Ideology and Elementary Structures

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article démontre comment la vie sociale et économique s'organise selon des idéologies qui manipulent les éléments matériels afin d'effectuer certaines sortes d'arrangements de production. On y compare les idéologies d'incorporation territoriales selon des liens de parenté ou de "reproduction". Les idées de Lévi-Strauss sur "l'atome de parenté" et la relation entre "structure" et "sentiment" sont réexaminées en fonction de ces idéologies.

> *A kinship system does not consist in the objective ties of descent or consanguinity between individuals. It exists only in human consciousness; it is an arbitrary system of representations, not the spontaneous development of a real situation.*
>
> (Lévi-Strauss 1968: 50)

INTRODUCTION

Needham has said 'there is no such thing as kinship, and it follows that there can be no such thing as kinship theory' (1971b: 5). Insofar as kinship is taken to be relations of blood or reproduction (however procreation is defined), and insofar as no people have ever used *just* these ties as a basis for ordering activities, then it does indeed follow that there can be no such thing, at least, as a kinship *system*. And it follows that if there are no kinship systems there are no elementary structures of kinship. In other words, Radcliffe-Brown's work on kinship based on his theory of 'relationships of the first order' (1941), and Lévi-Strauss's based on his 'atom of kinship', however brilliant they may be in their own terms, are quite beside the point. What they claim to be studying does not really exist.

But if we accept that relations of reproduction within a cultural definition of the processes involved may be used by the people

practising them to *construct models* for ordering other kinds of relations and that relations of reproduction take their definition, in part, from still other constructs which we call forms of marriage, then we may at least proceed with the analysis of *something*, whether we choose to label it 'kinship' or not. For instance, property may be regulated by selecting a principle of continuity through males, through females or through both.

A corollary is 'locality' or the relation of people to, and in, space. As in the case of kinship no people have ever used just proximity or territorial considerations as the sole basis for ordering their activities. But they have developed constructs out of this domain for ordering other kinds of relations. They have done this by contextualizing locality into domicile, meeting place, work place, birth place and so on in order to regulate such things as property rights and marriage.

Kinship and locality, then, cannot be studied as objective, material relations; a constructed kinship and local universe is 'given' in the human condition. Their domains are already classified and signified in terms of discrete human activities within their respective praxes — which brings us to the question of production.

Production has always taken place within a 'kinship' and 'local' context, that is within an already structured universe built from relations of 'reproduction' and spatial arrangements. Production activities both structure and are structured by these constructs. They structure them by requiring continuity in a particular form and by bringing people into a particular kind of working arrangement 'on the ground' — all in the interests of making a living. Production activities are structured by 'kinship' and 'locality' constructs in turn in that once particular spatial contexts are selected out and used as a basis for fixing and defining relations between people, and once particular 'kinship' associations are chosen over others to also fix and define people, the constructs themselves become determining, mediating forces in human activity, activity which is, first and foremost, concerned with production. It is in this sense that both 'kinship' and 'locality' are ideologies in the dual sense of the term (see Godelier 1976: 46). On the one hand they are the surface of social relations, a more or less accurate representation of the reality of the time, and, on the other, they

are an internal and necessary component in the relations of production. That is, they both describe and structure people's on the ground interactions and activities. In this dual role as representations and mediations kinship and locality cease to be and become something else, a something else which is only *partially* what it once was, now standing as a human construct at a level of abstraction above its former, objective, self. Nature becomes culture; culture restructures nature.

Like ideology, then, what we call 'material reality' also has a dual aspect: it includes concrete activities such as people producing, reproducing and habitating, but simultaneously it includes activities formulated out of the constructs from these already constructed activities. In theory it is only under crisis conditions that these two layers of ideology are stripped away to lay bare the more fundamental layers of reality, but even here that reality is never grasped *in toto* in all its possible contexts in space and in all its possible connections through kinship, but is only partially consulted. New aspects of kinship and locality may be selected out to form the basis for reordering activities in the interests of new production requirements but they are selected out of an historically developed matrix.

Strictly speaking, then, there is no such thing as kinship and locality but only 'kinship' and "kinship", 'locality' and "locality". The underlying concern with kinship and locality in human societies, then, is with developing, applying or reconsulting them as ideologies and partial ideologies in the service of ordering people and resources in the interests of human existence. The relationship of the four domains — kinship, locality, production, ideology — can now be expressed as follows:



Here, kinship and locality are two mutually-exclusive domains from which are selected certain factors and relations to form the basis of ideologies leading to certain kinds of production arrangements. There are two elementary forms of production association: on the one hand, people may group together in sufficient numbers over such sufficient resources that they can exist more or less independently of other people; on the other hand, people may group in such numbers over insufficient resources that they cannot exist independently but must establish alliance relations with other people.

