

Colonial Transfer: Abandonment or Disguised Domination?

A Canadian Indian Reserve Case

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article étudie une séquence d'événements sur une réserve indienne du Canada où le transfert de pouvoir et de ressources à la bande par le gouvernement a conduit de fait à une perte de ressources et à la fragmentation du groupe indien. L'action de processus internes de règlements de conflits et d'adoption de certains buts ont préservé la bande de fragmentation et de pertes continues. L'auteur recommande une formule pour le transfert du pouvoir. En l'absence de techniques efficaces pour trouver ce que les gens veulent et pour les aider à l'obtenir, le transfert du pouvoir à des groupes dominés restera nominal et peut très bien être regardé comme un abandon ou une domination voilée.

The transfer of power to colonial territories and submerged ethnic groups has been the announced goal of several governments since World War 2. However, there is a gap between goal and performance. I propose to analyze the case of a Canadian Ojibwa Indian band in which some of the policies of governments, both federal and provincial, created fragmentation, internal conflict and loss of resources. These effects ran directly counter to the increased economic and political power which governments were outwardly trying to convey. In fact, some government policies did achieve partial success, but negative and conflict-creating policies came close to cancelling out all that had been achieved.

In the case of Eagle band, only the working of internal conflict-resolving processes has saved the band from continued fragmentation and loss. Eagle band is a fictitious label for an

Ojibwa community where I did field work for two years in several intermittent periods of residence between 1969 and 1974. I use the assumed name to protect confidences. Attention is focussed on Eagle band in the hope that it will provide a microcosm of colonial transfer and a set of principles that can be tested elsewhere.

Colonial transfer, as the term is used here, means that the dominant government hands over a substantial measure of decision-making authority, power and control of resources to the subordinate group. The subordinate group may be an internal colony, an internal interest group or an overseas territory. I include Canadian Indian reserves among internal colonies. Canadian Indians are a legally defined ethnic population category. Indian bands are units of this legally defined ethnic population: units which have been administered by a special branch of the federal government. Bands usually, but not always, hold rights to tracts of Crown land reserved for them. Their reserves and their status may be viewed as the consequences of the bargains which representatives of the British Crown and the Canadian government made with the ancestors of the present-day Indians (Hawthorn, 1966:396). These bargains involved the ceding of hundreds of thousands of square miles in return for relatively small tracts of reserve lands, continuing cash payments (typically, \$5 per head per year in perpetuity) and other rights and payments.

The pattern of European-Amerindian transactions in North America can be divided into three policy phases: 1. Courtship and conciliation. 2. Domination, control, custody and forced or managed acculturation. 3. The image of transfer of power; the image of development and of increased economic and political self-determination for Indian groups. The three policy phases were not sharply separated. They did not march across the continent in neatly distinguished sequence. They were *tendencies* in attitude and policy. The title of each phase does broadly describe what happened; but the characteristics and timing of each phase vary a great deal according to regional and local circumstances. In addition, the practices of an earlier phase do not abruptly cease when the tide of a new policy begins to flow; the old policy continues as a slower and weaker undercurrent. Governments went on soothing Indians with gifts long after the military pressure

for conciliation had gone; even in the 1970's they seek Indian support. Domination and control continues to be exercised by government agencies in some situations where the avowed aim is to stimulate self-rule. The pressures of forced acculturation are still applied, though in subtler forms.

This paper deals with Phases Two and Three. Phase Two is discussed mainly for the light it sheds on Phase Three.¹ In subsequent sections I will give a condensed history of Eagle band, analyze the processes that led to the cohesiveness and relative independence of the band, and summarize the effects of the policies of governments during the period of colonial transfer. Assuming that the aim is to transfer some degree of authority, power and control of resources to the subordinate group, I will catalogue the actions that seem most likely to make the process of colonial transfer effective. Finally I will offer some general remarks about three contrasting views, three alternative action frameworks for colonial transfer and community development.

