship with him. For Deloria, kinship obligations were intimately tied to her ways of knowing the world. She not only reported to Boas about kinship systems; she was imbricated within these systems and felt obligated to them. Since kinship was an integral component of her work, her writing referred not only to biological relatives but also to the "social relatives" with whom she conducted interviews. We also see in her writing a resistance to Boasian epistemology, such as in her July 1932 letter to Boas in which she criticizes his practice of limiting compensation for research participants. Having kinship obligations to her interlocutors meant for Deloria that there was an expectation of mutual exchange. As she made clear to Boas, she was unwilling to let the prerogatives of western science undermine these obligations, for to "go at it like a white man, for me, an Indian, is to throw up an immediate barrier between myself and the people" (Deloria 1932). Deloria conceived of Waterlily as a truly collaborative and collective endeavour (Gardner 2003, 681). For Boas, however, personal relationships were separate from the objective methods of anthropological work (Finn 1993, 341). Divergences emerged when Deloria sought to sensitise him to alternate ways of knowing that exceeded objectivity.

In 1937, Boas enlisted Deloria's skills to verify a previous account of the Sun Dance Ceremony. She responded that this task would put her in a difficult position. Indeed, two key informants were relatives of hers who were reluctant to share information with outsiders, but who might feel obligated to do so because of their kinship ties with her. The ensuing conversation reveals Deloria's skepticism about the link between the authenticity of the account of the ceremony and Boas's concern with the verification of objective truth. Deloria insisted that such verifiability was beside the point in a context where diverse accounts were consistent with the multiple social locations and relations of Dakota people (Finn 1993, 341–42). Boas dismissed this notion of a multiple truth. Yet, just as Hurston had understood that Black folklore is adapting and changing and is no less "authentic" or "verifiable" as a result, Deloria knew that storytelling

has nothing to do with a consistent and authentic truth. On the contrary, storytelling is context specific. It involves improvisation and individualisation of the narrative, and it requires listeners to experience the lesson of the story in the moment of its telling. While Deloria was intrigued by these dynamic adaptations of stories, Boas did not see them as legitimate. This disagreement caused major problems in their working relationship (Gardner 2003, 682). Oftentimes, Deloria could not provide Boas with the "verifiability" he was seeking, for this verifiability concerned what the white male establishment in anthropology considered to be important. Deloria was unwilling to concede something that did not reflect her findings and her intimate knowledge of Dakota culture (Bonnie and Krook 2018, 290). Known as the "Walker affair," this disagreement ultimately led to a break in their working relationship. This break lasted about a year until they resumed their collaboration in 1939 (Cotera 2008, 53–57).

It was Deloria's "dissatisfaction with the scope of social scientific discourse, both in terms of its potential audience and its descriptive limitations," that provoked her to pursue the writing of *Waterlily* (Cotera 2004, 53). In her work of fictionalisation, Deloria rejected the constraints of ethnographic objectivity to assert the truth value of embodied and relational ways of knowing. Thus, she used the story of Waterlily to approach another problematic aspect of anthropological methodology: the fact that this method violates the cultural emphasis placed on dignity amongst women, which explains why many women are hesitant to share their stories or secrets, especially with outsiders (Finn 1993, 344–45).

In a letter to Mead dated October 1948, Deloria described *Waterlily* as the story of "a girl who lived a century ago, in a remote camp-circle of the Teton Dakotas." However, she clarified that:

> Only my characters are imaginary; the things that happen are what the many old women informants have told me as having been their own or their mothers' or other relatives' experiences. I can claim as original only the method of fitting these events and ceremonies into the tale.... It reads convincingly to any who understand Dakota life... And it is purely the woman's point of view, her problems, aspirations, ideals, etc. (Gardner 2003, 667)

Deloria had received a formal and westernised education, and she had learned to express herself in proper and ornate English. With *Waterlily*, she struggled to free herself from this training by trying to render the story in relatable everyday language. A list of sources she gave to Mead identified 49 principal contributors with whom she had worked extensively in gathering stories that spanned at

least a century: "I have been steeped in Dakota lore and seen and felt it ever since childhood, it is in fact the very texture of my being." Deloria was not the first of Boas's students to use the form of the novel to convey inner drives and personality. In 1922, Elsie Clews Parsons had published "American Indian Life," a collection of fictional portraits to which Boas himself had contributed a story called "An Eskimo Winter" (Gardner 2003, 671–72). Since *Waterlily*'s audience was not Indigenous, Deloria anglicised the names of the characters, which gave the impression that they had been ascribed at birth as the unchanging reflection of an essential "self." Yet, while Waterlily was a fictional character, her story was documented in Deloria's interviews (Gardner 2003, 676).

