

of the *American Anthropologist* brought several convincing statements of the inadequacy of Ackerman's critique, but apparently Prof. Schusky's book had gone to press by that time. And the bibliography is missing Lévi-Strauss' *Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté* — surely a *loci classicus* for the most basic kinship analysis.

The text of this small manual is attractive and the presentation clear, even if not systematic. Printing errors, however, occur on pp. 2, 15 and 23. The book throughout presents a number of genealogical diagrams to illustrate points, and the student is provided with a number of exercises with these diagrams — some even oriented toward improving his draftsmanship. These are certainly helpful, but they are not kinship. The glossary, on which introductory students will rely heavily, shows a lack of attention. Prof. Schusky opts for Murdock's definition of the clan — a queer breed which is empirically rare. This is his prerogative, of course, but if it is to be clear (or useful), there must be a much more extended treatment of the incorporation of in-marrying spouses than Schusky gives. His definition of exogamy is: "A rule of marriage that requires a person to marry outside such groups (p. 75)." — utterly incomprehensible without reading the previous entry, endogamy. And *marriage* does not appear at all.

This reviewer cannot recommend the book for his students, but then there is a totally different perspective of 'kinship' involved. I do not think, however, it is impossible to anticipate a text which will satisfy anthropologists of different orientations as well as answer to the fully-legitimate aims toward which the present manual is, unsuccessfully, directed.

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Manus Religion. R.F. FORTUNE. Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, (Bison Books edition). No date, xv-391 pp., 10 Plates. \$1.50.

This paper-back is apparently a photographically reproduced copy of the original 1935 edition published by the American Philosophical Society. It is already a classic. Its analysis of a religious system where each individual has his own guardian spirit (Sir Ghost) and where seances divining the actions of these spirits in causing human sickness are the major sanctions for a Puritanical moral code, forms an integral part of most texts on primitive religion. As such, a review of the book as a new study would be impertinent

Instead this reviewer will attempt to consider how such a classic can contribute to modern controversies in anthropology — thereby justifying its reissue, making it available to a wide audience, and not just to scholars with recourse to university libraries. To anticipate, let me say that I feel that this reprint is fully justified.

First one should note the inevitable anachronisms — the few introductory remarks criticising Tylorian theories about religious evolution, and the second half of the final chapter where a Malinowskian comparison is made of how well adapted Manus and Dobuan religious forms are for sanctioning a moral code. These date the work.

But the main body of the work is not dated. The forty-three case studies of sicknesses and seances, (pp. 105-342) each one extremely detailed in both the social structural information about participants and the cultural details involved, are magnificent (even over-full) primary data of a quality rarely found even in the work of anthropologists of law who explicitly advocate "case studies". The first three chapters (pp. 1-104) are a straightforward exposition of Manus concepts of ghostly guardian spirits, of magic and nature demons (*tchinal*), and of hereditary cursing power. These chapters contain considerable repetition, and with their dogmatic style might be dismissed as a collection of informants' generalisations, which the case studies merely illustrate. In fact, though this is not indicated as it should be by detailed cross-referencing, the early chapters are inductively derived from the case studies, (p. 239) — an innovation in 1935, and still modern today.

Fortune's concern throughout is to use Manus concepts, in describing both religion and kinship. As such his material dramatically demonstrates (*contra* Lounsbury *et al.*) how kinship terms are categories into which individuals are fitted (p. 147), not merely on a genealogical basis, but in terms of residence, adoption, economic assistance, or even (p. 294) through the supernatural marriage of ghosts. It also consistently demonstrates how supernatural beliefs are not just a reflection of human behavior, but provide a language through which human situations are interpreted (p. 47) or distorted (p. 150). What appears, however, in the religious language to be an extremely rigid conceptual structure (e.g. of clan solidarity, p. 348) in practice is an extremely flexible system, as in any particular case several other conflicting principles may be used. The analysis of how different mediums divine several different causes for illness, and of how different individuals support different divinations, and appropriately manipulate "kin" relationships to suit their political and economic interests is quite modern. It reminds one of VanVelsen's (1963) *Politics of Kinship*.

In the same vein, Fortune's explicit analysis of the hereditary ability of father's sisters' children (especially if female) to curse or to bless an individual, and of how this ability complements the authority and moral ghostly control exercised within patrilineages, is virtually identical with that of Leach in *Rethinking Anthropology* (1962). One may quarrel with Fortune's phrasing in the 1935 terms of "matrilineal lines" (p. 87), but the primary material could be simply restated in a modern idiom. In its description of Manus conceptual models the book admirably complements Margaret Mead's *Kinship in the Admiralty Islands*.

The book is also topical in terms of current discussions of theories of change. It is replete with examples of the long, slow change process that

had been under way in the Admiralty Islands since around 1900. The way in which mediums can innovate deliberately and can issue reinterpretations of cultural rules is liberally illustrated (e.g. p. 176). The effects of the 1918 influenza epidemic in depopulation and in causing clan fission are described (though the paradox that the clan so created in 1918 is mentioned in genealogies relating to the 1880's is not discussed). The total incorporation into the ghost cult of ideas of policemen, Government law courts, prohibition of prostitution, and white ghosts is clearly brought out.

We should be grateful to the University of Nebraska Press for making the book widely available again. Let us hope that this will enable its outstandingly rich 1928 material to be properly utilized in the controversies of 1966.

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The Vanishing Village: A Danish Maritime Community. Robert T. ANDERSON and Barbara GALLATIN ANDERSON. (Publication of the American Ethnological Society.) Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1964. xii-148 pp., bibliography, index, illustrations, maps. \$5.00.

Andersons' *The Vanishing Village* is an account of the emergence of an island folk community into 20th century suburb. The island is Amager — lying just off Copenhagen, and the village is Dragor — once the principal maritime seat of the island.

The Andersons find it profitable to separate what they call 'culture change' from what they call 'social change'. The former is considered relevant inasmuch as the village of Dragor is composed of the descendants of imported Dutch farmers as well as Danes, and the shifts necessary for the formation of a single Dragor folk community are labelled 'culture change'. 'Social change', on the other hand, may be in this book loosely equated with urbanization; that is, the processes of change which the community undergoes from its 19th century maritime orientation to the suburban appendage of Copenhagen which it is today. Nowhere, however, is the order of difference between 'culture change' and 'social change' clearly spelled out, and I am not convinced it is here a useful distinction. They are categories bequeathed the Andersons from the morass of jargon plaguing anthropology today — they do not clearly emerge from the data presented.

This causes the Andersons trouble. A fundamental thesis of this book is that Dragor change (social and cultural) has not led to conflict because it has been massive. Three questionable assumptions seem to underlie this thesis. First, the Andersons appear to assume real 'conflict' must be of the order of bloodshed, cargo cults and such like. But surely 'conflict' may be a *cultural* category, and it may be that a major 'conflict' is evidenced in the differences