HISTORY OF EAGLE BAND

Seven economic choices were open to Ojibwa and other tribes of the eastern and central Mid-North of the continent during Policy Phase One and the early part of Phase Two: 1. Subsistence hunting and gathering. 2. Subsistence horticulture. 3. Barter trade. 4. Intermittent wage-labor, mainly in the fur trade. 5. Market hunting and gathering — fur-trapping and the sale of wild meat. 6. Market horticulture. 7. Market trade: the activity of middlemen or merchant entrepreneurs.

Eagle band had followed the first three options in pre-contact times. After the European invasion, members of the band followed all seven choices; but their central activity was that of merchant entrepreneurs. They were a small trading band. Under the guid-

¹ The three policy phases can be clearly documented from primary and secondary sources. Scott explicitly drew attention to the transition from Phase One to Phase Two (in Shortt and Doughty, 1914:4:695, 724). Various letters from government officials: i.e., Colborne, 1820) forecast and advise the policy change. Hawthorn and associates, as expert policy advisors, recommended the change to Phase Three (1958:495-492; 1966:13-20). However, even before the first Hawthorn report of 1958, there had been scattered efforts by change-oriented officials and native leaders to convey more power to Indian bands.

ance of a strong and shrewd chief, they maintained a canoe trading network that spanned hundreds of miles.

About 120 years ago, Eagle band and a number of other bands signed a treaty with the British Crown, by which Eagle band received 40,000 acres of land astride what had been the fur-trading waterway. Much of the land was heavily timbered. After treaty, and even into the age of roads, railways and settlement, Chief Eagle and his band continued to operate a trading network — not from their own reserve, but from a base granted them by Mallard band on the opposite shore of Lake Mallard.

The government's aim at that time was to maintain a policy of control, custody and managed acculturation at minimum expense. In the interests of thrift, heavy pressure was placed on Indian bands to sell land and timber so that the money would reduce the cost of Indian administration.² Mallard band succumbed to the pressure. Eagle band successfully resisted until a time of thicker settlement and higher prices; and even then it sold only its timber. It has never sold or leased land. The political-economic histories of the two bands have been much different. In 1868 Mallard band surrendered its timber for sale at 32 cents a sawlog, a price which in retrospect seems meagre. In 1904 and 1907 it surrendered for sale nearly 75,000 of its 100,000 acres. The land surrenders are remembered with bitterness. Disagreements over the land sales led to animosities that remain alive today.

Eagle band members lived by trading, subsistence hunting and subsistence horticulture, while leaving their timber untouched during the period of low prices and sparse settlement. When the building of roads and railways made waterbourne trading unprofitable, Chief Eagle continued his enterprise until he had to admit that it was a losing venture. Members of the band moved from their Mallard post to their isolated reserve across the lake and down the river. The band tided itself over lean times by subsistence farming, hunting and gathering, until 1910, when the

² Letters from Indian superintendents contained in Public Archives of Canada, Record Group 10, and annual reports of agents and superintendents-general of Indian Affairs, contained in the sessional papers of the Parliament of Canada, clearly illustrate this pressure and these goals. Some government officials were paid partly on commission from the sales of Indian lands and timber, as an incentive to stimulate sales.

band at last agreed to sell one of the several varieties of timber that grew on the reserve — the white pine. When all returns were in, the white pine alone fetched a price of \$1,100,000. The band at that time had 80 members. By 1972 there were 232.

The timber sale marked the beginning of a new period in the life of Eagle band. For the first 60 years after treaty, band members lived by hunting, trapping, horticulture and commerce, and kept their assets of land, timber and strategic waterfrontage in holiday country intact. For the second 60 years the band has been converting its assets into cash, short-term consumer goods, long-term consumer goods such as houses, public service facilities such as roads, band community hall and street lights; public service positions such as that of a salaried chief; publicly owned business enterprises such as tourist cabins and a marina; and privately-owned capital plant and equipment such as horses, bulldozers and trucks for logging and hauling, privately owned tourist cabins, taxidermist's shop and general store.