Deloria's letter exchanges with Ruth Benedict reveal a lot about the development of *Waterlily*, including the fact that it was written alongside *Speaking of Indians* which drew on the same "Urtext." We also see in these letters many of Deloria's original conceptions of the novel (including plotlines) as well as the "search for an accessible style for a potentially uninterested and definitely uninformed audience; the determination to present her people in the best light; and her deference to Benedict" (Gardner 2003, 677). The novel's first draft was completed in 1944. In 1947, Deloria was still working through major cuts at the recommendation of two outside reviewers whom Benedict had asked to edit the novel. Of this editorial process Deloria remarked:

> I have tried to pare it down.... But there is repetition about kinship obligations, etc., especially between brother and sisters; and some, or perhaps all, of the visions could be cut.... I realize that sort of supernatural stuff is hard to swallow in this day and age. Maybe it should all be left out, and make them prosaic, matter-of-fact people. But that isn't true, either. (Gardner 2003, 677-678)

The correspondence between Benedict and Deloria and the revision of *Waterlily* continued until April of 1948. In a letter to Deloria dated November 7, 1944, Benedict praised the quality of the manuscript but recommended cuts to bring it "down to the usual size for such a book." She wrote: "We must get together and go over them, so that, when the war is over and publishers are taking books that don't have to do with the war effort, the manuscript will be ready to submit" (cited in Publisher's Preface; Deloria 2009, xxxv).

The hope was to publish *Waterlily* in late 1948. However, Benedict died in September of that year, and Mead inherited Benedict's responsibility over the manuscript. Editors who had reviewed the text at Benedict's request recommended that Deloria write the book as a popular fiction, with a "running

narrative" and "without repetition" for the sake of a smoother story (Gardner 2003, 678). They also insisted that Deloria present Waterlily as a heroine. Yet, this demand was geared toward focusing plot development on issues that traditional Dakota women found too personal to discuss in public. Deloria heeded her editors' advice because she wanted *Waterlily* out of the way so that she could finish her other manuscript. Later, however, she came to regret some of the changes she had been asked to make: "Probably it is because I wrote it, and the people grew familiar to me, but I like the tale quite much! And I do miss Waterlily, since she has gone off to you" (Gardner 2003, 678). A few months before her death in 1948, Benedict had declared: "I think you can well be very proud of it" (cited in Gardner 2009, xvii). For Deloria, however, *Waterlily* was not the book she had envisaged at first. Even though she did reduce the manuscript by at least half, the publisher ultimately refused to publish it. *Waterlily* remained unpublished until 1988.

Deloria's manuscripts were difficult for her to write because "the genres and audiences available to her were culturally inappropriate for what she was trying to accomplish" (Gardner 2003, 699). She knew what her various audiences expected, but she could not fully offer them what they wanted. This conundrum also underpins the more "scientific" writing that she produced during the same period and that Boas was uneasy with. Her writing had a subtext, and all of the editing undertaken to make it conform to the mold of scientific literature could not obscure its "oral communal origins" (Gardner 2003, 692). Deloria had to write her texts obliquely, just as Hurston had to code hers in humour. Through these circuitous routes of knowledge production, Deloria's contribution to anthropology in the Boasian vein was limited by the racial and gendered hierarchies of white academia as well as by hegemonic epistemological frameworks. The fact remains that Deloria's turn to a more dialogical and relational approach, along with her interest in speaking to female perspectives, constitutes a departure from Boasian scientific institutionalised anthropology—a departure that is perhaps best represented by *Waterlily*.

In short, the examples of Hurston and Deloria illustrate modes of engagements with interlocutors that recentre the human in the research experience. Through humour, fiction, attachment and a deep engagement to tell stories about the complexities of cultural life, many Black and Indigenous anthropologists of the twentieth century have opened new avenues for the articulation of anthropological work. Yet, to fully grasp the possibilities they have offered us, it is necessary to return to the rise of positivism and to the

role it played in the elaboration of anthropological methodologies. Such contextualisation will allow us to understand how the emergence of a radical humanism in anthropology can help forge new directions in the field.

*Abduction as a radical humanist principle*

The scholarship of Zora Neale Hurston and Ella Cara Deloria provokes us to consider the stakes of an abductive orientation to fieldwork. It also, however, reflects the entrenchments of our discipline's positivist commitments, as is made clear by the relationship between these women of colour and their preeminent white mentor, Franz Boas. Indeed, Hurston's and Deloria's experiences are painful examples of the way that positivist methodologies turned intermediaries into fodder in the making of cultural anthropology. Their lives force us to rethink the "messiness" of our inherited formations. By centring the story-work of each author, we see the disruption of the knowable subject at play. This is especially the case with Deloria's work, which she never intended to be a "factual" representation of "real" events. Deloria was reluctant to slot women's stories into the epistemologies of early twentieth-century scholarship, and it is this reluctance that led her to refuse to publish *Waterlily* as an ethnography. Similarly, in refusing to rewrite *Barracoon* in standard English, Hurston went against the conventions of knowability. Both women stayed committed to telling the stories of those who were disregarded or translated out of anthropology's centre on their own terms. Their engagement was the precursor of what Bochner (2001) has called the "narrative turn" in the social sciences of the 1990s (see also Goodson and Gill 2011). Born of the critique of positivist approaches–illustrated by works that explore the relationship between self and other, reflexivity, or researchers' discursive power to decontextualise the stories and lives of others—the narrative turn sought to centre the lived experiences of individuals and to present the diverse "voices" of marginalisedactors. Fifty years earlier, Deloria and Hurston had laid the groundwork for this turn through their contributions, without however achieving recognition. As BIPOC scholars, they were excluded from the higher ranks of university social life. Their approach involved the embodiment of a middle space, between two worlds; they were cultural translators who never fully belonged anywhere. This was especially evident in their attachments to multiple communities and their ambivalence about how to reckon with complex narratives and obligations. Such dynamics are instructive because they highlight the importance of refusing positivism's will to turn subjects into detached objects for the purpose of analysis and scrutiny. By taking seriously people's life worlds on their own terms, these