To effect the first arrangement people will apply an incorporative principle of group formation at some level of organization; to effect the second, they will apply a confederational one. The first formation is most effectively accomplished and maintained by selection and development of a principle(s) of association from the 'local' domain, and the second one from a 'descent' principle(s) in the 'kinship' domain.

Although people may select a 'formal' principle of association from one domain over the other as the *basis* for ordering relations at some level, the other domain is, nevertheless, present in some form. However, the form it takes *follows from* the kind of principle which has been selected from the domain which is *dominant* in the society in question and which has been formalized in ideology and practice. In other words, people who utilize a 'kinship' principle are still related in space and 'space' but 'space' is here derived from a 'kinship' principle of order, not a 'locality' one. On the other hand, people who utilize a 'locality' principle still have kinship and 'kinship', but here 'kinship' follows from the kind of 'locality' principle utilized.

'Locality' in a 'kinship'-based society is, *by definition,* both residential and possessory. It is the nature of kinship-confederational logic that members or representatives be sent out, but maintain their association with the core. The territorial integrity of core and production group is thus fractured and 'locality' cannot develop as an integrated category reflecting the residential situation. In order to maintain the production base of the core group and the integrity of the residentially 'fractured' total group, locality becomes 'locality' and ownership develops as an ideological principle, independent of residence. That is, members of the group

may live in one place while 'owning' another. 'The two dimensions, genealogy [here, the 'kinship' principle] and social/territorial category [possessors and that which is possessed] are inextricably intertwined...' (Turner 1977: 32).

The type of 'kinship' principle utilized to effect this proprietory relationship will, in turn, affect residential patterns in space, but indirectly through the mediation of the mode of production. If, for example, the society were matrilineal *and* the economy required that women remained collectively attached to the land of the 'lineage', it would be the men who found themselves elsewhere through marriage. If, however, the situation were reversed, it would be the women who would be mobile on marriage.

In a situation where the dominant principle of association is a 'locality' one, people will still have 'kinship' organization but it will follow from the kind of 'locality' principle utilized. For instance, where people are contained within the territory of origin over the generations, in time all members would come to be related in kinship terms. An ideology is then likely to develop closely reflecting this *consequential* arrangement. Here the 'kinship' system is likely to appear as a cognatic or genealogically-based one and would remain so as long as production associations continued to be formed within the territory concerned and did not become ordered primarily through the 'kinship' principle adopted.

Kinship-confederational and locality-incorporative principles are 'elementary' in two senses: first, they are historically prior, structuring total social formations at a hunter-gatherer level of subsistence; second, they are universally applicable, expressing a logic of relations between elements at some level of any formation's organization. Hunters like the Cree of northern Canada, for instance, utilize a locality principle of group formation based on residence within a range in order to promote cohesion and co-operation between fellow producers and to maximize pragmatic associations within the band. All share the same range and one may go anywhere within it and with whom one pleases. A consequence is that conflict and competition are heightened between people of different ranges, but are reduced within the range. On the other hand, in a lineal-exogamous system of the kinship-con-

federational type such as the Australians possess, conflict and competition is heightened between certain co-producers who live together, like husband and wife, while it is reduced between the owners of different territories through the gravitational process which draws people back to their respective homelands after marriage but in association with representatives of these other groups (e.g., spouse, spouse's siblings).

With the problem of the production community resolved at the band level systems like the Cree's allow a potential development which is precluded in systems based on Australian-like principles. Relations and associations can come to be based on the fact of coproduction itself. In lineal-exogamous systems, co-production simultaneously involves people with mutually exclusive ties throughout one's lifetime (one becomes a spouse but does not cease being a sibling).