There were two stages in the conversion of Eagle band's assets into cash and capital goods and income. In the first stage of logging, 1910 to about 1945, Eagle band people merely sold their timber to outside operators, but got no share in the profits from cutting, processing and marketing the wood, except as poorly-paid cutters — and much of the cutting was done by an imported labor force. In the second phase, Eagle band people began getting a share of profits by doing their own logging. In the first phase of tourism, up to the 1960's, Eagle band people worked for tourists, cottagers and lodgekeepers as guides and shore employees. In the second phase, they entered business for themselves as operators of facilities for fishing and hunting tourists. The band spent \$170,000. of its own money to build a hydro-electric power line and a road connecting the isolated reserve with the outside world. After that, tourists could readily travel in, and logs could move out in trucks belonging to band members.

Eagle band has undergone several transformations: 1. Trading band. 2. Group of opposite numbers to the Crown in negotiation of a treaty. 3. Possessors of legal rights and disabilities as persons of Indian status and sharers in a joint estate. 4. Legally defined ethnic population unit partaking of the nature of a unit

of local government, internal colony and holder of corporate property. 5. With the creation of band-owned tourist enterprises, Eagle band became an expanded version of the original population unit: a trading band. It took on each new role without losing earlier roles. It stands now as an enlarged and altered version of its former self, having lost most elements of its original Ojibwa Indian identity. The Ojibwa language is rapidly fading. The band's political forms, including the election of a chief and two councillors every two years, were imposed from the outside. Many other sociocultural patterns were voluntarily adopted. Yet the band retains some degree of cultural "Indianness." It retains an identity and a microculture of its own.

Demographically, Eagle band has gone through the following processes: fivefold expansion in membership from treaty to timber sale; threefold expansion from timber sale to 1972; scattering of population from trading-post base to isolated homesteads on the reserve; gathering in of the reserve population to a compact village at Eagle Bay; migration of half the population to live elsewhere.

Throughout Phase Two, Eagle band was able to retain substantial resources and accumulate information about ways of profiting from those resources. The band was prepared to a limited extent for the changes that took place in Phase Three. In some ways, agents of the larger society (specifically, the federal government) exerted pressure toward fragmentation and loss of resources — pressure which Eagle band resisted. In other ways, the government acted to conserve the band's resources. It observed the letter of the law which required the band's formal consent for any sale or lease; and if the band withheld that consent, it exercised stringent trusteeship over the band's land and money. The band's access to its own money was restricted, and permission to draw on capital funds was only sparingly granted.

ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PROCESS IN EAGLE BAY

Even in the period of domination, Eagle band achieved a relatively high degree of independence, by the social-ecological mechanisms which the band developed for maintaining cohesive-

ness, and by the deliberate decisions of leaders operating with the support of band members³ inside this social-ecological framework. Among these decisions were a decision to engage in trade as middlemen, and a decision to avoid forced acculturation. An elderly informant told me: "Chief Eagle said he didn't want schools, because schools are where they learn to lie and steal."

In Mallard band, some people accepted schools quite early. It is my hypothesis that the acculturative pressure of schooling played a part in creating a cultural split between progressives and conservatives which was compounded by economic and geographical fragmentation to produce a high degree of disunity. In these conditions it was easy for outsiders to separate the people of Mallard band from their resources.⁴

Members of Eagle band maintained a united front on acculturation. The group accepted the idea of acculturation, which was a major goal held by the main decision-makers in the larger society on behalf of the Indians. However, the band insisted upon becoming acculturated at its own speed. When acculturation had reached a fairly advanced stage, Eagle band accepted schools with enthusiasm. Today the residents of Eagle Bay are uniformly in favor of acculturation and economic development. Eagle band might have chosen, as did the Fox (Joffe, 1962), to bargain for advantage with the outside society while maintaining a high degree of cultural separateness. Eagle band members decided that cultural separateness did not pay off, in the social and material rewards offered by the larger society. However, they continued to defend their special legal status, which carried clear-cut benefits without perceptible disadvantage. The band is collectively wealthy,

³ Letters from Hudson's Bay Company factors who saw Chief Eagle and his band as possibly dangerous rivals contain several references to the practice of Chief Eagle of consulting members of his family before making decisions. Personal observation and interviews with Eagle Bay people in recent times give evidence of the obligation on a chief to gather consensus in private conversations before making decisions or launching public discussion.