marginalised scholars showed a deep commitment to an ethics and politics of attachment, a commitment made possible by the abductive methods they adopted to push against positivist tensions in their work. The fact remains, however, that anthropology's positivist roots constrained the ability of many to reconceptualise the field using other frameworks.

I will now end with a call for a radical break with anthropology's universalist and positivist mission. As we have seen, a different trajectory can be mapped by building on earlier attempts to radically rethink the positivist tradition via a contrary set of relational methods that recentre humanity. These relational methods resonate with a form of abduction through which one can tell an impossible story based on partial accounts, scattered facts and biographical snippets in ways that render enslaved and emancipated Black lives intelligible and valid within the context of narration. Contrary to positivism, which presumes an all-knowable truth and an all-knowable subject, but also to forms of interpretivism that posit the existence of cultural systems of knowledge forming a greater whole, abductive methods do not involve pulling apart into bits of abstractable data the context in which a story is told. Abduction invites us instead to consider "fabulated" relations (2019), whose constitutive elements are fabrication and complexity, as a way of decolonising positivism. Indeed, by discarding the assumption that narratives consist of discrete and discoverable units that together produce cultural meaning, we can tell a different story about positivism and perhaps even promote a different understanding of what science is and can be (McKittrick 2020).

I propose, then, to move anthropological methods from practices of distancing and detachment in the service of certainty to a relational space of contingent praxis, in such a way as to advance a new pedagogy for teaching the genealogies of anthropological theory. By making abduction a key method of radical humanism, we can open the way for an ethics and politics of attachment that combines pedagogy and attention to state and racial violence and subject-object relations and therefore allows us to tell the story of the field from the human side of knowledge production. In short, abduction can help us rebuild a discipline shaped by inscriptions of knowledge—epistemologies, unwritten letters, stolen biographies and itinerant lives—that continue to hinder the proleptic possibilities for a new future.

## 4. Conclusion: Toward a Radical Humanism in Anthropology

This 2021 conference is concerned with engagements and entanglements. In this talk, I described the entanglements between the liberal state and the discipline of anthropology. I also showed how engagements open the way for new genealogies beyond our discipline's positivist inscriptions.

The first entanglement in this story concerns the state surveillance of BIPOC communities and the way that bare life, racism and bare death are interwoven with the forensic practices that make Black bones matter. Then comes anthropology's historical entanglement with the objectification and use of Black and Brown bodies in the service of Western rationality. The entanglements between the state and anthropology in the objectification of Black and Brown bodies are reflected in the maintenance of white supremacy within contemporary academic institutions. These logics emerged out of a context of colonial conquest have shaped our discipline, and domains of colonial knowledge continue to define what counts as anthropological knowledge today. It is no surprise that the anthropological tools used to gain insights into the practices of peoples around the world produce subjects as objects and objects as estranged matter for scientific inquiry. In the field of biological anthropology, the collection of data—skulls, bones, bodies—requires the disaggregation of the dead corpse from any sense of personhood or social relations. Such disaggregation is part of the culture of positivism that was consolidated with the renewal of mid-century anthropology and that ranges from the collection and appropriation of things—skulls, bones, implements—to the documentation of peoples, languages and cultural practices so dear to ethnographic and natural history museums.

For their part cultural anthropologists have neglected to tell certain stories about the emergence of the field and, as a result, have been complacent in their understanding of absence. As we have seen, approaches that ran counter to twentieth-century anthropology and remained peripheral to what became the canon did not reflect a lack of conceptualisations or theory-building on the part of marginalised authors. They were a manifestation of a counter-archive whose time has now come.

Over the past fifty years, vigorous decolonising critiques have called into question anthropology's practices of exclusion and its methods for collecting materials and data. In the opening discussion on Delisha and Tree's remains, we saw that the context of "bone" production did not matter to Professors

Mann and Monge. All they could see was bones without history. Our task as anthropologists is, on the contrary, to see children in search of a revolutionary future and whose lives were embedded in social relationships. And though, post-1985, their bones constituted puzzles that were never fully solved, the human story is that these children were sisters, daughters, friends. Their smells, laughter and stories connected them to a community and connected us to that community in the process. And while Professor Monge continued to use their bones as teaching tools, she did so under conditions of estrangement that were not hers either.