In more complex societies, these two sets of organizing principles which are found relatively independently of one another in some hunter-gatherer societies, are intermingled but at different levels. In the modern non-ethnic nation state, for example, a territorial, residential ('locality') principle is employed as the basis for establishing rights and duties and for promoting cohesion at the national (where you are born or reside for a specified time), provincial (where you reside), county and township levels. The same principle is now also employed even at the domestic level where many rights and duties stem not only from the marriage contract but also rest on the fact of common residence (see, for example the recent changes in the Ontario Family Law Act). Indeed, in the 15th century our word 'family' meant 'domestic group or household', a meaning it still retains today in addition to its more modern aspect — 'a set of parents and children or relations' (see Silverman 1979 for an extended discussion). In the context of the nation state, none of the groupings mentioned above is a production grouping except, on occasion, the family. But, as we would expect in a system transformed out of a locality-incorporative hunter-gatherer base, co-production itself is as important a principle of association as 'locality' (i.e., groupings through work or class membership). As we would also expect, 'kinship' here assumes basically a cognatic form but of shallow generation depth. Relations established within

the cognatic grid are, to a point, negotiable and pragmatic (Schneider 1968).

One area where kinship-confederational logic is apparent in the modern world is in relations *between* nation states. In inter-relations these territorial jurisdictions act as kinship-confederational units; but here it is not spouses who are moved between such groupings in order to maintain alliances, but rather goods, services, organizations and personnel. First, 'kinship' (here, parent-age) is one criterion for membership in the nation state; second, citizenships are generally mutually exclusive; and, third, many nation states do refuse to allow themselves to be self-sufficient in order to force relations with other nation states (as Canada under the Liberals has done). However, obviously the situation is more complex than this and requires analysis at all levels of organization in terms of both sets of polar principles outlined here. But rather than pursue this question I will restrict myself to a discussion of less complex societies where one set of principles operates to the virtual exclusion of the other, or where the arrangement involves a simple combination of both sets on the same or different levels of organization.

ELEMENTARY VARIATIONS

In the kinds of societies with which we are concerned here, marriage is the principal process through which incorporation or confederation is achieved; that is, it is the process through which production groupings are formed and maintained. In a locality-incorporative society, on marriage the man, the woman, or both become ideologically redefined as part of a new, relatively autonomous relation, perhaps involving still other people to whom they are related in particular ways. In a kinship-confederational system, the man and the woman remain ideologically attached to their exogamous groupings of origin. In conventional anthropological terms, the first system has a conjugal focus, the second, a sibling focus.

Variations on the locality-incorporative theme are as follows:

1. The man and the woman are incorporated into each other's already-established local, production relations.

2. The woman is incorporated into the local, production relations of the man.

3. The man is incorporated into the local, production relations of the woman.

In the first variation the husband will stand in the same relation to his wife's children as she does and both of them will stand in the same relation to their respective siblings' children. In the second variation the woman will stand in the same relation to her husband's children as he does and in the same relationship as him to his brother's children. In the third variation, the man will stand in the same relation to his wife's children as she does and in the same relation as her to her sister's children.

Variations on the kinship-confederational theme are the following:

1. The 'descent' principle selected from the kinship grid may be lineal in which case it may be through males only, through females only or through both. In each case alliances between the groups formed on such a basis may involve a symmetrical or asymmetrical exchange of partners and the rules governing such exchanges may be prescriptive or proscriptive in nature.

2. The 'descent' principle may be cognatic in which case it may be strictly genealogical and branch indefinitely or it may be an admixture of lines, paths and networks defined over any number of generations. Alliance principles may vary as above.

In lineal alliance systems, the wife and the husband will stand in a different relation to their own children. In a patrilineal system the woman's children will be defined as those of her husband's group and in a matrilineal system the man's children will be defined as those of his wife's group. In a cognatic system, if marriage is within the cognatic group, husband and wife should stand in the same relation to their own children; if it is outside they may not.

The simple combinations of principles from both themes are as follows:

1. People who utilize a 'descent' principle from the kinship domain may incorporate spouses from other lineal or cognatic groupings into their own. Here, the women may be incorporated into the men's 'descent' group or the men may be incorporated into the women's. These arrangements we may call kinship-incorporative.

2. People who utilize a 'locality' principle from the locality domain may permit marriage outside the local, co-production group, beyond the range within which autonomy is normally achieved, but refuse to allow the outsider-spouse the status of insider even with common residence and co-production. Here, the men may marry out but not the women, or the women and not the men, or both. These arrangements we may call locality-confederational.