⁴ In talking to former pupils of Indian residential schools across Canada, I was told many stories about harsh punishments inflicted on pupils for speaking their own language. Many have admitted feelings of hostility, emotional confusion and inadequacy which they attribute to forced acculturation in the schools. Other persons spoke in praise of residential schools but expressed ambivalent or hostile feelings about Indian identity. More intensive investigation may well show that schools were a powerful influence for cultural fragmentation. (Mortimore and Yesno, 1966).

although its cash reserves are dwindling. Individual band members are not rich, but they are well housed, well-fed and well-clothed. There is no economic or geographical fragmentation.

Experience gave Eagle band members some preparation for taking on increased authority and control of resources. A number of men acquired some skill in bargaining. Examples of benefits from bargaining, planning and postponed gratification were in plain view. Band members had prestige — in the eyes of tourists because of knowledge of wildlife, in the eyes of many people in the surrounding country, because of their wealth. Per capita payments from the band fund, once more than \$20 a month, now \$6, increased the people's mobility. With this financial cushion to fall back on, they could choose between the city and the reserve, and adjust to the larger society on their own terms. They were receptive to new ideas. Development suggestions came from tourists and others.

The band evolved effective devices for resolving and preventing conflict. These devices still operate. Among them are joking and withdrawal behavior and a cooling and sifting process that filters out dissidents, troublemakers and victims of trouble; who tend to leave the community. These processes, together with some examples of benefits obtained, have led to a consensus among Eagle Bay residents in favor of economic development. However, the sorting-out process produces conflict at another level. It deposits at Eagle Bay two basic kinds of people: planning or efficiency-minded persons, and the "happy-go-luckies" who seek immediate satisfactions. Some persons are wedged near one of these ideal-type poles; others are strung in between. Observation at Eagle Bay points toward a concept quite close to Belshaw's Type C values:

...a conflict of possible objectives, reflecting the presence of inconsistent values, each with a different valence and potentiality for being translated into action. The actual choice in the light of behavior would be a reflection of the dominant value subscribed to by the actor, given the specific circumstances surrounding the action (1959: 557).

Four major politically relevant beliefs are held and followed by the people of Eagle Bay. They are an anti-conflict ethic, an egalitarian ethic, an intense interest in neighbors and a belief in

economic development. "Bold" and "cross" are common terms of reproach for persons who violate the anti-conflict ethic by undue frankness of speech and displays of bad temper. Disapproval descends on a person who is "bossy" or "tries to make a big guy of himself." However, this foundation of agreement is overlaid by a level of conflict between two opposing clusters of principles, which I call the efficiency code and the personal code. Those who tend to the efficiency code hold the following general beliefs: 1. Although tact is necessary, blunt speech is also needed at times. 2. A chief or manager must sometimes be a managerial and technical expert rather than merely a co-ordinator. He must sample opinions and gather consensus, but he must also make decisions and give orders. 3. Band membership and market efficiency often take precedence over kinship and personal loyalty. 4. Indian legal rights, and other benefits, must be fought for and defended; and Indian legal rights have definite limits. 5. Long-term goals must sometimes take precedence over short-term goals. Personal-code adherents, by contrast, believe strongly in the anti-conflict ethic and the egalitarian ethic as inviolable principles; they believe in the chief as consensus-gatherer, not as boss; in kinship and personal loyalties as of paramount importance; they take the unlimited view of Indian rights and other benefits, and the short-term view of spending, planning and investment. They tend to think of Indian rights as automatic and unbounded — connected, in a sense, with a bottomless pool of obligations.