As I have shown, disciplinary distancing leads to the detachment of subjects from their personhood in the lab or in the field. If anthropologists have transmuted their subjects into data (or into objects of analysis) through systems of classification and differentiation, it is because anthropological labour typically acquires value only in the context of institutional positivist imperatives. In light of these observations, I will make three final points.

First, my opening story about the estrangement of bones reveals not only methodological shortcomings, but also the profound power of the various forms of alienation at work. It is important to interrogate the performative labour that renders subjects as objects and that holds in tension the processes by which *black bones matter* for university pedagogy. We also see that objects that are also subjects must be afforded their own consideration of dignity. In the case of the Africa family, dignity consisted in the recognition of the continuity of life and death and in the centring of the copresence of the social, even in corporeal death. Ultimately, these processes are interrelated and combine different levels of entanglement, namely: (1) the subject-object relation; (2) the institutional histories of positivism that have led to the collection, investigation and display of BIPOC remains; and (3) the larger contexts of state violence that have contributed to the dehumanisation of BIPOC lives.

Second, alternate paths have already been charted within our discipline. By revisiting the works of Zora Neale Hurston and Ella Cara Deloria while also building on ongoing scholarship, we can trace a new genealogy of anthropology in light of the institutional, publishing and citational exclusions it produces. Approaches like critical abduction and intersubjective engagement can help us build a different archive of knowledge that will be essential for remapping the story of our discipline. As a fundamental principle of radical humanism, abduction can become a core component of ethnographic methods, thus offering a unique opportunity to think the discipline anew.

Third, by imploding positivism and its framework whereby objects are "things" waiting to be found, discovered, or kept in custody and examined with certainty, radical humanism opens up possibilities for a new ethical-political praxis. This alternate formulation will not only enable the re-situating of truth, but will also ensure that intersubjectivity remains embedded in its context of deployment.

Against the background of demands for rethinking anthropology's hegemonic inheritances and structures of engagement, I have told the story of the violent entanglements that connect the disciplining apparatus of the state to the disciplining apparatus of science. We have seen that these disciplining domains are not unrelated to anthropology's historical entanglement with the objectification of Black and Brown bodies, the "black dead," and the maintenance of white supremacy in the deployment methods, techniques of representation and modes of knowing that preserve the fiction of the knowable subject. In opposition to this, I have sought to disrupt the dominant notion of a stable, knowable, liberal subject in anthropology, a field whose humanism forecloses alternate ways of being in the world (Mignolo and Walsh 2018). I have also shown that a *radically humanist practice offers different tools for reconceptualising this field in disarray.* Such reconceptualisations can provide the principles necessary to move past our traditions of distancing and detachment—principles that are in keeping with the work I have been doing with Deborah Thomas,colleagues engaged with our Radical Humanism Initiative, and the Wenner-Gren Foundation.

*Toward a Radical Humanism in Anthropology*

When we turn to the Enlightenment project, the principles of which gave birth to the type of humanism at the heart of twentieth-century anthropological interventions, we see the hegemony of the particular European *worldings* that produced the narrative formulations underpinning anthropological positivism. Humanism as a Western philosophy was conceptualised between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries at the time of the European Renaissance and the Copernican Revolution (Clarke and Thomas, 2021). Central to its emergence was an attempt to reckon with reason and rationality through a form of universalism that dislodged theological conceptions of causality in favor of a new idea of "Man" as a secular political subject. This process involved what Sylvia Wynter (2003) referred to as "Coloniality," namely the conquest of one group by another as well as the complete takeover of the system by which we create knowledge, notions of value, ideas about politics and sensibilities toward hierarchy (see

also Copson 2015; da Silva 2007, 2017). For Wynter, the forms of universalism that emerged from coloniality required an externally oriented framework for thinking about the self. This framework was grounded in both the evangelising mission of the Christian church and the imperialising mission of the state through the tools of Western science. By extension, humanism is core to what Michel Rolph Trouillot called the project of the West, a project that facilitated the constitution of an "Other" against which the European "us" elaborated itself while generating a system of disciplinary order that separated nature from culture (de la Cadena 2010). Ultimately, humanism legitimated the hierarchies of humanity created in and through the new forms of production and labour organisation that emerged in the so-called "New World" with the development of plantation-based agriculture. The mechanism of this "Othering" was race, a modern classificatory principle and tool of domination that became the secular modality for organising inequality, disregarding Indigenous forms of knowledge and justifying slavery. At the core of twentieth-century humanism was a secular imperialism grounded in white supremacy that operated within exclusive methodological approaches.

In contrast, radical humanism promotes a praxis of equality, connection and becoming that moves us beyond the anthropological conception of a liberal subject that is knowable and reducible to cultural units and ethnographic data. Thus, a radically humanist anthropology departs from the humanism and universalism of earlier centuries, which never abandoned the subject-object distinction and remained entangled with the hierarchies of positivist certainty. By adopting a critical humanism that foregrounds the ethical and political life of our "interlocutors," we can take seriously the call to abandon anthropology's liberal suppositions. This project involves highlighting connections and refusing the presumption that individuals are knowable "subjects" whose inner motives and social lives are transparent. Instead, we can use abduction to embed the life worlds of people in the forms of bricolage and contradiction that constitute their dynamic existence.