It is tempting at this point to offer ethnographic examples of each variation and combination outlined thus far. Indeed, I have already done so in my discussion of Cree and Australian. The former fit quite neatly into variation 1 of the locality-incorporative theme and the Aranda, for example, into variation 1 of the kinship-confederational one where exchange is prescriptive and symmetrical (Turner 1978). However, I have studied these systems in depth myself and in re-analyzing other people's accounts of other societies certain problems of interpretation arise — as the reader will see when I deal with the Lele in the next part of the paper. While the Caribou Eskimo as reported by Vallee (1967) appear at first glance to be incorporating women into patrilocal groups, the terminological equations that should follow from this do not; they seem much closer to the Cree pattern. In Metge's (1976) account of the Maori cognatic clan system it is not clear what the entire system looks like from a female ego's point of view. The Toda (Rivers 1906) *could be* incorporating women into a patrilineal kinship group but the evidence is inconclusive. The Scottish Celts, according to Hubert (1934: 204), incorporated the wife into the cognatic clan of the husband if she came from another clan and then reversed the procedure so that if a man from a distant place came, on marriage, to the wife's clan he was incorporated into that clan. This had the effect of preventing the alienation of clan property through the 'foreign' spouse; for within the logic of the clan

system someone in their clan might press a claim through a genealogical connection to their clansperson's child in that other clan. From the points of view of the incorporators, however, the alien spouse had relinquished his or her former clan membership. However, we do not know the full terminological and jural consequences of such incorporations and it would be premature to assume the example to fit the 'type' at issue in all respects.

The situation is even more complex if we try and relate existing ethnographic accounts to variations of our themes which combine different principles at different levels of organization. Here, internal relations may be locality-incorporative and external, kinship-confederational or vice versa. But it is difficult to judge in concrete cases just what is dominant and what is subordinate in alliance considerations — village or clan, class or community. Among the North West Coast Indians of British Columbia, for instance, the village may be operating predominantly according to locality-incorporative logic despite the existence of clans but relations between villages according to kinship-confederational principles through clan alliances among the chiefly strata (Oberg 1973; Rosman and Rubel 1971). Similarly, while Bailey (1959) apparently provides us with an instance of the reverse situation with a village of intermarrying clans falling within a district, the district within the territorial jurisdiction of a chiefdom and the chiefdom within a kingdom, it is not clear that within the village marriage is not itself contracted primarily according to domestic coproduction considerations. If so the internal system is not kinship-confederational.

In short, the particular combinations of principles existent in any concrete situation can only be worked out with further research, including further fieldwork. The major justification for undertaking this task, it seems to me, is that the principles do seems to extend and deepen our understanding of analyses and ethnographies already established as classics within the discipline, as I hope to show in the next section. Even with this task complete, however, we would still be faced with the analysis of societies in which marriage is not the principle means of forming production communities. In fact, in the two examples mentioned above we begin to approach these kinds of societies; one set of principles at one level for marriage purposes but not production group formation,

the other set for production group formation but not via the use of marriage principles. In other words, the principles constituting our two polar models may be used to form various kinds of associations in more complex societies, be these corporations, classes, commonwealths and so on, by offering or withholding such things as resources, political allegiance, knowledge and expertise or the means of destruction. I have mentioned how international relations generally follow kinship-confederation logic, but a qualification must be added. In the case of those countries formed through the historical process of British colonialism, the Commonwealth was an attempt at union along locality-incorporative lines which failed. Here the territories in question were not contiguous and the relations between the nations were unequal. In the case of Canada, however, continentalism is a process of unification which might well succeed. For here, although the relationship between Canada and the United States is grossly unequal, their territories are indeed contiguous and the Canadian federal jurisdiction upholds, and increasingly attempts to practice a locality-incorporative ideology in its dealing with its southern 'neighbour' (even if some provincial jurisdictions would not). This becomes particularly catalytic when that neighbour's foreign policy is kinship-confederational in theory but locality-incorporative in practice in North America.

At the domestic-family level, on the other hand, there is not the same ambiguity and our system is strictly locality-incorporative — as it also is on the township and county levels.

THE ATOM OF KINSHIP RECONSIDERED

At the outset of this paper I remarked that if there are no kinship systems there are no elementary structures of kinship. It would appear, however, that there are elementary structures but they are not *kinship* structures. This being the case, what do Radcliffe-Brown's and Lévi-Strauss's formulations to this effect represent?