Some Eagle Bay persons can be identified as tending strongly to the efficiency pole or the personal pole; but no one person follows all beliefs to the letter. The code is implicit at both ends of the scale; but sometimes it finds partial expression in words. There is a back-and-forth surge of support between preference for instrumental, efficiency values and socio-emotional, personal values. This social-ecological process is a device for solving the problem of apportionment of increased resources. Eagle Band people had sizeable resources at their disposal during much of Phase Two. Even then they had some decisions to make about apportionment. It seems likely that the back-and-forth surge developed some time ago. In any event, its operations can be noted during the regimes of the three men who have been chief in the last 20 years.

Joe Eagle, the first of these three chiefs, held office for 17 years. It was under his regime that the band gained control of its logging and tourism, and built the road that ended its isolation. Chief Joe knew how to respond to public demand and how to integrate conflicting or divergent goals. When he came to office, post-World War 2 inflation had reduced the purchasing power of per capita distributions; people were becoming increasingly aware of the reserve's isolation. Only five families lived all year round at Eagle Bay. Among the remainder, some stayed away in winter, some left permanently and some resigned their Indian status and claimed their \$5,000-per-head share of the band fund. Eagle band's money was leaking away at more than \$40,000 a year. Band members had two important goals — to enjoy the comforts of modern home technology and access to the city, and also to enjoy the fishing and hunting and the tranquility and close emotional support of life in a small bush village. Eagle Bay people could only attain these goals serially. Chief Joe integrated them by building the road, and brought both within simultaneous reach. The out-flow of people was checked. Families began moving back to Eagle Bay.

During Chief Joe's regime there were several oscillations between the efficiency pole and the personal pole. Local control of logging was followed by wasteful high-grading in which many logs of lower value were left to rot. Chief Joe (with support from the members) increased timber dues, started tree-planting and began imposing quotas on cutting. When returns from logging declined and resentments grew against restrictions and orders, he obtained development grants, launched the band into the tourist industry and provided short-range satisfactions in the form of jobs and income. To the critics who objected to the large-scale use of band funds to supplement the grants, and the hiring of excessive numbers of employees in the tourist enterprises, he countered by securing further grants. He had a broad-spectrum style. Like a bicycle rider, he turned the way he was falling. From the band's viewpoint, the grants the band received were only a partial repayment of the \$180,000 plus labor which Eagle band had spent to build a road and a hydro-electric line which benefitted Indians and non-Indians alike. When Chief Joe took office in 1953, Phase

Three in government policy was taking shape — and he hastened it by pressing for increased control of money and timber.

When Chief Joe died in office in 1971, the principles of Phase Three had become official dogma. He was succeeded by his nephew and adopted brother, Leslie Eagle, who as a councillor had been Joe's hatchet man, his scapegoat deputy charged with the unpleasant jobs. During Leslie's term of office, his policy swung quite far in the direction of efficient, instrumental leadership; and in pushing for long-term goals Leslie ran afoul of deeply-held socio-emotional values; he issued blunt orders and commands, he tried to make people pay their gas and oil debts to the band-owned marina, and he stringently enforced logging quotas. He pressed tactfully for stricter control of hunting by band members, and hinted that it might be necessary to cut off the per capita distribution. He rebuked the band administrator, Betty Brunelle, for not spending enough time in the office, for delay in paying bills and answering letters, and for issuing herself cheques in advance. He was defeated in the election by the administrator's husband, Ronald Brunelle, who was better attuned to the values of the community, and had the support of close relatives and affines.

As soon as Ronald took office, he began to show his weakness in tasks that involved planning and universalistic efficiency values. He took criticism as a personal affront. For about four months he held no band meetings — breaking a long-standing band tradition. By the end of his term, band business enterprises had drawn \$84,000 from band funds to meet heavy deficits, without any clear accounting. Resentment built up against Ronald. In the 1974 election he was sharply defeated by Leslie Eagle.