What distinguishes today's call for a radical humanism in anthropology is the insistence on the urgency of moving away from the tools of positivism, which have detached science from humanity and produced distancing in anthropological practice. In contrast to positivism, radical humanism involves undoing the fictional coherence of social science logics and refusing modernity's claim to establish institutional norms that generate forms of knowledge centred

on the Global North. Today, students and faculty alike are demanding an end to the valorisation of a field dominated by institutional white supremacy, which has not only ordered anthropological writing, practices and principles, but has also shaped the modes of thought that determine the validity of anthropological knowledge. Meanwhile, in the Global South, in Northern and Southern classrooms, in labs and in public spaces, anthropology's tools and methods are being reformulated or abandoned as the forms of knowledge upon which they are based are being destabilised. Thus, we see that the decolonisation of anthropology involves much more than rethinking how the field poses the relationship between theory and practice. It *calls for a new politics of ethics, a politics of engagement,* a politics of practice and humanity that does not only have the effect of consolidating power and knowledge through the "not knowing" of positivist detachment.

What I am arguing is that anthropology—its methods and canon—has played and continues to play a role in this not knowing. Yet this must and can change. We can rewrite the way we envision the field. We can relearn its logic and teach it through its exclusions. Radical humanism—conceived as the overcoming of the atomised, knowable liberal subject (see also The Radical Humanism Initiative)—can get us there, for it allows us to challenge and undo the mechanisms of estrangement that have constituted the discipline and our various worlds in the process. In paving the way for *an anthropology of connection, the ethics and politics of attachment* can help us rethink the logics that underpin detachment and the stories we tell about them.

**Kamari Clarke**
*University of Toronto,*
Kamari.clarke@utoronto.ca

## Acknowledgements

Thanks to CASCA for commissioning this paper as a keynote for the 2021 Annual meeting. Special thanks to those who offered input and considerable feedback—Kristin Bright, Jennifer Burrell, Lieba Fairer, Ariana Hernandez-Reguant, Sara Kendall—and a tremendous thank you to Nicholas Smith, my invaluable research assistant on this project.

## Notes

1 Those killed included children Katricia Dotson (Tree), Netta, Delisha, Phil and Tomasa Africa and adults Rhonda, Teresa, Frank, CP, Conrad and John Africa (1931–85). Only two people survived: thirteen-year-old Birdie Africa and Ramona Africa. Following her release from jail (where she had been incarcerated on charges of riot and conspiracy), Ramona Africa sought to achieve justice for her family. In 1996, a federal jury ordered the city to pay a $1.5-million civil suit judgment to Ramona Africa and to relatives of the eleven people killed in the bombing. In November 2020, the city of Philadelphia formally apologised for the 1985 MOVE bombing. No compensation was included in this apology, and it later appeared that the remains of two of the Africa children had never been returned. Following political protests and negotiations with the Africa family, Tree and Delisha's remains were finally set to rest on Friday May 7, 2021.

2 Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/04/30/philadelphia-move-bombing-bones-upenn/

3 Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/04/30/philadelphia-move-bombing-bones-upenn/. On the anniversary of the MOVE bombing, the Africa family established May 13 as an annual day of "observation, reflection and recommitment". On a day when one expected to find solace in the final burial of all the MOVE members, the mayor of the city of Philadelphia announced that a few years earlier the city's health commissioner had become aware that the city still had the remains of victims of the MOVE bombing and that he "made a decision to cremate and dispose of them [the bones]" (Fitzsimons 2021).

4 Source: https://billypenn.com/2021/04/21/move-bombing-penn-museum-bones-remains-princeton-africa/

5 Mike Africa to *The Guardian*: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/apr/22/move-bombing-black-children-bones-philadelphia-princeton-pennsylvania

6 The Morton collection contains more than 1,300 crania, most of which are the remains of exhumed individuals stolen by grave robbers. Included in the collection are the skulls of many enslaved US individuals. Samuel George Morton (1799–1851) was a Philadelphia-based physician and anatomy lecturer who worked at the Academy of Natural Sciences. Morton's research on crania sought to establish the intellectual, moral and physical supremacy of white Europeans, especially those of German and English ancestry. After his death in 1851, the Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia purchased and expanded the collection. It was moved to the Penn Museum in 1966. Other prominent osteological collections with historical significance in the discipline of Physical Anthropology include the Hamman-Todd

collection, the Robert J. Terry collection and the Cobb collection. These collections are composed of deceased individuals obtained from the medical system, by way of purchase and donation in the case of the Cobb Collection and through the appropriation of "unclaimed" bodies in the case of the Hamman-Todd and Terry collections. As with the Morton collection, these collections depend upon the social marginalization of the individuals that compose them (see de la Cova 2019).