Lévi-Strauss dealt with Radcliffe-Brown by transforming his 'relationships of the first order' (Radcliffe-Brown 1941: 2) from this,



to this (Lévi-Strauss 1968: 42),



What for Radcliffe-Brown is a structure of three relations — husband/wife, brother/sister, parent/child — for Lévi-Strauss is a structure of four — brother/sister, father/son, mother's brother/sister's son, husband/wife. Whereas for Radcliffe-Brown marriage is a secondary feature, the negative result of the incest taboo, varying in form with the structure of *descent,* for Lévi-Strauss it is the positive aspect of alliance relationships. In Lévi-Strauss's scheme, therefore, the elementary structure must include the wife-giver, mother's brother.

But seen within the framework I have outlined here, both Radcliffe-Brown's and Lévi-Strauss's 'elementary structures' are equally partial and secondary, although Lévi-Strauss's formulation, as we shall see, is the more 'anthropological' of the two. Central to Radcliffe-Brown's 'element' is the relation of *parents and children:* as we have seen this is a structural feature of one variation on our locality-incorporative system where husband and wife incorporate into a new group in a new locality. Paradoxically in this connection, Radcliffe-Brown's model asserts simultaneously that siblings remain as a unit through the 'life' of the system, a feature of the lineal-exogamous variation on the kinship-confederational

theme. Central to Lévi-Strauss's model is the relation of *father to son,* and this is a structural feature again of one variation, but on the kinship-confederational theme, that is, the patrilineal-exogamous system. But in contrast to Radcliffe-Brown, Lévi-Strauss is consistent in his formulation — it is lineal-exogamous throughout.

Placed within our framework Radcliffe-Brown's and Lévi-Strauss's schemes can be encompassed within these two representations:



The one on the left reflects a genealogical model of the locality-incorporative system with its shifting conjugal and sibling foci; the one on the right the kinship-confederational system with its focus fixed in sibling terms. We are careful not to exclude the possibility that it may be the men and women of the lineal grouping and not just the men who exchanged men and women (spouses) between such groupings. And we also recognize the structural importance of the mother-daughter (matrilineal) principle in many societies. But what even these two representations cannot express, however, are the aspects 'kinship' and 'locality' in the structuring process. The problem is that while Radcliffe-Brown's scheme expresses two planes (kinship and marriage), Lévi-Strauss's three (kinship, descent and alliance), and the present one four (kinship, descent, alliance and principle of production group formation), none give an adequate representation of the *levels* of complexity involved. In fact, within the first two frameworks there is no recognition of the locality domain at all. The strength of Lévi-Strauss's over Rad-

cliffe-Brown's formulation, apart from the alliance perspective on marriage, is that it does imply confederation as a process. As we have seen, Radcliffe-Brown's implies two mutually exclusive processes simultaneously.

The 'locality' aspect could be expressed as this in a system which is locality-incorporative:



Here the residential grouping is the 'family' and incorporation is at the domestic level. In a kinship-confederational arrangement, locality could be expressed in these terms:



Here the system is matrilineal and the grouping formed around that principle has *jurisdiction* over a locality. Residence itself may be along quite different lines and would have to be expressed by encircling the relevant set of relations with a solid line.

SENTIMENTS RESTRUCTURED

One of the most remarkable things about Lévi-Strauss's formulation of 'the atom of kinship' is its success in accounting for the relation between structure and sentiment in many of the societies anthropologists have traditionally dealt with. A formula derived from the relations within the model holds that the relationship of mother's brother to sister's son is to the brother-sister relation as the father-son relation is to that between husband and wife (MB/ZS:B/Z: :F/S:H/W) (Lévi-Strauss 1968: 42). That is, for example, if there is a positive relation between MB/ZS and a negative one between B/Z there should also be a positive and a negative relation between the F/S and the H/W. In fact the formula holds true for the Trobriand Islanders of Melanesia, the Siuai of Bougainville, the Cherkess of the Caucasus, the Tonga of Polynesia, the Lake Kubutu of New Guinea, the Dobuans also of Melanesia, the Lambumbu of the New Hebrides, the Mundugumor also of New Guinea, and, with an important qualification important to our purposes, to the Lele of the Kasai (Lévi-Strauss 1968: 45; 1977). Needham (197la: xlviii-lv) also reports that it holds for the Dinka, Kagura, Limba, Nyorom Toro, Gogo and Iatmul peoples among others. How are we to account for this within our scheme?