THE CONFLICTING EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Government policies produced conflicting effects in Phase Three, as in Phase Two. There were considerable transfers of authority, information and resources. In many bands, the transfer of resources was inadequate to produce any increase in economic self-sufficiency⁵. In the case of Eagle band the group already held

⁵ This inadequacy is pointed out by Hawthorn and associates (1966:163-166).

substantial resources in its own right. The transfer process took two forms: conveying to the band a greater degree of control over its own money and timber, and bestowing grants for economic development. Increased authority to make decisions locally was conveyed to the band in several areas of policy and administration.

It is my hypothesis that some degree of conflict is inevitable when a group's decision-making authority or the group's resources are increased, decreased or converted into new forms. The conflict concerns the ways in which the increased or remaining authority or resources are to be used or shared out. Warnings might have been circulated in advance to allow co-ordinative techniques to be devised. This process is not immediately apparent; there is no intention of passing moral judgments when I note that governments failed to take such ideal measures. However, the faults of policy were more serious than this. Not only did governments fail to take conflict-soothing measures; it is now obvious (although it was not easy to see at the time) that governments acted in such a way to create and increase conflicts.

In the case of Eagle band, transfer of authority and resources was not accompanied by the transfer of an equivalent amount of skill and knowledge in administration, record-keeping, business management and resource conservation. As a result, substantial amounts of money and timber were lost.

Skill and information were transferred in disproportionate amounts to the band administrator, who thereby attained an information monopoly and became a power rival to the chief and council. The resulting conflicts contributed to the loss of resources. The same pattern of events occurred in several other bands. Training courses of a few days' or weeks' duration were designed for councillors; but only a slender volume of information was transmitted. A more serious training effort was focussed on band administrators.

In Eagle band, a field worker came at intervals to train Betty Brunelle, the band administrator. An atmosphere of secrecy surrounded the training sessions. If an outsider chanced to knock on the door when training was in progress, instruction abruptly halted; there were long embarrassed silences. Secrecy was part of the ethos of this federal agency.

At the suggestion that administrative and bookkeeping skills should be given to a number of persons in the band, so that there would be no information monopoly, an Indian Affairs official offered this opinion: "There is never enough money allotted in the budget for an integrated and wide-scale training programme of any sort. Experts in accounting and administration should be hired to teach people these skills. But just try to get the money for this kind of programme.... You're told the money isn't available.... The job of teaching bookkeeping and administration is entrusted to one general-purpose fieldworker who is so busy that he or she never gets more than a few hours each month with each administrator...."

Specialized, concentrated administrative training programmes were later made available. However, in the case of Eagle band and many other bands, the administrator was the only person chosen to take such training. In any event, such programmes involve removal to a distant training centre, which diminishes their effectiveness. Information transmitted to administrators remained skimpy; and yet, in the case of Eagle band and many other bands, it was sufficient to confer an information monopoly. So complete was the information monopoly at Eagle Bay that the administrator was able to defy or dodge a number of requests for information from band members, from government officials with a voice in awarding grants, and from a consultant preparing a development plan. Band members, officials and the consultant could not get a clear profit-and-loss statement about band business enterprises. Routine audits were unable to disentangle the knotted threads of unorthodox record-keeping. It was not until a provincial development officer began questioning (as a preliminary to consideration for further grants) and sent in a special auditor, that he was able to find out some of the business information that had never been available to members of the band⁶.

In the process of transferring authority, certain areas of authority were left unclear or ambiguous. For example, Eagle band

⁶ In Mallard band, which was fragmented, a business corporation had the effect of bringing together scattered advocates of economic development into an interest group with the capacity to act. It might be argued that the corporation would ultimately be beneficial to Eagle Bay, for this reason: Building of the road somewhat reduced the interdependence of Eagle Bay people, and reduced the cohesiveness of the community. The corporation might later act as a consolidating influence. So far, however, its influence has been divisive.

members could now get quite easy access to their capital money for housing loans of up to \$5,000, but responsibility for collecting repayment of the loans was not effectively transferred to the band and was not effectively carried out by the federal government. Therefore the bulk of the loans were not repaid, although most borrowers could afford to repay them. The band fund suffered serious losses as a result.