Sources: https://www.penn.museum/sites/morton/, https://uh.edu/engines/epi3221.htm, https://www.cobbresearchlab.com/collections/overview. See also https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/may/07/decolonising-museums-isnt-part-of-a-culture-war-its-about-keeping-them-relevant.

7 The most infamous is the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. This experiment spanned forty years, from the fall of 1932 until press leaks put an end to the project in 1972. It was run by the Public Health Service and conscripted Black men, many of them poor, to be tested and treated for "bad blood" and rheumatism. The participants were not told that the study primarily concerned the evolution of syphilis, a deadly venereal disease which affected two-thirds of participants and which was left to progress untreated. The experimental gynaecological surgeries performed by James Marion Sims are another example of scientific violence, in this case enacted upon enslaved Black Women. So too is the extraction of cervical cells from the body of Henrietta Lacks without her knowledge or consent.

Sources: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/05/16/youve-got-bad-blood-the-horror-of-the-tuskegee-syphilis-experiment/, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00340-5, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02494-z.

8 In a recent reflection in the *History of Anthropology Review*, Deborah Thomas explores how the University acts as a space of enclosure that facilitates the continuation of colonial violence and extraction. Enclosure, Thomas argues, not only refers to the material or physical state of being held, but "encompasses the spatial, temporal and psychic forms of restriction that confine our existence and our imagination." Source: https://histanthro.org/news/observations/enclosures-and-extraction/.

9 Michael Blakey, in a recent interview with Jemima Pierre, outlines the ways that race became fundamental to the development not only of anthropology but of science generally. Blakey links the violence of scientific racism to the confusion of two understandings of objectivity. On the one hand, there is an understanding of objectivity as a reference to the centrality of objects and evidence in the pursuit of knowledge. On the other hand, there is an understanding of objectivity as a presumption of neutrality or as "the ability to ascertain universal truths from observation." When we are unable to distinguish one from the other, argues Blakey, the table is set for

the enactment of violence on the grounds of presumed natural happenstance. Source: https://www.blackagendareport.com/anthropology-racial-science-and-harvesting-black-bones-dr-michael-blakey-interviewed-dr-jemima.

10 Though both Benedict and Boas funded Deloria's work, there is no evidence that they ever tried to help her get the credentials she needed to conduct her own research projects. This seems especially glaring considering that Benedict and Boas repeatedly went to great lengths to support other scholars. Boas fast-tracked Benedict through the PhD program. Benedict frequently arranged scholarships for her students (including Mead), but does not seem to have done so for Deloria despite her vast fieldwork experience.

## References


Allen, Jafari, and Ryan Jobson. 2016. "The Decolonizing Generation: (Race and) Theory in Anthropology since the Eighties." *Current Anthropology* 57 (2): 129–48.

Anderson, Mark. 2019. *From Boas to Black Power: Racism, Liberalism, and American Anthropology*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Asad, Talal, ed. 1973. *Anthropology & the Colonial Encounter*. London: Ithaca Press.

Baker, Lee. 1998. *From Savage to Negro: Anthropology and the Construction of Race, 1896–1954*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

——. 2004. "Franz Boas out of the Ivory Tower." *Anthropological Theory* 4 (1): 29–51.

Benedict, Ruth. 2005 [1934]. *Patterns of Culture*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Berman, Janet. 1996. "The Culture as It Appears to the Indian Himself: Boas, George Hunt, and the Methods of Ethnography." In *Volksgeist as Method and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the German Anthropological Tradition*, edited by George W. Stocking, Jr., 215–56. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Blakey, Michael L. 1999. "Scientific Racism and the Biological Concept of Race." *Literature and Psychology* 45 (1/2): 29–43.

——. 2020. "Understanding Racism in Physical (Biological) Anthropology." *American Journal of Physical Anthropology* 175 (2): 316–25.

Boas, Franz. 1887. "The Study of Geography." *Science* 9: 137–41.

——. (1888) 1940. "The Aims of Ethnology." In *Race, Language and Culture*, 626–38. New York: Macmillan.

——. 1909. *The Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island.* Publications of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, 5, part 2: 301–22.

——. 1920. "The Methods of Ethnology." *American Anthropologist* 22 (4): 311–21.

——. 1932. "The Aims of Anthropological Research." *Science* 76: 605–13.

——. (1935) 1978. "Preface." In Zora Neale Hurston, *Mules and Men*, ix–x. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Bochner, Arthur. 2001. "Narrative's Virtues." *Qualitative Inquiry* 7 (2): 131–57.

Bonnie, Sarah, and Susan Krook. 2018. "The Mentoring of Miss Deloria: Poetics, Politics, and the Test of Tradition." *American Indian Quarterly* 42 (3): 281–305.

Browne, Simone. 2015. *Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Candea, Matei. 2018. "Severed Roots: Evolutionism, Diffusionism and (Structural-) Functionalism." In *Schools and Styles of Anthropological Theory*, ed. Matei Candea, 18–59. New York: Routledge.

Cannizzo, Jeanne. 1983. "George Hunt and the Invention of Kwakiutl Culture." *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie* 20 (1): 44–58.