A cursory reading indicates that all of the above-mentioned peoples in some fashion utilize a lineal principle of descent, or at least a principle of exclusion which involves lineality in its formulation, suggesting these peoples fall within our kinship-confederational type. That is, they appear lineal-exogamous, at least for certain purposes or at certain stages in the life cycle of their members. While I cannot undertake a re-analysis of all these examples I can at least suggest that Lévi-Strauss's formula holds only in societies which are lineal-exogamous in structure or in *contexts* which are lineal-exogamous in societies where locality-incorporative processes are at work. For instance, the formula

might hold in relations after marriage but not before, or to relations with outsiders but not insiders or to relations before incorporation into another group or after and so on. Where the formula should not hold is in societies exclusively locality-incorporative or in contexts which are locality-incorporative in societies organized according to lineal-exogamous principles. To show what I mean I will analyse a society which is basically locality-incorporative and then turn to two of Lévi-Strauss's confirming cases.

Among the Swampy Cree of Shamattawa Manitoba affective relations assume the following form (a + indicates affection, co-operation and closeness; a — indicates restraint, avoidance and distance).

	before marriage	*after marriage*
parents children	+	+
brothers	+	+
sisters	+	+
brothers and sisters	+ tending toward	—
husband-wife	—	+
mother's brother/ sister's son	—	+ or — depending on personal factors

The data in the left-hand column tend to confirm Lévi-Strauss's thesis (—:+::+:—), while those in the right-hand column repudiate it. The problem with applying the formula in this society is twofold. First, there is the question of the relationships we are evaluating. The mother's brother's/sister's son relationship, for instance, is misdefined from the start. The term that happens to include the mother's brother in its ambience really means 'offspring of males of domestic groups of origin of females who married members of one's father's domestic group of origin the previous generation' (Turner and Wertman 1977: 59). At one level these are 'outsiders' (they are outside one's production network); at another level they are 'insiders' (they are within the range of potential fellow producers). A person *may* develop a positive tie to *some* of the people s/he calls by the term which expresses this relation or s/he may not depending largely on whom he or she even-

tually marries from among the offspring of people called by this term. Even here there is choice involved as to whether or not the wife's father will permit the development of a closer relation. The same comments can be made about the brother-sister relation defined by the formula — the Cree refer to a much wider circle of people and one cannot assume the same sentiment is felt toward all people in the category which includes actual brothers and sisters within its bounds.

This brings us to the second problem with the formula — the context of its application. If E/ego is unmarried we obtain one series, if married another. Prior to marriage in the Cree system E/ego sees things in very much the same terms as his or her siblings (the fur-trade traditional system is even mildly lineal although the generation span really only includes father and son). After marriage, however, all this changes. Brother and sister go away to form their own incorporating units at the domestic and brotherhood levels through same sex links to (minimally) the offspring of their parents same sex siblings, and through links formed by the marriages of one's same sex siblings. Brother and sister now begin to enter different production communities or networks and begin to 'drift apart'. This process is aided by the fact that there is no cultural principle of lineality which continually defines them in relation to the group of origin (although the introduction of patronymics works toward such a principle). Once we realize that there is a sibling focus at some stage in the life cycle we can at least use Lévi-Strauss's formula to predict the structure of sentiment before marriage. On the other hand a more complete analysis reveals a bias in the formula and supports our contention that it applies only in lineal-exogamus contexts.

Lévi-Strauss comes close to this realization himself in his analysis of the Lele (1977: 94-108). According to him sentiments are structured in the following way in this matrilineal society:

	before marriage		*after marriage*
MB/ZS	—	MMB/ZDS	+
F/S	+		—
B/Z	—		—
H/W	+		+

While at first glance this would seem to conform to Lévi-Strauss's formula in both contexts there are two problems with his presentation. First, the H/W relation noted in the left-hand column involves Ego's parents while in the right-hand column it, in fact, relates to Ego's own marriage. Second, the MB/ZS relation on the left column becomes a MMB/ZDS relation in the right, and some mental gymnastics are required to effect this transformation. The first problem is simply ignored. One series, then, really has only three relations and the other has four but one is a new relation. This new relation is there, according to Lévi-Strauss, because the MMB is really the wife-giver from Ego's point of view, not the MB. But if this is the case, the MMB should also have been included in the left-hand column. As wife-giver the MMB/ZDS relation is one of closeness and affection Lévi-Strauss says. But the MMB is also in Ego's clan and one would expect a certain amount of authority to be expressed, as is the case with the MB. Apparently not says Lévi-Strauss as there is a close bond between people of alternate generations.