The policy of budgetary thrift clashed with the policy of transfer. Because of the small size of appropriations for communication, training and fact-finding, the flow of information in both directions was meagre. Lack of information flowing into Eagle band resulted in loss of resources. Lack of information flowing out raised difficulties for policy-makers and development workers. Officials and development workers, bearing responsibility for liaison with many communities, lacked the intimate contact which is needed for an understanding of social structure and process. These difficulties also affected the provincial government, which entered into closer relations with Indian bands in Phase Three.

In the case of Eagle band, officials and development workers lacked full information about the band's cohesive and unitary structure, and its rhythmic swing between two sets of values and two kinds of leadership behavior. Important decisions were made by votes of the entire band at regular band meetings. When the band was compelled to form a specialized band business corporation as the price of cutting rights in provincial Crown timber, the results were damaging. A swing from an "efficient" to a "personal" chief had just taken place. The efficient chief was voted out — mainly because he violated the egalitarian ethic and the anti-conflict ethic of the band, by behavior that was judged to be too brusque and authoritarian. The new chief was able to control the corporation, transfer from open band meetings to closed corporation meetings most of the transactions of publicly-owned business enterprises, and suspend open meetings. In this way, the chief muffled conflict, avoided confrontation by hostile critics, and concealed information about the serious drain on band funds that had resulted from inefficient management of the band's tourist and logging enterprises.

CONCLUSIONS

In the Eagle Bay case, federal and provincial governments took some actions to increase the authority, power and resources of the subordinate group. At the same time they took some actions that made effective transfer difficult. From observation of positive and negative results, it is possible to say that the following conditions among others, are likely to make transfer effective:

1. Even in the period of domination, control and custody, the group should have access to substantial resources.

2. The group should have a pool of information about ways of profiting from these resources.

3. The group should have a social structure and ideological climate which encourages leaders who have skill at bargaining for advantage with outside agencies, and sensitivity to short-range demands within the group.

4. Cohesiveness and homogeneity or harmony of goals within the group should be reinforced.

5. The transfer of authority and resources must be accompanied by an equivalent transfer of information and skills.

6. Information and skills should be transferred to as many persons as possible.

7. Transfer is likely to lead to conflict over the sharing out of the authority and resources. Measures should be taken to prevent or resolve the conflict.

8. Grafting of alien political-economic forms on indigenous structures may have a distorting or fragmenting effect.

9. Policy-makers in the dominant society should examine their goals to see how closely those goals complement or coincide with one another and with the prevailing goals and values in the client society.

10. When authority is transferred, the division and assignment of authority should be clearly stated.

There are three possible policy directions that a dominant government can take toward colonial transfer. The same alterna-

tives hold true for the transfer of power to economically distressed groups at home or abroad. I suggest these alternatives may be labelled abandonment, disguised domination and genuine transfer. When conflicting policies are followed, causing fragmentation, loss of resources and at least partial failure of transfer, the general trend of policy is likely to fall into one of the first two categories. The dominant government may relinquish its authority and confer resources in such a way that the client population remains dependent on the dominant society while exercising the forms of independence. The dominant government may behave in such a way that the client population has no effective resources or skills. It will therefore be at the mercy of all outside agencies that operate in the political-economic market. This kind of transfer may be labelled abandonment. Genuine transfer is an active process. It involves willingness on the part of the patron government to supply resources, information and skills in large quantities. The task may involve enabling the client population to state its goals clearly and vigorously. The task may involve sponsoring a dialogue between "people" and "experts" in which goals are increasingly refined and ordered, and an enlarged range of alternatives placed before the people for their consideration. In short, effective transfer and effective development means finding out what the people want and helping them get it.

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