Clifford, James. 1983. "On Ethnographic Authority." *Representations* 2: 118–46.

Copson, Andrew. 2015. "What Is Humanism?" In *The Wiley Blackwell Handbook of Humanism*, edited by Andrew Copson and A. C. Grayling, 1–33. London: Wiley Blackwell.

Cotera, Maria Eugenia. 2004. "All My Relatives Are Noble": Recovering the Feminine in Ella Cara Deloria's *Waterlily*." *American Indian Quarterly* 28 (1/2): 52–72.

——. 2008. *Native Speakers: Ella Deloria, Zora Neale Hurston, Jovita Gonzalez, and the Poetics of Culture.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

da Silva, Denise Ferreira. 2007. *Toward a Global Idea of Race.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

——. 2017. "The Banalization of Racial Events." *Theory & Event* 20 (1): 61–65.

Darnell, Regna. 2001. *Invisible Genealogies: A History of Americanist Anthropology*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

de la Cadena, Marisol. 2010. "Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes: Conceptual Reflections beyond 'Politics.'" *Cultural Anthropology* 25 (2): 334–70.

de la Cova, Carlina. 2019. "Marginalized Bodies and the Construction of the Robert J. Terry Anatomical Skeletal Collection: A Promised Land Lost." In *Bioarchaeology of Marginalized People*, edited by Madeleine L. Mant and Alyson Jaagumägi Holland, 133–55. London: Academic Press.

Deloria, Ella Cara. 1932. *Franz Boas Papers.* Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society.

——. 2009. *Waterlily*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Derrida, Jacques. 2001. *The Work of Mourning*. Edited by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

DiGangi, Elizabeth A., and Jonathan Bethard. 2021. "Uncloaking a Lost Cause: Decolonizing Ancestry Estimation in the United States." *American Journal of Physical Anthropology* 175 (2): 422–36.

Doucet Battle, James. 2016. "Sweet Salvation: One Black Church, Diabetes Outreach, and Trust." *Transforming Anthropology* 24 (2): 125–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/traa.12073.

Fabian, Johannes. 1983. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Finn, Janet. 1993. "Ella Cara Deloria and Mourning Dove: Writing for Culture, Writing against the Grain." *Critique of Anthropology* 13 (4): 335–49.

Fitzsimons, Tim. 2021. "Philadelphia Health Commissioner Resigns after Cremating MOVE Bombing Remains." *NBC News*, May 13. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/philadelphia-health-commissioner-resigns-after-cremating-move-bombing-remains-n1267316.

Gardner, Susan. 2003. "'Though it Broke My Heart to Cut Some Bits I Fancied': Ella Deloria's Original Design for *Waterlily*." *American Indian Quarterly* 27 (3/4): 667–96.

——. 2009. "Introduction." In Ella Cara Deloria, *Waterlily*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures.* New York: Basic Books.

Goldenweiser, Alexander. 1933. *History, Psychology and Culture*. New York: Knopf.

Goodson, Ivor, and Scherto Gill. 2011. "The Narrative Turn in Social Research." *Counterpoints* 386: 17–33.

Harrison, Faye V. 1990 "'Three Women, One Struggle': Anthropology, Performance, and Pedagogy." *Transforming Anthropology* 1 (1): 1–9.

——. 1995. "The Persistent Power of 'Race' in the Cultural and Political Economy of Racism." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1): 47–74.

——. ed. 2011. *Decolonizing Anthropology: Moving Further toward an Anthropology for Liberation*, 3rd edition. American Anthropological Association.

Harrison, Faye V. and Ira Harrison, (eds.). 1999. *African American Pioneers in Anthropology.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Harrison, Faye V. and Donald Nonini. 1992. "Introduction to W. E. B. Du Bois." *Critique of Anthropology* 12 (3): 229–37.

Hartman, Saidiya. 2019. *Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Riotous Black Girls, Troublesome Women, and Queer Radicals*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Hicks, Dan. 2013. "Four-Field Anthropology: Charter Myths and Time Warps from St. Louis to Oxford." *Current Anthropology* 54, no. 6: 753–63.

Hill, Lynda. 1993. "Social Rituals and The Verbal Art of Zora Neale Hurston." PhD Diss, New York University.

Hurston, Zora Neale. (1934) 2020. "Characteristics of Negro Expression." In *Within the Circle*, 79–94. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

——. 1934. *Franz Boas Papers*. Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society.

——. (1935) 1978. *Mules and Men*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

——. (1943) 2019. *High John De Conquer*. Rockville, MD: Wildside Press.

——. 2002. *Zora Neale Hurston: A Life in Letters*. Edited by Carla Kaplan. New York: Doubleday.

——. 2018. *Barracoon: The Story of the Last Black Cargo*. New York: Amistad.

Jackson, Zakiyyah Iman. 2020. *Becoming Human: Matter and Meaning in an Antiblack World*. New York: NYU Press.

Kalos-Kaplan, Elizabeth. 2016. "'Making a Way out of No Way': Zora Neale Hurston's Hidden Discourse of Resistance." PhD Diss., Tulane University.