Now while all of this might be true a more economical explanation of the transformation of the structure of sentiments from the left-hand to the right-hand column, taking into account the switch in focus from the parental to Ego's generation in the case of the H/W relation, is that men are somehow incorporated into the wives' groups (matriclan, local clan segment?) after marriage. If this was the case the MMB, or the MB for that matter, would now no longer stand in an authority relation to the ZDS (ZS in the case of MB) but would now stand toward him as his father did before his marriage — as someone outside his own matriclan or local clan segment. Hence the positive nature of the MMB/ZDS relation. Ego's father would now assume a structural position more akin to someone *inside* his own matriclan or local clan segment and therefore assume more of a position of authority toward him. Hence the negative father-son relation after the son's marriage.

This hypothesis would also explain why the B/Z relation is negative after they marry — brother is incorporated into a new matriclan or local clan segment while sister remains where she is; their respective interests and associations continue to diverge. But why is their relation also negative *before* marriage? Douglas,

the Lele's ethnographer, and Lévi-Strauss following her (1977: 108-109), suggest that there is a structural opposition along sex lines in Lele society such that the men control the movements of women between groups and the women control the continuity of the clan and its male and female members. The women also remain closely aligned for production purposes. This division may be related to a contradiction between actual male dominance in practical activities and female ideological dominance within the matriclan where they embody the cultural principle of lineality responsible for clan continuity and where they, theoretically, incorporate the men of other clans or local clan segments through marriage.

For direct evidence of incorporation as a process we must turn to Douglas' own account of the Lele system (1963), and even here we must resist the temptation to view the Lele entirely through Douglas eyes, or should I say through the eyes of the British tradition of structural anthropology emanating from Radcliffe-Brown. Here are some of the things Douglas reports in passing. First, the Lele are organized into local clan sections or villages and within the section the group of men who coproduce and reside together do not necessarily belong to the same matriclan (pp. 96-97). Men from other clans are in fact recruited to a local clan section's 'core group' and are given the same status as the men already there, usually with marriage to unmarried women of the core group or to a wife of a core group member (p. 98). That is, incorporation is effected through marriage to a woman of the matriclan into which the males of the core group have married — the clan of these men's wives, daughters and daughter's daughters. Once in the local clan section by marriage and residence a man becomes 'brother' to the man already there (p. 96). The man, then, is incorporated into a group of men *ideologically defined* as belonging to a particular category but seems to be incorporated through the women there who belong to a different clan(s). Given that ideal marriage is with the mother's father's clan, all these men would, ideally, have married into the same matriclan:

> One way or another through its [the founding clan's] long association with the village, it was able to attract young men to marry a good proportion of its womenfolk locally, and so build up a large section... (Douglas 1963: 86).

We also learn from Douglas (p. 115) that the father had the 'final say' in the marriage of his daughter and controlled the future of his daughter's daughter. It is not the mother's brother or mother's mother's brother, then, who exercises ultimate jurisdiction as we could expect if the system were matrilineally *based.* The father could really only assume these rights here if he were incorporated in some fashion into the wife's clan or local clan section (as defined above) on marriage. From Douglas's own account it is not entirely clear what this process is and the Lele themselves seem intentionally ambiguous on the principles of group formation. But one thing at least is clear — it is not simply a case of matrilineages exchanging women among themselves. Incorporation is occuring at some level on marriage, seemingly into some kind of mixed lineal, local group and this process seems to take structural precedence over clan organization.

What is most important in Lévi-Strauss's analysis of the Lele is that he does, in fact, locate 'two "activating states" of the system, one corresponding to Ego's childhood and youth, of a classical type, and the other, which manifests itself when Ego reaches the age of marriage, constituting a transformation of the previous one' (Lévi-Strauss 1977: 100-101). The problem with his analysis, however, is that he treats the two states as transformations of the same theme when, in fact, they reflect two different themes: the first being lineal-exogamous, the second, locality-incorporative. Lévi-Strauss stays within the lineal-exogamus framework.

To illustrate how the principles defined here deepen our understanding of the kinds of societies Lévi-Strauss is most interested in I would like to turn to the Dobuan case. According to Lévi-Strauss (1968: 44) sentiments are structured along these lines in this matrilineal society:



However, according to Fortune, the chief ethnographer of these Melanesians, all these signs must be qualified and a number of additional relations and signs added. First, the father-child relation is positive in the context of the domestic group founded by the father; the relation becomes negative on the divorce of the parents. The mother-child relation, however, remains positive in such an eventuality (Fortune 1932: 15). The mother-daughter relation becomes negative only if the daughter remains in her father's village, where that village is far away from the mother's (p. 20). Second, the brother-sister relation, while normally positive, can become negative after their respective marriages (p. 8), while the relation between brothers is negative in the context of inheritance (p. 16). Third, while the relation between husband and wife is negative after marriage a positive one exists between prospective spouses (p. 10). Finally, the MB-ZS relation is positive in the context of betrothal (pp. 26-27) but is negative in the context of inheritance (p. 20), while the FZ/B's children relation is, by contrast, positive in the context of inheritance (p. 20).