Kovach, Margaret. 2021. *Indigenous Methodologies: Characteristics, Conversations, and Contexts.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Kroeber, A. L. 1943. "Franz Boas: 1858–1942." *Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association* 61.

Lacy, Sarah A., and Ashton Rome. 2017. "(Re)Politicizing the Anthropologist in the Age of Neoliberalism and #Blacklivesmatter." *Transforming Anthropology* 25 (2): 171–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/traa.12115.

Law, John. 2015. "What's Wrong with a One-World World?" *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory* 16 (1): 126–39.

Li, Darryl, 2021. "Genres of Universalism: Reading Race into International Law, with Help from Sylvia Wynter." *UCLA Law Review* 67 (6): 1686–1719.

McKittrick, Katherine. 2020. *Dear Science and Other Stories*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Meisenhelder, Susan. 2001. *Hitting a Straight Lick with a Crooked Stick: Race and Gender in the Work of Zora Neale Hurston.* Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Mignolo, Walter. 2015. "Sylvia Wynter: What Does it Mean to be Human?" In *Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis*, edited by Katherine McKittrick, 106–23. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Mignolo, Walter and Catherine E. Walsh. 2018. *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Mikell, Gwen. 1999. "Feminist and Black Culture in the Ethnography of Zora Neale Hurston." In *African American Pioneers in Anthropology*, edited by Faye Harrison and Ira Harrison, 51–69. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Mitchell, Paul W. 2021. "Editor's Introduction: The Morton Cranial Collection and Legacies of Scientific Racism in Museums." *History of Anthropology Review* 45. https://histanthro.org/news/observations/editors-introduction-morton/.

Omura, Keiichi, Grant Jun Otsuki, Shiho Satsuka, and Atsuro Morita, eds. 2018. *The World Multiple: The Quotidian Politics of Knowing and Generating Entangled Worlds*. New York: Routledge.

Ortner, Sherry B. 1984. "Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26 (1): 126–66.

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1998. The essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings 2. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Radin, Paul. 1933. *The Method and Theory of Ethnology*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Reichertz, Jo. 2004. "Abduction, Deduction and Induction in Qualitative Research" In *A Companion to Qualitative Research*, edited by Uwe Flick, Ernst Von Kardoff, and Ines Steinke, 159-164 . London: Sage Publications.

Roscoe, Paul. 1995. "The Perils of 'Positivism' in Cultural Anthropology." *American Anthropologist* 97 (3): 492–504.

Rothchild, Irving. 2006. "Induction, Deduction, and the Scientific Method: An Eclectic Overview of the Practice of Science." Madison, WI: Society for the Study of Reproduction. https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/SSR/fbd87d69-d53f-458a-8220-829febdf990b/UploadedImages/Documents/rothchild_scimethod.pdf.

Sharpe, Christina. 2016. *In the Wake: On Blackness and Being*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Smedley, Audrey. 1993. *Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

——. 1998. "'Race' and the Construction of Human Identity." *American Anthropologist* 100 (3): 690–702.

Sondheim, Stephen. 1970. "The Anthropologist as Hero." In *Claude Lévi–Strauss: The Anthropologist as Hero,* edited by E. N. Hayes and T. Hayes, 184–96. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Spier, Leslie. 1943. "Franz Boas and Some of his Views." *Acta Americana* 1: 108–27.

Stocking, George W., Jr. 1992. *The Ethnographer's Magic and Other Essays in the History of Anthropology*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Teslow, Tracy. 2014. *Constructing Race: The Science of Bodies and Cultures in American Anthropology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. 2003. "Anthropology and the Savage Slot: The Poetics and Politics of Otherness." In *Global Transformations*, 7–28. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Urry, John. 1972. "'Notes and Queries on Anthropology' and the Development of Field Methods in British Anthropology, 1870–1920." *Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 45–57.

Washington, Harriet A. 2006. *Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present*. New York: Doubleday Books.

White, Leslie. 1963. *The Ethnography and Ethnology of Franz Boas.* Austin, TX: Texas Memorial Museum.

Willis, William. 1972. "Skeletons in the Anthropological Closet." In *Reinventing Anthropology*, edited by Dell Hymes, 121–52. New York: Random House.

Williams, Vernon J., Jr. 1996. *Rethinking Race: Franz Boas and his Contemporaries*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Wolf, Eric. 1982. *Europe and the People Without History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wynter, Sylvia. 2001. "Towards the Sociogenic Principle: Fanon, Identity, the Puzzle of Conscious Experience, and What it is Like to Be 'Black.'" In *National Identities and Sociopolitical Changes in Latin America*, edited by Mercedes F. Durán-Cogan and Antonio Gómez-Moriana, 30–66. New York: Routledge.

——. 2003. "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, after Man, Its Overrepresentation—An argument." *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3 (3): 257–337.

——. 2005. "Race and Our Biocentric Belief System: An Interview with Sylvia Wynter." In *Black Education: A Transformative Research and Action Agenda for the New Century*, edited by Joyce E. King, 361–66. Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association.