In short, Lévi-Strauss's formula holds only under certain conditions — conditions which are imposed by lineal-exogamous logic operating at the *susu* or inheritance level. Here the situation can be represented in these terms:



At the domestic and village or coproduction levels, however, the system operates according to locality-incorporative principles which place a pressure on the above relations in this direction:



The resulting 'total system' involving both logics is ambivalent but in a predictable direction. Fortune's (1932: 19-20) own analysis of the Dobuan social structure reveals that a relation of tension exists between the 'marital grouping' and the *'susu'*, a tension which derives from the formation of production units (conjugal groups) from the juxtaposition of opposed 'kinship' groups *(susu).* This is why the prospective husband-wife relation can be positive before marriage — their respective *susu* are not yet involved. It also explains why the brother-sister relation can become negative after their respective marriages — each forms a new production unit with someone of the opposite sex in different clans and households; both are drawn from each other by their new domestic allegiances. The father-child relation becomes strained after divorce because the father will become incorporated into a new domestic group in another village while the mother, although joining another domestic group, remains tied to her children through their common membership in her *susu.* The mother/daughter relation becomes strained only through their 'divorce', that is, when the daughter goes to live in the father's village herself and allows her daughter to become incorporated into a *susu* in that village.

We can now also understand why the MB/ZS relation is positive in the context of betrothal but negative in inheritance matters. Marriage is first and foremost a village-domestic affair concerned with coproduction. Although it involves *susu* relations these are secondary and subordinate to locality-incorporative processes. The parents are therefore more involved in the marriage than the mother's brother (see Fortune 1932: 24-26, 29-30, 60). Temporarily, then, the father assumes a position of formal authority in relation to his son. In the context of inheritance within the *susu,* by contrast, it is the mother's brother who is in a position of authority and the father who is less threatening. Similarly, the FZ/brother's children relation is positive in the context of inheritance because the FZ has no jurisdiction over the brother's offspring who belong to a different *susu.*

Now where does all this leave Lévi-Strauss's 'atom of kinship' and for the matter, Radcliffe-Brown's 'relationships of the first order'? Insofar as both 'elementary structures' can be derived from elements and relations of a different order, I doubt that either can be taken as elementary either in a structural or an historical sense. The advantage of the model developed here is that it applies not only to societies which base their production arrangements primarily on marriage but also to societies where things other than men and women are exchanged or withheld to form production groupings. In these more complex societies the principles simply operate at other than 'kinship' or 'locality' levels.

Like the framework developed by Robin Fox (1967) this one recognizes the importance of residence and territoriality in structuring human associations, but in contrast to his does not attempt to deduce the universe (including those 'descent' systems which most interested Radcliffe-Brown and Lévi-Strauss) from first principles solely of that order.

How, then, did Radcliffe-Brown and Lévi-Strauss arrive at their respective formulations? Obviously a combination of intuition and scientific investigation but with Lév-Strauss perhaps the more faithful to the anthropological endeavour. Lévi-Strauss's model a basically non-Western 'kinship' arrangement (lineal-exogamous) but in Western terms by presenting group principles on an individual level (genealogical), while Radcliffe-Brown's portrays a Western

'kinship' arrangement (the result of applying locality-incorporative principles at the domestic level) but through non-Western group principles (sibling unity). Fox proceeds in much the same direction as Radcliffe-Brown but starts, more appropriately, from the domestic-residential context within which family and genealogical ties form while also recognizing the structural implications of marriage alliance. All three schemes are necessary stages in the history of ideas but all are partial and incomplete. The scheme offered here is also partial and incomplete but claims to subsume the previous three. Beyond filling out the internal structure of the scheme in all its combinations of elements and relations what needs to be done is relate it to the modern Western 'kinship' system in both structural and historical terms. My intuition is that we will find the 'atom of kinship' not at the base of this system, nor even in its past, but rather at the point of becoming.

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